    [Senate Hearing 118-616]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-616

                            THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 28, 2023
                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    ------

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    60-005                    WASHINGTON : 2025

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan             RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

                       Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
                     John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                   ----------

                               February 28, 2023

                                                                       Page

    The Conflict in Ukraine..........................................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Stent, Angela, Director Emerita, Georgetown University Center for     4
      Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies.

    Massicot, Dara, Senior Policy Researcher, Rand Corporation.......     6

    Kellogg, Lieutenant General Keith, Co-Chair, Center for American     17
      Security America First Policy Institute.

                                     (iii)

                            THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

                                          United States Senate,
                                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen,
    Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
    Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, and Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
    morning. The Committee meets today to discuss the ongoing war
    in Ukraine. This hearing comes at a somber moment as we mark 1
    year since Russia launched its illegal and unprovoked attack on
    Ukraine.
        I would like to welcome and thank the expert witnesses
    before us today. Dr. Angela Stent, is Director Emerita of
    Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East
    European Studies. She is an expert on Russian and European
    geopolitics, with extensive policy experience across the
    intelligence community, State Department, academia, and NATO.
        Dr. Dara--Excuse me, Ms. Dara Massicot, is a Senior Policy
    Researcher at the RAND Corporation. She specializes in Russian
    military strategy, combat operations, and escalation dynamics,
    and has served as the lead analyst on these issues at the
    Department of Defense. Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg is Co-
    Chair of the Center for American Security at the American
    Foreign Policy Institute.
        Both in and out of uniform, General Kellogg has served at
    the highest level of National Security leadership for years.
    Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has inflicted suffering upon
    innocent civilians, threatened European security, and caused
    serious consequences for the global economy.
        Now, more than ever, it is clear that if Putin succeeds in
    Ukraine, he will not stop there. Russia cannot be allowed to
    call the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any nation
    into question. Fortunately, several efforts have thwarted his
    initial assault. First and foremost is the incredible courage
    and fighting skill of the Ukrainian people, as well as the
    inspirational leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
        I had the opportunity to travel to Kyiv last month and was
    deeply moved by the Ukrainians' bravery and commitment to
    defending their homeland. Second is the remarkable
    statesmanship of the Biden Administration in forging a unified
    response, leading worldwide condemnation of Putin, and
    providing enormous military, economic, and humanitarian support
    for Ukraine.
        Finally, Putin's initial assault has folded from the inept
    performance of his own forces. This war has exposed a poorly
    led and poorly trained Russian army with corrupt leadership at
    every level, poor tactics and communications, and woeful
    logistics. This is a critical point in the fight. Ukraine has
    achieved some very notable successes, but there is hard
    fighting ahead and more to be done.
        We and the rest of the international community must
    continue to support the Ukrainian people and to expedite the
    assistance that Ukraine needs to be successful. During today's
    hearing, I would like to hear from our witnesses how these
    goals can best be achieved. Although NATO is in the midst of
    the greatest test it has ever faced, if Putin thought his
    actions over the past year would drive a wedge within our
    alliance and the international community, he was badly
    mistaken.
        NATO has shown remarkable unity and resolve, and a
    formidable array of our partners around the globe have joined
    together with incredible speed to provide Ukraine with
    military, economic, and humanitarian aid, reinforce combat
    power along NATO's Eastern flank, and impose the Accords on
    Russian decisionmakers.
        The carnage and destruction wrought by Putin's invasion
    cannot be undone. I am encouraged by Congress's bipartisan
    action to provide support to Ukraine. The assistance packages
    approved by Congress and championed by President Biden have
    made a decisive difference in helping Ukraine repel Putin's
    troops and mercenaries.
        These assistance packages are also providing much needed
    aid to displaced Ukrainians whose cities and towns continue to
    face indiscriminate bombardment by Russian forces. Just as
    Ukrainians have learned and adapted on the battlefield, the
    effort to aid and equip their security forces has evolved.
        Throughout the war, the Biden Administration has wisely
    calibrated our assistance to Ukraine to the conditions on the
    battlefield. To date, the United States has committed more than
    $30 billion in security assistance, including 10,000 javelin
    and stinger systems, 160 Howitzers, 38 HIMARS, 109 Bradley
    Fighting Vehicles, 31 Abrams tanks, 1 million rounds of
    artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defenses through the new
    AVs, and hundreds of thousands of other pieces of equipment and
    ammunition.
        We remain focused on striking the appropriate balance
    between providing supplies that can be employed immediately,
    while looking ahead to provide modern weapons systems that will
    require additional training. At the same time, we cannot lose
    sight of the most dangerous aspect of this conflict, Russia's
    escalation strategy. This battle is one of the few times in the
    atomic age that we have had a surrogate fight with the
    potential to draw nuclear powers into a confrontation.
        Russian nuclear threats cannot be dismissed or ignored, but
    they also cannot be seen as determinative and uncontested. They
    must be constantly evaluated as rhetoric or reality. I would
    ask for our witnesses' assessment of the escalation threat and
    how we can manage this dynamic moving forward.
        It is important to remember that this conflict matters not
    just to Ukrainian sovereignty and security, but also to that of
    our allies in Europe, and indeed our own security here at home.
    This is not a zero-sum endeavor. Rather, assistance to Ukraine
    is an investment to United States National Security, and I look
    forward to our witnesses' testimoneys, and I thank them again
    for their participation. With that, let me turn to the Ranking
    Member, Senator Wicker, please.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
    thanks to our distinguished panel of witnesses. Last Friday,
    February 24th, marked the solemn anniversary, 1 year since
    Russia's unprovoked, illegal, and brutal invasion of Ukraine.
        The courage and ingenuity shown by Ukrainian troops, many
    of whom were civilians before the war, continues to be nothing
    short of heroic. Now, after a long year of bloodshed and
    sacrifice, the war has entered a crucial phase.
        Today's hearing is an opportunity to review the current
    conditions of the war and its possible trajectory, and to
    discuss policy recommendations to help Ukraine win. I
    appreciated President Biden's visits to Ukraine and Poland last
    week.
        What I do not appreciate is the President's repeated
    failure to articulate United States goals and interest in
    Ukraine in a fashion that resonates with most Americans.
    Congress has appropriated over $100 billion of taxpayer funding
    to assist Ukraine and is likely--and more is likely to be
    needed later this year, so I would welcome our witnesses' views
    on why supporting Ukraine matters to the average American.
        In my view, this is not a particularly difficult case to
    make. United States support to Ukraine helps a capable,
    motivated, and grateful partner nation restore stability to a
    region of the world that is critical to our interests. As they
    prevent chaos spreading further into Europe, the Ukrainian
    armed forces are also significantly degrading the military
    capability of one of our chief adversaries, Putin's
    dictatorship.
        Finally, our support for Ukraine sends a clear message to
    the Chinese Communist Party that aggression will be met with
    resolve. Our allies in the Asia-Pacific understand the
    connection between projecting strength in Ukraine and deterring
    Chinese aggression. Japan, for example, just announced a $5.5
    billion aid package for Ukraine.
        American interests are being secured without U.S. boots on
    the ground and for a relatively modest cost. After a year of
    fighting, the oversight requirements Congress has put in place
    seem to be working. Just last week, three major independent
    U.S. watchdogs said they had not received any reports of major
    fraud regarding U.S. aid.
        Further, many allies and partners are helping us shoulder
    the burden. Britain, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and
    the Baltic States deserve special mention for their
    contributions. Unfortunately, there are some larger European
    partners who need to do much more, notably Germany and France.
        This war matters greatly to the United States but is being
    fought in Europe's backyard. I believe some in the Biden
    Administration have recognized that the drip, drip, drip
    approach to providing military assistance has prevented Ukraine
    from mounting successful counteroffensives to bring this war
    closer to an end. Make no mistake, Ukrainian battlefield
    victories are necessary for a just peace.
        Vladimir Putin is a war criminal who understands only brute
    force. He will not negotiate until he is forced to do so. I
    would like to hear from our witnesses about what more could be
    done to sharpen the military capabilities of the Ukrainian
    armed forces. We need to learn our lessons from the slow roll
    approach we use to arm the Ukrainians.
        Thus far, the Ukrainians have continually surprised many in
    the West with their ingenuity and their will to fight. We are
    at a pivotal moment in this war, an inflection point we cannot
    afford to waste as we go about defending the interest of the
    United States and our allies so that the 21st century is a
    peaceful, prosperous and American led century.
        I have repeatedly in this past year advocated Ronald
    Reagan's concept of peace through strength. In addition,
    Eisenhower said over 70 years ago, only with strength could we
    achieve the true task of this time to deter aggression and
    secure peace. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with you that we must
    help our Ukrainian friends, that our help should be expedited,
    and I do question whether the pace has been properly
    calibrated.
        I thank you and I look forward to working with you in this
    mutual bipartisan endeavor, and I thank our witnesses.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Now let
    me recognize, Dr. Stent. Dr. Stent, please.

           STATEMENT  OF  ANGELA  STENT, DIRECTOR  EMERITA,
            GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR EURASIAN, RUS-
            SIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

        Dr. Stent. Thank you very much. Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Wicker, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
    me to testify before your Committee at this very critical time.
    Let me begin with Russia's war aims.
        What does Vladimir Putin want? When Putin launched his
    unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year ago, his goal
    was to conquer the country in 3 days, to oust the Zelenskyy
    government, and to install a puppet regime loyal to Moscow.
    Putin does not believe that Ukraine is a separate nation, and
    he denies that it has the right to exist as a State.
        In my book, Putin's World: Russia Against the West and With
    the Rest, I have a cynical quote that sums up his view of the
    world. Putin said, there are only four truly sovereign states
    in the world, Russia, China, the United States, and India. All
    the rest had limited sovereignty, they are colonies. Having
    failed to take Kyiv and encountering fierce and effective
    resistance from the Ukrainians, Russian forces have been pushed
    back into what is now a brutal war of attrition.
        In his address to the Federal Assembly last week, Putin
    claimed that NATO had started the war and was out to destroy
    Russia, but he said, we will win on the battlefield. So, what
    exactly are the Russian war aims today? There was no hint in
    that speech a week ago, safe to tell the Russian people that
    this will be a long war and they have no choice but to support
    it.
        At a minimum, Russia wants to get total control of the
    Donbass region, the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which have
    been partially occupied by Russia since 2014. The next goal
    would be total control of two new regions, which he has
    declared are annexed to Russia, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, an
    artificial red line.
        Then Putin might be willing to sit down and negotiate an
    agreement for a cease-fire, but make no mistake, that would
    only be temporary. Putin has not given up his goal of
    conquering Ukraine altogether, and this could be a very long
    war. As critical for this Committee, I believe at this
    important time, is European views and the durability of the
    transatlantic coalition to support Ukraine.
        Many of you were at the Munich Security Conference last
    weekend and you saw and heard the public displays of
    transatlantic unity, encouragement for Ukraine's determination
    to prevail. So far, I believe this transatlantic unity has been
    remarkable. Europeans are suffering the economic fallout from
    the sanctions and the end of Russian hydrocarbon imports.
    Public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine, and the mild
    winter has mitigated some of the economic pain.
        It is likely that as the war drags on this year, there
    could be more public resistance to sending significant economic
    support to Ukraine and more calls to pressure Ukraine to begin
    to sit down at the negotiating table.
        If, of course, Russia were willing to sit down and
    negotiate with Ukraine. Russia will likely step up its
    information war in Europe this year, as elections in various
    countries loom. The same questioning will likely happen here in
    the United States as we approach next year's congressional and
    Presidential elections.
        At Munich, it was clear that Western governments do have to
    do a better job of explaining to their publics what the stakes
    are in this war and why it affects their interests. This is
    about international stability and a world in which rules are
    observed rather than the disruptive world Putin wants, one
    where there are no rules.
        The same is even more true for the global South, that is
    the developing world. I do have deep concerns about this. As we
    heard in Munich, these countries face significant problems,
    food insecurity, the impact of climate change, humanitarian
    disasters, and this European conflict, in the eyes of many, is
    absorbing too many resources from the West that would be better
    directed toward them.
        The global South has not taken sides in this war and has
    neither condemned nor sanctioned Russia, meaning that Putin is
    not isolated. He has been cultivating these countries for
    years. The United States and our allies need to do a better job
    of explaining to these countries why it is important that
    Russia not win this war. Depicting this as a fight between
    democracy and autocracy is ineffective in many of these
    countries.
        It is much more effective to highlight that Russia has
    violated the United Nations charter, it has violated
    international law. If Russia were to prevail, and the rest of
    the world to resume business as usual with Moscow, then no
    country would be secure in its borders and no one could count
    on preserving--no country could count on preserving its
    territorial integrity. Russia is expecting the developing world
    to remain neutral.
        NATO should step up its efforts to counter the Russian
    narrative, and however difficult it is, the United States
    should try harder to break Putin's information Iron Curtain and
    communicate directly with the Russian people and explain what
    Putin is doing and what this war is really about, and its true
    cost to the Russian people and future generations. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Stent. Ms.
    Massicot.

              STATEMENT OF DARA MASSICOT, SENIOR POLICY
                   RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION

        Ms. Massicot. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, Members
    of the Committee and staff----
        Chairman Reed. Could you bring the microphone closer, if
    possible, please.
        Ms. Massicot. Thank you. Sorry about that. Chairman Reed,
    Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the Committee and staff,
    thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. One year
    has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of
    Ukraine, and this grim milestone offers a moment of reflection.
        My area of expertise is Russian military capabilities,
    strategy, and operations. My remarks today focus on the past
    year of war, an assessment of where the war stands at present,
    and outlines considerations for the future.
        On the eve of Russia's invasion last year, nearly 200,000
    troops amassed on Ukraine's borders. The Ukrainian military and
    government transitioned to a higher level of readiness and
    State of emergency only a few weeks prior. Many assumed that if
    Russia used their advantages wisely, it would be difficult for
    Ukrainian forces to withstand for long. But the Russians did
    not prevail.
        They were instead routed outside many major cities and
    retreated on multiple occasions. Why? The answer has many
    components, and no single factor explains outcomes we see
    today. Moscow's invasion plan, as we know now, was created by a
    small, secretive group, and is riddled with faulty assumptions,
    arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors. War plan's
    design and objectives departed from Russian military strategy
    and undercut many of its advantages and amplified its
    structural disadvantages from the outset.
        The Russian command withheld its war plan from any elements
    of its invading force, until the last minute due to excessive
    secrecy leading to multiple preventable errors on their side.
    These mistakes then collided with fierce Ukrainian resistance,
    and Western weapons, intelligence, training, and planning
    support. Senior United States officials place Russian
    casualties at well over 100,000.
        The damage to the Russian army, the airborne and special
    forces is systemic and severe, and since last summer has
    hindered the Russian military's ability to make large
    territorial gains. The past year of war has come at a high cost
    to Ukraine, which is now largely dependent on weapons provided
    by the West.
        The Russian military has inflicted severe damage on
    Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, and its forces
    stand accused of committing war crimes and crimes against
    humanity against Ukrainians.
        Millions of Ukrainians are internally and externally
    displaced. However, Russian leaders are preparing for a
    protracted conflict. To replace lost personnel, Russia
    mobilized 300,000 men last September. They were hastily trained
    and their provisioning is uneven, as are their skill sets.
    Russia has been withdrawing its older equipment from strategic
    reserves in Siberia from the war's outset, although that
    equipment is in various states of serviceability.
        In January, the Russian military was again ordered to go on
    the offensive in the Donbas, even though its forces were not
    prepared. Currently, localized assaults are underway in
    Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, possibly to bring these
    regions under full occupation, and to keep Ukrainian forces
    engaged and unable to break away to begin their own
    counteroffensive.
        The tactics are crude. The Russians use repetitive armored
    assaults in some areas and in others are experimenting with
    assaults of storm troops. In many cases, this means human waves
    with high rates of casualties as they attempt to close on
    Ukrainian positions. Russian mobilized soldiers now make public
    appeals to be spared from what the coming--what they call,
    ``canon meat.''
        The Russian command shows a high tolerance for losses.
    However rudimentary, the method has brought incremental success
    in a few areas where Russian shelling occurs around the clock.
    Some Ukrainian positions like Bakhmut and areas around Cremona
    are under serious and mounting pressure, and missile strikes by
    the Russian air force continue to chip away at Ukrainian air
    defenses.
        I would like to end my remarks with a brief discussion
    about what may come next. The outcome of the war, of course, is
    highly contingent on multiple factors related to sustainment,
    force regeneration, and availability of Western support to
    Ukraine. Russia, for its part, has untapped manpower that
    numbers in the low millions and will likely need to mobilize
    replenishment this year.
        The Kremlin is pressuring its defense industrial base to
    produce more ammunitions, but it has not yet fully activated
    its wartime authorities. Without mobilizing more men and
    pulling more equipment from the reserves, another new incursion
    into Northeastern Ukraine, such as the Kharkiv region, would be
    difficult and in my opinion, another ground attack on Kyiv
    seems well beyond the ability of Russian forces now.
        There are several potentially disruptive events that Russia
    could undertake that might alter the dynamics of the war that I
    outline in more detail in my written remarks. So, in
    conclusion, Russian combat potential is diminished due to the
    losses that it has sustained. It is trying to overcome these
    deficits by consolidating its positions, generating more
    manpower and equipment, and using brute force tactics.
        Defending against this renewed offensive is taking a toll
    on Ukrainian forces, and Russia is actively digging in with
    fortifications, trenches, and minefields to make it costly for
    Ukraine to liberate more of its territory moving forward.
        The capabilities of both sides are being worn down, and
    Ukraine will need continued and predictable support as Russia
    digs deep into its reserves. This concludes my remarks. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dara Massicot follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. General Kellogg,
    please.

         STATEMENT  OF  LIEUTENANT   GENERAL   KEITH  KELLOGG,
          (RET.), CO-CHAIR, CENTER FOR AMERICAN SECURITY AMER-
          ICA FIRST POLICY INSTITUTE

        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
    Member, esteemed Members of the Committee, thank you for having
    me here today. I am grateful to be able to offer my
    perspective, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none
    has been a greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the
    uniform of the United States Army in nearly four decades of
    decorated service on behalf of this country. Much of that was
    combat service, including two tours in Vietnam, Operation Just
    Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War, and Iraq.
        I have had the privilege of being the Commander of Special
    Operations Command Europe and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort
    Bragg, North Carolina. My military career is one of multiple
    aspects in my life that make my perspective on the war in
    Ukraine unique.
        The second is my service in the last Administration on the
    National Security Council, the acting National Security Advisor
    to the President, and the National Security Advisor to the Vice
    President.
        Finally, a comprehensive 2 week visit I made last month to
    Ukraine. My trip to Ukraine was facilitated by the expertise of
    the Weathermen Foundation, founded by Best Weatherman and
    Andrew Duncan, seated behind me today, and led by my daughter,
    West Point graduate, Dr. Meaghan Mobbs.
        I visited arenas of battles near the line of contact. You
    know, Kharkiv, Izium, Donetsk, and interfaced across the
    spectrum of military forces, from senior decisionmakers to
    trigger pullers. In Bucha, in Izium, I saw the firsthand
    consequences of unbridled Russian aggression and their
    willingness to kill innocents and use indiscriminate violence
    against children.
        My views today, which are offered today in my strictly
    personal capacity, are consistent with everything I have
    written and I have said throughout this conflict. To be clear,
    Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a humiliating
    American withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that allowed
    Putin to believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a
    major response, much like he found in 2014 when he seized
    Crimea from Ukraine.
        Deterrence has failed. This failure has been compounded by
    a willingness to use strong words, unaccompanied by decisive
    and timely action. It is the incremental and halting of the
    American and allied response to the Russian invasion that
    persuades Putin he can drag out this war and count on time to
    be his friend and bring him to victory.
        It has been support sent in half measures and with
    hesitation, which succeeds in enabling the fighting of the war
    but not the ending of it. This is important because ending the
    war needs to be the principal American effort. If we do not
    demonstrate leadership now, we risk being mired in another
    endless war.
        As with all wars, there will be negotiation between the
    warring parties, and so we must look forward to what will
    hasten those negotiations, consistent with American honor and
    interest. It is clear the path to bringing about these
    negotiations is to rapidly increase Ukraine's lethality to
    enable Ukrainian forces to destroy currently committed Russian
    forces on the battlefield and disrupt their supply chain
    logistics.
        Putin must see that the fate of his army in the field in
    Ukraine is at risk of near total destruction. The reasons for
    American interest are many. The war threatens the American led
    international order.
        We cannot be secure in our leadership role if we allow a
    war of regression to regress and persist in a major sovereign
    State with the potential of a Russian victory. Simply saying
    whatever it takes as long as it takes is not policy, it is a
    slogan.
        One of the great maxims of warfare is tactics without
    strategy is just the noise before defeat. No number of
    supplemental aid packages, no round of sanctions, nor a
    Presidential visit to Kyiv will achieve success without a plan.
        The Ukraine war must end this year, but not any end will
    do. An end to the war in Ukraine must be defined with American
    interests at heart and there must be a pathway to achieve it.
    This can be achieved by first providing Ukraine with all the
    military armament it needs to defeat the Russian army in
    Ukraine.
        The survival of Putin's army in the field must be put at
    risk and you need to do it now. Second, the identification of
    an end State for how this war will end, with a road map to get
    there must be communicated effectively to the American people.
    Third, our allies must do more, spend more, and do it more
    quickly.
        This war is in their backyard and they cannot expect the
    citizens of the United States to continue to carry the
    overwhelming financial burden as they do today. All this is
    simple, but not easy. Let me be plain, Americans are right to
    ask the hard questions about why we are spending so much in
    Ukraine. Many of your own constituents, Americans with whom I
    have spoken, have legitimate concerns about our involvement in
    this war.
        We see a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions
    into the defense of Ukrainian borders while showing no real
    interest in the defense of American borders. From a strictly
    policy perspective, the correct answer is that American
    Government is equipped to do both. As we enter the second year
    in Ukraine, we cannot continue the status quo.
        We need to work toward an end to this war and do so
    immediately and decisively. If this war turns into a multiple
    year of attrition, which is its present trajectory, then
    Americans may be asked to sacrifice more than they are willing
    to give, and Ukraine will lose.
        As it stands, a Ukrainian defeat is an American defeat by
    proxy. This cannot be tolerated. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg
    follows:]

               Prepared Statement by The Honorable Keith Kellogg
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this
    Committee. Thank you for having me here today and for convening this
    important hearing. I am grateful to be able to offer my perspective,
    and I look forward to answering your questions.
        Among the many opportunities I have had in my life, none has been a
    greater privilege or a higher honor than wearing the uniform of the
    United States Army in my nearly four decades of decorated service on
    behalf of this country. Much of that was combat service, including two
    tours in Vietnam, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the first Gulf War,
    and in Iraq. The opportunity I am most fortunate to have had was
    commanding Special Operations Command-Europe and the 82d Airborne at
    Fort Bragg. The sense of stewardship and obligation I felt to my
    soldiers then is the same sentiment I hold toward our country now. This
    Committee has been instrumental in making many of those opportunities
    successful over the years--and you, your predecessors, and your hard-
    working staff have my gratitude for it.
        My military career is one of several aspects of my life that have
    shaped my perspective on the war in Ukraine. The second is my service
    in the National Security Council and as Acting National Security
    Advisor to President Trump and National Security Advisor to Vice
    President Pence in the last administration. And finally, my personal
    visit to Ukraine last month. I visited the arenas of battle in Kharkiv,
    Izium, Donetsk, and the suburbs of Kyiv. I saw Bucha firsthand--one of
    many sites of Russian massacres of Ukrainian civilians, including women
    and children--as well as Izmail and Odesa, which have experienced
    Russia's war. I may be the only senior retired American flag officer to
    have visited those cities during this past year. The Romulus T.
        Weatherman Foundation, a private operating foundation whose
    president is my daughter, West Point Graduate Dr. Meaghan Mobbs,
    facilitated my trip to Ukraine.
        I have offered my perspective on hundreds of media appearances, and
    in written commentary in various outlets and in long-form publications
    as the Co-Chair of the Center for American Security at the America
    First Policy Institute.
        My views today--which I offer today in my strictly personal
    capacity, informed by my experiences and affiliations but not on their
    behalf--are consistent with everything I have said and written
    throughout this conflict.
        It is no mystery why this war happened. The Russian dictator,
    Vladimir Putin, has always resented the American victory in the cold
    war, and has spoken openly of his desire to reverse it. He subscribes
    to a well-worn Russian strategic concept by which security is assured
    by pushing the Russian border as far westward as possible, and the
    conquest of Ukraine--barbaric and unprovoked as it was--was meant to
    begin that process in the modern era. So much for Russia's part in it:
    we are here to discuss America's part.
        To be clear, Russia's full-scale invasion was prefaced by a
    humiliating withdrawal and defeat in Afghanistan that led Putin to
    believe he could launch a new war in Europe without a major response
    much like he found in 2014, when he invaded Crimea.
        It is the weakness of a continuing cautious American response to
    the Russian invasion that persuades that same dictator to believe he
    can drag out the war, and count on time for his own victory. That
    weakness came in two parts. First it came in failing to deter it once
    the plans were known, beginning in late 2021. Next it came in a slow
    and hesitating provision of aid to Ukraine--a hesitation masked by the
    sheer size of the aid given, but real nonetheless--which succeeds in
    enabling the fighting of the war, but not the ending of it.
        That serial American weakness, I should note, had one signal early
    exception, in the policy of President Donald J. Trump. It was President
    Trump who broke from the policy of his predecessor and sent American
    weapons and aid to Ukraine that mattered: above all, Javelin anti-armor
    munitions that proved decisive in this war's opening days, weeks, and
    months. When we look to the causes of Ukrainian survival against a
    Russian onslaught that virtually no one expected them to survive, we
    credit first the spirit of the Ukrainians themselves and the leadership
    of their president. They are a nation that came together in supreme
    crisis and earned the world's admiration and respect. But their spirit
    would have been a mere moral victory without the arms and early allied
    training to take out Russian armor, to fix Russian columns in place,
    and to stop Russian aggression in its tracks.
        However, ending the war should be the principal American interest
    now or we risk another endless war.
        We do not imagine the war will end in a comprehensive Ukrainian
    battlefield victory, and still less in a Russian conquest of Ukraine.
    There will be some sort of negotiation between the warring parties--and
    so we must look toward what will hasten those negotiations, consistent
    with American honor and interest. A war born in American weakness can
    only be ended by American strength.
        That's why the path to bringing these negotiations about is to
    enable Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine. Putting the
    Russian Army in Ukraine at risk of defeat is a strong message Putin
    cannot ignore.
        The reasons for this American interest are many. This war threatens
    the American-led international order that our fathers and grandfathers
    painfully won in the Second World War, and in the cold war that
    followed. Our prosperity right here at home depends directly upon the
    maintenance and perpetuation of that order, with America in a leading
    role. We cannot be secure in that position while Russia pursues a war
    of aggression that overturns the global order, destabilizes commodities
    markets, and renders food-supply chains unstable. The fact that Russia
    does so as a strategic ally and partner of America's number-one rival
    and threat, the People's Republic of China, only accentuates the
    danger. Make no mistake: weakness against Russian aggression is
    weakness against the Communist-Chinese threat. We know from history
    that the dictatorial powers watch and learn, to discover just how far
    they can get: and we know that Russian victory in Ukraine today almost
    certainly means war for Taiwan tomorrow.
        For all this, America needs the Ukraine war to end. An end to the
    war in Ukraine must be defined, and there must be a pathway to it.
        We have yet to get this from the current Administration. Simply
    saying that one will support Ukraine for ``as long as it takes'' is a
    bumper sticker, not a strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages,
    no rounds of sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are
    substitutes for American leadership.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, esteemed Members of this
    Committee, we need to end this war now, and ensure that a negotiation
    process begins. In my commentary and written analysis over the last
    year, I have been consistent on what an America-First approach looks
    like to end this conflict.
          First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it
    needs to defeat the Russian Army in Ukraine, implement rigorous
    accountability measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
          Second, identify an end State for how this war will end--
    and a roadmap to get there.
          Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more,
    more quickly.
        All this is simple--but not easy. The questions of which armaments
    to send, and from where, and by whom, are complicated ones. There are
    answers, but each of them requires a tradeoff, and prudent
    prioritization. I know the Members of this Committee will appreciate
    and understand this inescapable constant in governance and its
    challenges.
        But the Ukrainian war is not simply a military challenge, nor even
    just a foreign-policy one. At its heart, for us in the United States,
    our involvement in this war--even in the time-tested and honorable
    American role as the ``arsenal of democracy''--raises a profound and
    necessary question of who, and for whom, our Nation is governed. I will
    speak directly to this, because the Members here must understand the
    gravity of it--even if the White House refuses to.
        Let me be plain: Americans are right to ask the hard questions
    about why we are spending so much on Ukraine. Many of your own
    constituents, Americans with whom I have spoken and met, have
    legitimate concerns about our involvement in this war. I want to
    address the two I hear most right here, and left unaddressed they will
    in the long run overtake and rightly eclipse our interests abroad.
          First and foremost, Americans have legitimate concerns
    about a Federal Government that is eager to pour billions into the
    defense of Ukrainian borders, while showing no real interest in the
    defense of American borders. From a strictly policy perspective, the
    correct answer is that American governance ought to do both--but
    ordinary people do not live in a strictly policy-oriented world. They
    live in the real world, where they see an administration sending arms
    to defend Ukrainian communities, while denying American communities the
    ability to defend their own homes and ways of life. I want to be
    absolutely emphatic: this is sowing the wind, and left unaddressed, the
    whirlwind will be reaped. You, each of you here holding elected office
    and trust from your constituents, must work urgently to close this gap.
          Second, Americans are rightly concerned that arms and aid
    sent to Ukraine is arms and aid taken away from an impending
    confrontation with Communist China, whether over Taiwan or some other
    flashpoint. The reality is that national security is not a zero-sum
    exercise: we can prudently sustain Ukrainian resistance to aggression
    and confront Communist China, if we manage our resources wisely. But
    that is only part of the picture: Americans with this concern are
    instinctually, and correctly, illuminating a real and significant
    challenge to our national-security apparatus. America's industrial
    base, though robust, is simply unprepared for war. The Ukraine
    emergency gives us a rare historical opportunity to enact industrial
    and procurement reform now, when it is still a choice and not a
    compulsion--and thereby acknowledge and address the entirely justified
    concerns of these fellow Americans.
        As we enter the second year of war in Ukraine, we cannot continue
    with the status quo. We need to work toward an end to this war, and do
    so now. If this war turns into a multi-year war of attrition, which is
    its present trajectory, then Ukraine may well lose. We need American
    leadership to prevent that.
        To conclude, and to reiterate, there are three things we must do
    now to bring about the peace negotiations that will bring this war to a
    rapid conclusion.
          First, provide Ukraine with the military armament it
    needs to defeat the Russian Army, implement rigorous accountability
    measures for that military assistance, and do it now.
          Second, identify an end State for how this war will end--
    and a roadmap to get there.
          Third, push our allies to do more, and to spend more,
    more quickly.
        There is more Congress can do, most notably regarding oversight,
    and this type of an open hearing is one great step to increase public
    awareness and transparency. Congress should be leading efforts on the
    oversight of U.S. distribution to Ukraine, particularly since its
    resources are going to a nation with longstanding corruption issues.
        If we take these steps--and if the Congress plays its full and
    Constitutional role in making them happen--than we will have done a
    service to the peace of Europe, to the peoples of Russia and Ukraine
    alike, and to the welfare of the world. And we'll have done something
    even more important than all of that: we'll have put America First.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Dr. Stent, one
    of the issues that continually engages the planners and the
    statesmen and women who deal with this problem is escalation.
    Could you comment upon the factors that you see, particularly
    since so much of this is really a function of what Putin is
    thinking, and that is an odd analysis one must make.
        Dr. Stent. Thank you, Chairman. That is obviously a key
    question. I think Putin from the beginning has wanted us to
    believe that he could escalate. He wants to intimidate not only
    the Ukrainians, but really the Western coalition, the NATO
    countries that are supporting Ukraine.
        Therefore, we have had these hints from him right from the
    beginning, you know, we are a very strong nuclear power, we can
    do things that you haven't even dreamed of, and that waxes and
    wanes.
        Sometimes it is more forceful. Sometimes he stops saying
    that. We have had at some point the Chinese even saying that it
    is--you know, criticizing the use of this kind of rhetoric, not
    criticizing him.
        The Indians, too. So, there has been some pushback there.
    He wants us to believe that he could do this. I think, you
    know, you cannot rule out, if we are talking about the
    potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon, right, you cannot
    rule out that he would never do it because he does have the
    weapons.
        I think we have allowed ourselves sometimes to limit what
    we are doing for Ukraine because we are too concerned about the
    potential for, World War III breaking out.
        Again, I don't want to dismiss it and say it couldn't
    happen. I think we have to be very careful in looking at this.
    There are many unknowns, but not allowing us to limit what we
    are doing because of this changing rhetoric that we hear from
    Vladimir Putin.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, doctor. Ms. Massicot, the
    Russians went in with a plan that collapsed. Their forces had
    multiple difficulties. What do you think they have learned,
    which they can usefully apply in the next several months?
        Ms. Massicot. I think they realized within about a month
    and a half that they had too many objectives for the forces
    they had left. So, you saw them withdraw from Kyiv. You saw
    them then withdraw from the Northeastern Ukraine.
        This has been a process that has been ongoing up until the
    recent withdrawal from Kherson. They are capable of adapting
    their tactics. There is some institutional learning going on in
    that regard. They are more effective now with their electronic
    warfare. They are more effective with some of their air
    defenses. It is hurting Ukraine's ability to fly drones that
    were very effective in the beginning.
        In terms of the larger issues that they are facing, they
    have shown an unwillingness or inability to target or interdict
    Western support coming into Ukraine. I think that is an
    escalation choice on their part. They don't want to open that
    up. They can't overcome that with that mentality, and I don't
    think they want to at this time.
        So tactically, yes, they can adapt. There is no secret new
    Russian army that is going to come from East of the Urals and
    finish this. They are very damaged at this point.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Kellogg, one of the
    strengths I think, of the Ukrainian forces is the training that
    we began in 2014 under President Obama for their young
    noncommissioned officers and their younger officers who today,
    as the clock ticks forward, are now senior NTOs and battalion
    officers. Is that your impression also?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator, it is. Their
    quality of leadership is much better than the Russian quality
    of leadership. The Russians have not learned the Western style
    leadership. We transferred our expertise with the young
    noncommissioned officers, which the Russians does not rely on
    our younger officers and our senior officers as well.
        I think the other thing they have done is the fact is the
    Russians violated every principal war I ever grew up with at
    the start of this invasion, and Ukrainians were able to
    capitalize on it. You cannot discount the value of Ukrainian
    soldiers either. There is one thing that Napoleon once said,
    the moral of the physical is three as to one, never discount
    the heart of a fighting army and the training they have
    received.
        Chairman Reed. I have witnessed that in my brief stay in
    Ukraine, where their forces are committed to the fight, unlike
    I think most of the Russian conscripts who are essentially, as
    was described, they are trying to avoid what--the meat grinder
    or whatever. So, I think that is an advantage.
        I think also, too, which is consistent in all your
    testimony, is the need to explain to the world what is at stake
    and to continue to provide support for the Ukrainian people.
    One other aspect of this is the overall effort, and sometimes
    we merely look at the military aspect, but there is a specific
    amount of humanitarian assistance and budgetary assistance to
    the government of Ukraine, and some of our allies are doing
    much more of that than they are with military assistance, but
    you need a combination of humanitarian, governmental, and
    military assistance to carry the day. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses. General Kellogg, you are dissatisfied with the
    pace of delivery of weaponry and ammunition. Dr. Stent
    mentioned in her testimony that we are limiting what we do for
    various reasons.
        One of the arguments that is sort of baffling is that we
    are holding back on some things because we need them to defend
    our interests in NATO. That is surprising to me since we are in
    NATO and we have positioned our resources there to defend
    against Russia.
        So, does it make sense to hold back our capabilities in
    other places in Europe rather than deliver them where the fight
    is right now?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. No Senator, t does not.
    Senator, the Ukrainians are fighting the fight that we thought
    we were going to fight 20 and 25 years ago, against the very
    people we thought we were going to fight, with the very
    equipment that we thought we were going to have to use in
    Europe.
        So, give the Ukrainians the equipment they need. An
    example, Army preposition set No. 2 is sitting in Germany.
    Multiple combat teams, multiple brigades are sitting right
    there. Transfer that equipment out. It is there. They can train
    for it in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. Unleash it against the
    Russians.
        That is what the equipment is designed to be used for. You
    might as well use the equipment as it was designed for. The
    Russians, once they have an inability to proceed on the
    battlefield, they have no ability to go toward NATO because
    they will not have the military capacity, as long as we use the
    equipment that we should be giving them right now.
        Senator Wicker. How soon could that be accomplished?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, it could be rapid. The
    equipment is stationed right there. You can get the pre-
    positioned sets moving as quickly as you want to. There will
    be--saying, well, it is going to affect our readiness.
        No, it doesn't, because the readiness which it was designed
    to be used for was to defeat the Russian army. That is what the
    Ukrainians are doing right now. Give them the tools they need
    to win this fight now.
        Senator Wicker. Well, if you would comment on the
    practicality of F-16s. Do you buy the Administration's stated
    reason for the reluctance there of the ATACMS?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. My concern on that, Senator, is
    the fact that if and when they need them, when the term was,
    they don't need them right now, but when they do need them, it
    will be late to give it to them.
        What they really need are the MiG-29s that came out of
    Poland. Given the equipment they are used to be using on
    there--now, it is not as the avionics, clearly, and not as good
    on United States aircraft as we see on like the example on MiG-
    29, but they can still put equipment on there that can defeat
    the Russian.
        You equip their HARM 88 missile on it. You can put a lot of
    ordinance on that, given the stuff that they are currently used
    to using in the air.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, is there any point in our
    training the Ukraine, beginning to train Ukrainian pilots on F-
    16s at this point? You recommend that or not?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I would be training
    them on everything we have got, because if we had an ability to
    bring them back, we should have done it months ago. It still
    takes time to train regardless of which, a tank crewman or a
    pilot in an aircraft. We probably should be training them, if
    we had an ability. We thought that we were going to come do it,
    get ahead of the game instead of behind the game.
        Senator Wicker. Then there are two schools of thought with
    regard to the Pacific. One is that this distracts us from our
    major threat, and that is the Communist Party of China. The
    other is that China is watching and looking for indications of
    American resolve. So why should we be--how should we be viewing
    this with regard to the pacing threat of China?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Two parts real quickly. The
    actions we are taking in Ukraine, supporting them, is being
    watched by China. If they see us with strength, then they would
    regard us with caution as well.
        I am not sure we are doing that. Sir, and the first
    question again was on the two fight. Sir, I believe that the
    fight in the Pacific, if we have to go there, will be primarily
    an air and naval fight. It won't be a ground fight.
        We are not going to march to Beijing. So, the systems are
    different. There is a ground war in Europe. It is an air and
    sea war, primarily, in the Pacific. Sort of like an apples and
    oranges.
        Senator Wicker. I hear two concerns on--among the talking
    heads. Now, one is corruption, and our resources are
    potentially being stolen over there. Am I correct that we are
    pretty much on top of that? Also, is it fair to count the
    burden sharing, as Mexico, I believe, indicated, in terms of
    the humanitarian aid that is being primarily shouldered by
    European allies.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, we are still giving,
    according to the Kiel Institute, sir, that--which tracks that
    still 50 percent of the aid out of the countries they track,
    41, is still 50 percent American. So, we are giving a lot. They
    need to step up to the plate and do more to be able to give
    that aid to them as well. Again, sure, the first question was
    on the comments, or the first one part of that----
        Senator Wicker. You know, I shouldn't ask two questions at
    one time, so thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you to each of you
    for being here this morning. Dr. Stent, you pointed out that
    Russia is going to step up its information war this year. I
    think they have been very effective in their information war,
    actually much more so than we have.
        I wonder if you and others on the panel have thoughts about
    what we should be doing to ramp up our information war to
    combat what Russia is doing, not just in Europe, but Africa and
    other places around the world.
        Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. I mean, we definitely should
    be. I think we have not done as good a job as we should. We
    know what the Russians are doing. It is very difficult to
    counter some of their disinformation, but we have a lot of
    smart people working on this who should understand how to do
    it. We have to do this for different audiences.
        So, I think we have to also, you know, explain to the
    Europeans, those people who oppose supporting Ukraine, what
    this is about. We definitely have to do more in the global
    South, whether that is radio, TV, using other media, really
    explaining to them what this conflict is about. As I said, I
    think we also have to try and penetrate that Iron information
    curtain in Russia itself.
        We are not getting through to the Russian people. It is
    very difficult to. They don't have alternative sources of
    information. Even when they do, they don't know what to
    believe. But I just think we should put more resources into
    that.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I agree. Before I go on, I want
    to ask you about Belarus, because Lukashenko last a couple of
    weeks ago announced that Belarus would not join Putin's war,
    although it continues to serve as a staging area. So, can you
    talk about how much you think we can rely on that? Are we going
    to see Belarus engage further with Putin in this war? What is
    the status of the citizens of the country in terms of their
    concern about the war?
        Dr. Stent. Sure, that is a very important question. So,
    Russia has been pressuring Belarus since the beginning to send
    troops there. But one thing that the dictator Lukashenko
    understands is that 80 percent of the Belarusian population do
    not support this war.
        If he did try and mobilize and send them there, he would
    face significant disruptions and protests at home. Yes, it is a
    very repressive State, but still, people do take to the streets
    there. So, he does understand that. That is why he said we will
    only during the war if Belarus is attacked by Ukraine.
        Now, of course, you could manufacture something, which they
    would be capable of doing and say, well, the Ukrainians
    threatened us. But so far, he has held that line. In fact,
    there are Belarusians who are fighting with the Ukrainians in
    Ukraine. If you look at the recent meeting between President
    Putin and President Lukashenko and just look at President
    Putin's body language, these are not two leaders who are too
    fond of each other.
        The Russians have been irritated by Lukashenko for a long
    time. On the other hand, he is completely dependent on them now
    to stay in power because of their fraudulent elections. So, I
    think I would not anticipate that Lukashenko will send troops
    there, unless something drastically changes and he is told that
    he has no choice, but he will face real opposition
    domestically.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ms. Massicot, what would be the
    impact of China providing weapons to Russia?
        Ms. Massicot. I think Russia has a few immediate needs that
    China could fill. I am not a China expert and I certainly don't
    understand whether or not they will do this or not, but Russia
    has shell hunger.
        They need artillery rounds now. China could fill that for
    them temporarily until their defense industrial base clicks
    into a higher gear, which is in progress now. It may take them
    multiple months or the end of the year for their own domestic
    resumption.
        I think also Chinese ISR would help Russia try to close
    some of the gap with Ukrainians, although the Ukrainians are
    outclassing them in this regard, either organically or through
    the support that we are providing them.
        Really those two things are immediate. Higher end
    capabilities--and this is very speculative. There are multiple
    shared systems between the two militaries. So, it could be air
    defense missiles. They run on the shared systems.
        Russia has been repurposing those for land attack
    munitions. I think that is probably a very low probability, but
    I would be looking at artillery. I would be looking at drones.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, hopefully they will decide that it
    is not in their interest to do that. Can I ask you about the
    Wagner group and the dynamic between the Wagner group and the
    Russian army, and whether there is any reason to think that is
    going to deteriorate, or have they reached peace and are able
    to work together?
        Ms. Massicot. I think it is deteriorating in real time this
    week. Those two groups have had tensions that date back to
    Syria, and it bubbles up and then it is resolved. The thing
    about President Putin is he doesn't like mess.
        Right now, this is very messy and uncontrolled. So, I think
    inevitably he will probably step in and resolve this. Wagner,
    over time, is becoming less important to the overall war
    effort. As Russia mobilizes, it has more men. That critical
    role that they played last summer will decline over time.
        Prigozhin is misreading a lot of really important cues
    right now. He is being told by important and dangerous people
    to stop with the public criticism and he persists. I think also
    they are taking a long-term approach to undercut him.
        He is not allowed to recruit from the prisons anymore and
    they are choking back some of his artillery supplies this week
    near Bakhmut. So, I think that this is deteriorating in real
    time. I don't think his future is a bright one.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ernst,
    please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much for being here, for our
    panelists this morning. I had the great opportunity this past
    weekend to spend time in Poland Saturday and Sunday with our
    Iowa Army National Guard troops.
        So, we do have a couple of units that were mobilized for
    regularly scheduled deployments. We have the 209th Medical
    Company, as well as the 1133d Transportation Company. I just
    want to say to all of our folks back home, their families and
    loved ones, that I am so very proud of, these hard charging
    young men and women from Iowa. They are doing an incredible job
    supporting in Poland. God bless them all.
        So, Dr. Stent, I know you had a very powerful message for
    all of us talking about the message we need to send not only to
    the world, but to Americans as well, and how we should be
    speaking to that. Can you just double down on that for me,
    please, and how we should be talking to the American people
    about this.
        Because as General Kellogg pointed out, it is important
    that Americans understand, because they do have valid concerns,
    but they need to understand the gravity of the war in Ukraine.
    So, what again, is that message and how do we communicate that?
        Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. You know, we have to explain
    to the American people, first of all, that in the last century,
    twice the United States had to intervene in a war in Europe to
    essentially save Europe and save the world from tyranny and
    from conquest. So, what is happening between Russia and
    Ukraine?
        Russia, you know, after 77 years after the end of World War
    II, just broke the system that we had. It violated all of the
    sort of rules that govern the world after the end of World War
    II, and by just invading a neighbor, really on a whim, with no
    provocation, it was saying that it could arbitrarily take over
    another country. It didn't respect its territorial integrity,
    its sovereignty.
        If Russia is allowed to continue, if Russia were to prevail
    in this war, this wouldn't be the end of it. It would want to
    take the whole of Ukraine. It set its sights on other
    countries. Itis already undermining Moldova, for instance.
        Really, it has also explicitly said that it believes that
    Poland is still in its sphere of influence, if you look at the
    two so-called treaties that were presented to the United States
    and NATO in December 2021. So, it is a question of--world
    order, that sounds very abstract, but it is a world in which
    Russia would like a world where there are no rules. It is a
    disruptive power.
        It could cause instability, on the European continent,
    certainly for a long time. That has huge economic impacts, and
    as we have seen, even global impacts in the way that it's
    prevented the Ukrainians from exporting much of their grain and
    fertilizers. So, I think the American people have to understand
    it does affect them.
        If Russia isn't stopped, we can't sort of wall ourselves
    off from this conflict. We need to reestablish rules that
    people will abide by and respect international law. So, I think
    that is probably the best way of explaining it.
        Senator Ernst. No, I really appreciate it. I don't think
    Americans want to live in a world that is dominated by Russia
    and by China. I think it is very important that Ukrainians win
    this war.
        Ms. Massicot, when we talk about equipment and the
    degradation of Russian capabilities, Ukrainian capabilities, is
    Ukraine sufficiently equipped to suppress and defeat Russia's
    air defenses? What are those weapons systems that the United
    States could maybe provide to effectively counter the Russian
    air defenses?
        Ms. Massicot. That is one of the most complicated missions
    to do. I don't think the Ukrainians would be able to do it
    comprehensively from the air. Russia's SIM system is really
    quite multilayered at this point in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine
    are both denying each other the use of air space right now.
        On the ground capabilities that could potentially disable
    some of these systems, the Ukrainians have been able to target
    them with precision munitions. So that is a--if they are
    provided the right type of information, they act on it pretty
    quickly.
        So that is really helping that degradation over time. From
    an air to ground perspective, I think that would be pretty
    difficult.
        Senator Ernst. So and just in closing, because my time is
    running out, I do believe in supporting Ukraine. I think it is
    important that we continue to do this and do it full on. Not
    the drip, drip, drip we have seen from the Administration.
        Really appreciate all of you being here today and sharing
    your message with all of our folks back home as well. But
    again, to the folks that love and support the 209th and the
    1133d, God bless them. They are doing well. You should be proud
    of them. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator
    Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Stent and
    Ms. Massicot, public reporting shows that the Chinese
    Government is considering providing lethal support for Russia's
    invasion of Ukraine. How does a hollowed out Russian army
    affect China's security posture, and what opportunities does
    the PRC Government see in providing lethal support to Russia?
        Dr. Stent. I will start with--thank you, Senator. I think
    we have to understand that the Chinese do not want Russia to
    lose this war. You know, Xi Jinping and Putin say extravagant
    things about each other.
        They are each other's best friends. When it comes down to
    the bottom line, from the Chinese point of view, Russia is the
    other major authoritarian country in the world that shares
    their grievances against the West, where they--both of them
    talk about a post-West order. In other words, they need Russia
    as a partner in trying to change the way that the world works
    and make it more safe, really, for autocracy.
        They may be very surprised and maybe even appalled by the
    performance of the Russian military, but now that it looks that
    Russia is really quite bogged down, they do not want Russia to
    lose this war.
        Because their concern is, and it is very hard for us to
    imagine that, but if somebody were to come after Vladimir
    Putin, who would rethink what Russia is doing, rethink its
    ties, its antagonistic ties to the West, rethink its aggressive
    policies, and rethink its dependance on China, then from the
    Chinese point of view, that would leave them alone.
        Again, hard for us to understand. So, I think that even
    though until now the Chinese have been fairly restrained in
    what they have done materially for Russia, even though they
    support rhetorically everything that is--the Russian narrative,
    they certainly would not want to see Russia lose.
        It remains to be seen whether they are willing to take the
    risk of supplying, as we hear, possibly artillery and drones.
        Ms. Massicot. I don't have much to add to that other than,
    again, from the they may be able to provide a short-term
    stopgap for the Russians and provide some type of artillery
    rounds or drones. But I agree with Dr. Stent.
        Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Stent, have the events in the past
    year led you to revise any conclusions you made in your 1990
    book, 1919 book--sorry, 2019 book, Putin's World. What are the
    biggest changes?
        Dr. Stent. So last week, an updated version of the book
    came out with a chapter on the Russia, Ukraine war. So
    obviously in that book, I certainly understood the tensions
    between Russia and Ukraine, but I think I, like many people,
    didn't believe that Putin would undertake a full-scale invasion
    of Ukraine the way he did.
        So, I think what it has led me to rethink is I had always
    viewed Putin as someone who was a pretty smart tactician and
    not a huge risk taker. So, in 2008, when Russia invaded
    Georgia, it didn't go to the capital, Tbilisi, and take out
    President Saakashvili, who of course, President Putin hated. It
    stopped and just recognized these two areas of Georgia as being
    independent, and even in 2014, it took over Crimea fairly
    bloodless and it didn't prosecute, continue prosecuting the war
    in the Donbass that started the war. I think what has changed
    is the amount of risk that Putin is willing to take. He was
    obviously woefully misinformed about the performance of his own
    military and about the performance of the Ukrainian military.
        I think we see someone who is so hell bent on
    reestablishing what he thinks is Russia's rightful empire that
    he is not listening to, I think, the counsel of anyone else.
    So, I think it is the willingness to take risks and to just dig
    himself in, and which I think has made me somewhat change my
    evaluation of him.
        Senator Gillibrand. With regard to the General Assembly,
    they voted overwhelmingly last week to condemn Russia's
    invasion, but there were 32 abstentions. Russia has been
    aggressively spreading misinformation, not just in Russia and
    the Homeland, but also in Africa and Latin America regarding
    the causes of the war.
        Who is at fault for grain and fertilizer shortages and
    similar topics? How can the United States and their allies
    counter these Russian diplomatic efforts? Both for Dr. Stent
    and----
        Dr. Stent. So, I think we do have to be more active
    diplomatically. I mean, we already discussed sort of
    information war, but we do have to be more active.
        I mean, Russia, even during this first year of the war, has
    increased its influence in Africa, partly through the Wagner
    group, but also partly through diplomacy. We just had Sergei
    Lavrov in South Africa recently, and you have just had this
    past week a joint naval exercise between Russia, China, and
    South Africa.
        So, I think we do have to step up our diplomatic efforts
    really in Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East to
    try and counter some of what Russia is doing.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank very much. Thank you
    all for being here today. General, thank you for your service.
    I would like to say that first, I was in Ukraine 6 months
    before this war started and talked to President Zelenskyy. They
    knew this was coming. They were putting people on--they were
    putting troops on the border through Belarus, all through the
    Don--all over the place, building up.
        We didn't do one thing. We said it was going to be a small
    incursion. That is what President Biden said. We are coming off
    Afghanistan. We looked--didn't look very smart. What would we
    do different, General, now, in your eyes?
        Now we are doing it, we are waiting. We seemed like we are
    one step behind in everything we are doing. What should we have
    done different at the beginning? Because it looks like we are
    going to be the defender of the free world, we need to learn
    from our mistakes and we made huge mistakes at the beginning of
    this.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator, and thanks for
    your question. As a former and retired military officer, I am a
    little bit disappointed in the military and intelligence
    community that either didn't relay this or didn't believe it as
    well. We had very senior officers say, one, that Ukraine would
    fall within 3 days of the invasion and try to get President
    Zelenskyy right out of town.
        That is when he made the comment, I don't need a ride, I
    need ammunition. You can have a beer with that kind of guy. The
    fact is we just didn't really believe it and we didn't look at
    it hard. I would really question our intelligence communities,
    all of them, and also the military why their decisionmaking was
    so poor in foreseeing this. Most of us saw it. We saw the
    indicators.
        I am a big believer in indicators and patterns, and the
    patterns and indicators were there. So, I think it was a fault
    somewhere in our systems that we didn't convince ourselves that
    it was really going to happen.
        Part of it may have been a misunderstanding of President
    Putin himself, and they just didn't believe he would do it. I
    have actually heard commentators say, up until the day before
    the invasion, he wouldn't--he was going to do it. Yes, he was,
    and if you read Putin, and I had a fortune when I was in the
    National Security Council, I brought Dr. Fiona Hill in on the
    NSC team. She came out of Brookings, and she is a very well-
    read person on Putin.
        She says when he says something, believe it, he is going to
    do it. We didn't believe.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Thank you, and now we are up to
    our ears in alligators. Looks like China is getting ready--and
    just a couple yes, no questions for Dr. Stent and General
    Kellogg. Let's talk about China's motivation. Do you think that
    the Chinese weapons are going to further drag out this
    conflict? Dr. Stent, yes or no.
        Dr. Stent. Yes.
        Senator Tuberville. General?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. No.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need to increase
    weapons supplies to Ukraine to counter Chinese munitions? Dr.
    Stent, since you said yes.
        Dr. Stent. Yes.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. If we are increasing our support
    in Ukraine, do you believe that that will slow down shipments
    to Taiwan in the future, if we continue to send munitions to
    Ukraine? You don't think it will?
        Dr. Stent. No.
        Senator Tuberville. All right. Ms. Massicot, at a hearing
    on February 15th, this Committee heard expert testimony that if
    the United States were to enter a war with China today, we
    would have just 2 weeks' worth of munitions, our stockpiles
    would be out. Do you agree with this assessment?
        Ms. Massicot. I don't have enough information to make an
    assessment. I am sorry, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Take a shot at it, General.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I do not agree with that
    assessment at all.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay, thank you. General Kellogg, do
    you have a clear sense of the overall United States strategy in
    Ukraine, and what does victory look like for Ukraine?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I do not have an overall view
    of what the current strategy in Ukraine is. I believe we should
    have one. I think you have to put, in State, you have to put
    Russia's army at risk in Ukraine. Putin has to understand he
    has got two options, lose his army or leave. If his army loses
    and is defeated, he falls.
        Senator Tuberville. Can Ukrainians win it on their own?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. No. I don't--they can win it on
    their own, if we give them the equipment to do it.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Okay. What is the most dangerous
    course of action for the United States when it comes to this
    conflict? What puts us in harm's way?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. By doing what we are doing
    right now, because it is not disciplined. It is also not
    emphatic.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. There was a poll out, the Russian
    people believe from a poll in Russia, that they are at war
    right now with the United States. The Russian people believe
    this. You think the American people think we are at war with
    the Russia, General?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. No, I do not, and that is
    because of the messaging.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Dr. Stent?
        Dr. Stent. No, I don't think so.
        Senator Tuberville. How concerned--General, are you
    concerned about nuclear conflict--how concerned?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think it has to be a
    consideration simply because it is in the Russian philosophy to
    use. They have got a large amount of what we--and I hate to use
    the term tactical nuclear weapons, and they believe in using
    it.
        It is something we really don't have. In their philosophy,
    to use it if it gets pushed, he may use it. I am hoping that
    there will be smarter people would--he would not use it, but
    you always have to understand the probability and possibility
    of it happening.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you
    all for your service, all of you. I appreciate it very much.
    First of all, I want to say that I am old enough to remember
    vividly the Vietnam War and all the conflicts we have had since
    then.
        I believe this is the most just position the United States
    has ever taken for the right cause, to be involved for the sake
    of freedom and democracy and what I think we all should be
    doing.
        So, I am very supportive and very appreciative of our
    efforts and all of them, but also we can do much better. I
    always think that too. I would ask the question to--any of you
    all can answer on these.
        Do you think--do the Ukrainians have the ability to produce
    weapons themselves? Are they manufacturing? Do you all know if
    there is any manufacturing in Ukraine right now? Mr. Massicot.
        Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. The Russians from the
    beginning of the war systematically attacked Ukraine's defense
    industrial base. So, a lot of those factories are----
        Senator Manchin. Since 2014?
        Ms. Massicot. What they could range back then, but
    especially since 2022. I mean, that is part of their strategy
    that they actually did implement. They went after those
    factories. So, either the workers are immobilized or they are
    fighting, or the facilities are damaged. So, no, at this
    point----
        Senator Manchin. They are not producing anything. They are
    depending totally, and there is a reason for that is what you
    are saying.
        Ms. Massicot. It is. There is a structural reason for that,
    yes.
        Senator Manchin. In Crimea right now, you know, I saw this
    morning there was a report in television that showing that most
    Crimeans are Russian, believe that they are part of Russia, and
    want to remain part of Russia. But I understand that Zelenskyy
    and Ukrainians want that to be part of their country because it
    is. So where do we go with that? How do you--and Miss, Dr.
    Stent, maybe you can talk to this or any of you all can answer
    it? Is it possible that Crimea would come back and be part of
    Ukraine, or would it remain separate?
        Dr. Stent. President Zelenskyy has said that it is. One, we
    do know what Ukraine's at least official war aims are, and it
    is their aim to take back Crimea, which of course, the Russians
    illegally annexed in 2014.
        There are some people who believe that if the Ukrainians
    tried to take back Crimea, if we come back to the question of
    escalation now, that that would be a ``red line'' for Putin and
    that might lead to a real military escalation.
        I think it is unlikely in this present phase of the war
    that the Ukrainians would be able to take back Crimea. Maybe
    they will in the longer term, depending on what happens in
    Russia, what happens, how----
        Senator Manchin. I know the bridge has been repaired. I saw
    the bridge is back in operation.
        Dr. Stent. Yes, the bridge is back in operation. I don't
    know what you think there are but----
        Senator Manchin. Anybody else on that?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, you know, Zelenskyy
    made the comment the war began in Crimea in 2014 and it will
    end in Crimea. I think he has to take that into consideration.
    I do think the Ukrainians with support can, in fact, penetrate
    toward Kherson, toward Crimea, and put it--but that would be
    something for negotiations somewhere along the line. Wars end
    by negotiations and that would just part of it.
        Senator Manchin. My only concern is basically it seemed
    like the Crimean people there are sympathetic and feel more
    connected to Russia than they do Crimea, from what we are
    hearing in type of reports.
        Without the citizen support, like they have the rest of
    Ukraine, it would be quite difficult, I would think. And the
    biggest thing I am concerned about is accountability. I think
    our support is unwavering. It is bipartisan, Democrat,
    Republican, overwhelmingly supporting the United States effort
    and supporting Ukraine.
        I am concerned about accountability. Are we basically good,
    from Inspector General, good counting on the equipment we are
    sending, the money that we are sending, vice versa. Because if
    you look at what happened in Afghanistan, that whole country, I
    mean, just was rigged with corruption.
        I think it shows how quickly it fell as soon as we left. I
    also believe that we left the wrong way, and I think that gave
    Putin much more stimulus to do what he has done. Do you have
    any comments on that, General?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think we are getting better,
    Senator, on accountability. We are not there yet. When we were
    in Ukraine recently, they are not--they do not object to
    accountability.
        I would provide a special inspector general or something
    like that to provide on the team to ensure accountability to
    the American people and make sure that their money is being
    well spent out there. But are there problems? Of course, there
    are. But they are getting better at it and they are trying to
    fix it.
        Senator Manchin. General, the last move, and I think has
    Zelenskyy has just removed one of his top officers, a top
    military person, and replaced him. What do you--what do you
    read into that, any of you?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. He has not only replaced with
    military officers, he has also replaced several other person
    people in his office because of corruption concerns out there.
    On the other side, remember, the Russians are on their fifth
    general and that is running this----
        Senator Manchin. I know that, but I am saying, do you think
    it is a smart move? Dr. Stent, do you have any comments on
    that?
        Dr. Stent. I think President Zelenskyy understands that if
    the European Union is really ever to accept Ukraine, it has to
    do a much better job of dealing with corruption. So, I think
    some of the sackings that we have seen in the past few weeks,
    both of military personnel, but then other personnel, it is all
    connected to that. Hopefully he will make progress with it.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. Thank you all.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Mullin,
    please.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you,
    panel, for being here. I have got a couple comments and some
    questions, too. Last week, I was on a trip to the Middle East,
    meeting with the leaders over there.
        General, you are absolutely right, Afghanistan is, the
    withdrawal was a very strong, negative black eye to the United
    States. It has made us extremely weak. In our allies, those
    that believed that we would be there are questioning if we
    would actually be there, if we were willing to walk away from
    something we had so much investment in and literally turn the
    country over to terrorists.
        The irony of that, though, is President Trump, obviously,
    when he was in office, he put in the Abraham Accord, and
    Abraham Accord was designed to help strengthen the economy in
    that region, but it has actually strengthened the allies in
    that region, too, by doing business together with Israel.
        The views that some of these world leaders have had with
    Israel has been broken and they have realized that they have a
    common foe, and it has strengthened themselves. What has
    started out as an opportunity for businesses, has actually
    helped fill the void that the United States have left behind.
    With that being said, it has definitely led to Putin's
    aggression because of our view.
        At the same time, the American people are questioning why
    we are even in Ukraine and what we are doing there. I feel very
    strongly that we need to be there, but I don't feel as though
    we should be taking the lead. I feel like it is what our NATO
    allies are for. That is what we have alliances for.
        I feel like that we need to be working with them, not
    necessarily leading. But it is obvious, too, with Germany, for
    instance, wavering back and forth on should they send weapons
    or shouldn't they send weapons, when the United States decided
    that we were going to send Abrams tanks.
        No telling when that is actually going to happen, though.
    You had Germany that finally agreed to start sending in
    weapons. General, is--what is your view of our leadership and
    the lack of leadership? How is this affecting what is happening
    in the neighbors of Ukraine and their activity going on in
    assisting Ukraine?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I
    am concerned about the decisiveness of support for Ukraine. I
    mean, this is a fight, it is an existential fight for Ukraine,
    and we need to support it.
        If we don't support this fight, we are going to be--and the
    third time, we are going to be fighting in Europe. We are not
    sending United States troops right now, and I don't think we
    should. No Ukrainians thought we should either. Every Ukrainian
    commander and every civilian and military leader, they do not
    want American troops on the ground. They want the equipment.
        They are able to fight it. But if this thing goes badly for
    the Ukrainians and it starts to fade toward NATO, then we may
    get involved in a fight that I would prefer we not do because
    we have done this twice before to save Europe.
        Senator Mullin. Should NATO shut down the airspace?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. The airspace in----
        Senator Mullin. Over Ukraine.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, the Russians have a lot of
    air dominance over Ukraine right now. The fact is, Ukrainians
    are still fighting with their fighters. They do not--they have
    not established air dominance at all. What you are seeing is
    the missiles coming in, but they are not able to fly the
    aircraft over Ukraine.
        Senator Mullin. Would it help if we were able to shut down,
    if NATO were to just simply shut down the airspace over
    Ukraine?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. You know, Senator, I think it
    is--I don't think the airspace would concern me very much right
    now because it is really contested and the Ukrainians are doing
    a fine job. I think there is other things we should do.
        The other thing that we should do is we should give them
    the ability to actually penetrate Russian space themselves and
    attack targets into Russia, because that is where the supply
    lines are located.
        The Russians are using their borders as a sanctuary. So, it
    is not so much airspace. I go back to ground space. It may be
    able to put the Russians at risk. We haven't put ? we, meaning
    the Ukrainians, have not been able to put the Russians at risk,
    as they should be able to do.
        Senator Mullin. Does Putin have the ability himself to
    launch nuclear weapons or does it go through a process? I know
    it used to go through a process. Is that--is that faded now? Is
    the lines blurred?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, they do have a process. I
    don't want to get into there because then I will fall back on
    what I did at the National Security Council. But they have a
    process. I am just hoping that if we ever get to a position
    like that, wiser heads would prevail.
        Senator Mullin. Well, I am familiar with the process.
    Before I was in the Senate, I was on the House Intel, and we
    were very aware of it, but I was concerned that it may be
    blurred now. One last comment I will make and I will make it
    brief.
        The IC community, at least the ones in the field, and I am
    not trying to defend the IC community here in Washington, DC. I
    think they are riddled with problems, but they did call it
    right. They were advising us that this was eminent, that they
    were going, and they were very precise on even the timeframe of
    when it was going to happen.
        Unfortunately, when we were meeting with the
    decisionmakers, they weren't very positive on Ukraine's resolve
    and that is where we misled it or misread it. We should
    understand that Ukraine was going to fight.
        I will admit I even got that wrong. Now that they are
    fighting, we should do everything we can to support them and
    with our allies. So, thank you guys, everybody, for your
    comments, and thanks for talking honestly and in agreeance with
    one voice. It is refreshing. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will pick up where
    Senator Mullin left off. I think while you come at this from
    different perspectives and have some differences in your
    testimoneys, I am picking up a common punchline, which is we
    are doing a lot, but we need to do more and we need to do it
    quicker.
        We have to calculate and calibrate, but we should do more
    and do it quicker. Our allies, they are doing a lot, but they
    should do a lot more and invest a lot more because they have
    more at stake here. General Kellogg, you talked about this war
    in their backyard, and I think that that is true.
        So I think that that is coming through loud and clear. I do
    want to just comment on one thing. General Kellogg, in your
    testimony, you said this, simply saying that one will support
    Ukraine for as long as it takes is a bumper sticker, not a
    strategy. No number of supplemental aid packages, no rounds of
    sanctions, and not even a Presidential visit to Kyiv are
    substitutes for American leadership.
        Let me just offer my thoughts on that. The sanctions
    packages that the United States have engineered, they ain't a
    bumper sticker--they ain't a bumper sticker. They are an
    example of great American diplomacy.
        The billions of dollars of aid that this Congress has
    appropriated for military purposes in Ukraine with the
    President's request, that ain't a bumper sticker. That is
    American leadership. One Estonia that did it. One Liechtenstein
    that did it. The billions and billions of aid for humanitarian
    purposes that we have allocated. Not a bumper sticker. That is
    American leadership.
        100,000 Ukrainian refugees in the United States in the 5-
    months after the invasion. Don't look at the Armed Services
    Committee and tell me that that is a bumper sticker. That is
    American leadership. Engineering a State of affairs where
    Finland and Sweden, whose popular approval for accession to
    NATO would have been about 25 percent a couple of years ago,
    are now on the verge of joining NATO and dramatically
    increasing both the NATO and Western defense capacity.
        Don't tell me that is a bumper sticker. That is American
    leadership. Engineering overwhelming votes in the General
    Assembly and the National Security Council to call out Putin's
    illegal war effort.
        Admittedly, they are nations that abstain, there are
    nations that stand with Russians that are acknowledging the
    facts. That ain't a bumper sticker, that is American
    leadership. I don't see any reason why anybody should be Debbie
    Downer about American leadership that has assembled a global
    coalition to stand for Ukraine.
        We are not trashing Zelenskyy any more, we are standing up
    with him. We are not undermining Ukraine anymore, we are
    standing up for Ukraine. If you wonder about American
    leadership, talk to President Zelenskyy, because we all do. We
    talk to him in person. I have colleagues who visit him in
    Ukraine. He came and addressed us right before Christmas. I had
    no reason to believe he was lying to us when he thanked us for
    American leadership.
        The global effort to stand for Ukraine against an illegal
    invasion by a dictator, that is not only necessary in all of
    our view to stand up against Putin but also to send a message
    to dictators around the globe, would not have happened without
    American leadership, by this Committee, by the Appropriations
    Committee, by the Intel Committee, by the Foreign Relations
    Committee, by the Administration.
        Could we do more, could we do it quicker, could we look in
    the rearview mirror and say things might have been done--? Of
    course. Should we exercise oversight on the investments that we
    make in Congress? Should we be able to answer questions the
    American public asked us about the stakes or about the dollars
    we are investing?
        Of course we should. Those are all really important
    questions and they are very fair. But to suggest that the
    coordinated effort of the Article 1 and 2 branches in outreach
    around the world to assemble a global coalition to support
    Ukraine is a bumper sticker rather than American leadership, I
    don't get it. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Fischer,
    please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
    panelists that are here today. I would like to begin by asking
    you to share your assessments on the current status of war in
    Ukraine.
        So, and hopefully I am going to be like Senator Tuberville
    and we will do yes or no unless you feel a driving desire that
    you have to explain further. We will start with you, doctor.
    How would you assess the current State of the Russian military
    in Ukraine?
        Dr. Stent. Well, they are struggling to perform better. On
    the other hand, they do have, you know, a few hundred thousand
    more people that they can throw into this war. They have
    learned a little bit from their mistakes, but still they are
    struggling.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Ms. Massicot.
        Ms. Massicot. I don't think they have culminated in the
    Clausewizian sense, but their combat effectiveness is
    definitely degraded. They are trying to find a solution. I
    think that they are trying to use brute force tactics to close
    on the Ukrainians as quickly as possible at a very high cost.
        I don't think they are capable of large incursions anymore,
    not for several years until they can properly regenerate
    armored force and rebuild their missile stocks. That being
    said, I do anticipate incremental gains in Donetsk and Luhansk.
        Potentially a little bit more in Zaporizhzhia. I don't have
    a timeline on that, but probably toward the summer. That is
    what their intentions are.
        Senator Fischer. When you talk about the Russians using
    brute force, brutal tactics, will the Ukrainians suffer through
    that and remain strong?
        Ms. Massicot. Their will to fight is very strong, but this
    is taking a toll on them. That is not only a high casualty
    situation for them as well, there is also a lot of
    psychological distress because, again, we are talking about
    mowing down human waves every day.
        Also, they have specific needs that are emerging from this
    type of fighting. We are talking about ammunition, small arms,
    50 caliber mortars, artillery shells to counter this. So, I
    know we talk a lot about ATACMS and F-16s, but I would just
    like to point out that they have immediate small arms needs, to
    include morphine.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, and General?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, thank you. I think you
    are heading to our war of attrition like we are seeing around
    Bakhmut right now. The longer this war goes, it accrues to
    Russia's favor. That is why it must be terminated as quickly as
    it can while Ukraine still has the advantage. Russia will have
    the advantage.
        Russia is learning right now, as we are seeing around
    Bakhmut, where they are changing how they fight, the tactics
    they are using by sheer mass and heavy use of artillery. They
    are going back to the way the Russians used to fight before.
        Senator Fischer. General, how important is it that the
    United States and our allies continue to be supportive to
    Ukraine for their psychological reasons and to show the
    Russians that we will be supportive to the Ukrainians? How does
    that play into your previous analysis that you just stated?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, I think the Ukrainians
    can do more. If you look what the Kiel Institute just said, and
    that is out of Kiel, Germany, the European Union only committed
    6 percent of their total stores of military stock, where the
    British have committed 25 percent of their total stock, and we
    are committing a lot of our stock as well.
        So, I think when it comes down, and referring back to what
    Senator Kaine said a minute ago, is there isn't a question
    about Presidential leadership, not with what this Congress has
    done, which has been enormous.
        Where you lead is from the top and where those decisions
    are made are from the top. The issue is getting the other
    allies to contribute more. They are not contributing what they
    can contribute to this fight.
        Senator Fischer. Mr. Massicot, how would you analyze that?
    What--how important is it for Congress, for our Administration,
    to be vocal about our support and our continued support, and
    also for our allies for NATO to step up? How does that play not
    just on the Ukrainians, but on the Russians as well?
        Ms. Massicot. So, I was in the Pentagon in 2014, the first
    time Russia invaded, and I could say that the response from
    this government is fundamentally very different. Our intel
    collection prior to the war was very different.
        Our response is very different. I do think the Russians are
    deterred from the upper end of their escalation. I think they
    remain absolutely terrified of our air power. They don't engage
    us in cyber-attacks.
        Senator Fischer. Are we too slow in getting to Ukraine what
    they need?
        Ms. Massicot. I don't have all the information, but it is
    my assumption that the logistics to get these weapons dug out
    of every corner from different parts of the globe is
    complicated logistically.
        I don't--from what I understand from the outside, I don't
    think it is a deliberate metering of things not to give it to
    them. I think there is a lot that is complicated in getting it
    to them. I don't know how to improve the logistics.
        Senator Fischer. But to show our resolve and getting it
    there is important?
        Ms. Massicot. I do.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you. Dr. Stent, how would
    you respond?
        Dr. Stent. I would--you know, it seems to me that we have
    been doing this incrementally, and we, first of all say, we are
    not going to send this----
        Senator Fischer. Then we do.
        Dr. Stent.--and then we do send it. So, in the end, we do
    the right thing. But probably some of these things could have
    been sent more quickly. I think obviously, what we are all
    awaiting now is what the outcome of this question about whether
    we are going to supply them with fighter jets, the F-16s will
    be.
        Senator Fischer. Air power earlier would have prevented
    some of the devastation we see on their infrastructure within
    their own country, and made them more reliant on the United
    States and our allies, wouldn't you say?
        Dr. Stent. Yes, I think so.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator King,
    please. Excuse me, Senator Kelly. I am sorry.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Senator King. General Kellogg, and for everybody here today,
    thank you for testifying. I want to followup a little bit on
    Senator Fischer's questions about the aid we have given to
    Ukraine.
        As you know, the United States in this close partnership
    with Ukraine, we have provided, I think the number to date is
    $29.8 billion in security assistance since this brutal attack
    occurred around a year ago.
        Equipment from the United States has included everything
    from ammunition, grenades, bombs, MVDs, HIMARS, 155-millimeter
    artillery pieces, counter fire, fire radars, much of what is in
    our inventory. Not everything but much. I also want to commend
    our allies for their support.
        Nearly 50 countries providing $13 billion in security
    assistance, most recently agreeing to provide tanks. This is
    going to be critical for Ukraine with the approach that they
    are going to need to take this spring. So, General Kellogg, can
    you provide your assessment on the effectiveness of both U.S.
    and partner military equipment.
        If you see any gaps, if there is something you think is not
    working well and something that we should address, a gap in
    capability, I would like to hear that. Then from a combat
    assessment, what has provided the greatest return on investment
    for the Ukrainians?
        What do you think the most important thing for us to
    continue to supply, if you have a sense for--you know, what I
    heard when I was in Munich a couple of weeks ago was that they
    need 155-millimeter artillery shells, that that supply is going
    down.
        They also made some other requests, some of which we are
    going to deal with here in the United States Senate. But if you
    could share your assessment, I would appreciate that.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator,
    what you really need is all the equipment you just mentioned,
    but more. We developed a package during the cold war called a
    salt breaker.
        The salt breaker where the Abrams tanks, the Bradley
    fighting vehicle, a pallet 155 self-propelled Howitzer, the
    Apache fighting system, all of those systems together allowed
    us to fight in the combined arms fashion. The combined arms
    fashion assault will break the Russians' back.
        The Russians are not capable of handling that. But we
    haven't given them the full suite. We haven't given the
    Ukrainians ATACMS. That is the long-range missile that fits
    into the pod of either HIMARS or MRS systems out there. It
    gives you extended range of 200 miles. It is GPS guided. It can
    attack their supply lines deep.
        We only give them 31 tanks. 31 tanks is a battalion, you
    need much more than that. Give them brigades levels so they can
    actually fight combined arms, and then maybe we have to do
    separately, you give the Europeans with the Challenger tanks
    from Britain, maybe they have one unit----
        Senator Kelly. My sense is in discussing with, you know,
    our highest military leadership including, you know, folks on
    the Joint Chiefs, that they are capable of using combined arms
    to fight. I think what you might be alluding to is they need to
    do it on a bigger scale. Certainly there are gaps.
        I mean, they are not using, you know, nor do they have
    Apache helicopters. That would be an entire another issue. But
    being able to combine ground troops with, artillery, with long
    range fires is something I think they have done rather
    effectively. Maybe not at the scale that you think.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Not at the scale that is needed
    to win.
        Senator Kelly. So give me a sense of what you feel the
    greatest return on our investment has been from the standpoint
    of equipment that we have provided them.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I would believe the best system
    that we have given them has been the HIMAR system. That is the
    one that has given deep fires, and the fires have been able to
    compensate and overcompensate for the Russian fires. So if you
    have to pick, artillery generally, even I am an old
    infantryman, artillery will win your fights, and we need to
    have as much artillery to dominate that.
        Plus one other system that is not really a military
    hardware system in the sense it is kinetic, but we need to give
    them more advanced intelligence systems that is able to use
    jammers, because they are using, Russians are using jammers to
    great effect right now, especially against the drones the
    Ukrainians have had. That is something we haven't really done.
    We probably should do more.
        Senator Kelly. I appreciate that. Just, if I could just
    take another 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. The HIMARS, they view
    as--it was a game changer for them. I agree, that is, a good
    example of a weapons system that has been very effective, and
    really, changed the momentum in this fight. Beyond that, what
    would be the next thing you think would be a game changer for
    them?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, again, sir, what I just
    talked about, it is not a kinetic system, but the ability to do
    anti-jamming in the intelligence type of collection and
    electronic warfare. The Russians do that very, very well.
        That is causing problems with the drones of the Ukrainians
    as well. It is also be able to target the Ukrainians much
    deeper. It is something that is really not thought about
    because it may not be sexy, but the fact is those are the kind
    of systems they need to support. It allows better targeting,
    longer range targeting, and with greater effects on the
    battlefield.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. I want to thank all of the witnesses for
    their very informative testimony. General Kellogg, I especially
    appreciate your testimony. It is clear eyed and hard-nosed, as
    you would expect from a seasoned statesman and military man
    like yourself who spent a lot of time on the battlefield and
    less time the halls of the Pentagon, so thank you.
        I think there are some important lessons for the
    Administration and Democrats to learn, and also Republicans to
    learn. I just want to revisit a few points of your testimony
    and make sure I have it correct.
        It sounds like one key point you are making is it is
    possible to support Ukraine without supporting President
    Biden's Ukraine policy, is that correct?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Correct.
        Senator Cotton. If I could synthesize the critique, I have
    heard about President Biden's Ukraine policy maybe down to a
    few points.
        First, in 2021, he did what Winston Churchill cautioned
    that we should never do with dictatorships but especially
    Russia, gave them temptations to a trial of strength by giving
    away the START and the New START treaty, and NordStream 2,
    turning the cheek on the Colonial Pipeline hack, inviting him
    to a big summit in Europe.
        Is that one part of the--one part of your take is that
    President Biden tempted Vladimir Putin to achieve what he has
    always wanted to achieve, which is subjugating Ukraine to a new
    Russian empire?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, Senator--Senator, I am a
    big believer in patterns. We all have patterns. We go to the
    shore the same way, by the same service station, and so do
    leaders. Putin saw it in the leadership of President Biden, a
    pattern, and he was able to exploit it.
        Senator Cotton. Second, over the year of the war, it sounds
    to me like your critique is that the President Biden, the
    Administration has been pussyfooting around their support for
    Ukraine, constantly providing them just enough to avoid a
    catastrophic defeat, not enough to win. It is, as you say, a
    pattern we have seen from the very beginning. We will give them
    ammunition, but not artillery.
        We will give them artillery, but not HIMARS. We will give
    them HIMARS and not armor. We will give them Bradleys, but not
    Abrams. We will give them Abrams but not cluster munitions and
    F-16, which is where we are now.
        Therefore, these dragged out the war longer than we should
    have if we had just provided Ukraine with what it needed to
    defend its territory from the very beginning. Am I right about
    that?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. You are correct, Senator.
    Senator, and you will appreciate this, this is like doing a
    river crossing. Once from the near bank to the far bank, you
    don't get to the middle on a river crossing and you said it was
    not a good idea. Once you commit, you go.
        Senator Cotton. To a point you were making earlier and
    Senator Kaine discussed with you, is that President Biden keeps
    talking about supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes, which
    is a substitute for helping Ukraine win as quick as it can, is
    that right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe so, because if this
    goes to a long range fight, it is an endless war and they
    cannot win a war of attrition.
        Senator Cotton. So from the beginning, it shouldn't have
    been about supporting Ukraine as long as it takes. It should be
    helping them win as quick as they can. For the record, Senator
    Kaine talked a lot about seeing through the rearview mirror. I
    think you were making these very points a year ago, weren't
    you, when you were looking through the windshield, not the
    rearview mirror.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Correct, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I think a lot of us were. Then the third
    take, after the first one, that President Biden tempted
    Vladimir Putin to go for the jugular and then he spent a year
    pussyfooting around in support for Ukraine, is that he has also
    allowed Europe to get away with not doing enough, especially on
    financial support and in particular Germany, France, and the
    European Union. Is that right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe Europe has been very
    laggard.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Now, I also hear you making a few
    other points as well that I want to pursue. Sometimes we hear a
    criticism of President Biden that he seems to care more about
    Ukraine's border than America's borders.
        I think that is fair criticism of President Biden. But it
    sounds like you believe, and that it is the case, that you can
    care about America's borders and protect our borders, while
    also help other countries protect their borders too, is that
    right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Recently since the terrible train wreck in
    East Palestine, Ohio, and President Biden's trip to Kyiv last
    week, I have heard some say that the President will go to Kyiv,
    but he won't go to East Palestine.
        I agree that is a fair criticism of President Biden. It
    sounds to me like you think it is possible to both go to East
    Palestine and support the people there who have been harmed by
    this train wreck, but also travel to Kyiv and show our support
    for the Ukrainian people and their fight against this war of
    aggression from Russia. Is that right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. My experience that Air Force
    One can go anywhere it wants to go.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you for that. Now, on negotiations,
    we also hear a lot of criticism that we are not doing enough to
    have a negotiated end to this conflict, that we need to get
    negotiations underway. I think you are--one of your key points
    in terms of supporting Ukraine now, backing them to the hilt as
    quick as we can, not for as long as it takes, is that the only
    way to get a negotiated settlement is to convince Vladimir
    Putin he has more to lose in the battlefield than he does at
    the negotiating table, Is that right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct, Senator. What
    you need to push pressure on him, if he loses his army, he
    loses, and that is what you put him at risk of.
        Senator Cotton. So this idea that, well, if we stop
    supporting Ukraine or if we gradually draw down our support for
    Ukraine, then we will magically have a negotiated settlement
    that protects America's interests.
        What you are saying is that, no, what we would do is
    further embolden Vladimir Putin, exactly what Joe Biden did in
    2021 to try to achieve maximalist gains first in Ukraine and
    then down the road against NATO partners. Is that right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. That is correct. It is fool's
    gold if you think you can reduce aid.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all for your testimony, which
    has been very helpful and instructive. General Kellogg,
    particularly to you, thank you for your service. I have visited
    Ukraine three times over roughly the last year, the last two of
    them with Senator Graham taking the overnight train into Kyiv.
        I respect particularly, General, your visit to Ukraine and
    the lessons that you have learned. One of the lessons that come
    to me over this past year is that the world, and particularly
    the United States, has consistently underestimated the
    Ukrainians.
        I came back from my first trip before the invasion telling
    anyone who would listen, including the President, that the
    Ukrainians are going to fight to the last person, with
    pitchforks if necessary. That is what President Zelenskyy told
    me, and he wasn't leaving that country.
        So I have strong confidence in Ukrainians, which has been
    bolstered by my visit just 10 days ago to the United States
    Army base in Bavaria, where American soldiers are training
    Ukrainians in the use of those Bradley armored vehicles. To
    quote one of them, they are quick studies, as you would expect,
    when you are defending your homeland, your children, your
    family, as we would be.
        Americans, in fact, the American soldiers training them
    said to me, they fight just like we do. So I have come back
    from each of these visits urging more military aid, more
    Stingers and Javelins, more of the air defense. Senator Graham
    and I came back last July urging that we provide the Patriot
    system, which we did after some hesitation and caution. In
    fact, delay.
        I am urging that we provide the F-16s, the air support that
    are necessary. The aircraft that they say are necessary for
    them to break through the air defenses that the Russians have
    established. Would you agree with me, General, that we should
    provide the F-16 and begin training those pilots immediately?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I would provide them
    everything we could possibly provide them to win this fight
    because it prevents American troops being deployed later if
    they can defeat the Russian military.
        If it takes the F-16, because it does have better avionics
    than the MiG-29 does, and you could upload the ARM 88 missiles,
    as an example, the answer is I would provide everything I can.
        Senator Blumenthal. What I have heard repeatedly, and not
    just from the Administration, from some on both sides of the
    aisle here, that providing these weapons systems is too
    complicated, too costly, too difficult in terms of training.
        What I saw, and what I have heard from our American
    military, is that the training obstacles can be overcome and
    the costs of failing to provide these weapon systems now will
    be greater later.
        We will pay more in terms of cost if we have to commit
    troops after one of our NATO allies is involved or attacked
    than we would now, because right now President Zelenskyy
    doesn't want and doesn't need American troops on the ground. He
    wants the weapons systems that he needs to win the war. Would
    you agree?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I totally agree, Senator. My
    experience with the Ukrainians and those that fought with the
    Ukrainians, they are very capable. They are very smart. It is a
    very educated population. They are fighting for the life of
    their country, and they will devote everything they can to do
    it. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. There is a hitch here. It is the
    challenge that I regard as really paramount right now here in
    the United States, which is our defense industrial base.
    ATACMS, I fully support providing ATACMS, but what I have been
    told is that we don't have enough right now. That we need to
    produce more.
        The same with some of the ammunition that has been
    mentioned. We need to produce more of it. We need a trained
    workforce that will provide the skills and the person power
    that is needed. Would you agree that we need to focus on the
    production of these weapon systems, not just talk about what is
    needed on the battlefield?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, absolutely. The defense
    industry is working on a peacetime schedule. We either get them
    to a wartime footing to actually ramp up the equipment that
    they are providing, which is actually backfilling the American
    military, which is more modern equipment.
        The Stinger line, we shut down for years. We need to bring
    those lines back on to make sure it is--and actually put the
    entire defense industry on a wartime footing. Not only get the
    munitions that are needed to defeat the Russians, the
    Ukrainians defeating the Russians, but also to bring our stocks
    back up to good levels.
        Senator Blumenthal. I hope we can have bipartisan agreement
    on that last point that you made, General, because I think it
    is the key to meeting those needs on the Ukrainian battlefield
    and being prepared to send a message to China, continued
    message about our resolve. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, each of you,
    for being here. Thank you for your testimony and thank you for
    answering all these questions. General Kellogg, we have seen
    the atrocities.
        We know Russia has a despicable government. We, our heart
    goes out to the Ukrainians for all their losses. It is--I mean,
    when you see that Putin is sitting there wanting to kill women
    and children, it is just despicable.
        If you were thinking about it, and just from the standpoint
    of American security, how important is this to American
    security that we make sure that the Ukrainians win and Russia
    loses? If the opposite happened, how adverse would that be on
    our own personal and our own security, which is our primary
    role up here in Congress to provide for the security of
    Americans?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I
    believe if you can defeat a strategic adversary and not use any
    United States troops, you are at the acme of professionalism,
    because letting the Ukrainians defeat that, it takes a
    strategic adversary off the table and then we can focus what we
    should be focusing against our primary adversary, which is
    China at this time.
        The concern I have got is I don't think we need to put
    American troops there. If we fail in this, we may have to fight
    another European war, which would be the third time. I don't
    think we should do that or need to do that as well.
        Senator Scott. General, why--I mean, I think we have to
    worry about--I think, we need to make sure Russia loses, in my
    opinion. We need to make sure the Ukrainians win. Why haven't--
    why hasn't Germany stepped up?
        I mean, this is not--you know, I don't know how close how
    many miles it is from the Ukrainian border to Germany, but why
    hasn't Germany stepped up and done its part on lethal aid. I
    mean, it seems to me that they should be, have a bigger concern
    than we do.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I believe Germany is a non-
    player in Europe right now. I think you look more toward the
    Poles as being the major player.
        While it is a very obviously important country, I think
    they are feckless. They just haven't supported it. They should
    support--they should be all in this fight because it is--they
    have seen the experience of us coming over in 2 years and
    actually defeating Germany in two wars.
        They just, the leadership they have gotten has not
    displayed the leadership you would expect from a wartime
    leader.
        Senator Scott. You think that--I mean, a lot of people
    believe that we can negotiate a settlement with Putin. Is there
    any type of settlement you believe that Putin, one, would be
    interested in doing, and then two, that would be worth anything
    if he agreed to?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I believe at the end,
    I believe the two experts to my right would say this, the only
    thing that Putin understands is power and strength. You have to
    basically put your knee on his throat, and how you do that is
    defeat the only thing that really counts for Putin, and that is
    the Russian army in Ukraine. Defeat that army and I believe
    Putin falls.
        Senator Scott. Is there any--you know, a lot of what we
    hear is that we have spent a lot of money. Germany is not, they
    have not done the lethal aid. They have done other types of
    aid.
        How can we quantify to the American public the importance
    of this? Because, some people, like in my State they ask me why
    we spend over $100--or committed, not spent, but committed $100
    billion.
        Is there a way that we can make sure the Biden
    Administration does what I think most, a lot of us believe in
    is we need to go all in now rather than piecemeal.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I believe it is fight
    there rather than here. It is better that we have to fight an
    adversary overseas, not use U.S. troops to do so. Ukrainians
    don't want United States troops. Everyone I have talked to said
    we can fight this fight as long as we get the kit to do it.
        I think if we don't--we need to tell the American people,
    you can basically walk and chew bubble gum at the same time. We
    should be addressing all of those issues that we have both here
    in the United States and overseas, and I think that balance can
    be displayed.
        I think that needs to be done, which I believe, through
    Presidential leadership. I think the President should pick up
    the phone and be asked to and call President Putin. Even right
    now, when he sees Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, they will
    not pick up the phone and talk to him, nor will the Chinese. I
    think that is a huge mistake.
        Senator Scott. So what is the takeaway for Xi right now
    with regard to how the Biden Administration has acted and how
    when you look at, you know, part of the American public
    questions what we are doing there. What is Xi's takeaway?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, the huge takeaway is that
    we are in a drift and we are not displaying Presidential
    leadership. What I mean by Presidential leadership is being
    very, very definitive on what is it going to take to win this
    fight.
        We are taking a backseat to letting Ukraine drive this
    decision. This decision of the free world decision of how we
    fight and how we win on the battlefield, and I believe
    Presidential leadership does count, decisive leadership does
    count.
        Putin needs to understand that decisive leadership, and
    that he is actually fighting us and the free world in this
    endeavor.
        Senator Scott. Thank each of you. Thank you, Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you. I think General Kellogg, the
    Germans would be surprised to be called feckless. They have
    made about 180 degree turn in their orientation toward conflict
    in arms and armament. I think clearly the United States has
    been the major donor, if you will, both in terms of military
    and humanitarian aid, in terms of dollars.
        I think, I was in Munich last week, I think in terms of
    percentage of GDP, we are like 12th behind a lot of other
    countries, particularly Poland, which has stepped up in an
    enormously consequential way. Both regard refugees, acting as a
    conduit for weapons.
        So I don't--I just don't think it--I just don't think it is
    accurate to say that the rest of the world and Europe is not
    stepping up. Because as a percentage of their economy, they are
    actually countries that are doing more than we are.
        I do have a specific question about, and I think, General
    Kellogg, you will agree with me on this one. That is, we go
    through these long debates about whether to send tanks, whether
    to send jet fighters.
        Then if we decide, yes, as we have learned with the tanks,
    there is this long lag time, three or 4 months. That mostly
    involves training. It seems to me that one way to shorten that
    is to say, well, we haven't decided yet about jet aircraft or
    tanks, but let's do the training now. Does that make sense?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, it really does. Train
    now with any system they have got and prepare for the future. I
    think it is there. Sir, I spent 5 years in Germany. The
    Germany, I remember when I was there, and spent 5 years in
    there, is not the Germany I see today, both in leadership and
    their military capacity and capability.
        So I understand it is a harsh statement, but I stand by the
    statement as well, but you are absolutely right, if we can
    train them on all the systems that we may provide them, they
    are very smart, they are very quick learned, and I think it
    would help out.
        Senator King. Professor Stent, a question about, one of the
    things that is puzzling to me, I remember when this started a
    year ago, all the talk was the sanctions are going to cripple
    Russia. They are going to be just out of business and riots in
    the street. Absolutely hasn't worked.
        Talk to me about why. Were the sanctions--were they the
    wrong sanctions? Were they not applied well? Did we
    underestimate the Russian capacity to circumvent them. Why have
    the sanctions regime not played a bigger part in this conflict?
        Dr. Stent. So I think we always tend to think the first
    reaction to something like the Russian invasion is to impose
    sanctions. I think we forget how resilient that Russian economy
    is despite the sanctions.
        The IMF said that Russia's economy was going to contract by
    8 percent last year. It contracted by 2 percent. They have been
    able to do this because they have had a smart policy of
    stabilizing the ruble, and because they have earned, you know,
    windfall profits last year from their oil and gas sales. They
    have managed to keep the war machine going despite sanctions.
        That is changing now. We have the oil price cap. They
    probably won't make those windfall profits anymore. But still,
    India has now become the largest purchaser of Russian oil,
    other countries, China. So they do still sell the hydrocarbons,
    even though the Europeans have now weaned themselves off the
    Russian imports.
        Senator King. But don't you think we underestimate other
    countries, particularly a country like Russia, their ability to
    absorb pain?
        Dr. Stent. Yes, I think we do, and I think----
        Senator King. They go back--he is invoking Stalingrad, and
    also sanctions against a dictatorial regime, the problem is the
    dictator will always have his Mercedes and caviar. So the
    sanctions don't have directly effect, and it is a country that
    doesn't have much in the way of political opposition, then I am
    not sure where the sanctions go. Are there additional sanctions
    we should be applying now?
        Dr. Stent. I mean, there is still some Russian banks we
    could sanction. We have sanctioned many of them. I think we
    also misunderstand the relationship between Putin and the
    oligarchs.
        I mean, and the people who lost their bank accounts and
    their yachts and everything else. They are not going to get
    together and say, we have to rid ourselves of this leader. That
    is not how the system works.
        Senator King. That hasn't worked.
        Dr. Stent. Right. I think the only other thing I would say
    is that I think the export control sanctions will be--will bite
    more this year, particularly the lack of access to
    semiconductors and components for manufacturing.
        So the Russians already started closing down some assembly
    lines with automobiles and things like that, and that will then
    hit the general population. But so far----
        Senator King. That is where I want to followup. Ms.
    Massicot, what is the status of the Russian defense industrial
    base? How are they--are they going to be able to keep producing
    ammunition and weapons?
        Ms. Massicot. Well, we found since the beginning of the
    last year of war that Putin has delayed decisions that he
    thinks are risky and well beyond when he should have done.
    Russia has not activated its full wartime authorities to
    command that defense industrial base to really go 24/7.
        There are some sectors of it that are. My understanding is
    that some of their longer range precision munitions, they are
    working triple shifts to try to get those missile stocks back
    up. My understanding is that artillery shells, it is pretty
    simple for them to construct it if they have the access to the
    raw materials, which they do.
        There is a bit of a delay right now. I think they will
    probably overcome it by the fall, maybe the late winter. So in
    the interim, I am not sure what they are going to do. I know
    they are trying to get it from North Korea. They are trying to
    get it from China.
        Senator King. The big question, and I know it has been
    covered. I was in another hearing downstairs, but the big
    question is, will China bail them out? Is there a yes or no
    answer to that? What do we think? What do we think China is
    going to do? Are they going to--so far, they have been content
    to stand on the sidelines and hold Russia's coat. Are they
    going to actually step in and start supplying weapons?
        Ms. Massicot. I think there probably is an answer for a
    China expert. I am not that person, but I would say that if
    they did intervene right now, it would fill a critical gap for
    the Russians for the next several months. I am not sure.
        Senator King. I raise the question, what our response is to
    that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator King. Senator Schmitt,
    please.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
    couple of questions, but let me--so let me try to give voice to
    what I think a lot of folks out there who are not sitting in
    these chairs feel about where we are at with regard to this
    policy. They have seen an Administration's disastrous
    withdrawal from Afghanistan.
        Hundreds or tens of billions of dollars' worth of equipment
    left behind, critical intelligence. They are told about
    respecting the sovereignty of other countries' borders but do
    nothing about the millions of people streaming across our
    Southern border and the fentanyl that is killing 300 people a
    day in every single one of our communities.
        The violence, the humanitarian crisis. Human beings being
    trafficked by drug cartels. They see a President go to Ukraine
    before he goes to Ohio where there is a toxic chemical spill. A
    lot of people who feel forgotten in all of this are frustrated.
        I suppose my first question, I guess, to all of you,
    briefly because I have limited time, is $113 billion. Now we
    can talk about percentage of GDP, but for most folks out there,
    that is a lot of money. One billion dollars is a lot of money.
    One hundred thirteen billion dollars is a lot of money when you
    have a porous open border.
        In fact, it is more money than we spend on the Department
    of Homeland Security every year. What can be done to ensure
    that these dollars are fully accounted for beyond what we are
    doing right now? I guess that is the first question I have, for
    each of you, if you have a point of view on that.
        Dr. Stent. Senator, my understanding is that we do have
    mechanisms in place, and this has been discussed----
        Senator Schmitt. My question is, let's say you are not
    satisfied with that. What else can be done?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, I think you can
    provide more--we don't have, for example, a special inspector
    general that is currently in Kyiv. We should probably put a
    full team on board to make sure that the accountability is
    there. It is a matter of emphasis.
        What you saw, we had the same thing in Afghanistan and
    places like that before, we put in a special IG that is able to
    track all of that. So if you are saying what to do more, that
    is kind of what I would say, and the Ukrainians are very
    willing to accept that. They understand they have got
    corruption issues.
        They told us that when we were there. They are not running
    from it. I think it would behoove us to actually improve that
    accountability, and the second, you asked a great question. I
    think we have a terrible messaging problem with the American
    people.
        Right now, we can walk and chew bubble gum at the same
    time. You can do all of this if you want to, you just have to
    be committed to it, and I don't think we are committed to it.
        Senator Schmitt. Well, let me just--so we have heard a lot
    about this, you know, existential threat to Ukraine and to
    Europe. I suppose, again, part of the frustration is the
    American people, the American taxpayers, they don't see these
    European countries stepping up. They just, they don't.
        We can talk about percentage of GDP, but Germany has walked
    away. There is other countries in Europe that could be doing a
    lot more. So I guess my question is, General Kellogg, to you,
    what specifically can those European countries do? This is in
    their backyard.
        You mentioned, you know, fight them there or fight them
    here. I don't know if that is a--you know, I don't think that
    most Americans believe that we are at a point where we are
    going to be fighting the Russians on American soil.
        So we are in the European theater here. What can these
    European countries do to step up? Because they got a lot of
    money for a lot of their social welfare programs in those
    countries, but they don't seem to have a lot of money for this,
    you know, existential threat.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Well, the comment you made is
    accurate because, for example, as I said, use the Kiel
    Institute, which tracks this very, very well. Only 6 percent of
    the European stocks in the European Union, military stocks have
    been used.
        Unlike the Brits, who--25 percent of their stock has been
    used. They do need to step out more. How you get them to step
    up more, you very candidly, is do what President Trump did, to
    stand up and use the presidency as a bully pulpit and say this
    is what needs to get done. We need to tell them that.
        We cannot continue--be continuing to expect that United
    States of America will carry 50 percent of the load, and that
    is what it is carrying when you analyze these other 41
    countries. It is in their backyard. You know, over a year ago,
    before this war started, I said this is a European fight before
    an American fight.
        Once the fight was joined, they said, okay, now we are into
    the game. Now we have to fight. But, yes, you are absolutely
    correct, they are not doing enough. But you have to get the
    President willing to say that and force them to do that, and
    they are not doing that right now, and we are not pushing them
    into supporting to the degree they should support.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Rosen,
    please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Of course, Ranking
    Member Wicker isn't here, but we really appreciate that you are
    holding this timely hearing on the ongoing war in Ukraine,
    which sadly comes shortly after the 1-year anniversary of
    Putin's brutal and unjustified invasion over Ukraine sovereign
    territory. As I have said before, the United States and our
    allies, I believe, must stand with Ukraine for as long as it
    takes for the Ukrainian people to win.
        Now is not the time to back down, especially with spring,
    as we know, the weather presents an opportunity for Ukrainian
    counteroffensive. So, Ms. Massicot, what is your assessment of
    the ability to rapidly and effectively provide some of these
    newer weapons systems and advanced technologies to Ukraine?
        I want to also bring up this point, how can the Pentagon,
    do you believe, improve its acquisition system to quickly adapt
    and maybe field some of the off the shelf technologies that are
    going to enable Ukraine off the battlefield, things we can do
    there?
        Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. I think about needs for
    Ukraine on two different timelines. There is the immediate
    needs, which we have talked about, artillery shells and
    additional small arms to prevent these Russian frontal
    assaults.
        I think some of the more advanced systems that we have
    talked about today, like the F-16s or ATAMCS, there is a lead
    time with that, with training. But I agree with my panelists,
    if you never start the process, you never start the process.
    When the war kicked off, I believe that it was really urgent
    for the Ukrainians to receive air defense systems, and I still
    think that is a really urgent thing that we must sustain.
        The Russians are working at chipping away at that over time
    with missile salvos at Ukrainian cities using Iranian Shahed
    drones. If they are able to treat the Soviet era SAMs, or some
    of our IRIS-T or NASAMS that have been provided, it would allow
    the Russian air force to come back in a very large way, and I
    worry that that would be very dangerous for the Ukrainians.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on. I am going to
    come back to you, Ms. Massicot, but I want to move on to Dr.
    Stent, because we have been hearing some of the conversation
    here.
        Of course, during Putin's address to the Russian people
    just last week, he reiterated his warnings to the West, and I
    am going to quote, he said, global confrontation. And so, are
    his threats intended for our domestic consumption or for us
    here in the United States? Just for domestic consumption inside
    Russia?
        Do you foresee a more aggressive Russia? I am thinking
    about his global confrontation posture. Perhaps cyber that he
    hasn't really played much. You say, well, maybe they don't see
    them marching here, but the cyber-attacks can hit you pretty
    hard as well. So, Dr. Stent, what is your opinion on that?
        Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. I think his speech was
    directed both to the domestic audience and to the foreign
    audience. He is telling his own people this war is a war with
    the West, with the United States.
        It is going to go on for a long time and we are going to
    prevail. He said, we are going to win on the battlefield. He is
    basically telling them that they have to accept it. For us, he
    is threatening us, that there are things that he hasn't done
    yet that he could do. Now, having said all of that, he wants to
    intimidate everyone.
        The Russians haven't done some things that we thought they
    might do. They have not attacked any of the convoys carrying
    weapons into Ukraine, either from Poland or Romania. I think at
    this point Putin still is not willing to get into a direct
    conflict with NATO, and there has been less cyber.
        I mean, there has been obviously some issues, but there
    have been less cyber attacks than we maybe feared that there
    might be. So that indicates to me that until now, he is
    observing some of his own, I know, red lines or limits, but he
    wants us to believe that he could go much further.
        So I think it is our test to try and discriminate between
    what are probably just empty threats and things that we should
    take seriously.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I am going to build on that
    with you, General Kellogg, then, because we think about these
    threats, and of course, they come maybe cyber and they also
    come with missiles.
        We know Russia's stockpile of missiles, they have fired
    thousands since the beginning. They are using their Soviet era
    munitions more and more. So what do you believe is the status
    of Russian munitions and their supply chain? How, if they are
    running low, as Ms. Massicot talked about, maybe having to move
    back up production, how will this counteract, how will this
    play in this counteroffensive actions in just in the next few
    months?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, thank you. Senator,
    they are at a stretch right now. Look, Senator, they are
    refurbishing T-62 tanks. Those tanks have been out of the
    inventory for over 40 years. But the amount of losses they have
    sustained in their modernized armored forces have been
    tremendous. They are falling back on systems that we haven't
    seen in the inventory back in the cold war, back when I was
    stationed in Germany years ago.
        So, their stocks are running low. That doesn't mean they
    don't have a lot there, but you can see they are using
    munitions that are not guided. That is where I would be
    concerned, where either the Iranians or Chinese are going to
    step up and provide them the munitions they currently don't
    have, to be able to use.
        That is reason why I believe the United States has an
    ability to continue to put pressure on them. I realize it is a
    heavy lift, but the more we do it, it counters the Russian
    ability to continue to fight this war.
        They are basically, in my opinion, the Russians are on
    their heels, both tactically, operationally, and strategically,
    and their supply chain is being broken right now.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am going to
    submit a question for the record on what you all might think
    will be their next--if they are on their back heels, what you
    might predict will be their next form of aggression that we
    need to look forward to. But my time is up, so I will send that
    for the record. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
    Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    the witnesses for their important testimony today. I just want
    to make a statement, Senator Schmitt's point about the
    Europeans doing more. General, you highlighted this. But I
    really think the 2 percent GDP commitment they have all made
    under NATO membership is really important.
        Now, I hear from folks back home in Alaska that, you know,
    they know how important this is, but if the Europeans can't
    meet their commitments, you are going to continue to see waning
    support in America. I think all our European allies need to
    understand that. So, but what I want to do is I want to turn to
    a topic that surprisingly hasn't come up yet, that I know a
    number of you, Dr. Stent, in particular, know and care about.
        That is the topic of energy. I would like to recount this
    story. My good friend, Senator John McCain and I were in a
    meeting with a very brave Russian, a Russian who is actually
    now in jail, Vladimir Kara-Murza. I had asked him, what more
    can we do to undermine the Putin regime? This is a number of
    years ago, and he said, Senator, the answer is very simple,
    produce more American energy. So American energy is this huge,
    important instrument of American power.
        Do you all agree with Vladimir Kara-Murza's statement on
    just how important energy is? Similar to tanks and aircraft
    carriers, relative to Russia, and relative to China. Xi Jinping
    fears American energy dominance, which we did such a good job
    of during the Trump Administration.
        This Administration now from day one has actually been
    attacking American energy, trying to shut down American energy,
    make it harder to produce. Literally insane. Makes no sense.
    Can you talk very briefly, because I have a number of
    questions, on the importance of American energy, not just for
    Americans, but as an instrument of American power as it relates
    to Russia.
        Dr. Stent, why don't you begin? I know you and your husband
    know a little bit about energy.
        Dr. Stent. Thank you, Senator. No, I mean, I would agree
    with you. Russia was an energy superpower before this war
    began. It will no longer be an energy superpower.
        Senator Sullivan. We are, if we want to be. If we could be,
    if we had the Federal Government's not help, just get the hell
    out of the way, right.
        Dr. Stent. Right. So there is obviously a contradiction
    between the Administration's policy on hydrocarbons and what
    would actually be needed to make it less easy for Russia to
    project its own power. I agree with you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General, do you have a view on
    that? I am sure you do.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Senator, my family is an oil
    well drilling family, so yes, I get it. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. That is a really important instrument of
    American power if we are the world's energy dominant--and by
    the way, all of the above. I want wind, solar, you know, as
    long as we are not buying it from China, but oil and gas, too,
    right?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Ms. Massicot, do you have a view on that?
        Ms. Massicot. You know, I do. I think there are elements of
    sanctions that are less impactful. Russia is able to find
    alternative customers for its main imports.
        Senator Sullivan. But America producing energy as a way to
    undermine Putin's power is a no brainer, isn't it?
        Ms. Massicot. I don't have an informed view, but that seems
    logical to me.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me--we are working on a project
    called the Willow Project. Just a quick--it is in Alaska. It
    has been under permitting God knows how long, 20 years. It
    would be mass production about 200,000 barrels a day, 2,500
    jobs to build it.
        We could start building it tomorrow if we get the President
    to approve it. Would a project like that help America's
    National Security, an additional 200,000 barrels a day, highest
    environmental standards in the world? Just real quickly, yes or
    no, to each of the witnesses. Dr. Stent.
        Dr. Stent. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. General.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Ms. Massicot. Was that a yes or no,
    maybe?
        Ms. Massicot. It is outside of my area of expertise.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, and then finally, just we have a
    member of the Administration, he won't admit it, and maybe he
    should come out and deny it. Mr. Kerry, not sure what to call
    him. He is not a Senator, is not Secretary of State.
        By the way, if he were up for confirmation, he wouldn't get
    confirmed in the Senate. He goes around the world, especially
    in Asia, telling--cautioning countries not to buy American LNG.
    Is that a good idea from a National Security perspective? Dr.
    Stent, you have a view on that?
        Dr. Stent. I think I will pass on that one.
        Senator Sullivan. All right. General, how about you? Good
    idea to go to Asia and say, hey, don't buy American LNG?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. No, I don't think that is a
    very good idea.
        Senator Sullivan. No, it is really ridiculously stupid. Let
    me just ask one final question, on the F16s, and this is just
    for all of the witnesses. I hosted some Ukrainian pilots last
    summer. Very brave, incredible young men.
        We wrote a letter to General Milley, Secretary Austin, last
    summer on the F-16s. I was very well informed that the Pentagon
    was moving toward approving F-16s. We have been working on it
    for months.
        Then the President got off the helicopter the other day and
    said, no, we are not going to do it. He looked very uninformed,
    but whatever, that is not always surprising. The Washington
    Post today came out with an editorial on moving forward with
    the F-16s.
        What I worry about is this Administration is going to do
    what they have been doing the whole time, which is eventually
    approve them, looked like they were going to before the
    President's statement.
        So, can you, any or all of you, just opine very quickly on
    why that is important, this weapon system now, not, 5 months
    from now like they have been doing on other ones?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, the reason why those
    systems are important is American technology is the best in the
    world. Our fighters, our bombers, the stealth technology, you
    name it, is the best in the world, and we should give them the
    best to have those fights. So it makes sense to give them
    systems like that if they believe it can improve the fight. It
    is a good--the F-16 is an example.
        It is a good air to air and air to ground system out there.
    We can put the most modern avionics on it, most modern weapon
    systems. Give them--I have always said this repeatedly, give
    them the systems, the best systems in the world to win the
    fight. Those best systems happen to be, I believe, American
    systems.
        Senator Sullivan. Any other views on the F-16 in
    particular?
        Ms. Massicot. Yes, I just would like to caution that we can
    give them an air platform, but we can't give them Western air
    power. There is a lot of additional enablers that go into that.
    That is not my decision to make about what is in them.
        But it is not just the pilots that need to be trained. It
    is the spare parts, it is the logisticians, it is everything
    else that goes into it. What do we assume risk wise if we
    invest in that capability?
        Is there something that comes off the table for the
    Ukrainians in the near term? I don't have that answer, but you
    all do and I know you are making very difficult decisions every
    day. Just there is risks involved in everything, and there is
    no easy ways forward now.
        Senator Sullivan. Dr. Stent, do you--thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Peters,
    please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our
    witnesses, thank you for being here today. It has been a quite
    of a wide-ranging discussion. I think a lot of questions have
    already been asked that I was going to ask, so I will be brief,
    and just kind of drilling down on some of the responses that I
    have heard.
        On the last question about a weapon system of the F-16 and
    understanding that it is not just a platform, you have got to
    have a whole system around those platforms, and going into
    combat as well. It is a complicated combined arms type of
    tactics that you have to use. But one question I had is
    contribution that the Germans have made.
        There has been questions related to European contributions.
    The Germans, I believe, made a pretty significant contribution
    with the Leopard 2 tanks. But I am curious as to your
    assessment of that tank going into combat.
        Clearly, a tank by itself is not a game changer. It has to
    be part of a broader system. But Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg,
    could you talk a little bit about what you think the Leopard 2
    will bring to the defensive and offensive capabilities of the
    Ukrainian military.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Sir, it is one of the three
    best tanks in the world. When you look at that, I happen to
    think the Abrams tank made by the United States is the best
    tank in the world. The Challenger 2 system that the British are
    providing is very good and so is the Leopard 2 system. They are
    all high quality.
        I think all three of them overmatch anything the Russians
    currently have, if they fight them together. But at the same
    time, I am saying that put them together in sets. If you are
    going to put the Leopard system with it out in the field, put
    the Marder system, the personnel carrier with it.
        If you are going to put the Abrams in the field, you put
    the Bradley with it. The Challenger doesn't really have a
    sister vehicles as good as ours that is out there. You kind of
    put the Bradley with it as well. But those systems are very
    good, and I think they just need to commit to giving those
    systems.
        I think the Germans would admit they would prefer not to
    have the Russians back on their front doorstep again, so push
    those systems forward. They are all good systems. They
    overcompensate the Russian systems very, very well, and the
    Ukrainians can fight those systems. They are good enough. They
    are smart enough to figure them out.
        Senator Peters. They are training them right now. You
    mentioned the T-62s that are being refurbished by the Russians.
    A Leopard will--is a good match for that one, isn't it?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. It is beyond a good match. It
    is an overmatch, which is okay by me.
        Senator Peters. Overmatch is always better.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. Ms. Massicot.
        Ms. Massicot. I think we need a long term strategy for
    Ukraine because they have been cutoff from receiving all of
    their Russian equipment. I think the Leopards are a start in
    that. I am not sure how the Ukrainians are planning on using
    those in the year ahead, whether it is keeping them in reserve
    and keeping them back and putting some of the older equipment
    forward to engage with the Russians directly.
        But counteroffensives are hard. They are hard for the
    Ukrainians. It is not just tanks that will enable that success.
    It needs continued U.S., Western--U.S. and Western intelligence
    support and planning guidance.
        Senator Peters. Clearly. You need more than just tanks, you
    need artillery and you need air support, you need intelligence,
    all of those factors. That is just part of the list, long list
    of what is necessary.
        One of the weapons systems that is changing warfare
    dramatically, and I think we saw this in Azerbaijan, was the
    use of drones. Drone warfare continues to advance pretty
    rapidly, and we are going to see increased developments as AI
    systems power drones as well. My question to you is, Iran is
    now providing drones.
        Do we have any assessment as to how those drones are being
    used? Are they effective? Give me a sense of what you think
    that is bringing to the battlefield, Iran's involvement,
    working with Russia in regards to drones. Ms. Massicot, do you
    want to start, and then General Kellogg.
        Ms. Massicot. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Shahed drones,
    they don't exactly have a very large payload, but it is
    complicating the picture for Ukrainian defenders. In the early
    days when Russia introduced that capability into Ukraine, the
    Ukrainians were using surface to air missiles to engage those
    drones. That is a really quick way to attrite that capability,
    and they have changed over time.
        I think they are using anti-aircraft guns now. They are
    doing other things to bring those down. There are rumors that
    Russia and Iran are potentially going to open up some kind of
    production capability inside Russia to create hundreds of
    those. That is a way for Russia to augment its precision strike
    capabilities.
        I mean, again, the payload is very small. They are using it
    to go after soft targets, cities. It just, it stresses
    Ukrainian defenses, and I think that is another issue we have
    to really look at, is the status of Ukrainian air defense
    interceptor missiles.
        Senator Peters. Talk a little bit more about the production
    that you--we may see in Russia.
        Ms. Massicot. From what I understand, the rumors in the
    press, it would be a Iranian, Russian effort to produce, I
    think, a few hundred drones. That is what I saw in the press.
        Senator Peters. General Kellogg.
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Iran has got a massive drone
    inventory, and they have figured out how to use these,
    primarily when they used them against the Saudis. They use
    kamikaze drones and swarm technology. It would have been
    putting massive amounts of drones against Ukrainians that
    they--that Ukraine just can't manage all of those targets at
    the same time.
        So, the fact is they are giving all of these drones, yes,
    he changes the nature of the battlefield. Individually though,
    they are effective, but not--they are not going to change the
    nature of the battlefield, but you put them in combination with
    your artillery, your ground forces as well, and it starts to
    change. It is a new technology. Iranians have perfected it and
    they are passing that to the Russians.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters. We have
    been having a discussion about who gives what, how much,
    etcetera. And, General Kellogg, you have made reference to the
    Kiel Institute, I believe, in terms of some of your comments,
    the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
        Well, they have an interesting chart that shows, and it is
    based on gross domestic product, because that is the only, I
    think, reasonable way to measure the capacity as well as the
    commitment of a country. In that chart, which I will make
    available to you, the United States is 10th in its
    contribution, because what it includes also is the absorption
    of immigrants.
        You realize there are millions of Ukrainians who have left.
    The number one country is Estonia, two is Latvia, three is
    Poland, four is the Czech Republic, five is Lithuania, six is
    Slovakia, seven Norway, eight is Bulgaria, nine is the United
    Kingdom, and the United States is tenth, and Germany, as we
    have talked about, is fourteenth.
        So, I think this graphically displays, from a very
    authoritative source, the level of commitment of our allies,
    which is astounding. In fact, frankly, I don't think it could
    be generated in the previous Administration. Indeed, I am still
    recoiling from President Trump's comment on the day of the
    invasion that Putin was a genius. Do you believe he is a
    genius?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. I think Putin is not a genius
    and he has proven that in spades.
        Chairman Reed. Well, you might have a call with your former
    boss on that. Also, I think just to clear up a confusion, your
    earlier response about the aircraft, you made a suggestion
    which I thought was absolutely brilliant, which is rather than
    F-16s, more MiGs, which they are familiar with flying, would be
    a much more adequate platform. Is that true?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. The MiG-29s, because they are
    so familiar with it, is a good aircraft. Is it as good as an
    American aircraft? No, but it is very effective against the
    Russians.
        Chairman Reed. Right. So, in terms of time, essence of
    being able to move quickly, those M-29s could be flown almost
    immediately by their pilots?
        Lieutenant General Kellogg. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you. I thought the panel was
    extraordinarily insightful. I want to thank you all, Dr. Stent,
    Ms. Massicot, General Kellogg. Again, thank you for your
    service, and as we said before--thank you, sir. With that, I
    will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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