

# THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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# THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, and Schmitt.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Let me call the hearing to order. Good morning. The Committee meets today to discuss the ongoing war in Ukraine. This hearing comes at a somber moment as we mark 1 year since Russia launched its illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine.

I would like to welcome and thank the expert witnesses before us today. Dr. Angela Stent, is Director Emerita of Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies. She is an expert on Russian and European geopolitics, with extensive policy experience across the intelligence community, State Department, academia, and NATO.

Dr. Dara—Excuse me, Ms. Dara Massicot, is a Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. She specializes in Russian military strategy, combat operations, and escalation dynamics, and has served as the lead analyst on these issues at the Department of Defense. Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg is Co-Chair of the Center for American Security at the American Foreign Policy Institute.

Both in and out of uniform, General Kellogg has served at the highest level of National Security leadership for years. Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has inflicted suffering upon innocent civilians, threatened European security, and caused serious consequences for the global economy.

Now, more than ever, it is clear that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will not stop there. Russia cannot be allowed to call the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any nation into question. Fortunately, several efforts have thwarted his initial assault. First and foremost is the incredible courage and fighting skill of the Ukrainian people, as well as the inspirational leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

I had the opportunity to travel to Kyiv last month and was deeply moved by the Ukrainians' bravery and commitment to defending

their homeland. Second is the remarkable statesmanship of the Biden Administration in forging a unified response, leading worldwide condemnation of Putin, and providing enormous military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

Finally, Putin's initial assault has folded from the inept performance of his own forces. This war has exposed a poorly led and poorly trained Russian army with corrupt leadership at every level, poor tactics and communications, and woeful logistics. This is a critical point in the fight. Ukraine has achieved some very notable successes, but there is hard fighting ahead and more to be done.

We and the rest of the international community must continue to support the Ukrainian people and to expedite the assistance that Ukraine needs to be successful. During today's hearing, I would like to hear from our witnesses how these goals can best be achieved. Although NATO is in the midst of the greatest test it has ever faced, if Putin thought his actions over the past year would drive a wedge within our alliance and the international community, he was badly mistaken.

NATO has shown remarkable unity and resolve, and a formidable array of our partners around the globe have joined together with incredible speed to provide Ukraine with military, economic, and humanitarian aid, reinforce combat power along NATO's Eastern flank, and impose the Accords on Russian decisionmakers.

The carnage and destruction wrought by Putin's invasion cannot be undone. I am encouraged by Congress's bipartisan action to provide support to Ukraine. The assistance packages approved by Congress and championed by President Biden have made a decisive difference in helping Ukraine repel Putin's troops and mercenaries.

These assistance packages are also providing much needed aid to displaced Ukrainians whose cities and towns continue to face indiscriminate bombardment by Russian forces. Just as Ukrainians have learned and adapted on the battlefield, the effort to aid and equip their security forces has evolved.

Throughout the war, the Biden Administration has wisely calibrated our assistance to Ukraine to the conditions on the battlefield. To date, the United States has committed more than \$30 billion in security assistance, including 10,000 javelin and stinger systems, 160 Howitzers, 38 HIMARS, 109 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 31 Abrams tanks, 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defenses through the new AVs, and hundreds of thousands of other pieces of equipment and ammunition.

We remain focused on striking the appropriate balance between providing supplies that can be employed immediately, while looking ahead to provide modern weapons systems that will require additional training. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the most dangerous aspect of this conflict, Russia's escalation strategy. This battle is one of the few times in the atomic age that we have had a surrogate fight with the potential to draw nuclear powers into a confrontation.

Russian nuclear threats cannot be dismissed or ignored, but they also cannot be seen as determinative and uncontested. They must be constantly evaluated as rhetoric or reality. I would ask for our witnesses' assessment of the escalation threat and how we can manage this dynamic moving forward.

It is important to remember that this conflict matters not just to Ukrainian sovereignty and security, but also to that of our allies in Europe, and indeed our own security here at home. This is not a zero-sum endeavor. Rather, assistance to Ukraine is an investment to United States National Security, and I look forward to our witnesses' testimonies, and I thank them again for their participation. With that, let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker, please.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER**

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to our distinguished panel of witnesses. Last Friday, February 24th, marked the solemn anniversary, 1 year since Russia's unprovoked, illegal, and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The courage and ingenuity shown by Ukrainian troops, many of whom were civilians before the war, continues to be nothing short of heroic. Now, after a long year of bloodshed and sacrifice, the war has entered a crucial phase.

Today's hearing is an opportunity to review the current conditions of the war and its possible trajectory, and to discuss policy recommendations to help Ukraine win. I appreciated President Biden's visits to Ukraine and Poland last week.

What I do not appreciate is the President's repeated failure to articulate United States goals and interest in Ukraine in a fashion that resonates with most Americans. Congress has appropriated over \$100 billion of taxpayer funding to assist Ukraine and is likely—and more is likely to be needed later this year, so I would welcome our witnesses' views on why supporting Ukraine matters to the average American.

In my view, this is not a particularly difficult case to make. United States support to Ukraine helps a capable, motivated, and grateful partner nation restore stability to a region of the world that is critical to our interests. As they prevent chaos spreading further into Europe, the Ukrainian armed forces are also significantly degrading the military capability of one of our chief adversaries, Putin's dictatorship.

Finally, our support for Ukraine sends a clear message to the Chinese Communist Party that aggression will be met with resolve. Our allies in the Asia-Pacific understand the connection between projecting strength in Ukraine and deterring Chinese aggression. Japan, for example, just announced a \$5.5 billion aid package for Ukraine.

American interests are being secured without U.S. boots on the ground and for a relatively modest cost. After a year of fighting, the oversight requirements Congress has put in place seem to be working. Just last week, three major independent U.S. watchdogs said they had not received any reports of major fraud regarding U.S. aid.

Further, many allies and partners are helping us shoulder the burden. Britain, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic States deserve special mention for their contributions. Unfortunately, there are some larger European partners who need to do much more, notably Germany and France.

This war matters greatly to the United States but is being fought in Europe's backyard. I believe some in the Biden Administration have recognized that the drip, drip, drip approach to providing military assistance has prevented Ukraine from mounting successful counteroffensives to bring this war closer to an end. Make no mistake, Ukrainian battlefield victories are necessary for a just peace.

Vladimir Putin is a war criminal who understands only brute force. He will not negotiate until he is forced to do so. I would like to hear from our witnesses about what more could be done to sharpen the military capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. We need to learn our lessons from the slow roll approach we use to arm the Ukrainians.

Thus far, the Ukrainians have continually surprised many in the West with their ingenuity and their will to fight. We are at a pivotal moment in this war, an inflection point we cannot afford to waste as we go about defending the interest of the United States and our allies so that the 21st century is a peaceful, prosperous and American led century.

I have repeatedly in this past year advocated Ronald Reagan's concept of peace through strength. In addition, Eisenhower said over 70 years ago, only with strength could we achieve the true task of this time to deter aggression and secure peace. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with you that we must help our Ukrainian friends, that our help should be expedited, and I do question whether the pace has been properly calibrated.

I thank you and I look forward to working with you in this mutual bipartisan endeavor, and I thank our witnesses.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Now let me recognize, Dr. Stent. Dr. Stent, please.

**STATEMENT OF ANGELA STENT, DIRECTOR EMERITA,  
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR EURASIAN, RUS-  
SIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES**

Dr. STENT. Thank you very much. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before your Committee at this very critical time. Let me begin with Russia's war aims.

What does Vladimir Putin want? When Putin launched his unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year ago, his goal was to conquer the country in 3 days, to oust the Zelenskyy government, and to install a puppet regime loyal to Moscow. Putin does not believe that Ukraine is a separate nation, and he denies that it has the right to exist as a State.

In my book, *Putin's World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest*, I have a cynical quote that sums up his view of the world. Putin said, there are only four truly sovereign states in the world, Russia, China, the United States, and India. All the rest had limited sovereignty, they are colonies. Having failed to take Kyiv and encountering fierce and effective resistance from the Ukrainians, Russian forces have been pushed back into what is now a brutal war of attrition.

In his address to the Federal Assembly last week, Putin claimed that NATO had started the war and was out to destroy Russia, but



he said, we will win on the battlefield. So, what exactly are the Russian war aims today? There was no hint in that speech a week ago, safe to tell the Russian people that this will be a long war and they have no choice but to support it.

At a minimum, Russia wants to get total control of the Donbass region, the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which have been partially occupied by Russia since 2014. The next goal would be total control of two new regions, which he has declared are annexed to Russia, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, an artificial red line.

Then Putin might be willing to sit down and negotiate an agreement for a cease-fire, but make no mistake, that would only be temporary. Putin has not given up his goal of conquering Ukraine altogether, and this could be a very long war. As critical for this Committee, I believe at this important time, is European views and the durability of the transatlantic coalition to support Ukraine.

Many of you were at the Munich Security Conference last weekend and you saw and heard the public displays of transatlantic unity, encouragement for Ukraine's determination to prevail. So far, I believe this transatlantic unity has been remarkable. Europeans are suffering the economic fallout from the sanctions and the end of Russian hydrocarbon imports. Public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine, and the mild winter has mitigated some of the economic pain.

It is likely that as the war drags on this year, there could be more public resistance to sending significant economic support to Ukraine and more calls to pressure Ukraine to begin to sit down at the negotiating table.

If, of course, Russia were willing to sit down and negotiate with Ukraine. Russia will likely step up its information war in Europe this year, as elections in various countries loom. The same questioning will likely happen here in the United States as we approach next year's congressional and Presidential elections.

At Munich, it was clear that Western governments do have to do a better job of explaining to their publics what the stakes are in this war and why it affects their interests. This is about international stability and a world in which rules are observed rather than the disruptive world Putin wants, one where there are no rules.

The same is even more true for the global South, that is the developing world. I do have deep concerns about this. As we heard in Munich, these countries face significant problems, food insecurity, the impact of climate change, humanitarian disasters, and this European conflict, in the eyes of many, is absorbing too many resources from the West that would be better directed toward them.

The global South has not taken sides in this war and has neither condemned nor sanctioned Russia, meaning that Putin is not isolated. He has been cultivating these countries for years. The United States and our allies need to do a better job of explaining to these countries why it is important that Russia not win this war. Depicting this as a fight between democracy and autocracy is ineffective in many of these countries.

It is much more effective to highlight that Russia has violated the United Nations charter, it has violated international law. If Russia were to prevail, and the rest of the world to resume busi-

ness as usual with Moscow, then no country would be secure in its borders and no one could count on preserving—no country could count on preserving its territorial integrity. Russia is expecting the developing world to remain neutral.

NATO should step up its efforts to counter the Russian narrative, and however difficult it is, the United States should try harder to break Putin's information Iron Curtain and communicate directly with the Russian people and explain what Putin is doing and what this war is really about, and its true cost to the Russian people and future generations. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Dr. Stent. Ms. Massicot.

**STATEMENT OF DARA MASSICOT, SENIOR POLICY  
RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION**

Ms. MASSICOT. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the Committee and staff—

Chairman REED. Could you bring the microphone closer, if possible, please.

Ms. MASSICOT. Thank you. Sorry about that. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the Committee and staff, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. One year has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and this grim milestone offers a moment of reflection.

My area of expertise is Russian military capabilities, strategy, and operations. My remarks today focus on the past year of war, an assessment of where the war stands at present, and outlines considerations for the future.

On the eve of Russia's invasion last year, nearly 200,000 troops amassed on Ukraine's borders. The Ukrainian military and government transitioned to a higher level of readiness and State of emergency only a few weeks prior. Many assumed that if Russia used their advantages wisely, it would be difficult for Ukrainian forces to withstand for long. But the Russians did not prevail.

They were instead routed outside many major cities and retreated on multiple occasions. Why? The answer has many components, and no single factor explains outcomes we see today. Moscow's invasion plan, as we know now, was created by a small, secretive group, and is riddled with faulty assumptions, arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors. War plan's design and objectives departed from Russian military strategy and undercut many of its advantages and amplified its structural disadvantages from the outset.

The Russian command withheld its war plan from any elements of its invading force, until the last minute due to excessive secrecy leading to multiple preventable errors on their side. These mistakes then collided with fierce Ukrainian resistance, and Western weapons, intelligence, training, and planning support. Senior United States officials place Russian casualties at well over 100,000.

The damage to the Russian army, the airborne and special forces is systemic and severe, and since last summer has hindered the Russian military's ability to make large territorial gains. The past year of war has come at a high cost to Ukraine, which is now largely dependent on weapons provided by the West.

The Russian military has inflicted severe damage on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, and its forces stand accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against Ukrainians.

Millions of Ukrainians are internally and externally displaced. However, Russian leaders are preparing for a protracted conflict. To replace lost personnel, Russia mobilized 300,000 men last September. They were hastily trained and their provisioning is uneven, as are their skill sets. Russia has been withdrawing its older equipment from strategic reserves in Siberia from the war's outset, although that equipment is in various states of serviceability.

In January, the Russian military was again ordered to go on the offensive in the Donbas, even though its forces were not prepared. Currently, localized assaults are underway in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, possibly to bring these regions under full occupation, and to keep Ukrainian forces engaged and unable to break away to begin their own counteroffensive.

The tactics are crude. The Russians use repetitive armored assaults in some areas and in others are experimenting with assaults of storm troops. In many cases, this means human waves with high rates of casualties as they attempt to close on Ukrainian positions. Russian mobilized soldiers now make public appeals to be spared from what the coming—what they call, “canon meat.”

The Russian command shows a high tolerance for losses. However rudimentary, the method has brought incremental success in a few areas where Russian shelling occurs around the clock. Some Ukrainian positions like Bakhmut and areas around Cremona are under serious and mounting pressure, and missile strikes by the Russian air force continue to chip away at Ukrainian air defenses.

I would like to end my remarks with a brief discussion about what may come next. The outcome of the war, of course, is highly contingent on multiple factors related to sustainment, force regeneration, and availability of Western support to Ukraine. Russia, for its part, has untapped manpower that numbers in the low millions and will likely need to mobilize replenishment this year.

The Kremlin is pressuring its defense industrial base to produce more ammunitions, but it has not yet fully activated its wartime authorities. Without mobilizing more men and pulling more equipment from the reserves, another new incursion into Northeastern Ukraine, such as the Kharkiv region, would be difficult and in my opinion, another ground attack on Kyiv seems well beyond the ability of Russian forces now.

There are several potentially disruptive events that Russia could undertake that might alter the dynamics of the war that I outline in more detail in my written remarks. So, in conclusion, Russian combat potential is diminished due to the losses that it has sustained. It is trying to overcome these deficits by consolidating its positions, generating more manpower and equipment, and using brute force tactics.

Defending against this renewed offensive is taking a toll on Ukrainian forces, and Russia is actively digging in with fortifications, trenches, and minefields to make it costly for Ukraine to liberate more of its territory moving forward.

The capabilities of both sides are being worn down, and Ukraine will need continued and predictable support as Russia digs deep into its reserves. This concludes my remarks. Thank you.  
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dara Massicot follows:]

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Testimony

## Russian Military Operations in Ukraine in 2022 and the Year Ahead

Dara Massicot

CT-A2646-1  
Testimony presented before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on February 28, 2023



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*Observations of Russian Military Operations in Ukraine in 2022 and the Year Ahead*

Testimony of Dara Massicot<sup>1</sup>  
The RAND Corporation<sup>2</sup>

Before the Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate

February 28, 2023

One year has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion against Ukraine. This grim anniversary offers a moment to reflect on the past year of war, discuss the current status of the fighting, and consider what the future holds. Since launching its invasion, the Russian military has inflicted severe damage on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Russian forces stand accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Despite the odds, Ukrainian forces have defended their lands, and Russia has retreated from northern and southern Ukraine on multiple occasions. One year of fighting has been taxing on the Ukrainian military, which is now largely dependent on weapons provided by the West. The Russian army is severely damaged. However, the Kremlin's intentions for Ukraine remain aggressive, yet downsized from the maximalist aims at war start. Russia has recently launched a renewed offensive in the Donbas using brute-force tactics as it tries to exhaust Ukrainian positions. This testimony will reflect on the past 12 months of war, discuss the current Russian offensive, and outline different contingencies in the year ahead.

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<sup>1</sup> The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.

<sup>2</sup> The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's mission is enabled through its core values of quality and objectivity and its commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. RAND subjects its research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoids financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursues transparency through the open publication of research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. This testimony is not a research publication, but witnesses affiliated with RAND routinely draw on relevant research conducted in the organization.

## Reflections on the Past Year of War

On the eve of Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian military forces were believed by most to have the upper hand. Nearly 200,000 troops had amassed at the border.<sup>3</sup> Western support at the time was centered on the provision of small arms, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and Javelin anti-tank weapons. U.S. officials, speaking off the record in January 2022, said they were preparing to support a Ukrainian insurgency if the government failed and the military was overpowered.<sup>4</sup> The Ukrainian government declared a state of emergency only one day in advance of the invasion.<sup>5</sup> As a result, many analysts assumed that if Russian forces used their advantages wisely, it would be very difficult for Ukrainian forces to withstand for long. Why the Russians did not prevail—why they were instead stopped in their tracks, routed outside major cities, and put on the defensive—has become one of the most important questions in both U.S. foreign policy and international security more broadly.

The answer has many components, and no single factor explains the outcomes we see today. On the Russian side of the equation, Moscow's invasion plan was created by a small group and was riddled with faulty assumptions, arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors.<sup>6</sup> The war plan's design and objectives departed from Russian military strategy principles and even previous operations in Ukraine and Syria.<sup>7</sup> Russia's war plan undercut many of its advantages—in the air in particular—and amplified its problems or disadvantages from the outset. The invasion used multiple lines of attack with no follow-on force available. This tethered the military to operational objectives that were overly ambitious for the force allocated to it, particularly because of the known or endemic structural problems of the Russian force, such as a lack of manpower for a task of this magnitude or how the army had been deliberately dismantled 15 years ago from the type of force needed to wage a large, protracted land war.<sup>8</sup>

Even though Russia's war plans were deliberately disclosed by the United States as part of a "prebunking" policy and published in the Ukrainian and Western press, the plan was not widely disseminated to Russia's military until the last minute.<sup>9</sup> It is now known that Russia's war plan was hidden for operational security reasons from key stakeholders and many rank-and-file soldiers until a few days or hours in advance, in some cases. In the days (or, in some cases, day)

<sup>3</sup> "Russia Has Massed up to 190,000 Personnel in and Near Ukraine, U.S. Says," *Reuters*, February 18, 2022.

<sup>4</sup> Helene Cooper, "U.S. Considers Backing an Insurgency If Russia Invades Ukraine," *New York Times*, January 14, 2022.

<sup>5</sup> Pavel Polityuk and Maria Tsvetkova, "Ukraine's Parliament Approves State of Emergency," *Reuters*, February 23, 2022.

<sup>6</sup> Dara Massicot, "What Russia Got Wrong: Can Moscow Learn from Its Failures in Ukraine?" *Foreign Affairs*, February 8, 2023.

<sup>7</sup> Massicot, 2023.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel Charap, Dara Massicot, Miranda Priebe, Alyssa Demus, Clint Reach, Mark Stalczyński, Eugeniu Han, and Lynn E. Davis, *Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality*, RAND Corporation, RR-4238-A, 2021, <https://www.rand.org/t/RR4238.html>.

<sup>9</sup> Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Dr Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, *Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2022*, Royal United Services Institute, November 30, 2022.

before the invasion, junior and mid-grade commanders pieced together simultaneously intricate yet unworkable orders.<sup>10</sup> This decision led to a series of preventable errors in command and control, deconfliction issues, and logistical bottlenecks. These mistakes, and other force employment errors (for example, emphasizing speed over proper route clearance) led to heavy losses of equipment and personnel in the opening weeks of the war.<sup>11</sup>

The Kremlin appears to have made multiple assumptions that caused it to be overconfident in its war plan, such as assuming that (1) the Ukrainian government and military would not strongly resist or be able to resist for long, (2) Russia's network of collaborators inside Ukraine would be able to administer a puppet government (nearly 700 were arrested),<sup>12</sup> and (3) Russia's troops would be greeted as liberators (despite its clandestine polling to the contrary).<sup>13</sup> Senior Russian officials, when confronted by their U.S. counterparts three months prior to the war, conveyed in these closed settings that they believed the West's support would not be strong enough to make a difference.<sup>14</sup>

This set of Russian mistakes then collided with the Ukrainian will to fight and Western weapons, intelligence, training, and planning support. The Ukrainian learning curve has been steep: Through experimentation, Ukrainian forces have been able to keep Russian forces off balance. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have shown creativity in their planning: for example, targeting Russian air bases and the Black Sea Fleet.<sup>15</sup> Ukraine is benefiting more from external support from partners abroad than is Russia.

The Russian military cannot be considered wholly incompetent or incapable of adaptation. The Russian military has been able to correct some of its mistakes by controlled withdrawals, downsizing its objectives, and adding mobilized personnel to address the mismatch between ends and means at the invasion's outset. It has made battlefield adjustments and rectified early problems: in one example, adjusting its electronic warfare assets, and it has been regularly jamming Ukrainian military communications and drones since last summer.<sup>16</sup> Russian forces have been firing 20,000 rounds of artillery per day at times, although western intelligence officials have noted publicly in late 2022 that its stockpiles are beginning to run low.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Zabrodskyi, Watling et al, 2022.

<sup>11</sup> Massicot, 2023.

<sup>12</sup> Greg Miller, Catherine Belton, "Russia's Spies Misread Ukraine and Mised Kremlin as the War Loomed," *Washington Post*, August 19, 2022.

<sup>13</sup> Greg Miller, Catherine Belton, "Russia's Spies Misread Ukraine and Mised Kremlin as the War Loomed," *Washington Post*, August 19, 2022.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Schwartz, Anton Troianovski, Yousur Al-Hlou, Masha Froliak, Adam Entous and Thomas Gibbons-Neff "Putin's War," *New York Times*, December 16, 2022.

<sup>15</sup> Leo Sands, "Saky Airfield: Ukraine Claims Crimea Blasts Responsibility after Denial," *BBC*, 7 September 2022.

<sup>16</sup> David Axe, "Russia's Electronic-Warfare Troops Knocked Out 90 Percent Of Ukraine's Drones," *Forbes*, December 24, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> *The Economist*, "Is Russia Running out of Ammunition?" December 20, 2022.



The Russian military has sustained staggering losses: Senior U.S. officials place Russian casualties at well over 100,000.<sup>18</sup> The army has lost thousands of pieces of armored equipment (around half of its prewar tanks in active service, for example) and several squadrons of fighter jets (which amounts to 6–8 percent of its total) and helicopters, Western officials say Russia has expended a large proportion of its precision strike munitions and artillery shells.<sup>19</sup>

For those who have studied the Russian military for a long time, some aspects of it, such as the army, airborne, and special forces, have sustained so much damage that, as a force, they are becoming unrecognizable from one year ago, but they still fight. This damage is systemic and severe and, since summer 2022, has hindered the Russian military's ability to make large territorial gains.

### A Renewed Offensive

Russian leaders are preparing for a protracted conflict. To replace lost personnel, Russia mobilized 300,000 men last September.<sup>20</sup> They were hastily trained, and their skill sets are highly variable. To replace equipment losses, the military is withdrawing older equipment from strategic reserves, as it has from the war's outset.<sup>21</sup> The Kremlin has increased defense budgets and ordered accelerated production of some military equipment.<sup>22</sup>

By October 2022, it appeared that Russian forces inside Ukraine were moving to the defensive after the appointment of General Sergey Surovkin as overall commander of the special military operation.<sup>23</sup> After retreating from the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, Russia assumed a defensive stance on the ground, building a network of defensive positions, trenches, and minefields, while it launched missiles at critical Ukrainian infrastructure and tried to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses from a distance.<sup>24</sup> Such a strategy could have given damaged and depleted Russian forces time to regroup, regenerate, train, and deploy 300,000 mobilized forces while complicating Ukrainian counteroffensives.

However, this was apparently not a satisfactory way forward for the Kremlin. By January, Putin demoted Surovkin, despite him having no obvious cause to be relieved, and replaced him

<sup>18</sup> Howard Altman, "Ukraine Situation Report: Russian Casualties 'Significantly Well over 100k' Says Top U.S. General," *The War Zone*, January 20, 2023.

<sup>19</sup> Brad Lendon, "Russia May Have Lost Up to Half of Its Operational Tank Fleet in Ukraine, Monitoring Group Says," *CNN*, February 9, 2023; Stijn Mitzer, "List of Aircraft Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine," *Oryx*, March 20, 2022.

<sup>20</sup> Mary Ilyushina, "Russia Defense Minister Says Mobilization Complete with 300,000 Summoned," *Washington Post*, October 28, 2022.

<sup>21</sup> Ihor Mykhylenko, "Аналіз запасів танків РФ на базах зберігання за Уралом [Analysis of Russian tank stocks at storage bases in the Urals]," Ukrainian Military Center, August 22, 2022, <https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/analiz-zapasiv-tankiv-rf-na-bazah-zberigannya-za-uralom/>.

<sup>22</sup> *Reuters*, "Russia to Spend \$600 Billion on Defense and Security by 2025," September 23, 2022.

<sup>23</sup> Mike Eckel, "Surovkin's Down, Gerasimov's Up: Russia's War On Ukraine Pivots Into Politics," *RadioFreeEurope*, January 12, 2023.

<sup>24</sup> Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, "Russia Trying to Exhaust Ukraine's Air Defenses, Pentagon Official Says," *Reuters*, November 19, 2022.

with General Valeriy Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff, who oversaw the disastrous initial invasion plan.<sup>25</sup> In making this move, the Kremlin had clearly decided that an offensive approach—even with shaky forces and depleted equipment—was preferable to a defensive one. Within a few weeks of his appointment, Gerasimov ordered localized assaults in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, ostensibly to bring these regions under full Russian occupation and to keep Ukrainian forces occupied and unable to break away to begin a counteroffensive.<sup>26</sup>

However, Russia's forces were ill-equipped for an offensive and needed more time to train and aggregate strike power with armored assets. Russian forces are attacking in several areas at present, near such towns as Bakhmut and Vuhledar, among others.<sup>27</sup> The tactics are crude. Any finesse or operational art in their doctrine has given way to brute force and repetitive attacks. The Russians are using repetitive armored assaults in some areas and human waves of "storm" troops elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> In other words, they use infantry to draw fire from defending Ukrainian forces, exposing Ukrainian positions that can then be targeted by Russian artillery and a second wave of better trained Russian troops.

With continued Ukrainian resistance and Western support, Russia's gains so far have been minimal and the losses steep, although it is early. Ukrainian forces claim that Russian casualties are in the hundreds per day, at rates not seen since the early weeks of the invasion.<sup>29</sup> Newly mobilized Russian troops, knowing they are being used as cannon fodder, have even made public appeals to officials to be spared.<sup>30</sup> Even with mobilization, judging from the Russian military's performance in the new offensives to date, it appears that the losses of trained crews, noncommissioned officers, junior officers, logisticians, and other specialists who were casualties of the war's early days have reduced the Russian military's combat effectiveness on the offensive.

Despite such diminished capacity, the Russian command shows a high tolerance for losses and continues to push its troops forward, prepared or not. The Russian military has shown a staggering indifference to the lives of its personnel during this war, in a sad tradition that extends

<sup>25</sup> Mike Eckel, "Surovikin's Down, Gerasimov's Up: Russia's War on Ukraine Pivots into Politics," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 12, 2023.

<sup>26</sup> "Russian Army Chief Says Focus Is Now on Liberation of Donetsk," *Moscow Times*, December 22, 2022.

<sup>27</sup> Isobel Koshiw, "Ukrainians Blow Up Bridge in Bakhmut Amid Reports Russia Closing In," *The Guardian*, February 14, 2023.

<sup>28</sup> Erin Snodgrass, "Satellite Photos Show Carnage in Vuhledar Where Russian Losses Are Mounting Amid Ukrainian Defense," *Business Insider*, February 13, 2023; Andrew E. Kramer, "'Our Losses Were Gigantic': Life in a Sacrificial Russian Assault Wave," *New York Times*, February 13, 2023.

<sup>29</sup> Kramer, 2023.

<sup>30</sup> Leonid Volkov [@leonidvolkov], "Другими словами, надежды Путина и его генералов на то, что мобилизованные помогут переломить ситуацию на фронте и позволят снова осуществлять наступательные действия — несбыточны. Ну и хорошо. 6/6 Еще пара видео для комплекта: <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/8517> [In other words, the hopes of Putin and his generals that the mobilized will help turn the tide at the front and allow offensive actions to be carried out again are unrealistic. Well, good. 6/6 A couple more videos for the kit: <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/8517>]," Twitter post, February 13, 2023, <https://twitter.com/leonidvolkov/status/1625070658634887169>.

back decades to the Soviet period.<sup>31</sup> Russian military leaders show little ability or interest to correct this issue.

However rudimentary, the method has brought some success. Russian shelling in some areas occurs around the clock. Some Ukrainian positions, such as Bakhmut, are under serious and mounting pressure.<sup>32</sup> Russian forces are also attacking near Kreminna, where the situation is described by Ukrainian officials as tough.<sup>33</sup> Missile strikes by the Russian Air Force, meanwhile, continue to chip away at Ukrainian air defenses.

## Outlook

President Putin is certainly digging in for the long haul, and the Russian military, although wounded, is still fighting. Sustained high-intensity, high-attrition combined-arms warfare is extraordinarily difficult and resource-intensive. Russia and Ukraine now have more recent experience with this type of fighting than any other countries in the world.

Russian military leaders are thinking about force regeneration, although their announced plans are aspirational if not outside their grasp for many years. In December, the Russian Defense Minister announced plans to enlarge Russia's force structure by creating new army units and increasing the size of the military to 1.5 million.<sup>34</sup> It was widely known that, prewar, when the Russian military was considered a trusted institution, it had known manning problems.<sup>35</sup> It is unlikely that Russia will be able to expand to that number in the next few years, short of multiple rounds of mobilization, expanding conscription, or recent efforts to incorporate separatist proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk into the Russian army officially.<sup>36</sup> There is no reliable data at present about Russian recruiting levels into professional enlisted service, and retention is frozen due to ongoing "stop loss" guidance in effect since fall 2022: Contracts for professional enlisted will continue until the end of the mobilization period, which has no formal end date as of February 2023.<sup>37</sup>

Russia still has untapped manpower (Russian officials say 25 million) and could call for another mobilization this year or next.<sup>38</sup> There remains a stockpile of armored equipment in strategic reserves (such as older tanks, artillery, and fighting vehicles) that likely number in the low thousands, based on prewar estimates. However, that equipment is in various states of

<sup>31</sup> Dara Massicot, "The Russian Military's People Problem: It's Hard for Moscow to Win While Mistreating Its Soldiers," *Foreign Affairs*, May 18, 2022.

<sup>32</sup> Isobel Koshiw, "Ukrainians Blow Up Bridge in Bakhmut Amid Reports Russia Closing in," *The Guardian*, February 14, 2023.

<sup>33</sup> "Russia Has Focused All Its Efforts on Kreminna Direction," *Espresso TV*, February 17, 2023.

<sup>34</sup> "Russian Military Announces Plan to Expand, Create New Units," Associated Press, December 21, 2022.

<sup>35</sup> Charap et al., 2021; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, "Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military's Ill-Fated Force Design," *War on the Rocks*, June 2, 2022.

<sup>36</sup> "[S]W: Russia Formally Integrates Proxy Militias from Eastern Ukraine into Russian Military," *Kyiv Independent*, February 21, 2023.

<sup>37</sup> Zoya Sheftalovich, "Full Text of Putin's Mobilization Decree—Translated," *Politico*, September 21, 2022.

<sup>38</sup> "Kremlin Denies That Mobilisation Decree Allows a Million to Be Enlisted," *Reuters*, September 22, 2022.

disrepair: Much of it has been sitting in open storage for many years, and some of it is beyond repair and has been stripped for parts. Russia has already been drawing down on this equipment since summer 2022. Without mobilizing even more men and pulling battalion sets of equipment from the reserves, it is my assessment that another attack on northeastern Ukraine, such as the Kharkiv region, would be difficult. Another attack on Kyiv seems well beyond the ability of Russian forces for years, or could be put off indefinitely, in my opinion.

The outcome of the war is highly contingent on multiple factors related to sustainment, force regeneration, and availability of western support to Ukraine. In addition, there are several potentially disruptive events that could alter the dynamics of the war in ways that could benefit Russia or Ukraine. Russia could make changes to its operational approach: for example, the training and creation of multiple armored units in Russia from reserves that could add strike power, although there is no publicly available evidence to suggest that this is happening. Should Russia be able to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, perhaps through the use of Shahed drones or persistent missile salvos, the Russian Air Force could be reintroduced to the war at a larger scale, a possibility that could be damaging to Ukrainian forces. There could be changes to outside support for either Ukraine or Russia. Just as more-advanced equipment for Ukraine would alter dynamics, the possibility of lethal aid from China to fill critical gaps for Russia would also affect the conflict, depending on what was provided.<sup>39</sup> One side could be exhausted before the other, perhaps through failed offensives that would leave its overall position weaker. Russian military morale is poor, but there are no signs of uncontrolled collapse along the front line, nor are there signs that collective protests are close to occurring inside Russia. Russia could decide to horizontally or vertically escalate and accept greater risks of direct conflict with NATO. So far, Russia has not escalated kinetically outside the boundaries of Ukraine, even as the Kremlin increasingly seeks to frame this war as an existential one for Russia with its rhetoric.<sup>40</sup> Russia has so far been unable or unwilling to interdict Western aid to Ukraine, but it is a risk that Russia could overcome this problem.

In conclusion, Russia's combat potential is diminished due to the number and type of losses it has sustained in the first year of the war. Russia is trying to overcome these deficits with mobilization and brute-force tactics. Defending against the renewed Russian offensive is taking a toll on Ukrainian forces, and Russia is actively digging in with fortifications, trenches, and minefields to make it costly for Ukraine to liberate more territory moving forward.

For now, Putin shows no signs of abandoning this war. He seems willing to sacrifice the lives of Russian men and mortgage Russia's future to achieve his goals. For Ukraine, in need of urgent and sustained support, it is a deadly commitment. Ukraine outclasses Russia with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); tactical adaptation; will to fight; and force employment. It does this organically and with Western weapons, training, and intelligence support. The

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<sup>39</sup> Samuel Horti and James Landale, "Ukraine War: Blinken Says China Might Give Weapons to Russia," *BBC News*, February 19, 2023.

<sup>40</sup> Guy Falconbridge, "Russia's Putin issues new nuclear warnings to West over Ukraine," *Reuters*, February 21, 2023.

capabilities of both sides are being worn down, and Ukraine will need continued and predictable support as Russia digs deep into its reserves.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. General Kellogg, please.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH KELLOGG,  
(RET.), CO-CHAIR, CENTER FOR AMERICAN SECURITY AMER-  
ICA FIRST POLICY INSTITUTE**

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of the Committee, thank you for having me here today. I am grateful to be able to offer my perspective, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none has been a greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the uniform of the United States Army in nearly four decades of decorated service on behalf of this country. Much of that was combat service,

including two tours in Vietnam, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War, and Iraq.

I have had the privilege of being the Commander of Special Operations Command Europe and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. My military career is one of multiple aspects in my life that make my perspective on the war in Ukraine unique.

The second is my service in the last Administration on the National Security Council, the acting National Security Advisor to the President, and the National Security Advisor to the Vice President.

Finally, a comprehensive 2 week visit I made last month to Ukraine. My trip to Ukraine was facilitated by the expertise of the Weathermen Foundation, founded by Best Weatherman and Andrew Duncan, seated behind me today, and led by my daughter, West Point graduate, Dr. Meaghan Mobbs.

I visited arenas of battles near the line of contact. You know, Kharkiv, Iziun, Donetsk, and interfaced across the spectrum of military forces, from senior decisionmakers to trigger pullers. In Bucha, in Iziun, I saw the firsthand consequences of unbridled Russian aggression and their willingness to kill innocents and use indiscriminate violence against children.

My views today, which are offered today in my strictly personal capacity, are consistent with everything I have written and I have said throughout this conflict. To be clear, Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a humiliating American withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that allowed Putin to believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a major response, much like he found in 2014 when he seized Crimea from Ukraine.

Deterrence has failed. This failure has been compounded by a willingness to use strong words, unaccompanied by decisive and timely action. It is the incremental and halting of the American and allied response to the Russian invasion that persuades Putin he can drag out this war and count on time to be his friend and bring him to victory.

It has been support sent in half measures and with hesitation, which succeeds in enabling the fighting of the war but not the ending of it. This is important because ending the war needs to be the principal American effort. If we do not demonstrate leadership now, we risk being mired in another endless war.

As with all wars, there will be negotiation between the warring parties, and so we must look forward to what will hasten those negotiations, consistent with American honor and interest. It is clear the path to bringing about these negotiations is to rapidly increase Ukraine's lethality to enable Ukrainian forces to destroy currently committed Russian forces on the battlefield and disrupt their supply chain logistics.

Putin must see that the fate of his army in the field in Ukraine is at risk of near total destruction. The reasons for American interest are many. The war threatens the American led international order.

We cannot be secure in our leadership role if we allow a war of regression to regress and persist in a major sovereign State with the potential of a Russian victory. Simply saying whatever it takes as long as it takes is not policy, it is a slogan.

One of the great maxims of warfare is tactics without strategy is just the noise before defeat. No number of supplemental aid packages, no round of sanctions, nor a Presidential visit to Kyiv will achieve success without a plan.

The Ukraine war must end this year, but not any end will do. An end to the war in Ukraine must be defined with American interests at heart and there must be a pathway to achieve it. This can be achieved by first providing Ukraine with all the military armament it needs to defeat the Russian army in Ukraine.

The survival of Putin's army in the field must be put at risk and you need to do it now. Second, the identification of an end State for how this war will end, with a road map to get there must be communicated effectively to the American people. Third, our allies must do more, spend more, and do it more quickly.

This war is in their backyard and they cannot expect the citizens of the United States to continue to carry the overwhelming financial burden as they do today. All this is simple, but not easy. Let me be plain, Americans are right to ask the hard questions about why we are spending so much in Ukraine. Many of your own constituents, Americans with whom I have spoken, have legitimate concerns about our involvement in this war.

We see a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions into the defense of Ukrainian borders while showing no real interest in the defense of American borders. From a strictly policy perspective, the correct answer is that American Government is equipped to do both. As we enter the second year in Ukraine, we cannot continue the status quo.

We need to work toward an end to this war and do so immediately and decisively. If this war turns into a multiple year of attrition, which is its present trajectory, then Americans may be asked to sacrifice more than they are willing to give, and Ukraine will lose.

As it stands, a Ukrainian defeat is an American defeat by proxy. This cannot be tolerated. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE KEITH KELLOGG

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this Committee. Thank you for having me here today and for convening this important hearing. I am grateful to be able to offer my perspective, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none has been a greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the uniform of the United States Army in my nearly four decades of decorated service on behalf of this country. Much of that was combat service, including two tours in Vietnam, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War, and in Iraq. The opportunity I am most fortunate to have had was commanding Special Operations Command-Europe and the 82d Airborne at Fort Bragg. The sense of stewardship and obligation I felt to my soldiers then is the same sentiment I hold toward our country now. This Committee has been instrumental in making many of those opportunities successful over the years—and you, your predecessors, and your hard-working staff have my gratitude for it.

My military career is one of several aspects of my life that have shaped my perspective on the war in Ukraine. The second is my service in the National Security Council and as Acting National Security Advisor to President Trump and National Security Advisor to Vice President Pence in the last administration. And finally, my personal visit to Ukraine last month. I visited the arenas of battle in Kharkiv,

Izium, Donetsk, and the suburbs of Kyiv. I saw Bucha firsthand—one of many sites of Russian massacres of Ukrainian civilians, including women and children—as well as Izmail and Odesa, which have experienced Russia's war. I may be the only senior retired American flag officer to have visited those cities during this past year. The Romulus T.

Weatherman Foundation, a private operating foundation whose president is my daughter, West Point Graduate Dr. Meaghan Mobbs, facilitated my trip to Ukraine.

I have offered my perspective on hundreds of media appearances, and in written commentary in various outlets and in long-form publications as the Co-Chair of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.

My views today—which I offer today in my strictly personal capacity, informed by my experiences and affiliations but not on their behalf—are consistent with everything I have said and written throughout this conflict.

It is no mystery why this war happened. The Russian dictator, Vladimir Putin, has always resented the American victory in the cold war, and has spoken openly of his desire to reverse it. He subscribes to a well-worn Russian strategic concept by which security is assured by pushing the Russian border as far westward as possible, and the conquest of Ukraine—barbaric and unprovoked as it was—was meant to begin that process in the modern era. So much for Russia's part in it: we are here to discuss America's part.

To be clear, Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a humiliating withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that led Putin to believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a major response much like he found in 2014, when he invaded Crimea.

It is the weakness of a continuing cautious American response to the Russian invasion that persuades that same dictator to believe he can drag out the war, and count on time for his own victory. That weakness came in two parts. First it came in failing to deter it once the plans were known, beginning in late 2021. Next it came in a slow and hesitating provision of aid to Ukraine—a hesitation masked by the sheer size of the aid given, but real nonetheless—which succeeds in enabling the fighting of the war, but not the ending of it.

That serial American weakness, I should note, had one signal early exception, in the policy of President Donald J. Trump. It was President Trump who broke from the policy of his predecessor and sent American weapons and aid to Ukraine that mattered: above all, Javelin anti-armor munitions that proved decisive in this war's opening days, weeks, and months. When we look to the causes of Ukrainian survival against a Russian onslaught that virtually no one expected them to survive, we credit first the spirit of the Ukrainians themselves and the leadership of their president. They are a nation that came together in supreme crisis and earned the world's admiration and respect. But their spirit would have been a mere moral victory without the arms and early allied training to take out Russian armor, to fix Russian columns in place, and to stop Russian aggression in its tracks.

However, ending the war should be the principal American interest now or we risk another endless war.

We do not imagine the war will end in a comprehensive Ukrainian battlefield victory, and still less in a Russian conquest of Ukraine. There will be some sort of negotiation between the warring parties—and so we must look toward what will hasten those negotiations, consistent with American honor and interest. A war born in American weakness can only be ended by American strength.

That's why the path to bringing these negotiations about is to enable Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine. Putting the Russian Army in Ukraine at risk of defeat is a strong message Putin cannot ignore.

The reasons for this American interest are many. This war threatens the American-led international order that our fathers and grandfathers painfully won in the Second World War, and in the cold war that followed. Our prosperity right here at home depends directly upon the maintenance and perpetuation of that order, with America in a leading role. We cannot be secure in that position while Russia pursues a war of aggression that overturns the global order, destabilizes commodities markets, and renders food-supply chains unstable. The fact that Russia does so as a strategic ally and partner of America's number-one rival and threat, the People's Republic of China, only accentuates the danger. Make no mistake: weakness against Russian aggression is weakness against the Communist-Chinese threat. We know from history that the dictatorial powers watch and learn, to discover just how far they can get: and we know that Russian victory in Ukraine today almost certainly means war for Taiwan tomorrow.

For all this, America needs the Ukraine war to end. An end to the war in Ukraine must be defined, and there must be a pathway to it.



We have yet to get this from the current Administration. Simply saying that one will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is a bumper sticker, not a strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages, no rounds of sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are substitutes for American leadership.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this Committee, we need to end this war now, and ensure that a negotiation process begins. In my commentary and written analysis over the last year, I have been consistent on what an America-First approach looks like to end this conflict.

- First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it needs to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine, implement rigorous accountability measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
- Second, identify an end State for how this war will end—and a roadmap to get there.
- Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more, more quickly.

All this is simple—but not easy. The questions of which armaments to send, and from where, and by whom, are complicated ones. There are answers, but each of them requires a tradeoff, and prudent prioritization. I know the Members of this Committee will appreciate and understand this inescapable constant in governance and its challenges.

But the Ukrainian war is not simply a military challenge, nor even just a foreign-policy one. At its heart, for us in the United States, our involvement in this war—even in the time-tested and honorable American role as the “arsenal of democracy”—raises a profound and necessary question of who, and for whom, our Nation is governed. I will speak directly to this, because the Members here must understand the gravity of it—even if the White House refuses to.

Let me be plain: Americans are right to ask the hard questions about why we are spending so much on Ukraine. Many of your own constituents, Americans with whom I have spoken and met, have legitimate concerns about our involvement in this war. I want to address the two I hear most right here, and left unaddressed they will in the long run overtake and rightly eclipse our interests abroad.

- First and foremost, Americans have legitimate concerns about a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions into the defense of Ukrainian borders, while showing no real interest in the defense of American borders. From a strictly policy perspective, the correct answer is that American governance ought to do both—but ordinary people do not live in a strictly policy-oriented world. They live in the real world, where they see an administration sending arms to defend Ukrainian communities, while denying American communities the ability to defend their own homes and ways of life. I want to be absolutely emphatic: this is sowing the wind, and left unaddressed, the whirlwind will be reaped. You, each of you here holding elected office and trust from your constituents, must work urgently to close this gap.
- Second, Americans are rightly concerned that arms and aid sent to Ukraine is arms and aid taken away from an impending confrontation with Communist China, whether over Taiwan or some other flashpoint. The reality is that national security is not a zero-sum exercise: we can prudently sustain Ukrainian resistance to aggression and confront Communist China, if we manage our resources wisely. But that is only part of the picture: Americans with this concern are instinctually, and correctly, illuminating a real and significant challenge to our national-security apparatus. America’s industrial base, though robust, is simply unprepared for war. The Ukraine emergency gives us a rare historical opportunity to enact industrial and procurement reform now, when it is still a choice and not a compulsion—and thereby acknowledge and address the entirely justified concerns of these fellow Americans.

As we enter the second year of war in Ukraine, we cannot continue with the status quo. We need to work toward an end to this war, and do so now. If this war turns into a multi-year war of attrition, which is its present trajectory, then Ukraine may well lose. We need American leadership to prevent that.

To conclude, and to reiterate, there are three things we must do now to bring about the peace negotiations that will bring this war to a rapid conclusion.

- First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it needs to defeat the Russian Army, implement rigorous accountability measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
- Second, identify an end State for how this war will end—and a roadmap to get there.
- Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more, more quickly.

There is more Congress can do, most notably regarding oversight, and this type of an open hearing is one great step to increase public awareness and transparency. Congress should be leading efforts on the oversight of U.S. distribution to Ukraine,

particularly since its resources are going to a nation with longstanding corruption issues.

If we take these steps—and if the Congress plays its full and Constitutional role in making them happen—than we will have done a service to the peace of Europe, to the peoples of Russia and Ukraine alike, and to the welfare of the world. And we'll have done something even more important than all of that: we'll have put America First.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General. Dr. Stent, one of the issues that continually engages the planners and the statesmen and women who deal with this problem is escalation. Could you comment upon the factors that you see, particularly since so much of this is really a function of what Putin is thinking, and that is an odd analysis one must make.

Dr. STENT. Thank you, Chairman. That is obviously a key question. I think Putin from the beginning has wanted us to believe that he could escalate. He wants to intimidate not only the Ukrainians, but really the Western coalition, the NATO countries that are supporting Ukraine.

Therefore, we have had these hints from him right from the beginning, you know, we are a very strong nuclear power, we can do things that you haven't even dreamed of, and that waxes and wanes.

Sometimes it is more forceful. Sometimes he stops saying that. We have had at some point the Chinese even saying that it is—you know, criticizing the use of this kind of rhetoric, not criticizing him.

The Indians, too. So, there has been some pushback there. He wants us to believe that he could do this. I think, you know, you cannot rule out, if we are talking about the potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon, right, you cannot rule out that he would never do it because he does have the weapons.

I think we have allowed ourselves sometimes to limit what we are doing for Ukraine because we are too concerned about the potential for, World War III breaking out.

Again, I don't want to dismiss it and say it couldn't happen. I think we have to be very careful in looking at this. There are many unknowns, but not allowing us to limit what we are doing because of this changing rhetoric that we hear from Vladimir Putin.

Chairman REED. Thank you, doctor. Ms. Massicot, the Russians went in with a plan that collapsed. Their forces had multiple difficulties. What do you think they have learned, which they can usefully apply in the next several months?

Ms. MASSICOT. I think they realized within about a month and a half that they had too many objectives for the forces they had left. So, you saw them withdraw from Kyiv. You saw them then withdraw from the Northeastern Ukraine.

This has been a process that has been ongoing up until the recent withdrawal from Kherson. They are capable of adapting their tactics. There is some institutional learning going on in that regard. They are more effective now with their electronic warfare. They are more effective with some of their air defenses. It is hurting Ukraine's ability to fly drones that were very effective in the beginning.

In terms of the larger issues that they are facing, they have shown an unwillingness or inability to target or interdict Western

support coming into Ukraine. I think that is an escalation choice on their part. They don't want to open that up. They can't overcome that with that mentality, and I don't think they want to at this time.

So tactically, yes, they can adapt. There is no secret new Russian army that is going to come from East of the Urals and finish this. They are very damaged at this point.

Chairman REED. Thank you. General Kellogg, one of the strengths I think, of the Ukrainian forces is the training that we began in 2014 under President Obama for their young noncommissioned officers and their younger officers who today, as the clock ticks forward, are now senior NTOs and battalion officers. Is that your impression also?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes, Senator, it is. Their quality of leadership is much better than the Russian quality of leadership. The Russians have not learned the Western style leadership. We transferred our expertise with the young noncommissioned officers, which the Russians does not rely on our younger officers and our senior officers as well.

I think the other thing they have done is the fact is the Russians violated every principal war I ever grew up with at the start of this invasion, and Ukrainians were able to capitalize on it. You cannot discount the value of Ukrainian soldiers either. There is one thing that Napoleon once said, the moral of the physical is three as to one, never discount the heart of a fighting army and the training they have received.

Chairman REED. I have witnessed that in my brief stay in Ukraine, where their forces are committed to the fight, unlike I think most of the Russian conscripts who are essentially, as was described, they are trying to avoid what—the meat grinder or whatever. So, I think that is an advantage.

I think also, too, which is consistent in all your testimony, is the need to explain to the world what is at stake and to continue to provide support for the Ukrainian people. One other aspect of this is the overall effort, and sometimes we merely look at the military aspect, but there is a specific amount of humanitarian assistance and budgetary assistance to the government of Ukraine, and some of our allies are doing much more of that than they are with military assistance, but you need a combination of humanitarian, governmental, and military assistance to carry the day. Senator Wicker, please.

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses. General Kellogg, you are dissatisfied with the pace of delivery of weaponry and ammunition. Dr. Stent mentioned in her testimony that we are limiting what we do for various reasons.

One of the arguments that is sort of baffling is that we are holding back on some things because we need them to defend our interests in NATO. That is surprising to me since we are in NATO and we have positioned our resources there to defend against Russia.

So, does it make sense to hold back our capabilities in other places in Europe rather than deliver them where the fight is right now?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. No Senator, it does not. Senator, the Ukrainians are fighting the fight that we thought we were

going to fight 20 and 25 years ago, against the very people we thought we were going to fight, with the very equipment that we thought we were going to have to use in Europe.

So, give the Ukrainians the equipment they need. An example, Army preposition set No. 2 is sitting in Germany. Multiple combat teams, multiple brigades are sitting right there. Transfer that equipment out. It is there. They can train for it in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. Unleash it against the Russians.

That is what the equipment is designed to be used for. You might as well use the equipment as it was designed for. The Russians, once they have an inability to proceed on the battlefield, they have no ability to go toward NATO because they will not have the military capacity, as long as we use the equipment that we should be giving them right now.

Senator WICKER. How soon could that be accomplished?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, it could be rapid. The equipment is stationed right there. You can get the pre-positioned sets moving as quickly as you want to. There will be—saying, well, it is going to affect our readiness.

No, it doesn't, because the readiness which it was designed to be used for was to defeat the Russian army. That is what the Ukrainians are doing right now. Give them the tools they need to win this fight now.

Senator WICKER. Well, if you would comment on the practicality of F-16s. Do you buy the Administration's stated reason for the reluctance there of the ATACMS?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. My concern on that, Senator, is the fact that if and when they need them, when the term was, they don't need them right now, but when they do need them, it will be late to give it to them.

What they really need are the MiG-29s that came out of Poland. Given the equipment they are used to be using on there—now, it is not as the avionics, clearly, and not as good on United States aircraft as we see on like the example on MiG-29, but they can still put equipment on there that can defeat the Russian.

You equip their HARM 88 missile on it. You can put a lot of ordinance on that, given the stuff that they are currently used to using in the air.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Well, is there any point in our training the Ukraine, beginning to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s at this point? You recommend that or not?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, I would be training them on everything we have got, because if we had an ability to bring them back, we should have done it months ago. It still takes time to train regardless of which, a tank crewman or a pilot in an aircraft. We probably should be training them, if we had an ability. We thought that we were going to come do it, get ahead of the game instead of behind the game.

Senator WICKER. Then there are two schools of thought with regard to the Pacific. One is that this distracts us from our major threat, and that is the Communist Party of China. The other is that China is watching and looking for indications of American resolve. So why should we be—how should we be viewing this with regard to the pacing threat of China?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Two parts real quickly. The actions we are taking in Ukraine, supporting them, is being watched by China. If they see us with strength, then they would regard us with caution as well.

I am not sure we are doing that. Sir, and the first question again was on the two fight. Sir, I believe that the fight in the Pacific, if we have to go there, will be primarily an air and naval fight. It won't be a ground fight.

We are not going to march to Beijing. So, the systems are different. There is a ground war in Europe. It is an air and sea war, primarily, in the Pacific. Sort of like an apples and oranges.

Senator WICKER. I hear two concerns on—among the talking heads. Now, one is corruption, and our resources are potentially being stolen over there. Am I correct that we are pretty much on top of that? Also, is it fair to count the burden sharing, as Mexico, I believe, indicated, in terms of the humanitarian aid that is being primarily shouldered by European allies.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Well, we are still giving, according to the Kiel Institute, sir, that—which tracks that still 50 percent of the aid out of the countries they track, 41, is still 50 percent American. So, we are giving a lot. They need to step up to the plate and do more to be able to give that aid to them as well. Again, sure, the first question was on the comments, or the first one part of that—

Senator WICKER. You know, I shouldn't ask two questions at one time, so thank you very much.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, and thank you to each of you for being here this morning. Dr. Stent, you pointed out that Russia is going to step up its information war this year. I think they have been very effective in their information war, actually much more so than we have.

I wonder if you and others on the panel have thoughts about what we should be doing to ramp up our information war to combat what Russia is doing, not just in Europe, but Africa and other places around the world.

Dr. STENT. Thank you, Senator. I mean, we definitely should be. I think we have not done as good a job as we should. We know what the Russians are doing. It is very difficult to counter some of their disinformation, but we have a lot of smart people working on this who should understand how to do it. We have to do this for different audiences.

So, I think we have to also, you know, explain to the Europeans, those people who oppose supporting Ukraine, what this is about. We definitely have to do more in the global South, whether that is radio, TV, using other media, really explaining to them what this conflict is about. As I said, I think we also have to try and penetrate that Iron information curtain in Russia itself.

We are not getting through to the Russian people. It is very difficult to. They don't have alternative sources of information. Even when they do, they don't know what to believe. But I just think we should put more resources into that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I agree. Before I go on, I want to ask you about Belarus, because Lukashenko last a couple of weeks ago announced that Belarus would not join Putin's war, although it continues to serve as a staging area. So, can you talk about how much you think we can rely on that? Are we going to see Belarus engage further with Putin in this war? What is the status of the citizens of the country in terms of their concern about the war?

Dr. STENT. Sure, that is a very important question. So, Russia has been pressuring Belarus since the beginning to send troops there. But one thing that the dictator Lukashenko understands is that 80 percent of the Belarusian population do not support this war.

If he did try and mobilize and send them there, he would face significant disruptions and protests at home. Yes, it is a very repressive State, but still, people do take to the streets there. So, he does understand that. That is why he said we will only during the war if Belarus is attacked by Ukraine.

Now, of course, you could manufacture something, which they would be capable of doing and say, well, the Ukrainians threatened us. But so far, he has held that line. In fact, there are Belarusians who are fighting with the Ukrainians in Ukraine. If you look at the recent meeting between President Putin and President Lukashenko and just look at President Putin's body language, these are not two leaders who are too fond of each other.

The Russians have been irritated by Lukashenko for a long time. On the other hand, he is completely dependent on them now to stay in power because of their fraudulent elections. So, I think I would not anticipate that Lukashenko will send troops there, unless something drastically changes and he is told that he has no choice, but he will face real opposition domestically.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Ms. Massicot, what would be the impact of China providing weapons to Russia?

Ms. MASSICOT. I think Russia has a few immediate needs that China could fill. I am not a China expert and I certainly don't understand whether or not they will do this or not, but Russia has shell hunger.

They need artillery rounds now. China could fill that for them temporarily until their defense industrial base clicks into a higher gear, which is in progress now. It may take them multiple months or the end of the year for their own domestic resumption.

I think also Chinese ISR would help Russia try to close some of the gap with Ukrainians, although the Ukrainians are outclassing them in this regard, either organically or through the support that we are providing them.

Really those two things are immediate. Higher end capabilities—and this is very speculative. There are multiple shared systems between the two militaries. So, it could be air defense missiles. They run on the shared systems.

Russia has been repurposing those for land attack munitions. I think that is probably a very low probability, but I would be looking at artillery. I would be looking at drones.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, hopefully they will decide that it is not in their interest to do that. Can I ask you about the Wagner group and the dynamic between the Wagner group and the Russian army,

and whether there is any reason to think that is going to deteriorate, or have they reached peace and are able to work together?

Ms. MASSICOT. I think it is deteriorating in real time this week. Those two groups have had tensions that date back to Syria, and it bubbles up and then it is resolved. The thing about President Putin is he doesn't like mess.

Right now, this is very messy and uncontrolled. So, I think inevitably he will probably step in and resolve this. Wagner, over time, is becoming less important to the overall war effort. As Russia mobilizes, it has more men. That critical role that they played last summer will decline over time.

Prigozhin is misreading a lot of really important cues right now. He is being told by important and dangerous people to stop with the public criticism and he persists. I think also they are taking a long-term approach to undercut him.

He is not allowed to recruit from the prisons anymore and they are choking back some of his artillery supplies this week near Bakhmut. So, I think that this is deteriorating in real time. I don't think his future is a bright one.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ernst, please.

Senator ERNST. Thank you very much for being here, for our panelists this morning. I had the great opportunity this past weekend to spend time in Poland Saturday and Sunday with our Iowa Army National Guard troops.

So, we do have a couple of units that were mobilized for regularly scheduled deployments. We have the 209th Medical Company, as well as the 1133d Transportation Company. I just want to say to all of our folks back home, their families and loved ones, that I am so very proud of, these hard charging young men and women from Iowa. They are doing an incredible job supporting in Poland. God bless them all.

So, Dr. Stent, I know you had a very powerful message for all of us talking about the message we need to send not only to the world, but to Americans as well, and how we should be speaking to that. Can you just double down on that for me, please, and how we should be talking to the American people about this.

Because as General Kellogg pointed out, it is important that Americans understand, because they do have valid concerns, but they need to understand the gravity of the war in Ukraine. So, what again, is that message and how do we communicate that?

Dr. STENT. Thank you, Senator. You know, we have to explain to the American people, first of all, that in the last century, twice the United States had to intervene in a war in Europe to essentially save Europe and save the world from tyranny and from conquest. So, what is happening between Russia and Ukraine?

Russia, you know, after 77 years after the end of World War II, just broke the system that we had. It violated all of the sort of rules that govern the world after the end of World War II, and by just invading a neighbor, really on a whim, with no provocation, it was saying that it could arbitrarily take over another country. It didn't respect its territorial integrity, its sovereignty.

If Russia is allowed to continue, if Russia were to prevail in this war, this wouldn't be the end of it. It would want to take the whole of Ukraine. It set its sights on other countries. It is already undermining Moldova, for instance.

Really, it has also explicitly said that it believes that Poland is still in its sphere of influence, if you look at the two so-called treaties that were presented to the United States and NATO in December 2021. So, it is a question of—world order, that sounds very abstract, but it is a world in which Russia would like a world where there are no rules. It is a disruptive power.

It could cause instability, on the European continent, certainly for a long time. That has huge economic impacts, and as we have seen, even global impacts in the way that it's prevented the Ukrainians from exporting much of their grain and fertilizers. So, I think the American people have to understand it does affect them.

If Russia isn't stopped, we can't sort of wall ourselves off from this conflict. We need to reestablish rules that people will abide by and respect international law. So, I think that is probably the best way of explaining it.

Senator ERNST. No, I really appreciate it. I don't think Americans want to live in a world that is dominated by Russia and by China. I think it is very important that Ukrainians win this war.

Ms. Massicot, when we talk about equipment and the degradation of Russian capabilities, Ukrainian capabilities, is Ukraine sufficiently equipped to suppress and defeat Russia's air defenses? What are those weapons systems that the United States could maybe provide to effectively counter the Russian air defenses?

Ms. MASSICOT. That is one of the most complicated missions to do. I don't think the Ukrainians would be able to do it comprehensively from the air. Russia's SIM system is really quite multi-layered at this point in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are both denying each other the use of air space right now.

On the ground capabilities that could potentially disable some of these systems, the Ukrainians have been able to target them with precision munitions. So that is a—if they are provided the right type of information, they act on it pretty quickly.

So that is really helping that degradation over time. From an air to ground perspective, I think that would be pretty difficult.

Senator ERNST. So and just in closing, because my time is running out, I do believe in supporting Ukraine. I think it is important that we continue to do this and do it full on. Not the drip, drip, drip we have seen from the Administration.

Really appreciate all of you being here today and sharing your message with all of our folks back home as well. But again, to the folks that love and support the 209th and the 1133d, God bless them. They are doing well. You should be proud of them. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Gillibrand, please.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Stent and Ms. Massicot, public reporting shows that the Chinese Government is considering providing lethal support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. How does a hollowed out Russian army affect China's se-



curity posture, and what opportunities does the PRC Government see in providing lethal support to Russia?

Dr. STENT. I will start with—thank you, Senator. I think we have to understand that the Chinese do not want Russia to lose this war. You know, Xi Jinping and Putin say extravagant things about each other.

They are each other's best friends. When it comes down to the bottom line, from the Chinese point of view, Russia is the other major authoritarian country in the world that shares their grievances against the West, where they—both of them talk about a post-West order. In other words, they need Russia as a partner in trying to change the way that the world works and make it more safe, really, for autocracy.

They may be very surprised and maybe even appalled by the performance of the Russian military, but now that it looks that Russia is really quite bogged down, they do not want Russia to lose this war.

Because their concern is, and it is very hard for us to imagine that, but if somebody were to come after Vladimir Putin, who would rethink what Russia is doing, rethink its ties, its antagonistic ties to the West, rethink its aggressive policies, and rethink its dependance on China, then from the Chinese point of view, that would leave them alone.

Again, hard for us to understand. So, I think that even though until now the Chinese have been fairly restrained in what they have done materially for Russia, even though they support rhetorically everything that is—the Russian narrative, they certainly would not want to see Russia lose.

It remains to be seen whether they are willing to take the risk of supplying, as we hear, possibly artillery and drones.

Ms. MASSICOT. I don't have much to add to that other than, again, from the they may be able to provide a short-term stopgap for the Russians and provide some type of artillery rounds or drones. But I agree with Dr. Stent.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Stent, have the events in the past year led you to revise any conclusions you made in your 1990 book, 1919 book—sorry, 2019 book, *Putin's World*. What are the biggest changes?

Dr. STENT. So last week, an updated version of the book came out with a chapter on the Russia, Ukraine war. So obviously in that book, I certainly understood the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, but I think I, like many people, didn't believe that Putin would undertake a full-scale invasion of Ukraine the way he did.

So, I think what it has led me to rethink is I had always viewed Putin as someone who was a pretty smart tactician and not a huge risk taker. So, in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia, it didn't go to the capital, Tbilisi, and take out President Saakashvili, who of course, President Putin hated. It stopped and just recognized these two areas of Georgia as being independent, and even in 2014, it took over Crimea fairly bloodless and it didn't prosecute, continue prosecuting the war in the Donbass that started the war. I think what has changed is the amount of risk that Putin is willing to take. He was obviously woefully misinformed about the perform-

ance of his own military and about the performance of the Ukrainian military.

I think we see someone who is so hell bent on reestablishing what he thinks is Russia's rightful empire that he is not listening to, I think, the counsel of anyone else. So, I think it is the willingness to take risks and to just dig himself in, and which I think has made me somewhat change my evaluation of him.

Senator GILLIBRAND. With regard to the General Assembly, they voted overwhelmingly last week to condemn Russia's invasion, but there were 32 abstentions. Russia has been aggressively spreading misinformation, not just in Russia and the Homeland, but also in Africa and Latin America regarding the causes of the war.

Who is at fault for grain and fertilizer shortages and similar topics? How can the United States and their allies counter these Russian diplomatic efforts? Both for Dr. Stent and—

Dr. STENT. So, I think we do have to be more active diplomatically. I mean, we already discussed sort of information war, but we do have to be more active.

I mean, Russia, even during this first year of the war, has increased its influence in Africa, partly through the Wagner group, but also partly through diplomacy. We just had Sergei Lavrov in South Africa recently, and you have just had this past week a joint naval exercise between Russia, China, and South Africa.

So, I think we do have to step up our diplomatic efforts really in Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East to try and counter some of what Russia is doing.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator Tuberville, please.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you. Thank very much. Thank you all for being here today. General, thank you for your service. I would like to say that first, I was in Ukraine 6 months before this war started and talked to President Zelenskyy. They knew this was coming. They were putting people on—they were putting troops on the border through Belarus, all through the Don—all over the place, building up.

We didn't do one thing. We said it was going to be a small incursion. That is what President Biden said. We are coming off Afghanistan. We looked—didn't look very smart. What would we do different, General, now, in your eyes?

Now we are doing it, we are waiting. We seemed like we are one step behind in everything we are doing. What should we have done different at the beginning? Because it looks like we are going to be the defender of the free world, we need to learn from our mistakes and we made huge mistakes at the beginning of this.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes, Senator, and thanks for your question. As a former and retired military officer, I am a little bit disappointed in the military and intelligence community that either didn't relay this or didn't believe it as well. We had very senior officers say, one, that Ukraine would fall within 3 days of the invasion and try to get President Zelenskyy right out of town.

That is when he made the comment, I don't need a ride, I need ammunition. You can have a beer with that kind of guy. The fact is we just didn't really believe it and we didn't look at it hard. I would really question our intelligence communities, all of them,

and also the military why their decisionmaking was so poor in foreseeing this. Most of us saw it. We saw the indicators.

I am a big believer in indicators and patterns, and the patterns and indicators were there. So, I think it was a fault somewhere in our systems that we didn't convince ourselves that it was really going to happen.

Part of it may have been a misunderstanding of President Putin himself, and they just didn't believe he would do it. I have actually heard commentators say, up until the day before the invasion, he wouldn't—he was going to do it. Yes, he was, and if you read Putin, and I had a fortune when I was in the National Security Council, I brought Dr. Fiona Hill in on the NSC team. She came out of Brookings, and she is a very well-read person on Putin.

She says when he says something, believe it, he is going to do it. We didn't believe.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes. Thank you, and now we are up to our ears in alligators. Looks like China is getting ready—and just a couple yes, no questions for Dr. Stent and General Kellogg. Let's talk about China's motivation. Do you think that the Chinese weapons are going to further drag out this conflict? Dr. Stent, yes or no.

Dr. STENT. Yes.

Senator TUBERVILLE. General?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. No.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Do you think we need to increase weapons supplies to Ukraine to counter Chinese munitions? Dr. Stent, since you said yes.

Dr. STENT. Yes.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Okay. If we are increasing our support in Ukraine, do you believe that that will slow down shipments to Taiwan in the future, if we continue to send munitions to Ukraine? You don't think it will?

Dr. STENT. No.

Senator TUBERVILLE. All right. Ms. Massicot, at a hearing on February 15th, this Committee heard expert testimony that if the United States were to enter a war with China today, we would have just 2 weeks' worth of munitions, our stockpiles would be out. Do you agree with this assessment?

Ms. MASSICOT. I don't have enough information to make an assessment. I am sorry, sir.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Take a shot at it, General.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I do not agree with that assessment at all.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Okay, thank you. General Kellogg, do you have a clear sense of the overall United States strategy in Ukraine, and what does victory look like for Ukraine?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I do not have an overall view of what the current strategy in Ukraine is. I believe we should have one. I think you have to put, in State, you have to put Russia's army at risk in Ukraine. Putin has to understand he has got two options, lose his army or leave. If his army loses and is defeated, he falls.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Can Ukrainians win it on their own?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. No. I don't—they can win it on their own, if we give them the equipment to do it.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes. Okay. What is the most dangerous course of action for the United States when it comes to this conflict? What puts us in harm's way?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. By doing what we are doing right now, because it is not disciplined. It is also not emphatic.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Okay. There was a poll out, the Russian people believe from a poll in Russia, that they are at war right now with the United States. The Russian people believe this. You think the American people think we are at war with the Russia, General?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. No, I do not, and that is because of the messaging.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes. Dr. Stent?

Dr. STENT. No, I don't think so.

Senator TUBERVILLE. How concerned—General, are you concerned about nuclear conflict—how concerned?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I think it has to be a consideration simply because it is in the Russian philosophy to use. They have got a large amount of what we—and I hate to use the term tactical nuclear weapons, and they believe in using it.

It is something we really don't have. In their philosophy, to use it if it gets pushed, he may use it. I am hoping that there will be smarter people would—he would not use it, but you always have to understand the probability and possibility of it happening.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator Manchin, please.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you all for your service, all of you. I appreciate it very much. First of all, I want to say that I am old enough to remember vividly the Vietnam War and all the conflicts we have had since then.

I believe this is the most just position the United States has ever taken for the right cause, to be involved for the sake of freedom and democracy and what I think we all should be doing.

So, I am very supportive and very appreciative of our efforts and all of them, but also we can do much better. I always think that too. I would ask the question to—any of you all can answer on these.

Do you think—do the Ukrainians have the ability to produce weapons themselves? Are they manufacturing? Do you all know if there is any manufacturing in Ukraine right now? Mr. Massicot.

Ms. MASSICOT. Thank you, Senator. The Russians from the beginning of the war systematically attacked Ukraine's defense industrial base. So, a lot of those factories are—

Senator MANCHIN. Since 2014?

Ms. MASSICOT. What they could range back then, but especially since 2022. I mean, that is part of their strategy that they actually did implement. They went after those factories. So, either the workers are immobilized or they are fighting, or the facilities are damaged. So, no, at this point—

Senator MANCHIN. They are not producing anything. They are depending totally, and there is a reason for that is what you are saying.

Ms. MASSICOT. It is. There is a structural reason for that, yes.

Senator MANCHIN. In Crimea right now, you know, I saw this morning there was a report in television that showing that most Crimeans are Russian, believe that they are part of Russia, and want to remain part of Russia. But I understand that Zelenskyy and Ukrainians want that to be part of their country because it is. So where do we go with that? How do you—and Miss, Dr. Stent, maybe you can talk to this or any of you all can answer it? Is it possible that Crimea would come back and be part of Ukraine, or would it remain separate?

Dr. STENT. President Zelenskyy has said that it is. One, we do know what Ukraine's at least official war aims are, and it is their aim to take back Crimea, which of course, the Russians illegally annexed in 2014.

There are some people who believe that if the Ukrainians tried to take back Crimea, if we come back to the question of escalation now, that that would be a "red line" for Putin and that might lead to a real military escalation.

I think it is unlikely in this present phase of the war that the Ukrainians would be able to take back Crimea. Maybe they will in the longer term, depending on what happens in Russia, what happens, how—

Senator MANCHIN. I know the bridge has been repaired. I saw the bridge is back in operation.

Dr. STENT. Yes, the bridge is back in operation. I don't know what you think there are but—

Senator MANCHIN. Anybody else on that?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, you know, Zelenskyy made the comment the war began in Crimea in 2014 and it will end in Crimea. I think he has to take that into consideration. I do think the Ukrainians with support can, in fact, penetrate toward Kherson, toward Crimea, and put it—but that would be something for negotiations somewhere along the line. Wars end by negotiations and that would just part of it.

Senator MANCHIN. My only concern is basically it seemed like the Crimean people there are sympathetic and feel more connected to Russia than they do Crimea, from what we are hearing in type of reports.

Without the citizen support, like they have the rest of Ukraine, it would be quite difficult, I would think. And the biggest thing I am concerned about is accountability. I think our support is unwavering. It is bipartisan, Democrat, Republican, overwhelmingly supporting the United States effort and supporting Ukraine.

I am concerned about accountability. Are we basically good, from Inspector General, good counting on the equipment we are sending, the money that we are sending, vice versa. Because if you look at what happened in Afghanistan, that whole country, I mean, just was rigged with corruption.

I think it shows how quickly it fell as soon as we left. I also believe that we left the wrong way, and I think that gave Putin much more stimulus to do what he has done. Do you have any comments on that, General?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I think we are getting better, Senator, on accountability. We are not there yet. When we were in

Ukraine recently, they are not—they do not object to accountability.

I would provide a special inspector general or something like that to provide on the team to ensure accountability to the American people and make sure that their money is being well spent out there. But are there problems? Of course, there are. But they are getting better at it and they are trying to fix it.

Senator MANCHIN. General, the last move, and I think has Zelenskyy has just removed one of his top officers, a top military person, and replaced him. What do you—what do you read into that, any of you?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. He has not only replaced with military officers, he has also replaced several other person people in his office because of corruption concerns out there. On the other side, remember, the Russians are on their fifth general and that is running this—

Senator MANCHIN. I know that, but I am saying, do you think it is a smart move? Dr. Stent, do you have any comments on that?

Dr. STENT. I think President Zelenskyy understands that if the European Union is really ever to accept Ukraine, it has to do a much better job of dealing with corruption. So, I think some of the sackings that we have seen in the past few weeks, both of military personnel, but then other personnel, it is all connected to that. Hopefully he will make progress with it.

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. Thank you all.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Mullin, please.

Senator MULLIN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, panel, for being here. I have got a couple comments and some questions, too. Last week, I was on a trip to the Middle East, meeting with the leaders over there.

General, you are absolutely right, Afghanistan is, the withdrawal was a very strong, negative black eye to the United States. It has made us extremely weak. In our allies, those that believed that we would be there are questioning if we would actually be there, if we were willing to walk away from something we had so much investment in and literally turn the country over to terrorists.

The irony of that, though, is President Trump, obviously, when he was in office, he put in the Abraham Accord, and Abraham Accord was designed to help strengthen the economy in that region, but it has actually strengthened the allies in that region, too, by doing business together with Israel.

The views that some of these world leaders have had with Israel has been broken and they have realized that they have a common foe, and it has strengthened themselves. What has started out as an opportunity for businesses, has actually helped fill the void that the United States have left behind. With that being said, it has definitely led to Putin's aggression because of our view.

At the same time, the American people are questioning why we are even in Ukraine and what we are doing there. I feel very strongly that we need to be there, but I don't feel as though we should be taking the lead. I feel like it is what our NATO allies are for. That is what we have alliances for.

I feel like that we need to be working with them, not necessarily leading. But it is obvious, too, with Germany, for instance, wavering back and forth on should they send weapons or shouldn't they send weapons, when the United States decided that we were going to send Abrams tanks.

No telling when that is actually going to happen, though. You had Germany that finally agreed to start sending in weapons. General, is—what is your view of our leadership and the lack of leadership? How is this affecting what is happening in the neighbors of Ukraine and their activity going on in assisting Ukraine?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I am concerned about the decisiveness of support for Ukraine. I mean, this is a fight, it is an existential fight for Ukraine, and we need to support it.

If we don't support this fight, we are going to be—and the third time, we are going to be fighting in Europe. We are not sending United States troops right now, and I don't think we should. No Ukrainians thought we should either. Every Ukrainian commander and every civilian and military leader, they do not want American troops on the ground. They want the equipment.

They are able to fight it. But if this thing goes badly for the Ukrainians and it starts to fade toward NATO, then we may get involved in a fight that I would prefer we not do because we have done this twice before to save Europe.

Senator MULLIN. Should NATO shut down the airspace?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. The airspace in—

Senator MULLIN. Over Ukraine.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, the Russians have a lot of air dominance over Ukraine right now. The fact is, Ukrainians are still fighting with their fighters. They do not—they have not established air dominance at all. What you are seeing is the missiles coming in, but they are not able to fly the aircraft over Ukraine.

Senator MULLIN. Would it help if we were able to shut down, if NATO were to just simply shut down the airspace over Ukraine?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. You know, Senator, I think it is—I don't think the airspace would concern me very much right now because it is really contested and the Ukrainians are doing a fine job. I think there is other things we should do.

The other thing that we should do is we should give them the ability to actually penetrate Russian space themselves and attack targets into Russia, because that is where the supply lines are located.

The Russians are using their borders as a sanctuary. So, it is not so much airspace. I go back to ground space. It may be able to put the Russians at risk. We haven't put ? we, meaning the Ukrainians, have not been able to put the Russians at risk, as they should be able to do.

Senator MULLIN. Does Putin have the ability himself to launch nuclear weapons or does it go through a process? I know it used to go through a process. Is that—is that faded now? Is the lines blurred?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, they do have a process. I don't want to get into there because then I will fall back on what I did at the National Security Council. But they have a process. I am

just hoping that if we ever get to a position like that, wiser heads would prevail.

Senator MULLIN. Well, I am familiar with the process. Before I was in the Senate, I was on the House Intel, and we were very aware of it, but I was concerned that it may be blurred now. One last comment I will make and I will make it brief.

The IC community, at least the ones in the field, and I am not trying to defend the IC community here in Washington, DC. I think they are riddled with problems, but they did call it right. They were advising us that this was eminent, that they were going, and they were very precise on even the timeframe of when it was going to happen.

Unfortunately, when we were meeting with the decisionmakers, they weren't very positive on Ukraine's resolve and that is where we misled it or misread it. We should understand that Ukraine was going to fight.

I will admit I even got that wrong. Now that they are fighting, we should do everything we can to support them and with our allies. So, thank you guys, everybody, for your comments, and thanks for talking honestly and in agreeance with one voice. It is refreshing. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Kaine, please.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will pick up where Senator Mullin left off. I think while you come at this from different perspectives and have some differences in your testimonies, I am picking up a common punchline, which is we are doing a lot, but we need to do more and we need to do it quicker.

We have to calculate and calibrate, but we should do more and do it quicker. Our allies, they are doing a lot, but they should do a lot more and invest a lot more because they have more at stake here. General Kellogg, you talked about this war in their backyard, and I think that that is true.

So I think that that is coming through loud and clear. I do want to just comment on one thing. General Kellogg, in your testimony, you said this, simply saying that one will support Ukraine for as long as it takes is a bumper sticker, not a strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages, no rounds of sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are substitutes for American leadership.

Let me just offer my thoughts on that. The sanctions packages that the United States have engineered, they ain't a bumper sticker—they ain't a bumper sticker. They are an example of great American diplomacy.

The billions of dollars of aid that this Congress has appropriated for military purposes in Ukraine with the President's request, that ain't a bumper sticker. That is American leadership. One Estonia that did it. One Liechtenstein that did it. The billions and billions of aid for humanitarian purposes that we have allocated. Not a bumper sticker. That is American leadership.

100,000 Ukrainian refugees in the United States in the 5-months after the invasion. Don't look at the Armed Services Committee and tell me that that is a bumper sticker. That is American leadership. Engineering a State of affairs where Finland and Sweden, whose popular approval for accession to NATO would have been



about 25 percent a couple of years ago, are now on the verge of joining NATO and dramatically increasing both the NATO and Western defense capacity.

Don't tell me that is a bumper sticker. That is American leadership. Engineering overwhelming votes in the General Assembly and the National Security Council to call out Putin's illegal war effort.

Admittedly, they are nations that abstain, there are nations that stand with Russians that are acknowledging the facts. That ain't a bumper sticker, that is American leadership. I don't see any reason why anybody should be Debbie Downer about American leadership that has assembled a global coalition to stand for Ukraine.

We are not trashing Zelenskyy any more, we are standing up with him. We are not undermining Ukraine anymore, we are standing up for Ukraine. If you wonder about American leadership, talk to President Zelenskyy, because we all do. We talk to him in person. I have colleagues who visit him in Ukraine. He came and addressed us right before Christmas. I had no reason to believe he was lying to us when he thanked us for American leadership.

The global effort to stand for Ukraine against an illegal invasion by a dictator, that is not only necessary in all of our view to stand up against Putin but also to send a message to dictators around the globe, would not have happened without American leadership, by this Committee, by the Appropriations Committee, by the Intel Committee, by the Foreign Relations Committee, by the Administration.

Could we do more, could we do it quicker, could we look in the rearview mirror and say things might have been done—? Of course. Should we exercise oversight on the investments that we make in Congress? Should we be able to answer questions the American public asked us about the stakes or about the dollars we are investing?

Of course we should. Those are all really important questions and they are very fair. But to suggest that the coordinated effort of the Article 1 and 2 branches in outreach around the world to assemble a global coalition to support Ukraine is a bumper sticker rather than American leadership, I don't get it. I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Fischer, please.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our panelists that are here today. I would like to begin by asking you to share your assessments on the current status of war in Ukraine.

So, and hopefully I am going to be like Senator Tuberville and we will do yes or no unless you feel a driving desire that you have to explain further. We will start with you, doctor. How would you assess the current State of the Russian military in Ukraine?

Dr. STENT. Well, they are struggling to perform better. On the other hand, they do have, you know, a few hundred thousand more people that they can throw into this war. They have learned a little bit from their mistakes, but still they are struggling.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Ms. Massicot.

Ms. MASSICOT. I don't think they have culminated in the Clausewitzian sense, but their combat effectiveness is definitely de-

graded. They are trying to find a solution. I think that they are trying to use brute force tactics to close on the Ukrainians as quickly as possible at a very high cost.

I don't think they are capable of large incursions anymore, not for several years until they can properly regenerate armored force and rebuild their missile stocks. That being said, I do anticipate incremental gains in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Potentially a little bit more in Zaporizhzhia. I don't have a timeline on that, but probably toward the summer. That is what their intentions are.

Senator FISCHER. When you talk about the Russians using brute force, brutal tactics, will the Ukrainians suffer through that and remain strong?

Ms. MASSICOT. Their will to fight is very strong, but this is taking a toll on them. That is not only a high casualty situation for them as well, there is also a lot of psychological distress because, again, we are talking about mowing down human waves every day.

Also, they have specific needs that are emerging from this type of fighting. We are talking about ammunition, small arms, 50 caliber mortars, artillery shells to counter this. So, I know we talk a lot about ATACMS and F-16s, but I would just like to point out that they have immediate small arms needs, to include morphine.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, and General?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, thank you. I think you are heading to our war of attrition like we are seeing around Bakhmut right now. The longer this war goes, it accrues to Russia's favor. That is why it must be terminated as quickly as it can while Ukraine still has the advantage. Russia will have the advantage.

Russia is learning right now, as we are seeing around Bakhmut, where they are changing how they fight, the tactics they are using by sheer mass and heavy use of artillery. They are going back to the way the Russians used to fight before.

Senator FISCHER. General, how important is it that the United States and our allies continue to be supportive to Ukraine for their psychological reasons and to show the Russians that we will be supportive to the Ukrainians? How does that play into your previous analysis that you just stated?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Well, I think the Ukrainians can do more. If you look what the Kiel Institute just said, and that is out of Kiel, Germany, the European Union only committed 6 percent of their total stores of military stock, where the British have committed 25 percent of their total stock, and we are committing a lot of our stock as well.

So, I think when it comes down, and referring back to what Senator Kaine said a minute ago, is there isn't a question about Presidential leadership, not with what this Congress has done, which has been enormous.

Where you lead is from the top and where those decisions are made are from the top. The issue is getting the other allies to contribute more. They are not contributing what they can contribute to this fight.

Senator FISCHER. Mr. Massicot, how would you analyze that? What—how important is it for Congress, for our Administration, to

be vocal about our support and our continued support, and also for our allies for NATO to step up? How does that play not just on the Ukrainians, but on the Russians as well?

Ms. MASSICOT. So, I was in the Pentagon in 2014, the first time Russia invaded, and I could say that the response from this government is fundamentally very different. Our intel collection prior to the war was very different.

Our response is very different. I do think the Russians are deterred from the upper end of their escalation. I think they remain absolutely terrified of our air power. They don't engage us in cyber-attacks.

Senator FISCHER. Are we too slow in getting to Ukraine what they need?

Ms. MASSICOT. I don't have all the information, but it is my assumption that the logistics to get these weapons dug out of every corner from different parts of the globe is complicated logistically.

I don't—from what I understand from the outside, I don't think it is a deliberate metering of things not to give it to them. I think there is a lot that is complicated in getting it to them. I don't know how to improve the logistics.

Senator FISCHER. But to show our resolve and getting it there is important?

Ms. MASSICOT. I do.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Thank you. Dr. Stent, how would you respond?

Dr. STENT. I would—you know, it seems to me that we have been doing this incrementally, and we, first of all say, we are not going to send this—

Senator FISCHER. Then we do.

Dr. STENT.—and then we do send it. So, in the end, we do the right thing. But probably some of these things could have been sent more quickly. I think obviously, what we are all awaiting now is what the outcome of this question about whether we are going to supply them with fighter jets, the F-16s will be.

Senator FISCHER. Air power earlier would have prevented some of the devastation we see on their infrastructure within their own country, and made them more reliant on the United States and our allies, wouldn't you say?

Dr. STENT. Yes, I think so.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator King, please. Excuse me, Senator Kelly. I am sorry.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator King. General Kellogg, and for everybody here today, thank you for testifying. I want to followup a little bit on Senator Fischer's questions about the aid we have given to Ukraine.

As you know, the United States in this close partnership with Ukraine, we have provided, I think the number to date is \$29.8 billion in security assistance since this brutal attack occurred around a year ago.

Equipment from the United States has included everything from ammunition, grenades, bombs, MVDs, HIMARS, 155-millimeter artillery pieces, counter fire, fire radars, much of what is in our in-

ventory. Not everything but much. I also want to commend our allies for their support.

Nearly 50 countries providing \$13 billion in security assistance, most recently agreeing to provide tanks. This is going to be critical for Ukraine with the approach that they are going to need to take this spring. So, General Kellogg, can you provide your assessment on the effectiveness of both U.S. and partner military equipment.

If you see any gaps, if there is something you think is not working well and something that we should address, a gap in capability, I would like to hear that. Then from a combat assessment, what has provided the greatest return on investment for the Ukrainians?

What do you think the most important thing for us to continue to supply, if you have a sense for—you know, what I heard when I was in Munich a couple of weeks ago was that they need 155-millimeter artillery shells, that that supply is going down.

They also made some other requests, some of which we are going to deal with here in the United States Senate. But if you could share your assessment, I would appreciate that.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Thank you, Senator. Senator, what you really need is all the equipment you just mentioned, but more. We developed a package during the cold war called a salt breaker.

The salt breaker where the Abrams tanks, the Bradley fighting vehicle, a pallet 155 self-propelled Howitzer, the Apache fighting system, all of those systems together allowed us to fight in the combined arms fashion. The combined arms fashion assault will break the Russians' back.

The Russians are not capable of handling that. But we haven't given them the full suite. We haven't given the Ukrainians ATACMS. That is the long-range missile that fits into the pod of either HIMARS or MRS systems out there. It gives you extended range of 200 miles. It is GPS guided. It can attack their supply lines deep.

We only give them 31 tanks. 31 tanks is a battalion, you need much more than that. Give them brigades levels so they can actually fight combined arms, and then maybe we have to do separately, you give the Europeans with the Challenger tanks from Britain, maybe they have one unit——

Senator KELLY. My sense is in discussing with, you know, our highest military leadership including, you know, folks on the Joint Chiefs, that they are capable of using combined arms to fight. I think what you might be alluding to is they need to do it on a bigger scale. Certainly there are gaps.

I mean, they are not using, you know, nor do they have Apache helicopters. That would be an entire another issue. But being able to combine ground troops with, artillery, with long range fires is something I think they have done rather effectively. Maybe not at the scale that you think.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Not at the scale that is needed to win.

Senator KELLY. So give me a sense of what you feel the greatest return on our investment has been from the standpoint of equipment that we have provided them.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I would believe the best system that we have given them has been the HIMAR system. That is the one that has given deep fires, and the fires have been able to compensate and overcompensate for the Russian fires. So if you have to pick, artillery generally, even I am an old infantryman, artillery will win your fights, and we need to have as much artillery to dominate that.

Plus one other system that is not really a military hardware system in the sense it is kinetic, but we need to give them more advanced intelligence systems that is able to use jammers, because they are using, Russians are using jammers to great effect right now, especially against the drones the Ukrainians have had. That is something we haven't really done. We probably should do more.

Senator KELLY. I appreciate that. Just, if I could just take another 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. The HIMARS, they view as—it was a game changer for them. I agree, that is, a good example of a weapons system that has been very effective, and really, changed the momentum in this fight. Beyond that, what would be the next thing you think would be a game changer for them?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Well, again, sir, what I just talked about, it is not a kinetic system, but the ability to do anti-jamming in the intelligence type of collection and electronic warfare. The Russians do that very, very well.

That is causing problems with the drones of the Ukrainians as well. It is also be able to target the Ukrainians much deeper. It is something that is really not thought about because it may not be sexy, but the fact is those are the kind of systems they need to support. It allows better targeting, longer range targeting, and with greater effects on the battlefield.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, General.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Cotton, please.

Senator COTTON. I want to thank all of the witnesses for their very informative testimony. General Kellogg, I especially appreciate your testimony. It is clear eyed and hard-nosed, as you would expect from a seasoned statesman and military man like yourself who spent a lot of time on the battlefield and less time the halls of the Pentagon, so thank you.

I think there are some important lessons for the Administration and Democrats to learn, and also Republicans to learn. I just want to revisit a few points of your testimony and make sure I have it correct.

It sounds like one key point you are making is it is possible to support Ukraine without supporting President Biden's Ukraine policy, is that correct?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Correct.

Senator COTTON. If I could synthesize the critique, I have heard about President Biden's Ukraine policy maybe down to a few points.

First, in 2021, he did what Winston Churchill cautioned that we should never do with dictatorships but especially Russia, gave them temptations to a trial of strength by giving away the START and the New START treaty, and NordStream 2, turning the cheek

on the Colonial Pipeline hack, inviting him to a big summit in Europe.

Is that one part of the—one part of your take is that President Biden tempted Vladimir Putin to achieve what he has always wanted to achieve, which is subjugating Ukraine to a new Russian empire?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes, Senator—Senator, I am a big believer in patterns. We all have patterns. We go to the shore the same way, by the same service station, and so do leaders. Putin saw it in the leadership of President Biden, a pattern, and he was able to exploit it.

Senator COTTON. Second, over the year of the war, it sounds to me like your critique is that the President Biden, the Administration has been pussyfooting around their support for Ukraine, constantly providing them just enough to avoid a catastrophic defeat, not enough to win. It is, as you say, a pattern we have seen from the very beginning. We will give them ammunition, but not artillery.

We will give them artillery, but not HIMARS. We will give them HIMARS and not armor. We will give them Bradleys, but not Abrams. We will give them Abrams but not cluster munitions and F-16, which is where we are now.

Therefore, these dragged out the war longer than we should have if we had just provided Ukraine with what it needed to defend its territory from the very beginning. Am I right about that?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. You are correct, Senator. Senator, and you will appreciate this, this is like doing a river crossing. Once from the near bank to the far bank, you don't get to the middle on a river crossing and you said it was not a good idea. Once you commit, you go.

Senator COTTON. To a point you were making earlier and Senator Kaine discussed with you, is that President Biden keeps talking about supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes, which is a substitute for helping Ukraine win as quick as it can, is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I believe so, because if this goes to a long range fight, it is an endless war and they cannot win a war of attrition.

Senator COTTON. So from the beginning, it shouldn't have been about supporting Ukraine as long as it takes. It should be helping them win as quick as they can. For the record, Senator Kaine talked a lot about seeing through the rearview mirror. I think you were making these very points a year ago, weren't you, when you were looking through the windshield, not the rearview mirror.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Correct, sir.

Senator COTTON. I think a lot of us were. Then the third take, after the first one, that President Biden tempted Vladimir Putin to go for the jugular and then he spent a year pussyfooting around in support for Ukraine, is that he has also allowed Europe to get away with not doing enough, especially on financial support and in particular Germany, France, and the European Union. Is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I believe Europe has been very laggard.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Now, I also hear you making a few other points as well that I want to pursue. Sometimes we hear a criticism of President Biden that he seems to care more about Ukraine's border than America's borders.

I think that is fair criticism of President Biden. But it sounds like you believe, and that it is the case, that you can care about America's borders and protect our borders, while also help other countries protect their borders too, is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. That is correct, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Recently since the terrible train wreck in East Palestine, Ohio, and President Biden's trip to Kyiv last week, I have heard some say that the President will go to Kyiv, but he won't go to East Palestine.

I agree that is a fair criticism of President Biden. It sounds to me like you think it is possible to both go to East Palestine and support the people there who have been harmed by this train wreck, but also travel to Kyiv and show our support for the Ukrainian people and their fight against this war of aggression from Russia. Is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. My experience that Air Force One can go anywhere it wants to go.

Senator COTTON. Thank you for that. Now, on negotiations, we also hear a lot of criticism that we are not doing enough to have a negotiated end to this conflict, that we need to get negotiations underway. I think you are—one of your key points in terms of supporting Ukraine now, backing them to the hilt as quick as we can, not for as long as it takes, is that the only way to get a negotiated settlement is to convince Vladimir Putin he has more to lose in the battlefield than he does at the negotiating table, Is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. That is correct, Senator. What you need to push pressure on him, if he loses his army, he loses, and that is what you put him at risk of.

Senator COTTON. So this idea that, well, if we stop supporting Ukraine or if we gradually draw down our support for Ukraine, then we will magically have a negotiated settlement that protects America's interests.

What you are saying is that, no, what we would do is further embolden Vladimir Putin, exactly what Joe Biden did in 2021 to try to achieve maximalist gains first in Ukraine and then down the road against NATO partners. Is that right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. That is correct. It is fool's gold if you think you can reduce aid.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Thank you, General.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Blumenthal, please.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you all for your testimony, which has been very helpful and instructive. General Kellogg, particularly to you, thank you for your service. I have visited Ukraine three times over roughly the last year, the last two of them with Senator Graham taking the overnight train into Kyiv.

I respect particularly, General, your visit to Ukraine and the lessons that you have learned. One of the lessons that come to me over this past year is that the world, and particularly the United States, has consistently underestimated the Ukrainians.

I came back from my first trip before the invasion telling anyone who would listen, including the President, that the Ukrainians are going to fight to the last person, with pitchforks if necessary. That is what President Zelenskyy told me, and he wasn't leaving that country.

So I have strong confidence in Ukrainians, which has been bolstered by my visit just 10 days ago to the United States Army base in Bavaria, where American soldiers are training Ukrainians in the use of those Bradley armored vehicles. To quote one of them, they are quick studies, as you would expect, when you are defending your homeland, your children, your family, as we would be.

Americans, in fact, the American soldiers training them said to me, they fight just like we do. So I have come back from each of these visits urging more military aid, more Stingers and Javelins, more of the air defense. Senator Graham and I came back last July urging that we provide the Patriot system, which we did after some hesitation and caution. In fact, delay.

I am urging that we provide the F-16s, the air support that are necessary. The aircraft that they say are necessary for them to break through the air defenses that the Russians have established. Would you agree with me, General, that we should provide the F-16 and begin training those pilots immediately?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, I would provide them everything we could possibly provide them to win this fight because it prevents American troops being deployed later if they can defeat the Russian military.

If it takes the F-16, because it does have better avionics than the MiG-29 does, and you could upload the ARM 88 missiles, as an example, the answer is I would provide everything I can.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What I have heard repeatedly, and not just from the Administration, from some on both sides of the aisle here, that providing these weapons systems is too complicated, too costly, too difficult in terms of training.

What I saw, and what I have heard from our American military, is that the training obstacles can be overcome and the costs of failing to provide these weapon systems now will be greater later.

We will pay more in terms of cost if we have to commit troops after one of our NATO allies is involved or attacked than we would now, because right now President Zelenskyy doesn't want and doesn't need American troops on the ground. He wants the weapons systems that he needs to win the war. Would you agree?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I totally agree, Senator. My experience with the Ukrainians and those that fought with the Ukrainians, they are very capable. They are very smart. It is a very educated population. They are fighting for the life of their country, and they will devote everything they can to do it. Yes, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. There is a hitch here. It is the challenge that I regard as really paramount right now here in the United States, which is our defense industrial base. ATACMS, I fully support providing ATACMS, but what I have been told is that we don't have enough right now. That we need to produce more.

The same with some of the ammunition that has been mentioned. We need to produce more of it. We need a trained workforce that will provide the skills and the person power that is needed.



Would you agree that we need to focus on the production of these weapon systems, not just talk about what is needed on the battlefield?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, absolutely. The defense industry is working on a peacetime schedule. We either get them to a wartime footing to actually ramp up the equipment that they are providing, which is actually backfilling the American military, which is more modern equipment.

The Stinger line, we shut down for years. We need to bring those lines back on to make sure it is—and actually put the entire defense industry on a wartime footing. Not only get the munitions that are needed to defeat the Russians, the Ukrainians defeating the Russians, but also to bring our stocks back up to good levels.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I hope we can have bipartisan agreement on that last point that you made, General, because I think it is the key to meeting those needs on the Ukrainian battlefield and being prepared to send a message to China, continued message about our resolve. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Scott, please.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, each of you, for being here. Thank you for your testimony and thank you for answering all these questions. General Kellogg, we have seen the atrocities.

We know Russia has a despicable government. We, our heart goes out to the Ukrainians for all their losses. It is—I mean, when you see that Putin is sitting there wanting to kill women and children, it is just despicable.

If you were thinking about it, and just from the standpoint of American security, how important is this to American security that we make sure that the Ukrainians win and Russia loses? If the opposite happened, how adverse would that be on our own personal and our own security, which is our primary role up here in Congress to provide for the security of Americans?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I believe if you can defeat a strategic adversary and not use any United States troops, you are at the acme of professionalism, because letting the Ukrainians defeat that, it takes a strategic adversary off the table and then we can focus what we should be focusing against our primary adversary, which is China at this time.

The concern I have got is I don't think we need to put American troops there. If we fail in this, we may have to fight another European war, which would be the third time. I don't think we should do that or need to do that as well.

Senator SCOTT. General, why—I mean, I think we have to worry about—I think, we need to make sure Russia loses, in my opinion. We need to make sure the Ukrainians win. Why haven't—why hasn't Germany stepped up?

I mean, this is not—you know, I don't know how close how many miles it is from the Ukrainian border to Germany, but why hasn't Germany stepped up and done its part on lethal aid. I mean, it seems to me that they should be, have a bigger concern than we do.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I believe Germany is a non-player in Europe right now. I think you look more toward the Poles as being the major player.

While it is a very obviously important country, I think they are feckless. They just haven't supported it. They should support—they should be all in this fight because it is—they have seen the experience of us coming over in 2 years and actually defeating Germany in two wars.

They just, the leadership they have gotten has not displayed the leadership you would expect from a wartime leader.

Senator SCOTT. You think that—I mean, a lot of people believe that we can negotiate a settlement with Putin. Is there any type of settlement you believe that Putin, one, would be interested in doing, and then two, that would be worth anything if he agreed to?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, I believe at the end, I believe the two experts to my right would say this, the only thing that Putin understands is power and strength. You have to basically put your knee on his throat, and how you do that is defeat the only thing that really counts for Putin, and that is the Russian army in Ukraine. Defeat that army and I believe Putin falls.

Senator SCOTT. Is there any—you know, a lot of what we hear is that we have spent a lot of money. Germany is not, they have not done the lethal aid. They have done other types of aid.

How can we quantify to the American public the importance of this? Because, some people, like in my State they ask me why we spend over \$100—or committed, not spent, but committed \$100 billion.

Is there a way that we can make sure the Biden Administration does what I think most, a lot of us believe in is we need to go all in now rather than piecemeal.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, I believe it is fight there rather than here. It is better that we have to fight an adversary overseas, not use U.S. troops to do so. Ukrainians don't want United States troops. Everyone I have talked to said we can fight this fight as long as we get the kit to do it.

I think if we don't—we need to tell the American people, you can basically walk and chew bubble gum at the same time. We should be addressing all of those issues that we have both here in the United States and overseas, and I think that balance can be displayed.

I think that needs to be done, which I believe, through Presidential leadership. I think the President should pick up the phone and be asked to and call President Putin. Even right now, when he sees Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, they will not pick up the phone and talk to him, nor will the Chinese. I think that is a huge mistake.

Senator SCOTT. So what is the takeaway for Xi right now with regard to how the Biden Administration has acted and how when you look at, you know, part of the American public questions what we are doing there. What is Xi's takeaway?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Well, the huge takeaway is that we are in a drift and we are not displaying Presidential leadership. What I mean by Presidential leadership is being very, very definitive on what is it going to take to win this fight.

We are taking a backseat to letting Ukraine drive this decision. This decision of the free world decision of how we fight and how we win on the battlefield, and I believe Presidential leadership does count, decisive leadership does count.

Putin needs to understand that decisive leadership, and that he is actually fighting us and the free world in this endeavor.

Senator SCOTT. Thank each of you. Thank you, Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you. I think General Kellogg, the Germans would be surprised to be called feckless. They have made about 180 degree turn in their orientation toward conflict in arms and armament. I think clearly the United States has been the major donor, if you will, both in terms of military and humanitarian aid, in terms of dollars.

I think, I was in Munich last week, I think in terms of percentage of GDP, we are like 12th behind a lot of other countries, particularly Poland, which has stepped up in an enormously consequential way. Both regard refugees, acting as a conduit for weapons.

So I don't—I just don't think it—I just don't think it is accurate to say that the rest of the world and Europe is not stepping up. Because as a percentage of their economy, they are actually countries that are doing more than we are.

I do have a specific question about, and I think, General Kellogg, you will agree with me on this one. That is, we go through these long debates about whether to send tanks, whether to send jet fighters.

Then if we decide, yes, as we have learned with the tanks, there is this long lag time, three or 4 months. That mostly involves training. It seems to me that one way to shorten that is to say, well, we haven't decided yet about jet aircraft or tanks, but let's do the training now. Does that make sense?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, it really does. Train now with any system they have got and prepare for the future. I think it is there. Sir, I spent 5 years in Germany. The Germany, I remember when I was there, and spent 5 years in there, is not the Germany I see today, both in leadership and their military capacity and capability.

So I understand it is a harsh statement, but I stand by the statement as well, but you are absolutely right, if we can train them on all the systems that we may provide them, they are very smart, they are very quick learned, and I think it would help out.

Senator KING. Professor Stent, a question about, one of the things that is puzzling to me, I remember when this started a year ago, all the talk was the sanctions are going to cripple Russia. They are going to be just out of business and riots in the street. Absolutely hasn't worked.

Talk to me about why. Were the sanctions—were they the wrong sanctions? Were they not applied well? Did we underestimate the Russian capacity to circumvent them. Why have the sanctions regime not played a bigger part in this conflict?

Dr. STENT. So I think we always tend to think the first reaction to something like the Russian invasion is to impose sanctions. I

think we forget how resilient that Russian economy is despite the sanctions.

The IMF said that Russia's economy was going to contract by 8 percent last year. It contracted by 2 percent. They have been able to do this because they have had a smart policy of stabilizing the ruble, and because they have earned, you know, windfall profits last year from their oil and gas sales. They have managed to keep the war machine going despite sanctions.

That is changing now. We have the oil price cap. They probably won't make those windfall profits anymore. But still, India has now become the largest purchaser of Russian oil, other countries, China. So they do still sell the hydrocarbons, even though the Europeans have now weaned themselves off the Russian imports.

Senator KING. But don't you think we underestimate other countries, particularly a country like Russia, their ability to absorb pain?

Dr. STENT. Yes, I think we do, and I think—

Senator KING. They go back—he is invoking Stalingrad, and also sanctions against a dictatorial regime, the problem is the dictator will always have his Mercedes and caviar. So the sanctions don't have directly effect, and it is a country that doesn't have much in the way of political opposition, then I am not sure where the sanctions go. Are there additional sanctions we should be applying now?

Dr. STENT. I mean, there is still some Russian banks we could sanction. We have sanctioned many of them. I think we also misunderstand the relationship between Putin and the oligarchs.

I mean, and the people who lost their bank accounts and their yachts and everything else. They are not going to get together and say, we have to rid ourselves of this leader. That is not how the system works.

Senator KING. That hasn't worked.

Dr. STENT. Right. I think the only other thing I would say is that I think the export control sanctions will be—will bite more this year, particularly the lack of access to semiconductors and components for manufacturing.

So the Russians already started closing down some assembly lines with automobiles and things like that, and that will then hit the general population. But so far—

Senator KING. That is where I want to followup. Ms. Massicot, what is the status of the Russian defense industrial base? How are they—are they going to be able to keep producing ammunition and weapons?

Ms. MASSICOT. Well, we found since the beginning of the last year of war that Putin has delayed decisions that he thinks are risky and well beyond when he should have done. Russia has not activated its full wartime authorities to command that defense industrial base to really go 24/7.

There are some sectors of it that are. My understanding is that some of their longer range precision munitions, they are working triple shifts to try to get those missile stocks back up. My understanding is that artillery shells, it is pretty simple for them to construct it if they have the access to the raw materials, which they do.

There is a bit of a delay right now. I think they will probably overcome it by the fall, maybe the late winter. So in the interim, I am not sure what they are going to do. I know they are trying to get it from North Korea. They are trying to get it from China.

Senator KING. The big question, and I know it has been covered. I was in another hearing downstairs, but the big question is, will China bail them out? Is there a yes or no answer to that? What do we think? What do we think China is going to do? Are they going to—so far, they have been content to stand on the sidelines and hold Russia's coat. Are they going to actually step in and start supplying weapons?

Ms. MASSICOT. I think there probably is an answer for a China expert. I am not that person, but I would say that if they did intervene right now, it would fill a critical gap for the Russians for the next several months. I am not sure.

Senator KING. I raise the question, what our response is to that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you. Senator King. Senator Schmitt, please.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a couple of questions, but let me—so let me try to give voice to what I think a lot of folks out there who are not sitting in these chairs feel about where we are at with regard to this policy. They have seen an Administration's disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Hundreds or tens of billions of dollars' worth of equipment left behind, critical intelligence. They are told about respecting the sovereignty of other countries' borders but do nothing about the millions of people streaming across our Southern border and the fentanyl that is killing 300 people a day in every single one of our communities.

The violence, the humanitarian crisis. Human beings being trafficked by drug cartels. They see a President go to Ukraine before he goes to Ohio where there is a toxic chemical spill. A lot of people who feel forgotten in all of this are frustrated.

I suppose my first question, I guess, to all of you, briefly because I have limited time, is \$113 billion. Now we can talk about percentage of GDP, but for most folks out there, that is a lot of money. One billion dollars is a lot of money. One hundred thirteen billion dollars is a lot of money when you have a porous open border.

In fact, it is more money than we spend on the Department of Homeland Security every year. What can be done to ensure that these dollars are fully accounted for beyond what we are doing right now? I guess that is the first question I have, for each of you, if you have a point of view on that.

Dr. STENT. Senator, my understanding is that we do have mechanisms in place, and this has been discussed—

Senator SCHMITT. My question is, let's say you are not satisfied with that. What else can be done?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, I think you can provide more—we don't have, for example, a special inspector general that is currently in Kyiv. We should probably put a full team on board to make sure that the accountability is there. It is a matter of emphasis.

What you saw, we had the same thing in Afghanistan and places like that before, we put in a special IG that is able to track all of that. So if you are saying what to do more, that is kind of what I would say, and the Ukrainians are very willing to accept that. They understand they have got corruption issues.

They told us that when we were there. They are not running from it. I think it would behoove us to actually improve that accountability, and the second, you asked a great question. I think we have a terrible messaging problem with the American people.

Right now, we can walk and chew bubble gum at the same time. You can do all of this if you want to, you just have to be committed to it, and I don't think we are committed to it.

Senator SCHMITT. Well, let me just—so we have heard a lot about this, you know, existential threat to Ukraine and to Europe. I suppose, again, part of the frustration is the American people, the American taxpayers, they don't see these European countries stepping up. They just, they don't.

We can talk about percentage of GDP, but Germany has walked away. There is other countries in Europe that could be doing a lot more. So I guess my question is, General Kellogg, to you, what specifically can those European countries do? This is in their backyard.

You mentioned, you know, fight them there or fight them here. I don't know if that is a—you know, I don't think that most Americans believe that we are at a point where we are going to be fighting the Russians on American soil.

So we are in the European theater here. What can these European countries do to step up? Because they got a lot of money for a lot of their social welfare programs in those countries, but they don't seem to have a lot of money for this, you know, existential threat.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Well, the comment you made is accurate because, for example, as I said, use the Kiel Institute, which tracks this very, very well. Only 6 percent of the European stocks in the European Union, military stocks have been used.

Unlike the Brits, who—25 percent of their stock has been used. They do need to step out more. How you get them to step up more, you very candidly, is do what President Trump did, to stand up and use the presidency as a bully pulpit and say this is what needs to get done. We need to tell them that.

We cannot continue—be continuing to expect that United States of America will carry 50 percent of the load, and that is what it is carrying when you analyze these other 41 countries. It is in their backyard. You know, over a year ago, before this war started, I said this is a European fight before an American fight.

Once the fight was joined, they said, okay, now we are into the game. Now we have to fight. But, yes, you are absolutely correct, they are not doing enough. But you have to get the President willing to say that and force them to do that, and they are not doing that right now, and we are not pushing them into supporting to the degree they should support.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Rosen, please.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Of course, Ranking Member Wicker isn't here, but we really appreciate that you are holding this timely hearing on the ongoing war in Ukraine, which sadly comes shortly after the 1-year anniversary of Putin's brutal and unjustified invasion over Ukraine sovereign territory. As I have said before, the United States and our allies, I believe, must stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes for the Ukrainian people to win.

Now is not the time to back down, especially with spring, as we know, the weather presents an opportunity for Ukrainian counter-offensive. So, Ms. Massicot, what is your assessment of the ability to rapidly and effectively provide some of these newer weapons systems and advanced technologies to Ukraine?

I want to also bring up this point, how can the Pentagon, do you believe, improve its acquisition system to quickly adapt and maybe field some of the off the shelf technologies that are going to enable Ukraine off the battlefield, things we can do there?

Ms. MASSICOT. Thank you, Senator. I think about needs for Ukraine on two different timelines. There is the immediate needs, which we have talked about, artillery shells and additional small arms to prevent these Russian frontal assaults.

I think some of the more advanced systems that we have talked about today, like the F-16s or ATAMCS, there is a lead time with that, with training. But I agree with my panelists, if you never start the process, you never start the process. When the war kicked off, I believe that it was really urgent for the Ukrainians to receive air defense systems, and I still think that is a really urgent thing that we must sustain.

The Russians are working at chipping away at that over time with missile salvos at Ukrainian cities using Iranian Shahed drones. If they are able to treat the Soviet era SAMs, or some of our IRIS-T or NASAMS that have been provided, it would allow the Russian air force to come back in a very large way, and I worry that that would be very dangerous for the Ukrainians.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I want to move on. I am going to come back to you, Ms. Massicot, but I want to move on to Dr. Stent, because we have been hearing some of the conversation here.

Of course, during Putin's address to the Russian people just last week, he reiterated his warnings to the West, and I am going to quote, he said, global confrontation. And so, are his threats intended for our domestic consumption or for us here in the United States? Just for domestic consumption inside Russia?

Do you foresee a more aggressive Russia? I am thinking about his global confrontation posture. Perhaps cyber that he hasn't really played much. You say, well, maybe they don't see them marching here, but the cyber-attacks can hit you pretty hard as well. So, Dr. Stent, what is your opinion on that?

Dr. STENT. Thank you, Senator. I think his speech was directed both to the domestic audience and to the foreign audience. He is telling his own people this war is a war with the West, with the United States.

It is going to go on for a long time and we are going to prevail. He said, we are going to win on the battlefield. He is basically telling them that they have to accept it. For us, he is threatening us, that there are things that he hasn't done yet that he could do. Now, having said all of that, he wants to intimidate everyone.

The Russians haven't done some things that we thought they might do. They have not attacked any of the convoys carrying weapons into Ukraine, either from Poland or Romania. I think at this point Putin still is not willing to get into a direct conflict with NATO, and there has been less cyber.

I mean, there has been obviously some issues, but there have been less cyber attacks than we maybe feared that there might be. So that indicates to me that until now, he is observing some of his own, I know, red lines or limits, but he wants us to believe that he could go much further.

So I think it is our test to try and discriminate between what are probably just empty threats and things that we should take seriously.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you, and I am going to build on that with you, General Kellogg, then, because we think about these threats, and of course, they come maybe cyber and they also come with missiles.

We know Russia's stockpile of missiles, they have fired thousands since the beginning. They are using their Soviet era munitions more and more. So what do you believe is the status of Russian munitions and their supply chain? How, if they are running low, as Ms. Massicot talked about, maybe having to move back up production, how will this counteract, how will this play in this counteroffensive actions in just in the next few months?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, thank you. Senator, they are at a stretch right now. Look, Senator, they are refurbishing T-62 tanks. Those tanks have been out of the inventory for over 40 years. But the amount of losses they have sustained in their modernized armored forces have been tremendous. They are falling back on systems that we haven't seen in the inventory back in the cold war, back when I was stationed in Germany years ago.

So, their stocks are running low. That doesn't mean they don't have a lot there, but you can see they are using munitions that are not guided. That is where I would be concerned, where either the Iranians or Chinese are going to step up and provide them the munitions they currently don't have, to be able to use.

That is reason why I believe the United States has an ability to continue to put pressure on them. I realize it is a heavy lift, but the more we do it, it counters the Russian ability to continue to fight this war.

They are basically, in my opinion, the Russians are on their heels, both tactically, operationally, and strategically, and their supply chain is being broken right now.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am going to submit a question for the record on what you all might think will be their next—if they are on their back heels, what you might predict will be their next form of aggression that we need to look forward to. But my time is up, so I will send that for the record. Thank you.



Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for their important testimony today. I just want to make a statement, Senator Schmitt's point about the Europeans doing more. General, you highlighted this. But I really think the 2 percent GDP commitment they have all made under NATO membership is really important.

Now, I hear from folks back home in Alaska that, you know, they know how important this is, but if the Europeans can't meet their commitments, you are going to continue to see waning support in America. I think all our European allies need to understand that. So, but what I want to do is I want to turn to a topic that surprisingly hasn't come up yet, that I know a number of you, Dr. Stent, in particular, know and care about.

That is the topic of energy. I would like to recount this story. My good friend, Senator John McCain and I were in a meeting with a very brave Russian, a Russian who is actually now in jail, Vladimir Kara-Murza. I had asked him, what more can we do to undermine the Putin regime? This is a number of years ago, and he said, Senator, the answer is very simple, produce more American energy. So American energy is this huge, important instrument of American power.

Do you all agree with Vladimir Kara-Murza's statement on just how important energy is? Similar to tanks and aircraft carriers, relative to Russia, and relative to China. Xi Jinping fears American energy dominance, which we did such a good job of during the Trump Administration.

This Administration now from day one has actually been attacking American energy, trying to shut down American energy, make it harder to produce. Literally insane. Makes no sense. Can you talk very briefly, because I have a number of questions, on the importance of American energy, not just for Americans, but as an instrument of American power as it relates to Russia.

Dr. Stent, why don't you begin? I know you and your husband know a little bit about energy.

Dr. STENT. Thank you, Senator. No, I mean, I would agree with you. Russia was an energy superpower before this war began. It will no longer be an energy superpower.

Senator SULLIVAN. We are, if we want to be. If we could be, if we had the Federal Government's not help, just get the hell out of the way, right.

Dr. STENT. Right. So there is obviously a contradiction between the Administration's policy on hydrocarbons and what would actually be needed to make it less easy for Russia to project its own power. I agree with you.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. General, do you have a view on that? I am sure you do.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Senator, my family is an oil well drilling family, so yes, I get it. Yes, sir.

Senator SULLIVAN. That is a really important instrument of American power if we are the world's energy dominant—and by the way, all of the above. I want wind, solar, you know, as long as we are not buying it from China, but oil and gas, too, right?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes, sir.

Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Massicot, do you have a view on that?

Ms. MASSICOT. You know, I do. I think there are elements of sanctions that are less impactful. Russia is able to find alternative customers for its main imports.

Senator SULLIVAN. But America producing energy as a way to undermine Putin's power is a no brainer, isn't it?

Ms. MASSICOT. I don't have an informed view, but that seems logical to me.

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. Let me—we are working on a project called the Willow Project. Just a quick—it is in Alaska. It has been under permitting God knows how long, 20 years. It would be mass production about 200,000 barrels a day, 2,500 jobs to build it.

We could start building it tomorrow if we get the President to approve it. Would a project like that help America's National Security, an additional 200,000 barrels a day, highest environmental standards in the world? Just real quickly, yes or no, to each of the witnesses. Dr. Stent.

Dr. STENT. Yes.

Senator SULLIVAN. General.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes.

Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Massicot. Was that a yes or no, maybe?

Ms. MASSICOT. It is outside of my area of expertise.

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay, and then finally, just we have a member of the Administration, he won't admit it, and maybe he should come out and deny it. Mr. Kerry, not sure what to call him. He is not a Senator, is not Secretary of State.

By the way, if he were up for confirmation, he wouldn't get confirmed in the Senate. He goes around the world, especially in Asia, telling—cautioning countries not to buy American LNG. Is that a good idea from a National Security perspective? Dr. Stent, you have a view on that?

Dr. STENT. I think I will pass on that one.

Senator SULLIVAN. All right. General, how about you? Good idea to go to Asia and say, hey, don't buy American LNG?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. No, I don't think that is a very good idea.

Senator SULLIVAN. No, it is really ridiculously stupid. Let me just ask one final question, on the F16s, and this is just for all of the witnesses. I hosted some Ukrainian pilots last summer. Very brave, incredible young men.

We wrote a letter to General Milley, Secretary Austin, last summer on the F-16s. I was very well informed that the Pentagon was moving toward approving F-16s. We have been working on it for months.

Then the President got off the helicopter the other day and said, no, we are not going to do it. He looked very uninformed, but whatever, that is not always surprising. The Washington Post today came out with an editorial on moving forward with the F-16s.

What I worry about is this Administration is going to do what they have been doing the whole time, which is eventually approve them, looked like they were going to before the President's statement.

So, can you, any or all of you, just opine very quickly on why that is important, this weapon system now, not, 5 months from now like they have been doing on other ones?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, the reason why those systems are important is American technology is the best in the world. Our fighters, our bombers, the stealth technology, you name it, is the best in the world, and we should give them the best to have those fights. So it makes sense to give them systems like that if they believe it can improve the fight. It is a good—the F-16 is an example.

It is a good air to air and air to ground system out there. We can put the most modern avionics on it, most modern weapon systems. Give them—I have always said this repeatedly, give them the systems, the best systems in the world to win the fight. Those best systems happen to be, I believe, American systems.

Senator SULLIVAN. Any other views on the F-16 in particular?

Ms. MASSICOT. Yes, I just would like to caution that we can give them an air platform, but we can't give them Western air power. There is a lot of additional enablers that go into that. That is not my decision to make about what is in them.

But it is not just the pilots that need to be trained. It is the spare parts, it is the logisticians, it is everything else that goes into it. What do we assume risk wise if we invest in that capability?

Is there something that comes off the table for the Ukrainians in the near term? I don't have that answer, but you all do and I know you are making very difficult decisions every day. Just there is risks involved in everything, and there is no easy ways forward now.

Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Stent, do you—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Peters, please.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our witnesses, thank you for being here today. It has been a quite of a wide-ranging discussion. I think a lot of questions have already been asked that I was going to ask, so I will be brief, and just kind of drilling down on some of the responses that I have heard.

On the last question about a weapon system of the F-16 and understanding that it is not just a platform, you have got to have a whole system around those platforms, and going into combat as well. It is a complicated combined arms type of tactics that you have to use. But one question I had is contribution that the Germans have made.

There has been questions related to European contributions. The Germans, I believe, made a pretty significant contribution with the Leopard 2 tanks. But I am curious as to your assessment of that tank going into combat.

Clearly, a tank by itself is not a game changer. It has to be part of a broader system. But Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg, could you talk a little bit about what you think the Leopard 2 will bring to the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian military.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Sir, it is one of the three best tanks in the world. When you look at that, I happen to think the Abrams tank made by the United States is the best tank in the world. The Challenger 2 system that the British are providing is

very good and so is the Leopard 2 system. They are all high quality.

I think all three of them overmatch anything the Russians currently have, if they fight them together. But at the same time, I am saying that put them together in sets. If you are going to put the Leopard system with it out in the field, put the Marder system, the personnel carrier with it.

If you are going to put the Abrams in the field, you put the Bradley with it. The Challenger doesn't really have a sister vehicles as good as ours that is out there. You kind of put the Bradley with it as well. But those systems are very good, and I think they just need to commit to giving those systems.

I think the Germans would admit they would prefer not to have the Russians back on their front doorstep again, so push those systems forward. They are all good systems. They overcompensate the Russian systems very, very well, and the Ukrainians can fight those systems. They are good enough. They are smart enough to figure them out.

Senator PETERS. They are training them right now. You mentioned the T-62s that are being refurbished by the Russians. A Leopard will—is a good match for that one, isn't it?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. It is beyond a good match. It is an overmatch, which is okay by me.

Senator PETERS. Overmatch is always better.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes, sir.

Senator PETERS. Ms. Massicot.

Ms. MASSICOT. I think we need a long term strategy for Ukraine because they have been cutoff from receiving all of their Russian equipment. I think the Leopards are a start in that. I am not sure how the Ukrainians are planning on using those in the year ahead, whether it is keeping them in reserve and keeping them back and putting some of the older equipment forward to engage with the Russians directly.

But counteroffensives are hard. They are hard for the Ukrainians. It is not just tanks that will enable that success. It needs continued U.S., Western—U.S. and Western intelligence support and planning guidance.

Senator PETERS. Clearly. You need more than just tanks, you need artillery and you need air support, you need intelligence, all of those factors. That is just part of the list, long list of what is necessary.

One of the weapons systems that is changing warfare dramatically, and I think we saw this in Azerbaijan, was the use of drones. Drone warfare continues to advance pretty rapidly, and we are going to see increased developments as AI systems power drones as well. My question to you is, Iran is now providing drones.

Do we have any assessment as to how those drones are being used? Are they effective? Give me a sense of what you think that is bringing to the battlefield, Iran's involvement, working with Russia in regards to drones. Ms. Massicot, do you want to start, and then General Kellogg.

Ms. MASSICOT. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Shahed drones, they don't exactly have a very large payload, but it is complicating the picture for Ukrainian defenders. In the early days when Russia in-

roduced that capability into Ukraine, the Ukrainians were using surface to air missiles to engage those drones. That is a really quick way to attrite that capability, and they have changed over time.

I think they are using anti-aircraft guns now. They are doing other things to bring those down. There are rumors that Russia and Iran are potentially going to open up some kind of production capability inside Russia to create hundreds of those. That is a way for Russia to augment its precision strike capabilities.

I mean, again, the payload is very small. They are using it to go after soft targets, cities. It just, it stresses Ukrainian defenses, and I think that is another issue we have to really look at, is the status of Ukrainian air defense interceptor missiles.

Senator PETERS. Talk a little bit more about the production that you—we may see in Russia.

Ms. MASSICOT. From what I understand, the rumors in the press, it would be a Iranian, Russian effort to produce, I think, a few hundred drones. That is what I saw in the press.

Senator PETERS. General Kellogg.

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Iran has got a massive drone inventory, and they have figured out how to use these, primarily when they used them against the Saudis. They use kamikaze drones and swarm technology. It would have been putting massive amounts of drones against Ukrainians that they—that Ukraine just can't manage all of those targets at the same time.

So, the fact is they are giving all of these drones, yes, he changes the nature of the battlefield. Individually though, they are effective, but not—they are not going to change the nature of the battlefield, but you put them in combination with your artillery, your ground forces as well, and it starts to change. It is a new technology. Iranians have perfected it and they are passing that to the Russians.

Senator PETERS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Peters. We have been having a discussion about who gives what, how much, etcetera. And, General Kellogg, you have made reference to the Kiel Institute, I believe, in terms of some of your comments, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Well, they have an interesting chart that shows, and it is based on gross domestic product, because that is the only, I think, reasonable way to measure the capacity as well as the commitment of a country. In that chart, which I will make available to you, the United States is 10th in its contribution, because what it includes also is the absorption of immigrants.

You realize there are millions of Ukrainians who have left. The number one country is Estonia, two is Latvia, three is Poland, four is the Czech Republic, five is Lithuania, six is Slovakia, seven Norway, eight is Bulgaria, nine is the United Kingdom, and the United States is tenth, and Germany, as we have talked about, is fourteenth.

So, I think this graphically displays, from a very authoritative source, the level of commitment of our allies, which is astounding. In fact, frankly, I don't think it could be generated in the previous Administration. Indeed, I am still recoiling from President Trump's

comment on the day of the invasion that Putin was a genius. Do you believe he is a genius?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. I think Putin is not a genius and he has proven that in spades.

Chairman REED. Well, you might have a call with your former boss on that. Also, I think just to clear up a confusion, your earlier response about the aircraft, you made a suggestion which I thought was absolutely brilliant, which is rather than F-16s, more MiGs, which they are familiar with flying, would be a much more adequate platform. Is that true?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. The MiG-29s, because they are so familiar with it, is a good aircraft. Is it as good as an American aircraft? No, but it is very effective against the Russians.

Chairman REED. Right. So, in terms of time, essence of being able to move quickly, those M-29s could be flown almost immediately by their pilots?

Lieutenant General KELLOGG. Yes.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you. I thought the panel was extraordinarily insightful. I want to thank you all, Dr. Stent, Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg. Again, thank you for your service, and as we said before—thank you, sir. With that, I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

