[Senate Hearing 118-624]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-624
NOMINATIONS OF THE 118th
CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION,
PART I
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
January 3, 2024 to January 3, 2025
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Part I
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-078 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
118th Congress, 2nd Session
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Responses to additional questions from members of the committee
and any other material submitted for the record are located at
the end of each hearing transcript.............................
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Part I
Thursday, January 25, 2024....................................... 1
Lakhdhir, Hon. Kamala Shirin, of Connecticut, nominated to be
Ambassador to The Republic of Indonesia.................... 3
O'Donnell, Courtney Diesel, of California, nominated to be
United States Permanent Representative to The United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
with the Rank of Ambassador................................ 6
Plitt, Andrew William, of Maryland, nominated to be An
Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development (Middle Eastern Affairs)......... 8
Stone, Laura, of Utah, nominated to be Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of
America to The Republic of the Marshall Islands............ 11
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 31
Thursday, February 8, 2024....................................... 61
Rand, Dr. Dafna Hochman, of Maryland, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor.................................................. 65
Welton, Donna Ann, of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste..................... 67
Lang, Stephan A., of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Coordinator for International Communications and
Information Policy......................................... 69
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 83
Thursday, March 7, 2024.......................................... 119
Taylor, Margaret L., of Maryland, nominated to be Legal
Advisor of the Department of State......................... 130
Woodhouse, Erik John, of Virginia, nominated to be Head of
the office of Sanctions Coordination....................... 132
Forden, Robert William, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to The Kingdom of Cambodia...................... 134
Aliu, B. Bix, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to
Montenegro................................................. 136
Sfraga, Dr. Michael, of Alaska, nominated to be Ambassador-
at-Large for Arctic Affairs................................ 139
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 158
(iii)
Part II
May 9, 2024...................................................... 495
Nkengasong, Hon. John N., of Georgia, nominated to be
Ambassador-at-Large For Global Health Security and
Diplomacy.................................................. 499
Horst, Elizabeth K., of Minnesota, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.......... 501
Fitrell, Hon. Troy, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of The Seychelles.......................... 503
Adams-Smith, Kelly, of New Jersey, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Moldova................................. 505
Sarri, Kristen, of Maryland, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State For Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs....................... 507
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 525
June 13, 2024.................................................... 563
Gavito, Jennifer D., of Colorado, nominated to be Ambassador
to the State of Libya...................................... 566
Harris, Joshua M., of Maryland, nominated to be Ambassador to
the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria................ 568
Lord, Peter W., of Florida, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Republic of Senegal, and Ambassador to the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau.............................................. 570
Iturregui, Hon. Juan Carlos, of Maryland, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Dominican Republic....................... 572
Jacobson, Hon. Tracey Ann, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq......................... 574
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 596
September 11, 2024............................................... 661
Smith, Hon. Julie, of Michigan, nominated to be an Under
Secretary of State [Political Affairs]..................... 669
Hallett, Stephanie L., of Florida, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Kingdom of Bahrain.................................. 671
Jones, Douglas D., of Maryland, nominated to be Ambassador to
Bosnia and Herzegovina..................................... 673
Heath, Michael G., of California, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Malawi.................................. 675
Daschbach, Mary E., of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Togolese Republic........................ 678
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 702
September 19, 2024............................................... 753
McIntyre John, of Texas, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Kingdom of Eswatini........................................ 756
Neitzke, Jeremey, of Illinois, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Lesotho..................................... 758
Dressel, Abigail L., of Connecticut, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola and Ambassador to the
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe............... 760
Holtsnider, James, of Iowa, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Independent State of Samoa................................. 763
Stimmler, Brian, of Nebraska, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Kyrgyz Republic........................................ 765
Jacobsen, Amanda S., of Washington, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea............ 779
Hanigan, Keith D., of New Jersey, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Solomon Islands..................................... 781
Jones, Kali C., of Louisiana, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of Benin...................................... 783
Miley, Stephanie A., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia................... 786
Tocco, Christophe Andre, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania........... 788
Additional Material Submitted for The Record................. 795
NOMINATIONS
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chris Van
Hollen presiding.
Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Booker, Duckworth, Romney, Young, and
Ricketts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons [presiding]. Good morning. I would like to
call this hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
order.
I am Senator Coons of Delaware. Briefly, I am sitting in
for Senator Van Hollen who is delayed due to traffic and will
take over when he arrives.
Let me just broadly say how grateful I am to all four of
the nominees today for your willingness to continue serving our
nation in critical and important roles in places around the
world in nations where we need to strengthen our bilateral
relations in critical roles at a moment of great challenge, a
genuine humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the Middle East and so
many other humanitarian needs in the Middle East region.
I am going to briefly introduce Courtney O'Donnell and then
I believe Senator Van Hollen will come and read the
introduction of the other three nominees. That is what I was
prepared for this morning.
But before I do so I will briefly turn to our ranking
member, Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. I agree with what he said.
[Laughter.]
Senator Coons. I love it when that happens. Thank you,
Senator Romney.
I am so proud to introduce Courtney O'Donnell, the nominee
to serve as our Ambassador to UNESCO. I have dedicated a great
deal of time to a multiyear effort to have the United States be
able to rejoin UNESCO, which happened last year.
Courtney O'Donnell will serve as the U.S. Permanent
Representative to UNESCO. I have known her since she worked in
the Obama-Biden administration. I am impressed by how
effectively she advocates for policies that make the United
States stronger abroad.
Courtney is just the right person for this role with a
genuine passion for education and cultural advancement, and has
held senior roles in two administrations, in nonprofit and
philanthropic organizations, and the private sector.
During the Obama administration she worked with UNESCO to
highlight America's community college and vocational
institutions. As chief of staff to the Second Gentleman she has
been a leader on a range of national and global issues
including gender equity and helping launch the U.S. National
Strategy to Combat Antisemitism.
As the mother of two wonderful and deeply loved teenage
sons, Felix and Oliver, she fully grasps how critical it is for
the United States to engage globally to ensure a better and
more just future for all of our children.
President Biden has recommitted to U.S. leadership at
UNESCO which requires someone who will work very closely with
the committee--with this committee to advance our national
interests and counter agendas of other nations.
I am personally concerned about the PRC and its role in
United Nations organizations and felt that in our absence their
influence at UNESCO and many other entities had steadily
increased and so I think it is particularly important we move
quickly to confirm Ms. O'Donnell.
Do I have a script to introduce the other three? Do I have
a script to introduce the other three?
If you will forgive me I will briefly introduce our three
other nominees. I am told that Senator Van Hollen is on his
way. Excuse me.
Kamala Lakhdhir has been nominated to be ambassador to
Indonesia. A career member of the Foreign Service, she served
previously as ambassador to Malaysia as well as holding
critical assignments in China and Saudi Arabia and Northern
Ireland.
She has served as director of the Office of Maritime
Southeast Asian Affairs which included responsibility for our
bilateral relations with Indonesia.
She has served as a Pearson Fellow, something I recommend
to all senators to have a Pearson Fellow and to all members of
the Foreign Service as a tremendous experience.
She served on the House International Foreign Relations
Committee's Asia and Pacific Subcommittee and on the House
Financial Services Committee's International Monetary Policy
and Trade Subcommittee and was deputy coordinator of the Taiwan
coordination staff in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.
Andrew Plitt is nominated to be USAID assistant
administrator for the Middle East. A career member of the
Foreign Service--the Senior Foreign Service--Mr. Plitt
currently serves as AID's senior deputy assistant administrator
for the Middle East.
Just as important as his qualifications for this role I am
certain the senator from Maryland would want me to emphasize he
is from Maryland.
[Laughter.]
Senator Coons. His career has taken him to the West Bank
and Gaza, Jordan, Morocco, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire--all important
countries.
He served as deputy assistant administrator for the Middle
East covering North Africa and Egypt as director of the Office
of North African and Arabian Affairs in the Bureau of the
Middle East, and director of the Office of Strategic Planning
and Operations.
Last, Laura Stone is nominated to be ambassador to the
Marshall Islands. A career member of the Senior Foreign
Service, she currently serves as deputy coordinator of the
secretary's Office of COVID Response and Health Security.
Before that she served as deputy assistant secretary for India,
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and the Maldives.
Senator Romney. And most importantly she is from Utah.
[Laughter.]
Senator Coons. With these amazing qualified nominees it is
my joy and honor to turn chairing of this hearing over to
Senator Van Hollen of Maryland.
Senator Booker. While the chairmen switch, and I rarely
disagree with Senator Romney she was actually born in New
Jersey.
[Laughter.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Van Hollen [presiding]. Well, first of all, Senator
Coons, thank you for stepping in and I apologize for running a
little late. I was with another member of this committee,
Senator Hagerty, over at the Asia Society providing remarks
this morning.
And as you have probably heard already, Senator Romney and
I have agreed to forego those lengthy opening remarks that are
often provided here so that we can get to the testimony and
then the questions.
I do just want to add my word of congratulations and thanks
to all of you. Congratulations on your nominations. Thank you
all for having served this country already in one capacity or
another, and for those of you who were Foreign Service officers
I come from a Foreign Service family. We are grateful for your
service and that of your family members. So I do want to
acknowledge all of them as well.
If it is okay with my colleagues we will just then turn it
over and we will begin. I think we will begin, our first
witness, with Ambassador Lakhdhir.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAMALA SHIRIN LAKHDHIR, OF CONNECTICUT, A
CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC
OF INDONESIA
Ms. Lakhdhir. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Romney, and members of the
committee, I am honored to be here as President Biden's nominee
to be the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.
If confirmed I will work closely with this committee to
advance U.S. interests and strengthen our important partnership
with Indonesia.
Indonesia has come an incredibly long way since my first
assignment in Jakarta from 1994 to 1996. The country now
symbolizes the growing prosperity and stability at the heart of
the Indo-Pacific.
It is the world's third largest democracy, a G-20 member,
and the leader in ASEAN and APEC. On February 14--yes, St.
Valentine's Day--204 million Indonesian voters will vote for
president, vice president, and approximately 20,000
legislators.
It is my hope that Indonesia will successfully carry out
free and fair elections and continue to consolidate democratic
institutions.
This year we celebrate the 75th anniversary of U.S.-
Indonesia relations and our progress is truly remarkable. In
November Presidents Biden and Widodo upgraded our ties to a
comprehensive strategic partnership which launched numerous new
initiatives including enhanced cooperation on climate change,
maritime security, health, semiconductors, and billions in
private sector investments.
Secretary of Defense Austin has signed a new defense
cooperation arrangement with his Indonesian counterpart
expanding our role as Indonesia's largest defense engagement
partner.
I look forward to working closely with U.S. companies as
they pursue high-quality investment opportunities and seek to
expand trade. Indonesia's participation as a founding partner
in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity is an
important step toward boosting our economic relations.
Indonesia is home to a rapidly growing digital economy and,
if confirmed, I will work to build a stronger platform for
cyber and digital cooperation.
Indonesia is a crucial partner in tackling the climate
crisis and, if confirmed, I will deepen cooperation to reduce
emissions and preserve Indonesia's rich biodiversity.
Together with partners and stakeholders we are working to
transform Indonesia's power sector by investing in clean and
renewable energy.
If confirmed, I will work to enhance our long-standing
cooperation on rule of law, counterterrorism, anti-corruption,
and trafficking in persons.
I will support Indonesian efforts to reinforce interfaith
harmony and to advance respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
As 2023 ASEAN chair Indonesia played a constructive role in
working to address the Burma crisis. If confirmed, I will work
with my friend and colleague Ambassador Yohannes Abraham to
urge Indonesia's continued engagement on Burma.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today and I welcome your questions. I would also like to add I
welcome your visit to Indonesia if I am confirmed.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lakhdhir follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kamala Shirin Lakhdhir
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Romney, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is an honor to be here today as President Biden's
nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. I am
grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for placing their
confidence in me, and if confirmed, I look forward to working closely
with this Committee to advance U.S. interests and strengthen our
increasingly important partnership with Indonesia.
With the Chairman's permission, I would like to remember my
parents, who were the initial inspiration for my Foreign Service
career. My mother, Ann Hallan Lakhdhir, from Brooklyn and Connecticut,
wished to serve in the Foreign Service, at a time when that was
impossible for a married woman. She urged me to have the career that
was not possible for her. My father, Noor Lakhdhir, was born in Mumbai,
India, and against all odds was able to come to the United States for
higher education. My parents provided my first education in
appreciating and respecting different cultures and countries. I would
also like to thank all my colleagues and mentors, who have played and
continue to play a vital role in supporting me throughout my career.
I have dedicated many of my nearly 33 years as a career Foreign
Service Officer to advancing U.S. relations with the dynamic and
vitally important countries of Southeast Asia. I was honored to serve
as U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to leading the dedicated
Mission team of Americans and Indonesians who work tirelessly to
advance the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. I pledge to be a responsible
steward of resources provided by Congress, both for diplomatic
operations and foreign assistance.
Indonesia has come an incredibly long way since my first assignment
in Jakarta from 1994-1996. The country now symbolizes the growing
prosperity and stability at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. It is the
world's third largest democracy, a G20 member, and a leader in ASEAN
and APEC.
On February 14, Indonesia's citizens head to the polls to select a
new president and national and regional legislatures. In one day, 204
million registered Indonesian voters will elect approximately 20,000
legislators. It is my hope that Indonesia will successfully carry out
free and fair elections and continue to consolidate democratic
institutions.
This year, we celebrate the 75th anniversary of U.S.-Indonesia
relations, and our progress is truly remarkable. In November, President
Biden welcomed President Joko Widodo to Washington, where the leaders
upgraded our ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership--the highest
in Indonesia's foreign relations.
The announcement is backed by numerous new bilateral initiatives,
including enhanced cooperation on climate change, maritime security,
health, semiconductors, and billions in private sector investments.
Secretary of Defense Austin has signed a new Defense Cooperation
Arrangement with his Indonesian counterpart, expanding our role as
Indonesia's largest defense engagement partner. If confirmed, I will
mobilize our personnel and resources to deliver on these initiatives
and improve Indonesia's defense capabilities.
I look forward to working closely with U.S. companies in Indonesia
as they pursue high-quality investment opportunities and seek to expand
trade. Indonesia's participation as a founding partner in the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, or IPEF, is an important
step toward boosting our economic relations. Indonesia is home to a
rapidly growing digital economy, and if confirmed, I will work to build
a stronger platform for U.S.-Indonesia cyber and digital cooperation.
Indonesia also boasts a large, vibrant youth population, offering
immense opportunities to further our cooperation on education,
exchanges, and tourism.
Indonesia is a crucial partner in tackling the climate crisis and
if confirmed, I will work to deepen cooperation to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and preserve Indonesia's rich biodiversity. Together with
other partners and stakeholders, we are working to implement the $21
billion Just Energy Transition Partnership to transform Indonesia's
power sector by investing in clean and renewable energy.
We are proud to be a key partner for Indonesia in capacity building
across a range of sectors, especially good governance and rule of law.
If confirmed, I will work to enhance our long-standing
counterterrorism, anti-corruption, and trafficking in persons
cooperation. I will also support Indonesian efforts to reinforce
interfaith harmony and to advance respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
As 2023 ASEAN Chair, Indonesia played a constructive role in
working to address the Burma crisis, among other issues. If confirmed,
I will work with my friend and colleague Ambassador Yohannes Abraham to
urge Indonesia's continued engagement on Burma within ASEAN.
As two of the world's largest democracies, the United States and
Indonesia have a strong interest in cooperating to tackle the most
complex regional and global challenges.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and
I welcome your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you for your testimony.
Now let us go to Ms. O'Donnell.
STATEMENT OF COURTNEY DIESEL O'DONNELL, OF CALIFORNIA,
NOMINATED TO BE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR
Ms. O'Donnell. Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today as President Biden's
nominee to serve as the United States Permanent Representative
to UNESCO.
I am grateful to President Biden and Secretary of State
Blinken for their confidence in me with this nomination.
Thank you, Senator Coons, for your kind introduction and
your strong leadership and support of UNESCO's mission.
I would not be here today without the unconditional love
and support of family and friends near and far. While my father
is no longer with us he remains the strongest force in my life.
I send my love to my mother, a retired teacher, watching in St.
Louis who continues to teach me daily, and my sons Felix and
Oliver watching today before they head to school in California.
Thank you to my sister and best friend Kelly, who is here
today along with my cousin Isabella, who comes with approval
from her social studies teacher.
To my husband Cassidy, you are a constant source of
strength.
I grew up in a tight-knit family close to my grandmother, a
social worker who worked with children with special needs, and
my grandfather who ran a Catholic charity and served as mayor
of their small town.
Their influence inspired my deep, deep inspiration for
public service. I love this country and I have had the honor of
serving in two senior roles in two different presidential
administrations.
In the office of then Second Lady Dr. Jill Biden, I lead
partnerships with UNESCO to promote America's community
colleges globally. Most recently in the office of Second
Gentleman Douglas Emhoff I worked to combat antisemitism, one
of UNESCO's most urgent mandates.
As President Biden has noted, the United States is
stronger, safer, and more prosperous when we engage with the
rest of the world, including American leadership in
multilateral organizations.
I am fully aware that international institutions like
UNESCO are far from perfect, but issues critical to our
national security are being addressed there every day and with
our return to the body our strongest presence is required.
While many know UNESCO in association with their World
Heritage sites and efforts to preserve irreplaceable cultural
treasures, the organization plays a role in many other areas
impacting our daily lives and national security interests, from
developing norms and standards for emerging technologies like
AI and neuro technology, protecting journalists doing vital
work, leading scientific collaborations across nations, and
expanding STEM education to women and girls, among others.
If confirmed I would advocate for America's foreign policy
goals with a focus on three key areas and in very close
collaboration with this committee.
First, I would work to counter the influence of the PRC,
Russia, and other authoritarian states and competitors. We know
the PRC works with--works through U.N. agencies such as UNESCO
to undermine the interests of the United States and those of
our allies and partners.
If confirmed I would rally those allies and seek additional
partners to take aggressive positions to counter such
activities.
Second, I would work aggressively to combat antisemitism
and counter anti-Israel bias. UNESCO is the only U.N. agency
specifically charged with promoting Holocaust education
efforts.
In the wake of the October 7th Hamas terrorist attacks
against Israel and the related rise of antisemitism worldwide
this work has never been more urgent. If confirmed I would be
proud to stand with our Israeli partners and allies.
Third, one of my top priorities would be working to ensure
that UNESCO was operating transparently, efficiently, and with
the highest level of accountability. I sit here taking very
responsibly the fact that U.S. taxpayer dollars would be
spent--are being spent to--as part of our return to UNESCO and
I would take most seriously the opportunity to work with this
committee to ensure that those dollars are spent wisely.
Since my nomination I have benefited from consultations
with members of this--with senators and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and their staffs. I value highly the
critical role that this body plays in the execution and
oversight of our foreign policy.
If confirmed it would be the honor of a lifetime to serve
in this--to serve my country in this role and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. O'Donnell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Courtney Diesel O'Donnell
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to serve as the United States Representative
to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. I am grateful to both President Biden and Secretary of
State Blinken for the trust and the confidence they have bestowed on
me.
I would not be here today without the unconditional love of family
and friends. While my father is no longer with us, he remains the
strongest force in my life. Thanks to my mother, Phyllis, a retired
educator in St. Louis, my sons Felix and Oliver, watching from
California, and my sister Kelly who's here today. To my husband
Cassidy--you are my source of strength.
I grew up in a tight-knit family, close to my grandmother, a social
worker who worked with children with special needs, and my grandfather,
who ran a Catholic charity and served as mayor of their small town.
Their example inspired my deep commitment to public service.
I love this country and have had the honor of serving in senior
roles in two presidential administrations on a range of issues relevant
to this role. In the office of then Second Lady Dr. Jill Biden, I led
partnerships with UNESCO to promote America's vocational and community
college institutions globally. In the office of Second Gentleman
Douglas Emhoff, I worked to combat antisemitism, one of UNESCO's most
urgent mandates. I also bring experience from over a decade leading
global teams and initiatives in the private sector to this position.
President Biden has frequently noted, the United States is
stronger, safer and more prosperous when we engage with the rest of the
world--including American leadership in multilateral organizations. I
am fully aware that UNESCO, like all international institutions, is an
imperfect body. But issues critical to U.S. national security are being
addressed at UNESCO, and now that the U.S. has returned and been
elected to the Executive Board, our strong presence is required. If
confirmed, I will use the full strength of this position to ensure that
U.S. interests remain at the center of our engagement.
Many people know of UNESCO in association with their World Heritage
Sites and efforts to preserve irreplaceable cultural treasures. But the
organization also plays a role in many other areas impacting America's
national security interests--from developing norms for emerging
technologies like A.I. and neurotechnology, protecting journalists
doing vital work, leading scientific collaborations, and expanding STEM
education programs to women and girls.
If confirmed, I would advocate for America's foreign policy goals,
with a focus on three key areas--(1) to counter the influence of the
PRC, Russia and other authoritarian states and competitors; (2) combat
antisemitism and counter anti-Israel bias; and, (3) ensure UNESCO is
operating efficiently and transparently, with the highest level of
accountability. If confirmed, I would do so in close collaboration with
the members of this committee.
We know the PRC works through U.N. agencies, such as UNESCO, to
undermine the United States' values and interests, and as well as those
of our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would rally those allies
and seek additional partners to take aggressive, unified positions at
UNESCO to counter these malevolent activities.
Importantly, UNESCO is the only U.N. agency specifically charged
with promoting Holocaust education efforts. In the wake of the October
7 Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel and the related rise of
antisemitism worldwide, this work has never been more urgent. Too often
at UNESCO, as in other U.N. bodies, Israel is singled out for
criticism, abuse and attack. If confirmed, countering antisemitism and
hate in all forms will be among my highest priorities, building upon my
experience working on the first-ever U.S. National Strategy to Combat
Antisemitism. I will also be proud to stand with our Israeli partners
and allies to challenge this unacceptable discrimination.
I would work to ensure that UNESCO is operating efficiently and
transparently, with the highest level of accountability, and in line
with U.S. interests. I take seriously the responsibility to ensure U.S.
taxpayer dollars are used wisely. Since my nomination, I have greatly
benefited from consultations with the members and staff of this
committee on this issue. I value the role that this committee and
Congress plays in the execution of our foreign policy and oversight,
and if confirmed, I look forward to continuing this collaboration, and
receiving your input and counsel.
UNESCO is an imperfect body. But now more than ever, we cannot
allow a vacuum, nor can we cede our leadership role to strategic
competitors such as the PRC; nor can we miss an opportunity to call out
and combat antisemitism in real-time. Restoring American leadership at
UNESCO with a Senate confirmed Ambassador is critical for advancing
these priorities.
If confirmed, it would be the honor of a lifetime to serve my
country in this capacity. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
And now Mr. Plitt, and I want to thank Senator Coons for
pointing out you come from the great state of Maryland.
But Mr. Plitt?
STATEMENT OF ANDREW WILLIAM PLITT, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE
AN ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS)
Mr. Plitt. Thank you.
Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you today as President Biden's nominee for the
assistant administrator for the Bureau of the Middle East at
U.S. Agency for International Development.
I would like to thank the President, Vice President Harris,
Secretary Blinken, and Administrator Power for their trust in
my leadership, especially during such a critical moment in the
Middle East.
As I appear before you today I would be remiss not to
acknowledge the unwavering love and steadfast support of my
family, my mother Anna Plitt, my accomplished spouse Lene Lind,
and my sons Noah and Liam who is here with me today.
I am immensely honored by the sacrifices they have made
throughout my more than three decades of Foreign Service--as a
Foreign Service officer serving across multiple continents.
I have spent my career representing the United States
abroad in some of the most complex and demanding environments
with the majority of that time covering the Middle East.
My experience has given me a deep appreciation for how
vital development and humanitarian assistance are to advance
our country's national security objectives.
Even before the heinous attacks perpetrated by Hamas
against Israel on October 7th and the continuing conflict in
Gaza the region faced significant challenges. Russia's
unprovoked war against Ukraine aggravated tenuous food security
across the region as the cost of wheat imports skyrocketed.
Meanwhile, the increasing frequency of droughts and water
shortages led to poor domestic harvests, further straining
fragile economies. Last year alone the region endured crippling
natural disasters such as the devastating earthquakes in Syria
and Morocco and the floods in Libya.
Governance and economic mismanagement such as we see in
Lebanon and Tunisia place fragile economies at risk of
collapse. Across the region rising authoritarianism,
corruption, and terrorism were already threatening the region's
prospect for peace.
Now more than ever it is imperative that the United States
remain committed to helping people of the Middle East and North
Africa.
As we help families find viable pathways to peaceful and
secure livelihoods we help them build a future in which
terrorist organizations like Hamas find no quarter.
The continuing conflict in Gaza, growing Houthi threats in
the Red Sea, and violence perpetrated by Hezbollah underscore
the importance of leading with American values as these and
other Iranian-aligned militia groups attempt to further inflame
regional tensions.
Last week I visited our staff in Israel where I saw
firsthand our team's tireless efforts not only to increase the
amount of assistance reaching Palestinian civilians in Gaza but
also the meticulous planning they undertake in cooperation with
Israeli Government counterparts.
The exhaustive efforts of our team to safeguard our
assistance and facilitate its delivery to civilians caught in
this conflict not only demonstrates American goodwill but it
also secures American interests.
I recognize the need is immense and we are working every
day to do more. I have been privileged to work across the
Middle East and North Africa region for many years.
I have witnessed up close the significant impact of USAID
assistance efforts including in Syria where we have helped
partners reach 5 million people in need of emergency health
services and in Libya where USAID technical assistance to the
general electricity company has succeeded to unify and
strengthen the eastern and western power grids, leading to more
than a 60 percent increase in power supply in just two years.
We are at an inflection point where our engagements will
shape not only the region but our--but we will shape the world
for generations to come. If confirmed I pledge to work closely
with the committee and Congress to advance our foreign policy
objectives through our development efforts.
I commit to working with the administrator, the State
Department, and Congress to ensure USAID is well prepared to
respond not only to the impacts of the ongoing conflict in Gaza
but also to broader events across the region where there are
challenges and opportunities to advance American values.
I will ensure that USAID effectively manages the resources
Congress allocates and take decisive proactive steps to
safeguard those resources against diversion.
I have long appreciated the bipartisan support for USAID's
work in the Middle East. If confirmed I look forward to working
with you and others in Congress to continue to secure and
advance U.S. interests.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Plitt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew Plitt
Senator Van Hollen, Senator Romney, and distinguished members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President
Biden's nominee for the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for the
Middle East at the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
I would like to thank the President, Vice President Harris,
Secretary Blinken, and Administrator Power for their trust in my
leadership, especially during such a critical moment in the Middle
East.
As I appear before you today, I would be remiss not to acknowledge
the unwavering love and steadfast support of my family--my accomplished
spouse Lene Lind, my sons Noah and Liam who join me here today, along
with my mother, Anna Plitt. I am immensely honored by the sacrifices
they have made throughout my more than three decades as a foreign
service officer serving across multiple continents.
I have spent my career representing the United States abroad in
some of the most complex and demanding environments, with the majority
of that time covering the Middle East. My experience has given me a
deep appreciation for how vital development and humanitarian assistance
are to advance our country's national security objectives.
Even before the heinous attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel
on October 7 and the continuing conflict in Gaza, the region faced
significant challenges. Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine
aggravated tenuous food security across the region as the cost of wheat
imports skyrocketed. Meanwhile, the increasing frequency of droughts
and water shortages led to poor domestic harvests, further straining
fragile economies.
Last year alone, the region endured crippling natural disasters,
such as the devastating earthquakes in Syria and Morocco and floods in
Libya. Governance and economic mismanagement such as in Lebanon and
Tunisia place fragile economies at risk of collapse. Across the region,
rising authoritarianism, corruption, and terrorism were already
threatening the region's prospects for peace.
Now more than ever, it is imperative that the United States remain
committed to helping the people of the Middle East and North Africa. As
we help families find viable pathways to peaceful and secure
livelihoods for themselves and their children, we help them build a
future in which terrorist organizations like Hamas find no quarter. The
continuing conflict in Gaza, growing Houthi threats in the Red Sea, and
violence perpetrated by Hezbollah underscore the importance of leading
with American values as these, and other Iranian-aligned militia groups
attempt to further inflame regional tensions.
Last week I visited our staff in Israel where I saw first-hand our
team's tireless efforts not only to increase the amount of assistance
reaching Palestinian civilians in Gaza, but also the meticulous
planning they undertake in cooperation with Israeli Government
counterparts. The exhaustive effort of our team to safeguard our
assistance and facilitate its delivery to civilians caught in this
conflict not only demonstrates American goodwill, but also secures
American interests. I recognize the need is immense. We are working
everyday to do more.
As the current Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle
East, I have been privileged to work across the Middle East and North
Africa region for nearly three years. I have witnessed first-hand the
significant impact of USAID assistance efforts--including in Syria
where we've helped partners reach five million people in need of
emergency health services through mobile medical clinics, equipping of
health facilities and training of medical workers; or in Libya where
USAID technical assistance to the General Electricity Company of Libya
succeeded to unify and strengthen the eastern and western power grids--
leading to a more than 60 percent increase in power supply in just two
years.
We are at an inflection point where our engagements will shape not
only the region, but our world for generations to come. If confirmed, I
pledge to work closely with this Committee and Congress to advance our
foreign policy objectives through our development efforts. I commit to
working with the Administrator, the State Department, and Congress to
ensure USAID iswell-prepared to respond not only to the impacts of the
ongoing conflict in Gaza, but also to broader events across the region
where there are challenges and opportunities to advance American
values. I will ensure that USAID effectively manages the resources
Congress allocates and takes decisive proactive steps to safeguard
those resources against diversion.
I have long appreciated the bipartisan support for USAID's work in
the Middle East and North Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with you and others in Congress to continue to secure and
advance U.S. interests.
I am mindful of the immense scope of challenges the United States
faces not only in the Middle East, but across the globe. At this
critical time, all eyes are on U.S. leadership. USAID offers hope, but
more importantly, tangible alternatives to malign influences in the
region. I believe
USAID can advance a U.S. vision that offers opportunity, peace,
prosperity, and security. I am honored to be considered to work with
you in this capacity.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Ms. Stone of Utah?
STATEMENT OF LAURA STONE, OF UTAH, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE
SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, NOMINATED
TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL
ISLANDS
Ms. Stone. Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member
Romney, members of the committee.
Good morning. I am honored to appear before you as the
President's nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the
Marshall Islands.
I want to extend a special thank you to Senator Romney.
Utah is my family's home and was a special place for my kids to
return to every year throughout their nomadic Foreign Service
childhoods.
I would like to start by extending a heartfelt concern to
the people of the Marshall Islands, a nation of sprawling low-
lying atolls, over the recent impact of the high seas and
waves.
I am grateful for the confidence shown by the President and
Secretary Blinken in nominating me. I spent my 31-year career
advancing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific including 17 years
in the region.
If confirmed I look forward to working with Congress to
reinforce ties with the Republic of Marshall Islands, one of
our most strategically important and steadfast partners in the
Pacific.
I would like to take a moment to thank my family who
supported me in my life and career: my parents who gave me a
profound curiosity about the world around me and a desire to
make the world a better place; my husband, Mark, who has been a
true partner and soul mate in this adventurous life and has
made me a better person and a better public service; my sister
Nikki and her family have shown me what it means to stick my
neck out and soar; and my kids, Sarah, a college student in
Louisiana, and Rachel, who joins me today, who provided
constant thoughtful inspiration and meaning to my work.
Finally, although there are too many to name I want to
thank my many friends and colleagues who provided guidance and
support. My world has been enriched and blessed by all of you.
I spent a lifetime preparing for the challenges we now face
in the Pacific. I have worked with partners like Taiwan, Japan,
Thailand, India, Mongolia, and Vietnam, but I have also spent
years working to understand the tactics and motivations of the
PRC, identified by the recent National Security Strategies as
our most serious developing competitor and most consequential
geopolitical challenge.
Building on our National Security Strategies, Indo-Pacific
strategies and Pacific partnership, we have a path forward that
I believe in and in which our approach to the Marshall Islands
can safely nest.
We must counter the PRC's advances by reinforcing our
relationships with our allies and partners to include a focus
on deepening ties with Pacific Island countries, and while the
People's Republic of China's provocative actions span the globe
they are most acute in the Pacific.
I am excited about the prospect, if confirmed, of working
with our partners in the Marshall Islands. This month the
Marshall Islands reelected Dr. Hilda Heine to a second term,
championing gender equality.
I hope to continue to forge strong bonds with the
Marshallese to find opportunities for women's economic
empowerment and combating human trafficking and gender-based
violence.
The astonishing videos out of Kwajalein Atoll this week
demonstrated the threat to the Marshall Islands posed by rising
sea waters. If confirmed I would enhance bilateral cooperation
on resilience to sea level rise and harness U.S. expertise to
support Marshallese partners.
I feel we can implement strategies to help protect the
people of the Marshall Islands and our strategic facilities.
With the October 16th signing of COFA-related agreements I
am excited to be at the forefront of implementation if
confirmed. These agreements signify the strength of our
enduring partnership and underline our shared commitment to
mutual prosperity.
Together we can enhance economic development and advance
the well being of the people of the Marshall Islands.
If confirmed, I aim to promote the ability of Marshallese
veterans who have served in the United States Armed Forces to
receive health care and veterans benefits that they deserve by
streamlining and enhancing access to health care services. Our
veterans deserve nothing less than the best medical care and
support.
As we pursue these policies, if confirmed I am excited to
work with colleagues in U.S. law enforcement, the military,
interior, and others throughout the interagency.
I have the deepest respect for the skills perspective and
expertise of our interagency partners and recognize the need
for coordination and collaboration to find the best outcomes.
As the greatest of nations our people and our principles
are our greatest strength. Thank you again for your
consideration and the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to your questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Laura Stone
Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, members of the
committee, good morning. I am honored to appear before you as the
President's nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall
Islands.
I want to extend a special thank you to Senator Romney. Utah was my
family's home and a special place for my kids to return to every year
throughout their nomadic foreign service childhoods.
I am grateful for the confidence shown by the President and
Secretary Blinken in nominating me. I have spent my 31-year career
advancing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, including seventeen years
in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to
reinforce ties with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, one of our
most strategically important and steadfast partners in the Pacific.
I would like to take a moment to thank my family, who have
supported me in my life and career. My parents, who live in Summit
County Utah, gave me a profound curiosity about the world around me and
a desire to make the world a better place. My husband, Mark, has been a
true partner and soul mate in this adventurous life, and has made me a
better person and better public servant. My sister Nikki and her family
have shown me what it means to stick my neck out and soar. And my kids,
Sarah a college student in Louisiana, and Rachel who joins me today,
provide constant thoughtful inspiration and meaning to my life's work,
and show me what it means to be powerful and confident young women
forging their own paths forward. I am in awe of both of you. Finally,
although there are too many to name, I want to thank my many friends
and colleagues, who have provided guidance and inspiration. My world
has been enriched and blessed by all of you.
I have spent a lifetime preparing for the challenges we now face in
the Pacific. I have worked with partners like Taiwan, Japan, Thailand,
India, Mongolia, and Vietnam. But I have also spent years working to
understand the tactics and motivations of the PRC--identified by recent
National Security Strategies from Democratic and Republican
Administrations as our most serious developing competitor and most
consequential geopolitical challenge.
Building on our National Security Strategies, Indo-Pacific
Strategies, and Pacific Partnership, we have a path forward that I
believe in, and in which our approach to the Marshall Islands can
safely nest. We must counter the PRC's advances by reinforcing our
relationships with our allies and partners--to include a focus on
deepening ties with Pacific Island Countries. And while the People's
Republic of China's provocative actions span the globe, they are most
acute in the Pacific. Addressing corruption is not just a moral
imperative; it is a strategic necessity for the prosperity and well-
being of our nations.
I'm excited about the prospect, if confirmed, of working with our
partners in the Marshall Islands. This month, the Marshall Islands re-
elected Dr. Hilda Heine to a second term, championing gender equality.
I hope to continue to forge strong bonds with the Marshallese to find
opportunities for women's economicempowerment and combatting human
trafficking and gender-based violence.
The astonishing videos out of Kwajalein Atoll this week
demonstrated the threat to the Marshall Islands posed by rising sea
levels. If confirmed, I would enhance bilateral cooperation on
resilience to sea-level rise and harness U.S. expertise to support
Marshallese partners. I feel we can implement strategies to help
protect the people of the Marshall Islands and our strategic
facilities.
With the October 16th signing of COFA-related agreements, I am
excited to be at the forefront of implementation. These agreements
signify the strength of our enduring partnership and underline our
shared commitment to mutual prosperity. Together, we can enhance
economic development and advance the well-being of the people of the
Marshall Islands.
If confirmed, I aim to promote the ability of Marshallese veterans,
who haveserved in the United States armed forces, to receive the
healthcare and veteran benefits they deserve, by streamlining and
enhancing access to healthcareservices. Our veterans deserve nothing
less than the best medical care and support.
As we pursue these policies, if confirmed, I am excited to work
with my colleagues in U.S. law enforcement, the military, Interior, and
others throughout the interagency. I have the deepest respect for the
skills, perspective, and expertise our interagency partners bring, and
recognize the need for coordination and collaboration to find the best
outcomes. As the greatest of nations, our people and our principles are
our greatest strength.
Thank you again for your consideration and the opportunity to
appear before you today. I look forward to your comments and questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I thank all of you for your
opening statements and testimony. Now we will have a series of
questions five minutes each and I will begin.
Ambassador Lakhdhir, again, congratulations on this
nomination. I visited Indonesia in April of last year, the trip
that also took us to Vietnam, and as you indicated there are a
whole breadth of important issues between the United States and
Indonesia including the central role, an important role they
play within ASEAN.
I was pleased to team up with Senator Romney. Among the
many items in the NDAA was an authorization to create an ASEAN
center here in Washington and the United States to help deepen
those relationships.
I did want to focus specifically on the issue of critical
minerals in Indonesia and the important role Indonesia can play
in the world's clean energy transition, and as you know
Indonesia is rich in nickel especially but they are also
working on the processing side, not just the mining side.
Could you talk a little bit more about U.S. efforts, and I
know this was a part of the conversation that President Biden
had with President Widodo in terms of how Indonesia can be a
constructive and positive player in terms of the clean energy
transition, help the United States reduce our reliance on China
both for processing and how that can also be a great benefit to
the people of Indonesia.
If you could just speak to that.
Ms. Lakhdhir. Thank you, Senator.
I am aware and I understand that there has been very frank
and direct conversations with the Indonesian Government about
the clean energy transition and also critical minerals mining
and processing.
As part of the joint statement that came out of the
President's meeting in November there was a commitment to
working together on environmental concerns, labor concerns,
safety concerns related to the mining sector and mining
processing center.
I am also aware that there is engagement with private--U.S.
private sector industry on how they can contribute and invest
in Indonesia and bring their high-quality labor, safety, and
environmental standards to the industry.
This is, as you correctly said, very important both for
Indonesian people's livelihoods, environment, and also for the
issue of climate change and reducing emissions.
If I am confirmed I am committed to working across this
range of issues and also being very clear eyed with both our
U.S. companies and with Indonesian counterparts on the efforts
that have to be made across a series of different sectors.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
So Mr. Plitt, again, congratulations on your nomination.
You covered a lot of territory in your opening statement.
I do want to state with respect to the situation in Gaza we
have a absolute humanitarian disaster on our hands in Gaza. I
want to thank Senator Coons who held a Appropriations Foreign
Ops Subcommittee hearing--closed hearing--classified hearing
the other day. Thank you, Senator Coons, for that.
And in my view we need a lot more cooperation from a lot of
players in the region including the Netanyahu Government in
terms of opening more crossings like the Erez Crossing and
other areas.
I just do want to read for the record here a statement I
received from Ambassador Satterfield who is our humanitarian
aid coordinator selected by the President, and I am quoting him
here now because there have been allegations made about
diversion of U.N. provided and international NGO provided
humanitarian aid to Hamas.
So I want to read his statement which categorically rejects
that claim. Quote, ``To date I have not received any
allegations, evidence, or reports of any incidents of Hamas
diversion or theft of U.S. or other assistance or fuel from
U.N.-delivered assistance from any of our partners or from the
Government of Israel since humanitarian assistance resumed in
Gaza October 21st.''
He goes on to say that there may be other sources that are
also going through inspection checkpoints. He cannot vouch 100
percent for those, but this I just think it is important since
there has been a lot of misinformation about that.
Another place we visited was Jordan and lots of issues
regarding water because, as you know, Jordan has very little
water. Could you talk to some of AID's efforts in Jordan with
respect to water?
Mr. Plitt. Yes, thank you, Senator.
With respect to Jordan who is the recipient of the largest
USAID program in the region, much of that investment is in the
water sector.
Jordan only is able to meet, roughly, 60 percent of its
water needs. It has water purchases it makes through an
agreement with Israel and we are working with them to help fund
a national conveyance project which will have desalination down
in Aqaba and bring water up towards Amman where the vast
majority of the population lives and where there are great
needs.
So over the course of the next few years there is a
solicitation out and USAID along with the Development Finance
Corporation will play a big part in ensuring that--its success
and that there are investments in the infrastructure needed to
ensure waters--the water security of the kingdom of Jordan.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
And I just want to note we have been joined by my friend
and colleague from Maryland but most importantly the chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Cardin.
Thank you for joining us.
Senator Romney?
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Plitt, as I understand it a great proportion of the aid
which is provided by USAID is provided to the U.N. which then
furthers the support for various entities throughout the Middle
East.
Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Plitt. I would say a large portion is particularly on
the humanitarian assistance front where we have a strong
partner in the World Food Programme.
Senator Romney. Why do we not provide that directly as
opposed to using the U.N.?
And the reason I say that is because obviously there are
other forces in the U.N. that are not necessarily aligned with
our interests and providing funding to the U.N. to provide
humanitarian resources suggests the opportunity for that to be
not necessarily diverted but perhaps not as carefully watched
and as carefully attributed to the United States.
If we send money to the U.N. and then out goes U.N.
packaging that says here, this is given to you by the U.N. it
is, like, wait, why do we not just send it directly from
ourselves? Why do we use the U.N. as a vehicle for providing
humanitarian aid in the Middle East?
Mr. Plitt. Thank you, Senator.
I believe the principal reason why we do channel much of
our humanitarian assistance to the U.N. is because they are
present on the ground in a lot of these places which are
nonpermissive and they have had a long presence.
Certainly in the case of the World Food Programme they have
the most extensive reach in terms of ensuring the food security
to the populations.
Places like Yemen: Two-thirds of the population is
dependent on humanitarian aid. It is very difficult to work in
that environment with the behavior of the Houthis, and the U.N.
is present on the ground.
We are cognizant of the need to brand our aid and ensure
that the U.S.--the American people get credit for that aid and
so we do that as much as possible both through the U.N. and
through their international NGO partners that we have who work
alongside the U.N. in these difficult environments.
Senator Romney. I am thinking about, for instance, in Gaza.
The Chairman read a statement indicating--from USAID--that,
hey, there have not been resources diverted to go to Hamas.
At the same time, the people of Gaza support Hamas, voted
for Hamas. It is their government, if you will, and their
choice to have Hamas.
If the U.N. provides food to all the people in Gaza that
would include not just those that voted for Hamas but also
Hamas fighters.
I mean, Hamas fighters are going to eat as well and I am
sure the U.N. does not say, okay, here, you get in line here
but anyone from Hamas you cannot eat.
I mean, so it does not have to have diversion for there to
be, if you will, USAID through U.N. providing food and other
assistance, medicines and so forth, to members of Hamas. Is
that right?
Mr. Plitt. I think I would respond to that by advising that
there are 2.2 million Palestinians in Gaza who are desperate.
I would reemphasize Special Envoy Satterfield is that we do
not have any indication that our aid through the U.N. has been
diverted. I mean, I do not think we can make any guarantees
with 2.2 million people that a member of Hamas does not get a
sandwich here and there.
But the desperation that exists, the food security
situation that exists, requires that we work with vetted
partners and those on the ground to ensure that the needs of
desperate civilians are met.
Senator Romney. Ms. O'Donnell, same sort of concern that I
had raised with the history at UNESCO. It has obviously been
seen as being antisemitic in the past and we have withdrawn
from UNESCO.
President Biden reestablished relations with UNESCO. You
said that you would combat the antisemitism that has been
consistently a part of UNESCO's history. How do you combat
that?
Is not the best way to combat it to basically say we are
not going to participate, we are not going to provide funding
to UNESCO, we are not going to be supportive of an antisemitic
anti-Israeli oriented organization?
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you for the question, Senator Romney,
and I fully believe like our President that multilateral--you
just referenced some of the flaws and concerns with the U.N.
system.
I sit here today eyes wide open to those flaws and I think
it is even more important that we have our seat at the table to
represent not just the interests of the U.S. but those of our
allies and partners.
And I do think we know what happens when the U.S. leaves
the stage and it is incredibly critical that we be there. And I
think how do we do that? We do that by partnering with the
like-minded member states who are part of the UNESCO and being
a part of coalition building to bring others on to this case,
and I think I will bring if confirmed to this role my
experience having worked on the first ever National Strategy to
Combat antisemitism that we rolled out as part of the
administration with Second Gentleman Douglas Emhoff and I will
bring a conviction to ensure that anti-Israel bias in all of
its forms is warded against.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, forgive me. I just want to
submit something for the record. I actually associate myself
with pretty much a lot of the line of questioning.
I just want to correct for one thing and submit an article
from U.S. News & World Report. The average age in Gaza is about
18 years old, 40 percent of the population 14 or under.
There is only probably about 8 or 9 percent of that
population that actually voted in that 2006 election. So to say
that the people of Gaza voted for Hamas just for the sheer
numbers I would like to just submit an article to that point.
Senator Van Hollen. Without objection.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
hearing transcript.]
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen and Senator
Romney. Thank you to all of our nominees.
Ms. O'Donnell, if I might just follow up with the line of
questioning that Senator Romney was just on.
Our last ambassador to UNESCO, a lifelong friend of mine, a
Delawarean, engaged with me regularly about what were the
drivers and the reasons why we left UNESCO.
Over several years of observing what happened in our
absence and engaging with the new DG Azoulay I became convinced
that in our absence some of the very good work that you will be
doing and that the United States does through UNESCO diminished
and the increased reach and force of folks who have competing
interests was ascendant.
So talk, if you would, briefly about the distinction
between our concerns about anti-Israel bias within UNESCO that
Senator Romney addressed and the critical Holocaust education
and work combating antisemitism that UNESCO does globally that
if we are not present is not funded and driven as effectively.
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you for the question, Senator Coons,
and I do want to take this chance to reiterate that in our
absence the menu did change at UNESCO and we need to be
forthright and it makes all the more reason that we be back.
I think we have seen time and time again--we have seen time
and time again what happens when the U.S. is absent from the
forum and in my work with the Obama-Biden administration and--
--
Senator Coons. Your work on the National Strategy on
Combating Antisemitism prepares you well for a role where you
will be advocating for a stronger and broader role in Holocaust
education, in combating Holocaust denial, and in combating
antisemitism at exactly the moment when antisemitism is on the
rise not just throughout Europe or the Middle East but
globally.
How important is it to you to play a role in advocating for
these core values from the United States?
Ms. O'Donnell. Yes. I sit here today proud to be an
American and the incredible opportunity and the need to
continue to advance those goals.
I have been a part, as you said, in my work with the Second
Gentleman Douglas Emhoff, and I have visited communities that
have been hit by the scourge and felt the worst impact of what
antisemitism can bring and sat with those families and been
with them, and I know that with the work of our partnerships
with allies and like-minded partners we will be able to bring
more opportunity to----
Senator Coons. Many members may be unfamiliar with the
breadth of what UNESCO does. So I understand if they do not
grasp that in addition to World Heritage sites it has a central
role in education, in setting standards for education and for
educational research in science as well as in cultural issues
like core values.
I look forward to supporting your nomination. I am grateful
for your willingness to step forward and serve. It will not be
easy but there are several U.N. entities that we--from which we
withdrew and in our absence the PRC and others with interests
antithetical to ours have advanced.
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coons. Mr. Plitt, if I might briefly.
As assistant administrator responsible for the Middle East
you will have a central role in ensuring not just that we
deliver critical humanitarian assistance to the ongoing
humanitarian crisis in Gaza and in other countries throughout
the region like Lebanon and Jordan and Egypt, but developing--
helping these communities and nations develop outside of the
current or after the current crisis.
What do you view as the most critical needs and
opportunities for the longer term in development in the region?
Mr. Plitt. Thank you, Senator Coons.
I think for a long time one of the biggest problems in the
region has been in the realm of governance. Freedom House still
in their latest freedom index shows the Middle East region--
Middle East, North Africa region--as the least free in the
world and a lot of that has to do with governance.
So we are increasing our investments in civil society to
try to hold governments accountable and in certain key
countries where we have a good cooperation with the Government
we work on anti-corruption measures to address the issues of
governance.
Senator Coons. I know you are not in the role yet but do
you have a view on what are the most pressing things we could
do to accelerate and improve the delivery of critical
humanitarian aid into Gaza?
Mr. Plitt. Yes. As you know, Special Envoy Satterfield is
in the lead on this and one of his deputies is our very own
from USAID, and we are working on a multi-pronged approach to
address the inefficiencies that currently exist, working
closely with Israel and the Government of Egypt, looking at
things like opening up more corridors of assistance to get into
Gaza, to increase the efficiencies of the inspection regimes at
Nitzana and at Kerem Shalom, looking at what we can do to grow
the volume of assistance that we are bringing in through a
budding humanitarian hub in Jordan.
And eventually and what we need to press hard for is
commercial access because humanitarian assistance alone cannot
maintain 2.2 million people living at a reasonable standard.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
We look forward to staying in regular touch with you as you
advance into this role. Thank you to all four of the nominees
and for your decades of dedication to representing the United
States around the world in challenging environments.
You have important roles. I look forward to supporting your
nominations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Senator Ricketts?
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I add my
thanks to Senator Coons for all your work to promote the United
States around the world and your dedication to our country and
the sacrifices you make being away from your friends and family
as you serve. So thank you.
I am going to hit upon the same theme that you have heard
upon already with regard to the U.N. and the anti-Israel bias.
Last year the U.N. passed twice as many anti-Israel resolutions
as all other countries combined. All other countries combined.
Twice as many against Israel.
And it is no secret that UNESCO has a long history of anti-
Israel bias as well, starting with when they granted the
membership to Palestine, and we have covered already that the
Biden administration is rejoining UNESCO to counter the malign
influence of the PRC. However, the anti-Israel bias still
remains.
Since October 7th UNESCO has routinely criticized Israel's
war against Hamas often with little or no context to the
October 7th attacks in which Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis and
took 240 hostages.
Specifically, UNESCO has routinely criticized Israeli
targeting of educational establishments in Gaza despite Hamas'
clear use of many civilian sites for military purposes. These
public admissions leave out critical context and undermine
support for our ally Israel.
So, Ms. O'Donnell, I was gratified to hear you talk about
in your opening remarks how you were going to push back against
the anti-Israel and antisemitic biases in UNESCO.
If confirmed then I presume you will encourage UNESCO to
condemn Hamas' targeting and indiscriminate attacks on the
state of Israel. Is that accurate?
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you, Senator, for the question, and
thank you for the opportunity for me to readdress this issue.
This is a forum in which it is my--this is my first time in a
forum like this and I do not want my initial nerves to detract
from my testimony.
I have deep respect for this body and deep respect for
these issues, and I want to be crystal clear: As I stated in my
opening remarks, I would do everything within the power of the
position.
I would not hesitate to speak up. I would work with allies.
I share the deep and grave concerns about the ways that this
bias is reflected whether it is with resolutions that really
indiscriminately attack Israel.
With other ways that we see it in all of its forms it is
unjust and I have--I bring with me the absolute, not just
promise, but passion to be an effective ambassador for U.S.
national security interests and we are not successful if that
does not include standing with Israel as a partner and standing
with allies.
And I sit here with great pride that I come with the
support of the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish
Council and other Jewish groups to represent and speak for
them.
So thank you for the question. Thank you for the chance to
address it, and as I said this would be one of my top
priorities working in close consultation with this committee if
confirmed.
Senator Ricketts. Do you have some specific ideas on how
you can work with UNESCO's failure to condemn Hamas' use of
educational and cultural sites as launching pads for attacks on
Israel?
Are there some specific ideas on things that you can do to
be able to raise this issue and get UNESCO to condemn Hamas
misusing these civilian sites?
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you, Senator, for the question again.
I share the concern and the disgust for the ways sometimes
those inscription of Heritage Sites are used to erase the true
national tie and--tie to Israel and I think as I said before
and Senator Coons has mentioned it is about being in the room.
It is about taking back that microphone and it is about not
just talking to our allies but it is about talking to those who
are uncertain and being forceful in defending the interests of
Israel.
I think, if confirmed, I would take very seriously the role
I would need to play and I would do that actively to advance
these policies and to really look out for any action across any
of UNESCO's mandate of activities that would counter our
interest or those of our allies and strategic partners.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.
I am just about out of time but I will just emphasize again
when we have seen some United Nations agencies like the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency that are involved in
educational missions in Gaza we have seen that they have
produced textbooks and have teachers that are promoting
antisemitic anti-Israel ideas, and it is absolutely critical
that you take the leadership role in UNESCO to make sure that
anything that is going on in Gaza, anything that we are doing
in there with regard to cultural or education does not have
that sort of antisemitic anti-Israel content.
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you, Senator Ricketts, for raising
that, the textbook example, and I think what you raise is
exactly what if confirmed I would be charged to do is to
essentially be diligent about every way that we all know that
hate and bias shows its ugly head in so many different ways, be
it textbooks, be it Heritage Sites, be it resolutions, and
there is no place for that in this world and there is no place
for that when representing the United States of America.
And so I firmly commit to that and look forward to working
with you and members of this committee on that.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Ms. O'Donnell. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.
And we have two letters in support of Ms. O'Donnell, one
from the American Jewish Committee, the other from the World
Jewish Congress. I ask unanimous consent that they both be
placed in the record without objection.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
this transcript.]
Senator Van Hollen. Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
express my gratitude to Senator Coons for holding a
constructive, classified meeting around the issues around
humanitarian aid.
I really would like to pick up with you, Mr. Plitt, because
I just have really grave concerns. Absent, obviously, a
classified setting there has been public reports that there is
efforts going on to get a negotiated pause in the fighting
around the hostages, which is encouraging to me what has been
reported publicly.
But the gravity of the humanitarian crisis, the sheer
enormity of the suffering of residents of Gaza--the
amputations, and C-sections and procedures going on without
anesthesia, the near pandemic--they are near famine levels of
starvation, the challenges now with dysentery and more, it is
simply stunning and unconscionable the level of misery and
suffering amongst innocent people and it makes me, number one,
just constantly be concerned if we are doing everything we can
simply to help with humanitarian efforts.
I am fully in accord with the region and I have had direct
conversations with Sisi in Egypt, with MBS in Saudi Arabia.
Everyone knows of the urgency to degrade or destroy Hamas and
their--and the other Iranian proxies that are doing so much to
upend peace, to upend what Hamas clearly does not want, which
is two nations living side by side.
But right now the urgency--the fierce urgency of now in
addition to ending the terrorism that has plagued the region
and undermined peace is to deal with this humanitarian crisis.
And so I just want to sort of ask you, whether it is
opening the Erez Crossing, expanding the hours and resources
used for inspection of humanitarian aid in trucks, increasing
efforts to create zones of deconfliction, can we be doing more
as a nation to bring about a appropriate response to the crisis
of human suffering in Gaza?
Mr. Plitt. Thank you, Senator Booker.
I know it is heart wrenching. It is hard to look at the
reports that we keep getting out of Gaza with regards to what
the civilians are enduring, the harm to civilians. The
protection of civilian issue is critical as well as the access
issue.
I know we are through Special Envoy Satterfield pushing to
look what more we can do to open additional crossings.
There has been damages through the conflict. It remains
dramatically and probably the most complex crisis that I have
seen in my career just because of the trauma that was suffered
by Israel from October 7th and also the tactics that Hamas is
using that places people in danger as the IDF goes after Hamas
to eliminate them and to create conditions.
Senator Booker. I guess if I can interrupt because,
clearly, Hamas has violated unbelievable international rules of
conflict using hospitals and schools, making the military
operation extraordinarily complex and difficult.
And I am not in any way diminishing the impossible
challenges that you have when a ceasefire is broken on October
6th, going into October 7th and then the enemy does horrific
things, unimaginable violence that I have now witnessed to a
degree most of the public has not and through video, and then
retreats and embeds themselves around civilian populations. It
is deplorable.
And yet I know our history as a nation from the Berlin
airlift to the extraordinary efforts going on today or more
recently like the ability to get resources into Haiti amidst an
unstable, dangerous environment.
I just would imagine, and maybe this goes a little bit to,
I think, Senator Romney's important line of questioning is the
U.S. has the assets and the ability to get resources there that
do not endanger or undermine--just simply anesthesia--into
that--into that theater.
Why are we not as a country, perhaps, going around the
complicated challenges we are seeing or the lack of will for
opening up arteries of support? Why are we not doing more
direct and should that not be considered as an option?
Mr. Plitt. My understanding is that when Special Envoy
Satterfield runs into issues pushing for greater access those
issues are raised to a higher level.
I think at the beginning of the conflict our administrator
Samantha Power she referred to President Biden as our
humanitarian desk officer to work with the prime minister of
Israel, to push things through which has unlocked access.
It has been a back and forth and where we have seen
progress, and we have lost progress just because of the
complexity of the conflict. But I have confidence in the work
of Special Envoy Satterfield.
Senator Booker. Well, I am going to end my time. I am over
my time.
But I just want to say this clearly. I support Israel's
efforts to defend itself to end this lurching into cycles of
unimaginable violence in the region.
Before October 7th Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others were
putting--principally putting the Palestinian people at the
center of a effort to normalize relations. We were on the
pathway in my lifetime towards a peace process that was more
promising than ever and Hamas upended that and that will
continually be their intention.
Even now they are still firing rockets. Even now they are
still saying, we will regroup and do another October 7th.
So I support Israel's efforts to destroy or degrade Hamas.
That said, I do believe that this is a Schindler's List like
moment when five years from now we will look back and say could
we not have done more to save innocent lives, to end
unimaginable misery.
And I believe we could be doing more and we must, and the
frustration I hear from folks on both sides of the aisle about
our ability to work with an administration in Israel that has a
military operation that, again, I just spoke to but are they
doing everything they should be doing to ease the flow of
humanitarian aid that is not being undermined and used or
assaulted by terrorism as our ambassador has said.
So this is my frustration and I am hoping--and I am looking
forward to voting and supporting you but I am hoping that this
sense of urgency that every hour there are things going on that
I believe we could be doing more to stop from happening.
Thank you for the generosity.
Senator Van Hollen. You are welcome. Thank you, Senator
Booker.
I am now going to turn the hearing over to the chair of the
full committee Senator Cardin.
The Chairman [presiding]. First, if I might, before
recognizing Senator Duckworth, express my thanks to Senator Van
Hollen and Senator Romney and let me explain. One of my top
priorities as chairman of this committee is to act on the
nominees that require Senate confirmation.
That requires us to have the hearings like we are having
today and it is not easy to get hearings scheduled in our
calendars.
This committee has broad jurisdiction. There is a lot of
work that we have to do and we call upon our members in order
to be able to conduct these confirmation hearings.
Senator Van Hollen and Senator Romney have been troopers in
allowing us to have these hearings so that we can move these
nominations forward. I just really want the committee to know
and our nominees to know how much we appreciate the two of them
in conducting this hearing.
I also want to thank all four of our nominees for their
public service and their willingness to continue in public
service. We know these are challenging times and we thank you
very much for your commitment.
And then lastly before I recognize Senator Duckworth I want
to express as chairman of this committee our deep condolences
on the loss of Bobbi Barrasso, the spouse of one of our
members, Senator Barrasso. She passed away this morning.
We know it has been a long illness but we wanted Senator
Barrasso to know and the Barrasso family that they are in our
thoughts and prayers as they go through this difficult time.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
start off by associating myself with Senator Booker's remarks.
I absolutely uphold Israel's right to defend herself and I
agree with him that Hamas has said that they are dedicated to
the destruction of Israel, our greatest ally in the Middle
East.
But I too am deeply, deeply appalled by the suffering that
is occurring in Gaza and I do feel that we here in this august
body can and should do more.
With that, I would like to begin with Ambassador Lakhdhir.
[Speaks foreign language.]
Senator Duckworth. Welcome. It is good to see you again.
As you know, improving our relationships with our allies
and partners in Southeast Asia is extremely important to me
both personally but also because I understand how critical the
region is to our national security.
When I visited Jakarta last August I learned firsthand
about how much we have been able to accomplish with Indonesia
just in the last year. Elevating the strategic partnership
achieved by the Obama administration in 2016 to a comprehensive
strategic partnership, that is a great achievement.
We have signed a new five-year Millennium Challenge
Corporation compact that is focused on improving financing
infrastructure projects and we are continuing to deepen our
security cooperation, for example, with our B-52s landing in
Indonesia in--for the very first time as part of Cope West.
Ambassador, as both Indonesia and the United States hold
consequential national elections this year, and you have
alluded to this already, how can we ensure that no matter the
changes in domestic politics we as a nation will remain a
reliable partner committed to a free, open, and prosperous
Indo-Pacific?
Ms. Lakhdhir. Thank you very much, Senator.
I think--and I think for us, the United States, we have a
long-standing strategic partnership with Indonesia and it
crosses all of government, all of the parties.
It also crosses through civil society, private sector, the
media. It is so comprehensive that while there will be change
due to the elections--there will certainly be a new president.
Exactly who that will be we do not know.
But I think the strategic partnerships we have built across
Indonesian society and government will be the foundation for
our relationship with the new government and new members of
parliament.
So I think in all those areas that you highlighted and some
of them I highlighted in my opening remarks I think Indonesians
are seeking our partnership, seeking our support to move
forward into a more prosperous and democratic future.
So I am very optimistic and if I am confirmed I hope to
work on all these areas with the support of this committee and
particularly with the support of yourself.
Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you.
And if confirmed will you continue to prioritize maritime
security partnerships with Indonesia, especially our naval and
Coast Guard capabilities in the region?
Ms. Lakhdhir. Yes.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And congratulations to each of our nominees today and thank
you for your willingness to continue to serve this country.
Ambassador Lakhdhir, Indonesia has made real progress on
women's rights and empowerment. But as we know there is still a
lot of work to be done.
Can you talk about what more you can do once confirmed in
your role as Ambassador and what the United States can do to
promote women's leadership throughout Indonesia and Southeast
Asia including through ASEAN, which now has a women, peace, and
security plan, which is very exciting?
Ms. Lakhdhir. Thank you, Senator.
So in thinking about this, so I think the MCC-2 compact has
a specific pillar--I do not know if that is the correct term--
focused on women and women's economic empowerment.
I am very aware that USAID has also focused a lot of their
efforts on maternal health, HIV/AIDS, health that affect women
and children.
I also know the embassy has and through my own experience
in Malaysia focused through exchange programs through YSEALI,
through entrepreneurship for women, STEAM for girls and women
in terms of the educational sector on giving greater education
and opportunities for women.
I think the other--Malaysia has a very large youth
population. One of the statistics that is interesting is the
number of Indonesian women in the formal workforce is very low
and so if you want to create the dynamic of greater economic
prosperity bringing your women into the workforce and giving
them effective jobs.
I think I could keep going. I think you sense that this is
of interest. So I am committed to this for the benefit of
Indonesians and for our partnership.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I think it is also
important to point out that nations and societies that empower
women tend to be more stable and, as you point out, have more
economic prosperity.
So there are very good foreign policy reasons why this is
something that we need to embrace and support.
Ms. Stone, the Marshall Islands continue to maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan but also do a lot of trade
with China. I was disappointed to see that Nauru announced its
decision to no longer recognize Taiwan and that Tuvalu is also
considering whether it is going to continue to recognize
Taiwan.
So can you talk about how China views the Marshall Islands?
Are they a target for economic and geopolitical influence?
Ms. Stone. Thank you, Senator, for that question, and I
know you in particular have been very active in developing
strategies and policies to counter China where they are
overstepping their bounds. So thank you very much for that.
I agree that the PRC is targeting Taiwan's most vulnerable
partners and certainly we have an obligation to work with our
Taiwan partners, to show concrete and actionable value on
continued relations with Taiwan.
It is certainly something that we are going to be looking
at very carefully, and China often over promises and under
delivers when they are trying to activate these flips.
If confirmed I commit to working very closely with Taiwan's
representatives to communicate our shared democratic values,
which is a very valuable thing in democratic RMI, and also our
concrete ability to be a true long-term partner to advance the
opportunities for the people of Marshall Islands.
I also note that we are somewhat hamstrung by the fact that
the United States has been lacking ambassador level diplomatic
representation for a while in Majuro and that does hamper our
ability to communicate clearly with the Government of Marshall
Islands the need to be cautious when dealing with the PRC.
So thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you and, clearly, when China
has diplomatic presence that is much--actually much broader
than the United States right now, anytime we do not have
ambassadors on the ground it is a real detriment to our
national security and foreign policy.
Let me also observe that I think many of us saw the
horrific pictures on the news in the last week about the impact
of climate change and the waves on our base in the Marshall
Islands, and the Marshall Islands have really been a leader on
trying to raise the concerns about climate change and the
impact on small islands and countries like the Marshall
Islands.
So I hope you will continue to encourage them to speak out
and that we will do everything we can to support those efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Congratulations to the witnesses.
Three topics I want to raise. First, to follow up on
Senator Booker on the Gaza humanitarian situation, Mr. Plitt,
the need for Israel to defend itself against an organization
pledged to its destruction is clear.
But what we are watching here is the effort in Gaza a
defense against Hamas or is it a war against Gazans or
Palestinians, and we are looking at the evidence and we look at
rhetoric and we look at civilian casualties and we look at
humanitarian aid and we look at discussions about the future of
Palestinian self-autonomy, and the evidence is troubling in
terms of answering the question.
It troubles a lot of us. To me the clearest bit of evidence
where positive changes could make the biggest difference is in
the humanitarian space. Civilian casualties, because of the way
Hamas embeds with civilians, very, very challenging.
But the effort to get aid to 2.2 million people who have
suffered under Hamas that would be the quickest way that Israel
could demonstrate this is about defeating Hamas; it is not
about hurting Gazans or Palestinians.
And my colleagues and I have been extremely disappointed
about the pace, about the quantity of aid, and when we talk to
our own U.S. officials in the region--you mentioned Ambassador
Satterfield--they are not happy about it either.
Things that should not be hard to get agreement on--open
the Kerem Shalom border crossing--are incredibly difficult.
They take way too long and then that leads to really difficult
challenges for 2.2 million people, again, who have, largely,
suffered under Hamas.
And so I just want to underline and exclamation point this
notion that humanitarian aid and hostage release I think are
the two kind of highest priorities in this and they are
connected. Hostage release in the past came with a cessation of
hostilities and that allowed more humanitarian aid to be able
to easily be distributed.
So I think the effort on this committees is going to be
very focused on this humanitarian aid question and, obviously,
your role with USAID will put you right in the middle of that.
Ms. O'Donnell, I just want to say a word about UNESCO.
Senator Ricketts asked you the questions about how hard
UNESCO's history has been, the double standard applied to
Israel. We would want our U.N. bodies to call out bad behavior
if they see it but the double standard applied to Israel
compared to other nations has been so obvious.
And, yet, when the U.S. is absent from the institutions
like the U.N. Human Rights Council or UNESCO it gets worse.
When we absented ourselves from these institutions--I had a
meeting once with Michelle Bachelet when she was the Human
Rights Commissioner and she said, look, is there a double
standard? There is a double standard. It is outrageous.
But when the U.S. is absent it gets worse and worse and
worse, and when the U.S. comes and is back at the table--it may
still not be to our liking--it gets better.
UNESCO hosted a conference on antisemitism in October just
a few months ago. They would not have done that in the past.
They are doing that now. Europe was wanting them to do it as
well as the United States.
But as frustrating as these institutions are and do stand
strong for our principles and stand strong for support for
democratic allies, stand strong for human rights, stand strong
with Israel against the double standard, it is probably not
going to be to your liking. But your standing strong will move
the center of the dialogue in a better place. So I would
encourage you.
And then finally, Madam Ambassador, I am intrigued about--
intrigued/worried about the upcoming elections in Indonesia
just from what I am reading. So Indonesia has a president who
cannot run for another term because of term limits.
The president's son is running for vice president. The
Indonesian constitution says presidents and vice presidents
have to be 40 years old but the president's son is 36 years old
and the constitutional court, I gather, has rendered a ruling
that he is qualified to run for vice president.
We have a similar provision in the U.S. Constitution. There
is parts of the Constitution like what is due process that are
vague. What is cruel and unusual punishment--that is vague.
But you got to be 35 years old is about the clearest thing
in the Constitution. So how am I to understand a constitutional
ruling in a nation that has a 40 year old age limit for VP
saying that a 36-year-old meets the qualification?
Ms. Lakhdhir. So you spoke correctly. The constitutional
court made the decision. I am not an expert in Indonesian
constitutional law but there was a decision that allowed the
current president's oldest son to run as vice president with
the current defense minister.
And there has been follow up. There is another process
where that is investigated and there was a decision related to
that but that there was also a decision that since this had
already happened that this would continue on. So he is running
as vice president.
Senator Kaine. Well, it is obviously troubling. I mean, I
credit everything you said about the importance of the
relationship and even about improvements in the relationship,
which I think are notable and that should be celebrated.
But a nation that would casually cast aside a clear
constitutional command about who can run and who cannot run we
at least--that should at least be a red flag for us and in
terms of your priorities should you be confirmed promoting rule
of law and democracy, I think, should climb the ladder.
Thank you.
Ms. Lakhdhir. I agree, Senator.
The Chairman. We ask all of our nominees to be ambassadors
to make advancing human rights and good governance a priority
of our missions.
In Indonesia it is clear that we have an ally but there are
certain challenges in regards to accountability, in regards to
how human rights is handled with their security forces.
So there are questions that we ask all nominees. I am going
to ask you all to answer them for the record and they are do
you agree to appear before this committee and make officials
from your office available to the committee and designated
staff when invited?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. Do you commit to keep this committee fully
and currently informed about the activities under your purview?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation while policies are being developed, not just
providing notification after the fact?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. Do you commit to promptly responding to
requests for briefings and information requested by the
committee and its designated staff?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. Well, you answered all those questions right.
You did a good job.
So back again, Ambassador Lakhdhir, in regards to Indonesia
the human rights is an issue that we are concerned about with
all missions.
We would ask that you keep us informed as to how you are
using your position, if confirmed, to advance American values
and respect for human rights in all countries but particularly
as Ambassador to Indonesia.
Ms. Lakhdhir. Yes, it is the center of our partnership with
Indonesia as I understand it. It is something we raise.
I am aware of the concerns about the security services both
in the past and sometimes currently. So I am committed to
engaging very proactively with the Indonesians and also
briefing this committee.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. O'Donnell, I am very excited about your
background being uniquely situated to deal with the challenges
we have at UNESCO. The Second Gentleman has been a real leader
in fighting antisemitism and I know that you have played a
critical role in that regard.
UNESCO is the only U.N. agency that is charged with
fighting antisemitism particularly and encouraging Holocaust
education.
So as you have heard a lot of questions here in a defensive
mode into what they are doing that is negative I would hope
that you will develop a strategy that it could be a positive
force to fight antisemitism, particularly of Holocaust
education.
Ms. O'Donnell. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
And I do--while a lot of the attention has been exactly
that, to the negative, I do think it is really important that
we think about the ways that we can elevate our national
security interests and that does involve Holocaust education
efforts and a whole of society approach to this.
Senator Kaine mentioned a recent meeting in October that
UNESCO chaired around antisemitism. Given emerging
technologies, given the need for reaching people in various
forum I think there are more and more partners who we can
engage in this work and one of the strengths I bring to the
role is coalition building to advance good.
I have seen firsthand the power of public-private
partnerships. Since I have been nominated there have been
academic nonprofit and other institutions who have reached out
to say we are so thrilled you are back--how can we get
involved.
And I think this is--this applies to many topics that can
advance our affirmative agenda and if confirmed I would be
absolutely thrilled and honored to work with you and this
committee on these issues and more.
The Chairman. On that point let me yield to Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. And I just want to say, Senator Cardin, I
forgot to mention one thing about UNESCO using the UNHCR as a--
as an analogue.
So we are out of the UNHCR and our current ambassador is
Michele Taylor, who many of us know, and what she is
discovering is she has been able to lobby Human Rights Council
members successfully for resolutions that get blocked in the
Security Council because of the automatic veto.
So she has been able to lobby through the UNHCR human
rights resolutions about Russian atrocities in Ukraine, for
example, that when the Security Council takes them up that veto
is going to be automatic.
And so not to--not to predict too rosy a path for Ms.
O'Donnell in this position but the absence of the mandatory
veto in some of the U.N. agencies actually opens up an
opportunity for advocacy there that would be automatically
blocked in the Security Council.
The Chairman. I thank you for that. I have been a strong
advocate of our multilateral organizations. I have been a
representative of the Senate to the United Nations General
Assembly.
I have been very actively engaged in the OSCE and have
taken offices in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, engaged with
Senator Wicker on the OAS trying to strengthen that
institution.
The United Nations has had major bias against Israel. We
know that. We see that in the Human Rights Council. We see that
in UNESCO. It has been pointed out today.
But there is so much good it could do and our leaders need
to make those efforts to try to change the bias that is there,
and I agree with Senator Kaine for a long time we were not part
of the Human Rights Council.
We were not part of UNESCO. I had long conversations with
President Obama about the advantages of participation rather
than not being at the table.
I have had conversations with Israel about U.S. being at
the table rather than ceding that by not being--participating.
I believe in participating and I believe we can do much better
not just fighting the discrimination that has been there but as
a positive agenda.
So I thank you very much for your comment on that.
Mr. Plitt, I am not going to go through what all my
colleagues have said. I agree that we have to do more in
regards to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. It is unacceptable.
I recognize the challenges that Hamas has created in that
region and you pointed that out that the environment of that
war makes it extremely difficult to get in effective supplies
that are necessary for the civilian population.
So you have heard our concerns. We want to work in
partnership with you on this and we will continue to find ways
that we can be more effective.
And, Ms. Stone, Marshall Islands is very important to us.
It is very important in our concerns about PRC and its
influence. It is one of our association--free member
associations under COFA.
There is a challenge right now because it is not in that
status that is predictable for the future and I know that you
will hear about that from the people of the Marshall Islands.
And you have one additional challenge on how you are going
to deal with a sore spot that we had there on nuclear waste
materials that is deposited in the Marshall Islands.
So I would just urge you to figure out how you can keep us
informed, please, as to how we can strengthen our relationship
with our free association partners and deal with some of the
areas that are potential to affect that relationship.
These are small countries but incredibly important. They do
not get the attention here in Washington and it is up to you to
make sure they get the focus that we need to keep that
partnership going.
Ms. Stone. Thank you, Senator. I am very happy to do that.
The Chairman. We are going to keep the record open until
the close of business tomorrow for members who might have
friendly questions that they want to ask you.
We would ask that you try to get those answers in as
quickly as possible and as completely as possible so that we
can move the--to the next phase which is the committee business
meeting to act on your nominations.
Senator Kaine, anything further?
With that, the committee will stand adjourned. Thank you
all very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Kamala Shirin Lakhdhir by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with Indonesian
officials to mitigate and prevent a backsliding on Human Rights due to
Indonesia's new criminal code?
Answer. Democratic principles and human rights are at the center of
U.S. foreign policy and integral to the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. I
understand senior U.S. officials, civil society advocates, and the
business community have highlighted concerns related to certain
provisions of Indonesia's new criminal code including those that may
hinder free speech and extend criminal liability to businesses. If
confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the Government of Indonesia
as well as civil society and the private sector and emphasizing the
importance of protecting civic space as well as promoting and
protecting human rights, to ensure a robust democracy and a resilient
society.
Question. How will you work to support civil society in Indonesia
to protect the rights of the most vulnerable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will proactively engage with the Indonesian
Government, civil society, and the private sector to consult and raise
concerns about the most vulnerable in Indonesian society. An active and
free civil society is an essential component of a democratic society.
Due in large part to the work of civil society organizations, Indonesia
has made positive progress in consolidating democracy and protecting
human rights over the past twenty years. However, there is more work to
be done.
Question. Given the current challenges of democratic backsliding
and rising authoritarianism occurring around the world, it is
imperative that U.S. representatives shine a public light on these
issues. To that end, can I get your commitment that you will deliver a
public speech open to the press at a venue in Indonesia within your
first six months on the importance of democracy and human rights and
that you will specifically raise democracy and human rights in your
interactions with the Indonesian Government?
Answer. Democratic principles and human rights are at the center of
U.S. foreign policy and an important part of the U.S.-Indonesia
relationship. Under the elevated framework of a Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership, President Biden and President Widodo announced their
intent to further expand cooperation on all issues of common concern,
including good governance; pluralism; and respect for human rights and
the rule of law. If confirmed, I commit to speaking out on the
importance of democracy and human rights both publicly and in
engagements with the Government of Indonesia, and I commit to giving
public remarks open to the press on the importance of democracy and
human rights within the first six months of my tenure as Ambassador.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Kamala Shirin Lakhdhir by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China is the ``only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang,
flood our communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest
quantity of greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute
control of Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of
these destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a
threat to the United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As
Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will
advance U.S. national security interests and counter the People's
Republic of China (PRC) efforts to expand its problematic influence and
use of coercion, through diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, and
commercial advocacy to bolster U.S.-Indonesia ties.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. The United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change, when it is in the
U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues
across the U.S. interagency and Congress to advance U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests in Indonesia and countering efforts by our strategic
and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State and
interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's efforts to
expand its influence in Indonesia and the region.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign the open letter to the President.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to address employee concerns
personally by creating an open, trusting, and harassment-free work
environment. I am mindful of and value Department employees' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, I understand the
expression of disagreement does not in and of itself constitute
insubordination. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor to determine the proper course of action
should such a matter arise.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. I believe these employees were expressing a dissenting view
to their leadership. I would hope that employees would feel confident
to directly raise their concerns with their supervisors and management
rather than signing an anonymous letter.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make sure that Mission Indonesia
employees know that there are several avenues available to express
policy disagreements. I would encourage employees to use established
channels to express their views.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist group and antisemitic entity.
This foreign terrorist organization seeks to eliminate the State of
Israel, and its founding charter calls for the killing of Jewish
people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration supports
humanitarian pauses to allow for an influx of aid into Gaza and the
safe exit of hostages and other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a
sustained flow of aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians
seeking safer locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is
attempting to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The
U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas'
terrorism, consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect
itself, consistent with international law. The Administration has urged
Israel to differentiate between civilians and Hamas terrorists and to
avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of civilians as human shields, a
blatant violation of international law, does not lessen Israel's
obligations under international humanitarian law.
Question. Indonesia is the most populous country in Southeast Asia,
the most populous Muslim-majority nation in the world, the third-
largest democracy in the world, and is one of the world's largest
economies. We collaborate with Indonesia on matters like defense and
counterterrorism, education, the environment, and energy. In spite of
Indonesia's economic size and the strategic importance of our
partnership with the nation, Indonesia is the 24th largest U.S. trading
partner and the 33rd largest U.S. export market. If confirmed, how will
you work to bring Indonesia's U.S. export market up to par with the
size of its economy?
Answer. The United States was the second largest export market and
fourth largest import supplier for Indonesia in 2022 with $47.5 billion
in bilateral trade in 2022, an 18 percent increase over the prior year.
If confirmed, I will work to see this positive trend continue
throughout my tenure as Ambassador, including working with U.S.
interagency partners to address barriers to trade and investment. Our
efforts will continue to include reinforcing Indonesia's strong support
for Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and Just
Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP), encouraging its pursuit of OECD
membership, and cooperating to build secure and resilient semiconductor
supply chains.
Question. How should Indonesia confront Communist China's
aggression in the South China Sea?
Answer. Although Indonesia does not have a territorial dispute with
the PRC or other claimants over disputed islands in the South China
Sea, Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf
overlap with the PRC's expansive and unlawful maritime claims in the
South China Sea. Indonesian policy makers have sought to assert
Indonesia's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ while avoiding
public actions or statements that are overtly critical of the PRC.
Indonesia has prioritized resolving maritime boundary disputes with
other Southeast Asian claimants while advocating close adherence to
international law. Indonesia has also called for expediting
negotiations on an ASEAN-PRC Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China
Sea. If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Indonesia to
protect and preserve unimpeded lawful commerce and respect for
international law, including freedoms of navigation and overflight and
other lawful uses of the sea.
Question. Do you support the U.S. sanctioning the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Chinese Maritime Militia vessels that
violate Indonesia's internationally recognized maritime borders?
Answer. The United States supports Indonesia's efforts to uphold
its rights in accordance with the international law of the sea as well
as its leadership and coordination within the region. If confirmed, I
look forward to closely engaging with the Indonesian Government on our
shared regional security challenges, including the need to uphold
freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea,
and to push back on PRC aggressive and coercive behavior.
Question. Given the Indonesian public's waning view of the United
States in the past two decades, in your view, does Indonesia envision a
future more closely aligned with Beijing or Washington?
Answer. It is my understanding that although the Indonesian public
does not always agree with U.S. policies, they continue to hold a
favorable view of U.S. engagement in Indonesia and the region.
Indonesia has long maintained a non-aligned foreign policy. Even so,
the United States and Indonesia share deep and enduring ties. Our
latest upgrade in ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership--the
highest level in Indonesia's foreign relations--is based on shared
values, including a fundamental belief in the importance of democracy,
rule of law, and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I look forward to
deepening our partnership.
Question. Given Indonesia's history of militant extremism and
terrorism, do you believe that Indonesia is on course to become more or
less democratic following its presidential and parliamentary elections
next month?
Answer. Democratic principles and human rights are at the center of
U.S. foreign policy and integral to the U.S.-Indonesia relationship.
While Indonesia has made positive progress in consolidating democracy
and protecting human rights over the past twenty years, there is still
work to be done. We will continue to advance our priorities with
whomever the Indonesian people elect as President.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the International
Development Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development
Administration, and USAID to support American participation in
Indonesian investment and development projects?
Answer. The United States advances a wide range of investment and
development projects in Indonesia including support for micro, small,
and medium-sized enterprises, bringing internet connectivity to rural
Indonesians, supporting deployment of clean and renewable energy, and
helping support the development of Indonesia's new capital city.
Support for investment and development projects includes, but is not
limited to, a $650 million USAID Bilateral Development Cooperation
Framework, a $50 million USAID Bilateral Framework Agreement with the
Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the latest $649 million
Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact. If confirmed, I will continue
to work closely with our DFC, USTDA, MCC, and USAID colleagues,
including to identify and vet projects in Indonesia that support its
development needs and advance our shared strategic interests.
Question. Indonesia is among the world's largest producer of nickel
and other critical minerals important to the American economy. While
the Administration has been proactive in working with Indonesia to help
develop these resources so that it can serve as an alternative to the
growing Chinese monopoly on these minerals, I am concerned that recent
agreements will only strengthen the market dominance of Chinese firms
in this sector. The Biden Administration committed to future
negotiations on a critical minerals agreement with Indonesia. Given
that Chinese firms have considerable stakes in a wide majority of
mining and processing sites in Indonesia, how will you ensure that the
U.S. does not fund Chinese enterprises, including those that supply the
PLA?
Answer. Supporting U.S. private sector investment in Indonesia's
nickel processing sector directly contributes to the U.S. economy and
diminishes the PRC's control of this industry. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Mission continues to support U.S. investment in Indonesia,
as appropriate. We will continue, as appropriate, to caution private
U.S. investors about the challenges and risks of doing business with
PRC enterprises that currently dominate Indonesia's nickel processing
sector.
Question. Chinese-owned and operated nickel plants in Indonesia
have previously killed workers, confiscated visas, withheld pay, and
imported Chinese workers in violation of Indonesian immigration law. If
confirmed, how will you help fortify Indonesia's labor and migration
laws against Chinese abuses?
Answer. Democratic principles and human rights are at the center of
U.S. foreign policy and an important part of the U.S.-Indonesia
relationship. These values include support for strong labor rights. I
understand civil society advocates have highlighted serious concerns
with the labor practices at PRC-owned and -operated nickel processing
plants. If confirmed, I will continue our Mission's engagement with
Indonesian Government officials as well as civil society and the
private sector to ensure strong labor, social, and environmental
safeguards, with appropriate enforcement, become the standard in
Indonesia's nickel sector.
Question. Do you believe that Indonesian critical mineral sites
operated by Chinese and U.S. joint ventures are free of forced labor?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Question. As the country with the world's fourth largest
population, a fast-growing economy, and a leading player in ASEAN,
Indonesia is regarded as an attractive accession candidate for BRICS.
When Indonesia was invited to join BRICS last year, it declined. In
your view, why did Indonesia decline to join BRICS?
Answer. Indonesia has had a long-standing non-aligned foreign
policy and has been selective in which organizations it joins.
Apparently, Indonesia did not join BRICS last year because it did not
believe membership at this time was in its interest.
Question. Do you think it is possible for a country to join BRICS
and still be regarded as a U.S. partner or ally?
Answer. Yes. The United States maintains strong partnerships with
Brazil, India, and South Africa, all founding BRICS members.
Question. How should the U.S. ensure we discourage this
strategically important partner from joining the BRICS in the future,
when a new administration in Indonesia takes power this year?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue demonstrating to
Indonesia why the United States is the economic partner of choice based
on our fair and transparent trade practices, our superior technology
and expertise, and our world-class labor and environmental standards.
Specifically, we will continue to support Indonesia in its OECD
membership bid, work together as IPEF and JETP partners, and cooperate
to build secure and resilient semiconductor supply chains.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Courtney Diesel O'Donnell by Senator James E. Risch
The U.S. and the U.N.
Question. What are your views on the need for management reform
within the U.N. system?
Answer. More must be done. An efficient and effective United
Nations is essential to achieving America's strategic objectives. As I
stated in my testimony, I take seriously the responsibility to ensure
U.S. taxpayer dollars are used wisely, and if confirmed one of my top
priorities would be to ensure they are deployed with accountability and
in the interest of the national security of the United States. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure UNESCO adheres to best management and
oversight practices in the areas of protecting whistleblowers, ensuring
accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse, promoting zero
tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and managerial
transparency. If confirmed, I would do so in close collaboration with
members of this committee.
Americans Within U.N. Organizations
Question. Now that the Office of ``Multilateral Personnel and
Strategy'' has been established, please provide your assessments of the
office's work to achieve its mission to increase Americans in the U.N.
system and combat malign influence in international organizations,
particularly UNESCO.
Answer. I have been briefed that the Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel is actively promoting the appointment and
election of qualified United States citizens throughout the United
Nations system. I have also reviewed with concern in Senator Risch's
``A Concrete Agenda for Transatlantic Cooperation on China'' 2020 China
Europe Report the ways in which the Chinese have strategically pursued
employment opportunities within the U.N. system to advance their goals
and steer their agenda.
The United States is currently underrepresented at UNESCO. The
return of the United States presents a valuable and timely opportunity
to identify openings and advocate more quickly for American employment
within the body and other U.N. agencies. I appreciated the chance to
speak to committee staff about the importance of this issue, and if
confirmed I would welcome the opportunity to collaborate to identify
additional channels to recruit talented Americans whose expertise would
add significant value to our presence and leadership within such
multilateral bodies.
I understand that the Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel
is also leading Department efforts to counter harmful third-country
efforts to reshape or undermine the rules-based international order,
including now at UNESCO, where we are strengthening relationships with
traditional allies and emerging partners on issues important to United
States interests.
Question. Specifically on the Junior Professional Officer (JPO)
program, how can the Administration better recruit and retain talented
Americans for this program?
Answer. Senator Risch's report makes clear the ways that the PRC
has deployed the JPO program to its advantage across multiple U.N.
agencies. Here too if confirmed, I see a vital opportunity to advance
U.S. interests.
I understand that the State Department remains focused on the
recruitment and retention of JPOs. For recruitment, the Department
looks to expand existing targeted recruitment efforts by leveraging
alumni of the JPO program and increasing outreach to different talent
pipelines. For retention, the Department seeks to improve post-JPO
hiring of U.S. citizens through formal advocacy and works to link JPOs
to U.S. citizens already employed by the U.N. If confirmed, I am
committed to working with the IO/MSP office and other stakeholders to
recruit more Americans to work at UNESCO.
I would also bring my skills in strategic communications, my
network across diverse sectors, and passion for encouraging America's
brightest to commit to serve our Nation that I have fostered through my
role as a Commissioner for the White House Fellows program and other
forums.
UNESCO
Question. The U.S. ceased funding to UNESCO because the
organization granted Palestine full membership. U.S. code (P.L. 101-146
and P.L. 103-236) prohibits the U.S. from funding any organization
which grants full membership to Palestine. The FY 24 Budget included
$150 million in payments of arrears to UNESCO and late last year, the
U.S. regained membership in the organization. In your opinion, what
does the future of U.S. participation look like?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to strengthen U.S. participation
in UNESCO and ensure that taxpayer dollars are used with the utmost
discretion, and that our participation is guided by what is best for
U.S. national security interests. As I stated in my testimony, if
confirmed, I would do so by advocating for America's foreign policy
goals, with a focus on three key areas--(1) to counter the influence of
the PRC, Russia, and other authoritarian states and competitors; (2)
combat antisemitism and counter anti-Israel bias; and (3) ensure UNESCO
is operating efficiently and transparently, with the highest level of
accountability.
I also would seek to deepen and expand partnerships to support
UNESCO's work in advancing democratic values, supporting freedom of
expression, journalist protection, cultural and natural heritage
protection, academic freedom, and access to education for all; and to
ensure that new standards for the ethics of AI and other emerging
technologies are consistent with democratic values and human rights.
Question. If confirmed, what are your three main goals for the
U.S.-UNESCO relationship?
Answer. As I said in my testimony, if confirmed, I would advocate
for America's foreign policy goals, with a focus on three key areas--
(1) to counter the influence of the PRC, Russia and other authoritarian
states and competitors; (2) combat antisemitism and counter anti-Israel
bias; and (3) ensure UNESCO is operating efficiently and transparently,
with the highest level of accountability. If confirmed, I would do so
in close collaboration with this committee.
Question. Does that the Administration intend to pay all of its
arrears to UNESCO?
Answer. Given the U.S. has rejoined UNESCO, I recognize the
importance and urgency of demonstrating our leadership and action as a
force to combat the PRC and others who threaten our values and
interests. Paying our dues is an element of that re-engagement. As I
understand, the Department requested $150 million for Fiscal Year 2024
for UNESCO, of which $75 million would be used to pay U.S. arrears,
with the plan to request additional funding from Congress in ensuing
years until the U.S. arrears are fully resolved. I also understand the
role that Congress plays in appropriations, and if confirmed I would
work closely with all appropriate parties to ensure that U.S. taxpayer
dollars at UNESCO are spent with accountability and to advance U.S.
national security interests.
Question. If paid, how will the arrears be distributed?
Answer. I believe the best way to ensure U.S. contributions reflect
U.S. priorities is to be at the table when budgets are discussed and
decided upon. The election of the U.S. to the UNESCO Executive Board in
December 2023 will enable us to do so. If confirmed, I would work with
all relevant parties to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars at UNESCO are
spent with accountability and to advance U.S. national security
interests--and would vigorously engage with the Director General, the
Secretariat, UNESCO Executive Board, and others to ensure that funds
are directed to initiatives that are in line with the interest of the
United States. If confirmed, I would do so in close consultation with
members of this committee.
Question. Since UNESCO has already settled its finances from the
years with arrears, will the arrears amount be paid back to members of
UNESCO, including Palestine?
Answer. I have been briefed that no, the arrears amount will not be
paid back to members of UNESCO. I have also been briefed that in
accordance with UNESCO's financial regulations and established
practice, the payment of assessed contributions (including arrears)
will finance the UNESCO Programme and Budget, which pays for UNESCO's
administrative costs and the costs of UNESCO's ``major programmes'' in
the areas of education, natural sciences, social and human sciences,
culture, and communication and information.
If confirmed, I would be steadfast in countering anti-Israel bias
and ensuring U.S. taxpayer dollars would be directed towards programs
that advance national security interest of the United States.
Question. How will you ensure that no U.S. taxpayer dollars that go
to UNESCO end up going to Palestine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the UNESCO secretariat and
other UNESCO member states to ensure that taxpayer dollars provided for
the purpose of financing the UNESCO Programme and Budget, which pays
for administrative costs and the costs of UNESCO's ``major programmes''
in the areas of education, natural sciences, social and human sciences,
culture, and communication and information, are spent appropriately and
are not diverted to any other uses.
As it relates to these and all funds and programs, again as I
stated in my testimony, I take seriously the responsibility to ensure
U.S. taxpayer dollars are used wisely, and if confirmed one of my top
priorities would be to ensure such funds are deployed with
accountability and in the interest of the national security of the
United States.
Question. If arrears are paid, please describe the types of
projects that the arrears would be directed toward?
Answer. I have been briefed that the uses of funds paid to settle
arrears are the same as the uses of assessed contributions paid on
time--they are used to pay for UNESCO's administrative costs and the
costs of UNESCO's ``major programmes'' in the areas of education,
natural sciences, social and human sciences, culture, and communication
and information. If confirmed, I would apply the same rigor and
responsibility to these programs--and would work vigorously to ensure
the programs are directed in ways that advance and prioritize maximum
impact for our contributions and would do so in close consultation with
members of the committee.
Question. UNESCO is one of the only, if not the only, U.N.
organization with a direct mandate on Holocaust education. Given the
global rise in antisemitism and UNESCO's checkered history, how can you
ensure this mandate is protected and carried out to maximum effect?
Answer. As the only international organization with a mandate to
promote Holocaust education, UNESCO has a vital role to play in
ensuring that this history is appropriately taught and used to combat
antisemitism. As I stated in my testimony, in the wake of the October 7
Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel and the related rise of
antisemitism worldwide, this mandate has never been more urgent at
home, abroad, and within the U.N. system.
American leadership is vital to this work. Just last week on
January 24th, UNESCO announced the establishment of a permanent
exhibition on the Holocaust in the former Yugoslavia at Block 17 of the
Memorial and Museum at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia signed the
historic agreement at UNESCO Headquarters. UNESCO will serve as the
depository of this agreement to preserve memory and advance Holocaust
education. The importance of American leadership and support is clear
and if confirmed I would be proud to advocate and support this work.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the renewed U.S. investment in
UNESCO's Holocaust education programming is put to work efficiently and
effectively to tackle this rising antisemitism. Drawing upon my
experience in the development and implementation of the U.S. National
Strategy to Counter Antisemitism, I would work to strengthen current
partnerships and bring together broader coalitions to expand the reach
and impact of these programs. I would focus U.S. support on countering
Holocaust denial and distortion both online and offline, expanding
educational programs, and developing capacity building for policy
makers and teachers.
Question. How will you use the U.S.'s membership in UNESCO to
counter malign Chinese influence?
Answer. If confirmed, a key part of my role will be to reassert
U.S. values and strengthen efforts to ensure UNESCO is fulfilling its
mandate. As noted in my testimony and detailed extensively in Senator
Risch's work in the SFRC Majority 2020 Report referenced above, we know
that the PRC works through U.N. agencies, such as UNESCO, to undermine
the United States' values and interests, as well as those of our allies
and partners.
If confirmed, I will rigorously assess the ways in which the PRC is
exerting its agenda and develop strategic plans to counter harmful
actions in close consultation with members of this committee. If
confirmed, I will also expand U.S. leadership in UNESCO by building
coalitions with like-minded partners to counter PRC efforts to
undermine human rights through AI rules and guidelines, cultural and
natural heritage sites, and education.
Question. In particular, what is your strategy to ensure that U.S.
taxpayer dollars are not used toward funding the Category 1 Learning
Center in Shanghai, China?
Answer. I have been briefed that the Learning Center will be paid
for almost entirely with voluntary contributions from China, and if
confirmed a key priority would be to address this issue in close
consultation with the committee. As I said in my testimony, if
confirmed, I would work to ensure that UNESCO is operating efficiently
and transparently, with the highest level of accountability, and in
line with U.S. interests. I would vigorously engage with the Director
General, the Secretariat, UNESCO Executive Board and others to ensure
that U.S. funds are not directed to initiatives such as the Learning
Center that are not in line with the interest of the United States.
If confirmed, I would also work with the UNESCO Secretariat and
allies and partners to ensure strong oversight of the IISTEM Center
through the UNESCO Executive Board, which has jurisdiction over the
Center. If confirmed, I would do so in close consultation with members
of this committee.
Question. What is your strategy to address the concerns that the
World Heritage Committee is being used by the Government of China to
make historical and political claims on territory?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to examine
this issue and determine how we can most effectively counter any PRC
uses of UNESCO heritage inscriptions to distort history.
If confirmed, I would rally allies and partners to call for an
immediate end to the PRC's efforts to erase Uyghur culture, including
attempts to manipulate and dominate global discourse on Xinjiang. I
would also rally allies and partners to address PRC policies designed
to eliminate Tibet's distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious
traditions.
Question. How will you use the U.S. membership in UNESCO to promote
collaboration with U.S. educational institutions and private companies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would draw upon my experience from the
private, academic, and nonprofit sectors as well as my expertise in
cultivating global partnerships to build such important coalitions. If
confirmed, I would be committed and prepared to encourage U.S.
companies and academic institutions to participate in UNESCO advisory
bodies so that we can harness U.S. expertise and values at the table as
UNESCO considers issues such as emerging technologies and education
that are important to U.S. interests.
If confirmed, I would also promote U.S. nominations for UNESCO
programs such as UNESCO University Chairs, which create partnerships
between UNESCO and Universities with expertise in UNESCO's mandated
areas of work. I would do such work in close collaboration with the
committee to ensure we bring the talent and innovation of American
business and academic leaders to the table for these important
convenings and programs to follow.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Courtney Diesel O'Donnell by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China is the ``only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang,
flood our communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest
quantity of greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute
control of Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of
these destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a
threat to the United States?
Answer. Yes. I have been briefed that last year, the Director of
National Intelligence testified that ``the CCP represents both the
leading and most consequential threat to U.S. national security and
leadership globally.'' The Administration assesses that under President
Xi, the CCP has become more repressive at home and more aggressive
abroad, seeking to undercut U.S. influence and partnerships, including
at UNESCO.
If confirmed, a major focus of my role will be to reassert U.S.
values and strengthen efforts to ensure UNESCO is fulfilling its
mandate. As noted in my testimony, we know that the PRC works through
U.N. agencies, such as UNESCO, to undermine the United States' values
and interests, as well as those of our allies and partners. If
confirmed, I will expand U.S. leadership in UNESCO by building
coalitions with like-minded partners to counter PRC efforts to
undermine human rights through AI rules and guidelines, cultural and
natural heritage sites, and education.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. Through my preparations, I understand that the
Administration assesses the CCP's activities in the context of the fact
that, as Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more repressive
at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the
CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between
Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its
authoritarian system.''
If confirmed, I will ensure all actions at UNESCO are directed with
the national security interests of the United States at the core of our
work, which includes countering the influence of the PRC and other
authoritarian states and competitors, in close consultation with this
committee.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. I understand that as the United States competes vigorously
with the PRC, and that the United States manages this competition
responsibly so that competition does not veer into conflict. As noted,
taking aggressive measures to counter the malevolent activities of the
PRC at UNESCO would be one of my key areas of focus if confirmed.
The United States works with the PRC to address transnational
challenges when it is in our interest to do so--as Secretary Blinken
has said, not as a favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange
for walking away from our principles, but because it is what the world
expects. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of State's
Office of China Coordination, members of this committee, and relevant
parties to advance U.S. objectives and counter harmful behavior by the
PRC in UNESCO. I will also rigorously assess the ways in which the PRC
is exerting its agenda at UNESCO and develop strategic plans to counter
such actions in close consultation with members of this committee.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests and countering efforts by our strategic and regional
competitors to undermine those interests at UNESCO. The Administration
has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential geopolitical
challenge facing the United States, and that the United States is
committed to working to strengthen our partners in the region. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Department and interagency
colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's efforts to expand its
influence at home and abroad.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. One of the principles of my management style is robust and
open communication, which includes respect for differing views and
constructive criticism. I also respect the expertise that nonpartisan,
career employees and contractors of the Department of State bring to
their vital work--and if confirmed would value their inputs in the
process of developing policy recommendations and actions of the
Mission.
If confirmed, I would uphold this Administration's policy to
empower U.S. diplomats to do their jobs without being targeted or
subjected to retaliation in violation of applicable policies and laws
that allow for employees to express dissent as well as report
wrongdoing or a violation of the law.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. I understand that all Department of State employees,
contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, and personal
services contractors are protected from retaliation for making a
protected disclosure. I also recognize the important role that
whistleblowers perform for U.S. citizens and the Department when they
report evidence of wrongdoing. If confirmed, I would uphold relevant
laws and policies pertaining to the protection of whistleblowers,
including the provisions of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(b)(8).
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I would utilize the management skills that I
have gained over decades of managing teams to maintain open
communication, high standards of excellence, and accountability across
the Mission--and I would take all discipline issues seriously. I
understand that the Department maintains established procedures,
including in the Foreign Affairs Manual, for addressing incidents or
allegations that may serve as grounds for disciplinary action. If
confirmed, I will diligently follow established procedures for handling
such issues, consistent with the rights and responsibilities of
Department employees.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not. The Administration has been clear that
Israel has the right to defend itself against an active terrorist
threat from Hamas.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist group and antisemitic entity.
This terrorist organization seeks to eliminate the State of Israel, and
its founding charter calls for the murder of the Jewish people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. Yes, the Administration has stated that an indefinite
ceasefire right now would give Hamas time to regroup and continue its
terror attacks against Israel, now and in the future. The
Administration has also said it supports humanitarian pauses, not
indefinite, to allow for an influx of aid into Gaza and the safe exit
of hostages and other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. The Administration supports Israel's right to protect
itself from Hamas' terrorism, consistent with international law, and an
indefinite ceasefire right now doesn't do that.
It is the policy of the Administration to support temporary
humanitarian pauses to enable a sustained flow of aid and to allow the
voluntary movement of civilians who are seeking to move to safer
locations. The U.S. Government is actively working with partners to
secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. Israel has the right to protect itself, consistent with
international law. The United States has urged Israel to differentiate
between civilians and Hamas terrorists and do everything possible to
avoid civilian casualties. Israel's task is made difficult by the fact
that Hamas embeds itself among the civilian population.
Question. The United States was instrumental in UNESCO's
establishment in 1945 with a strong belief in its emphasis on
education, science, and culture. However, as you know, we have
withdrawn our participation on two occasions due to UNESCO's decision
to admit Palestinians as a member state and because of UNESCO documents
denying Jewish ties to Judaism's holiest sites in Jerusalem. Given the
global rise in antisemitism since Hamas's terror attack on October 7,
2023, how would you combat antisemitism at UNESCO, if confirmed?
Answer. Antisemitism has no place in UNESCO or any other
international organization, and as stated in my testimony, if
confirmed, combating antisemitism and anti-Israel bias would be a
primary focus of my work.
If confirmed, I will build upon my experience working on the first-
ever U.S. National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism and work closely
with Israel and likeminded partners at UNESCO to confront and oppose
antisemitism as well as any efforts to unfairly single out or
delegitimize Israel--including by diminishing historical Jewish
connections to sites nominated for inscription to the World Heritage
List.
In addition, I will actively support programs and activities, such
as Holocaust education, that bolster the legitimacy of Israel and make
clear that antisemitism is unacceptable anywhere. As I stated in my
testimony, in the wake of the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks against
Israel and the related rise of antisemitism worldwide, this mandate has
never been more urgent at home, abroad, and within the U.N. system.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the renewed U.S. investment in
UNESCO's Holocaust education programming is put to work efficiently and
effectively to tackle this rising antisemitism. I would work to
strengthen current partnerships and bring together broader coalitions
to expand the reach and impact of these programs. I would focus U.S.
support on countering Holocaust denial and distortion both online and
offline, expanding educational programs, and developing capacity
building for policy makers and teachers.
Question. Do you believe that Jerusalem is the undivided and
eternal capital of the Jewish people?
Answer. The United States recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital.
Question. Do you agree with UNESCO statements describing
Palestinian areas as ``occupied'' by Israel?
Answer. I believe that anti-Israel bias and one-sided language in
Middle East resolutions have no place at UNESCO or any other
international organization. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the United States continues to prioritize seeking an end to any
disproportionate focus on Israel as part of our engagement with UNESCO.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S.'s withdrawal from UNESCO
over Palestinian membership has prevented other U.N. bodies from
recognizing Palestinian statehood?
Answer. I share the Administration's view that efforts by the
Palestinians to join international organizations are premature and
counterproductive.
As I understand it, the existing laws regarding Palestinian
membership in the U.N. system maintain a deterrent factor and include a
provision to reinstate restrictions on contributions to UNESCO should
the Palestinians obtain standing as a member state in other U.N.
bodies. As I have stated, I believe that U.S. leadership is vital, and
if confirmed would vigorously work to stand with our Israeli partners
and challenge unfair discrimination in the form of criticism, abuse, or
attack.
Question. The U.S. is the largest financial contributor to UNESCO,
contributing 22 percent of the organization's total budget. If
confirmed, how should the U.S. leverage its significant contribution to
UNESCO to shape future UNESCO decisions regarding Israel?
Answer. I believe that the best way to ensure that U.S.
contributions reflect U.S. priorities is to be at the table when those
priorities are discussed and decided at the UNESCO Executive Board and
General Conference.
If confirmed, I will work to build alliances with other UNESCO
member states to ensure that UNESCO is governed effectively and that
decisions by UNESCO on the uses of funds are consistent with U.S.
values and interests, particularly with regard to Israel. As I stated
in my testimony, UNESCO remains the only U.N. organization with the
mandate for Holocaust education, and if confirmed I will work closely
with the UNESCO Director-General and UNESCO members to advance this
important work.?
Question. The Chinese Communist Party is actively seeking to
normalize its unique interpretation of international relations and
sovereignty by using international organizations like the U.N. and
UNESCO. How do you view the PRC's growing funding of and influence over
UNESCO?
Answer. U.S. leadership in UNESCO is critical to halting the PRC's
aggressive efforts to shape UNESCO's priorities and diminish long-
standing international norms and standards.
During the five years the United States was absent from UNESCO, the
PRC successfully pressed for language in resolutions to align with its
national agenda, including in areas such as ethics of emerging
technologies, safeguarding of cultural and natural heritage, and
education. The PRC also expanded its influence in the organization
through increased funding, strategic placement of key personnel,
membership on influential committees, and extensive outreach to
developing country delegations.As I said in my testimony, if confirmed,
I would rally allies and partners to take unified positions at UNESCO
to counter these activities.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to stem this influence?
Answer. If confirmed, a key part of my role will be to reassert
U.S. values and strengthen efforts to ensure UNESCO is fulfilling its
mandate. I will also rigorously assess the ways in which the PRC is
exerting its agenda and develop strategic plans to counter such actions
in close consultation with members of this committee.
If confirmed, I will also expand U.S. leadership in UNESCO by
building coalitions with like-minded partners to counter PRC efforts to
undermine human rights through AI rules and guidelines, cultural and
natural heritage sites, and education.
Question. UNESCO has recognized five aspects of Uyghur culture as
intangible world heritage. Do you believe that UNESCO publications
referencing the Uyghurs should mention the Chinese Communist Party's
destruction of hundreds of mosques, shrines, graveyards, and historic
Uyghur books in Xinjiang?
Answer. If confirmed, as part of a concerted focus on countering
the influence of the PRC, one of my priorities will be to address
concerns that the PRC uses UNESCO heritage inscriptions to distort
history to reinforce the Communist Party's view of the past, bolster
the idea of a Han-centric identity, dilute the contributions of
minority groups, and legitimize the party's rule over regions with
large ethnic minorities.
If confirmed, I would rally allies and partners to call for an
immediate end to efforts to erase Uyghur culture, including by attempts
to manipulate and dominate global discourse on Xinjiang.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Courtney Diesel O'Donnell by Senator Ted Cruz
Congress decided over a decade ago that the U.S. would limit
participation in U.N. organizations that admit the Palestinians
as a state. Congress was concerned inter alia that Palestinian
officials systematically torque the agendas of organizations
they join in an anti-Israel direction, politicizing and
delegitimizing those organizations while moving them away from
their original missions.
In 2011, UNESCO admitted the Palestinians as a member state,
and the U.S. cut support for the organization. Subsequent
actions by UNESCO confirmed the wisdom of that decision and the
veracity of Congressional concerns, including passage by UNESCO
of language denying a Jewish connection to the Temple Mount,
Judaism's holiest site. In 2018, the U.S. completely withdrew
from UNESCO.
In summer 2023, the Biden administration rejoined UNESCO.
Then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources, Richard Verma, submitted a to UNESCO Director
General Audrey Azoulay highlighting that the organization was
``decreasing politicized debate, especially on Middle East
issues.'' Administration officials said that engagement with
UNESCO would ensure that the organization further reduce its
anti-Israel bias and return to its core mission. On September
17, UNESCO listed Ancient Jericho as a site in the ``State of
Palestine.'' The resolution stripped any Jewish connection from
the history of the site.
Since October 7, UNESCO's anti-Israel bias has crossed the
line into routine advocacy. On October 17, UNESCO's Director-
General used his platform to suggest that Israel was targeting
journalists. On October 27, UNESCO suggested that Israel was
targeting protected educational institutions. On December 2,
UNESCO gave a statement to NPR suggesting that Israel was
deliberately targeting protected cultural property.
Question. Do you believe UNESCO has decreasing politicized debate,
especially on Middle East issues, since the U.S. rejoined?
Answer. Since the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel,
the unfair bias against Israel and rise of anti-Semitism has been clear
around the globe and within U.N. bodies. UNESCO must do more toward
decreasing politicized debate, especially on Middle East issues, and
the United States presence is critical to counter these threats.
As I stated in my testimony, if confirmed I would vigorously
advocate for America's policy goals, and a key focus area would be to
combat antisemitism and counter anti-Israel bias. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with like-minded member states to oppose any one-sided
resolutions against Israel and ward against similar actions driven by
such unacceptable discrimination. In November 2023, the Israeli Foreign
Ministry publicly thanked the United States for its efforts on this
front.
Question. Do you believe Israel has deliberately targeted
journalists?
Answer. No. I have not seen evidence that supports this claim. I
share the concern that the Administration has expressed about the
unprecedented number of journalists killed in Gaza. Journalists perform
essential work during conflicts, and the United States has consistently
urged all parties to do everything possible to avoid harm to
journalists and other civilians. Israel's task is made difficult by the
fact that Hamas embeds itself among the civilian population.
As I have stated, if confirmed I would vigorously work to stand
with our Israeli partners and challenge unfair discrimination in the
form of criticism, abuse, or attack.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with the Biden
administration's commitment to depoliticizing UNESCO for UNESCO
officials to suggest Israel has targeted journalists?
Answer. UNESCO must do more toward decreasing politicized debate,
especially on Middle East issues. Ensuring a safe environment for
journalists around the globe is a critical piece of UNESCO's work and
mandate. U.S. presence is key to pushing back on anti-Israel narratives
in this work.
If confirmed, I intend to play a key role in ensuring that the
UNESCO Secretariat strengthens measures to protect journalists and
conducts fact-finding missions without bias. I will insist that as
UNESCO produces reports on journalists' deaths and injuries in the
conflict, that the reports are balanced and not politicized by members
seeking to target Israel.
Question. Do you believe Israel has targeted protected educational
institutions?
Answer. No. I have not seen evidence that supports this claim. I
share the concern that the Administration has expressed about damage to
educational institutions, and I understand the Administration continues
to engage on this matter. Israel's task is made difficult by the fact
that Hamas embeds itself among the civilian population. The
Administration continues to urge that Israel take every feasible step
to minimize harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
As I have stated, if confirmed I would vigorously work to stand
with our Israeli partners and challenge unfair discrimination in the
form of criticism, abuse, or attack.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with the Biden
administration's commitment to depoliticizing UNESCO for UNESCO
officials to suggest Israel has targeted protected educational
institutions?
Answer. UNESCO must do more toward decreasing politicized debate,
especially on Middle East issues. UNESCO is the lead U.N. agency for
education and has worked to ensure continuity of education, including
during the COVID 19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Israel and likeminded
partners to ensure that there is no unfair blame on the Israeli Defense
Forces or attempts to unfairly characterize Israel's legitimate right
of self-defense. I will insist that UNESCO reporting on damage to
educational institutions in Gaza is balanced and not politized by
members seeking to target Israel.
Question. Do you believe that Israel has targeted protected
cultural property?
Answer. No. I have not seen evidence that supports this claim. I
understand the Administration continues to engage with Israel about the
importance of safeguarding cultural property. Israel's task is made
difficult by the fact that Hamas embeds itself among the civilian
population. The United States stands firmly for preservation of
historic and cultural property around the world.
If confirmed, I would work with the appropriate parties to call for
investigations into specific reports when appropriate, with a
consistent focus on challenging any anti-Israel bias or discrimination.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with the Biden
administration's commitment to depoliticizing UNESCO for UNESCO
officials to suggest Israel has targeted protected cultural property?
Answer. UNESCO must do more toward decreasing politicized debate,
especially on Middle East issues. UNESCO has a mandate to implement
protections for cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Israel and likeminded
partners to ensure that there is no unfair blame of the Israeli Defense
Forces or attempts to unfairly characterize Israel's legitimate right
of self-defense. I would push for UNESCO's Secretariat to ensure that
fact-finding missions are conducted without bias and that reporting on
attacks and the resulting damage or destruction is balanced and not
politicized by members seeking to target Israel. Again, U.S. presence
is key to pushing back on anti-Israel narratives at UNESCO.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Andrew William Plitt by Senator James E. Risch
Israel and Palestinian Territories
In 2021, the Biden Administration restarted aid to the West
Bank and Gaza. In the past three years, programming has
dramatically increased from zero, to $75 million, to $219
million. Nevertheless, Hamas' terrorist attack on October 7
devastated Israel, surged popularity for terrorist groups in
the territories, and increased resentment toward the United
States.
Question. What has the United States gained since restarting
assistance to the West Bank and Gaza?
Answer. By restarting assistance, the United States demonstrated
that we are committed to supporting the Palestinian people and
advancing the U.S. policy goal of a peaceful two-state solution for
Israelis and Palestinians. Investments to increase economic
opportunity, increase access to basic services, empower civil society
and youth, and promote effective local management offer Palestinians
valuable alternatives to malign influences in the region. Our bilateral
program has supported health care for Palestinians through our
commitment to the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, which provides
critical care to tens of thousands of Palestinians who would otherwise
not receive the necessary medical attention. We have also supported
improvements in essential services for more than 700,000 people,
including water, sanitation, and access to food, and increased the
capacity of more than 100 civil society organizations and community-
based organizations to deliver these services. Business support and
technical and vocational education and training benefited more than 250
small and medium enterprises, firms, and institutions that foster
economic development, including job creation, while youth empowerment
programming imparts workforce readiness skills and opportunities for
constructive engagement in society to thousands of young people.
With the funding provided through the Middle East Partnership for
Peace Act, USAID developed programs to work towards tangible outcomes
in various fields - such as medicine, solutions for water scarcity,
entrepreneurship and economic relationships, and technology. While
heightened tensions, security, and movement restrictions have increased
the difficulties of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, all
of USAID's partners remain committed to these efforts.
USAID's partners are actively working with the agency to modify
planned activities through pivots to virtual engagements, delays, or
other accommodations that will allow activities to continue offering
vital opportunities for Israelis and Palestinians to build trust,
mutual understanding and respect by advancing cooperation at a person-
to-person level.
Question. What ``lessons learned'' have you taken away from USAID's
programming in relation to October 7?
Answer. The heinous attacks of October 7 underscored the cruelty of
Hamas, including against Gazans. Hamas' actions and malevolent presence
in Gaza underscore the need to coordinate closely with Israel, Egypt
and U.N. partners to ensure that assistance reaches vulnerable
communities and measures are taken to prevent diversion. This tragedy
has also made clear that the United States must play a critical role in
shaping a post-conflict Gaza, both as a leading political power and as
a leading provider of humanitarian and development assistance, capable
of convening like-minded international partners to contribute to a
lasting peace.
Question. What role do you envision USAID having in post-conflict
Gaza, and what will your role be as Assistant Administrator, if
confirmed?
Answer. U.S. Government leadership of international efforts to
support security, governance, and economic recovery are critical for a
stable and peaceful region. USAID is engaged with interagency and
international partners at all levels to consider how we might best
contribute to a stable and peaceful path forward. If confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with Congress as these plans take shape.
Question. Since the Administration restarted assistance to the West
Bank and Gaza, my team has had a constructive and transparent
relationship with USAID. Do you commit to supporting this ongoing
conversation between my staff and the USAID team managing assistance to
the West Bank and Gaza?
Answer. Yes. I appreciate and value Congress' insights and commit
to continuing an open dialogue with the members and staff of this
committee and Congress.
Yemen
Question. The Biden Administration recently announced Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designations for the Houthis, which
will go into effect on February 16, 2024. Previously, the Houthis were
listed as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), which was scrutinized
for its impact on humanitarian operations. How do you interpret the
recent SDGT designations' impact on USAID's humanitarian programming in
Yemen?
Answer. The U.S. designation of the Houthi movement as an SDGT
blocks financial transactions with the Houthis by U.S. persons. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) included a 30-day phase-in period and released five general
licenses, in conjunction with those previously in place, to mitigate
any unintended consequences of the designation to the Yemeni people
such as companies or financial institutions choosing to stop critical
work in Yemen, such as facilitating remittances to individuals or
imports of food and other necessary goods, to avoid the risk of
violating sanctions. These measures are carefully designed to protect
key humanitarian and development programs funded by the U.S.
Government, as well as maintain essential commercial transactions for
necessities like life-saving food and medical assistance. The roll-out
of the SDGT designation and general licenses has been designed to
proactively mitigate potential unintended secondary consequences,
including commercial de-risking, when the designation comes into effect
on February 16.
Question. How would an FTO designation impact USAID's humanitarian
programming in Yemen?
Answer. The SDGT designation provides tools to deny the Houthis
access to the U.S. financial system and to open options to sanction
those who conduct unauthorized business with the Houthis while allowing
for licenses and other mitigating measures that minimize the harm to
Yemeni civilians that an FTO designation may present. An FTO
designation on top of this would be duplicative as a practical matter
and also runs the risk of having an even greater deterrent effect on
aid groups continuing to provide assistance to vulnerable populations
in Yemen; on commercial importers continuing to bring to market vital
food, medicines and other commodities essential to basic human needs;
and on financial service providers who are essential to the provision
of remittances to vulnerable Yemeni people. If confirmed, I will work
with this committee to mitigate those risks and continue supporting
lifesaving aid to the Yemeni people.
Question. What role, if any, do you think USAID should play in
sanctions and terrorism designations?
Answer. USAID should continue to coordinate closely on issues of
sanctions and terrorism designations with the Departments of Treasury
and State to gauge the impacts on aid operations, humanitarian needs,
and the economy, including by managing de-risking activities with
commercial partners. With regard to designations, USAID tracks the
impact of sanctions on international entities, including humanitarian
and development actors, private sector entities, to mitigate de-risking
and exacerbation of existing dire humanitarian and economic crises.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Treasury
Department, State Department, and aid organizations to facilitate
legal, responsible, and efficient humanitarian operations in Yemen?
Answer. If confirmed, I will participate in USAID's ongoing
coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Treasury,
and aid organizations closely to facilitate critical humanitarian
assistance into Yemen. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure these
working relationships include a comprehensive interagency policy
response.
Question. In considering humanitarian operations in a place like
Yemen, how do you balance political and military conditions, such as
Saudi-led efforts for a peace treaty and rocket attacks on U.S.
military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea?
Answer. The primary focus of humanitarian efforts is to provide
assistance and support to the most vulnerable people. USAID works
closely with other branches of the U.S. Government, along with the
international community, to navigate the particularly dynamic
geopolitical environment of Yemen effectively. USAID works in close
coordination with the Department of State and the U.S. Special Envoy to
Yemen to bolster diplomatic efforts and support the U.N.-led peace
process. By supporting diplomatic efforts, it is possible to contribute
to a more stable and secure environment for humanitarian and
development operations.
Syria
Question. The United States has not had a consistent Syria policy
over the last 12 years since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.
Consequently, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others have decided to
normalize relations with Assad, hoping Assad will deliver on assurances
to stem the flow of captagon, remove Iran and Russia from Syria, and
allow Syrians to return without being killed or conscripted. Do you
believe Assad can be rehabilitated?
Answer. I do not support normalization of relations with the Assad
regime unless there is irreversible progress towards a political
solution to the underlying conflict. Durable stability in Syria, and
the greater region, can only be achieved through a political process
that represents the will of all Syrians.
Question. Do you believe Assad can or will deliver on any of the
assurances listed above?
Answer. Thus far, Assad has not taken the steps necessary to
resolve Syria's crisis. The U.S. Government will continue to hold Assad
and his regime to account for their atrocities against the Syrian
people.
Question. There have been a number of reported aid diversion issues
in Syria. In one instance, an investigation into suspected diversion
began December 2022, but Congress was not informed until November 2023.
What do you think an acceptable timeline would be to keep Congress
informed of suspected aid diversion? Do you agree that 11 months is too
long?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining open communication
with Congress. I agree that the timeframe cited in the question is too
long. I believe it to be an outlier and intend to ensure it remains as
such.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Andrew William Plitt by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China is the ``only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang,
flood our communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest
quantity of greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute
control of Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of
these destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a
threat to the United States?
Answer. I agree with the Administration's 2022 National Security
Strategy and Secretary Blinken's statement that the PRC is the only
competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
power to advance that objective.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. USAID's focus remains on our affirmative development model
that advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity,
demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to partner-
country resilience and independence, in contrast to the PRC's model of
dependence and debt.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP would constructively work with the United States in good faith,
knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocutors with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. USAID does not work with the CCP.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. No USAID assistance is provided to or through the PRC
Government or Chinese Communist Party. I see no path forward for any
joint activity.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024
walkout?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. USAID prides itself on supporting diverse viewpoints in the
pursuit of better development program decisions and results. One way
the Agency does this is through USAID's Direct Channel, which was
launched in 2011. The Direct Channel permits Direct-Hire and Personal
Services Contractor (PSC) staff--including U.S. Cooperating Country
National (CCN), and Third-Country National (TCN) PSCs--to transmit
their opinion or dissent on any substantive USAID program and
assistance policy issues directly to the Agency's Front Office. USAID
U.S. Direct-Hire employees are also eligible to send a formal
dissenting view on a substantive foreign policy issue directly to the
Secretary of State and senior State Department staff through the State
Dissent Channel. Use of either or both channels is at the employee's
discretion.
If confirmed, I will encourage employees to use the channels
available to them for constructive feedback on the Agency's development
policies. I will also follow personnel laws and policies regarding
employee conduct and discipline, including those related to
insubordination.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. Whistleblowers serve an important function for the public
and USAID when they report evidence of wrongdoing. All USAID employees,
contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, and personal
services contractors are protected from retaliation for making a
protected disclosure. Whistleblower protections require protected
individuals to follow appropriate reporting procedures. If confirmed, I
will follow the personnel laws and policies regarding whistleblower
protections, where they apply and as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the applicable personnel laws
and policies regarding employee conduct and discipline.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. As President Biden has indicated, now is not the time for a
permanent ceasefire. If confirmed, I will participate in interagency
discussions to shape future policy decisions.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes. Hamas has warned they want to repeat October 7 until
Israel is annihilated.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. Yes, a permanent ceasefire at this time would benefit Hamas
and with the risk that these groups could reconstitute.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. As President Biden has indicated, now is not the time for a
permanent ceasefire. I do not support calls for Israel to stop
defending itself from Hamas.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. Israel has a right to defend itself. Hamas has embedded
itself within the civilian population in Gaza and is using Palestinians
as human shields, which creates an extra challenge for Israel. Israel
has also spoken about its obligations to protect civilians, and I will
continue to urge Israel to take all possible precautions to avoid
civilian harm during operations. This is both a moral responsibility
and a strategic imperative.
Question. USAID provides bilateral assistance to seven countries
and territories in the Middle East and North Africa, including the West
Bank and Gaza. The President's FY 2024 budget requested the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) be appropriated $225 million for the Palestinians.
We know that, in the past, humanitarian aid for Palestinians has been
stolen by Hamas. Humanitarian aid is also given to Lebanon, where
Hezbollah exerts significant control. Has Hamas misdirected
humanitarian aid to support their operations?
Answer. The United States remains in close touch with the
Government of Israel (GOI). No aid enters Gaza without the GOI's
consent and approval. To date, no diversion of U.S. assistance to Hamas
or other foreign terrorist organizations has been reported by either
the GOI or any of our implementers since the start of the war. The
USAID/West Bank and Gaza Mission has a comprehensive vetting, audit and
compliance program that is regularly reviewed by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and USAID's Office of the Inspector General
(OIG).
USAID and our partners remain in full compliance of counter-
terrorism requirements since the restart of activities.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to ensure
USAID funds and programs do not enrich Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis,
Syria's brutal regime, or other malign actors in the region?
Answer. USAID assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq,
Yemen, and Syria is subject to USAID's extensive counter-terrorism
partner vetting system and other oversight procedures to prevent
assistance from flowing to individuals or organizations that are
affiliated with terrorists. USAID/West Bank and Gaza has a 100% audit
requirement of all locally incurred costs and requires anti-terrorism
certifications for every organization that receives funding.
Our risk mitigation practice also includes a requirement that our
implementers conduct due diligence, including documenting their
assessment and management of risks. USAID also requires our staff to
undertake internal risk analyses that include the identification of
risks and ways to respond to them. Our partners utilize robust feedback
and complaints mechanisms, which enable partners to make improvements
to programs while ensuring the safeguarding of beneficiaries and
community members and deterring fraud, waste, and abuse. USAID also has
a third party monitoring program for both development and humanitarian
assistance. USAID staff regularly consult with interagency colleagues
and reporting to identify areas of potential vulnerability. Moreover,
USAID has a close partnership with the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG). USAID partners are required to promptly report and respond to
any suspected incidents of diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse to USAID
and the OIG. USAID/OIG has a fraud, waste and abuse hotline and
conducts fraud awareness training for our implementing partners. USAID
retains the right to disallow costs that may result in a violation of
U.S. law.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that taxpayer dollars,
targeted for the Palestinian people, are not stolen by Hamas in support
of terrorism? What can be done when we are not present to inspect the
delivery of aid?
Answer. USAID continues to monitor our programs through direct
monitoring, third-party monitoring (TPM), post-distribution monitoring,
and/or remote monitoring as security conditions allow. While current
conditions limit some of our TPM partner's direct monitoring
capabilities, given unreliable telecommunication infrastructure,
ongoing kinetic activity, and access restrictions, our TPM partner is
still able to use other TPM components, including meetings and phone
interviews with sub-partners as telecommunications permit, market
monitoring, desk review of partner program documents, or direct
observation of partner programs and facilities.
USAID's implementers use robust feedback and complaints mechanisms
that include a range of channels, such as WhatsApp, toll-free hotlines,
and dedicated email accounts, and receive feedback from all project
stakeholders, both direct and indirect. These mechanisms allow partners
to make iterative improvements to programs while ensuring the
safeguarding of beneficiaries and community members and deterring
fraud. USAID partners are also required to promptly report and respond
to any suspected incidents of diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse to
USAID and the Office of Inspector General.
Additionally, USAID employs its robust counter-terrorism vetting
program, including anti-terrorism certifications, vetting key
personnel, and ensuring compliance with vetting procedures.
Question. If confirmed, will you investigate past abuses by the
Palestinian Authority, or other Palestinian entities of USAID funds,
such as corruption and mismanagement?
Answer. USAID does not fund the Palestinian Authority and complies
with the Taylor Force Act and other relevant laws. USAID has zero
tolerance for: (1) lack of transparency on risks in a program; (2)
failure to promptly report fraud, waste, and abuse of USAID assistance;
and (3) inaction to correct weaknesses identified by investigative
action. The most recent GAO report from December 2023 (GAO-24-106243)
noted that USAID complied with counter-terrorism policies and
procedures for fiscal years 2020 through 2022. If confirmed, I commit
to fully engaging with Congress on any allegations of abuse of USAID
funds.
Question. Given the Palestinian Authority's ``Pay to Slay'' policy,
how will you ensure that funds do not go to the families of terrorists
responsible for attacks on American and Israeli civilians?
Answer. The prisoner payment system is abhorrent. I conveyed this
in person during recent travels. USAID, in concert with other U.S.
officials, has repeatedly raised the issue directly with Palestinian
leadership to urge them to end it.
The State Department is leading efforts to pressure the Palestinian
Authority to change this policy, and I would defer questions on that
progress to the State Department. In the meantime, USAID is fully
committed to maintaining compliance with the Taylor Force Act and all
other applicable laws.
Question. Do you believe aid to the Palestinians helped to resolve
tensions between Israel and Palestinians?
Answer. USAID restarted assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in
2021, where our primary focus continues to be building a foundation for
a two-state solution. In the short time since USAID has resumed its
operations in the West Bank and Gaza, we have focused on our commitment
to supporting the Palestinian people and advancing peace between
Israelis and Palestinians.
Investments to increase economic opportunity, increase access to
basic services, empower civil society, and promote effective local
management offer Palestinians valuable alternatives to malign
influences in the region. Our bilateral program has supported health
care for Palestinians through our commitment to the East Jerusalem
Hospital Network, which provides critical care to tens of thousands of
Palestinians who would otherwise not receive the necessary medical
attention. We have supported essential services, including water,
sanitation, and access to food; and have increased the capacity of
civil society organizations and community-based organizations to
deliver these services. Small and medium enterprise support and
technical and vocational education and training foster economic
development, including job creation, while youth empowerment
programming imparts workforce readiness skills and provides
opportunities for constructive engagement in society.
With the funding provided through the Middle East Partnership for
Peace Act, USAID developed programs to work towards tangible outcomes
in various fields--such as medicine, addressing water insecurity,
entrepreneurship and economic relationships, and technology. While
heightened tensions, security, and movement restrictions have increased
the difficulties of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, all
of USAID's partners remain committed to these efforts. USAID's partners
are actively working with the agency to modify planned activities
through pivots to virtual engagements, delays, or other accommodations
that will allow activities to continue offering vital opportunities for
Israelis and Palestinians to build trust, mutual understanding and
respect by advancing cooperation at a person-to-person level. The
combination of these efforts builds a freer, more prosperous, and more
secure region benefitting Palestinians and Israelis.
Question. How will you ensure that none of the aid we provide to
Lebanon ends up in the hands of Hezbollah?
Answer. USAID implements a rigorous, three-stage process to
mitigate the risk of U.S. Government resources inadvertently
benefitting designated terrorist or sanctioned groups like Hezbollah.
Under the first stage, USAID implementers are contractually obligated
to conduct due diligence using open source reporting and publicly
available databases. The second stage requires USAID's staff and
implementers to conduct and assess the likelihood that an organization
may be affiliated with a sanctioned group through local sources. The
third stage is the application of USAID's partner vetting requirements,
which requires vetting of awards and subawards that exceed $25,000.
USAID provides humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in
Lebanon through experienced and trusted independent partners on the
ground, who distribute this emergency aid directly to people in need.
Our humanitarian partners have aggressive risk-mitigation and
monitoring systems in place, and USAID exercises considerable oversight
over the programs. USAID staff in the field meet regularly with
partners and visit project sites to directly monitor program
implementation. USAID partners also fully cooperate with a third party
monitoring mechanism to monitor all programs and provide immediate
updates on any interference with aid.
All USAID partners are required to provide immediate notification
of credible instances of fraud, waste, or abuse to the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) and the Agreement Officer. USAID shares any
incidents involving sanctioned groups with USAID's General Counsel and
the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
USAID works with partners, the OIG, and OFAC to follow up on any
reports of program irregularities and ensure that partners are not in
violation of any U.S. Government laws, including sanctions.
Question. In your view, is it appropriate that Jordan be the
largest recipient of economic aid in the region when it has a higher
GDP per capita than most other aid recipients in the region? Please
explain.
Answer. Jordan is a strategic and trusted U.S. partner in the
region. According to the World Bank's 2022 reporting on per-capita GDP,
Jordan ranks lower than several other aid recipients in the region and,
in 2023, the World Bank revised its ranking of Jordan from an Upper
Middle Income Country to a Lower Middle Income Country.
The economic aid USAID provides helps to support Jordan's security,
which is critically important at this moment of crisis and regional
instability. As host to the second-largest population of Syrian
refugees (whose population growth significantly outpaces that of the
rest of Jordan) and to hundreds of thousands of refugees of other
nationalities, Jordan faces significant strains on its resources. U.S.
foreign assistance helps defray the cost of providing basic health,
education, and water services to these vulnerable families who are
unable to safely return home. USAID's continued assistance is also
crucial to defending against the economic impacts of the Israel-Hamas
conflict which threaten the livelihoods of Jordanians.
I recognize that, in the long run, Jordan's stability requires
reducing aid dependency and growing its economy. In September 2022,
Secretary of State Blinken and Jordan's Minister of Foreign Affairs
signed a seven-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) that reiterated
our longstanding bilateral partnership while aiming to incentivize key
water and public sector reforms that will reduce Jordan's aid
dependency and foreign debt, and strengthen its ability to support
private sector-led economic growth. Through the MOU, the United States
intends to provide a lower level of annual funding than in previous
years--a minimum of $960 million in Economic Support Fund assistance,
as well as up to $75 million in incentive funding (subject to the
appropriation and availability of funds). In the first year of the
MOU's implementation, Jordan successfully met all agreed-upon reform
benchmarks, and Jordanian officials have reaffirmed their commitment to
achieving the benchmarks, noting that the reforms are more important
than ever.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Andrew William Plitt by Senator Rand Paul
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinians
Question. On January 26, 2023, the State Department paused
additional funding to UNRWA due to allegations that employees of UNRWA
were involved in the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel. If
confirmed as Assistant Administrator, what steps would you take to
guarantee that future U.S. assistance does not directly or indirectly
fund terrorism and corruption?
Answer. USAID does not fund UNRWA.
USAID coordinates with our partners to safeguard assistance
delivered in Gaza from Hamas influence or interference and to protect
against Hamas or other foreign terrorist organizations from benefiting
directly or indirectly from assistance. Our risk mitigation measures
for assistance to Gaza include counter-terrorism partner vetting, anti-
terrorism certifications that require organizations to certify
compliance with anti-terrorism laws, and mandatory anti-terrorism
clause provisions in grants and contracts. We continuously review
interagency reporting to identify potential areas of vulnerability. We
also work closely with the Office of Inspector General (OIG) on audits
and investigations related to this assistance, and USAID implementing
partners participate in the OIG's fraud prevention training.
In the West Bank and Gaza, the counter-terrorism partner vetting
program also includes an additional level of scrutiny whereby all
grants and cooperative agreements to organizations in the West Bank and
Gaza are reviewed by the Office of Palestinian Affairs at the U.S.
Embassy in Jerusalem to ensure that the potential partner organizations
are accurately representing their affiliations.
USAID has zero tolerance for: (1) lack of transparency on risks in
a program; (2) failure to promptly report fraud, waste, and abuse of
USAID assistance; and (3) inaction to correct weaknesses identified by
investigative action. USAID monitors our programs through direct
monitoring, third-party monitoring (TPM), post-distribution monitoring
and/or remote monitoring, as conditions allow.
USAID actively engages with our partners to plan medium and longer
term monitoring for when there is a reduction in kinetic activity and
improved access. These longer term plans would include program site
visits and structured observations of program activities, such as
distributions. Our partners utilize feedback and complaint mechanisms
to deter fraud, including WhatsApp, toll-free hotlines, and dedicated
email accounts.
Question. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel,
how much U.S. humanitarian, economic, or developmental assistance has
been sent to Gaza and the West Bank?
Answer. USAID has not provided any new economic or development
assistance funds to programming in the West Bank or Gaza since October
7, 2023. Since October 7, the United States has announced more than
$127 million in humanitarian funding for Palestinian civilians in Gaza
and the West Bank, including nearly $58 million from USAID.
Question. What oversight mechanics exist at USAID for assistance
meant for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza?
Answer. USAID assistance in the West Bank and Gaza is subject to
USAID's extensive counter-terrorism partner vetting and oversight
procedures to help prevent assistance from flowing to individuals or
organizations that are affiliated with terrorists. Our risk mitigation
measures for assistance to Gaza include counter terrorism partner
vetting, anti-terrorism certifications that require organizations to
certify compliance with anti-terrorism laws, and mandatory anti-
terrorism clause provisions in grants and contracts. Assistance is also
subject to Office of Inspector General audits and investigations.
Monitoring of USAID-funded assistance, as security conditions allow,
includes direct monitoring, third-party monitoring, post-distribution
monitoring, and remote monitoring.
USAID requires partners to conduct due diligence. We also require
our staff to undertake internal risk analyses that include the
identification of risks and ways to respond to them. In addition, our
partners utilize robust feedback and complaints mechanisms that include
a range of channels, such as WhatsApp, toll-free hotlines, and
dedicated email accounts, and receive feedback from all project
stakeholders, both direct and indirect. These mechanisms allow partners
to make iterative improvements to programs while ensuring the
safeguarding of beneficiaries and community members and deterring
fraud. Moreover, USAID partners are required to promptly report and
respond to any suspected incidents of diversion, fraud, waste, and
abuse to USAID and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as well as
undergo the OIG's fraud prevention training. USAID retains the right to
disallow costs that may result in a violation of U.S. law.
Question. If confirmed, would you support independent financial
audits to ensure USAID funds sent to Gaza are not diverted?
Answer. USAID/WBG requires all prime awardees (U.S. and non-U.S.)
and significant subawardees (subawardees that incur cumulative
expenditures greater than $750K per their fiscal year) to undergo
annual agency contracted audits by Mission-approved independent
auditing firms. The audits cover financial accountability, internal
control systems, and compliance with the awards terms and conditions
and applicable laws and regulations. More specifically the audits check
implementers' compliance with the vetting standards as outlined in
Mission Order 21. The audit reports are reviewed by the Mission to
determine if the organizations have experienced significant or material
weaknesses and corrective actions, if necessary, are determined based
on the independent auditors' findings and OIG's recommendations.
Additionally, each year the appropriations act includes language that
requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an audit
and an investigation of the treatment, handling, and uses of all funds
for the bilateral West Bank and Gaza Program, including all funds
provided as cash transfer assistance, under the heading ``Economic
Support Fund.'' These reports have not uncovered any funds being
diverted and the Mission intends to maintain its high oversight
standards.
Question. What conditions are you willing to place on foreign
assistance toward the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian governing
entities?
Answer. USAID follows the law with respect to assistance to the
Palestinian Authority and governing entities. USAID fully complies with
the Taylor Force Act and all other laws applicable to our programming.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would be undertaken to
investigate past abuses of USAID funds by the Palestinian Authority or
other Palestinian entities, including corruption and mismanagement?
Answer. USAID does not fund the Palestinian Authority and complies
with the Taylor Force Act and other relevant laws. USAID has zero
tolerance for: (1) lack of transparency on risks in a program; (2)
failure to promptly report fraud, waste, and abuse related to USAID
assistance; and (3) inaction to correct weaknesses identified by
investigative action. The most recent GAO report (GAO-24-106243) from
December 2023 noted that USAID complied with its antiterrorism policies
and procedures during fiscal years 2020 through 2022. If confirmed, I
commit to refer allegations of waste, fraud and abuse of USAID
assistance under my purview to the USAID Inspector General for
investigation, and I will engage openly with Congress on any
allegations of abuse of USAID funds.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Andrew William Plitt by Senator Ted Cruz
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza
In January 2021, the Biden administration decided to direct
significant assistance to the Gaza Strip. An internal State
Department analysis assessed ``there is a high-risk Hamas could
potentially derive indirect, unintentional benefit from U.S.
assistance to Gaza,'' and therefore the State Department
requested a specific license from the Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to conduct such
activities even if they benefited designated terrorists. OFAC
issued at least two such licenses and USAID issued notices for
implementing partners highlighting those licenses, including
Implementing Partner Notice No. 2022-WBG-03. Much of the
assistance was channeled through the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA), and indeed by July 2022 the Biden
administration had announced more than $618 million in
assistance for UNRWA.
Since the October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks, Israel has
produced evidence that Hamas diverted billions of dollars of
humanitarian assistance to construct infrastructure for
terrorism, which was used to plan and perpetuate those attacks.
Over 1,200 people, including dozens of Americans, were killed
or kidnapped in those attacks. On January 26 the State Dept.
suspended assistance to UNRWA over allegations that UNRWA
staffers had participated in the October 7 attacks.
Question. Did you support the Biden administration's decision
starting in 2021 to provide special licenses permitting the
provisioning of assistance that benefited designated terrorists? If you
did, knowing what you know now, would you still have supported that
decision?
Answer. I condemn Hamas and its heinous attack on Israeli civilians
on October 7th. I am committed to ensuring that terrorist groups do not
divert life-saving assistance.
OFAC licenses issued by the Department of the Treasury have been
used since 2006 for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, among other
places, and are critical to enable life-saving assistance to reach
people in need. OFAC licenses do not remove the responsibility for our
partners to avoid transactions that might benefit Hamas and other
sanctioned groups; document how they are mitigating the risk that
sanctioned groups or foreign terrorist organizations could benefit from
USAID-funded assistance; and promptly report on and respond to
incidents. Moreover, in the West Bank and Gaza, USAID maintains a
comprehensive counter-terrorism partner vetting, audit and compliance
program that is regularly reviewed by the Government Accountability
Office and the Office of Inspector General. We have not received
evidence or reports of Hamas-directed diversion of U.S. assistance from
any of our partners or from the Government of Israel since the start of
the war. USAID and our partners remain in full compliance of applicable
counter-terrorism legal requirements since the restart of activities.
Question. Did you support the Biden administration's decision
starting in 2021 to provide resources to UNRWA? If you did, knowing
what you know now, would you still have supported that decision?
Answer. USAID does not fund UNRWA.
Question. How much assistance has USAID provided for activities in
the Gaza Strip since January 2021?
Answer. Several USAID development activities operate in both the
West Bank and Gaza concurrently, so the level of programming only in
Gaza is an approximation. USAID estimates that, of the development
assistance provided to partners since January 2021, approximately $91
million supported development programming in Gaza.
For humanitarian assistance, USAID has provided more than $108.4
million in both the West Bank and Gaza since January 2021. USAID
provides humanitarian assistance to Gaza and the West Bank in response
to applications submitted by implementers that are based on assessed
need rather than geographic area. Due to the current immense need in
Gaza, the vast majority of USAID's humanitarian assistance is being
implemented in Gaza. However, due to the fluidity of the context,
USAID's humanitarian implementing partners have the budget and
geographic flexibility to quickly pivot their programming to address
needs in the West Bank in the event that conditions deteriorate.
Question. How much assistance has USAID provided to UNRWA since
January 2021?
Answer. USAID does not fund UNRWA.
Question. How much American assistance sent to the Gaza Strip do
you assess was diverted by Hamas and other terrorist groups?
Answer. We have no evidence or reports of diversion of U.S.
assistance to Hamas or other foreign terrorist organizations from any
of our partners or from the Government of Israel since the start of the
war. The United States remains in close touch with the Government of
Israel, and no aid enters Gaza without close coordination with the
Government of Israel.
Question. Do you believe that it is in the national security
interest of the United States to provide assistance if doing so
requires suspending terrorism sanctions including through waivers,
licenses, edits to GTSR, the removal of entities from the SDN list,
etc.
Answer. The use of sanctions to combat terrorism is and should
remain an important foreign policy tool of the United States. Likewise,
support for delivery of assistance by vetted and reliable humanitarian
partners is also an important foreign policy priority. Tools like
general licenses help us ensure that sanctions regimes do not
indirectly harm vulnerable communities in need of life-saving
assistance. To this end, USAID has a number of requirements in place to
mitigate risk and ensure assistance reaches its intended recipients.
USAID conducts counter-terrorism vetting of those involved with
implementation of our funded activities and coordinates with our
partners to provide oversight of activities under very challenging
circumstances to prevent assistance from flowing to individuals or
organizations that are affiliated with terrorists. Partners are
required to sign anti-terrorism certifications and submit management
plans to USAID prior to implementation and adapt them as needed to
ensure compliance with U.S. law and effective management of U.S.
Government-funded activities. This process of continuous oversight also
includes regular monitoring, including third party monitoring, and
evaluation, allowing for fast identification and correction of issues.
Question. If confirmed, you would have significant authority over
efforts to rebuild the Gaza Strip. Describe the role you envision for
UNRWA in those efforts.
Answer. USAID does not fund UNRWA. It will be critical for the U.S.
Government to be in a leadership position on efforts to bring together
the security, governance, and stabilizing elements that are necessary
for a peaceful Gaza. The vision involves broad international
partnership. The U.S. Government cannot and will not solely fund the
effort required to return people to their homes and meet their basic
needs. Recovery efforts, in consultation with Congress, will require
sequencing to ensure that Gaza is sufficiently secure before
undertaking activities to restore healthcare, education, livelihoods,
etc. USAID is engaged with interagency and international partners at
all levels to consider how we might best contribute to a peaceful path
forward.
Anonymity of Recipients of USAID Humanitarian Assistance
Since October 7, the Biden administration has surged aid to
the Gaza Strip. On October 18, the White House announced $100
million in new assistance. On December 5, USAID announced more
than $21 million in addition. According to the U.N.'s Financial
Tracking Service database, the Biden administration provided
$34 million in grants earmarked for ``Confidential'' NGOs and
U.N. agencies as part of that surge. Some of that aid involves
cash transfers (see: https://fts.unocha.org/flows/284432,
https://fts.unocha.org/flows/296080, https://fts.unocha.org/
flows/293444, https://fts.unocha.org/flows/296082, https://
fts.unocha.org/flows/296081)
In the past, USAID grantees have been improperly kept
anonymous in relevant databases, obscuring the nature and scope
of American taxpayer money being sent to the Gaza Strip. In one
instance in 2022, a grant tracked by USAID's Global Acquisition
and Assistance System (GLAAS) was labeled as going to the West
Bank to an anonymous grantee. After I inquired about the grant,
it turned out that the amount was wrong, the assistance was
going to the Gaza Strip, and the group should not have been
granted anonymity--and that the group does not operate in the
West Bank, only the Gaza Strip.
Question. Who were the grantees for the $34 million in assistance
logged as ``confidential'' in the U.N. database?
Answer. The $34 million in assistance included funding to the World
Food Program (WFP), U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), and three non-governmental organization (NGO) partners.
I would welcome an opportunity to share their identities with you in
another setting; since October 7, due to increased security concerns
from our NGO implementing partners and their staff, my humanitarian
colleagues are not publicly disclosing their names.
Question. Who were the final recipients of any cash transfers
through these grants?
Answer. The final recipients of these market-based assistance and
electronic voucher activities were the most vulnerable households in
the West Bank and Gaza, which USAID partners selected using assessment
tools based on food insecurity status, disability status, poverty
levels, and protection risks. Our partners employ rigorous beneficiary
verification processes to ensure that assistance is provided to the
most vulnerable households, while avoiding any affiliation with
sanctioned groups or armed actors. In order to avoid placing
beneficiaries at risk, these beneficiary lists are not shared publicly.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Laura Stone by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Government to
strengthen its anti-corruption policies and practices?
Answer. Deterring corruption goes together with economic
development: corruption diverts funds from essential services and
undermines public confidence in government. If confirmed, I would aim
to assist the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) in reaching its
development goals. These include an increase in the standard of living
of people in the RMI; critical support for health, education, and
infrastructure; and mitigation of environmental impacts. I will
continue to ensure that U.S. programs are implemented consistent with
well-informed assessments from those on the ground and are transparent
and accountable. I further commit to working with law enforcement and
Congress to ensure that our Marshallese partners have the information,
tools, and technical assistance needed to combat corruption.
Question. How will you engage with civil society actors in the
Marshall Islands to support their efforts in addressing impunity for
corruption within the Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to actively collaborate with local
NGOs, community leaders, and activists to understand their
perspectives, concerns, and proposed solutions regarding corruption
issues. This engagement will involve regular meetings, consultations,
and partnerships to ensure transparency, accountability, and effective
governance. Together, we can work towards fostering a culture of
integrity and combating corruption for the benefit of all people in the
Marshall Islands.
Question. Given the current challenges of democratic backsliding
and rising authoritarianism occurring around the world, it is
imperative that U.S. representatives shine a public light on these
issues. To that end, can I get your commitment that you will deliver a
public speech open to the press at a venue in the Marshall Islands
within your first six months on the importance of democracy and human
rights and that you will specifically raise democracy and human rights
in your interactions with the Government of the Marshall Islands?
Answer. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) Government
generally respects the human rights of those in the Marshall Islands.
However, some problems persist, including a lack of legal provisions
protecting workers' rights, combatting trafficking in persons, and
addressing gender-based violence and gender inequality. If confirmed, I
will work through outreach programs as well as NGOs and RMI's
Government to address these issues; and commit to discussing with the
Government and giving a speech on the importance of our shared
commitment with the people of the Marshall Islands on the power of
democracy and human rights.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Laura Stone by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China is the ``only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang,
flood our communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest
quantity of greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute
control of Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of
these destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a
threat to the United States?
Answer. Yes. The Director of National Intelligence has assessed
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' I agree
that under President Xi, the CCP has become more repressive at home and
more aggressive abroad, seeking to undercut U.S. influence, alliances,
and partnerships. If confirmed, I will advance U.S. national security
interests and push back against PRC efforts to expand its problematic
influence, through robust and forthright diplomatic engagements, public
diplomacy, and advocacy aimed at bolstering U.S.-RMI economic ties.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. I agree with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, which highlights the
CCP's efforts to undermine U.S. influence and its global partnerships
and establish new norms that facilitate or endorse authoritarian
approaches.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. I agree with your concerns, and also note that the United
States may at times need to work with the PRC to address certain
transnational challenges when it is in our interest to do so, not as a
favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from
our principles. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of
State's Office of China Coordination to advance U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests in the RMI and countering efforts by our strategic
and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State and
interagency colleagues and Congress to address China's efforts to
expand its influence in the RMI and the region and to counter its use
of coercion. The Republic of the Marshall Islands has diplomatic ties
with Taiwan. If confirmed, I would not expect to approve any joint
activity with organizations or representatives from the PRC in the RMI.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. Anonymously signing an open letter criticizing U.S.
policies is not the method I would endorse to bring alternative policy
viewpoints to the attention of leadership; however, I recognize that it
is important that employees be able to safely express disagreement
without fear of reprisal regardless of whether the actions are
technically covered as ``insubordination.'' If confirmed, I would
carefully comply with the U.S. Government and the Department of State's
personnel regulations and procedures. I would seek advice from those
specialists who would ensure that those processes are faithfully
implemented.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. Similar to answer 7, anonymously signing a letter to the
President is a less-than-ideal mechanism to bring an alternative policy
view before leadership, but I recognize that it is important that
employees be able to safely express disagreement without fear of
reprisal regardless of whether the actions are technically covered as
``whistleblowing.''
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. U.S. Embassy Majuro is a very small Mission, and open
communication channels are essential to proper functioning. If
confirmed, I hope to create an atmosphere in which informal and formal
communication, including dissent, advice, and constructive criticism
from all staff, is welcomed and encouraged. I agree that
insubordination (clarified by GAO to mean ``refusal to obey some order
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed'') is
according to 3 FAM 4370 a disciplinary offense related to conduct on
the job and may result in counseling and a penalty commensurate with
the scale of the offense.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist group and antisemitic entity.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. My understanding is that while we support humanitarian
pauses to allow for an influx of aid into Gaza and the safe exit of
hostages and other vulnerable people, an indefinite ceasefire right now
would give Hamas time to regroup and would fail to prevent Hamas from
continuing terror attacks against Israel, now and in the future.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. My understanding is that the Administration's policy is to
support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a sustained flow of aid
and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians who are seeking to
move to safer locations. The U.S. Government is actively working with
partners to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. We
support Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas's terrorism,
consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. Israel has the right to protect itself, consistent with
international law. My understanding is that the United States has urged
Israel to differentiate between civilians and Hamas terrorists and do
everything possible to avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of
civilians as human shields, a blatant violation of international law,
does not lessen Israel's obligations under international humanitarian
law. RMI has one of the strongest records of support for Israel in the
United Nations. If confirmed, I will work with our partners in the RMI
to encourage them to continue this support and use their voice in
international organizations to fight antisemitism.
Question. The Marshall Islands are crucial to U.S. security
interests in the western Pacific. The United States' relationship with
the Marshall Islands is mutually beneficial--we operate a military base
there, provide security guarantees, and furnish economic assistance to
the small island nation. It is crucial that we maintain amicable
relations with the Marshall Islands and ensure that Chinese influence
does not erode our national security interests. How should the U.S. aid
the Marshall Islands' economic development?
Answer. The Marshall Islands participates in U.S. Government
programs and services that support economic development, from USDA
rural development loans and grants for housing, to FAA airport and air
traffic control support, to U.S. postal services. These programs and
services provide significant contributions to the RMI's economy. In the
Marshall Islands, the United States invested approximately $10.5
million per year until 2023 in key infrastructure with an emphasis on
health, education, and water, sanitation, and sewer and has continued
assistance at pro-rated 2023 levels under this year's Continuing
Resolutions.
If confirmed, I commit to working hand in hand with the RMI
Government to continue our efforts to improve the economic situation
for the people of the Marshall Islands, including by building schools
and healthcare facilities and to improve health standards and the
quality of education. If the 2023 Compact-related agreements enter into
force following the passage of the necessary implementing legislation,
I commit to strong implementation of U.S. economic assistance to the
Marshall Islands at increased levels.
Question. If confirmed, are there any Development Finance
Corporation projects you envision working with the Marshall Islands on?
Answer. The White House announced in September 2023 that the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and USAID intend to
launch a microfinance facility to expand access for micro, small, and
medium-sized enterprises in DFC-eligible Pacific Island countries,
including the Republic of the Marshall Islands. If confirmed, I would
work with DFC to identify further opportunities to expand access to
finance for development, such as to women-owned enterprises.
Question. How could the U.S. promote regional integration between
the Freely Associated States and nearby U.S. territories and Pacific
Island countries?
Answer. Promoting closer economic and cultural interaction and
integration between the Freely Associated States (FAS), nearby U.S.
territories, and Pacific Island countries requires a multifaceted
approach. I believe promoting cultural exchanges and people-to-people
ties can deepen understanding and foster goodwill among communities.
Trade and tourism ties within the region and to significant partners
can foster economic integration. The United States can also facilitate
dialogue and collaboration in the region through regional forums and
initiatives, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Micronesian
Presidents' Summit and our own U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit. If
confirmed, I will continue fostering economic, political, and cultural
ties that enhance mutual development and prosperity. By supporting
capacity-building programs and technical assistance with Pacific
Islands countries we can strengthen governance, infrastructure, and
resilience to shared challenges like sea level rise.
Question. Do you believe that China will attempt to exert greater
influence over the Marshall Islands in the future? Please explain.
Answer. The PRC has made a practice of targeting vulnerable
countries, particularly those that are strategically important or have
diplomatic ties with Taiwan. I believe the PRC will increase efforts to
exert greater influence in the Marshall Islands. If confirmed, I will
continue working with our international and interagency partners,
including Taiwan, to demonstrate the concrete value of relations with
Taiwan to the people of the Marshall Islands, including the importance
of our shared democratic principles.
Question. If confirmed, will you express or make policy decisions
that the United States should not take aggressive steps to challenge
CCP influence in the Marshall Islands?
Answer. No. If confirmed, my priorities would stem from our
National Security Strategy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Pacific
Partnership Strategy, which describe in no uncertain terms that the
United States faces unprecedented challenges from the People's Republic
of China, including the PRC's attempts to undermine the rules-based
international order. These strategies highlight the importance of
enhancing our relationships with allies and partners, to include a
specific focus on deepening ties with Pacific Island Countries.
Question. If so, do you believe this influence will threaten the
security interests of the Marshall Islands or the U.S.?
Answer. The Republic of Marshall Islands is a strategically
important partner of great geopolitical interest. Under the Compact of
Free Association (COFA), the United States maintains responsibility and
authority for all defense and security matters in or relating to the
RMI, and access to RMI air or waters by any third parties' militaries
is foreclosed, subject to the terms of the Compact. The United States
has established defense sites in the RMI, including the U.S. Army
Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll base and the U.S. Space and Missile Defense
Command's Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site.
If confirmed, I would partner with the RMI and align with our
allies and partners to expand diplomatic, development, and people-to-
people ties that will strengthen the RMI's resilience and ability to
avoid predatory and coercive economic practices. If confirmed, I would
work swiftly to support good governance, transparency, and anti-
corruption efforts and would work with Congress to advance U.S.
interests in the region and sustain the progress achieved through this
partnership.
Extending COFA-related assistance is a critical component of the
Indo-Pacific, Pacific Partnership, and National Security Strategies. It
is an investment in ensuring the stability and prosperity of our
Pacific Island neighbors, and signals to our allies, partners, and
competitors that the U.S. commitment to the Freely Associated States
(FAS) is ironclad.
Question. How will you ensure that the Marshall Islands maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not switch ties to China?
Answer. Taiwan is a reliable, likeminded, and democratic partner,
and its partnership with the RMI provides significant and sustainable
benefits to the citizens of that country. Taiwan brings unique skills
and expertise to the RMI, in areas such as public health, agriculture,
digital technology, renewable energy, disaster relief, and education.
If confirmed, I plan to continue to expand our cooperation with
Taiwan to help strengthen our many shared interests and values with the
RMI. I would work with the interagency and our close partners in the
country--including Japan, Australia, and Taiwan--to promote our shared
interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific region and to show continued
concrete benefits to the people of the Marshall Islands.
Question. Our understanding from the Wall Street Journal and other
sources is that the National Security Council convened a Policy
Coordination Committee conference call on Friday, May 26, 2017
(hereinafter ``PCC conference call''), to discuss with NSC staff and
other administration officials as to whether FBI agents should arrest
or detain several officials from China's Ministry of State Security who
had allegedly pressured Chinese dissident, Guo Wengui, to stop his
anti-CCP advocacy while in the United States in violation of their
transit visas, and whose plane was about to depart a New York airport.
Did you, or any other EAP Bureau official, oppose or otherwise not
support proposals for FBI agents to arrest or detain several officials
from China's Ministry of State Security at a New York airport who had
allegedly conducted official business while in the United States in
violation of their transit visas?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to fully support U.S.
Government initiatives to respond to any violations of U.S. law by the
PRC. While I cannot comment here on the contents of a classified call
or on deliberations on criminal law enforcement matters, I want to
thank your staff for having provided me an opportunity to address this
important topic in a classified setting. I have spent a lifetime
preparing for the challenges we now face in the Pacific, including
years working to understand the tactics and motivations of the PRC. I
strongly believe we must counter the PRC's advances and challenge its
provocative actions at home and abroad.
Question. The Wall Street Journal and other sources reported the
National Security Council convened a ``PCC meeting'' to discuss, among
other things related to U.S.-China relations, the outcome of the May
26, 2017, PCC conference call. Did you attend this subsequent PCC
meeting?
During a subsequent PCC meeting, did you oppose or otherwise not
support efforts to lay out a specific policy, plan of action,
or other interagency understanding if the FBI should once again
find itself either in the position to arrest or detain Chinese
officials conducting official business in violation of their
transit visas, or in another comparable situation?
During this PCC meeting, did you express or otherwise convey the
view that the United States should not be confrontational
towards China?
Answer. I attended, as a back-bencher without a speaking role, a
classified PCC meeting months later on the topic of law enforcement and
consular affairs. I have never opposed or not supported efforts to plan
for a comparable situation. I have never expressed or otherwise
conveyed the view that the United States should not be confrontational
towards China. I have a long history of meeting Chinese threats and
provocations with strong responses from the U.S. Government--China
understands U.S. resolve through actions. I believe that the United
States has a pressing need to counter China, especially in
strategically important vulnerable countries such as the Marshall
Islands.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Shaheen, Murphy,
Booker, Van Hollen, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
With apologies to our nominees, there is a lot going on
today. You may have read about some of that in the paper.
The Republicans are holding a conference as we speak, so I
am going to recognize Senator Risch first because he is going
to have to go to his Republican Conference discussions that are
taking place in an effort to try to get a strategy on how we
are going to be moving forward in the next couple days.
Senator Risch?
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that. And this we do--this happens around here
occasionally. We get--things get into a bottleneck and that is
where we are. So thank you very much for accommodating me.
Let me begin with the position of Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. This is a
critically important post.
The DRL bureau manages millions of dollars in assistance
around the world. This assistance and this platform must be
used to further U.S. national interests and not the agenda of
the left and particularly as to social issues.
In particular I am concerned by recent efforts to expand
the definitions of human rights and human rights defender.
It is critical we continue to support internationally
recognized human rights around the world and not get distracted
by niche causes. If everything else is defined as a right we
lose focus and success will escape us.
Ms. Rand, should you be confirmed I expect you will help
ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are directed to those most
vulnerable and to the most trusted partners who value working
with the American people.
On the nomination of the Ambassador for Timor-Leste it is
important that we further develop our partnership there
alongside allies like Australia.
In particular we should focus on infrastructure development
and energy security including liquid natural gas, given the
country's resources.
China has made big inroads on infrastructure development.
We must counteract that.
Finally, on the nomination of U.S. Coordinator for
International Communications and Information Policy, Mr. Lang
has years of experience working on cyberspace at the State
Department.
Unfortunately, the department has been behind on these
issues. I look forward to hearing about how the Bureau of
Cyberspace and Digital Policy can advance U.S. leadership on
digital issues and limit reliance on Chinese-made equipment in
5G networks worldwide.
With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. And before Senator Risch leaves let me thank
him for his cooperation in arranging for this hearing.
We recognize that our schedules have been very, very
challenging over the--this year and our effort is to try to
move as many of President Biden's nominees as possible and I
thank Senator Risch for his cooperation in allowing us to
schedule this hearing.
We added two additional nominees with the--with Senator
Risch's cooperation. So thank you very much in that regard.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And let me just assure our nominees, first,
thank you for your willingness to serve. It is a challenge.
Public service is not easy and you have in many cases
devoted your entire careers to public service. So we thank you
very much for your willingness and we thank your families.
I think we see some of your families in the front row. If
not, we have some very young people who are here. But we thank
you and your families because we know it is a family sacrifice
to serve in the public domain.
And let me also just point out the obvious. This hearing is
very important and we will be asking you some questions at this
hearing. There will be some questions for the record that we
will ask you to respond to.
Our staffs have already done a lot of vetting in regards to
your nomination. So it is a whole process. I just want to
explain that for particularly the young people that are here
there is a whole process that we go through in regards to
vetting nominees and to the Senate confirmation of nominees.
So this is one part of it. The hearing is a very important
part of it. But I want to just acknowledge why there may not be
as many senators here today as we normally have. That speaks to
two things.
First, it speaks to the quality of the people who are
nominated--they are outstanding and that we recognize that--and
to the conflicts on our schedule today as a result of the
supplemental appropriation bills that are being considered as
this hearing is taking place.
We do have a scheduled vote for a little later this
afternoon and there arenegotiations going on as to how that
vote will take place, et cetera.
So that is the reasons why you might not see the type of
normal participation at this hearing. It is a reflection, I
think, of the quality--the positive quality of our nominees as
well as the conflicts that are on the schedule today. But we
wanted to be able to move these nominees forward.
So, again, thank you for your cooperation. I am going to
start with the department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor--DRL. Whether you are generals from Myanmar or the
Kremlin in Moscow, repression is on the rise.
Attacks against human rights defenders are up across the
globe. Coups and democratic backsliding threatens progress on
every continent in Africa. Instability now stretches from the
Red Sea to the Atlantic.
Behind all this is the cancer of corruption that undermines
the rule of law, good governance, threatening democratic
institutions and human rights. That is why we need an assistant
secretary who will be there, a powerful voice for democratic
values and human rights.
The DRL Bureau has not had a Senate-confirmed leader for
more than three years. That is unacceptable. We need to have a
confirmed person at DRL.
Why? Because it is our voice in regards to our values and
there is a lot of areas that the State Department needs to
concentrate on as it deals with diplomacy globally.
We recognize that. Our missions have a lot of important
tasks that they have to take on. But we need someone to
advocate for our values at the highest levels of the department
and that requires us to have a confirmed person in that
position.
Dr. Rand, if confirmed I hope you will commit to be a
strong voice to protect and advance American values. That means
being a champion on DRL's global democracy programs. That means
raising staff morale and strengthening the reach of the bureau
and policy discussions in the department across the interagency
deliberations.
That means harnessing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act to advance a human rights agenda. I wrote
the Magnitsky Act to honor a young lawyer in Russia who
discovered corruption. He reported it to the authorities. So
they arrested him, they tortured him, and he died in a Russian
prison.
I hope you will commit to strengthening the use of Global
Magnitsky provisions if you are confirmed. More recently in
December a new law was enacted as part of the State
Department's Authorization Act.
It mandates that the administration submit to Congress
reports on how the governments of the world are fulfilling
their obligations to battle against corruption in all forms--
the Combating Global Corruption Act.
To ensure this is done well I expect DRL will have to play
a very, very important role because it is not going to be
embraced by every mission around--that we have around the
world. It is going to be your responsibility, if confirmed, to
make sure that that law is implemented as Congress has intended
it to be.
Now let me turn to Ms. Welton and Timor-Leste. It earned
its independence after centuries of colonial rule under
Portuguese and then Indonesian Governments. Even today we see
senior figures rising to power in Indonesia that threatens to
drag up the nation's painful past.
So, whether it is being a partner to their energy
transition or supporting our Peace Corps volunteers on the
ground the United States has the obligation to support the
youngest country in Asia's democratic ambitions.
Finally, I want to welcome Mr. Lang who is the nominee to
lead the coordination for international communications and
information policy at the State Department. Not many people
truly understand the intricacies of this position but it is
incredibly important.
That is because part of your job will be to continue to
build and strengthen our cybersecurity policies, an area where
the world's autocratic regimes have shown increasing interest.
So I hope you will commit to making human rights and the
protection of democratic institutions one of your priorities. I
look forward to hearing from all of you about that.
And without objection I am going to ask consent to include
in the record a statement from Senator Klobuchar in support of
Mr. Lang.
She had hoped to be here but she is engaged in some other
activities. But she wanted me to make sure that I express her
strong support for your nomination and include her comments in
our record.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
this transcript.]
The Chairman. With that, we are going to now turn to our
witnesses.
First, Dr. Rand, who currently serves as a distinguished
resident fellow in strategic affairs at Georgetown University's
Institute for Study of Diplomacy and is a lecturer at Princeton
School of Public and International Affairs.
Dr. Rand has spent the past two decades in public service
including most recently as the director of the Office of
Foreign Assistance at the Department of State.
Dr. Rand, you will be followed by Ms. Welton, who serves as
the acting deputy assistant secretary for programs and
operations in the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs.
She previously served as the lead negotiator for bilateral
defense agreements that involve access, status protection, and
burden sharing with more than 25 years of experience in foreign
service including as Charge in Helsinki.
And I understand you are fluent in several languages
including Korean, Indonesian, German, and some Dari and
Finnish.
So, you far exceed my capacity as I struggle to be able to
speak in English. So, thank you very much for your capacities
that are desperately needed at the State Department.
And Mr. Lang has been the deputy assistant secretary for
international information and communication policies since
November 2022.
Previously served as the minister counselor for economic
affairs at the U.S. Embassy Tokyo and the Bureau of Economic
and Business Affairs Office of the International Communications
and Information Policy as director of both the Office of
Multilateral Affairs and the Office of Bilateral and Regional
Affairs.
He served in Mexico City, has been a senior analyst to the
U.S. Trade Representative in the office of Japan, Korea, and
APEC affairs.
So he served in China and Taipei, which is an interesting
combination that you have, which I think will serve us well in
those capacities.
So let us start first with Dr. Rand. Your full statements
will be made part of our record. We ask that you try to
summarize your comments in about five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAFNA HOCHMAN RAND, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND LABOR
Dr. Rand. Sure. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thanks also to Senator Risch for his words in the very
beginning.
Members of the committee, thanks for considering my
nomination today for the position of assistant secretary for
DRL and I want to first and foremost thank my family for their
love and support.
You see behind me Doug Rand, my tremendous husband, and my
children Maya, Jonah, and Elijah Rand, and I also want to thank
my parents who are not here but are watching from Boston,
Esther and Richard.
Twenty years ago as a Senate staffer in this very building
I was inspired to pursue a career in U.S. foreign policy in
order to advance U.S. interests and values.
In the ensuing decades, whether serving within the U.S.
Government or in nonprofits, I have strived to advance American
power, especially our unique ability to improve lives at home
and abroad.
I am committed to transformative ethical leadership,
leaving institutions where I serve better than when I found
them, focusing on mission impact and integrity.
If confirmed as the assistant secretary for DRL I plan to
pursue a number of priorities but for the sake of time let me
focus on three of particular significance.
First, how we respond to the PRC is a fundamental urgent
importance to those of us who care about the norms shaping the
world that we leave for our children.
Yes, the U.S. is not only competing with the PRC in the
military and economic domains. These are critical to U.S.
national security and prosperity. But this is also a contest
about the fate of the rules-based international order. The
PRC's vision suppresses freedom of expression and persecutes
ethnic and religious minorities.
Second, in the wake of Russia's unprovoked aggression
against Ukraine mitigating the threat that Russia poses to
European and global security must remain a top priority for the
United States and those who care about democratic values.
Russia promotes its venal mode of governance, delights in
mobilizing the world's authoritarians who are threatened by
democratic freedoms.
And, third, if confirmed I will prioritize working with
this committee and all of Congress on the critical body of
international human rights laws that you all have worked on for
decades.
In particular, Mr. Senator--Mr. Chair--Senator Cardin, I
want to just emphasize how much I want to work with you and
your staff on implementing the countering corruption bill that
you just mentioned that has just passed and congratulate you on
that--on the years of work.
In my view, the assistant secretary of state for DRL has a
special responsibility to work with Congress on its many human
rights-related efforts. There are many other regions where I am
concerned about democratic backsliding, closing civic space,
unjust labor standards and religious freedom.
I note in particular the democratic backsliding in Africa
and continued repression in Iran. If confirmed, I will dedicate
myself to promoting the rule of law and advancing human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
Without the United States having afforded these rights to
generations of my own family I would not have this professional
opportunity to take on this responsibility today.
I look forward very much to our conversation and to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rand follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee,
thank you for considering my nomination for the position of Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, or DRL. I am
grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken for their trust and
to the entire State Department for their dedicated service to the
American people.
I thank my family for their love and support: my husband, Doug
Rand, as well as my children, Maya, Jonah, and Elijah Rand.I stand on
the shoulders of giants, and today I recall the legacy of my paternal
grandfather, Aaron Hochman, who served for over 50 years as a civilian
engineer at the Department of Defense, dedicating his life to solving
national security challenges including the design of the Pentagon's
first mega-computer. My maternal grandfather, Yehuda Rosenman, escaped
persecution and near-certain death by booking a ticket on one of the
last boats to leave Poland in August 1939. He could have spent his life
burying the past but instead he retrained as a social worker and
dedicated himself to Jewish communal leadership and the rights of those
in need, including refugees left behind in Europe.
Twenty years ago, I was a junior Senate staffer in this building,
inspired to pursue a career in U.S. foreign policy in order to advance
American interests and values. In the ensuing decades, whether serving
within the U.S. Government or in non-profit organizations, I have
strived to embody three core principles: (1) advancing American power,
especially our unique ability to improve lives at home and abroad; (2)
the universal pursuit of human dignity, something we all share and that
is valued across cultures and geographies; and (3) a commitment to
transformative, ethical leadership, leaving the institutions where I
serve better than I found them, focusing on mission, impact, and
integrity.
If confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, I plan to pursue a number of priorities. Allow me to speak
to three of particular significance:
First, the United States response to the People's Republic of China
(PRC) is of fundamental, urgent importance to those of us who
care about the norms shaping the world that we leave for our
children. The United States is not only competing with the PRC
in the military and economic domains, although those are
critical to U.S. national security and prosperity. There is
also a contest over the fate of a rules-based global order.
This contest is playing out in every region of the world, with
the PRC attempting to present a vision for the international
order that deemphasizes the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all people, including ethnic and religious
minorities. The PRC is propagating dangerous, repressive
technologies, encouraging elite capture and corruption, and
engaging in transnational repression.
Second, in the wake of Russia's unprovoked aggression against
Ukraine, mitigating the threat that Russia poses to European
and global security must remain a top priority for the United
States and our democratic allies. Russia is actively working to
undermine Europe's democratic order; we must help our allies
respond by shoring up their democratic institutions. Russia
promotes its venal model of authoritarianism--where corruption
enriches the coffers of elites, the people are denied basic
freedoms, and domestic repression facilitates its aggression
abroad. Russia delights in mobilizing the world's autocrats
against democratic freedoms, and Russia's security proxies are
degrading democratic possibilities in Africa and elsewhere.
Third, if confirmed I will prioritize working with this committee
and all of Congress to advance implementation of critical
international human rights legislation. Key laws have been
passed to end the unlawful recruitment or use of child
soldiers, protect religious freedom, uphold global labor
standards, and hold human rights violators and corrupt
officials accountable for grave abuses. In my view, the
Assistant Secretary of State for DRL has an important
responsibility to work with Congress on its international
human-rights-related legislation. These laws reflect Americans'
continuing solidarity with those beyond our shores who seek
freedom and dignity.
There are many other countries where I am concerned about
democratic backsliding, closing civic space, unjust labor standards,
and human rights violations and abuses. In Africa and the Middle East,
de-democratizing trends are pervasive, and armed conflict and human
rights abuses are exacting a terrible toll on civilians. I note in
particular my concern about Iran and the groups it supports--both the
threat they pose to U.S. interests and those of our allies and the
scale and scope of repression Iran has wrought on its own people.I
f confirmed, I commit to elevate and expand on DRL's work to
protect human rights defenders, civic activists, and journalists while
promoting the rule of law and advancing human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Without the United States having afforded these rights to
generations of my family, I would not have had the opportunity to take
on this responsibility today. I look forward to your questions.
__________
The Chairman. I know the clock says two minutes but if you
want to take more time that is perfectly okay.
Ms. Welton?
STATEMENT OF DONNA ANN WELTON, OF NEW YORK, A CAREER MEMBER OF
THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
TIMOR-LESTE
Ms. Welton. Chairman Cardin, thanks to Ranking Member Risch
in absentia and distinguished members of the committee. It is
an honor to be here today as President Biden's nominee to serve
as the U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste.
I am deeply grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken
for placing their confidence in me to represent the United
States in Dili.
If confirmed I look forward to working closely with the
committee to advance U.S. interests in Timor-Leste. I am only
here today because of the support of friends and family,
especially my three children who are at work today who have
kept me grounded and made me laugh and always proud.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my
colleagues who began this journey with me in 1984 with the
United States Information Agency, one of whom, Carlos Aranaga,
is here today.
We were charged with telling America's story to the world.
We did and we still do. That mission has never been more
important than it is today.
I grew up in a small town in upstate New York. I was the
first person in my family to have a passport, getting on a
plane when I was 16 to spend a year in Japan as an exchange
student.
That experience gave me the courage and the language skills
to pursue public service as a diplomat and an appreciation for
powerful change that can come through international education.
I am pleased to report that the United States and Timor-
Leste enjoy strong bilateral relations. Timor-Leste is a
democracy that shares our commitment to upholding human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
It is also a developing country with still nascent
institutions, limited human capital, and significant economic
and health challenges.
Through engagement that strengthens Timor-Leste's
governance institutions, security, and economic stability, the
United States has become one of Timor-Leste's most essential
partners.
If confirmed as ambassador to Timor-Leste I will focus on
deepening our partnership as we work together toward a free and
open Indo-Pacific region.
Further, if confirmed my highest priority will be the
safety and security of all U.S. citizens in Timor-Leste
including our amazing Peace Corps volunteers.
I will also prioritize the well-being of our mission
personnel and their families and ensure a productive, safe, and
respectful workplace.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear here today and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Welton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donna A. Welton
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is an honor to be here today as President Biden's
nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste. I am deeply
grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for placing their
confidence in me to represent the United States. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with this Committee to advance U.S.
interests in Timor-Leste.
I am here today because of the support of friends and family,
especially my three children--Hannah, Ian, and Esther--who have always
kept me grounded and made me laugh and always proud. I would also like
to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues who began this journey
with me in 1984 with the United States Information Agency, one of whom,
Carlos Aranaga, is here today. We were charged with telling America's
story to the world. We did, and still do.That mission has never been
more important.
I grew up in a small town in upstate New York. I was the first
person in my family to have a passport, getting on a plane when I was
16 to spend a year living in Japan as an exchange student. That
experience gave me the courage and the language skills to pursue public
service as a diplomat, and an appreciation for powerful change that can
come through international education.
As a career Foreign Service Officer, I have dedicated over 30 years
of my life to serving our country. It has been a privilege to do so.
The United States and Timor-Leste enjoy strong bilateral relations.
Timor-Leste is a democracy that shares our commitment to human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It is also a developing country with nascent
institutions, limited human capital, and significant economic and
health challenges. Through engagement that strengthens Timor-Leste's
governance institutions, security, and economic stability, the United
States has become one of Timor-Leste's most essential partners. If
confirmed, I will focus on deepening our partnership as we work
together towards a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
While direct trade between the United States and Timor-Leste is
small, we are supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to diversify its economy
and further integrate into global commerce. We support Timor-Leste's
bids to join ASEAN and the WTO and are fostering its commercial law and
regulatory regime. We are also providing development assistance that is
focused on helping Timor-Leste build a diverse and inclusive economy.
USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, and Peace Corps are all delivering programs that improve
economic opportunity and diversification as well as the health and
education of Timor-Leste's people. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S.
development assistance continues to advance U.S. national security and
economic prosperity and promotes a path to Timorese self- reliance and
resilience.
Our growing security cooperation with Timor-Leste is focused on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime and border
security, and professionalizing Timorese defense forces. A rotating
U.S. Navy Seabees detachment provides critical humanitarian assistance
and infrastructure support to the Timorese people. Timor-Leste joined
the National Guard State Partnership program with Rhode Island in 2020,
and the United States trains Timorese law enforcement personnel at our
International Law Enforcement Academy in Thailand. The United States is
supporting the rehabilitation of Baucau Airfield and in June 2023 the
United States provided the Government of Timor-Leste a Cessna aircraft,
enabling Timor-Leste to better monitor its territory, respond to
natural disasters, and promote economic development. If confirmed, I
will work to build on these initiatives that benefit thousands of
Timorese citizens, bolster the influence of the United States, and
advance our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
With a young, growing population, and a youth unemployment rate of
33 percent, Timor-Leste's leaders are focused on accessing economic and
educational opportunities. The United States has responded to that call
over the last 21 years by providing more than 700 Timorese young
leaders with opportunities to develop essential skills through U.S.
education and exchange programs. This includes the Fulbright program,
the U.S.-Timor-Leste scholarship program, the Young Southeast Asian
Leaders Initiative, media development, and English language
scholarships. These people-to-people connections promote mutual
understanding between our nations and strengthen our bilateral
relationship. In a country with limited exposure to the United States,
engaging the next generation of Timorese leaders and changemakers is
vital. If confirmed, I will work to build upon and expand these
exchange programs that build bridges between our two peoples.
Finally, if confirmed, my highest priority will be the safety and
security of all U.S. citizens in Timor-Leste. I will also prioritize
the well-being of our Mission personnel and their families and ensure a
productive, safe, and respectful workplace.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Lang?
STATEMENT OF STEPHAN A. LANG, OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER MEMBER OF
THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE U.S. COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION POLICY, WITH THE RANK OF
AMBASSADOR
Mr. Lang. Thank you, Chairman Cardin and members of the
committee, and I would also like to express my appreciation to
Ranking Member Risch for his comments earlier.
I am deeply honored to be before you today as the
President's nominee to serve as the U.S. Coordinator for
International Communications and Information Policy.
I am happy to have my wife Karin Lang, my mother Stephanie
Lang, and my daughter Nathalie here with me today. My other
daughter Veronica is watching from Michigan. Without their
support I would not be here.
The digital economy has become the foundation of the global
economy, improving lives around the world. But with these great
benefits have also come challenges, and we must work diligently
and relentlessly to overcome them.
I am proud to be part of the U.S. team in the Bureau of
Cyberspace and Digital Policy championing an affirmative vision
for technology and supporting America's unmatched leadership in
innovation and entrepreneurship.
We urgently need solidarity with like-minded partners
around the world to better face the existential challenge from
countries that do not share our democratic values, particularly
China.
The PRC's stated ambitions for leadership in the digital
economy are clear. We must work together with those who share
our rights-respecting approach to ensure that we lead the
development and deployment of advanced technologies.
We and our partners must lead in setting standards,
defending norms, and building interoperable regulatory
frameworks not only because it is critical to our national
security and economic prosperity but also to make sure that
technology enables free expression and other basic rights.
We cannot allow these technologies to become tools to
monitor citizens, censor dissent, and measure loyalty. If
confirmed I will accelerate our work to promote trusted supply
in digital infrastructure in markets around the world.
We will encourage telecom operators to choose trusted
vendors when building out 5G networks and will further expand
that work to include other technologies like cloud services,
data centers, subsea cables, and satellite networks.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been a strong
supporter of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
Confirming a U.S. Coordinator for International Communications
and Information Policy with the rank of ambassador will further
elevate this important work and if confirmed I commit to
consulting with you as we advance our leadership in this
increasingly critical domain of global competition.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to appear before you
here today. I look forward to any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lang follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephan A. Lang
Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of
the committee.
I'm deeply honored to appear before you today as the President's
nominee to serve as the U.S. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy. I'm grateful to Secretary
Blinken and Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy
Nathaniel Fick for their support for my nomination and the opportunity
to advance critical U.S. interests on digital and tech policy. And I'd
like to give special thanks to Senator Klobuchar for giving me the
honor of introducing me.
I'm so happy that my mother, Stephanie Lang, is here today. The
example she and my late father, Bill, set for me of hard work and
perseverance, no matter what, was the inspiration for my career. I
wouldn't be here if it weren't for my wife and career partner, Karin
Lang. Raising our family while pursuing two Foreign Service careers in
tandem has been the adventure of a lifetime and my greatest joy. And
I'd like to sincerely thank my daughters Nathalie, who's here today,
and Veronica, who's watching from Michigan, for putting up with so much
as their mother and I have dragged them around the world a few times
over in service to our country.
When I was a kid growing up in the suburbs of Kansas City, I never
imagined that I would be here as a nominee to lead U.S. diplomacy on
information and communications technology. I had never left the United
States, and I could count the people I had met from foreign countries
on one hand. But I unexpectedly had the opportunity to study in the UK,
and a whole new set of experiences opened up for me. Back then, I wrote
my friends letters on paper. I couldn't access U.S. newspapers, even in
the school library. And I talked to my parents on the phone only once
every other week.
So much has changed. We have constant and instantaneous access to
information from anywhere in the world. I can video call friends on the
other side of the globe basically for free. And the digital economy has
become the foundation of the global economy, improving lives around the
world.
But with these great benefits have also come challenges, and we
must work diligently and relentlessly to overcome them. I am proud to
be part of the U.S. team championing an affirmative vision for
technology and supporting America's unmatched leadership in innovation
and entrepreneurship.
It has been an honor to work with U.S. stakeholders--in the private
sector and civil society--to advance the cause of an open, secure,
interoperable, reliable, and innovative global digital economy.
We urgently need solidarity with like-minded partners around world
to better face the existential challenge from countries that don't
share our democratic values, particularly China. The PRC's stated
ambitions for leadership in the digital economy, including through
emerging technologies such as AI, telecommunications infrastructure,
and other elements of their Digital Silk Road, are clear. We must work
together with those who share our democratic values to ensure that we
lead the development and deployment of advanced technologies because it
is foundational for both our national security and our economic
strength.
This work is also critical to preserving and advancing our
democratic values. We and our partners must lead in setting standards,
defending norms, and building interoperable regulatory frameworks in
order to make sure that technology enables free expression, allows
people to assemble virtually, and lets different perspectives and ideas
coexist. We cannot allow these technologies to become tools to monitor
citizens, censor dissent, and measure loyalty.
If confirmed, I will accelerate our work to promote trusted supply
in digital infrastructure in markets around the world. We will
encourage telecom operators to choose trusted vendors, including when
building out 5G networks and to reject the misleading below-market
pricing of untrusted vendors such as Huawei. We'll further strengthen
our support for providers that won't be under an obligation to share
data at the whim of the Chinese Communist Party. And we'll further
expand that work to include other technologies like cloud services,
data centers, subsea cables, and low-earth orbit satellite
constellations providing broadband Internet services.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been a strong supporter
of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, and as a recent GAO
report confirmed, the bureau has been successful in elevating U.S.
diplomacy across the range of tech issues. Confirming a U.S.
Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy
with the rank of Ambassador will further elevate this important work.
And if confirmed, I commit to consulting with you as we advance our
leadership in this increasingly critical domain of global competition.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to appear before you here
today. I look forward to any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Again, thank you all for your testimonies.
I have obligatory questions that we ask all of our nominees
to the executive branch. I would ask that you would answer them
individually yes or no and it deals with cooperation with our
committee.
The first question is do you agree to appear before this
committee and make officials from your office available to the
committee and designated staff when invited?
If you just go down the line it will be fine.
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. If confirmed do you commit to keep this
committee fully and currently informed about the activities
under your purview?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. If confirmed do you commit to engaging in
meaningful consultations while policies are being deployed, not
just providing notification after the fact?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. If confirmed do you commit to promptly
responding to requests for briefings and information requested
by the committee and its designated staff?
[All witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
The Chairman. Well, you all passed those tests. That was--
you did a good job. Congratulations.
Dr. Rand, I want to start in regards to DRL and the
challenges that you will have if confirmed in implementing
policies that sometimes present challenges to different
missions or different other agencies within the Department of
State.
So we have passed several bills dealing with PRC and
accountability. We passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act,
the Uyghurs Forced Labor Protection Act, the Hong Kong Autonomy
Act.
If confirmed how can you help us make sure that those laws
are implemented not just by the United States--that we work on
a multilateral dimension in order to carry out the intent of
those bills passed by Congress?
Dr. Rand. Thanks, Senator Cardin.
I just want to step back for a second and note that the
worrisome trends with the PRC and its--in Hong Kong in
particular in the past couple of months, and I would just note
that Freedom on the Net report noted for the sort of ninth year
and consecutively that the PRC is jailing the most journalists
in the world, a shocking number, and half of those are actually
Uyghur journalists.
So that was just a statistic that underscores the
importance of this body of legislation that you all have worked
on. And I also want to note my concern for the record of what
is going on in Hong Kong, especially this--the jailing of Jimmy
Lai, of course, but also the announcements of these bounties
for individuals who are outside of the country.
In terms of our collaboration together I see that as
fundamental to my role as assistant secretary in DRL. These
laws come from great ideas that were hatched here in this body
that I respect where I have worked and more can be done in the
State Department, frankly, to implement them.
I understand that there has been some discussion about how
we can work together to increase implementation of some of the
Uyghur Policy Act, UFPLA in particular, and I have some ideas
that if confirmed I would like to come back here and share with
you all about what we can do.
You noted on the multilateral aspect of our human rights
policy and this is critical. This is where U.S. leadership at
the U.N. Human Rights Council and other international
organizations but also bilaterally with key like-minded
partners in Europe, in Australia, Canada, elsewhere can help
force multiply our efforts, especially when it comes to the
PRC.
So if confirmed I will work with critical allies to make
sure that some of our measures of accountability on the PRC are
duplicated around the world because it is the pinch
multilaterally that will really be felt there.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank you for that, and I appreciate you
mentioning the global--Fighting Global Corruption Act in your
opening comments. I will not ask further questions on that.
But it is going to take tremendous effort on your part to
get that implemented the way Congress has intended and I think
in regards to Global Magnitsky there is a well understood the--
within the executive branch of the importance of that program
and the fact it can be even of greater use and you will have a
key role to play in that regard.
I want to cover the issue of Russia and in Gaza the lack of
having an international community voice in those countries
through their civil societies.
In Russia we see activists imprisoned every day who try to
engage their country to promote democracy and we know civil
societies are struggling within Russia to have any role
whatsoever.
I would state that if we are going to have peace in Gaza we
need to have civil societies that are active, that can help the
people with their own authorities as well as speaking out in
regards to the needs.
So what can you see you do in order to strengthen the
presence of civil societies in those areas where civil
societies are struggling?
Dr. Rand. Thanks, Senator.
So in Russia right now it seems as if the revisionism and
the aggression that was so clearly on display in February of
2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine has been expressed also
through an increased repression domestically.
So there is this connection between the revisionism, the
aggression abroad, and greater repression at home, and you are
right that there is critical networks of civil society some of
whom have fled, frankly, and DRL has been very active in
supporting some of these networks of human rights defenders.
So I just underscore and congratulate the bureau on its
work thus far and commit, if confirmed, to continuing this work
to help human rights defenders from that area of the world
including in Belarus, frankly.
Civil society is critical. It is critical to the future of
Ukraine. It is critical to the future of democratic order and
institutions across Europe and Eastern Europe and I am watching
these other states where Russia is trying to infiltrate,
frankly, and trying to push away and diminish democratic
institutions in countries like Moldova, et cetera.
So if confirmed this will be a high priority. It is not
just in Russia itself where the situation is terrible and
getting worse but also in its--in the region where Russia is
having an outside hand and is using its aggression in Ukraine
to stir up--to really diminish democratic freedoms.
The Chairman. You are absolutely right in Ukraine.
President Zelensky is really trying hard to develop democratic
institutions.
He is really fighting a system that had significant
corruption in it and he is now trying to prevent the growth of
oligarchs that could compromise the democratic institutions in
a free Ukraine.
We need to be laser focused on helping him deal with the
challenges he is confronting. We have a president who really
wants to make progress but it is a challenge and he needs the
help of the United States. So I am glad to see that you are
focused on that issue.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the things that would help a lot is passing the
supplemental funding bill so that Ukraine could keep their
government operations open and continue to fight the war
against Russia. So let us not forget that.
I think this is a question for Dr. Rand but also maybe for
Mr. Lang because last month the World Economic Forum released a
report that cited misinformation and disinformation as the most
concerning global risk of the next two years and I would argue
that it is one of the greatest threats to democracy both at
home and abroad.
So, obviously, the State Department has a Global Engagement
Center that is intended to lead our response to address
disinformation campaigns, but I think there has been some
challenges in getting the Global Engagement Center to do the
kind of coordination and cooperation that needs to happen in
order to be effective.
So can you talk about how you would implement countering
disinformation and democracy programming in coordination with
the Global Engagement Center? And then I will ask you, Mr.
Lang, also if you would respond to that.
Dr. Rand. Sure. First of all, thank you very much, Senator,
and I would just want to say off the bat that as assistant
secretary, if confirmed, I will work with these colleagues but
also across the State Department.
This is a cross-State Department effort, including with the
new bureau of CDP and the regional bureaus and the Global
Engagement Center and GPA, et cetera.
You have identified a critical issue and DRL's foreign
assistance programs are trying to make a dent in this problem
including by working on internet freedom. DRL has a very
advanced and specific set of programs that are trying to
promote independent voices when there is censorship afoot.
We are finding around the world that blocking internet is a
tool of the autocrats and then flooding the zone with mis- and
disinformation, as you rightly put, as a way to shore up
authoritarians and those who want to threaten the freedom.
So it is that combination of censorship and then
misinformation which is very dangerous and we are seeing it.
Even this month, frankly, there have been instances where we
have seen new instances of it. So if confirmed I am going to
take a look at all the foreign assistance programs we have.
I suspect we can do more with CDP and with others to update
them and to integrate them. There is also the interagency that
has good ideas and I also want to talk to experts.
The White House just issued its EO on AI and that
artificial intelligence and new technologies are making this
much more complicated.
So I would like to work with all of those technical experts
to see what we can do on our foreign assistance programs.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Lang?
Mr. Lang. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
And I agree that this is a critical issue and one that the
United States Government and the State Department needs to
fully engage on.
The Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau has a coordinator
for digital freedom who leads our efforts on misinformation and
disinformation.
I am not a part of that team but I know that they have
prioritized this, especially working through the OECD's
misinformation and disinformation hub of which the United
States is a co-chair of the steering group.
That has been one of the key channels through which we have
tried to advance our interests on this critical issue.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that and I know there is a
lot of good work going on. I would argue that one of the
challenges we have is that nobody is in charge.
There is a lot of effort but no one person who is
responsible and that that hinders our ability to move forward
in a coordinated way.
Let me stay with you, Mr. Lang, for a very parochial issue
that deals with some of the technical aspects of your position.
One of the challenges that we have had in northern New
Hampshire that I think is shared by some of our neighbors along
the Canadian border is that we have challenges between our
small rural communities and communicating, particularly for law
enforcement and safety issues, because of the licensing process
that requires approval by both the FCC and Canada's ISED to
change where towers go and where radio communications can
happen.
Let me give a lot of credit to Ambassador Cohen who has
been very helpful with our office in trying to address these
issues.
But if confirmed would you be willing to help assist us in
working on this problem because it is a very real challenge for
some of those very small communities?
Mr. Lang. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
The FCC has the lead in managing those issues but, of
course, my team works hand in hand with the FCC all the time in
their engagements with international partners, and we would be
more than happy to help facilitate those efforts to resolve
those issues.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And Dr. Rand, you mentioned Belarus in your opening
statement or maybe it was in your response to Senator Cardin.
But how specifically would you work with USAID and with
Voice of America to support independent media and human rights
defenders in Belarus who have really done an amazing job under
very difficult circumstances with Lukashenko in charge?
Dr. Rand. Right, Senator, and Lukashenko is deepening sort
of techniques and tactics which are, again, utilizing new
technology. So you have to keep up with the innovation of some
of these autocrats.
Yes, this is a whole-of-government effort in Belarus and
USAID is doing tremendous work as well. DRL has one piece of
this puzzle, which is to help some of the human rights
defenders, especially when they are out of the country and
trying to continue to build civil society networks outside the
country.
Of course, there is also important work that other agencies
are doing. There is also DRL has a role in the diplomacy here,
right, raising these issues in Belarus at the multilateral
forum, making sure other governments in Europe that have a lot
on their plate, frankly, when it comes to democratic aversions
and backsliding in their region also raise issues in Belarus.
So I see DRL as both a programmatic office but really,
frankly, a diplomatic office that needs to continue pressuring
the diplomats around me to ensure that these issues are raised
everywhere they go.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, and congratulations to
all of you and Ms. Welton, I am out of time but I very much
appreciate the importance of your role in the Indo-Pacific as
we are looking at countering China.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is
great to see all of you. Congratulations on your nominations.
Dr. Rand, it was good to talk to you a little bit just
yesterday and I just wanted to follow up on a couple of the
things we talked about starting with the Leahy laws named after
our former colleague Senator Patrick Leahy, which as you know
bars military assistance to units of foreign security forces if
the Secretary of State has credible information that the unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights.
Now, this law has been on the books for a very long time
now but it has been, I think, challenging for the State
Department to implement--well, let me put it differently. The
State Department, in my view, has never had sort of the
political will to really implement this.
Can you speak a little bit to what you would do to make
sure that countries comply and the United States implements the
Leahy laws?
Dr. Rand. Thank you, Senator, and I enjoyed our
conversation as well in your office.
The Leahy law is a critical law that has been on the bucks
and if confirmed, first and foremost, I will apply it
consistently and fairly around the world.
All U.S. security assistance recipients are subject to the
Leahy law and I will make sure first operationally that DRL has
the resources, the bandwidth, the capital, that it needs to
continue working on this law including the vetting that goes on
to take in the allegations of credible information and then to
deem in a fair and consistent manner which units are ineligible
per the first part of the law.
So that is DRL's job and if confirmed that is going to
require my management and my leadership to make sure. I have a
fairly good sense they are doing a great job now but if
confirmed I will go in and see what else I can do to make sure
that it is implemented.
That is the first part of the law, and I also want to
underscore that there is a second part of the law that Senator
Leahy really used to emphasize publicly when he talked about
the law and how proud he was of the law and that was the duty
to inform the host government that a unit has been deemed
ineligible.
If we just ding at them and take away the security
assistance without informing and conveying this accountability
measure then we are only doing half of our work.
So if confirmed I want to work on the diplomatic part, the
duty to inform, making sure that our embassies and our posts
understand that this is part of their legal obligations and
that they need to work with host governments, ministries of
defense, and others to convey that there are individuals and
units and leaders that have committed these GVHR--gross
violations of human rights--and that they must be held
accountable. That is in the law itself, that there is a
requirement for military accountability or when it is police
judicial--require civilian accountability.
So that second part I will commit to you that I will work
with my colleagues and the diplomatic corps, and if necessary
go embassy to embassy where there is a great deal of security
assistance being given to make sure that that is being
implemented.
Senator Van Hollen. So on that--on the first point,
actually, the first phase of that which is identifying
countries where there is credible evidence of violations of the
Leahy law I believe that triggers in itself a responsibility to
notify the Congress, even at that stage. Is that correct?
Dr. Rand. That has been the custom. So yes, and if
confirmed, I will continue that because I see no reason not to.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. Well, if that is the case then
at least to my knowledge the Leahy law is not even be triggered
in many circumstances, at least based on notification I have
seen, which does raise certain questions.
I mean, you do not even get to the second part if you do
not have the original determinations of credibility,
credibility violations.
Let me just ask you a broader question because, as you
know, President Biden has said we have a values-based foreign
policy.
I mean, no country is, obviously, perfect but that we want
to make sure that we fight to uphold democracy and human rights
around the world and our adversaries often point to some of our
inconsistencies in applying that standard both to friends as
well as to foes.
Would you agree that failure to apply that measure
consistently undermines the credibility of our foreign policy
when that happens?
Dr. Rand. Yes, thank you. And to step back, this is one of
the reasons I am excited to return to this bureau where I was
the deputy assistant secretary.
I believe that DRL is a fundamental and critical part of
our foreign policy. Yes, it is just a bureau in the State
Department but it really speaks to the values of human dignity,
of freedom, of universal rights that are core to our country,
that are in our Constitution, and that have been expressed for
decades if not centuries in our foreign policy.
We need to be consistent. We need to be clear. There are
times when we are going to have to prioritize other issues over
human rights.
I will try to make sure those times are few and far
between, and I fundamentally believe in terms of my vision for
this bureau that we can integrate human rights and values into
our geopolitical and strategic interests.
They will need balance these. They are not always at odds.
There is a careful and creative diplomatic way to integrate
them that overall improves our power, our standing, our
influence, and our leverage that befits a global superpower.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I appreciate that. Because
if we do not do that, again, our adversaries will claim we are
only using this as a political cudgel when it is convenient
against our adversaries and not applying the standard to our
friends as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome
to all three of our witnesses. Thank you very much for your
continued willingness to serve the United States of America.
Dr. Rand, I am very glad that you are taking up this post.
It is one of the most important in the department.
I, frankly, just want to build on Senator Van Hollen's
questions because I really do worry about the impression that
is created around the world about our sincerity when it comes
to human rights when we continue to let some of our most
important strategic and security allies get away with some just
absolutely miserable human rights records and I want to draw
your attention to Egypt because this committee has been in a
pretty regular fight, dispute, argument, with the
administration over the question of aid released to a country
that does not lock up dozens of political prisoners, does not
lock up hundreds of political prisoners.
Egypt literally has tens of thousands of people in prison
today for political crimes and, yet, it was Chairman Cardin,
not the administration, who had to hold $235 million in fiscal
year '22 military aid just so that the law was followed.
The law says Egypt cannot get this money unless they make
progress on certain human rights issues including significantly
improving pretrial detention practices, accelerating the pardon
and release of those political prisoners, and more generally
providing space for human rights defenders.
The reason we always get from the administration on why we
have to waive these human rights conditions with Egypt is that
they will not cooperate or help us without the human rights
conditions being waived.
I think that fundamentally misunderstands the fact that
many of the things that Egypt used to do 30 years ago just to
please us they now do today because they have independent
strategic reasons, for instance, to be in a security
cooperative relationship with Israel.
So I want to ask you if you would commit to this committee
that you will not advocate for releasing that $235 million
until those conditions are met--progress on pretrial detention,
the acceleration of pardon and release of political prisoners
which include thousands of people imprisoned for speech and
association, and the expansion of space for human rights
defenders, civil society advocates, and political opposition.
Dr. Rand. Senator, first of all, thank you for your service
and your record on these issues and human rights in the Senate.
We have worked together on other countries and it is--you have
been an incredible champion as has the chair.
On Egypt you have my word that if confirmed as assistant
secretary for DRL I will be the voice at the table that takes
U.S. law and in this case the very clear language in the report
on the foreign operations bill about conditionality to Egypt
that has been very clear now for the past three or four years
and make sure and advocates within the State Department and
within the interagency to ensure that we do not--that we adhere
to the law, essentially, and we comply with these requirements
regarding human rights.
I cannot promise that I always will win these interagency
debates but I can promise you that if confirmed I will be the
voice at the table making a clear, analytical, thoughtful, well
informed argument and trying to figure out how diplomatically
we can change the situation on the ground because that
ultimately is what is so worrisome is that with all these years
since we have had these levers of accountability the situation
has gotten a little bit better here, a little bit worse this
year, but fundamentally has not improved at all.
And as you say this is a country where we have a very
complex, important strategic relationship. We have many issues
that we are working on with Egypt. It is a very big country, a
huge population, a young population. It is critical that we
remain present and there and the human rights situation is
unacceptable.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, I do not disagree. I just think by
and large in the Middle East our policy sometimes gets stuck in
1989 and we say the same things over and over and over again
and we assume that actors behave the same way they did 30 years
ago.
We give the same amount of money to Egypt that we did when
we started our direct military financing relationship with them
despite how things have so fundamentally changed.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to submit a question for the
record on Tunisia. I would just note that last year's budget
request cited Tunisia as a possible recipient of additional
military aid, quote, ``if Tunisia shows signs of a return to
democratic governance.''
This is another country where we have an opportunity to use
our aid as a clear signal about our frustration, displeasure,
and worry about the quick slide away from democracy.
We also have a opportunity to support civil society at a
real moment of peril in Tunisia. We can withhold aid as a sign
that we are serious about pushing human rights and democracy
but we can also flow aid to nongovernment actors in places like
Tunisia who are still carrying on the fight.
So this is another country that I know the chairman cares
about as well and I will submit a question or two for the
record on Tunisia as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy, let me just underscore the point that you
raised in regards to Egypt and in regards to the role that we
expect DRL to play in advocating for the enforcement of our
laws and the value-based foreign policy that we believe is the
strength of America and underscore the point that Senator Van
Hollen also made.
If we are not informed we cannot assist in carrying out our
policies. So we recognize that the battle within the State
Department has many different objectives and historically our
values have not always been at the highest priorities in the
conversations that take place with our strategic partners.
We recognize that, but we expect you to advocate for our
values and to win those battles in the State Department.
But we also expect you to keep us informed. We have a
responsibility. The first questions I asked you, and you
already have said yes to all the questions we asked, is to keep
us informed so that we can also engage those battles.
But if we do not know what is going on it is tough for us
to do that. So Senator Murphy is absolutely right. We will take
unilateral action at times but it is better if we are informed
before we do that.
So I am just going to encourage you to respond to our
requests as it relates to how well you are succeeding in your
battles at the State Department.
Dr. Rand. I will be up here frequently. I will engage with
your staff. You will be hearing from me.
I am a former Senate staffer so I really understand how
useful, frankly, the senators can be, the staff can be, in this
part of our foreign policy.
The Chairman. So let me go to Timor-Leste for a moment, Ms.
Welton.
There are a lot of good things happening there. Their path
to ASEAN looks positive. Looks like that is moving forward.
They have a free society, which is also unusual in that part of
the world.
But as you pointed out there are some concerns, concerns on
their relationship with PRC. We want countries to have good
relationships with all countries but if it is against our
foreign policy and what we are trying to achieve--for example,
the South China Sea being open and free to commerce--then it is
a concern to us that the PRC has relationships with other
countries it can make it challenging for us to implement the
policies that we think are best in that region.
So I do want you to tell us a little bit more how you are
going to deal with that trend of relationship to the PRC.
And also it is a young country as far as the development of
their civil societies. How do you encourage the strengthening
of civil societies and the protection and growth of human
rights respect for all of its citizens?
Ms. Welton. I definitely appreciate your question and I
share your concern, Senator--Mr. Chairman--about the negative
influence and the attempts at coercion that we are seeing more
and more from the People's Republic of China around the world,
not just, of course, in Timor-Leste.
I think if confirmed I am going--I would focus on the
general areas that are outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy
but on a retail level in Timor-Leste and that is to support and
continue the programs that USAID, DRL, and others in the
interagency do to support governance institutions, fight the
tendency towards corruption, and make the operations of the
Government as clear and transparent and as supportive of the
aspirations of the Timor-Leste people as possible. I will, if
confirmed, be that engager.
The other aspect that we are focused on there, as I
understand, is to strengthen the economy--to diversify the
economy so that they have many opportunities to grow and
support livelihood and living status in Timor-Leste and that
includes improving education, which we are doing through the
Millennium Challenge Compact and through USAID programs, focus
on civil society through programs that are focused on women as
well as the media and a whole host of things.
I will spend a lot of time encouraging Dr. Rand if she is
confirmed--her folks--to help us do that. It is increasingly
important as I have heard today and I definitely agree that our
values be front and center of everything that we do, even in a
small place like Timor-Leste.
Their voice when added to ASEAN will also add tremendously
to regional stability and economic growth for them and for the
Indo-Pacific. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for that answer. As I said
earlier, the confirmation process we take very seriously here.
We listen to what you are saying and we expect that you will
keep us informed on progress.
We will send you some friendly reminders at times as to
what things are going on. Our staff is pretty good at following
up with letters to you all.
But you can beat them to the punch by just informing us as
to what you are doing. We appreciate that. It is lonely at
times. We like letters and communication.
Ms. Welton. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So do not hesitate to keep us informed.
Ms. Welton. I have to say that over the many years of my
career as a Foreign Service officer I have always enjoyed
having your staff visit our posts and our missions overseas.
They bring a lot of energy, a lot of knowledge, and they really
do help us in our work. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you for saying that. We appreciate
those thoughts. We also know that you look forward when their
plane takes off and leaves the country as well.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So we know how this all goes.
Anyway, Mr. Lang, last year was the first full fiscal year
for the International Technology, Security, and Innovation Fund
and it was used to help deal with some of the cabling.
This will be the second year. Can you just give us an
indication of where you think the priority should be on the
utilization of these funds?
Mr. Lang. Yes, Senator Cardin.
First of all, I would like to express appreciation for the
Congress' support for ITSI funding. It is a very valuable tool
for us in our efforts to promote trusted supply in ICT
infrastructure.
I think undersea cables is an important area where we will
endeavor to use those funds. We recently--the Bureau of
Cyberspace and Digital Policy recently announced that we would
be able to use $15 million over the next three years to support
connections in the Pacific, working together with industry and
Australia as well to help facilitate connections that would not
otherwise be made--by private companies and I think that is a
good example of the kind of work that we would like to expand
to help build out trusted infrastructure for countries that are
looking to make the difficult choice between trusted and
untrusted suppliers.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Rand, I am glad that Senator Murphy raised Egypt. I
would have raised it if he did not but I want to raise India as
well. We know about the plot to assassinate a sheikh on U.S.
soil and Canadian soil.
I would like to hear your commitment to how you would get
engaged in those types of efforts to make sure that type of
conduct does not take place.
Dr. Rand. Yes, it is very concerning what happened on U.S.
soil and on Canadian soil and, first and foremost, it is clear
that India is a critical ally, partner. We are the oldest
democracy. They are the biggest democracy.
But it is those shared values, our democratic values, that
we need that bind this alliance and as--if confirmed as DRL
Assistant Secretary I will be a voice in the administration
making sure that we are not abashed--we are not afraid--to talk
about our concerns about human rights, democracy, and, of
course, these troubling trends towards what we are seeing.
Again, I am not in administration so I do not know all the
details of what happened and I understand DOJ and FBI are
working on it.
But I think it is really critical that even as we
strengthen our relationship with India as part of our Indo-
Pacific strategy we make human rights and democracy the center
of that relationship and we talk truth in this relationship and
we speak frankly about our concerns.
And so I am not shy and I will be a voice at the State
Department and in the administration making that clear.
The Chairman. I appreciate that, and I could mention many
other countries that we have that are allies or strategic
partners. We like to have a strategic relationship with just
about every country in the world if we can. Some it is
impossible.
But we do need to work with the global community. But as
President Biden said it needs to be embraced in our values and
you are the principal enforcer to make sure that message is
understood by those that are engaged in U.S. foreign policy. So
we will--we will hold you to that.
The record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow. I would encourage you, as Senator Murphy already
indicated--gave you a preview on one of the questions--that if
you could get those questions answered as promptly as possible
and as completely as possible so that we can clear the formal
process and be able to act on your nominations in a timely way.
And with that, again, with your thanks for your public
service and to your family, the hearing will stand adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
It is clear that transnational repression is quickly becoming
a tool of choice for autocratic and illiberal regimes around
the world. The exporting of repression not only violates the
human rights of targeted individuals, but I believe is
contributing to global democratic decline. Addressing
transnational repression will require a sustained, whole-of-
government effort.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that combatting
transnational repression, in both its digital and physical forms, is
prioritized within the Department as well as the interagency? What
existing U.S. policy tools could be pursued more robustly to respond to
this problem?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to continuing DRL's vital work
defending human rights defenders around the world. I would expand
ongoing efforts across the Department of State to counter transnational
repression (TNR), coordinating where appropriate with other agencies
including the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. I would
utilize all available tools to promote accountability, including
financial sanctions and visa restrictions, such as the ``Khashoggi
Ban'' visa restriction policy, for those engaging in acts of TNR, as
appropriate.
As TNR is a global concern, I would seek to expand ongoing work
with our allies and partners to raise awareness and share our efforts
and best practices in terms of what has worked in deterring TNR. And,
to seek new multilateral opportunities to amplify the message that TNR
undermines global stability and impedes on our democratic values. This
would include our work with the EU in the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology
Council to combat the targeting of human rights defenders online and
our work to strengthen international cooperation countering the
proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware, which is used as a tool
for digital repression. I would ensure we continue to raise our
concerns about TNR directly with perpetrating governments and in
multilateral engagements at every appropriate opportunity. I would also
work to advancepolicy and programs to increase support and protections
for victims of TNR.
Question. As Assistant Secretary, how would you ensure that the
rights of marginalized populations, including LGBTQI+ rights, are an
integral component of our U.S. foreign policy and democracy promotion
around the world?
Answer. Democracies are stronger when the human rights of all
persons are promoted and protected, and effective U.S. diplomacy
requires engagement with people across societies, including with
marginalized groups. The State Department is committed to providing
swift responses to human rights abuses and violations targeting persons
with disabilities, LGBTQI+ persons, women and girls, members of
religious minorities, and marginalized racial, ethnic, and indigenous
communities. If confirmed, I will work with State Department colleagues
to continue developing effective policies and programs to promote and
protect the human rights of all persons, including by providing
emergency assistance to at-risk communities, empowering civil society,
combatting discriminatory foreign laws and policies, and protecting
vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to help make the
Global Magnitsky Sanctions Program more active and responsive in the
coming year? Are there additional tools and resources you would need to
do so?
Answer. In 2023, the U.S. Government announced a total of 24
primary designations under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program,
marking the same number of total primary designations as in 2022. If
confirmed, I would work closely with the Office of the Sanctions
Coordinator and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs to continue
to refine and improve the implementation of the Global Magnitsky
Sanctions Program to continue to enhance its efficacy, efficiency, and
responsiveness and address any resource needs. If confirmed, I will
review the impact of the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Program and discuss
my findings with Congress, including whether any new tools or resources
are needed to shore up implementation and efficacy.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to providing Congress a
fulsome justification for any national interest waiver under 7031(c)
designations?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the mandatory
quarterly report to Congress on Section 7031(c) continues to include
the required relevant information on national interest justifications
for waivers.
The PRC has waged an aggressive campaign to export its
authoritarian model, including through its AI-driven
surveillance technology, to countries across the Indo-Pacific
and beyond. This campaign directly undermines U.S. national
security interests and weakens human rights protections and
institutions in the affected countries.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with our partners and
allies to counter and mitigate PRC attempts to export its
authoritarianism?
Answer. The Administration's 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS)
makes clear the pressing strategic challenge posed by powers that layer
authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. The NSS
underscores that specific authoritarian behaviors, such as the misuse
of technologies for repression, pose a challenge to U.S. national
security interests and undermine international peace and stability. If
confirmed, I will first review how the Administration is countering
these actions by the PRC and other governments, particularly in reining
in these repressive technologies. I will engage with Congress as we
deepen our efforts, including by working with allies and partners to
ensure that dangerous technologies are not undermining a free, open,
prosperous, and secure international order and working with interagency
partners such as the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to leverage
sanctions and other accountability tools, export controls, and other
mechanisms to make progress.
Rwanda is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa to appear in
Freedom House's list of ``Top 10 Origin States'' for acts of
direct, physical transnational repression. According to Freedom
House, Rwandan dissidents who criticize the Government or
President Kagame are subjected to ``digital threats, to
assault, detention, rendition, and even assassination.'' One
such Rwandan dissident was Maryland resident Leopold Munyakazi
[moon-yuh-KAZI] who criticized the Rwandan Government during a
speech in the U.S. in 2006 and is now serving a 14-year prison
sentence in Rwanda for ``genocide denial.'' I am not aware of
any serious diplomatic intervention on his behalf by officials
at the embassy or by officials here in Washington.
Question. Are you aware of this case? If confirmed, what steps will
you take to ensure the State Department looks into allegations that the
Rwandan Government may have interfered in Mr. Munyakazi's deportation
and subsequent imprisonment? How will you ensure the Department
increases pressure on Rwandan President Kagame to end his ongoing
campaign of transnational repression?
Answer. I am aware of the case of Mr. Munyakazi and, if confirmed,
I look forward to engaging with interagency colleagues, including
domestic law enforcement agencies, on this case.
As the National Security Strategy makes clear, addressing
transnational repression is an important priority for this
Administration. I am aware of the Freedom House research as well as the
October 2023 Human Rights Watch report on Rwanda describing these
serious allegations. If confirmed, I will work with Congress and the
interagency to use our full suite of tools to promote accountability.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take strengthen DRL and
its voice within the Administration? What will you do to boost the
morale of DRL staff?
Answer. As a Senate confirmed Assistant Secretary, I will bring
vision, new ideas, and energy to DRL. I will elevate the bureau's work,
primarily by ensuring that each DRL office has a chance to participate
in policy-making efforts at the highest level. I will promote the good
work that is being done inside DRL--with the State Department Seventh
Floor, White House, interagency, and with outside stakeholders. I will
ensure that our programmatic and policy officers have the training,
guidance, and resources they need to be successful. The State
Department should always be a learning organization and to that end, I
will invite outside speakers and organize professional development
activities. Finally, DRL's internal teamwork, mission-oriented spirit,
and the inclusivity of its staff are sources of its excellence. I will
continue to cultivate these strengths.
The United States has long played a leading role in
supporting democracy, human rights, and justice in Sri Lanka.
However, despite large-scale public protests in 2022 leading to
the ouster of the president and calls for serious reforms, Sri
Lanka continues to suffer from serious human rights abuses and
impunity. Moreover, the current government continues to violate
Sri Lanka's own constitution by indefinitely delaying mandated
elections.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to address promote
human rights, justice and democracy in Sri Lanka?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of State
continues to raise its concerns about reconciliation and human rights
publicly and privately with the Government of Sri Lanka, including the
rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities, land
expropriation, freedoms of expression and association, arbitrary
detention, and corruption. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the
Department continues to promote justice for victims and accountability
for those responsible for abuses during Sri Lanka's civil war. As a
member of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Human Rights Council, I
will ensure the United States remains committed to advocating for these
issues.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to continuing US leadership
at the U.N. Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka including supporting a
Human Rights Council Resolution seeking to address these critical
issues?
Answer. I understand the United States has served in the Core Group
of countries that have drafted Human Rights Council Resolutions on
``Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri
Lanka'' since 2013. If confirmed, I will continue to support
coordination with our Core Group partners on international efforts to
promote human rights for all communities in Sri Lanka and ensure the
protection and preservation of evidence of past human rights abuses to
be used in future accountability processes.
The unconstitutional re-election of President Nayib Bukele in
El Salvador presents a unique challenge for DRL in the coming
years. President Bukele has publicly embraced his efforts to
dismantle democratic institutions, suspend due process,
demonize human rights defenders, and consolidate power in a few
short years. We understand that the United States' relationship
with El Salvador is complex, with bilateral partnerships on
counter-narcotics, migration, and economic cooperation, and El
Salvador's improved security conditions cannot be ignored.
However, the mass incarceration, undermining of rule of law,
and State-sponsored intimidation of civil society actors and
independent journalists who dare to challenge Bukele's positive
image should be of significant concern to the United States.
Question. What would you hope to achieve as Assistant Secretary for
DRL to improve constitutional governance and human rights in El
Salvador?
Answer. While security has improved in El Salvador the country
continues to experience human rights and democracy challenges. If
confirmed, I will continue DRL's efforts to address mass incarceration,
rule of law, and intimidation of civil society actors and independent
journalists. I will continue to support our civil society partners as
well as human rights and environmental defenders through policy and
programmatic efforts.
Question. As Azerbaijan prepares to host COP 29, an event that will
convene the international community in Baku, how can we push the Aliyev
Government to release jailed journalists and political prisoners?
Answer. I share your concern about the arrests of journalists and
others widely considered to be political prisoners in Azerbaijan.
Although I am not currently in the Administration, I understand U.S.
officials in Baku and Washington continue to call on the Government of
Azerbaijan to respect the human rights of all, to cease harassment, and
to release all those held for exercising their human rights and
fundamental freedoms. I understand the Administration has also
expressed concern about the arrest and detention of Gubad Ibadoghlu and
has urged the Azerbaijani Government to immediately release him.
If confirmed, I will work with allies to ensure that we leverage
the international attention and prestige offered to Azerbaijan as it
hosts COP29, in order to release the unjustly detained. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with members of Congress on this issue.
Question. President Saied's rule in Tunisia has only become more
autocratic while implementing none of the economic reforms desperately
called for by Tunisian citizens. How do we bolster civil society in
Tunisia while sending a strong message that further regression on
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will not be tolerated?
Answer. I am alarmed at Tunisia's democratic backsliding and
erosion of constitutional governance. If confirmed, I will continue to
prioritize Tunisia, including by strengthening democratic institutions,
protecting and investing in Tunisia's vibrant civil society, and
ensuring that U.S. assistance is directly benefiting the Tunisian
people.
If confirmed, I will also reiterate the importance of Tunisia
respecting human rights, including the fundamental freedoms of
expression and association. I look forward to engaging with Congress on
this top priority.
Mexico is one of the United States' most important partners,
not only in the hemisphere, but in the world. On a range of
issues, from managing migration to combating fentanyl
trafficking to strengthening nearshoring, it is imperative that
the United States have a productive relationship with our
closest southern neighbor. Having said that, I think there are
legitimate concerns about the current status of democratic
governance, human rights, and rule of law in Mexico. These
include concerns about increasing militarization, protecting
the independence of Mexico's judiciary and other autonomous
institutions, and rampant attacks against journalists and human
rights defenders, which I think the United States must be vocal
on.
Question. What is your assessment of the status of human rights and
democracy in Mexico, and how would you advance DRL's agenda in Mexico
as Assistant Secretary?
Answer. Mexico is an important partner to the United States on a
number of crucial, complex issues of vital national interest. Yet the
country faces continual challenges to human rights and democracy. With
over 100,000 missing and disappeared, frequent violence against
journalists and politicians, and sustained violence against women and
other marginalized groups, there remains important work to be done to
improve the state of human rights and democracy in Mexico. If
confirmed, I will continue DRL's crucial work tackling these issues. I
will ensure that we raise human rights and the rule of law in our
diplomatic interactions with the Mexican Government. I will continue
DRL's work of supporting and engaging with Mexican civil society on
critical issues such as violence against journalists, gender-based
violence, and protections for marginalized communities. Lastly, if
confirmed, I will work with the interagency to ensure that human
rights, the rule of law, and anti-corruption goals are integrated into
the range of other areas and issues where we cooperate intensively with
the Government of Mexico.
Israel/Palestinians
Question. Even though the fighting in Gaza continues, the planning
for a future free of Hamas must happen now. Like most Gazans, civil
society actors there have suffered terribly during the violence.
However, strong civil society and a responsive civil administration
that respects the rights of its citizens will be crucial for Gazans to
effectively govern themselves after this war and ultimately reach a
negotiated two-state solution. What is your assessment of civil society
groups in Gaza, as well as the West Bank? What would be your strategy,
if confirmed, to both build that capacity in a technical sense while
helping civil society actors rebuild their lives? How would you
coordinate this effort with other bureaus within the State Department
and with USAID?
Answer. Around the world, we have seen how respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, along with a strong civil society, are
critical to peace and security and responsive governance. Gaza's robust
civil society has faced unprecedented challenges over the past number
of years under Hamas' rule and during the current hostilities. If
confirmed, I will be committed to building and enhancing the capacity
of civil society organizations in Gaza and the West Bank, especially
those that protect civilians, advocate for fundamental freedoms, and
promote independent journalism. Doing so will be critical to advancing
stability, freedom of expression, and eventual democratic governance in
the Gaza Strip after the current hostilities end.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) also has a responsibility to reform
and improve its governance in order to support the Palestinian people's
aspirations for freedom and dignity. Civil society in the West Bank is
currently operating under significant restrictions by the PA, making it
difficult to continue its vital work. If confirmed, I will support
ongoing Department efforts to urge governance reforms in the PA, so
that human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society
organizations can register and operate without undue restrictions and
speak freely without retribution. Likewise, if confirmed, I will work
closely with my counterparts across the Department and with USAID to
ensure effective implementation of programming.
Abuse of LGBTQI+ Persons
Question. In December 2023, the Biden Administration sanctioned
Uganda's Commissioner General of Prisons for serious human rights
abuses, including the use of forced anal examinations on LGBTQI+
prisoners. Used by authorities in criminal prosecutions for same-sex
sexual conduct, these exams are not only medically discredited, but
have also been deemed a form of torture. Yet, these are not the only
harmful practices impacting LGBTQI+ people around the globe. LBQT women
experience high levels of corrective rape, while LGBTQI+ human rights
defenders are routinely held in arbitrary detention. If confirmed, what
actions would you take to encourage an end to these forms of violence
against LGBTQI+ persons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue DRL's critical work to
promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons, and to prevent
and deter violations of their rights. This includes working the Special
Envoy to Advance the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons, DRL's Office of
Security and Human Rights, posts, and regional bureaus to identify
perpetrators of human rights abuses against LGBTQI+ persons and use the
full range of policy tools to promote accountability. I will support
the ongoing work of the Special Envoy, who leads the interagency effort
to end conversion therapy practices, as mandated by Executive Order
14075, to work with host and partner governments, civil society,
religious groups, health organizations, and other interlocutors to end
so-called ``conversion therapy'' practices targeting LGBTQI+ persons,
including ``corrective'' rape, forced pregnancy, psychiatric
institutionalization, and other abuses.
Question. Without speaking to any specific request for assistance
the administration may have received, can you confirm whether the
administration is in fact using its new legal flexibility to provide
support to the ICC's Ukraine investigation? Will you support the active
use of that new flexibility if confirmed?
Answer. While I am not privy to the details of the Administration's
current engagement with the ICC, I understand the United States has
been supportive of a variety of pathways to justice for atrocities that
have taken place as part of Russia's war against Ukraine--and
Congressional support for this has been critical. If confirmed, I would
strongly support initiatives to promote justice for Russia's atrocities
and abuses, including through the ICC, in close coordination with the
Office of Global Criminal Justice and other U.S. Government
counterparts.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand by Senator James E. Risch
Question. What is the definition of ``human rights?''
Answer. Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings
regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, or religion.
I look to the definitions of human rights articulated in the U.S.
constitution as a starting point. In addition, definitions of
universally-recognized human rights are found in various international
instruments adopted or ratified by the United States, such as the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture, among
others. Human rights include, but are not limited to, the right of the
individual to life and liberty and security of person, to not be held
in slavery or subject to torture, and to exercise freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, association, and religion or belief.
follow-up questions
Question. What is the definition of ``universally-recognized
human rights''?
Answer. There is no definiition of the term ``universally-
recognized human rights'' in international law.
Question. What is the definition of ``internationally-
recognized human rights''?
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``internationally-
recognized human rights'' in international law.
Question. Is there a difference in the definition of
``universally-recognized human rights'' and ``internationally-
recognized human rights?''
Answer. There is no definition of ``universally-recognized
human rights'' and ``internationally-recognized human rights''
in international law.
Question. What are the U.S. legal obligations under the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Answer. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a
non-binding resolution of the United Nations General Assembly
and creates no legally binding obligations for the United
States.
Question. Is the United States Government bound by definitions of
``human rights'' contained in international treaties, agreements,
accords, or resolutions to which the United States is not a party?
Answer. No, the United States is not bound by definitions of
``human rights'' contained in international treaties, agreements,
accords, or resolutions to which the United States is not a party.
Question. What is the definition of ``human rights defender?''
Answer. In my view, human rights defenders are those individuals,
working alone or in groups, who non-violently advocate for the
promotion and protection of universally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Question. Is access to abortion a human right protected under
international law?
Answer. No, access to abortion is not a human right protected under
international law. Moreover, the United States is not a party to any
international human rights law treaties that enshrine access to
abortion as a human right.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring full and
complete compliance with current U.S. law, which prohibits the use of
U.S. foreign assistance to perform or promote abortion as a method of
family planning, support involuntary sterilizations, or lobby for or
against the legalization of abortion overseas?
Answer. Yes, I commit to ensuring full and complete compliance with
current U.S. law. If confirmed, I will ensure that all of DRL's work
continues to be in compliance with all applicable U.S. law, including
restrictions related to abortion.
Question. If confirmed, will you also commit to ensuring that all
of the Bureau's grantees--including sub-grantees--fully adhere to U.S.
law?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to ensuring that all of DRL's
grants are in compliance with all applicable U.S. law for foreign
assistance. To accomplish this goal, I will maintain strict, ongoing
monitoring and oversight of all of DRL's foreign assistance awards.
Question. Is it your view that using the voice, vote, and influence
of the United States to encourage countries who signed to Geneva
Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women's Health and Strengthening the
Family to ``un-sign'' such declaration constitutes lobbying under the
Siljander amendment? If not, why not?
Answer. I am not currently in the Administration, so I am
unfamiliar with how the Biden-Harris Administration is currently
approaching the Geneva Consensus Declaration (GCD). However, I do
understand that President Biden removed the United States from the GCD
in January 2021 because aspects of the document are inconsistent with
current U.S. priorities to advance gender equality and the empowerment
of all women and girls. The GCD is not a U.N. document and does not
reflect negotiated consensus in Geneva or any U.N. forum.
If confirmed, I am committed to comply with all applicable
statutory restrictions related to abortion, including the Siljander
Amendment.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to sharing with the committee
information on the grantees and sub-grantees implementing all of your
bureau's programming, regardless of whether that information needs to
be shared in and open or confidential manner?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to sharing appropriate
information with the committee on the grantees and sub-grantees
implementing DRL's foreign assistance programming,consistent with the
need to protect sensitive or otherwise controlled or restricted
information. I will also ensure that I work with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and others in Congress to share sensitive
information in line with State Department rules and regulations.
Question. What is the utility of the Summit for Democracy beyond
just dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review how we can best utilize the
networks and activities of the Summit for Democracy process to advance
U.S. foreign policy. I believe that the first two Summits for Democracy
built momentum and galvanized political will for global democratic
renewal across governments and authorities, civil society, private
sector actors, and citizens in countries around the world.
There were additional effects of the last two Summits. First, I
understand that over 100 governments made over 750 commitments to
strengthen democratic institutions, protect human rights, and
accelerate the fight against corruption, both at home and abroad. Some
of these commitments have already been translated into impactful
actions--from enacting national strategies on anti-corruption and
taking meaningful steps towards creating an independent judiciary to
joining international efforts to support media sustainability
initiatives and protect journalists. Second, the Summit process itself
has woven together a diverse array of democracies in new ways that have
helped to contain authoritarianism in the multilateral space. For
example, 90 percent of Summit partners displayed resounding support for
an UNGA resolution last year calling for the immediate end to the war
in Ukraine. Summit partners also took an unprecedented step within the
U.N. Economic and Social Council to remove Iran from the Commission on
the Status of Women with 90 percent of affirmative votes for the
resolution coming from Summit participants. Third, the Summit deepened
civil society networks--tying together these organizations globally and
strengthening them as they engage and confront their governments. More
than 1,400 non-governmental organizations actively took part in
consultations associated with the Summit for Democracy process.
Question. What is the utility of inviting countries that do not
share U.S. democratic values to the Summit?
Answer. I am not currently in the Administration but if confirmed I
will review the rationale for how we or other leading governments
invite countries to this Summit and other similar fora. I look forward
to discussing this issue with you in greater detail and soliciting your
feedback and good ideas.
Question. Who leads on matters of democracy and human rights policy
abroad--the Secretary of State or the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development?
Answer. The Department is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency,
with the Secretary of State serving as the President's principal
foreign policy advisor and most senior U.S. diplomat. USAID is the U.S.
Government's lead international development, health, and humanitarian
assistance agency. Coordination and collaboration between the two
agencies are critical to advance U.S. interests. If confirmed, I would
prioritize robust collaboration between DRL and USAID's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, guided by the Department-USAID
Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2022-2026.
Question. If confirmed, how will you de-conflict democracy and
human rights programming undertaken by the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congressional authorizers
and appropriators to consider the comparative advantage and
Congressional intent regarding the Department of State and USAID's
democracy and human rights programmatic work. The work of the State and
USAID to bolster democracy and protect human rights globally is
complementary and mutually reinforcing. I will forge a close, strong
working relationship with USAID leadership and ensure that DRL, other
bureaus at State, and USAID each understand their roles in contributing
to a whole-of-government strategy in this area. There is plenty of work
to be done, and the more we work together across State-USAID--sharing
information about our programs, continuously integrating our evidence
of impact, adapting shared innovations--the more likely we are to
advance U.S. goals.
Through continued close coordination and collaboration across State
and USAID, and by working with partners in Congress, I will position
DRL to creatively integrate diplomatic and programmatic levers in order
to advance U.S. policy bolstering democratic institutions, promoting
accountability, and safeguarding human rights.
Question. Do you believe that the strike against Qasem Soleimani
was legal?
Answer. Yes. I understand the United States articulated the legal
basis for the strike at the time it occurred in January 2020. These
types of determinations are heavily fact-based. However, as I was not
serving in government at that time, I have no additional insights into
the information that served as the basis for that determination.
Question. The Department, in particular DRL, has attempted to
``modernize'' the various country reports for annual reporting for
Human Rights. What do you think could be improved?
Answer. As part of the Secretary's Modernization agenda, I
understand that DRL has prioritized streamlining the annual Human
Rights Report (HRR) so that it is more concise and efficiently
produced, to enable DRL and the Department to more effectively engage
in the diplomacy and policy advocacy the HRR is designed to support. If
confirmed, I will look at efforts to date to modernize these reports
and push further substantive and process reforms. In particular, I
would like to consider how to use technology-based tools to reduce the
labor required in producing the report. This may require more
centralized and comprehensive research tools and the integration of
digital instructional materials into draft reports. I look forward to
reengaging with Congress and hearing your good ideas regarding HRR
reform.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to briefing the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee when asked and to be responsive to
Congressional inquiries in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to briefing the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee when requested and responding to Congressional
inquiries in a timely manner.
Question. In your opinion, what bureau should have the interagency
and programming lead on Internet Freedom and why?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue DRL's leadership on this
issue, while working closely with the other bureaus, namely CDP, and
agencies engaged in work to promote Internet Freedom. Many stakeholders
in the interagency have expertise and therefore close collaboration is
critical. Based on my prior experience with DRL programs and policy
work, DRL policy leads are keenly familiar with complex human rights
concerns that provide context for Internet governance. In terms of
programs, DRL brings to bear the institutional knowledge and technical
expertise to support human rights-centered program design, including by
leveraging its long-standing history ofpartnerships with organizations
and networks of local activists. DRL's rich programming in this area
complements and reinforces DRL programming on other regional and
thematic priorities, in line with all congressional directives. My
goal, if confirmed, is to ensure an impactful, evidence-based approach
to the programs funded through the annual Global Internet Freedom
appropriations directive.
Question. The U.S. Government's efforts to stymie atrocities via
the Atrocity Prevention Task Force have been dismal. If confirmed, how
do you view DRL's role on the Task Force and what can be done to ensure
the task force is meeting its mandate?
Answer. I strongly support prioritizing atrocity prevention and, if
confirmed, I will review current Department efforts. I will engage
experts, Congress, and NGOs to determine how DRL can best contribute to
the work of the Atrocity Prevention Task Force.
Our strategy within DRL must synthesize our diplomatic efforts with
DRL's atrocity prevention and transitional justice programming, which
addresses atrocity risk through early warning, strengthening civil
society, empowering marginalized populations, and documenting abuses
for eventual accountability.
In addition, if confirmed, I will ensure that DRL's efforts
implementing an array of accountability mechanisms (e.g., Leahy law,
Child Soldier Prevention Act, Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, human
rights-based U.S. visa restrictions and financial sanctions) limit
impunity for perpetrators of atrocities. I will ensure that these tools
are integrated into a larger atrocity prevention vision.
Question. Do you commit to ensure that tools such as the 7031(c)
visa restriction tool is not politicized?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues
to apply section 7031(c) visa restrictions to individuals on the basis
of their involvement in significant corruption or gross violations of
human rights. I also will ensure the Department continues to consider
other available tools to promote accountability for corrupt and anti-
democratic actors as well as individuals involved in human rights
violations and abuses.
Question. Do you commit to sharing relevant documents with the
committee regarding the new Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance
(CHIRG)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will regularly consult with the committee
on implementation of the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance,
including by responding to requests for documents.
Question. What role does DRL play in the new CHIRG?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review how DRL and other bureaus are
managing CHIRG implementation. It is my current understanding that the
CHIRG is a joint initiative led by DRL and the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM). It establishes a bottom up, institutional
process by which DRL and PM work together, in coordination with the
Office of the Legal Advisor, regional and functional bureaus,
embassies, DoD, and other USG entities as appropriate, to gather and
corroborate information on incidents of civilian harm potentially
involving U.S.-furnished or -authorized end-items. It is my
understanding that the objective of the CHIRG is also to develop
appropriate policy recommendations to respond to such incidents and
reduce the risk of such incidents in the future.
Question. The PAIRS mechanism (Political Accountability,
Inclusivity and Resiliency Support Mechanism) is an important tool for
advancing democratic governance in places that matter for U.S.
interests. We were pleased to see DRL emphasize political parties in
its new PAIRS objectives framework, because the U.S.G. needs to be
focused on strengthening core political institutions of democracy. This
is critical as DRL has shifted too far toward supporting civil society
at the expense of strengthening the core political institutional
components of democracy. What will you to do make sure DRL continues a
focus on supporting parties and other such entities?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to bolstering DRL's support to
political parties and strengthening core political institutional
components of democracy through the PAIRS mechanism. If confirmed, I
will ensure that DRL programming under PAIRS strengthens its focus on
how parties can better understand citizens' priorities, develop policy
agendas that reflect and respond to them, and provide an alternative
vision responsive to public concerns.
Question. As Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL), if confirmed, what will your approach to human rights
dialogues on the African continent be?
Answer. Based on my previous experience in DRL, I have seen that
human rights dialogues can be effective if held under the right
circumstances and with the right agendas and interlocuters. If
confirmed, I will review our schedule and cadence of human rights
dialogues and possibly make some changes, after consulting with the
Secretary and others. Hard conversations about human rights should
occur in other fora, in addition to these dialogues.
Moreover, sometimes human rights dialogues provide a strategic
opportunity to strengthen partnerships with civil society, the private
sector, and/or the media in certain countries. At other times, human
rights dialogues can be used strategically to convey important
messages. The bottom line is that human rights dialogues need to be
held carefully, and strategically to be effective.
Question. As Assistant Secretary for DRL, if confirmed, do you
commit to conducting a review of DRL programming in Africa to ensure
DRL is funding projects that meets current needs and is filling gaps
not addressed by larger USAID or other State Department assistance
programs?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to conducting a review to
ensure DRL programming in Africa proactively advances DRL goals on the
sub-continent to meet current needs. I also commit to ensuring DRL
programming is well coordinated and not duplicative of other
programming efforts in other parts of State and USAID to ensure a
strategic impact in Africa. DRL programs should be selective, creative,
distinct, and most importantly impactful.
Question. As Assistant Secretary for DRL, if confirmed, how will
you ensure that the voice of DRL is elevated within the State
Department and interagency as it relates to ongoing crises in Africa,
including in Sudan, Ethiopia, DR Congo, and the Sahel?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to ensure
that the DRL perspective on Africa is elevated within the State
Department and interagency, especially as it relates to ongoing crises,
such as those in Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the
Sahel.
If confirmed, I will be personally engaged, drawing on my existing
good relationships within the Department and interagency and fostering
new relationships, as well as my professional experiences working on
conflict, democracy, and human rights in Africa both in the non-profit
sector and within the U.S. Government over the past several years. I
will ensure that DRL's voice and interests informs the policy-making
process with respect to ongoing crises in Africa and signal to the DRL
team that Sub-Saharan Africa is a priority. If confirmed, I will be
reviewing the array of policy tools to address the human rights
situations across the region, making sure that we are using everything
in our toolbox, creatively integrating levers of bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, and matching the right diplomatic and
programmatic initiatives.
Question. What is your understanding of the bipartisan, bicameral
Congressional concerns regarding U.S. policy on Sudan?
Answer. I understand that Congress, like the Department of State,
wants to see an immediate end to the conflict, accountability for past
atrocities and prevention of future ones, unhindered humanitarian
assistance to affected communities, and the formation of a democratic
government led by civilians in Sudan. I share these important goals and
want to end this devastating conflict. If confirmed, I will review how
I can personally, with the DRL team, contribute--including by bringing
fresh eyes, energy, and perspectives to the diplomatic efforts and
efforts to bring the right leverage to bear on the belligerent parties.
Question. In your opinion, are issues of democracy, return to
civilian leadership, and human rights adequately prioritized by the
State Department in its approach to Sudan?
Answer. I am not currently in the administration, but it is my
sense that the Department, as part of a whole-of-government,
interagency approach, is working tirelessly and with urgency to end the
bloodshed in Sudan, bring about a return to civilian leadership, and
support a democratic transition process in Sudan. On December 6, 2023,
the Secretary determined that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces and
Rapid Support Forces have committed war crimes in Sudan, and also
determined that members of the Rapid Support Forces and allied militia
have committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
It is incumbent upon us to prioritize this policy effort. If
confirmed, I would be a strong, tireless voice within the interagency,
advocating for human rights, justice, and freedom in Sudan. I would
relentlessly continue pressing for diplomatic solutions.
If confirmed, I would review DRL's existing policies and lines of
effort and determine how best the DRL team can further address the
devastating conflict in Sudan, including with respect to accountability
tools such as sanctions and visa restrictions, human rights monitoring
and reporting, and programming.
Question. In your opinion, what role should DRL be playing in
supporting Sudanese civilians in their aspirations for a transition to
democracy?
Answer. I think it is important to support civilian efforts to
chart Sudan's future. Diplomatically, DRL can be a voice advocating for
civilian rule as part of any negotiated settlement. Programmatically,
DRL should do as much as it can to bolster the role of civil society,
labor unions and workers' rights associations, political parties,
resistance committees, emergency response rooms, women, youth, and
other marginalized groups.
As Secretary Blinken said in a May 22 video message to the Sudanese
people--``Sudan's civilians must be the ones to define Sudan's path
going forward and lead a political process to restore Sudan's
democratic transition and form a civilian government.''
follow-up questions
Question. How would you, if confirmed as the Assistant
Secretary for DRL, contribute to the work of the U.S. Special
Envoy for Sudan in resetting U.S. policy on Sudan, including
efforts to end the conflict and establish a lasting peace and
democracy in the war torn country?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Special Envoy
Perriello on a strategy to elevate Sudanese civilians in ending
the bloodshed and supporting the democratic transition in
Sudan. We need fresh thinking and new ideas. I will work with
him and other interagency colleagues to develop a shared plan
of work to promote justice and accountability, prevent
atrocities, and support Sudanese civilians as they coalesce
around a vision for Sudan's transition to democracy.
If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, I would marshal all
available resources of DRL--both our programs and our policy
influence--to support an end to the crisis in Sudan and the
establishment of lasting peace and democracy. I do not believe
that DRL's perspective has been at the table sufficiently and I
will change that if confirmed.
Question. How would you, if confirmed, ensure your bureau
influences policy discussions and solutions significantly more
than it does now regarding civilian-led transition strategies?
Answer. Sudan's civilians must be the ones to define Sudan's
path going forward and lead a political process to restore
Sudan's democratic transition and form a civilian government.
And a diverse set of civil society actors must be part of the
peaceful solution. If confirmed, I will elevate DRL's voice and
role in the policymaking process, diplomatic efforts, and
programmatic investments. The leadership of a confirmed
Assistant Secretary allows for a stronger role for the bureau
and I plan on drawing on expertise from civil society, Sudan
analysts, and contacts within Sudan itself. I will also work
with this Committee and other experts in Congress to ensure
that DRL speaks for and on behalf of new, creative policy
ideas.
DRL, working with the Special Envoy, has a critical role to
play to support marginalized voices, including civil society,
women and youth, to engage in peace processes. If confirmed as
the Assistant Secretary, I will also draw on DRL's decades of
experience bringing civil society voices and perspectives to
elite negotiations around peace and democratic transitions.
There may be lessons and approaches from other cases that
could be appropriate to Sudan.
Unfortunately, until the military withdraws from governance
and focuses on defending the nation from external threats, no
civilian transition strategy will be fully reflective of
Sudan's diverse communities.
While the security forces continue their destructive
conflict, humanitarian agencies, national NGOs, civil society
organizations, professional unions and neighborhood-based
resistance committees will continue to need U.S. support.
Question. In your opinion, what role should DRL be playing in
supporting documentation of atrocities in Sudan?
Answer. I understand that the Department of State and USAID are
documenting and preserving evidence of atrocities and other crimes
being committed by both warring sides to the conflict in Sudan.
If confirmed, I would continue to support the necessary funding and
coordination of these efforts, to promote accountability for victims
and the success of any future transitional justice initiatives. I would
also support Sudanese citizen-led efforts to negotiate for peace and
reestablish a civilian-led transitional government, which will be
necessary to build the governance institutions required for true
accountability and sustainable peace.
follow-up question
Question. Please provide information on the ongoing programs
documenting and preserving evidence of atrocities and other
crimes being funded by State and USAID in Sudan and provide
additional areas of programming where you believe DRL can and
should do more.
Answer. If confirmed, I am eager to work with Congress and a
range of Sudan experts to build DRL's programming portfolio in
Sudan, given that it will be one of my top priorities as
Assistant Secretary. I understand that current DRL programming
in Sudan supports local civil society organizations, lawyers,
and other local actors to document and securely preserve
information, field research, and witness statements about
atrocities and other crimes. This work can take many forms and
includes documentation of mass killings or murder, attacks on
civilian objects/infrastructure/areas, sexual or gender-based
violence, looting, destruction of property and forced
disappearances. These efforts seek to preserve evidence that
meets standards for criminal justice processes and to aid in
advocacy around justice and accountability. I understand that
DRL also directly supports local networks to operate an early
warning system that documents past and ongoing atrocities in
Sudan. My understanding is that all DRL programming in Sudan
also integrates psychosocial support as well as community truth
telling in order to counter false narratives that drive
conflict.
I believe DRL can and should be doing more, using an
analytical, evidence-based approach of what could work in this
current context and focusing on Sudanese voices and expertise.
For instance, we could increase support to local documenters
collecting evidence for specific investigations. Local experts
know the operating environment the best. We should be
considering what type of documentation will be necessary for
future accountability efforts. Additionally, DRL can and should
do more to provide for psychosocial support for documenters and
survivors and invest in forensic efforts that can assist in
investigations and provide closure for families of missing
persons. Finally, DRL should be building the capacity of
diverse civil society to contribute to a democratic transition.
Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to engaging with the Bureau
for Global Criminal Justice and the Bureau of African Affairs on the
consistent review and updating of the atrocities determination for
Sudan, including as to whether genocide is occurring in Darfur?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully commit to engaging with the Office of
Global Criminal Justice and the Bureau of African Affairs on the issue
of atrocity determinations for Sudan.
In December 2023, the Secretary announced his determination that
members of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
committed war crimes, and that members of the RSF and allied militia
committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The Secretary
made this determination to bear witness to, and to shine a light on,
the abuses suffered by the Sudanese people at the hands of the very
people who are meant to protect them. As Secretary Blinken's statement
conveyed, that determination did not ``preclude the possibility of
future determinations as additional information about the parties'
actions becomes available.''
It is imperative that we continue to track and document the scope
and breadth of the belligerents' myriad crimes. If confirmed, I would
work with the interagency to rally the international community to help
us end the violence, address the humanitarian crisis, and promote
justice for survivors and victims, including by shining a light on the
full extent of atrocity crimes in Sudan.
Question. In your opinion, has the Biden Administration adequately
used accountability mechanisms, including sanctions under the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights and Accountability Act and Executive Order
14098, for those responsible?
Answer. I understand that since the start of the conflict in Sudan,
the Department of the Treasury has sanctioned fourteen individuals and
entities under E.O. 14098 for their role in fueling the Sudan conflict,
committing atrocities, and undermining Sudan's democratic transition. I
have been briefed that the Department of State has taken steps to
impose visa restrictions on more than a dozen individuals who are
responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic transition
in Sudan. Further, on September 6, 2023, the Department of State
announced the designation of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces General and
West Darfur Sector Commander, Abdul Rahman Juma, under Section 7031(c),
for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the
extrajudicial killing of the Governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abbakar,
and his brother.
However, if confirmed, I will immediately review all measures
available to hold those responsible for the bloodshed in Sudan
accountable to see what more can be done. I will work with the
committee and others in Congress to ensure the Department continues to
promote accountability for those who undermine peace and the democratic
transition in Sudan.
Question. What is your analysis of how democratic the election held
on December 20, 2023 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was?
Answer. I appreciate the committee's interest in recent elections
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and welcome committee views.
If confirmed, I will be glad to consult with the committee on policy
issues regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Constitutional Court certified the National Independent
Electoral Commission's (CENI) results in the 2023 presidential race and
declared Felix Tshisekedi president-elect of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
I am watching for final reports released by domestic and
international observation missions close to the situation, but am well
aware that preliminary reports noted insecurity, logistical issues, and
preparatory shortcomings that created significant delays and barriers
to voting on election day. For many, incidents of fraud and corruption
raised doubts about the integrity of the results. If confirmed, I would
strongly urge Congolese authorities to launch a comprehensive review of
the electoral process, investigate those who attempted to undermine the
will of the people, and, in consultation with international and
Congolese stakeholders, act on recommendations to improve future
elections. I appreciate CENI's January announcement that 82 legislative
and provincial candidates--including 12 from President Tshisekedi's
party--were disqualified for illicit activities, including fraud,
corruption, and vote buying. If confirmed, I will urge authorities to
maximize transparency by ensuring that findings are published, and
appeals are considered in accordance with Congolese law.
Question. In your opinion, what should DRL priorities to support
democracy and human rights in DR Congo be?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that DRL continues to
prioritize respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms--
particularly the crucial role of human rights defenders and independent
journalists--urging prosecutions, sanctioning, and sentencing of
violators, and promoting the development of accountable institutions,
to send a strong signal that impunity has no place in the DRC any
longer. I will also work closely with our Congolese counterparts to
follow through on critical governance reforms to ensure that domestic
revenues are devoted to the benefit of the Congolese people. Finally, I
will underscore the importance of civic space and media freedom, anti-
corruption, and respect for labor rights, which will also bolster the
DRC's business competitiveness globally and secure supply chains for
critical minerals.
follow-up questions
Question. What is your understanding of the key constraints
to "securing supply chains for critical minerals" in DRC for
American investment?
Answer. First, I should note that I am not in the
Administration currently and therefore have not been part of
developing policies on critical minerals supply chains. I
recognize that there are economic security and national
security reasons for securing supply chains for critical
minerals. However, if confirmed, I intend to shape these
policies to take into account critical U.S. goals including:
ensuring that armed non-state actors do not exploit ungoverned
spaces; considering how human rights violators may or may not
be benefitting from these projects; and ensuring that U.S.
investments do not compound or exacerbate business climates
that could be rife with, corruption. Human rights violations,
corruption, and armed actors (political violence) will
therefore be the chief constraints that I focus on if
confirmed.
Question. In your assessment, is the State Department
adequately focused on these constraints in its engagement on
critical mineral supply chains, including as it relates to the
development of the Lobito Corridor?
Answer. As I am not currently in the administration, I do not
have full visibility in how the State Department is considering
very real concerns about human rights, armed actors, governance
and corruption in its work on critical mineral supply chains. I
am very concerned about each of these elements, however. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Department considers these
human rights considerations even as we invest in critical
mineral supply chains. I will rely on DRL's expertise on anti-
corruption, governance, and business and human rights
initiatives to ensure that all critical mineral supply chain
policies, including in the Lobito Corrido, are focused on human
rights and conflict prevention considerations. There are also
labor concerns with the critical mineral policies and if
confirmed I will build on the Administration's global labor
directive to work with interagency colleagues to raise the
labor standards, including in the Lobito Corridor.
Question. How would you ensure that, if confirmed as
Assistant Secretary for DRL, the bureau`s equities in promoting
democracy and human rights are effectively integrated into
interagency decisions about the Lobito Corridor, specifically
regarding efforts to ensure long-term democratic stability and
accountability for government commitments on democratic and
rights reforms in partner countries?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the Department's
collaboration with the U.S. interagency in the Lobito Corridor
to ensure that democracy and human rights are integrated into
interagency decisions. I will direct human rights officers at
the bureau, office, and embassy level to continue promoting
democracy and human rights alongside their colleagues in
regional bureaus and the Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs.
For example, I understand that human rights officers at the
embassy level made substantial contributions to the original
development financing projects in the Lobito Corridor. This
holistic approach integrating human rights and labor rights was
a model, and it must be perpetuated once the ideas come to the
Washington interagency process. I will ensure that these field
voices representing real human rights who were involved in the
original design are represented in the interagency. In
addition, DRL's many contacts across the business and human
rights fields are an asset to the bureau; if confirmed, I will
ensure that I can use these contacts and networks, to protect
local labor and human rights while pursuing policies that
promote American businesses and clean supply chains for the
benefit of American workers and consumers.
Question. What is your assessment of the human rights situation in
Uganda?
Answer. Human rights are under attack in Uganda, and journalists,
human rights defenders, and anyone else who opposes the status quo are
at risk of arrest, torture, and enforced disappearances. Following the
enactment of the Anti-Homosexuality Act--only the latest attack on the
human rights of Ugandans in recent years--I have seen multiple credible
reports of increasing threats, violence, and abuse perpetrated against
the Ugandan people, including LGBTQI+ persons and those who provide
services to them. If confirmed, I would consult with the committee on
policies designed to ensure that the Government of Uganda takes
affirmative steps to protect the human rights of all Ugandans.
Question. What is your assessment of Nigeria's 2023 electoral
process?
Answer. The February and March 2023 elections failed to meet the
expectations of many Nigerians despite positive developments in the
pre-election period such as revisions to the electoral law that
increased the transparency of the collation process, increased training
on voting equipment, and high turnout during voter registration. While
independent election observers generally found that the results of the
presidential race reflected the will of voters in most states, I
understand there were significant problems surrounding the electoral
process, including serious technical and logistical challenges, as well
as instances of voter suppression, voter intimidation, and electoral
violence, that left many voters very frustrated. I was pleased to learn
that following the elections, the State Department took steps to impose
visa restrictions on specific individuals in Nigeria for undermining
the democratic process during Nigeria's 2023 elections cycle. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with the committee on U.S.
policy issues relating to Nigeria.
Question. Do you agree with the assessment by the State Department
that, as of June 2023, the Government of Ethiopia was no longer engaged
in a pattern of gross violations of internationally-recognized human
rights? Why or why not?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by reports of continued human rights
violations and abuses committed after the signing of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front in November 2022. I am also closely
watching the ongoing violence against civilians in Amhara and Oromia.If
confirmed, I will review all available arguments and evidence within
the Department to determine whether the Government of Ethiopia is
perpetrating gross violations of human rights. I currently do not have
the same information on hand as the Department does. It is imperative
that the Government of Ethiopia respect human rightsand improve access
to conflict areas by credible international human rights monitors.
If confirmed, Ethiopia would be a priority of mine. I will closely
monitor the human rights situation in Ethiopia to inform our policy and
ensure compliance with all applicable laws.
Question. Under your leadership, if confirmed, how will DRL engage
with the Africa Bureau on post-coup transitions and preventing future
coups on the African continent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will enhance active collaboration between
DRL and the Bureau of African Affairs on post-coup transitions and
preventing future coups. DRL works with the Africa Bureau to ensure
that post-coup governments understand that quick and credible
transitions to democratically elected, civilian-led governments are a
priority of the United States. I would seek to continue and expand U.S.
Government efforts, through foreign assistance programming and
diplomatic engagement, that focus on enabling and supporting free and
fair elections and electoral processes that are peaceful and inclusive,
post-coup and in other settings.
If confirmed, I will work with others at State and in the
interagency to focus on how to prevent coups. I would like my team and
others to evaluate evidence, learning, and expert analyses as part of a
broader strategy that considers the right tools to coup proof societies
and polities. These may include capacity building for key actors and
civil society, diplomatic pressure, or other forces pushing for
political compromise.
Question. What lessons should be learned from the recent coups in
Africa? How should the Biden Administration adjust its approach to
countries at risk for coups, like Burundi, Cameroon, South Sudan,
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria?
Answer. Recent coups in Africa have highlighted the critical
importance of U.S. efforts to stem democratic backsliding, build
sustainable democratic institutions and norms that are more resilient
to coups, and confront human rights violations and abuses using both
punitive measures and positive inducements. If confirmed, I would work
with the Africa Bureau to ensure that post-coup governments understand
that quick and credible transitions to democratically elected, civilian
governments are a priority of the United States, especially those
looking for security assistance. I would also continue DRL's work to
support civil society, ensure members of marginalized groups, including
youth, have a voice in political processes, promote human-centered
security, and prioritize resources to encourage democratic governance,
effective service delivery, accountability, anti-corruption measures,
and dialogue between capitals and communities, which are key to long-
term stability and prosperity.
Adherence to constitutionally mandated term limits and strong
democratic institutions are fundamental to a country's peace and
prosperity, and African voters overwhelmingly support having a say in
how they are governed and by whom. If confirmed, I would work to expand
U.S. Government efforts, through diplomatic engagement and foreign
assistance programming, that focus on enabling and supporting free and
fair elections and electoral processes that are peaceful and inclusive.
I would also support capacity building for key actors and civil
society, training for national elections commissions, representation of
marginalized groups in government, law enforcement accountability
training, and voter education and election observation.
Question. How should lessons learned from situations in Mali and
Sudan inform the State Department's sense of urgency in addressing
protracted conflicts and failed peace processes in places like Cameroon
and South Sudan?
Answer. While all have unique causes, at the core of undemocratic
transfers of power and violent conflicts on the continent is violence
against civilians, a lack of accountable democratic governance, and
closed political space, and each requires a democratic governance
solution and sustained U.S. leadership.
If confirmed, I will work closely with other bureaus, other
agencies, and civil society, including local civil society
organizations, to continue investments in institutional reforms,
support for civil society and empowering people on the continent to
build a more sustainable peace and democracy.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest quantity of
greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute control of
Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these
destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a threat to
the United States?
Answer. Yes. In March 2023, the Director of National Intelligence
testified that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most
consequential threat to U.S. national security and leadership
globally.'' Under President Xi, the CCP has become more repressive at
home and more aggressive abroad, seeking to undercut U.S. influence and
alliances.
If confirmed, I will defend democratic principles and promote
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms even in the face of
our strategic competition with China. I will press the PRC for an end
to human rights abuses and violations while pressing for sorely needed
human rights reforms, including by raising these concerns in
multilateral fora at every possible opportunity.
On Xinjiang specifically, if confirmed, I will work closely with
other relevant bureaus in the State Department, in addition to other
agencies including the Department of the Treasury, to promote
accountability for PRC officials connected to the ongoing atrocities
and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet, and throughout the PRC. I
will work to utilize the range of accountability tools at the
Department's disposal, including the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of
2020, to take additional actions in this regard. Additionally, I will
work to advance our efforts to address Uyghur forced labor. Since
enactment of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), the
Department has worked with the interagency to add several dozen
entities to the Entity List. I will work diligently to continue the
process of adding more entities to the list.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. The CCP's actions have become more repressive at home and
more aggressive abroad, as Secretary Blinken has stated.
According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S.
influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster
some norms that favor its authoritarian system.''
I am under no illusions about the CCP, and I promise to press the
PRC to end its atrocities and its transnational repression. I will also
stay closely coordinated with others in the Department working on
counter-narcotics issues.
I promise to press CCP officials for sorely needed human rights
reforms and urge them to adhere to international human rights law. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with you in this regard.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. As the United States competes vigorously with the PRC, the
United States manages this competition responsibly so that competition
does not veer into conflict. The United States will continue to work
with the PRC to address transnational challenges when it is in our
interest to do so--as Secretary Blinken has said, not as a favor to us
or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from our
principles, but because it is what the world expects. If confirmed, I
will advance U.S. objectives and counter harmful behavior by the PRC,
including the PRC's human rights abuses and transnational repression.
If confirmed, I will meet with activists and diaspora communities
while remaining clear-eyed about the risks individuals take when they
meet with U.S. officials or stand up for human rights and democracy.
For example, on February 5, I understand that Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink and Senior Bureau
Official for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Robert S. Gilchrist
discussed the ongoing human rights situation in Hong Kong with U.S.-
based democracy activists who have been unjustly targeted by Hong Kong
authorities. If confirmed, I will continue such discussions with these
and other activists. I will raise concerns about Hong Kong's extra-
territorial use of the National Security Law and evaluate all options
to promote accountability for those involved in human rights abuses,
transnational repression, and the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy.
I will make sure that we continue to condemn PRC violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Congress plays a critical role
in this effort, and I look forward to working with you and your staff
if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests and countering efforts by our strategic and regional
competitors, including the PRC, to undermine those interests. Again, I
am clear-eyed about the threats posed by CCP activities. I will support
working together with organizations or representatives from the PRC
only where our interests align, such as promoting the rights of persons
with disabilities through the U.S.-China Coordination Meeting on
Disability.
If confirmed, I will support Secretary Blinken's implementation of
the ``invest, align, compete'' strategy, which highlights the ways in
which the PRC's global vision threatens the rules based international
order. As part of this strategy, if confirmed, I will work with the
interagency to counter PRC efforts undermining human rights and
democracy.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign this letter to the President.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate in any walkout that may have
taken place on the January 16, 2024.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has made clear that he welcomes active
use of the Department of State's dissent channel, takes it seriously,
and uses it to reflect on his own thinking in terms of policy making
and what he proposes to the President. If confirmed, I will reflect
this approach in my leadership style by encouraging DRL employees to
come directly to me if they have alternative points of view and would
like to influence U.S. policy. I believe that is the most direct,
appropriate way to influence supervisors' views. I will also consult
with the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor and others if I
have concerns about employee conduct.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. As I am not currently serving in the Administration, I am
not familiar with the details of this letter. More generally, recognize
and support Department employees' right to freedom of expression under
the First Amendment, including to express disagreement with a
dissenting view. If confirmed, I will uphold relevant laws and policies
pertaining to the protection of whistleblowers, including the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(b)(8). If I have any questions about
whistleblowing or employees' conduct, I will consult with colleagues
from the Office of the Legal Advisor at State and other relevant
personnel offices.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. I understand that the Department maintains established
procedures, including in the Foreign Affairs Manual, for addressing
incidents or allegations that may serve as grounds for disciplinary
action. If confirmed, I will scrupulously follow established procedures
for handling such issues, consistent with the rights and
responsibilities of Department employees, consulting with appropriate
personnel officers at State. If confirmed, I will also ensure that DRL
bureau employees understand that there are several avenues available to
express policy disagreements and would encourage employees to use
established channels to express their views.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza. I supported the U.S. brokered humanitarian pause in November
2023 and continue to support U.S. government efforts to negotiate
similar humanitarian pauses in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is an antisemitic entity and a designated
foreign terrorist organization (FTO) whose founding charter calls for
the killing of Jews.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. Yes, a ceasefire could give Hamas time to regroup. I do not
support calling for a ceasefire and instead support the
Administration's policy of advancing humanitarian pauses, which have
previously resulted in hostage releases, enabled an increase in the
flow of aid, and allowed the voluntary movement of civilians who sought
to move to safer locations.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. I support the Administration's policy to advance temporary
humanitarian pauses to enable a sustained flow of aid and to allow the
voluntary movement of civilians who are seeking to move to safer
locations. If confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts to
secure the release of all hostages that Hamas is holding. I support
Israel's right to defend itself and ensure a terrorist attack like
October 7 never happens again. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken
have made clear publicly, it matters how Israel does so. If confirmed,
I will commit to promoting compliance with international humanitarian
law, including that feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm are
taken. If confirmed, I will also advocate for Israel to investigate any
credible allegations of international humanitarian law violations and
human rights abuses when they arise and ensure that proper Israeli
accountability mechanisms are utilized. Doing so is a moral and
strategic imperative.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. I agree with President Biden's policy of supporting Israel,
which has a right to defend itself to ensure a terrorist attack like
October 7 never happens again. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's ongoing efforts to urge Israel to comply with
international humanitarian law, including the requirement to
distinguish between civilians and Hamas terrorists and to take all
feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm. Hamas's use of
civilians as human shields, a blatant violation of international law,
does not lessen Israel's obligations under international humanitarian
law. If confirmed, I will commit to urging Israel to investigate any
credible allegations of international humanitarian law violations and
human rights abuses when they arise and to make full use of Israeli
mechanisms for accountability. Doing so is a moral and strategic
imperative.
Question. In 2021, the Biden Administration de-listed the Houthis
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) so that humanitarian aid could be
delivered to Yemen. Would you describe the treatment of the Yemeni
people by the Houthis as ``humanitarian?''
Answer. Absolutely not. The Houthis have engaged in extensive human
rights abuses against the Yemeni people, as has been well-documented in
the Department's annual human rights reports. The prior decision, in
2021, to lift the Houthis' terrorist designations was taken because of
concerns over the unintended, adverse humanitarian impacts of these
designations on the flow of aid into the country by implementers
managing humanitarian assistance programs.
If confirmed, I will focus on the significant problem of Houthi
human rights abuses. As illustrated in the 2022 Human Rights Report on
Yemen, Houthi abuses included impunity for acts involving unlawful or
arbitrary killings; forced disappearances; torture or other physical
abuses; harsh and life-threatening conditions of detention; unlawful
recruitment or use of child soldiers; interference in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance; restrictions on freedom of expression; and
arbitrary or unlawful arrests and detention. Ongoing Houthi violence
against women and girls, including rape, sexual violence, and other
abuses, is also gravely concerning.
The Secretary announced on January 17, 2024, that the Department is
designating Ansarallah (commonly referred to as the Houthis) as an
SDGT, effective February 16, 2024, to promote accountability for its
unprecedented attacks against international shipping. At the same time,
we are taking significant steps to mitigate any adverse impacts this
designation may have on the humanitarian aid access to the people of
Yemen, including robust outreach to aid implementers, providers and
other partners who are crucial to facilitating humanitarian assistance.
If confirmed, I will promote efforts to hold the Houthis
accountable for their human rights abuses at home and reckless, illegal
attacks on international shipping abroad, while also continuing to
address the humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people.
Question. Given the Houthis' numerous recent attacks in the Red Sea
and the Gulf of Aden, do you believe the administration was right to
de-list the Houthis from these designations?
Answer. Although I am not currently in the Administration, I
strongly support the January 17,2024 decision to re-list Ansarallah
(commonly referred to as the Houthis) as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist (SDGT) in response to the Iranian-enabled Houthi attacks on
commercial shipping and naval vessels and crews transiting the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden. I understand that the SDGT designation is carefully
calibrated to maximize its impact on the Houthis by isolating them and
restricting their access to resources while mitigating the impact on
vulnerable Yemeni civilians to the greatest extent possible. If
confirmed, I will promote efforts to hold the Houthis accountable for
their human rights abuses and reckless, illegal attacks on
international shipping, while also continuing to address the
humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people.
Question. Now that the Houthis have been declared an SDGT, do you
believe they should also be listed as an FTO?
Answer. I believe the Department's response must be calibrated and
targeted to preserve U.S. interests in a peace settlement in Yemen,
while maximizing the deterrent effect on the Houthis. The United States
must hold the group accountable for its actions while mitigating
adverse humanitarian impacts on the people of Yemen.
I understand that humanitarian considerations continue to be an
important factor in decisions regarding the option of a Foreign
Terrorist Organization designation of the Houthis. If confirmed, I will
promote efforts to hold the Houthis accountable for their human rights
abuses and reckless attacks on international shipping, while also
continuing to address the humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people. I
look forward to re-engaging with you on this issue if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree that the Houthis are being supported by, and
a proxy of, another declared FTO Iran?
Answer. Yes, I agree. The United States government has been clear
that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping are enabled by Iran,
which provides them with financing, weaponry, intelligence and
logistics assistance, and other support necessary to carry out these
attacks. The supply of arms and related materiel to the Houthis
directly violates U.N. Security Council resolution 2216. Iran's support
is unacceptable and must end.
Question. If confirmed, would you advocate for re-listing the
Houthis as an FTO?
Answer. I understand that the SDGT designation announced by the
Secretary on January 17, 2024, is carefully calibrated to maximize its
impact on the Houthis by isolating them and restricting their access to
resources, while mitigating the impact on vulnerable Yemeni civilians
to the greatest extent possible. If confirmed, I will review additional
mechanisms, including designations, that would promote efforts to hold
the Houthis accountable for their human rights abuses and reckless
attacks on international shipping, while also continuing to address the
humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people.
Question. Much of your experience is related to counterterrorism
and you've made statements about addressing the root causes of
terrorism through infrastructure and education. If confirmed, what
programs would you implement at DRL to counter terrorist recruitment,
especially in the Middle East?
Answer. There is a significant body of public research suggesting
that individuals who feel disenfranchised are often susceptible to
joining terrorist organizations. This is most prevalent in places that
lack sufficient basic education and infrastructure, and often
pronounced where governance is lacking, corrupt, or repressive. In that
sense, promoting more credible, just governance and advocating for
human rights and the rule of law can, in some cases, reduce the
attractiveness of terrorist organizations to certain individuals. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with State and interagency
colleagues to address current sources of terrorist recruitment and
mobilization, including by promoting human rights and democratization
as a way to address the root causes of terrorism globally. Congress has
an important role on this national security issue, and I look forward
to working with you if confirmed.
Question. What about global violence in general? What solutions
would you employ to reduce it?
Answer. Around the globe, repressive regimes are using violence and
intimidation to stymie civil society actors, journalists, and other
individuals who seek to exercise human rights such as freedom of speech
or assembly. The PRC and Russia are exporting models of
authoritarianism that often lead to violence and repression. If
confirmed, I will review all policy tools across State and the
interagency to ensure that our diplomatic, programmatic, and
multilateral mechanisms are countering these global trends. This
includes reviewing how DRL foreign assistance programming can be most
effective and where other tools can protect basic freedoms and reduce
civilian harm.
Question. DRL implements programming in countries that may not
share all of the democratic norms we associate with liberal
democracies, but are nonetheless strategic partners of the United
States. Warranted or not, DRL programming is often perceived as
threatening to the governments in power in these countries. Do you
support DRL programming in countries that are strategic partners at the
potential cost of damaging our relationship with those countries?
Answer. DRL programming focuses on supporting democracy and human
rights. One of democracy's unique strengths is the ability to
acknowledge its imperfections and confront them openly and
transparently. If confirmed, I will review DRL's foreign assistance
programs to ensure that all of our programs are strategic, impactful
and advancing top U.S. foreign policy priorities. I will seek input
from colleagues around the world, including U.S. embassy officials,
local leaders, partner governments and civil society. I will also seek
input from Congressional champions of democracy and human rights, and
look forward to re-engaging on this issue if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, how would DRL programs in these countries
coordinate with other State Department and U.S. government efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that DRL continues to closely
coordinate with other Department of State functional and regional
bureaus, including Embassies, USAID, and other U.S. government
agencies. I recognize that there are many departments and agencies that
play a critical role in bolstering democratic institutions, promoting
accountability, and safeguarding human rights. Through continued, close
coordination and collaboration, I believe DRL will be best positioned
to leverage different expertise, harness diverse insights, share
successes and learn from setbacks, and ensure the most effective use of
U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Question. Should DRL prioritize defending democracy where it
already exists or fostering where it doesn't?
Answer. The strengthening of democracy is imperative if we are to
achieve a more peaceful, prosperous, free, and just world. A democracy-
centered approach to our foreign policy reflects core American values,
and is in the United States' national security interest. In every
region of the world, people want to be free, expect their rights to be
protected, and are driven by the hope of a democratic future. DRL aims
to support this desire by safeguarding democracy, human rights, and
fundamental freedoms for all, everywhere.
If confirmed, I would guide DRL to continue its work tailored to a
number of different types of countries. These include a) partner
countries with strong social movements, civil society and other
democratic actors; b) countries undergoing democratic transitions; c)
those under threat of democratic backsliding; and d)those where
democracy has not yet taken root. DRL should have separate strategies
and sets of programs for each of these different types of countries.
While all these lines of efforts are essential to revitalize, defend,
and support democracy worldwide, if confirmed, I would lead the bureau
in efforts to determine how it will strategically prioritize engagement
within each of these categories and where other bureaus and agencies
might have a comparative advantage. I would seek Congressional,
academic, NGO, and other inputs as I consider DRL's future trajectory
and vision.
Question. This Congress, Senator Shaheen and I introduced the
Taxpayers and Savers Protection (TSP) Act to force the Thrift Savings
Plan to divest from securities with exposure to the People's Republic
of China and Hong Kong. As the world's pre-eminent supporter of
authoritarianism that is pursuing a strategy to reduce America's power,
it makes no sense for any of our public officials' retirement dependent
on the success of the Chinese economy. Do you currently have
investments in securities, including in passive index funds, with
exposure to the People's Republic of China or Hong Kong?
Answer. Per my conversation with Senator Rubio's staff on February
6, 2024, I am reviewing my spouse's and my investments. At present, our
investments are only in broad-based passive index funds and U.S.
municipal bonds.
Question. Do you think it is appropriate for a State Department
official that oversees programs that assist activists standing up to
the oppression of the Chinese Communist Party to hold a financial stake
in the Chinese economy?
Answer. I take seriously the ethical obligation to avoid conflicts
of interest and will conduct myself accordingly. If confirmed, I will
ensure that we continue to assist activists standing up to oppressive
actions by the Chinese Communist Party, both through our programming
and public and private advocacy. I will not stand for the PRC's
targeting of those brave enough to stand up for human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout the country, including in Xinjiang,
Hong Kong, and Tibet. This includes its attempts to silence activists
and human rights defenders outside of China's borders, who the PRC
continues to target through its global campaign of transnational
repression.
Question. If confirmed, will you divest all of your financial
stakes in Chinese securities or index funds that include Chinese
assets?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to divesting from any securities or
index funds that would present unacceptable exposure to the PRC or Hong
Kong in accordance with guidance received from State Department's Legal
Advisor's Office.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand by Senator Christopher Murphy
The FY 24 budget request cited Tunisia as a possible
recipient for additional military aid from the FMF Emerging
Global Priorities Fund ``if Tunisia shows signs of a return to
democratic governance.'' It's been nearly a year since we
received that budget request. Since that time, more than 20
opposition, media and business figures have been imprisoned,
accused of ``plotting against state security.'' Local elections
in December saw just 11 percent of voters turn out, the same
figure who participated in parliamentary elections earlier in
the year. Apathetic voters see these bodies as essentially
powerless, as President Saied has centralized more and more
power in the presidency.
Question. Now that we have another year of examples, is it your
assessment that a return to democracy in Tunisia this year is a
realistic possibility? What support, if any, would you propose to the
2024 presidential election process in Tunisia? What changes would you
advocate to the scope and emphasis of U.S. aid programs in Tunisia, if
any?
Answer. I share the Administration's serious alarm at the continued
erosion of democratic governance in Tunisia. Independent Tunisian civil
society remains essential in promoting democratic governance and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. If confirmed, I will
advocate for continued Department prioritization of policies and
programs to strengthen democratic institutions, defend against further
human rights abuses, and protect Tunisia's vibrant civil society,
including by ensuring that U.S. assistance is directly benefitting the
Tunisian people and making critical investments in civil society.
Since he seized power more than three years ago, President
Saied has followed a dictator's handbook almost to the letter:
disbanding parliament, writing a new constitution that
consolidates his power, disbanding judicial independence and
employing military tribunals, and arresting members of the
opposition including treason charges for the leader of the
largest opposition party. In April 2023, when Administrator
Power testified on the administration's FY 24 budget request, I
raised my concerns with the administration's desire to zero out
aid to civil society while maintaining the same amount of
military aid.
Question. The Senate fixed this in our FY 24 State and Foreign
Operations bill, by including $15 million for civil society. With the
political opposition essentially eliminated in Tunisia, how important
is it that we maintain the oxygen to civil society as one of the only
independent voices still left in Tunisia's dictatorship? Will you
commit to fighting for the inclusion of robust funding for civil
society in the FY 25 request when it is sent to Congress in the coming
weeks?
Answer. Supporting Tunisian civil society means continuing to
support democratic governance and promote respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. If confirmed, I will reiterate, as the
Administration has done, the essential role of Tunisian civil society
organizations, which remain on the forefront of protecting human rights
and advocating for democratic governance, the rule of law, and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and
association.
If confirmed, I also will ensure that DRL continues to consult with
and seek opportunities to amplify the voices of Tunisian civil society
groups. I commit to advocating for continued robust funding for the
protection and support of Tunisia's independent and vibrant civil
society.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Dafna Hochman Rand by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Do you believe China's actions amount to genocide?
Answer. Yes. In January 2021, then Secretary of State Pompeo
determined that since at least March 2017, the PRC, under the direction
and control of the CCP, has committed genocide and crimes against
humanity against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. Secretary Blinken has
reaffirmed that these atrocities are ongoing and a wide variety of
publicly available reporting and documentation from other governments,
U.N. bodies, and civil society organizations provides further evidence.
I agree with this determination.
Question. What will you do to address what the Administration
describes as a ``genocide'' committed by the Chinese Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners to
promote accountability for the PRC's ongoing genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang. I will work multilaterally, including at
the U.N. Human Rights Council, with other international organizations,
and in coordination with allies, encouraging the use of targeted
sanctions, visa restrictions, export controls, and import restrictions.
I will also publicly and privately condemn the PRC's actions, calling
for an end to these crimes and atrocities.
Question. How many People's Republic of China (PRC) Government
officials have been sanctioned under the UHRPA?
Answer. On December 8, 2023, the Department of State submitted the
``Report to Congress on the Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to Section
6(a) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, P.L. 116-145,''
which identified two PRC Government officials connected to ongoing
serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The Department of the Treasury
concurrently sanctioned the two PRC Government officials identified in
the report. Gao Qi was designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 and UHRPA, for
his involvement in serious human rights abuses. Hu Lianhe was
designated pursuant to E.O. 13818, in support of UHRPA objectives, for
being a foreign person who is or has been a leader or official of an
entity, including any government entity, that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious human rights abuses.
If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to hold others
accountable under a range of tools including UHRPA.
Question. How effectively is the Administration using the UHRPA?
Answer. I am not currently in the Administration, but if confirmed,
I will review how UHRPA is being implemented to ensure maximal
effectiveness and impact. I will make sure that the Department uses a
range of policy tools, including UHRPA, to promote accountability for
PRC officials implicated in atrocities and other human rights abuses in
Xinjiang and throughout the country.
Since UHRPA was passed in 2020, the Department has designated 14
persons involved in serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang under the
Global Magnitsky sanctions program and has imposed visa restrictions
under Section 7031(c) on eight PRC and CCP officials for their
involvement in gross violations of human rights in Xinjiang. In March
2021, the United States coordinated with the EU, UK, and Canada to
impose multilateral sanctions on several individuals and entities
implicated in the atrocities in Xinjiang.
Question. If confirmed, how will you promote the use of the UHRPA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take a fresh look at how to enhance
the use of UHRPA along with other foreign policy tools to promote
accountability for PRC officials connected to the ongoing atrocities
and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet and throughout the PRC. I
will seek input from civil society, expert analysts and academics, and
Congress to implement UHRPA effectively and robustly, and to ensure
that we are impactful in holding PRC officials accountable.
Question. The Biden Administration rejoined the United Nations
Human Rights Council in 2021. How many members of the Human Rights
Council are serious human rights abusers?
Answer. There are several members of the Human Rights Council that
are serious human rights abusers. The United States, as a member of the
Council, uses its role to place a spotlight on human rights abusers all
over the world, including those that are sitting members of the
Council.
If confirmed, I will work with colleagues in allied governments, to
supporting efforts to prevent human rights abusers from joining the
Human Rights Council (HRC). When the United States plays an active and
constructive role on the HRC, we have the ability to engage with our
allies and partners to keep some of the countries with the worst human
rights records off the Council. For example, U.S. leadership ensured
Russia was suspended from the HRC in 2022, and the seat was replaced by
a U.S. ally, Czechia. The United States also supported efforts to elect
Albania over Russia to the HRC in 2023.
Question. What reforms do you believe are needed at the Human
Rights Council?
Answer. Council membership needs to be bolstered by those with
strong human rights records. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues
at State, supporting efforts to improve the Council's membership and
ensuring that the Council remains focused on critical international
human rights violators, such as Iran and Syria. I also think the
standing agenda item focused on Israel is biased, as no other country
has an entire HRC agenda item devoted to it. The United States plays an
indispensable role in defending Israel at the U.N., including at the
Human Rights Council, and we need to be actively engaged at the Council
to play this role.
Question. Do you believe that the Human Rights Council has a bias
against Israel?
Answer. Yes, I do. The Council's bias against Israel is evident in
the standing agenda item focused on Israel. Our active engagement and
membership in the HRC is important, so that our ally is not standing
alone. When the U.S. is not present, there is no one in the HRC to
fully defend Israel.
Question. Do you believe Russia should provide reparations to
Ukraine?
Answer. Yes. I believe Russia is responsible for billions of
dollars in damage to Ukraine's critical infrastructure, businesses,
schools, hospitals, and cultural sites, as well as its environment,
caused by Russia's war of aggression. Russia must be held accountable
for the wide-ranging harm it has caused to its sovereign neighbor and
to individuals in Ukraine, and paying reparations is crucial. If
confirmed, I will work with our allies and partners to explore all
legal avenues to induce Russia to cease its aggression and pay for the
damage it has caused, including by exploring the potential use of
frozen assets.
Question. In your opinion, have Russia and President Putin
committed war crimes in Ukraine?
Answer. I concur with the U.S. Government's determination that
members of Russia's forces have committed war crimes in Ukraine. The
evidence is overwhelmingly clear and consistent.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure war crimes committed by
Russia in Ukraine are documented?
Answer. I firmly support President Biden's commitment to promoting
accountability for Russia's crimes in Ukraine and justice for victims.
Comprehensive accountability will take years, if not decades, and U.S.
support will remain essential. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's efforts to pursue multiple pathways to justice for the
international crimes committed in the context of Russia's war. I will
continue DRL's support to civil society groups contributing to
documentation, as well as those who advocate for victims and contribute
to investigations in Ukraine and elsewhere. I will also support efforts
by international organizations and inquiries, including the United
Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Donna Ann Welton by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Do you pledge to fully support Congressional Delegations
(CODELs) and Staff Delegations (STAFFDELs) that seek to travel to post?
Answer. If confirmed, yes, I pledge to fully support Congressional
Delegations (CODELs) and Staff Delegations (STAFFDELs) that seek to
travel to post.
Question. Do you agree to fully support any CODEL or STAFFDEL, with
the only exceptions for simultaneous or overlapping visits by the
President or First Lady of the United States, the Vice President, or
the Secretaries of State or Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, yes, I commit to supporting to the fullest
extent possible any CODEL or STAFFDEL.
Question. What implications do Timor-Leste's upcoming elections
have for its relations with Australia and China?
Answer. Jose Ramos-Horta was elected President in a free and fair
presidential election in 2022 and Xanana Gusmao was elected Prime
Minister following a free and fair parliamentary election in 2023. I
understand that, following those elections, Timor-Leste continues to
maintain a ``friend to all'' foreign policy and seeks to maintain good
relations with its neighbors and major powers, including Australia, the
People's Republic of China (PRC), and the United States. If confirmed
as Ambassador to Timor-Leste, I will focus on partnering with Australia
and other like-minded countries to counter harmful behavior by the PRC
as we work with Timor-Leste to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. In particular, I will partner with the Timorese Government and
civil society to further strengthen Timor-Leste's democratic
institutions, protect human rights, and counter corruption.
Question. How much assistance, both in terms of aid and investment,
is China providing to Timor-Leste? What can the U.S. do to offset
Timor-Leste's growing ties with China?
Answer. Timor-Leste maintains a ``friend to all'' foreign policy
and seeks to maintain good relations with its neighbors and major
powers, including the United States and the People's Republic of China
(PRC). While Australia and the United States are Timor-Leste's largest
development partners, I understand that, to meet the country's economic
development goals, the Government of Timor-Leste has partnered with the
PRC on certain infrastructure projects, including construction of roads
and some government buildings including the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. I also understand that, in 2023, Timor-Leste and the PRC
upgraded their bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership and announced a shared intent to further expand bilateral
cooperation. If confirmed, I will focus on countering harmful behavior
by the PRC as we work with Timor-Leste to maintain a free and open
Indo-Pacific region. In particular, I will partner with the Timorese
Government and civil society to further strengthen Timor-Leste's
democratic institutions, uphold human rights, and counter corruption. I
will also focus on supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to diversify its
economy and further integrate into global commerce, including
supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to join ASEAN and the WTO. Finally, I
will continue the strong security sector cooperation between the United
States and Timor-Leste.
Trafficking in Persons
In the State Department's 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report,
Timor-Leste remained on Tier 2 for its continued and sustained
efforts to meet the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking. In the reporting period between the two latest
reports, Timor-Leste significantly improved its capacity to
identify trafficking victims, provide services, and more but
failed to prosecute any traffickers.
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with the Government of
Timor-Leste and the Ambassador-at-Large to Combat and Monitor
Trafficking in Persons to improve trafficking on the ground?
Answer. Combating human trafficking is a human rights and security
priority. While Timor-Leste has made significant efforts to combat
trafficking in persons, the country does not meet the minimum standards
for the elimination of trafficking. If confirmed, I commit to working
with the Government of Timor-Leste, Timorese civil society, and the
Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to
strengthen Timor-Leste's anti-trafficking efforts.
Specifically, I will engage with senior members of the Timorese
Government to encourage the prioritization and funding of anti-
trafficking initiatives. I will also continue and expand law
enforcement and judicial training for Timorese officials, including
sponsoring Timorese officials to attend courses at the International
Law Enforcement Training Center (ILEA) in Bangkok through funding from
the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL), to increase Timorese capacity to identify human
trafficking and increase trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and
convictions. I will also work with civil society to strengthen their
capacity to raise awareness of trafficking and provide services to
victims, as well as forge strong links between civil society and the
Timorese Government. Finally, I will work with the Ambassador-at-Large
to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to ensure accurate
reporting of trafficking in Timor-Leste and to effectively use high-
level engagement from Washington to advance this priority issue.
Question. Understanding the prioritized recommendations, if
confirmed, what steps are most important in your opinion?
Answer. Many of the prioritized recommendations for Timor-Leste in
the 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report--including increasing
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions in accordance with anti-
trafficking laws, and improving victim identification and services--
relate to capacity challenges of the Government of Timor-Leste. If
confirmed, I will collaborate with USAID, the Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Office
to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and subject matter
experts across the U.S. Government to support Timor-Leste's law
enforcement and judicial capacity to combat human trafficking. These
efforts could include sponsoring Timorese officials to attend courses
at the International Law Enforcement Training Center (ILEA) in Bangkok
through funding from INL, promoting educational exchanges and study
opportunities in the United States for Timor-Leste's current and
emerging leaders, and supporting engagement between U.S. subject matter
experts and Timorese leaders.
Question. Do you commit to accurately portraying the realities of
trafficking on the ground as it is reported through the annual
Trafficking in Persons report?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Ambassador to Timor-Leste, I commit to
accurately portraying the realities of trafficking on the ground as it
is reported through the annual Trafficking in Persons Report.
Religious Freedom
In the State Department's 2022 Report on International
Religious Freedom, Timor-Leste was noted as having a general
lack of societal and governmental respect for religious
freedom.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on this issue?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Ambassador, I commit to engage with
Timorese civil society to promote respect for religious freedom. I will
also ensure the Embassy continues to support programs that promote
freedom of religion or belief, including for members of minority
religious groups.
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with the host
government and the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom to improve religious freedom on the ground?
Answer. Freedom of religion or belief is a right which the United
States and Timor-Leste both value. I understand that members of
minority religious groups in Timor-Leste, including Muslim and
Protestant communities, generally reported experiencing religious
tolerance.
If confirmed as Ambassador, I commit to lead the Embassy's
continued engagement with the Government of Timor-Leste regarding
reports of discrimination in civil service hiring, rejection by public
officials of documentation of members of religious minority groups, and
other challenges. I will also work with the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom to ensure the annual International
Religious Freedom report continues to accurately reflect the religious
freedom situation in Timor-Leste.
Human Rights
In the State Department's 2022 Country Reports on Human
Rights, Timor-Leste was noted as having several significant
human rights issues including corruption, arbitrary killings,
violence against disabled persons, as well as the worst forms
of child labor.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on these issues?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to engaging with civil society
to promote human rights in Timor-Leste and to address corruption,
arbitrary killings, violence against persons with disabilities, and the
worst forms of child labor, among other challenges. While Timor-Leste
has made significant progress in consolidating democracy and protecting
human rights since gaining independence in 2002, there is more work to
be done, and civil society must play an important role in promoting and
preserving a free and democratic society.
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with the host
government to improve human rights on the ground?
Answer. Timor-Leste is a democracy committed to upholding human
rights, and respect for democratic principles and human rights are
central to the U.S.-Timor-Leste relationship. If confirmed, I will
regularly engage with Timorese officials at the highest-level to
encourage the Government of Timor-Leste to promote and protect human
rights. I will also support exchanges and programs that increase
knowledge and awareness of human rights issues and continue and expand
law enforcement and judicial training that promotes the rule of law.
Finally, I will look to partner with Timor-Leste on international
matters of shared concern, such as the crisis in Burma, to promote
democracy and human rights.
International Organizations
Question. If confirmed, please describe how you can work with U.S.-
U.N. and IO colleagues to find, recruit, and retain qualified Americans
in the U.N. system.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing work
of the Bureau of International Organizations, Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel, and their coordination with USUN to find,
recruit, and retain qualified U.S. citizens in the U.N. system. I will
support IO colleagues as they proactively identify openings and
advocate for more U.S. citizens in key leadership positions across the
U.N. and across international organizations. I will support efforts to
expand existing targeted recruitment efforts by increasing outreach
through different talent pipelines, connecting U.S. citizens already
employed by the U.N. with prospective applicants, and sharing the IO
Careers website as the advocacy portal.
Question. If confirmed, please describe how you can work with USUN
and IO colleagues to promote American or likeminded initiatives within
the U.N. system, including on technical matters at specialized bodies.
Answer. I would collaborate with the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs to identify issues such as education, AI
governance, climate change, and upholding freedom of navigation where
Timor-Leste and the United States have common interests in potential
engagement within the U.N. system. Our efforts would include
cooperation in specialized bodies such as the International Maritime
Organization and UNESCO, as well as in the Fourth International
Conference on Small Island Developing States, and Summit of the Future.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Donna Ann Welton by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest quantity of
greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute control of
Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these
destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a threat to
the United States?
Answer. The 2023 Annual Threat Assessment by the U.S. Intelligence
Community was very clear: ``China has the capability to directly
attempt to alter the rules-based global order in every realm and across
multiple regions, as a near-peer competitor that is increasingly
pushing to change global norms and potentially threatening its
neighbors.'' As Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP
has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. However,
the United States, through its positive presence in Timor-Leste, is
regarded as a trusted, reliable, and close partner. If confirmed, I
will continue to advance U.S. national security interests and counter
the People's Republic of China (PRC) efforts to expand its problematic
influence and use of coercion, through diplomatic engagements, public
diplomacy, commercial advocacy, and innovative development assistance.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on defending and advancing
U.S. interests in Timor-Leste and the immediate region, mindful that
Beijing is devoted to carrying out Xi's vision of making the PRC the
preeminent power in East Asia. If confirmed, I will counter attempts to
undercut U.S. influence and drive wedges between the United States and
its partners.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. Stabilizing the relationship with the PRC is in the U.S.
interest and the United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change, when it is in the
U.S. interest to do so. We will not sacrifice our capacity to
strengthen our positions, economic and security-related, in Southeast
Asia. If confirmed, I will work across the U.S. interagency and with
Congress to advance U.S. objectives and counter harmful behavior by the
PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be consistently defending
and advancing U.S. interests, and I will work closely with State
Department and interagency colleagues, and with Congress to achieve
those goals. Other than meetings of multilateral organizations to which
both the United States and the PRC are long-standing members, I do not
foresee any joint activity in Timor-Leste.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign the letter.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate in the January 16, 2024, walkout.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. I believe that open discussion and examination of
dissenting views contributes to better policies and a stronger team,
and I recognize that we, as U.S. citizens, have the hard-won right to
express our views freely. However, I would encourage colleagues and
subordinates to participate in constructive ways to debate and provide
input.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. Because ``whistleblowing'' is a term and activity covered
by legislation and regulations, I would consult with our legal office
to determine if the referenced actions were protected.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will handle discipline issues at the
embassy in consultation with Department human resource and legal
specialists. If confirmed, I will also seek to set a standard of trust
and openness that would permit full discussion of contentious issues
and elicit constructive criticism in ways that would benefit our
policies and uphold our commitment to serving U.S. interests as defined
by leadership in the Department and the White House.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire in
Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a foreign terrorist organization that is
antisemitic. Its founding charter calls for the killing of Jewish
people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. I understand that the Administration supports humanitarian
pauses to allow for the transport of aid and safe exit of hostages and
other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a
sustained flow of aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians
seeking safer locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is
attempting to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The
U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas's
terrorism, consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect
itself, consistent with international law. The Administration has urged
Israel to differentiate between civilians and Hamas terrorists and to
avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of civilians as human shields, a
blatant violation of international law, does not lessen Israel's
obligations under international humanitarian law. If confirmed, I will
ensure that our position on the Israel-Hamas conflict is clearly
explained and understood by Timor-Leste leadership and the public.
Question. Timor-Leste's political parties are largely led by
individuals who were part of the country's independence movement whose
rivalries have perpetuated political instability in the country. How
should the U.S. strengthen Timor-Leste's political institutions?
Answer. Since independence, Timor-Leste has made significant
progress in strengthening its democratic institutions, including
overseeing multiple successful elections and peaceful transitions of
power, most recently in 2023. The United States is committed to
partnering with Timor-Leste to further strengthen its democratic
institutions and promote good governance, and we regularly engage the
Timorese Government and civil society on these issues. Through U.S.
Government exchange programs, including the Fulbright program, the
U.S.-Timor-Leste scholarship program, the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
Initiative, as well as media engagement and English-language
scholarships, we are also building people-to-people ties between our
two countries and helping to develop the next generation of Timorese
leaders. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts and ensure that
support for democracy and human rights remains central to our
engagement with Timor-Leste.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the Chinese
Communist Party does not build further inroads in Timor-Leste?
Answer. Timor-Leste is a democracy that shares our commitment to
upholding human rights. Through engagement that strengthens Timor-
Leste's governance institutions, security, and economic stability, the
United States has become one of Timor-Leste's most essential partners.
If confirmed as Ambassador to Timor-Leste, I will focus on countering
harmful behavior by the PRC as we work together to maintain a free and
open Indo-Pacific region.
In particular, I will partner with the Timorese Government and
civil society to further strengthen Timor-Leste's democratic
institutions and counter corruption. I will also focus on supporting
Timor-Leste's efforts to diversify its economy and further integrate
into global commerce, including supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to
join ASEAN and the WTO. Finally, I will continue the strong security
sector cooperation between the United States and Timor-Leste.
Question. Timor-Leste is one of the few remaining countries in
Southeast Asia that is not part of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Should the U.S. role support Timor-Leste obtain full
membership in ASEAN? Please explain.
Answer. The United States supports Timor-Leste's efforts to gain
full ASEAN membership and was pleased that Timor-Leste obtained full
observer status in 2022. I believe Timor-Leste's accession to ASEAN is
important for the country's regional economic integration and long-term
economic stability. I also believe that Timor-Leste, as a democracy
with a commitment to upholding human rights, would be an important
voice within ASEAN. The United States recognizes and respects, however,
that Timor-Leste's ASEAN membership is, ultimately, a decision between
Timor-Leste and the current ASEAN member states.
I understand the U.S. Government is partnering with Timor-Leste to
achieve the milestones outlined in its Roadmap for full ASEAN
membership, including improving human resources capacity and English-
language training, fostering a better business environment, and
strengthening security sector capacity. If confirmed, I will continue
and build upon these efforts.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with other U.S. allies,
like Australia, in supporting Timor-Leste's development goals?
Answer. Timor-Leste is a developing country with still-nascent
institutions, limited human capital, and significant economic and
health challenges. The United States is supporting Timor-Leste's
efforts to diversify its economy and further integrate into global
commerce, including supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to join ASEAN and
the WTO. I understand the U.S. Embassy works to coordinate our
development assistance with Australia and other like-minded partners in
Timor-Leste. If confirmed, I will work to deepen this collaboration to
ensure our development assistance programs are complementary and that,
together, we are helping the Timorese people build a more prosperous,
healthy, and democratic country.
Question. If confirmed, are there any DFC programs or projects you
would pursue with Timor-Leste interlocutors?
Answer. Timor-Leste is a developing country with still-nascent
institutions, limited human capital, and significant economic and
health challenges. The United States is supporting Timor-Leste's
efforts to diversify its economy and further integrate into global
commerce, including supporting Timor-Leste's efforts to join ASEAN and
the WTO. I understand that, in the past year, USAID facilitated the
first DFC loan to be approved for a Timorese microfinance institution,
which also promotes access to finance for women and rural
microenterprises, to support increased economic opportunities.
If confirmed, I will work with DFC to identify additional
opportunities where U.S. financing can advance Timor-Leste's economic
development goals and strengthen our bilateral partnership.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Stephan A. Lang by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest quantity of
greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute control of
Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these
destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a threat to
the United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As
Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will
counter the People's Republic of China (PRC) efforts to advance its
authoritarian approach to technology and its problematic influence and
use of coercion. Through diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, and
commercial advocacy to bolster U.S. ties with our allies, partners, and
like-minded countries globally, I will work to promote the United
States' positive, rights-respecting vision for information and
communications technology.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.'' These actions extend to multilateral
fora, where we have seen a concerted effort by the PRC, guided by the
CCP, to advance its own international vision for the future. The PRC's
actions in these multilateral bodies undermines the values and
principles underpinning the rules-based system of international
cooperation created by the United States and other countries working
together, following World War II. The PRC prefers a system that
benefits itself and its authoritarian partners, and that shield
undemocratic regimes from international criticism.
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. The United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change and stemming the flow
of fentanyl, when it is in the U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed, I
will work with my colleagues across the U.S. interagency and Congress
as well as our allies and partners globally to advance U.S. objectives
and counter harmful behavior by the PRC, including its efforts to
export its authoritarian approach to technology.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security and economic interests globally and countering efforts by our
strategic and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State and
interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's efforts to
achieve technological leadership and promote its authoritarian approach
to the use of information and communications technologies.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign the letter.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate in the January 16, 2024, walkout.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. I am mindful of and value Department employees' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, I recognize that the
expression of disagreement does not in and of itself constitute
insubordination. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor to determine the proper course of action in
this or any other specific cases.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing?''
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Department of State's
Office of the Legal Advisor to understand whether an action constituted
whistleblowing. Moreover, if confirmed, I will ensure that I and other
managers in the Department protect whistleblowers' rights, including
the right to free speech under the First Amendment.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. I am mindful of and valued the Department of State
employees' right to free speech under the First Amendment. As Secretary
Blinken has said, we should ``be sure to sustain and expand the space
for debate and dissent that makes our policies and our institution
better.'' Moreover, from what I understand the expression of dissent is
unlikely to constitute insubordination. However, in other contexts, in
the event a discipline issue came to me, including insubordination, I
would consult with the Department's experts and attorneys to ensure the
matter is handled appropriately.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist organization and an antisemitic
entity. I condemn antisemitism in all its forms. This foreign terrorist
organization seeks to eliminate the State of Israel, and its founding
charter calls for the killing of Jewish people. I am deeply concerned
about the rise of antisemitism around the world since the October 7
Hamas attack against Israel.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. Yes, while the Biden-Harris Administration supports
humanitarian pauses to allow for the flow of aid into Gaza and the safe
exit of hostages and other vulnerable people, an indefinite ceasefire
right now would give Hamas time to regroup and would fail to prevent
Hamas from continuing terror attacks against Israel, now and in the
future.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is the policy of the Administration to support temporary
humanitarian pauses, which would allow a sustained flow of aid and
allow voluntary movement of civilians who are seeking to move to safer
locations. The U.S. government is actively working with partners to
secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. We support Israel's
right to protect itself from Hamas' terrorism, consistent with
international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. In his engagements with Israel, including during his
February 7 visit to Tel Aviv, the Secretary continues to press Israel
on the imperative of maximizing civilian protection. Israel has the
right to protect itself. Israel must take all possible precautions to
avoid civilian harm during operations. Protecting civilians is both a
moral responsibility and a strategic imperative.
Question. Chinese-owned applications, like TikTok, are gathering
information on U.S. citizens by tracking their phone usage across
applications. TikTok also tailors its content in America to sow
misinformation and teach the youth to hate our country. Several
countries, such as India, Nepal, Britain, Australia, Canada, France,
and New Zealand have implemented restrictions on the use of TikTok in
their countries. Do you believe that TikTok is an avenue for Chinese
Communist Party influence in other countries?
Answer. Yes, concerns about national security vulnerabilities
associated with the use of TikTok led to the passage and signing of the
No TikTok on Government Devices Act which prohibits the download or use
of TikTok on all federal government devices. Making sure technologies
work for, not against, democracies is a key priority for the United
States. Our approach is aligned with our international leadership
promoting democratic principles and fundamental freedoms as key
components of a secure cyberspace, as laid out in the National
Cybersecurity Strategy's affirmative vision to build a defensible,
resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem. My team and I will
continue to work with the interagency to leverage our expertise in
cyberspace and digital policy to address concerns related to the
security of communications technologies, data privacy, and data
security.
Question. How should the U.S. counter malign authoritarian
influence over applications like TikTok?
Answer. On TikTok specifically, the Department has since July 2021
prohibited the creation of official Department of State TikTok accounts
and prohibited the app's use on Department-owned devices. In December
2022, President Biden signed into law legislation requiring the removal
of TikTok from all federal government-owned devices, including federal
government-owned equipment at our embassies overseas. In February 2023,
OMB issued a Memorandum, titled ``No TikTok on Government Devices''
Implementation Guidance, to guide Federal agencies in implementation of
that legislation. The State Department is working to ensure compliance
with that Memorandum.
Question. If confirmed, would you support American diplomacy
encouraging other countries to implement restrictions on TikTok?
Answer. The Department is addressing hard questions about the
importance of data security and the need to ensure technologies work
for, not against, democracies. This includes working to ensure tech
platforms continue to promote and respect human rights, both online and
offline. We are also promoting meaningful connectivity and advancing
inclusive and equitable access to digital technologies that support
everyone's potential to thrive in a digitally connected world.
Question. Do you support the banning of TikTok in the U.S.?
Answer. In December 2022, President Biden signed into law
legislation requiring the removal of TikTok from all federal
government-owned devices, including federal government-owned equipment
at our embassies overseas. In February 2023, OMB issued a Memorandum,
``No TikTok on Government Devices'' Implementation Guidance, to guide
Federal agencies in implementation of that legislation. I am not able
to comment on potential legislation.
Question. President Biden's re-election campaign is reportedly
pushing the President to join TikTok in order to appeal to young
voters. Do you agree that TikTok is an effective way to reach young
voters?
Answer. We defer to the election campaign teams for how best to
reach voters.
Question. If confirmed, what would you tell foreign officials that
are considering incorporating TikTok into their official communications
strategies?
Answer. Making sure technologies work for, not against, democracies
is a key priority for the United States. We are coordinating with our
partners within and outside of the Department to grapple with hard
questions about the importance of data security and human rights within
the ICT ecosystem. We have warned foreign partners about the broader
risks stemming from companies being subject to the legal requirements
of authoritarian regimes.
Question. Should a President of the United States start a TikTok
account, what message would that send to U.S. allies that have
instituted restrictions on its use?
Answer. In December 2022, President Biden signed into law
legislation requiring the removal of TikTok from all federal
government-owned devices, including federal government-owned equipment
at our embassies overseas. The State Department is working to ensure
compliance with the law and with OMB's February 2023 implementing
guidance. Since July 2021, the Department has prohibited the creation
of official Department of State TikTok accounts and prohibited the
app's use on Department-owned devices. We defer to the Administration
and campaign teams on their social media posture.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Stephan A. Lang by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. PRC Influence in ITU Working Groups: There are concerns
that Chinese companies are overrepresented in International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) working groups and leadership positions,
thus driving standards that favor Chinese companies. Did you attend the
ITU's World Radiocommunication Conference 2023 (WRC-23) in Dubai last
year?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How would you describe the actions of the Chinese
Government and Chinese companies during that conference?
Answer. The Chinese Government and Chinese companies worked
throughout the conference to advance their own commercial and security
interests. They faced difficulties in building support within their
region--which includes allies and partners such as Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and India--and so they worked with Russia,
Iran, Brazil, and South Africa to push developing countries towards the
PRC's goals.
Question. If confirmed, how would you lead the State Department's
efforts to counter the PRC's influence at the ITU?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to lead the State
Department's efforts to counter the PRC's influence at the ITU through
multiple channels to build support for a positive, rights-respecting,
U.S. vision for information and communication technologies; coordinate
closely with our allies and partners; engage with the developing world;
and push back against efforts by the PRC, Iran, and Russia to promote
authoritarian approaches to technology that harm U.S. interests.
Question. What preparations are you making now to ensure U.S.
interests are advanced at the 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference?
More specifically, what steps would you take to increase U.S.
participation in working groups and leadership positions?
Answer. Preparations for WRC-27 are already underway. The ITU has
held its first working party meeting on spectrum for 5G and 6G of the
new cycle, and U.S. preparations for the first meeting of other ITU
working parties covering topics such as satellite, science, and
aeronautical and maritime are ongoing. My team is already working
closely with colleagues in other agencies, the U.S. private sector, and
allies and international partners to participate in the working parties
and prepare for WRC-27. This includes an open and transparent process
to encourage participation by U.S. stakeholders and identify and foster
potential U.S. experts and leaders to join the U.S. delegation and
assume leadership roles at WRC-27.
Radio-Frequency Spectrum Management
Question. In November 2023, you attended the World
Radiocommunication Conference on behalf of the United States. U.S.
policy in this area has been subject to review and criticism, including
in January 2021, when the GAO outlined several recommendations in GAO-
21-474. The ITU recently announced the ``ITU Generation Connect Young
Leadership Programme in Partnership with Huawei.'' Are you concerned
this partnership will be a tool to advance Chinese interests?
Answer. We are tracking Huawei's (and PRC's) engagement with the
ITU, including this partnership to support 90 STEM students to
implement their own digital development initiatives. If confirmed, I
will continue to ensure U.S. leadership and oversight of the ITU,
including through support to its independent oversight and governing
bodies, to make certain that any such partnerships advance the entire
ITU's mission and digital development objectives, without being used as
tools to advance any one nation or company's agenda.
Question. Are you aware of any meaningful safeguards in place to
prevent this fellowship program from further entrenching Chinese
interests and representation at ITU affiliated entities?
Answer. Any ITU partnership with private sector entities is
governed by ITU and U.N. partnership and ethics guidelines, which
provide for member state oversight via reporting from the ITU's
independent advisory body and the ITU Council, where I serve as the
U.S. Councilor. Partnerships are implemented with the ITU Secretariat
staff, who must adhere to ITU governing documents that provide the ITU
its mandate and direction. Additionally, the United States will push
back in cases where these activities go beyond the ITU's mandate. The
United States also has its own proactive agenda at the ITU, including
programs that reduce digital divides and empower youth with digital
skills, to ensure content that advances U.S. values and principles is
part of the ITU's ecosystem.
Question. If confirmed, would you advocate for increasing these
safeguards?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate at the ITU
for increased mechanisms for transparency and oversight into the ITU's
implementation of programs and partnerships with external entities. I
have been leading U.S. engagement with partners to support ITU
Secretary General Doreen Bogdan-Martin's comprehensive transformation
agenda aimed at building staff, oversight mechanisms, and financial
resources that will increase transparency and accountability for member
states.
Question. Are any U.S. taxpayer dollars being used to support this
program?
Answer. The U.S. Government has not, and will not, support or
participate in the Huawei/ITU Generation Connect Young Leadership
Programme. Instead, we will continue to support the ITU's overall Youth
Strategy and other programs to empower youth with digital skills and
reduce digital divides in a manner that remains consistent with U.S.
principles and objectives. If confirmed, I will also continue to
identify ways to leverage CDP's Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity
Program initiatives to advance the United States role as a leader in
digital development.
Question. In December 2023, NBC reported the Chinese balloon that
transited the U.S. in early 2023 actually used an American internet
service provider to send and receive communications from China,
primarily related to navigation. According to the same report, a senior
official at the State Department claimed, ``[the balloon] was used by
China for surveillance and that it was loaded with equipment able to
collect signals intelligence.'' Are you concerned that a U.S. internet
service provider facilitated navigation of the Chinese spy balloon?
Answer. I share this concern as both the presence of the balloon
over U.S. airspace and the reported use of U.S. internet service
providers present serious security risks. I would refer you to the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence for further information on the PRC
surveillance balloon incident and their findings.
Question. What steps should be taken to prevent this from happening
again?
Answer. If confirmed, my team and I will support efforts by the
U.S. interagency to guard against violations of U.S. territorial
sovereignty and misuse of American technology. I would refer you to the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence for further information on the PRC
surveillance balloon incident and efforts to prevent such incidents
from occurring in the future.
Question. Please describe the interagency process for making
decisions on spectrum management activities that involve other
agencies, particularly when consensus could not be reached.
Answer.
Answer. For the purpose of developing U.S. positions for WRC-23,
the process begins with the FCC gathering input from the private sector
through its WRC Advisory Committee (WAC) and NTIA gathering input from
the federal agencies through its Radio Conference Subcommittee (RCS).
The two agencies then develop their positions based on this input and
work to reach agreement on a common position. In those few instances
where the FCC and NTIA are not able to reach agreement, the State
Department reconciles the two and decides on a final U.S. position for
the conference.
Question. Please describe the interagency process for making
decisions on whether to support studying a band for global
harmonization.
Answer. The process for developing a U.S. position to a WRC on
whether to support a frequency band for global harmonization follows
the same path outlined above. Given the high profile of these
decisions, the Department of State hears directly from many commercial
and federal agency stakeholders during this process. And given the
often strongly held views on many frequency bands, these tough
decisions are often some of the final ones to be made.
Question. Please describe any processes that involved reviewing or
updating the General Guidance Document consistent with the
recommendations of GAO-21-474.
Answer. The General Guidance Document provides helpful guidance on
developing U.S. inputs into ITU working party and study group meetings
as ITU technical studies are underway, but it is not directly
applicable to developing U.S. proposals for WRC-23 itself.
__________
Statement Supporting the Nomination of Stephan A. Lang to be U.S.
Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy
Submitted by Senator Amy Klobuchar
I would like to recognize Stephen A. Lang, who has been nominated
to serve as the U.S. Coordinator for Communications and Information
Technology with a rank of Ambassador. With increased aggression and
cyber attacks around the world, it is more important than ever to have
a nominee with decades of experience and a title that reflects that.
My husband John Bessler and I have known Steve and his wife Karin
for years. Both Steve and Karin have worked as foreign service officers
for nearly thirty years. Their service has taken them around the world,
including China, Mexico, Japan, Cuba, Thailand, and here in Washington,
D.C., and they have done it all while raising two daughters. Steve
served as the point person when then-Senator Heidi Heitkamp and I
visited Mexico City in 2014 to push for coordinated efforts to combat
human trafficking in Mexico and the U.S.
Throughout his decades of service, Steve has focused on technology
issues, especially 5G networks, cloud services, and undersea cables.
This makes him a natural fit for the position of Coordinator for
Communications and Information Technology, where he will lead the State
Department's work on the digital economy. As malicious state and non-
state actors continue to weaponize information systems and advance
their capacities for cyberwarfare, our government must be prepared to
defend U.S. digital interests.
I'm also pleased to note that Steve and Karin have Minnesota ties.
Karin's family still has a farm in Atwater that her family has tended
for decades, and she attended the University of Minnesota with my
husband. Steve's paternal grandparents were born and raised in Austin,
Minnesota.
Mr. Lang's decades of experience and devotion to our Nation put him
in a position to ensure that the State Department is best equipped to
promote U.S. digital interests.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin, Chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Duckworth, Risch,
Ricketts, Barrasso, Cruz, and Hagerty.
Also Present: Senator Murkowski.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
For the United States to protect and advance our interests
around the world we must have well qualified and committed
public servants in our diplomatic posts.
Today's nominees are incredibly competent and experienced
with almost a hundred years of collective government service
among the four current government employees as well as a
renowned expert on the Arctic.
I am gratified that they are before the committee today
after a very long wait. I want to thank them personally for
their willingness to serve and in most cases continue to serve
in a public role.
We know it is a sacrifice not only for you and your
families and we welcome your families here today and thank them
for the sacrifices that they have made.
I am going to yield as is the customary practice of our
committee to members who want to introduce our nominees today
and I will start with Senator Schatz.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a pleasure for me to introduce Mr. Robert William
Forden, the nominee to be our next Ambassador to the Kingdom of
Cambodia. In light of new leadership in Cambodia and ongoing
challenges to our bilateral relationship including the PRC's
growing influence this is an essential role and with decades of
experience and deep expertise working in the Indo-Pacific Mr.
Forden is the right person for this job.
He is a career diplomat who spent three decades in the
Foreign Service representing American interests in the PRC,
Taiwan, Vietnam, and Israel. That included more than 12 years
working in the PRC including as Deputy Chief of Mission in the
U.S. Embassy in Beijing.
In addition, Mr. Forden spent almost a decade in Taiwan as
the branch chief and later deputy director for the American
Institute in Taiwan. Today he serves as a senior advisor in the
State Department's East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau
supporting important ongoing work to advance a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
In short, Mr. Forden would bring a combination of
tremendous experience, expertise, and commitment to this role
in this critical moment.
I want to take a moment to thank Mr. Forden's family,
though they are not here today, including his wife and
children, one of whom is currently serving in the United States
Army.
As we know, it is the sacrifices that Foreign Service
families make every day that help to support our diplomatic
missions around the globe.
Finally, before I close I want to point out--before I close
I want to point out that Mr. Forden was nominated for this
position 624 days ago. His file was completed within three
weeks and he has been waiting for a hearing ever since.
That is also completely unprecedented and undermines our
national security interests and our standing in the region.
Confirming ambassadors, especially to a region as important as
the Indo-Pacific, is essential for American interests and at a
time when we are facing growing threats in the region we need
skilled diplomats more than ever.
So, Mr. Forden, we thank you for your patience and your
continued willingness to serve and we hope that we can quickly
confirm your nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Duckworth?
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to second Senator Schatz's very strong word in
support of Mr. Forden's nomination to be Ambassador to
Cambodia. It is a critical time in that country. The kingdom
has reached out to the United States and I think it is time
that we get an ambassador in there.
I am here, however, to introduce Bix Aliu to be Ambassador
to Montenegro. I thought no one had waited longer than Mr. Aliu
at 535 days but apparently Mr. Forden and has him beat,
although Mr. Aliu's file was completed within 11 days so you
win that part. But still it is ridiculous that it has been that
long.
I want to thank all of the nominees for their continued
willingness to serve. It is not an obligation that you have
taken lightly and I am sure you and your family know that well.
I also have the pleasure of introducing Mr. Aliu because he
is a fellow Illinoisan who has--I understand that he is joined
today by his wife and children and that his father may also be
watching from afar.
Mr. Aliu, your example of dedication to public service as a
career member of the Senior Foreign Service is impressive and I
am glad that your family is able to witness as you proceed to
the next chapter of your distinguished career.
Mr. Aliu's origin further demonstrates the value of the
American story and one that lends immense value to our
diplomatic corps. Born in Chicago to immigrant parents he has
dedicated his professional life to representing the United
States policies, interests, and values abroad.
He has served extensively throughout Europe including at
prior postings in Montenegro as well as in Poland, Hungary, and
North Macedonia.
Just last year he received the Presidential Rank
Meritorious Service Award for 2023. He speaks five additional
languages and demonstrated substantial experience in complex
environments handling European Affairs.
Mr. Aliu is well qualified to assume this role and begin
serving the United States' interests in Montenegro. I
appreciate your dedication and that of all of our nominees here
today. Welcome.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. It is a pleasure to have Senator Murkowski in
our committee today. We would love to have you on our committee
but it is a pleasure to have you introduce your nominee.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, members of the committee. It is nice to be back in front
of this committee.
Very distinguished panel in front of you today but I am
grateful that you have included Dr. Michael Sfraga who is
nominated to be the first Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic
affairs. He was named more than a full year ago--February 13th,
2023--as part of today's hearing.
Alaska--we are the state that makes the United States of
America an Arctic nation. I have been engaged in Arctic issues
since I came to the Senate a long time ago.
I have been working on these Arctic initiatives for decades
and one of the things that I have been working to advance very,
very hard is the creation of this ambassadorship and now for
Dr. Sfraga to be nominated to it.
So I am here today to ask you to join me in supporting Dr.
Sfraga. He is a fellow Alaskan. He is a longtime colleague. He
is a man that I can call a friend. But more importantly to you
all he has exceptional qualifications for this position.
Now, you all know--you get your intelligence briefings for
the recent Munich Security Conference--you know the global
interest in the Arctic is at a record high. All of you are
aware of the economic, the environmental, and particularly the
security-related matters that we face in the Arctic as well as
its importance to our geopolitical power and our international
relations.
All of you are aware of the pressing need to get the people
and the policies in place so that the United States can
actually present itself as an Arctic nation.
On the personnel side of business one of the most important
steps that we have left to do is to confirm an Arctic
Ambassador. I will share with you we are the only Arctic
country without one. Everybody else has an Arctic Ambassador.
Even some of the non-Arctic countries like Singapore have
an Arctic Ambassador. We need this position because we need to
elevate our diplomacy to the region to show that we are not
just an indifferent bystander but we are an active and we are a
strategic leader in the Arctic.
And as important as the position is you got to have the
right person and I would commend to you Dr. Sfraga as that
right person. He is an Alaskan. He is from Fairbanks.
Part of the reason that he understands the Arctic is that
he has not just read about it or visited. He lives it. He has
made it his home and he has lived there for decades, and while
living in Alaska Dr. Sfraga has also dedicated himself to a
career of service to the Arctic and to our nation.
He is an accomplished geographer, researcher, teacher with
a Ph.D. from the University of Alaska. He helped establish the
University of the Arctic. He co-created and co-led the State
Department's Fulbright Arctic Initiative.
He established the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center,
which has become the Arctic public square for high-level
conversations about the Far North. He chairs currently the U.S.
Arctic Research Commission which advises us here in Congress
and the President on international Arctic research.
You are going to hear from him and I am sure you are going
to be impressed by him. I may have recommended him to the
President but he stands apart ahead of anyone else--ahead of
anyone else who could have been selected for this position.
And I will tell you I attend these Arctic conferences.
Whether it is the Arctic Council, the Arctic Circle Assembly,
Arctic Frontiers, Arctic Parliamentarians, the Munich Security
Conference that he was just at Dr. Sfraga is there at every
single one of them and he is not just there as an idle
participant. He is there moderating the panels. He has been
asked to speak.
If there is any challenge that you have as a committee it
is that his expertise in the Arctic is so voluminous it takes a
while to wade through all of it. He has been there. He is the
person--he is the person that we need for this important
position at this time.
So after a year of holding back on this nomination I am
before you today to urge with everything that I have to confirm
Dr. Sfraga to be our Arctic Ambassador as soon as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
The Chairman. Well, Senator Murkowski, again, thank you so
much for being before our committee.
I was in Greenland last year with members of the Senate and
the absence of a confirmed Arctic Ambassador was very clearly
noted in our visit to Greenland and the importance for the
United States in protecting our national security interests.
And I have traveled with you on security issues and it is
always a pleasure to be in your company on these issues. So
thank you very much for your contribution to our nomination
hearing. You are free to go on and do the business that you
need to do. Considering that this is the State of the Union day
I am sure you have other commitments. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I were not speaking from the dais as chair
I would have insisted on introducing Ms. Taylor. I could not
have a--be a stronger proponent of her nomination. I am
convinced that she is likely the most qualified individual ever
nominated to be legal advisor, an impressive feat given the
prior occupants of that position.
She has been general counsel of USAID for almost three
years, served as a career attorney in L, as the Office of Legal
Advisor is called, for 10 years. Dare I say more?
Served with distinction on the staff of this committee as
chief counsel and deputy staff director. During the years that
I had the privilege of working with Ms. Taylor she proved to be
a superb lawyer, a manager, a skilled negotiator, and a
wonderful colleague.
She is smart, tough, and persistent, exactly the person we
need to lead our pushback against China and Russia as those
countries seek to shape international law and institutions in
their favor.
My enthusiasm for Ms. Taylor is shared by all of the living
former legal advisors from Reagan to Trump who have written to
Senator Risch and me a strong endorsement of her qualifications
and her speedy confirmation.
Well, we did not do the speedy confirmation but let us move
this nomination forward. I have incredibly high regard for the
Office of Legal Advisor and the career officials who staff it.
I am deeply proud and enthusiastic that Ms. Taylor, an alum and
friend of both that office and this committee, will be the next
legal advisor and I urge all of you to support her nomination
here and on the floor.
Mr. Forden, Cambodia has now seen decades of democratic
backsliding. This has weakened its institution and endangered
human rights. It has limited Cambodia's ability to play a
positive role in ASEAN and other organizations in the Indo-
Pacific and has given Beijing an opening to expand its
influence in the country's civilian and military
infrastructure.
We need to get Mr. Forden on the ground to help address
these challenges. I have received a resounding endorsement from
Terry Bradshaw--Branstad, excuse me--Branstad. Yeah, a good
football player.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. He was the ambassador to China during the
Trump administration with whom Mr. Forden served as Deputy
Chief of Mission.
The ambassador writes that Mr. Forden's outstanding
leadership and management coupled with his four decades of
experience in the East and Southeast Asia make him an
extraordinarily well qualified candidate to be Ambassador to
Cambodia and notes that Mr. Forden is an ideal candidate to
protect U.S. interests against China's efforts in Cambodia.
Without objection, that letter will be made part of our
record.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
this transcript.]
The Chairman. Mr. Aliu, Montenegro is a vulnerable--
valuable partner in the NATO alliance that hosts the largest
number of Ukrainian refugees in the Balkans.
It has been the target of Russia's influence including an
attempted coup to stop Montenegro from joining NATO. Moscow
also would like to derail its European Union membership
prospects. We need an ambassador on the ground who will work to
support Montenegro's European aspirations.
But I also want to quote from a letter from Georgette
Mosbacher, ambassador to Poland under President Trump and under
whom you served.
Ambassador Mosbacher highlighted your experience in the
region, knowledge of the languages and culture, and previous
work in Montenegro and she said, quote, ``I simply cannot
recommend a stronger, more capable leader or a more decent
human being than Bix.''
Without objection, that letter will also be made part of
our record.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
this transcript.]
The Chairman. High praise and, if confirmed, I expect you
will continue to advocate for a Europe whole, free, and at
peace.
Mr. Woodhouse, the current embodiment of the Sanctions
Coordinator office was created by this committee led by Ranking
Member Risch and is essential to efforts to constrain our
adversaries be it Iran, North Korea, Russia, or terrorist
groups like Hamas.
There has been strong bipartisan support for its efforts
and the individual that leads the office. You are superbly
qualified for this position having worked on and implemented
sanctions up close from multiple angles at the Treasury
Department, as an attorney in private practice, and your
current position as deputy assistant secretary for sanctions.
While you have been in that role you have witnessed an
impressive coordinated campaign among more than 30 countries to
hold Russia accountable for its war against Ukraine.
This coordination has strengthened our alliances, laid
critical groundwork for future sanction actions, and further
isolated Russia and degraded its war machine. Sanctions have
become an essential tool of our foreign policy and we cannot
afford to have the sanctions coordinator position vacant. We
need Mr. Woodhouse in that place.
Dr. Sfraga, the Arctic is a dynamic, fragile, and largely
unexplored region of our world that holds both unique
opportunities but also extreme risks.
Dr. Sfraga is one of the world's foremost experts on the
Arctic, its environment, its resources, its people, its
nations, making him an excellent choice to be the Ambassador-
at-Large for Arctic affairs.
He hails from Alaska, is the founding director of the
Wilson Center's Polar Institute, and as chairman of the United
States Arctic Research Commission he enjoys strong support from
the co-chairs of the Arctic Caucus. We already heard from
Senator Murkowski but also Senator King and Senator Sullivan.
For all of you today I want to recognize the dedication
every one of you brings to your work. I want to thank you and
your families for your service. I look forward to hearing from
each of you.
Some final points. First, I want to take a moment to thank
Victoria Nuland for her incredible service to the country as
under secretary for political affairs and several months as the
acting deputy secretary.
She is a known force at the State Department and around the
world and we will certainly miss her insight and wisdom. We are
deeply appreciative of her service, her engagement with this
committee, in particular her stalwart efforts to advance U.S.
interests in support in Ukraine.
On a personal note, I treasure the opportunities I had to
get her advice on very challenging circumstances around the
world. She always was very frank in pointing out our needs and
gave us excellent advice on how the Senate could operate.
Next, I would like to address how we arrived at this
hearing. The nominees on this panel have been pending in this
committee for an average of more than 400 days.
Let me repeat that. They have been pending in this
committee for over 400 days.
I have tried to work with the ranking member since October
to secure before this committee and Senator Menendez has tried
for many months before that.
During that time we have had numerous rationales offered
for not consenting to a hearing and I have sought to work
through each one in good faith. My efforts have not resulted in
agreement or any accommodation.
On February 26th Senator Risch and I received a letter from
the Deputy Secretary of State Verma outlining the chronology of
all their efforts in order to comply with the requests that
were made by the State Department.
So after several months I have made the decision I could
either let these nominees languish without even giving the
members of the committee an opportunity to hear from the
nominees or I could follow the precedent that Ranking Member
Risch set as Chairman during the 116th Congress.
Now, I was neither Chair nor ranking member at that time
but I am well aware that there were multiple instances with
which the chair noticed nominations over the objections of the
minority.
At that time Chairman Risch emphasized his view and let me
just quote from my colleague: ``A fair process requires that at
some point document discovery must end and the process of
evaluating and questioning must begin. This can only occur in a
hearing in which every member of the committee has the
opportunity to raise questions, voice concerns, or highlight
any objections.''
That is what Senator Risch said in the 116th. I do not
recall any Republican members, several of whom are still on the
committee today, objecting or expressing any concerns to that
decision.
Today's hearing is not only critical to consider important
national security nominations it is fully consistent with the
Republican precedent of just a few years ago. I hope all of us
can agree that there cannot be one standard for Republican
nominees and a different standard for Democratic nominees.
So that is how we arrived at today's hearing. But as we
move forward I want to emphasize my deep commitment to working
with all members, both Democrats and Republicans, to do
important work of the committee and the American people.
Senator Risch and I are working on an agenda for a business
meeting that we hope that we will be able to notice very
shortly. We are working with several bipartisan bills that have
been suggested by members of the Senate including Senator Rubio
and Hassan's bipartisan bill the SHIP Act, which follows up on
the hearing we had in regards to Iran and enforcing the
sanctions against Iran through secondary sanctions.
We hope that we will be able to bring that bill before our
committee. We are working on a bill by Senator Coons and Graham
that deals with the conservation needs with Senator Shaheen and
Wicker in regards to the Western Balkans, a bill that I am
working on with Senator Wicker in regards to the International
Freedom Protection Act and several others.
So we hope that we will be able to note a business meeting
shortly on these issues and others where we have bipartisan
interest.
With that, let me turn it to the distinguished ranking
member Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
certainly your description of how we have handled these things
in the past is absolutely accurate. I take no difficulty with
that at all.
We are, however, at that point where we have these five
nominations which we have objected to and I know, the Chairman
knows, and his predecessor knows that we have serious
objections to them. Those objections continue today.
On most of the run of the mill appointments we get they get
cleared pretty quickly and we do have hearings on them and we
move along.
On occasion we have ones that we just cannot clear, and so
that everyone knows we take our obligation with--the advice and
consent obligation in the Constitution very, very seriously and
we have dug on all of these and we wound up with these five out
of all of them that we have had before that we just cannot
agree to.
And so it is time that there be a hearing and if they want
to continue the laundry gets put out here in this hearing and
we go from there.
Obviously, unless things change dramatically I am going to
put a hold on these when they do get to the floor. You have the
numbers. You will be able to put them out there and we will go
from there.
But, again, I stress that the result--the time result has
been a function of our looking into these and things you are
going to hear today that we have problems with on all five of
the nominees.
Obviously, they are going to get a chance to defend
themselves. Then I have some witnesses I would like to call to
corroborate the things we are going to say about these here in
the hearing today.
So with that, let us talk, first of all, about Ms. Taylor.
I want to address her nomination specifically to start with.
She certainly--currently serves as general counsel at USAID
where she oversees the enforcement of U.S. laws toward its
contractors and partners.
Sadly, on her watch some of these partners repeatedly
promoted abortion overseas in violation of U.S. law. Given the
slow response and weak justifications I received when I raised
these questions I have substantial concerns she will not draw a
strong line in State's relationship with organizations that
violate U.S. law.
I have got a second reason for holding her and I am going
to continue to hold her. She is the highest ranking and the one
State Department wants the most to be confirmed and I am going
to continue to do that and until the State Department gives us
some basic information that I want.
I have been asking for eight months for information
regarding the suspension of Special Envoy Robert Malley's
security clearance. The department's defiance left me no choice
but to hold this nomination until State responded.
State came in to brief me and the Chairman. We went into
the SCIF. This was supposed to be secret and nobody was
supposed to know because it was such a big deal.
I can tell you what happened in that SCIF. Nothing. They
refused to give us the information as to why Malley's clearance
was suspended.
This is important to me. It is important to the Chairman.
It is important to this committee. Because we all listened to
Mr. Malley for a long time. He told us things. We acted and
thought about and formed beliefs based on those and they will
not tell us why his clearance was suspended.
So they have to tell us but they will not. They act like we
work for them instead of them working for us. And so until that
happens I am going to continue to hold Ms. Taylor's nomination
and it is--and I have gotten word to the Secretary to quit
calling me and asking me for favors when they will not do what
they are supposed to do.
If I were the Chairman of the committee I would subpoena
this and if they did not answer the subpoena I would go to try
to hold them in contempt of court.
This is not right. We cannot do our oversight work without
getting this information. Certainly, it is classified
information but I am the most senior member of the Intelligence
Committee. I hear this stuff every day. The people that came in
to brief us my clearance was at least as good, probably better,
than the guys that came in to brief us. So, in any event, that
is going to continue on.
Regarding Mr. Woodhouse to be sanctions coordinator, that--
as the chairman indicated I was the one that put together the
legislation that created that particular position. It is a
great position to have.
Mr. Woodhouse played a pivotal role in the administration's
protection of Nord Stream 2 pipeline from mandatory bipartisan
sanctions before Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
While Mr. Woodhouse was not the only administration
official responsible for this blatant violation of the law,
during his confirmation process it has become clear that he
intentionally misled the committee and ignored facts that
contradicted Biden policy.
My legislation created that job and his predecessor did a
good job at it. I believe Mr. Woodhouse will not embody the
same standards required for this position and I am going to
leave the rest of this to Senator Cruz who has some very strong
thoughts on this matter and he will be here today to talk about
that.
Turning to Mr. Aliu, I have concerns regarding his judgment
and leadership as Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Warsaw.
Mr. Aliu did not seek approval from Washington when a foreign
national with concerning business ties stayed at the official
residence with his permission for six weeks.
This person was a foreign national with business ties in
Montenegro, the country to which Mr. Aliu is now nominated. In
any event, several current Foreign Service officers have
described the toxic work environment under Mr. Aliu's
leadership.
One of these individuals wrote a formal letter regarding
complaints against Mr. Aliu, a redacted copy of which I am
going to submit for the record today. The posting was
classified as, quote, ``difficult to staff'' while Mr. Aliu was
running it. Immediately upon him leaving, the difficulty of the
staff was removed. So I cannot support his nomination.
Regarding the nomination of Mr. Sfraga, this is a difficult
one, to be Ambassador for Arctic and certainly I support a--we
need a nominee in the Arctic. I have great respect for Senator
Murkowski but this is another example I think of the
administration's failure to vet nominees.
Mr. Sfraga traveled extensively to Russia and China and
negotiated multiple MOUs with Chinese institutions tied to
government defense and intelligence services and appeared on a
panel--appeared on a panel--with Russians who were sanctioned
by the United States Government.
One of the MOUs that he negotiated was going to allow China
to access the computers at the university where he worked. That
was stopped, fortunately. Certainly, a bad judgment.
In addition to that, while our staff was going through
this, he failed to disclose that any of this--and he had to
update his file three times when confronted with information
about his record.
My staff found out about trips he made. They went to him
and said, hey, you did not disclose this trip. He said, oh, I
forgot, and so he disclosed the trip. That happened multiple
times, not just once.
Finally, he wrote an op-ed extolling the importance of the
U.S.-Russia relationship after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I
continue to strongly oppose his nomination and it is
unfortunate we have him here today.
Finally, there is Mr. Forden. The department says the
health and safety of U.S. diplomats is its highest priority;
indeed, we should always guarantee our diplomats their basic
privileges and immunities.
Sadly, Mr. Forden and failed to ensure these protections
during his tenure at Embassy Beijing during COVID. In our staff
investigation of his nomination, they found that from 2020 to
2023 department leadership in Washington and at Embassy Beijing
subjected diplomats and their families to severe, unsafe, and
degrading treatment by the Chinese Government, our greatest
adversary and a major, major counter intelligence threat.
Specifically, State granted a waiver of--a waiver of
inviolability--inviolability--in September of 2020, which
waived certain diplomatic privileges and immunities to allow
the Chinese Government to test and quarantine U.S. diplomats
upon arrival in China.
That is not allowed unless there is the waiver. The Chinese
violated this waiver constantly. Yet, Mr. Forden encouraged
compliance and never imposed any real costs on the Chinese for
these violations.
I am submitting a letter for the record from multiple
courageous whistleblowers of whom--some of whom are with us
here today, as well as the numerous documents that I have
obtained.
These documents show that under Mr. Forden career diplomats
had to comply with draconian quarantine protocols, often
against their will and in deplorable conditions.
Some examples include not being allowed to quarantine at
home and instead be put in a Chinese quarantine hotel,
quarantines enforced for weeks on end with little to no ability
to communicate with Embassy staff or loved ones, dilapidated
quarantine hotels with no cleaning services and still filthy
from previous occupants, minor children separated from their
families and the ability--inability to get basic medical care.
In one case a toddler was denied treatment for food poisoning.
In December of 2020 Embassy Beijing began to allow the
Chinese Government to require incoming arrivals to submit to a
blood test in the United States, a major change in protocol,
and only from U.S. labs that were handpicked by Chinese Embassy
and consulates.
Let us let this sink in. The U.S. Government facilitated
Chinese collection of DNA from dozens of U.S. diplomats inside
the United States. This is appalling.
When asked Mr. Forden's defense was he was on leave and not
involved in the creation or implementation of these policies.
But this is not true. Mr. Forden returned to post in July of
2020, two months before the initial waiver was issued.
Mr. Forden will tell you that no diplomats were forced into
fever hospitals or similar institutions. This is also not true.
A mother and her infant went into a fever hospital on his
watch. Just days after he left post two American families were
detained in makeshift fever clinics for at least 60 days each.
That shows how bad things got and there are photos of this
condition which we are going to submit into the record.
State will also say our diplomats voluntarily submitted to
these protocols and conditions. This is not true either. The
information was never disclosed to them and the list goes on.
An unwillingness to stand up for our diplomats and
deference to an authoritarian government are not qualities we
should promote and these are not people that we want running
our embassies.
I want to thank the whistleblowers and their families for
their difficult service in China and for their bravery. For
those of you that are here today I am sorry the State
Department failed you.
If I hear of any reprisals against these whistleblowers who
have come forward--all career employees at the State
Department--there is going to be serious consequences that flow
from that.
As I say, we will get to some witnesses in a few minutes.
Look, I do not like this any more than anybody else does. It is
unfortunate we have these. But we take these matters seriously,
and I understand the majority has the power to run over us.
They can sure do that. Out of the five I doubt all five of you
will make it because I do not think that the majority leader is
going to devote the time to all five but there you are for
trying.
So with that, let us get on with it. We will hear from them
and then we will hear from others who have matters to say in
that regard.
The Chairman. We are now going to allow our nominees to
make opening statements. I will give you extra time if you want
to respond to some of the statements that the--that Senator
Risch has made.
We will start with Margaret Taylor.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET L. TAYLOR, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE
LEGAL ADVISOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Taylor. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Just for clarity, are we doing five minutes or two minutes?
The Chairman. The normal practice for nominees I think is
three minutes--three to five minutes. But because of the
ranking member's opening statements and serious issues that he
has raised if you want to take more time to respond to that you
may.
Ms. Taylor. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you as
President Biden's nominee to serve as legal advisor of the
Department of State.
I am so grateful to President Biden, to Secretary Blinken,
to Administrator Power, and to the members of this committee
for your consideration--and your staff.
I welcome my family seated behind me including my loving
husband of nearly 22 years, my wise, son, and my supportive
sister, as well as my kind daughter who I am told is watching
from her college dorm room.
I also want to acknowledge my parents who instilled in me
the importance of education and hard work. They are no
strangers to the sacrifices of public service. My father was a
major in the United States Army when I was born at Fort Bliss
in Texas.
I also want to acknowledge my maternal grandfather Edward
Turner who served on a landing ship tank LST 912 in the South
Pacific in World War II, participating in five invasions in
1944 and 1945, and surviving an attack by an enemy plane. He
and his generation sacrificed so much so that we could be free.
I felt called to public service early on. It was in my
third year at Columbia Law School in New York City that
terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center towers, a
few miles south of where I sat stunned, speechless, and
terrified for my country.
In the days and weeks that followed the call I felt to
public service became a single-minded commitment to the rule of
law, to combat the threats to America's safety and security,
and to advance the safety and security of peace-loving people
around the world.
I spent 10 years as an attorney pursuing these goals in the
office I am now nominated to lead. I have worked under both
Republican and Democratic administrations. I believe
wholeheartedly in the role of this committee and Congress in
shaping our foreign policy and that that is vitally important.
If confirmed I will do what I have always sought to do
throughout my career, provide objective legal advice of the
highest quality in the service of our Constitution and the
American people and if confirmed this will be my top priority.
I will use legal diplomacy vigorously to advance U.S.
interests internationally and support the international legal
rules that the U.S. helped to develop and that have benefited
the United States so greatly since the end of World War II.
I look forward to your questions, and if I may respond
briefly to Senator Risch. In my time as general counsel of
USAID I have provided legal advice that is consistent with all
applicable provisions of law related to the use of appropriated
funds including on the issue that you have raised and I want
you to feel assured about that.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret L. Taylor
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the
committee: It is a tremendous honor to appear before you as President
Biden's nominee to serve as Legal Advisor to the Department of State. I
am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and Administrator
Power for their confidence in me. I also want to express my gratitude
to the Members of this committee, and your staff, for your
consideration.
I had the privilege of working for this committee as its democratic
deputy counsel, and later chief counsel and deputy staff director. The
5\1/2\ years I spent here were among the most rewarding and meaningful
of my career. The work of this committee is incredibly important, and I
was honored to have the chance to assist in that work. Because of it, I
am dedicated to the importance of the Article I branch of government in
shaping and implementing our Nation's foreign policy.
I welcome my family, seated behind me, including my loving husband
of nearly 22 years; my wise son; my supportive sister; and my kind
daughter--who I'm told is watching from her college dorm room. I also
want to acknowledge my parents, who instilled in me the importance of
education and hard work. They are no strangers to the sacrifices of
public service. My father was a Major in the United States Army when I
was born at Fort Bliss in Texas.
I also want to acknowledge my maternal grandfather, Edward Turner,
who served on a Landing Ship Tank, LST-912, in the South Pacific in
World War II, participating in 5 invasions in 1944 and 1945, and
surviving an attack by an enemy plane. He and his generation sacrificed
so much so that we could be free.
I felt called to public service early on. I worked at the
Department of Justice before attending Columbia Law School in New York
City. It was in my third year there that terrorists flew planes into
the World Trade Center towers a few miles south of where I sat-stunned,
speechless, and terrified for my country. In the days and weeks that
followed, the call I felt to public service became a single-minded
commitment to the rule of law, to combat the threats to America's
safety and security, and to advance the safety and security of peace-
loving people around the world.
After graduation and a judicial clerkship, I spent 10 years as an
attorney pursuing these goals in the Office I am now nominated to lead.
I worked under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I spent
years learning the ins and outs of the legal aspects of sanctions,
foreign assistance, international extradition, treaty negotiations and
ratification, and combating trafficking in persons. I want to highlight
this last item. It was a privilege to be a part of the efforts to use
diplomacy to prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and prevent human
trafficking; and I recognize and appreciate Congress's role in pressing
for action to combat international trafficking in persons.
I won't rehash all of the accomplishments of this committee while I
was a staffer here. Suffice it to say, I believe the role of this
committee, and Congress, in shaping our foreign policy is vitally
important. And when I departed the committee in 2018, I sincerely
wanted the public to understand that better. So, I spent several years,
outside of government, writing and offering public commentary about the
legal aspects of Congress's role in foreign policy and national
security.
If confirmed, I will do what I have always sought to do throughout
my career as a lawyer: provide objective legal advice of the highest
quality; with the utmost commitment to integrity and ethical
leadership; and in the service of our Constitution and the American
people. If confirmed, this will be my top priority. I have led the
Office of the General Counsel at USAID for more than three years with
this philosophy, and I am grateful to my colleagues there for the
privilege of working alongside them to help people around the world
live lives of dignity.
In addition, if confirmed, I will use legal diplomacy vigorously to
advance U.S. interests internationally and support the international
legal rules that the U.S. helped to develop and that have benefited the
United States so greatly since the end of World War II.
We depend on these norms of behavior in international politics.
Russia's flagrantly illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a direct
challenge to these international rules. So are the People's Republic of
China's expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. There are
other examples.
We are a nation of laws. We respect our international obligations.
The United States must continue to be a confident and principled voice
for international legal norms in international politics.
I would be humbled and honored to serve the United States in this
new capacity. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Woodhouse?
STATEMENT OF ERIK JOHN WOODHOUSE, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE
HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF SANCTIONS COORDINATION WITH THE RANK OF
AMBASSADOR
Mr. Woodhouse. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
distinguished Members of the committee, I am honored to appear
before you today. Thank you for considering my nomination and I
also thank the committee staff for meeting with me.
I am honored that President Biden has nominated me to lead
the Office of Sanctions Coordination. I am grateful for
Secretary Blinken's support for my candidacy.
I am here because of the love and support of my family, and
most importantly my wife Emily and our three children. They are
the foundation of my ability to serve.
I am thrilled that my mother Cristina and my stepfather
Erdmann can be here with me today. My father, Mark Woodhouse,
passed away almost exactly two years ago. He would be very
proud to know that I am here with you today.
Beyond my family, I am grateful for many mentors and
friends whose encouragement and lessons have shaped me in ways
that bring me here today.
I have spent more than half my career in public service in
various roles at the State Department and at the Treasury
Department and a substantial time also in the private sector.
I have seen from several perspectives how impactful
sanctions can be as well as the importance of enforcement,
clear communication, and engagement and would commit myself to
furthering these efforts if confirmed.
In my current job I work on sanctions policy with
colleagues across the State Department and the interagency as
well as with our partners and allies around the world. I have
worked closely with the current Office of Sanctions
Coordination since its inception and have seen the important
role it plays for U.S. sanctions policy overall.
If confirmed I would seek to continue and deepen this work
to ensure that our sanctions are fully integrated and in
support of our foreign policy.
The office makes the State Department more effective
internally, in the interagency, and diplomatically when it
comes to sanctions policy and implementation. Within the
department more than 10 bureaus reporting to four different
under secretaries work intensively on sanctions programs within
their purview, and although an impressive amount of
collaboration already happens it is a tall task.
The office can play a key role ensuring consistency across
our sanctions practice, identifying and shepherding good ideas
through the bureaucracy, and resolving disagreements and
ensuring that we are being responsive and timely.
The office also has played a key role facilitating and
strengthening coordination with the Treasury Department as well
as with partners and allies on sanctions policy and
implementation and, if confirmed, this work would remain a
priority for me.
I am also mindful of the committee's role in creating the
position for which I am nominated and would feel a special
responsibility to ensure effective consultation with the
committee in the course of our work.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee,
our sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to
pursue our foreign policy and national security.
I am honored to be nominated to lead the State Department's
work in this area and, if confirmed, to be entrusted with the
responsibilities that entails.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woodhouse follows:]
Prepared Statement for Erik J. Woodhouse
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the
committee, I am honored to appear before you today. Thank you for
considering my nomination, and I also thank the committee staff for
meeting with me. I am honored that President Biden has nominated me to
lead the Office of Sanctions Coordination and grateful for Secretary
Blinken's support for my candidacy.
I am here because of the love and support of my family, most
importantly my wife Emily and our three children. They are the
foundation of my ability to serve. I am thrilled that my mother,
Cristina, and my stepfather, Erdmann, can be here with me today. My
father, Mark, passed away almost two years ago; he would be very proud
to know that I am here with you today. Beyond my family, I am grateful
for many mentors and friends whose encouragement and lessons have
shaped me in ways that helped bring me here today.
I have spent more than half of my career in public service, in
various roles at the State Department and at the Treasury Department,
and a substantial time also in the private sector. I've seen from
several perspectives how impactful sanctions can be, as well as the
importance of enforcement, clear communication, and engagement, and
would commit myself to furthering these efforts if confirmed.
In my current job, I work on sanctions policy with colleagues
across the State Department and the interagency, as well as with our
partners and allies around the world. I have worked closely with the
current Office of Sanctions Coordination since its inception and have
seen the important role it plays for U.S. sanctions policy overall. If
confirmed, I would seek to continue and deepen this work to ensure that
our sanctions are fully integrated and in support of our foreign
policy.
The Office makes the State Department more effective internally, in
the interagency, and diplomatically when it comes to sanctions policy
and implementation. Within the Department, more than ten bureaus
reporting to four different Under Secretaries work intensively on
sanctions programs within their purview and although an impressive
amount of collaboration already happens, it is a tall task. The Office
can play a key role ensuring consistency across our sanctions practice,
identifying and shepherding good ideas through the bureaucracy,
resolving disagreements, and ensuring that we are being responsive and
timely. The Office also has played a key role facilitating and
strengthening coordination with the Treasury Department, as well as
with partners and allies, on sanctions policy and implementation. If
confirmed, this work would remain a priority for me.
I also am mindful of this committee's role in creating the position
for which I am nominated, and would feel a special responsibility to
ensure effective consultation with the committee in the course of our
work.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the committee, our
sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to pursue our
foreign policy and national security. I am honored to be nominated to
lead the State Department's work in this area, and if confirmed, to be
entrusted with the responsibilities that entails.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Forden?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT WILLIAM FORDEN, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM
OF CAMBODIA
Mr. Forden. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for considering my
nomination to be the next United States Ambassador to the
kingdom of Cambodia.
I am honored by the faith President Biden and Secretary
Blinken have placed in me. If confirmed, I will work closely
with Congress to advance U.S. interests in Cambodia.
The United States is a long-standing and committed partner
of the Cambodian people and we seek to work with Cambodia's new
government to advance a shared vision of a free, open,
prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific region.
We have productive bilateral cooperation on a number of
important issues but we have much work to do in others. There
have been many setbacks in Cambodia in recent years concerning
democracy and human rights. If confirmed I will make these
issues a key priority.
The United States also has serious concerns about the
intent, nature, and scope of construction at Ream Naval Base
and the role the PRC military is playing in this process.
The United States will continue to support efforts to
maintain and preserve Cambodia's sovereignty. It would be a
great honor to lead our experienced and professional U.S.
mission staff in Phnom Penh.
If confirmed I will do my utmost to prioritize their safety
and security and ensure the American taxpayers' resources are
used efficiently and effectively to advance U.S. interests.
On a more personal note, it has been my lifelong dream to
contribute to U.S.-Cambodia relations. As a young college
student I watched as my mother, a public school teacher, served
as a volunteer English tutor to Cambodian refugees sponsored by
our church.
Meeting these wonderful people and learning about
Cambodia's rich culture and history instilled in me a deep
appreciation for that beautiful country.
Finally, I cannot conclude without thanking the people who
have supported me throughout my 35-year career in the Foreign
Service. My parents, Bill and Toby, watching from--today from
their home in St. George, Utah, were tremendous role models and
instilled in me a deep respect for people from all cultures and
backgrounds.
And I am so appreciative of my wife Jasmine, my daughters
Jessica and Emily, and my son Christopher, who have made
enormous sacrifices to join me in frequent moves around the
world. Without their love and support I would not be where I am
today.
And I am equally proud of my daughter-in-law Noelle, who,
like my son Christopher, is a distinguished West Point graduate
serving our country in the United States Army.
Thank you again, members of the committee, for your
consideration. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert William Forden
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the
committee: Thank you for considering my nomination to be the next
United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia. I am honored by
the faith that President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in me.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to advance U.S.
interests in Cambodia. I look forward to supporting the Cambodian
people in their aspirations for a truly independent, prosperous country
that respects democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.
The United States is a longstanding and committed partner of the
Cambodian people, and we seek to work with Cambodia's new government to
advance a shared vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-
Pacific region.
We have productive bilateral cooperation on a number of important
issues. Law enforcement, child protection, education, cultural
preservation, public health, and POW/MIA accounting are some of the
bright spots in our bilateral relations. Our two countries also
continue to work together on regional and global issues, such as the
full range of ASEAN cooperation, the Mekong-U.S. Partnership,
condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and implementing DPRK-
related U.N. Security Council resolutions.
While we have worked well together in these areas, there is still
much work to do in others. Cambodia has regressed from a flawed, but
functioning, democracy to a state of governance that has little
tolerance for dissent. There have been many setbacks concerning human
rights and democratic practices, including the conviction for
``treason'' of political opposition leader Kem Sokha and the
imprisonment of U.S.-Cambodian citizen Seng Theary and union leader
Chhim Sithar.
It is my belief that Cambodia's new generation of leaders offers an
opportunity to improve the country's international standing, including
by restoring genuine multi-party democracy, ending politically
motivated trials, and allowing independent media outlets to reopen and
function without interference. If confirmed, I will make advancing
respect for human rights and multiparty democracy a central focus of my
work.
The United States has serious concerns about the intent, nature,
and scope of construction at Ream Naval Base, as well as the role the
PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the
facility. The United States will continue to support efforts to
maintain and preserve Cambodia's sovereignty.
Our experienced and professional U.S. Mission staff in Phnom Penh--
both American and locally employed staff--are dedicated to defending
U.S. national interests and strengthening the U.S.-Cambodia
relationship. If confirmed, I will prioritize their safety and
security, work to invest in their professional development, and do my
utmost to ensure that the resources provided by American taxpayers are
used efficiently and effectively to advance U.S. interests. I would be
honored to lead and facilitate our team's efforts throughout the
Kingdom.
On a more personal note, it has been a life-long dream for me to
contribute to building a strong relationship between the people of the
United States and Cambodia. Ever since I was a young college student, I
watched as my mother served as a volunteer English tutor for Cambodian
refugees that were sponsored by our church. Meeting these wonderful
people in our home and learning about Cambodia's rich culture and its
long history--both its ancient history as well as its more recent
tragic history--instilled in me a deep appreciation and fascination
with that beautiful country.
Finally, I cannot conclude without thanking the people who have
inspired and supported me throughout my 35-year career in the Foreign
Service. My parents, Bill and Toby, watching today from their home in
St. George, Utah, were tremendous role models and instilled in me a
thirst for life-long learning and travel and a deep respect for people
from all cultures and backgrounds. My father himself was a life-long
public servant in the field of corrections in California and my mother
was a public-school teacher and entrepreneur in the education field.
I am so proud and appreciative of my wife, Jasmine, my daughters
Jessica and Emily, and my son Christopher, who have made enormous
sacrifices to follow me as we moved frequently throughout their lives
to live in places as diverse as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Israel.
Without their love and support, I would not be where I am today. I am
equally proud of my daughter-in-law Noelle who, like my son
Christopher, is a distinguished West Point graduate currently serving
our country in the United States Army.
Thank you, Members of the committee, for your consideration of my
nomination. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Aliu?
STATEMENT OF B. BIX ALIU, OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE
SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, NOMINATED
TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MONTENEGRO
Mr. Aliu. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch,
and distinguished committee members.
I am humbled and honored to appear before you as President
Biden's nominee to be the next U.S. Ambassador to Montenegro. I
am grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for their
confidence in me and I hope to earn your trust as well. If
confirmed I will work closely with you to advance U.S.
interests in Montenegro.
I would not be here today without my family's support. With
me is my wife Dr. Nora Zajazi, who has championed me through
our incredible 36-year journey together; my son Bled, a Nittany
Lion and a recent GW Law grad who is a member of the D.C. bar,
and my warrior daughter Tea who is alive today because she beat
leukemia and who is studying archaeology and historical
preservation when she has time because she is a cheerleader and
a member of the rugby team at the University of Mary
Washington.
My children are my greatest blessing and I am very proud of
the global citizens they have become. However, none of us would
be here without my parents Azem and Shirley and their
sacrifices. They fled the former Yugoslavia, leaving everything
behind to allow my sisters and me to pursue a better life in
the United States.
Distinguished committee members, if confirmed, I will be
the first Albanian American in our history to serve as a U.S.
Ambassador, a testament that if you trust in God, dream big,
work hard you will succeed.
Over my 22-year diplomatic career I have been privileged to
serve American citizens and promote U.S. interests and values
around the world. Recently I led Mission Poland and guided our
team in advancing humanitarian and security goals as Russia's
brutal invasion sent millions of Ukrainians across the border.
The welfare of American citizens is ever paramount and I
worked with Polish leaders to secure a safe passage for
Americans fleeing Ukraine. If confirmed the safety and security
of U.S. citizens in Montenegro will remain a top priority.
American leadership matters. Montenegro's 2023 elections
provided a historic opportunity to accelerate the country on
its EU path.
However, we must also be clear eyed about the risks this
goal--to this goal that Montenegro's governing coalition poses
and remain engaged with practical solutions to help the country
attain its rightful place in the European Union, which 80
percent of Montenegrins desire.
If confirmed four priorities will guide my work. First,
Russia's brutal war in Ukraine underscores the urgency for
Montenegro to accelerate critical reforms for EU accession:
democratic development, stability and prosperity.
If confirmed I will lead an interagency effort to engage
Montenegrin leaders and to promote the rule of law, fight
intense corruption, respect human rights, and deliver tangible
results to their citizens, all in line with U.S. national
security objectives.
Second, Montenegro has been a steadfast NATO ally for seven
years including stalwart support to Ukraine and deployments to
NATO's eastern flank. If confirmed I will work to deepen those
NATO security ties.
Third, we will strengthen Montenegrin resilience against
malign actors seeking to undermine its democracy and
institutions, expand journalistic professionalism, buttress
civil society, and amplify U.S. messaging on transatlantic
values.
And, finally, if confirmed I will support Montenegro's
economic prosperity through a renewed U.S.-Montenegro economic
dialogue to strengthen the investment climate.
It is also essential that the United States and the EU help
identify viable alternatives to PRC investment especially in
critical infrastructure.
Montenegro is at a crossroads. The country needs effective
democratic institutions cemented in the Euro-Atlantic framework
and committed to the welfare of all of its citizens.
We are Montenegro's ally in building a better tomorrow as
part of NATO and the EU. Montenegrin citizens clearly have
voiced this desire with their votes and deserve nothing less.
I would be honored to lead our mission in Podgorica. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee and
welcome your questions and God bless the United States of
America.
If I could, sir, I would like to address a couple of the
claims that were made.
Senator, thank you for your concern about my visitor. I
wanted to be very, very clear that I strictly adhere to
policies that respect--in respect to contact reporting.
In fact, the minority counsel did receive a review. DS did
a review of the instance and confirmed that I abided by
requirements with respect to contact foreign reporting and
temporary stay.
I have never had a security violation in my career in the
Foreign Service and at the time I also informed the Ambassador
and the RSO of the visitor.
I want to talk a little bit about the allegations of my
difficulties with staff as well. My leadership style is to
empower. My leadership style is an empathetic leadership style.
My leadership style is the core of my being.
I have always protected the people that I have worked--that
I have worked with and I will continue to do so. If you note in
my resume, half of my career has been dedicated to nurturing
and the professional development of diplomats. I worked at the
Foreign Service Institute to do so.
So this is the first that I am hearing about these claims.
The difficulty to staff piece is the last thing that I wanted
to touch on and you very rightly so said, sir, that in the two-
year--after I left it went up. It was taken away.
It was taken away because I put parameters in place to make
sure that we had the correct number of people bidding on jobs
that we had--we reached out and expanded our outreach for work
in Poland and that is a cycle. It takes a cycle to happen.
And so I am very, very happy that it is correct. It is no
longer a hard to fill post. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aliu follows:]
Prepared Statement of B. Bix Aliu
Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished
committee members; I am humbled and honored to appear before you as
President Biden's nominee to be the next U.S. Ambassador to Montenegro.
I am grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for their
confidence in me, and I hope to earn your trust as well. If confirmed,
I will work closely with you to advance U.S. interests in Montenegro.
I would not be here today without my family's support. With me is
my wife, Dr. Nora Zajazi, who has championed me through our incredible
36-year journey together; my son, Bled, a Nittany Lion and recent GW
law grad; and my daughter, Tea, who is studying archeology and
historical preservation at the University of Mary Washington. My
children are my greatest blessing, and I am very proud of the global
citizens they have become. None of us would be here without the
sacrifices of my parents, Azem and Shirley. They fled the former
Yugoslavia, leaving everything behind to allow my sisters and me to
pursue a better life in the United States. Distinguished committee
members, if confirmed, I will be the first Albanian American in our
history to serve as a U.S. Ambassador--a testament that if you trust in
God, dream big, and work hard, you will succeed.
Over my 22-year diplomatic career, I have been privileged to serve
American citizens and promote U.S. interests and values in the UAE,
Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Hungary. Recently, I
led Mission Poland and guided our team in advancing humanitarian and
security goals as Russia's brutal invasion sent millions of Ukrainian
refugees across the Polish border. The welfare of American citizens is
ever paramount, and I worked with Polish leaders to secure safe passage
for Americans fleeing Ukraine. If confirmed, the safety and security of
U.S. citizens in Montenegro will remain my top priority.
I have always ensured mission policies reflect Administration and
congressional priorities. I have sent tough, clear messages advocating
for the rule of law, democratic institutions, media freedom, and rights
of minority groups--often in the face of outside criticism. These
experiences have prepared me to lead U.S. Mission Podgorica.
American leadership matters. Montenegro's 2023 elections provide a
historic opportunity to accelerate the country on its EU path. We must
also be clear-eyed about the risks to this goal that Montenegro's
governing coalition poses, and remain engaged, with practical
solutions, to help the country attain its rightful place in the
European Union, which 80% of Montenegrins desire.
If confirmed, four priorities will guide my work:
First, Russia's brutal war in Ukraine underscores the urgency
for Montenegro to accelerate critical reforms for EU accession,
democratic development, stability, and prosperity. If
confirmed, I will lead an interagency effort to engage
Montenegrin leaders and promote the rule of law, fight
entrenched corruption, respect human rights, and deliver
tangible results to their citizens, all in line with U.S.
national security objectives.
Second, Montenegro has been a steadfast NATO Ally for seven
years, including stalwart support to Ukraine, deployments to
Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia, and increasing troops for
Enhanced Vigilance Activities in Bulgaria. If confirmed, the
mission and I will work to deepen those security ties, also
through our excellent State Partnership Program with the Maine
National Guard; and streamline Montenegro's acquisitions that
enhance interoperability, such as its recent purchase of patrol
boats built in Alabama and 65 JLTVs produced in Oshkosh,
Wisconsin.
Third, we will strengthen Montenegrin resilience against
malign actors seeking to undermine its democracy and
institutions. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the
interagency, EU, and local partners to counter disinformation;
expand journalistic professionalism, freedom, and independence;
buttress civil society; and amplify U.S. messaging on Trans-
Atlantic values. We will also pursue sanctions, where
appropriate, to confront and counter malign actors.
Finally, if confirmed, I will support Montenegro's economic
prosperity through a renewed U.S.-Montenegro Economic Dialogue
to strengthen the investment climate, improve infrastructure,
diversify energy sources, promote decarbonization, and deepen
regional economic integration. It is essential that the United
States and EU partners help identify viable alternatives to
problematic PRC investment, particularly in critical
infrastructure. To that end, I will encourage adopting Blue Dot
Network and Strategic Ports initiatives to bolster sustainable,
transparent development, level the playing field for U.S.
exporters and suppliers; and reduce trade barriers.
Montenegro is at a crossroads--the country needs effective
democratic institutions cemented in the Euro-Atlantic framework and
committed to the welfare of all its citizens. The United States will
work with Montenegro's leaders to advance shared goals, uphold
international commitments, and tackle corruption. We are Montenegro's
ally in building a better tomorrow as part of NATO and the EU.
Montenegrin citizens clearly voiced this desire with their votes and
deserve nothing less. I would be honored to lead our Mission in
Podgorica. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee
and welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Dr. Sfraga?
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL SFRAGA, OF ALASKA, NOMINATED TO BE
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR ARCTIC AFFAIRS
Dr. Sfraga. Thank you, Chairman Cardin and Ranking Member
Risch and distinguished members of the committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today as the nominee for
Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic affairs.
I am grateful for the trust and confidence President Biden
and Secretary Blinken have placed in me to represent a region
in which I live and have dedicated most of my career. I would
also like to thank Senator Murkowski for her gracious
introduction and for her continued support.
I come before you today as an Alaskan and a humble example
of the American dream. I am the son of working-class parents
and the first in my family to graduate from college.
My story compels me, it requires me, to serve our nation.
My family could not be with me today, but I thank them for
their love, their support, their strength, and their humor.
My father, a high school graduate and blue-collar worker,
passed away in November, but I know he is relishing this
moment--as his son sits before you as a nominee to serve our
country.
The Arctic is undergoing profound change. Russia's war
against Ukraine has rendered cooperation virtually impossible
with Russia including in the Arctic.
The PRC is attempting to reshape the global rules-based
system in its favor and increasingly working with Moscow to
elevate and advance its presence and its influence in the
Arctic in ways that threaten our interests.
And at the same time climate change is disproportionately
impacting the Arctic and its people. If confirmed, I commit to
addressing these changes by promoting U.S. leadership and
interests while countering geopolitical competitors' ambitions
and ensuring Arctic governance is reserved for Arctic nations
by strengthening cooperation with like-minded Arctic allies and
partners to keep the Arctic a region of peace, stability, and
prosperity, by combating climate change and addressing its
impacts to build more resilient Arctic communities, and by
advocating for more economic, social, and cultural
opportunities in the region in meaningful consultation with
indigenous and local communities.
The creation of this position has already shown our allies
and partners, and our adversaries that we are serious about our
interests in the Arctic.
If confirmed I look forward to working with this committee,
the Congress, and the administration with a sense of urgency
and purpose to advance our important interests in the Arctic.
Thank you, sir. And if I may just follow up on just a
couple of points.
Senator Risch, I share your concerns about Chinese
influence in universities and other organizations. I share
those concerns. Memorandums of agreement, partnerships,
sometimes they seem opaque. But as your document points out
they have not been opaque.
They have been very purposeful in their use as a tool just
like many of the tools of the PRC. So I share that concern.
In terms of documentation, I appreciate you and your
staff's willingness to accept a more full picture of my career
by documenting more and more of my presentations and
publications, about 150 to 200 or so altogether--I appreciate
that--and providing a full accounting of MOUs.
In terms of travel to Russia, indeed, I traveled to Russia
after Crimea was invaded in 2014 but not after 2022. It is hard
to ignore half of the Arctic, which is Russia, and in the North
it is a big neighborhood but a small community and you must
engage and, indeed, at one of those conferences President Putin
did provide a keynote address but I had no interaction with
President Putin at all.
Sir, I would just leave it at that, aside from saying that
the North needs leadership and this position can project and
reflect U.S. policy domestically and internationally.
I thank you both, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sfraga follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael Sfraga
Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished
Members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today
as a nominee for the position of Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic
Affairs.
I am grateful for the trust and confidence President Biden and
Secretary Blinken have placed in me to represent a region in which I
live--and have dedicated most of my career. I would also like to thank
Senator Murkowski for her gracious introduction and support.
I come before you as a humble example of the American dream, the
American promise, the American dividend. I am the son of working-class
Italian Americans who came to this country at the turn of the last
century and worked too many hours, for too many years to ensure our
family had our most basic needs met; they created the path that led me
to this chair.
I am the first in my family to attend to college, to earn a
bachelor's degree, a master's degree, and a PhD. I am a proud native of
Brooklyn, New York and resident of Fairbanks, Alaska. My story compels
me--requires me--to serve our nation.
My family could not be with me today, but I thank them for their
love, support, strength, and humor. My father, a high school graduate
and blue-collar worker passed away in November, but I know he is
relishing in this moment--as his son sits before you as a nominee to
serve our country.
The Arctic is undergoing profound change, including an increasingly
challenging geopolitical environment. Russia's illegal war of
aggression against Ukraine has rendered cooperation with Moscow
virtually impossible, including in the Arctic.
The PRC is attempting to reshape the global rules-based system in
its favor and increasingly working with Moscow to elevate and advance
its presence and influence in the Arctic. And at the same time, the
impacts of climate change are disproportionality impacting the Arctic
environment and its people.
These realities have resulted in a renewed unity among likeminded
Arctic nations:
To reinvigorate and expand the transatlantic Alliance, motivating
Finland and Sweden to join NATO and making 7 of the 8 Arctic
nations members of the most powerful defensive alliance in
world history.
To combat climate change.
To work closely to bring about more economic, social, and cultural
opportunities across the region.
And to strengthen the international rules-based order.
These four points are in line with the U.S. National Security
Strategy that states, ``The United States seeks an Arctic region that
is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative'' and mirror the four
pillars of the 2023 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region:
Security
Climate Change and Environmental Protection
Sustainable Economic Development
International Cooperation and Governance.
If confirmed, I commit to supporting the Strategy's implementation
while advancing U.S. interests through the following six priorities:
Strengthen cooperation with likeminded Arctic and non-Arctic Allies
and partners in efforts to keep the Arctic a region of peace,
stability, and prosperity, and expand international and sub-
national cooperation especially across the North American
Arctic.
Leverage the tools of government to increase commerce through
sustainable economic growth. This includes expanding Arctic
infrastructure and connectivity, and the responsible
development of essential commodities, such as critical
minerals.
Promote U.S. leadership and interests while countering geopolitical
competitors' ambitions; ensuring Arctic governance is reserved
for Arctic nations; and leverage the region's unique position
to strengthen the international rules-based system.
Address the impacts of climate change and build more resilient
Arctic communities.
Empower U.S. Arctic rights- and stakeholders, especially Indigenous
and local communities, through regular meaningful
consultations, to inform policy and support their participation
in international fora.
Advance domestic and international understanding of the importance
of the Arctic region and help build the next generation of
Arctic leaders.
I know the President's decision to create the position of
Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs, in close consultation with the
Congress, will enhance and elevate the nation's Arctic leadership.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Ambassador's office projects and
reflects U.S. Arctic policy, brings value and support to the many
offices within the Department with Arctic equities; creates one focal
point within the Department of State to inform, lead, facilitate, and
coordinate Arctic efforts and policy directives; and serves as a
resource and partner for our bilateral Ambassadors, interagency
colleagues, and international partners.
I am honored to have been nominated for this position and, if
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee, the Congress,
and the Administration--with a sense of urgency and purpose--to achieve
these important goals. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me thank all of you for your statements
and, again, for your willingness to serve our country. I am
going to reserve my time.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, and I will try to be brief
because I do have some witnesses.
So let me first follow up with that. Have you engaged with
the FBI at all regarding your work with the Russians and the
Chinese?
Dr. Sfraga. Sir, I have not engaged directly with the
Russian--with the FBI on work with Russia and China.
Senator Risch. Have they done any investigations of you in
that regard?
Dr. Sfraga. I have no idea, sir.
Senator Risch. You know that we have been told that that
happened. Is that correct?
Dr. Sfraga. I do know that.
Senator Risch. Yeah. And you are aware that we cannot get
the FBI to deny that. Are you aware of that?
Dr. Sfraga. I am not aware of that.
Senator Risch. And have you retained an attorney at all in
regards to a possible investigation?
Dr. Sfraga. No, sir.
Senator Risch. Okay. Thank you.
Let me give an opportunity because this is going to go into
the record so I want to give Mr. Aliu a chance to respond to
this. Give me just a second here.
This was the letter. I am wondering if you saw this. Did
you see the letter that was dated April 21, 2021, and this is
Mr. Aliu. Have you seen the letter dated April 21, 2021, to
Ambassador Carol Z. Perez, Acting Under Secretary of State for
Management and District General of the Foreign Service? Have
you seen that letter?
Mr. Aliu. No, sir.
Senator Risch. Okay. I want to quote from this letter
because it is going to go into the record and I want you to
respond to it, please.
This was from an employee and it is someone who was
employed there in the Embassy. Quote, ``The time I spent at
Embassy Warsaw under DCM Aliu's leadership was one of the worst
experiences of my Foreign Service career.
``He created an incredibly toxic work environment and often
exhibited blatantly inappropriate or unethical behavior,
especially once he became Charge. When one individual curtailed
and raised concerns about his behavior he retaliated against
him by maligning them to other senior leaders during visits,
calls, et cetera.
``That experience had a chilling effect on other officers.
When other officers curtailed they did not cite him or his
behavior in their curtailment requests for fear of reprisal.''
Do you want to respond to that?
The Chairman. I am going to let you respond. Just for the
record I want to point out that you are quoting from a letter
that we just got this morning. This nomination has been pending
for 535 days. But we did not receive this information from the
Republicans until this morning.
Senator Risch. And just for the record, too, this came from
a whistleblower and we did not have it either until recently.
Mr. Aliu. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator.
I share your concern because there is nothing more
important to me than the well being and the welfare of the
people that I work with. I worked very, very closely with your
staff, sir, and with yourself when I worked in Poland. We took
on a lot of challenges, and I want to thank you for that and I
want to thank your staff for that.
Let me address this issue. I have never seen this letter so
it is very difficult for me to be able to respond to that
letter without having read it and without having seen it.
But the department has shared an unprecedented amount of my
personnel information with your staff and there are no
complaints of any type or anything like that in that
information that they have shared.
If there were such complaints I would have not passed the
vetting for the nomination today nor would I have received the
Presidential Rank Award I did because of the thorough vetting.
I also provided minority counsel with a list, the very
detailed lists of the people that curtailed during Ambassador
Mosbacher's and my time--five people in four years. Two of
those people we asked to leave.
So there are--the claims in that letter, the part that I
heard you mention, something about me badmouthing somebody to
other people, that is not my modus operandi. I do not badmouth
anybody. I have not badmouthed anybody.
I have nurtured and I have allowed for the professional
development of the staff. My record as well as many other
testimonials--the support from Ambassador Mosbacher, the
support from Senator Blackburn, the support from many, many
Republicans--will also attest my dedication including
Ambassador Ric Grenell, including Bill White, all of whom, by
the way, wished--wanted me to thank you and say hello to you on
their behalf.
Sir, I take nothing more important. I think there is
nothing more important than the well being of our staff, their
physical being and their mental being, and I have--my credit--
my reputation shows that. So thank you very much.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, my time is almost up and I do
want to save some time because we are--it is going to take a
bit. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez?
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just start off as someone who understands being
falsely accused. I believe that due process at the minimum
requires notice--due notice--and time and an opportunity to be
heard.
And so to the extent that we are going to challenge, which
is perfectly legitimate, nominees, having notice so that a
fulsome answer to any of those issues could be had is something
that I would hope that the committee would make as its
practice.
Now, let me say that I regret to say that I have a strong
objection to Ms. Taylor's nomination because the State
Department will be getting a damn good legal advisor, and since
I know that legal advisors can often create challenges for the
interests of the committee as it relates to needing things that
they want from the State Department I wish she was on this side
of the ledger, even though we have a great counsel here at the
committee, than there.
But I know she will do an extraordinary job. I do hope that
as part of that extraordinary job you will remember the
obligations under the CASE Act to this committee and that you
will advise the department appropriately.
Do I have your commitment on that?
Ms. Taylor. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Now, let me--I am interested in all these nominees but I
only have limited time so I will submit some questions for the
record. Let me focus on Mr. Woodhouse because as the architect
and author of many of the sanctions that you will be called
upon to coordinate for the State Department I want to pursue
some with you.
Iran continues to deny any direct involvement in the
attacks of Iran-based groups against the United States in the
Middle East. However, there is no denying that its proxies do
not have the weaponry and intelligence capabilities to execute
such attacks on the United States without Tehran.
If confirmed you would be the lead sanctions diplomat
responsible for coordinating sanctions and ensuring their full
implementation.
So, Mr. Woodhouse, do you believe that our sanctions on
Iran have been effective? Is there more if you were confirmed
in this role that you would be advising the State Department to
pursue?
Is it a moment, especially with what Iran is continuing to
do not only through its proxies and destabilizing of the region
but its violation of the IAEA's obligations that it has for
which we know less today than we did before, to
internationalize those sanctions? Can you give me some thinking
on that?
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you for that question, Senator.
Iran is an adversary and one of the leading state sponsors
of terrorism and I would absolutely treat it that way. It is
also one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world
with long-standing programs addressing the full range of its
harmful and destabilizing activities.
The Biden administration has not lifted any sanctions on
Iran and we have continued to implement and enforce those
sanctions. This includes actions involving Iranians' oil
exports, its support for terrorism and its proxies in the
region.
Senator Menendez. But, for example, we are not sanctioning
China, which is purchasing huge amounts of Iranian oil and is
giving flow to the Iranians of money.
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you, Senator. We have--in a number of
actions that have involved Iranian oil sales we have designated
entities in China both in Hong Kong and mainland China.
Senator Menendez. Well, it is far--we cannot claim success
with the flow that is going into China of Iranian oil and
therefore the flow of money that is going from China to Iran.
Let me turn to Venezuela. I urged the Biden administration
not to preemptively give away the enforcement mechanism that
the United States possesses through sanctions until we saw real
tangible results from the Maduro regime.
Then in January I was, sadly, proven right when Maduro's
handpicked Supreme Court upheld a ban on the candidacy of Maria
Corina Machado, the opposition candidate who won overwhelmingly
last year's primary election. She is now barred.
So when the primary opponent that the people have spoken
already want this person to be their candidate is barred then
it seems to me that the Maduro regime has failed to live up to
its end of the deal and there have to be consequences from the
United States and our allies.
Maduro gained sanctions relief and other measures that only
benefit the regime. How are you going to hold the Maduro regime
accountable for failing to uphold the Barbados agreement as
Venezuela's presidential election remains set for July 28?
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you for that question, Senator. We
continue to believe that the Barbados agreement is the most
effective path forward to achieve a return to democracy in
Venezuela.
However, as you note, a number of actions by Maduro and his
representatives have been inconsistent with that agreement and
cast real doubt on their willingness to follow through on that
agreement.
We have already begun to pull back sanctions relief,
specifically General License 43 involving interactions with the
gold sector in Venezuela, and we have been clear that if Maduro
and his representatives do not get back on track with the
Barbados agreement we will not renew General License 44 which
authorizes activities in the oil sector.
So we are watching the situation very carefully and we are
prepared to allow General License 44 to expire and not offer
any additional sanctions relief until Venezuela returns and
gets back--Maduro and his representatives get back on track
with the Barbados agreement.
Senator Menendez. Well, I look forward to following up in
written questions with you. These two issues as it relates to
your nomination is of critical importance to me and I would
like to see a more fulsome--maybe there will be an opportunity
for you and I to speak after your hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Woodhouse. I would welcome that, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts?
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Right now the world is more dangerous since--than any time
since World War II and this makes the work that we do on this
committee so critical.
It goes without saying that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, when it acts in a bipartisan manner, is going to be
more effective. As a new member of this committee I have
enjoyed working with my Democratic colleagues on a number of
important issues. I would point to the work Senator Shaheen and
I have done when we have engaged on the European Subcommittee.
That is why I was disappointed to hear about how we got to
this nominations hearing today. I agree that we have to have
Ambassadors and State Department officials in their posts to
pursue American interests.
However, it is vital that we have the right people in those
posts and this makes our oversight role here so important
because the responsibilities of these positions warrants
scrutiny and vetting.
It has been nine months since we first learned that Robert
Malley was suspended and placed on administrative leave because
of an investigation into his possible mishandling of classified
documents.
This was revealed, by the way, not by the State Department
but by the press. Malley was not some low-level official
either. He was the special envoy for Iran who played a critical
role in this administration's Iran policy.
Soon after the press reports revealed that Malley was under
investigation by the FBI and the State Department Diplomatic
Security Office. We then come to find out through a leaked
sensitive State Department memo published by the Tehran Times
that Malley's investigation and clearance suspension had
occurred weeks earlier than originally known and, again, just
let me stress that we learned that from not the State
Department but the state-controlled Tehran Times, not our own
government.
And, finally, in September a press report revealed that
Iran had orchestrated an influence operation that involved
Malley's close associates and yet we have not heard from the
State Department on whether this revelation was related to
Malley's suspension and investigation.
Time and time again the State Department has stonewalled
requests from Congress to understand the basics of these
allegations, let alone whether something more nefarious was
occurring.
However, it has chosen to hide behind the Privacy Act
despite the law providing clear exception for oversight
committees. This is coming from an administration that on its
first day pledged that it would bring transparency and truth
back to government. Clearly, that is not the case.
Ms. Taylor, are you familiar with the Privacy Act of 1974?
Ms. Taylor. Yes, I am, Senator, because at USAID we do deal
with the Privacy Act on a fairly routine basis.
Senator Ricketts. Very good. Based on your legal
understanding does the Privacy Act provide an exception for
congressional oversight committees?
Ms. Taylor. Yes, it does, Senator. It provides an exception
for that either house of Congress or committees or
subcommittees of Congress.
Senator Ricketts. So based on your legal understanding do
you agree that the Privacy Act includes an exception for
congressional inquiries, does not require prior written consent
from the concerned individual, and makes no distinction between
majority and minority requests?
Ms. Taylor. I am not sure about the majority/minority
request piece of it but, yes, that is my understanding.
Senator Ricketts. Okay. Great.
Based on your legal understanding do you believe the
Privacy Act would prevent the disclosure to this committee
information pertaining to the suspension of Robert Malley's
security clearance?
Ms. Taylor. Senator, I do not believe the Privacy Act would
have that effect and I would--I will just say I am not privy to
any of the conversations at the State Department on this matter
so I have limited visibility into any of this.
Senator Ricketts. So, Mr. Chairman, it has been 250 days
since we found out of Malley's suspension and, clearly, this
administration does not want to cooperate. We have got letters
back from them basically saying they are using the Privacy Act
to say they cannot do it despite that it very clearly says that
Congress does have the ability to hear this.
You were--and, obviously, I was not in the SCIF with you
when you heard from the folks there. But I do not think it is
unreasonable for this committee to perform its inherent
oversight role and demand transparency.
Therefore, I make a motion for the committee to suspend the
rules and subpoena all the relevant documents related to
Malley's suspension and investigation so we can get to the
bottom of this and if the chairman is unwilling to consider a
suspension of the rules then I would ask that we take this off
and have a vote on it in our next business meeting.
The Chairman. If the gentleman would yield just for a
moment. The State Department does not have that information. It
is the FBI that has the information that you are referring to.
The FBI operates under a different set of standards in regards
to investigations.
So it is not the State Department that is the proprietary
entity that has the material that you are requesting.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. I think there is no doubt that the FBI has
this information. But State Department certainly has that
information and they admitted as much to you and I when we met
with them. So I----
The Chairman. I do not think they did. I agree with you
that they were not responsive to your requests but I do not
believe the State Department had the information. I think the
State Department said--that is why we had the representative
from the Justice Department that was in the SCIF. That was the
entity that was responding to us. It was not the State
Department.
Senator Risch [continuing]. Well, they were all there and
they would not tell us how to get this information. I mean----
Senator Ricketts [continuing]. So, again, perhaps, if there
is some----
The Chairman [continuing]. I think the challenge----
Senator Ricketts [continuing]. Clarity on this we could
take it up again.
The Chairman. I think the challenge is that in law
enforcement that does investigations they are very protective
of any of the information from anyone. I do not necessarily
agree with that but that is law enforcement. It is not State
Department.
Senator Ricketts. But--okay. So, again, if we do a subpoena
of the State Department--I agree FBI operates under different
terms so I totally get that.
But if we subpoena the State Department and they have no
records then they would have nothing to give us. But if they do
have records, even just basic HR records on when Mr. Malley was
suspended and so forth would that not be helpful in us getting
to understand that? And if the Chairman does not want to take
it up here I certainly understand taking it up at a business
meeting.
The Chairman. I am more than happy to work with you on
that. It is just not relevant to this hearing or the nominee
that you are referring.
Senator Ricketts. I think it is.
The Chairman. I am more than----
Senator Ricketts [continuing]. I think it is relevant
because the Chair--the ranking member, rather--is putting a
hold on Ms. Taylor because of the lack of responsiveness from
the State Department.
The Chairman. We will continue to work with you in that
regard but it is not relevant to this specific hearing that we
have before us.
Senator Ricketts. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Risch and to all of our nominees today, thank you all very much
for your willingness to continue to serve the country and
congratulations on your nominations.
I would like to address what are some underlying issues
that, sadly, do not have anything to do with your nomination
but do have to do with what we need to do to ensure that we
have ambassadors and representatives of the United States in
place who can do the work of this country, and I am very
disappointed that there is such a lack of trust on this
committee that 500 days into the nominations of Mr. Aliu we
finally get the information that is the concern that the
minority has had.
And I think those are serious allegations and they need to
be investigated and I would like to have done that 500 days
ago.
And you do not need to respond, Senator Risch, but I think
this committee needs to get its act together so that we do not
have hearings in the future where we are--so that we are,
first, not holding up nominees for 200-plus days when we need
you in the field and, secondly, that we are having a hearing
like this where a lot of dirty laundry is being aired when we
should be talking about the role that these nominees are going
to play in the countries to which we hope you will serve.
So I am really disappointed in the behavior of the
committee today and I hope that we are going to fix that, going
forward.
Now, Mr. Aliu, recognizing that you have not seen those
letters accusing you I will say that my office has received
numerous enthusiastic recommendations about your service and
have commended your leadership and your management style and
your character.
So I would like to, therefore, raise questions about
Montenegro and the job that you hopefully will be going to
serve.
I had the pleasure of visiting Montenegro in the--within
the last year and we met with President Milatovic at the Munich
Security Conference. This is a country, as you point out, that
is on the cusp of EU membership and I want you to talk to us a
little bit about how we can support how you would support
Montenegro if you are confirmed as ambassador as they continue
their accession talks with the EU.
Mr. Aliu. Senator Shaheen, thank you so much and thank you
for your leadership, and thank you for the kind words.
I would be remiss if I did not thank you for your
leadership in Europe when I was charge in Poland and if I did
not thank Senator Risch and his team because we worked very,
very hard and protected media freedom in that country and I
would be remiss if I did not mention that. Thank you so much.
First, if confirmed, what I would continue to do is ensure
that Montenegro continues down its path towards EU accession.
We have vibrant programs through our INL programming that the
Embassy is implementing right now because right now Montenegro
has opened 33 chapters of 35 for accession talks.
They closed three provisionally and they are working on two
of the most important. The EU has put--chapters 23 and 24,
judicial reform and security reform--the EU has put conditions
on Montenegro that they cannot move forward if they do not
close these chapters.
So what we are doing and what the Embassy is doing, and I
hope to continue and expand, is provide both technical and
capacity-building assistance to the prosecutor's office to the
special police to combat corruption and organized crime.
They have done a--the new government has done a miraculous
job in the 100 days that they have been in power. They have
named judicial councils, filled vacant constitutional court
places.
They have named a very competent and brave Chief Special
Prosecutor--Mr. Novovic, that is taking on crime and
prosecuting bad actors. We need to continue to help them but we
also need to continue to push on the EU and, if confirmed, I
will do so to make this accession process transparent and fair.
Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I certainly agree with that on
the EU.
In my brief time that I have left, Dr. Sfraga, given that
NATO has welcomed the two new Arctic allies in Sweden and
Finland can you talk about how you would work with NATO
partners if you are confirmed to ensure that we are all working
together to deter Russian and Chinese aggression in the Arctic?
Dr. Sfraga. Thank you, Senator, for the question. We all do
wait patiently but maybe with a good sense of urgency about
Sweden's imminent ascension to NATO.
With seven of the eight Arctic nations now members of the
NATO it intensifies and further coordinates and further
strengthens the transatlantic alliance because what we have
created now is a trans-Arctic alliance and Sweden now is a big
part of that as is Finland, of course, and NATO.
Ma'am, I would certainly work very closely with our
European bureau, our NATO colleagues, and in Brussels. The job
of this ambassadorship should be to inform and to bring value
to this discussion.
The Arctic is unique but it is globalized, and so now we
have a region in the Arctic that is very much part of NATO's
portfolio. With the networks that an ambassador should have,
that ambassador should be able to inform the process, inform
interoperability, look at opportunities to strengthen this
alliance but needs to work very closely with our bilateral
ambassadors in those countries, bring value to internal
discussions, work appropriately with the Department of Defense,
and think about ways in which we communicate what it is that we
are doing.
This is the most--this is the strongest defensive alliance
the world has ever seen, and it has now grown because of
actions from another country.
These two countries, Finland and Sweden, bring to us
capacities that we need, we welcome. They are friends. They are
allies. They have unique capabilities in the North that can not
only be used in their side of the North but, I would argue, in
the North American side of the North. There is an analogue
here. And so I would see this role to be connecting and to
informing and to assisting in that process.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forden, I would like to start with you. You are
nominated to be the Ambassador to Cambodia. I have spent time
in Cambodia. I have also spent a lot of time dealing with the
PRC.
Can you tell me how extensive is China's influence in
Cambodia?
Mr. Forden. Thank you for that important question, Senator.
We have seen in--especially in recent years--for quite a
long time that Chinese investment in Cambodia has risen
dramatically, that Chinese citizens traveling to Cambodia and
residing there and getting involved in sometimes nefarious----
Senator Hagerty. I think that is an understatement. The
influence of China in military affairs, political affairs,
economic affairs, is extensive. I know that. You know that.
Mr. Forden. Right.
Senator Hagerty. What I want to talk to you about is how do
you stand up to Chinese influence because we need our diplomats
to be strong. We need our diplomats to stand up to nefarious
influence, as you mentioned. It is all over Cambodia.
So I want to go back to your time when you were serving at
mission China. First, I want to ask you this. Are you aware of
the legislation that Senator Peters and I just passed out of
the Homeland Security Committee yesterday dealing with BGI and
WuXi AppTec?
Mr. Forden. No, I am not.
Senator Hagerty. These are PRC-influenced and controlled
companies that take the genomic data of people all over the
world including Americans and they work with the PRC. Exposing
any American genetic data to the PRC is a grave concern of
mine.
Let us go back to your time serving as DCM in China. You
understand this, don't you? You understand the approach of the
Chinese. Would you be concerned about them having our DNA data?
Mr. Forden. Absolutely, but----
Senator Hagerty. I am glad you share my concern. But
according to whistleblower complaints back in 2021 when you
were in charge of the Embassy in Beijing you knowingly allowed
DNA collection from our U.S. Government employees through blood
tests prior to their entry to China and it is in spite of the
national security and the counterintelligence concerns that you
seem to share with me.
The U.S. Government had no way to verify that China only
used these samples for COVID-19. In fact, China refused to
deanonymize or to--I am sorry, to anonymize and to destroy the
samples. Weren't you concerned?
Mr. Forden. I certainly was concerned but, Senator, at the
time that policy--those policy decisions were made in
Washington and then we were instructed to implement them in
China.
My understanding was that they were shared with all of the
relevant agencies and I can tell you at post----
Senator Hagerty. Well, here is my understanding.
Mr. Forden [continuing]. Beijing is that we also discussed
those with all of the relevant agencies and I was never--no
information was ever brought to my attention that any of the
relevant agencies believed that what the Chinese were doing
with COVID testing in China would enhance their ability to
collect the DNA because----
Senator Hagerty. I think you should--I think you should
have followed the instructions from the State Department
because back in September 2020 they granted--the State
Department granted a limited waiver of inviolability--Senator
Risch mentioned this--that allowed for predeparture COVID
testing for U.S. personnel so long as conditions remained the
same on the ground.
But the conditions then were nasal swab testing. They went
to blood testing. The PRC even dictated which labs could be
used in America.
You did nothing to stop that. You did not notify through
the front channel the State Department as you were instructed
to do. You did not stop that from happening. In fact, you
recommended that our personnel comply with the PRC's request. I
think that is deeply, deeply concerning.
And then we get documents from March and June of 2021 that
talk about your consent to this protocol change. Going to
COVID-19 blood tests and only at labs that they allowed opened
the door for the PRC. They gain an inch because you allowed
that to happen.
And then what happens next? It gets even worse. In early
2021 it comes to Mission China's attention that the PRC has now
escalated beyond blood tests to go to anal swabs of our
personnel in their apartments. That is shocking to me.
Did you decide to stand up then to the PRC?
Mr. Forden. Senator, the reports of anal swabs of U.S.
diplomats are completely false, and there was an instance that
occurred when a U.S. diplomat incorrectly complied--voluntarily
complied with that when he should not have and we rapidly and
immediately protested to the----
Senator Hagerty. So you protested this----
Mr. Forden [continuing]. And told--and told----
Senator Hagerty [continuing]. But you did not protest them
taking our blood samples and exposing our DNA.
Mr. Forden. I never--by that time I was----
Senator Hagerty. What I am saying is we have to have
diplomats that will stand up for American interests and will
stand up to China.
Mr. Forden [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Hagerty. If you are going to go to Cambodia you
need to be able to stand up for our interest and for our
diplomats' interest. You need to be strong against China, not
allow them an inch and certainly not allow them the mile.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forden. Senator, there is an enormous amount of
information here that is being--that is incorrect and not true
that you are weaving into this narrative.
We--Ambassador Branstad and I--throughout our tenure there
we tirelessly pushed back on the Chinese on every single one of
the things that you mentioned.
With regard to blood tests, at no point ever while I was in
China did I waive anyone's diplomatic immunity or instruct
anybody in China to comply with a request for a blood test in
China. These blood tests----
Senator Hagerty. No. Not in China, in the U.S.
Mr. Forden [continuing]. I understand. These blood tests in
the U.S.----
Senator Hagerty. At the labs the PRC dictated.
Mr. Forden. That is right.
Senator Hagerty. You did allow it.
Mr. Forden. That was a Washington, D.C.-based decision and
policy. I was never consulted on that issue because that was a
requirement that the Chinese Embassy in Washington put out
there for travelers to China.
Senator Hagerty. And I just read you what the notice
required. You were supposed to notify the State Department
through the front office channel if conditions on the ground
changed. Conditions certainly changed going from a nasal swab
to taking our blood test and DNA.
Mr. Forden. Well, I--every single change of any type that
happened with blood testing or requirements in China that
occurred during my tenure was immediately, almost in real time,
informed to the department.
We were having daily phone calls, email exchanges, and
weekly conference calls on all of these issues and every change
was communicated back.
Senator Hagerty. So you are saying you did--under the
limited waiver of inviolability that Senator Risch mentioned--
you did notify the front office channels. You did do that when
this condition on the ground changed--when this condition
moving to a blood test requirement you did notify them as
required?
Mr. Forden. That was a development in Washington and not in
Beijing. They were quite aware--well aware of that because that
was a requirement that the Chinese Embassy in Washington
notified to the State Department about requirements including
visa requirements that people would need to travel to China.
So I can talk about what happened in China and I can assure
you that everything that happened in China we shared, again,
almost in real time any changes, any modifications.
Any additional requirements that were imposed in China were
shared almost in real time with our counterpart offices in the
State Department and informed to department leadership at the
time, which was Secretary Pompeo and Under Secretary Bulatao.
Senator Hagerty. Did you relay at any time your concerns
about the Chinese Government having access to our blood
samples?
Mr. Forden. That was a discussion that occurred in
Washington in the interagency.
Senator Hagerty. I remain very concerned about this. You
are aware of my legislation to try to address it. We have to
keep our DNA here and I want our diplomats to be protecting
Americans at every turn possible. I would expect that from each
of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Woodhouse, the position of sanctions coordinator is
supposed to oversee and implement sanctions in an objective and
nonpartisan way. In examining your record during the Biden
administration I have become concerned that you are singularly
unqualified for this position.
Far too often the Biden administration has politicized
sanctions. This administration has used sanctions as a bludgeon
against countries and international figures whom Democrats do
not like while ignoring much more significant violations by
those embraced by the global populist left.
You have sanctioned our friends and ignored our enemies and
the mess on the global stage is a direct result of that. Let's
start by talking about Israel and Hamas.
Hamas has launched repeated wars against Israel during the
Biden administration, injuring, kidnapping, murdering thousands
of people including dozens of Americans.
They know they cannot defeat Israel militarily so their
fundamental strategy is to use Palestinian human shields to
generate Palestinian civilian casualties and, therefore,
international outrage to damage Israel.
To counter that strategy in 2018, I authored and secured
into law mandatory sanctions against Hamas and Hezbollah
terrorists for using human shields. In May of 2021 Hamas
launched yet another war against Israel once again using human
shields.
Mr. Woodhouse, how many Hamas terrorists did you sanction
for using human shields during this conflict?
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you for that question, Senator.
During the Biden administration we have released multiple
rounds of sanctions targeting both Hamas and its financial
networks in the region and globally, seeking to continue to
degrade its ability to operate and perpetrate these awful
crimes against Israel.
Senator Cruz. I understand you want to make a generic
statement. I am going to ask the question again because it is
precise. How many Hamas terrorists did you sanction for using
human shields during the 2021 conflict?
Mr. Woodhouse. With respect to the Shield Act sanctions I
will have to get back to you. I do not have that number
currently.
Senator Cruz. Well, I can help you on it. That number was
zero. You did not sanction anybody and that is why you do not
have the number because there is not an answer to give.
All right. Let us move forward. Hamas sanctioned. They use
human shields. You have got a mandatory obligation to sanction
them but this administration does not want to because in a
conflict between the Palestinians and Israel this
administration has decided that you are for the Palestinians
and against Israel.
Recently you exercised the other half of that. This
administration sanctioned Israelis. Those sanctions were
imposed pursuant to a new executive order that imposes
crippling sanctions on, quote, ``persons undermining peace,
security, and stability in the West Bank.''
Critics have rightly said that this executive order and
your imposition of sanctions is meant to target only Israeli
Jews living in Judea and Samaria. The administration has
claimed in your talking points that the sanctions are neutral.
So if it is neutral it ought to be pretty simple to answer this
question.
The Palestinian Authority gives hundreds of millions of
dollars to terrorists who murder Jews. These are ``pay to
slay'' payments, which they call martyrs funds.
How many sanctions have you imposed on the Palestinian
Authority or Palestinian officials for paying for the murder of
Jews?
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you for that question, Senator.
The program that you just referenced has been very recently
established. There has been one round of sanctions imposed
under that program. I cannot preview future actions----
Senator Cruz. All on Jews?
Mr. Woodhouse [continuing]. The first round did--the
targets were all Israeli, yes.
Senator Cruz. Well, and clearly in the wake of October 7th
you are looking at Hamas terrorists who murdered 1,200 people,
who rape women, who murder children and I will tell you it was
sickening. A number of us sat here. The Chairman of this
committee arranged for us to listen to stories of the horrors
that came on.
Why does the Biden administration look at that and say,
clearly, what we need to do is sanction Israeli Jews? But we do
not sanction Hamas. We do not sanction Hamas terrorists for
using human shields and you do not sanction the Palestinian
Authority for essentially offering rewards for the murder of
civilians.
Why not?
Mr. Woodhouse. Senator, President Biden and the
administration have been very clear that the United States
stands behind Israel's right to defend itself against these
attacks. We also have imposed----
Senator Cruz. Okay. Except for the fact that you are only
sanctioning our friends and you are not sanctioning our
enemies.
All right. My time has expired but I want to ask one last
thing. You have screwed up sanctions in the Middle East. You
have screwed up sanctions in Latin America, which could be an
entire other round of questioning. But let me end with this.
Screwing up sanctions also caused the war in Ukraine. If
you knew in 2021 that allowing Nord Stream 2 to be physically
completed would convince Vladimir Putin that he was able to
destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure and then invade Ukraine
would you still have made the same decisions you made then
about Nord Stream 2 to give Putin a multibillion-dollar gift
and an invitation to invade Ukraine?
Mr. Woodhouse. Thank you, Senator.
When Russia began that invasion they had already heard from
the President, standing next to German Chancellor Scholz, that
if Russia invaded, Nord Stream 2 would be no more and
Chancellor Scholz said that there was no disagreement----
Senator Cruz. If Russia--so did that work? I find your
answer astonishing.
Mr. Woodhouse. Well, Nord Stream 2 is no more.
Senator Cruz. Are you claiming responsibility for that?
Mr. Woodhouse. No.
Senator Cruz. You will make news if you are saying that.
Mr. Woodhouse. No.
Senator Cruz. I am not aware of that. Well, then that
cannot be your answer. If that is not what you are saying--you
smirk and say Nord Stream 2 is no more, but your gift, refusing
to enforce the sanctions on Nord Stream 2, caused the invasion.
My question, which you did not answer, if you knew then
what you know now would you still have given that gift to Putin
and started the war?
Mr. Woodhouse. Senator, the decision that we had to make in
2021 was a pipeline that was almost complete. The Secretary has
been clear----
Senator Cruz. Are you going to answer the question? Would
you have made the same decision knowing what you know now, yes
or no?
Mr. Woodhouse. The decision that we had to make at that
time was based on the facts and the realities available at that
time.
Senator Cruz. It was staggeringly wrong. All of us told you
it was staggeringly wrong. You did not listen to us and it
caused the war because you put ideology above the interests of
America and above the interests of our allies.
The Chairman. Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want--I
understand you can deny it but I want to formally request that
we have some witnesses to testify.
The Chairman. Right, and as Senator Risch is aware that
when we call witnesses for a hearing it has worked out. We will
have some from each, the Democrats and Republicans, and we will
decide whether it is necessary.
We have not done that on nomination hearings. It would
require advance notice so, yes, your request is denied.
Senator Risch. And thank you for that. I would say that
this is a little different. These are fact witnesses who can
corroborate some of these if not all of these allegations here.
Let me say, first of all, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that--all the documentation I referred to and will
submit for the record, please.
The Chairman. No objections, but pointing out, again, that
this material was not shared with the committee prior to today.
Senator Risch. Well, the--Mr. Chairman, with all due
respect, there is some material that came in--the one letter
came in today. But these--some of the whistleblower letters
came in in '20 and '22 and you have had--the majority and
minority have had----
The Chairman. Just to be clear, you gave us a folder that
included, I think, three documents. Those documents were first
seen by us today, if I understand correctly.
I do not know the additional documents you are referring to
but the three documents that you gave us in a folder today at
our desk it is my understanding that they were not--we had not
seen them until this morning.
Senator Risch. There is very little in there that has not
been seen. The whistleblower complaints were directed to you or
to the minority and the majority way back when. So that is
included in here.
And I have a number of other documents that I have that
have been in possession. They have been in--we used them for
the investigations on this matter. So----
Senator Shaheen. I do not think we received it.
The Chairman. We had not looked at it. But I am not going
to object to you including it in the record.
Senator Risch. And I----
The Chairman. You have the right to include what you want
to into the record. I just want everyone to understand that it
will be our opportunity to review that information and we look
forward to reviewing it.
Senator Risch. If and when we ever get to a debate on the
floor we will reference those and read them into the record on
the floor. But in the meantime I would like them in the record
for the committee to review.
The Chairman. That is--without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
this transcript.]
Senator Risch. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think that the rhetoric that has been used
by particularly our Republican colleagues with certain
innuendos they are just not accurate. I think our witnesses
have responded to each of those. I am going to be asking some
questions for the record just to clarify that.
Mr. Forden, you made it very clear that the decisions in
regards to testing was not made in China, that if--to the
extent the decision was made it was made by the Secretariat's
office in Washington, DC. That was not your decision making. I
think you were pretty clear about the role that you played
there.
Ms. Taylor, I think you have been pretty clear that in
regards to the abortion policies that you did not change any of
the decisions. That was in the Trump administration as far as
the framework for the laws and the application of the laws.
So it is interesting that my Republican colleagues are
using that to say that there is a difference under the Biden
administration when in fact some of their complaints are
probably under the Trump administration.
But you are a legal advisor. You follow the law, if I
understand what you had said.
Mr. Aliu, I think you had responded that--to the charges
that have been made that they are just not true and that will--
you may have a disgruntled employee issue. We recognize that
and we will take a look at the information that has been made
part of our record.
Mr. Woodhouse, the number of sanctions that have been
imposed particularly against Russia are unprecedented. This is
the single largest number of sanctions I think we have ever
imposed, and the sanctions against Iran we cannot find any more
to impose.
We want to enforce the sanctions but we are looking--we
have pretty well exhausted the cupboard as to what we can find
for sanctions.
So I just want to point--make the record clear that--the
aggressiveness of the Biden administration in regards to the
use of sanctions.
Mr. Sfraga, I can understand if you have written or
participated in a hundred or 200 conferences and that there
will be a lot of material there that we have a right to go
through and that you are attending conferences on the Arctic
would certainly include Russia and China.
So I think that you would not be an expert in this area if
you did not have those opportunities. So we will take a look at
all the information being made available by the Republicans
today. We will take a look at all the information.
You will be--I have a feeling there is going to be some
questions for the record, and maybe I am wrong on that but I
got to think there is going to be a few questions that will be
asked.
We are going to ask that the record remain open until the
close of business tomorrow, March the 8th, for questions for
the record. I would ask you all to do your best to get them
back as complete and as quickly as possible so that we can then
evaluate with the next way that we will continue our process of
vetting executive nominations and I will certainly be working
closely with all members of the committee.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry Senator Cruz has
left because I was a co-sponsor of those--the legislation on
Nord Stream 2, and I certainly disagreed with the
administration's failure to put those sanctions on after that
legislation was passed.
But for anybody to suggest that that is the reason that
Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine denies the reality of the
situation.
So I just want to give an opposing view for the record that
I do not believe Vladimir Putin used Nord Stream 2 as the
reason to invade Ukraine. It certainly was not the reason when
he went into Ukraine in 2014.
I do not think it is the reason he went in two years ago
and I think we need to do everything we can to stop him.
The Chairman. And with those comments the hearing will
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Responsiveness to Committee and Congress
Question. First, I have a few questions that speak to the
importance that this committee places on responsiveness by all
officials in the executive branch, and that we expect and will be
seeking from you. I would ask you to provide just a YES or NO answer.
Do you agree to appear before this committee and make officials from
your office available to the committee and designated staff when
invited?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I agree to work with this committee to
make appropriate officials from my office available to the committee
and designated staff when invited.
Question. Do you commit to keep this committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to keep this committee fully
and currently informed about the activities under my purview.
Question. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation
while policies are being developed, not just providing notification
after the fact?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation with the committee.
Question. Do you commit to promptly responding to requests for
briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated
staff? Thank you.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to promptly responding to
requests for briefings and information requested by the committee and
its designated staff.
Global Magnitsky
As you know, I am a proud champion of the Global Magnitsky
Act, which has promoted accountability for human rights
violators and corrupt officials around the world. One provision
of Global Magnitsky requires the Administration to make
determinations about whether foreign persons have engaged in
sanctionable activity, upon a request from the Chair and
Ranking Member of the SFRC. There have been three such joint
Chair and Ranking member requests. To date, the Executive
Branch has not complied.
Question. Can you provide your assurance that you will work with
the committee to ensure that all provisions of the Global Magnitsky Act
are fully complied with?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working within the
Department and with the Department of the Treasury and this committee
on the implementation of all sanctions authorities, including the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
Use of Force and Houthis
Question. The White House has sent at least four reports to
Congress over the past two months pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution, providing notice of strikes against Houthi targets. What is
your view on the need for authorization to use military force for these
actions on an ongoing basis?
Answer. I understand the Administration's view is that the
President's constitutional authority under Article II authorizes the
recent uses of force against the Houthis to protect and defend U.S.
forces and degrade and disrupt the ability of the Houthis to carry out
attacks against vessels in the Red Sea region.
I am not currently involved in deliberations regarding the legal
basis for uses of force against Houthi targets but, if confirmed, I
commit to actively engage in these discussions, and to ensure that
Congress is well-informed about these very important matters.
On a personal note, it is my view that the most important and grave
decision a government can make is whether to send its sons and
daughters into harm's way.
International Criminal Court
Question. In the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress
made clear that we support the President assisting the International
Criminal Court's investigation into Russia's atrocities in Ukraine,
including Putin's war crimes. If confirmed, would you work to support
the ICC's efforts to hold Putin to account?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Ambassador-at-
Large for Global Criminal Justice and others to further U.S. support
for a range of international investigations and inquiries into war
crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine and against its people,
including those conducted by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC).
I appreciated when the Senate passed S. Res. 546 on March 15, 2022,
which provided that the Senate ``supports any investigation into war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and systematic human rights abuses
levied by President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Security Council, the
Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, and President Putin's military
commanders.''
Question. In the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress
made clear that we support the President assisting the International
Criminal Court's investigation into Russia's atrocities in Ukraine,
including Putin's war crimes. In your view, would aiding the Russia/
Ukraine investigation pave the way for prosecutions against the U.S. or
contrary to our interests?
Answer. No. Russia's cruel and systematic flouting of international
law, including the United Nations Charter, and its utter inaction in
addressing alleged atrocity crimes set it apart. It is in service of
U.S. national security interests to uphold the rule of law and to
ensure those responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community are held accountable. The International
Criminal Court can play a meaningful role in this regard, especially
where, as in Russia, there is a complete absence of accountability
efforts at the national level. Constructive engagement with the ICC
supports rather than undermines U.S. interests, including advancing
accountability and protecting our personnel.
Question. As General Counsel of USAID, can you confirm that you
have advised full compliance with U.S. law, including related to
statutory restrictions on foreign assistance related to reproductive
health?
Answer. Yes, as the General Counsel of USAID, I have advised full
compliance with U.S. law, including related to statutory restrictions
on foreign assistance related to reproductive health.
Question. Was there any change in USAID's legal position on
compliance with such restrictions, including the Helms and Siljander
amendments, from the Trump administration?
Answer. There has been no change in USAID's legal position on
compliance with statutory restrictions on foreign assistance related to
reproductive health, including the Helms Amendment and the Siljander
Amendment, from the previous administration to the current
administration. USAID continues to comply with such statutory
restrictions.
Statutory abortion restrictions are implemented through mandatory
standard provisions included in USAID grants, cooperative agreements,
and contracts. My understanding is that these standard provisions have
been substantively the same for many years.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator James E. Risch
Section b(9) of the Privacy Act of 1974 states: ``No agency
shall disclose any record unless disclosure of the record would
be to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter
within its jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof,
any joint committee of Congress or subcommittee of any such
joint committee.''
Question. In your legal opinion, does the Privacy Act provide an
exception for disclosures to Congressional committees?
Answer. Yes, in my view, this language provides an exception for
disclosure of Privacy Act-protected information to either House of
Congress, or, to the extent of a matter within its jurisdiction, any
committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee. If confirmed, I commit to
working with the committee and others in Congress to share appropriate
information and be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws
of the United States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation
process.
Question. In your legal opinion, do you agree this exception covers
congressional inquiries regarding matters of oversight?
Answer. Yes, in my view, this language provides an exception for
disclosure of Privacy Act-protected information to either House of
Congress, or, to the extent of a matter within its jurisdiction, any
committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee. This could include
information that is related to matters over which a committee or
subcommittee is exercising oversight. If confirmed, I commit to working
with the committee and others in Congress to share appropriate
information and be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws
of the United States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation
process.
Question. In your legal opinion, do matters pertaining to the
security clearance of senior employees at the State Department fall
under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?
Answer. While I am not in a position to answer hypothetical
questions, as a general matter, in my view, matters pertaining to the
security clearance of senior employees at the State Department would
fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In fact, I understand that there is now a requirement in the FY 24 NDAA
that the Chair and Ranking members of this committee be informed when a
covered State Department official's security clearance is suspended or
revoked.
If confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and others in
Congress to share appropriate information andbe as transparent as
possible, consistent with the laws of the United States and the
Constitution.
Question. In your legal opinion, do you agree this exception does
not require written consent prior to disclosure?
Answer. Yes, in my view, this language provides an exception for
disclosure of Privacy Act-protected information to either House of
Congress, or, to the extent of a matter within its jurisdiction, any
committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee. Such an exception would not
require a written Privacy Act authorization by the affected individual
prior to the disclosure. If confirmed, I commit to working with the
committee and others in Congress to share appropriate information and
be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United
States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. In your legal opinion, do you agree this exception does
not require a request from the Chairman of a committee in order for the
exception to apply?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to examine prior executive
and legislative branch policy and practice, caselaw, and regulation on
this specific matter. However, if confirmed, I commit to working with
the committee and others in Congress to share appropriate information
and be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the
United States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Section b(9) of the Privacy Act of 1974 states: ``No agency
shall disclose any record. unless disclosure of the record
would be to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of
matter within its jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee
thereof, any joint committee of Congress or subcommittee of any
such joint committee.''
Question. In your legal opinion, do you agree this exception makes
no distinction between majority and minority requests?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to examine prior executive
and legislative branch policy and practice, caselaw, and regulation on
this specific matter. However, if confirmed, I commit to working with
the committee and others in Congress to share appropriate information
and be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the
United States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. In your opinion, do matters pertaining to the security
clearance of employees at the State Department fall under the
jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?
Answer. While I am not in a position to answer hypothetical
questions, as a general matter, in my view, matters pertaining to the
security clearance of senior employees at the State Department would
fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In fact, I understand that there is now a requirement in the FY 24 NDAA
that the Chair and Ranking members of this committee be informed when a
covered State Department official's security clearance is suspended or
revoked.
If confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and others in
Congress to share appropriate information andbe as transparent as
possible, consistent with the laws of the United States and the
Constitution.
Question. In your opinion, what legal justification, if any, would
allow the Department to withhold information from the committee of
jurisdiction during congressional oversight inquiry?
Answer. While I am not in a position to answer hypothetical
questions, disclosure of information must be consistent with all
applicable law. There are categories of information for which courts
have upheld the right of the executive branch to withhold from
disclosure to Congress. If confirmed, I commit to working with the
committee and others in Congress to share appropriate information and
be as transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United
States and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Hypothetical Legal Question--Let's assume a senior
official at USAID has his or her security clearance suspended. The
State Department has told me the Privacy Act prevents them from
providing such information to the committee. Do you agree? Is that
USAID's position?
Answer. While I am not in a position to answer hypothetical
questions, if a senior official at USAID had his or her security
clearance suspended, it would be up to USAID's Office of the General
Counsel, in consultation with other agencies as appropriate, to advise
whether under the particular facts and circumstances of the matter any
laws of the United States or the U.S. Constitution would impact USAID's
ability to provide such information.
If confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and others in
Congress to share appropriate information and be as transparent as
possible, consistent with the laws of the United States and the
constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Over the last 8 months, I have asked the State Department
for information relating to Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley and
the conditions surrounding his security clearance revocation. State has
repeatedly refused my formal request for information, citing the
Privacy Act. The Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, provides an exception
for ``either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its
jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint
committee of Congress or subcommittee of any joint committee.'' Do you
agree or disagree that the nature of Mr. Malley's infractions are
excluded from Congress under the Privacy Act?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation. If confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide the committee with
full access to the details of the allegations against Mr. Malley that
prompted the Department to include the FBI?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. I am concerned that Mr. Malley's lapse in judgement may
have negatively impacted U.S.-Iran policy or improperly influenced
proximity talks with the regime. Is Mr. Malley's investigation related
to his work as the Special Envoy for Iran or is this an unrelated
issue? If it is related, how?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. How did the actions that resulted in the suspension of
Mr. Malley's clearance impact the conduct of U.S.-Iran policy?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Did Mr. Malley have any role--formal or informal--leading
to the September 2023 deal with Iran in which the United States unfroze
$6 billion of Iranian assets? If yes, was his alleged infraction
related to his conduct in these negotiations?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Mr. Malley was the point person for the JCPOA discussions
in Vienna between May 2021 and August 2022. Did his alleged infraction
impact his conduct or the American negotiating position during these
talks?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Was the suspension of Mr. Malley's security clearance
related to the Iran Experts Initiative or any other Iranian malign
influence operation or activity?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Can you confirm Mr. Malley's security clearance has been
suspended?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. If so, on what date was Mr. Malley notified that his
security clearance has been suspended?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. On what date did Mr. Malley stop serving as the Special
Envoy to Iran?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. On what date(s) did the alleged event(s) occur that led
to the investigation or suspension? Please provide details of the
alleged conduct that resulted in such investigation or suspension.
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Is it true that Mr. Malley was on personal leave for
serious family health issues? If yes, which dates did the leave begin
and end? If not, who was responsible for providing this response to
congressional inquiries?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Can you confirm or deny reports that Mr. Malley met with
wrongfully detained Americans' families after being placed on leave
without pay? If so, in what capacity did he take the meeting(s)?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. When did Mr. Malley, as required by 12 FAM 233, turn in
all ``Department-issued credentials that provide logical or physical
access to classified systems or designated classified spaces/facilities
and any and all Special issuance Agency-issued passport(s) to the
Office of Personnel Security and Suitability (DS/SI/PSS)''?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Given that the Special Envoy for Iran leads the State
Department's Iran Action Group (IAG), was Special Envoy Malley
restricted from physically accessing IAG's classified spaces?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. When and how were IAG members informed that Special Envoy
Malley's clearance was suspended?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Was Mr. Malley read into any covert action programs or
DoD special access programs (SAPs)? If so, which departments or
agencies and who at those departments or agencies sponsored his
request? If so, were there any objections from the relevant departments
or agencies? Were standard vetting procedures governing these programs
followed, or did Mr. Malley receive any waivers? If so, from whom did
he receive waivers?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Is the FBI leading an investigation regarding Mr. Malley?
If yes, on what date did the Department involve the FBI? What about the
allegations demanded FBI involvement?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. On August 27, 2023, the Tehran Times released an
allegedly authentic ``sensitive but unclassified'' memorandum dated
April 21, 2023, informing Mr. Malley of his suspended security
clearance. Is this memorandum authentic?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Has the Department performed, begun to perform, or is it
intending to perform a top-to-bottom security review following the
release of allegedly authentic sensitive government documents?
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. If you cannot provide substantive answers to any of the
above questions (question 12 through question 29) at this time, if
confirmed, do you commit to providing full, substantive answers to the
committee on each of the above questions (question 12 through question
29)?
Answer. I do not currently have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation. But, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee
and others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. The War Powers Resolution requires congressional
notifications when United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into situations where there is imminent involvement in
hostilities. In your legal opinion, what do you think the term
``hostilities'' means?
Answer. For purposes of the War Powers Resolution, I understand the
Executive Branch has generally interpreted the term ``hostilities'' as
situations in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged
in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces. I agree
with that interpretation. If confirmed, I commit to actively engage in
discussions related to the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution
with other interagency lawyers.
Question. At present, in your view, are United States Armed Forces
introduced into hostilities or into situations where there is imminent
involvement in hostilities in the Red Sea or an associated area?
Answer. I am not currently involved in deliberations regarding the
application of the War Powers Resolution to operations in the Red Sea,
but if confirmed I commit to actively engage in these discussions and
to ensure that Congress is well-informed about these very important
matters.
Question. Under multiple administrations, certain terrorist
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have not been released for good
reason. What is your legal opinion regarding Guantanamo Bay detentions?
Answer. It is the position of this and prior Administrations, based
on now longstanding judicial precedent, that detainees at the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility are held pursuant to the 2001 AUMF,
as informed by the laws of war. The AUMF authorizes detention of
individuals who were part of, or substantially supported, al-Qaida or
Taliban forces and associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. The AUMF generally
authorizes detention until the end of hostilities. Separate from the
legal authority to detain, detainees designated for continued law-of-
war detention are eligible for review by the Periodic Review Board, an
administrative, interagency body established under Executive Order
13567 to determine whether their detention remains necessary to protect
against a continuing significant threat to U.S. security. My
understanding is that as of March 7, 2024, there are 16 detainees who
have been determined to be eligible for transfer. If confirmed, I will
support the Department of State's efforts to identify appropriate
transfer locations and negotiate security and humane treatment
assurances prior to any transfer.
Question. In the event the Biden administration attempts to release
any detainee, do you commit to providing SFRC significant advance
notice and consultation before such transfer?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Executive Branch's
efforts to appropriately notify and consult with the SFRC and other
relevant committees prior to the transfer of any detainee from the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
Question. What is your view on the scope of the 2001 AUMF?
Answer. The Executive Branch has long interpreted the 2001 AUMF as
authorizing use of force against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated
forces, including against ISIS. The Executive Branch has also been
clear that the 2001 AUMF does not authorize the President to use force
against every group that commits terrorist acts. I share these views.
As I indicated in my opening statement at the March 7, 2023,
hearing, I am dedicated to the importance of the Article I branch of
government in shaping and implementing our nation's foreign policy.
Question. What is your view on the scope of Article II authority on
the use of force?
Answer. It is my view that the most important and grave decision a
government can make is whether to send its sons and daughters into
harm's way.
I understand that the longstanding view of the Executive Branch
across administrations of both parties has been that the President may
order military action without the prior approval of Congress only when
(1) that action serves an important national interest, and (2) the
reasonably anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the operation
would not rise to the level of ``war'' for purposes of the
Constitution's Declare War Clause. The Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel has published a series of opinions across administrations
of both parties explaining these limitations in more detail.
As I said in my opening statement for the March 7, 2023, hearing, I
am dedicated to the importance of the Article I branch of government in
shaping and implementing our nation's foreign policy. If confirmed, I
am committed to a cooperative and continuing relationship with Congress
on these matters.
Question. Do you believe that the 2001 AUMF should be repealed or
updated? Why or why not?
Answer. I understand that President Biden has committed to work
with Congress to ensure that outdated authorizations for the use of
military force are replaced with a more specific framework that will
ensure that we can continue to protect Americans from terrorist
threats. I absolutely share this commitment and, if confirmed, look
forward to working with you on these important issues.
Question. Do you believe that any legislative update to the 2001
AUMF should ensure that detention authority for terrorist detainees is
not interrupted? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, I share this Administration's view that any
legislative updates to the 2001 AUMF should ensure the Executive Branch
has uninterrupted authority to continue operations that are necessary
to address terrorist threats, including detention activities.
Question. Do you believe that any legislative update to the 2001
AUMF should ensure that current military operations against terrorists
around the world continue to be authorized?
Answer. Yes, I share this Administration's view that any
legislative updates to the 2001 AUMF should ensure the Executive Branch
has uninterrupted authority to continue operations that are necessary
to address terrorist threats.
Question. Should the 2002 AUMF be repealed? Why or why not?
Answer. I share the Administration's support for repeal of the 2002
AUMF, which is consistent with President Biden's longstanding
commitment to repealing outdated authorizations for the use of military
force.
Question. In your legal opinion, based on public reporting, do you
believe the 2002 AUMF provided an independent legal basis for the
strike against Soleimani?
Answer. I am not aware of all the circumstances surrounding the
strikes against Soleimani because I was not in government at the time.
My recollection of public reporting, at the time, was that the Trump
Administration relied on both Article II of the U.S. Constitution and
the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq to
justify the strike.
As I said in my opening statement for my hearing, I am dedicated to
the importance of the Article I branch of government in shaping and
implementing our nation's foreign policy. President Biden has committed
to work with Congress to ensure that outdated authorizations for the
use of military force are replaced with a more specific framework that
will ensure that we can continue to protect Americans from terrorist
threats. I absolutely share this commitment and, if confirmed, look
forward to working with you on these important issues.
Question. Would a repeal of the 2002 AUMF provide any litigation
risks for detention operations?
Answer. I understand that it is the position of this and prior
Administrations, based on now longstanding judicial precedent, that
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility are held pursuant to
the 2001 AUMF, as informed by the laws of war. It is my understanding
that no ongoing military detention operations are dependent on the 2002
AUMF as a domestic legal basis. If confirmed, I commit to study this
issue further.
Question. In your view, what legal advantage does a repeal of the
2002 AUMF provide the President?
Answer. I share the Administration's support for repeal of the 2002
AUMF, which is consistent with President Biden's longstanding
commitment to repealing outdated authorizations for the use of military
force.
As I said in my opening statement for my hearing, I am dedicated to
the importance of the Article I branch of government in shaping and
implementing our nation's foreign policy. President Biden has committed
to work with Congress to ensure that outdated authorizations for the
use of military force are replaced with a more specific framework that
will ensure that we can continue to protect Americans from terrorist
threats. I absolutely share this commitment and, if confirmed, look
forward to working with you on these important issues.
Question. Do you commit to working closely with this committee and
directing your staff to brief the committee on any use of force
undertaken pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, 2002 AUMF, or Article II of the
U.S. Constitution?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working closely with the
committee to ensure the committee is well informed on these important
issues related to the use of military force by the United States.
Question. What is the definition of ``reproductive health rights
and services''? From where is that definition derived?
Answer. It is my understanding that ``reproductive health rights
and services'' is not a term typically used by the Department of State
or USAID. However, if confirmed, I will ensure that any legal advice
regarding reproductive health takes into account all relevant laws.
Question. Is the United States bound by international agreements--
whether a treaty, convention, accord, or other instrument--to which the
United States is not a party?
Answer. No.
Question. Is access to abortion a human right protected under
international law?
Answer. No, access to abortion is not a human right protected under
international law. The United States is not a party to any
international human rights law treaty that enshrines access to abortion
as a human right under international law.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring full and
complete compliance with current U.S. law, which prohibits the use of
U.S. foreign assistance to perform or promote abortion as a method of
family planning, support involuntary sterilizations, or lobby for or
against the legalization of abortion overseas?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring Department officials
receive the legal advice necessary for full and complete compliance
with all applicable legal requirements, including statutory
restrictions related to abortion.
Question. If confirmed, will you also commit to ensuring that all
implementers of U.S. foreign assistance--including sub-contractors and
sub-grantees--fully adhere to U.S. law?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that State Department
officials receive the legal advice necessary to ensure all
implementers, including sub-contractors and sub-grantees, fully adhere
to U.S. legal requirements, including statutory restrictions related to
abortion, in implementing State Department foreign assistance programs.
Question. Is it your view that using the voice, vote, and influence
of the United States to encourage countries who signed to Geneva
Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women's Health and Strengthening the
Family to ``un-sign'' such declaration constitutes lobbying under the
Siljander amendment? If not, why not?
Answer. My understanding is that the Biden-Harris Administration's
position on the GCD relates neither to abortion nor the legalization of
abortion. President Biden removed the United States from the GCD in
January 2021 because aspects of the document are inconsistent with
current U.S. priorities to advance gender equality and the empowerment
of all women and girls. The Department and USAID continue to comply
with all applicable statutory restrictions related to abortion,
including the Siljander Amendment.
Question. USAID routinely hires individuals who have served as
implementers of U.S. foreign assistance. Would it present a conflict of
interest if an individual who recently led implementation of a USAID-
funded global health program, for example, to be hired by USAID to lead
the design of a follow-on global health program?
Answer. Determinations of conflicts of interest are fact-specific.
I commit to providing Department officials advice that ensures full
compliance with the law and is also sensitive to the appearance of a
conflict and upholds a strong culture of ethics.
Under 5 CFR 2635.502, where an employee knows that a particular
matter involving specific parties is likely to have a direct and
predictable effect on the financial interest of a member of his
household, or knows that a person with whom he has a covered
relationship is or represents a party to such matter, and where the
employee determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable
person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question his
impartiality in the matter, the employee should not participate in the
matter unless he has informed the agency designee of the appearance
problem and received authorization from the agency designee. An
individual who joins the federal government from the private sector
would have a covered relationship for purposes of this regulation with
their former employer for one year.
Based on the conflict of interest rules in section 502, a new USAID
employee would not be prohibited from working on the design of a global
health program based on their expertise and experience. However, the
employee could not make decisions in order to benefit their former
employer. Furthermore, the new employee would likely need to recuse
from the program's implementation if their former employer applies for
funding or otherwise becomes involved in the follow-on program. Any
other prudential considerations would depend on a full assessment of
the relevant facts.
Question. Section 1263(d) of the Global Magnitsky Act requires that
the President make a sanctions determination within 120 days after
receipt of a joint request from the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (or other relevant committee
leadership). If confirmed, will you commit to help ensure Congress
receives a specific determination to any such request within 120 days
of submission?
Answer. Yes, and if confirmed, I am committed to working within the
Department and with the Department of the Treasury and this committee
on the implementation of all sanctions authorities, including the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
Question. What role should L play in genocide determinations?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary of State decides, as a
matter of foreign policy, whether the U.S. Government should publicly
characterize particular actions and abuses as a specific atrocity,
including genocide, based on an analysis of the law, available facts,
and policy considerations. I also understand that the role of L, in
coordination with relevant Department policy offices, including the
Office of Global Criminal Justice, is to advise the Secretary in
applying the law to the available facts. If confirmed, I will look
forward to advising the Secretary on these critical issues and
supporting the Department's important efforts to promote justice and
accountability for genocide and other atrocities.
Question. In your legal opinion, should the atrocities committed by
Vladamir Putin against Ukrainians be considered a genocide?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary of State decides, as a
matter of foreign policy, whether the U.S. Government should publicly
characterize particular abuses as a specific atrocity, including
genocide, based on an analysis of the law, available facts, and policy
considerations. I also understand that, in 2023, Secretary Blinken
determined that members of Russia's forces have committed war crimes
and, along with other Russian officials, crimes against humanity in
Ukraine. I agree with that assessment. If confirmed, I will look
forward to supporting the Department's efforts to address atrocities in
Ukraine and to promote accountability for those responsible.
Question. In your legal opinion, should the atrocities perpetrated
in Sudan be considered a genocide?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary of State decides, as a
matter of foreign policy, whether the U.S. Government should publicly
characterize particular abuses as a specific atrocity, including
genocide, based on an analysis of the law, available facts, and policy
considerations. I also understand that, in December 2023, Secretary
Blinken determined that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed war crimes in Sudan. He
also determined that members of the RSF and allied militias have
committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. I agree with
that assessment. As Secretary Blinken's statement conveyed, the
determination did not ``preclude the possibility of future
determinations as additional information about the parties' actions
becomes available.'' If confirmed, I will look forward to supporting
the Department's efforts to address atrocities in Sudan and to promote
accountability for those responsible.
Question. The re-instatement and expansion of the Protecting Life
in Global Health Assistance Policy, formerly known as the Mexico City
Policy, during the last administration reignited a longstanding debate
about aid conditionality and the ``rights'' of U.S. foreign assistance
implementers and beneficiaries. Do foreign non-governmental
organizations have a legally-enforceable ``right'' to United States
foreign assistance, or is the provision of U.S. foreign assistance
discretionary?
Answer. The provision of U.S. foreign assistance is discretionary,
and foreign assistance programs must be implemented consistent with
applicable legal requirements.
Question. Does Congress have the right to place conditions upon the
use of the U.S. foreign assistance it appropriates?
Answer. Yes, Congress may place conditions on the use of
appropriated funds made available for U.S. foreign assistance
consistent with its constitutional authorities.
Question. Does the Executive also have the right to condition U.S.
foreign assistance?
Answer. Yes, the Executive Branch may place conditions on the use
of appropriated funds made available for U.S. foreign assistance
consistent with applicable statutory requirements and its
constitutional authorities.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring full and
complete compliance with current law, which prohibits the use of U.S.
foreign assistance to perform or promote abortion as a method of family
planning; support involuntary sterilizations; or lobby for or against
the legalization of abortion overseas?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that State Department
officials receive the legal advice necessary to fully and completely
comply with all applicable legal requirements, including statutory
restrictions related to abortion.
Question. Do you commit to ensure that tools such as the 7031(c)
visa restriction tool is not politicized?
Answer. Under Section 7031(c), the Secretary, or his or her
designee must publicly or privately designate foreign government
officials and their immediate family members when the Secretary has
credible information that the official has been involved, directly or
indirectly, in significant corruption or a gross violation of human
rights, where no exception is met and the requirement is not waived.
The designation is mandatory when the requirements are met, and the law
does not provide an exception based on political considerations. I will
seek to ensure that 7031(c) designations meet the requirements.
Question. Do you commit to sharing relevant documents with the
committee regarding the new Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance
(CHIRG)?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with other bureaus within
the Department of State, the committee, and others in Congress to share
appropriate information and be as transparent as possible, consistent
with the laws of the United States and the constitutionally-mandated
accommodation process.
Question. What role does L play in the new CHIRG?
Answer. I am aware of the CHIRG but am not involved in
implementation of the CHIRG in my current role. If confirmed, I commit
to ensure that L is appropriately involved in the CHIRG process.
Question. In your opinion, what is the definition of ``human
rights''?
Answer. Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings; all
individuals have these same human rights regardless of race, sex,
nationality, ethnicity, language, or religion. Examples of such human
rights include, but are not limited to, the right of the individual to
life and liberty and security of person, to not be held in slavery or
subject to torture, and to exercise freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly, association, and religion or belief.
Question. In your opinion, is access to abortion a ``human right''?
Answer. In my opinion, access to abortion is not a human right
protected under international law.
Question. In your opinion, what is the definition of
``internationally-recognized human rights''?
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``internationally-
recognized human rights'' in international law.
Question. In your opinion, is access to abortion an
``internationally-recognized human right''?
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``internationally-
recognized human rights'' in international law. However, in my opinion,
access to abortion is not a human right protected under international
law and the United States is not a party to any international human
rights law treaty that enshrines access to abortion as a human right
under international law.
Question. In your opinion, what is the definition of ``universally-
recognized human rights''?
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``universally-recognized
human rights'' in international law.
Question. In your opinion, is access to abortion a ``universally-
recognized human right''?
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``universally-recognized
human rights'' in international law. However, in my opinion, access to
abortion is not a human right protected under international law and the
United States is not a party to any international human rights law
treaty that enshrines access to abortion as a human right, under
international law.
Question. Is there a difference in the definition of ``universally-
recognized human rights''? and ``internationally-recognized human
rights''?
Answer. There is no definition of ``universally-recognized human
rights'' and ``internationally-recognized human rights'' in
international law.
Question. What are the U.S. legal obligations under the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Answer. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a non-
binding resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and creates
no legally binding obligations for the United States.
Question. Is the United States Government bound by definitions of
``human rights'' contained in international treaties, agreements,
accords, or resolutions to which the United States is not a party?
Answer. No, the United States is not bound by the definition of
``human rights'' contained in international treaties, agreements,
accords or resolutions to which the United States is not a party.
Question. In March of 2023, USAID sent the committee a CN for $5M
to the organization Global Fund for Women. Yes or no--does this
organization promote abortion advocacy?
Answer. During my time as the General Counsel of USAID, I have
provided legal advice that is consistent with all laws related to the
use of appropriated funds, including the Siljander Amendment.
USAID's May 23, 2023, letter to you from USAID's Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs,
responding to your May 16, 2023, letter regarding a congressional
notification submitted by USAID to the committee, notes that ``USAID
abides by the statutory restrictions related to abortion, including the
Helms Amendment, which prohibits the use of USAID funds to perform
abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any
person to practice abortion, and the Siljander Amendment, which
prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds to lobby for or against
abortion. USAID has no evidence of any violation of the abortion
restrictions or any other legal requirement applicable to this
program.''
The letter notes that statutory abortion restrictions are
implemented through a mandatory standard provision included in USAID
grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts, and this provision was
included in the agreement with the partner organization. The letter
also notes that the partner organization provided an implementation
plan that specified the additional staff hired to oversee use of USAID
funds in an appropriate manner consistent with the terms of the grant
award, to include that the activities supported under the USAID-funded
award are not connected to reproductive health services or lobbying.
While USAID had no legal concerns with the proposed use of the
funding, the Agency withdrew the congressional notification on
September 7, 2023, because funds would have otherwise expired at the
end of the fiscal year. The funds from the withdrawn congressional
notification were then programmed into an existing and already notified
five-year, $50 million commitment to the World Bank's Investing in
Childcare initiative.
[The letter referred to above follows:]
Question. What is the definition of ``human rights defender''?
Answer. I understand that the Department defines ``human rights
defender'' as individuals, working alone or in groups, who non-
violently advocate for the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Question. In your legal opinion, should John Podesta's appointment
to replace Secretary Kerry be submitted to the Senate for Advice and
Consent? If no, please provide a detailed explanation.
Answer. While I have not been involved in this issue, if confirmed,
I would ensure that State Department officials receive the legal advice
necessary to comply with all applicable legal requirements related to
appointments, including those in section 1(j) of the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)).
Question. Section 5105 of the National Defense Authorization Act
provides much needed congressional oversight over the appointment of
special envoys. Do you commit to advising President Biden that he
should submit a nomination for any appointee who will be ``exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States'' to
the Senate for its advice and consent before the appointee takes
office? For the purpose of ensuring compliance with this law, how would
you define significant authority?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to advise on this
statutory provision in my current position, my understanding is that
section 1(j) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22
U.S.C. 2651a(j)) concerning Special Envoys and similar positions
requires a case-by-case analysis with respect to particular positions.
If confirmed, I would study the statutory provisions related to Special
Envoys and similar positions and work with attorneys in the Office of
the Legal Advisor and Department leadership to implement them.
Question. For positions not exercising significant authority,
Section 5105 requires the President or Secretary of State to notify the
committee 15 days before such appointment: (1) a certification the
position does not require the exercise of significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the U.S.; (2) a description of the duties and
purpose of the position; and (3) a rationale for giving the specific
title and function of the position. Do you commit to advising the
President and Secretary of State to provide substantively robust
notifications to Congress and consult with the committee as
appointments are contemplated?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that State Department
officials receive the legal advice necessary to comply with all
applicable legal requirements related to Special Envoys, including the
notification provisions in section 1(j) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (which was enacted in section 5105 of the
Department of State Authorization Act of 2021) (22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)).
Question. Section 5105 also provides a limited exception for
temporary appointments exercising significant authority, pending
notifications to SFRC. Do you commit to adhering to these limits? That
same section requires the disclosure of ``all'' information related to
potential conflicts of interests? What is your legal view of the term
``all''?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to advise on this
statutory provision in my current position, my understanding is that
section 1(j)(3) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956
(22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)) contains a provision for the President to maintain
or establish certain positions for temporary periods, and that the
relevant subsection contains a notification provision requiring that
the notification include ``all relevant information'' regarding any
potential conflict of interest which an appointee may have with regard
to their temporary appointment under that section. If confirmed, I
would study this provision and the other statutory provisions related
to Special Envoys and similar positions and would work with attorneys
in the Office of the Legal Advisor and Department leadership to
implement them.
Question. Does the Department of State pay the salary of ``L''
detailees seconded to SFRC?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If yes, does this present a conflict of interest? Why or
why not?
Answer. It is my understanding that it is a common, long-standing
practice for Executive Branch employees to be detailed to Congress for
certain periods of time. As both the Senate and the State Department
are part of the federal government, my understanding is that there is
no conflict of interest for a State Department employee detailed to
work for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Whether working at the
State Department or for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, an
employee would be subject to supervision and direction in their work,
and would be charged with advancing the national interest, rather than
any personal or private interest. The federal ethics rules recognize
that Executive Branch employees can be detailed to Congress from time
to time, and specify that employees who are detailed for over a month
are subject to Congress's ethical standards and must also continue to
abide by the conflict of interest statutes. 5 C.F.R. 2635.104(b).
Question. What steps would you take to ensure there is no conflict
of interest between the State Department and Congress in this regard?
Please provide any written guidance on these issues.
Answer. Although there is no conflict of interest within the
federal government, I recognize that the SFRC and the Department may
have institutional sensitivities they would like to protect while also
facilitating details that are mutually beneficial. If confirmed, that
would be my goal as well: To provide opportunities for attorneys to
work for the SFRC when it would be beneficial for both the committee
and the office of the legal adviser, and on terms that are acceptable
to both the committee and the department. I understand, for example,
that recent details have been arranged through an exchange of letters
that notes the protection of classified and confidential information.
If confirmed, I also would work with attorneys in the Office of the
Legal Advisor to ensure that any detailee is advised of the ethics and
conflict of interest rules that apply during their service with the
SFRC.
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. How have your personal and professional experiences and
role as a Chief Counsel on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
prepared you to be Legal Advisor of the Department of State?
Answer. All of my professional roles have afforded me experiences,
knowledge, and wisdom that will be valuable in this new role, if
confirmed. My personal experiences and convictions have given me an
energetic commitment to hard work and to having the courage to do what
is right. My time on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will allow
me to bring the perspective of the committee, and Congress more
broadly, to all aspects of my duties as Legal Advisor, if confirmed.
I felt called to public service early on. I worked at the
Department of Justice before attending Columbia Law School in New York
City. It was in my third year there that terrorists flew planes into
the World Trade Center towers a few miles south of where I sat-stunned,
speechless, and terrified for my country. In the days and weeks that
followed, the call I felt to public service became a single-minded
commitment to the rule of law, to combat the threats to America's
safety and security, and to advance the safety and security of peace-
loving people around the world.
After graduation and a judicial clerkship, I spent 10 years as an
attorney pursuing these goals in the Office I am now nominated to lead.
I worked under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I spent
years learning the ins and outs of the legal aspects of sanctions,
foreign assistance, international extradition, treaty negotiations and
ratification, and combating trafficking in persons. I want to highlight
this last item. It was a privilege to be a part of the efforts to use
diplomacy to prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and prevent human
trafficking; and I recognize and appreciate Congress's role in pressing
for action to combat international trafficking in persons.
The five and a half years I spent as a staffer on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee were among the most rewarding and
meaningful of my career. During my time as counsel for the committee,
Congress passed and Presidents enacted into law the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act; sanctions on North Korea, Iran, Russia, and human
rights abusers including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act; and hundreds of other bills, resolutions, and
treaties. I also assisted with the passage through this committee of
two Authorizations for the Use of Military Force. Through all of these
experiences I learned how to negotiate and compromise, work
productively in a bipartisan manner, and communicate effectively. My
time on the committee taught me the importance of respecting and
amplifying this committee's voice in building peace, security and
freedom for Americans and peace-loving people around the world.
The work of this committee is incredibly important, and I was
honored to have the chance to assist in that work. As Legal Advisor, I
will be dedicated to the importance of the Article I branch of
government in shaping and implementing our nation's foreign policy.
My time as the General Counsel of USAID has been a profoundly
valuable and rewarding experience. I have learned so much about leading
and managing people with empathy, and in a spirit of cooperation and
trust. I am so thankful for my time at USAID, and I will bring the
management skills and legal knowledge I have developed to my new role,
if confirmed.
Question. With more than 300 days since your nomination, I welcome
the opportunity to hear about your priorities in fulfilling this
critical position. How will you build upon the work of your
predecessor?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do what I have always sought to do
throughout my career as a lawyer: provide objective legal advice of the
highest quality; with the utmost commitment to integrity and ethical
leadership; and in the service of our Constitution and the American
people. If confirmed, this will be my top priority.
In addition, if confirmed, I will use legal diplomacy vigorously to
advance U.S. interests internationally and support the international
legal rules that the United States helped to develop and that have
benefited the United States so greatly since the end of World War II.
If confirmed, I would look to support important policy initiatives that
have significant legal components, as well as elevate and accelerate
initiatives on which L takes the lead role. There are many, but I will
highlight just a few.
Diplomacy to Counter Russian Aggression and Support NATO
Russia's aggression against and invasion of Ukraine is a direct
challenge to the international rules the United States has helped
develop. The Administration already has significant accomplishments
where L has played a crucial support role, most notably the coalition
of countries this Administration assembled to counter Russia's
aggression in Ukraine, and the accession into NATO of Finland and
Sweden. There's much more to be done, of course, including finding ways
to ensure Russia pays for the damage it has caused in Ukraine.
Diplomacy Related to the South China Sea
The United States has been clear, in public statements, that the
PRC's expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea do not comport
with international law. Attorneys in the Office of the Legal Advisor
participate actively in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
initiatives in the region and beyond to make this clear. In 2023, the
Office of the Legal Advisor, in close cooperation with the Bureau of
East Asia and Pacific Affairs met with more than 20 foreign government
counterparts to discuss the PRC's unlawful South China Sea maritime
claims, abuse of legal mechanisms, and so-called ``gray zone''
activities aimed at other South China Sea claimants, including the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. I would look to elevate and
accelerate this work.
G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
If confirmed, I look forward to providing legal advice in support
of the Department's efforts as part of the G7's Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). Through PGI, the U.S. Government,
alongside our G7 partners, aims to mobilize billions of dollars,
including from the private sector, in infrastructure investments that
will make a difference in people's lives around the world, strengthen
and diversify supply chains, and advance shared national security
interests.
Resolution of Conflicts
I would be remiss if I did not highlight the important role State
Department lawyers have always played an important role in supporting
negotiations to resolve conflicts, including in the Middle East,
Africa, and elsewhere, because bringing peace to other countries
enhances our national security. If confirmed I will support and foster
that work, which is particularly critical now.
Elevate and Accelerate Rule of Law Diplomacy
One of the ways I would elevate and accelerate all of these efforts
is by working with my legal adviser counterparts around the globe. L
has relationships with counterpart offices among our allies and
partners in the G7, across Europe, in East Asia, and elsewhere. If
confirmed, I look forward to deepening those relationships, including
with the global South, in support of promoting a common understanding
of the international rules and their importance to peace and
prosperity.
The United States must continue to be a confident and principled
voice for international legal norms in international politics. A
confirmed Legal Advisor brings a confident voice--backed by the support
of the U.S. Senate--to discussions both within the Administration and
with legal counterparts around the world. There is no substitute for
the advice and consent of this body when it comes to projecting U.S.
values with conviction.
On a more personal note, I recall vividly my personal interactions,
as a young attorney in L, with three State Department Legal Advisors:
William Taft and John Bellinger in the Bush administration, and Harold
Koh in the Obama administration. Each of them inspired me, and those
interactions were a key part of why I have remained in public service
for my career. If confirmed, I hope to inspire young attorneys pursuing
a similar path.
In this respect, I want to compliment and congratulate the career
officials at the Department, especially Principal Deputy Legal Advisor
Richard Visek, who has been a friend and colleague of mine for many
years.
I would be humbled and honored to serve the United States in this
new capacity.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit the largest quantity of greenhouse
gases in the world today. With their absolute control of Chinese
society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these destructive
actions tomorrow if they so choose to do so. Is the CCP a threat to the
United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As
Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will
provide sound legal advice to support U.S. policy to advance U.S.
national security interests and counter the People's Republic of China
(PRC) efforts to expand its problematic influence, including through
legal engagements with our allies and partners aimed at promoting
adherence to international law and upholding the rules-based
international order.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. Senior U.S. policymakers have established that the United
States will work with the PRC, including through appropriate legal
engagement, to address transnational challenges, such as
counternarcotics, when it is in the U.S. interest to do so. If
confirmed, I will work with my colleagues across the U.S. interagency
and Congress to provide legal advice to support U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be to provide legal advice
to support U.S. national security interests, including adherence to
international law, in countering efforts by our strategic and regional
competitors to undermine those interests. The Administration has been
clear that the PRC is the most consequential geopolitical challenge
facing the United States, and that the United States is committed to
working to strengthen our regional partners' capacities to uphold
international law. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of
State and interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's
efforts to expand its influence, particularly where such efforts are
inconsistent with international law.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024
walkout?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, would you define an employee or contractor,
operating under your supervision, that signs an open letter criticizing
you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the President, as
insubordination as defined by the Government Accountability Office?
Answer. The Executive Branch's definition of insubordination as a
willful refusal to follow a lawful order is consistent with GAO's
definition. Using this definition, I would not regard such a letter as
an act of insubordination.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing''?
Answer. The statutory definition of whistleblowing covers reports
of a reasonable belief of violations of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health and safety, as long as
such a report is not otherwise prohibited by law. Although I have not
personally reviewed the letter, it is my understanding that the letter
you reference expressed a policy disagreement rather than a disclosure
of wrongdoing.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, and if faced with an act of insubordination,
I would consult with Human Resources specialists and with the
employment lawyers in the Office of the Legal Advisor to ensure we
follow the law and Department policy.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization
(FTO) and an antisemitic entity. This foreign terrorist organization
seeks to eliminate the State of Israel, and its founding charter calls
for the killing of Jewish people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. I support the Administration's policy of advancing
humanitarian pauses, which have previously resulted in hostage
releases, enabled and increase in the flow of aid, and allowed the
voluntary movement of civilians who sought to move to safer locations.
The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to defend itself from
Hamas' terrorism, consistent with international law.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a
sustained flow of aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians
seeking safer locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is
attempting to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The
U.S. Government supports Israel's right to defend itself from Hamas'
terrorism, consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to defend
itself, consistent with international law. The Administration has urged
Israel to avoid civilian casualties and abide by its obligations under
international humanitarian law, include the obligation to distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Hamas's use of civilians as human
shields, a blatant violation of international law, does not lessen
Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law.
Question. This committee has requested meaningful information and
briefings regarding the security clearance suspension and investigation
of the former Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley. Department
officials have not shared any pertinent information and claim they are
legally prohibited from disclosing this information, or underlying
concerns regarding impacts upon policy and national security. The law
is crystal clear regarding providing information to the Legislative
branch given the oversight role Congress plays over the executive
branch. Do you believe there is a legal justification in not providing
the information required to Congress?
Answer. Although I do not have any knowledge of the specifics of
this situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee
and others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible consistent with the laws of the United States
and the Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. In your opinion, can the State Department withhold
information to Congress, or appropriate committees of jurisdiction,
that has grave national security implications?
Answer. I have the utmost respect for the essential role Congress
plays in the foreign policy-making process, and the legitimate
oversight and legislative roles of this committee and other committees
of jurisdiction.
Generally, when there is a disagreement between the branches about
the disclosure of information, there is a constitutionally based
obligation to engage in a serious and good faith effort to reach a
reasonable accommodation.
If confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and others in
Congress to share appropriate information and be as transparent as
possible, consistent with the laws of the United States and the
Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to providing the requested
information to an appropriate committee of jurisdiction, by
unclassified or classified means?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to providing requested
information to appropriate committees of jurisdiction, by unclassified
or classified means, consistent with the laws of the United States and
the Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. U.S. foreign assistance is prohibited, by law, to perform
or promote abortion or advocate for or against the legalization of
abortion overseas. However, in 2023, it was discovered USAID planned to
obligate a $10 million grant to an organization and implementer who
promoted abortion and pro-abortion lobbying efforts. As vetted by you,
USAID argued the grant was justified and there were no violations of
law regarding promoting abortion in foreign assistance. Ultimately,
USAID rescinded the grant proposal. What was your role in advocating
for pro-abortion aid in foreign assistance?
Answer. I have had no such role. As I noted in my confirmation
hearing, in my time as the General Counsel of USAID, I have provided
legal advice that is consistent with all applicable provisions of law
related to the use of appropriated funds.
Attached, for your reference, is a May 23, 2023, letter to Senator
Risch from USAID's Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for
Legislative Affairs responding to a May 16, 2023, letter from Senator
Risch regarding a congressional notification submitted by USAID to the
committee. Among other things, the May 23, 2023, letter notes that
``USAID abides by the statutory restrictions related to abortion,
including the Helms Amendment, which prohibits the use of USAID funds
to perform abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or
coerce any person to practice abortion, and the Siljander Amendment,
which prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds to lobby for or
against abortion. USAID has no evidence of any violation of the
abortion restrictions or any other legal requirement applicable to this
program.''
Statutory abortion restrictions are implemented through mandatory
standard provisions included in USAID grants, cooperative agreements,
and contracts. These standard provisions have been substantively the
same for many years.
While USAID had no legal concerns with the proposed use of the
funding, the Agency withdrew the congressional notification on
September 7, 2023, because funds would have otherwise expired at the
end of the fiscal year. The funds from the withdrawn congressional
notification were then programmed into an existing and already notified
five-year, $50 million commitment to the World Bank's Investing in
Childcare initiative.
Question. Is it legal to provide foreign assistance to advocate or
perform abortions in any of State's programs?
Answer. My understanding is that, like USAID, the Department of
State abides by all statutory restrictions related to abortion,
including the Helms Amendment, which prohibits the use of foreign
assistance funds to perform abortion as a method of family planning or
to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortion, and the
Siljander Amendment, which prohibits the use of foreign assistance
funds to lobby for or against abortion.
Question. Did you opine that the grant was in violation of federal
law on abortion? If no, What did you advise?
Answer. No. As I noted in my confirmation hearing, in my time as
the General Counsel of USAID, I have provided legal advice that is
consistent with all applicable provisions of law related to the use of
appropriated funds.
The attached May 23, 2023, letter to Senator Risch from USAID's
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Legislative Affairs
responded to a May 16, 2023, letter from Senator Risch. I, with the
assistance of career attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel,
reviewed this letter for legal accuracy before it was sent to Senator
Risch.
It states that USAID abides by the statutory restrictions related
to abortion, including the Helms Amendment and the Siljander Amendment.
It states that USAID has had no evidence of any violation of the
abortion restrictions or any other legal requirement applicable to the
program addressed in the May 23, 2023, letter to Senator Risch.
The letter notes that statutory abortion restrictions are
implemented through a mandatory standard provision included in USAID
grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts, and this provision was
included in the agreement with the partner organization.
Question. Will you assure the committee that you will not advocate
for or stretch legal authorities at State to promote or conduct pro-
abortion activities in foreign assistance programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise Department officials to comply
with all applicable legal requirements, including statutory
restrictions related to abortion.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator Bill Hagerty
Congressional Review of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to take the position that
informal unwritten agreements with Iran relating to the nuclear program
of Iran trigger the legal requirements for congressional review in the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act?
Answer. I was the Democratic Chief Counsel on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee when the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015
(``the Act'') was drafted and passed on a bipartisan basis.
The Act provides, in pertinent part, that ``[t]he term `agreement'
means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes
the United States, commits the United States to take action, or
pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take
action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment
or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.''
The answer to the question would depend on whether a particular
agreement falls within this definition.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Department receives the legal
advice necessary to act fully in accordance with the requirements of
the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.
Question. Given that there is an explicit exception to the Privacy
Act protections for Congressional oversight committees, is there any
legal justification for the State Department to withhold information
relevant for Congressional oversight with respect to the Robert Malley
matter? If so, please provide the specific statute that provides this
justification.
Answer. Although I do not have knowledge of the specifics of this
situation, if confirmed, I commit to working with the committee and
others in Congress to share appropriate information and be as
transparent as possible, consistent with the laws of the United States
and the Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process.
Question. Is Abram Paley, in his current capacity as acting Special
Envoy for Iran, exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States?
Answer. While I have not been involved in this issue, if confirmed,
I would advise the Department on all applicable legal requirements
related to Special Envoys, including those in section 1(j) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)).
Question. If no, did the President or Secretary of State submit, as
required by Section 5105 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81), a waiver, which would allow Paley
to operate in the role for 180 days without Senate confirmation, to
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before
Paley's appointment?
Answer. While I have not been involved in this issue, if confirmed,
I would advise the Department on all applicable legal requirements
related to Special Envoys, including those in section 1(j) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)).
Question. If yes, did the Secretary of State submit, as required by
Section 5105 of the FY 2022 NDAA, a notification for temporary
appointments exercising significant authority to appropriate
congressional committees not later than 15 days after Paley's
appointment?
Answer. While I have not been involved in this issue, if confirmed,
I would advise the Department on all applicable legal requirements
related to Special Envoys, including those in section 1(j) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(j)).
Question. Please provide the full legal justification, as you
understand it, of the Biden administration's claims that construction
of homes for Israeli Jews in the West Bank is ``inconsistent with
international law.'' Please do not simply state that this has been the
longstanding position of both Republican and Democratic administrations
prior to the Trump administration.
Answer. I understand that this Administration believes it is
critical for Israel to refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate
tensions and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state
solution; this includes settlement activity. It has been long-standing
U.S. policy--under both Republican and Democratic administrations--that
new settlements are counterproductive to the cause of peace. I
understand the Secretary of State recently made a statement in which he
reaffirmed that the Israeli Government's settlement program is
inconsistent with international law. I have not had the opportunity to
engage on the relevant facts or underlying legal analysis that informs
this position, but if confirmed, I will look closely at this issue.
Question. The State Department has often helped create the climate
to resolve prominent bilateral commercial and legal issues. Do you
agree that this is an appropriate and important role of the Legal
Advisor and other senior State Department officials? One current matter
that would benefit from constructive engagement by the Department is
the San Jose shipwreck in Colombia, the value of which is estimated to
be between $7 billion and $20 billion. This is one of the largest
claims by U.S. citizens against a foreign State in the world. As such,
I believe this is partly a foreign policy issue with implications for
U.S.-Colombia relations. I would welcome an effort by the Department to
facilitate an amicable resolution with Colombia.
Answer. Yes, this is an appropriate and important role of the Legal
Advisor and other senior State Department officials. I understand that
the Office of the Legal Advisor and other bureaus in the State
Department have been tracking this case closely.
In December, the Office of the Legal Advisor submitted a non-
disputing party statement outlining the United States' views on the
agreement underlying the case, the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement. That Agreement provides Sea Search-Armada LLC with a right
to pursue its claim directly against Colombia through investor-state
arbitration pursuant to the terms of that Agreement. A jurisdictional
hearing on Sea Search-Armada LLC's claims was held in December 2023,
and a decision is awaited. If confirmed, I commit to closely following
these proceedings.
Question. If confirmed, do you agree to look into this matter and
encourage the amicable resolution of this dispute?
Answer. Yes, I commit to closely following the ongoing proceedings
initiated by the claimants, which are aimed at providing a resolution
of the dispute.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Margaret L. Taylor by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. Under the Biden administration, USAID has made clear many
times over that it takes full compliance seriously with the Helms and
Siljander amendments. My understanding is that it has taken the same
approach to those statutory restrictions over the course of many
administrations, including the Trump administration. Can you confirm
that USAID's legal position is unchanged from the Trump administration?
Answer. While policies addressing aspects of the abortion issue may
change depending on the Administration, U.S. law has remained the same.
President Biden revoked, by Presidential Memorandum dated January 28,
2021, his predecessor's Presidential Memorandum of January 23, 2017,
addressing policies related to this issue.
There has been no change in USAID's legal position on compliance
with statutory restrictions on foreign assistance related to
reproductive health, including the Helms Amendment and the Siljander
Amendment, from the previous to the current administration. USAID
continues to comply with such statutory restrictions.
Statutory abortion restrictions are implemented through mandatory
standard provisions included in USAID grants, cooperative agreements,
and contracts. These standard provisions have been substantively the
same for many years.
Question. Can you confirm that, in your current position at USAID
and previous tenure at the Department of State, that you have advised
full compliance with U.S. law, including related to statutory
restrictions on foreign assistance related to reproductive health?
Answer. Yes, as the General Counsel of USAID, I have advised full
compliance with U.S. law, including related to statutory restrictions
on foreign assistance related to reproductive health.
Question. Can implementers funded via USAID grants legally use
appropriated foreign assistance funds to advocate for abortion?
Answer. No.
Question. Is that consistent with the view under the Trump
administration?
Answer. Yes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Erik John Woodhouse by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and designated
staff when invited?
Answer. Yes , if confirmed, I agree to work with the committee to
make appropriate officials from my office available to the committee
and designated staff when invited.
Question. Do you commit to keep this committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation with the committee.
Question. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation
while policies are being developed, not just providing notification
after the fact?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to promptly responding to requests for
briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated
staff? Thank you.
Answer. Yes.
Russia Sanctions Circumvention
Question. Despite the comprehensive, coordinated sanctions effort
by the U.S. and its allies, Russia has worked to circumvent some
sanctions, particularly related to microchips and other key components
necessary to support Russia's war machine. What are your views on how
best to crack down on this type of sanctions evasion and other indirect
trade with Russia?
Answer. Sanctions and export controls are having significant
impacts on the Russian economy and Russia's ability to wage war against
Ukraine. We remain deeply concerned about efforts to circumvent our
sanctions and export controls on microchips and other key components.
If confirmed, I am committed to continuing to work with allies and
partners to tighten our sanctions to disrupt the networks that
facilitate evasion and to crack down on individuals and entities
attempting to evade them, including by continuing engagement with
governments and the private sector in high-risk jurisdictions for
evasion.
Question. Export controls and Russia:st year the Kyiv school of
Economics found more than 1,000 foreign components in 58 pieces of
recovered Russian military equipment, many of which are subject to
export controls. The Royal United Services Institute found in a study
over 450 unique components sourced from Western manufacturers in
Russian systems, including from 318 U.S.-based companies. If confirmed,
what would be your approach to ensuring that American companies monitor
their supply chains and prevent goods they manufacture from ending up
in Russia?
Answer. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we
have imposed unprecedented sanctions and export controls. We continue
to work with countries around the world to ensure these measures are
properly enforced. As part of this effort, we are working with the
Departments of Commerce and the Treasury to ensure American companies
understand their responsibilities under our regulations and to
underscore the importance of stopping the diversion of their products.
We also engage with foreign governments and foreign companies to build
understanding of our sanctions and export controls--and to stress the
reputational and enforcement risks of supplying Russia's war machine.
If confirmed, I will continue this important work to stem the flow of
critical technology to the battlefield.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Erik John Woodhouse by Senator James E. Risch
Question. If confirmed, what practical steps will you take to stop
money from flowing into the Kremlin's coffers and into Putin's pocket?
Please be specific.
Answer. Since 2022, the United States, in coordination with allies
and partners, has sanctioned more than 4,000 entities and individuals
connected to Russia. If confirmed, I am committed to utilizing
sanctions in coordination with our allies and partners to constrict
Russia's resources and ability to finance its aggression, and to deny
the Kremlin and its enablers the benefits of the rules-based global
economy. By way of example, I will support steps to tighten compliance
and enforcement of the oil price capand to limit Russia's future energy
revenues by impeding its development of future energy projects.
Question. What do you view as the primary goal of U.S. sanctions on
Russia?
Answer. The primary goals of our sanctions and export controls on
the Russian Federation are to limit the Kremlin's revenues and to
disrupt Russia's efforts to procure the items and materials it needs to
sustain its war of aggression or expand its defense industrial base.
Our sanctions are degrading Russia's sources of financial resilience
and making it more and more difficult for Russia to prosecute its war
effort. If confirmed, I am committed to working with our allies and
partners to achieve our shared objectives.
Question. Have U.S. sanctions on Russia yielded effective results?
Answer. U.S. sanctions and export controls are addressing our key
objectives. First, we are limiting the revenues the Kremlin has to fuel
its aggression. Russian oil and gas revenues have declined sharply, and
overall Russia faces declining government revenues and increasing
defense spending, leading to a growing budget deficit, and forcing the
Kremlin to sacrifice Russia's future prosperity. Second, we are
disrupting Russia's ability to procure goods it needs to supply its
military and to build the weapons the Kremlin wants.
Question. Despite western sanctions, the Russian economy has
statistically continued to grow as it transitioned to a wartime
economy. Do you believe that sustained U.S. and allied sanctions will
eventually slow or reverse this trend?
Answer. Our sanctions and export controls disrupt Russia's access
to equipment for its military while constraining its economic options
and targeting industries Russia aims to rely on in the future. Russia
has a growing budget deficit, high spending, and declining government
revenue; it is also cutting its budget for education, health care, and
economic growth. Russia's economy has been effectively split between a
growing military sector and the rest of the economy which is choked of
investment and future prospects. In the short run, Russia will likely
continue to grow as long as energy prices remain relatively high and
massive fiscal spending pumps up the defense sector, but doing so will
require sacrificing its future economic prosperity and degrading
Russia's sources of financial resilience.
Russia's Revenue from Oil Sales to Illicit Trade Partners
Question. In defiance of sanctions by U.S. and our allies, Russia
has increased its illicit trade ties with Iran, China and North Korea.
What specific strategies will you implement to block these routes?
Please specifically address:
Answer. While U.S. and partner measures are designed to put
downward pressure on Russia's energy revenues, U.S. sanctions generally
do not block Russian energy exports to other countries. The Department
of the Treasury has issued General License 8 authorizing a broad range
of energy-related transactions with sanctioned Russian banks. The price
cap policy does not seek to restrict the volumes of Russian crude oil
on the global market, which could result in higher global oil prices
that increase Putin's profits. The price cap policy seeks to leave
Russia with no good options: either to sell oil under the price cap for
less than other global suppliers, or to face high costs to export it
through non-Price Cap Coalition avenues. If confirmed, I will continue
to work with the Price Cap Coalition to further limit the Kremlin's
profits while maintaining market stability and energy supply.
Question. Russia's procurement of lethal and non-lethal military
supplies from Iran, China, and North Korea.
Answer. To carry out its brutal and unjustified war against
Ukraine, Russia's military continues to seek to acquire equipment,
munitions, and related components, including from foreign suppliers.
Russia's procurement efforts often involve multiple layers of front
companies spanning different jurisdictions to obfuscate the ties
between foreign sellers and Russia. If confirmed I will support our
ongoing efforts to employ our broad set of counterproliferation tools
to its fullest to prevent or disrupt these foreign inputs to Russia's
defense sector.
Question. Russia's procurement of western-manufactured high-tech
materials and high precision equipment through Chinese entities.
Answer. As we have warned when issuing multiple rounds of sanctions
since last year, PRC entities continue to support Russia's war of
aggression against Ukraine by transferring key dual-use goods. If
confirmed I will continue to work to disrupt and deter those that evade
our sanctions and export control measures.
State and Treasury together have designated several PRC entities
that have supported Russia's war effort. I commit to using sanctions
and other appropriate means to counter PRC support to Russia's war
effort.
Question. Russia's procurement of drones and other deep fire
weaponry from Iran.
Answer. Since Iran's initial shipment of UAVs to Russia, the United
States and our foreign partners including the EU have sanctioned dozens
of entities and individuals linked to Iran's UAV program. These actions
build on years of using all the tools in our nonproliferation toolkit--
not only sanctions, but also interdiction, export controls, diplomatic
engagement, and capacity building--to try to constrain these entities'
procurement, production, and proliferation of UAVs. If confirmed, I
commit to supporting this expansive and holistic approach to impede
Iranian proliferation.
Question. How can the United States use sanctions to counter
Russian influence in Africa?
Answer. The U.S. has deployed sanctions to respond to Russia's
malign activities in Africa for several years with designations focused
on Mali, CAR, Sudan, and elsewhere. In particular, in January 2023, we
designated the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,
which has had a range of disruptive impacts. Building on previous
rollouts, on March 8, the U.S. sanctioned one entity in CAR and one
Russian company for their support to the Wagner Group. Moving forward,
I will continue to use all tools at my disposal to disrupt Russia's
malign efforts across the continent.
Question. Please provide your assessment of the effectiveness of
the Russian oil price cap.
Has the mechanism worked as intended? If not, how not?
What are the primary challenges to enforcing the cap?
What are the most common methods by which violators evade
sanctions on the cap?
What successes have there been in prosecuting violators
of the price cap?
How could the price cap policy be improved?
What is the status of discussions between the U.S. and
European allies on altering the oil price cap policy?
Answer. We continue to see the Price Cap Coalition's policies,
including import bans on Russian crude oil and petroleum products,
constraining Russian revenues. In 2023, Russian oil tax revenue was
down nearly 30 percent compared to 2022. Russia's oil export revenue in
December 2023 fell 2.6 billion USD compared to November 2022, before
the Coalition import bans and price cap policy were implemented.
We saw Russia responding to our efforts by increasing its reliance
on a limited number of markets and turning to unreliable service
providers. The Kremlin has been forced to invest significant resources
in an effort to export more of its oil via a ``shadow fleet,'' an
infrastructure of ships, insurers, and other service providers with
opaque ownership structures and a history of sanctions evasion
activities.
In response, in October 2023, the Coalition launched the price
cap's second phase with a two-pronged approach: tightening enforcement
of the price cap for trades that used Coalition services, while
increasing the costs to the Kremlin of selling oil via its alternative
shipping ecosystem. Consistent with this approach, the U.S. Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has since
taken repeated enforcement actions against those found to be accessing
Coalition services to move Russian oil above the price cap. The
Coalition also implemented changes to the price cap policy to
strengthen the attestation and recordkeeping processes for certain
covered service providers. Most recently, on February 23, OFAC took the
next step of increasing pressure against Russia's ability to move its
oil outside of the price cap's reach, by designating Sovcomflot,
Russia's largest state-owned shipping company and fleet operator.
As part of these efforts, OFAC has now designated 18 entities and
identified over 40 vessels owned by those 18 entities as blocked
property. Since the start of these enforcement actions in October 2023,
the discount on Russian oil has increased meaningfully, an outcome that
is consistent with the goals of the policy's second phase: force Putin
to either sell his oil under the price cap for much less than other
global suppliers or face high costs to export it through non-Coalition
avenues.
The Coalition remains focused on further reducing Kremlin profits
while maintaining market stability and energy supply. We continue to
work with our Coalition partners to monitor the effectiveness of the
price cap policy and ensure it is meeting these goals.
Simultaneously, the United States continues to sanction entities
involved in the development of key energy projects and associated
infrastructure--including Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project. Our
designations aim to degrade Russia's future capacity to produce and
export its energy resources.
According to a January 2024 report published by Russia's Finance
Ministry, Russia's annual oil and natural gas revenues fell to just
over USD 99.34 billion USD in 2023, a 24 percent year-on-year decrease
and the lowest since 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic pushed oil prices
sharply lower. Russia's weaponization of its energy resources has laid
bare its unreliability as an energy supplier. This has significant
implications for a country that, in 2021, relied on oil and natural gas
revenues for 45 percent of its federal budget. As importing countries
turn to more reliable sources for energy, there are very limited
opportunities for Russia to secure additional markets. This shift will
result in real, long-term losses for Russia, in terms of both its
global energy influence and its future energy revenues.
Question. Under what conditions would the U.S. consider lifting
sanctions on Russia?
Answer. The Russian Government continues to pursue malign,
maximalist goals and has shown no signs that it is interested in de-
escalating its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The United States will
continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions and export control
measures as long as Russia continues its efforts to destabilize our
partners and allies.
Question. How could you work with anti-corruption civil society
organizations, such as Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, to
better identify Russian oligarch assets for sanction? Would you support
the creation of a State-Treasury-Civil Society task force to facilitate
such efforts?
Answer. The Department continues to strongly support the Department
of Justice-led Task Force KleptoCapture, which aims to leverage the
U.S. Government's tools and authorities against efforts to evade or
undermine the economic actions taken by the U.S. Government in response
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Since its establishment, the
KleptoCapture task force has taken significant actions including
facilitating the seizure of superyachts and other assets of sanctioned
individuals with close ties to the Russian regime; dismantling Russian
criminal networks; and enforcing sanctions violations. We also support
civil society's independent efforts to identify and share information
about targets for potential U.S. Government action.
Question. Do you support seizing Russian sovereign assets in the
United States and transferring those assets to Ukraine for its
reconstruction?
Answer. G7 leaders have committed to continuing work to identify
all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets
could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with our respective
legal systems and international law. If confirmed, consistent with our
laws and regulations, I will support the U.S. Government's work with
our allies and partners to find ways to unlock the economic value of
these assets and ensure it is Russia who pays for the damage it has
caused to Ukraine.
Question. Should the Office of Sanctions Coordination have a role
in assisting with ongoing G7 talks regarding seizure of Russian
sovereign assets? If so, what role?
Answer. Discussions with partners and allies, including the G7,
regarding the complex issue of harnessing the value of Russian
sovereign assets for the benefit of Ukraine involve a coordinated
effort across relevant USG agencies and sub-components with relevant
expertise. The Office of Sanctions Coordination can support the U.S.
Government work on these issues, including engagement with G7 and other
partners and allies.
Question. How will you urge our EU and other European partners to
increase sanctions on Russia???
Answer. Sanctions and export controls are having a significant
impact on the Russian economy and Russia's ability to wage war. We work
closely with our European partners to share information, coordinate
designations, and support sanctions enforcement. If confirmed, I am
committed to utilizing sanctions in coordination with our allies and
partners, not only against Russia, but on individuals and companies in
other countries that help Russia procure items to supply its war
effort, including its defense industrial base.?
Question. If China takes military action against Taiwan, sanctions
will inevitably be a part of the international response. How would you
engage with European counterparts to ensure they are aware of the
potentiality of this scenario?
Answer. We work closely with our European partners to share
information, coordinate designations, and support sanctions
enforcement. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with my
European counterparts to prepare for a variety of potential situations
that may entail sanctions responses, including a scenario in which
China takes military action against Taiwan.
Question. What more can the Administration do to enforce
sanctions--particularly Chinese purchases of Iranian oil? What are the
challenges associated with Iran oil sanctions enforcement? Is it a lack
of capability, will or resources?
Answer. Our sanctions have caused Iran to rely heavily on a ghost
fleet that sells mostly to teapot refineries in the PRC, which imposes
heavy operational and economic costs on Iran. Larger state-owned
Chinese firms have stayed away from Iranian oil, suggesting that our
program has deterred Chinese companies with Western exposure from
engaging in this trade. Since January 2021, we have designated over 180
entities and individuals across multiple jurisdictions, including in
the People's Republic of China, United Arab Emirates, and Southeast
Asia, that have played a critical role in the production, sale, and
shipment of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian
petrochemicals and petroleum products. We have also identified nearly
40 vessels as blocked property involved in this trade.
Question. Iran's ghost fleet, which it uses to evade sanctions, has
grown from 70 to over 300 vessels during the Biden administration, yet
we've seen remarkably little action to curb the activity of these
vessels. What is the Department's role and strategy to counter ship to
ship transfers, vessels turning off transponders, changing flags, or
other techniques to avoid penalties?
Answer. We continue to take action targeting Iran's exports of oil
and petrochemicals. In addition to the actions noted in response to a
previous question, we also engaged in outreach to allies, partners, and
private industry, including international flag registries, to ensure
that the risks and red flags associated with Iran's illicit shipments
are well understood. Our engagement includes demarches and advisories
to inform actors in the oil sector about the risk of U.S. sanctions
associated with petroleum shipments and sanctions evasion tactics
involving Iranian oil and vessels.
Question. The New York Times reported a U.S. insurance company,
American Club, insures 27 ships suspected of carrying sanctioned
Iranian oil. Do current sanctions authorities apply to insurance
companies? If so, how have you engaged with American Club to stop
insuring these ships?
Answer. The Departments of State and Treasury continue to engage
with industry to encourage enhanced due diligence regarding Iranian oil
sales, compliance, and preventing exposure to U.S. sanctions risk. This
outreach also involves the issuance of advisories to inform actors in
the sector about the risk of U.S. sanctions associated with petroleum
shipments involving Iranian oil and vessels. The Office of Foreign
Assets Control is primarily responsible for investigations of potential
sanctions violations by U.S. persons.
Question. What actions have you taken against the United Arab
Emirates for purchases of Iranian oil?
Answer. Since January 2021, we have designated over 180 entities
and individuals across multiple jurisdictions, including entities in
the United Arab Emirates, that have played a critical role in the
production, sale, and shipment of hundreds of millions of dollars'
worth of Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum products.
Question. The administration issued a waiver on September 11, 2023
for the National Iranian Oil Company and the Central Bank of Iran
citing the ``national security interest of the United States''? Please
describe in detail the U.S. national security interest furthered by
this waiver.
Answer. Transferring funds from restricted Iranian accounts in the
Republic of Korea to restricted accounts in Qatar for humanitarian
trade was consistent with longstanding U.S. policy across
administrationsto ensure our sanctions do not prevent humanitarian
trade. The transfer was also necessary to facilitate the release of
U.S. citizens from unjust detention in Iran. This money will never
enter Iran, can only be accessed for humanitarian purposes, and goes
directly to third-party vendors. The Department of the Treasury
maintains oversight of these funds.
Question. The State Department issued a new 120-day waiver allowing
Iraq to pay Iran for electricity, stressing Tehran could only use the
funds for humanitarian trade and seeking to blunt criticism of giving
Iran the money. How did the unfreezing of funds impact the Sudani's
Government's efforts to control Iranian-aligned Shia militia group
attacks against U.S. troops and diplomats?
Answer. This waiver is designed to incentivize change in Iraq's
energy sector while reducing Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy. It has
been renewed 21 times since 2018 and remains vital to the Iraqi
Government. As has been our position for years, Iranian restricted
funds may only be used for humanitarian trade and other limited non-
sanctionable transactions. These funds are closely monitored, and we
remain in close contact with our foreign government and financial
institution partners to ensure they are only used for non-sanctionable
purposes.
Question. What is the status of the Oman channel used to facilitate
the unfreezing of Iranian assets frozen in Iraq?
Answer. The Iranian regime does not have direct access to the
transferred funds. These funds are contained in restricted accounts and
can only be used for humanitarian and other non-sanctionable purposes.
Question. Oman faces a potential FATF gray-listing. What assurances
do you have from Oman on preventing diversions of unfrozen Iranian
assets to terrorism? How effective have those assurances been?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade--food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural
items from third-party vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable
purposes with authorization by the U.S. Government. These funds are
closely monitored by the Department of the Treasury, and we remain in
close contact with our foreign government and financial institution
partners to ensure these funds are only used for non-sanctionable
purposes.
Question. Iran's support for terror groups is the regime's most
malign activity. Iran was named ``the leading state sponsor of
terrorism'' by the Bureau of Counterterrorism in November 2023 for
``facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities
around the world.'' How do you respond to argument that the transfer of
funds to Iran, to include unfreezing Iranian assets in jurisdictions
abroad, has increased Iranian support for regional terrorism, to
include Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis?
Answer. The Iranian Government has, for decades, at the expense of
its own people's needs, consistently prioritized supporting
destabilizing activities in the region. Across administrations,
including this and the prior one, it has remained a longstanding U.S.
policy to ensure our sanctions do not prevent food, medicine, and other
humanitarian goods and services from flowing to ordinary people, no
matter how objectionable their governments. The Iranian regime does not
have direct access to the transferred funds.? These funds are contained
in restricted accounts and can only be used for humanitarian and other
non-sanctionable purposes.
Question. While the Biden administration insists that unfrozen
Iranian funds are for humanitarian purposes, isn't all money fungible
and a net gain for the regime's terror budget? Please explain in
detail.
Answer. The Iranian Government, at the expense of its own people's
needs, has consistently prioritized supporting destabilizing activities
in the region. Across administrations, including this and the prior
one, it has remained a longstanding U.S. policyto ensure our sanctions
do not prevent food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and
services from flowing to ordinary people, no matter how objectionable
their governments. The availability of these funds for limited
humanitarian trade in Iraq and Oman is consistent with that policy.
Question. What are the dangers of monetizing hostage policy? What
impact does monetizing hostage policy have on the safety of Americans
abroad?
Answer. The State Department has no higher priority than the safety
and security of U.S. citizens overseas. This Administration has made
clear that we are willing to make tough decisions to bring home
Americans who are unjustly detained overseas. Regarding the September
2023 Iran hostage deal, the President and Secretary determined the
trade-off necessary to get Americans home was in our national security
interest. The United States will do whatever it can to provide all
appropriate support for U.S. nationals--including lawful permanent
residents with significant ties to the United States--held overseas.
Question. Do you support the permanent freeze of Iranian funds held
in Qatar, Oman, Iraq, and other jurisdictions? Why or why not?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade, as well as for other non-sanctionable purposes with
authorization by the U.S. Government. Across administrations, including
this and the prior one, it has remained a longstanding U.S. policyto
ensure our sanctions do not prevent food, medicine, and other
humanitarian goods and services from flowing to ordinary people, no
matter how objectionable their governments. The availability of these
funds in Iraq and Oman is consistent with that policy.
Question. Do you agree that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(SDGT) and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) should not be
lifted until they have demonstrated that they have permanently ceased
terror activities?
Answer. The IRGC, including its Quds force, remain designated as a
FTO and a SDGT. If confirmed, I am committed to using all tools at our
disposal, including sanctions, and working in close coordination with
our allies and partners, to counter the terrorist threat posed by Iran
and its proxies.
Question. Just this week, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) admitted ``the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in
relation to [Iran's] production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors
and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.'' What conditions
would warrant snapback sanctions under UNSCR 2231?
Answer. UNSCR 2231 (2015) provides that a JCPOA participant State
may notify the Security Council of an issue it believes constitutes
significant non-performance of JCPOA commitments to initiate the
``snapback'' of previous U.N. sanctions on Iran. The Administration has
made clear it will continue to vigorously enforce U.S. unilateral
sanctions and implement the provisions of UNSCR 2231. The
Administration has also stated that it remains in close consultation
with European allies regarding the imposition and enforcement of new
sanctions in response to Iran's actions.
Question. What is the Administration's strategy to penalize and
deter Iran's further nuclear advances and non-compliance with its
nonproliferation obligations??
Answer. The Administration has made clear that Iran's continued
expansion of nuclear activities that have no credible civilian
justification and failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA remain
deeply troubling. The Administration has underscored that it continues
to vigorously enforce sanctions on Iran, including actions targeting
Iran's oil and petrochemical trade, and that the IAEA Board of
Governors must be prepared to consider further action as necessary to
hold Iran to account if Iran does not provide the necessary cooperation
required by its safeguards obligations.
Iran and Other Malign Global Actors
During the Biden administration, U.S. adversaries to include
Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela have grown
closer to form a broader ``axis of evil''.
Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate U.S. sanctions
policy on Russia, China, and Iran to ensure they are aligned?
Answer. The Office of Sanctions Coordination was created, in part,
to ensure that our sanctions policies are well coordinated across
diverse sanctions programs and that these policies continue to advance
our foreign policy goals. Doing so requires working closely with the
State Department's regional bureaus and other stakeholders, including
counterparts at the National Security Council and at the Treasury
Department, to ensure we are creatively using all the tools at our
disposal to meet the challenges posed by our adversaries.
Question. As U.S. adversaries grow closer in building a resistance
economy insulated from the U.S. economic system and committed to
evading sanctions, how will you ensure U.S. sanctions have the maximum
impact?
Answer. Countering evasion networks is crucial to maintaining the
effectiveness of our sanctions. Working with our partners in the G7 and
around the world, using data and expert analysis to identify the
linkages that facilitate evasion, and using the full range of our
sanctions tools to consistently disrupt those entities and individuals
that facilitate sanctions evasion and circumvention will remain a
priority of mine if confirmed.
Question. Where do you see opportunities to drive wedges between
U.S. adversaries?
Answer. Increasing the costs of coordination between our
adversaries is important to countering sanctions evasion and ensuring
our sanctions are maximally effective. Through diplomatic engagement
and targeted sanctions, we can disrupt those linkages and make it
harder and more expensive for our adversaries to support each other and
engage in malign activity.
Question. In general, how do you plan to engage with partners like
the UAE, Qatar, and Oman who engage with U.S. adversaries and have a
questionable history of sanctions enforcement? How do we keep them on
our side without excusing bad behavior?
Answer. Robust and frank engagement with partners on sanctions
enforcement and implementation is essential to keeping them on our
side. We must ensure they clearly understand our concerns, have
actionable information, and have the capacity to enforce. When
enforcement or other cooperation is not forthcoming, we must also be
willing to utilize all tools at our disposal as needed.
Question. How do you assess the importance of sanctions, including
from the Caesar Act, to pressure the Syrian regime to implement the
reforms outlined in UNSCR 2254?
Answer. Our sanctions, including under the Caesar Act, are
important tools to promote accountability for the Assad regime's abuses
and press it to take genuine and credible steps toward a political
solution in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. A
Syrian-owned, Syrian-led political process remains the only viable
solution to the conflict. We are working with our allies, likeminded
partners, and the U.N. to implement UNSCR 2254. The Administration
remains committed to using all tools at its disposal, including Caesar
Act sanctions, to pursue a resolution to the Syrian conflict.
Question. The Arab Gas Pipeline is intended to deliver natural gas
from Egypt to Lebanon via pipelines in Syria, in exchange for a transit
fee or payment in kind to the Assad regime. Do you assess that the Arab
Gas Pipeline is compliant with the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
of 2019? If so, please give a detailed answer.
Answer. The parties and the World Bank are still discussing the
financing terms and contracts of the gas pipeline project. The
Departments of State and the Treasury need to receive the final details
of the financing terms and contracts to assess any relevant sanctions
implications. At that time, the Departments of State and the
Treasurywill have the information necessary to make a final
determination regarding the pipeline's compliance with the Caesar Act.
Question. As the Syrian portion of the Arab Gas Pipeline is
refurbished and maintained by Russian state-owned industries, notable
Gasprom, please provide an analysis of the pipeline's compliance with
Russia and Ukraine sanctions. [Less a question more a request, please
answer]
Answer. We are aware of media reports that Russian firm
Stroytransgaz was involved in construction of the Syrian portion of the
Arab GasPipeline, which was completed in February 2008. Stroytransgaz
has been on the OFAC SDN list since 2014. The Departments of Treasury
and State have yet to receive details on the final financing terms and
contracts. Only at that time will the Departments of State and the
Treasury have the information needed to assess any sanctions
implications and make any final determinations.
Question. The State Department has made a commitment to Senator
Risch to provide a briefing and determination on Caesar sanctions
compliance for the Arab Gas Pipeline before issuing any comfort letter,
pre-assurance, licenses or waivers to Egypt or in support of activating
the pipeline. Do I have your commitment to do the same?
Answer. I would welcome the opportunity to provide briefings to
Congressional staff or members on the Arab Gas pipeline and Lebanon
proposals, as we have done before. The Departments of Treasury and
State have made no final determinations to date. I understand that the
parties and the World Bank are still discussing the financing terms and
contracts. The Departments of Treasury and State need to receive the
details of the final financing terms and final contracts to be able to
assess any relevant sanctions implications. As Secretary Blinken has
made clear, we have not lifted or waived Syria-related sanctions.
Question. The Sanctioning the Use of Defenseless Shields Act of
2018 (P.L. 115-348) direct sanctions against entities that employ human
shields. Given extensive confirmed reporting of Hamas and Hezbollah use
of human shields, why has the Department not issued sanctions in
compliance with the law?
Answer. Hamas and Hezbollah have been designated terrorist groups
for more than 20 years. Using its counterterrorism authorities, the
U.S. Government has sanctioned Hamas and Hezbollah for their terrorist
activity, as well as their leaders and the supporters who enable that
terrorist activity. This Administration remains steadfastly committed
to countering Hamas and Hezbollah and the financial networks
underpinning them, as demonstrated by the designation of numerous
persons connected to these groups that have been announced since this
administration began in January 2021.
Question. What barriers exist to issuing sanctions under the Use of
Defenseless Shields Act?
Answer. The Administration has demonstrated it wholeheartedly
believes that civilians should not suffer the consequences of the
inhumanity and brutality of Hamas, Hezbollah, or any other terror
group. And, if confirmed, I will continue to support the use of the
tools at our disposal to target these groups, their financiers, and the
financial transfer mechanisms that funnel funds in support of terrorist
activities.
Question. Would you support corruption sanctions on Lebanese
officials across the sectarian spectrum who prevent Lebanon from
selecting a president and implementing reforms needed to recover from
the economic crisis?
Answer. Sanctions are one tool, among many, to promote
accountability for corrupt actors and those whose activities undermine
democratic institutions or contribute to the breakdown of the rule of
law. We are committed to leveraging all tools at our disposal to press
the Lebanese political class to elect a president and implement the
reforms needed to recover from the economic crisis, in line with the
demands of the Lebanese people.
Afghanistan
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) said that U.S. aid through the United Nations is
possibly being taken by the Taliban.
Question. How do you view the role of sanctions coordinator in
enforcing sanctions on the Taliban?
Answer. The Taliban remain designated under U.S. counterterrorism
sanctions as well as several of its leaders and members at the United
Nations. There have been no sanctions lifted since August 2021. In
December 2023, the U.S. imposed sanctions under Global Magnitsky on two
Taliban leaders for human rights abuses related to the ongoing
repression of women and girls. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely within the State Department and across the interagency to
ensure U.S. sanctions against the Taliban support broader policy
objectives, including countering terrorism, promoting human rights, and
preventing diversion of humanitarian assistance.
Question. Which criteria does the State Department use to determine
which officials from Latin American and Caribbean Governments are
subject to 7031(c) designations?
Answer. I understand that when the Secretary of State has credible
information that a foreign government official has been involved in
significant corruption and/or a gross violation of human rights, the
Secretary is required to designate or identify that official and his or
her immediate family members under Section 7031(c). The Department of
State actively reviews cases and applies this authority to designate
current and former foreign government officials globally, and it aligns
with our broad efforts to counter corruption and protect human rights.
Question. What role do sanctions, and 7031(c) designations have in
contributing to promoting democracy, human rights, and security in
Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. Sanctions and public designation under authorities,
including Section 7031(c), allow the United States to promote
accountability for corrupt and anti-democratic actors, as well as
individuals involved in human rights violations and abuses. These
actions aim to disrupt or deter future violations and abuses.
Question. How does the State Department assess the effectiveness of
sanctions and 7031(c) designations in achieving their intended goals in
Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. Sanctions and other authorities, including Section 7031(c),
are important tools in the Department's efforts to promote
accountability for human rights violations and abuses, counter impunity
for corruption, and address democratic backsliding in the Western
Hemisphere. During this administration we have used these tools across
the region, including in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, and
Colombia. Designations are highly fact and context-specific, and the
Department works with our embassies, the inter-agency, and civil
society to gather and analyze relevant information regarding impact,
including impacts that may manifest themselves over the long term.
Question. The U.S. and Argentina recently cooperated on seizing a
Venezuelan cargo plane tied to Iran and its terrorist proxies. If
confirmed, what will you do to ensure we continue enforcing counter-
terrorism sanctions, particularly in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The Administration is committed to countering terrorism and
enforcing U.S. law with respect to designated actors. If confirmed, I
will continue our work in this area, including with our partners in the
Western Hemisphere, to enforce U.S. sanctions against violators,
including against Iran, its proxies and partners wherever they may be
found.
Question. From your perspective, how can the United States better
utilize sanctions with to limit the malign activities and influence of
PRC in Latin America?
Answer. The Administration has deepened partnerships in Latin
American to help protect against external interference or coercion,
including from the PRC, and coordinate on sanctions enforcement. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on sanctions
policy and monitor the activities of the PRC in Latin America and act
where appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what considerations will guide your
assessment to canceling the sanction relief extended to Venezuela since
October 2022 [sic], particularly in light of the lack of response to
lifting of the ban on opposition presidential candidates running for
office?
Answer. We already have revoked General License 43 in response to
actions by Maduro and his representatives that are inconsistent with
the agreements reached in Barbados last year. The State Department
press spokesperson has made clear that unless Maduro and his
representatives show progress in creating conditions for competitive
elections, we will not renew General License 44 (relief to Venezuela's
oil and gas sector) when it expires on April 18, 2024.
Question. If not, under what conditions would you advocate for
changes to the U.S. sanctions program for Venezuela? Under what
conditions would you advocate for changes to the U.S. sanctions program
for Venezuela?
Answer. The United States will reconsider its sanctions on
Venezuela when Maduro takes concrete steps towards competitive
elections. The State Department press spokesperson has made clear that
unless Maduro and his representatives show progress in creating
conditions for competitive elections, we will not renew General License
44 (relief to Venezuela's oil and gas sector) when it expires on April
18, 2024.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to convince the EU to
match U.S. sanctions until there is a credible transition to democratic
order in Venezuela?
Answer. Last year, Department officials engaged European
counterparts on Venezuela sanctions policy on multiple occasions, and I
travelled to Madrid to reinforce the importance of the EU staying
aligned with the U.S. on Venezuela sanctions policy. The EU renewed
their sanctions regime on Venezuela late last year. If confirmed, I
will continue to urge the EU to remain aligned with the U.S. on
Venezuela sanctions policy.
Question. How is the State Department collaborating with the
Treasury Department in implementing Executive Order 13850, specifically
targeting individuals involved in Venezuela's gold sector or any other
sector of the Venezuelan economy?
Answer. The Department works closely with the Department of the
Treasury on the implementation of the Venezuela sanctions program,
including with respect to General License 43, which had authorized
transactions with Venezuela's state-owned gold company, and was
rescinded in January.
Question. Do you support stronger sanctions against Maduro, and the
allies of Maduro, currently sanctioned for committing human rights
abuses, trafficking drugs, or are involved in corruption/subverting
democracy in Venezuela?
Answer. Maduro has been designated for his subversion of democracy,
and many of his allies have been designated for committing human rights
abuses, trafficking drugs, corruption, and further subversion of
democracy. I will continue to advocate for the use of our sanctions
authorities to support the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan
people.
Question. What is the State Department's assessment of how much
revenue has dictator Maduro received from the November 2022 Chevron
license?
Answer. I refer you to Chevron for information on how much revenue
Maduro received from the license. As money goes into the energy sector,
Maduro is likely to accrue some revenue, but this will happen slowly as
businesses need to have confidence in the investment climate in
Venezuela before any significant increases in revenue are seen by
Maduro.
Question. What is the State Department's assessment of how revenue
dictator Maduro's regime is expected/projected to earn from the
licenses extended on October 18?
Answer. We regularly assess the impact our foreign policy has on
Maduro and his associates with the objective of restoring democracy in
Venezuela. We refer you to private sector participants for more
information on payments associated with their activities in Venezuela.
We are unaware of any new financial relationships, including
investments in Venezuela's gold sector that occurred prior to General
License 43 being revoked.
Question. What is the latest impact assessment of the USG's foreign
policy of giving sanctions relief and corresponding revenue flows to
the Maduro regime?
Answer. We regularly assess the impact our foreign policy has on
Maduro and his associates with the objective of restoring democracy in
Venezuela. We refer you to private sector participants for more
information on payments associated with their activities in Venezuela.
We are unaware of any new financial relationships, including
investments in Venezuela's gold sector that occurred prior to General
License 43 being revoked.
Question. If confirmed, will you advocate against any unilateral
changes to U.S. sanctions or conditions put in place against the Cuba
regime as required by U.S. law, including the Libertad Act absent the
Cuban regime committing to a democratic process and democratic
openings?
Answer. U.S. sanctions against Cuba are codified in statute. The
embargo will not be lifted absent Congressional action or if the
statutory criteria for terminating the embargo are met. If confirmed, I
will continue to maintain sanctions on Cuba as required by U.S. law.
As the Biden-Harris Administration outlined on May 16, 2022, we are
committed to promoting accountability for human rights abuses and
supporting the political and economic well-being of the Cuban people.
Question. If confirmed, do you pledge to advocate for a Section
7301(c) designation of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, the outgoing
Vice President of Argentina? Please provide your rationale for your
decision.
Answer. While the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator does not lead
on visa restriction authorities, if confirmed I will work with relevant
stakeholders to consider appropriate tools to address corruption in
Latin America and elsewhere.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to advocating for a Section
7031(c) designation for former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa due
to his involvement in significant acts of corruption, as evidenced by
his 2020 bribery conviction related to activities during his presidency
from 2007 to 2017?
Answer. While the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator does not lead
on visa restriction authorities, if confirmed I will work with relevant
stakeholders to consider appropriate tools to address corruption in
Latin America and elsewhere.
Question. Why has the State Department focused on Section 7301(c)
designations for officials from governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean that have actively cooperated with the United States on
strategic diplomatic and national security matters such as former
Guatemala president Alejandro Giammattei? Please explain the process
and criteria that it has used since January 2021 to designate
individuals in Latin American and the Caribbean under Section 7031(c).
Answer. The Department uses a variety of accountability tools,
including Section 7031(c), to advance U.S. foreign policy priorities
articulated in the U.S. Strategy to Counter Corruption. I understand
that the State Department considers credible information from a variety
of sources that meets the Section 7031(c) threshold for designation.
Regarding former Guatemalan president Alejandro Giammattei's January
designation, I understand that the Department had credible information
of Mr. Giammattei's involvement in significant corruption, which
triggered the Congressionally mandated obligation to designate him
under Section 7031(c).
Question. How has the amendment to Executive Order 13851, signed by
President Biden on October 24, 2022, which expanded sanctions and
imposed visa restrictions on over 500 Nicaraguans and their family
members affiliated with the Nicaraguan Government or supportive of
actions undermining democratic institutions, influenced the Murillo
regime's commitment to restoring democracy in Nicaragua?
Answer. The aim of these measures is to increase the pressure on
the Ortega--Murillo regime and promote accountability. We have deployed
targeted sanctions and imposed over 1,100 visa restrictions against
those undermining democracy. These actions complement our diplomatic
efforts to press for restoring full civil and political rights for all
Nicaraguans. We cannot preview sanctions actions, but if confirmed, I
will work within the Department and interagency to support the
effective use of our sanctions tools in support of our objectives in
Nicaragua.
Question. On a September 20, 2021 ``telephonic press briefing on
the Biden-Harris Administration actions in response to the ongoing
crisis in Northern Ethiopia'', you said the ``situation in Ethiopia
shocks the conscience the extent of the human rights and humanitarian
crisis in Ethiopia is too great now not to use every tool at our
disposal. This is why President Biden signed this executive order
authorizing the use of financial sanctions against those contributing
to or prolonging the crisis.'' In the time since Executive Order 14046
was signed by President Biden, no Ethiopians have been designated. What
is your perspective on this??
Answer. The U.S. remains committed to supporting peace in Ethiopia,
and we continuously assess how to employour array of toolsappropriate
to the policy context. In addition to sanctions, we have utilized other
tools, such as an Atrocities Determination and visa restrictions, to
address concerns in the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement and other areas. Moving forward, I will continue to monitor
the situation and work with thestakeholders within the State Department
and across the interagency to deploy our sanctions tools, as
appropriate.
Question. Similarly, on May 4, 2023, President Biden signed
Executive Order 14098 on ``imposing sanctions on certain persons
destabilizing Sudan and undermining the goal of a democratic
transition.'' To date, 5 individuals have been designated under the EO,
largely Bashir-era Islamists. With the exception of Hemedti's brother,
we have yet to see designations target the individuals most responsible
for the destruction of Sudan and related humanitarian disaster. How
would you address this as sanctions coordinator?
Answer. In addition to the designation of five individuals, the
United States has designated nine SAF and RSF-affiliated entities,
including those located outside Sudan, that have financial or other
connections to the warring entities. The U.S. also issued anotice in
June 2023 declaring all gold from Sudan as conflict-affected and high
risk. The U.S., in coordination with our allies, will continue to
deploy sanctions to disrupt the SAF's and RSF's ability to prosecute
the war, to support negotiations, and to undermine the ability of non-
democratic spoilers from shaping Sudan's future.
Question. On March 4, 2024, the termination of the Zimbabwe
Sanctions Program was announced by the Administration, along with the
announcement of 14 Global Magnitsky designations. We have received
assurances that these 14 designations are just the start of the rollout
of Global Magnitsky sanctions on Zimbabweans responsible for acts of
significant corruption and/or responsible for gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. As Sanctions Coordinator, how
would you prioritize this and ensure that the Administration follows
through on its commitments to Congress?
Answer. I remain deeply concerned about human rights abuses and
widespread corruption in Zimbabwe, which continue to undermine
democratic processes in the country. Moving forward, I will continue to
advocate for the use of all available tools, including Global Magnitsky
sanctions and visa restrictions, as appropriate, to promote
accountability for those actors who engage in human rights abuses and
corruption.
Question. The old Zimbabwe sanctions regime included authorities to
designate individuals for undermining democratic governance. Please
clarify in writing the Department's view regarding whether the Global
Magnitsky Act and/or 7031(c) sanctions cover matters pertaining to
undermining democratic governance.
Answer. Undermining democratic governance often has a nexus to
human rights abuses and violations and corruption. If confirmed, I will
continue to advocate for the use of all available tools to address
malign actors in Zimbabwe.
Question. On December 4, 2023, Secretary Blinken announced new visa
restriction policies for Uganda and Zimbabwe under Section 212(a)(3)(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act for undermining democracy. On
December 5, 2023, my staff requested a briefing on the updated
policies, and have followed up on the request on multiple occasions in
person and in writing. To date, the briefing has not been held. Please
describe the updated visa policies for Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Answer. On December 4, 2023, Secretary Blinken announced an
expansion of the visa restriction policy introduced after Uganda's
flawed 2021 presidential elections. I understand that this expanded
visa restriction policy includes current or former Ugandan officials or
others who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the democratic process in Uganda or for policies or actions
aimed at repressing members of marginalized or vulnerable populations.
The Secretary also announced a new visa restriction policy for
undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. I understand that under this policy,
individuals who undermine the democratic process in Zimbabwe--including
in the lead-up to, during, and following Zimbabwe's August 2023
elections--may be found ineligible for U.S. visas.
I understand that a briefing to discuss these policies with SFRC
staff is scheduled for March 14 at 1 p.m.
Question. Do you commit, as Sanctions Coordinator if confirmed, to
responding to briefing requests from my office in a timely fashion?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What has the United States achieved in our Myanmar policy
through the use of sanctions? Please be specific.
Answer. Sanctions on 91 individuals and 50 entities since the 2021
coup have proved impactful in disrupting the junta's financial and
economic activities, and we will continue to pursue such efforts. We
have disrupted the supply chain of aviation fuel; restricted revenue
from reaching military leaders, arms traders, state-owned entities, and
cronies and other businesspeople affiliated with and enabling the
military regime; and disrupted the regime's use of foreign currency to
purchase weapons through sanctions on two state-owned banks and the
largest state-owned energy company.
Question. What is the role that Chinese state-owned and commercial
entities play in funding and supplying the Burma military government?
How can we use sanctions policy to address the role these entities have
played in Burma to date?
Answer. Since the military coup in Burma, the PRC maintains high-
level engagement with the military regime, including through trade and
investment ties. We continue to urge all members of the international
community, including the PRC, to press the regime to cease the
violence, release all those unjustly detained, and support the people
of Burma's aspirations to live in peace and in an inclusive,
representative democracy.
We do not preview potential sanctions actions, but the U.S.
Government will use all tools available, if appropriate, to address
concerns.
Question. Why has the U.S. Government not used authorities under
the Global Magnitsky Act or the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy
Act since 2021 to sanction PRC officials (including HKSAR officials)
who continue to undermine the internationally recognized human rights
and basic freedoms of Hong Kong citizens?
Answer. The Department continuously evaluates the best approach and
response to the ongoing dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and rule of
law. If confirmed, I would welcome consultations with you and your
staff regarding potential actions as we consider options to promote
accountability for those involved in human rights abuses, transnational
repression, and the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy.
Question. Is it true that the Foundation for Climate and
Environmental Protection M.V. was funded by the Russian state-owned
energy company Gazprom? (Please note that I've entered into the hearing
record the bylaws for the foundation, which provides details on its
funding.)
Answer. In November 2021, the Department reported a vessel for
engaging in activity covered by PEESA, as amended. The owner of the
vessel was a German foundation, and the Department was aware of certain
reports regarding Nord Stream 2 AG planning to provide funding to the
foundation. The Department determined that the foundation fell within
the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as amended.
Accordingly, the Department did not report or sanction the foundation.
This determination was based on all of the relevant facts available at
that time.
follow-up question
Question. Is it true that the Foundation for Climate and
Environmental Protection M.V. was funded by the Russian state-
owned energy company Gazprom? (Please note that I've entered
into the hearing record the bylaws for the foundation, which
provides details on its funding.) Please provide a yes or no
answer, and explain why.
Answer. The website for the Foundation for Climate and
Environmental Protection M.V. currently acknowledges receiving
funding from Nord Stream 2 AG. The Department was aware of
certain reports regarding Nord Stream 2 AG planning to provide
funding to the foundation at the time of the determination. The
Department reviewed the statute of the foundation at the time,
which the Department understands to be the document entered
into the record. It did not specify details on its funding
sources beyond noting the initial =200,000 provided by the
state government to establish the foundation.
Question. Per your own PEESA report submission in November 2021,
the pipe-laying support ship (``Blue Ship'') was engaged in pipe-laying
activities. Is it true that ``Blue Ship'' was owned by the Foundation
for Climate and Environmental Protection M.V.? (Please note that I've
entered into the hearing record the ownership registration of this
vessel.)
Answer. Yes, at the time of the Department's November 2021 report,
the ``Blue Ship'' was owned by the Foundation for Climate and
Environmental Protection M.V.
follow-up question
Question. Per your own PEESA report submission in November
2021, the pipe-laying support ship (``Blue Ship'') was engaged
in pipe-laying activities. Is it true that ``Blue Ship'' was
owned by the Foundation for Climate and Environmental
Protection M.V.? (Please note that I've entered into the
hearing record the ownership registration of this vessel.)
Please provide a yes or no answer, and explain why.
Answer. Yes, at the time of the Department's November 2021
report, the ``Blue Ship'' was owned by the Foundation for
Climate and Environmental Protection M.V.
Question. Is it true that the bylaws of this foundation stated that
the organization may operate as a business? (Please note again that I
have entered into the hearing record a copy of this organization's
bylaws.)
Answer. The Department looked at documents related to the
foundation to review the purposes of the foundation. The Department
considered those documents and a number of facts available at the time
and determined that the foundation fell within the exception in section
7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as amended. I am aware that there are other
views on the interpretation of this statutory exception. If confirmed,
I would seek to engage with the committee on questions of
interpretation like this in the future.
follow-up question
Question. Is it true that the bylaws of this foundation
stated that the organization may operate as a business? (Please
note again that I have entered into the hearing record a copy
of this organization's bylaws.) Please provide a yes or no
answer, and explain why.
Answer. The Department reviewed the statute establishing the
foundation and other documents at the time of the
determination. The Department understands this question to
refer to the founding statute of the foundation, which is the
document entered into the record. Consistent with the documents
entered into the hearing record, the Department was aware that
the foundation could establish and maintain a commercial
business, which does not mean the foundation itself was
operating as a business. Any profits earned by the foundation
were to be retained for the purposes of the foundation. The
Department considered those documents and a number of facts
available at the time and determined that the foundation fell
within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as
amended.
Question. Is it true that PEESCA explicitly requires sanctions on
vessels engaged in pipe-laying activities and the entities that own
them, even government entities, if they are operating as a business
enterprise? (For reference, see Sec. 7503 (e)(6)(B) of FY 2020 NDAA, as
amended by FY 2021 NDAA Sec. 1242 (22 USC 9526 note.)
Answer. Section 7503 (e)(6) of PEESA, as amended, provides that
sanctions ``shall not apply with respect to-- (A) the European Union;
(B) the Government of Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or any
member country of the European Union; or (C) any entity of the European
Union or a government described in subparagraph (B) that is not
operating as a business enterprise.'' The Department determined that
the foundation fell within this exception, based on all of the relevant
facts available at the time.
follow-up question
Question. Is it true that PEESCA explicitly requires
sanctions on vessels engaged in pipe-laying activities and the
entities that own them, even government entities, if they are
operating as a business enterprise? (For reference, see Sec.
7503 (e)(6)(B) of FY 2020 NDAA, as amended by FY 2021 NDAA Sec.
1242 (22 USC 9526 note.) Please provide a yes or no answer, and
explain why.
Answer. Section 7503(a)(1)(B)(i) of PEESA, as amended,
requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, to report to Congress any foreign
persons determined to have knowingly, sold, leased, or
provided, or facilitated selling, leasing, or providing, any
vessels that engaged in pipe-laying or pipe-laying activities
at depths of 100 feet or more below sea level for the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the
Turkstream pipeline project, or any project that is a successor
to either such project. Section 7503(c) of PEESA, as amended,
requires the imposition of sanctions on any person identified
under subsection (a)(1)(B). Separately, Section 7503 (e)(6) of
PEESA, as amended, provides that sanctions ``shall not apply
with respect to: (A) the European Union; (B) the Government of
Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or any member country
of the European Union; or (C) any entity of the European Union
or a government described in subparagraph (B) that is not
operating as a business enterprise.'' The Department determined
that the foundation fell within this exception, based on all of
the relevant facts available at the time.
Question. Is it true that this organization listed pipelaying
activities in relations to completing Nord Stream 2 as a primary
purpose on its website? Yes or no? (See https://web.archive.org/web/
20210819155945/https://klimastiftung-mv.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/
Satzung-Kopie.pdf)
Answer. The Department was aware of reports that the foundation
intended to support Nord Stream 2, that the Blue Ship engaged in
pipelaying activities, and that the foundation was the registered owner
of the Blue Ship. The Department considered a number of facts available
at the time about the foundation and determined that the foundation
fell within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as
amended.
follow-up question
Question. Is it true that this organization listed pipelaying
activities in relations to completing Nord Stream 2 as a
primary purpose on its website? Yes or no? (See htps://
web.archive.org/web/20210819155945/htps://klimastitiung-mv.de/
wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Satzung-Kopie.pdf). Please provide a
yes or no answer, and explain why.
Answer. In its November 2021 report, the Department
determined that the ``Blue Ship'' did engage in pipelaying or
pipelaying activities at depths of 100 feet or more below sea
level for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
project. The ``Blue Ship'' was owned by the Foundation for
Climate and Environmental Protection M.V. at the time of the
Department's November 2021 report. The document linked in this
question is not the foundation's website but rather its
founding statute which does not make specific reference to
pipe-laying activities.
Question. If this organization was backed by Russian state funding
and employed vessels for the purpose of assisting with the completion
of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, why wasn't didn't you designate this
organization as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
(PEESA), as amended by the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Clarification Act PEESCA)?
Answer. The Department considered a number of facts available at
the time and determined that the foundation fell within the exception
in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as amended. Accordingly, the
Department did not report or sanction the foundation.
follow-up question
Question. If this organization was backed by Russian state
funding and employed vessels for the purpose of assisting with
the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, why did you not
designate this organization as required by the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended by the
Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act PEESCA)?
Please provide a fulsome response.
Answer. The Department considered a number of facts available
at the time and determined that the foundation fell within the
exception in section 7503(e)(6)(C) of PEESA, as amended. The
Department's determination at the time reflected a number of
facts about the foundation, including the following. The
foundation's establishment was proposed and approved by the
Government of the German state of Mecklenberg-West Pomerania.
The Prime Minister of the state government appointed, and could
remove, the board of directors of the foundation, and also
appointed the foundation's board of trustees. The board of
directors was responsible for management of the foundation. The
foundation's statute also noted that any profits earned by the
foundation were to be retained for the purposes of the
foundation. Based on these and other facts available at the
time, the Department determined that the foundation fell within
the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(C) of PEESA, as amended.
Accordingly, the Department did not report or sanction the
foundation and assessed that no waiver was required.
Question. PEESA and PEESCA provided a waiver for national security
reasons. Why didn't the administration just request a waiver for this
organization?
Answer. The Department considered a number of facts and determined
that the foundation fell within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c)
of PEESA, as amended. Accordingly, the Department did not report or
sanction the foundation and assessed that no waiver was required.
follow-up question
Question. Please describe the specific facts considered by
the Department and the reasoning as to why the foundation fell
within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as
amended.
Answer. The Department's determination at the time reflected
a number of facts about the foundation, including the
following. The foundation's establishment was proposed and
approved by the Government of the German state of Mecklenberg-
West Pomerania. The Prime Minister of the state government
appointed, and could remove, the board of directors of the
foundation, and also appointed the foundation's board of
trustees. The board of directors was responsible for management
of the foundation. The foundation's statute also noted that any
profits earned by the foundation were to be retained for the
purposes of the foundation. Based on these and other facts
available at the time, the Department determined that the
foundation fell within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(C)
of PEESA, as amended. Accordingly, the Department did not
report or sanction the foundation and assessed that no waiver
was required.
Question. Looking back, would you have pushed for sanctions on the
Foundation for Climate and Environmental Protection M.V. and ``Blue
Ship''?
Answer. In November 2021, the Department reported the ``Blue Ship''
for engaging in activity covered by PEESA, as amended. The owner of the
vessel was the Foundation for Climate and Environmental Protection M.V.
The Department considered a number of facts about the foundation and
determined that the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(c) of PEESA, as
amended, applied. The determination was consistent with the exception
that Congress itself provided in PEESA, as amended, and it was also
consistent with the Administration's policy at the time.
follow-up question
Question. Looking back, would you have pushed for sanctions
on the Foundation for Climate and Environmental Protection M.V.
and ``Blue Ship''? Please answer a yes or no and explain why.
Answer. The Department considered a number of facts about the
foundation at the time and determined that the exception in
section 7503(e)(6)(C) of PEESA, as amended, applied. The
determination was consistent with the exception that Congress
itself provided in PEESA, as amended, and it was also
consistent with the Administration's policy at the time. I am
aware that there are other views on the interpretation of this
statutory exception. If confirmed, I would seek to engage with
the committee on questions of interpretation like this in the
future.
follow-up question
Question. You note in your responses that the organization
was engaging in activities related to the completion of Nord
Stream 2. The foundation's bylaws also confirm this. This was a
front organization in Germany that:
had no connection to the federal Government of
Germany,
was funded and controlled by a Russian state-owned
energy firm, and
was engaged in business operations related to the
completion of Nord Stream 2.
Given the facts above, how could this organization possibly
qualify for an exception specifically reserved for Allied
Government entities that do NOT operate as business enterprises
related to Nord Stream 2 pipelaying activities.
Answer. The Department's determination at the time reflected
a number of facts about the foundation, including the
following: The foundation's establishment was proposed and
approved by the Government of the German state of Mecklenberg-
West Pomerania. The Prime Minister of the state government
appointed, and could remove, the board of directors of the
foundation, and also appointed the foundation's board of
trustees. The board of directors was responsible for management
of the foundation. The foundation's statute also noted that any
profits earned by the foundation were to be retained for the
purposes of the foundation. Based on these and other facts
available at the time, the Department determined that the
foundation fell within the exception in section 7503(e)(6)(C)
of PEESA, as amended. Accordingly, the Department did not
report or sanction the foundation and assessed that no waiver
was required.
The exception in section 7503(e)(6)(C) of PEESA, as amended,
states that sanctions ``shall not apply any entity of the
European Union or a government described in subparagraph (B) .
. .'' The statute does not define government entity, and this
provision is not restricted to federal governments or federal
government entities.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Erik John Woodhouse by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China is the ``only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang,
flood our communities with fentanyl, and emit, by far the largest
quantity of greenhouse gases in the world today. With their absolute
control of Chinese society and industry, the CCP could stop all of
these destructive actions tomorrow if they so choose. Is the CCP a
threat to the United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As
Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will
work to advance U.S. national security interests and support the U.S.
Government's work to counter harmful activities by the People's
Republic of China.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. The United States will work with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) to address global and transnational challenges, such as
climate change, when it is in the U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed,
I will work with my colleagues across the U.S. interagency and Congress
to advance U.S. objectives and counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests and countering efforts by our competitors, including
the People's Republic of China (PRC), to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to supporting our partners in the face of this
challenge. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State
and interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's harmful
activities.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024
walkout?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to address employee concerns
personally by creating an open, trusting, and harassment-free work
environment. I am mindful of and value Department employees' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, I understand the
expression of disagreement does not in and of itself constitute
insubordination. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor to determine the proper course of action
should such a matter arise.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing''?
Answer. I believe these employees were expressing a dissenting view
to their leadership. I would hope that employees would feel confident
to directly raise their concerns with their supervisors and management
rather than signing an anonymous letter. ``Whistleblowing'' is a term
and activity covered by legislation and regulations; I defer to the
Department's Office of the Legal Advisor to determine whether the
referenced actions are considered protected whistleblowing activity.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make sure that employees in the Office
of Sanctions Coordination know that there are several avenues available
to express policy disagreements. I would encourage employees to use
established channels to express their views.
According to Department regulations, insubordination is a
disciplinary matter related to conduct on the job and may result in
counseling and a penalty commensurate with the scale of the offense. If
confirmed, I would address discipline issues, including
insubordination, in consultation with the Department's human resources
and legal professionals.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist group and antisemitic entity.
This foreign terrorist organization seeks to eliminate the State of
Israel, and its founding charter calls for the killing of Jewish
people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration supports
humanitarian pauses to allow for an influx of aid into Gaza and the
safe exit of hostages and other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a
sustained flow of aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians
seeking safer locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is
attempting to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The
U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas'
terrorism, consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. I understand that the U.S. Government supports Israel's
right to protect itself, consistent with international law, and that
the Administration has urged Israel to differentiate between civilians
and Hamas terrorists and to avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of
civilians as human shields, a blatant violation of international law,
does not lessen Israel's obligations under international humanitarian
law.
Question. The Protecting European Energy Security Act (PEESA)
required the Department to submit a list to Congress and then sanction
all vessels and other entities involved in pipelaying activities
related to Nord Stream 2. Under your capacity in the Economic Bureau,
the Department chose to look the other way as a Russian front
organization, continued pipelaying projects, and this Russian entity
was exempt from sanctions. Did anyone inform you there were
organizations operating as Russian front entities?
Answer. In November 2021, the Department reported a vessel for
engaging in activity covered by PEESA, as amended. The owner of the
vessel was a German foundation. The Department determined that the
foundation fell within a PEESA exception that provides that sanctions
``shall not apply'' to a ``any entity of [a member state of the
European Union] not operating as a business enterprise.'' Accordingly,
the Department did not report or sanction the foundation. This
determination was based on all of the relevant facts available at that
time.
Question. Did you advocate for sanctions on these Russian front
groups? If not, why?
Answer. The Administration was clear in its opposition to Nord
Stream 2 as a bad deal for Ukraine and Europe and a Kremlin
geopolitical project. Consistent with PEESA, as amended, the
Administration sanctioned a number of persons related to Nord Stream
2's construction, including several Russia-linked entities.
Question. Iran obtains substantial funding from its illegal
petroleum shipments abroad. The Biden administration has failed to
fully enforce sanctions on these ships, which has enabled Tehran to
fund its international terrorist operations and support its proxies who
are destabilizing the region and targeting U.S. uniformed service
members. Do you believe Iran should benefit from the administration's
lack of sanctions enforcement, while the proxies it arms and bankrolls
kill American servicemembers and target our allies?
Answer. We continue to enforce our sanctions on Iran, including
actions targeting petroleum and petrochemical shipments, and have not
lifted a single sanction on Iran. Since January 2021, we have
designated over 180 entities and individuals across multiple
jurisdictions, including in the People's Republic of China, United Arab
Emirates, and Southeast Asia, that have played a critical role in the
production, sale, and shipment of hundreds of millions of dollars'
worth of Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum products. We have also
identified nearly 40 vessels as blocked property involved in this
trade.
Question. I have serious concerns regarding the administration's
waiver that allowed approximately $10 billion in Iranian funds to be
transferred to foreign banks and do not have any direct oversight by
the U.S. on uses. What is the exact amount that has been transferred
from Iraq to Oman under the waiver?
Answer. I understand that since August 2023, 505 million euros have
been transferred from Iraq to Oman. The Iranian regime does not have
direct access to the transferred funds. These funds are contained in
restricted accounts and can only be used for humanitarian and other
non-sanctionable purposes.
Question. How many transactions have taken place and which entities
were involved?
Answer. I understand that there have been two transactions that
have occurred, both for approved humanitarian goods. The Administration
has established rigorous oversight mechanisms to ensure these
restricted funds can only be used for humanitarian trade--food,
medicine, medical devices, and agricultural items from third-party
vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable purposes with
authorization by the U.S. Government. None of these funds will ever
enter Iran.
Question. What specific U.S. oversight mechanisms are in place to
prevent diversion or abuse or is the administration assuming partners
to voluntarily share this information?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade--food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural
items from third-party vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable
purposes with authorization by the U.S. Government. Further detail can
be provided by the Departments of State and the Treasury in a different
setting.
Question. Have there been any disbursements of these accounts?
Answer. I understand that there have been two transactions that
have occurred, both for approved humanitarian goods. The Administration
has established rigorous oversight mechanisms to ensure these
restricted funds can only be used for humanitarian trade--food,
medicine, medical devices, and agricultural items from third-party
vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable purposes with
authorization by the U.S. Government. None of these funds will ever
enter Iran.
Question. The wavier that permitted the transfer of these funds is
up for review in a few days. Would you recommend the renewal of this
waiver?
Answer. The Administration fully supports this waiver, which was
designed to incentivize change in Iraq's energy sector while reducing
Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy. This waiver has been renewed 21
times since 2018, and our strategy is working. Over the past year, the
Iraqi Government made progress to increase electricity imports from its
Arab neighbors and signed a landmark $27 billion deal with
TotalEnergies that will help Iraq significantly reduce its dependency
on Iranian energy imports. Iraq is also investing in gas capture,
developing natural gas fields, and upgrading its power grid.
Question. Do you support my SHIP Act, which would require the
imposition of sanctions upon those engaged in the import of illicit
petroleum from Iran?
Answer. The Administration continues to enforce our sanctions on
Iran, including actions targeting petroleum and petrochemical
shipments, and have not lifted a single sanction on Iran. However, we
have concerns that the sanctions in the proposed SHIP Act would overlap
with existing energy sector sanctions with respect to Iran, such as the
Iran Sanctions Act and the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act.
The current language is also broad, which could make enforcement
difficult and jeopardize the willingness of other countries to assist
with U.S. sanctions enforcement efforts. These provisions could be
perceived as imposing far-reaching additional ``secondary'' sanctions
across the globe, penalizing a wide range of foreign port owners, which
could cause retaliatory trade sanctions.
Question. The administration decided not to snap back sanctions
upon the Maduro regime after they violated the Barbados agreement by
not allowing opposition candidate Maria Corina Machado to run in free
and fair presidential elections. Does the administration intend to
reimpose any or all sanctions on Venezuela this month if there is no
significant change in the conduct by the Maduro regime?
Answer. In response to Maduro and his representatives' decision to
uphold the bar on Maria Corina Machado, we revoked General License 43,
which authorized transactions involving Minerven, Venezuela's state-
owned gold mining company. The State Department press spokesperson has
made clear that unless Maduro and his representatives show progress in
creating conditions for competitive elections, we will not renew
General License 44 (relief to Venezuela's oil and gas sector) when it
expires on April 18, 2024.
Question. Will the Administration take additional measures to make
these sanctions more effective, particularly with respect to
prohibition on the purchase of Venezuelan bonds?
Answer. The Administration makes every effort to ensure that
sanctions are effective across all programs, and our sanctions on
Venezuela remain in effect. U.S. persons remain prohibited from trading
in the primary Venezuelan bond market.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Erik John Woodhouse by Senator Pete Ricketts
Enforcement of Sanctions on Iranian Oil
Question. In response to Senator Menendez, you said, ``The Biden
administration has not lifted any sanctions on Iran, and we have
continued to implement and enforce those sanctions. This includes
actions involving Iranian oil exports, its support for terrorism, and
its proxies in the region.'' How many barrels of oil do you estimate
Iran has exported since the start of the Biden administration?
Answer. A commercial source estimates that between January 20,
2021, and March 8, 2024, Iran exported approximately 1.53 billion
barrels of crude oil, condensate, and refined liquid petroleum
products.
Question. How many dollars-worth of oil do you estimate Iran has
exported since the start of the Biden administration?
Answer. Our sanctions have caused Iran to rely heavily on a ghost
fleet that sells mostly to teapot refineries in the PRC. This
arrangement imposes heavy operational and economic costs on Iran. While
the Iranian regime strives to evade U.S. sanctions, such evasion is
very costly. We assess that the regime receives substantially less
profit than the market price would indicate for the oil that it can
sell. Because Iran is engaged almost exclusively in black market oil
sales the actual profits it receives cannot be estimated with accuracy.
EIA estimates, assuming the exports were sold at prevailing spot
prices, Iranian crude oil, condensate, and refined liquid petroleum
products revenues at approximately $37 billion in 2021, $54 billion in
2022, and $46 billion in 2023. The 2023 estimate was made in June 2023
for the full year. No EIA estimate is available for 2024. EIA's total
estimate for 2021, 2022, and 2023 is $137 billion, but includes early
January 2021 and does not include 2024.
Question. How many barrels of oil do you estimate Iran exported in
2023?
Answer. A commercial source estimates that Iran exported
approximately 475 million barrels of crude oil, condensate, and refined
liquid petroleum products in 2023.
Question. How many dollars-worth of oil do you estimate Iran
exported in 2023?
Answer. The Energy Information Agency's (EIA) June 2023 Short-Term
Energy Outlook estimated Iran's 2023 oil, condensate, and refined
liquid petroleum products revenue would be $46 billion. Our sanctions
have caused Iran to rely heavily on a ghost fleet that sells mostly to
teapot refineries in the PRC. This arrangement imposes heavy
operational and economic costs on Iran. While the Iranian regime
strives to evade U.S. sanctions, such evasion is very costly. We assess
that the regime receives substantially less profit than the market
price would indicate for the oil that it can sell.
Question. How do these figures compare with 2022, 2021, and 2020?
Answer. A commercial source estimates Iran's oil, condensate, and
refined liquid petroleum products exports were approximately 273
million barrels in 2020, 421 million barrels in 2021, and 423 million
barrels in 2022. EIA estimates, assuming the exports were sold at
prevailing spot prices, Iranian oil, condensate, and refined liquid
petroleum products revenues at approximately $15 billion in 2020, $37
billion in 2021, $54 billion in 2022, and $46 billion in 2023. The 2023
estimate was made in June 2023 for the full year.
Question. If Iranian oil revenue increased from 2022 to 2023, how
do you explain this increase given your statement that the Biden
administration has continued to enforce oil sanctions?
Answer. The most recent EIA estimate showed Iranian oil,
condensate, and refined liquid petroleum products revenue decreasing
from 2022 to 2023. Iranian oil revenue is affected by global crude oil
prices that were depressed due to Covid in 2020 into 2021, driven
higher by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and moderated in 2023.
Question. The Sanctioning the Use of Civilians as Defenseless
Shields Act (PL 115-348), which was signed into law on December 21,
2018, requires the President to annually submit to Congress a list of,
and to impose sanctions on, individuals involved with the use of human
shields by Hamas and Hizballah, as well as foreign persons, agencies or
instrumentalities that knowingly and materially support or direct the
use of human shields by these groups. In October 2023, President Biden
said, ``the humanitarian crisis in Gaza--innocent Palestinian
families--and the vast majority have nothing to do with Hamas. They're
being used as human shields.'' The sanctions authority under this act
expired on December 31, 2023. Did Hamas use innocent civilians as human
shields before December 31, 2023?
Answer. Hamas has repeatedly violated its obligations under
international humanitarian law, including through actions such as using
civilians as human shields and taking hostages.
Question. If so, did the Administration sanction anyone from Hamas
for its use of human shields as was required under the Sanctioning the
Use of Civilians as Defenseless Shields Act?
Answer. Hamas has been a designated terrorist group for more than
20 years and was heavily sanctioned long before October 7. Using its
counterterrorism sanctions authorities, the U.S. Government has
sanctioned Hamas for its terrorist activity, as well as its leaders and
the supporters who enable that terrorist activity. We remain
steadfastly committed to countering Hamas and the financial network
underpinning it, as demonstrated by the five tranches we rolled out
sanctioning 35 Hamas-related targets since October.
Question. If the Administration had evidence that Hamas was using
innocent civilians as human shields and did not impose sanctions as a
result, what is the explanation for this course of action?
Answer. Hamas has been a designated terrorist group for more than
20 years and was heavily sanctioned long before October 7. Using its
counterterrorism authorities, the U.S. Government has sanctioned Hamas
for its terrorist activity, as well as its leaders and the supporters
who enable that terrorist activity. We remain steadfastly committed to
countering Hamas and the financial network underpinning it, as
demonstrated by the five tranches we rolled out sanctioning 35 Hamas-
related targets since October.
Question. Do you support legislation, such as the Strengthening
Tools to Counter the Use of Human Shields Act, which would renew this
sanctioning authority through 2030?
Answer. The Administration whole-heartedly believes that civilians
should not suffer the consequences of the inhumanity and brutality of
Hamas or any other terror group. The Executive Branch has sanctions
authority enabling it to respond to the activity of terrorist groups
and their supporters. And, if confirmed, I would continue to support
the use of the most appropriate tools at our disposal to target Hamas,
its financiers, and its financial transfer mechanisms that funnel funds
in support of Hamas's terrorist activities.
Question. So far, the Biden administration has used the EO to only
target four Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Does the Biden
administration plan to use the EO to target the Palestinian Authority,
given that its pay-for-slay program incentivizes terrorism, and,
therefore, threatens the peace, security, andstability of the West
Bank?
Answer. Sanctions under Executive Order 14115 target those
responsible or complicit in or who have directly or indirectly engaged
or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten peace,
security, or stability of the West Bank, regardless of religion,
ethnicity, or location. We have a long track record of targeting
Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. We have imposed five rounds of sanctions against Hamas since
October 7.
Question. What is the exact amount that has been transferred from
Iraq to Oman under the waiver?
Answer. Since August 2023, 505 million euros have been transferred
from Iraq to Oman. The Iranian regime does not have direct access to
the transferred funds. These funds are contained in restricted accounts
and can only be used for humanitarian and other non-sanctionable
purposes.
Question. In what currencies have the funds been transferred?
Answer. The funds were transferred in euros.
Question. Can you confirm the number of transactions and the nature
of the transactions that have taken place?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade--food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural
items from third-party vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable
purposes with authorization by the U.S. Government. Two transactions
have occurred, both for approved humanitarian goods.
Question. Can you describe which entities were involved and what
the funds were used to purchase?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade--food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural
items from third-party vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable
purposes with authorization by the U.S. Government. Further detail can
be provided by the Departments of State and the Treasury in a different
setting.
Question. What specific oversight mechanisms are in place to
prevent diversion or abuse?
Answer. The Administration has established rigorous oversight
mechanisms to ensure these restricted funds can only be used for
humanitarian trade--food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural
items from third-party vendors--as well as for other non-sanctionable
purposes with authorization by the U.S. Government. Treasury maintains
robust scrutiny over funds linked to Iran, including those overseas.
Further detail can be provided by the Departments of State and the
Treasury in a different setting.
Question. Do you believe that the Administration should renew the
waiver as is or limit its authority to restrict the transfer of funds
to third countries?
Answer. The Administration fully supports this waiver, which was
designed to incentivize change in Iraq's energy sector while reducing
Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy. This waiver has been renewed 21
times since 2018, and our strategy is working. Over the past year, the
Iraqi Government made progress to increase electricity imports from its
Arab neighbors and signed a landmark $27 billion deal with
TotalEnergies that will help Iraq significantly reduce its dependency
on Iranian energy imports. Iraq is also investing in gas capture,
developing natural gas fields, and upgrading its power grid.
Question. Do you believe that renewal poses risks given the
fungibility of money?
Answer. The Iranian Government, at the expense of its own people's
needs, has consistently prioritized supporting destabilizing activities
in the region. Across administrations, including this and the prior
one, it has remained a longstanding U.S. policy to ensure our sanctions
do not prevent food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and
services from flowing to ordinary people, no matter how objectionable
their governments. The availability of these funds in Iraq and Oman is
consistent with that policy.
Question. Nearly two years after Russia's illegal invasion of
Ukraine, Rosatom raked in $14 billion dollars in annual revenue in
2023. U.S. and European purchases of Russian nuclear commodities likely
amounted to over $2 billion of this total. Last year, finally, the
Administration began to target the company by sanctioning Russian
nuclear and Rosatom-linked individuals and entities. However, the
Administration can and should go further. Do you believe the
Administration should sanction Rosatom's senior leadership, including
its supervisory and management boards, under Executive Order 14024
while also applying OFAC sanctions?
Answer. Since 2022, the Departments of State and the Treasury have
imposed sanctions on over 30 Rosatom-related entities and individuals
pursuant to E.O. 14024--including Rosatom subsidiaries involved in
nuclear weapons development, nuclear-applicable component manufacturing
and quantum computing, and overseas corporate development. We do not
preview sanctions designations. If confirmed, I will continue to use
all available tools to continue to constrain Rosatom's harmful
activities, as appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Robert William Forden by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and designated
staff when invited?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to appearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee when requested and responding to
Congressional inquiries in a timely manner.
Question. Do you commit to keep this committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to keeping the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee fully and currently informed about the activities
under my purview.
Question. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation
while policies are being developed, not just providing notification
after the fact?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee while policies
are being developed.
Question. Do you commit to promptly responding to requests for
briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated
staff?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to promptly responding to
requests for briefings and information requested by the committee and
its designated staff.
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage with the Cambodian
Government and civil society to address the long-standing backsliding
in Cambodia's democratic institutions, encourage greater pluralism in
its political system, and advocate for human rights defenders and
others that have been wrongfully imprisoned?
Answer. If confirmed, I will underscore that Cambodia's new
Government has an opportunity to improve the country's international
standing and relationship with the United States, including by
restoring genuine multi-party democracy, ending politically motivated
trials, and allowing independent media outlets to reopen and function
without interference. I will continue to urge the Cambodian Government
for the release of all individuals who have been unjustly detained. I
also commit to maintaining the U.S. policy of meeting and partnering
with civil society organizations to address democracy and human rights
issues in Cambodia.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies will you employ to counter
PRC encroachment in Cambodia, particularly with regards to its
seemingly growing influence over Cambodia's civilian and military
infrastructure?
Answer. I have serious concerns over Cambodia's growing dependency
on the PRC and the expanding PLA military presence in the country,
including at Ream Naval Base. If confirmed, I will urge the Cambodian
Government to closely examine the agreements its defense officials have
made with the PRC to ensure the PRC will not be allowed a military
presence at Ream or to install sensitive technology at the base that
undermines Cambodia's sovereignty, contravenes its constitution, or
threatens regional stability. If confirmed, I will engage with the
Cambodian Government as well as with our likeminded and regional
partners to increase understanding that Cambodia's autonomy and
regional security are at stake.
Question. What messages do you think will resonate with the
Cambodian Government regarding the value of engaging with the U.S. and
our allies on economic development and other goals, compared to other
actors in the region?
Answer. Cambodia's new Government has expressed its desire to
improve bilateral ties, prioritizing the economic and investment
aspects of the bilateral relationship with the United States. As the
United States and Cambodia explore areas for potential expanded
economic cooperation, involvement by U.S. public and private sector
actors that are highly regarded in Cambodia for high standards,
transparency, and respect for rule of law present a viable alternative
to engagement with other countries in the region, including the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
Question. If confirmed, how would you revitalize engagement with
Cambodian authorities and anti-trafficking civil society organizations
to make tangible and sustained progress on this challenge?
Answer. The Cambodian Government's insufficient efforts to address
human trafficking, including forced criminality in online scam
operations, led to its downgrade to Tier 3 in the 2022 TIP Report. If
confirmed, I will work in collaboration with civil society
organizations to encourage Cambodian authorities to identify and
prosecute traffickers and enablers at all levels and identify and refer
trafficking victims to appropriate services.
Embassy Beijing
Question. Mr. Forden, did you develop any policy to send U.S.
personnel to Chinese hospitals while at Embassy Beijing?
Answer. No. However, we were aware that there was a possibility
that a U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) staff member or Eligible Family Member
(EFM) may need to enter a Chinese hospital during the COVID pandemic
were they to fall ill, and we discussed contingency plans in such an
event. The plan was that should a USDH member of our staff or EFM fall
seriously ill with COVID and in the opinion of Mission China medical
staff, require immediate and life-saving medical treatment, we might
have needed to allow admission to a Chinese hospital, including
possibly a ``fever hospital'' for isolating and treating COVID
patients. We were also aware of the possibility that a USDH staff
member or EFM could arrive at a Chinese port of entry on a commercial
flight and be confirmed positive for COVID. In this case, we were
prepared to medically evacuate anyone (within 48 hours) who tested
positive and faced forced admission to a Chinese ``fever hospital'' for
isolating and treating COVID patients. Fortunately, we never had to
activate the contingency plan as no USDH staff member or EFM was forced
into a Chinese ``fever hospital'' during my tenure at post.
Question. Were you present at Embassy Beijing in early 2020? What
dates were you at Embassy Beijing?
Answer. I was away from post and was not involved in Mission China
policy or management affairs from January 1, 2020, through July 3,
2020, during which time I was in the United States for medical
treatment (non-COVID related) and from mid-June through July 3
traveling back to Beijing and completing quarantine. During that time,
other senior officers at Embassy Beijing were selected by Ambassador
Branstad to serve as Acting DCM. I reassumed my duties as DCM on July
4, 2020, and remained at post through the remainder of 2020 and first
half of 2021.
Question. Were any U.S. personnel (direct hires or family members)
sent to Chinese fever hospital due to COVID during your tenure?
Answer. No. None of the widely publicized cases of our diplomats
being subjected to confinement to PRC ``fever hospitals'' and being
exposed to unsafe and unacceptable conditions happened during my time
in China. I cannot speak to events or decisions made after I completed
my assignment and left China on July 15, 2021. After that date and to
the present, I have had no involvement in China policy or management
issues related to Mission China. Throughout Ambassador Branstad's and
my tenure, we maintained a strict policy of removing any staff or
family member back to the United States--by medical evacuation if
necessary--in the event they faced forced confinement to a ``fever
hospital'' or exposure to unsafe conditions as a result of testing
positive for COVID. During my tenure, every member of our staff or
family member who requested medevac because of a positive COVID test
was medically evacuated back to the United States. Neither Ambassador
Branstad nor I allowed USDH staff or family members to be involuntarily
confined to a Chinese ``fever hospital.''
There was a case during my tenure that may have caused some
confusion. While completing her quarantine period in a hotel in
Shanghai in April 2021, the spouse of a Foreign Service Officer tested
``weakly positive'' for COVID. PRC health officials requested that she
go to an ``interim testing clinic'' for additional tests to determine
whether she was truly positive for COVID or not. The Embassy and
Consulate Shanghai offered to request a medevac for her with or without
her husband and children back to the United States immediately, but she
declined and volunteered to take the tests. She requested and, after
Mission China staff intervened forcefully, was allowed to bring her
nursing infant with her to the ``interim testing clinic.''
Because her tests provided mixed results over several days, she and
her infant ended up spending six nights in the clinic before she was
permitted by PRC health authorities to return to the hotel to complete
her quarantine period. During her time in the clinic, in response to
her repeated inconclusive tests, including one after she had already
been returned to the quarantine hotel, PRC health authorities requested
that she be transferred to the COVID isolation ward of a PRC ``fever
hospital'' but she refused, and Mission China staff intervened with PRC
officials to ensure she was not forced to do so.
Throughout her time in the ``interim testing clinic,'' we
repeatedly offered, and she declined to be medevac'd to the United
States. During the six nights she spent in the clinic, in phone calls
with Mission China staff and in a later extended conversation she had
with me personally, she described the conditions in the ``interim
testing clinic'' as ``spartan, but clean and acceptable, and that the
bed and food were fine.'' She and her infant had a private room and
bathroom, could access wi-fi at any time, had constant communication
with her spouse and family as well as Mission China management and
medical staff, and could order food and supplies, such as diapers,
delivered to her room. She confirmed that she was able to accept or
decline any tests but voluntarily underwent multiple tests to confirm
her negative status for COVID. She also voluntarily allowed her infant
to undergo tests.
After returning to the hotel, she and her infant completed the
quarantine requirement, and she went on to join her husband and other
child at their post of assignment. They completed one full assignment,
successfully traveling in and out of China several times since then and
accepted a second consecutive assignment in Mission China where the
family continues to serve today.
Question. Given the concerns raised about your time at Embassy
Beijing and the documents cited by the minority at your hearing (which
had not been previously provided to you or the majority), is there
anything else you would like to provide for the record?
Answer. Nothing was a higher priority for Ambassador Branstad and
me than the health, safety, and security of the almost 2,700 employees
of Mission China, including nearly 2000 U.S. Direct Hire staff and
family members. Many of them were my lifelong colleagues and friends
with whom I have served in China multiple times. Ambassador Branstad,
myself, and many members of my team in Beijing and at the Consulates
worked tirelessly to push back on the PRC's unscientific and
unacceptable COVID control protocols throughout my time in China.
Ambassador Branstad, I, and my political, medical, and management
staff, engaged senior PRC officials often and forcefully to urge China
to back off unacceptable requirements for diplomats, noting in
virtually every diplomatic note that these were unnecessary,
unscientific, and contrary to China's obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other applicable bilateral
agreements on immunities between China and the United States.
Ambassador Branstad, I, and our staff also regularly engaged like-
minded foreign mission counterparts in efforts to build consensus to
confront the PRC on these measures and we succeeded in coordinating
joint protests to the PRC Foreign Ministry on many issues, including on
getting PRC officials to concede that they would not separate a
positive child from his or her parents and vice versa.
I was not the architect of the policy of waiving diplomatic
privileges and immunities. I was not at post when the policy decision
was made in Washington in May 2020. On June 1, 2020, Mission China
brought back the first 100 staff on a charter flight to Tianjin, China,
providing limited waivers of personal inviolability for one or more
nasal/throat COVID swab tests. My understanding (though again I was
away from post for medical treatment) was that the only way the PRC was
willing to allow our diplomats to enter the PRC, was if the United
States allowed testing on arrival. Hence, the United States could
choose to keep our personnel away from post or bring them back, which
required a limited waiver of their personal inviolability for the
purpose of one or more nasal/throat COVID swab tests. I understand that
the Department chose the latter given the importance of having U.S.
diplomats on the ground in China. When I returned to my duties more
than a month after the arrival of the first charters, I followed
Ambassador Branstad's orders to lead efforts to bring back the rest of
our staff following the same protocol dictated to us by Secretary
Pompeo. I followed that protocol strictly the rest of my tenure as DCM
and Charge d'Affaires, successfully returning more than 1,400 staff and
family members to restaff mission China.
Ambassador Branstad and I did support Secretary Pompeo's policy of
waiving privileges and immunities for COVID tests to allow our staff to
return to China as it allowed us to safely bring back staff and family
members to restaff Mission China at a time when our staffing was so
depleted, and staff beleaguered that we could not safely fulfill our
mission. Ambassador Branstad felt strongly that we needed to be able
to: provide services to the many tens of thousands of American citizens
trapped in China during a dangerous epidemic; ensure that the PRC did
not cut off the supply of PPE, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals
to the United States at a time we were struggling to address the
rapidly rising death toll from COVID in the United States; ensure
monitoring and enforcement of President Trump's phase one trade
agreement and efforts to stem the flow of fentanyl to the U.S. from
China; and monitor the spread of COVID in China as the PRC sought to
hide its complicity in the origins of the pandemic and the realities of
COVID spread in its own cities.
I am proud of the work our Mission-wide ``Homecoming Task Force''
and our management team did to respond 24/7 to each and every complaint
about dirty hotel rooms, poor food, and poorly trained PRC medical
personnel whose COVID swab tests were sometimes clumsily administered.
For the small number of the 1,400 staff and family members who traveled
to China during my tenure and faced sometimes difficult and trying
conditions with Chinese swab tests and hotels, we did everything in our
power to protest, push back against unacceptable conditions, and
address complaints such as by successfully moving some families to
Mission residences for quarantine and for those in hotels, for example
by providing vacuum cleaners and clean linens/towels, addressing wi-fi
issues, and helping to arrange food deliveries from outside vendors for
families in quarantine.
In addition, our Mission management staff and Homecoming Task Force
worked tirelessly to create and rapidly update briefings and materials
for all staff and family members who were considering and preparing to
travel to China. These materials were briefed in multiple conference
calls, townhalls, and phone calls to all travelers and/or their agency
representatives before they traveled to China. I myself participated in
numerous conference calls with those planning/preparing to travel to
China, those already in quarantine, and to the Mission community at
large to try to address concerns and provide our personal commitment to
not allow, for example, the separation of children from parents in the
event of a positive COVID test.
Serving as a diplomat in the PRC has never been an easy assignment
(I know as well as anyone, given my ten years myself in three separate
assignments to China) but adding an extraordinary pandemic, rapidly
changing PRC COVID control regulations, staffing shortages, and long
separations from family in the U.S., made these assignments even more
stressful. Ambassador Branstad and I lobbied and succeeded in getting
the State Department to extend financial support for families while
they remained in the U.S. and raising the hardship differential to 25
percent of staff salaries for serving in China. For those who decided
to curtail because they did not feel comfortable having their families
return to China in the midst of the pandemic and with the testing and
quarantine protocols in place, Ambassador Branstad and I were very
supportive and the Department of State readily approved ``no-fault''
curtailments and cancellations of assignments, and as far as I am
aware, officers who did curtail or cancel their assignments were able
to be reassigned without prejudice to positions of equal or greater
responsibilities.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Robert William Forden by Senator James E. Risch
Chief of Mission Responsibilities
Question. What responsibilities do Chiefs of Mission have to
safeguard the privileges and immunities of their diplomats and other
personnel?
Answer. There is no higher priority than the health, safety, and
security of the members of the Mission, especially U.S. Direct Hire
(USDH) staff and family members. It is the responsibility of the Chiefs
of Mission to ensure that the personnel under their authority act in
accordance with Department policies. Per Department policy, as
reflected in the Foreign Affairs Manual (2 FAM 220), any waiver of
privileges and immunities of mission personnel must be authorized by
the Department in Washington. If confirmed, protecting employees and
their families would remain my highest priority.
follow-up question
Question. Please specifically answer the question as to
whether you believe that the Chief of Mission is responsible
for safeguarding the privileges and immunities of personnel at
post, and how specifically Chiefs of Mission should carry out
those responsibilities.
Answer. I believe it is the responsibility of all Chiefs of
Mission to ensure that personnel under their authority act in
accordance with Department policies. The Department has a FAM
section on diplomatic immunity. See 2 FAM 220. Per Department
policy, any waiver of privileges and immunities of mission
personnel must be authorized by the Department from Washington.
Likewise, any demarches and protests invoking the Vienna
Conventions or diplomatic law must go through Washington. As
such, Chiefs of Mission rely heavily on the Department's
policymakers and legal experts in Washington when it comes to
matters of privileges and immunities. Having said this, I
believe all Chiefs of Mission are responsible to ensure that
the policymakers and legal experts in Washington learn of any
incidents (e.g., an unlawful search of a diplomat's residence)
or policies adopted by the receiving state that violate or
implicate privileges and immunities of mission personnel so
that guidance can be formulated regarding any appropriate
protests notes or other reciprocal measures that may be
necessary. I believe Chiefs of Mission must also ensure that
any requests for waiver of immunity are communicated to
Washington for guidance in a prompt manner.
Question. What are the key management lessons you have learned from
your stewardship over Embassy Beijing during your tenure?
Answer. The early days of the COVID virus were uncharted territory
for all of us. Ambassador Branstad and I, along with all Mission China
leadership, did our best to ensure that all members of Mission China--
USDHs, Eligible Family Members (EFMs), and Locally Employed Staff
(LES)--remained healthy, safe, and secure. If confirmed, I will also
work closely with staff and Washington to ensure the same in Mission
Cambodia.
follow-up question
Question. Please answer the question as to whether you
learned anything from your time leading Embassy Beijing.
Answer. I have learned many lessons from each position in
which I have served in my years as a Foreign Service Officer.
Some management lessons from my time in China include the
importance of close and frequent communication with the
Department, other agencies at post, and all posts within the
Mission. Leading a mission as large with so many different
agencies in China, spread across six cities, has also taught me
much about the importance of ensuring that messaging on policy
and procedures is effectively communicated throughout the
organization.
Question. Do you take any personal responsibility for the members
of the Mission China community who suffered greatly during your tenure
due to policies that you championed and/or implemented?
Answer. In my capacities as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge
d'Affaires, I do take responsibility for members of the Mission.
Nothing was a higher priority for Ambassador Branstad and me than the
health, safety, and security of the almost 2,700 employees of Mission
China, including nearly 2,000 USDH staff and family members. Many of
them were my lifelong colleagues and friends with whom I have served in
China multiple times. Ambassador Branstad, myself, and many members of
my team in Beijing and at the Consulates worked tirelessly to push back
on the PRC's unscientific and unacceptable COVID control protocols
throughout my time in China. If confirmed, protecting employees and
their families would remain my highest priority.
follow-up question
Question. Please answer the questions as to whether you
specifically take responsibility for the suffering that was
caused by decisions you made or implemented as DCM and CdA of
Embassy Beijing.
Answer. I do take responsibility for the range of
experiences, good and bad, that Mission China personnel may
have had during my time in Beijing. It was an extraordinary
time and I and my team faced unprecedented challenges.
Ambassador Branstad, myself, and our team in Beijing and at the
Consulates worked tirelessly to push back on the PRC's
unscientific and unacceptable COVID control protocols, while
also working hard to advance U.S. foreign policy priorities. If
confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure that our
employees and their families will be safe and secure.
Question. Is Mission China now a less desirable post for Foreign
Service personnel?
Answer. As with serving at any of our many diplomatic posts abroad,
there are a variety of benefits and challenges to serving in Mission
China and those vary for each individual based on their background,
academic and professional interests, family situation and other
factors. Given our relationship with the PRC, we face many unique
challenges in Mission China. It is not possible to attribute changes in
number of bidders to any single factor.
follow-up question
Question. Please answer the question, citing supporting
evidence for your position.
Answer. I do not believe Mission China is now a less
desirable post. During the last bidding cycle, all posts in
Mission China were over 90 percent filled, and currently the
Mission has less than five positions remaining open. During the
pandemic, the Department went to great lengths to provide
incentives to counter the PRC's COVID response. These
incentives worked, as the statistics this cycle show.
Regardless of the incentives, China has many other aspects that
Foreign Service Officers and Specialists appreciate. The
international schools in China remain highly attractive to
bidders, who also often appreciate the extremely tight-knit
Foreign Service community in China.
Question. Do you feel in any way responsible for Mission China now
being a less desirable post (fewer bidders, now a 2-year tour)?
Answer. The PRC and zero-COVID policies impacted the morale of
Mission China employees and families and made living in China
difficult. However, Mission China and the Department used recruiting
and retention tools such as Service Needs Differential to retain and
recruit talent to Mission China.
follow-up question
Question. Do you feel in any way responsible for Mission
China now being a less desirable post (fewer bidders, now a 2-
year tour)?
Answer. I do not believe that Mission China is now a less
desirable post. See above.
Question. Please answer the question, using the current
situation (zero COVID is over).
Answer. I do not believe that Mission China is now a less
desirable post. During the last bidding cycle, all posts in
Mission China were over 90 percent filled, and currently the
Mission has less than five positions remaining open. During the
pandemic, the Department went to great lengths to provide
incentives to counter the PRC's COVID response. These
incentives worked, as the statistics this cycle show.
Regardless of the incentives, China has many other aspects
which Foreign Service Officers and Specialists appreciate. The
international schools in China remain highly attractive to
bidders, who also often appreciate the extremely tight-knit
Foreign Service community.
Question. Do you think Mission China being a less desirable post
hurts U.S. national security?
Answer. Annually, in the Foreign Service bid cycle we face
different challenges in filling all open positions with the right
people. We have several tools that can be used to entice bidders to
take assignments in challenging environments, and the Department has
used those tools extensively to ensure Mission China is attractive to
our diplomats. Although the Department faced certain challenges in
previous years in recruiting talent to Mission China, there was a
significant increase in bidders the last bidding year, and nearly all
positions were filled.
follow-up question
Question. Please answer the question as to whether Embassy
Beijing being a more difficult post to staff (as evidenced in
your response) hurts U.S. national security.
Answer. I do not believe that Mission China is now a less
desirable post. China remains an exciting assignment that
provides employees the opportunity to make a significant
contribution to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Our Mission
Team is strong, and their efforts make a real difference in the
bilateral relationship and in strengthening our national
security. I will continue to advocate, as I have throughout my
career, for Foreign Service Officers to bid on jobs in Mission
China. I consider service there to be critically important to
U.S. national security.
Blood Tests on U.S. Soil
Question. Does this mean that after you became aware that China
would require blood tests, you continued to recommend that Post bring
people in on commercial flights?
Answer. In late Fall 2020, the PRC initiated a requirement for all
travelers to China to obtain a COVID antigen test and submit the test
result to the PRC Embassy or Consulate before they would be allowed to
board a flight to China. This additional antigen test required by China
for travelers was notified to the Department of State in Washington by
the PRC Embassy (I was in Beijing at the time, not in Washington). The
Department of State reviews and facilities the application for visas
and other travel requirements for U.S. diplomats out of Washington. The
PRC Embassy provided a list of U.S. testing facilities from which they
would accept these test results. These were testing facilities located
in U.S. cities and subject to U.S. health privacy laws. They took blood
samples and provided the traveler with a test result document that the
traveler could upload and email to the PRC Embassy or nearest consulate
to obtain a permit to travel to China that could be provided to the
airline at the time of checking in for the flight. All that was shared
with the PRC Embassy or consulate was the document with the outcome of
the test. It would have been a violation of U.S. law if these testing
facilities transferred blood samples or DNA of travelers to PRC
authorities. I am not aware of any information that this ever took
place.
I don't recall if I conveyed a recommendation specifically to the
Department about COVID antigen tests in the United States, which was
something required by China as a condition for all travelers worldwide
before they would be allowed to board a flight to China. However, I did
continue to believe that it was safe for staff and family members to
return to China or arrive in China to begin a new assignment either via
charter flights which we continued throughout my tenure, as well as
commercial flights when those were more convenient and more cost-
efficient for the traveler. I myself returned to China during this
period via a commercial flight, following all of the protocols the PRC
had in effect at that time that applied to all travelers.
follow-up questions
In your answers to previous questions, you wrote that: ``This
additional antigen test required by China for travelers was
notified to the Department of State in Washington by the PRC
Embassy;'' and that: ``I don't recall if I conveyed a
recommendation specifically to the Department about COVID
antigen tests in the United States.'' Whistleblowers attest to
SFRC that all decisions made by the Department in Washington
with respect to Mission China were done so in conjunction with
Mission China and its leadership.
Question. Did the Department of State in Washington never
consult with Mission China about this new requirement and ask
for your opinion or that of anyone on your senior leadership
team?
Answer. They may have asked for input from our management
team, but I do not recall ever being asked specifically about
the new requirement. In any event, it was a Washington decision
whether to allow our diplomatic staff and family members to
comply with the PRC's request that all travelers provide
results of an antigen test to board a flight to China. I do not
recall ever having a specific discussion in our EAC or Country
Team about these tests, I believe because Washington had
already approved to have our staff travel to China and fulfill
the Chinese Embassy's requirements for antigen test results,
like all travelers of all nationalities traveling to China at
that time.
Question. Do you recall the EAC meeting where the Mission's
CDC representative told you about the new blood testing
requirements? Did you express any concerns about the
requirements at that time, either within the Mission or to
Washington?
Answer. Not specifically, but I do recall talking to our CDC
and MED officials about how useful antigen tests were and
having the impression that they, like many medical
professionals at that time, were not sure how reliable they
were for determining active COVID infection.
Question. My understanding is that the Embassy did submit a
Diplomatic Note protesting the blood testing requirement. However,
guidance documents obtained by the committee from your tenure instructs
employees to comply with the blood tests. Other than sending a
Diplomatic Note and raising the issue with your Chinese counterparts,
did you do anything to prevent U.S. Government employees from having to
submit to blood tests at labs in the U.S. chosen by the Chinese
Embassy?
Answer. These were tests conducted in the United States by U.S.-
based labs, subject to U.S. laws. All that was communicated to the PRC
Embassy or consulate was the outcome of the test. This additional
antigen test required by China for travelers was notified to the
Department of State in Washington by the PRC Embassy (I was in Beijing
at the time, not in Washington). The Department of State reviews and
facilities the application for visas and other travel requirements for
U.S. diplomats out of Washington. Since compliance by U.S. Government
employees to the requirement to submit to a COVID antigen test in the
United States in order to board a flight to China was approved in
Washington, I did not try to prevent our staff from complying with this
requirement. In fact, I submitted to an antigen test when I returned
from a business trip in the United States in April 2021. We did,
however, protest repeatedly and vigorously to PRC authorities all of
the PRC's testing and quarantine regulations which were unscientific
and unnecessary for the purposes of controlling the outbreak of COVID.
We restated this in almost every diplomatic note we sent to the PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during my tenure, but it is also something
we reiterated in most of our engagements with PRC officials by
Ambassador Branstad, myself, and my senior staff.
follow-up questions
A previous question I asked whether you did anything to push
back on the blood tests other than sending a Diplomatic Note
and raising the issue with your Chinese counterparts. Your
response only mentions diplomatic notes and raising concerns in
meetings.
Question. Did you do anything beyond that, or even consider
other policy options? Repeating that you ``repeatedly and
vigorously protested'' the Chinese Government's COVID does not
provide us with a sense of what you actually did.
Answer. We raised every new PRC COVID quarantine and testing
requirement, as well as some rumored to be coming, with our
counterparts at the PRC Foreign Ministry and in some cases by
our CDC and MED staff with their counterparts. These
discussions came in most of our engagements, whether over the
phone during calls to deliver demarches on other subjects, in
person meetings or, for example, when I hosted PRC Foreign
Ministry officials, or they hosted me to working meals. We also
protested in many written communications, including most of our
diplomatic notes regarding COVID or return of our staff to
China, as well as emails sent by various sections of the
Embassy. Our five consulates likewise raised these issues with
their local counterparts regularly, especially in meetings to
discuss protocols for incoming flights with our staff.
Question. Is it correct to assume that the Chinese Government
declined to change its policy in response to diplomatic notes?
Answer. For the most part, yes, though with the Department's
support we pushed back on a number of the most unreasonable of
the Covid-zero policies. And we reported back regularly this
situation to Washington via email, phone calls, conference
calls, and cables.
We did have some success in protesting some discrete issues
that were rumored or announced for all travelers without
exception for diplomats, including: the separation of children
who test positive from their parents--China backed down and
exempted diplomats after our protest; the use of anal swab
testing--after our protest China publicly confirmed that
diplomats were exempt; and, requirement for full quarantine in
a hotel--early on, under pressure from us, China backed down
and allowed diplomats to quarantine in residences in many
cases, though revoked this later when they reportedly decided
that some third-country diplomats were not following the
quarantine rules appropriately.
We also had success in pushing back on the Foreign Ministry
when we had specific cases in which families experienced
extreme difficulties in quarantine hotels, for example, a case
in which a child had severe allergies in a hotel--China allowed
us to move the family to their residence for quarantine.
Question. Did you protest diplomats being subjected to blood
tests, and what was China's response? The Diplomatic Note we
have on blood tests dates from November 2020.
Answer. I do not recall specifically protesting to PRC
officials the requirement for antigen tests for travelers to
board flights to China from the United States. As this would
have been an issue for travelers departing the United States
coming to China, concerns would have been raised in, or
protested from, Washington rather than Beijing. I and key
members of my senior staff, however, did regularly protest all
of China's COVID control measures in our engagements with our
PRC counterparts.
Question. Did you and the Mission consider blood tests to be
scientifically unnecessary? Or did you agree that they were
necessary for public health reasons?
Answer. I never had an opinion on the issue as I am not a
medical expert, and the question was not posed to me, but to
our medical experts in Washington.
The Diplomatic Note we have on blood tests dates from
November 2020, before the PRC designated individual labs in the
United States where diplomats had to go for COVID testing.
Question. Did you ever protest against the Chinese Government
requiring U.S. Government personnel to go to certain labs?
Answer. I do not recall doing so. In general, protesting such
a requirement would not be something Mission China would
initiate. Rather, we would ordinarily protest at Washington's
instruction following a cable or other official message
instructing and providing language for us to do so. I do not
recall the diplomatic note you reference.
Question. Did you ever question why the Chinese Government
would require testing at such a small number of labs?
Answer. No, I was not generally aware of the details
regarding antigen testing in the United States as this was an
issue that was handled in Washington. I do recall that when I
had to locate a lab in the United States to get an antigen test
before returning to China, there were at least 3-4 labs in the
Los Angeles area listed from which I could choose. Also, it is
fairly routine for countries to require lab tests for
immigration purposes be conducted from certain labs that they
have certified will provide the right format test results. The
United States does this, for example, for immigrant visas
overseas, identifying only a few local labs--called panel
physicians--from which applicants must pass medical examination
required by CDC regulations for entry into the United States on
an immigrant visa.
Question. Did you ever raise any concerns about blood testing
with Department leadership back in Washington?
Answer. I do not recall specifically doing so.
Question. Our understanding is that the Chinese Government
originally allowed blood tests to be done either by finger
prick or venous blood draw. However, in December 2020, that
changed, and finger prick tests were no longer allowed. Did you
ever raise concerns with the Department in Washington about
this change?
Answer. I do not recall them allowing a finger prick, but
since this was part of the process in the United States for
travelers to obtain travel documents to board flights to China,
it was Washington offices that were focused on what was
required to obtain antigen tests.
Question. Did you ever question why the Chinese Government
would make this change?
Answer. I was not aware of the change.
Question. Why would the U.S. Government allow a foreign adversary
that is a counterintelligence threat to collect U.S. Government
employee DNA on our own soil?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge behind the U.S. Government's
decision to allow U.S. Government employees to comply with China's
requirement for a COVID antigen test to board flights to China.
Question. Why did the Embassy tell employees to submit to these
blood tests? Were national security concerns about biometric data
collection on U.S. Government employees a factor in that decision?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge behind the U.S. Government's
decision to allow U.S. Government employees to comply with China's
requirement for a COVID antigen test to board flights to China. I do
not recall any Mission China instruction to employees to submit to
COVID antigen tests in the United States, but the requirement was
included in the Department's guidance to staff who were planning to
travel to China along with information about obtaining visas, nasal/
throat swab COVID tests, self-isolating in advance of flights, and
other requirements necessary prior to boarding either charter or
commercial flights to China. These were tests conducted in the United
States by U.S.-based labs, subject to U.S. laws. All that was
communicated to the PRC Embassy or consulates to allow airlines to
allow a passenger to board was a document certifying a negative COVID
antigen test. I am unaware of any report that biological material or
other private information was shared with PRC authorities by these
U.S.-based labs and, my understanding is that if a U.S.-based lab had
done so, it would have violated U.S. laws and subjected the lab to
prosecution.
follow-up questions
Question. In the earlier batch of questions, you discussed
your engagement on throat/nasal swabs, and that you consulted
only informally with several relevant agency representatives.
However, you do not mention at any time consulting with the
intelligence community and agencies represented at Post
responsible for security on the blood tests.
Answer. I recall having conversations with some relevant
agency section chiefs regarding the throat/nasal swabs but do
not recall specifically discussing the blood tests, nor do I
recall any of these agency section chiefs raising the blood
tests with me.
Question. At the time, was it Mission China's view that if a
private business is requiring testing to comply with national
and local government policy, that our diplomats are not
protected under VCDR?
Answer. See my answer above. Mission China did not take an
independent view. We relied on the Department's guidance for
such determinations. I assume that policymakers at the
Department in turn consulted with the Office of the Legal
Advisor on issues raising legal questions.
Question. Was that view based on the view of the Department
of State in Washington?
Answer. See my answer above.
Question. According to whistleblower testimony and Department
of State documents, during your tenure, all U.S. personnel
(including children) had a downloaded ``Health Kit'' with a
strict green pass/red pass system that determine movement. It
was a centralized system, rather than being determined by
individual restaurants, grocery stores, barber shops, or other
private entities. Can you confirm that this Health Kit was a
requirement of the Chinese Government, not private entities?
Answer. I do recall the ``Health Kit'' that individuals who
entered China needed to download to their phones to record
negative COVID tests. It was not a centralized system, but one
specific to localities. In fact, different localities often
required different applications to be used. During my tenure,
it was not required to travel within cities but was often
required by restaurants, barber shops, and grocery and
department stores to enter them. I recall the system was very
unevenly used; often no one asked to see your app status.
However, it was strictly enforced at airports and train
stations; you could not travel between cities if your app did
not confirm you were tested and certified free of COVID.
Question. Was it your and Mission China's view that
subjecting U.S. diplomats to this health kit and associated
contract tracing accorded with their diplomatic privileges and
immunities?
Answer. Mission China did not take an independent view. We
relied on the Department's policymakers in DC, who I assume
consulted with the Office of the Legal Advisor when
appropriate.
Question. Were the health kit requirements allowable under
the September 2020 LWOI? Or is it your view that the LWOI did
not apply? If not, why not?
Answer. They were in no way related to the LWOIs that we
submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for each traveler
as they entered China and completed a quarantine period. These
LWOIs were one-time, narrow waivers for the testing upon entry
into the country and testing during quarantine. They did not
apply to anything other than those tests. As for the ``health
kit'' requirements, again, Mission China did not take an
independent view but relied on guidance from the Department.
Question. Were U.S. diplomats free to travel around China or
within the Chinese city they lived in during your tenure?
Please be specific in your response.
Answer. During my tenure, diplomats were free to travel
around China as long as they had a ``health kit'' app on their
phone that showed them to be tested as COVID-free. Many members
of our staff traveled for both business and leisure during this
period, myself included. There may have been temporary travel
restrictions within some cities during periods of local COVID
outbreaks, but I do not recall them happening in any of the
cities in which our staff work. I am not aware of any
restrictions on movement within the cities in which our staff
worked and lived during my time in China. Although there was at
least one time when there were rumors that travel in and out of
two districts in Beijing may be restricted, I do not recall it
ever materializing. There were a few neighborhoods in Beijing
that were locked down for short periods of time because of
minor COVID outbreaks but these were far away from where our
USDH staff lived or worked.
Your responses do not directly mention the testing
requirements in Shunyi District in Beijing during your tenure,
which whistleblowers attest were required by municipal
authorities (a government entity). Embassy guidance obtained by
SFRC notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the
Embassy aware of the testing requirements in Shunyi District.
It further notes the involvement of local authorities in the
testing requirements.
Question. Does your response to question 13 on week- long
movement restrictions refer to this case, or is that another
case? If it is another case, please describe it in greater
detail.
Answer. My response to question 13 was a reference to this
case, but I do not have a detailed recollection of it. I
believe the issue was discussed frequently for about a week
within the EAC and Country Team, that we protested to the PRC
Foreign Ministry about it several times, but then it ceased to
be a major issue as either staff and families complied with the
testing or did not, but that there were no lasting issues for
staff. I do not believe any of our staff or family members
faced limitations on travel but do recall that if you did not
test to keep your ``health kit'' showing that you tested
negative, you could be blocked from entering some restaurants,
schools, and some other public venues.
Question. Was the testing in Shunyi District required by any
organ of the Chinese Government? Please explain in detail.
Answer. I do not recall specifically what entity issued the
announcement. My management team was very active in responding
to the reports and briefed it to the Country Team. My
understanding is that there were some members of the community
who lived in Shunyi that did submit to free testing by the
local health authorities, while others obtained tests at
Beijing United Hospital, the joint-venture hospital vetted by
our Mission Medical Unit staff. I believe our approach was as
reported in a cable we sent to the Department in December 2020
and conveyed to the Mission Community in management notices in
which we detailed what was rumored to be coming and outlined
that we would not require anyone to comply, and it was their
own decision if they wished to do so. At the same time, we made
clear to the PRC Foreign Ministry that we believed diplomats
could not be compelled to comply with a request to test. I do
not recall how many of our USDH staff and family members
complied with the request to test or if any did not. I do not
believe, however, that any of our Mission China staff or family
members were restricted from moving around the city whether
they tested or not.
Question. Did this in-country testing exceed what the
Department authorized in the September 2020 LWOI? If it did
exceed that authorization, please explain why the Embassy
encouraged compliance with the requirements. (We are only aware
that the Department authorized a second LWOI in 2022, over a
year after these in-country testing requirements took place.)
Answer. Again, the LWOIs we issued at the Department's
instructions beginning in June 2020 were solely one-time
waivers for the purposes of testing upon arrival at the airport
and during quarantine and nothing else. The cable sent by the
Department on September 18, 2020, merely restated that we
should continue to send diplomatic notes for USDH staff and
family members traveling to China, like those it instructed us
to send for the more than 900 staff and family members who had
already returned to China on charter flights prior to that.
Question. Once in-country testing began in violation of the
September 2020 LWOI, why did you not request a 2nd waiver to
cover in- country testing as your successor eventually did?
Answer. As I mentioned above, the premise of this question is
incorrect. The Department did not believe that the in-country
testing undertaken voluntarily by our personnel violated
diplomatic law. The Department in Washington was aware of the
practice and was consulting with the Office of the Legal
Advisor where appropriate.
Question. Please answer the question asked, which is about
your consultations with respect to blood tests. Did you consult
with anyone, including any responsibilities related to national
security (RSO, RSO/CI, FBI, the intelligence community, etc.)
on the blood tests?
Answer. I do not recall initiating such a conversation nor
anyone initiating such a conversation with me specifically
about blood tests. Had they done so, I would have recommended
they convey their concerns through their agency headquarters to
the State Department, which is where the decisions were made on
this issue.
Question. On throat/nasal swabs, in saying your consultations
were informal, does that mean that the potential risks of DNA
collection by permitting throat/nasal swab in China were never
discussed in an official EAC or other senior staff setting
wherein a consensus decision was reached?
Answer. I was not in China in spring 2020 when these issues
were presumably initially discussed in the Beijing EAC or
Country Team with Ambassador Branstad. Throughout my time in
China, however, we did regularly discuss at EAC and Country
Team meetings the processes and issues involved in bringing
staff back to China, and it would have been impossible for any
agency to not be aware of the details of testing and
quarantining as they were all represented at Country Team
meetings. As for specific conversations about the risks of DNA
collection, I only recall the several discussions I had one-on-
one with several relevant agency chiefs in which they expressed
doubt that nasal/throat swabs provided China access to DNA
samples from our staff that China could not readily access as
easily through other avenues.
Question. On throat/nasal swabs, with whom did you consult?
Did you consult with the RSO, RSO/CI, the FBI, the intelligence
community, or anyone else with responsibilities related to
national security?
Answer. I consulted with several of those entities.
Question. Did any Embassy employees raise concerns with you
or your senior staff about the blood tests? If yes, what did
you do about those concerns?
Answer. I do not recall any employee raising concerns with me
directly about blood tests. I cannot speak to what my senior
staff's conversations may have been with others, but none of my
senior staff brought any such concern to my attention. In any
event, this would have been an issue for travelers departing
the United States coming to China and, for that reason,
concerns would have been mostly likely to have been raised in
Washington rather than Beijing.
Question. Which U.S. Government agencies at Post did you consult on
this issue? What kind of consultations were done with the intelligence
community and offices at Post responsible for security?
Answer. While I have no personal knowledge behind the U.S.
Government's decision to allow U.S. Government employees to comply with
China's requirement for a COVID antigen test to board flights to China,
I did have concerns about whether COVID throat/nasal swabs at the
Chinese port of entry and in quarantine would provide DNA or other
biometric data to China that it did not already have ready means to
access through other avenues. I discussed this informally with several
relevant agency representatives at post who assured me that this was
not the case. More importantly, I was also aware that in Washington all
of the proposed measures to comply with PRC COVID protocols, including
nasal/throat swabs upon arrival and in quarantine were discussed
interagency, including with relevant agencies, and was told that no
objections were raised. As for blood tests, we did not instruct any
staff or family members to comply with blood tests or any other types
of tests in China beyond the nasal/throat swabs required for entry into
the country and during quarantine.
Question. You said to Senator Hagerty in your hearing that the
``reports of anal swabs of U.S. diplomats are completely false,'' but
then highlighted the example of someone who did ``incorrectly'' and
``voluntarily'' comply. State Department press guidance and other
documents obtained by the committee indicate that ``several'' U.S.
Government employees complied with the test. When you said that
``reports of anal swabs of U.S. diplomats are completely false,'' to
what were you referring? What were the false reports?
Answer. I am aware of only one U.S. diplomat in China during my
tenure who, during his period in home quarantine and despite
instructions to the contrary, complied with a request from a PRC local
health official in February 2021 for a self-administered ``anal swab''
for COVID testing. As soon as it came to our attention, I believe the
same day, we immediately protested to the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which apologized and confirmed that foreign diplomats are not
required to comply with such tests and should not be asked. We
immediately reminded all Mission personnel that they should not comply
with any request in quarantine for any test beyond a throat/nasal swab
COVID test and if they were requested to do anything beyond what the
Department authorized as part of the ``on arrival'' screening and
quarantine, to refuse and contact the Embassy immediately.
Changing Conditions in China
Multiple U.S. Government officials have told SFRC that
everything that Embassy employees submitted to was
``voluntary'' and that submitting to China's testing in-country
was a ``personal decision.'' However, over half a dozen
whistleblowers told the committee that this masks what was
actually occurring:
that the Embassy generally fostered a culture of
compliance with PRC demands;
that non-State officials under COM authority were
never told they did not have to take COVID tests until they
challenged the need to submit to China's COVID testing regime;
that non-State officials were not told about the
2020 LWOI; and
that State in Washington DC was being told everyone
was taking expanded COVID tests voluntarily, but that ``no one
[at Mission China] saw it that way--it was required to get back
into our homes and go to school.''
Question. Is something voluntary if you have to submit to it or not
be able to engage in your daily life?
Answer. As part of China's ``zero covid'' policy, private entities
and businesses, who are not parties to the Vienna Conventions, became
the indirect enforcers of China's strict measures. As an example,
private schools attended by children of our mission required contact
tracing and testing to gain entry. If a USDH staff or family member
declined to comply with school requirements for COVID tests, their
child could have been denied entry into that school, which likely would
have resulted in the child having to home school or the child and/or
entire family having to curtail and return to the United States. Many
families chose to comply with the school's testing requirements in lieu
of curtailment even though post management would have absolutely
supported a family's decision to curtail.
The compliance with China's requirements for entry into the
country, including the COVID antigen test in the United States and the
nasal/throat swab tests at the port of entry and in quarantine were
required if any of our staff or family members wanted to travel to or
return to China. They were fully apprised of the requirements in
advance and could opt out of travel to China by arrangement with their
agency or curtail their assignments. Ambassador Branstad and I always
supported personnel decisions to curtail for these reasons.
As for testing beyond those required to enter China, we made clear
in every communication with staff in management notices, cables,
country team meetings, and town halls, that compliance with other
requirements was a personal decision of the employee or family member.
We explained that failure to comply could result in creating issues for
children's ability to attend school, much like vaccine requirements for
other diseases are a prerequisite for children to attend the
international schools in China, and we always supported any decision to
curtail for those who wished.
We also noted that there were reports that local PRC health
authorities could restrict the ability to enter some public venues,
like restaurants, only to those who could demonstrate a negative test
result from a recent COVID test. We noted that should an employee or
family member choose to comply, PRC local health officials may accept
test results from a clinic of their choosing, including the joint-
venture clinics and hospitals that our community commonly used. There
were many rumors and much speculation regarding possible restrictions
on movements within cities during my tenure, but most of them proved to
be inaccurate and, in the only case I recall it did happen in an area
in which some of our staff lived in Beijing, I believe it lasted only a
week, only affected one's ability to enter restaurants or grocery
stores in the area, and did not have a major impact on our staff or
family members' ability to live their lives normally. However, the
rumors themselves did often create anxieties among our Mission
community. Of course, large-scale local shutdowns and movement
restrictions did occur after I left China.
While we left it up entirely to USDH staff and family members to
decide whether to comply or not, we did recommend to our community that
they utilize COVID testing in the event of a local outbreak to support
efforts to help ensure that they did not expose their colleagues to
COVID by coming into the Embassy or consulates until they were sure
they were not infected with COVID. COVID testing was readily available
at the joint-venture hospitals and clinics our Mission community used
regularly for healthcare, which were fully vetted by our Mission
medical staff.
Notably, throughout my tenure our Mission medical and CDC experts
advised me that they did not believe COVID to have spread very widely
in the cities in which our Mission staff worked and resided during my
tenure, with the exception of the original outbreak in Wuhan. To the
best of my knowledge, no USDH staff or family member contracted COVID
while in China during my tenure, which is remarkable given the degree
to which COVID had spread worldwide.
follow-up questions
You wrote in response to several questions that in-country
COVID testing requirements were required by private entities
not subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(VCDR), and that these entities ``became the indirect enforcers
of China's strict measures.'' You also wrote: ``While I am not
a lawyer, I understood from the State Department's Office of
the Legal Advisor that COVID tests undertaken by USDH staff and
their families for the purpose of accessing schools,
restaurants, barber shops, etc., on an individual voluntary
basis are not inconsistent with a host state's obligations
under the VCDR to accord a sending state's personnel with
certain immunities.''
Question. In doing testing, were the private entities
ensuring their own compliance with government requirements in
pursuit of ``zero COVID''?
Answer. Yes, I believe so.
Question. Whistleblowers with school-age children attest that
schools told them they were required by the Government to do
COVID testing on children. In other words, it was not a private
directive. Were you aware of this? Was it your and the
Embassy's view that such testing--at the direction of the
Chinese Government but enforced by a school--was not covered
under VCDR?
Answer. I was not aware of the specifics behind school
requirements. Our management team worked to provide all the
information it had about such requirements to the State
Department and relied on the guidance from the Department with
regard to its assessment of whether such requirements posed
safety/security issues or were problematic from a legal
perspective. We were not advised that they did, and we are
required to rely on the State Department to advise us on what
is and is not consistent with diplomatic privileges and
immunities. I will note as I did in my original answers, that
foreign diplomats' children in the US are required to comply
with vaccine regulations and during with testing protocols
(during COVID) in order to attend US public schools.
Question. Is something voluntary if you do not have appropriate
information to make an informed decision?
Answer. All of these issues were discussed regularly in our Country
Team meetings at which all sections and agencies had representatives or
otherwise participated and they were asked to ensure that all of their
staff were informed. They were also discussed thoroughly during our
Emergency Acting Committee (EAC) meetings, which had broad section and
agency representation. These policies were communicated to all sections
and agencies, and I relied on my senior staff to ensure their
subordinates were fully briefed. In addition, Ambassador Branstad and I
participated in numerous town halls to which all members of the
community, including USDH staff and family members, were invited to
participate in person or virtually, and we explained our policies and
fielded all questions.
Question. Is something--like going into a fever hospital--voluntary
if you are told that the only alternative is going back to the United
States potentially for months and then possibly losing your job at Post
due to extended absence or experiencing extended family separation?
Answer. Ambassador Branstad and I recognized that it clearly was
not an easy decision for individuals and families to make. For that
reason, we worked very hard to ensure that all staff and family members
understood thoroughly the process involved during the COVID pandemic of
entering China and the risks associated with that, including that it
was our policy to avoid having anyone be forced into a fever hospital
by having them medevac'd if tested positive. While we did return a
small number of travelers to the United States when they tested
positive upon arrival, none of our USDH staff or family members were
forced into Chinese fever hospitals for treatment during my tenure. I
cannot speak to events that occurred nor decisions taken after I
completed my assignment and departed China in mid-July 2021, however.
Question. What was the rationale for you and other leadership at
Mission China characterizing U.S. Government employee's compliance with
China's COVID protocols as voluntary?
Answer. Ambassador Branstad and I endeavored to ensure that USDH
staff and family members were fully briefed on the situation they would
face in China if they chose to travel to post, including the COVID
testing they would be required by China to undertake before travel, at
the port of entry, and during quarantine. Those ``upon-arrival''
requirements were never characterized as voluntary, and Secretary
Pompeo made the policy decision to waive the personal inviolability of
diplomats and their EFMs after exhausting all other possibilities and
arguments with the PRC to get our personnel into the country without
testing and quarantine.
Once our personnel cleared the ``upon-arrival'' quarantine and
testing, living in China during the ``zero Covid'' era posed other
challenges to Mission personnel. This included the need sometimes to
demonstrate a negative test for children to attend school, to travel
between Chinese cities, and in some locales during local COVID
outbreaks, to enter for example, some restaurants and barber shops.
Many of our personnel chose to comply by obtaining a negative COVID
test at the joint-venture hospitals and clinics that normally provided
medical services to our community and were fully vetted by Mission
medical staff, to access those services. Ambassador Branstad and I also
supported any decision to curtail or cancel assignments should the USDH
staff or family decide that they did not wish to voluntarily undertake
that risk.
Question. In December 2020, you signed out an EAC cable encouraging
U.S. Embassy employees to comply with China's COVID testing in-country
but that it was a ``personal decision.'' After stating it was a choice,
the cable warns of restrictions of movement and the inability to come
to the Embassy if individuals refused to test. This is repeated in
several management notices that went out around that time. Were these
additional tests authorized by the September 2020 LWOI?
Answer. The EAC cable was to inform Washington that we had
discussed the possibility that this issue could arise and that the
interagency EAC agreed that our management notice was appropriate.
While I am not a lawyer, I understood from the State Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor that COVID tests undertaken by USDH staff
and their families for the purpose of accessing schools, restaurants,
barber shops, etc., on an individual voluntary basis are not
inconsistent with a host state's obligations under the VCDR to accord a
sending state's personnel with certain immunities. Indeed, foreign
diplomats in the United States who wish to have their children attend
school in the United States must get certain vaccinations to comply
with local school attendance requirements. They do so without a waiver
from their sending state, but rather by making the personal voluntary
medical decision for their children in order to access a service they
would otherwise be ineligible to partake in absence of the
vaccinations.
Question. Was it your recommendation to Main State back in
Washington that U.S. Government employees comply with these testing
requirements?
Answer. Our EAC cable is clear: We reported to the State Department
that, though it had not yet occurred, there was a possibility that USDH
staff and family members could be asked to comply with local health
authority or school requirements to test as a condition of attending
school or entering public places and reported that the consensus of the
interagency EAC was to issue the management notice described.
follow-up question
Question. You do not answer the question. Please answer the
question asked.
Answer. I believe I did answer the question. In our
management notices during that time and the EAC cable sent to
the Department in December 2020, we noted the possibility that
our USDH staff and family members, in the event of a local
outbreak, might be requested to test to prove they were not
infected with COVID. We encouraged our staff and family members
to test to be supportive of efforts to control COVID outbreaks
and to help ensure their colleagues were not exposed to COVID
in the workplace. However, we emphasized in every case that it
was a personal decision whether to comply with requests from
China's public health authorities for COVID tests, noting that
it was possible that failure to do so could create obstacles to
children being able to attend school or for staff and family
members to be able to enter some restaurants or other public
venues. We also noted that those who did wish to comply could
get tested at the hospitals and clinics the Mission community
used for regular medical care and were vetted by the Mission
Medical Unit staff. If you believe they were, what is the
justification for that?
Question. If you believe they were, what is the justification for
that?
Answer. Our EAC cable is clear: We reported to the State Department
that, though it had not yet occurred, there was a possibility that USDH
staff and family members could be asked to comply with local health
authority or school requirements to test as a condition of attending
school or entering public places and reported that the consensus of the
interagency EAC was to issue the management notice described.
follow-up question
Question. Please answer the question asked--whether you
believed the in-country testing requirements was allowable
under what the Department authorized in the September 2020
LWOI, and if so, what your justification is for that view. The
response should focus on the following situation, as it was
notified to the Mission China community in December 2020: ``if
Chinese authorities ask members of Mission China to under
COVID-19 testing as part of a response to a specific COVID-19
exposure or outbreak'' (20 BEIJING 2480).
Answer. The language in the September 18, 2020, cable from
the Department is not relevant as it merely restated the
Department's instructions in effect since June 2020 that we
send a diplomatic note to China each time a USDH traveler or
family member is preparing to enter China to waive privileges
and immunities for the purpose of one or more nasal/throat swab
COVID tests upon entry and during quarantine. It does not apply
to anything else.
Our guidance to Mission personnel, after consulting with the
Department in Washington, was that the decision to test was an
individual decision. However, we encouraged testing to help in
controlling local COVID outbreaks and to ensure COVID was not
spread within the Mission community. We noted to staff and
family members that they could obtain tests at the hospitals
and clinics, like Beijing United Family Hospital, that were
vetted and used by Mission community members for regular
medical care.
Question. Did someone tell you that they were acceptable under the
September 2020 LWOI? If so, who was that?
Answer. To be clear, they were not covered under the LWOIs we
issued on a one-time basis for each individual when they entered the
country. I understood from the State Department's Office of the Legal
Advisor that COVID tests undertaken by USDH staff and their families
for the purpose of accessing schools, restaurants, barber shops, etc.,
on an individual voluntary basis are not inconsistent with a host
state's obligations under the VCDR (just as foreign diplomats in the
United States who wish to have their children attend school in the
United States must get certain vaccinations to comply with local school
attendance requirements), so they did not require a limited waiver of
immunities.
Question. You argued China never violated the September waiver and
that conditions after September 2020 did not ``fundamentally change.''
Please confirm that the following changed conditions in PRC mandates
happened during your tenure: On January 29, 2021, an Embassy Management
Notice detailed a quarantine policy for Beijing-bound U.S. Government
travelers that expanded quarantine and monitoring to 28 days. This is
beyond the 14 days authorized by State in September 2020, correct?
Answer. The waivers we conveyed to the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs via diplomatic notes from June 2020 through my departure in
mid-July 2021 were one-time waivers for each individual for the purpose
of allowing one or more nasal/throat COVID swab tests upon entry into
China and during quarantine. This requirement of a nasal/throat swab
upon arrival and one or more nasal/throat swab tests during a
quarantine period never changed during my tenure. There were shifting,
often temporary or applicable only to certain cities in which COVID
outbreaks had occurred, changes in the number of tests administered
during quarantine and the length of quarantine, as well as the
sometimes additional requirement of seven days home monitoring after
quarantine, all of which were immediately communicated back to the
State Department via regular email, phone calls, and conference calls
with relevant bureau staff.
follow-up questions
Question. In response to the question above, you wrote: ``The
waivers we conveyed to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs via
diplomatic notes from June 2020 through my departure in mid-
July 2021 were one-time waivers for each individual for the
purpose of allowing one or more nasal/throat COVID swab tests
upon entry into China and during quarantine.'' In our
questions, the September 2020 LWOI refers to that requested in
20 BEIJING 1690 by Amb. Branstad (a cable you also cleared on).
This LWOI--according to our review of State Department
documentation and interviews with more than half a dozen
whistleblowers--was a broader LWOI that applied to any Mission
personnel returning to China (as distinct from waivers
requested for specific individuals in summer 2020). Is the
September 2020 LWOI a single/general waiver that applied to any
Mission personnel returning to Mission China?
Answer. The Department's instructions to us in its September
18, 2020, cable were to continue using the exact same
diplomatic note language on waiving diplomatic privileges and
immunities we had used for each of the nine charter flights to
date, and use that in diplomatic notes for those arriving on
commercial flights as well. Prior to September 2021, the
Department had provided tailored language for each charter
flight along with the manifest of passengers. Since it would be
impractical for the Department to generate tailored diplomatic
note language for the many individuals who would arrive on
different commercial flights at different times, the Department
in this cable authorized the Embassy to use the same standard
language for each individual arriving on commercial air. In
effect, this cable did not do anything other than to allow us
to maintain the same process and use the same diplomatic note
language as we moved to allow some staff to travel to China by
commercial air. The diplomatic note language we used to provide
the PRC notification that the United States waived
inviolability for an individual arriving on commercial air was
no different than that which we provided for those who had
arrived on charter flights.
Question. Was every U.S. direct hire and their families
informed that the Department of State waived their privileges
and immunities in the 2020 LWOI?
Answer. Certainly, all members of the Country Team were aware
of the Department's instructions beginning in the period prior
to my return to post. We discussed the waivers as well during
many if not most of the EAC and Country Team meetings during
the final year I was in China. In any event, every USDH
traveler and family member was briefed prior to boarding a
flight to China during that time that they would be required to
take a nasal/throat swab COVID test upon arrival and additional
such tests during the quarantine period, but nothing else. Our
diplomatic notes to China during this time were primarily
intended to notify China that we would allow these tests upon
arrival and during quarantine but stake out a clear position
that we were waiving no other rights under the VCDR.
Question. On March 24, 2021, the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou sent
an email to U.S. personnel that they would now be expected to do 4
COVID tests ``upon landing''--up from 2 tests authorized in the waiver.
Is this correct? Were you aware PRC health authorities required
installation of a special camera and door alarm outside the front doors
of U.S. Government personnel so the PRC Government could monitor their
compliance with quarantine mandates? This was not authorized in the
original 2020 waiver, correct?
Answer. I do not recollect such an email, but to clarify, the
fundamental requirement of a nasal/throat swab upon arrival and one or
more nasal/throat swab tests during a quarantine period never changed
during my tenure. Cameras in China are ubiquitous and part of that
authoritarian state's method of not only monitoring its citizens but
foreign diplomats as well. Despite our protests, there are cameras that
monitor the outside of all of our facilities, including residential
compounds, throughout China. However, I do not recall being informed of
any special ``COVID cameras or door alarms'' at our diplomats'
residences during my time in China.
Question. What would you have considered a ``fundamental change''
in requirements that you believe would have required you to submit a
front channel cable to the Department of State, or that would have
changed your recommendation in 20 BEIJING 1690?
Answer. One example that could have required a request to the
Department to reconsider the LWOI would have been a fundamental change
in the nature of the nasal/throat swab COVID tests or an added
requirement that USDH staff and family members be confined to Chinese
Government facilities rather than commercial hotels. Such changes never
took place during my tenure in China. The shifting modifications to the
length and composition of quarantine periods (from one to three weeks)
and addition of a home monitoring period of a week were reported back
to Washington immediately in emails, phone calls, and weekly conference
calls, as they were introduced in some cities for select periods, and
sometimes removed or reduced at other times.
Fever Hospitals//Quarantine
Question. You attested in writing that ``we did not allow any USDH
Mission personnel nor EFMs to be admitted to a Chinese hospital for
COVID-related treatment.'' You also stated that no one was forced into
a fever hospital under your leadership, or a ``similar institution.''
Answer. That is correct. None of the widely publicized cases of our
diplomats being subjected to confinement to PRC ``fever hospitals'' and
being exposed to unsafe and unacceptable conditions happened during my
time in China. I cannot speak to events or decisions made after I
completed my assignment and departed China on July 15, 2021. After that
date and to the present, I have not been involved in China policy or
management issues related to Mission China. Throughout Ambassador
Branstad's and my tenure, we maintained a strict policy of removing any
staff or family member back to the United States--by medical evacuation
if necessary--in the event any faced forced confinement to a ``fever
hospital'' or exposure to unsafe conditions as a result of testing
positive for COVID. During my tenure, every member of our staff or
family member who requested medevac because of a positive COVID test
was medevac'd back to the United States. Neither Ambassador Branstad
nor I allowed any USDH staff or family members to be involuntarily
confined to a Chinese ``fever hospital.''
follow-up questions
Question. What is an ``interim testing clinic''?
Answer. My understanding from our then-Regional Medical
Officer was that an ``interim testing clinic'' or ``interim
assessment clinic'' was a testing center used to determine
whether a suspected COVID positive individual was actually
infected with COVID or not. Should they be confirmed positive,
they would be transferred and admitted to a ``fever hospital''
for isolation and treatment. If confirmed negative for COVID,
they would be discharged or, if they had just arrived in the
country, returned to their residence or hotel to complete the
required quarantine period.
Question. What is different about this facility from a
``fever hospital'' or ``fever clinic,'' which are the only two
terms we've seen used in official State Department documents or
whistleblower testimony to refer to COVID treatment facilities?
Please differentiate in terms of living conditions, medical
treatments provided, and whether U.S. diplomats could leave
this facility if they wanted to do so.
Answer. My understanding from our then Regional Medical
Officer was that the term ``fever hospital'' refers to the
special COVID isolation and treatment wards China established,
often in existing hospital complexes that continued to provide
other care. The ``fever hospital'' referred to the ward that
housed patients who were confirmed positive for COVID, whether
symptomatic or not, and where they would be isolated and
treated for COVID. ``Fever clinics'' was a term used more
loosely and generally referred to clinics outside of hospitals
that were established to screen and isolate COVID patients, but
I have also seen it used interchangeably with ``testing
centers'' at times. The ``interim testing clinic'' or ``interim
assessment center'' to which I referred was a clinic in or
outside of a hospital complex that was established to test
possible COVID patients and determine whether they were truly
positive for COVID or not. They did not treat COVID but rather
worked only to determine whether someone should be transferred
to the ``fever hospital'' or be discharged. I understand that
patients who were referred to these testing clinics were
usually suspected to possibly be positive for COVID and would
not be allowed to leave until tests established that they were
not (or in the case of our staff and family members, medically
evacuated from China). Our Mission Medical Unit staff had
toured some ``assessment centers'' in summer and fall 2020,
including patient rooms, and found them to be clean and well
maintained at that time. And, as I noted with respect to the
spouse of a Foreign Service Officer that spent six nights in an
``interim testing center'' in April 2021, the conditions were
basic, but acceptable. As for ``fever hospitals,'' I do not
know what the conditions were during my tenure as our staff
were not able to visit the inside of patient rooms in these
facilities during the period I was in China and COVID was
spreading globally.
Question. Since your written responses indicated that no one
went into a fever hospital or ``similar institution,'' is it
your contention that an ``interim testing clinic'' is not
similar to a fever hospital? If so, please explain.
Answer. Yes, an ``interim testing clinic'' during my time in
China was very different from a ``fever hospital.'' My
understanding, based on conversations with our then-Regional
Medical Officer was that the latter was a ward that housed and
treated both fully symptomatic and asymptomatic patients who
were confirmed positive for COVID, while an ``interim testing
clinic'' was a clinic where patients were tested to determine
if they were truly positive for COVID and, if so, needed to be
admitted to a ``fever hospital.'' I cannot speak to what
conditions were like in a ``fever hospital'' during my time in
China because our medical staff were not able to tour the
patient rooms in a ``fever hospital.''
Question. Since you were Chief of Mission, what is your
explanation for not being aware of diplomatic notes sent from
U.S. Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulate Shanghai about this
case and that the Department referred to it as a ``detention''?
Answer. It was not routine for me to review each of the
hundreds of diplomatic notes that were sent by our consulates
or management staff, and authorized by senior staff, unless
they involved significant policy issues. In any event, at that
time I was out of the country on a business trip and only
returned to China at the beginning of April 2021 and then spent
22 days in a combination of a quarantine hotel and an Embassy
residence. During this time, I was briefed in general via
emails and phone calls on the case of the spouse in the
``interim testing clinic'' but was not directly involved in
drafting or clearing diplomatic notes.
Question. One of several challenges I have in accepting your
version of events is that the first family we know of that was
imprisoned for 60+ days in the Ditan facility went into that
facility within 10 days of your departure from Post. It is
difficult to believe that you ably protected our diplomats
throughout your tenure, but within 10 days of your departure
our people were placed in horrible facilities for weeks on end,
subjected to appalling treatment, and unable to leave until
they tested negative with no recourse. Based on my staff's
investigation, the Chinese Government seemed to be operating
with impunity. How would you describe the conditions facing
U.S. Government personnel in China with respect to COVID on the
day of your departure from Post?
Answer. The conditions facing U.S. Government personnel in
China during my final weeks at post were not significantly
different than during the previous 12 months I was at post.
However, I learned after I left that the Delta variant of COVID
had just begun to spread globally, including in China and, as I
understand it, had for the first time begun to create
increasing numbers of asymptomatic COVID test results. As I
understand it, later that summer was the first time we had ever
seen asymptomatic positive COVID tests among staff after they
had already tested negative at the airport upon arrival in
China, but I only heard about this long after I departed post.
Question. What were the state of Chinese requirements of our
diplomats at the time of your departure?
Answer. They were not much different than during the previous
year, although China had cut back considerably on allowing many
of our staff or family members to quarantine in Mission China
residences and had increased the numbers of tests required
during quarantine from one in July 2020, to two later on, and
by the time I left, to once or twice a week while in
quarantine.
Question. What was happening in the June/July 2021 timeframe
in terms of China's requirements, conditions on the ground, and
pressure on the diplomatic community to comply with zero COVID
that created the conditions for long-term detention of U.S.
Government personnel and their families, including minor
children?
Answer. I do not recall any major shift in Chinese
requirements or pressure of the diplomatic community as I was
preparing to depart post in late June, my successor arrived and
assumed duties as DCM July 1, and I packed out in the first
weeks of July. I cannot speak to events or decisions made after
I departed on July 15, 2021.
Question. Do you take any responsibility for the state of
things when you left and their proximity to this even worse
treatment of U.S. diplomats, or does that responsibility fall
solely on the new Charge d'Affaires who had only just assumed
his duties?
Answer. I cannot recall any signs in my final months in China
that would suggest a major change was coming either in China's
COVID control policies or the situation on the ground in China.
Of course, throughout the previous year, we had constantly
grappled with ever-changing COVID developments worldwide and in
China, including frequent shifts in how China was responding,
and Ambassador Branstad, I, and our senior staff spent enormous
amounts of time on dealing with COVID issues. I am not
surprised that the challenges continued after I departed.
However, neither Ambassador Branstad nor I ever faced the
extraordinary issue that reportedly arose after I left, namely,
a large number of asymptomatic positive COVID tests for USDH
staff and family who tested negative before boarding and upon
arrival.
At the same time, I cannot speak to events or decisions made
by the Department of State or my successor after I departed
post. After I left Beijing, I went directly to home leave in
California and was not aware of any of the issues that arose
after my departure until many months later.
Throughout your verbal and written responses, your words seem
carefully chosen. We asked you about blood tests. You told us
you never allowed them in China but did not disclose that all
USDHs and EFMs had to do blood tests in the United States
before going to China. You stated that you did not allow people
to go into Chinese hospitals, and no one was forced into a
fever hospital or ``similar institution,'' but failed to
disclose that a mother and infant were held in a medical
facility for nearly a week (and you claim to be unaware of
diplomatic notes that characterize that stay in the medical
facility as a ``detention.'').
Question. Why should I believe that you will be open, candid,
and straightforward with myself and other members of the
committee?
Answer. Throughout this process, I have endeavored to be as
open, truthful, and candid, on every one of the questions posed
to me. I have tried to be careful in my responses to ensure I
do not provide misleading or incorrect answers about what are
sometimes very complex issues. I was surprised in my initial
meeting with Minority Staff in September 2022 to be quizzed on
these issues as no one told me in advance that this would be a
topic of conversation. I answered as fully and truthfully as I
could, relying on my memory of events that had taken place
years earlier and with which I had not subsequently been
involved. Following that meeting, I offered repeatedly to meet
with the staff again and answer any questions and provide
clarifications. I continue to try to do my best to answer
questions based on my memory, my discussion with former
colleagues who have helped me recall some events, and documents
I can locate. I pledge to always be open, candid,
straightforward, and truthful with the committee and committee
staff.
Question. Were you not aware of the mother and baby that went into
a fever hospital in Shanghai in April 2021?
Answer. I am well aware of the case to which you refer, especially
since I have been a close friend of the Foreign Service Officer's
family for more than 35 years. While completing her quarantine period
in a hotel in Shanghai in April 2021, the spouse of a Foreign Service
Officer tested ``weakly positive'' for COVID. PRC health officials
requested that she go to an ``interim testing clinic'' for additional
tests to determine whether she was truly positive for COVID or not. The
Embassy and Consulate General Shanghai offered to request a medevac for
her with or without her husband and children back to the United States
immediately, but she declined and volunteered to take the tests. She
requested and, after Mission China staff intervened forcefully, was
allowed to bring her nursing infant with her to the ``interim testing
clinic.''
Because her tests provided mixed results over several days, she and
her infant ended up spending six nights in the clinic before she was
permitted by PRC health authorities to return to the hotel to complete
her quarantine period. During her time in the clinic, in response to
her repeated inconclusive tests, including one after she had already
been returned to the quarantine hotel, PRC health authorities insisted
that she be transferred to a COVID isolation ward (or ``fever
hospital'') for monitoring and treatment, but she refused and Mission
China staff intervened with PRC officials to ensure she was not forced
to do so.
Throughout her time in the ``interim testing clinic,'' we
repeatedly offered, and she declined to be medevac'd to the United
States. During the six nights she spent in the clinic, in phone calls
with Mission China staff and in a later extended conversation she had
with me personally, she described the conditions in the ``interim
testing clinic'' as ``spartan, but clean and acceptable,'' and that
``the bed and food were fine.'' She and her infant had a private room
and bathroom, had full access to wi-fi, was in constant communication
with her spouse and family as well as Mission China management and
medical staff, and could order food and supplies, such as diapers,
delivered to her room. She confirmed that she was able to accept or
decline any tests, but voluntarily underwent multiple tests to confirm
her negative status for COVID.
After returning to the hotel, she and her infant completed the
quarantine requirement, and she went on to join her husband and other
child at their post of assignment. They completed one full assignment,
successfully traveling in and out of China several times since then and
accepted a second consecutive assignment in Mission China where the
family continues to serve today.
There was an earlier case in January 2021 that has also caused some
confusion. A contractor--not a USDH employee or family member--who
worked for a company that provided maintenance services to the Embassy
and consulates fell ill with COVID-like symptoms shortly after arriving
in China on a charter flight. After consulting with Mission China
medical staff who were concerned about his symptoms, the contractor
agreed to be hospitalized for observation while awaiting a medevac. His
teenage son accompanied him to the hospital. Since he was not a USDH
employee, we had no authority to medevac him, but we supported his
company in arranging a private medical evacuation and he and his son
were returned to the U.S. within a few days. I am not aware whether he
was ever diagnosed with COVID or not, however.
Question. Were you aware of the diplomatic notes about this
family's ``detention,'' which is how the Department described it?
Answer. I am not familiar with the diplomatic notes to which you
refer, but Ambassador Branstad, I, and my senior staff regularly
protested all aspects of the PRC's unscientific and unnecessary COVID
testing, quarantining, and hospitalization regulations, including
pointing out in diplomatic notes that they were inconsistent with their
international legal obligations. As for the case you mention that
involved the spouse of a Foreign Service Officer, because she declined
our repeated offer to be medevac'd, my staff in Beijing and Shanghai
were directly involved throughout and protested to PRC officials about
nearly every aspect of this spouse and her infant child's time spent in
an ``interim testing clinic'' while local health officials tried to
determine if she was a true positive for COVID. My staff intervened
with PRC officials to ensure that she and her infant child were not
moved into a COVID isolation ward (or ``fever hospital'').
Although I was away from the Embassy at the time this case occurred
(I was in the United States for business meetings and then in
quarantine in an Embassy residence for almost the same period as the
mother and her child), the Acting DCM at the time and our Management
Counselor kept me briefed on the situation.
Question. If you were aware of all this, why did you tell SFRC that
no one went into a Chinese fever hospital or similar institution during
your tenure?
Answer. As I explained above, no USDH staff or family members,
including this mother and her child, were admitted to a fever hospital
during my tenure. Indeed, my staff intervened with PRC officials to
ensure that she and her infant child were not moved into a COVID
isolation ward (or ``fever hospital'').
Question. Had anyone from the Embassy visited that hospital to make
sure it was a safe place for U.S. Government personnel?
Answer. I understand the medical assistant at our consulate general
in Shanghai was very familiar with this clinic, had visited it prior to
the outbreak of COVID, and was in direct contact with doctors in the
clinic conducting the tests the spouse volunteered to take. In
addition, the spouse described the conditions as ``spartan, but clean
and acceptable, and that the bed and food were fine.'' She and her
infant had a private room and bathroom, could access wi-fi at any time,
had constant communication with her spouse and family as well as
Mission China management and medical staff, and could order food and
supplies, such as diapers, delivered to her room. Had she described any
threat to her health or safety or that of her infant, we would have
insisted on her immediate medevac (recall, she declined our offer of a
medevac).
Question. Were you aware of worsening conditions regarding
quarantine, testing, and U.S. Direct Hires or Eligible Family Members
being put into fever hospitals? If you were aware, how did you ``push
back'' and by what metrics of success do you measure this pushback?
Answer. I relied on my management staff both in the Embassy and at
the consulates to report to me and Ambassador Branstad regularly about
testing and quarantine conditions, issues that arose, and how they were
addressing them. I was available 24/7 to address any major issue that
arose, including by urgently communicating with the PRC Foreign
Ministry and/or with Washington. Ambassador Branstad and I pushed back
regularly on our PRC counterparts to address any testing or quarantine
issues that arose as did key members of my political, management,
medical, and CDC staff experts. I believe we were able to resolve
fairly quickly the vast majority of issues, although some persisted or
took multiple days to get full resolution. Ambassador Branstad and I
were prepared, and did several times, to suspend the return of staff
and family members to China or switch the arrival of flights to other
cities when testing or quarantine issues in a particular city could not
be resolved quickly. As for issues arising regarding ``fever
hospitals,'' it never was an issue during Ambassador Branstad's or my
tenures as we never had a USDH staff or family member be sent to a
``fever hospital'' and maintained throughout our tenures, with
Washington's support, the policy of immediately requesting medevac of
any of our staff who faced unsafe or unacceptable conditions as a
result of testing positive for COVID, and we had a repeated commitment
from the PRC Foreign Ministry that it would support and help facilitate
such a medevac of our staff, whether the staff were located in their
residence, quarantine hotel, or medical facility.
State Management and Operations
Question. What responsibilities do Chiefs of Mission have to
safeguard the privileges and immunities of their diplomats and other
personnel?
Answer. There is no higher priority than the health, safety, and
security of the members of the Mission, especially USDH staff and
family members. It is the responsibility of the Chiefs of Mission to
ensure that the personnel under their authority act in accordance with
Department policies. Per Department policy, as reflected in the Foreign
Affairs Manual (2 FAM 220), any waiver of privileges and immunities of
mission personnel must be authorized by the Department in Washington.
If confirmed, protecting employees and their families would remain my
highest priority.
Question. What are the key management lessons you have learned from
your stewardship over Embassy Beijing during your tenure?
Answer. The early days of the COVID virus were uncharted territory
for all of us. Ambassador Branstad, I, and all of Mission China
leadership did our best to ensure that all members of Mission China--
USDHs, EFMs, and LES--remained healthy, safe, and secure. If confirmed,
I will also work closely with staff and Washington to ensure the same
in Mission Cambodia.
Question. Do you take any personal responsibility for the members
of the Mission China community who suffered greatly during your tenure
due to policies that you championed and/or implemented?
Answer. Nothing was a higher priority for Ambassador Branstad and
me than the health, safety, and security of the almost 2,700 employees
of Mission China, including nearly 2,000 USDH staff and family members.
Many of them were my lifelong colleagues and friends with whom I have
served in China multiple times. Ambassador Branstad, myself, and many
members of my team in Beijing and at the Consulates worked tirelessly
to push back on the PRC's unscientific and unacceptable COVID control
protocols throughout my time in China. If confirmed, protecting
employees and their families would remain my highest priority.
Question. Is Mission China now a less desirable post for Foreign
Service personnel?
Answer. As with serving at any of our many diplomatic posts abroad,
there are a variety of benefits and challenges to serving in Mission
China and those vary for each individual based on their background,
academic and professional interests, family situation and other
factors. Given our relationship with the PRC, we face many unique
challenges in Mission China. It is not possible to attribute changes in
number of bidders to any single factor.
Question. Do you feel in any way responsible for Mission China now
being a less desirable post (fewer bidders, now a 2-year tour)?
Answer. The PRC and zero-COVID policies impacted the morale of
Mission China employees and families and made living in China
difficult. However, Mission China and the Department used recruiting
and retention tools such as Service Needs Differential to retain and
recruit talent to Mission China.
Question. Do you think Mission China being a less desirable post
hurts U.S. national security?
Answer. Annually, in the Foreign Service bid cycle we face
different challenges in filling all open positions with the right
people. We have several tools that can be used to entice bidders to
take assignments in challenging environments, and the Department has
used those tools extensively to ensure Mission China is attractive to
our diplomats. Although the Department faced certain challenges in
previous years in recruiting talent to Mission China, there was a
significant increase in bidders the last bidding year, and nearly all
positions were filled.
Question. Many U.S. missions have been under enormous stress over
the last several years. What is your understanding of morale throughout
Mission Cambodia?
Answer. My understanding is that periods of intense workload and
special responsibilities, such as Cambodia's ASEAN Chair Year in 2022,
created an especially busy work environment during certain periods.
However, Embassy Phnom Penh has an engaged Locally Engage Staff (LES)
Association, First and Second Tour Officer Board, and other active
organizations that have played an invaluable role in keeping the morale
up. If confirmed, I intend to make mission morale a priority and
demonstrate leadership that is worthy of our fine staff.
Question. How do you intend to improve morale at Mission Cambodia?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything in my power to
ensure that all members of Mission Cambodia--U.S. Direct Hires (USDHs),
Eligible Family Members (EFMs), and LES--understand their value to the
Embassy community and find meaning in their work. If confirmed, I will
also work closely with Washington to secure the resources necessary to
ensure Mission Cambodia staff are able to achieve their professional
goals. Wherever appropriate, I will also prioritize mentorship,
guidance, and good counsel.
Question. How do you intend to create a unified mission and vision
at Mission Cambodia?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to rally Mission Cambodia around the
Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and Washington's priorities to create
a unified mission and vision. If confirmed, I will also do my utmost to
create a sense of community that is guided by the same mission, values,
and principles. I will support mission activities that bring people
together.
Question. Management is a key responsibility for Chiefs of Mission.
How would you describe your management style?
Answer. I would describe my management style as one of empowerment,
trust, respect, integrity, and empathy. In every Mission that I have
served, I have sought to model the highest possible standards in each
of these areas. If confirmed, I aim to create an atmosphere of open
communication where Mission Cambodia staff feel valued and heard in the
course of advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives. I will always hold
myself to the highest ethical and moral standards.
Question. Do you believe it is ever acceptable or constructive to
berate subordinates, either in public or private?
Answer. I do not believe it is ever acceptable or constructive to
berate subordinates, either in public or private. If confirmed, I aim
to foster professional growth and development through an open,
consultative, and constructive approach centered on the Department's
management and leadership precepts.
Question. How do you envision your relationship with the deputy
Chief of Mission?
Answer. As with any work environment in which I have worked, I
intend to form a strong working relationship with my subordinates based
on trust and respect, including with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).
If confirmed, I will seek the DCM's counsel on policy and management
issues, delegate tasks wherever necessary and appropriate, and empower
the DCM to carry out the position's core functions.
Question. If confirmed, what leadership responsibilities do you
intend to entrust to your deputy Chief of Mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to entrust my DCM with carrying out
duties related to management and human resources issues, among other
things. DCMs worldwide are responsible for the important task of
mentorship of first and second tour officers, and Mission Cambodia will
follow this model. If confirmed, we will also discuss other areas of
interest that the DCM may be well-positioned to cover. In my absence,
the DCM would be fully empowered to assume the role of Charge
d'Affaires as appropriate.
Question. In order to create and continue employee excellence at
the Department, accurate and direct employee evaluation reports (EERs)
for Foreign Service Officers are imperative, though often lacking. Do
you believe that it is important to provide employees with accurate,
constructive feedback on their performances in order to encourage
improvement and reward those who most succeeded in their roles?
Answer. The State Department's EER is a valuable tool to evaluate
performance and assess employees for possible promotion. If confirmed,
I commit to providing constructive feedback through formal and informal
channels on staff performance to encourage improvement and reward those
who have excelled in their roles.
Question. If confirmed, would you support and encourage clear,
accurate, and direct feedback to employees in order to improve
performance and reward high achievers?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to supporting and encouraging clear,
accurate, and direct feedback to employees to improve performance and
reward high achievers.
Question. It is imperative that U.S. diplomats get outside of posts
abroad to meet with local actors, including host government officials,
non-government organizations, and local citizens. In your experience,
do U.S. diplomats get outside of our Embassy walls enough to accomplish
fully their missions?
Answer. It has always been my experience that our diplomats and
local staff make every effort, within the limits of security measures,
to get out as much as possible. For example, I encourage staff members
across all sections and agencies to get out for reporting purposes and
participate in public outreach, such as meeting with students or
explaining our travel and contracting regulations to appropriate
audiences.
Question. How do you intend to improve the ability of U.S.
diplomats to better access all local populations?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to improve the ability of U.S.
diplomats to better connect with local communities by ensuring that
Mission Cambodia has cultivated a broad network of contacts across
government, civil society, media, academia, and youth. If confirmed, I
would also encourage staff to get outside the walls of the Embassy,
within the limits of security measures, to engage with contacts not
only in Phnom Penh but also throughout the countryside.
Question. Congressional Delegations (CODELs) and Staff Delegations
(STAFFDELs) serve a critical oversight mission. Do you pledge to
support fully CODELs and STAFFDELs that seek to travel to post?
Answer. If confirmed, yes, I pledge to fully support CODELs and
STAFFDELs that seek to travel to post, as appropriate.
Question. Do you agree to support fully any CODEL or STAFFDEL, with
the only exceptions for simultaneous or overlapping visits by the
President or First Lady of the United States, the Vice President, or
the Secretaries of State or Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, yes, I commit to support, to the fullest
extent possible, any CODEL or STAFFDEL, as appropriate.
follow-up question
Question. Please confirm that, if confirmed, you agree to
support any CODEL or STAFFDEL that does not coincide with
simultaneous or overlapping visits by the President or First
Lady of the United States, the Vice President, or the
Secretaries of State or Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, yes, I commit to support any CODEL or
STAFFDEL as appropriate that does not coincide with
simultaneous or overlapping visits by the President or First
Lady of the United States, the Vice President, or the
Secretaries of State or Defense.
Question. In the State Department's 2023 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Cambodia was listed as Tier 3 for its enduring lack of effort
to meet the minimum standards to eliminate human trafficking. Cambodia
was also noted for its outsized role in cyber scams affecting thousands
of people every year.
Answer. [Please see below]
Question. If confirmed, what concrete steps could you take to help
Cambodia operationalize the prioritized recommendations contained in
the TIP report?
Answer. The Cambodian Government's insufficient efforts to address
human trafficking, including forced criminality in online scam
operations, led to its downgrade to Tier 3 under the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. If confirmed, I will work in
collaboration with civil society organizations to encourage Cambodian
authorities to identify and prosecute traffickers and enablers at all
levels and identify and provide services to TIP victims.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to accurately portraying the
realities of the trafficking situation on the ground in Cambodia via
the annual country report within the Trafficking in Persons report?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Ambassador to Cambodia, I commit to
accurately portraying the realities of trafficking on the ground as it
is reported through the annual Trafficking in Persons Report.
Question. In the State Department's 2023 International Religious
Freedom report, Cambodia was noted as having a general lack of societal
and governmental respect for religious freedom.
Answer. [Please see below]
Question. What is your assessment of this particular issue and if
confirmed, how will you work with the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-
country?
Answer. While Buddhism is the state religion in Cambodia, the
Government is tolerant of all religions and belief systems and openly
celebrates its diversity and religious harmony. Despite the country's
tragic past, harmony and solidarity between different religions is the
norm in the Kingdom. If confirmed, I will engage with the Cambodian
Government and relevant religious communities to promote religious
freedom and highlight the importance of ongoing Cambodian Government
initiatives to fully integrate religious minorities into society, as
well as the benefits of respecting the country's religious pluralism.
If confirmed, I will also work closely with the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom and his office to advance respect for
freedom of religion or belief for all in Cambodia.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining the Department policy
of meeting and partnering with civil society to promote freedom of
religion or belief in Cambodia.
Question. If confirmed, what concrete steps can you take to help
Cambodia increase their societal and governmental respect for religious
freedom?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Embassy continues to engage
with the Government and civil society on the issue of religious
freedom. The Cambodian Government has an ongoing initiative to appoint
more Muslims to roles within local and national government, but more
can be done to incorporate members of other faiths and religions and
indigenous groups. I will ensure the Embassy continues to hire and
develop a Locally Engaged Staff workforce that resembles all of
Cambodia through outreach activities to underrepresented religious and
ethnic minority groups and communities throughout the country.
Question. In the State Department's 2022 Human Rights Report,
Cambodia is noted as having significant human rights issues including
unlawful or arbitrary killings, torture, political prisoners, overly
restrictive laws on the operation of nongovernmental organizations and
civil society, among others.
Answer. [Please see below]
Question. How will you direct your Embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. Civil society organizations are key partners for advancing
democracy, human rights, and good governance. If confirmed, I commit to
maintaining the U.S. policy of meeting and partnering with civil
society organizations to address democracy and human rights issues in
Cambodia. I also commit to protect members of civil society, supporting
them to continue their important work and to raise awareness on the
critical role they play in healthy and robust democracies.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to personally engaging with civil
society to advance, promote, and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Cambodia.
Question. How can you, if confirmed as ambassador, work alongside
IO and USU to recruit and retain talented Americans for placement
within the U.N. system either in appointments, elections, or other
roles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing work
of the Bureau of International Organizations, Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel, and their coordination with USUN to find,
recruit, and retain qualified U.S. citizens in the U.N. system. I will
support IO colleagues as they proactively identify openings and
advocate for more U.S. citizens in key leadership positions across the
U.N. and across international organizations. I will support efforts to
expand existing targeted recruitment efforts by increasing outreach
through different talent pipelines, connecting U.S. citizens already
employed by the U.N. with prospective applicants, and sharing the IO
Careers website as the advocacy portal.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Robert William Forden by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. How do you view this upcoming change in leadership? Do
you believe this is an opportunity to reengage with Cambodia?
Answer. It is my belief that Cambodia's new generation of young,
mostly western-educated leaders represents an opportunity for a
possible reorientation in the U.S.-Cambodia relationship. However, the
U.S.-Cambodia relationship will not reach its full potential until
there is progress on democracy and human rights in Cambodia, as well as
efforts to preserve Cambodia's sovereignty in the face of growing
influence by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Question. How will you work with the Cambodian Government to
advocate for the reestablishing of democratic norms, the promotion of
human rights, and building resilience to external influence from the
PRC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will underscore that Cambodia's new
Government has an opportunity to improve the country's international
standing, including by restoring genuine multi-party democracy, ending
politically motivated trials, and allowing independent media outlets to
reopen and function without interference. If confirmed, I will also
urge Cambodian authorities to undertake efforts to preserve Cambodia's
sovereignty in the face of growing influence by the PRC.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Robert William Forden by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit the largest quantity of greenhouse
gases in the world today. With their absolute control of Chinese
society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these destructive
actions tomorrow if they so choose to do so. Is the CCP a threat to the
United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As
Secretary Blinken has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will
advance U.S. national security interests and counter the People's
Republic of China (PRC) efforts to expand its problematic influence and
use of coercion, through diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, and
commercial advocacy to bolster U.S.-Cambodia ties.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. The United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change, when it is in the
U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues
across the U.S. interagency and Congress to advance U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests in Cambodia and countering efforts by our strategic
and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State and
interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's efforts to
expand its influence in Cambodia and the region.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign the letter.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate in the January 16, 2024, walkout.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. I am a firm believer that an honest exchange of opinion and
robust debate creates better policies and serves to rally teams around
the same goals and objectives. However, signing an open letter
criticizing U.S. policies is not the method I would endorse to bring
viewpoints to the attention of leadership. If confirmed, I would
carefully comply with the U.S. Government's and the State Department's
personnel regulations and procedures.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing''?
Answer. Since ``whistleblowing'' is a term and activity covered by
legislation and regulations, I defer to the Department's Office of the
Legal Advisor to determine whether the referenced actions are
considered protected whistleblowing activity.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I hope to create an atmosphere in which open
communication is welcomed and encouraged. I would encourage employees
to use established channels to express their views. According to
Department regulations, insubordination is a disciplinary matter
related to conduct on the job and may result in counseling and a
penalty commensurate with the scale of the offense. If confirmed, I
commit to addressing insubordination in consultation with the
Department's human resources and legal professionals.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have never expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is an antisemitic entity and a foreign terrorist
organization.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. I understand that the Administration supports humanitarian
pauses to allow for the safe release of hostages and other vulnerable
people, as well as to enable the transport of aid.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support humanitarian pauses to enable a sustained flow of
aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians seeking safer
locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is attempting to
secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The U.S. Government
supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas's terrorism,
consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect
itself, consistent with international law. The Administration has urged
Israel to differentiate between civilians and Hamas terrorists and to
avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of civilians as human shields, a
blatant violation of international law, does not lessen Israel's
obligations under international humanitarian law.
Question. From July 2020 to July 2021, you were stationed at
Embassy Beijing as either the Charge d'Affaires or Deputy Chief of
Mission. During your leadership, the Mission failed to follow
Department guidance regarding the testing and quarantine requirements
for entry into China including the number of throat/nasal swab tests
and the length of time in location of quarantine as required. It
appears that under your leadership, Embassy Beijing went above and
beyond the requirements and acquiesced several times to the Chinese
authorities' demands, which involved invasive testing and quarantine
procedures. Why did you fail to formally inform the Department via
cable, as required, to ANY changes in COVID protocols?
Answer. During my tenure, the PRC's protocol for COVID testing and
quarantine for travelers arriving remained fundamentally the same, with
a nasal/throat swab test at the port of entry, a quarantine period in a
hotel, and additional nasal/throat swab tests during the period of
quarantine. PRC central Government authorities delegated to local
health departments the power to implement the protocol as they saw
appropriate to local conditions and developments, such as local
outbreaks or a sudden surge in positive COVID cases at ports of entry.
During my tenure, the number of days required in a quarantine hotel
versus home quarantine (total of between 1-21 days) and the number of
nasal/throat swabs given during the quarantine period (between 1-5) did
vary from city to city depending on local conditions. The nature of the
tests given upon arrival and in quarantine, and for which the
Department made the decision to authorize a limited waiver of personal
inviolability, however, never changed from what the Department approved
in a cable on September 18, 2020.
My staff reported every change in quarantine period and frequency
of testing to the State Department in almost daily emails, phone calls,
and weekly conference calls. It was an intense and fluid period in
which our staffing was often severely depleted, and we relied on these
means of communication with Washington to ensure rapid consideration
and provision of information to staff preparing to travel to China.
Changes were all also reported by my staff in regular group emails to
staff and family members who were considering returning to China or
preparing to travel, as well as relevant offices at the State
Department. I am not aware of any request during this period from the
State Department for us to put in a cable these shifts by local health
authorities in how they implemented the testing and quarantine
requirements in various localities.
Question. Where does it state in the Department's response cable,
10 STATE 92790, where it allows FUNDAMENTAL changes without reporting
back to the Department?
Answer. As I explained above, China's requirement of one or more
nasal/throat swab COVID tests and a quarantine period in a hotel/
residence did not fundamentally change during my tenure. Variations
from time to time and locale in the number of tests and quarantine days
were reported to the Department in almost real time via emails, phone
calls, and conference calls.
Question. Did you ever draft or send a cable, as required, to
inform the Department you had approved additional CCP testing and
quarantine requirements?
Answer. My staff reported every change in quarantine period and
frequency of testing to the State Department in almost daily emails,
phone calls, and weekly conference calls. It was an intense and fluid
period in which our staffing was often severely depleted, and we relied
on these means of communication with Washington to ensure rapid
consideration and provision of information to staff preparing to travel
to China. Changes were all also reported by my staff in regular group
emails to staff and family members who were considering returning to
China or preparing to travel, as well as relevant offices at the State
Department. I am not aware of any request during this period from the
State Department for us to put in a cable these shifts by local health
authorities in how they implemented the testing and quarantine
requirements in various localities.
Question. I am concerned with regard to these previously approved
blood testing requirements of employees and family members, and the
fact that those results were provided to the Chinese Communist Party.
Blood tests were not listed in the approved Department COVID testing
protocols, yet, they occurred and could be used for DNA collection.
Additionally, the blood tests, which apparently took place in the U.S.,
were approved by the CCP. Who approved the blood testing of employees?
And why were these blood tests approved?
Answer. In late Fall 2020, the PRC initiated a requirement for all
travelers to China to obtain a COVID antigen test and submit the test
result to the PRC Embassy or Consulate before they would be allowed to
board a flight to China. This additional antigen test required by China
for travelers was notified to the Department of State in Washington by
the PRC Embassy (I was in Beijing at the time, not in Washington). The
Department of State reviews and facilities the application for visas
and other travel requirements for U.S. diplomats out of Washington. The
PRC Embassy provided a list of U.S. testing facilities from which they
would accept these test results. These were testing facilities located
in U.S. cities and subject to U.S. health privacy laws. They took blood
samples and provided the traveler with a test result document that the
traveler could upload and email to the PRC Embassy or nearest consulate
in order to obtain a permit to travel to China that could be provided
to the airline at the time of checking in for the flight. It would have
been a violation of U.S. law if these testing facilities transferred
blood samples or DNA of travelers to PRC authorities. I am not aware of
any information that this ever took place.
Question. What labs conducted the blood tests?
Answer. U.S. testing facilities at a number of cities across the
United States conducted the blood tests. Travelers could choose from a
long list of U.S. testing centers that the PRC Embassy provided on its
website, test results from which would be accepted by the PRC Embassy
or consulates for purposes of providing a permit, along with the usual
passport and visa, for a traveler to board a flight to China.
Question. Did State do any background vetting on the labs,
technicians, or doctors involved with the blood testing?
Answer. These were testing facilities located in U.S. cities and
subject to U.S. health privacy laws. It would have been a violation of
U.S. law if these testing facilities transferred blood samples or DNA
of travelers to PRC authorities.
Question. Does State have a list of the labs, doctors, or
technicians who conducted the testing?
Answer. The PRC Embassy posted the list of testing centers/labs on
its website.
Question. Did State conduct a walkthrough or a survey of each lab
to ensure proper protections were in place for U.S. Government
employees' and family members' DNA?
Answer. These were testing facilities located in U.S. cities and
subject to U.S. health privacy laws. It would have been a violation of
U.S. law if these testing facilities transferred blood samples or DNA
of travelers to PRC authorities.
Question. Can you certify or assert with confidence the CCP has not
used the blood testing for anything but COVID testing?
Answer. The only information the traveler needed to provide to the
PRC Embassy or consulate was the test result document from the testing
center. If a U.S. testing center provided PRC authorities with blood
samples or DNA, it would be a violation of U.S. laws and subject to
prosecution. I am not aware of any reports that this took place.
Question. Can you certify or assert with confidence the CCP
destroyed the blood samples collected for COVID testing?
Answer. The only information the traveler needed to provide to the
PRC Embassy or consulate was the test result document from the testing
center. If a U.S. testing center provided PRC authorities with blood
samples or DNA, it would be a violation of U.S. laws and subject to
prosecution.
Question. Did you, or any members of your family, take blood tests
prior to your arrival in China?
Answer. In April 2021, I returned to China from a business trip to
the United States. I had a COVID antigen test completed at a lab in Los
Angeles, CA, listed on the PRC's list of accepted labs for this
purpose. I received a certificate of a negative COVID antigen result,
uploaded it as required to the website of the PRC Consulate in Los
Angeles and received a confirmation that I could present to the airline
with my passport and visa to allow me to board a flight to Hong Kong
and onward to Beijing the next day, which I did.
Question. During your tenure, were you aware of the CCP placing
special COVID cameras and door alarms at our diplomats' residences?
Answer. Not that I can recall. CCTV cameras in China are ubiquitous
and part of that authoritarian state's method of not only monitoring
its citizens but foreign diplomats as well. Despite our protests, the
PRC maintains many CCTV cameras that monitor all our facilities,
including all of our residential compounds, throughout China. However,
I do not recall being informed of any special ``COVID cameras or door
alarms'' at our diplomats' residences during my tenure.
Question. What did you do about it?
Answer. As I mentioned above, I was not aware of any special COVID
cameras or door alarms at our residences.
Question. Did the Department approve of this?
Answer. As mentioned above, I was not aware of any special COVID
cameras or door alarms at our residences.
Question. During your tenure, did you draft, edit, or coordinate
any protocol changes for testing or vetting for Mission China before or
after your departure from post?
Answer. Not that I can recall.
Question. If so, did post implement any of the changes you
advocated for when updated COVID requirements for China were released
after your departure?
Answer. I did not draft, edit, or coordinate any protocol changes
for testing or vetting for Mission China before or after my departure
from post.
Question. For the past decade, the bilateral U.S. relationship with
Cambodia has been strained as Cambodia's relationship with the CCP has
expanded. Cambodia's human rights record has deteriorated given their
close ties to the CCP and the U.S. suspended military joint exercises
with Cambodia. The President's letter of instruction to Chiefs of
Mission and U.S. Code require and find Ambassadors to be responsible in
protecting all U.S. Government personnel safety and security. Given
your poor judgement and lack of taking responsibility in China, why
should this committee trust you to protect employees in Cambodia with
the CCP's strong influence?
Answer. Nothing was a higher priority for Ambassador Branstad and
me than the health, safety, and security of the almost 2,700 employees
of Mission China, including nearly 2000 U.S. Direct Hire staff and
family members. Many of them were my lifelong colleagues and friends
with whom I have served in China multiple times. Ambassador Branstad,
myself, and many members of my team in Beijing and at the Consulates
worked tirelessly to push back on the PRC's unscientific and
unacceptable COVID control protocols throughout my time in China.
Ambassador Branstad, I, and my political, medical, and management
staff, engaged senior PRC officials often and forcefully to urge China
to back off unacceptable requirements for diplomats, noting in
virtually every diplomatic note that these were unnecessary,
unscientific, and contrary to China's obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other applicable bilateral
agreements on immunities between China and the United States.
Ambassador Branstad, I, and our staff also regularly engaged like-
minded foreign mission counterparts in efforts to build consensus to
confront the PRC on these measures and we succeeded in coordinating
joint protests to the PRC Foreign Ministry on many issues, including on
getting PRC officials to concede that they would not separate a
positive child from his or her parents and vice versa.
I was not the architect of the policy of waiving diplomatic
privileges and immunities. I was not at post when the policy decision
was made in Washington in May 2020. On June 1, 2020, Mission China
brought back the first 100 staff on a charter flight to Tianjin, China,
providing waivers for each of their personal inviolability for the
purpose of one or more nasal/throat COVID swab tests. My understanding
(though again I was away from post for medical treatment) was that the
only way the PRC was willing to allow our diplomats to enter the PRC,
was if the United States allowed testing on arrival. Hence, the United
States could choose to keep our personnel away from post or bring them
back, which required a limited waiver of their personal inviolability
for the purpose of one or more nasal/throat COVID swab tests. I
understand that the Department chose the latter given the importance of
having U.S. diplomats on the ground in China. When I returned to my
duties more than a month after the arrival of the first charters, I
followed Ambassador Branstad's orders to lead efforts to bring back the
rest of our staff following the same protocol dictated to us by
Secretary Pompeo. I followed that protocol strictly the rest of my
tenure as DCM and Charge d'Affaires, successfully returning more than
1,400 staff and family members to restaff mission China.
Ambassador Branstad and I did support Secretary Pompeo's policy of
waiving privileges and immunities for COVID tests to allow our staff to
return to China as it allowed us to safely bring back staff and family
members to restaff Mission China at a time when our staffing was so
depleted, and staff beleaguered that we could not safely fulfill our
mission. Ambassador Branstad felt strongly that we needed to be able
to: provide services to the many tens of thousands of American citizens
trapped in China during a dangerous epidemic; ensure that the PRC did
not cut off the supply of PPE, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals
to the United States at a time we were struggling to address the
rapidly rising death toll from COVID in the United States; ensure
monitoring and enforcement of President Trump's phase one trade
agreement and efforts to stem the flow of fentanyl to the U.S. from
China; and monitor the spread of COVID in China as the PRC sought to
hide its complicity in the origins of the pandemic and the realities of
COVID spread in its own cities.
Ambassador Branstad, myself, and many members of my team in Beijing
and at the Consulates worked tirelessly to push back on the PRC's
unscientific and unacceptable COVID control protocols throughout my
time in China. If confirmed, protecting employees and their families
would remain my highest priority.
Question. If confirmed, how will you counter the CCP's military
expansion into Cambodia, notably the Ream Naval base, among others?
Answer. I have serious concerns over Cambodia's growing dependency
on the PRC and the expanding PLA military presence in the country,
including at Ream Naval Base. If confirmed, I will urge the Cambodian
Government to closely examine the agreements its defense officials have
made with the PRC to ensure the PRC will not be allowed a military
presence at Ream or to install sensitive technology at the base that
undermines Cambodia's sovereignty, contravenes its constitution, or
threatens regional stability. If confirmed, I will engage with the
Cambodian Government as well as with our likeminded and regional
partners to increase understanding that Cambodia's autonomy and
regional security are at stake.
Question. Do you support the bipartisan legislation Senator Markey
and I introduced to hold Cambodia accountable for their democracy and
human rights backsliding?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to underscore to the
Cambodian Government the importance of making progress on democracy and
human rights in Cambodia. I will continue to use all tools available to
promote accountability for those involved in human rights abuses and
democratic backsliding in Cambodia. The U.S.-Cambodia relationship will
not reach its full potential until there is progress on democracy and
human rights.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Robert William Forden by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. Do you stand by your testimony that only a single U.S.
diplomat was subjected to an anal swab test by Chinese authorities when
you were serving as Charge d'Affaires at U.S. Embassy Beijing?
Answer. Yes. I am aware of only one adult U.S. diplomat in China
during my tenure, who despite instructions to the contrary, complied
with a request from a Chinese local health official in February 2021
for an ``anal swab'' for COVID testing. As soon as it came to our
attention, we immediately protested to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which apologized and confirmed that foreign diplomats are not
required to comply with such tests and should not be asked. We
immediately reminded all Mission personnel that they should not comply
with any request in quarantine for any test beyond a throat/nasal swab
COVID test that was authorized by the Department and if they were
requested to do anything beyond that, they were to refuse and contact
the Embassy immediately.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to B. Bix Aliu by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Responsiveness to Committee and Congress
First, I have a few questions that speak to the importance
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials
in the executive branch, and that we expect and will be seeking
from you. I would ask you to provide just a YES or NO answer:
Question. Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and designated
staff when invited?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to keep this committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation
while policies are being developed, not just providing notification
after the fact?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to promptly responding to requests for
briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated
staff? Thank you.
Answer. Yes.
EU Accession
Montenegro's leadership is committed to making progress on
their EU accession effort, but the EU Commission notes that
polarization and political instability hinder the Government's
ability to carry out required reforms. In particular, the EU
Commission's December 2023 report found that no progress has
been made on justice reform.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to help Montenegro
overcome these obstacles to its European future?
Answer. In its first 100-days, the Europe Now-led Government has
overcome several issues addressed in the EU Commission's December 2023
report by filling vacant Constitutional Court, Judicial Council, and
Supreme State Prosecutor positions. If confirmed, I will encourage
leaders to strengthen Montenegro's legal systems and implement all the
necessary rule of law reforms for EU accession. Further, I would
advocate among our EU partners for clearly stated benchmarks and
counsel merited enlargement.
Anti-Corruption
The EU assesses that corruption and organized crime have
infiltrated state structures in Montenegro. My Combatting
Global Corruption Act passed as part of the 2024 National
Defense Authorization Act, and would require embassies such as
Embassy Podgorica to have an anti-corruption point of contact,
assess Montenegrin efforts to combat corruption, and make
recommendations to the Secretary of State on Global Magnitsky
sanctions when appropriate.
Question. What would be your process for assessing corruption in
Montenegro? Do you commit to prioritizing Embassy resources for this
important work?
Answer. If confirmed, I would apply a three-pronged approach for
assessing corruption in Montenegro, working with national law
enforcement, local and international civil society organizations like
Transparency International and Freedom House, and journalists.
Moreover, I would maintain the U.S. Embassy's vigorous efforts to
assist Montenegro in fighting endemic corruption. I would prioritize
strengthening Montenegro's ability to investigate and prosecute complex
organized crime and corruption; and continue support for the national
anticorruption strategy, which includes civil society, to prevent and
combat corruption.
Relations with Serbia
Montenegro has a complex relationship with Serbia given the
role of Serbian businesses in Montenegrin media, the important
role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegrin society, and
Serbian political pressure on the Montenegrin Government on
issues like Kosovo's independence.
Question. How would you work to ensure respect for Montenegrins'
religious and cultural connections to Serbia, while mitigating
potential malign influence on independent media and foreign policy?
Answer. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) remains one of
Montenegro's most trusted institutions, with 63 percent of all
Montenegrin citizens being adherents. For many Montenegrins, it is a
vital institution that underpins not only faith, but major life
milestones. However, the SOC is not just a faith community. It also
demonstrates clear interest in influencing political outcomes. If
confirmed, I will ensure that our engagement with all religious groups,
including the SOC, will promote freedom of religion or belief even as
we work against disinformation and malign influence.
Foreign Malign Influence
China's financing of a highway segment in Montenegro, the
first of four, contributed to Montenegro's public debt hitting
110 percent of GDP at its peak.
Question. If you were advising the Montenegrin Government, how
would you recommend that they proceed on the other highway segments and
other infrastructure projects financed by China?
Answer. If confirmed, I would advise that we work with the
interagency to implement programs such as a foreign investment
screening mechanism, the Blue Dot Network, and the Strategic Ports
Initiative. These mechanisms would allow Montenegro to better evaluate
potential projects through a national security lens to ensure that they
are adequately protecting their critical infrastructure and promote
development in accordance with global standards.
Question. Does the Montenegrin Government understand the risk of
large debts to the PRC?
Answer. Yes. Montenegro took a =925-million loan from China's Exim
Bank to finance 85 percent of the Bar-Boljare highway's first phase
constructed by, PRC state-owned, Chinese Road and Bridge Corporation.
Montenegro has paid down the loan, reducing its debt to =712 million.
The Government entered a hedge agreement with several unnamed banks to
limit currency exchange risk and renegotiated the terms to decrease
exposure to PRC economic coercion. The Government renewed the hedging
agreement in late 2023. Montenegro's Ministry of Finance maintains that
the transaction aligned with their 2024 budget, which authorizes the
Government to borrow up to $1.15 billion this year. The Government will
likely finance future infrastructure projects with this revenue stream
while avoiding future loans with the PRC.
Question. Given the concerns raised about your management and the
documents cited by the minority at your hearing (which had not been
previously provided to you or the majority), is there anything else you
would like to provide for the record?
Answer. Please find attached award nominations that attest to my
leadership-style and dedication to both Embassy personnel and the U.S.
foreign policy mission--included are nominations for the James A.
Baker, III Award for Outstanding Deputy Chief of Mission endorsed by
Ambassadors Mosbacher in 2020 and Brzezinski in 2022, Edward J. Perkins
Memorial Award(s) for Leadership in Diversity and Inclusion in 2021,
and Superior Honor Award for outstanding leadership at U.S. Mission
Warsaw in 2021.
I would like to respond the concerns expressed by the Minority over
the extended stay of a foreign national visitor in my residence. I did
not initially anticipate my guest's extended stay that European COVID
lockdown protocols necessitated. I immediately reported it to the
Ambassador and RSO. During my entire 22-year career, I have strictly
adhered to all reporting requirements with respect to contact with
foreign nationals and cohabitation. 12 FAM 271.2 defines ``foreign
national roommates'' and includes a 30-day calendar stay reporting
requirement. However, the inclusion of the 30-day calendar stay was
established on January 21, 2022, when 12 FAM 270 was updated by the
Department, and was fully implemented later that year. Prior to that
time, Department policy did not include a time-delineated reporting
requirement. Even absent this requirement, however, I immediately
reported it to the Ambassador and RSO.
The guest in my residence in Poland stayed with me from March 19 to
April 25, 2020. The reason for the extended stay was due to Polish and
European COVID-19 lockdown protocols at the time. At no time during the
stay did I discuss U.S. foreign policy regarding Montenegro or Poland.
I was unaware that I would be nominated to be ambassador to Montenegro
at the time (2020). I never discussed any issues related to Saudi
Arabia.
I reported my initial contact with this person in 2014 in line with
the FAM. The contact was also reported during my periodic DS security
clearance verifications. If confirmed, I will continue to remain
strictly in compliance with all FAM reporting requirements.
On June 1, 2023, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H) conveyed to
Minority Counsel the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's confirmation that
in this instance I abided by applicable security reporting requirements
at the time with respect to contact with foreign nationals and the
temporary stay at my Warsaw residence.
Material Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
to Support the Nomination of B. Bix Aliu
Awards Nominations
Q02
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to B. Bix Aliu by Senator James E. Risch
Montenegro and the United States
Question. How will you work with Montenegro's Government and
private sector to increase economic ties with the United States? What
would you do differently than the current ambassador?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use the bilateral Economic Dialogue to
bolster bilateral trade and investment. I will build on its success to
promote a level playing field for U.S. companies in key sectors like
infrastructure, energy, and IT. I will also push for increased economic
security cooperation, building on $15 million in Foreign Military
Assistance funds Montenegro received in 2023 to build an artillery
munitions plant, contributing to Allied military production and support
for Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression.
follow-up question
Question. Please provide a more fulsome response to the
second part of the question: what would you do differently than
the current Ambassador?
Answer. I want to note that U.S. Embassy Podgorica is doing
an excellent job with the recent trade mission to Montenegro
and reinvigorating the U.S.-Montenegro Economic Dialogue. If
confirmed, there are four further approaches I would use to
increase economic ties and private sector investments: 1. surge
public diplomacy and press on the benefits of working with U.S.
businesses; 2. engage the U.S.-based diaspora for its support
and investment in Montenegro; 3. collaborate with the
Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the
Department of Commerce to bring more trade missions to
Montenegro; 4. Work with the Government of Montenegro and the
EU on the Government's plan to build regional connectivity
(especially Albani, BiH, Serbia, and others) as part of the
EU's Growth Plan expected to begin work in April 2024.
If confirmed, I would also work with AmCham and Montenegro's
resident Embassy to hold trade fairs in Washington, DC.
Recognizing that Montenegro is a small but growing economy, I
would encourage Montenegrin leaders to participate in regional
investment opportunities that attract U.S. corporations. I have
experience in Poland with Select USA and would support such
missions if confirmed.
Finally, if confirmed, I would strongly urge the Montenegrin
Government to take up foreign investment screening, the OECD's
Blue Dot Network (BDN), and the Strategic Ports Initiative
(SPI) to protect U.S. national security interests and lower
American companies' investment risk profiles. Some of the most
significant investment opportunities for U.S. companies are in
Montenegro's infrastructure. Increased U.S. investment will
also counterbalance activity by PRC state-owned companies in
the region.
BDN is a new initiative set to launch in April 2024. It aims
to promote infrastructure development that is financially,
environmentally, and socially sustainable by certifying
projects that meet international standards. BDN helps signal to
American investors that certified projects address the most
common risk factors and lower risk profiles. The SPI builds
foreign port development, management, and operational capacity
to counter malign influence or control that could adversely
affect U.S. interests, particularly in maritime spaces. Smart
Port Workshops equip governments with commercial know-how to
make better choices when facing port development challenges and
financing gaps.
SPI's Transaction Advisory Service advises governments on
port financing and development. If confirmed, I would support
activities such as these to increase U.S. businesses' access to
the Montenegrin market.
Question. This week, a Montenegrin court overturned a previous
ruling that required the extradition of South Korean crypto-currency
businessman and fugitive Kwon Do-hyung to the United States. If
confirmed, how would you work with the Montenegrin authorities to move
the extradition of Mr. Kwon forward?
Answer. The United States has significant interests in extraditing
and prosecuting Kwon in the United States. If I am confirmed and this
issue remains unresolved, I will work in close partnership with the
Department of Justice to ensure Montenegro is aware of the advantages
of Kwon being prosecuted in the United States, including the
significant interests that the United States has in extraditing and
prosecuting Kwon for his extensive fraud that resulted in billions of
dollars of losses to investors, including many in the United States.
Question. How can the United States help Montenegro improve its
energy security?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to help
Montenegro further diversify its energy supply, develop competitive
energy markets, and better integrate domestic and regional energy
markets. Montenegro aims to increase renewable energy production; the
country has excellent conditions for solar and wind power. I will also
work to ensure a level playing field for U.S. companies seeking to
invest in the energy sector, particularly in renewable energy, and will
highlight for Montenegrin interlocutors the risks of PRC investments.
Montenegro and the EU
Montenegro has been very clear about its frustration of the
slow pace of its accession to the European Union. While they
began the EU accession process at the same time as Serbia,
Montenegro has opened 33 of the 35 chapters for negotiations,
while Serbia has only opened 22 chapters. Montenegro has
provisionally closed three chapters, while Serbia has only
closed 2.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Ambassador to Montenegro or
the U.S. Government should actively lobby the European Union to move
faster on allowing Montenegro to join the bloc? Why or why not?
Answer. The future of the Western Balkan countries lies squarely
within the EU. The United States has long supported EU accession for
qualified aspirants, including Montenegro. EU enlargement advances
democratic progress and promotes peace, stability, and prosperity.
If confirmed, I will urge EU institutions to prioritize
enlargement, sending a signal to Montenegro and other EU candidate
states that accession is possible for countries that make the necessary
reforms.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Ambassador to Montenegro or
the U.S. Government should actively lobby the European Union to de-link
the EU accessions of Montenegro and Serbia, allowing Montenegro to
accede first? Why or why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will urge the EU to consider Montenegro's
accession based on the country's progress and merits, not in relation
to any other aspirants. I would urge the European Union to prioritize
enlargement and make clear that it has played a key role in advancing
democratic progress and promoting peace, stability, and prosperity
throughout the region.
Foreign Influence
Question. What strategy do you have to engage with pro-Russian
parties in the Montenegrin Government?
Answer. Our engagement with the Montenegrin Government and ruling
coalition will be based on the October 2023 coalition agreement, which
commits to accelerating Montenegro's accession to the European Union,
staying fully aligned with EU Foreign and Security policy, ensuring
Montenegro is an active NATO Ally, and maintaining friendly relations
with all countries recognized by Montenegro, which includes Kosovo. If
confirmed, I will act to hold political parties accountable to this
agreement and will not hesitate to call out actions that diverge from
these stated values of this government.
Question. How will you engage the Government of Montenegro on the
importance of countering Russian and Chinese malign influence?
Answer. As a NATO Ally and the EU-accession front-runner,
Montenegro plays a pivotal role in a volatile region still struggling
to embrace Euro-Atlantic values and susceptible to malign foreign
influence from Russia and China. If confirmed, I will lead the Embassy
team to ensure that Montenegro remains firmly on its Euro-Atlantic
path, and continues its alignment with EU Foreign and Security
Policies, including sanctions against Russia and China.
follow-up question
Question. Please provide a more fulsome response addressing
how you will engage with the Government of Montenegro on
seizing sanctioned Russian assets in their jurisdiction and
repurposing them to support Ukraine's reconstruction, including
the touchpoints in the Montenegrin Government with which you
will discuss this issue and the arguments you will present to
them.
Answer. As an EU candidate, Montenegro aligns its foreign
policy with EU foreign policy, including the EU's sanctions
against Russia. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's
efforts to utilize foreign assistance to bolster Montenegrin
sanctions enforcement capacity, including by supporting the
development of new legislation to ensure Montenegro has the
legal framework to enforce the sanctions it has committed to
implement. This legislation is necessary for Montenegro to meet
interim benchmarks in accession Chapters 23 and 24; I would
encourage them to expedite these measures. If confirmed, I
would urge Parliamentary leaders and PM Spajic to include a
clause in this legislation that allows Russian assets seized
through sanctions to be used for Ukraine's reconstruction. To
further these objectives, I will engage with the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Finance, the Tax and Customs
Directorate, the Directorate for Inspections Affairs, and the
Directorate for Cadaster and State Property.
Question. How will you help support free and fair elections in
Montenegro and efforts to counter foreign interference in the election
process?
Answer. We are working with Allied partners to counter Russian
election meddling as part of a broader, global effort. If confirmed, I
will use the full range of available tools, including sanctions, to
expose and counter Russia's malign agenda. In November 2023, the United
States imposed sanctions on two Montenegrins whose corrupt activities
enabled Russia's efforts to compromise the independence of the
country's democratic institutions and judiciary, including its efforts
to influence electoral outcomes.
Defense Cooperation
Question. How will you encourage Montenegro to fulfill its NATO
pledge to spend 2 percent GDP on defense?
Answer. Montenegro met the Wales NATO Summit targets in its 2024
budget, adopted in December 2023, allocating over two percent of GDP to
defense, 30 percent of which is for force modernization. Although
actual defense spending has fallen short of the two percent target
because of unrealized defense contracts, Montenegro has several defense
capital investment projects underway that will boost actual spending
over the two percent target and enhance Montenegro's contributions to
the Alliance.
Question. As maritime threats rise around the world, including the
Red Sea and South China Sea, how will you engage with Montenegro on
increasing cooperation between our navies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue Embassy Podgorica's efforts
to expand the ties between the U.S. Navy and Montenegro through three
major investments: delivery and installation of a maritime radar system
that will provide full coverage of the Montenegrin coast, delivery of
four new patrol boats that increase Montenegro's patrol capabilities by
400 percent, and increased military educational engagement.
Montenegro's own planned investments, including the purchase of two
offshore patrol vessels, will allow Montenegro to join EU and NATO
deployments to the Mediterranean by 2030.
Corruption and Reform
Montenegro has been well-known as a quiet and welcoming spot
in which Russians can hide their ill-gotten gains. This
connection has continued despite Russia's 2022 invasion of
Ukraine and the resultant sanctions. According to RFE/RL, at
least 19,000 Montenegrin properties are owned by Russians,
including a villa owned by U.S. and EU-sanctioned oligarch Oleg
Deripaska.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to push
Montenegro to enforce U.S. and EU sanctions against these individuals?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to improve Montenegro's sanctions
enforcement. The United States should leverage its foreign assistance
to support Montenegrin institutions responsible for enforcing
sanctions. Building on the United States' robust assistance to
Montenegro's criminal justice sector, I would lead Embassy Podgorica to
similarly engage institutions responsible for sanctions enforcement,
which would enable greater sanctions compliance efforts against malign
Russian actors.
Question. What can the United States do to support anti-corruption
efforts and democratic reforms in Montenegro?
Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain the U.S. Embassy's already
strong efforts to assist Montenegro in fighting endemic corruption and
supporting democratic reforms. For example, with an annual budget of
approximately $4 million in INCLE funds, INL Montenegro implements a
broad range of programs that enhance Montenegro's rule of law and law
enforcement capacities and strengthen its democratic institutions. INL
assistance builds the capacity of Office of the Special State
Prosecutor and the Special Police to investigate and prosecute complex
organized crime and corruption.
Question. How will you encourage Montenegro's Government to ensure
its economy is not used for sanctions evasion?
Answer. Montenegro has adopted all EU sanctions related to Russia's
aggression in Ukraine. If confirmed, I will maintain the U.S. Embassy's
already strong efforts to assist Montenegro in fighting endemic
corruption and support democratic reforms that deny corrupt actors and
sanctions evaders a haven to operate. I will support Montenegro in
strengthening its legal systems and implement all the necessary rule of
law reforms required for EU accession, including a strict new anti-
money laundering law that will support sanctions enforcement and help
prevent sanctions evasion.
Question. How will you engage with the Government of Montenegro on
seizing sanctioned Russian assets in their jurisdiction and repurposing
them to support Ukraine's reconstruction?
Answer. As an EU aspirant, Montenegro has fully aligned its foreign
and security policies with the EU, including sanctions in response to
Russia's brutal war of aggression in Ukraine. If confirmed, I will
continue the Embassy's work to strengthen Montenegro's sanctions
enforcement regime through a combination of technical and
infrastructure support so that Montenegro's sanctions enforcement will
align with prevailing standards in policy and practice, yielding
improved sanctions compliance against Russian malign actors.
Reform
In the past ten years, Montenegro has made good reforms, but
it has far to go. In 2024, Freedom House rated Montenegro as
only ``Partly Free'' and as a ``Transitional or Hybrid''
regime.
Question. In your opinion, in which spheres has Montenegro made the
most progress, and in which areas do you believe Montenegro has fallen
short? Please provide examples to back up your answer.
Answer. Montenegro has made significant progress in political
pluralism and participation, as evident in the 2020 and 2023 elections
that ushered in a generational change in leadership. However, the
country faces challenges in areas like corruption, judicial
independence, and electoral reform.
If confirmed, I will support and encourage key Montenegrin
institutions and leaders who are fighting for positive change.
Question. If confirmed, in which reform areas would you direct
Embassy Podgorica to concentrate its reform efforts? Why?
Answer. One of the Embassy's top priorities is to support the
Government's efforts to strengthen the rule of law to advance
Montenegro's EU accession bid. Montenegro has made tangible progress on
the implementation of Chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights)
and 24 (justice, freedom, and security) of the EU accession framework,
areas where Embassy Podgorica has focused its reform efforts. If
confirmed, I will continue to prioritize our rule of law work as it is
essential for Montenegro's EU accession and its political stability.
Trafficking in Persons
In the State Department's 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report,
Montenegro was noted for its continued failure to meet the
minimum standards to eliminate trafficking.
Question. If confirmed, what concrete steps could you take to help
Montenegro operationalize the prioritized recommendations contained in
the TIP report?
Answer. Montenegro was ranked as ``Tier 2 Watch List'' in the
latest Trafficking in Persons Report in 2023 as it has not fully met
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making
significant efforts to do so.
Through INL assistance programs, the U.S. Embassy is developing
Montenegro's investigative capacity to identify trafficking cases and
build judicial capacities to bring perpetrators to justice. If
confirmed, I will urge the Government to investigate, prosecute, and
convict traffickers and call for improvements to victim identification,
protection, and compensation.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to accurately portraying the
realities of the trafficking situation on the ground in Montenegro
through the annual country report on trafficking in persons?
Answer. The United States is committed to combatting human
trafficking because it represents an attack on human rights and
freedoms. If confirmed, I pledge to ensure that Embassy Podgorica's
contributions to the Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report
continue to accurately portray the realities of trafficking in
Montenegro.
Religious Freedom
In the State Department's 2022 International Religious
Freedom report, Montenegro was noted as lacking overall
societal and governmental respect for international religious
freedom and for its disparate treatment of religious minorities
in country.
Question. What is your assessment of this particular issue and if
confirmed, how will you work with the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-
country?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our engagement with all
religious groups is in line with our core values, including respect for
religious freedom. I will work with our Embassy to engage all religious
communities and inform the Department's understanding of religious
freedom. I will speak out in favor of our fundamental values on issues
like democracy and human rights, including the fundamental freedom of
religion or belief.
follow-up question
Question. Please provide a more fulsome response,
specifically listing ways you will work with the Ambassador-at-
Large for International Religious Freedom to bolster religious
freedom in-country?
Answer. If confirmed, I would lead the Embassy in identifying
critical touchpoints throughout the year and host engagements
between the Ambassador-at-Large and Montenegrin religious
leaders. I would bolster the Embassy's ongoing collaboration
with the Ambassador-at-Large, ensuring that annual reporting
reflects my meetings with faith actors of all backgrounds,
civil society, and government officials. If confirmed, I will
also seek opportunities to collaborate with the Ambassador-at-
Large to speak out against attempts by malign actors to use
religion to advance pro-Kremlin policies and disinformation to
undermine Montenegro's democracy and which are contrary to U.S.
values. Public diplomacy will be critical; I would work with
IRF to engage the Ambassador-at-Large in speaking
opportunities, working with educational institutions and CSOs
to enforce religious freedom, including the right to practice
according to one's faith.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the work already underway at
Embassy Podgorica to promote religious freedom, including personally
engaging with civil society organizations that work to promote societal
and governmental respect for international religious freedom and
religious minorities.
Question. If confirmed, what concrete steps can you take to help
Montenegro increase their societal and governmental respect for
religious freedom?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. Embassy engagement with
all actors in Montenegro is guided by core U.S. values, including the
right to freedom of religion. In our public messaging and engagements
in private, we will take every opportunity to clearly communicate the
importance of these values and the importance of tolerance and
multiculturalism, for which Montenegro is known across the Western
Balkan region.
Also, I will speak out in favor of our fundamental values on issues
like democracy and human rights.
Human Rights
In the State Department's 2022 Human Rights Report,
Montenegro was noted as having a litany of significant human
rights issues, including alleged torture, threats of violence
against journalists, limits on the freedom of expression, and
more.
Question. How will you direct your Embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the work already underway by
the Embassy in Podgorica, working with the Government and members of
the international community and civil society to support democratic
growth and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
I will continue to support Montenegro in strengthening its legal
systems and implementing all the necessary rule of law reforms for EU
accession, measures that will bolster rule of law and improve
protections for human rights, including freedom of expression.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to personally engaging with
civil society on this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I am fully committed to engaging civil
society and will ensure our Embassy's work in this area is centered on
the defense of democracy, promotion of civil liberties, and the
protection of human rights.
International Organizations
Question. How can you, if confirmed as Ambassador, work alongside
IO and USUN to recruit and retain talented Americans for placement
within the U.N. system either in appointments, elections, or other
roles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing work
of the Bureau of International Organizations, Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel and their coordination with USUN to find,
recruit, and retain qualified U.S. citizens in the U.N. system. I will
support IO colleagues as they proactively identify openings and
advocate for more U.S. citizens in key leadership positions across the
U.N. and across international organizations. I will support efforts to
expand existing targeted recruitment efforts by increasing outreach
through different talent pipelines, connecting U.S. citizens already
employed by the U.N. with prospective applicants, and sharing the IO
Careers website as the advocacy portal.
State Management and Oversight
Question. Should Chiefs of Mission (COM) and Deputy Chiefs of
Mission (DCM) be held to a higher standard of conduct than the rest of
post?
Answer. Yes, absolutely. Leaders should model integrity and need to
hold themselves to a higher set of standards than others. They must
lead by example and demonstrate the behavior and conduct expected of
others.
Question. Are COMs and DCMs ultimately responsible for the conduct
of those they lead?
Answer. Leaders must understand although they may not be the cause
of behavior contrary to mission goals and principles, leaders
ultimately have a responsibility for the conduct of the organization
and people they lead. A leader needs to make decisions, be trustworthy,
empower others, communicate clearly, and support resilience. COMs and
DCMs need to establish and maintain clear standards in line with
Department policy and the FAM/FAH, enforce that criterion, and address
behaviors and individuals who are not upholding the organization's
standards.
Question. Should COMs and DCMs be models of behavior for the rest
of their posts?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe that relationships with foreigners while
serving abroad can create counterintelligence issues, particularly when
not reported properly? How do you think these risks should be
mitigated?
Answer. 12 FAM 270 outlines the guidelines all employees must
follow at the Department of State when reporting a foreign contact. The
Department of State has annual mandatory training for employees, Post
holds briefings on CI threats and contact reporting requirements
particular to Post. All concerns should be reported to DS in DC or the
RSO at post, who oversee reviewing/investigating and adjudicating each
case and following due process. DS is the ultimate decision maker in
such cases.
Question. Who at the State Department is the appropriate
adjudicator for COMs who breaks rules at post?
Answer. The A/S, PDAS, and ultimately the Secretary, but it is up
to all of us to ensure the Ambassador is getting feedback on their
performance (you cannot fix what you do not know), being told the truth
and consequences of actions, and any acts of discrimination, harassment
or unethical/illegal behavior must be reported via outlined procedures
to the Department. Due process must be followed.
Question. Do you believe it is important to uphold the relevant
whistleblower protection laws and refrain from retaliation against
employees who file complaints, even if those complaints are against
you?
Answer. Yes, completely agree.
Question. At any point while you were Charge d'Affaires or DCM at
Mission Poland, was Embassy Warsaw ever listed by the State Department
as a post that is ``Historically Difficult to Staff''?
Answer. Mission Poland was a Historically Difficult to Staff (HDS)
post in bid-years 2018, 2019, and 2021. I worked to reverse this status
by expanding our recruitment efforts; updating data and reports
regarding conditions in Warsaw, in particular highlighting positive
attributes; and interviewing potential staff.
Posts are designated HDS on an annual basis; GTM analysis
determines positions as Hard-To-Fill (HTF) if there are fewer than
three bids from qualified, at-grade bidders; and posts with more than
50 percent HTF positions are considered Most Difficult to Staff (MDS).
The Department determines a mission is HDS if it has been MDS for at
least three out of four most recent bid cycles. HDS in not necessarily
an indicator of morale at post; other elements like the country's
climate, a difficult language without incentive pay, and a closed
culture may contribute to staffing difficulties.
Question. Many U.S. missions have been under enormous stress over
the last several years. What is your understanding of morale throughout
Mission Montenegro?
Answer. As I understand, morale in Mission Montenegro is positive.
In a recent survey, +80 percent U.S. direct-hires and locally employed
staff members indicated that they were satisfied with their employment
at the Embassy, and more than half reported that they have strong or
excellent morale. For those who reported average or low morale, the
major concerns were: 1. inflation and its impact on purchasing power
for local staff; 2. overcrowding in the current Embassy building (a
move to a New Office Building is anticipated in fall 2024); and 3.
workload for some offices, as demands for the Mission have grown faster
than the Embassy's personnel footprint. If confirmed, I will work to
address personnel and compensation issues and effectively communicate
to all Embassy staff the decisions made and the reasons behind those
decisions.
Question. How do you intend to improve morale at Mission
Montenegro?
Answer. I will continue the Embassy's already ongoing efforts to
promote high morale by prioritizing internal communication with the
Mission community, through town halls, community events, and team
building. I will support a smooth transition to the first phase of a
New Embassy Office Building, opening anticipated in fall 2024, which
should allow more space for all employees. To address the concerns of
locally employed staff (LE Staff), I would host our Post Management
Officer (PMO) and GTM/Overseas Employment analyst to improve
communication and transparency in post's Local Compensation Plan and
compensation reviews. Where justified, I will also advocate with the
Department for additional staffing in sections most impacted by heavy
workload.
Question. How do you intend to create a unified mission and vision
at Mission Montenegro?
Answer. I will create a unified mission and vision at the Mission
by working with the Embassy team to establish a clear interagency
strategy, one that is aligned with core U.S. values and policy
priorities. Furthermore, I will ensure that Embassy team members' work
is prioritized according to that strategy. I will regularly engage with
all employees about our Mission goals, both communicating my personal
view and welcoming team members' feedback on ways that we can all work
together to advance U.S. goals in Montenegro.
Question. Management is a key responsibility for Chiefs of Mission.
How would you describe your management style?
Answer. I am an empathetic leader who empowers his people, supports
and protects his team, communicates vision, and has as a top priority
the physical and mental well-being of his team. As DCM and long-term
Charge, I have implemented ``Mission Tenet'' exercises, where the
entire community participates in a mission-wide exercise to establish a
list of behavioral norms and expectations for the mission. We all then
promise to hold each other accountable to them. ``Be a decent human
being'' is almost always at the top. I have spent almost half of my
career working at the Foreign Service Institute to teach, train and
mentor the future leaders of our service, both civil and foreign. I
hold our public servants in the highest regard, and will always
advocate for improved conditions, high-morale, work-life balance, and
esprit de corps.
Question. Do you believe it is ever acceptable or constructive to
berate subordinates, either in public or private?
Answer. Never.
Question. How do you envision your relationship with the Deputy
Chief of Mission?
Answer. As a two-time DCM for 5 ambassadors, both career and non-
career, I have learned what qualities I wish to emulate and which I do
not. Communication, confidence, trust, and honesty are a must between
the two. The two should be complementary to each-other, but with
diverse views and experiences to bring as much experience to the table
as possible. Each should debate freely and openly when there are points
of disagreement. They should understand each-others style, personality
types, and preferred method of communication. They must respect each-
other and have each-others back to present a united front. However,
both individuals should be ready and able to tell the other when any
red lines are close to being breached. If those red lines are crossed,
both individuals must have the moral courage to hold the other
responsible and report any issues when required.
Question. If confirmed, what leadership responsibilities do you
intend to entrust to your Deputy Chief of Mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be the CEO, and the DCM will be the
COO. Diplomacy is an apprenticeship--and I very much look forward to
working with the DCM and providing them with professional development
opportunities in order to prepare them to lead their own mission--share
contacts, and encourage the DCM to form their own; share meetings;
prepare the DCM to act as Charge in my absence; ensure the DCM has
high-level contacts in DC and in-country and help establish their
reputation and ability to influence. I will also learn from them--they
will have served at post longer, and if confirmed, I look forward to
their counsel and guidance. I have been lucky to have had some
excellent relationships with the Ambassadors that I have worked with.
If confirmed, I commit to working towards the same.
Question. In order to create and continue employee excellence at
the Department, accurate and direct employee evaluation reports (EERs)
for Foreign Service Officers are imperative, though often lacking. Do
you believe that it is important to provide employees with accurate,
constructive feedback on their performances in order to encourage
improvement and reward those who most succeeded in their roles?
Answer. Yes, these elements are part of my leadership style.
Question. If confirmed, would you support and encourage clear,
accurate, and direct feedback to employees in order to improve
performance and reward high achievers?
Answer. Yes, I would support.
Question. It is imperative that U.S. diplomats get outside of posts
abroad to meet with local actors, including host government officials,
non-government organizations, and local citizens. In your experience,
do U.S. diplomats get outside of our Embassy walls enough to accomplish
fully their missions?
Answer. I place high value in engaging with the host government,
civil society and other organizations, and local citizens. COVID
protocols drastically impacted person-to-person diplomacy; however,
this critical engagement is resuming and, if confirmed, I would support
a return to interactions that meet or exceed pre-COVID activity. My
impression is that U.S. Embassy Podgorica has excellent relations with
all elements of Montenegrin society and the host government, an aspect
I would use as a springboard to further U.S. foreign policy.
Question. How do you intend to improve the ability of U.S.
diplomats to better access all local populations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage Mission staff take external
meetings, develop external contacts, participate in public panel
sessions in line with their core job functions, and share their stories
and American culture at our American Corners and at educational
institutions as appropriate.
The role of every American at post is to represent the best of the
United States abroad. I would embody that approach and encourage my
staff to replicate it. Further, in partnership with my Public Diplomacy
Section's exchanges, cultural programs, and youth engagements, I would
build increased support for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and
Accessibility, with a focus on improving the treatment of marginalized
groups.
Question. Congressional Delegations (CODELs) and Staff Delegations
(STAFFDELs) serve a critical oversight mission. Do you pledge to
support fully CODELs and STAFFDELs that seek to travel to post with the
only exceptions for simultaneous or overlapping visits by the President
or First Lady of the United States, the Vice President, or the
Secretaries of State or Defense?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, we would fully support CODELs and
STAFFDELs that seek to travel to post with the only exceptions for
simultaneous or overlapping visits by the President or First Lady of
the United States, the Vice President, or the Secretaries of State or
Defense.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to B. Bix Aliu by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What are the key tactics Russia has employed in its
attempts to increase its influence in Montenegro?
Answer. Russia works to destabilize Montenegro through
disinformation campaigns, election meddling through covert political
financing, and espionage. Since 2022, Montenegro has expelled 11
Russian diplomats and citizens over ``conspiracy to make a criminal
enterprise and espionage.'' If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Embassy
team to collaborate with the interagency, EU, and local partners to
counter disinformation; bolster Montenegrin civil society and
independent journalism; amplify U.S. messaging on shared transatlantic
values; and, when appropriate, we will also pursue sanctions.
Question. How have Montenegro's historical ties with the West,
including its NATO membership, contributed its response to Russian
aggression and efforts to increase its influence in the country?
Answer. A majority of Montenegrins see their future in the EU, and
Montenegro's leadership is committed to EU accession. Montenegro has
fully aligned its foreign and security policies with the EU, to include
adopting all Russia sanctions. Montenegrin leaders consider NATO
membership to be a pillar in Montenegro's foreign policy. Prime
Minister Milojko Spajic has made pointed declarations against Russia's
unjust war and has committed to supporting Ukraine and all NATO Allies.
If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Embassy team to ensure that
Montenegro remains firmly on its Euro-Atlantic path; continues its
alignment with EU Foreign and Security Policies, including sanctions
against Russia; is a capable NATO Ally; and continues to assist Ukraine
to defend against Russia's brutal aggression.
Question. What steps can the European Union and NATO take to
support Montenegro in resisting Russian influence and advancing its
integration into Western institutions?
Answer. NATO is a credible deterrent to overt Russian aggression
and can help mitigate hybrid threats like cyberattacks and
disinformation campaigns. For example, in the wake of the 2022 cyber-
incident on Montenegro's Government systems, France and the United
States provided expert support to quell the attack and reduce further
impact.
The EU enlargement process has advanced democratic progress and
promoted peace, stability, and prosperity throughout Europe. If
confirmed, I will encourage Montenegro's leaders to work together
passing the reforms necessary to meet interim benchmarks and make real
advances in rule of law. I will advocate among our EU partners for
clearly stated benchmarks and encourage merited accession.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to B. Bix Aliu by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit the largest quantity of greenhouse
gases in the world today. With their absolute control of Chinese
society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these destructive
actions tomorrow if they so choose to do so. Is the CCP a threat to the
United States?
Answer. In 2023, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that ``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential
threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' Under
President Xi, the CCP has become more repressive at home and more
assertive abroad, seeking to undercut U.S. influence and alliances. If
confirmed, I will advance U.S. national security interests and push
back against PRC efforts to expand its malign influence, through robust
and forthright diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, and commercial
advocacy to bolster U.S.-Montenegro ties.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. The Administration assesses the Chinese Communist Party's
(CCP) activities in the context of the fact that, as Secretary Blinken
has said, the CCP has become more repressive at home and more
aggressive abroad. According to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the CCP is seeking to
``undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its
partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. The United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change, when it is in the
U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues
across the U.S. interagency and Congress to advance U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC and other actors in Montenegro.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests in Montenegro and countering efforts by our
strategic and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of State and
interagency colleagues and Congress to address the PRC's efforts to
expand its influence in Montenegro and the region.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No, I did not sign the open letter to the President.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No, I did not participate.
Question. If confirmed, would you define one of the employees or
contractors operating under your supervision signing an open letter
criticizing you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the
President, as insubordination as defined by the Government
Accountability Office?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to address employee concerns
personally by creating an open, trusting, and harassment-free work
environment. I am mindful of and value Department employees' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, I understand the
expression of disagreement does not in and of itself constitute
insubordination. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor to determine the proper course of action
should such a matter arise.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing''?
Answer. I believe these employees were expressing a dissenting view
to their leadership. I would hope that employees would feel confident
to directly raise their concerns with their supervisors and management
rather than signing an anonymous letter. ``Whistleblowing'' is a term
and activity covered by legislation and regulations; I defer to the
Department's Office of the Legal Advisor to determine whether the
referenced actions are considered protected whistleblowing activity.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make sure that employees know that
there are several avenues available to express policy disagreements. I
would encourage employees to use established channels to express their
views.
According to Department regulations, insubordination is a
disciplinary matter related to conduct on the job and may result in
counseling and a penalty commensurate with the scale of the offense. If
confirmed, I would address discipline issues, including
insubordination, in consultation with the Department's human resources
and legal professionals.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No, I have not expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is an antisemitic entity. Hamas, which is
designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization,
seeks to eliminate the State of Israel, and its founding charter calls
for the killing of Jewish people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. The Administration supports humanitarian pauses to allow
for delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza and for the safe exit of
hostages and other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration's stated
policy is to support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a
sustained flow of aid and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians
seeking safer locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is
attempting to secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The
U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas'
terrorism consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. The U.S. Government supports Israel's right to protect
itself, consistent with international law. The Administration has urged
Israel to differentiate between civilians and Hamas terrorists and to
avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of civilians as human shields, a
blatant violation of international law, does not lessen Israel's
obligations under international humanitarian law.
Question. Department policy requires all employees to report when
they live, or cohabitate, with a foreign national. This is to protect
employees from possible exposure to counterintelligence risks.
Employees are advised that failure to comply may affect continued
access to classified information. How long did you reside with any
foreign nationals in your government residence in Poland?
Answer. During my entire 22-year career, I have strictly adhered to
all reporting requirements with respect to contact with foreign
nationals and cohabitation. 12 FAM 271.2 defines ``foreign national
roommates'' and includes a 30-day calendar stay reporting requirement.
However, the inclusion of the 30-day calendar stay was established on
January 21, 2022, when 12 FAM 270 was updated by the Department, and
was fully implemented later that year. Prior to that time, Department
policy did not include a time-delineated reporting requirement. Even
absent this requirement, however, I immediately reported it to the
Ambassador and RSO. The guest in my residence in Poland stayed with me
from March 19 to April 25, 2020. The reason for the extended stay was
due to Polish and European COVID-19 lockdown protocols at the time.
Again, I immediately informed the Ambassador and RSO of the visitor. I
reported my initial contact with this person in line with the FAM in
2014. The contact was also reported during my periodic DS security
clearance verifications. If confirmed, I will continue to remain
strictly in compliance with all FAM reporting requirements.
On June 1, 2023, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H) conveyed to
Minority Counsel the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's confirmation that
in this instance I abided by applicable security reporting requirements
at the time with respect to contact with foreign nationals and the
temporary stay at my Warsaw residence.
Question. Did you report the cohabitation, as required, prior to or
during the time period you had a foreign national living in your
residence?
Answer. Yes, during that period, I reported the stay to the
Ambassador and the RSO.
Question. It is my understanding that employees are briefed upon
arrival at every overseas assignment regarding cohabitation reporting
requirements, regardless of rank or position. Did you report this
living arrangement prior to the foreign national living in your
residence?
Answer. I did not initially anticipate my guest's extended stay.
European COVID lockdown protocols necessitated it, and when this became
apparent during the visit, I immediately reported it to the Ambassador
and RSO.
I reported my initial contact with this person in 2014 in line with
the FAM. The contact was also reported during my periodic DS security
clearance verifications. On June 1, 2023, the Bureau of Legislative
Affairs (H) conveyed to Minority Counsel the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security's confirmation that in this instance I abided by applicable
security reporting requirements at the time with respect to contact
with foreign nationals and the temporary stay at my Warsaw residence.
Question. It is my understanding the foreign national was a
Montenegrin national with ties to Saudi Arabian and Montenegrin
businesses. Did you discuss U.S. foreign policy regarding Montenegro or
Poland, or any Saudi business when you lived with the foreign national?
Answer. No, I did not discuss U.S. foreign policy regarding
Montenegro or Poland. I was unaware that I would be nominated to be
Ambassador to Montenegro at the time (2020). I never discussed any
issues related to Saudi Arabia.
Question. Can you comment on the employees who departed the U.S.
Embassy in Poland early while under your leadership?
Answer. I want to assure you that during my tenure in Poland, there
were no curtailments due to my leadership or management style. Post was
operating during a time of intense stress--a global pandemic, Russia's
war against Ukraine, and a change of administration. Curtailments
happen for a variety of personal and professional reasons. The mental
health and the safety of my employees has always been a top priority
for me, and will remain so, if confirmed. As I noted during my hearing,
during my 4-year tenure in Poland, there were five curtailments, three
for personal/family reasons and two that were asked to leave by
leadership; a list was provided to minority counsel. I prioritize the
wellbeing and safety of those who work for me, and my record shows that
this approach has been effective.
Question. Montenegro is a member of NATO and maintains positive
bilateral relations with the U.S. In late 2022, Montenegro expelled
multiple Russian diplomats and Russian citizens regarding an espionage
investigation. Montenegro adopted sanctions against Moscow following
the invasion of Ukraine which resulted in cyberattack targeting from
Moscow. If confirmed, how will you support Montenegro in maintaining
resilience in the face of Russian aggression?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Embassy team to
collaborate with the interagency, EU, and local partners to counter
disinformation; bolster Montenegrin civil society and independent
journalism; amplify U.S. messaging on shared transatlantic values;
build Montenegro's cyber-resiliency supported by DoD's cyber security
cooperation and the Maine National Guard State Partnership Program;
and, when appropriate, we will also pursue sanctions against malign or
corrupt actors.
Question. Are there any specific programs you will advocate for to
reduce energy reliance upon Russia energy in Montenegro?
Answer. Montenegro derives all its power domestically from two
hydropower plants in Perucica and Piva and the coal-fired Pljevlja
thermal power plant (TPP). It has no reliance on Russian gas. If
confirmed, the critical energy sector focus will be decarbonization,
which is in line with Administration priorities.
If confirmed, I would leverage the Economic Dialogue and other
mechanisms to continue facilitating private sector participation in
renewable energy policy making and encourage U.S. companies to bid on
renewable energy projects.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Michael Sfraga by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Responsiveness to Committee and Congress
First, I have a few questions that speak to the importance
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials
in the executive branch, and that we expect and will be seeking
from you. I would ask you to provide just a YES or NO answer:
Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and designated
staff when invited?
Do you commit to keep this committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation
while policies are being developed, not just providing notification
after the fact?
Do you commit to promptly responding to requests for
briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated
staff?
Answer. Yes, I agree and commit to all of the above.
Russia's Membership
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has made itself a pariah on the
international stage. While the Russian Federation remain a
member of the Council, though the Arctic Council's official
business has been on pause since Russia started its war in
March 2022.
Question. What is the future of the Arctic Council given Russia's
actions in Ukraine and the strain it has placed on the Arctic Council's
ability to function as a body?
Answer. Because of Russia's illegal full-scale invasion of
Ukraine--contrary to the values of the Arctic Council--the United
States and its likeminded Arctic partners paused their participation in
the Arctic Council during Russia's chairmanship in March 2022. Since
then, the Council has taken incremental steps to advance work and
recently agreed to the gradual resumption of virtual meetings of the
Arctic Council's Working Groups and Expert Group to ensure critical
Arctic projects can advance through the region's preeminent
multilateral forum without returning to business as usual with Russia.
The United States will continue to adjust its participation as needed
in response to the behavior of the Russian Federation while also
seeking to sustain the Council, and advance our interests, as outlined
in the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region.
Resources in Arctic
The Arctic is changing more rapidly than any other place on
Earth. The race to explore and exploit this region as it
becomes more accessible certainly presents opportunities but
also great risks.
Question. What is your vision for responsible activities and
resource management in the Arctic?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other federal agencies and
the State of Alaska, in consultation with Alaska Native Tribes,
communities, and corporations, to prioritize good governance,
environmental responsibility, and sustainable development of natural
resources in support of the National Security Strategy and the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region. The Strategy's Climate Change and
Environmental Protection Pillar and the Sustainable Economic
Development Pillar emphasize the importance of reducing emissions,
improving scientific understanding, and conserving ecosystems, all
while supporting the pursuit of economic opportunities and sustainable
development for local communities, including critical minerals.
Question. How do the other Arctic nations approach and manage
increased human activity in the Arctic. In what areas do you think
better cooperation is necessary?
Answer. Other like-minded Arctic states share similar strategies,
and, if confirmed, I would work closely with our Arctic allies and
partners, as well as our missions in the region, to manage increased
human activity in the Arctic.
University of Alaska
Question. Dr. Sfraga, while employed by the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks, was it your responsibility to negotiate or implement any
MOUs with Chinese universities? Did you negotiate or implement any MOUs
with Chinese universities?
Answer. No. I did not negotiate, sign, or implement any MOUs while
employed by the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. This was the purview
of the Dean and Provost.
Question. Senator Risch stated that you ``appeared on a panel with
Russians sanctioned by the United States Government.'' Is that
accurate? Can you please respond?
Answer. In 2021, I spoke on a virtual panel of the Fort Ross
Dialogue. To my knowledge, other panelists on that panel were not and
have not been sanctioned. I was also not aware of any sanctioned
entities sponsoring the event; to my knowledge neither Transneft nor
Sovcomflot were sanctioned at the time of the event.
In 2017, I participated in-person on a panel at The Arctic:
Territory of Dialogue event in Arkhangelsk, Russia, as previously
reported to the committee. Dr. Elena Kudryashova, Rector of the
Lomonosov Northern (Arctic) Federal University, moderated the panel and
was sanctioned in June 2022.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Michael Sfraga by Senator James E. Risch
Question. What do you view as the main purpose of this position?
What are the primary responsibilities you will assume if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs, I
would serve as the counterpart to other nations' Arctic Ambassadors;
provide expertise to and facilitate communication among our bilateral
ambassadors; lead U.S. delegations at international Arctic meetings,
conferences, or events; inform U.S. Arctic policy; advance applicable
strategies and initiatives; and communicate and project U.S. Arctic
policy at home and abroad. I would engage with domestic Arctic
constituents, utilizing my personal and professional networks
throughout the State of Alaska and Indigenous communities, to advocate
with and for them globally, as appropriate.
follow-up question
In your initial answer to the question above, you stated
that, if confirmed, you would ``engage with domestic Arctic
constituents, utilizing [your] personal and professional
networks throughout the State of Alaska and indigenous
communities, to advocate with and for them globally, as
appropriate.'' In a later question, you noted your ``decades of
experience and leadership in Arctic-related issues as well as
substantial personal and professional networks in Alaska, to
include the Alaska Federation of Natives, State of Alaska,
Indigenous and rural communities, Native corporations, and
industry.''
Question. Please confirm that, if confirmed as a State
Department official, you would have no remit, authority,
responsibility, or other role in U.S. domestic policy beyond
those directly connected to relations between the United States
and foreign governments and other international Arctic
stakeholders.
Answer. If confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic
Affairs, as a State Department official, I would have no remit,
authority, responsibility, or other role in U.S. domestic
policy beyond those directly connected to relations between the
United States and foreign governments and other international
Arctic stakeholders.
Question. If confirmed, what is your plan to establish the format
and operations of this office and build a foundation and precedent for
future successors in the role?
Answer. The office would serve as a single point of contact with
the State Department for applicable Arctic matters. The Ambassador's
office would be developed to complement and elevate, rather than
duplicate existing work across the Department. Office staff are already
working closely with colleagues in the relevant functional and regional
bureaus and at missions abroad, as well as the interagency, to develop
policy, plan and lead coordination meetings, and prepare U.S.
Government representatives for internal and external Arctic
engagements. If confirmed, I would be eager to benefit from their
already-strong working relationships and would bring my own expertise
and leadership to the position.
follow-up question
Question. How would you avoid potential conflicts of interest
involving matters related to individuals or organizations with
whom you have a prior relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will comply with all federal ethics
laws, rules and regulations. In my ethics agreement, I
committed to resigning from all outside positions upon
confirmation, and I understand my obligation under the ethics
regulations to recuse from working on official matters
involving the organizations from which I am resigning. I will
not show undue preference in my role as Ambassador-at-Large to
any organization or individual, and I will seek guidance from
the Department of State Ethics Office on any ethics issues that
arise.
Question. If confirmed, how to you plan to structure this office?
Please describe the size and organizational structure of the Arctic
Ambassador's staff as you envision it, and how it will fit into the
broader bureaucratic structure at the Department.
Answer. As of March 2024, the Ambassador's office has five staffing
billets in addition to the Ambassador: a Chief of Staff, two Senior
Advisrs, a Public Diplomacy Officer, and an administrative support
professional. If confirmed, I would lead the office and seek
opportunities to add to its expertise. I do not foresee changes to
Departmental organization, but I would seek to coordinate and convene
the many stakeholders, including our missions abroad and Arctic leaders
in other agencies, to strengthen unity of effort in a results-driven
approach.
Question. If you are confirmed, how do you view your role as Arctic
Ambassador in the context of other bodies in the U.S. Government that
manage various aspects of U.S. arctic policy?
Answer. The Office of the Arctic Ambassador should add value
through leadership and its circumpolar foreign policy perspective to
elevate and amplify the excellent work the U.S. Government and its many
Arctic partners already do. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Arctic leaders across the Executive Branch and the Congress to advance
U.S. interests.
Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate your work with U.S.
Government bodies and non-government organizations? Please be specific.
Answer. The Department is fortunate to already have strong
collaborative partnerships with the many agencies working on Arctic
issues, supported by regular interagency coordination calls and
detailees who work at the Department of Defense's Ted Stevens Center in
Alaska. If confirmed, I would bring to the position decades of
experience and leadership in Arctic-related issues as well as
substantial personal and professional networks in Alaska, to include
the Alaska Federation of Natives, State of Alaska, Indigenous and rural
communities, Native corporations, and industry. The office of the
Ambassador-at-Large would continue to serve as the central point of
contact to help external entities navigate the Department's
organizational structure on Arctic-related matters under my leadership.
If confirmed, I would also seek to bring interagency expertise into the
Department, either through the detail process or other mechanisms.
Similarly, I would seek to partner with organizations focused on Arctic
affairs in ways that advance U.S. policy and leadership in the region.
follow-up questions
Question. In your initial response to the question above, you
described your potential role as being, ``the central point of
contact to help external entities navigate the Department's
organizational structure on Arctic-related matters under my
leadership.'' What did you mean by this?
Answer. Within the Department of State, numerous functional
and regional bureaus handle respective Arctic-related equities,
including bilateral relationships with Arctic states, PRC
regional ambitions, NORAD, NATO, Arctic Council, climate
change, energy security, investment screening, and critical
infrastructure, among many others. If confirmed, the
Ambassador's office will continue to help other federal
agencies, Congressional offices, and like-minded foreign
governments connect to the most appropriate experts in the
State Department based on the issue at hand.
Question. What ``external entities'' are you referring to?
Answer. ``External entities'' are those external to the
Department. Primary examples include other federal agencies,
Congressional offices, and like-minded foreign governments.
Question. What measures and safeguards would you implement to
ensure that helping ``external entities navigate the
Department's organizational structure,'' does not enable
foreign or external actors to advocate more effectively for
policies that are at odds with U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. ``External entities'' are those external to the
Department such as other federal agencies, Congressional
offices, and like-minded foreign governments. Serving as this
central point of contact would help the Ambassador's office
maintain awareness of the myriad of Arctic-related activities
in various offices and bureaus, both to ensure all internal
Department views are represented and accounted for externally,
and also to ensure our collective awareness of foreign or
external actors aiming to advocate for policies at odds with
U.S. national security interests.
In your response to the question above, you stated that you
``would seek to partner with organizations focused on Arctic
affairs in ways that advance U.S. policy and leadership in the
region.''
Question. Which organizations did you have in mind?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully comply with the
Department's policies, guidance, and legal requirements related
to any potential partnership with any organization, including
related to the identification and vetting of potential
partners.
Question. How would you evaluate these organizations' goals
to ensure compatibility with U.S. interests?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully comply with the
Department's policies, guidance, and legal requirements related
to any potential partnership with any organization, including
related to the identification and vetting of potential
partners. Any potential partner would not only be vetted
through multiple offices and bureaus with Arctic equities
throughout the Department, but also through the Under Secretary
for Management as well as the Bureau of Global Public Affairs
as needed.
Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate with the Senior
Arctic Official?
Answer. The Senior Arctic Official (SAO), a Senior Foreign Service
Officer in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, would continue to represent the United States in
the Arctic Council and liaise with his or her counterparts in other
Arctic States. If confirmed, I would build upon and expand the already
close working and strategic relationship between the Ambassador-at-
Large office and the SAO and staff, as I would with all Department
officials engaged in Arctic affairs, to ensure U.S. equities in the
Arctic Council both shape and are shaped by a holistic view of U.S.
foreign policy priorities. If confirmed, I would work with the SAO to
ensure the Ambassador's office is effectively supporting U.S.
initiatives and interests at the Council.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play
in U.S. participation in the Arctic Council?
Answer. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs would continue to house the SAO and represent the
United States in the Arctic Council. If confirmed, I would provide
additional expertise on matters in the Council's purview, coordinate
with the SAO on specific matters pertaining to the Council, as
appropriate, and join the SAO at international meetings and fora, when
needed, to reinforce and enhance our nation's position in the Arctic
and within the Council.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe that the Office of the
Arctic Ambassador should play in liaising with indigenous communities
in the United States? Please explain the reasoning behind your answer.
Answer. The State of Alaska makes the United States an Arctic
State, and our northern communities living in the Arctic understand the
profound changes happening there through personal experience. The
Administration's National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR),
published in October 2022, notes that coordination, consultation, and
co-management with Indigenous Peoples should underpin all U.S. work in
the Arctic. Whether participating in the Arctic Council, cultural
efforts such as the in Fulbright Arctic Initiative, or other people-to-
people exchange programs, the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic must be
able to advocate for shared interests. If confirmed I would leverage my
extensive network to incorporate Indigenous knowledge, perspectives,
and concerns in policy formation as applicable.
Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate with the Arctic
Executive Steering Committee?
Answer. In my current position as Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research
Commission, I am a member of the Arctic Executive Steering Committee
(AESC) and the Chair's coordination processes. If confirmed, I would
build on my close relationship with the team at the White House to
ensure the Department of State is robustly represented in the
interagency and to ensure other agencies have access to the
Department's expertise and counsel in shaping their own work. I would
also work closely with the AESC Chair to ensure synergistic efforts,
avoid duplication of work, and harmonize dovetailing workstreams.
follow-up questions
In your responses to several previous questions, you
described your close relationships with Native communities.
Russia and China have repeatedly used Native communities as a
conduit for foreign malign investment and influence that might
otherwise be subject to increased regulatory scrutiny.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with Allies and
other stakeholders to address this vulnerability?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to share best practices
and lessons learned with like-minded governments on USG efforts
to invest in infrastructure, improve access to services, and
support growing economic sectors to improve Allied and Arctic
community collaboration. I would also work with Allies and
partners to expand high-standard investment, counter the
narrative of adversaries, and advance sustainable development
across the Arctic region.
Question. In your resubmitted nomination file, you list a new
professional affiliation as a Senior Fellow at Arctic360.
Please describe the nature of your role at Arctic360 and your
responsibilities.
Answer. During my approximately one year as a non-compensated
Senior Fellow, I was not active in the organization. I stepped
down in February 2024.
Question. Why is your name not listed on the ``Senior
Fellows,'' section of the website? See here: https://
arctic360.org/senior-fellows.
Answer. As noted in my previous answer, as of February 2024,
I am no longer affiliated with the organization.
Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize your work on
security and non-security issues related to the Arctic?
Answer. Russia's war against Ukraine has upended the longstanding
paradigm of regular cooperation in the Arctic and made cooperation with
Russia in the Arctic virtually impossible. Traditional military and
other security issues (e.g., energy, food, infrastructure) are
interconnected in the Arctic, and the Department is fortunate to have a
robust collection of Bureaus and offices engaged in the full scope of
work on U.S. Arctic priorities. If confirmed, I would seek to bring my
expertise and leadership on these intersecting issues to further
advance the full suite of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
I would leverage the Department's breadth and depth of regional and
functional expertise to elevate U.S. leadership in the Arctic and
ensure security remains at the forefront of our efforts in this region
of growing geopolitical tensions.
Question. In general, what do you believe have been the successes
and failures of the Arctic Council?
Answer. For nearly three decades, the Arctic Council has been the
preeminent forum for intergovernmental cooperation on Arctic issues,
with the exception of those related to military security matters. As a
consensus-based forum, the Arctic Council has succeeded in advancing
circumpolar work on issues of mutual interest to all Arctic States
while providing a place unique among international fora for Indigenous
Peoples' participation. It has maintained Arctic State primacy over
regional governance issues and provided space for the genesis of key
legally binding arrangements on topics such as oil spill response and
search and rescue. However, in a region of increasing geopolitical
competition and global interest, the Council will need to reflect on,
adapt to, and evolve with these changing circumstances to retain its
influence and importance.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to combat Russian
influence in international engagements focused on the Arctic, including
in the Arctic Council?
Answer. If confirmed, I would elevate U.S. leadership in the Arctic
by representing U.S. views and priorities through a robust
international presence as well as strategic domestic participation in
related fora. I would stand side-by-side with our six Arctic NATO
Allies to advance our collective interests. This new ``trans-Arctic''
alliance reinforces the Transatlantic Alliance. Presenting an
unequivocable vision in support and defense of our nation's interests--
as well as those of our Allies--is an important role for the Ambassador
to play. Our active, substantive presence at the global policy table
protects our influence. Strong, persistent, visible U.S. leadership is
needed throughout the Arctic. I would leverage the tools at my disposal
to represent the United States, providing a strong and consistent
message to counter the narratives pushed by our adversaries.
Because of Russia's illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine--
contrary to the values of the Arctic Council--the United States and its
likeminded Arctic partners paused their participation in the Arctic
Council during Russia's chairmanship in March 2022. Since Norway took
over as Chair in May 2023, the Council has taken incremental steps to
advance its work, and Arctic states recently agreed to the gradual
resumption of virtual meetings of the Arctic Council's Working Groups
and Expert Group to ensure critical Arctic projects can advance through
the region's preeminent multilateral forum without returning to
business as usual with Russia. If confirmed, I would support the United
States interagency as it continues to adjust its participation as
needed in response to the behavior of the Russian Federation while
seeking to sustain the Council and advance U.S. interests as outlined
in the 2022 National Strategy of the Arctic Region.
Question. In general, what do you believe are Russia's economic,
geopolitical, strategic, and environmental goals in the Arctic?
Answer. The Arctic remains central to Russia's economy and national
security in large part because of its dependence on oil, natural gas,
and mineral resources in the north. This reality, coupled with the
impacts of U.S. and like-minded nation sanctions and actions to
constrain Russia's economy, make Russia ever more desperate to secure
new markets for and investments in its resource development, most
prominently with the PRC. However, Russia must balance reliance on the
PRC with its national identity as an Arctic State, viewing Arctic
dominance as key to being a global superpower. Russia's north is also
home to important Russian strategic assets, and its militarization and
expanding collaboration with the PRC presents a new frontier of
geopolitical challenges for the United States and our allies.
Question. Russia has floated the idea of leaving the Arctic Council
and recently removed all mentions of the Arctic Council from its Arctic
policy. In your opinion, how would the official departure of Russia
from the Arctic Council positively or negatively affect the Council?
Answer. The Arctic Council has, from its inception, included
participation by all eight Arctic States, which makes it the premier
forum for Arctic cooperation and maintains Arctic State preeminence
over issues of regional governance. If confirmed, I would work closely
with our likeminded Arctic Allies and partners to sustain the Arctic
Council, in line with U.S. interests and as outlined in the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region.
Question. How do risks posed by the inability to cooperate with
Russia on scientific and environmental compare to the risks posed by
Russia's growing influence in the Arctic?
Answer. Russia contains about 45 percent of the geographical Arctic
and more than half of Arctic coastline. Russia's north is central to
its economy and national security, and it maintains a large military
presence across the region. Its bases outnumber all combined NATO bases
in the Arctic by thirty percent. Furthermore, inaccessibility of
scientific data from this part of the Arctic impedes scientific work
critical to better understanding climate change and its impacts, while
Russia's ambition to increase shipping across the Northern Sea Route,
accessed through the Bering Strait, poses increased environmental
risks. If confirmed, I would seek to enhance our coordination with
Arctic Allies to mitigate the impact of Russia's violation of
international principles and provide a bulwark against Russian malign
actions in the Arctic.
Question. How should U.S. diplomatic strategy toward the Arctic
reflect the rising security threats from Russia's military buildup in
the Arctic region?
Answer. The Arctic has always been a region with military activity.
The key to ensuring U.S. national security and homeland defense in the
Arctic is making sure we have adequate domain awareness and
capabilities in the region by deepening our alliances and partnerships
with likeminded states, investing in regional governance mechanisms,
and ensuring diplomatic, commercial, and military presence. The
accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO opens a new phase of
cooperation to counter Russia's activities in the Arctic. If confirmed,
my position would elevate U.S. leadership and diplomatic presence in
the region and support efforts outlined in national strategies, which
acknowledge increasing strategic competition in the Arctic and seek to
position the United States to both effectively compete and manage
tensions.
Question. In the past, Russia has used its Arctic territories as a
testing ground for weapons, including nuclear weapons. If such a
nuclear test were to occur during your tenure in the role to which you
have been nominated, how would you advise the Secretary of State and
President to respond?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult closely with relevant State
Department offices and leadership, the Department of Defense, and the
White House to develop a response that includes an Arctic perspective
before making any recommendations.
Question. Do you believe China, as a self-declared ``near-Arctic
state,'' is entitled to participation in platforms and international
policy discussions about the Arctic? If so, what level of participation
do you believe they should they have?
Answer. The PRC is not a near-Arctic State. It does, however, have
ambitions to increase its regional influence and undermine Arctic State
preeminence through dual-use scientific research, strategic economic
investments, and robust participation at international events, while
remaining the pacing challenge for the United States globally. The
Arctic Council is the premier forum for Arctic governance, and the
United States is committed to preserving that status. The PRC is one of
13 non-Arctic states accredited as an Arctic Council Observer--a non-
decision-making status--while other platforms related to Arctic
cooperation include more extensive participation by non-Arctic states.
I share the committee's concerns about the PRC's intentions in the
Arctic and, if confirmed, would seek to leave no doubt about U.S.
Arctic leadership and Arctic State primacy over regional governance
issues.
Question. How should the U.S. respond to Chinese attempts to pursue
resource extraction in the Arctic, including of critical minerals?
Answer. The vast majority of mineral and other non-living natural
resources in the Arctic are under national jurisdiction, either land
territory or the continental shelf of an Arctic coastal state. The
small area of Arctic seabed resources beyond national jurisdiction is
within the competence of the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
Thus, access to mineral and other non-living natural resources in the
Arctic is subject to approval by the respective Arctic coastal state or
the ISA. It is therefore imperative the United States hold the PRC to
its international obligations and work with other Arctic states to
preserve the competencies of the ISA and improve allied investment
screening mechanisms.
Question. If confirmed, how do you envision your work on the Arctic
influencing or affecting broader U.S. strategy toward China?
Answer. The PRC has ambitions to increase its regional influence
and undermine Arctic State preeminence through dual-use scientific
research, strategic economic investments, and robust participation at
international events, while remaining the pacing challenge for the
United States globally. If confirmed, I would ensure U.S. Arctic policy
is consistent with and supportive of overall U.S. policy toward the
PRC, protect the full breadth of U.S. interests, and work to include
U.S. Arctic interests in policy formation processes government wide.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Michael Sfraga by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Dr. Sfraga, in your opening statement, you highlighted
how Russia and the People's Republic of China are increasing their
cooperation to elevate and advance their presence and influence in the
Arctic. What challenges does Russia face in the Arctic region, and why
is China seen as a crucial partner for its Arctic development?
Answer. The Arctic remains central to Russia's economy and national
security due in large part to its dependence on oil, gas, and mineral
resources in the north, the increasing accessibility of these resources
due to climate change, and the increasing need for these resources due
to the impacts of U.S. and likeminded nation sanctions and actions to
constrain Russia's economy. Russia's war against Ukraine has upended
the longstanding paradigm of normal cooperation in the Arctic. The
United States and our partners have isolated Russia diplomatically and
worked collectively to degrade the Kremlin's war economy. The PRC has
become its principal investor, leveraging Russia's economic challenges
to increase the PRC's influence, including its ambitions in the Arctic.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Michael Sfraga by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In May 2022, Secretary Blinken said that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is the ``only country with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) clearly holds the reins of power in the PRC and
has used this power to commit genocide in Xinjiang, flood our
communities with fentanyl, and emit the largest quantity of greenhouse
gases in the world today. With their absolute control of Chinese
society and industry, the CCP could stop all of these destructive
actions tomorrow if they so choose to do so. Is the CCP a threat to the
United States?
Answer. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence testified
``the CCP represents both the leading and most consequential threat to
U.S. national security and leadership globally.'' As Secretary Blinken
has said, under President Xi, the CCP has become more repressive at
home and more aggressive abroad. If confirmed, I will advance U.S.
national security interests and counter the People's Republic of China
(PRC) efforts to expand its problematic influence and use of coercion,
through diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, and commercial
advocacy to bolster U.S. ties across the Arctic region.
Question. Does the CCP undertake any activities that are beneficial
to U.S. interests? If so, please explain.
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the CCP has become more
repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. According to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence's 2023 Annual Threat
Assessment, the CCP is seeking to ``undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system.''
Question. Do you believe that there are any areas within which the
CCP that would constructively work with the United States in good
faith, knowing that at any moment Chinese interlocuters with U.S.
representatives could be disappeared at a moment's notice? If so,
please explain.
Answer. I believe we are clear eyed about the challenges in the
relationship. The United States will work with the PRC to address
transnational challenges, such as climate change, when it is in the
U.S. interest to do so. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues
across the U.S. interagency and Congress to advance U.S. objectives and
counter harmful behavior by the PRC.
Question. If confirmed, will you approve any joint activity with
organizations or representatives from the PRC in the countries or areas
in which you will work?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be advancing U.S. national
security interests in the Arctic region and countering efforts by our
strategic and regional competitors to undermine those interests. The
Administration has been clear that the PRC is the most consequential
geopolitical challenge facing the United States, and that the United
States is committed to working to strengthen our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work closely with regional and functional
bureaus, our missions abroad, the interagency, and Congress to address
the PRC's efforts to expand its influence in the Arctic region.
Question. As you may be aware, a group of federal employees penned
an open letter to President Biden criticizing U.S. support for Israel
in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
In addition, on January 16, 2024, employees from nearly two dozen
agencies staged a walkout in protest of the administration's Israel
policy. Efforts like these directly undermine the duty of our diplomats
to advance the policies of the President of the United States. Yes or
no, did you sign the letter to the President expressing opposition to
the President's Israel policy?
Answer. No.
Question. Yes or no, did you participate in the January 16, 2024,
walkout?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, would you define an employee or contractor,
operating under your supervision, that signs an open letter criticizing
you, or policies you undertake at the instruction of the President, as
insubordination as defined by the Government Accountability Office?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to address employee concerns
personally by creating an open, trusting, and harassment-free work
environment. I am mindful of and value Department employees' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, I understand the
expression of disagreement does not in and of itself constitute
insubordination. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor to determine the proper course of action
should such a matter arise.
Question. In your view, are the actions these federal employees
took, by anonymously signing a letter to the President of the United
States, covered as ``whistleblowing''?
Answer. I believe these employees were expressing a dissenting view
to their leadership. If confirmed, I would work with the Department of
State's Office of the Legal Advisor as necessary to understand whether
a particular action constituted whistleblowing. I would hope that
employees would feel confident to directly raise their concerns with
their supervisors and management rather than doing so anonymously or
signing a public letter.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address discipline issues,
such as insubordination, that do not take established dissent channels?
Answer. I am mindful of and value Department of State employees'
right to free speech under the First Amendment. If confirmed, I will
make sure that employees in the office of the Ambassador-at-Large for
Arctic Affairs know that there are several avenues available to express
policy disagreements. I would encourage employees to use established
channels to express their views.
Question. Have you ever expressed support for an Israeli ceasefire
in Gaza?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you agree that Hamas is an antisemitic entity?
Answer. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist group and antisemitic entity.
This foreign terrorist organization seeks to eliminate the State of
Israel, and its founding charter calls for the killing of Jewish
people.
Question. Would a ceasefire allow these groups to reconstitute and
attack Israel, and Americans, in the future?
Answer. I have never worked on issues related to the Middle East.
It is my understanding that the Administration supports temporary
humanitarian pauses to allow for an influx of aid into Gaza and the
safe exit of hostages and other vulnerable people.
Question. Do you agree that calling for a ceasefire in Gaza means
calling for Israel to stop its pursuit of Hamas, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, that orchestrated the October 7 attacks and
still refuses to release all Israeli and American hostages?
Answer. I have never worked on issues related to the Middle East.
It is my understanding that the Administration's stated policy is to
support temporary humanitarian pauses to enable a sustained flow of aid
and to allow the voluntary movement of civilians seeking safer
locations. Working with partners, the U.S. Government is attempting to
secure the release of all hostages held by Hamas. The U.S. Government
supports Israel's right to protect itself from Hamas' terrorism,
consistent with international law.
Question. Do you believe that Israel, in its operation against
Hamas, which is known to use civilians as human shields, is taking all
necessary steps to minimize civilian casualties?
Answer. I have no experience on issues related to the Middle East.
I understand that the U.S. Government supports Israel's right to
protect itself, consistent with international law, and that the
Administration has urged Israel to differentiate between civilians and
Hamas terrorists and to avoid civilian casualties. Hamas's use of
civilians as human shields, a blatant violation of international law,
does not lessen Israel's obligations under international humanitarian
law.
Question. The Protecting European Energy Security Act (PEESA)
required the Department to submit a list to Congress and then sanction
all vessels and other entities involved in pipelaying activities
related to Nord Stream 2. Under your capacity in the Economic Bureau,
the Department chose to look the other way as a Russian front
organization, continued pipelaying projects, and this Russian entity
was exempt from sanctions. Did anyone inform you there were
organizations operating as Russian front entities?
Answer. I have not worked in the Department of State's Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs.
Question. Under your leadership, the University of Alaska
apparently almost agreed to allow access to the email systems of the
university to the CCP. Why did you agree to this?
Answer. I was not involved in or aware of any discussions about
allowing the CCP access to University of Alaska email systems.
Question. Do you believe the CCP has the best interest of
American's private information, including electronic communications
they have?
Answer. No.
Question. While working in an official capacity, you travelled to
China and Russia, including sitting on panels with sanctioned
individuals, on numerous occasions without reporting the trips. Why
didn't you report these trips, as required?
Answer. I disclosed and discussed my travel with two agents of DSS
in connection with my nomination. I further appreciated the opportunity
to provide additional information to this committee on my travels
spanning decades of engagement on Arctic issues and have disclosed
travel throughout the process as the committee requested it. I assure
you I share the committee's concerns about the PRC and Russia and did
not intentionally withhold information at any time.
In 2021, I spoke on a virtual panel of the Fort Ross Dialogue. To
my knowledge, other panelists on that panel were not and have not been
sanctioned. I was also not aware of any sanctioned entities sponsoring
the event; to my knowledge neither Transneft nor Sovcomflot were
sanctioned at the time of the event.
In 2017, I participated in-person on a panel at The Arctic:
Territory of Dialogue event in Arkhangelsk, Russia, as previously
reported to the committee. Dr. Elena Kudryashova, Rector of the
Lomonosov Northern (Arctic) Federal University, moderated the panel and
was sanctioned in June 2022.
Question. Why did you continue to leave out unreported trips from
your notifications when instances of these trips were brought to light?
Answer. I share the committee's concerns about the PRC and Russia
and did not intentionally withhold information or purposefully omit any
trips at any point in this process. I disclosed and discussed my travel
with two agents of DSS in connection with my nomination. I further
appreciated the opportunity to provide additional information to this
committee on my travels spanning decades of engagement on Arctic issues
and have disclosed travel throughout the process as the committee
requested it.
Question. In recent years, we have seen an increase in Chinese and
Russian military ships patrolling Alaska's coast in the Bering Sea. We
know our adversaries take interest in the region's rich mineral
deposits and shipping lanes. Why have we seen an increase of Chinese
and Russian ships coming so close to our sovereign territory in recent
years?
Answer. The United States is seeing increased Russia-PRC
cooperation in the Arctic, including in the Bering Sea and Strait, a
strategic chokepoint. For many years Russia-PRC cooperation focused on
economic investment in the Russian Arctic, but this cooperation is now
expanding to joint naval exercises, growing economic ties, and
cooperation between the FSB and the Chinese Coast Guard in the Arctic.
Russia and the PRC are two competitors who actively seek to challenge
sovereignty and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I would look
forward to supporting existing Administration efforts, as well as
advocating for an increase in the number of U.S. icebreakers actively
deployed in the Arctic and the completion of the nation's first Arctic
deep draft port in Nome, Alaska.
Question. How does China's recent self-declaration as a ``near-
Arctic state'' reflect its new approach to the region?
Answer. In the PRC's 2018 Polar White Paper and its March 2022
Five-Year Plan, the PRC outlines its goals to create a Polar Silk Road
through economic investments and scientific research. It also signaled
its intent to play a larger role in oceans governance, including in the
Arctic. The PRC views the Polar Regions as a ``strategic frontier,'' as
it does the deep sea, outer space, and cyber space. The PRC seeks to
exploit all these domains to their advantage. I share the concerns of
the committee about the dual-use nature of PRC research in the region
and the potential for economic coercion and dependence on the PRC.
Question. In your view, should China be treated as a partner or an
adversary in the Arctic region?
Answer. The PRC is the pacing challenge for the United States
globally, with ambitions in the Arctic to increase its influence
through dual-use scientific research and strategic economic investments
intended to undermine Arctic State preeminence in the region. I share
the committee's concerns about China's activities in the Arctic and, if
confirmed, would seek to leave no doubt about U.S. leadership in the
region as an Arctic State and about Arctic State primacy over regional
governance issues.
Question. How do you think great power competition will play out in
the Arctic region? Do you believe that China and Russia will work
together to undermine U.S. interests in the region?
Answer. The PRC's gateway to the Arctic goes through Russia. This
helps explain why we are seeing increased Russia-PRC cooperation in the
Arctic, expanding from economic investment to joint naval exercises off
the coast of Alaska. If confirmed, I will look to work with the
Department of Defense to invest in defense and deterrence in the
Arctic, while acting in a predictable and transparent manner to reduce
the risk of miscalculation, build resilient Arctic communities, promote
investment and sustainable development in the region, and uphold
international law, rules, norms, and standards in the Arctic.
__________
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
C O N T E N T S
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Page
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin
Letter to Senators Cardin and Risch from Deputy Secretary 272
of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma,
Regarding Nominees Forden, Aliu, and Taylor..............
Letter from Former U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad 284
to Senator Cardin Supporting Robert Forden to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia....................
Letter from The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia-- 286
Leukodystrophy Center to Senators Cardin and Risch
Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro....
Letter from Joel Fitch to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix 288
Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro......................
Letter from Foreign Service Officer Alejandro Gonzalez to 289
Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to
Montenegro...............................................
Letter from Former U.S. Ambassador to Poland Georgette 293
Mosbacher to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be
Ambassador to Montenegro.................................
Letter from Noorie Bajaj Womack to Senator Cardin and 294
Congressman Murphy Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be
Ambassador to Montenegro.................................
Letter from Doug Factor, Foreign Service Officer, to 295
Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to
Montenegro...............................................
Letter from Anthony Pirnot, Former Political Counselor, 296
U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix
Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro......................
Letter from Cindy Biggs, Former Foreign Service Officer, 297
U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix
Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro......................
Letter from Former Department of State Legal Advisors to 298
Senators Menendez and Risch Supporting Margaret Taylor to
be Legal Advisor to the Department of State..............
========================================================================
Additional Material Submitted for the Record by Senator
James E. Risch
Letter to Secretary of State Blinken from Senator Risch 301
Opposing the Nomination of Robert Forden to be Ambassador
to the Kingdom of Cambodia (dated November 30, 2023).....
Material Relating to Senator Risch's Letter of 11/30/2023
to Secretary Blinken Opposing the Nomination of Robert
Forden to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia
Attachment 1: MRN 20 Beijing 1690....................... 309
Attachment 2: MRN 20 State 92790........................ 314
Attachment 3: Travel to China For Embassy Beijing 320
Travelers Only (file name is dated 6.21.2021)..........
Attachment 4: Mission China Travel-to-China Checklist 334
(file name dated 06.03.2021............................
Attachment 5: Management Notice to Embassy Beijing 335
American Employees, January 29, 2021...................
Attachment 6: Email Thread on Travel to China, Updates 338
for U.S. Consulate Guangzhou, March 17, 2021...........
Attachment 7: SH Management Notice No. 40: Travel 350
Guidance Update, June 10, 2021.........................
Attachment 8: Follow-up Questions for Robert Forden 362
Submitted by Senator Risch, July 17, 2023..............
Attachment 9: SH Management Notice 15: Travel Policies, 370
March 19, 2021.........................................
Attachment 10: Mission China Homecoming Task Force 381
Complete FAQ Guide. Last updated August 28, 2020.......
Attachment 11: Photo of the Extra Installed COVID 388
Camera, and the Normal Building Camera.................
Attachment 12: Photos of Door Alarm to Enforce Home 389
Detention..............................................
Attachment 13: MRN 20 BEIJING 2480...................... 391
Attachment 14: Letter from Senator James E. Risch to 393
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, April 20, 2022......
========================================================================
Additional Material Supporting Senator Risch's Opposition
to the Nomination of Robert Forden to be Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Cambodia
MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378, Mission China: Lessons Learned, 395
Ordered Departure........................................
Mandarin Version--Protocol Document: Li Zi No. 1 (2021)... 401
English Version--Protocol Document: Li Zi No. 1 (2021).... 404
DipNotes (Diplomatic Notes) to China on COVID issues (2020- 406
2021)--Redacted..........................................
DipNotes re. Detained Family--(SH and BJ)--Redacted....... 417
Whistleblower Letter to Senators Cardin and Risch, March 419
6, 2024--Redacted........................................
Email Thread (Obtained Through FOIA) Regarding China's 426
Conduct of Anal Swab COVID Tests on Multiple U.S.
Government Employees.....................................
========================================================================
Material Supporting Senator Risch's Opposition to the
Nomination of B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Whistleblower Complaint I: Official Complaint Sent to the 444
State Department on April 21, 2021 (redacted)............
Whistleblower Complaint II: Sent to the Committee on March 447
6, 2024 (redacted).......................................
12 FAM 275.1 Policy 09-25-2017--FAM Regulation in Effect 449
During February and April 2020...........................
========================================================================
Material Supporting Senator Risch's Opposition to the
Nomination of Erik Woodhouse to be Head of the Office of
Sanctions Coordination
Bylaws--Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation 450
M.V......................................................
Blue Ship (Ownership Registration)........................ 461
========================================================================
Material Supporting Senator Risch's Opposition to the
Nomination of Dr. Michael Sfraga to be Ambassador-at-
Large for Arctic Affairs
Website for the International Arctic Forum 2017, an event 466
headlined by Vladimir Putin, featuring Dr. Michael Sfraga
as a speaker.............................................
U.S. Department of the Treasury--Expanded Sanctions....... 471
UAF-SJTU--Memorandums of Understanding.................... 478
SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker................. 482
========================================================================
Material Supporting Senator Risch's Opposition to the
Nomination of Margaret L. Taylor to be Legal Advisor of
the Department of State
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State 487
Blinken Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the
Department of State's Failure to Respond to His Questions
About the Change in Security Status of Special Envoy for
Iran, Robert Malley--Part I..............................
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State 489
Blinken Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the
Department of State's Failure to Respond to His Questions
About the Change in Security Status of Special Envoy for
Iran, Robert Malley--Part II.............................
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State 492
Blinken Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the
Department of State's Failure to Respond to His Questions
About the Change in Security Status of Special Envoy for
Iran, Robert Malley--Part III............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Material Submitted for the
Record by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Letter to Senators Cardin and Risch from Deputy Secretary
of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma,
Regarding Nominees Forden, Aliu, and Taylor
Cardin/Richard Verma-2
Cardin/Richard Verma-3
Cardin/Richard Verma-4
Cardin/Richard Verma-5
Cardin/Richard Verma-6
Cardin/Richard Verma-7
Cardin/Richard Verma-8
Cardin/Richard Verma-9
Cardin/Richard Verma-10
Cardin/Richard Verma-11
Cardin/Richard Verma-12
Letter from Former U.S. Ambassador to China Terry
Branstad to Senator Cardin Supporting Robert Forden
to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia
Cardin/Forden/Terry Branstad-2
Letter from The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia--
Leukodystrophy Center to Senators Cardin and Risch
Supporting B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Cardin/Aliu/Children's Hospital-2
Letter from Joel Fitch to Senator Cardin Supporting
B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Foreign Service Officer Alejandro Gonzalez
to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu to
be Ambassador to Montenegro
Cardin/Gonzalez/Aliu-2
Cardin/Gonzalez/Aliu-3
Cardin/Gonzalez/Aliu-4
Letter from Former U.S. Ambassador to Poland Georgette
Mosbacher to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu
to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Noorie Bajaj Womack to Senator Cardin and
Congressman Murphy Supporting B. Bix Aliu
to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Doug Factor, Foreign Service Officer,
to Senator Cardin Supporting B. Bix Aliu
to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Anthony Pirnot, Former Political Counselor,
U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, to Senator Cardin Supporting
B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Cindy Biggs, Former Foreign Service Officer,
U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, to Senator Cardin Supporting
B. Bix Aliu to be Ambassador to Montenegro
Letter from Former Department of State Legal Advisors to
Senators Menendez and Risch Supporting Margaret
Taylor to be Legal Advisor to the Department of State
Cardin/Former DoS Legal Advisors/Margaret Taylor-2
Additional Material Submitted for the
Record by Senator James E. Risch
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RISCH SUPPORTING
HIS OPPOSITION TO THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT FORDEN
TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
Letter to Secretary Blinken from Senator Risch
Opposing the Nomination of Robert Forden
(dated November 30, 2023)
Risch/Forden-2
Risch/Forden-3
Risch/Forden-4
Risch/Forden-5
Risch/Forden-6
Risch/Forden-7
Risch/Forden-8
MATERIAL RELATING TO SENATOR RISCH'S
LETTER OF 11/30/2023 TO SECRETARY BLINKEN
OPPOSING THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT FORDEN
Attachment 1:
MRN 20 Beijing 1690
Risch/Forden Attachment 1-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 1-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 1-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 1-5
Attachment 2:
MRN 20 State 92790
Risch/Forden Attachment 2-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 2-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 2-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 2-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 2-6
Attachment 3:
Travel to China For Embassy Beijing Travelers Only
(file name is dated 6.21.2021)
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-7
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-8
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-9
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-10
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-11
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-12
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-13
Risch/Forden Attachment 3-14
Attachment 4:
Mission China
Travel-to-China Checklist
(file name dated 06.03.2021
Attachment 5:
Management Notice to Embassy
Beijing American Employees
January 29, 2021
Risch/Forden Attachment 5-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 5-3
Attachment 6:
Email Thread on Travel to China
Updates for U.S. Consulate Guangzhou
March 17, 2021
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-7
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-8
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-9
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-10
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-11
Risch/Forden Attachment 6-12
Attachment 7:
SH Management Notice No. 40:
Travel Guidance Update,
June 10, 2021
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-7
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-8
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-9
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-10
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-11
Risch/Forden Attachment 7-12
Attachment 8:
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-7
Risch/Forden Attachment 8-8
Attachment 9:
SH Management Notice 15:
Travel Policies, March 19, 2021
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-7
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-8
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-9
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-10
Risch/Forden Attachment 9-11
Attachment 10:
Mission China Homecoming Task Force
Complete FAQ Guide. Last updated August 28, 2020
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-2
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-3
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-4
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-5
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-6
Risch/Forden Attachment 10-7
Attachment 11:
Photo of the Extra Installed
COVID Camera, and the Normal Building Camera
Attachment 12:
Photos of Door Alarm
to Enforce Home Detention
Risch/Forden Attachment 12-2
Attachment 13:
MRN 20 BEIJING 2480
Risch/Forden Attachment 13-2
Attachment 14:
Letter from Senator James E. Risch to
Secretary of State Antony Blinken,
April 20, 2022
Risch/Forden Attachment 14-2
END OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED AS ATTACHMENTS TO THE NOVEMBER 30 LETTER TO
SECRETARY OF STATE BLINKEN FROM SENATOR RISCH
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPORTING SENATOR RISCH'S
OPPOSITION TO THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT FORDEN
MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378
Mission China: Lessons Learned, Ordered Departure
Risch/Forden/MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378-2
Risch/Forden/MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378-3
Risch/Forden/MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378-4
Risch/Forden/MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378-5
Risch/Forden/MRN: 20 BEIJING 2378-6
Mandarin Version
Protocol Document: Li Zi No. 1 (2021)
Risch/Forden/Li Zi No. 1 (2021)--Mandarin-2
Risch/Forden/Li Zi No. 1 (2021)--Mandarin-3
English Version
Protocol Document: Li Zi No. 1 (2021)
Risch/Forden/Li Zi No. 1 (2021)--English-2
DipNotes to China on COVID issues (2020-2021)--Redacted
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-2
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-3
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-4
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-5
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-6
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-7
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-8
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-9
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-10
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/COVID-11
DipNotes re. Detained Family
(SH and BJ)--Redacted
Risch/Forden/DipNotes/Detained Family-2
Whistleblower Letter to Senators Cardin and Risch
March 6, 2024--Redacted
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-2
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-3
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-4
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-5
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-6
Risch/Forden/Whistleblower Letter/March 6, 2024-7
Email Thread (Obtained Through FOIA)
Regarding China's Conduct of Anal Swab COVID
Tests on Multiple U.S. Government Employees
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-2
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-3
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-4
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-5
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-6
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-7
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-8
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-9
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-10
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-11
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-12
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-13
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-14
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-15
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-16
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-17
Risch/Forden/China's COVID Tests-18
MATERIAL SUPPORTING SENATOR RISCH'S
OPPOSITION TO THE NOMINATION OF B. BIX ALIU
TO BE AMBASSADOR TO MONTENEGRO
Whistleblower Complaint I
Official Complaint Sent to the State Department
on April 21, 2021 (redacted)
Risch/Aliu/Whistleblower Complaint I-2
Risch/Aliu/Whistleblower Complaint I-3
Whistleblower Complaint II
Sent to the Committee on March 6, 2024 (redacted)
Risch/Aliu/Whistleblower Complaint II-2
12 FAM 275.1 Policy 09-25-2017
FAM Regulation in Effect During
February and April 2020
Copy of the FAM regulation in effect during February and
April 2020, available at
Access: https://fam.state.gov/fam/12fam/12fam0270.html
MATERIAL SUPPORTING SENATOR RISCH'S
OPPOSITION TO THE NOMINATION OF ERIK WOODHOUSE
TO BE HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF
SANCTIONS COORDINATION
Bylaws--Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation M.V.
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-2
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-3
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-4
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-5
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-6
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-7
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-8
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-9
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-10
Risch/Woodhouse/Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation-11
Blue Ship
(Ownership Registration)
Ownership registration for ``Blue Ship,'' a vessel engaged in
pipelaying activities identified in the November 2021 Protecting
European Energy Security Act report but not sanctioned despite its
ownership by a Russian-funded front organization called the
``Foundation for Climate and Energy Protection M.V.''
Risch/Woodhouse/Blue Ship-2
Risch/Woodhouse/Blue Ship-3
Risch/Woodhouse/Blue Ship-4
Risch/Woodhouse/Blue Ship-5
MATERIAL SUPPORTING SENATOR RISCH'S OPPOSITION
TO THE NOMINATION OF DR. MICHAEL SFRAGA
TO BE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR ARCTIC AFFAIRS
Website for the International Arctic Forum 2017, an event headlined
by Vladimir Putin, featuring Dr. Michael Sfraga as a speaker.
Risch/Sfraga/International Arctic Forum 2017-2
Risch/Sfraga/International Arctic Forum 2017-3
Risch/Sfraga/International Arctic Forum 2017-4
Risch/Sfraga/International Arctic Forum 2017-5
U.S. Department of the Treasury--
Expanded Sanctions
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-2
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-3
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-4
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-5
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-6
Risch/Sfraga/Expanded Sanctions-7
UAF-SJTU--Memorandums of Understanding
An overview of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between
the University of Alaska-Fairbanks and SJTU during Dr. Sfraga's
tenure as Vice Chancellor.
Risch/Sfraga/Memorandums of Understanding-2
Risch/Sfraga/Memorandums of Understanding-3
Risch/Sfraga/Memorandums of Understanding-4
SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker
Australian Strategic Policy Institute's designation of the
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) as ``high risk'' for its
high level in defense research and alleged links to
cyberattacks.
Risch/Sfraga/SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker-2
Risch/Sfraga/SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker-3
Risch/Sfraga/SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker-4
Risch/Sfraga/SJTU Chinese Defense Universities Tracker-5
MATERIAL SUPPORTING SENATOR RISCH'S
OPPOSITION TO THE NOMINATION OF MARGARET L. TAYLOR
TO BE LEGAL ADVISOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State Blinken
Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the Department of State's
Failure to Respond to His Questions About the Change in Security Status
of Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley--Part I.
Risch/Taylor/Senator Risch's Hold on Nominations-1-2
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State Blinken
Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the Department of State's
Failure to Respond to His Questions About the Change in Security Status
of Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley--Part II.
Risch/Taylor/Senator Risch's Hold on Nominations-2-2
Risch/Taylor/Senator Risch's Hold on Nominations-2-3
Correspondence from Senator Risch to Secretary of State Blinken
Relating to Senator Risch's Concerns About the Department of State's
Failure to Respond to His Questions About the Change in Security Status
of Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley--Part III.
Risch/Taylor/Senator Risch's Hold on Nominations-3-2
[all]