[Senate Hearing 118-616]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-616
THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-005 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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February 28, 2023
Page
The Conflict in Ukraine.......................................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 3
Witness Statements
Stent, Angela, Director Emerita, Georgetown University Center for 4
Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies.
Massicot, Dara, Senior Policy Researcher, Rand Corporation....... 6
Kellogg, Lieutenant General Keith, Co-Chair, Center for American 17
Security America First Policy Institute.
(iii)
THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen,
Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
morning. The Committee meets today to discuss the ongoing war
in Ukraine. This hearing comes at a somber moment as we mark 1
year since Russia launched its illegal and unprovoked attack on
Ukraine.
I would like to welcome and thank the expert witnesses
before us today. Dr. Angela Stent, is Director Emerita of
Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East
European Studies. She is an expert on Russian and European
geopolitics, with extensive policy experience across the
intelligence community, State Department, academia, and NATO.
Dr. Dara--Excuse me, Ms. Dara Massicot, is a Senior Policy
Researcher at the RAND Corporation. She specializes in Russian
military strategy, combat operations, and escalation dynamics,
and has served as the lead analyst on these issues at the
Department of Defense. Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg is Co-
Chair of the Center for American Security at the American
Foreign Policy Institute.
Both in and out of uniform, General Kellogg has served at
the highest level of National Security leadership for years.
Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has inflicted suffering upon
innocent civilians, threatened European security, and caused
serious consequences for the global economy.
Now, more than ever, it is clear that if Putin succeeds in
Ukraine, he will not stop there. Russia cannot be allowed to
call the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any nation
into question. Fortunately, several efforts have thwarted his
initial assault. First and foremost is the incredible courage
and fighting skill of the Ukrainian people, as well as the
inspirational leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
I had the opportunity to travel to Kyiv last month and was
deeply moved by the Ukrainians' bravery and commitment to
defending their homeland. Second is the remarkable
statesmanship of the Biden Administration in forging a unified
response, leading worldwide condemnation of Putin, and
providing enormous military, economic, and humanitarian support
for Ukraine.
Finally, Putin's initial assault has folded from the inept
performance of his own forces. This war has exposed a poorly
led and poorly trained Russian army with corrupt leadership at
every level, poor tactics and communications, and woeful
logistics. This is a critical point in the fight. Ukraine has
achieved some very notable successes, but there is hard
fighting ahead and more to be done.
We and the rest of the international community must
continue to support the Ukrainian people and to expedite the
assistance that Ukraine needs to be successful. During today's
hearing, I would like to hear from our witnesses how these
goals can best be achieved. Although NATO is in the midst of
the greatest test it has ever faced, if Putin thought his
actions over the past year would drive a wedge within our
alliance and the international community, he was badly
mistaken.
NATO has shown remarkable unity and resolve, and a
formidable array of our partners around the globe have joined
together with incredible speed to provide Ukraine with
military, economic, and humanitarian aid, reinforce combat
power along NATO's Eastern flank, and impose the Accords on
Russian decisionmakers.
The carnage and destruction wrought by Putin's invasion
cannot be undone. I am encouraged by Congress's bipartisan
action to provide support to Ukraine. The assistance packages
approved by Congress and championed by President Biden have
made a decisive difference in helping Ukraine repel Putin's
troops and mercenaries.
These assistance packages are also providing much needed
aid to displaced Ukrainians whose cities and towns continue to
face indiscriminate bombardment by Russian forces. Just as
Ukrainians have learned and adapted on the battlefield, the
effort to aid and equip their security forces has evolved.
Throughout the war, the Biden Administration has wisely
calibrated our assistance to Ukraine to the conditions on the
battlefield. To date, the United States has committed more than
$30 billion in security assistance, including 10,000 javelin
and stinger systems, 160 Howitzers, 38 HIMARS, 109 Bradley
Fighting Vehicles, 31 Abrams tanks, 1 million rounds of
artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defenses through the new
AVs, and hundreds of thousands of other pieces of equipment and
ammunition.
We remain focused on striking the appropriate balance
between providing supplies that can be employed immediately,
while looking ahead to provide modern weapons systems that will
require additional training. At the same time, we cannot lose
sight of the most dangerous aspect of this conflict, Russia's
escalation strategy. This battle is one of the few times in the
atomic age that we have had a surrogate fight with the
potential to draw nuclear powers into a confrontation.
Russian nuclear threats cannot be dismissed or ignored, but
they also cannot be seen as determinative and uncontested. They
must be constantly evaluated as rhetoric or reality. I would
ask for our witnesses' assessment of the escalation threat and
how we can manage this dynamic moving forward.
It is important to remember that this conflict matters not
just to Ukrainian sovereignty and security, but also to that of
our allies in Europe, and indeed our own security here at home.
This is not a zero-sum endeavor. Rather, assistance to Ukraine
is an investment to United States National Security, and I look
forward to our witnesses' testimoneys, and I thank them again
for their participation. With that, let me turn to the Ranking
Member, Senator Wicker, please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thanks to our distinguished panel of witnesses. Last Friday,
February 24th, marked the solemn anniversary, 1 year since
Russia's unprovoked, illegal, and brutal invasion of Ukraine.
The courage and ingenuity shown by Ukrainian troops, many
of whom were civilians before the war, continues to be nothing
short of heroic. Now, after a long year of bloodshed and
sacrifice, the war has entered a crucial phase.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to review the current
conditions of the war and its possible trajectory, and to
discuss policy recommendations to help Ukraine win. I
appreciated President Biden's visits to Ukraine and Poland last
week.
What I do not appreciate is the President's repeated
failure to articulate United States goals and interest in
Ukraine in a fashion that resonates with most Americans.
Congress has appropriated over $100 billion of taxpayer funding
to assist Ukraine and is likely--and more is likely to be
needed later this year, so I would welcome our witnesses' views
on why supporting Ukraine matters to the average American.
In my view, this is not a particularly difficult case to
make. United States support to Ukraine helps a capable,
motivated, and grateful partner nation restore stability to a
region of the world that is critical to our interests. As they
prevent chaos spreading further into Europe, the Ukrainian
armed forces are also significantly degrading the military
capability of one of our chief adversaries, Putin's
dictatorship.
Finally, our support for Ukraine sends a clear message to
the Chinese Communist Party that aggression will be met with
resolve. Our allies in the Asia-Pacific understand the
connection between projecting strength in Ukraine and deterring
Chinese aggression. Japan, for example, just announced a $5.5
billion aid package for Ukraine.
American interests are being secured without U.S. boots on
the ground and for a relatively modest cost. After a year of
fighting, the oversight requirements Congress has put in place
seem to be working. Just last week, three major independent
U.S. watchdogs said they had not received any reports of major
fraud regarding U.S. aid.
Further, many allies and partners are helping us shoulder
the burden. Britain, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and
the Baltic States deserve special mention for their
contributions. Unfortunately, there are some larger European
partners who need to do much more, notably Germany and France.
This war matters greatly to the United States but is being
fought in Europe's backyard. I believe some in the Biden
Administration have recognized that the drip, drip, drip
approach to providing military assistance has prevented Ukraine
from mounting successful counteroffensives to bring this war
closer to an end. Make no mistake, Ukrainian battlefield
victories are necessary for a just peace.
Vladimir Putin is a war criminal who understands only brute
force. He will not negotiate until he is forced to do so. I
would like to hear from our witnesses about what more could be
done to sharpen the military capabilities of the Ukrainian
armed forces. We need to learn our lessons from the slow roll
approach we use to arm the Ukrainians.
Thus far, the Ukrainians have continually surprised many in
the West with their ingenuity and their will to fight. We are
at a pivotal moment in this war, an inflection point we cannot
afford to waste as we go about defending the interest of the
United States and our allies so that the 21st century is a
peaceful, prosperous and American led century.
I have repeatedly in this past year advocated Ronald
Reagan's concept of peace through strength. In addition,
Eisenhower said over 70 years ago, only with strength could we
achieve the true task of this time to deter aggression and
secure peace. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with you that we must
help our Ukrainian friends, that our help should be expedited,
and I do question whether the pace has been properly
calibrated.
I thank you and I look forward to working with you in this
mutual bipartisan endeavor, and I thank our witnesses.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Now let
me recognize, Dr. Stent. Dr. Stent, please.
STATEMENT OF ANGELA STENT, DIRECTOR EMERITA,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR EURASIAN, RUS-
SIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
Dr. Stent. Thank you very much. Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify before your Committee at this very critical time.
Let me begin with Russia's war aims.
What does Vladimir Putin want? When Putin launched his
unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year ago, his goal
was to conquer the country in 3 days, to oust the Zelenskyy
government, and to install a puppet regime loyal to Moscow.
Putin does not believe that Ukraine is a separate nation, and
he denies that it has the right to exist as a State.
In my book, Putin's World: Russia Against the West and With
the Rest, I have a cynical quote that sums up his view of the
world. Putin said, there are only four truly sovereign states
in the world, Russia, China, the United States, and India. All
the rest had limited sovereignty, they are colonies. Having
failed to take Kyiv and encountering fierce and effective
resistance from the Ukrainians, Russian forces have been pushed
back into what is now a brutal war of attrition.
In his address to the Federal Assembly last week, Putin
claimed that NATO had started the war and was out to destroy
Russia, but he said, we will win on the battlefield. So, what
exactly are the Russian war aims today? There was no hint in
that speech a week ago, safe to tell the Russian people that
this will be a long war and they have no choice but to support
it.
At a minimum, Russia wants to get total control of the
Donbass region, the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which have
been partially occupied by Russia since 2014. The next goal
would be total control of two new regions, which he has
declared are annexed to Russia, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, an
artificial red line.
Then Putin might be willing to sit down and negotiate an
agreement for a cease-fire, but make no mistake, that would
only be temporary. Putin has not given up his goal of
conquering Ukraine altogether, and this could be a very long
war. As critical for this Committee, I believe at this
important time, is European views and the durability of the
transatlantic coalition to support Ukraine.
Many of you were at the Munich Security Conference last
weekend and you saw and heard the public displays of
transatlantic unity, encouragement for Ukraine's determination
to prevail. So far, I believe this transatlantic unity has been
remarkable. Europeans are suffering the economic fallout from
the sanctions and the end of Russian hydrocarbon imports.
Public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine, and the mild
winter has mitigated some of the economic pain.
It is likely that as the war drags on this year, there
could be more public resistance to sending significant economic
support to Ukraine and more calls to pressure Ukraine to begin
to sit down at the negotiating table.
If, of course, Russia were willing to sit down and
negotiate with Ukraine. Russia will likely step up its
information war in Europe this year, as elections in various
countries loom. The same questioning will likely happen here in
the United States as we approach next year's congressional and
Presidential elections.
At Munich, it was clear that Western governments do have to
do a better job of explaining to their publics what the stakes
are in this war and why it affects their interests. This is
about international stability and a world in which rules are
observed rather than the disruptive world Putin wants, one
where there are no rules.
The same is even more true for the global South, that is
the developing world. I do have deep concerns about this. As we
heard in Munich, these countries face significant problems,
food insecurity, the impact of climate change, humanitarian
disasters, and this European conflict, in the eyes of many, is
absorbing too many resources from the West that would be better
directed toward them.
The global South has not taken sides in this war and has
neither condemned nor sanctioned Russia, meaning that Putin is
not isolated. He has been cultivating these countries for
years. The United States and our allies need to do a better job
of explaining to these countries why it is important that
Russia not win this war. Depicting this as a fight between
democracy and autocracy is ineffective in many of these
countries.
It is much more effective to highlight that Russia has
violated the United Nations charter, it has violated
international law. If Russia were to prevail, and the rest of
the world to resume business as usual with Moscow, then no
country would be secure in its borders and no one could count
on preserving--no country could count on preserving its
territorial integrity. Russia is expecting the developing world
to remain neutral.
NATO should step up its efforts to counter the Russian
narrative, and however difficult it is, the United States
should try harder to break Putin's information Iron Curtain and
communicate directly with the Russian people and explain what
Putin is doing and what this war is really about, and its true
cost to the Russian people and future generations. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Stent. Ms.
Massicot.
STATEMENT OF DARA MASSICOT, SENIOR POLICY
RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION
Ms. Massicot. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, Members
of the Committee and staff----
Chairman Reed. Could you bring the microphone closer, if
possible, please.
Ms. Massicot. Thank you. Sorry about that. Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the Committee and staff,
thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. One year
has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, and this grim milestone offers a moment of reflection.
My area of expertise is Russian military capabilities,
strategy, and operations. My remarks today focus on the past
year of war, an assessment of where the war stands at present,
and outlines considerations for the future.
On the eve of Russia's invasion last year, nearly 200,000
troops amassed on Ukraine's borders. The Ukrainian military and
government transitioned to a higher level of readiness and
State of emergency only a few weeks prior. Many assumed that if
Russia used their advantages wisely, it would be difficult for
Ukrainian forces to withstand for long. But the Russians did
not prevail.
They were instead routed outside many major cities and
retreated on multiple occasions. Why? The answer has many
components, and no single factor explains outcomes we see
today. Moscow's invasion plan, as we know now, was created by a
small, secretive group, and is riddled with faulty assumptions,
arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors. War plan's
design and objectives departed from Russian military strategy
and undercut many of its advantages and amplified its
structural disadvantages from the outset.
The Russian command withheld its war plan from any elements
of its invading force, until the last minute due to excessive
secrecy leading to multiple preventable errors on their side.
These mistakes then collided with fierce Ukrainian resistance,
and Western weapons, intelligence, training, and planning
support. Senior United States officials place Russian
casualties at well over 100,000.
The damage to the Russian army, the airborne and special
forces is systemic and severe, and since last summer has
hindered the Russian military's ability to make large
territorial gains. The past year of war has come at a high cost
to Ukraine, which is now largely dependent on weapons provided
by the West.
The Russian military has inflicted severe damage on
Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, and its forces
stand accused of committing war crimes and crimes against
humanity against Ukrainians.
Millions of Ukrainians are internally and externally
displaced. However, Russian leaders are preparing for a
protracted conflict. To replace lost personnel, Russia
mobilized 300,000 men last September. They were hastily trained
and their provisioning is uneven, as are their skill sets.
Russia has been withdrawing its older equipment from strategic
reserves in Siberia from the war's outset, although that
equipment is in various states of serviceability.
In January, the Russian military was again ordered to go on
the offensive in the Donbas, even though its forces were not
prepared. Currently, localized assaults are underway in
Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, possibly to bring these
regions under full occupation, and to keep Ukrainian forces
engaged and unable to break away to begin their own
counteroffensive.
The tactics are crude. The Russians use repetitive armored
assaults in some areas and in others are experimenting with
assaults of storm troops. In many cases, this means human waves
with high rates of casualties as they attempt to close on
Ukrainian positions. Russian mobilized soldiers now make public
appeals to be spared from what the coming--what they call,
``canon meat.''
The Russian command shows a high tolerance for losses.
However rudimentary, the method has brought incremental success
in a few areas where Russian shelling occurs around the clock.
Some Ukrainian positions like Bakhmut and areas around Cremona
are under serious and mounting pressure, and missile strikes by
the Russian air force continue to chip away at Ukrainian air
defenses.
I would like to end my remarks with a brief discussion
about what may come next. The outcome of the war, of course, is
highly contingent on multiple factors related to sustainment,
force regeneration, and availability of Western support to
Ukraine. Russia, for its part, has untapped manpower that
numbers in the low millions and will likely need to mobilize
replenishment this year.
The Kremlin is pressuring its defense industrial base to
produce more ammunitions, but it has not yet fully activated
its wartime authorities. Without mobilizing more men and
pulling more equipment from the reserves, another new incursion
into Northeastern Ukraine, such as the Kharkiv region, would be
difficult and in my opinion, another ground attack on Kyiv
seems well beyond the ability of Russian forces now.
There are several potentially disruptive events that Russia
could undertake that might alter the dynamics of the war that I
outline in more detail in my written remarks. So, in
conclusion, Russian combat potential is diminished due to the
losses that it has sustained. It is trying to overcome these
deficits by consolidating its positions, generating more
manpower and equipment, and using brute force tactics.
Defending against this renewed offensive is taking a toll
on Ukrainian forces, and Russia is actively digging in with
fortifications, trenches, and minefields to make it costly for
Ukraine to liberate more of its territory moving forward.
The capabilities of both sides are being worn down, and
Ukraine will need continued and predictable support as Russia
digs deep into its reserves. This concludes my remarks. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dara Massicot follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. General Kellogg,
please.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH KELLOGG,
(RET.), CO-CHAIR, CENTER FOR AMERICAN SECURITY AMER-
ICA FIRST POLICY INSTITUTE
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member, esteemed Members of the Committee, thank you for having
me here today. I am grateful to be able to offer my
perspective, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none
has been a greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the
uniform of the United States Army in nearly four decades of
decorated service on behalf of this country. Much of that was
combat service, including two tours in Vietnam, Operation Just
Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War, and Iraq.
I have had the privilege of being the Commander of Special
Operations Command Europe and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. My military career is one of multiple
aspects in my life that make my perspective on the war in
Ukraine unique.
The second is my service in the last Administration on the
National Security Council, the acting National Security Advisor
to the President, and the National Security Advisor to the Vice
President.
Finally, a comprehensive 2 week visit I made last month to
Ukraine. My trip to Ukraine was facilitated by the expertise of
the Weathermen Foundation, founded by Best Weatherman and
Andrew Duncan, seated behind me today, and led by my daughter,
West Point graduate, Dr. Meaghan Mobbs.
I visited arenas of battles near the line of contact. You
know, Kharkiv, Izium, Donetsk, and interfaced across the
spectrum of military forces, from senior decisionmakers to
trigger pullers. In Bucha, in Izium, I saw the firsthand
consequences of unbridled Russian aggression and their
willingness to kill innocents and use indiscriminate violence
against children.
My views today, which are offered today in my strictly
personal capacity, are consistent with everything I have
written and I have said throughout this conflict. To be clear,
Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a humiliating
American withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that allowed
Putin to believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a
major response, much like he found in 2014 when he seized
Crimea from Ukraine.
Deterrence has failed. This failure has been compounded by
a willingness to use strong words, unaccompanied by decisive
and timely action. It is the incremental and halting of the
American and allied response to the Russian invasion that
persuades Putin he can drag out this war and count on time to
be his friend and bring him to victory.
It has been support sent in half measures and with
hesitation, which succeeds in enabling the fighting of the war
but not the ending of it. This is important because ending the
war needs to be the principal American effort. If we do not
demonstrate leadership now, we risk being mired in another
endless war.
As with all wars, there will be negotiation between the
warring parties, and so we must look forward to what will
hasten those negotiations, consistent with American honor and
interest. It is clear the path to bringing about these
negotiations is to rapidly increase Ukraine's lethality to
enable Ukrainian forces to destroy currently committed Russian
forces on the battlefield and disrupt their supply chain
logistics.
Putin must see that the fate of his army in the field in
Ukraine is at risk of near total destruction. The reasons for
American interest are many. The war threatens the American led
international order.
We cannot be secure in our leadership role if we allow a
war of regression to regress and persist in a major sovereign
State with the potential of a Russian victory. Simply saying
whatever it takes as long as it takes is not policy, it is a
slogan.
One of the great maxims of warfare is tactics without
strategy is just the noise before defeat. No number of
supplemental aid packages, no round of sanctions, nor a
Presidential visit to Kyiv will achieve success without a plan.
The Ukraine war must end this year, but not any end will
do. An end to the war in Ukraine must be defined with American
interests at heart and there must be a pathway to achieve it.
This can be achieved by first providing Ukraine with all the
military armament it needs to defeat the Russian army in
Ukraine.
The survival of Putin's army in the field must be put at
risk and you need to do it now. Second, the identification of
an end State for how this war will end, with a road map to get
there must be communicated effectively to the American people.
Third, our allies must do more, spend more, and do it more
quickly.
This war is in their backyard and they cannot expect the
citizens of the United States to continue to carry the
overwhelming financial burden as they do today. All this is
simple, but not easy. Let me be plain, Americans are right to
ask the hard questions about why we are spending so much in
Ukraine. Many of your own constituents, Americans with whom I
have spoken, have legitimate concerns about our involvement in
this war.
We see a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions
into the defense of Ukrainian borders while showing no real
interest in the defense of American borders. From a strictly
policy perspective, the correct answer is that American
Government is equipped to do both. As we enter the second year
in Ukraine, we cannot continue the status quo.
We need to work toward an end to this war and do so
immediately and decisively. If this war turns into a multiple
year of attrition, which is its present trajectory, then
Americans may be asked to sacrifice more than they are willing
to give, and Ukraine will lose.
As it stands, a Ukrainian defeat is an American defeat by
proxy. This cannot be tolerated. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg
follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Keith Kellogg
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this
Committee. Thank you for having me here today and for convening this
important hearing. I am grateful to be able to offer my perspective,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none has been a
greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the uniform of the
United States Army in my nearly four decades of decorated service on
behalf of this country. Much of that was combat service, including two
tours in Vietnam, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War,
and in Iraq. The opportunity I am most fortunate to have had was
commanding Special Operations Command-Europe and the 82d Airborne at
Fort Bragg. The sense of stewardship and obligation I felt to my
soldiers then is the same sentiment I hold toward our country now. This
Committee has been instrumental in making many of those opportunities
successful over the years--and you, your predecessors, and your hard-
working staff have my gratitude for it.
My military career is one of several aspects of my life that have
shaped my perspective on the war in Ukraine. The second is my service
in the National Security Council and as Acting National Security
Advisor to President Trump and National Security Advisor to Vice
President Pence in the last administration. And finally, my personal
visit to Ukraine last month. I visited the arenas of battle in Kharkiv,
Izium, Donetsk, and the suburbs of Kyiv. I saw Bucha firsthand--one of
many sites of Russian massacres of Ukrainian civilians, including women
and children--as well as Izmail and Odesa, which have experienced
Russia's war. I may be the only senior retired American flag officer to
have visited those cities during this past year. The Romulus T.
Weatherman Foundation, a private operating foundation whose
president is my daughter, West Point Graduate Dr. Meaghan Mobbs,
facilitated my trip to Ukraine.
I have offered my perspective on hundreds of media appearances, and
in written commentary in various outlets and in long-form publications
as the Co-Chair of the Center for American Security at the America
First Policy Institute.
My views today--which I offer today in my strictly personal
capacity, informed by my experiences and affiliations but not on their
behalf--are consistent with everything I have said and written
throughout this conflict.
It is no mystery why this war happened. The Russian dictator,
Vladimir Putin, has always resented the American victory in the cold
war, and has spoken openly of his desire to reverse it. He subscribes
to a well-worn Russian strategic concept by which security is assured
by pushing the Russian border as far westward as possible, and the
conquest of Ukraine--barbaric and unprovoked as it was--was meant to
begin that process in the modern era. So much for Russia's part in it:
we are here to discuss America's part.
To be clear, Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a
humiliating withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that led Putin to
believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a major response
much like he found in 2014, when he invaded Crimea.
It is the weakness of a continuing cautious American response to
the Russian invasion that persuades that same dictator to believe he
can drag out the war, and count on time for his own victory. That
weakness came in two parts. First it came in failing to deter it once
the plans were known, beginning in late 2021. Next it came in a slow
and hesitating provision of aid to Ukraine--a hesitation masked by the
sheer size of the aid given, but real nonetheless--which succeeds in
enabling the fighting of the war, but not the ending of it.
That serial American weakness, I should note, had one signal early
exception, in the policy of President Donald J. Trump. It was President
Trump who broke from the policy of his predecessor and sent American
weapons and aid to Ukraine that mattered: above all, Javelin anti-armor
munitions that proved decisive in this war's opening days, weeks, and
months. When we look to the causes of Ukrainian survival against a
Russian onslaught that virtually no one expected them to survive, we
credit first the spirit of the Ukrainians themselves and the leadership
of their president. They are a nation that came together in supreme
crisis and earned the world's admiration and respect. But their spirit
would have been a mere moral victory without the arms and early allied
training to take out Russian armor, to fix Russian columns in place,
and to stop Russian aggression in its tracks.
However, ending the war should be the principal American interest
now or we risk another endless war.
We do not imagine the war will end in a comprehensive Ukrainian
battlefield victory, and still less in a Russian conquest of Ukraine.
There will be some sort of negotiation between the warring parties--and
so we must look toward what will hasten those negotiations, consistent
with American honor and interest. A war born in American weakness can
only be ended by American strength.
That's why the path to bringing these negotiations about is to
enable Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine. Putting the
Russian Army in Ukraine at risk of defeat is a strong message Putin
cannot ignore.
The reasons for this American interest are many. This war threatens
the American-led international order that our fathers and grandfathers
painfully won in the Second World War, and in the cold war that
followed. Our prosperity right here at home depends directly upon the
maintenance and perpetuation of that order, with America in a leading
role. We cannot be secure in that position while Russia pursues a war
of aggression that overturns the global order, destabilizes commodities
markets, and renders food-supply chains unstable. The fact that Russia
does so as a strategic ally and partner of America's number-one rival
and threat, the People's Republic of China, only accentuates the
danger. Make no mistake: weakness against Russian aggression is
weakness against the Communist-Chinese threat. We know from history
that the dictatorial powers watch and learn, to discover just how far
they can get: and we know that Russian victory in Ukraine today almost
certainly means war for Taiwan tomorrow.
For all this, America needs the Ukraine war to end. An end to the
war in Ukraine must be defined, and there must be a pathway to it.
We have yet to get this from the current Administration. Simply
saying that one will support Ukraine for ``as long as it takes'' is a
bumper sticker, not a strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages,
no rounds of sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are
substitutes for American leadership.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this
Committee, we need to end this war now, and ensure that a negotiation
process begins. In my commentary and written analysis over the last
year, I have been consistent on what an America-First approach looks
like to end this conflict.
First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it
needs to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine, implement rigorous
accountability measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
Second, identify an end State for how this war will end--
and a roadmap to get there.
Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more,
more quickly.
All this is simple--but not easy. The questions of which armaments
to send, and from where, and by whom, are complicated ones. There are
answers, but each of them requires a tradeoff, and prudent
prioritization. I know the Members of this Committee will appreciate
and understand this inescapable constant in governance and its
challenges.
But the Ukrainian war is not simply a military challenge, nor even
just a foreign-policy one. At its heart, for us in the United States,
our involvement in this war--even in the time-tested and honorable
American role as the ``arsenal of democracy''--raises a profound and
necessary question of who, and for whom, our Nation is governed. I will
speak directly to this, because the Members here must understand the
gravity of it--even if the White House refuses to.
Let me be plain: Americans are right to ask the hard questions
about why we are spending so much on Ukraine. Many of your own
constituents, Americans with whom I have spoken and met, have
legitimate concerns about our involvement in this war. I want to
address the two I hear most right here, and left unaddressed they will
in the long run overtake and rightly eclipse our interests abroad.
First and foremost, Americans have legitimate concerns
about a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions into the
defense of Ukrainian borders, while showing no real interest in the
defense of American borders. From a strictly policy perspective, the
correct answer is that American governance ought to do both--but
ordinary people do not live in a strictly policy-oriented world. They
live in the real world, where they see an administration sending arms
to defend Ukrainian communities, while denying American communities the
ability to defend their own homes and ways of life. I want to be
absolutely emphatic: this is sowing the wind, and left unaddressed, the
whirlwind will be reaped. You, each of you here holding elected office
and trust from your constituents, must work urgently to close this gap.
Second, Americans are rightly concerned that arms and aid
sent to Ukraine is arms and aid taken away from an impending
confrontation with Communist China, whether over Taiwan or some other
flashpoint. The reality is that national security is not a zero-sum
exercise: we can prudently sustain Ukrainian resistance to aggression
and confront Communist China, if we manage our resources wisely. But
that is only part of the picture: Americans with this concern are
instinctually, and correctly, illuminating a real and significant
challenge to our national-security apparatus. America's industrial
base, though robust, is simply unprepared for war. The Ukraine
emergency gives us a rare historical opportunity to enact industrial
and procurement reform now, when it is still a choice and not a
compulsion--and thereby acknowledge and address the entirely justified
concerns of these fellow Americans.
As we enter the second year of war in Ukraine, we cannot continue
with the status quo. We need to work toward an end to this war, and do
so now. If this war turns into a multi-year war of attrition, which is
its present trajectory, then Ukraine may well lose. We need American
leadership to prevent that.
To conclude, and to reiterate, there are three things we must do
now to bring about the peace negotiations that will bring this war to a
rapid conclusion.
First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it
needs to defeat the Russian Army, implement rigorous accountability
measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
Second, identify an end State for how this war will end--
and a roadmap to get there.
Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more,
more quickly.
There is more Congress can do, most notably regarding oversight,
and this type of an open hearing is one great step to increase public
awareness and transparency. Congress should be leading efforts on the
oversight of U.S. distribution to Ukraine, particularly since its
resources are going to a nation with longstanding corruption issues.
If we take these steps--and if the Congress plays its full and
Constitutional role in making them happen--than we will have done a
service to the peace of Europe, to the peoples of Russia and Ukraine
alike, and to the welfare of the world. And we'll have done something
even more important than all of that: we'll have put America First.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Dr. Stent, one
of the issues that continually engages the planners and the
statesmen and women who deal with this problem is escalation.
Could you comment upon the factors that you see, particularly
since so much of this is really a function of what Putin is
thinking, and that is an odd analysis one must make.
Dr. Stent. Thank you, Chairman. That is obviously a key
question. I think Putin from the beginning has wanted us to
believe that he could escalate. He wants to intimidate not only
the Ukrainians, but really the Western coalition, the NATO
countries that are supporting Ukraine.
Therefore, we have had these hints from him right from the
beginning, you know, we are a very strong nuclear power, we can
do things that you haven't even dreamed of, and that waxes and
wanes.
Sometimes it is more forceful. Sometimes he stops saying
that. We have had at some point the Chinese even saying that it
is--you know, criticizing the use of this kind of rhetoric, not
criticizing him.
The Indians, too. So, there has been some pushback there.
He wants us to believe that he could do this. I think, you
know, you cannot rule out, if we are talking about the
potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon, right, you cannot
rule out that he would never do it because he does have the
weapons.
I think we have allowed ourselves sometimes to limit what
we are doing for Ukraine because we are too concerned about the
potential for, World War III breaking out.
Again, I don't want to dismiss it and say it couldn't
happen. I think we have to be very careful in looking at this.
There are many unknowns, but not allowing us to limit what we
are doing because of this changing rhetoric that we hear from
Vladimir Putin.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, doctor. Ms. Massicot, the
Russians went in with a plan that collapsed. Their forces had
multiple difficulties. What do you think they have learned,
which they can usefully apply in the next several months?
Ms. Massicot. I think they realized within about a month
and a half that they had too many objectives for the forces
they had left. So, you saw them withdraw from Kyiv. You saw
them then withdraw from the Northeastern Ukraine.
This has been a process that has been ongoing up until the
recent withdrawal from Kherson. They are capable of adapting
their tactics. There is some institutional learning going on in
that regard. They are more effective now with their electronic
warfare. They are more effective with some of their air
defenses. It is hurting Ukraine's ability to fly drones that
were very effective in the beginning.
In terms of the larger issues that they are facing, they
have shown an unwillingness or inability to target or interdict
Western support coming into Ukraine. I think that is an
escalation choice on their part. They don't want to open that
up. They can't overcome that with that mentality, and I don't
think they want to at this time.
So tactically, yes, they can adapt. There is no secret new
Russian army that is going to come from East of the Urals and
finish this. They are very damaged at this point.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Kellogg, one of the
strengths I think, of the Ukrainian forces is the training that
we began in 2014 under President Obama for their young
noncommissioned officers and their younger officers who today,
as the clock ticks forward, are now senior NTOs and battalion
officers. Is that your impression also?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator, it is. Their
quality of leadership is much better than the Russian quality
of leadership. The Russians have not learned the Western style
leadership. We transferred our expertise with the young
noncommissioned officers, which the Russians does not rely on
our younger officers and our senior officers as well.
I think the other thing they have done is the fact is the
Russians violated every principal war I ever grew up with at
the start of this invasion, and Ukrainians were able to
capitalize on it. You cannot discount the value of Ukrainian
soldiers either. There is one thing that Napoleon once said,
the moral of the physical is three as to one, never discount
the heart of a fighting army and the training they have
received.
Chairman Reed. I have witnessed that in my brief stay in
Ukraine, where their forces are committed to the fight, unlike
I think most of the Russian conscripts who are essentially, as
was described, they are trying to avoid what--the meat grinder
or whatever. So, I think that is an advantage.
I think also, too, which is consistent in all your
testimony, is the need to explain to the world what is at stake
and to continue to provide support for the Ukrainian people.
One other aspect of this is the overall effort, and sometimes
we merely look at the military aspect, but there is a specific
amount of humanitarian assistance and budgetary assistance to
the government of Ukraine, and some of our allies are doing
much more of that than they are with military assistance, but
you need a combination of humanitarian, governmental, and
military assistance to carry the day. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses. General Kellogg, you are dissatisfied with the
pace of delivery of weaponry and ammunition. Dr. Stent
mentioned in her testimony that we are limiting what we do for
various reasons.
One of the arguments that is sort of baffling is that we
are holding back on some things because we need them to defend
our interests in NATO. That is surprising to me since we are in
NATO and we have positioned our resources there to defend
against Russia.
So, does it make sense to hold back our capabilities in
other places in Europe rather than deliver them where the fight
is right now?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. No Senator, t does not.
Senator, the Ukrainians are fighting the fight that we thought
we were going to fight 20 and 25 years ago, against the very
people we thought we were going to fight, with the very
equipment that we thought we were going to have to use in
Europe.
So, give the Ukrainians the equipment they need. An
example, Army preposition set No. 2 is sitting in Germany.
Multiple combat teams, multiple brigades are sitting right
there. Transfer that equipment out. It is there. They can train
for it in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. Unleash it against the
Russians.
That is what the equipment is designed to be used for. You
might as well use the equipment as it was designed for. The
Russians, once they have an inability to proceed on the
battlefield, they have no ability to go toward NATO because
they will not have the military capacity, as long as we use the
equipment that we should be giving them right now.
Senator Wicker. How soon could that be accomplished?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, it could be rapid. The
equipment is stationed right there. You can get the pre-
positioned sets moving as quickly as you want to. There will
be--saying, well, it is going to affect our readiness.
No, it doesn't, because the readiness which it was designed
to be used for was to defeat the Russian army. That is what the
Ukrainians are doing right now. Give them the tools they need
to win this fight now.
Senator Wicker. Well, if you would comment on the
practicality of F-16s. Do you buy the Administration's stated
reason for the reluctance there of the ATACMS?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. My concern on that, Senator, is
the fact that if and when they need them, when the term was,
they don't need them right now, but when they do need them, it
will be late to give it to them.
What they really need are the MiG-29s that came out of
Poland. Given the equipment they are used to be using on
there--now, it is not as the avionics, clearly, and not as good
on United States aircraft as we see on like the example on MiG-
29, but they can still put equipment on there that can defeat
the Russian.
You equip their HARM 88 missile on it. You can put a lot of
ordinance on that, given the stuff that they are currently used
to using in the air.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, is there any point in our
training the Ukraine, beginning to train Ukrainian pilots on F-
16s at this point? You recommend that or not?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I would be training
them on everything we have got, because if we had an ability to
bring them back, we should have done it months ago. It still
takes time to train regardless of which, a tank crewman or a
pilot in an aircraft. We probably should be training them, if
we had an ability. We thought that we were going to come do it,
get ahead of the game instead of behind the game.
Senator Wicker. Then there are two schools of thought with
regard to the Pacific. One is that this distracts us from our
major threat, and that is the Communist Party of China. The
other is that China is watching and looking for indications of
American resolve. So why should we be--how should we be viewing
this with regard to the pacing threat of China?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Two parts real quickly. The
actions we are taking in Ukraine, supporting them, is being
watched by China. If they see us with strength, then they would
regard us with caution as well.
I am not sure we are doing that. Sir, and the first
question again was on the two fight. Sir, I believe that the
fight in the Pacific, if we have to go there, will be primarily
an air and naval fight. It won't be a ground fight.
We are not going to march to Beijing. So, the systems are
different. There is a ground war in Europe. It is an air and
sea war, primarily, in the Pacific. Sort of like an apples and
oranges.
Senator Wicker. I hear two concerns on--among the talking
heads. Now, one is corruption, and our resources are
potentially being stolen over there. Am I correct that we are
pretty much on top of that? Also, is it fair to count the
burden sharing, as Mexico, I believe, indicated, in terms of
the humanitarian aid that is being primarily shouldered by
European allies.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, we are still giving,
according to the Kiel Institute, sir, that--which tracks that
still 50 percent of the aid out of the countries they track,
41, is still 50 percent American. So, we are giving a lot. They
need to step up to the plate and do more to be able to give
that aid to them as well. Again, sure, the first question was
on the comments, or the first one part of that----
Senator Wicker. You know, I shouldn't ask two questions at
one time, so thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you to each of you
for being here this morning. Dr. Stent, you pointed out that
Russia is going to step up its information war this year. I
think they have been very effective in their information war,
actually much more so than we have.
I wonder if you and others on the panel have thoughts about
what we should be doing to ramp up our information war to
combat what Russia is doing, not just in Europe, but Africa and
other places around the world.
Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. I mean, we definitely should
be. I think we have not done as good a job as we should. We
know what the Russians are doing. It is very difficult to
counter some of their disinformation, but we have a lot of
smart people working on this who should understand how to do
it. We have to do this for different audiences.
So, I think we have to also, you know, explain to the
Europeans, those people who oppose supporting Ukraine, what
this is about. We definitely have to do more in the global
South, whether that is radio, TV, using other media, really
explaining to them what this conflict is about. As I said, I
think we also have to try and penetrate that Iron information
curtain in Russia itself.
We are not getting through to the Russian people. It is
very difficult to. They don't have alternative sources of
information. Even when they do, they don't know what to
believe. But I just think we should put more resources into
that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I agree. Before I go on, I want
to ask you about Belarus, because Lukashenko last a couple of
weeks ago announced that Belarus would not join Putin's war,
although it continues to serve as a staging area. So, can you
talk about how much you think we can rely on that? Are we going
to see Belarus engage further with Putin in this war? What is
the status of the citizens of the country in terms of their
concern about the war?
Dr. Stent. Sure, that is a very important question. So,
Russia has been pressuring Belarus since the beginning to send
troops there. But one thing that the dictator Lukashenko
understands is that 80 percent of the Belarusian population do
not support this war.
If he did try and mobilize and send them there, he would
face significant disruptions and protests at home. Yes, it is a
very repressive State, but still, people do take to the streets
there. So, he does understand that. That is why he said we will
only during the war if Belarus is attacked by Ukraine.
Now, of course, you could manufacture something, which they
would be capable of doing and say, well, the Ukrainians
threatened us. But so far, he has held that line. In fact,
there are Belarusians who are fighting with the Ukrainians in
Ukraine. If you look at the recent meeting between President
Putin and President Lukashenko and just look at President
Putin's body language, these are not two leaders who are too
fond of each other.
The Russians have been irritated by Lukashenko for a long
time. On the other hand, he is completely dependent on them now
to stay in power because of their fraudulent elections. So, I
think I would not anticipate that Lukashenko will send troops
there, unless something drastically changes and he is told that
he has no choice, but he will face real opposition
domestically.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ms. Massicot, what would be the
impact of China providing weapons to Russia?
Ms. Massicot. I think Russia has a few immediate needs that
China could fill. I am not a China expert and I certainly don't
understand whether or not they will do this or not, but Russia
has shell hunger.
They need artillery rounds now. China could fill that for
them temporarily until their defense industrial base clicks
into a higher gear, which is in progress now. It may take them
multiple months or the end of the year for their own domestic
resumption.
I think also Chinese ISR would help Russia try to close
some of the gap with Ukrainians, although the Ukrainians are
outclassing them in this regard, either organically or through
the support that we are providing them.
Really those two things are immediate. Higher end
capabilities--and this is very speculative. There are multiple
shared systems between the two militaries. So, it could be air
defense missiles. They run on the shared systems.
Russia has been repurposing those for land attack
munitions. I think that is probably a very low probability, but
I would be looking at artillery. I would be looking at drones.
Senator Shaheen. Well, hopefully they will decide that it
is not in their interest to do that. Can I ask you about the
Wagner group and the dynamic between the Wagner group and the
Russian army, and whether there is any reason to think that is
going to deteriorate, or have they reached peace and are able
to work together?
Ms. Massicot. I think it is deteriorating in real time this
week. Those two groups have had tensions that date back to
Syria, and it bubbles up and then it is resolved. The thing
about President Putin is he doesn't like mess.
Right now, this is very messy and uncontrolled. So, I think
inevitably he will probably step in and resolve this. Wagner,
over time, is becoming less important to the overall war
effort. As Russia mobilizes, it has more men. That critical
role that they played last summer will decline over time.
Prigozhin is misreading a lot of really important cues
right now. He is being told by important and dangerous people
to stop with the public criticism and he persists. I think also
they are taking a long-term approach to undercut him.
He is not allowed to recruit from the prisons anymore and
they are choking back some of his artillery supplies this week
near Bakhmut. So, I think that this is deteriorating in real
time. I don't think his future is a bright one.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much for being here, for our
panelists this morning. I had the great opportunity this past
weekend to spend time in Poland Saturday and Sunday with our
Iowa Army National Guard troops.
So, we do have a couple of units that were mobilized for
regularly scheduled deployments. We have the 209th Medical
Company, as well as the 1133d Transportation Company. I just
want to say to all of our folks back home, their families and
loved ones, that I am so very proud of, these hard charging
young men and women from Iowa. They are doing an incredible job
supporting in Poland. God bless them all.
So, Dr. Stent, I know you had a very powerful message for
all of us talking about the message we need to send not only to
the world, but to Americans as well, and how we should be
speaking to that. Can you just double down on that for me,
please, and how we should be talking to the American people
about this.
Because as General Kellogg pointed out, it is important
that Americans understand, because they do have valid concerns,
but they need to understand the gravity of the war in Ukraine.
So, what again, is that message and how do we communicate that?
Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. You know, we have to explain
to the American people, first of all, that in the last century,
twice the United States had to intervene in a war in Europe to
essentially save Europe and save the world from tyranny and
from conquest. So, what is happening between Russia and
Ukraine?
Russia, you know, after 77 years after the end of World War
II, just broke the system that we had. It violated all of the
sort of rules that govern the world after the end of World War
II, and by just invading a neighbor, really on a whim, with no
provocation, it was saying that it could arbitrarily take over
another country. It didn't respect its territorial integrity,
its sovereignty.
If Russia is allowed to continue, if Russia were to prevail
in this war, this wouldn't be the end of it. It would want to
take the whole of Ukraine. It set its sights on other
countries. Itis already undermining Moldova, for instance.
Really, it has also explicitly said that it believes that
Poland is still in its sphere of influence, if you look at the
two so-called treaties that were presented to the United States
and NATO in December 2021. So, it is a question of--world
order, that sounds very abstract, but it is a world in which
Russia would like a world where there are no rules. It is a
disruptive power.
It could cause instability, on the European continent,
certainly for a long time. That has huge economic impacts, and
as we have seen, even global impacts in the way that it's
prevented the Ukrainians from exporting much of their grain and
fertilizers. So, I think the American people have to understand
it does affect them.
If Russia isn't stopped, we can't sort of wall ourselves
off from this conflict. We need to reestablish rules that
people will abide by and respect international law. So, I think
that is probably the best way of explaining it.
Senator Ernst. No, I really appreciate it. I don't think
Americans want to live in a world that is dominated by Russia
and by China. I think it is very important that Ukrainians win
this war.
Ms. Massicot, when we talk about equipment and the
degradation of Russian capabilities, Ukrainian capabilities, is
Ukraine sufficiently equipped to suppress and defeat Russia's
air defenses? What are those weapons systems that the United
States could maybe provide to effectively counter the Russian
air defenses?
Ms. Massicot. That is one of the most complicated missions
to do. I don't think the Ukrainians would be able to do it
comprehensively from the air. Russia's SIM system is really
quite multilayered at this point in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine
are both denying each other the use of air space right now.
On the ground capabilities that could potentially disable
some of these systems, the Ukrainians have been able to target
them with precision munitions. So that is a--if they are
provided the right type of information, they act on it pretty
quickly.
So that is really helping that degradation over time. From
an air to ground perspective, I think that would be pretty
difficult.
Senator Ernst. So and just in closing, because my time is
running out, I do believe in supporting Ukraine. I think it is
important that we continue to do this and do it full on. Not
the drip, drip, drip we have seen from the Administration.
Really appreciate all of you being here today and sharing
your message with all of our folks back home as well. But
again, to the folks that love and support the 209th and the
1133d, God bless them. They are doing well. You should be proud
of them. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Stent and
Ms. Massicot, public reporting shows that the Chinese
Government is considering providing lethal support for Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. How does a hollowed out Russian army
affect China's security posture, and what opportunities does
the PRC Government see in providing lethal support to Russia?
Dr. Stent. I will start with--thank you, Senator. I think
we have to understand that the Chinese do not want Russia to
lose this war. You know, Xi Jinping and Putin say extravagant
things about each other.
They are each other's best friends. When it comes down to
the bottom line, from the Chinese point of view, Russia is the
other major authoritarian country in the world that shares
their grievances against the West, where they--both of them
talk about a post-West order. In other words, they need Russia
as a partner in trying to change the way that the world works
and make it more safe, really, for autocracy.
They may be very surprised and maybe even appalled by the
performance of the Russian military, but now that it looks that
Russia is really quite bogged down, they do not want Russia to
lose this war.
Because their concern is, and it is very hard for us to
imagine that, but if somebody were to come after Vladimir
Putin, who would rethink what Russia is doing, rethink its
ties, its antagonistic ties to the West, rethink its aggressive
policies, and rethink its dependance on China, then from the
Chinese point of view, that would leave them alone.
Again, hard for us to understand. So, I think that even
though until now the Chinese have been fairly restrained in
what they have done materially for Russia, even though they
support rhetorically everything that is--the Russian narrative,
they certainly would not want to see Russia lose.
It remains to be seen whether they are willing to take the
risk of supplying, as we hear, possibly artillery and drones.
Ms. Massicot. I don't have much to add to that other than,
again, from the they may be able to provide a short-term
stopgap for the Russians and provide some type of artillery
rounds or drones. But I agree with Dr. Stent.
Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Stent, have the events in the past
year led you to revise any conclusions you made in your 1990
book, 1919 book--sorry, 2019 book, Putin's World. What are the
biggest changes?
Dr. Stent. So last week, an updated version of the book
came out with a chapter on the Russia, Ukraine war. So
obviously in that book, I certainly understood the tensions
between Russia and Ukraine, but I think I, like many people,
didn't believe that Putin would undertake a full-scale invasion
of Ukraine the way he did.
So, I think what it has led me to rethink is I had always
viewed Putin as someone who was a pretty smart tactician and
not a huge risk taker. So, in 2008, when Russia invaded
Georgia, it didn't go to the capital, Tbilisi, and take out
President Saakashvili, who of course, President Putin hated. It
stopped and just recognized these two areas of Georgia as being
independent, and even in 2014, it took over Crimea fairly
bloodless and it didn't prosecute, continue prosecuting the war
in the Donbass that started the war. I think what has changed
is the amount of risk that Putin is willing to take. He was
obviously woefully misinformed about the performance of his own
military and about the performance of the Ukrainian military.
I think we see someone who is so hell bent on
reestablishing what he thinks is Russia's rightful empire that
he is not listening to, I think, the counsel of anyone else.
So, I think it is the willingness to take risks and to just dig
himself in, and which I think has made me somewhat change my
evaluation of him.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to the General Assembly,
they voted overwhelmingly last week to condemn Russia's
invasion, but there were 32 abstentions. Russia has been
aggressively spreading misinformation, not just in Russia and
the Homeland, but also in Africa and Latin America regarding
the causes of the war.
Who is at fault for grain and fertilizer shortages and
similar topics? How can the United States and their allies
counter these Russian diplomatic efforts? Both for Dr. Stent
and----
Dr. Stent. So, I think we do have to be more active
diplomatically. I mean, we already discussed sort of
information war, but we do have to be more active.
I mean, Russia, even during this first year of the war, has
increased its influence in Africa, partly through the Wagner
group, but also partly through diplomacy. We just had Sergei
Lavrov in South Africa recently, and you have just had this
past week a joint naval exercise between Russia, China, and
South Africa.
So, I think we do have to step up our diplomatic efforts
really in Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East to
try and counter some of what Russia is doing.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank very much. Thank you
all for being here today. General, thank you for your service.
I would like to say that first, I was in Ukraine 6 months
before this war started and talked to President Zelenskyy. They
knew this was coming. They were putting people on--they were
putting troops on the border through Belarus, all through the
Don--all over the place, building up.
We didn't do one thing. We said it was going to be a small
incursion. That is what President Biden said. We are coming off
Afghanistan. We looked--didn't look very smart. What would we
do different, General, now, in your eyes?
Now we are doing it, we are waiting. We seemed like we are
one step behind in everything we are doing. What should we have
done different at the beginning? Because it looks like we are
going to be the defender of the free world, we need to learn
from our mistakes and we made huge mistakes at the beginning of
this.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator, and thanks for
your question. As a former and retired military officer, I am a
little bit disappointed in the military and intelligence
community that either didn't relay this or didn't believe it as
well. We had very senior officers say, one, that Ukraine would
fall within 3 days of the invasion and try to get President
Zelenskyy right out of town.
That is when he made the comment, I don't need a ride, I
need ammunition. You can have a beer with that kind of guy. The
fact is we just didn't really believe it and we didn't look at
it hard. I would really question our intelligence communities,
all of them, and also the military why their decisionmaking was
so poor in foreseeing this. Most of us saw it. We saw the
indicators.
I am a big believer in indicators and patterns, and the
patterns and indicators were there. So, I think it was a fault
somewhere in our systems that we didn't convince ourselves that
it was really going to happen.
Part of it may have been a misunderstanding of President
Putin himself, and they just didn't believe he would do it. I
have actually heard commentators say, up until the day before
the invasion, he wouldn't--he was going to do it. Yes, he was,
and if you read Putin, and I had a fortune when I was in the
National Security Council, I brought Dr. Fiona Hill in on the
NSC team. She came out of Brookings, and she is a very well-
read person on Putin.
She says when he says something, believe it, he is going to
do it. We didn't believe.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Thank you, and now we are up to
our ears in alligators. Looks like China is getting ready--and
just a couple yes, no questions for Dr. Stent and General
Kellogg. Let's talk about China's motivation. Do you think that
the Chinese weapons are going to further drag out this
conflict? Dr. Stent, yes or no.
Dr. Stent. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. General?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. No.
Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need to increase
weapons supplies to Ukraine to counter Chinese munitions? Dr.
Stent, since you said yes.
Dr. Stent. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. If we are increasing our support
in Ukraine, do you believe that that will slow down shipments
to Taiwan in the future, if we continue to send munitions to
Ukraine? You don't think it will?
Dr. Stent. No.
Senator Tuberville. All right. Ms. Massicot, at a hearing
on February 15th, this Committee heard expert testimony that if
the United States were to enter a war with China today, we
would have just 2 weeks' worth of munitions, our stockpiles
would be out. Do you agree with this assessment?
Ms. Massicot. I don't have enough information to make an
assessment. I am sorry, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Take a shot at it, General.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I do not agree with that
assessment at all.
Senator Tuberville. Okay, thank you. General Kellogg, do
you have a clear sense of the overall United States strategy in
Ukraine, and what does victory look like for Ukraine?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I do not have an overall view
of what the current strategy in Ukraine is. I believe we should
have one. I think you have to put, in State, you have to put
Russia's army at risk in Ukraine. Putin has to understand he
has got two options, lose his army or leave. If his army loses
and is defeated, he falls.
Senator Tuberville. Can Ukrainians win it on their own?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. No. I don't--they can win it on
their own, if we give them the equipment to do it.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Okay. What is the most dangerous
course of action for the United States when it comes to this
conflict? What puts us in harm's way?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. By doing what we are doing
right now, because it is not disciplined. It is also not
emphatic.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. There was a poll out, the Russian
people believe from a poll in Russia, that they are at war
right now with the United States. The Russian people believe
this. You think the American people think we are at war with
the Russia, General?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. No, I do not, and that is
because of the messaging.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Dr. Stent?
Dr. Stent. No, I don't think so.
Senator Tuberville. How concerned--General, are you
concerned about nuclear conflict--how concerned?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think it has to be a
consideration simply because it is in the Russian philosophy to
use. They have got a large amount of what we--and I hate to use
the term tactical nuclear weapons, and they believe in using
it.
It is something we really don't have. In their philosophy,
to use it if it gets pushed, he may use it. I am hoping that
there will be smarter people would--he would not use it, but
you always have to understand the probability and possibility
of it happening.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you
all for your service, all of you. I appreciate it very much.
First of all, I want to say that I am old enough to remember
vividly the Vietnam War and all the conflicts we have had since
then.
I believe this is the most just position the United States
has ever taken for the right cause, to be involved for the sake
of freedom and democracy and what I think we all should be
doing.
So, I am very supportive and very appreciative of our
efforts and all of them, but also we can do much better. I
always think that too. I would ask the question to--any of you
all can answer on these.
Do you think--do the Ukrainians have the ability to produce
weapons themselves? Are they manufacturing? Do you all know if
there is any manufacturing in Ukraine right now? Mr. Massicot.
Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. The Russians from the
beginning of the war systematically attacked Ukraine's defense
industrial base. So, a lot of those factories are----
Senator Manchin. Since 2014?
Ms. Massicot. What they could range back then, but
especially since 2022. I mean, that is part of their strategy
that they actually did implement. They went after those
factories. So, either the workers are immobilized or they are
fighting, or the facilities are damaged. So, no, at this
point----
Senator Manchin. They are not producing anything. They are
depending totally, and there is a reason for that is what you
are saying.
Ms. Massicot. It is. There is a structural reason for that,
yes.
Senator Manchin. In Crimea right now, you know, I saw this
morning there was a report in television that showing that most
Crimeans are Russian, believe that they are part of Russia, and
want to remain part of Russia. But I understand that Zelenskyy
and Ukrainians want that to be part of their country because it
is. So where do we go with that? How do you--and Miss, Dr.
Stent, maybe you can talk to this or any of you all can answer
it? Is it possible that Crimea would come back and be part of
Ukraine, or would it remain separate?
Dr. Stent. President Zelenskyy has said that it is. One, we
do know what Ukraine's at least official war aims are, and it
is their aim to take back Crimea, which of course, the Russians
illegally annexed in 2014.
There are some people who believe that if the Ukrainians
tried to take back Crimea, if we come back to the question of
escalation now, that that would be a ``red line'' for Putin and
that might lead to a real military escalation.
I think it is unlikely in this present phase of the war
that the Ukrainians would be able to take back Crimea. Maybe
they will in the longer term, depending on what happens in
Russia, what happens, how----
Senator Manchin. I know the bridge has been repaired. I saw
the bridge is back in operation.
Dr. Stent. Yes, the bridge is back in operation. I don't
know what you think there are but----
Senator Manchin. Anybody else on that?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, you know, Zelenskyy
made the comment the war began in Crimea in 2014 and it will
end in Crimea. I think he has to take that into consideration.
I do think the Ukrainians with support can, in fact, penetrate
toward Kherson, toward Crimea, and put it--but that would be
something for negotiations somewhere along the line. Wars end
by negotiations and that would just part of it.
Senator Manchin. My only concern is basically it seemed
like the Crimean people there are sympathetic and feel more
connected to Russia than they do Crimea, from what we are
hearing in type of reports.
Without the citizen support, like they have the rest of
Ukraine, it would be quite difficult, I would think. And the
biggest thing I am concerned about is accountability. I think
our support is unwavering. It is bipartisan, Democrat,
Republican, overwhelmingly supporting the United States effort
and supporting Ukraine.
I am concerned about accountability. Are we basically good,
from Inspector General, good counting on the equipment we are
sending, the money that we are sending, vice versa. Because if
you look at what happened in Afghanistan, that whole country, I
mean, just was rigged with corruption.
I think it shows how quickly it fell as soon as we left. I
also believe that we left the wrong way, and I think that gave
Putin much more stimulus to do what he has done. Do you have
any comments on that, General?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think we are getting better,
Senator, on accountability. We are not there yet. When we were
in Ukraine recently, they are not--they do not object to
accountability.
I would provide a special inspector general or something
like that to provide on the team to ensure accountability to
the American people and make sure that their money is being
well spent out there. But are there problems? Of course, there
are. But they are getting better at it and they are trying to
fix it.
Senator Manchin. General, the last move, and I think has
Zelenskyy has just removed one of his top officers, a top
military person, and replaced him. What do you--what do you
read into that, any of you?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. He has not only replaced with
military officers, he has also replaced several other person
people in his office because of corruption concerns out there.
On the other side, remember, the Russians are on their fifth
general and that is running this----
Senator Manchin. I know that, but I am saying, do you think
it is a smart move? Dr. Stent, do you have any comments on
that?
Dr. Stent. I think President Zelenskyy understands that if
the European Union is really ever to accept Ukraine, it has to
do a much better job of dealing with corruption. So, I think
some of the sackings that we have seen in the past few weeks,
both of military personnel, but then other personnel, it is all
connected to that. Hopefully he will make progress with it.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you,
panel, for being here. I have got a couple comments and some
questions, too. Last week, I was on a trip to the Middle East,
meeting with the leaders over there.
General, you are absolutely right, Afghanistan is, the
withdrawal was a very strong, negative black eye to the United
States. It has made us extremely weak. In our allies, those
that believed that we would be there are questioning if we
would actually be there, if we were willing to walk away from
something we had so much investment in and literally turn the
country over to terrorists.
The irony of that, though, is President Trump, obviously,
when he was in office, he put in the Abraham Accord, and
Abraham Accord was designed to help strengthen the economy in
that region, but it has actually strengthened the allies in
that region, too, by doing business together with Israel.
The views that some of these world leaders have had with
Israel has been broken and they have realized that they have a
common foe, and it has strengthened themselves. What has
started out as an opportunity for businesses, has actually
helped fill the void that the United States have left behind.
With that being said, it has definitely led to Putin's
aggression because of our view.
At the same time, the American people are questioning why
we are even in Ukraine and what we are doing there. I feel very
strongly that we need to be there, but I don't feel as though
we should be taking the lead. I feel like it is what our NATO
allies are for. That is what we have alliances for.
I feel like that we need to be working with them, not
necessarily leading. But it is obvious, too, with Germany, for
instance, wavering back and forth on should they send weapons
or shouldn't they send weapons, when the United States decided
that we were going to send Abrams tanks.
No telling when that is actually going to happen, though.
You had Germany that finally agreed to start sending in
weapons. General, is--what is your view of our leadership and
the lack of leadership? How is this affecting what is happening
in the neighbors of Ukraine and their activity going on in
assisting Ukraine?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I
am concerned about the decisiveness of support for Ukraine. I
mean, this is a fight, it is an existential fight for Ukraine,
and we need to support it.
If we don't support this fight, we are going to be--and the
third time, we are going to be fighting in Europe. We are not
sending United States troops right now, and I don't think we
should. No Ukrainians thought we should either. Every Ukrainian
commander and every civilian and military leader, they do not
want American troops on the ground. They want the equipment.
They are able to fight it. But if this thing goes badly for
the Ukrainians and it starts to fade toward NATO, then we may
get involved in a fight that I would prefer we not do because
we have done this twice before to save Europe.
Senator Mullin. Should NATO shut down the airspace?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. The airspace in----
Senator Mullin. Over Ukraine.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, the Russians have a lot of
air dominance over Ukraine right now. The fact is, Ukrainians
are still fighting with their fighters. They do not--they have
not established air dominance at all. What you are seeing is
the missiles coming in, but they are not able to fly the
aircraft over Ukraine.
Senator Mullin. Would it help if we were able to shut down,
if NATO were to just simply shut down the airspace over
Ukraine?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. You know, Senator, I think it
is--I don't think the airspace would concern me very much right
now because it is really contested and the Ukrainians are doing
a fine job. I think there is other things we should do.
The other thing that we should do is we should give them
the ability to actually penetrate Russian space themselves and
attack targets into Russia, because that is where the supply
lines are located.
The Russians are using their borders as a sanctuary. So, it
is not so much airspace. I go back to ground space. It may be
able to put the Russians at risk. We haven't put ? we, meaning
the Ukrainians, have not been able to put the Russians at risk,
as they should be able to do.
Senator Mullin. Does Putin have the ability himself to
launch nuclear weapons or does it go through a process? I know
it used to go through a process. Is that--is that faded now? Is
the lines blurred?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, they do have a process. I
don't want to get into there because then I will fall back on
what I did at the National Security Council. But they have a
process. I am just hoping that if we ever get to a position
like that, wiser heads would prevail.
Senator Mullin. Well, I am familiar with the process.
Before I was in the Senate, I was on the House Intel, and we
were very aware of it, but I was concerned that it may be
blurred now. One last comment I will make and I will make it
brief.
The IC community, at least the ones in the field, and I am
not trying to defend the IC community here in Washington, DC. I
think they are riddled with problems, but they did call it
right. They were advising us that this was eminent, that they
were going, and they were very precise on even the timeframe of
when it was going to happen.
Unfortunately, when we were meeting with the
decisionmakers, they weren't very positive on Ukraine's resolve
and that is where we misled it or misread it. We should
understand that Ukraine was going to fight.
I will admit I even got that wrong. Now that they are
fighting, we should do everything we can to support them and
with our allies. So, thank you guys, everybody, for your
comments, and thanks for talking honestly and in agreeance with
one voice. It is refreshing. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will pick up where
Senator Mullin left off. I think while you come at this from
different perspectives and have some differences in your
testimoneys, I am picking up a common punchline, which is we
are doing a lot, but we need to do more and we need to do it
quicker.
We have to calculate and calibrate, but we should do more
and do it quicker. Our allies, they are doing a lot, but they
should do a lot more and invest a lot more because they have
more at stake here. General Kellogg, you talked about this war
in their backyard, and I think that that is true.
So I think that that is coming through loud and clear. I do
want to just comment on one thing. General Kellogg, in your
testimony, you said this, simply saying that one will support
Ukraine for as long as it takes is a bumper sticker, not a
strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages, no rounds of
sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are
substitutes for American leadership.
Let me just offer my thoughts on that. The sanctions
packages that the United States have engineered, they ain't a
bumper sticker--they ain't a bumper sticker. They are an
example of great American diplomacy.
The billions of dollars of aid that this Congress has
appropriated for military purposes in Ukraine with the
President's request, that ain't a bumper sticker. That is
American leadership. One Estonia that did it. One Liechtenstein
that did it. The billions and billions of aid for humanitarian
purposes that we have allocated. Not a bumper sticker. That is
American leadership.
100,000 Ukrainian refugees in the United States in the 5-
months after the invasion. Don't look at the Armed Services
Committee and tell me that that is a bumper sticker. That is
American leadership. Engineering a State of affairs where
Finland and Sweden, whose popular approval for accession to
NATO would have been about 25 percent a couple of years ago,
are now on the verge of joining NATO and dramatically
increasing both the NATO and Western defense capacity.
Don't tell me that is a bumper sticker. That is American
leadership. Engineering overwhelming votes in the General
Assembly and the National Security Council to call out Putin's
illegal war effort.
Admittedly, they are nations that abstain, there are
nations that stand with Russians that are acknowledging the
facts. That ain't a bumper sticker, that is American
leadership. I don't see any reason why anybody should be Debbie
Downer about American leadership that has assembled a global
coalition to stand for Ukraine.
We are not trashing Zelenskyy any more, we are standing up
with him. We are not undermining Ukraine anymore, we are
standing up for Ukraine. If you wonder about American
leadership, talk to President Zelenskyy, because we all do. We
talk to him in person. I have colleagues who visit him in
Ukraine. He came and addressed us right before Christmas. I had
no reason to believe he was lying to us when he thanked us for
American leadership.
The global effort to stand for Ukraine against an illegal
invasion by a dictator, that is not only necessary in all of
our view to stand up against Putin but also to send a message
to dictators around the globe, would not have happened without
American leadership, by this Committee, by the Appropriations
Committee, by the Intel Committee, by the Foreign Relations
Committee, by the Administration.
Could we do more, could we do it quicker, could we look in
the rearview mirror and say things might have been done--? Of
course. Should we exercise oversight on the investments that we
make in Congress? Should we be able to answer questions the
American public asked us about the stakes or about the dollars
we are investing?
Of course we should. Those are all really important
questions and they are very fair. But to suggest that the
coordinated effort of the Article 1 and 2 branches in outreach
around the world to assemble a global coalition to support
Ukraine is a bumper sticker rather than American leadership, I
don't get it. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists that are here today. I would like to begin by asking
you to share your assessments on the current status of war in
Ukraine.
So, and hopefully I am going to be like Senator Tuberville
and we will do yes or no unless you feel a driving desire that
you have to explain further. We will start with you, doctor.
How would you assess the current State of the Russian military
in Ukraine?
Dr. Stent. Well, they are struggling to perform better. On
the other hand, they do have, you know, a few hundred thousand
more people that they can throw into this war. They have
learned a little bit from their mistakes, but still they are
struggling.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Ms. Massicot.
Ms. Massicot. I don't think they have culminated in the
Clausewizian sense, but their combat effectiveness is
definitely degraded. They are trying to find a solution. I
think that they are trying to use brute force tactics to close
on the Ukrainians as quickly as possible at a very high cost.
I don't think they are capable of large incursions anymore,
not for several years until they can properly regenerate
armored force and rebuild their missile stocks. That being
said, I do anticipate incremental gains in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Potentially a little bit more in Zaporizhzhia. I don't have
a timeline on that, but probably toward the summer. That is
what their intentions are.
Senator Fischer. When you talk about the Russians using
brute force, brutal tactics, will the Ukrainians suffer through
that and remain strong?
Ms. Massicot. Their will to fight is very strong, but this
is taking a toll on them. That is not only a high casualty
situation for them as well, there is also a lot of
psychological distress because, again, we are talking about
mowing down human waves every day.
Also, they have specific needs that are emerging from this
type of fighting. We are talking about ammunition, small arms,
50 caliber mortars, artillery shells to counter this. So, I
know we talk a lot about ATACMS and F-16s, but I would just
like to point out that they have immediate small arms needs, to
include morphine.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, and General?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, thank you. I think you
are heading to our war of attrition like we are seeing around
Bakhmut right now. The longer this war goes, it accrues to
Russia's favor. That is why it must be terminated as quickly as
it can while Ukraine still has the advantage. Russia will have
the advantage.
Russia is learning right now, as we are seeing around
Bakhmut, where they are changing how they fight, the tactics
they are using by sheer mass and heavy use of artillery. They
are going back to the way the Russians used to fight before.
Senator Fischer. General, how important is it that the
United States and our allies continue to be supportive to
Ukraine for their psychological reasons and to show the
Russians that we will be supportive to the Ukrainians? How does
that play into your previous analysis that you just stated?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, I think the Ukrainians
can do more. If you look what the Kiel Institute just said, and
that is out of Kiel, Germany, the European Union only committed
6 percent of their total stores of military stock, where the
British have committed 25 percent of their total stock, and we
are committing a lot of our stock as well.
So, I think when it comes down, and referring back to what
Senator Kaine said a minute ago, is there isn't a question
about Presidential leadership, not with what this Congress has
done, which has been enormous.
Where you lead is from the top and where those decisions
are made are from the top. The issue is getting the other
allies to contribute more. They are not contributing what they
can contribute to this fight.
Senator Fischer. Mr. Massicot, how would you analyze that?
What--how important is it for Congress, for our Administration,
to be vocal about our support and our continued support, and
also for our allies for NATO to step up? How does that play not
just on the Ukrainians, but on the Russians as well?
Ms. Massicot. So, I was in the Pentagon in 2014, the first
time Russia invaded, and I could say that the response from
this government is fundamentally very different. Our intel
collection prior to the war was very different.
Our response is very different. I do think the Russians are
deterred from the upper end of their escalation. I think they
remain absolutely terrified of our air power. They don't engage
us in cyber-attacks.
Senator Fischer. Are we too slow in getting to Ukraine what
they need?
Ms. Massicot. I don't have all the information, but it is
my assumption that the logistics to get these weapons dug out
of every corner from different parts of the globe is
complicated logistically.
I don't--from what I understand from the outside, I don't
think it is a deliberate metering of things not to give it to
them. I think there is a lot that is complicated in getting it
to them. I don't know how to improve the logistics.
Senator Fischer. But to show our resolve and getting it
there is important?
Ms. Massicot. I do.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you. Dr. Stent, how would
you respond?
Dr. Stent. I would--you know, it seems to me that we have
been doing this incrementally, and we, first of all say, we are
not going to send this----
Senator Fischer. Then we do.
Dr. Stent.--and then we do send it. So, in the end, we do
the right thing. But probably some of these things could have
been sent more quickly. I think obviously, what we are all
awaiting now is what the outcome of this question about whether
we are going to supply them with fighter jets, the F-16s will
be.
Senator Fischer. Air power earlier would have prevented
some of the devastation we see on their infrastructure within
their own country, and made them more reliant on the United
States and our allies, wouldn't you say?
Dr. Stent. Yes, I think so.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator King,
please. Excuse me, Senator Kelly. I am sorry.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator King. General Kellogg, and for everybody here today,
thank you for testifying. I want to followup a little bit on
Senator Fischer's questions about the aid we have given to
Ukraine.
As you know, the United States in this close partnership
with Ukraine, we have provided, I think the number to date is
$29.8 billion in security assistance since this brutal attack
occurred around a year ago.
Equipment from the United States has included everything
from ammunition, grenades, bombs, MVDs, HIMARS, 155-millimeter
artillery pieces, counter fire, fire radars, much of what is in
our inventory. Not everything but much. I also want to commend
our allies for their support.
Nearly 50 countries providing $13 billion in security
assistance, most recently agreeing to provide tanks. This is
going to be critical for Ukraine with the approach that they
are going to need to take this spring. So, General Kellogg, can
you provide your assessment on the effectiveness of both U.S.
and partner military equipment.
If you see any gaps, if there is something you think is not
working well and something that we should address, a gap in
capability, I would like to hear that. Then from a combat
assessment, what has provided the greatest return on investment
for the Ukrainians?
What do you think the most important thing for us to
continue to supply, if you have a sense for--you know, what I
heard when I was in Munich a couple of weeks ago was that they
need 155-millimeter artillery shells, that that supply is going
down.
They also made some other requests, some of which we are
going to deal with here in the United States Senate. But if you
could share your assessment, I would appreciate that.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator,
what you really need is all the equipment you just mentioned,
but more. We developed a package during the cold war called a
salt breaker.
The salt breaker where the Abrams tanks, the Bradley
fighting vehicle, a pallet 155 self-propelled Howitzer, the
Apache fighting system, all of those systems together allowed
us to fight in the combined arms fashion. The combined arms
fashion assault will break the Russians' back.
The Russians are not capable of handling that. But we
haven't given them the full suite. We haven't given the
Ukrainians ATACMS. That is the long-range missile that fits
into the pod of either HIMARS or MRS systems out there. It
gives you extended range of 200 miles. It is GPS guided. It can
attack their supply lines deep.
We only give them 31 tanks. 31 tanks is a battalion, you
need much more than that. Give them brigades levels so they can
actually fight combined arms, and then maybe we have to do
separately, you give the Europeans with the Challenger tanks
from Britain, maybe they have one unit----
Senator Kelly. My sense is in discussing with, you know,
our highest military leadership including, you know, folks on
the Joint Chiefs, that they are capable of using combined arms
to fight. I think what you might be alluding to is they need to
do it on a bigger scale. Certainly there are gaps.
I mean, they are not using, you know, nor do they have
Apache helicopters. That would be an entire another issue. But
being able to combine ground troops with, artillery, with long
range fires is something I think they have done rather
effectively. Maybe not at the scale that you think.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Not at the scale that is needed
to win.
Senator Kelly. So give me a sense of what you feel the
greatest return on our investment has been from the standpoint
of equipment that we have provided them.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I would believe the best system
that we have given them has been the HIMAR system. That is the
one that has given deep fires, and the fires have been able to
compensate and overcompensate for the Russian fires. So if you
have to pick, artillery generally, even I am an old
infantryman, artillery will win your fights, and we need to
have as much artillery to dominate that.
Plus one other system that is not really a military
hardware system in the sense it is kinetic, but we need to give
them more advanced intelligence systems that is able to use
jammers, because they are using, Russians are using jammers to
great effect right now, especially against the drones the
Ukrainians have had. That is something we haven't really done.
We probably should do more.
Senator Kelly. I appreciate that. Just, if I could just
take another 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. The HIMARS, they view
as--it was a game changer for them. I agree, that is, a good
example of a weapons system that has been very effective, and
really, changed the momentum in this fight. Beyond that, what
would be the next thing you think would be a game changer for
them?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, again, sir, what I just
talked about, it is not a kinetic system, but the ability to do
anti-jamming in the intelligence type of collection and
electronic warfare. The Russians do that very, very well.
That is causing problems with the drones of the Ukrainians
as well. It is also be able to target the Ukrainians much
deeper. It is something that is really not thought about
because it may not be sexy, but the fact is those are the kind
of systems they need to support. It allows better targeting,
longer range targeting, and with greater effects on the
battlefield.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. I want to thank all of the witnesses for
their very informative testimony. General Kellogg, I especially
appreciate your testimony. It is clear eyed and hard-nosed, as
you would expect from a seasoned statesman and military man
like yourself who spent a lot of time on the battlefield and
less time the halls of the Pentagon, so thank you.
I think there are some important lessons for the
Administration and Democrats to learn, and also Republicans to
learn. I just want to revisit a few points of your testimony
and make sure I have it correct.
It sounds like one key point you are making is it is
possible to support Ukraine without supporting President
Biden's Ukraine policy, is that correct?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Correct.
Senator Cotton. If I could synthesize the critique, I have
heard about President Biden's Ukraine policy maybe down to a
few points.
First, in 2021, he did what Winston Churchill cautioned
that we should never do with dictatorships but especially
Russia, gave them temptations to a trial of strength by giving
away the START and the New START treaty, and NordStream 2,
turning the cheek on the Colonial Pipeline hack, inviting him
to a big summit in Europe.
Is that one part of the--one part of your take is that
President Biden tempted Vladimir Putin to achieve what he has
always wanted to achieve, which is subjugating Ukraine to a new
Russian empire?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator--Senator, I am a
big believer in patterns. We all have patterns. We go to the
shore the same way, by the same service station, and so do
leaders. Putin saw it in the leadership of President Biden, a
pattern, and he was able to exploit it.
Senator Cotton. Second, over the year of the war, it sounds
to me like your critique is that the President Biden, the
Administration has been pussyfooting around their support for
Ukraine, constantly providing them just enough to avoid a
catastrophic defeat, not enough to win. It is, as you say, a
pattern we have seen from the very beginning. We will give them
ammunition, but not artillery.
We will give them artillery, but not HIMARS. We will give
them HIMARS and not armor. We will give them Bradleys, but not
Abrams. We will give them Abrams but not cluster munitions and
F-16, which is where we are now.
Therefore, these dragged out the war longer than we should
have if we had just provided Ukraine with what it needed to
defend its territory from the very beginning. Am I right about
that?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. You are correct, Senator.
Senator, and you will appreciate this, this is like doing a
river crossing. Once from the near bank to the far bank, you
don't get to the middle on a river crossing and you said it was
not a good idea. Once you commit, you go.
Senator Cotton. To a point you were making earlier and
Senator Kaine discussed with you, is that President Biden keeps
talking about supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes, which
is a substitute for helping Ukraine win as quick as it can, is
that right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe so, because if this
goes to a long range fight, it is an endless war and they
cannot win a war of attrition.
Senator Cotton. So from the beginning, it shouldn't have
been about supporting Ukraine as long as it takes. It should be
helping them win as quick as they can. For the record, Senator
Kaine talked a lot about seeing through the rearview mirror. I
think you were making these very points a year ago, weren't
you, when you were looking through the windshield, not the
rearview mirror.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Correct, sir.
Senator Cotton. I think a lot of us were. Then the third
take, after the first one, that President Biden tempted
Vladimir Putin to go for the jugular and then he spent a year
pussyfooting around in support for Ukraine, is that he has also
allowed Europe to get away with not doing enough, especially on
financial support and in particular Germany, France, and the
European Union. Is that right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe Europe has been very
laggard.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Now, I also hear you making a few
other points as well that I want to pursue. Sometimes we hear a
criticism of President Biden that he seems to care more about
Ukraine's border than America's borders.
I think that is fair criticism of President Biden. But it
sounds like you believe, and that it is the case, that you can
care about America's borders and protect our borders, while
also help other countries protect their borders too, is that
right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Recently since the terrible train wreck in
East Palestine, Ohio, and President Biden's trip to Kyiv last
week, I have heard some say that the President will go to Kyiv,
but he won't go to East Palestine.
I agree that is a fair criticism of President Biden. It
sounds to me like you think it is possible to both go to East
Palestine and support the people there who have been harmed by
this train wreck, but also travel to Kyiv and show our support
for the Ukrainian people and their fight against this war of
aggression from Russia. Is that right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. My experience that Air Force
One can go anywhere it wants to go.
Senator Cotton. Thank you for that. Now, on negotiations,
we also hear a lot of criticism that we are not doing enough to
have a negotiated end to this conflict, that we need to get
negotiations underway. I think you are--one of your key points
in terms of supporting Ukraine now, backing them to the hilt as
quick as we can, not for as long as it takes, is that the only
way to get a negotiated settlement is to convince Vladimir
Putin he has more to lose in the battlefield than he does at
the negotiating table, Is that right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct, Senator. What
you need to push pressure on him, if he loses his army, he
loses, and that is what you put him at risk of.
Senator Cotton. So this idea that, well, if we stop
supporting Ukraine or if we gradually draw down our support for
Ukraine, then we will magically have a negotiated settlement
that protects America's interests.
What you are saying is that, no, what we would do is
further embolden Vladimir Putin, exactly what Joe Biden did in
2021 to try to achieve maximalist gains first in Ukraine and
then down the road against NATO partners. Is that right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct. It is fool's
gold if you think you can reduce aid.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all for your testimony, which
has been very helpful and instructive. General Kellogg,
particularly to you, thank you for your service. I have visited
Ukraine three times over roughly the last year, the last two of
them with Senator Graham taking the overnight train into Kyiv.
I respect particularly, General, your visit to Ukraine and
the lessons that you have learned. One of the lessons that come
to me over this past year is that the world, and particularly
the United States, has consistently underestimated the
Ukrainians.
I came back from my first trip before the invasion telling
anyone who would listen, including the President, that the
Ukrainians are going to fight to the last person, with
pitchforks if necessary. That is what President Zelenskyy told
me, and he wasn't leaving that country.
So I have strong confidence in Ukrainians, which has been
bolstered by my visit just 10 days ago to the United States
Army base in Bavaria, where American soldiers are training
Ukrainians in the use of those Bradley armored vehicles. To
quote one of them, they are quick studies, as you would expect,
when you are defending your homeland, your children, your
family, as we would be.
Americans, in fact, the American soldiers training them
said to me, they fight just like we do. So I have come back
from each of these visits urging more military aid, more
Stingers and Javelins, more of the air defense. Senator Graham
and I came back last July urging that we provide the Patriot
system, which we did after some hesitation and caution. In
fact, delay.
I am urging that we provide the F-16s, the air support that
are necessary. The aircraft that they say are necessary for
them to break through the air defenses that the Russians have
established. Would you agree with me, General, that we should
provide the F-16 and begin training those pilots immediately?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I would provide them
everything we could possibly provide them to win this fight
because it prevents American troops being deployed later if
they can defeat the Russian military.
If it takes the F-16, because it does have better avionics
than the MiG-29 does, and you could upload the ARM 88 missiles,
as an example, the answer is I would provide everything I can.
Senator Blumenthal. What I have heard repeatedly, and not
just from the Administration, from some on both sides of the
aisle here, that providing these weapons systems is too
complicated, too costly, too difficult in terms of training.
What I saw, and what I have heard from our American
military, is that the training obstacles can be overcome and
the costs of failing to provide these weapon systems now will
be greater later.
We will pay more in terms of cost if we have to commit
troops after one of our NATO allies is involved or attacked
than we would now, because right now President Zelenskyy
doesn't want and doesn't need American troops on the ground. He
wants the weapons systems that he needs to win the war. Would
you agree?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I totally agree, Senator. My
experience with the Ukrainians and those that fought with the
Ukrainians, they are very capable. They are very smart. It is a
very educated population. They are fighting for the life of
their country, and they will devote everything they can to do
it. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. There is a hitch here. It is the
challenge that I regard as really paramount right now here in
the United States, which is our defense industrial base.
ATACMS, I fully support providing ATACMS, but what I have been
told is that we don't have enough right now. That we need to
produce more.
The same with some of the ammunition that has been
mentioned. We need to produce more of it. We need a trained
workforce that will provide the skills and the person power
that is needed. Would you agree that we need to focus on the
production of these weapon systems, not just talk about what is
needed on the battlefield?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, absolutely. The defense
industry is working on a peacetime schedule. We either get them
to a wartime footing to actually ramp up the equipment that
they are providing, which is actually backfilling the American
military, which is more modern equipment.
The Stinger line, we shut down for years. We need to bring
those lines back on to make sure it is--and actually put the
entire defense industry on a wartime footing. Not only get the
munitions that are needed to defeat the Russians, the
Ukrainians defeating the Russians, but also to bring our stocks
back up to good levels.
Senator Blumenthal. I hope we can have bipartisan agreement
on that last point that you made, General, because I think it
is the key to meeting those needs on the Ukrainian battlefield
and being prepared to send a message to China, continued
message about our resolve. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, each of you,
for being here. Thank you for your testimony and thank you for
answering all these questions. General Kellogg, we have seen
the atrocities.
We know Russia has a despicable government. We, our heart
goes out to the Ukrainians for all their losses. It is--I mean,
when you see that Putin is sitting there wanting to kill women
and children, it is just despicable.
If you were thinking about it, and just from the standpoint
of American security, how important is this to American
security that we make sure that the Ukrainians win and Russia
loses? If the opposite happened, how adverse would that be on
our own personal and our own security, which is our primary
role up here in Congress to provide for the security of
Americans?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I
believe if you can defeat a strategic adversary and not use any
United States troops, you are at the acme of professionalism,
because letting the Ukrainians defeat that, it takes a
strategic adversary off the table and then we can focus what we
should be focusing against our primary adversary, which is
China at this time.
The concern I have got is I don't think we need to put
American troops there. If we fail in this, we may have to fight
another European war, which would be the third time. I don't
think we should do that or need to do that as well.
Senator Scott. General, why--I mean, I think we have to
worry about--I think, we need to make sure Russia loses, in my
opinion. We need to make sure the Ukrainians win. Why haven't--
why hasn't Germany stepped up?
I mean, this is not--you know, I don't know how close how
many miles it is from the Ukrainian border to Germany, but why
hasn't Germany stepped up and done its part on lethal aid. I
mean, it seems to me that they should be, have a bigger concern
than we do.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe Germany is a non-
player in Europe right now. I think you look more toward the
Poles as being the major player.
While it is a very obviously important country, I think
they are feckless. They just haven't supported it. They should
support--they should be all in this fight because it is--they
have seen the experience of us coming over in 2 years and
actually defeating Germany in two wars.
They just, the leadership they have gotten has not
displayed the leadership you would expect from a wartime
leader.
Senator Scott. You think that--I mean, a lot of people
believe that we can negotiate a settlement with Putin. Is there
any type of settlement you believe that Putin, one, would be
interested in doing, and then two, that would be worth anything
if he agreed to?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I believe at the end,
I believe the two experts to my right would say this, the only
thing that Putin understands is power and strength. You have to
basically put your knee on his throat, and how you do that is
defeat the only thing that really counts for Putin, and that is
the Russian army in Ukraine. Defeat that army and I believe
Putin falls.
Senator Scott. Is there any--you know, a lot of what we
hear is that we have spent a lot of money. Germany is not, they
have not done the lethal aid. They have done other types of
aid.
How can we quantify to the American public the importance
of this? Because, some people, like in my State they ask me why
we spend over $100--or committed, not spent, but committed $100
billion.
Is there a way that we can make sure the Biden
Administration does what I think most, a lot of us believe in
is we need to go all in now rather than piecemeal.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I believe it is fight
there rather than here. It is better that we have to fight an
adversary overseas, not use U.S. troops to do so. Ukrainians
don't want United States troops. Everyone I have talked to said
we can fight this fight as long as we get the kit to do it.
I think if we don't--we need to tell the American people,
you can basically walk and chew bubble gum at the same time. We
should be addressing all of those issues that we have both here
in the United States and overseas, and I think that balance can
be displayed.
I think that needs to be done, which I believe, through
Presidential leadership. I think the President should pick up
the phone and be asked to and call President Putin. Even right
now, when he sees Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, they will
not pick up the phone and talk to him, nor will the Chinese. I
think that is a huge mistake.
Senator Scott. So what is the takeaway for Xi right now
with regard to how the Biden Administration has acted and how
when you look at, you know, part of the American public
questions what we are doing there. What is Xi's takeaway?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, the huge takeaway is that
we are in a drift and we are not displaying Presidential
leadership. What I mean by Presidential leadership is being
very, very definitive on what is it going to take to win this
fight.
We are taking a backseat to letting Ukraine drive this
decision. This decision of the free world decision of how we
fight and how we win on the battlefield, and I believe
Presidential leadership does count, decisive leadership does
count.
Putin needs to understand that decisive leadership, and
that he is actually fighting us and the free world in this
endeavor.
Senator Scott. Thank each of you. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you. I think General Kellogg, the
Germans would be surprised to be called feckless. They have
made about 180 degree turn in their orientation toward conflict
in arms and armament. I think clearly the United States has
been the major donor, if you will, both in terms of military
and humanitarian aid, in terms of dollars.
I think, I was in Munich last week, I think in terms of
percentage of GDP, we are like 12th behind a lot of other
countries, particularly Poland, which has stepped up in an
enormously consequential way. Both regard refugees, acting as a
conduit for weapons.
So I don't--I just don't think it--I just don't think it is
accurate to say that the rest of the world and Europe is not
stepping up. Because as a percentage of their economy, they are
actually countries that are doing more than we are.
I do have a specific question about, and I think, General
Kellogg, you will agree with me on this one. That is, we go
through these long debates about whether to send tanks, whether
to send jet fighters.
Then if we decide, yes, as we have learned with the tanks,
there is this long lag time, three or 4 months. That mostly
involves training. It seems to me that one way to shorten that
is to say, well, we haven't decided yet about jet aircraft or
tanks, but let's do the training now. Does that make sense?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, it really does. Train
now with any system they have got and prepare for the future. I
think it is there. Sir, I spent 5 years in Germany. The
Germany, I remember when I was there, and spent 5 years in
there, is not the Germany I see today, both in leadership and
their military capacity and capability.
So I understand it is a harsh statement, but I stand by the
statement as well, but you are absolutely right, if we can
train them on all the systems that we may provide them, they
are very smart, they are very quick learned, and I think it
would help out.
Senator King. Professor Stent, a question about, one of the
things that is puzzling to me, I remember when this started a
year ago, all the talk was the sanctions are going to cripple
Russia. They are going to be just out of business and riots in
the street. Absolutely hasn't worked.
Talk to me about why. Were the sanctions--were they the
wrong sanctions? Were they not applied well? Did we
underestimate the Russian capacity to circumvent them. Why have
the sanctions regime not played a bigger part in this conflict?
Dr. Stent. So I think we always tend to think the first
reaction to something like the Russian invasion is to impose
sanctions. I think we forget how resilient that Russian economy
is despite the sanctions.
The IMF said that Russia's economy was going to contract by
8 percent last year. It contracted by 2 percent. They have been
able to do this because they have had a smart policy of
stabilizing the ruble, and because they have earned, you know,
windfall profits last year from their oil and gas sales. They
have managed to keep the war machine going despite sanctions.
That is changing now. We have the oil price cap. They
probably won't make those windfall profits anymore. But still,
India has now become the largest purchaser of Russian oil,
other countries, China. So they do still sell the hydrocarbons,
even though the Europeans have now weaned themselves off the
Russian imports.
Senator King. But don't you think we underestimate other
countries, particularly a country like Russia, their ability to
absorb pain?
Dr. Stent. Yes, I think we do, and I think----
Senator King. They go back--he is invoking Stalingrad, and
also sanctions against a dictatorial regime, the problem is the
dictator will always have his Mercedes and caviar. So the
sanctions don't have directly effect, and it is a country that
doesn't have much in the way of political opposition, then I am
not sure where the sanctions go. Are there additional sanctions
we should be applying now?
Dr. Stent. I mean, there is still some Russian banks we
could sanction. We have sanctioned many of them. I think we
also misunderstand the relationship between Putin and the
oligarchs.
I mean, and the people who lost their bank accounts and
their yachts and everything else. They are not going to get
together and say, we have to rid ourselves of this leader. That
is not how the system works.
Senator King. That hasn't worked.
Dr. Stent. Right. I think the only other thing I would say
is that I think the export control sanctions will be--will bite
more this year, particularly the lack of access to
semiconductors and components for manufacturing.
So the Russians already started closing down some assembly
lines with automobiles and things like that, and that will then
hit the general population. But so far----
Senator King. That is where I want to followup. Ms.
Massicot, what is the status of the Russian defense industrial
base? How are they--are they going to be able to keep producing
ammunition and weapons?
Ms. Massicot. Well, we found since the beginning of the
last year of war that Putin has delayed decisions that he
thinks are risky and well beyond when he should have done.
Russia has not activated its full wartime authorities to
command that defense industrial base to really go 24/7.
There are some sectors of it that are. My understanding is
that some of their longer range precision munitions, they are
working triple shifts to try to get those missile stocks back
up. My understanding is that artillery shells, it is pretty
simple for them to construct it if they have the access to the
raw materials, which they do.
There is a bit of a delay right now. I think they will
probably overcome it by the fall, maybe the late winter. So in
the interim, I am not sure what they are going to do. I know
they are trying to get it from North Korea. They are trying to
get it from China.
Senator King. The big question, and I know it has been
covered. I was in another hearing downstairs, but the big
question is, will China bail them out? Is there a yes or no
answer to that? What do we think? What do we think China is
going to do? Are they going to--so far, they have been content
to stand on the sidelines and hold Russia's coat. Are they
going to actually step in and start supplying weapons?
Ms. Massicot. I think there probably is an answer for a
China expert. I am not that person, but I would say that if
they did intervene right now, it would fill a critical gap for
the Russians for the next several months. I am not sure.
Senator King. I raise the question, what our response is to
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator King. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
couple of questions, but let me--so let me try to give voice to
what I think a lot of folks out there who are not sitting in
these chairs feel about where we are at with regard to this
policy. They have seen an Administration's disastrous
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Hundreds or tens of billions of dollars' worth of equipment
left behind, critical intelligence. They are told about
respecting the sovereignty of other countries' borders but do
nothing about the millions of people streaming across our
Southern border and the fentanyl that is killing 300 people a
day in every single one of our communities.
The violence, the humanitarian crisis. Human beings being
trafficked by drug cartels. They see a President go to Ukraine
before he goes to Ohio where there is a toxic chemical spill. A
lot of people who feel forgotten in all of this are frustrated.
I suppose my first question, I guess, to all of you,
briefly because I have limited time, is $113 billion. Now we
can talk about percentage of GDP, but for most folks out there,
that is a lot of money. One billion dollars is a lot of money.
One hundred thirteen billion dollars is a lot of money when you
have a porous open border.
In fact, it is more money than we spend on the Department
of Homeland Security every year. What can be done to ensure
that these dollars are fully accounted for beyond what we are
doing right now? I guess that is the first question I have, for
each of you, if you have a point of view on that.
Dr. Stent. Senator, my understanding is that we do have
mechanisms in place, and this has been discussed----
Senator Schmitt. My question is, let's say you are not
satisfied with that. What else can be done?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I think you can
provide more--we don't have, for example, a special inspector
general that is currently in Kyiv. We should probably put a
full team on board to make sure that the accountability is
there. It is a matter of emphasis.
What you saw, we had the same thing in Afghanistan and
places like that before, we put in a special IG that is able to
track all of that. So if you are saying what to do more, that
is kind of what I would say, and the Ukrainians are very
willing to accept that. They understand they have got
corruption issues.
They told us that when we were there. They are not running
from it. I think it would behoove us to actually improve that
accountability, and the second, you asked a great question. I
think we have a terrible messaging problem with the American
people.
Right now, we can walk and chew bubble gum at the same
time. You can do all of this if you want to, you just have to
be committed to it, and I don't think we are committed to it.
Senator Schmitt. Well, let me just--so we have heard a lot
about this, you know, existential threat to Ukraine and to
Europe. I suppose, again, part of the frustration is the
American people, the American taxpayers, they don't see these
European countries stepping up. They just, they don't.
We can talk about percentage of GDP, but Germany has walked
away. There is other countries in Europe that could be doing a
lot more. So I guess my question is, General Kellogg, to you,
what specifically can those European countries do? This is in
their backyard.
You mentioned, you know, fight them there or fight them
here. I don't know if that is a--you know, I don't think that
most Americans believe that we are at a point where we are
going to be fighting the Russians on American soil.
So we are in the European theater here. What can these
European countries do to step up? Because they got a lot of
money for a lot of their social welfare programs in those
countries, but they don't seem to have a lot of money for this,
you know, existential threat.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, the comment you made is
accurate because, for example, as I said, use the Kiel
Institute, which tracks this very, very well. Only 6 percent of
the European stocks in the European Union, military stocks have
been used.
Unlike the Brits, who--25 percent of their stock has been
used. They do need to step out more. How you get them to step
up more, you very candidly, is do what President Trump did, to
stand up and use the presidency as a bully pulpit and say this
is what needs to get done. We need to tell them that.
We cannot continue--be continuing to expect that United
States of America will carry 50 percent of the load, and that
is what it is carrying when you analyze these other 41
countries. It is in their backyard. You know, over a year ago,
before this war started, I said this is a European fight before
an American fight.
Once the fight was joined, they said, okay, now we are into
the game. Now we have to fight. But, yes, you are absolutely
correct, they are not doing enough. But you have to get the
President willing to say that and force them to do that, and
they are not doing that right now, and we are not pushing them
into supporting to the degree they should support.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Of course, Ranking
Member Wicker isn't here, but we really appreciate that you are
holding this timely hearing on the ongoing war in Ukraine,
which sadly comes shortly after the 1-year anniversary of
Putin's brutal and unjustified invasion over Ukraine sovereign
territory. As I have said before, the United States and our
allies, I believe, must stand with Ukraine for as long as it
takes for the Ukrainian people to win.
Now is not the time to back down, especially with spring,
as we know, the weather presents an opportunity for Ukrainian
counteroffensive. So, Ms. Massicot, what is your assessment of
the ability to rapidly and effectively provide some of these
newer weapons systems and advanced technologies to Ukraine?
I want to also bring up this point, how can the Pentagon,
do you believe, improve its acquisition system to quickly adapt
and maybe field some of the off the shelf technologies that are
going to enable Ukraine off the battlefield, things we can do
there?
Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. I think about needs for
Ukraine on two different timelines. There is the immediate
needs, which we have talked about, artillery shells and
additional small arms to prevent these Russian frontal
assaults.
I think some of the more advanced systems that we have
talked about today, like the F-16s or ATAMCS, there is a lead
time with that, with training. But I agree with my panelists,
if you never start the process, you never start the process.
When the war kicked off, I believe that it was really urgent
for the Ukrainians to receive air defense systems, and I still
think that is a really urgent thing that we must sustain.
The Russians are working at chipping away at that over time
with missile salvos at Ukrainian cities using Iranian Shahed
drones. If they are able to treat the Soviet era SAMs, or some
of our IRIS-T or NASAMS that have been provided, it would allow
the Russian air force to come back in a very large way, and I
worry that that would be very dangerous for the Ukrainians.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on. I am going to
come back to you, Ms. Massicot, but I want to move on to Dr.
Stent, because we have been hearing some of the conversation
here.
Of course, during Putin's address to the Russian people
just last week, he reiterated his warnings to the West, and I
am going to quote, he said, global confrontation. And so, are
his threats intended for our domestic consumption or for us
here in the United States? Just for domestic consumption inside
Russia?
Do you foresee a more aggressive Russia? I am thinking
about his global confrontation posture. Perhaps cyber that he
hasn't really played much. You say, well, maybe they don't see
them marching here, but the cyber-attacks can hit you pretty
hard as well. So, Dr. Stent, what is your opinion on that?
Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. I think his speech was
directed both to the domestic audience and to the foreign
audience. He is telling his own people this war is a war with
the West, with the United States.
It is going to go on for a long time and we are going to
prevail. He said, we are going to win on the battlefield. He is
basically telling them that they have to accept it. For us, he
is threatening us, that there are things that he hasn't done
yet that he could do. Now, having said all of that, he wants to
intimidate everyone.
The Russians haven't done some things that we thought they
might do. They have not attacked any of the convoys carrying
weapons into Ukraine, either from Poland or Romania. I think at
this point Putin still is not willing to get into a direct
conflict with NATO, and there has been less cyber.
I mean, there has been obviously some issues, but there
have been less cyber attacks than we maybe feared that there
might be. So that indicates to me that until now, he is
observing some of his own, I know, red lines or limits, but he
wants us to believe that he could go much further.
So I think it is our test to try and discriminate between
what are probably just empty threats and things that we should
take seriously.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I am going to build on that
with you, General Kellogg, then, because we think about these
threats, and of course, they come maybe cyber and they also
come with missiles.
We know Russia's stockpile of missiles, they have fired
thousands since the beginning. They are using their Soviet era
munitions more and more. So what do you believe is the status
of Russian munitions and their supply chain? How, if they are
running low, as Ms. Massicot talked about, maybe having to move
back up production, how will this counteract, how will this
play in this counteroffensive actions in just in the next few
months?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, thank you. Senator,
they are at a stretch right now. Look, Senator, they are
refurbishing T-62 tanks. Those tanks have been out of the
inventory for over 40 years. But the amount of losses they have
sustained in their modernized armored forces have been
tremendous. They are falling back on systems that we haven't
seen in the inventory back in the cold war, back when I was
stationed in Germany years ago.
So, their stocks are running low. That doesn't mean they
don't have a lot there, but you can see they are using
munitions that are not guided. That is where I would be
concerned, where either the Iranians or Chinese are going to
step up and provide them the munitions they currently don't
have, to be able to use.
That is reason why I believe the United States has an
ability to continue to put pressure on them. I realize it is a
heavy lift, but the more we do it, it counters the Russian
ability to continue to fight this war.
They are basically, in my opinion, the Russians are on
their heels, both tactically, operationally, and strategically,
and their supply chain is being broken right now.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am going to
submit a question for the record on what you all might think
will be their next--if they are on their back heels, what you
might predict will be their next form of aggression that we
need to look forward to. But my time is up, so I will send that
for the record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the witnesses for their important testimony today. I just want
to make a statement, Senator Schmitt's point about the
Europeans doing more. General, you highlighted this. But I
really think the 2 percent GDP commitment they have all made
under NATO membership is really important.
Now, I hear from folks back home in Alaska that, you know,
they know how important this is, but if the Europeans can't
meet their commitments, you are going to continue to see waning
support in America. I think all our European allies need to
understand that. So, but what I want to do is I want to turn to
a topic that surprisingly hasn't come up yet, that I know a
number of you, Dr. Stent, in particular, know and care about.
That is the topic of energy. I would like to recount this
story. My good friend, Senator John McCain and I were in a
meeting with a very brave Russian, a Russian who is actually
now in jail, Vladimir Kara-Murza. I had asked him, what more
can we do to undermine the Putin regime? This is a number of
years ago, and he said, Senator, the answer is very simple,
produce more American energy. So American energy is this huge,
important instrument of American power.
Do you all agree with Vladimir Kara-Murza's statement on
just how important energy is? Similar to tanks and aircraft
carriers, relative to Russia, and relative to China. Xi Jinping
fears American energy dominance, which we did such a good job
of during the Trump Administration.
This Administration now from day one has actually been
attacking American energy, trying to shut down American energy,
make it harder to produce. Literally insane. Makes no sense.
Can you talk very briefly, because I have a number of
questions, on the importance of American energy, not just for
Americans, but as an instrument of American power as it relates
to Russia.
Dr. Stent, why don't you begin? I know you and your husband
know a little bit about energy.
Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. No, I mean, I would agree
with you. Russia was an energy superpower before this war
began. It will no longer be an energy superpower.
Senator Sullivan. We are, if we want to be. If we could be,
if we had the Federal Government's not help, just get the hell
out of the way, right.
Dr. Stent. Right. So there is obviously a contradiction
between the Administration's policy on hydrocarbons and what
would actually be needed to make it less easy for Russia to
project its own power. I agree with you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General, do you have a view on
that? I am sure you do.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, my family is an oil
well drilling family, so yes, I get it. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. That is a really important instrument of
American power if we are the world's energy dominant--and by
the way, all of the above. I want wind, solar, you know, as
long as we are not buying it from China, but oil and gas, too,
right?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Massicot, do you have a view on that?
Ms. Massicot. You know, I do. I think there are elements of
sanctions that are less impactful. Russia is able to find
alternative customers for its main imports.
Senator Sullivan. But America producing energy as a way to
undermine Putin's power is a no brainer, isn't it?
Ms. Massicot. I don't have an informed view, but that seems
logical to me.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me--we are working on a project
called the Willow Project. Just a quick--it is in Alaska. It
has been under permitting God knows how long, 20 years. It
would be mass production about 200,000 barrels a day, 2,500
jobs to build it.
We could start building it tomorrow if we get the President
to approve it. Would a project like that help America's
National Security, an additional 200,000 barrels a day, highest
environmental standards in the world? Just real quickly, yes or
no, to each of the witnesses. Dr. Stent.
Dr. Stent. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. General.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Massicot. Was that a yes or no,
maybe?
Ms. Massicot. It is outside of my area of expertise.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, and then finally, just we have a
member of the Administration, he won't admit it, and maybe he
should come out and deny it. Mr. Kerry, not sure what to call
him. He is not a Senator, is not Secretary of State.
By the way, if he were up for confirmation, he wouldn't get
confirmed in the Senate. He goes around the world, especially
in Asia, telling--cautioning countries not to buy American LNG.
Is that a good idea from a National Security perspective? Dr.
Stent, you have a view on that?
Dr. Stent. I think I will pass on that one.
Senator Sullivan. All right. General, how about you? Good
idea to go to Asia and say, hey, don't buy American LNG?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. No, I don't think that is a
very good idea.
Senator Sullivan. No, it is really ridiculously stupid. Let
me just ask one final question, on the F16s, and this is just
for all of the witnesses. I hosted some Ukrainian pilots last
summer. Very brave, incredible young men.
We wrote a letter to General Milley, Secretary Austin, last
summer on the F-16s. I was very well informed that the Pentagon
was moving toward approving F-16s. We have been working on it
for months.
Then the President got off the helicopter the other day and
said, no, we are not going to do it. He looked very uninformed,
but whatever, that is not always surprising. The Washington
Post today came out with an editorial on moving forward with
the F-16s.
What I worry about is this Administration is going to do
what they have been doing the whole time, which is eventually
approve them, looked like they were going to before the
President's statement.
So, can you, any or all of you, just opine very quickly on
why that is important, this weapon system now, not, 5 months
from now like they have been doing on other ones?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, the reason why those
systems are important is American technology is the best in the
world. Our fighters, our bombers, the stealth technology, you
name it, is the best in the world, and we should give them the
best to have those fights. So it makes sense to give them
systems like that if they believe it can improve the fight. It
is a good--the F-16 is an example.
It is a good air to air and air to ground system out there.
We can put the most modern avionics on it, most modern weapon
systems. Give them--I have always said this repeatedly, give
them the systems, the best systems in the world to win the
fight. Those best systems happen to be, I believe, American
systems.
Senator Sullivan. Any other views on the F-16 in
particular?
Ms. Massicot. Yes, I just would like to caution that we can
give them an air platform, but we can't give them Western air
power. There is a lot of additional enablers that go into that.
That is not my decision to make about what is in them.
But it is not just the pilots that need to be trained. It
is the spare parts, it is the logisticians, it is everything
else that goes into it. What do we assume risk wise if we
invest in that capability?
Is there something that comes off the table for the
Ukrainians in the near term? I don't have that answer, but you
all do and I know you are making very difficult decisions every
day. Just there is risks involved in everything, and there is
no easy ways forward now.
Senator Sullivan. Dr. Stent, do you--thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our
witnesses, thank you for being here today. It has been a quite
of a wide-ranging discussion. I think a lot of questions have
already been asked that I was going to ask, so I will be brief,
and just kind of drilling down on some of the responses that I
have heard.
On the last question about a weapon system of the F-16 and
understanding that it is not just a platform, you have got to
have a whole system around those platforms, and going into
combat as well. It is a complicated combined arms type of
tactics that you have to use. But one question I had is
contribution that the Germans have made.
There has been questions related to European contributions.
The Germans, I believe, made a pretty significant contribution
with the Leopard 2 tanks. But I am curious as to your
assessment of that tank going into combat.
Clearly, a tank by itself is not a game changer. It has to
be part of a broader system. But Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg,
could you talk a little bit about what you think the Leopard 2
will bring to the defensive and offensive capabilities of the
Ukrainian military.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, it is one of the three
best tanks in the world. When you look at that, I happen to
think the Abrams tank made by the United States is the best
tank in the world. The Challenger 2 system that the British are
providing is very good and so is the Leopard 2 system. They are
all high quality.
I think all three of them overmatch anything the Russians
currently have, if they fight them together. But at the same
time, I am saying that put them together in sets. If you are
going to put the Leopard system with it out in the field, put
the Marder system, the personnel carrier with it.
If you are going to put the Abrams in the field, you put
the Bradley with it. The Challenger doesn't really have a
sister vehicles as good as ours that is out there. You kind of
put the Bradley with it as well. But those systems are very
good, and I think they just need to commit to giving those
systems.
I think the Germans would admit they would prefer not to
have the Russians back on their front doorstep again, so push
those systems forward. They are all good systems. They
overcompensate the Russian systems very, very well, and the
Ukrainians can fight those systems. They are good enough. They
are smart enough to figure them out.
Senator Peters. They are training them right now. You
mentioned the T-62s that are being refurbished by the Russians.
A Leopard will--is a good match for that one, isn't it?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. It is beyond a good match. It
is an overmatch, which is okay by me.
Senator Peters. Overmatch is always better.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. Ms. Massicot.
Ms. Massicot. I think we need a long term strategy for
Ukraine because they have been cutoff from receiving all of
their Russian equipment. I think the Leopards are a start in
that. I am not sure how the Ukrainians are planning on using
those in the year ahead, whether it is keeping them in reserve
and keeping them back and putting some of the older equipment
forward to engage with the Russians directly.
But counteroffensives are hard. They are hard for the
Ukrainians. It is not just tanks that will enable that success.
It needs continued U.S., Western--U.S. and Western intelligence
support and planning guidance.
Senator Peters. Clearly. You need more than just tanks, you
need artillery and you need air support, you need intelligence,
all of those factors. That is just part of the list, long list
of what is necessary.
One of the weapons systems that is changing warfare
dramatically, and I think we saw this in Azerbaijan, was the
use of drones. Drone warfare continues to advance pretty
rapidly, and we are going to see increased developments as AI
systems power drones as well. My question to you is, Iran is
now providing drones.
Do we have any assessment as to how those drones are being
used? Are they effective? Give me a sense of what you think
that is bringing to the battlefield, Iran's involvement,
working with Russia in regards to drones. Ms. Massicot, do you
want to start, and then General Kellogg.
Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Shahed drones,
they don't exactly have a very large payload, but it is
complicating the picture for Ukrainian defenders. In the early
days when Russia introduced that capability into Ukraine, the
Ukrainians were using surface to air missiles to engage those
drones. That is a really quick way to attrite that capability,
and they have changed over time.
I think they are using anti-aircraft guns now. They are
doing other things to bring those down. There are rumors that
Russia and Iran are potentially going to open up some kind of
production capability inside Russia to create hundreds of
those. That is a way for Russia to augment its precision strike
capabilities.
I mean, again, the payload is very small. They are using it
to go after soft targets, cities. It just, it stresses
Ukrainian defenses, and I think that is another issue we have
to really look at, is the status of Ukrainian air defense
interceptor missiles.
Senator Peters. Talk a little bit more about the production
that you--we may see in Russia.
Ms. Massicot. From what I understand, the rumors in the
press, it would be a Iranian, Russian effort to produce, I
think, a few hundred drones. That is what I saw in the press.
Senator Peters. General Kellogg.
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Iran has got a massive drone
inventory, and they have figured out how to use these,
primarily when they used them against the Saudis. They use
kamikaze drones and swarm technology. It would have been
putting massive amounts of drones against Ukrainians that
they--that Ukraine just can't manage all of those targets at
the same time.
So, the fact is they are giving all of these drones, yes,
he changes the nature of the battlefield. Individually though,
they are effective, but not--they are not going to change the
nature of the battlefield, but you put them in combination with
your artillery, your ground forces as well, and it starts to
change. It is a new technology. Iranians have perfected it and
they are passing that to the Russians.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters. We have
been having a discussion about who gives what, how much,
etcetera. And, General Kellogg, you have made reference to the
Kiel Institute, I believe, in terms of some of your comments,
the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Well, they have an interesting chart that shows, and it is
based on gross domestic product, because that is the only, I
think, reasonable way to measure the capacity as well as the
commitment of a country. In that chart, which I will make
available to you, the United States is 10th in its
contribution, because what it includes also is the absorption
of immigrants.
You realize there are millions of Ukrainians who have left.
The number one country is Estonia, two is Latvia, three is
Poland, four is the Czech Republic, five is Lithuania, six is
Slovakia, seven Norway, eight is Bulgaria, nine is the United
Kingdom, and the United States is tenth, and Germany, as we
have talked about, is fourteenth.
So, I think this graphically displays, from a very
authoritative source, the level of commitment of our allies,
which is astounding. In fact, frankly, I don't think it could
be generated in the previous Administration. Indeed, I am still
recoiling from President Trump's comment on the day of the
invasion that Putin was a genius. Do you believe he is a
genius?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think Putin is not a genius
and he has proven that in spades.
Chairman Reed. Well, you might have a call with your former
boss on that. Also, I think just to clear up a confusion, your
earlier response about the aircraft, you made a suggestion
which I thought was absolutely brilliant, which is rather than
F-16s, more MiGs, which they are familiar with flying, would be
a much more adequate platform. Is that true?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. The MiG-29s, because they are
so familiar with it, is a good aircraft. Is it as good as an
American aircraft? No, but it is very effective against the
Russians.
Chairman Reed. Right. So, in terms of time, essence of
being able to move quickly, those M-29s could be flown almost
immediately by their pilots?
Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you. I thought the panel was
extraordinarily insightful. I want to thank you all, Dr. Stent,
Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg. Again, thank you for your
service, and as we said before--thank you, sir. With that, I
will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
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