    [Senate Hearing 118-618]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 118-618

                          REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 28, 2023

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-008                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

    _________________________________________________________________

                       Subcommittee on Strategic Command

     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine, Chairman	DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts	TOM COTTON, Arkansas
     JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois	        DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
     JACKY ROSEN, Nevada		        KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
     MARK KELLY, Arizona 			TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 March 28, 2023

                                                                       Page

    Testimony on Regional Nuclear Deterrence.........................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................     1

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Roberts, Brad, Ph.D., Director, Center for Global Security            2
      Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

    Weaver, Gregory, Senior Associate [non-resident], Project on          7
      Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

    Bunn, M. Elaine, Senior Advisor [non-resident], Project on           12
      Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

    Montgomery, Evan B., Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director, Research     14
      Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

                                     (iii)

                    TESTIMONY ON REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:52 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members Present: King, Fischer, Cotton, and
    Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. This hearing of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Armed
    Services will come to order.
        I first want to thank our witnesses for joining us at
    today's hearing on regional nuclear deterrence. Today's hearing
    may sound somewhat esoteric but it is deadly serious to our
    national security. We have debated strategic deterrence
    extensively in this Committee and, in fact, the 2022 Nuclear
    Posture Review concentrated on our nuclear use policy,
    modernizing our triad so that we might ensure that we are never
    coerced by a near peer adversary such as Russia or China.
        The question we ask today is about regional nuclear
    deterrence. In other words, how can we ensure a conventional
    conflict with a near peer adversary or a conflict between two
    nuclear-armed adversaries does not resort to the use of nuclear
    weapons, which then escalates into a broader nuclear exchange?
    This is the nuclear escalation ladder that theorists have
    worried about for decades.
        Today Ukraine is an example of regional nuclear deterrence.
    Russia's strategic triad is certainly something that the United
    States must take account of in terms of its involvement in the
    conflict. Meanwhile, our extended NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] deterrent has prevented Russia from intervening
    directly with NATO allies. However, that is not the end of this
    dilemma.
        Russia has a doctrine referred to as ``Escalate to
    Deescalate,'' which is when they feel that they are in danger
    of being conventionally overmatched and their country's
    existence is at stake. It will involve first using low-yield
    weapons to stun any opponent. Will taking back Crimea trigger
    this doctrine? Will taking back some of the property, the land
    that Russia has allegedly annexed trigger this doctrine? We
    know Russia is running low on conventional munitions. If Russia
    enters into a conflict with a NATO ally will they quickly
    resort to low-yield weapons?
        I hope today's hearing informs us as to whether our
    deterrent is appropriately tailored for such a regional
    conflict. Are we selfdeterred with our high-yield arsenal of
    ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBMs [submarine
    launched ballistic missile]? There is a debate about bringing
    back a low-yield, submarine-launched cruise missile, that which
    will deter Russia in a regional conflict. Would it deter Russia
    in a regional conflict? These same questions apply to China and
    Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan.
        Today's witnesses have all thought about these questions
    and many of them have served in Government, enacting policies
    on this issue. It is important that we hear and learn from them
    today so that we are better informed as we prepare for our
    discussions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    later this spring.
        After remarks from Senator Fischer we will have statements
    from our witnesses and a round of questions from our Senators.
        Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    all our witnesses for being here today and for sharing your
    perspective on nuclear strategy and deterrence theory,
    particularly with respect to the role it plays in regional
    nuclear stability.
        According to the 2022 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review],
    effective nuclear deterrence, quote, ``requires tailor
    strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best
    understanding of their decisionmaking and perceptions,'' end
    quote. The NPR also notes that the United States, quote, ``will
    collaborate with allies and partners to tailor extended
    deterrence and assurance policies,'' end quote.
        These strategies must be continuously evaluated to ensure
    they reflect and take into consideration the evolving threat
    environment. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on
    effective strategy concepts and how they may impact regional
    nuclear deterrence.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator King. If the witnesses will introduce themselves. I
    do not know what order you want to proceed. Brad, do you want
    to start?

     STATEMENT OF BRAD ROBERTS, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL
       SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

        Dr. Roberts. Sure. Thank you for the opportunity to join
    you in this discussion today. I am Dr. Brad Roberts. I am
    Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory. The views I am expressing are my
    personal views, not those of the lab, and I had the pleasure
    and honor of serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy through the first Obama
    term.
        In my time I would like to make five quick arguments. The
    first is that we should appreciate that allies are living in
    the nuclear crosshairs of our nuclear-armed adversaries. Our
    nuclear-armed adversaries seek to remake the regional orders in
    which they sit, and the prize in this competition, and if there
    were a war, in war, the prize is the allegiance of our allies.
    They should not be simply an afterthought in our defense
    strategy. The deterrence protection we provide of them is
    central to the confrontation in which we are involved today.
    These allies experience a good deal of anxiety about the life
    in the nuclear crosshairs and about the credibility of U.S.
    extended deterrence guarantees to them.
        Second argument. In the U.S. discussion of extended
    deterrence we tend to put our focus on the hardware--dual-
    capable aircraft, the B-61 bomb, SLCM-N [nuclear-armed sea-
    launched cruise missile]--all very important, but we should not
    forget the software. The software includes declaratory policy
    and other statements of leadership intent. It includes
    consultations, processes, and mechanisms within the alliance
    structures. It includes concepts and principles for nuclear
    deterrence and employment. It includes operational plans and
    planning processes and exercise programs to exercise those
    plans. It includes the knowledge base that is essential to all
    of that. As we consider the weaknesses in the extended
    deterrence posture we should consider the weaknesses in the
    software side.
        Third argument. The existing extended deterrence posture
    was designed for an era long past. The existing extended
    deterrence posture is a result of the Presidential Nuclear
    Initiatives of the immediate post-cold war period, when the
    United States withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from Asia, 97
    percent of its nuclear weapons from Europe, all of its weapons
    from naval surface combatants, and all of its nuclear-armed
    cruise missiles from attack submarines. Most of those things
    were destroyed. The cruise missiles were kept until 2010, when
    they aged out.
        This was a bet we placed as a Nation that extended
    deterrence could be provided with a few remaining nuclear
    weapons in Europe and our central strategic forces. We saw this
    as appropriate in the benign environment of the time. Russia,
    China, and North Korea perceived a different security
    environment, of course, and have been well focused on creating
    new nuclear advantages for themselves over a long period of
    time, and theories of victory in conflict with us that involve
    the coercion of our adversaries and the disruption of our
    military options by nuclear means.
        Our allies are very clear that they want forward-deployed
    weapons as a part of the extended deterrence commitment, or at
    least forward deployable in East Asia. Thus, there is a rising
    discussion of what kind of capabilities the alliances need in
    future years, whether there is the right diversity in the
    posture in addition to the right number.
        Fourth argument. Looking ahead a decade or so, the
    challenges facing extended nuclear deterrence seem destined to
    grow. I think we all expect that when the Ukraine conflict
    dials back into a frozen conflict the Russia we are going to
    face for the next decade or so is going to be difficult,
    threatening, and ever more reliant on nuclear weapons. We
    clearly expect greater nuclear-backed coercion out of China, as
    its nuclear arsenal grows and its theater nuclear force grows,
    and we expect the same from North Korea. There is a mismatch,
    in other words, between the legacy posture of 1991 and the
    challenge that is emerging in front of us.
        Fifth and finally, strengthening of extended nuclear
    deterrence has been a clear priority for three Presidential
    administrations in a row, and the fact of bipartisan consensus
    on this aspect of our nuclear strategy is striking and should
    be preserved. That bipartisanship has enabled a good deal of
    progress in adapting extended deterrence to new circumstances
    and strengthening it by various means, but more progress is
    needed. This will not be possible without leadership focus,
    which has ebbed and flowed, and with that focus I think we will
    see the accomplishment of various projects that are already
    underway, such as finalizing the nuclear modernization and
    strengthening the consultative processes in East Asia. But
    there are some important new challenges still in front of us
    about future capabilities and future concepts.
        Thanks so much for the opportunity to contribute.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Statement by Dr. Brad Roberts
        Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to your discussion of
    regional nuclear deterrence. In my judgment, extended deterrence
    challenges are at the very core of the new deterrence problem. A
    failure of extended deterrence in Europe or Northeast Asia is the most
    plausible route to nuclear war, including strategic nuclear war. Those
    who make nuclear policy are well focused on this fact but many others
    in the defense department and the broader U.S. defense community are
    not. More attention is needed to new challenges and to the State of
    existing capabilities relative to those new challenges. Let me
    highlight five points for your consideration.
        First, our allies and partners are in the nuclear cross-hairs of
    our adversaries. Russia, China, and North Korea have all developed
    theories of victory in nuclear-backed confrontation with the United
    States that target the vulnerabilities of our allies and partners. They
    use nuclear coercion to try to persuade those allies and partners to
    influence the United States to be restrained. In crisis, they plan to
    engage in nuclear blackmail and brinksmanship to try to separate allies
    from each other and from the United States. For war, they have created
    an array of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities to win at
    the regional level while trying to deter U.S. escalation and using
    nuclear threats to de-couple the United States from the defense of its
    allies. Ultimately, the political allegiance and alignment of those
    allies and partners would be the prize in any such conflict, given the
    ambitions of these adversaries to re-make the regional security orders
    without an American presence.
        Many allies and partners feel under considerable pressure from
    these facts. We will soon have two new allies in Europe who have sought
    membership of NATO in part because of the nuclear threat they face from
    Russia. Thus, the assurance of these allies and partners has been a
    steadily rising policy concern. A failure of assurance could prove to
    be a tipping point in the global nuclear order. The loss of confidence
    by one ally in the U.S. extended nuclear commitment would likely lead
    others to conclude that they too can no longer rely on the United
    States for nuclear protection and must seek nuclear weapons of their
    own. Alternatively, some allies might reluctantly conclude that
    appeasement is the better choice. Either choice would be detrimental to
    U.S. interests.
        In this new, more multipolar, and more adversarial security
    environment, the nuclear protection the United States extends to its
    allies and partners is much more important than in the so-called
    unipolar moment.
        Second, the U.S. discussion of extended nuclear deterrence tends to
    focus on the hardware side. It is important to bear in mind as well the
    software of extended deterrence, as it is integral. The hardware
    includes:

          Nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) forward-
    deployed in Europe as part of NATO's unique nuclear sharing
    arrangements

          A limited capability to forward deploy DCA elsewhere in
    the world if needed in time of crisis and war in support of U.S
    alliance commitments

          U.S. strategic forces, which serve as ``the ultimate
    guarantee'' of the safety and security of U.S. allies.

        The software includes:

          Declaratory policy

          o  From the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review: ``the fundamental role
    of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our
    Allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of
    nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
    of the United States or its allies and partners''

          Supplemental statements of Presidential intent

          o  These are generally tailored to specific allies and alliance
    commitments (as reflected, for example, in summit communiques and the
    NATO Strategic Concept)

          Consultative mechanisms

          o  For example, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended
    Deterrence Dialogue with Japan

          Concepts and principles for the employment of nuclear
    weapons in war

          o  Purpose: ``to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage
    possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its
    allies and partners'' (2022 NPR)

          Operational plans and the associated planning processes

          The knowledge base to support the development of
    principles, concepts, and plans

          Exercises that demonstrate commitments, capabilities, and
    concepts

        In examining the health of the extended deterrence enterprise, it
    is essential to consider both hardware and software.
        Third, the existing U.S. posture for extending deterrence to its
    allies and partners was designed for an era long past. As part of the
    reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, the
    United States withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from Asia, 97 percent
    of its nuclear weapons from Europe, and all of its nuclear weapons from
    naval surface vessels. It also put into storage the nuclear-armed
    cruise missiles previously deployed on attack submarines, with the
    promise that such weapons could be redeployed in time of crisis and
    war, especially in Northeast Asia. [In 2010, the stored cruise missiles
    aged out and were retired. This resulted in the commitment to make
    dual-capable fighter-bombers and their bombs available globally.] In
    the benign security environment of the time, the United States bet that
    it could meet its extended deterrence requirements primarily with its
    strategic forces and secondarily with a small number of nuclear weapons
    and dual capable aircraft forward deployed in Europe.
        But leaders in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang did not judge the
    security environment to be benign. Already in the 1990's, they
    perceived a growing need to protect themselves from what they believed
    to be a dangerous America besotted with its power and driven by
    hegemonic and ideological ambitions. They responded by rethinking
    modern conflict. All three have developed concepts and plans for
    crisis, war, and long-term competition with the United States and its
    allies--which they apparently believe will enable them to break our
    will, and that of our allies, to resist their ambitions. To enable
    their new theories of victory, they then set about the task of making
    the necessary adaptations to their military postures.
        One result was an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons by all
    three and the associated buildup and diversification of their nuclear
    arsenals. All three have pursued expansion of their strategic systems,
    which they appear to believe will enhance their flexibility in limited
    war scenarios. All three have strengthened their regional nuclear
    forces. One Russian leader has bragged of building ``a nuclear scalpel
    for every military problem in Europe.'' Analysis by one leading think
    tank identifies more than 30 different Russian theater nuclear delivery
    systems. China's leadership has not apparently embraced nuclear weapons
    in the same way Russia's leadership has, but it too has assembled a
    theater strike posture composed of many hundreds of missiles capable of
    delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons. North Korea has also
    developed and deployed diverse means to deliver nuclear weapons in
    Northeast Asia.
        While Russia, China, and North Korea adapted and expanded their
    nuclear arsenals to their new purposes, the United States has allowed
    its nuclear posture to age and contract. For three decades it has
    maintained its deterrent via a stockpile stewardship program and has
    extended the life of existing warheads and bombs while foreswearing any
    new nuclear capabilities. In addition, the arsenal has lost much of the
    flexibility it once had. For example, of the 21 delivery systems
    deployed in 1990, only four remain. For the employment of non-strategic
    weapons, it has only one system (in contrast to the 30-plus deployed by
    Russia).
        The force structure bet placed by the United States in the early
    1990's looks less attractive as the security environment has eroded
    over the last decade. The general U.S. preference to rely primarily on
    strategic systems for extended deterrence doesn't sit well with many
    allies. Many European allies highly value the forward presence of
    United States nuclear weapons, just as allies in Northeast Asia highly
    value the promise of such a presence in crisis and war. They do so for
    good reason. Forward-deployed weapons as a tangible display of U.S.
    nuclear resolve to defend their vital interests. Moreover, the threat
    to respond to limited regional nuclear employment with a forward-based,
    low-yield U.S. weapon is generally seen as more credible than the
    threat to respond to such an attack with U.S. strategic forces, as the
    latter would seem certain to generate a retaliatory strike onto the
    American Homeland. The retirement of the forward-deployed and--
    deployable capabilities, as proposed by some, would send a very
    unhelpful message at a time when Russia, China, and North Korea are all
    enhancing their theater nuclear postures.
        Thus, there is a strong demand signal from allies for the requisite
    capabilities. NATO heads of State and government have regularly re-
    endorsed the sharing arrangements and called for their expansion. The
    sharing nations have overcome domestic political resistance to pursue
    modernization of aging delivery systems. Similarly, Japan and South
    Korea have sought visible and tangible displays of United States
    intentions and capabilities to re-deploy nuclear weapons into their
    region on their behalf.
        There is, moreover, a rising discussion within U.S. alliances about
    possible qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the U.S. nuclear
    umbrella. The discussion of possible qualitative deficiencies centers
    on the loss of flexibility as the United States went from many to one
    means of delivering weapons at the regional level. Some make the case
    for a new theater-range, dual-capable stand-off penetrating missile.
    Others make the case for new capabilities that are non-ballistic and
    low yield. Others make the case for a capability to respond in a
    nuclear contingency without visible force generation. Some see SLCM-N
    as the answer; others see different technical solutions.
        The discussion of possible quantitative deficiencies centers on the
    question of whether the number of available theater nuclear systems
    will be sufficient for a world of deepening major power hostility and
    growing deterrence challenges at the regional level. The 1991 force
    sizing construct for extended deterrence simply doesn't fit the world
    of 2023. Is more capability needed? Yes. How much more? I do not
    believe that the United States and its allies and partners need a
    theater nuclear posture that is symmetric to that of their adversaries.
    But we need some concept for answering the question ``how much is
    enough?'' The answer must follow from our strategy and not from the
    legacy posture.
        The software side of the posture needs some more attention as well.
    A critical shortfall was identified in 2018 by the National Defense
    Strategy Commission. Concluding that the United States could well lose
    its next major war, it strongly criticized the then-existing State of
    U.S. thinking about how to manage the risks of regional conflict with
    nuclear-armed adversaries. It called for more work to better understand
    the ways in which U.S. adversaries have prepared for such wars, the
    risks of both inadvertent and intentional escalation, and how to de-
    escalate and terminate such wars while avoiding a catastrophic result.
    The latest National Defense Strategy indicates that some work is now
    underway on these matters.
        In sum, the erosion of deterrence has reached a point where some
    basic improvements to the overall U.S. extended deterrence posture are
    warranted, both qualitative and quantitative. The answers of the early
    1990's are not sound for 2023. Recognizing the need for improvements is
    an urgent priority, as doing so can set in motion the analytical and
    political work to realize such improvements.
        Fourth, looking ahead a decade, the challenges facing U.S. extended
    nuclear deterrence seem destined to grow. Given is experience in
    Ukraine, Russia can be expected to become more dependent on nuclear
    threats to NATO, not less. North Korea can be expected to make
    continued progress in assembling a diverse nuclear force and to become
    more assertive in challenging the regional security order. A key factor
    will be China's strategic breakout. While challenging in its own right,
    the growth and diversification of China's nuclear forces create a new
    problem for United States nuclear deterrence strategy: contending with
    concerted action in crisis and war by two nuclear peers while credibly
    extending nuclear deterrence into two simultaneous regional crises.
    Against this backdrop, the United States must ask even more of its
    allies for regional deterrence.
        Fifth, the strengthening of extended deterrence has been a clear
    national priority for three Presidential administrations in a row. This
    bipartisan consensus is striking and should be preserved. This
    consensus has made possible a good deal of progress. But progress is
    not success. Success requires seeing through things already set in
    motion. On the hardware side, this includes, for example, timely
    delivery of promised capabilities (not just F35 and B61 but also B21
    and LRSO). On the software side, this includes, for example,
    strengthening the nuclear consultative processes with Japan and South
    Korea. Success also requires doing some things that have proven beyond
    our reach so far. On the hardware side, we must develop a theater force
    sizing construct that is fit for purpose while also determining how to
    add some more flexibility back into the posture. On the software side,
    we must develop our own theories of victory in peacetime conflict,
    crisis, and war against nuclear-armed adversaries and the associated
    concepts for escalation, de-escalation, and war termination that
    integrate conventional and nuclear operations. This further progress
    will not be possible without continued leadership focus and bipartisan
    engagement.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute these ideas. I
    look forward to the discussion.
        Brad Roberts is director of the Center for Global Security Research
    at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. From 2009 to 2013 he served
    as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile
    defense policy. In this capacity, he was head of the U.S. delegation to
    NATO's nuclear High-Level Group and co-founder of the United States-
    Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue and the United States-ROK Extended
    Deterrence Policy Committee. The views expressed here are his personal
    views and should not be attributed to his employer or its sponsors.

        Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Roberts.
        Mr. Weaver. Dr. Roberts, sorry. Mr. Weaver.

     STATEMENT OF GREGORY WEAVER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE [NON-RESIDENT],
          PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Mr. Weaver. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, Senator Fischer, Senator
    Cotton, Senator Tuberville. Thanks for the opportunity to
    participate here. My name is Greg Weaver. Today marks the 1-
    year anniversary of my retirement from Federal service. My last
    three positions in Government I was the Chief Nuclear Policy
    and Strategy Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the
    Joint Staff in the J5. I was the Principal Director for Nuclear
    Missile Defense Policy under Deputy Assistant Secretary Bunn in
    OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy. Before that I
    was the Deputy J5 in United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
    in Omaha.
        My comments today also reflect just my personal views.
        I want to commend the Subcommittee for focusing on what I
    think is a particularly important, urgent, and evolving
    challenge that we need to get on top of. Frankly, I believe
    improving our ability to deter and counter adversary limited
    nuclear use in a regional conflict is the single most important
    challenge we face in U.S. nuclear strategy today, and let me
    explain why.
        It is broadly agreed that the most likely path to limiting
    nuclear deterrence failure is escalation in the context of
    major conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries.
    It is also broadly agreed that the most likely path to a large-
    scale Homeland nuclear exchange between major powers is
    escalation from limited nuclear use in the context of such a
    conflict. Thus, regional nuclear deterrence is the key to
    addressing the most likely path to nuclear war at any level of
    violence.
        Deterring Russian limited use is our most immediate and
    challenging regional nuclear problem, although China is rapidly
    rising in that area. So I am going to focus today on the Russia
    problem to illustrate the nature of what we are up against.
        President Putin's criminal invasion of Ukraine demonstrated
    both a high propensity to take risk and to miscalculate in the
    process of doing so. Perhaps this propensity to take risk and
    miscalculate will be alleviated by Putin's eventual departure,
    but we cannot count on that and we do not know when that will
    be. The Russian leadership's historical propensity to
    underestimate NATO's resolve and unity under threat long
    preceded Putin and will likely survive him.
        An effective regional nuclear strategy in Europe must be
    based, as Senator Fischer pointed out, on an understanding of
    Russia's nuclear strategy and doctrine. Both are ultimately
    rooted in the assumption that limited nuclear use in theater is
    unlikely to escalate to a large-scale Homeland exchange, though
    I do not believe the Russians are certain that they can avoid
    uncontrolled escalation.
        It is important to understand that Russian conventional and
    nuclear strategy and doctrine are fully integrated with each
    other. Their nuclear forces role is to both deter large-scale
    nuclear attacks on the Russian homeland and to compensate for
    NATO conventional superiority in two ways. First, through the
    limited use of nuclear weapons in theater to coerce war
    termination on terms acceptable to Russia, if possible, but
    second, to defeat NATO conventional forces through large-scale
    theater nuclear strikes, if necessary. The latter is what
    drives Russia's force requirement for thousands of theater
    nuclear weapons embedded throughout their conventional forces.
        What then is required to deter Russian limited nuclear
    escalation in theater in an ongoing conventional war with NATO?
    Well, because Russian strategy is based on the belief that
    mutual deterrence of large-scale Homeland strikes is very
    robust, we cannot rely solely on the suicidal threat of a
    large-scale United States nuclear response to limited Russian
    escalation or on the potential for uncontrolled escalation.
    Deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use requires the
    perceived ability of the United States and our NATO allies to
    persevere in the face of limited nuclear escalation without
    being politically coerced into accepting Russia's terms and
    without being decisively militarily disadvantages.
        Our longstanding flexible response strategy is, I believe,
    fit for that purpose but only if it is enabled by U.S. and
    allied nuclear and conventional forces that are capable of
    three key things. First, being able to continue to operate
    effectively to achieve U.S. and allied objectives in a limited
    nuclear use environment. Second, being able to counter the
    military impact of Russian theater nuclear use, and third,
    providing the President a credible range of response options to
    restore deterrence by convincing Russian leadership they have
    miscalculated in a dire way, that further use of nuclear
    weapons will not result in them achieving their objectives, and
    that they will incur costs in the process that far exceed any
    benefits they can achieve should they choose to escalate
    further.
        In sum, our capabilities must convince them that nuclear
    escalation is always their worst option.
        Now, for the nuclear capabilities bottom line. To meet
    these requirements with high confidence we need a range of
    forward-deployed, survivable theater nuclear capabilities that
    can reliably penetrate adversary air and missile defenses with
    a range of explosive yields on operationally relevant
    timelines--and that is an extensive list of attributes. Based
    on these attributes, planned U.S. nuclear capabilities, in my
    view, are not sufficient for the future threat environment we
    face. Strategic nuclear forces alone are insufficiently
    flexible and timely to convince a major power adversary that we
    are fully prepared to counter limited nuclear use with
    militarily effective nuclear responses of our own.
        Theater nuclear forces are needed for this role, but our
    planned theater nuclear forces, in my opinion, are too small,
    insufficiently survivable, and insufficiently militarily
    relevant. Completing the modernization of our dual-capable
    fighter aircraft capabilities is necessary, but it is not
    sufficient.
        Our theater nuclear forces can be made a much more credible
    deterrent without having to match Russia and China weapon-for-
    weapon by supplementing our dual-capable fighter force with at
    least one more survivable, forward-deployed, selectable yield
    delivery system that has a high probability to penetrate
    adversary defenses. Several candidate systems could meet this
    requirement, but I assess the SLCM-N, deployed on attack
    submarines, is the best solution for these reasons. First, it
    is highly survivable day to day and thus not subject to a
    preemptive strike. Second, it provides theater nuclear
    deterrent presence, whether it is actually present or not,
    because the adversary will not know where those submarines are
    located. Third, it provides an effective ability to penetrate,
    in part due to, in some cases, being capable of launching from
    inside the outer edges of an adversary's integrated air defense
    system.
        Fourth, it provides operationally significant promptness
    when compared to bomber-delivered, air-launched cruise
    missiles, it exploits the submarine fleet's large, preexisting
    launch infrastructure, reducing cost, it has no ballistic
    missile launch signature that could be misinterpreted by an
    adversary, and finally, it could leverage the LRSO [long range
    stand off], air-launched cruise missile modernization program,
    reducing the impact on our nuclear weapons infrastructure of
    building an additional theater nuclear capability. No other
    system I am aware of checks all those boxes.
        So in conclusion, and I know I have gone a little long,
    regional nuclear deterrence is not the place the United States
    should choose to take risk, and not only because theater
    deterrence failure is the most likely path to large-scale
    nuclear war, though that is a pretty good reason in and of
    itself. An inability to confidently deter or counter adversary
    limited nuclear use will undermine the credibility of U.S.
    capability and will to project power against nuclear-armed
    adversaries in defense of United States and allied vital
    interests, making major power conventional war more likely in
    both Europe and Asia. Our allies have not forgotten this and
    neither should we.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Weaver follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Mr. Gregory Weaver
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today's
    hearing. It's an honor to be here. I commend the Subcommittee for
    focusing on this urgent, important, and evolving challenge.
        My comments today are my own and should not be attributed to the
    Center for Strategic and International Studies.
        My colleagues have masterfully addressed the broader political-
    military aspects of the worsening regional nuclear deterrence problem
    set we face. I will focus instead on the nature of regional nuclear
    deterrence dynamics and their impact on U.S. deterrence strategy and
    requirements. I believe improving our ability to deter and counter
    adversary limited nuclear use in regional conflicts is the most
    important challenge we face in U.S. nuclear strategy. Let me explain
    why.
        It is broadly agreed the most likely path to nuclear deterrence
    failure is escalation in the context of a major conventional conflict
    between nuclear-armed adversaries. It is also broadly agreed the most
    likely path to a large-scale homeland nuclear exchange between major
    powers is escalation from limited nuclear use in the context of a
    large-scale conventional conflict.
        That is where broad consensus ends on how deterrence of limited
    nuclear use and large-scale escalation are related.
        Some analysts and practitioners make two erroneous and dangerous
    assumptions regarding nuclear deterrence and nuclear escalation. First,
    they believe it is highly unlikely that nuclear deterrence will fail at
    any level, and under any circumstances, leading them to conclude that
    our planned capabilities are more than sufficient to deter limited use
    under any circumstances. Second, they also believe that if nuclear
    weapons are used at all, in any number or yield, the war will escalate
    rapidly out of control to a catastrophic large scale exchange almost
    automatically.
        These assumptions lead them to conclude that all that is needed to
    deter limited nuclear use is the latent potential for a large-scale
    U.S. nuclear response, and that our current and planned capabilities
    are thus more than sufficient to deter limited use under any
    circumstances.
        I think such a strategy is dangerously unsuited for credibly
    extending nuclear deterrence to U.S. allies because I disagree with
    both of these assumptions, and so do Russian, and possibly Chinese,
    strategists.
        As we consider how to deter limited nuclear first use we must first
    ask ourselves this question:
        Do we want to base our strategy to deter limited nuclear use on the
    presupposition that any limited nuclear use will result in uncontrolled
    escalation, and therefore such limited use won't happen if we rely on
    that threat? That is not a prophecy we want to become self-fulfilling
    if deterrence does fail in a limited way. But basing our strategy and
    force posture on these flawed assumptions risks making it just that.
        In my view, central strategic deterrence of large scale homeland
    exchanges between nuclear-armed great powers is very stable, making
    limited use unlikely to escalate out of control rapidly. Note, I did
    not say that limited nuclear escalation cannot or will not escalate out
    of control. Of course it can, and our deterrence strategy should
    continue to leverage that risk without relying solely on it.
        But the decision to initiate a large-scale nuclear strike on the
    homeland of a nuclear-armed great power is clearly suicidal as long as
    both sides retain large-scale survivable second strike capabilities.
    Thus, leaders are likely to tolerate limited nuclear exchanges without
    conducting such a large-scale strike on the adversary's homeland. This
    is not because they want to wage limited nuclear war, but because the
    alternatives can be summarized as surrender or suicide.
        Deterrence is about what an adversary thinks, and how he
    calculates. There is no area of national security affairs in which the
    dictum ``the adversary gets a vote'' is more true. In a deterrence
    relationship, the adversary doesn't just have ``a'' vote, they have the
    only vote. It is our job to decisively influence how they cast it.
        Deterring Russian limited use is the most immediate and challenging
    regional nuclear deterrence problem, so I will use the Russia problem
    to illustrate what we are up against. Putin's Russia cast their vote in
    favor of the use of large-scale military force against Ukraine,
    demonstrating both a high propensity to take risk, and to miscalculate
    in the process of doing so. That combination of risk-taking and
    miscalculation is extremely troubling, especially when paired with
    Russia's repeated brandishing of nuclear threats.
        Perhaps this dangerous propensity to take risk and miscalculate
    will be alleviated by Putin's eventual departure. But we can't count on
    that, and we don't know when that will be in any case. The Russian
    leadership's historical propensity to profoundly and repeatedly
    underestimate NATO's resolve and political unity under threat long
    preceded Putin, and will likely survive him, even if Russia's risk-
    taking propensity lessens somewhat in a post-Putin era.
        The dismal performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine is
    likely to lead them to further increase their reliance on nuclear
    weapons. This means that in a future war with NATO they could perceive
    the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict. If true, this
    means that once Russia reconstitutes its conventional forces, deterring
    Russian limited nuclear use will become even more important to
    deterring Russian conventional aggression than before Ukraine.
        To formulate an effective regional nuclear deterrence strategy in
    Europe we must closely examine Russia's nuclear strategy and doctrine.
    Both are ultimately rooted in the assumption that limited nuclear use
    in theater is unlikely to escalate to a large scale homeland exchange,
    though I do not believe the Russians are certain they can avoid
    uncontrolled escalation. Based on the scope and content of China's
    ongoing nuclear buildup, their strategy and doctrine may be evolving
    based on this perception as well.
        Russian conventional and nuclear strategy and doctrine are fully
    integrated. Their nuclear forces' role is to both deter large scale
    nuclear attacks on the Russian homeland and compensate for NATO
    conventional superiority through the limited use of nuclear weapons in
    theater through coercion if possible, but through defeat if necessary.
        The coercive escalation option is to initiate limited first use of
    nuclear weapons to compel termination of an ongoing conventional war on
    terms acceptable to Russia.
        The defeat escalation option is to conduct large-scale theater
    nuclear operations against NATO's conventional forces if the Russian
    leadership assesses they pose a threat to ``the very existence of the
    Russian state''. This option is what drives Russia's force requirement
    for thousands of theater nuclear weapons embedded throughout their
    conventional forces.
        What, then, is required to deter Russian limited nuclear escalation
    in theater given their strategy and doctrine, their demonstrated
    propensity to take the risk of invading their neighbors, and their
    track record of miscalculating regarding NATO's will and cohesion?
        Given that Russian strategy is based on the belief that mutual
    strategic deterrence of large-scale homeland strikes is very robust,
    deterrence of limited nuclear use requires the perceived ability of the
    U.S. and our NATO allies to persevere in the face of Russian limited
    escalation without being politically coerced into accepting war
    termination on Russia's terms, and without being decisively militarily
    disadvantaged. That requires a set of U.S. nuclear capabilities that
    are militarily relevant in such a conflict. Russian theater nuclear
    capabilities are designed to be just that: militarily relevant in a
    limited nuclear war. The evolution of Chinese theater nuclear
    capabilities seems to indicate they understand this as well.
        In my view the core requirement for deterring Russian limited
    nuclear escalation in a war with NATO is a Flexible Response strategy
    that credibly convinces the Russian leadership that limited nuclear
    escalation does not provide effective insurance against miscalculating
    about NATO's resolve and cohesion, will not result in war termination
    on their terms, and does indeed run the risk of uncontrolled escalation
    because the United States and our Allies are visibly prepared for what
    Schelling called a ``competition in risk-taking'' to defend our vital
    interests.
        Such a strategy must be enabled by U.S. and Allied nuclear and
    conventional forces that are capable of three key things:
          1.  Providing a robust range of response options to restore
    deterrence by convincing Russian leadership they have miscalculated in
    a dire way, that further use of nuclear weapons will not achieve their
    objectives, and that they will incur costs that far exceed any benefits
    they can achieve.
          2.  Countering the military impact of Russian theater nuclear
    use.
          3.  Continuing to operate effectively to achieve U.S. and Allied
    objectives in a limited nuclear use environment.
        In sum, our strategy and capabilities must convince them with high
    confidence that nuclear escalation is always their worst option. And
    while there remains uncertainty about whether China's nuclear strategy
    and doctrine are shifting to match the comprehensive nuclear buildup
    they are undertaking, we are likely to need to be able to do the same
    in the Asia-Pacific theater.
        Now for the nuclear capabilities bottom line: to meet the
    requirements for deterring limited nuclear use with high confidence we
    need a range of forward deployed, survivable theater nuclear
    capabilities that can reliably penetrate adversary theater air and
    missile defenses with a range of explosive yields and on operationally
    relevant delivery timelines. Based on these attributes, I do not
    believe that planned U.S. nuclear capabilities are sufficient for the
    future threat environment we face.
        Strategic nuclear forces alone are insufficiently flexible and
    timely to convince a major power adversary that we are fully prepared
    to counter limited nuclear first use with militarily effective nuclear
    responses of our own. Given Russian strategy, doctrine, and
    capabilities, theater nuclear capabilities are required.
        Completing the modernization of our dual capable fighter aircraft
    capabilities is necessary, but not sufficient. Our planned theater
    nuclear forces are too small, insufficiently survivable, and
    insufficiently militarily relevant. But they could be improved to be a
    much more credible deterrent to limited nuclear use without having to
    match Russia and China weapon for weapon.
        We should supplement dual capable fighter modernization with at
    least one more survivable, forward deployed, selectable yield delivery
    system with a higher probability to penetrate advanced defenses. There
    are several candidates that could meet this requirement, but I assess
    that SLCM-N deployed on attack submarines is the best solution for the
    following reasons:
        It is highly survivable day-to-day, and thus not subject to
    preemptive strike.
        It provides theater nuclear deterrent presence, whether it is
    actually present or not.
        It provides an effective ability to penetrate, in part due to in
    some instances being capable of launch from inside the outer edges of
    an adversary's integrated air defenses.
        It provides operationally significant promptness when compared to
    bomber-delivered ALCMs.
        It exploits the attack submarine fleet's large pre-existing
    launcher infrastructure, reducing cost.
        It has no ballistic missile launch signature that could be
    misinterpreted by an adversary.
        It could leverage the LRSO program, reducing the impact on our
    nuclear weapons enterprise.
        No other system I am aware of checks all those boxes.
        In conclusion, regional nuclear deterrence is not the place the
    U.S. should choose to take risk, and not only because theater
    deterrence failure is the most likely path to large scale nuclear war
    that poses an existential threat to the United States, though that is a
    pretty good reason in and of itself. An inability to confidently deter
    or counter limited theater nuclear use will undermine the credibility
    of U.S. capability and willingness to decisively project power against
    a nuclear-armed adversary in defense of U.S. and Allied vital
    interests. Our Allies have not forgotten this. Neither should we.

        Senator King. Thank you very much. Compelling testimony. I
    appreciate it.
        Ms. Bunn.

      STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, SENIOR ADVISOR [NON-RESIDENT],
          PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member
    Fischer, and other Subcommittee Members for the invitation. It
    really is a pleasure to testify before you again, but this time
    as a private citizen representing only myself and not as a
    United States Government (USG) official. I spent 40 years in
    Government, mainly at Department of Defense. My last job there
    was as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile
    Defense Policy, following Brad, in 2013 to 2017.
        Senator King. Did you say 40 years?
        Ms. Bunn. Forty years. Forty.
        Senator King. You were hired as a child?
        Ms. Bunn. I just had my 70th birthday. That is on the
    record.
        I also, in that National Association of Securities Dealers
    (NASD) job, as did Brad, spend a lot of time with allies, both
    as the U.S. Representative to the High Level Group of NATO as
    well as co-chairing the deterrence dialogs with Japan and South
    Korea.
        The United States has made very explicit extended nuclear
    deterrence commitments to more than 30 countries, NATO
    countries as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In so
    doing, the United States has privately and publicly affirmed
    that aggression against those countries could, under some
    circumstances, merit a U.S. nuclear response.
        I have come to believe that extended deterrence is amazing
    from both sides. We have our non-nuclear allies, who have
    foresworn their own nuclear weapons and rely on another
    country, the U.S., in high-end situations, including nuclear
    attacks on their own territory and people. It is amazing that
    the U.S. takes on the risk and responsibility of putting its
    own forces, even its population and territory, at risk on
    behalf of an ally. That is an amazing fact to the point that
    some, in the past, have found it incredible. That is the reason
    we have an independent French nuclear force.
        It should be no surprise that our non-nuclear allies need
    to constant reassurance that they are very interested in how we
    think about deterrence, how we might respond. It is not amazing
    that they need that constant interaction to feel secure.
        In January, South Korean President Yoon speculated publicly
    that if North Korean provocations increased, South Korea might
    consider building its own nuclear weapons or maybe asking the
    United States to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the South,
    as it did before 1991. Although President Yoon later stressed
    that his comments did not represent official policy, they were
    still significant, marking the first time since the 1970's that
    a South Korean President has raised the prospect of acquiring
    nuclear weapons.
        Do President Yoon's comments indicate that some in South
    Korea are concerned about the credibility of the United States
    extended nuclear deterrence commitment? I think so. While I am
    not worried about non-nuclear allies deciding to have their own
    nuclear weapons in the very near term, I can see it happening,
    5, 10, 15 years from now, with South Korea probably the first
    among them.
        United States will has long been the underlying concern for
    allies. They know we have weapons, but would we use them? It is
    not ``could we'' but ``would we.'' I think it consultations at
    multiple levels, real ones, where we listen as well as talk,
    where we have exercises, both tabletop and field exercises,
    where we have forward deployments of conventional and sometimes
    nuclear forces. All of those things say that we have a stake in
    and will take risk for allies' security.
        If South Korea, or another ally, does ask for deployment of
    United States nuclear weapons on their territory, or nuclear
    sharing arrangements, dual-capable aircraft and the B-61 bombs,
    as in NATO, or offshore SLCM-N, which I have not heard allies
    discussing much, but if allies raise any of these hardware
    issues I think the U.S. should be willing to have frank
    discussions about their view and be open to talks on the
    plusses and minuses of what allies believe they need and not
    simply give a kneejerk ``no.''
        There are things we can do short of deploying nuclear
    forces in allied countries. For example, the last three Nuclear
    Posture Reviews have all said that the United States maintains
    globally deployable, dual-capable aircraft, primarily to assure
    Northeast Asian allies. But we have not demonstrated that
    capability with exercises. That should be an easy one to do.
        In any event, with or without forward-deployed nuclear
    weapons there is a need for ongoing consultations that are deep
    and nuanced, more realistic exercises, and greater allied
    integration in operational planning.
        Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Montgomery.

       STATEMENT OF EVAN B. MONTGOMERY, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW AND
    DIRECTOR, RESEARCH STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY
                              ASSESSMENTS

        Dr. Montgomery. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and
    share my thoughts with you. I would like to focus my remarks on
    the potential consequences of China's nuclear modernization.
        For more than a decade, China's conventional military
    modernization has been upending the balance of power in the
    Indo-Pacific region. Until recently, though, China's nuclear
    arsenal has been a secondary concern. The situation is starting
    to change now that China is engaged in a significant
    quantitative and qualitative nuclear buildup. This nuclear
    buildup could be destabilizing both regionally and globally,
    and I would like to highlight three areas of concern that have
    been raised to date.
        The first is the possibility that China could pose a future
    first-strike threat against United States strategic forces.
    This previously implausible scenario could become a genuine
    concern if Beijing fields accurate and difficult-to-detect
    system that could threaten United States command and control
    targets, as well as large numbers of ICBMs that could threaten
    U.S. strategic delivery systems.
        Thankfully, the likelihood of this scenarios is
    extraordinarily low because the demands of a successful first
    strike are so extraordinarily high. Nevertheless, if China's
    nuclear buildup unfolds in the way that many now anticipate, it
    cannot be discounted entirely, especially if United States
    officials take into account the combined nuclear forces of
    Russia and China in their calculations, as they should.
        The second area of concern is the possibility that China's
    nuclear buildup could embolden Beijing to start a conventional
    conflict against the United States. From China's perspective, a
    larger and more survivable strategic deterrent could ensure
    that any fight between the United States and China does not
    escalate and remains at the conventional level, a prospect that
    might actually benefit China given its conventional military
    modernization.
        This situation is certainly a far more plausible risk than
    the threat of a first strike. Nevertheless, China would still
    need to be confident that it could suppress Taiwan and succeed
    in a clash with the United States, two very costly courses of
    action no matter how many improvements the People's Liberation
    Army (PLA) makes.
        The third area of concern associated with China's nuclear
    buildup, and I think the one that is likely to be the most
    serious over the long run, is the possibility that China could
    build the tools to make limited nuclear threats. For instance,
    China could soon be equipped with multiple, highly accurate
    theater nuclear options, enabling it to hold many regional
    targets at risk with low-yield nuclear weapons. These
    capabilities are especially worrisome because they could serve
    as the foundation for an alternative coercive strategy against
    Taiwan, one that might look easier, faster, and cheaper than,
    for example, launching a direct invasion of the island and
    embarking on a large-scale conventional war against the United
    States.
        Specifically, if Beijing paired limited nuclear threats
    with, for example, blockade operations against the island and
    attacks against leadership targets, it would pose major
    dilemmas for the United States as it determined whether and how
    to intervene.
        In sum, the nuclear buildup that China has embarked upon
    could have significant consequences. Although it has received
    less attention than the expansion of its strategic forces, a
    potential buildout of China's theater nuclear capabilities
    could have major implications for the United States, and here I
    will briefly highlight three.
        The first implication is for U.S. nuclear force structure.
    For years, the United States has been concerned about the
    imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons between itself and
    Russia. Yet there might be a similar imbalance on the horizon
    with respect to China. If Beijing fields a variety of nuclear-
    armed theater missile systems, the United States may not have
    symmetrical, proportional, effective, and credible responses in
    hand. That dilemma could become especially sharp if
    Washington's relatively small inventory of non-strategic
    nuclear weapons is needed to deter limited nuclear threats by
    two major power adversaries at the same time.
        The second implication is for U.S. extended nuclear
    deterrence arrangements. Theater nuclear forces could enable
    Beijing to drive wedges between the United States and its
    allies and partners. In other words, Washington could face
    dilemmas similar to those that it confronted during the cold
    war when Soviet investments in theater nuclear systems that
    could target European allies without striking the United States
    Homeland raised decoupling concerns that required skillful
    alliance management to address. If so, the United States might
    need to consider binding itself and its allies more tightly
    together, for instance, by pursuing nuclear sharing
    arrangements with Japan and South Korea, not unlike those that
    exist with select NATO allies.
        The third and final implication is a broader one for United
    States defense planning, namely that China's nuclear buildup
    will require the United States to prepare for a wider range of
    threats. To date, the Department of Defense, in particular, is
    focused on the challenges posed by a PLA air and amphibious
    assault against Taiwan as well as PLA attacks against United
    States ports, forward-operating forces, air bases, and
    information networks. China's nuclear buildup could open up new
    avenues of coercion against Taiwan, some of which, like the
    early resort to limited nuclear threats in lieu of invasion,
    could seem appealing to leaders in Beijing while posing
    considerable difficulties for policymakers in Washington.
        Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Montgomery follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator King. I want to thank all of our witnesses. This
    has been amazingly provocative and thoughtful and information,
    so I want to thank you.
        It seems to me--I mean, I think of the formula for
    deterrence as will plus capacity, and will is a hard thing to
    measure and quantify. I think you testified about the software
    of nuclear deterrence, and statements, policies, doctrines are
    important. Capacity, though, is something that can be measured,
    and I think all of you--well, I will ask--do any of you
    disagree with the proposition that we do not have sufficient
    low-level, regional deterrent capacity while we are deployed?
    Does anybody disagree with that?
        Mr. Weaver. Senator, I not only agree with it, I also think
    that if we were to take steps to correct that----
        Senator King. I think your mic is not on.
        Mr. Weaver. Yes. I not only do not disagree with that, I
    think that if we were to take steps to correct that problem, to
    actually bolster our theater nuclear capabilities, it would
    actually help work part of the software problem, which is we
    would be demonstrating that we have the will to address this
    problem, even though it is politically fraught, potentially, in
    our alliances.
        Senator King. Believe it or not, I wrote my senior thesis
    on this subject. I will not tell you how many years ago it was,
    but Admiral Roberts at STRATCOM tried his best to get naval
    intelligence to find it, but I could not find it.
        But it seems to me that the strategic dilemma is that if
    all we have is massive retaliation, it is not credible that we
    would use that in case of a tactical use in Ukraine or
    Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia. So that is really the
    dilemma.
        I will ask the question I know you are going to ask. SLCM-N
    is not funded in the current budget. It was funded for R&D
    [research and development] last year. This year it is zero. Is
    that not correct? But, Mr. Weaver, you testified that you
    thought that was the most logical forward deployed, and you
    gave five reasons why. I do not mean to have you repeat your
    testimony but I am a little puzzled why that is not in the
    budget.
        Mr. Weaver. Well, Senator, I was involved in the 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review that recommended it and the Joint Staff,
    and I was also involved in the 2022 Posture Review with the
    administration decided not to do it. As you know, the Chairman
    recommended SLCM-N.
        There are, as I said in my statement, there are other
    theater nuclear options we could pursue. We could build mobile,
    land-based systems. But when you take the full look at the set
    of attributes that most address the nature of our theater
    deterrence problem, in both Europe and Asia, I believe SLCM-N
    is the best option we have readily available. Now if you want
    to invent something completely new and have it take longer to
    get--and we do not have much time----
        Senator King. We do not need to invent a platform. We have
    the platform.
        Mr. Weaver. Exactly, and we have the platform already.
        Senator King. Dr. Roberts, do you agree with this line of
    discussion?
        Dr. Roberts. I do. We have just concluded--three of the
    four of us just concluded a study group report on dealing with
    the emergence of a second nuclear peer, and its implications of
    two nuclear peers for our nuclear strategy, a bipartisan group,
    and we have a strong endorsement for SLCM-N in the report.
        Senator King. Well, another danger, other than the weakness
    of the deterrent, it seems to me, is an incentive to our allies
    to develop their own nuclear capability. As you suggested, the
    President of South Korea sort of speculated on that some time
    ago. But at some point they are going to say, ``Well, if we
    cannot rely on a reliable, credible deterrent, we have got to
    develop our own capacity.'' In a sense, our extended deterrent,
    it seems to me, is a proxy for those other countries developing
    their own capability, which, from a proliferation point of
    view, is a good thing. Ms. Bunn?
        Ms. Bunn. I am one who has reluctantly come to the
    conclusion that we do need a TLAM-N [Nuclear-armed Tomahawk
    Land Attack Missile] in this discussion group that we are
    talking about. I am sorry, SLCM-N. Did I say TLAM-N? SLCM-N.
    Many battles in my career over TLAM-N, and why was I reluctant?
    Because SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] do have many
    missions, and I also fought many battles with the Navy. I am
    just not sure the Navy will ever fully support this because we
    fought many battles trying to keep TLAM-N in the force before
    it was retired.
        So that was my reluctance. But I do think that we need it
    for--if we decide, if the U.S. decides we need it for deterring
    and responding to limited use, then we should go forward with
    it. We should fund it. Right now I do not think we can pin it
    on allies are asking for it. I have not heard a lot of allies
    talking about it specifically. Usually in conference if it is
    raised, it is raised by Americans. But I suspect they do not
    want to get in the middle of a policy debate in the U.S.
        Senator King. But they want the extended deterrence.
        Ms. Bunn. They want capabilities. If they are concerned
    that either adversaries do not think we would use the
    capabilities we have now because they are not appropriate--they
    are too high yield, they cannot get through, various reasons we
    would not use those--then they have good analysts. They want us
    to have something that we can see actually, that our
    adversaries could see us actually employing. If they do not
    think you would ever use it, then it does not deter.
        Senator King. Well, I am over my time. I want to turn it
    over to Senator Fischer. But the whole point here is to never
    have these weapons used, and we do not want an adversary to
    think that they can use a low-level weapon and pay no
    significant price, which gets us to the place where we are in a
    nuclear confrontation.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
        On Saturday, March 25th, President Putin, he announced that
    Russia is going to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus,
    and he also informed us that an agreement had been made with
    Belarus to equip 10 of the Belarusian aircraft with tactical
    nuclear weapons, along with their Iskander mobile short-range
    ballistic missile system. It was fascinating, I thought, that
    he did this. Obviously, I got a very strong message that he
    would do this, first of all, take the action, and second, tell
    us what he did.
        Mr. Weaver, let us start with you. How do you think that
    this action is going to change the nuclear deterrence dynamic
    that we see in Europe right now?
        Mr. Weaver. So, Senator, I do not believe Russian
    deployment of some of their non-strategic capabilities to
    Belarus changes the military equation in Europe at all. It is a
    political move. The Russians have long complained that we have
    nuclear weapons forward based in Europe on the territory of our
    allies and that we have nuclear sharing arrangements with them.
        Senator Fischer. They made it clear. This was not for
    Belarus to use. It was for Belarus to use for Russia.
        Mr. Weaver. Right. But the Russians have somewhere between
    1,500 and 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons today. They are
    embedded throughout their conventional forces across the
    Russian Federation. Moving a few of them forward now into
    Belarus really does not change the military equation. They
    range anybody in NATO that they want to with the existing
    systems they have, including the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise
    missile that has a range of about 2,000 kilometers, that
    violated the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) Treaty and
    led to our withdrawal.
        So they can threaten NATO throughout its depth, and they
    have always had the ability to move Russian forces forward into
    Belarus in the event of a conflict, in any event. So I do not
    think it changes the military equation but it is a political
    signal.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts and Ms. Bunn, do you agree
    with that?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, I would agree with that. It will be
    interesting. The Russians, and now the Chinese in NPT [Treaty
    on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] meetings have
    complained about NATO nuclear sharing, and I do not know if
    this will change their rhetoric on that at all. Probably not.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts, anything to add on that?
        Dr. Roberts. Same essential view. The Russian military
    strategy for local war, which is what it claims to be fighting,
    as opposed to a regional war against a large coalition, that
    strategy is in part about keeping it local, keeping the
    outsiders out, casting a long shadow, making us fearful that if
    we engage we will pay a terrible price. President Putin has to
    keep beating that drum one way or another. I think this is just
    one more sign of his effort to alarm us, but it does not change
    the military equation.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Roberts, between recent news of
    Russia's noncompliance with the New START [Strategic Arms
    Reduction] Treaty, China's modernization rate, and North
    Korea's daily shows of force, we also see Iran's nuclear
    weaponization capability. How should the U.S. focus our
    regional nuclear strategy? If we are talking about regions, how
    do we focus that?
        Dr. Roberts. Well, I do not think we have the luxury of
    prioritizing. One of the big questions in the two peer study
    was do you prioritize one over the other, or the first
    contingency over the possible second one? Our conclusion was,
    we cannot afford to do that. Too much risk. It is giving a
    green light to aggression in the area you have not prioritized.
        My take on this is that the complex landscape you describe
    renders essentially out of date the bet we placed in 1991, the
    bet that we could do regional deterrence essentially with our
    strategic forces and a little bit of theater nuclear force. The
    rebalance has to come between those two elements of the bet we
    placed. So, with the rest of the group, I think more weapons
    and a more diverse toolkit at the regional level are in our
    interest and in the interest of our allies.
        But let us be clear. I do not think any of us are arguing
    that the United States and its allies should have a regional
    nuclear posture that is symmetric to that of Russia or China or
    North Korea. We have different strategies, so we need different
    numbers and different types of weapons.
        Senator Fischer. Would you say there are plans out there
    now that would address that? Has planning taken place? Do you
    know?
        Dr. Roberts. Capability development or operational
    planning?
        Senator Fischer. Both.
        Dr. Roberts. Both.
        Senator Fischer. Both. You said it. It is not the same. It
    is not the same.
        Dr. Roberts. Correct.
        Senator Fischer. You have to address each one individually.
    So do you know of any plans that have taken place either within
    Government or outside of Government?
        Dr. Roberts. So for development of new capability, the
    Administration certainly has a plan.
        Senator Fischer. Right.
        Dr. Roberts. In my view, it needs to evolve in the
    direction we have talked about. Operational planning, of course
    the STRATCOM commander stands ready to do what might need to be
    done tonight. But I bear in mind the findings of the National
    Defense Strategy Commission of 2018, which concluded, as you
    will recall, that the United States could well lose a war
    against a nuclear-armed rival, largely not because we have the
    wrong capabilities, but because we have not understood the
    nature of the war that is being waged against us. We have not
    done our intellectual homework. We have not developed the
    concepts we need to organize our operational planning and
    conduct operations. I do not know to what extent that remains
    true, but that was an important marker that rang a lot of alarm
    bells for me.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator King. This is the third Armed Services hearing I
    have been at today, and the question that you just touched upon
    has come up at all three, which is the change nature of modern
    warfare, and the likelihood of a modern conflict starting with
    cyber, directed energy, electronic warfare, space capabilities.
    I asked the Marine general today if his landing ships would be
    okay with no GPS [Global Positioning System] and no
    communications. That is the world that we have to live in.
        So this is beyond the scope of this hearing to some extent,
    but I would be interested in your thoughts about, the cliche is
    generals always fight the last war. Are we doing that or are we
    adequately taking account of the change strategic, not only the
    strategic landscape but the technological landscape. Wars are
    often won on whoever has the newest technology.
        Dr. Montgomery, your thoughts.
        Dr. Montgomery. I do believe we are. To some extent, at
    least when we talk about this in the nuclear domain I think we
    may overemphasize some of those changes in technology. They are
    very worrisome. They are concerning. They certainly pose risks
    to command and control, which is a serious concern. But at the
    end of the day, when we are talking about strategic stability
    between major powers, it ultimately comes back to the ability
    of one side to pose a disarming threat against another one.
    Right now we have Russia, that does not quite pose that
    capability but is a nuclear peer, China apparently aspires to
    be a nuclear peer, and those buildups are not unrelated to but
    separate from those very novel aspects of future warfare.
        So I think while important, it is still essential to keep
    our focus, at least again in the nuclear domain, in terms of
    delivery system warheads, yields, accuracy, et cetera.
        Senator King. Well in command and control, I have always
    said we do not have a triad. We have a quad, that command and
    control is an essential----
        Dr. Montgomery. Absolutely.
        Senator King.--part of the credibility of the deterrent,
    which is essentially providing a deterrent.
        Let me ask another question. We have talked about peer
    adversaries and Russia and China particularly. What about
    nuclear-armed countries that we are not engaged with directly,
    India and Pakistan being an example? What role, if any, do we
    have in their potential use of nuclear weapons? One of the
    things that I think that may be deterring Russia is after
    Hiroshima they have never been used. Nobody wants to be the
    first person to use them again, and I think that is something
    of a deterrent. I suspect that China is communicating that to
    Russia.
        What about Pakistan and India? Ms. Bunn, do you have
    thoughts?
        Ms. Bunn. That is a hard one because I think we have less
    influence. They are not our adversaries.
        Senator King. Right.
        Ms. Bunn. They are not our formal extended nuclear
    deterrent allies, and so they are in a different category as
    far as how we deal with them and how we can influence them, how
    we deal with them as adversaries or how we can influence them
    as allies.
        Senator King. The last thing we want is to normalize the
    use of nuclear weapons.
        Ms. Bunn. Absolutely. I would certainly agree with you that
    trying to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used again is
    one way to keep that diplomatic psychological pressure on them
    not to be the ones to do it.
        Senator King. Other thoughts on this issue?
        Mr. Weaver. Could I add one thing on it, Senator?
        Senator King. Sure.
        Mr. Weaver. I think another aspect of the question you are
    asking is when and if there is another limited use of nuclear
    weapons in a conflict, what lessons will all the other nuclear
    states--and non-nuclear states--draw from the outcome of that
    use? That is another reason why it is so important that we
    focus on this problem of being able to deter limited nuclear
    use effectively, with high confidence, and second, if
    deterrence fails in a limited way that we have the ability to
    counter the effects of adversary-limited nuclear use so that
    they do not win the conflict as a result. They are not seen as
    having won because they used nuclear weapons, because that
    would create a huge proliferation problem around the world.
        Senator King. Well, I commented in my opening statement
    about the doctrine of ``Escalate to Deescalate.'' The Russians
    have told us that is their doctrine, and for us to not take
    that seriously it seems to me is a major strategic and tactical
    mistake. I mean, Maya Angelou says when somebody tells you who
    they are, you should believe them. They have told us who they
    are on this subject, and we need to be sure that we have a
    credible deterrent that does not involve a massive strike,
    which they do not think we will do, if they use a one-kiloton
    weapon on Kharkiv. Dr. Roberts?
        Dr. Roberts. I just wanted to add a comment on your comment
    about no one wants to break the taboo. I hope that is true, but
    President Putin seems like a guy who has gotten a lot of power
    and influence out of breaking taboos. In 2014, he stood under
    the banner when he explained his annexation of Crimea, the
    banner saying, ``New Rules or No Rules.'' He has been living
    the ``no rules'' game and generating a lot of power and fear
    accordingly.
        The taboo against the employment of nuclear weapons is one
    of the last major taboos he has not broken. I hope he does not
    break it, but I am not convinced that he thinks preserving the
    taboo is important.
        Senator King. Well, we have to give him a reason in terms
    of what he will reap as a consequence----
        Dr. Roberts. That is right.
        Senator King.--beyond the taboo. We cannot rely on the
    taboo to protect us, I think.
        Dr. Roberts. That is right. Absolutely.
        Senator King. I would like to like, are either of our
    Senators intending to come back? Okay.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. I just want to really thank you for being
    here today. I think these discussions are extremely helpful to,
    first of all, educate the Members of Congress, but also to
    educate our public as well to the threats that this country
    faces.
        When we look at North Korea, they have various missiles.
    They have ICBMs. They have long range, short range. They have
    an underwater nuclear attack drone now that is out there. We
    obviously are developing things as well, but when we see other
    countries doing this, how does that affect us in our
    decisionmaking, to counter and provide deterrence, not just for
    the weapons, which we have talked about--tactical weapons,
    weapons in theater, the changes we see there regionally--but
    also the platforms?
        Dr. Montgomery, you are nodding your head.
        Dr. Montgomery. I often do. Two points. I think there is a
    quantitative dimension to this and a qualitative dimension. So
    quantitatively, when you see countries like North Korea
    building up their forces--and we are not talking about a rogue
    State with 10 or 15 nuclear weapons, but potentially a regional
    nuclear power with 50 or 100 nuclear weapons--those numbers
    matter. It becomes potentially more difficult for the United
    States with say, 1,550 treaty-accountable strategic warheads,
    to manage threats from and deter a peer in Russia, an aspiring
    peer in China, a North Korea with a significant arsenal. That
    is a lot of weapons to measure up against.
        In terms of the qualitative dimension, if you look at the
    diversity and capabilities that a country like North Korea is
    investing in--and, Senator King, this ties to your question
    about Pakistan and India as well--Pakistan also has made
    investments in low-yield nuclear capabilities. So now we see
    Russia placing significant emphasis on low-yield nuclear
    weapons, Pakistan placing significant emphasis on low-yield
    nuclear weapons, North Korea investing in low-yield nuclear
    weapons, and potentially China exploring low-yield nuclear
    weapons. We should probably take that message that a lot of
    adversaries and potential adversaries or countries we have
    difficult relations with see a lot of value in these
    capabilities and think about what deficiencies in our arsenal
    might exist that could potentially undermine deterrence,
    relative to those systems.
        Senator Fischer. It also limits the options that can be
    presented to our President to make decisions in a short period
    of time, in response to actions of other nations. Correct?
        Dr. Montgomery. Absolutely. You know, we talk about our
    strategic forces, one of their key attributes being promptness.
    Promptness, I do not think, is an attribute you would ascribe
    to some of the limited low-yield nuclear options that we have.
    That does mean that the options available to the President in a
    crisis that are time sensitive are limited.
        Senator Fischer. Any other comments on that?
        Dr. Roberts. Sure. You asked about how we react watching
    these developments, and for a long time we watched and did not
    react. For a long time it was unthinkable to us that these
    things mattered because, after all, we had conventional
    dominance, we had confidence in our strategic nuclear
    deterrent, and we did not see--the problem, the threat remained
    unthinkable. It was just implausible to most in the U.S.
    national security community that an adversary might ever
    contemplate the possibility of employing a nuclear weapon in a
    conflict with the United States and somehow escaping intact.
        Our view began to shift, principally as a result of the
    Russian annexation of Crimea, a wake-up call. As Ash Carter
    said at the time, it was time for a ``new playbook on Russia,''
    and we discovered a need for a new playbook on North Korea, a
    new playbook on China, and now we are all trying to create that
    new playbook.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator King. Well, again I want to thank you. I cannot
    help but mention something that bothers me in this field. It
    turns out that no President since Jimmy Carter has participated
    in a nuclear exercise, an attack exercise, in real time. I find
    that puzzling. I mean, I do not the President to walk into that
    room for the first time in a real-life situation. I have gone
    through several of those exercises, and it is terrifying but
    also educational.
        So that is neither here nor there, but I find it striking
    that, as I say, no President, apparently since Jimmy Carter,
    has participated in such an exercise, which I do not get.
        Thank you all very much for your testimony today. It has
    been very informative, as I said, and helpful to this
    Subcommittee as we prepare for the National Defense Act that is
    coming up in a couple of months.
        Thank you again. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

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