[Senate Hearing 118-618]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-618
REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 28, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-008 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Strategic Command
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine, Chairman DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 28, 2023
Page
Testimony on Regional Nuclear Deterrence......................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 2
Witness Statements
Roberts, Brad, Ph.D., Director, Center for Global Security 2
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Weaver, Gregory, Senior Associate [non-resident], Project on 7
Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bunn, M. Elaine, Senior Advisor [non-resident], Project on 12
Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Montgomery, Evan B., Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director, Research 14
Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
(iii)
TESTIMONY ON REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:52 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: King, Fischer, Cotton, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. This hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Armed
Services will come to order.
I first want to thank our witnesses for joining us at
today's hearing on regional nuclear deterrence. Today's hearing
may sound somewhat esoteric but it is deadly serious to our
national security. We have debated strategic deterrence
extensively in this Committee and, in fact, the 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review concentrated on our nuclear use policy,
modernizing our triad so that we might ensure that we are never
coerced by a near peer adversary such as Russia or China.
The question we ask today is about regional nuclear
deterrence. In other words, how can we ensure a conventional
conflict with a near peer adversary or a conflict between two
nuclear-armed adversaries does not resort to the use of nuclear
weapons, which then escalates into a broader nuclear exchange?
This is the nuclear escalation ladder that theorists have
worried about for decades.
Today Ukraine is an example of regional nuclear deterrence.
Russia's strategic triad is certainly something that the United
States must take account of in terms of its involvement in the
conflict. Meanwhile, our extended NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] deterrent has prevented Russia from intervening
directly with NATO allies. However, that is not the end of this
dilemma.
Russia has a doctrine referred to as ``Escalate to
Deescalate,'' which is when they feel that they are in danger
of being conventionally overmatched and their country's
existence is at stake. It will involve first using low-yield
weapons to stun any opponent. Will taking back Crimea trigger
this doctrine? Will taking back some of the property, the land
that Russia has allegedly annexed trigger this doctrine? We
know Russia is running low on conventional munitions. If Russia
enters into a conflict with a NATO ally will they quickly
resort to low-yield weapons?
I hope today's hearing informs us as to whether our
deterrent is appropriately tailored for such a regional
conflict. Are we selfdeterred with our high-yield arsenal of
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBMs [submarine
launched ballistic missile]? There is a debate about bringing
back a low-yield, submarine-launched cruise missile, that which
will deter Russia in a regional conflict. Would it deter Russia
in a regional conflict? These same questions apply to China and
Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan.
Today's witnesses have all thought about these questions
and many of them have served in Government, enacting policies
on this issue. It is important that we hear and learn from them
today so that we are better informed as we prepare for our
discussions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
later this spring.
After remarks from Senator Fischer we will have statements
from our witnesses and a round of questions from our Senators.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all our witnesses for being here today and for sharing your
perspective on nuclear strategy and deterrence theory,
particularly with respect to the role it plays in regional
nuclear stability.
According to the 2022 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review],
effective nuclear deterrence, quote, ``requires tailor
strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best
understanding of their decisionmaking and perceptions,'' end
quote. The NPR also notes that the United States, quote, ``will
collaborate with allies and partners to tailor extended
deterrence and assurance policies,'' end quote.
These strategies must be continuously evaluated to ensure
they reflect and take into consideration the evolving threat
environment. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on
effective strategy concepts and how they may impact regional
nuclear deterrence.
Thank you very much.
Senator King. If the witnesses will introduce themselves. I
do not know what order you want to proceed. Brad, do you want
to start?
STATEMENT OF BRAD ROBERTS, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL
SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Roberts. Sure. Thank you for the opportunity to join
you in this discussion today. I am Dr. Brad Roberts. I am
Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. The views I am expressing are my
personal views, not those of the lab, and I had the pleasure
and honor of serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy through the first Obama
term.
In my time I would like to make five quick arguments. The
first is that we should appreciate that allies are living in
the nuclear crosshairs of our nuclear-armed adversaries. Our
nuclear-armed adversaries seek to remake the regional orders in
which they sit, and the prize in this competition, and if there
were a war, in war, the prize is the allegiance of our allies.
They should not be simply an afterthought in our defense
strategy. The deterrence protection we provide of them is
central to the confrontation in which we are involved today.
These allies experience a good deal of anxiety about the life
in the nuclear crosshairs and about the credibility of U.S.
extended deterrence guarantees to them.
Second argument. In the U.S. discussion of extended
deterrence we tend to put our focus on the hardware--dual-
capable aircraft, the B-61 bomb, SLCM-N [nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missile]--all very important, but we should not
forget the software. The software includes declaratory policy
and other statements of leadership intent. It includes
consultations, processes, and mechanisms within the alliance
structures. It includes concepts and principles for nuclear
deterrence and employment. It includes operational plans and
planning processes and exercise programs to exercise those
plans. It includes the knowledge base that is essential to all
of that. As we consider the weaknesses in the extended
deterrence posture we should consider the weaknesses in the
software side.
Third argument. The existing extended deterrence posture
was designed for an era long past. The existing extended
deterrence posture is a result of the Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives of the immediate post-cold war period, when the
United States withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from Asia, 97
percent of its nuclear weapons from Europe, all of its weapons
from naval surface combatants, and all of its nuclear-armed
cruise missiles from attack submarines. Most of those things
were destroyed. The cruise missiles were kept until 2010, when
they aged out.
This was a bet we placed as a Nation that extended
deterrence could be provided with a few remaining nuclear
weapons in Europe and our central strategic forces. We saw this
as appropriate in the benign environment of the time. Russia,
China, and North Korea perceived a different security
environment, of course, and have been well focused on creating
new nuclear advantages for themselves over a long period of
time, and theories of victory in conflict with us that involve
the coercion of our adversaries and the disruption of our
military options by nuclear means.
Our allies are very clear that they want forward-deployed
weapons as a part of the extended deterrence commitment, or at
least forward deployable in East Asia. Thus, there is a rising
discussion of what kind of capabilities the alliances need in
future years, whether there is the right diversity in the
posture in addition to the right number.
Fourth argument. Looking ahead a decade or so, the
challenges facing extended nuclear deterrence seem destined to
grow. I think we all expect that when the Ukraine conflict
dials back into a frozen conflict the Russia we are going to
face for the next decade or so is going to be difficult,
threatening, and ever more reliant on nuclear weapons. We
clearly expect greater nuclear-backed coercion out of China, as
its nuclear arsenal grows and its theater nuclear force grows,
and we expect the same from North Korea. There is a mismatch,
in other words, between the legacy posture of 1991 and the
challenge that is emerging in front of us.
Fifth and finally, strengthening of extended nuclear
deterrence has been a clear priority for three Presidential
administrations in a row, and the fact of bipartisan consensus
on this aspect of our nuclear strategy is striking and should
be preserved. That bipartisanship has enabled a good deal of
progress in adapting extended deterrence to new circumstances
and strengthening it by various means, but more progress is
needed. This will not be possible without leadership focus,
which has ebbed and flowed, and with that focus I think we will
see the accomplishment of various projects that are already
underway, such as finalizing the nuclear modernization and
strengthening the consultative processes in East Asia. But
there are some important new challenges still in front of us
about future capabilities and future concepts.
Thanks so much for the opportunity to contribute.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Statement by Dr. Brad Roberts
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to your discussion of
regional nuclear deterrence. In my judgment, extended deterrence
challenges are at the very core of the new deterrence problem. A
failure of extended deterrence in Europe or Northeast Asia is the most
plausible route to nuclear war, including strategic nuclear war. Those
who make nuclear policy are well focused on this fact but many others
in the defense department and the broader U.S. defense community are
not. More attention is needed to new challenges and to the State of
existing capabilities relative to those new challenges. Let me
highlight five points for your consideration.
First, our allies and partners are in the nuclear cross-hairs of
our adversaries. Russia, China, and North Korea have all developed
theories of victory in nuclear-backed confrontation with the United
States that target the vulnerabilities of our allies and partners. They
use nuclear coercion to try to persuade those allies and partners to
influence the United States to be restrained. In crisis, they plan to
engage in nuclear blackmail and brinksmanship to try to separate allies
from each other and from the United States. For war, they have created
an array of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities to win at
the regional level while trying to deter U.S. escalation and using
nuclear threats to de-couple the United States from the defense of its
allies. Ultimately, the political allegiance and alignment of those
allies and partners would be the prize in any such conflict, given the
ambitions of these adversaries to re-make the regional security orders
without an American presence.
Many allies and partners feel under considerable pressure from
these facts. We will soon have two new allies in Europe who have sought
membership of NATO in part because of the nuclear threat they face from
Russia. Thus, the assurance of these allies and partners has been a
steadily rising policy concern. A failure of assurance could prove to
be a tipping point in the global nuclear order. The loss of confidence
by one ally in the U.S. extended nuclear commitment would likely lead
others to conclude that they too can no longer rely on the United
States for nuclear protection and must seek nuclear weapons of their
own. Alternatively, some allies might reluctantly conclude that
appeasement is the better choice. Either choice would be detrimental to
U.S. interests.
In this new, more multipolar, and more adversarial security
environment, the nuclear protection the United States extends to its
allies and partners is much more important than in the so-called
unipolar moment.
Second, the U.S. discussion of extended nuclear deterrence tends to
focus on the hardware side. It is important to bear in mind as well the
software of extended deterrence, as it is integral. The hardware
includes:
Nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) forward-
deployed in Europe as part of NATO's unique nuclear sharing
arrangements
A limited capability to forward deploy DCA elsewhere in
the world if needed in time of crisis and war in support of U.S
alliance commitments
U.S. strategic forces, which serve as ``the ultimate
guarantee'' of the safety and security of U.S. allies.
The software includes:
Declaratory policy
o From the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review: ``the fundamental role
of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our
Allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United States or its allies and partners''
Supplemental statements of Presidential intent
o These are generally tailored to specific allies and alliance
commitments (as reflected, for example, in summit communiques and the
NATO Strategic Concept)
Consultative mechanisms
o For example, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended
Deterrence Dialogue with Japan
Concepts and principles for the employment of nuclear
weapons in war
o Purpose: ``to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage
possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its
allies and partners'' (2022 NPR)
Operational plans and the associated planning processes
The knowledge base to support the development of
principles, concepts, and plans
Exercises that demonstrate commitments, capabilities, and
concepts
In examining the health of the extended deterrence enterprise, it
is essential to consider both hardware and software.
Third, the existing U.S. posture for extending deterrence to its
allies and partners was designed for an era long past. As part of the
reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, the
United States withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from Asia, 97 percent
of its nuclear weapons from Europe, and all of its nuclear weapons from
naval surface vessels. It also put into storage the nuclear-armed
cruise missiles previously deployed on attack submarines, with the
promise that such weapons could be redeployed in time of crisis and
war, especially in Northeast Asia. [In 2010, the stored cruise missiles
aged out and were retired. This resulted in the commitment to make
dual-capable fighter-bombers and their bombs available globally.] In
the benign security environment of the time, the United States bet that
it could meet its extended deterrence requirements primarily with its
strategic forces and secondarily with a small number of nuclear weapons
and dual capable aircraft forward deployed in Europe.
But leaders in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang did not judge the
security environment to be benign. Already in the 1990's, they
perceived a growing need to protect themselves from what they believed
to be a dangerous America besotted with its power and driven by
hegemonic and ideological ambitions. They responded by rethinking
modern conflict. All three have developed concepts and plans for
crisis, war, and long-term competition with the United States and its
allies--which they apparently believe will enable them to break our
will, and that of our allies, to resist their ambitions. To enable
their new theories of victory, they then set about the task of making
the necessary adaptations to their military postures.
One result was an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons by all
three and the associated buildup and diversification of their nuclear
arsenals. All three have pursued expansion of their strategic systems,
which they appear to believe will enhance their flexibility in limited
war scenarios. All three have strengthened their regional nuclear
forces. One Russian leader has bragged of building ``a nuclear scalpel
for every military problem in Europe.'' Analysis by one leading think
tank identifies more than 30 different Russian theater nuclear delivery
systems. China's leadership has not apparently embraced nuclear weapons
in the same way Russia's leadership has, but it too has assembled a
theater strike posture composed of many hundreds of missiles capable of
delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons. North Korea has also
developed and deployed diverse means to deliver nuclear weapons in
Northeast Asia.
While Russia, China, and North Korea adapted and expanded their
nuclear arsenals to their new purposes, the United States has allowed
its nuclear posture to age and contract. For three decades it has
maintained its deterrent via a stockpile stewardship program and has
extended the life of existing warheads and bombs while foreswearing any
new nuclear capabilities. In addition, the arsenal has lost much of the
flexibility it once had. For example, of the 21 delivery systems
deployed in 1990, only four remain. For the employment of non-strategic
weapons, it has only one system (in contrast to the 30-plus deployed by
Russia).
The force structure bet placed by the United States in the early
1990's looks less attractive as the security environment has eroded
over the last decade. The general U.S. preference to rely primarily on
strategic systems for extended deterrence doesn't sit well with many
allies. Many European allies highly value the forward presence of
United States nuclear weapons, just as allies in Northeast Asia highly
value the promise of such a presence in crisis and war. They do so for
good reason. Forward-deployed weapons as a tangible display of U.S.
nuclear resolve to defend their vital interests. Moreover, the threat
to respond to limited regional nuclear employment with a forward-based,
low-yield U.S. weapon is generally seen as more credible than the
threat to respond to such an attack with U.S. strategic forces, as the
latter would seem certain to generate a retaliatory strike onto the
American Homeland. The retirement of the forward-deployed and--
deployable capabilities, as proposed by some, would send a very
unhelpful message at a time when Russia, China, and North Korea are all
enhancing their theater nuclear postures.
Thus, there is a strong demand signal from allies for the requisite
capabilities. NATO heads of State and government have regularly re-
endorsed the sharing arrangements and called for their expansion. The
sharing nations have overcome domestic political resistance to pursue
modernization of aging delivery systems. Similarly, Japan and South
Korea have sought visible and tangible displays of United States
intentions and capabilities to re-deploy nuclear weapons into their
region on their behalf.
There is, moreover, a rising discussion within U.S. alliances about
possible qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. The discussion of possible qualitative deficiencies centers
on the loss of flexibility as the United States went from many to one
means of delivering weapons at the regional level. Some make the case
for a new theater-range, dual-capable stand-off penetrating missile.
Others make the case for new capabilities that are non-ballistic and
low yield. Others make the case for a capability to respond in a
nuclear contingency without visible force generation. Some see SLCM-N
as the answer; others see different technical solutions.
The discussion of possible quantitative deficiencies centers on the
question of whether the number of available theater nuclear systems
will be sufficient for a world of deepening major power hostility and
growing deterrence challenges at the regional level. The 1991 force
sizing construct for extended deterrence simply doesn't fit the world
of 2023. Is more capability needed? Yes. How much more? I do not
believe that the United States and its allies and partners need a
theater nuclear posture that is symmetric to that of their adversaries.
But we need some concept for answering the question ``how much is
enough?'' The answer must follow from our strategy and not from the
legacy posture.
The software side of the posture needs some more attention as well.
A critical shortfall was identified in 2018 by the National Defense
Strategy Commission. Concluding that the United States could well lose
its next major war, it strongly criticized the then-existing State of
U.S. thinking about how to manage the risks of regional conflict with
nuclear-armed adversaries. It called for more work to better understand
the ways in which U.S. adversaries have prepared for such wars, the
risks of both inadvertent and intentional escalation, and how to de-
escalate and terminate such wars while avoiding a catastrophic result.
The latest National Defense Strategy indicates that some work is now
underway on these matters.
In sum, the erosion of deterrence has reached a point where some
basic improvements to the overall U.S. extended deterrence posture are
warranted, both qualitative and quantitative. The answers of the early
1990's are not sound for 2023. Recognizing the need for improvements is
an urgent priority, as doing so can set in motion the analytical and
political work to realize such improvements.
Fourth, looking ahead a decade, the challenges facing U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence seem destined to grow. Given is experience in
Ukraine, Russia can be expected to become more dependent on nuclear
threats to NATO, not less. North Korea can be expected to make
continued progress in assembling a diverse nuclear force and to become
more assertive in challenging the regional security order. A key factor
will be China's strategic breakout. While challenging in its own right,
the growth and diversification of China's nuclear forces create a new
problem for United States nuclear deterrence strategy: contending with
concerted action in crisis and war by two nuclear peers while credibly
extending nuclear deterrence into two simultaneous regional crises.
Against this backdrop, the United States must ask even more of its
allies for regional deterrence.
Fifth, the strengthening of extended deterrence has been a clear
national priority for three Presidential administrations in a row. This
bipartisan consensus is striking and should be preserved. This
consensus has made possible a good deal of progress. But progress is
not success. Success requires seeing through things already set in
motion. On the hardware side, this includes, for example, timely
delivery of promised capabilities (not just F35 and B61 but also B21
and LRSO). On the software side, this includes, for example,
strengthening the nuclear consultative processes with Japan and South
Korea. Success also requires doing some things that have proven beyond
our reach so far. On the hardware side, we must develop a theater force
sizing construct that is fit for purpose while also determining how to
add some more flexibility back into the posture. On the software side,
we must develop our own theories of victory in peacetime conflict,
crisis, and war against nuclear-armed adversaries and the associated
concepts for escalation, de-escalation, and war termination that
integrate conventional and nuclear operations. This further progress
will not be possible without continued leadership focus and bipartisan
engagement.
Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute these ideas. I
look forward to the discussion.
Brad Roberts is director of the Center for Global Security Research
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. From 2009 to 2013 he served
as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile
defense policy. In this capacity, he was head of the U.S. delegation to
NATO's nuclear High-Level Group and co-founder of the United States-
Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue and the United States-ROK Extended
Deterrence Policy Committee. The views expressed here are his personal
views and should not be attributed to his employer or its sponsors.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Roberts.
Mr. Weaver. Dr. Roberts, sorry. Mr. Weaver.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY WEAVER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE [NON-RESIDENT],
PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Weaver. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, Senator Fischer, Senator
Cotton, Senator Tuberville. Thanks for the opportunity to
participate here. My name is Greg Weaver. Today marks the 1-
year anniversary of my retirement from Federal service. My last
three positions in Government I was the Chief Nuclear Policy
and Strategy Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the
Joint Staff in the J5. I was the Principal Director for Nuclear
Missile Defense Policy under Deputy Assistant Secretary Bunn in
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy. Before that I
was the Deputy J5 in United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
in Omaha.
My comments today also reflect just my personal views.
I want to commend the Subcommittee for focusing on what I
think is a particularly important, urgent, and evolving
challenge that we need to get on top of. Frankly, I believe
improving our ability to deter and counter adversary limited
nuclear use in a regional conflict is the single most important
challenge we face in U.S. nuclear strategy today, and let me
explain why.
It is broadly agreed that the most likely path to limiting
nuclear deterrence failure is escalation in the context of
major conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries.
It is also broadly agreed that the most likely path to a large-
scale Homeland nuclear exchange between major powers is
escalation from limited nuclear use in the context of such a
conflict. Thus, regional nuclear deterrence is the key to
addressing the most likely path to nuclear war at any level of
violence.
Deterring Russian limited use is our most immediate and
challenging regional nuclear problem, although China is rapidly
rising in that area. So I am going to focus today on the Russia
problem to illustrate the nature of what we are up against.
President Putin's criminal invasion of Ukraine demonstrated
both a high propensity to take risk and to miscalculate in the
process of doing so. Perhaps this propensity to take risk and
miscalculate will be alleviated by Putin's eventual departure,
but we cannot count on that and we do not know when that will
be. The Russian leadership's historical propensity to
underestimate NATO's resolve and unity under threat long
preceded Putin and will likely survive him.
An effective regional nuclear strategy in Europe must be
based, as Senator Fischer pointed out, on an understanding of
Russia's nuclear strategy and doctrine. Both are ultimately
rooted in the assumption that limited nuclear use in theater is
unlikely to escalate to a large-scale Homeland exchange, though
I do not believe the Russians are certain that they can avoid
uncontrolled escalation.
It is important to understand that Russian conventional and
nuclear strategy and doctrine are fully integrated with each
other. Their nuclear forces role is to both deter large-scale
nuclear attacks on the Russian homeland and to compensate for
NATO conventional superiority in two ways. First, through the
limited use of nuclear weapons in theater to coerce war
termination on terms acceptable to Russia, if possible, but
second, to defeat NATO conventional forces through large-scale
theater nuclear strikes, if necessary. The latter is what
drives Russia's force requirement for thousands of theater
nuclear weapons embedded throughout their conventional forces.
What then is required to deter Russian limited nuclear
escalation in theater in an ongoing conventional war with NATO?
Well, because Russian strategy is based on the belief that
mutual deterrence of large-scale Homeland strikes is very
robust, we cannot rely solely on the suicidal threat of a
large-scale United States nuclear response to limited Russian
escalation or on the potential for uncontrolled escalation.
Deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use requires the
perceived ability of the United States and our NATO allies to
persevere in the face of limited nuclear escalation without
being politically coerced into accepting Russia's terms and
without being decisively militarily disadvantages.
Our longstanding flexible response strategy is, I believe,
fit for that purpose but only if it is enabled by U.S. and
allied nuclear and conventional forces that are capable of
three key things. First, being able to continue to operate
effectively to achieve U.S. and allied objectives in a limited
nuclear use environment. Second, being able to counter the
military impact of Russian theater nuclear use, and third,
providing the President a credible range of response options to
restore deterrence by convincing Russian leadership they have
miscalculated in a dire way, that further use of nuclear
weapons will not result in them achieving their objectives, and
that they will incur costs in the process that far exceed any
benefits they can achieve should they choose to escalate
further.
In sum, our capabilities must convince them that nuclear
escalation is always their worst option.
Now, for the nuclear capabilities bottom line. To meet
these requirements with high confidence we need a range of
forward-deployed, survivable theater nuclear capabilities that
can reliably penetrate adversary air and missile defenses with
a range of explosive yields on operationally relevant
timelines--and that is an extensive list of attributes. Based
on these attributes, planned U.S. nuclear capabilities, in my
view, are not sufficient for the future threat environment we
face. Strategic nuclear forces alone are insufficiently
flexible and timely to convince a major power adversary that we
are fully prepared to counter limited nuclear use with
militarily effective nuclear responses of our own.
Theater nuclear forces are needed for this role, but our
planned theater nuclear forces, in my opinion, are too small,
insufficiently survivable, and insufficiently militarily
relevant. Completing the modernization of our dual-capable
fighter aircraft capabilities is necessary, but it is not
sufficient.
Our theater nuclear forces can be made a much more credible
deterrent without having to match Russia and China weapon-for-
weapon by supplementing our dual-capable fighter force with at
least one more survivable, forward-deployed, selectable yield
delivery system that has a high probability to penetrate
adversary defenses. Several candidate systems could meet this
requirement, but I assess the SLCM-N, deployed on attack
submarines, is the best solution for these reasons. First, it
is highly survivable day to day and thus not subject to a
preemptive strike. Second, it provides theater nuclear
deterrent presence, whether it is actually present or not,
because the adversary will not know where those submarines are
located. Third, it provides an effective ability to penetrate,
in part due to, in some cases, being capable of launching from
inside the outer edges of an adversary's integrated air defense
system.
Fourth, it provides operationally significant promptness
when compared to bomber-delivered, air-launched cruise
missiles, it exploits the submarine fleet's large, preexisting
launch infrastructure, reducing cost, it has no ballistic
missile launch signature that could be misinterpreted by an
adversary, and finally, it could leverage the LRSO [long range
stand off], air-launched cruise missile modernization program,
reducing the impact on our nuclear weapons infrastructure of
building an additional theater nuclear capability. No other
system I am aware of checks all those boxes.
So in conclusion, and I know I have gone a little long,
regional nuclear deterrence is not the place the United States
should choose to take risk, and not only because theater
deterrence failure is the most likely path to large-scale
nuclear war, though that is a pretty good reason in and of
itself. An inability to confidently deter or counter adversary
limited nuclear use will undermine the credibility of U.S.
capability and will to project power against nuclear-armed
adversaries in defense of United States and allied vital
interests, making major power conventional war more likely in
both Europe and Asia. Our allies have not forgotten this and
neither should we.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weaver follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Gregory Weaver
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today's
hearing. It's an honor to be here. I commend the Subcommittee for
focusing on this urgent, important, and evolving challenge.
My comments today are my own and should not be attributed to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
My colleagues have masterfully addressed the broader political-
military aspects of the worsening regional nuclear deterrence problem
set we face. I will focus instead on the nature of regional nuclear
deterrence dynamics and their impact on U.S. deterrence strategy and
requirements. I believe improving our ability to deter and counter
adversary limited nuclear use in regional conflicts is the most
important challenge we face in U.S. nuclear strategy. Let me explain
why.
It is broadly agreed the most likely path to nuclear deterrence
failure is escalation in the context of a major conventional conflict
between nuclear-armed adversaries. It is also broadly agreed the most
likely path to a large-scale homeland nuclear exchange between major
powers is escalation from limited nuclear use in the context of a
large-scale conventional conflict.
That is where broad consensus ends on how deterrence of limited
nuclear use and large-scale escalation are related.
Some analysts and practitioners make two erroneous and dangerous
assumptions regarding nuclear deterrence and nuclear escalation. First,
they believe it is highly unlikely that nuclear deterrence will fail at
any level, and under any circumstances, leading them to conclude that
our planned capabilities are more than sufficient to deter limited use
under any circumstances. Second, they also believe that if nuclear
weapons are used at all, in any number or yield, the war will escalate
rapidly out of control to a catastrophic large scale exchange almost
automatically.
These assumptions lead them to conclude that all that is needed to
deter limited nuclear use is the latent potential for a large-scale
U.S. nuclear response, and that our current and planned capabilities
are thus more than sufficient to deter limited use under any
circumstances.
I think such a strategy is dangerously unsuited for credibly
extending nuclear deterrence to U.S. allies because I disagree with
both of these assumptions, and so do Russian, and possibly Chinese,
strategists.
As we consider how to deter limited nuclear first use we must first
ask ourselves this question:
Do we want to base our strategy to deter limited nuclear use on the
presupposition that any limited nuclear use will result in uncontrolled
escalation, and therefore such limited use won't happen if we rely on
that threat? That is not a prophecy we want to become self-fulfilling
if deterrence does fail in a limited way. But basing our strategy and
force posture on these flawed assumptions risks making it just that.
In my view, central strategic deterrence of large scale homeland
exchanges between nuclear-armed great powers is very stable, making
limited use unlikely to escalate out of control rapidly. Note, I did
not say that limited nuclear escalation cannot or will not escalate out
of control. Of course it can, and our deterrence strategy should
continue to leverage that risk without relying solely on it.
But the decision to initiate a large-scale nuclear strike on the
homeland of a nuclear-armed great power is clearly suicidal as long as
both sides retain large-scale survivable second strike capabilities.
Thus, leaders are likely to tolerate limited nuclear exchanges without
conducting such a large-scale strike on the adversary's homeland. This
is not because they want to wage limited nuclear war, but because the
alternatives can be summarized as surrender or suicide.
Deterrence is about what an adversary thinks, and how he
calculates. There is no area of national security affairs in which the
dictum ``the adversary gets a vote'' is more true. In a deterrence
relationship, the adversary doesn't just have ``a'' vote, they have the
only vote. It is our job to decisively influence how they cast it.
Deterring Russian limited use is the most immediate and challenging
regional nuclear deterrence problem, so I will use the Russia problem
to illustrate what we are up against. Putin's Russia cast their vote in
favor of the use of large-scale military force against Ukraine,
demonstrating both a high propensity to take risk, and to miscalculate
in the process of doing so. That combination of risk-taking and
miscalculation is extremely troubling, especially when paired with
Russia's repeated brandishing of nuclear threats.
Perhaps this dangerous propensity to take risk and miscalculate
will be alleviated by Putin's eventual departure. But we can't count on
that, and we don't know when that will be in any case. The Russian
leadership's historical propensity to profoundly and repeatedly
underestimate NATO's resolve and political unity under threat long
preceded Putin, and will likely survive him, even if Russia's risk-
taking propensity lessens somewhat in a post-Putin era.
The dismal performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine is
likely to lead them to further increase their reliance on nuclear
weapons. This means that in a future war with NATO they could perceive
the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict. If true, this
means that once Russia reconstitutes its conventional forces, deterring
Russian limited nuclear use will become even more important to
deterring Russian conventional aggression than before Ukraine.
To formulate an effective regional nuclear deterrence strategy in
Europe we must closely examine Russia's nuclear strategy and doctrine.
Both are ultimately rooted in the assumption that limited nuclear use
in theater is unlikely to escalate to a large scale homeland exchange,
though I do not believe the Russians are certain they can avoid
uncontrolled escalation. Based on the scope and content of China's
ongoing nuclear buildup, their strategy and doctrine may be evolving
based on this perception as well.
Russian conventional and nuclear strategy and doctrine are fully
integrated. Their nuclear forces' role is to both deter large scale
nuclear attacks on the Russian homeland and compensate for NATO
conventional superiority through the limited use of nuclear weapons in
theater through coercion if possible, but through defeat if necessary.
The coercive escalation option is to initiate limited first use of
nuclear weapons to compel termination of an ongoing conventional war on
terms acceptable to Russia.
The defeat escalation option is to conduct large-scale theater
nuclear operations against NATO's conventional forces if the Russian
leadership assesses they pose a threat to ``the very existence of the
Russian state''. This option is what drives Russia's force requirement
for thousands of theater nuclear weapons embedded throughout their
conventional forces.
What, then, is required to deter Russian limited nuclear escalation
in theater given their strategy and doctrine, their demonstrated
propensity to take the risk of invading their neighbors, and their
track record of miscalculating regarding NATO's will and cohesion?
Given that Russian strategy is based on the belief that mutual
strategic deterrence of large-scale homeland strikes is very robust,
deterrence of limited nuclear use requires the perceived ability of the
U.S. and our NATO allies to persevere in the face of Russian limited
escalation without being politically coerced into accepting war
termination on Russia's terms, and without being decisively militarily
disadvantaged. That requires a set of U.S. nuclear capabilities that
are militarily relevant in such a conflict. Russian theater nuclear
capabilities are designed to be just that: militarily relevant in a
limited nuclear war. The evolution of Chinese theater nuclear
capabilities seems to indicate they understand this as well.
In my view the core requirement for deterring Russian limited
nuclear escalation in a war with NATO is a Flexible Response strategy
that credibly convinces the Russian leadership that limited nuclear
escalation does not provide effective insurance against miscalculating
about NATO's resolve and cohesion, will not result in war termination
on their terms, and does indeed run the risk of uncontrolled escalation
because the United States and our Allies are visibly prepared for what
Schelling called a ``competition in risk-taking'' to defend our vital
interests.
Such a strategy must be enabled by U.S. and Allied nuclear and
conventional forces that are capable of three key things:
1. Providing a robust range of response options to restore
deterrence by convincing Russian leadership they have miscalculated in
a dire way, that further use of nuclear weapons will not achieve their
objectives, and that they will incur costs that far exceed any benefits
they can achieve.
2. Countering the military impact of Russian theater nuclear
use.
3. Continuing to operate effectively to achieve U.S. and Allied
objectives in a limited nuclear use environment.
In sum, our strategy and capabilities must convince them with high
confidence that nuclear escalation is always their worst option. And
while there remains uncertainty about whether China's nuclear strategy
and doctrine are shifting to match the comprehensive nuclear buildup
they are undertaking, we are likely to need to be able to do the same
in the Asia-Pacific theater.
Now for the nuclear capabilities bottom line: to meet the
requirements for deterring limited nuclear use with high confidence we
need a range of forward deployed, survivable theater nuclear
capabilities that can reliably penetrate adversary theater air and
missile defenses with a range of explosive yields and on operationally
relevant delivery timelines. Based on these attributes, I do not
believe that planned U.S. nuclear capabilities are sufficient for the
future threat environment we face.
Strategic nuclear forces alone are insufficiently flexible and
timely to convince a major power adversary that we are fully prepared
to counter limited nuclear first use with militarily effective nuclear
responses of our own. Given Russian strategy, doctrine, and
capabilities, theater nuclear capabilities are required.
Completing the modernization of our dual capable fighter aircraft
capabilities is necessary, but not sufficient. Our planned theater
nuclear forces are too small, insufficiently survivable, and
insufficiently militarily relevant. But they could be improved to be a
much more credible deterrent to limited nuclear use without having to
match Russia and China weapon for weapon.
We should supplement dual capable fighter modernization with at
least one more survivable, forward deployed, selectable yield delivery
system with a higher probability to penetrate advanced defenses. There
are several candidates that could meet this requirement, but I assess
that SLCM-N deployed on attack submarines is the best solution for the
following reasons:
It is highly survivable day-to-day, and thus not subject to
preemptive strike.
It provides theater nuclear deterrent presence, whether it is
actually present or not.
It provides an effective ability to penetrate, in part due to in
some instances being capable of launch from inside the outer edges of
an adversary's integrated air defenses.
It provides operationally significant promptness when compared to
bomber-delivered ALCMs.
It exploits the attack submarine fleet's large pre-existing
launcher infrastructure, reducing cost.
It has no ballistic missile launch signature that could be
misinterpreted by an adversary.
It could leverage the LRSO program, reducing the impact on our
nuclear weapons enterprise.
No other system I am aware of checks all those boxes.
In conclusion, regional nuclear deterrence is not the place the
U.S. should choose to take risk, and not only because theater
deterrence failure is the most likely path to large scale nuclear war
that poses an existential threat to the United States, though that is a
pretty good reason in and of itself. An inability to confidently deter
or counter limited theater nuclear use will undermine the credibility
of U.S. capability and willingness to decisively project power against
a nuclear-armed adversary in defense of U.S. and Allied vital
interests. Our Allies have not forgotten this. Neither should we.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Compelling testimony. I
appreciate it.
Ms. Bunn.
STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, SENIOR ADVISOR [NON-RESIDENT],
PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member
Fischer, and other Subcommittee Members for the invitation. It
really is a pleasure to testify before you again, but this time
as a private citizen representing only myself and not as a
United States Government (USG) official. I spent 40 years in
Government, mainly at Department of Defense. My last job there
was as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy, following Brad, in 2013 to 2017.
Senator King. Did you say 40 years?
Ms. Bunn. Forty years. Forty.
Senator King. You were hired as a child?
Ms. Bunn. I just had my 70th birthday. That is on the
record.
I also, in that National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) job, as did Brad, spend a lot of time with allies, both
as the U.S. Representative to the High Level Group of NATO as
well as co-chairing the deterrence dialogs with Japan and South
Korea.
The United States has made very explicit extended nuclear
deterrence commitments to more than 30 countries, NATO
countries as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In so
doing, the United States has privately and publicly affirmed
that aggression against those countries could, under some
circumstances, merit a U.S. nuclear response.
I have come to believe that extended deterrence is amazing
from both sides. We have our non-nuclear allies, who have
foresworn their own nuclear weapons and rely on another
country, the U.S., in high-end situations, including nuclear
attacks on their own territory and people. It is amazing that
the U.S. takes on the risk and responsibility of putting its
own forces, even its population and territory, at risk on
behalf of an ally. That is an amazing fact to the point that
some, in the past, have found it incredible. That is the reason
we have an independent French nuclear force.
It should be no surprise that our non-nuclear allies need
to constant reassurance that they are very interested in how we
think about deterrence, how we might respond. It is not amazing
that they need that constant interaction to feel secure.
In January, South Korean President Yoon speculated publicly
that if North Korean provocations increased, South Korea might
consider building its own nuclear weapons or maybe asking the
United States to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the South,
as it did before 1991. Although President Yoon later stressed
that his comments did not represent official policy, they were
still significant, marking the first time since the 1970's that
a South Korean President has raised the prospect of acquiring
nuclear weapons.
Do President Yoon's comments indicate that some in South
Korea are concerned about the credibility of the United States
extended nuclear deterrence commitment? I think so. While I am
not worried about non-nuclear allies deciding to have their own
nuclear weapons in the very near term, I can see it happening,
5, 10, 15 years from now, with South Korea probably the first
among them.
United States will has long been the underlying concern for
allies. They know we have weapons, but would we use them? It is
not ``could we'' but ``would we.'' I think it consultations at
multiple levels, real ones, where we listen as well as talk,
where we have exercises, both tabletop and field exercises,
where we have forward deployments of conventional and sometimes
nuclear forces. All of those things say that we have a stake in
and will take risk for allies' security.
If South Korea, or another ally, does ask for deployment of
United States nuclear weapons on their territory, or nuclear
sharing arrangements, dual-capable aircraft and the B-61 bombs,
as in NATO, or offshore SLCM-N, which I have not heard allies
discussing much, but if allies raise any of these hardware
issues I think the U.S. should be willing to have frank
discussions about their view and be open to talks on the
plusses and minuses of what allies believe they need and not
simply give a kneejerk ``no.''
There are things we can do short of deploying nuclear
forces in allied countries. For example, the last three Nuclear
Posture Reviews have all said that the United States maintains
globally deployable, dual-capable aircraft, primarily to assure
Northeast Asian allies. But we have not demonstrated that
capability with exercises. That should be an easy one to do.
In any event, with or without forward-deployed nuclear
weapons there is a need for ongoing consultations that are deep
and nuanced, more realistic exercises, and greater allied
integration in operational planning.
Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
Dr. Montgomery.
STATEMENT OF EVAN B. MONTGOMERY, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, RESEARCH STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY
ASSESSMENTS
Dr. Montgomery. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and
share my thoughts with you. I would like to focus my remarks on
the potential consequences of China's nuclear modernization.
For more than a decade, China's conventional military
modernization has been upending the balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific region. Until recently, though, China's nuclear
arsenal has been a secondary concern. The situation is starting
to change now that China is engaged in a significant
quantitative and qualitative nuclear buildup. This nuclear
buildup could be destabilizing both regionally and globally,
and I would like to highlight three areas of concern that have
been raised to date.
The first is the possibility that China could pose a future
first-strike threat against United States strategic forces.
This previously implausible scenario could become a genuine
concern if Beijing fields accurate and difficult-to-detect
system that could threaten United States command and control
targets, as well as large numbers of ICBMs that could threaten
U.S. strategic delivery systems.
Thankfully, the likelihood of this scenarios is
extraordinarily low because the demands of a successful first
strike are so extraordinarily high. Nevertheless, if China's
nuclear buildup unfolds in the way that many now anticipate, it
cannot be discounted entirely, especially if United States
officials take into account the combined nuclear forces of
Russia and China in their calculations, as they should.
The second area of concern is the possibility that China's
nuclear buildup could embolden Beijing to start a conventional
conflict against the United States. From China's perspective, a
larger and more survivable strategic deterrent could ensure
that any fight between the United States and China does not
escalate and remains at the conventional level, a prospect that
might actually benefit China given its conventional military
modernization.
This situation is certainly a far more plausible risk than
the threat of a first strike. Nevertheless, China would still
need to be confident that it could suppress Taiwan and succeed
in a clash with the United States, two very costly courses of
action no matter how many improvements the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) makes.
The third area of concern associated with China's nuclear
buildup, and I think the one that is likely to be the most
serious over the long run, is the possibility that China could
build the tools to make limited nuclear threats. For instance,
China could soon be equipped with multiple, highly accurate
theater nuclear options, enabling it to hold many regional
targets at risk with low-yield nuclear weapons. These
capabilities are especially worrisome because they could serve
as the foundation for an alternative coercive strategy against
Taiwan, one that might look easier, faster, and cheaper than,
for example, launching a direct invasion of the island and
embarking on a large-scale conventional war against the United
States.
Specifically, if Beijing paired limited nuclear threats
with, for example, blockade operations against the island and
attacks against leadership targets, it would pose major
dilemmas for the United States as it determined whether and how
to intervene.
In sum, the nuclear buildup that China has embarked upon
could have significant consequences. Although it has received
less attention than the expansion of its strategic forces, a
potential buildout of China's theater nuclear capabilities
could have major implications for the United States, and here I
will briefly highlight three.
The first implication is for U.S. nuclear force structure.
For years, the United States has been concerned about the
imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons between itself and
Russia. Yet there might be a similar imbalance on the horizon
with respect to China. If Beijing fields a variety of nuclear-
armed theater missile systems, the United States may not have
symmetrical, proportional, effective, and credible responses in
hand. That dilemma could become especially sharp if
Washington's relatively small inventory of non-strategic
nuclear weapons is needed to deter limited nuclear threats by
two major power adversaries at the same time.
The second implication is for U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence arrangements. Theater nuclear forces could enable
Beijing to drive wedges between the United States and its
allies and partners. In other words, Washington could face
dilemmas similar to those that it confronted during the cold
war when Soviet investments in theater nuclear systems that
could target European allies without striking the United States
Homeland raised decoupling concerns that required skillful
alliance management to address. If so, the United States might
need to consider binding itself and its allies more tightly
together, for instance, by pursuing nuclear sharing
arrangements with Japan and South Korea, not unlike those that
exist with select NATO allies.
The third and final implication is a broader one for United
States defense planning, namely that China's nuclear buildup
will require the United States to prepare for a wider range of
threats. To date, the Department of Defense, in particular, is
focused on the challenges posed by a PLA air and amphibious
assault against Taiwan as well as PLA attacks against United
States ports, forward-operating forces, air bases, and
information networks. China's nuclear buildup could open up new
avenues of coercion against Taiwan, some of which, like the
early resort to limited nuclear threats in lieu of invasion,
could seem appealing to leaders in Beijing while posing
considerable difficulties for policymakers in Washington.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Montgomery follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator King. I want to thank all of our witnesses. This
has been amazingly provocative and thoughtful and information,
so I want to thank you.
It seems to me--I mean, I think of the formula for
deterrence as will plus capacity, and will is a hard thing to
measure and quantify. I think you testified about the software
of nuclear deterrence, and statements, policies, doctrines are
important. Capacity, though, is something that can be measured,
and I think all of you--well, I will ask--do any of you
disagree with the proposition that we do not have sufficient
low-level, regional deterrent capacity while we are deployed?
Does anybody disagree with that?
Mr. Weaver. Senator, I not only agree with it, I also think
that if we were to take steps to correct that----
Senator King. I think your mic is not on.
Mr. Weaver. Yes. I not only do not disagree with that, I
think that if we were to take steps to correct that problem, to
actually bolster our theater nuclear capabilities, it would
actually help work part of the software problem, which is we
would be demonstrating that we have the will to address this
problem, even though it is politically fraught, potentially, in
our alliances.
Senator King. Believe it or not, I wrote my senior thesis
on this subject. I will not tell you how many years ago it was,
but Admiral Roberts at STRATCOM tried his best to get naval
intelligence to find it, but I could not find it.
But it seems to me that the strategic dilemma is that if
all we have is massive retaliation, it is not credible that we
would use that in case of a tactical use in Ukraine or
Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia. So that is really the
dilemma.
I will ask the question I know you are going to ask. SLCM-N
is not funded in the current budget. It was funded for R&D
[research and development] last year. This year it is zero. Is
that not correct? But, Mr. Weaver, you testified that you
thought that was the most logical forward deployed, and you
gave five reasons why. I do not mean to have you repeat your
testimony but I am a little puzzled why that is not in the
budget.
Mr. Weaver. Well, Senator, I was involved in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review that recommended it and the Joint Staff,
and I was also involved in the 2022 Posture Review with the
administration decided not to do it. As you know, the Chairman
recommended SLCM-N.
There are, as I said in my statement, there are other
theater nuclear options we could pursue. We could build mobile,
land-based systems. But when you take the full look at the set
of attributes that most address the nature of our theater
deterrence problem, in both Europe and Asia, I believe SLCM-N
is the best option we have readily available. Now if you want
to invent something completely new and have it take longer to
get--and we do not have much time----
Senator King. We do not need to invent a platform. We have
the platform.
Mr. Weaver. Exactly, and we have the platform already.
Senator King. Dr. Roberts, do you agree with this line of
discussion?
Dr. Roberts. I do. We have just concluded--three of the
four of us just concluded a study group report on dealing with
the emergence of a second nuclear peer, and its implications of
two nuclear peers for our nuclear strategy, a bipartisan group,
and we have a strong endorsement for SLCM-N in the report.
Senator King. Well, another danger, other than the weakness
of the deterrent, it seems to me, is an incentive to our allies
to develop their own nuclear capability. As you suggested, the
President of South Korea sort of speculated on that some time
ago. But at some point they are going to say, ``Well, if we
cannot rely on a reliable, credible deterrent, we have got to
develop our own capacity.'' In a sense, our extended deterrent,
it seems to me, is a proxy for those other countries developing
their own capability, which, from a proliferation point of
view, is a good thing. Ms. Bunn?
Ms. Bunn. I am one who has reluctantly come to the
conclusion that we do need a TLAM-N [Nuclear-armed Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile] in this discussion group that we are
talking about. I am sorry, SLCM-N. Did I say TLAM-N? SLCM-N.
Many battles in my career over TLAM-N, and why was I reluctant?
Because SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] do have many
missions, and I also fought many battles with the Navy. I am
just not sure the Navy will ever fully support this because we
fought many battles trying to keep TLAM-N in the force before
it was retired.
So that was my reluctance. But I do think that we need it
for--if we decide, if the U.S. decides we need it for deterring
and responding to limited use, then we should go forward with
it. We should fund it. Right now I do not think we can pin it
on allies are asking for it. I have not heard a lot of allies
talking about it specifically. Usually in conference if it is
raised, it is raised by Americans. But I suspect they do not
want to get in the middle of a policy debate in the U.S.
Senator King. But they want the extended deterrence.
Ms. Bunn. They want capabilities. If they are concerned
that either adversaries do not think we would use the
capabilities we have now because they are not appropriate--they
are too high yield, they cannot get through, various reasons we
would not use those--then they have good analysts. They want us
to have something that we can see actually, that our
adversaries could see us actually employing. If they do not
think you would ever use it, then it does not deter.
Senator King. Well, I am over my time. I want to turn it
over to Senator Fischer. But the whole point here is to never
have these weapons used, and we do not want an adversary to
think that they can use a low-level weapon and pay no
significant price, which gets us to the place where we are in a
nuclear confrontation.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
On Saturday, March 25th, President Putin, he announced that
Russia is going to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus,
and he also informed us that an agreement had been made with
Belarus to equip 10 of the Belarusian aircraft with tactical
nuclear weapons, along with their Iskander mobile short-range
ballistic missile system. It was fascinating, I thought, that
he did this. Obviously, I got a very strong message that he
would do this, first of all, take the action, and second, tell
us what he did.
Mr. Weaver, let us start with you. How do you think that
this action is going to change the nuclear deterrence dynamic
that we see in Europe right now?
Mr. Weaver. So, Senator, I do not believe Russian
deployment of some of their non-strategic capabilities to
Belarus changes the military equation in Europe at all. It is a
political move. The Russians have long complained that we have
nuclear weapons forward based in Europe on the territory of our
allies and that we have nuclear sharing arrangements with them.
Senator Fischer. They made it clear. This was not for
Belarus to use. It was for Belarus to use for Russia.
Mr. Weaver. Right. But the Russians have somewhere between
1,500 and 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons today. They are
embedded throughout their conventional forces across the
Russian Federation. Moving a few of them forward now into
Belarus really does not change the military equation. They
range anybody in NATO that they want to with the existing
systems they have, including the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise
missile that has a range of about 2,000 kilometers, that
violated the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) Treaty and
led to our withdrawal.
So they can threaten NATO throughout its depth, and they
have always had the ability to move Russian forces forward into
Belarus in the event of a conflict, in any event. So I do not
think it changes the military equation but it is a political
signal.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts and Ms. Bunn, do you agree
with that?
Ms. Bunn. Yes, I would agree with that. It will be
interesting. The Russians, and now the Chinese in NPT [Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] meetings have
complained about NATO nuclear sharing, and I do not know if
this will change their rhetoric on that at all. Probably not.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts, anything to add on that?
Dr. Roberts. Same essential view. The Russian military
strategy for local war, which is what it claims to be fighting,
as opposed to a regional war against a large coalition, that
strategy is in part about keeping it local, keeping the
outsiders out, casting a long shadow, making us fearful that if
we engage we will pay a terrible price. President Putin has to
keep beating that drum one way or another. I think this is just
one more sign of his effort to alarm us, but it does not change
the military equation.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts, between recent news of
Russia's noncompliance with the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty, China's modernization rate, and North
Korea's daily shows of force, we also see Iran's nuclear
weaponization capability. How should the U.S. focus our
regional nuclear strategy? If we are talking about regions, how
do we focus that?
Dr. Roberts. Well, I do not think we have the luxury of
prioritizing. One of the big questions in the two peer study
was do you prioritize one over the other, or the first
contingency over the possible second one? Our conclusion was,
we cannot afford to do that. Too much risk. It is giving a
green light to aggression in the area you have not prioritized.
My take on this is that the complex landscape you describe
renders essentially out of date the bet we placed in 1991, the
bet that we could do regional deterrence essentially with our
strategic forces and a little bit of theater nuclear force. The
rebalance has to come between those two elements of the bet we
placed. So, with the rest of the group, I think more weapons
and a more diverse toolkit at the regional level are in our
interest and in the interest of our allies.
But let us be clear. I do not think any of us are arguing
that the United States and its allies should have a regional
nuclear posture that is symmetric to that of Russia or China or
North Korea. We have different strategies, so we need different
numbers and different types of weapons.
Senator Fischer. Would you say there are plans out there
now that would address that? Has planning taken place? Do you
know?
Dr. Roberts. Capability development or operational
planning?
Senator Fischer. Both.
Dr. Roberts. Both.
Senator Fischer. Both. You said it. It is not the same. It
is not the same.
Dr. Roberts. Correct.
Senator Fischer. You have to address each one individually.
So do you know of any plans that have taken place either within
Government or outside of Government?
Dr. Roberts. So for development of new capability, the
Administration certainly has a plan.
Senator Fischer. Right.
Dr. Roberts. In my view, it needs to evolve in the
direction we have talked about. Operational planning, of course
the STRATCOM commander stands ready to do what might need to be
done tonight. But I bear in mind the findings of the National
Defense Strategy Commission of 2018, which concluded, as you
will recall, that the United States could well lose a war
against a nuclear-armed rival, largely not because we have the
wrong capabilities, but because we have not understood the
nature of the war that is being waged against us. We have not
done our intellectual homework. We have not developed the
concepts we need to organize our operational planning and
conduct operations. I do not know to what extent that remains
true, but that was an important marker that rang a lot of alarm
bells for me.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. This is the third Armed Services hearing I
have been at today, and the question that you just touched upon
has come up at all three, which is the change nature of modern
warfare, and the likelihood of a modern conflict starting with
cyber, directed energy, electronic warfare, space capabilities.
I asked the Marine general today if his landing ships would be
okay with no GPS [Global Positioning System] and no
communications. That is the world that we have to live in.
So this is beyond the scope of this hearing to some extent,
but I would be interested in your thoughts about, the cliche is
generals always fight the last war. Are we doing that or are we
adequately taking account of the change strategic, not only the
strategic landscape but the technological landscape. Wars are
often won on whoever has the newest technology.
Dr. Montgomery, your thoughts.
Dr. Montgomery. I do believe we are. To some extent, at
least when we talk about this in the nuclear domain I think we
may overemphasize some of those changes in technology. They are
very worrisome. They are concerning. They certainly pose risks
to command and control, which is a serious concern. But at the
end of the day, when we are talking about strategic stability
between major powers, it ultimately comes back to the ability
of one side to pose a disarming threat against another one.
Right now we have Russia, that does not quite pose that
capability but is a nuclear peer, China apparently aspires to
be a nuclear peer, and those buildups are not unrelated to but
separate from those very novel aspects of future warfare.
So I think while important, it is still essential to keep
our focus, at least again in the nuclear domain, in terms of
delivery system warheads, yields, accuracy, et cetera.
Senator King. Well in command and control, I have always
said we do not have a triad. We have a quad, that command and
control is an essential----
Dr. Montgomery. Absolutely.
Senator King.--part of the credibility of the deterrent,
which is essentially providing a deterrent.
Let me ask another question. We have talked about peer
adversaries and Russia and China particularly. What about
nuclear-armed countries that we are not engaged with directly,
India and Pakistan being an example? What role, if any, do we
have in their potential use of nuclear weapons? One of the
things that I think that may be deterring Russia is after
Hiroshima they have never been used. Nobody wants to be the
first person to use them again, and I think that is something
of a deterrent. I suspect that China is communicating that to
Russia.
What about Pakistan and India? Ms. Bunn, do you have
thoughts?
Ms. Bunn. That is a hard one because I think we have less
influence. They are not our adversaries.
Senator King. Right.
Ms. Bunn. They are not our formal extended nuclear
deterrent allies, and so they are in a different category as
far as how we deal with them and how we can influence them, how
we deal with them as adversaries or how we can influence them
as allies.
Senator King. The last thing we want is to normalize the
use of nuclear weapons.
Ms. Bunn. Absolutely. I would certainly agree with you that
trying to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used again is
one way to keep that diplomatic psychological pressure on them
not to be the ones to do it.
Senator King. Other thoughts on this issue?
Mr. Weaver. Could I add one thing on it, Senator?
Senator King. Sure.
Mr. Weaver. I think another aspect of the question you are
asking is when and if there is another limited use of nuclear
weapons in a conflict, what lessons will all the other nuclear
states--and non-nuclear states--draw from the outcome of that
use? That is another reason why it is so important that we
focus on this problem of being able to deter limited nuclear
use effectively, with high confidence, and second, if
deterrence fails in a limited way that we have the ability to
counter the effects of adversary-limited nuclear use so that
they do not win the conflict as a result. They are not seen as
having won because they used nuclear weapons, because that
would create a huge proliferation problem around the world.
Senator King. Well, I commented in my opening statement
about the doctrine of ``Escalate to Deescalate.'' The Russians
have told us that is their doctrine, and for us to not take
that seriously it seems to me is a major strategic and tactical
mistake. I mean, Maya Angelou says when somebody tells you who
they are, you should believe them. They have told us who they
are on this subject, and we need to be sure that we have a
credible deterrent that does not involve a massive strike,
which they do not think we will do, if they use a one-kiloton
weapon on Kharkiv. Dr. Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. I just wanted to add a comment on your comment
about no one wants to break the taboo. I hope that is true, but
President Putin seems like a guy who has gotten a lot of power
and influence out of breaking taboos. In 2014, he stood under
the banner when he explained his annexation of Crimea, the
banner saying, ``New Rules or No Rules.'' He has been living
the ``no rules'' game and generating a lot of power and fear
accordingly.
The taboo against the employment of nuclear weapons is one
of the last major taboos he has not broken. I hope he does not
break it, but I am not convinced that he thinks preserving the
taboo is important.
Senator King. Well, we have to give him a reason in terms
of what he will reap as a consequence----
Dr. Roberts. That is right.
Senator King.--beyond the taboo. We cannot rely on the
taboo to protect us, I think.
Dr. Roberts. That is right. Absolutely.
Senator King. I would like to like, are either of our
Senators intending to come back? Okay.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. I just want to really thank you for being
here today. I think these discussions are extremely helpful to,
first of all, educate the Members of Congress, but also to
educate our public as well to the threats that this country
faces.
When we look at North Korea, they have various missiles.
They have ICBMs. They have long range, short range. They have
an underwater nuclear attack drone now that is out there. We
obviously are developing things as well, but when we see other
countries doing this, how does that affect us in our
decisionmaking, to counter and provide deterrence, not just for
the weapons, which we have talked about--tactical weapons,
weapons in theater, the changes we see there regionally--but
also the platforms?
Dr. Montgomery, you are nodding your head.
Dr. Montgomery. I often do. Two points. I think there is a
quantitative dimension to this and a qualitative dimension. So
quantitatively, when you see countries like North Korea
building up their forces--and we are not talking about a rogue
State with 10 or 15 nuclear weapons, but potentially a regional
nuclear power with 50 or 100 nuclear weapons--those numbers
matter. It becomes potentially more difficult for the United
States with say, 1,550 treaty-accountable strategic warheads,
to manage threats from and deter a peer in Russia, an aspiring
peer in China, a North Korea with a significant arsenal. That
is a lot of weapons to measure up against.
In terms of the qualitative dimension, if you look at the
diversity and capabilities that a country like North Korea is
investing in--and, Senator King, this ties to your question
about Pakistan and India as well--Pakistan also has made
investments in low-yield nuclear capabilities. So now we see
Russia placing significant emphasis on low-yield nuclear
weapons, Pakistan placing significant emphasis on low-yield
nuclear weapons, North Korea investing in low-yield nuclear
weapons, and potentially China exploring low-yield nuclear
weapons. We should probably take that message that a lot of
adversaries and potential adversaries or countries we have
difficult relations with see a lot of value in these
capabilities and think about what deficiencies in our arsenal
might exist that could potentially undermine deterrence,
relative to those systems.
Senator Fischer. It also limits the options that can be
presented to our President to make decisions in a short period
of time, in response to actions of other nations. Correct?
Dr. Montgomery. Absolutely. You know, we talk about our
strategic forces, one of their key attributes being promptness.
Promptness, I do not think, is an attribute you would ascribe
to some of the limited low-yield nuclear options that we have.
That does mean that the options available to the President in a
crisis that are time sensitive are limited.
Senator Fischer. Any other comments on that?
Dr. Roberts. Sure. You asked about how we react watching
these developments, and for a long time we watched and did not
react. For a long time it was unthinkable to us that these
things mattered because, after all, we had conventional
dominance, we had confidence in our strategic nuclear
deterrent, and we did not see--the problem, the threat remained
unthinkable. It was just implausible to most in the U.S.
national security community that an adversary might ever
contemplate the possibility of employing a nuclear weapon in a
conflict with the United States and somehow escaping intact.
Our view began to shift, principally as a result of the
Russian annexation of Crimea, a wake-up call. As Ash Carter
said at the time, it was time for a ``new playbook on Russia,''
and we discovered a need for a new playbook on North Korea, a
new playbook on China, and now we are all trying to create that
new playbook.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. Well, again I want to thank you. I cannot
help but mention something that bothers me in this field. It
turns out that no President since Jimmy Carter has participated
in a nuclear exercise, an attack exercise, in real time. I find
that puzzling. I mean, I do not the President to walk into that
room for the first time in a real-life situation. I have gone
through several of those exercises, and it is terrifying but
also educational.
So that is neither here nor there, but I find it striking
that, as I say, no President, apparently since Jimmy Carter,
has participated in such an exercise, which I do not get.
Thank you all very much for your testimony today. It has
been very informative, as I said, and helpful to this
Subcommittee as we prepare for the National Defense Act that is
coming up in a couple of months.
Thank you again. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
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