    [Senate Hearing 118-615]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-615

                    GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 15, 2023

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-004 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan             RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

                       Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director

                     John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                               February 15, 2023

                                                                       Page

    Global Security Challenges and Strategy..........................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................     6

                               Witness Statements

    Lin, Dr. Bonny, Director, China Power Project and Senior Fellow,      8
      Asian Security, Center for Strategic & International Studies.

    Hill, Fiona, Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and          21
      Europe, The Brookings.

    Zakheim, Roger, Director, Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation      27
      and Institute.

                                     (iii)

                    GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2023

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
    room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and
    Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
    morning. The Committee meets to discuss the global security
    challenges confronting the United States. Before I introduce
    our witnesses, I would like to welcome the Members of the Armed
    Services Committee to our first public hearing of the 118th
    Congress.
        I am pleased to welcome our new Ranking Member, Senator
    Roger Wicker. He is a tremendous colleague, and I look forward
    to working with him leading this Committee in the bipartisan
    fashion that has been done for many, many years.
        To our returning Members, thank you for your continued
    service and partnership, and to our new Members, Senator
    Mullin, Senator Budd, and Senator Schmitt, welcome. I look
    forward to working with each of you. Okay. Now, I have been
    informed, since we have a quorum, and that is transitory----
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Reed. Since the quorum is now present, I ask the
    Committee to consider 1,790, Pending Military Nominations. All
    of these nominations have been before the Committee for the
    required length of time. Is there a motion to table report this
    list of 1,790, Pending Military Nominations to the Senate?
        Senator Wicker. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        Voice: Second.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. All in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]

        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
     WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 15,
                                     2023.
         1.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (William T. Johnson) (Reference No. 101)

         2.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Eric
    J. Kunkle) (Reference No. 102)

         3.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (William E. McCarville) (Reference No. 103)

         4.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Leslie A. McCampbell) (Reference No. 104)

         5.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Hardy P. Merrill) (Reference No. 105)

         6.  Col. Leigh A. Swanson, USAF to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 197)

         7.  MG Sean A. Gainey, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding
    General, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/US Army Forces
    Strategic Command (Reference No. 200)

         8.  MG Heidi J. Hoyle, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, G-4, US Army (Reference No. 201)

         9.  BG Laurence S. Linton, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
    202)

        10.  In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major general and below (list begins with Stacy M. Babcock) (Reference
    No. 203)

        11.  MG Andrew J. Gebara, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration,
    Headquarters US Air Force (Reference No. 209)

        12.  MG Robert M. Collins, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
    Technology (Reference No. 210)

        13.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Natalie D. Richardson) (Reference No. 213)

        14.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jonathan M. Bise) (Reference No. 214)

        15.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Nathan K. Aiken) (Reference No. 215)

        16.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Jovon A. Williams) (Reference No. 216)

        17.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Bryan W. Sixkiller) (Reference No. 217)

        18.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Lacresha A. Merkle) (Reference No. 218)

        19.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Justin T. Schneider) (Reference No. 220)

        20.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (D011285) (Reference No. 221)

        21.  In the Army there are 2 appointment to the grade of colonel
    and below (list begins with Lajohnne A. Morris) (Reference No. 222)

        22.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Yuland Tsou) (Reference No. 223)

        23.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Blaire R. Griffin) (Reference No. 224)

        24.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Timothy J. Maki) (Reference No. 225)

        25.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Russell W. Vanderlugt) (Reference No. 226)

        26.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Brian J. Slotnick) (Reference No. 227)

        27.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jessica L. Home) (Reference No. 228)

        28.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John
    R. Taylor) (Reference No. 229)

        29.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Jason L. Norquist) (Reference No. 230)

        30.  In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Queschae B. Blue-Clark) (Reference No. 231)

        31.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Michael B. Cohen) (Reference No. 232)

        32.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Irene Garcia) (Reference No. 233)

        33.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Yong J. Lee) (Reference No. 234)

        34.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Mahealani N. McFarland) (Reference No. 235)

        35.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Clayton A. Sutton) (Reference No. 236)

        36.  In the Army there are 58 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kevin M. Adams) (Reference No.
    237)

        37.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Christopher M. Kientz) (Reference No. 239)

        38.  In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Adam D. Akers) (Reference No. 240)

        39.  In the Army there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Jesse R. Chapin) (Reference No. 241)

        40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Brendan T. McShea) (Reference No. 242)

        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Matthew R. Burmeister) (Reference No. 243)

        42.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Jessica K. Smuth) (Reference No. 244)

        43.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (Megan L. Jimenez) (Reference No. 245)

        44.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Brendon M. Esquibel) (Reference No. 246)

        45.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Robert J. Bell, Jr.) (Reference No.
    248)

        46.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (John C. Jarvis) (Reference No. 250)

        47.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Andres J. Agramonte) (Reference
    No. 251)

        48.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Robert A. Lien) (Reference No.
    252)

        49.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kevin F. Champaigne) (Reference
    No. 253)

        50.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Duane A. Gumbs) (Reference No. 254)

        51.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Richard P. Charest) (Reference No.
    255)

        52.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Aaron S. Ellis) (Reference No. 256)

        53.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael P. Ruegger) (Reference No.
    258)

        54.  In the Marine Corps there are 645 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Patrick J. Abbott) (Reference No. 259)

        55.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Adalberto Castro II) (Reference No. 260)

        56.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Vincent S. Ginestra) (Reference No. 261)

        57.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Jonathan J. Butler) (Reference No. 262)

        58.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Dustin A. Hamm) (Reference No. 263)

        59.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Scott M. Carter) (Reference No. 264)

        60.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Branden D. Palmer) (Reference No. 265)

        61.  In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Joshua Adornorivera) (Reference No. 266)

        62.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Jeffrey Tang) (Reference No. 267)

        63.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Robert W. Kreuger III) (Reference No. 268)

        64.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with David K. Coker) (Reference No. 269)

        65.  In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with James D. Ballard, Jr.) (Reference No. 270)

        66.  In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Fadi S. Abdelhalim) (Reference No. 271)

        67.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Bradley C. Kirby) (Reference No. 272)

        68.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (William D. Hawkins) (Reference No. 273)

        69.  In the Marine Corps there are 309 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joussef J. Abchidonado) (Reference
    No. 274)

        70.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of captain
    and below (list begins with Michael Holifield) (Reference No. 275)

        71.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Martin L. Leonard) (Reference No. 276)

        72.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (James E. Hammond) (Reference No. 277)

        73.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Mario J. Cardoso) (Reference No. 278)

        74.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Brett W. Sadowksi) (Reference No. 279)

        75.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Leland H. Sebring III) (Reference No. 280)

        76.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Beau D. Hufstetler) (Reference No. 281)

        77.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Kimberly Francis) (Reference No. 282)

        78.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jeffrey S. Clark) (Reference No. 295)

        79.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Alicia K. Premo) (Reference No. 296)

        80.  In the Air Force there are 143 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with David A. Alt) (Reference No. 297)

        81.  In the Air Force there are 365 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Brant Adams) (Reference No. 298)

        82.  In the Air Force there are 36 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Phillip C. Barras) (Reference No.
    299)

        83.  In the Air Force there are 60 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Khashayar Azimi) (Reference No. 300)

        84.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Apoorv Vohra) (Reference No. 301)

        85.  In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Christopher W. Swiecki) (Reference No. 302)

        86.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Wisdom K. Henyo) (Reference No. 303)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 1,790

        Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you, and returning
    now to my comments. We are lucky to have our extremely talented
    witnesses with us today. We understand there are significant
    challenges facing us, from China's growing influence, through
    Russia's reckless aggression on issues faces a complex and
    dangerous security environment. Prevailing in this environment
    will require a thoughtful, resolute strategy informed by
    experts like those before us today.
        Dr. Bonny Lin is the Director of the China Power Project
    and Senior Fellow for Asian Security at the Center for
    Strategic and International Studies. She is an expert on United
    States military strategy in the Indo-Pacific, with leadership
    experience across the Department of Defense (DOD) and with the
    RAND Corporation. Dr. Fiona Hill is a Senior Fellow in the
    Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings
    Institution.
        Dr. Hill has served as a top advisor for European and
    Russian policy on the National Security Council, and is an
    expert on issues related to Russia, Central Asia, energy, and
    strategic competition.
        Mr. Roger Zakheim is the Director of the Ronald Reagan
    Presidential Foundation and Institute. He is an expert on U.S.
    defense strategy, having served as a professional staff member
    on the House Armed Services Committee and other national
    security positions. He currently serves on the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy Commission.
        Our objective today is to examine the national security
    issues that this Committee should consider as we prepare for
    the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. As the
    Biden administration's national defense strategy makes clear,
    China is our primary competitor.
        It is the only nation with both the intent and the
    capability to mount a sustained challenge to the security and
    economic interests of the United States, and its allies and
    partners around the world.
        At the same time, Russia remains a violent, destabilizing
    force. Putin's assault on Ukraine has inflicted horrific
    suffering on innocent civilians seeking a free and democratic
    society, it threatens European stability, and harms the global
    economy. In addition, nations like Iran and North Korea
    continue to push the boundaries of military brinksmanship, and
    issues like terrorism and climate change remain persistent. The
    significance of these threats is widely understood.
        The question is how to address them in order to deter or
    mitigate the threat to U.S. national security, and
    international stability more broadly. To begin, we have to
    recognize that America faces an existential struggle between
    democracy and autocracy. Beijing and Moscow seek to change the
    international order by exploiting vulnerable nations through
    coercive economic and military pressure.
        America must offer an alternative to this kind of foreign
    policy. Given the economic, cultural, and geographic ties
    between many of our partners in China, we can't ask them to
    choose between engaging with the United States or China, based
    solely on an economic or military calculation.
        We should use all our tools of statecraft and build
    mutually beneficial relationships. Indeed, forging and
    maintaining strong international partnerships is likely to be
    the decisive factor in any future conflict. We have seen this
    through Ukraine's remarkable performance against Russia, and it
    will hold true also in the Pacific.
        Our greatest comparative advantage over China is our
    network of allies and strengthening that network should be at
    the center of our strategy moving forward. The development of
    the Quad, involving the United States, Japan, India, and
    Australia, presents a valuable framework.
        Similarly, our defense agreement with the Australia and the
    United Kingdom, known as AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom,
    United States], provides an excellent platform for improving
    the capabilities of our allies and increasing our engagement in
    the region.
        Our adversaries' presence around the globe is evolving. I
    would ask our witnesses to share their assessment of the
    Ukraine conflict in a larger context of the evolving
    international order, as well as the implications for United
    States defense strategy going forward. Similarly, I would like
    to know what military and nonmilitary factors are most likely
    to impact Chinese decisionmaking with respect to potential
    aggression against Taiwan.
        As the Russian shootdown of the Chinese surveillance
    balloon in our airspace should remind us, the top priority of
    the national defense strategy is homeland defense. America's
    skies and seas must be secure to protect its citizens, and the
    Department must pursue technologies that provide forward
    detection to buy decision time for decisionmakers.
        Finally, as we adapt to meet these global challenges, we
    need to consider that we are entering an era of trilateral
    nuclear competition. The cold war was essentially a bilateral
    rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which
    developed deterrence theory and communications methods based on
    two competitors.
        That has changed with the ascendancy of China and its
    growing nuclear arsenal. I would ask our witnesses to help us
    understand this new trilateral dynamic and how it may impact
    efforts to deter the use of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, long
    term strategic competition is not just a rivalry of military or
    economic power, but also a competition of ideas. This requires
    us to develop an understanding of our adversaries' strengths,
    weaknesses, philosophies, and objectives, as well as our own.
        This is where the knowledge and insights of the experts
    before us today are so valuable. I look forward to our
    witnesses' testimony, and I thank them again for their
    participation. Let me now recognize and turn to the Ranking
    Member, Senator Wicker.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    congratulate you for once again holding the position of chair
    of this important committee. As Ranking Member, I hope to and
    expect to continue the great bipartisanship that has become a
    tradition of this body.
        Also, let's take a moment to salute my predecessor, Hon.
    Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma. He left us Oklahoma sized cowboy boots
    to fill, and we are going to do our best to carry his legacy,
    with a relentless focus on supporting the men and women who
    protect America every day.
        I want to salute and recognize the invaluable contributions
    of our returning Members, and welcome three new Members of our
    Committee, Senator Mullin from Oklahoma, Senator Budd from
    North Carolina, and Senator Schmitt from Missouri. Their states
    play a critical role in defending our Nation.
        Also, there are a number of servicemembers and veterans
    there. Particularly, I would say to Mr. Budd, my first Active
    Duty station as then Captain Wicker was Seymour Johnson Air
    Force Base. So I hope you will look out for my buddies there at
    Seymour Johnson, as well as the entire military.
        Today's hearing is an important opportunity to speak with
    experts, and so we welcome them. Particularly important as we
    begin to craft this year's National Defense Authorization Act,
    hopefully earlier than usual.
        The United States faces an increasingly complex and
    dangerous security environment. Indeed, it is fair to say that
    this is the most dangerous moment since the cold war. The
    Chinese Communist Party is engaged in a massive project of
    military modernization and its threat to unify, as they say,
    and I would say invade, Taiwan becomes clearer every day.
        Nearly 1 year ago, Beijing's junior partner, Russia,
    launched an unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine. This war
    poses a direct threat to peace and prosperity on the European
    continent and to America's vital economic and security
    interests. Moscow's war machine in Ukraine is aided by Iran.
        In addition to supplying Russia with lethal drones, Iran
    continues to spread mayhem elsewhere as it marches closer
    toward a nuclear weapons capability. Iran's volatility and
    malign influence is matched by North Korea. The 38th parallel
    remains one of the most dangerous places in the world.
        Further, we cannot take our eye off the global war on
    terror. Global terrorist organizations continue to recruit,
    train, and operate in the greater Middle East and beyond, and
    pose a direct threat to us here in our Homeland.
        Our first job in this community is to provide the tools our
    military needs to deter and defeat these threats. There is no
    doubt that continued real growth in the defense budget top line
    above inflation, real growth above inflation is an absolute
    necessity, a bare necessity. We are in the crucial years of
    this military competition and we cannot afford to let our guard
    down, Mr. Chairman.
        This Committee led the bipartisan charge to increase the
    defense budget in last year's cycle, a successful effort. I
    hope our witnesses will provide their views on the defense
    budget top line and the need to resource our warfighters, as
    well as initial thoughts on how to tackle the manifold threats
    we face from adversaries abroad.
        The war in Ukraine illustrates the importance of properly
    funding our military. On a bipartisan basis, Congress has
    provided billions of dollars of equipment and munitions to help
    the Ukrainian armed forces defend their country's sovereignty
    and independence.
        Although we have provided considerable resources, I remain
    disappointed that the Administration has been hesitant to
    provide Ukraine with advanced capabilities to secure victory.
        Time and again the Administration's reluctance to provide
    rapid delivery of critical capabilities, stingers, javelins,
    HIMARS, and Abrams, to name a few, has cost the Ukrainians
    valuable time. It has led to the projected battle of attrition
    we may be seeing today.
        So I would ask our witnesses to comment on the war and
    suggest ways that this Committee can continue to help the brave
    and steadfast Ukrainian troops actually win, actually win,
    rather than preserve the stalemate.
        Now, here at home, the war in Ukraine has exposed
    shortcomings in our defense industrial base and supply chains.
    Expanding our lines of production, especially for critical
    munitions, should continue to be a priority this year. I would
    welcome our witnesses' perspective on this issue and how it
    applies to the Taiwan situation.
        The defense industrial base is not only important for
    today's fight in Ukraine but of supreme importance for the
    competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both the
    Trump and Biden administrations have placed strategic
    competition with China as the top priority for the national
    defense strategy.
        The previous Republican administration and the current
    Democratic administration are together, have been together on
    this issue. Winning this competition will require a significant
    investment.
        Developing and fielding game changing technologies that
    will keep us a step ahead of Beijing, in addition to developing
    transformational technology, competing--out competing China
    will require increased production of platforms and weapon
    systems such as our battle fleet of ships.
        Congress proved last year that it could take bold steps to
    advantage the United States by passing the CHIPS [Creating
    Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors] and Science Act.
    We would be interested in our witnesses' views on how this
    Committee can help the Department of Defense focus on the long
    term strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party in
    this respect.
        So I thank our witnesses. I thank the indulgence of my
    friend the chair. I would note that the namesake of Mr.
    Zakheim's Institute of President Reagan, summed up his national
    security policy as peace through strength, and I hope all of my
    colleagues continue to keep that motto in mind as we embark on
    this very important year. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Dr. Lin, please.

     STATEMENT OF DR. BONNY LIN, DIRECTOR, CHINA POWER PROJECT AND
         SENIOR FELLOW, ASIAN SECURITY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Dr. Lin. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
    and distinguished Members of the Senate Committee on Armed
    Services. Thank you for the opportunity today to testify at
    this important hearing.
        I will focus on three issues, the nature of the PRC
    [People's Republic of China] challenge, what the United States
    is doing, and how China is responding. The 2022 United States
    National Security Strategy appropriately identifies China as
    the only competitor with both the intent to reshape
    international order, and increasingly, the economic,
    diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. China
    continues to coerce United States allies and partners.
        China continues to engage in rapid military monitors issue
    of its conventional and nuclear capabilities to become a world
    class military on par with the United States by 2049. On
    critical global challenges such as Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine, China's role remains problematic. The difficulty of
    dealing with China is magnified by Xi Jinping's dismantling of
    collective political leadership and the establishment of
    himself as a sole leader of China.
        With respect to the United States approach to the PRC, the
    Biden administration has identified and made significant
    progress in three areas, invest, align, and compete. First, the
    Biden administration has worked with Congress to invest over $1
    trillion at home to improve U.S. economic innovation and
    competitiveness.
        This includes the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law, 2022
    CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. Second,
    the United States has trained its unique advantage we have over
    the PRC, our alliances and partnerships.
        For example, Japan now not only shares a common strategic
    vision with the United States but is also committed to do far
    more than its own defense. Australia has agreed to enhance
    force posture cooperation and more United States rotational
    presence.
        The Philippines has provided the United States with access
    to four additional military locations. The United States has
    resumed large scale military drills with South Korea. The Biden
    administration is also facilitating greater cooperation between
    allies and partners.
        This includes the United States, Japan, Australia, a United
    States, Japan, ROK [Republic of Korea] trilateral cooperation,
    AUKUS and the Quad. NATO [North American Treaty Organization]
    is also increasingly engaging with Indo-Pacific countries.
    Third and central to the United States approach to the PRC is a
    need to outcompete China.
        DOD has prioritized PRC as the pacing challenge and Taiwan
    continues as the pacing scenario. The problem in defense is
    improving United States posture and presence, logistics and
    pre-positioned material, and infrastructure throughout the
    Indo-Pacific. The United States is enhancing joint, allied, and
    partner capabilities, increasing training and information
    sharing, and co-developing critical and emerging technologies.
        DOD is also investing in new operational concepts to fight
    in a highly contested environment. The Biden administration has
    made clear that engagement with China is necessary to prevent
    competition from spiraling into conflict. However, United
    States engagement efforts to date are prone to disruption, and
    the PRC continues to stonewall calls for critical dialogs.
        Overall, the United States approach toward the PRC has
    encouraged Beijing to compete more against the United States
    and our allies and partners. The PRC blames the United States
    and our allies and partners for its--what it views as its
    deteriorating security environment and does not view its
    behavior as problematic.
        We have not seen any clear indicators of dampening PRC
    ambitions or activities. There is a real risk that Beijing
    could miscalculate, and intensifying United States-China
    competition could lead to confrontation.
        Moving forward, the United States needs to continue to
    deepen our alliances and partnerships and strengthen this
    critical advantage that we have. The Biden administration also
    needs to bolster its economic strategy toward the PRC.
        If joining the CPTPP [Comprehensive and Progressive
    Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership] is completely off the
    table, the United States should look at other bilateral or
    multilateral arrangements. The United States should also
    continue to work with our coalition of friends to counter PRC
    economic coercion.
        The United States also needs to continue to invest in our
    military to ensure that DOD has the resources needed to train
    and invest in our capabilities to deny PRC aggression, and to
    build a more resilient and dispersed United States posture.
        Finally, the United States needs to maintain high level
    engagements with China and expand people to people contacts.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Bonny Lin follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Dr. Lin. Dr. Hill, please.

     STATEMENT OF FIONA HILL, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON THE UNITED
              STATES AND EUROPE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

        Dr. Hill. Thank you so much, Chairman Reed, and Senator
    Wicker. It is a great honor to be with you, my fellow
    witnesses, the Members of the Committee today.
        Before I begin my opening remarks, I would just like to
    flag that I have a news article in Foreign Affairs with my
    colleague Angela Stent on this very topic, and I would just ask
    that that could be submitted for the record so the Members and
    staff could read it later.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        Dr. Hill. Thank you. I want to focus on one specific
    challenge in my opening remarks and look forward to answering
    the questions that you and Senator Wicker laid out in your
    opening statements.
        But first of all, just as you, Senator Reed, emphasized in
    your introduction, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February
    2022 was an assault on the post-World War II global order. The
    war in Ukraine has necessitated the third intervention by the
    United States and a European conflict in a little over a
    century, and what will now likely be our third attempt at
    revamping the international security system.
        Now, this world order wasn't just our order, but a set of
    rules that all nations, including Russia and its predecessor,
    the Soviet Union, had agreed to. Russia violated the United
    Nations charter and fundamental principles of international law
    by attacking an independent State that had been recognized by
    all the international community, including Russia itself, for
    more than 30 years.
        So, the current challenge in Europe is how to craft a more
    durable, regional security arrangement that rolls back Russia's
    land grab in Ukraine, is embraced by all Europeans, and sets a
    precedent for reinvigorating the largest set of international
    agreements. We need to find a formula that is not entirely
    dependent on the military and economic power of the United
    States or its political leadership to ensure long term success.
        The European security environment was irrevocably altered
    or ruptured in 2014 when Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimean
    Peninsula and sparked off a brutal conflict and proxy war in
    the Donbas region.
        None of the United States and Europe's mechanisms and
    practices for keeping the peace after World War II and during
    the cold war had much, if any, effect on deterring Russia from
    seizing Crimea in 2014, or attempting to take Kiev and the rest
    of Ukraine in 2022.
        Western deterrence failed in part because American and
    European policymakers never meaningfully emphasized the West's
    red lines. Indeed, one might even ask, what were our red lines?
    Because we certainly did not appear to uphold the post-World
    War II principle of ensuring independent State sovereignty and
    territorial integrity after 2014.
        Instead, European leaders, led by Germany and France,
    rushed to push Russia's annexation of Crimea to one side and
    broker a quick peace settlement in Donbas, the Minsk Accords,
    which would have limited Ukraine's sovereignty if fully
    implemented.
        The tepid Western political response to Russia's violation
    of Ukraine's territory and the limited application of sanctions
    after this first invasion convinced Moscow that attacking
    Ukraine was not, in fact, a serious breach of post-World War II
    norms, and Western commentary since 2014 has more frequently
    focused on the risk of stepping over Russia's red lines rather
    than enforcing the West's.
        We have spent more time contemplating the perils of
    provoking Russia's mercurial President Vladimir Putin, than the
    merits of bolstering Europe's resilience to Putin's coercive
    power.
        In charting a path forward, we need to recognize that the
    war in Ukraine has been brewing for decades because of a key
    distinction in the way that the international community and the
    United States approach the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
    former Yugoslavia in the 1990's.
        In the chaos of Yugoslavia, the country was dissolved
    without the recognition of a single successor State. Serbia's
    territorial claims against all of its members were rejected. In
    the case of the USSR, the United States and every other country
    recognized Russia as the sole successor State.
        Moscow inherited the Soviet Union's United Nation (UN)
    Security Council seat and its other privileges and obligations,
    as well as it seemed, the Soviet Union's cold war sphere of
    influence in Eastern Europe. Ukraine, along with all the other
    former Soviet republics, fell into a gray zone where Russia's
    interests seemed to trump theirs, and they were deemed by all
    of us, Russia's near abroad.
        Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Moscow has the
    right to dominate this neighborhood and claim lost territory.
    For Putin, the war in Ukraine is a continuation of the Soviet
    struggle with the United States to carve up Europe after 1945.
        Russia sees NATO as a United States Cold-War bloc, a cover
    for American imperialism, and not as an alliance of equals to
    ensure common defense and security. So in this context for
    Russia, NATO's post-cold war expansion and Ukraine's reluctance
    to implement the Minsk Accords in Donbas became the current
    war's casus belli.
        So redefining European security and restoring deterrence
    will involve explicitly countering this narrative. Building an
    international coalition against Russia's aggression to
    facilitate the eventual settlement of the war in Ukraine will
    require the same.
        The United States and its allies must clarify and emphasize
    that they are supporting Ukraine on the battlefield to uphold
    the United Nations charter and international law. We need to
    step up our diplomatic efforts, including in the United
    Nations, to convince friends and middle powers in the so-called
    global South that our goal is not to return Western supremacy,
    but to keep the world safer for every nation.
        If Russia succeeds in carving up Ukraine, then the future
    sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states could be
    imperiled, so upholding international norms must once again be
    a central part of our global security strategy. Thank you so
    much for your time.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Fiona Hill follow:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Dr. Hill. Mr. Zakheim, please.

          STATEMENT OF ROGER ZAKHEIM, DIRECTOR, RONALD REAGAN
                 PRESIDENTIAL FOUNDATION AND INSTITUTE

        Mr. Zakheim. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
    me to testify today on global security challenges and strategy.
    Less than a year ago, I had the honor of testifying before this
    Committee, when, as many of you will recall, the world
    witnessed Russia's massive military convoy assembled on the
    road to Kiev.
        One year later, that convoy of armor and steel is no more.
    The Russian military failed to seize Kiev, and Ukrainians are
    valiantly fighting to preserve their freedom and sovereignty.
    We have learned a lot in a year, some of which is worth
    reviewing as we consider the State of our national security
    strategy and the efficacy of the national defense strategy.
        First, we have learned that supporting Ukraine with
    military capabilities necessary to defend their sovereign
    territory will not lead to escalation or spillover. Instead,
    Western support has helped transform the battlefield, badly
    damaging Russia's military capabilities, and moderated for now,
    Putin's military objectives.
        Going forward, our support to Ukraine, be it with tanks,
    drones, aircraft or missiles, should be tailored to executing a
    counter offensive strategy that rolls back Russia's gains and
    restores Ukraine's sovereign territory.
        We have also learned that the war in Ukraine has revealed
    how the digital age is leveling the playing field between great
    powers and smaller countries. Ukraine has skillfully deployed
    precision munitions, drone technology, and sophisticated
    encrypted software to gain the upper hand against Russia's
    invading conventional military.
        But while Russia's military conventional force is badly
    damaged, it is not defeated. We stand at the precipice of a new
    stage in the war, where Ukraine will need tanks and other
    conventional offensive platforms in order to dislodge
    entrenched Russian forces.
        Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates that conventional
    forces still matter. Submarines, tanks, fighting bombers,
    munitions, and end strength cannot be sacrificed in favor of a
    future capability that merely exists on a PowerPoint slide.
        We need to sustain our conventional capability to prevail
    in today's conflicts. Third, industrial capacity may be
    America's Achilles heel as we implement our national defense
    strategy.
        As Ranking Member Wicker pointed out, this is a key area of
    focus for this committee. Just in time manufacturing, which
    products are made only to meet existing immediate demand, may
    make business sense for big box stores and their suppliers, but
    the war in Ukraine makes clear that just in time means out of
    time on the battlefield.
        The effort to deploy, arm, feed, and supply forces is a
    monumental task, and the massive consumption of equipment
    systems, vehicles, and munitions requires a large scale
    industrial base for resupply.
        These takeaways lead to a more general observation that
    realizing the objectives of our national defense strategy
    requires a builders' mindset. Now is a time to build a force
    capable of winning today and tomorrow. The challenge before
    this committee is to ensure the NDS is executed.
        To do so, I recommend the following steps which I outline
    in depth in my written testimony, which I hope is considered
    for the record. Number one, prioritize winning today by
    countering China. number two, investing in winning tomorrow,
    and three, resourcing the demands of the National Defense
    Strategy.
        China's recent brazen breach of United States airspace is
    just the latest case of aggressive and provocative actions by
    the CCP. The primary test of the NDS [National Defense
    Strategy] is whether we are able to deter China from seizing
    control of Taiwan and arrest its pursuit of hegemony in the
    Indo-Pacific.
        Its actions in the Taiwan Strait, combined with its robust
    military modernization program, suggests Beijing is considering
    this sooner rather than later. While we have made and this
    Cmmittee has done a remarkable job of progress in areas of
    warfighting that are relevant to the Taiwan scenario, more is
    needed for other high end munitions relevant in the Western
    Pacific.
        While our force must be capable of deterring adventurism
    and the present competition with China, it must also be
    prepared for a future 21st century conflict. We are far below
    the scale of investment required to replace air, land, and sea
    platforms with AI [artificial intelligence] infused autonomous
    systems.
        In comparison, as this committee knows, China is rapidly
    incorporating the achievements of its commercial sector into
    its military modernization. Not since the Reagan administration
    has our country committed itself to sustained multiyear
    rebuilding of our military. Executing this defense strategy,
    one, as was pointed out, is a line between the Trump and Biden
    administrations.
        It requires a jump from today's spending levels of just 3
    percent GDP [gross domestic product] to what I believe around 5
    percent GDP. As Congress debates how to manage spending amidst
    the debt ceiling negotiations, it should be mindful that
    cutting defense to fiscal year 2022 levels, which would be
    about 10 percent of the top line, would render the defense
    strategy non-executable. It would reduce our military to
    nothing more than a regional force.
        Our defense strategy seeks to preserve American peace and
    prosperity by building and sustaining the U.S. military that
    maintains what President Reagan called the margin of safety.
    Notably, this is not the most ambitious defense strategy. It
    does not seek military dominance everywhere, nor does it call
    for a force capable of winning two conflicts simultaneously.
        Rather, it is a strategy prudently tailored to address the
    security needs of the country, not the political calculus of
    the moment, ensuring no foreign power threatens our interests.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Roger Zakheim follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Zakheim. Thank you
    to all the witnesses for your excellent testimony. All of your
    written statements will be made part of the record. Without
    objection, thank you. Dr. Hill, President Putin has made
    several speeches over the years where he has made it clear he
    wants to restore the Russian Empire.
        So if he succeeds in the Ukraine, can we have reasonable
    certainty he will continue these efforts in other countries?
        Dr. Hill. Well I think, Senator, that we can. He has
    already made it very clear, as you have discussed, that he is
    interested in acquiring territory in what was the former
    Russian empire.
        As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we recognized Russia
    as the successor State to the Soviet Union, which was itself
    the successors to the Russian Empire. In fact, we incorporated
    many of the territories that were lost after the Russian
    Revolution.
        So Putin has made it very clear, of course, the priorities
    of the Slavic states, Belarus and Ukraine, but also Moldova.
        We have just heard recently in the last few days, I am sure
    people have been reading the press reports that the Moldovan
    Government feels under incredible strain and has been getting
    intel itself that Russia is planning, some kind of aggression
    against them.
        Of course, also Kazakhstan, because northern Kazakhstan was
    settled by Slavs, Ukrainians and Russians, in the Soviet
    period. So all of those countries feel a great deal of anxiety.
        We can also say, of course, that our allies and partners in
    Poland, the Baltic states, which were forcibly taken into the
    Soviet Union during World War II, Finland, which was attacked
    by the Soviet Union 1939, 1940, and other countries in the
    neighborhood feel similarly threatened by this expansionary
    nature of Russian aims.
        Putin has said the world needs to get used to the fact that
    Russia is territory expanding again. In fact, Sergei Lavrov,
    the Foreign Minister of Russia, has demanded that the rest of
    Europe accept these new realities.
        So even if we were to have a settlement based on some kind
    of recognition of the frontier lines that are now holding on
    the front, even a temporary one, we should be very certain that
    Russia, under Putin, and the people around him will look for
    every opportunity to push beyond that at some time in the
    future.
        In fact, that is what we have seen in Ukraine from the
    beginning, 2014 was the beginning of a process, not the end of
    Russia's territorial aims.
        Chairman Reed. Now, you mentioned settlement. Can you give
    us any indication of what it would take to get Putin to sit
    down and have some type of settlement?
        Dr. Hill. Well, right now there is not much indication of
    that, just to be frank. I mean, I think this is a pretty grim
    picture, in part because Putin didn't feel deterred in the
    first place. I think all of us have mentioned here.
        The other thing is that Putin also feels that he has a lot
    of support from the rest of the world, including from China. I
    think it would be very interesting to hear from Dr. Lin about
    really what China's views of this are now.
        Because unfortunately, it may very well take countries like
    China pushing Russia for there to be any break in Putin's
    resolve at this particular moment. It would have to be, I
    think, other countries beyond the United States and its Western
    allies, demonstrating to Putin in some fashion behind the
    scenes or more directly, that this war is not in their
    interests and that they want him to move toward the negotiating
    table.
        Right now, the circumstances on the ground are such that
    Putin really believes that he can push more manpower. This gets
    back to what Mr. Zakheim was already saying about the
    importance of looking at the battlefield. But we need to have a
    diplomatic initiative. We need to get the rest of the
    international community behind us in support of pushing Russia
    back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. I always recognize an excellent
    question. So, Dr. Lin, can you comment upon the Chinese
    reaction to Ukraine, and particularly their willingness at some
    point to step up and help contain. I would note that they made
    statements against the use of nuclear weapons, which are
    somewhat encouraging. Dr. Lin.
        Dr. Lin. Sure, thank you. So, Senator Reed, if you recall
    at the very beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
    position that China took was, I would say, very, very much pro-
    Russia. A 2-day China decision is still that the United States
    and our NATO allies are responsible for Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine.
        What we are seeing is some shift since last year of China's
    position in terms of not fully taking Russia's position
    politically, as China wants to salvage its relationship with
    particularly our European colleagues.
        We are also seeing that there is increasing reporting of
    Chinese support by select smaller Chinese companies, for
    example, providing of surveillance equipment for the Wagner
    Group, as well as Russian operations in Ukraine. We also know
    that China's trade with Russia increased 34 percent last year.
        So as we move forward, I think one thing we need to pay
    attention to is what might push China more in Russia's
    direction. I worry that as China looks at how strong our
    position is with our allies and partners, China may feel it
    needs a stronger partner internationally and doesn't have too
    many options, and Russia is unfortunately one of the partners
    that China is keen to keep.
        Chairman Reed. Doctor Zak--Mr. Zakheim, excuse me, I get
    confused. Can you comment briefly, very brief because my time
    is running out, about this, the issue of the dynamic between
    China and Russia.
        Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    elevation. You know, we saw that around the Winter Olympics and
    they made this explicit when Putin and Xi met. We are not
    seeing it on the operational side in terms of the military
    support like we are seeing between Iran and Russia.
        But I think, as my colleague pointed out, it is the
    diplomatic support, legitimizing, equivocating in terms of what
    is and is not permissible is where China, I think, is helping
    Russia the most. Legitimizing war crimes would be the first
    example I would point to.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Zakheim, you
    participated in the current development of the National Defense
    Strategy and the previous National defense strategy. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Zakheim. I had an opportunity to be on the Defense
    Strategy Commission to review the former one, and we will
    review the present one.
        Senator Wicker. In your testimony, you make a case for real
    growth in the defense budget. That's real purchasing power over
    and above what is being taken out by inflation, and you talk
    about measuring our defense contribution in terms of a
    percentage of the GDP.
        Why is that a good way to measure it? You talked toward the
    end of your testimony, your written testimony, about how we
    could still--we can do that and still achieve some real savings
    and efficiencies.
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GDP, I think, is
    a good way to look historically of what our country, our Nation
    has devoted to national defense. As you know, we are below 3.5
    percent GDP and declining in the out years.
        Historically, we have been over 10 percent. During the
    Reagan buildup, we were between 5 and 6 percent.
        I think the combination terms of where our military is
    today, and that is a force that hasn't actually been modernized
    since the Reagan buildup for a variety of reasons, either peace
    dividends or what we have spent on armed conflict, plus
    inflationary challenges, plus the national environment, which
    my colleagues have outlined in their testimony, requires doing
    this.
        I think there are three fundamental pieces here that are
    required. I think of it as winning today, which is taking our
    conventional force and upgrading it. I think it is leveraging
    the technologies that will transform our military, that China
    is doing as well.
        That requires a whole new suite of investments led by
    autonomy in every domain of warfare, and the third, as you have
    pointed out and lead on, Senator Wicker, industrial capacity.
    The reality that we have seen from Ukraine, it will play out.
    We are seeing it right now in terms of backlog in supporting
    Taiwan.
        What we need for our own national defense, we just don't
    have the industrial capacity to keep up. If you add all three
    of them, Chairman, Ranking Member I wouldn't disagree with you,
    but I am not sure 5 percent real growth is enough to get there.
    What I am trying to get to is what the national defense
    strategy actually calls for.
        This is what the defense strategy says it seeks to do in
    terms of leading in three regions of the world, being able to
    compete today, and to prevail one conflict, while holding
    another adversary preventing a second conflict. To do all that
    requires a force that we simply don't have today and
    capabilities we don't have enough of today.
        Senator Wicker. Well, that is a very important statement
    you just made. So it really, in terms of what we need, we need
    to quantify exactly what we need to buy in the near and
    foreseeable future, and that might be more than 5 percent.
        Mr. Zakheim. I believe so. Ranking Member Wicker and
    Chairman Reed, I think this Committee, what you have done in
    terms of adding to the defense request has gone a long way. I
    know it is hard to do, but I don't believe it is insufficient.
        Senator Wicker. Dr. Hill, what about that?
        Dr. Hill. Well, I--obviously planning ahead and trying to
    foresee where we might end up is pretty difficult, given as Mr.
    Zakheim is talking about, the capacity issues that have been
    revealed by the war in Ukraine. I mean, right now,
    unfortunately, it is very hard to say how long this is going to
    continue.
        But I think one thing that we do have to factor in here is,
    you know, sadly listening to Dr. Lin, it seems more and more
    likely that China and Russia will find their interests
    converging, as they already have up until this date. But we
    might be actually dealing with problems on two fronts for a
    long time to come.
        I think, you know, something to add to what Dr. Lin said is
    China has no interest in Russia losing in this war, and in
    fact, might in fact have a vested interest in this war going on
    in Ukraine as long as possible, because, of course, it does
    take up a large amount of equipment and armaments, particularly
    ammunition, as we now know, and the increasing demands from
    Ukraine, which are tied very much to the battlefield, for other
    equipment.
        We have seen our other allies from Europe, not just NATO
    countries but others, stepping up to assist Ukraine here too.
    So there is a question about their production capacity. I think
    that we should factor in as well what the European militaries
    are going to require, too, because they are also dependent on
    our production.
        Senator Wicker. Do you agree that the Russian offensive
    seems to have stalled? If there were a successful counter
    offensive by Ukraine in the next 2 to 3 months, China would pay
    attention to that and perhaps alter their ambitions.
        Dr. Hill. It is possible. I think, again, we know that it
    is extraordinarily difficult now for the Ukrainians to dislodge
    the Russians from certain positions. They have dug in very
    heavily in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
        We are seeing this World War I like fighting on the front
    line in the Donbass region. I think all of us are looking at
    this, not just military experts, but others see that this is
    going to be quite a grind.
        I think China obviously is watching this very closely. The
    situation in Taiwan is quite difficult. This is a maritime
    challenge, not one of land warfare. Actually, one thing to bear
    in mind is the Russian navy has not really been affected by
    this. We are seeing these joint naval exercises with South
    Africa.
        That is why I mentioned the importance of getting two
    middle powers and other friends in the global South with China
    and Russia that might show different kinds of offensives or
    actions that Russia could take to distract us from what is
    happening in Ukraine.
        As I said, this is extraordinary difficult situation that
    we are in, but I think we would make a mistake if we think if
    China and what Russia is doing as two separate things. I think
    right now they are melded together and we have to have a 360
    degree perspective around this, including what our other allies
    and partners can bring to the table.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator
    Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    all for your testimony. I want to drill down on this
    convergence of China, Russia, Iran, and the concerns that you
    have all expressed about how these world powers are aligning.
        China has been projecting power in many ways for a long
    time the last 10 or 15 years. Their doubling of their military
    budget, their investment in Belt and Road initiative to create
    bases, create opportunities worldwide to project their power.
        Russia has been projecting its power through an invasion of
    Ukraine. What they are doing in Moldova right now. A constant
    push of their power. Iran has been projecting its power through
    conflict, through the use of proxies, through constant malign
    activities. So I would like your recommendations on the best
    way to try to create a deterrence, a stronger deterrence
    against conflict.
        Ways to establish the future or path to peace with all of
    these different regions. Specifically with addressing China,
    Dr. Lin, you talked about building up our allies, our partners
    to maximize our deterrence capabilities and demonstrate a
    united front in the region. I would love some more specific
    ideas about how best to do that, whether that means basing
    agreements for deployments, whether that means any other
    alignment that you think is useful as a way to promote
    deterrence.
        I would also like to hear about ways that we may be able to
    deter Iran and Russia. One of the ideas I would like your
    thoughts on is the Abraham Accords, specifically as a way to
    create a regional alliance across the Middle East against Iran,
    to counter Iran, and also to push those Middle East countries
    from aligning with China.
        Because when we are absent, the gap is filled and we don't
    want that gap being filled by China. Many of our allies, that
    gap was filled by Russia. Russia gives them their weapons.
    Russia makes different kinds of investments, and when we don't
    participate in these international agreements and
    collaborations, the gap is filled by, unfortunately, others who
    do not align with our interests or values.
        So I would like your thoughts on each of these questions,
    and your best recommendations for how do we create long term
    alignments for peace? How do we deter conflict, especially with
    China, and especially with Iran in the future?
        Dr. Lin. Thank you, Senator. I can take a quick stab at the
    range of questions, excellent questions that you had. You
    mentioned the China, Russia, Iran alignment. I would just note
    that the stronger of them is between China and Russia, whereas
    the China, Iran one is one that is still growing.
        If you look today, the Iranian President is actually in
    China meeting with Xi Jinping. One of the reasons why he is
    there is because of the fact that he wants to make sure that
    China can move as fast as possible on the major agreements that
    were signed last year.
        He also recognizes that China is trying to do somewhat of a
    balancing act in the Middle East with the fact that China is
    heavily dependent on oil from Saudi Arabia and also recently
    signed major agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council.
        So I would just note that the China, Iran relation is one
    to watch, but I don't think it is, from China's view, as
    strategically important as Russia right now, given the fact
    that Russia is significantly much more powerful than Iran, and
    also besides that Russia is China's neighbor.
        In terms of what the United States can do to further
    bolster our alliances and partnerships, what we already--we
    already have many developments underway. A couple that I will
    highlight that I think are worth very much following up on is
    recently we saw the greater alignment between NATO and four
    East Asian countries, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New
    Zealand.
        My understanding is NATO seeks to normalize that. We should
    try to support that as much as possible, increasing, as Dr.
    Hill mentioned, increasing the linkages between our European
    allies and partners, and our critical allies in the Indo-
    Pacific.
        I would also note there has been consideration of whether
    Japan might join AUKUS. All of these developments that we
    already have underway we should continue. For example, United
    States, Japan, Australia, trilateral, the United States, ROK,
    Japan trilateral. All of these are incredibly important in
    terms of our positioning in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you.
        Dr. Hill. I would like to agree with what my colleague, Dr.
    Lin, has just said about the importance of creating all the
    linkages with the various alliance structures and partnerships
    that we already have.
        One of the things that I probably should have mentioned
    before about Russia's aims throughout this war and Ukraine is
    to begin to create new alliances for Russia as well.
        As Dr. Lin pointed out, Russia is one of the few close
    partners of China at this point, but that is the same for
    Russia. Although Russia has emphasized a great deal in terms of
    partnership building in Middle East, for example, in other
    parts of East Asia, and Latin and South America, trying to
    revitalize old Soviet ties, the close relationship between
    Russia and Iran has been a problem there.
        Senator, as you pointed out with the Abraham Accords, one
    of the main factors for those Accords was, of course,
    opposition to Iran and Iran's role in the region. If Russia
    remains the only power that has relations with Iran, that will
    actually become a problem in its other relationships over time,
    including with Israel and some of its other close partners, the
    UAE, for example.
        So I think we do absolutely have to find ways in which we
    can work with these sort of middle powers, and others that, so
    far are trying to sit on the fence and watch us from a distance
    because they frankly don't want to choose sides.
        India is one of those countries that has a crisis at the
    moment because India's relationships with Russia were an
    important counterpart for India against China. Of course, the
    closer the China and Russia pull together, the more untenable
    India's own security position becomes.
        We should also pay attention to the so-called BRICS,
    Brazil, Russia and India. I have already said China and South
    Africa. I mentioned already this, but the new naval exercises
    that South Africa and Russia and China are conducting, I mean,
    we should make it very clear to South Africa that that is just
    not acceptable.
        Other countries should be doing that, too. It shouldn't
    just be the United States stepping out there. We have just had
    President Biden visiting with President Lula in Brazil. Brazil
    is eager to take a larger international role.
        We should try to capitalize upon that. We need to really
    think about how we can reinvigorate our own relationships with
    middle powers on countries in all of the key areas of Asia,
    Latin and South America, and Africa.
        That should be part of our strategy, and one area in which
    we could focus on this. It is not perhaps in the mandate of
    this particular committee, but is focusing on the combination
    of fuel, food, and fertilizer.
        Because one of the key things that we have seen as a result
    of this war in Ukraine is how important Ukraine, Russia,
    Kazakhstan, the Black Sea area for global food supplies,
    fertilizer, which is, of course, tied together, and also flows
    of fuel.
        This is where we really have a lot of leverage with other
    powers, because they have been dependent on all of those flows
    and have been very concerned about the impact of this war. This
    also includes China, which was a major investor in Ukraine
    prior to the outbreak of war, particularly in the agricultural
    sector.
        So there may be something there that we can look up as a
    recommendation for emphasizing in our outreach.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Zakheim,
    for the record, you can submit something, if you would. Thank
    you. Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Zakheim, what
    do you see as being the primary lessons learned from the war in
    Ukraine thus far?
        Mr. Zakheim. The number one lesson is that we are--should
    stand and we will advance our interests by standing with
    Ukraine. That aggression needs to be countered, and if we do
    so, that is not going to be escalatory, but in fact,
    stabilizing.
        I think the best thing we can do for our national interests
    is to see Russia defeated in Ukraine. This Committee and this
    Congress has done a lot to support Ukraine in realizing that.
        I think we have to start measuring our support for Ukraine
    by the particular weapons platform that is on the table and
    think more broadly and strategically, what is our aim, what is
    our goal?
        The goal is to roll back Russia, to support Ukraine in
    their counter-offensive, and we should be supporting them with
    the necessary munitions and platforms to realize that
    objective.
        That will return security and stability to Europe and deter
    Vladimir Putin. He has never been deterred because he has never
    had to deal with a counter to his aggression. We have talked
    about 2014 Crimea.
        As the Senator knows, start in 2008 with Georgia. This is
    the first time we have had the counter, and we need to pull it,
    and support it through to the end.
        Senator Fischer. One thing that I have been focused on from
    the very beginning is our munitions capacity, and the
    production that we see, when you say--I thought you kind of
    glossed over that on your answer, and I think there is a real
    and urgent need to expand munition production capacity as
    quickly as possible, not just to address the ongoing war that
    we see in Ukraine.
        What additional steps do you think you would recommend to
    Congress to consider to overcome our current limitations that
    we have on that capacity?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, I agree with you and did not
    mean to gloss it over. In fact, I share your view that this is
    an urgent problem. It is an urgent problem in Ukraine. It is an
    urgent problem in Taiwan.
        Many of those munitions and capabilities, we now need in
    those two theaters, but we also need here at home. As you are
    fully aware, we don't have that capacity, both in terms of what
    we need for current scenario planning and also for surge
    capacity.
        I think this Committee started it in this past year's
    National Defense Authorization Bill, but it is limited. Most
    important thing this Congress could do, and I know I am
    preaching to the converted here in authorizing committee, but
    multiyear procurement. I think you saw a lot of this.
        If you are able to buy things over the course of three or 4
    years, you would make it cheaper. You know, that is an
    efficiency that I know Senator Wicker is focused on, other
    Members of this Committee.
        But at scale, an industrial capacity, this is capital
    intensive investments, not just to get the particular
    ammunition that can be produced on the curved production line,
    but it is multiple production line. Senator, as you know, it is
    not just about munitions.
        The most important capability for a Taiwan scenario, and I
    assume Dr. Lin would agree, is our undersea capability. We are
    retiring our undersea capability at a faster rate than we are
    producing them. That, in its essence, is a capital problem,
    focused, you know, around industrial capacity, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. I agree with you, and that was the reason
    that I was able to get the amendment in the NDAA, to address
    that problem specifically.
        On this Committee, and this for all of our panelists, on
    this committee we have been debating and changing security
    dynamics, in particular the return of great power competition.
        What do you see as being implications that we have for our
    military in that regard, and how do you think the events that
    we have seen play out over the past year may have changed your
    view of that discussion? Dr. Lin, would you like to start?
        Dr. Lin. Thank you. So in terms of great power competition
    and looking at the China dynamic, I think if I could add really
    quickly to what China is learning from Ukraine, I think what
    China is seeing is how long a war can occur.
        Related to the Taiwan scenario, and what the United States
    needs to do, is we need to make sure that we are not expending
    all of our ammunition, that is within a very short period of
    time.
        Recently CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
    Studies] did extensive war gaming, and we found, given our
    current stocks, they would run out within 2 weeks. If we are
    expecting a Taiwan conflict to last more than that, we
    definitely need to buildup our defense industrial base, as well
    as both the surge capacity, as well as the capacity to be able
    to have more of these stocks pre-positioned in the region.
        In terms of great power competition, what I am seeing from
    China's end, particularly after Speaker Pelosi's visit to
    Taiwan last August, is a greater willingness on China's end to
    use limited demonstration of military force to express its
    displeasure.
        What it is taking way from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
    why it thinks Russia needed to invade Ukraine was that it saw
    that Russian efforts at diplomacy with our NATO allies and with
    the United States failed.
        If you don't believe that diplomacy can allow you to
    achieve your aims, then you have to think about a greater use
    of military force, including demonstrations of force, at
    smaller scale.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Dr. Hill.
        Dr. Hill. Thank you so much, Senator Fischer. Again, I
    concur with my colleagues here on the panel. Actually, I want
    to pick up on something that Mr. Zakheim absolutely was right
    in emphasizing, but in fact, all of this started in 2008 with
    Russia's move into Georgia.
        In fact, we have had 15 years of this phase of great power
    competition, if that is how we want to call it, that we should
    have been paying closer attention to. We thought that was an
    aberration.
        It turned out not to be. What we have to recognize here is
    obviously we are in a very different competition, if that is
    what we want to call it, from Russia and China. Russia has been
    in the process of revanchism and revisionism, trying to
    overturn a territorial order in Europe.
        Of course, Russia--China is similarly engaged with Taiwan,
    who is obviously of a different nature, but also territorial
    claims against many of its neighbors, Japan, Vietnam, and
    others in the South China Seas. The United States is not in
    that position of territorial acquisition.
        Again, I think part of the message that we have to get
    across all the time, notwithstanding all the accusations that
    we have from previous U.S. actions and at different times in
    our history, is that we are actually trying to maintain the
    current international order, which means the territorial
    integrity of all of the recognized states. That is different.
        That should enable us to build a coalition of other
    countries, including middle powers, to push back against the
    actions of China and Russia, and specifically of Russia at this
    juncture, but China over the future.
        So we all have to focus on how when we are answering these
    questions, we are going to work with our allies in all of these
    different alignments that we have already talked about, in
    NATO, with all AUKUS, expanding that out, and also trying to
    push, as I mentioned before, countries like South Africa away
    from contemplating the kind of activities that they are now
    engaging in.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Shaheen, please.
    Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you to each of you
    for being here today. Mr. Zakheim, I couldn't agree more about
    multiyear procurement. It would also help if people could count
    on our getting a budget done every year. That would be a good
    first start, so I hope all of us on this committee will take
    that to heart.
        Ms. Hill, or Dr. Hill, Belarus has seemingly been reluctant
    to embrace Putin's war in Ukraine, but Russia continues to use
    the territory in Belarus to stage its an invasion.
        Can you briefly tell me how Putin views his relationship
    with Lukashenko, and whether we expect Belarus to engage to a
    greater level in the war in Ukraine in the future?
        Dr. Hill. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. It is actually very
    important for us to remember Belarus, because it still is
    technically an independent country, but as you were mentioning,
    it has been used as a staging ground for this conflict by
    Ukraine--for Ukraine by Russia.
        We also know, of course, that President Lukashenko of
    Belarus has been in some political difficulty in the most
    recent elections, and there is a lot of questions about whether
    he was, in fact, actually elected.
        We had a large opposition movement that emerged, and this
    will continue to be questions about his long-term grip on
    power. What we do know, of course, is that he has become
    increasingly dependent for political and economic support for
    Russia, which is why Belarussian sovereignty is now being used.
        I think Russia was also a model for what Putin wanted to
    achieve in Ukraine and still remain so. You know, we have
    probably forgotten that several decades ago, Belarus and Russia
    entered into a union State.
        Nobody quite knew what that meant, but it was obviously one
    in which Russia dominates all of Belarus's security policy and
    politics and economics. That was clearly what Putin wanted with
    Ukraine after the initial phases of the invasion.
        He wanted to do the same thing. So I think that we need to
    focus on Belarus and thinking forward as well.
        Senator Shaheen. Excuse me for interrupting, but so do we
    think Lukashenko is going to bow to Putin's getting the country
    further engaged in the war in Ukraine?
        Dr. Hill. I think he has limits to what he can actually do.
    He is dependent on Putin for propping him up on the one hand,
    but on the other, he has such a level of opposition. We are
    seeing Belarusians fighting for Ukrainians.
        We have got a lot of Belarussian opposition in the Baltic
    states, in Poland and elsewhere. I think Lukashenko knows that
    if he used the country, or let the country be used as a
    platform for yet another set of invasions of Ukraine and
    actually then committed Belarusian forces, that he would face
    severe problems at home.
        I think all the signs are that he is trying to shift his
    way toward the exit. I mean, he is been flashing sort of
    signals behind the scenes that he would like to do something
    different. The challenge is trying to figure out how to
    facilitate that under the current circumstances.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Given the turmoil in the world
    right now, are there opportunities that we should be trying to
    take advantage of?
        Obviously, in Syria, for example, the devastation of the
    earthquake has finally allowed or forced Assad to open up some
    more avenues into the country for humanitarian aid.
        You talk, I think, Dr. Lin and Dr. Hill, each of you talked
    a little bit about the opportunities with some of our Asian
    partners to get closer together to address China. But are there
    other opportunities that we ought to be looking at in this
    turmoil and trying to take advantage of?
        Dr. Hill. I will just say very quickly, in addition to
    those that you have outlined, because I think those are genuine
    opportunities, that we should also take a much harder look at
    all of the web of our relationships in the Western Hemisphere,
    for example.
        One of the issues that we discovered under the last
    Administration when we had the crisis in Venezuela was that
    regional countries were not well-disposed toward the United
    States, in part because we failed to have a coherent policy
    toward our neighbors in Latin and South America.
        We focused on problems rather than how we can build those
    relationships up. I think with the shift to President Lula in
    Brazil, this provides more of an opportunity because he is
    traditionally been much more interested in international
    affairs.
        We also have opportunities in Mexico and in other countries
    to try to work with them looking forward. Our big problem is
    that 87 countries around the world, including many of our
    neighbors in Latin and South America still tend to have visa
    free regimes with Russia.
        They are looking toward Russia and China for investment and
    sometimes assistance. We could work on that front as well.
    Thank you. Mr. Zakheim.
        Mr. Zakheim. Senator, I just would add that, and I know you
    do a lot of work on this, allies. I mean, there is no better
    way, in order to engage allies and allies more willing to work
    with us, than when you have revanchist powers invading other
    countries. They are playing out in terms of what the CCP is
    doing.
        Certainly with Russia, you see Finland and Sweden, and then
    of course, as was mentioned, what the opportunities we have in
    the Indo-Pacific. I would add that we need to give these are
    more meat.
        You know, the AUKUS framework is a great example, but other
    types, particularly industrial cooperation, how we deal with
    supply chain challenges in terms of impacts to the military, we
    are not making these alliances and relationships meaningful
    enough for the current security environment.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Rounds,
    please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all
    of you for taking the time to visit with us today. My question
    will focus specifically on NATO and our obligations under
    Article 5, and the impact that we could see should we have to
    respond.
        Assuming the possibility exists that a belligerent Putin
    attack or at least he has interest in perhaps expanding out of
    Ukraine and into one of our other allied countries that are
    part of NATO, what would be the probability, in your
    estimation, that we would also find ourselves not only legally
    obligated to respond in that area, but just very briefly, what
    do you believe the probability is of us having to also respond
    in short order to another conflict area regarding China?
        Just the probability, and I am just going to do right down
    the line. Dr. Lin.
        Dr. Lin. Thank you. So I think the possibility of a large
    scale conflict, two simultaneous, large scale conflicts are
    relatively low right now, mainly because we are not seeing
    clear signs yet that China coordinates its plans for Taiwan on
    what Russia is doing in Ukraine.
        Because if we did see that, we would have seen significant
    more use of force by China against Taiwan in the past year or
    so.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Dr. Hill.
        Dr. Hill. I think in addition to what Dr. Lin has said
    within the NATO realm in Europe, we are actually seeing Russia
    being quite cautious. Notwithstanding the brutality on the
    ground in Ukraine, we haven't yet seen some of the things that
    people were worried about in terms of talks of convoys going in
    to Ukraine from NATO countries. There were reports, of course,
    of missiles from the Black Sea going over potentially to--
    Moldova.
        Senator Rounds. But my question is, should we have to
    respond under Article 5. Assuming we had to respond under
    Article 5, what is the probability of having a second front
    open up? What would be that probability on the other side of
    the world?
        Dr. Hill. On the other side of the world, as I think Dr.
    Lin has said, I think that is quite low. I think in Europe what
    we are seeing is Russia is more likely to keep on trying with
    cyber, political, and economic intrusions than more military
    expansion because of Russia's own concerns about having to
    respond to too many fronts at the same time.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Dr. Lin. If I could add quickly, I meant to say it is low
    now, but it would be increasing over time.
        Senator Rounds. As we get closer to perhaps the 2027
    timeframe.
        Dr. Lin. But also as the United States-China competition
    intensifies, as China will be thinking, well, what are the best
    ways--if we need to use force, they will be thinking if the
    United States is distracted, it is a better opportunity for us
    to use force.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Mr. Zakheim. Senator Rounds, I am a little less sanguine
    than my colleagues here. This scenario that you have raised,
    the simultaneity problem is one that our defense strategy
    struggles with. As you know, we shifted away from building a
    force that could deal with two major regional contingencies.
        What that did, as you know, raised the salience of nuclear
    weapons, a dangerous scenario. But that is what our approach
    is. If we are in one fight, the way we are going to hold off
    the other fight for the most part is rely on allies and rely on
    our nuclear deterrent. That is a place we don't want to be.
        So winning in Ukraine is key here because it pins down
    Vladimir Putin, weakens his military, and reduces the
    likelihood we face the same simultaneity problem, which you
    have raised here.
        But I am not sanguine. I think what we saw in the Winter
    Olympics, and this China, Russia axis presents the very problem
    that you are thinking about.
        Senator Rounds. Following up on that, should we find
    ourselves in that type of a position, and we would be required
    to--I have always said, look, nobody wants to use nuclear
    weapons, but the best way not to have to use nuclear weapons is
    to be just overwhelming in our capabilities.
        We are currently in the middle of upgrading our NC3. What
    would be, Dr. Zakheim, what would be your opinion as to our
    process in the upgrading, and what should we be working on or
    focused on right now with regard to our nuclear capabilities on
    the triad?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, I think this Committee has done a great
    job of modernizing the triad. Of course, it is not happening
    fast enough, and you know that, the Committee gets the
    briefings on it.
        I thought the Nuclear Posture Review was good. It certainly
    didn't change the doctrine. But we are still stuck at the
    strategic level. As you know, Senator, the Chinese and the
    Russians are modernizing not only at the strategic level, but
    also kind of at theater level, intermediate level, tactical
    weapons, and we are behind there.
        I think what that does is introduce the possibility and
    elicits a form of escalation that none of us would ever want.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am up
    against my time limit.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. Senator
    Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of
    the panelists. Clearly, there are many demands on our
    resources. That is an understatement. I would consider a
    foundational concern to be the need to invest in our
    infrastructure, which is not only a matter of geopolitical
    competition, but also the readiness of the force--the forces.
        As chair of the subcommittee on Readiness, improving our
    military's readiness is a top priority. In the last year, let
    me give you some examples, there have been numerous issues with
    the military's infrastructure in Hawaii, from water main breaks
    to toxic chemical leaks and spills endangering our groundwater.
        I know that these kinds of events are not particular to
    Hawaii, even across the country. We need to better maintain and
    modernize our DOD infrastructure to take care of our people,
    get our systems out of maintenance on time, and be able to
    support national security.
        I will start with Dr. Lin. It is clear that INDOPACOM, AOR
    infrastructure needs to be modernized. Can you elaborate on the
    importance of our infrastructure for our national security,
    especially in the Pacific?
        Dr. Lin. So our infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific,
    particularly the fact that we are now investing in much more
    resilient and dispersed basing is absolutely critical,
    particularly as we look at the range of missiles, the hundreds.
        I think right now is based on what DOD release last year.
    The range of the missiles that China has in its vicity is
    clearly around 2,000 or so. The range of missiles that China
    can bring to bear means that in any fight, whether it is over
    Taiwan, we will need to be able to be able to disperse our
    assets so we are not reliant on any particular base.
        In order to be able to maintain that we can function for in
    particular airfields, we need harden our infrastructure. We
    also need to work with our allies and partners to make sure
    that we have the capabilities to quickly repair, for example,
    runways and other facilities. So it is absolutely critical to
    the fight.
        Senator Hirono. We basically, from what I can see, and
    especially with the examples of what is happening in Hawaii, we
    have aging infrastructure, which we tend to ignore until
    something breaks, and then you have Tripler Hospital, which is
    the main military hospital, not have water or not have
    electricity. We can't have that and maintain readiness.
        So I hope the other two panelists agree that even as we
    need to pay attention to other aspects of keeping our military
    ready, that let's not forget about some of these foundational
    concerns. I want to get to again, Dr. Lin, a key foundation of
    our national defense strategy is integrated deterrence, which
    highlights the need to work cooperatively with our allies.
        A number of you have already emphasized how important it is
    to strengthen our allies and partners, to strengthen our
    economic, cultural, and defense relationships. It is all of a
    piece because we can't just focus on the mil to mil
    relationships.
        We can deter aggression in the Pacific, for example, with
    our network of allies and partners, including increased posture
    forward and greater opportunities to conduct training in the
    region.
        Dr. Lin, between the recently announced access agreements
    with the Philippines, the United States basing the historic
    AUKUS agreement to share nuclear propulsion information and
    work on emerging technologies, and the current renegotiation of
    the compacts of freely associated states, the Administration is
    taking large steps forward and strengthening our relationships
    in the important Indo-Pacific region. What kind of message do
    these steps send to both China and our regional partners?
        Dr. Lin. Thank you. So our efforts to strengthen relations,
    whether it is on the defense front or on the political front,
    it sends a message of reassurance to our allies and partners
    that are looking to us to help them, to help deter Chinese
    coercion and deter Chinese aggression.
        What I would note is China is watching these efforts very,
    very closely. While it does have a deterrent effort, it is also
    causing China to think, well, how do we counter this?
        As China looks at this, what China is looking for is what
    they find as the weakest link among our allies and partners,
    and also they probably also have in their mind thinking, well,
    do we also need the same sort of partnerships and alliances?
        That is where, again, returning back to the China-Russia
    relationship. As China is watching what we are doing with our
    allies and partners, it must be in Beijing thinking, well, we
    need to definitely have our own partnerships and Russia is
    definitely one of them that China needs to keep.
        Senator Hirono. So how important is our relationship with
    the Pacific Island nations, i.e. our compact partners?
        Dr. Lin. Senator, absolutely important, because, as you
    know, China is trying to increase its military presence there.
    As the PLA becomes more or more active, it is now venturing
    much more beyond the first island chain into the second island
    chain.
        So if we are able to deny China a military base within the
    second island chain area, that would allow the United States to
    continue to flow our forces into the region much more easily
    than if China, for example, had a military base on the Solomon
    Islands.
        It would also make it much easier for us to support some of
    our key allies there, including Australia.
        Senator Hirono. Dr. Hill and Mr. Zakheim, do you agree that
    we can do a lot more with our Island nation partners, i.e.
    Marshall Islands, the Micronesia, Palau, and other island
    nations?
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes.
        Dr. Hill. Absolutely.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Zakheim,
    how would you assess our military recruitment, with all the
    politics we have added into it in the last few years?
        Mr. Zakheim. We are below where we need to be, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Another question here on spending. In
    2023, the Department of Defense, we spent $163 billion on
    procurement, $139 billion on research and development. Don't
    you think that is a little bit much on research and development
    as compared to building machines and ammunition to fight wars?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, I think we need to do better on
    procurement, as your question suggests.
        The R&D [research and development] is critical for the
    military we need for tomorrow, but we also need to emphasize
    the transition of our current force, and getting the software
    it needs and the AI infusion that is going to be critical to
    making these platforms useful in some of the scenarios we are
    discussing here.
        My own view is that the strategy is right, is we should
    focus on today and tomorrow, and the procurement needs to go
    up, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, sometimes you worry about
    tomorrow, today, and tomorrow never happens, and it is
    dangerous, the world we live in now with all the hotspots.
        Also with the risk posed by our Army and Navy's efforts to
    divest, you know, and especially in the SSGN [subsurface guided
    nuclear], we are going to do away with one a year, which
    carries 154 Tomahawk missiles, and we are going to transition
    over to a boat that carries 40 missiles. Are we gambling here
    on this research that we are just talking about?
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes, again, I don't have an issue with levels
    of research, but I agree with you, Senator, that we are not
    doing enough on the procurement side to keep pace with
    retirements.
        You are right that the capability, both in terms of total
    number of boats and in terms of the tubes, in terms of what the
    boat could deliver is a huge problem for us in the Taiwan
    scenario.
        It goes to procurement, as you point out, the multi-year
    piece, the fact that we can't build as many as we are retiring.
    Ultimately, I think this is capital required for industrial
    capacity improvement here, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Doctor, you got a comment on that?
        Dr. Hill. I would just urge us to be really still
    emphasizing research as well as infrastructure that Senator
    Hirono also mentioned.
        As Dr. Lin said, our adversaries look out for the weakest
    links and we can be sure that China is spending an awful lot of
    money right now on research and development, including trying
    to get access to our own IP [intellectual property] and our
    other research as well. We can only really keep ahead, as you
    said, because there is always a risk that tomorrow never comes.
        We can only ever really keep ahead of our adversaries by
    being on the cutting edge. That is why America has always
    succeeded in the past, because we have managed to find a
    balance between the needs of today and what we think is coming
    across the horizon tomorrow.
        I think in a basic infrastructure, as the Senator pointed
    out, is pretty critical. We have just seen with what has
    happened in the earthquake in Turkey, how important roads are,
    port facilities, for example, how easily they can be destroyed.
    We need to be looking at where all our weak links are and what
    we can do to shore them up.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Just one quick question, Mr.
    Zakheim on Ukraine and Russia, I have been perplexed for a year
    of what--how Putin has fought this war. He probably had some
    good thoughts about it. He kind of tiptoed into it. Do you
    think he is having second thoughts about not doing shock and
    awe like we did in Iraq?
        Mr. Zakheim. I think that was the original plan, and he
    realized that the military thought he had was not the one that
    was on the ground.
        Now I think the strategy has changed, as we are all
    reading, Senator, which is he is going to fight us for as long
    as it takes and allow his people to mow down until they are
    able to advance inch by inch, foot by foot.
        I think we, that is the side of freedom, Ukraine and its
    supporters, the West, the United States need to take advantage
    of this opportunity by speedily getting the platforms and
    capabilities in there not to allow this become a war of
    attrition.
        Senator Tuberville. This next wave of fighting that we are
    getting ready to have, don't you think, is going to be more of
    a precision fight, ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance]. We are talking about tanks and stuff. Those
    things aren't going to last very long if we go that direction.
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, I think that is where the future of
    warfare is. We are going to see whether what you are describing
    is able to roll back Russian forces, which are actually
    embedded and encamped and dug into territory.
        I think that is why the Ukrainians need more of these
    conventional forces like tanks. I think they would also benefit
    from fighter aircraft as well to dislodging the Russian
    positions.
        Senator Tuberville. Because of the 500,000 troops Russia
    has got on the border, is that what you are saying?
        Mr. Zakheim. They are going to keep on pushing them in.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Tuberville. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you. First, I want to welcome Senator
    Tuberville from the end of the row. He is now no longer at the
    end of the--Senator Tuberville, welcome to the--from not being
    on the end of the row, as you have been very ably----
        Senator Tuberville. It got very lonely on that end,
    especially with this big room that we had. Thank you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Mr. Zakheim, first, I want to thank you for
    your organization and leadership of the Reagan Defense Forum,
    which is a really important part of thinking through some of
    these strategic questions.
        Here is my question. It strikes me, as you look back at the
    Ukraine conflict, that if you combine the Ukrainians' will to
    fight with the resources of the West and the United States,
    Putin really in the long run doesn't stand a chance.
        It strikes me that Putin's best hope now is dividing the
    West and dividing the United States. Do you think that is a
    legitimate concern?
        Mr. Zakheim. I absolutely think that is part of the Putin
    strategy. I think he also questions the will of the West to
    continue to support Ukraine.
        Senator King. That is what I mean----
        Mr. Zakheim. Absolutely, yes. I agree with that.
        Senator King. He wants to divide us, get us tired of the
    conflict, and then he is just going to win through the passage
    of time.
        Mr. Zakheim. I think that is his approach, Senator. I
    agree.
        Senator King. You mentioned, you used the word a few
    minutes ago, speedily. One of my concerns is that, for example,
    with the tanks, our response has been slow and then we have to
    go through training.
        I am worried right now at this moment that the Russians are
    preparing for a major offensive in the East that the Ukrainians
    aren't going to be ready for because they don't have the
    equipment.
        In other words, we have telegraphed to them that we don't
    have the tanks there yet and they are going to try to take
    advantage of this gap. Is that something of concern?
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes, and I think the unclassified information
    I have reviewed certainly suggests that. The way I think about
    it, Senator, is the strategy here is to help Ukraine realize a
    counteroffensive, to break through that Russian line that is
    emerging in the Donbass.
        To do that, we should give them all the capabilities
    necessary. Tanks is one example. Fourth generation fighter
    aircraft is another. We tend to think about the platform and
    get stuck rather thinking about the strategy.
        If we trust Ukraine to restore its sovereign territory,
    then we should trust some of the platforms to do that, and not
    worry they are going to use the platform for some other purpose
    or escalate the battle beyond the territory of Ukraine.
        Senator King. Have the Ukrainians been respectful of those
    limitations in terms of escalating the battle into Russia?
        Mr. Zakheim. Best that I can tell, yes. There have been
    some debates, I believe, on the margins, but it has always been
    focused on within the sovereign territory of Ukraine.
        Senator King. Dr. Hill, I know you touched on this. It
    worries me, looking at a map yesterday, the Belarus border is
    about 60 miles from Kiev. If I were Putin, I would be very
    tempted to try to have another offensive toward Kiev and the
    decapitation of the government. I take it you believe that
    Belarusian politics and the regional balance does not raise the
    level of risk of that happening?
        Dr. Hill. Well, look, I think the risk is always there
    because, of course, Belarus and its President Lukashenko are
    very much dependent on Russia at this particular point. Of
    course, there is an awful lot of troops.
        I think that the pressures inside Belarus, political
    pressures would make it very difficult for Lukashenko to
    contemplate this. This would also be a huge alarm bell for all
    of the other former Soviet republics.
        I mean, if Belarus is been actually deployed in this war, I
    think we are going to see a pretty aggressive response from
    others as well.
        Senator King. Based upon the intelligence that we saw a
    year ago, we would know if the Russians were moving significant
    forces in that direction.
        Dr. Hill. Yes, we have seen buildup, you know, getting back
    to what Senator Tuberville was talking about before, about the
    placement of men and equipment there. Looks like some of them
    are being trained. But we haven't seen particularly at the
    moment that we are expecting waves of people going over the
    Belarusian border. But we mustn't rule it out.
        Senator King. In fact, that ties one of--part of the
    strategy probably of those deployments is to tie the Ukrainians
    down to some extent, defending that border rather than putting
    all their forces in the East and the South.
        Dr. Hill. Absolutely, and Putin is at pains all the time to
    still raise the threat to Kiev itself of another assault. I
    think getting back to what Mr. Zakheim said before about not
    being sanguine about anything actually. We have to be
    continuously vigilant and continue to look at the intelligence
    about any of these contingencies.
        Senator King. Dr. Lin, final question. The key to the
    success thus far of the Ukrainians has been their amazing
    courage and will to fight. What do you assess of--how do you
    assess the will to fight of the people of Taiwan and their
    leadership? Is there leadership of the Churchillian quality of
    Zelenskyy? Or are they closer to, let's say, Gandhi?
        Dr. Hill. That is an excellent question, Senator. I think
    Taiwan is strengthening its will to fight. It's being very
    encouraging for Taiwan to look at what Ukraine has
    accomplished, and it is instilling more confidence in the
    Taiwan people.
        I would also note that unlike Ukraine, where folks could
    leave the land, Taiwan is surrounded by water. So even if we
    are not necessarily seeing the strong will now, when push comes
    to shove, I think many people in Taiwan will find they have no
    escape routes and they need to fight for their home.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. I want to thank each of you for being here.
    I come from Florida. We have got 21 bases and three unified
    commands. Military is a pretty big deal, especially in our
    panhandle, but all across our State.
        So you look at the Chinese spy balloon, you look at them
    build a military to defeat us, you would think that American
    citizens would start waking up and saying we are to stop buying
    things from communist China because seems like they are taking
    the money they make to go--eventually defeat us is what their
    goal, so I guess the first thing is, do you think Americans are
    to stop buying things made in communist China because it
    ultimately flows to the Chinese Communist Party and it can hurt
    us? I mean, what do you all think?
        Dr. Hill. Sure. So I think we definitely, the U.S.
    Government is already imposing significant restrictions on
    export of technology that could be used, as far as we know, to
    fuel military civil fusion in China, as well as the PLA. With
    respect to technology below that, I think there is still a lot
    of advantage that Americans actually get from the cheaper
    products from China.
        Senator Scott. But doesn't China get a benefit?
        Dr. Hill. For some of the more cheaper products, not as
    much, but definitely on the higher end, China is benefiting
    more. So we need to desegregate where we want to limit our
    exports to China and where exports to China or buying from
    China could actually benefit United States consumers and United
    States citizens.
        Mr. Zakheim. Senator, I might add that I agree with the way
    Dr. Lin framed it. It is the strategic decoupling that is key.
    We have failed, and as you know, you have led on this in the
    Senate, to make sure that we are not giving China the types of
    capabilities through our commerce that enhance the top tip of
    the spear for part of their military.
        But we also have an interest in making China dependent on
    older technologies, and the scale of our exports to China in
    some ways could benefit us, but certainly on the military side,
    those elements, and I think we are seeing some good things out
    of the Bureau of Industry and Security and Commerce that are
    starting to put up walls, but it has taken way too long.
        Senator Scott. Do you think that China thinks we are
    getting weaker or stronger in relative to them? How do you
    think their leadership thinks?
        Mr. Zakheim. What I have read, and the way that they are
    planning is that they think they can beat us, particularly in
    the Taiwan scenario.
        Senator Scott. Right. What about, you read all this and
    what you hear is that how much time was put in on woke, having
    to woke military. It seems to me I have always thought we ought
    to have--I served in the Navy. I thought our job was to be a
    lethal military, that people are scared to death of us.
        So do you think that--what do you think the government of
    China thinks when they read that we are focused on pronouns and
    things like that rather than how we have the most lethal
    military force?
        Mr. Zakheim. Senator, I think the defense strategy is clear
    on this and it starts with Secretary Mattis, we need to focus
    on being the most lethal force, as you point out, focusing on
    the core mission. Anybody in the U.S. military wants to focus
    on their mission.
        We have done polling at the Reagan Institute, the Reagan
    National Defense survey. Politicization is a problem. The
    American people have reduced trust and confidence in the
    military because they believe the military is politicized.
        The more we can do to allow our military, our men and women
    in uniform to focus on warfighting, the better it will be for
    our military and the more it will deter China.
        Dr. Hill. I would like to make a comment that look, I am
    afraid that the more that we have partisan and political
    fights, the more adversaries think that we are weak. I have
    made that point many times in public before. They watch all of
    this and frankly, they think we have lost it.
        So the more I am afraid that we make statements like this,
    the more that we start attacking our fellow Americans for
    whatever perspective we think they come from, the more that
    Russia and China think that we are working ourselves out of
    history.
        They watch all of this very carefully, but not in the ways
    that you think. I think China and Russia do know that we still
    can be lethal, but we are most lethal when we get our act
    together and that we are all Americans fighting together on one
    side. That is what our adversaries and our friends are looking
    to us.
        They would like us to get over all of these fights that we
    are having internally, and so, I mean, I would just urge to--I
    don't understand what that label means. I am trying not to use
    labels. I think the more that we can stand up and just show
    that we are Americans in solidarity, the more we will be able
    to have a deterrent effect on our adversaries, and more will
    bring our friends behind us, because they are watching us and
    thinking, has America lost the plot at this moment?
        Senator Scott. So I just--we stopped the vaccine mandate
    just recently in December. One of the issues I think a lot of
    us have been focused on is how do we reinState people that were
    discharged and how do we make sure they are not put in an
    adverse monetary position. We have a problem with retention.
        We have a problem with recruitment. So how much do you
    think it would be important that we let people come back in,
    that for religious or health reasons, decided not to take the
    vaccine or--and also make sure that they don't have to pay back
    pay. They don't have to pay for training, things like that.
        Mr. Zakheim. Readiness is key here. We are not meeting our
    numbers, and so I believe this Congress has given authority to
    the Secretary of Defense and Department Health to do just that.
    It is about execution now at this stage, Senator Scott.
        Dr. Lin. If I could add, one major event that our military
    has over the PLA is the quality of our personnel. If you look
    at the what President Xi Jinping has mentioned in terms of
    priorities for the PLA, after military theory and organization,
    the second priority is development of the PLA personnel, and
    equipment comes after that.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott, and for the
    information of my colleagues, there are two votes beginning at
    11:30 a.m. Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, all. I
    am so sorry, I had another meeting I had to speak at. I am sure
    you probably covered this in generality, but I would like to
    ask the questions again.
        First of all, I think what I am hearing loud and clear is
    if we have laundry that is dirty and need wash, don't do it in
    the public when the military is involved. I am hearing that
    loud and clear. Which probably every time we have military
    conversations or disagreement, it should be done in the skiff
    with all 100 of us so we can talk about it to each other, and
    how we come out of there unified.
        So that is a clear message you are giving us, and you got
    to continue to give that. I feel very strongly about that. Next
    of all, I would like--Dr. Lin, I will start with you. First of
    all, does the Taiwanese have the ability to defend themselves
    against mainland China, to be independent?
        If not, would they have the ability with the United States
    help? If it took the United States help, would we have any
    allies coming with us to defend Taiwan the way that they have
    come together in Europe on Ukraine?
        Dr. Lin. Thank you, Senator, for the question. So to be
    frank, Taiwan would not be able to stand by itself.
        Senator Manchin. It cannot defend itself, no matter what we
    do, no matter what equipment we give them.
        Dr. Lin. When you are talking about a large scale invasion,
    given the vast power disparities that China can bring to bear,
    Taiwan would not be able to stand alone.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. Can they do it with our help? Are we
    able to do it to deter that or just basically prolong it?
        Dr. Lin. Yes. So I think that is what the department is
    focused on with Taiwan as the pacing scenario, to make sure
    that the United States can be able to flow enough assets and
    have the right, both posture and capabilities, as well as
    operational----
        Senator Manchin. I am understanding there is a little bit
    of a difference of what we believe that they would need to
    defend themselves and be successful versus what they desire to
    have.
        Dr. Lin. So, when Taiwan thinks about his defense needs,
    its thinking not only about the high end contingency of the
    Chinese invasion, it is also thinking about the day to day gray
    zone incursions that China is flying into Taiwan's air defense
    identification zone. So, from their perspective, they need to
    cover all the different threats.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. How about allies? Which allies would
    come to the defense that look at Taiwan and the commitment
    other than the United States? I have not heard of other allies
    believing that it is of national interest to them to go and
    fight or support Taiwanese war against China.
        Dr. Lin. So, we are increasingly hearing from Japan that
    the defense of Taiwan is vital to Japanese national security.
    That is why they made the critical national security documents,
    the new documents that came out in December from Japan's end
    reflect the seriousness that Japan takes for its problem.
        Senator Manchin. About South Korea?
        Dr. Lin. South Korea--I would put South Korea lower than
    potentially Australia and other--I put Japan----
        Senator Manchin. Japan the highest.
        Dr. Lin. Australia. South Korea would be a bit lower.
        Senator Manchin. I got you, Okay.
        Dr. Lin. The Philippines would probably be somewhere
    between Australia and South Korea.
        Senator Manchin. We are pretty much effort in the
    Philippines right now trying to build that up. Okay, and Dr.
    Hill, Ukraine. Does Ukraine have the ability to fight and win
    the war to take back the Donbass and also Crimea?
        Dr. Hill. Well, it is not just Donbass and Crimea, it is
    also these are the two regions, as well as Kherson and
    Zaporizhzhia.
        Senator Manchin. Sure. I mean, basically putting their
    country----
        Dr. Hill. Yes--I, as much as we have been talking before,
    depends on the provision of military assistance from the United
    States and other allies, and also a diplomatic effort too.
        I think just primarily on the battlefield, it is going to
    be extraordinarily difficult, because, you know, we have
    already had a discussion about how much the Russians have dug
    in at this particular point.
        So, we need to have diplomacy pushing alongside the
    military. I can't honestly say about whether it is feasible for
    Ukraine. There are differences of opinion in the United States,
    UK, and among other----
        Senator Manchin. Are you all gauging the support of the
    Russian citizens toward this fight? Do they believe it is an
    honorable fight, it is a needed fight? It is one that they have
    to put their country and take back?
        Dr. Hill. This is being put to the test. What Putin is
    trying to tell the Russians at the moment is this is the third
    patriotic war after Napoleon's invasion, Nazi invasion. I mean,
    this is ridiculous of Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Second
    World War. Now, this is the next invasion.
        I think not all Russians are buying this. We have seen a
    million people leave, and I am not convinced myself that
    another additional 500,000 people are willing to be sacrificed
    on the front lines of what is, to some extent, a vanity project
    for Vladimir Putin.
        Senator Manchin. Do you think Ukrainians have the willpower
    and the people power to continue this fight?
        Dr. Hill. So, they certainly have the willpower. The people
    power is under some stress at the moment because of the sheer
    numbers that Russia is trying to push to the battlefield. We
    are aware of that, which is why, as Mr. Zakheim has been
    saying, it is very important to outweigh with the equipment.
    But again, diplomatic support is going to be crucial. It won't
    be just won on the battlefield, this war----
        Senator Manchin. Yes, but diplomatic--and I am always
    concerned the United States might intervene in, or the
    Europeans put so much pressure on to go to the negotiating
    table and Putin is going to walk away with a win. No matter if
    he loses, he will walk away with the propaganda win.
        Dr. Hill. I have exactly the same concerns, which is why we
    have to really step up our diplomacy with other countries to
    make very clear how unacceptable it is to have Putin get away
    with what is a violation of international--yes.
        Senator Manchin. My final--I am running out of time. I
    know, I am so sorry. If I may, sir. The, basically the will for
    our allies to stay in this fight, are they going to be forced
    back as energy independence or energy security or lack of it,
    or a need of the Russian energy cheap energy they have had
    before? Is that going to force maybe this to a table or to
    resolve prior to where it needs.
        Dr. Hill. This is much less of a factor than it was before.
    I think actually you will find that Europeans resolve is much
    stronger than perhaps is often seen from here.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Mullin,
    please.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman, and just for common
    purposes, I want to see if there is any way I could get a list
    of promotions before we vote on them because I think I just
    voted on my brother-in-law to be promoted, and I wanted Billy
    to maybe put a hold on them before I do that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Mullin. I like him sometimes but not always.
        Chairman Reed. Absolutely. We could. You have to go through
    1,700 names but----
        Senator Mullin. Well, that is fine. I will find him pretty
    quick.
        Chairman Reed. No, that is no problem.
        Senator Mullin. Anyways, I appreciate the opportunity to
    serve on this Committee, and I want to go straight to, sir,
    forgive me if I miss your name, but Zakheim? Is that kind of--
    --
        Mr. Zakheim. But I will take Zakheim.
        Senator Mullin. Say that again.
        Mr. Zakheim. Zakheim.
        Senator Mullin. Zakheim. All right, Zakheim. In 2022, to
    the National Defense Strategy Briefing mentioned our enemies
    use of irregular warfare as a way to destabilize our allies and
    undermine our conventional military power. Can you speak of the
    effects of Russia's energy warfare has had on Europe's resolve
    and the allies in Ukraine?
        Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for the question, Senator. I want to
    associate myself with what Dr. Hill just said, where they
    absolutely tried to intimidate and browbeat the Europeans into
    submission on the basis of turning off the spigots, and energy
    warfare is really what it came down to.
        I think in this regard, Europe, I guess from my standpoint,
    surprised me. They have diversified. Recently, as you may be
    aware Senator, Vladimir Putin is now going to reduce production
    because he hasn't seen the effects of this this form of
    warfare. So, I think it is actually been a good news story to
    date.
        Senator Mullin. Well, I have said this multiple times that
    U.S. energy independence brings on global stabilization. People
    want to do business with the United States.
        Dr. Hill, you made a reference that we should be trying to
    help our allies move more with food, fuel, and fertilizer.
        The problem is, is that underneath this current
    Administration, the war on energy, even the president's
    comments just recently that he is wanting to eliminate fossil
    fuels within 10 years, it causes problems with our allies,
    would you agree?
        Dr. Hill. Well, it depends on, you know, how we are framing
    all of that. I mean----
        Senator Mullin. Well, if we cut fossil fuels, you are going
    to damage food supply. As a rancher, someone that produces a
    lot of protein for the American people, I can't run my tractors
    and our semis on electricity. If I could, it would cost two or
    three more times to buy that product, which there is not the
    margin in there.
        So, it is going to hurt the food supply. Fertilizer, my
    lord, we saw the effects of that last year. So, when you make
    that comment, it would have to have worse effects on our allies
    because they would have to depend on somebody else for that.
        Dr. Hill. Well, look, you are absolutely right in making
    this distinction and I am glad you did, because, of course, 70
    percent of food production is fuel, just as you have pointed
    out. It is not the electricity, it is actually the fuel that is
    in the major equipment, but it is also for making fertilizer
    because all the ammonia phosphates and, you know, fertilizers
    are used with natural gas.
        So, we have to--what I was going to say is we have to have
    a very sensible discussion about all of this. There is another
    dimension beyond the fuel, fertilizer, food mix, which you have
    quite rightly pointed out, which is of nuclear energy, too. We
    haven't put this in the mix.
        Vladimir Putin has, of course, imperiled civilian nuclear
    power by attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, going
    through the Chernobyl exclusion zone. We have been dependent on
    Russia for some of the fuel supply system for nuclear fuel.
        This is a time for us to step up into this realm as well. I
    think, possibly for this Committee and many others, we should
    be having a very sensible, open discussion on the complexities
    of this issue and how to balance it off.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you. I agree. Sir, what lessons
    should we learn from Russia's irregular warfare?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, they have been effective with hybrid
    warfare. As you know, in Georgia, in Crimea. In this case,
    Putin was perhaps overconfident in his conventional forces
    capability and didn't pursue that route.
        Although I would note that the day before Russia had the
    physical land invasion of Ukraine, there were robust cyber-
    attacks on Ukraine, on their government servers, and actually
    globally. So, we have to think of this conflict as one that is
    playing out in all domains, including, I think, what you are
    characterizing as the irregular domain as well.
        The notion that we are in some sort of steady State of
    either peace or conflict, the reality is that there are
    elements of military domains right now that are in active
    conflict, cyber being the primary example.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you, sir. With the fact that I came
    over from the House and we respect the time because we get
    cutoff, I am going to yield back the remainder of my time to
    you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. That is the example that everyone
    should follow. I agree. I think, Senator Mullin, you have added
    so much to the committee already.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Mullin. You will get over it soon.
        Chairman Reed. With that, let me recognize for 5 minutes,
    Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I am not going to use any of
    my 5 minutes to comment on any reaction. Thank you all for
    being here. It has been very, very helpful and enlightening. I
    have been to Kiev three times in the past year.
        Every time I go, I am so deeply moved and impressed by the
    resolve and resilience of the Ukrainian people, which I think
    in the end of the day is the reason that they will win. Because
    as Presidents Zelenskyy told me during one of my visits with
    him, they will fight to the last person and they will fight
    with pitchforks if they need to do it.
        I have supported his requests for the javelins and
    stingers, and then for long range artillery and still longer-
    range artillery. The ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile Systems],
    not just the HIMARS [High Mobility Artillery Rocket System].
    For the tanks that he needs, not just the Bradley and Stryker
    vehicles, but the Leopards and the Challengers. Now for the
    fighter aircraft.
        As important as those munitions and artillery and other
    hardware are, I think the morale and determination of the
    people of Ukraine is equally important. In that connection, I
    have worked with Senator Graham to support designating Russia
    as a State sponsor of terrorism.
        Every time I have met with Presidents Zelenskyy, he has
    mentioned it. In fact, when we brought him a copy of the
    resolution, passed unanimously by the United States Senate,
    asking the Administration to designate Russia as a State
    sponsor of terrorism, his face alighted.
        We presented him with the resolution in July, Senator
    Graham and I. It has meaning to the people of Ukraine. Would
    you agree with me that Russia should be designated a State
    sponsor of terrorism?
        Dr. Hill. I would actually have to say with regret that I
    would not. Let me just elaborate why. Because I think that what
    we really need to do is to be able to persuade other countries
    in the global South and elsewhere, that it is very important
    for them to support Ukraine and to push back against Russian
    aggression.
        We have to focus this on what Russia has done to violate
    Ukraine's territorial integrity. I think once you put it into
    that designation, you then start to have a lot of countries
    pull back from any support that they might have given, because
    the consequences of that will be questioning whether that's
    going to happen to them as well. We have many other conflicts
    around the world.
        We have Saudi Arabia's attacks on Yemen, for example, and
    many of those where I would hesitate to think that we would
    apply that designation. What we have to do when we look at this
    is to see whether we can actually use the precedent of whatever
    action we take.
        There is one other element that I do want to point out,
    though, that we should be making very clear that the United
    States, along with the United Kingdom, have a special role in
    supporting Ukraine because of the agreements that we had in
    1994 to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty,
    independence, when we pushed them to give up nuclear weapons.
        One thing we haven't mentioned on this panel is the
    proliferation challenge that we now face because of this. So I
    do think that we, the United States, along with the United
    Kingdom and others, should be stressing continuously how much--
    how important it is to support Ukraine. But I am afraid that
    with regret, I would hesitate taking this step.
        Senator Blumenthal. How about the Wagner Group? Would you
    agree with me that we should designate the Wagner group as a
    terrorist or a foreign terrorist group?
        Dr. Hill. I think that would fall into that category. I
    think with the Wagner Group and another paramilitary
    formations, we can discuss those, some of the atrocious acts
    that they are undertaking. They have actually attacked Special
    Forces of the United States in Syria in 2018.
        Senator Blumenthal. So, you would distinguish----
        Dr. Hill. I would distinguish Wagner. Is this the actions
    of particular groups under that State rubric.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, over the course of this
    year, the prospect of potential escalation by Putin has been
    raised as a reason not to provide each of these weapons'
    platforms as we have gone along. I have said the danger of
    escalation has been vastly overestimated.
        Just as we have underestimated the capability of the
    Ukrainian forces, we have overestimated or exaggerated Putin's
    potential for escalating. Could you give me your thoughts about
    whether we are close to that escalation point, whether it would
    be triggered by the fourth-generation fighter aircraft that now
    we are urging be provided?
        Dr. Hill. I want to seed some of this to Dr. Zakheim, but I
    just want to make it very clear, Putin escalates all the time.
    Sending 500,000 extra people, 300,000 extra people to the front
    is an escalation.
        We are seeing a lot of caution, as we mentioned earlier,
    about crossing over into NATO territory because he doesn't want
    to have a full-on kinetic war with NATO. But I don't think that
    actually specific choices of equipment really--germane to this
    debate.
        Mr. Zakheim. I agree with Dr. Hill, and I think the point
    here is what is the platform going to be used for? Why is it
    necessary? That is the question that should animate
    decisionmaking with the emphasis on urgency and speed.
        I agree with you, Senator. I think fighter aircraft, ones
    that this Congress has authorized the United States military
    not to use anymore, that could easily be sent over there, could
    have a material impact on the fight within the sovereign
    territory of Ukraine.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. I agree with what Senator Blumenthal said
    that the Administration has been deterring itself from
    providing the Ukrainians the weapons they need. I would say
    from the very beginning they engaged in half measures while
    Ukraine has half succeeded, and they should quit pussyfooting
    around on the battlefield.
        I want to look before Russians launched this war, though,
    Mr. Zakheim, to what happened in 2021. Winston Churchill, in
    his famous Iron Curtain speech, cautioned against offering
    temptations to a trial of strength.
        He offered that caution specifically about the Russians,
    who had said he had just seen up close and personal as allies
    and friends for many years, and there is nothing they respect
    so much as military strength and nothing for which they have
    less respect than military weakness.
        Can you tell us how did the botched withdrawal in
    Afghanistan perhaps tipped Vladimir Putin to a trial of
    strength in Ukraine?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, I think they correlate, Senator. I agree
    with the thrust of your question. The United States looked
    weak. It didn't look like it was going to--did not support the
    State until every U.S. servicemember went home and it looked
    like we were unable to carry out military operations. So, we
    looked defeated, and I think when you look weak, people like
    Vladimir Putin seek to exploit the opportunity.
        Senator Cotton. When Joe Biden took office, I think it is
    fair to say that Vladimir Putin's top two foreign policy
    priorities, at least as it related to the United States, were
    one, the extension of the New START treaty, which is a badly
    one-sided nuclear arms control treaty that the Obama
    administration entered, and two, the waiver of sanctions on the
    Nordstream 2 pipeline.
        In his very first week in office, Joe Biden extended the
    New START treaty. Shortly after that, he waived sanctions on
    Northstream 2 pipeline. How did Joe Biden's decision to give
    Vladimir Putin his top two foreign policy priorities without
    any concessions whatsoever perhaps tempt Vladimir Putin into a
    trial of strength in Ukraine?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, it made clear to everybody, including, I
    think, President Biden, that engagement of Vladimir Putin, that
    seeking to put forward a carrot in order to prevent the type of
    behavior that we have seen consistently from Vladimir Putin, as
    mentioned before, from 2008 in Georgia, 2014 in Crimea, is not
    going to work.
        That, as you point out at the beginning of your question,
    Senator Cotton, President Putin responds to one thing, force in
    kind and strength. I think that is what the Ukrainians have
    shown and this Congress has supported, and actually pushed the
    President to be more forceful in that support and to understand
    the urgency that is required there.
        Senator Cotton. Let's look at the provision of weapons to
    Ukraine. Actually, let's go back to the Obama-Biden era since.
    In President Obama's era, we provided meals ready to eat and
    blankets not ammunition and javelins. Then since then it has
    been a constant story of ammunition but not artillery,
    artillery but HIMARS, HIMARS but not armor. Infantry fighting
    vehicles, but not tanks.
        Okay, tanks, but not fighters or ATACMS or cluster
    munitions or so forth. I have to assume, given this pattern, we
    are going to see provision of some of those weapons and
    platforms sometimes in the future when they are less effective
    than they would have been if they had been provided months ago
    or at the beginning of this war.
        But let's look at one in particular, since a lot of these
    things we are talking about, Bradley fighting vehicles, special
    Abrams tanks, F-16s do have long logistics tails and take some
    training. We have heard a lot today about Russians being dug in
    trench lines, almost World War I style warfare.
        We have more than 1 million cluster munitions in our
    stockpiles here in the United States. Today, we are not
    providing them in anything like sizable numbers. Could you
    explain what cluster munitions could do to help the Ukrainians
    perhaps break through the stalemate in Eastern Ukraine?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, as you point out, they
    disperse, they clear the field, and they are very effective in
    having a strategic impact when you are dealing with the
    tactical problem that you have outlined.
        Senator Cotton. Why would we not provide cluster munitions,
    which would be ready to fire in a matter of days, unlike, say,
    an Abrams tank or an F-16?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, I think anything that we have in our
    inventory that would be useful for this battle, we ought to
    offer the Ukrainians.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. One final question for you, Mr.
    Zakheim. This is in your role at the Ronald Reagan Institute.
    You will do an annual poll about the American people's respect
    and admiration for our military.
        It has shown alarming downward trends in recent years. Can
    you give us some thoughts, both on the poll and from your
    experience, in crafting these questions and following over the
    years about why that is the case?
        Mr. Zakheim. Senator, thank you for that. We do the Reagan
    National Defense Survey annually, and just 4 years ago, the
    American people's trust and confidence in military was over 70
    percent.
        As you referenced there, Senator, now it is actually below
    50 percent. The most recent defense survey we asked the
    respondents why, and the response was clear that the American
    people believe that the military has become politicized. That
    is expressed in a variety of different ways from civilian
    leadership politicizing the military, to military leaderships
    politicizing the military, to concerns about wokeism, and
    extremism, and divisive differently across percentage lines.
        But I think it is not a concern of the American people that
    the U.S. military is unable to carry out their core mission of
    protecting this country and being the best military force in
    the world. It is a concern about politicization penetrating
    their mission, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to the witnesses.
    If I had 10 minutes of questioning, I would spend 5 comparing a
    Biden administration that has assembled a global coalition to
    stand for democracy against an illegal invasion, and a previous
    Administration that illegally withheld congressionally mandated
    arms sales to Ukraine to extort a political advantage by doing
    so.
        But I have 4 minutes and 39 seconds, and so I want to take
    2 minutes, Dr. Lin, with you on a question about China and
    diplomacy, and then 2 minutes with Dr. Hill and Mr. Zakheim
    about an ally's reference, picking up on some of your verbal
    testimony. Dr. Lin, in the events surrounding this spying
    balloon incident, the thing that has troubled me the most is
    not the capacity of a high-altitude balloon.
        I probably been troubled most by General Austin trying to
    call his counterpart in China and no one picking up the phone.
    What does this say about the diplomatic relationship, as an
    expert, that that is happening, and what do we need to do so
    that we have, at a minimum, clear channels of communication to
    avoid unnecessary escalations?
        Dr. Lin. Senator, that is an excellent question. I am not
    surprised that Secretary Austin's counterpart did not pick up
    the phone.
        We have a track record of us reaching out to the PLA, and
    them not picking up the phone, or responding at a much later
    time where it is no longer relevant to the situation that we
    are trying to deal with.
        It shows that across the United States engagement with
    China, our military-to-military ties and relationship is
    relatively weak. Despite the efforts of this Administration to
    focus on deconfliction, crisis communications with the PLA, we
    have not made significant progress.
        I wouldn't fault that to be on the United States side, I
    would fault that to be the Chinese. From their perspective,
    they have very little incentives to communicate or deconflict
    from us because they view our attempts to communicate with them
    as either allowing a green light of certain types of U.S.
    operations.
        Senator Kaine. Don't they, though, value stability and they
    wouldn't like surprises or accidents or miscalculations that
    weren't in their sort of intentional interest?
        Dr. Lin. They do value that. But we have seen since 2021
    that they have canceled the Military Maritime Consultative
    Agreement, the key military to military dialogs to prevent
    unsafe encounters or whatnot.
        I think from the Chinese perspective, they believe that if
    they can reach an agreement with the United States at the
    highest strategic level on how the relationship should be
    framed, all the other elements to fall in line, which is why
    from their perspective, they are very intent on constructing
    this framework of United States, China relations. Which from
    the United States perspective, that is only one piece of the
    relationship.
        Senator Kaine. Right. Thank you. To Dr. Hill and Mr.
    Zakheim, Dr. Hill, you said something about, I think it was in
    reference to American allies in the hemisphere, that we pay
    attention to problems rather than build relationships. Mr.
    Zakheim, you said we need to always focus on allies as one of
    the most important strengths we have. Against any adversary,
    the network of allies we have is important.
        I am the chairman of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of
    the Senate Foreign Relations committee, and I see this
    throughout the Americas, deep Chinese involvement economically,
    humanitarian aid.
        You know, debt deals that will get you in trouble later but
    they might be attractive upfront. What our allies tend to say
    to us is we would rather deal with you. I mean, we are
    culturally more connected. We are suspicious of some of the
    Chinese offers that are on the table.
        But if they have got an offer and you have got nothing, how
    do we say to our people, well, we are turning down the free 5G
    system or the the port infrastructure bill. So, talk a little
    bit about, particularly in the Americas, your thoughts about
    the way to, you know, turn episodic attention to problems into
    a more sustained effort to build relationships.
        Dr. Hill. I think this is absolutely spot on, and we need a
    strategy because China has a strategy. Maybe they come in, as
    you said, in a very specific way, as with the Belt and Road
    Initiative, investments in energy in places like Venezuela, for
    example, coming in with other forms of assistance, targeting
    elites. We know that the Chinese are extremely, very good at
    honing in on elites and propping them up. Russia does exactly
    the same.
        It is part of this top-down approach that Dr. Lin has
    described, they look for a framework of the relations that
    starts at the top and then they let everything else flow from
    there. That is not the way that we approach our allies and
    partners in any hemisphere, let alone in the Western
    hemisphere.
        When I was in the previous Administration, I worried a
    great deal as a result of the crisis in Venezuela, that we
    didn't have a plan. That we didn't have deep relationships. We
    took a lot of other neighboring countries for granted, and we
    didn't have a deep relationships.
        Senator Kaine. Could I let Mr. Zakheim--we have identified
    the problem. He will give us the solution.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Zakheim. No pressure there, Senator. I do think the
    answer here is diplomacy that Dr. Hill is speaking about.
    Brazil was raised before, and President Biden's engagement, I
    think is absolutely critical. Trade and commerce, and this is
    what needs to grow. That is what we do best as a country,
    unleash our free market.
        We have tried this, and success and failed over the
    decades, but that continues to be worked aggressively. I think
    looking at Colombia, I think there is a layer where a security
    relationship appropriately tailored for the country can have a
    positive impact in terms of the type of effects that you are
    talking about, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Budd,
    please.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member
    Wicker. I am honored to join the Armed Services committee, and
    I will certainly be a good steward of our military interests in
    North Carolina.
        Senator Wicker, I will work to keep your legacy alive at
    Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. Appreciate your service there.
    It is clear that deterrence failed in Ukraine. I am deeply
    concerned that the Biden administration's policies and actions
    will similarly lead to deterrence failing in Asia, and that
    China will attempt to take Taiwan by force.
        Mr. Zakheim, you were recently reappointed to the National
    Defense Strategy Commission. Understanding that the Commission
    work just started on the 2022 National Defense Strategy, what
    does the NDS get right, and please give two or three examples
    of what the Biden administration got wrong.
        Mr. Zakheim. A glaring gap in the national defense strategy
    of the Biden administration, but I think it was also true for
    the Trump administration, is that Senator, when you look for
    the world resources, dollars, what is required to execute that
    strategy, you will not find that word.
        So, I think for policymakers and elected officials, your
    challenge is to figure out what is exactly required to realize
    the significant objectives of that defense strategy. That is
    where I think the Commission historically has been helpful, and
    I think we will do so again. I think the simultaneity question
    that came up earlier, Senator, would be a second, I point to.
        It is quite different than 2017 where we didn't see as
    clearly and didn't have as much evidence of this Russia, China
    axis. It is live, it is real, and we need to think through
    that.
        Nuclear weapons cannot be the only answer, nor can some
    kind of vague reference to allies. It needs to have meaning.
    AUKUS is a good step, but that should be one of many examples
    which right now we don't have.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Continuing on, last year you told
    this committee that a strategy of deterrence by denial is a
    sound approach to keep China from invading Taiwan. Do you
    maintain that position? If so, what is your current assessment
    of our posture in the Indo-Pacific? Should we, for example,
    invest more heavily or move faster in specific areas?
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes, I do think the denial approach,
    deterrence by denial is still sound, although as mentioned
    earlier in this hearing, some of the key elements, particularly
    undersea warfare capability, fast boats, submarines are just
    not being produced at a clip that will realize that--you know,
    the deterrence by denial.
        I think this committee and this Administration previous
    mission has done a good job investing in some of the
    capabilities, missiles, anti-ship missiles. Long range
    precision munitions are key for that fight that was less
    apparent or we hadn't addressed that sufficiently the last go
    around.
        So, I think those would be two areas where we need to
    emphasize really that are critical to accomplishing the
    deterrence by denial strategy. Last point on that, Senator, I
    would also say that we have to continue to focus on balancing.
        Whereas Taiwan might be the most apparent and clearest
    flash point, the Indo-Pacific has other challenges. China has
    other ambitions in their global nature, as we see most recently
    in terms of China invading our aerospace.
        Senator Budd. So, Mr. Zakheim, much has been made about
    potential timelines for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but
    predicting when might make war seem inevitable, an invasion
    seems inevitable. So, what are the near and long term risks of
    deterrence failing without significant and sustained growth of
    our defense budget?
        Mr. Zakheim. Well, I take the view here that this strategy,
    which is a bipartisan strategy between the Biden and Trump
    administration, wants to deter for today. It recognizes the so-
    called Davidson window as a real possibility, and we have to
    deter and operate with the urgency that it could happen today.
        That is the best way to push it out to tomorrow, and with
    tomorrow, we need to continue to make those investments where
    we have the modernized force that China is clearly investing
    in.
        I think one thing this committee has done well, we know
    about the Chinese military modernization because this committee
    requires an annual China military modernization report. We
    learn a lot and we educate the public around it.
        As much as we are concerned about what China is doing with
    their signal fusion, just focusing on their core military
    modernization has revealed what a significant challenge we are
    facing today.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Many Americans, some would say a
    majority of Americans, support Ukraine, including the
    reclaiming of territory taken by Russia. A growing number of
    Americans, however, are rightly concerned in the U.S.--that the
    U.S. is providing too much aid, particularly in comparison to
    our European allies.
        So, in my limited time, Dr. Hill, given that the United
    States is no longer resourced to fight two major wars
    simultaneously, we must consider real tradeoffs between
    continuing to arm Ukraine or being ready to deter, or if
    necessary, defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
        Where and how should the United States encourage our
    European allies to step up so we can free up resources to focus
    on the priority theater in the Indo-Pacific?
        Dr. Hill. Thank you, Senator. But I actually think that
    Russia and China are fused together in this regard. We all
    forget that Russia is actually in Asia, and as a Asia-Pacific
    power, it actually has a long border with China. In fact, the
    longest border that Russia has in any country is with China.
        Russia has benefited from China's assistance and
    facilitation of this war, including moving its own troops from
    the Russian Far East to the front in Ukraine. So, China and
    Russia are part of the same problem, unfortunately. I do agree
    with you that we need to work very closely with our European
    allies.
        We also have European allies who are interested in the
    Asia-Pacific region, the AUKUS alignment, for example, includes
    the United Kingdom. We have unfortunately got into a bit of a
    spat with France over that, but I think we can recover from
    this.
        We need to think about our other European allies that are
    major maritime powers, which France and the United Kingdom
    actually are. But I do think we need to recognize that
    Europeans are stepping up on the front in Ukraine. We may also
    have to ask Europe what it is prepared to do in the Indo-
    Pacific region as well, because they have interest.
        Senator Budd. Very good. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Rosen,
    please.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Wicker, for holding this very timely hearing on global
    security challenges, which comes ahead of the unfortunately,
    the 1-year anniversary of Vladimir Putin's brutal and
    unjustified invasion of Ukraine. As Russia and Ukraine, of
    course, we know they are both preparing for spring counter
    offensives because of the weather there.
        It is absolutely critical, I believe, that the United
    States and our allies stand with Ukraine for as long as it
    takes to help the Ukrainian people win. So, Dr. Hill, I want to
    build on a question that Senator Manchin asked you. If Ukraine
    were to undertake a military operation in Crimea, which was
    illegally annexed by Russia in 2014, how could the United
    States and NATO allies deter Russian escalation short of a
    direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia?
        Dr. Hill. Well, first of all, Senator Rosen, thank you very
    much for this question, but there is a lot of territory between
    the Ukrainian front lines and Crimea at this particular point.
    The Ukrainians have been able to penetrate into the airspace
    over Crimea using drones and the long-range missiles.
        We have seen some of this happen. But in actual fact, what
    Putin is trying to do is consolidate all the territory around
    Crimea to keep it. In fact, what Mr. Zakheim was already
    talking about, which is the military battle in the Donbass
    region, in Zaporizhzhia region, Kherson is pretty important.
        So, we have got to look at that before Crimea comes onto
    the agenda. Now, there is a case, and I think that we have to
    be discussing this with the Ukrainians, behind the scenes about
    what to do when it comes to the issue of Crimea over the longer
    term. Russia has claimed all of this territory, not just
    Crimea. We have to figure out how are we going to push those
    claims back.
        It is not just a question of how far we can push Ukrainian
    territory forward again in this battle, but what are we going
    to do about that territory over the longer term? The Ukrainians
    were willing to discuss some of the formulations
    internationally prior to all of the atrocities that have been
    carried out here.
        I think we have to have an international level discussion
    in the United Nations of how to handle this. It is unacceptable
    at any point for Russia to have any kind of political control
    and claims of sovereignty over Ukrainian territory. So, it is
    not just a question of what happens when Ukraine tries to
    retake territory, but how are we going to handle this over the
    longer term.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, and I kind of want to build
    on that because we know that we are trying to add Finland and
    Sweden. Their NATO ascension is really going to bolster our
    alliance, of course, in significant ways. We all know that.
        So, what do you think the advantages, comparative
    advantages, or the challenges that we might have bringing them
    into the alliance. Will that help us? How will that help us in
    some of the things that we are trying to do as well?
        Dr. Hill. Well, look, Finland and Sweden have made a
    strategic decision to join NATO. They could have gone to any
    point since World War II, since the creation of NATO, and they
    did not. Finland has a very long border with Russia. It was
    attacked by the Soviet Union in the 1930's, 1940's.
        Finland has actually got an incredibly important defensive
    posture. They can put up to 800,000 people under arms. So,
    Finland is determined to defend itself and is also making it
    very clear that it wants to be part of the defense of Europe,
    so this is very significant. Sweden was completely neutral up
    until this point. This is a huge rupture in the strategic
    posture of Sweden.
        Sweden is also making it clear that it intends to defend
    Europe writ large, too. This puts on the agenda a whole
    rethinking of our European security posture. This isn't just
    something that the United States has to step up to, Sweden and
    Finland are stepping up as well.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to build on that in a
    minute or so I have left. Dr. Lin, I want to talk with you a
    little bit about mainly maintaining our defense technological
    edge. Global competition, we have declining R&D, we have
    contracting challenges, we have a huge STEM workforce gap,
    huge.
        There are just a few of the impediments that we have to
    growing at the edge with our adversaries. We see them all
    around. We have been talking about this today, particularly
    China, and that is a pacing challenge for us.
        How, in your opinion, do you assess the United States'
    ability to develop, to adopt, to deploy these emerging
    technologies for national security, and particularly as
    compared to China, which we know is really moving forward
    pretty quickly?
        Dr. Lin. I guess I will separate the development of
    technology into two aspects. One is developing of the talent,
    which I think China is able to do much faster because they have
    more of the STEM education, because they are able to redirect
    education in certain ways that we and the United States
    Government are not--don't have the same authoritarian powers to
    do.
        I would say that when it actually comes to the fielding and
    ability to operate these emerging technology, that is where,
    and this goes back to our discussion earlier, the personnel and
    the training within the PLA is far lacking than the United
    States. So, we can see a lot of, for example, new weapon
    systems online, but that doesn't mean that China's actually
    able to operate these new weapons systems.
        I would say that I wouldn't characterize the United States
    as necessarily lagging behind the Chinese. I would say we have
    different advantages in terms of we have the personnel and we
    are able to incorporate the technologies, but China--I am
    sorry, on the military side.
        But China is able to invest more and is also able to have
    more--they have also more STEM graduates to help try to develop
    that technology to begin with.
        Senator Rosen. So, you would say going broad and deep in
    STEM education, starting as early as possible, pre-K all the
    way through to develop the pipeline would be in our critical
    best interest.
        Dr. Lin. Yes, for sure.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Sullivan,
    please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    unfortunately, my colleague from Virginia is not here. Had I
    had 10 minutes to raise an issue, I would have asked you guys,
    a previous Democratic administration, the Obama administration
    wouldn't give the Ukrainians javelins because they were scared
    about sparking a war with Putin. The next Administration, the
    Trump administration, immediately gave javelins.
        Previous Democratic administration, the Obama
    administration declared a red line in Syria, then watched
    everybody walk over it, invited the Russians into the Middle
    East for the first time in decades, and the next Administration
    declared a red line in Syria with Russian proxies saying if
    they get any closer to our special forces, we will destroy
    them. Then we destroyed them. Hundreds of them, killed them.
        So, there is a lot of comparisons here, and I just want my
    colleagues to know, but I don't have 10 minutes. I am going to
    turn to another topic that is all about American strategy and
    that is energy. I am glad to see Senator Manchin, Senator
    Mullin have raised this.
        A very memorable meeting I had many years ago with our
    former chairman here, Senator McCain, and a Russian dissident,
    very brave Russian dissident who is now in jail, Vladimir Kara-
    Murza, I had asked him, what more can we do to undermine the
    Putin regime?
        What more can we do to go after Putin and the oligarchs? He
    said it is easy, Senator. The number one thing you can do as a
    country is produce more American energy, number one. Do you
    agree with that, Dr. Hill, Mr. Zakheim?
        If you can keep your answers short, I have a bunch of
    questions. American energy as a really important tool of
    American power to deal with great powers like Russia and China.
        Dr. Hill. Well, I would say yes, writ large, together with
    our allies and rethinking also our energy posture, absolutely.
        Mr. Zakheim. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Dr. Lin, someone else who is
    very scared of American energy dominance is Xi Jinping. You
    read the reporting, it makes him very nervous. I was just in
    the Middle East, 60 percent of China's oil and gas goes through
    the Straits of Hormuz. If we are in a conflict with them, we
    could shut that down in 10 minutes.
        Does American--is American energy dominance important for
    us, all the above oil, gas, renewables, whatever, but certainly
    oil and gas, is that important for our competition with China?
    Is that something we should emphasize?
        Dr. Lin. Absolutely, and China imports about 70 percent of
    its oil, so it is a huge dependency that China needs to work
    around.
        Senator Sullivan. So, they are scared when they look at
    American energy dominance, is that correct?
        Dr. Lin. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. We haven't
    done American energy dominance. We haven't produced more
    American energy. To the contrary, when this Administration came
    into office, they did three things. They immediately started
    shutting down their production of American energy. They
    immediately started shutting down American energy
    infrastructure.
        They immediately started pressuring American financial
    institutions not to invest in American energy, and then when
    the prices of energy went up on working families, they went
    overseas. President bended knee to the king of Saudi Arabia,
    begging for more oil, lifting sanctions on Venezuela, a
    terrorist regime to get more oil, and they make it harder to
    produce American energy here.
        Let me ask you this question, assume that there was a
    project in America, $9 billion investment, 200,000 barrels a
    day, 2,500 jobs to build it, 75 percent of which are union,
    lowest greenhouse gas emissions in the world, highest
    environmental standards in the world of any energy project.
        From a national security perspective, if that was in front
    of you right now, would you say approve it or would you say,
    no, keep begging from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela? What would
    you do, Dr. Lin? Will you approve a project like that?
        Dr. Lin. I would approve it, but I would also continue to
    strengthen our relations with Saudis and many of our partners.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree 100 percent, but not Venezuela,
    right?
        Dr. Lin. No, not Venezuela.
        Senator Sullivan. You don't need to go begging from them.
    Dr. Hill, would you approve a project like that, from a
    national security perspective. That is all I ask.
        Dr. Hill. From a national security perspective, absolutely,
    but we also need to look at the domestic versus the export
    potential.
        Senator Sullivan. Correct.
        Dr. Hill. Because I think what we have got--what we are
    talking about here is how much energy that the United States
    can also export in our own----
        Senator Sullivan. But 200,000 barrels a day, that gives us
    muscle, right, from America----
        Dr. Hill. Certainly, in the short to medium term it does.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, absolutely. Dr. Zakheim, what about
    you?
        Mr. Zakheim. I agree.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, thank you. Now, final question.
    Assume we had a senior Administration official who goes to
    Asia, who cautions our allies in Asia not to purchase clean
    burning American LNG and then tells these same Asian allies
    don't help some of the other countries, ASEAN countries, for
    example, transition from coal to gas, make them transition from
    coal to wind turbines. Would that be smart American foreign
    policy, diplomatic policy as it relates to Asia and building
    our alliances? Does that make sense to any of you?
        Dr. Hill. There is one element and----
        Senator Sullivan. Well just real quick because I am out of
    time, but----
        Dr. Hill. No, no, but the point is that China is making
    huge inroads on renewables and on in a green energy use,
    including on constructing turbines. So it wouldn't necessarily
    be the wrong thing to do, if we can also have the technology
    that----
        Senator Sullivan. China is building a coal plant a week,
    and in ASEAN, they want to build more coal plants. We have
    John, I am naming John Kerry, if you haven't noticed. Does that
    make sense for John Kerry to go to Asia and warn our allies not
    to buy American LNG and tell the ASEAN countries you can't go
    from coal to gas, you have got to go from coal to windmill,
    which no industrialized country has ever done. Dr. Lin, does
    that make any sense?
        Dr. Lin. So I think one of the concerns that countries
    particularly in ASEAN but also in Pacific Island have is about
    climate change and how that affects their national security. So
    I don't know is, what Secretary Kerry was thinking behind that.
    But I think from a U.S. perspective, it makes sense to
    encourage our allies and partners to buy American.
        Senator Sullivan. To buy American LNG. Dr. Zakheim.
        Mr. Zakheim. I associate with Dr. Lin.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I am going to
    recognize Senator Duckworth and ask Senator Warren to take over
    as I go vote. I shall return. Someone said that once. Excuse
    me.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the
    panel. I want to pick up on a thread from earlier in the
    conversation and discuss why I find the CCP's actions across
    the Indo-Pacific, from the Mekong River to the South China Sea
    to the Pacific island nations, so incredibly troubling.
        It is no secret that the CCP is using economic coercion and
    expanding its diplomatic presence in this key area of the
    world. Reality dictates that countries in this region cannot
    simply ignore China's presence and proximity.
        Yet I still hear from our allies and partners about how the
    United States remains a strong partner of choice, and even
    those who are not yet allies and partners. I sat down and had a
    meeting with the prime minister of Cambodia, and he said he
    wanted to engage with the United States as a partner when it
    comes economically--to economic engagement. Which brings me to
    my first question.
        Dr. Lin, it is lovely to see you again, and I appreciated
    your insights when I was preparing for my travel to Taiwan last
    year, and I look forward to hearing more of your thoughts as I
    plan another trip to the region. Your testimony highlighted how
    our Nation's alliances and partnerships are a critical
    advantage over the PRC, and I couldn't agree more.
        That is why I am leading a CODEL next week to Indonesia and
    Japan to discuss a wide range of issues, including energy
    security and the role that biofuels can play in reducing our
    reliance on fossil fuels. Facilitating greater economic
    engagement among friendly nations or those who would like to
    become more friendly.
        The importance of expanding people to people academic
    exchanges, including those that have brought many Indonesians
    to study in Illinois. I will also engage both countries on
    bolstering multilateral organizations like ASEAN.
        Dr. Lin, how do you see the role of multilateral
    partnerships and agreements in countering malign CCP activity?
    How can the United States best show support for all of our
    Southeast Asian partners with our relationships with them, but
    also encouraging other partners like Taiwan to engage with our
    Southeast Asian partners? Thank you.
        Dr. Lin. Senator Duckworth, great to see you, too. I am
    really heartened that you are taking another trip to the
    region, because part of what we need to do from the United
    States, not only the Biden administration, but also through our
    Congress, is to have more visits to the region.
        Our own presence there to the region reassures our allies
    and partners, and also showcases that we care and are listening
    to them to what they are most concerned with. With respect to
    multilateral organizations, we are already doing quite a bit in
    this area, and I would point out for Indonesia, what is
    particularly valuable is the recent Indonesian agreement with
    Vietnam to settle their disagreements over the EEZ, and that
    settlement is a model that should be emulated, or that we
    should support other Southeast Asian countries to do because it
    shows that we can, or rather United States and other partners
    can settle disputes peacefully in the South China Sea.
        That is a clear pushback against China's claims in the
    South China Sea, the nine dash line claims. As from Japan, I
    would recommend that given all the major shifts that were
    happening, that we are seeing since this December in terms of
    Japan's national defense strategy and whatnot, your trip comes
    at a very pivotal point to really understand what direction
    Japan is taking.
        We had discussed earlier that Japan is likely one of the
    few countries that Taiwan can probably depend on more among
    United States allies for its defense.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and you touched on this. I
    think that there are current cooperation agreements that we can
    expand upon, and there are new partnerships we should pursue to
    ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
        I also think we need to look at what is happening in
    Europe, specifically the war of choice in Ukraine. So my next
    question, Dr. Lin--to both, Dr. Lin and Dr. Hill, building on
    what Dr. Lin was just talking about, with working with our
    Asian partners to expand more of these partnerships and
    agreements.
        With only a few exceptions, many countries in Southeast
    Asia have not joined in sanctioning Russia following the
    invasion of Ukraine, and many of them are watching what is
    happening in Russia and gaining a different lessons learned for
    what that means for them, whether it is Taiwan, whether it is
    for freedom of navigation in the South--in the Indo-Pacific
    region.
        What message or actions help convince our non-European
    allies and partners to condemn Russian action? Conversely, what
    message in action resonate with European allies and partners as
    a counter to CCP malign activity? How do we get more of our
    engagement with Europe, and to get our European partners to
    understand that the Indo-Pacific region is important to them
    too?
        Dr. Lin. Right. So in terms of getting more Asian allies
    and partners on board to sanction Russia, I think part of it is
    also trying to understand what is holding them back. Is it
    because they are very dependent on Russian arms? Is it because
    they are dependent on certain types of trade with villagers?
        Or to the extent that we can decrease their dependency on
    Russia? I think that is a way in which we could shift their
    perspective because there's something holding them back. I
    think most guys you recognize that Russia's invasion of Ukraine
    is a clear atrocity and something that they oppose, but it is
    getting them to the sanctions that we need to work on.
        Senator Duckworth. Dr. Hill.
        Dr. Hill. I agree completely with Dr. Lin. I think, you
    know, part of the issue that we face, not just in Southeast
    Asia but elsewhere, is a lot of countries are values neutral
    when they look at this.
        So we have to clarify what is at risk. It is not autocracy
    versus democracy because they can constantly challenge us. It
    is really the violation of territorial integrity. So when Dr.
    Lin was talking about the importance of those helping Indonesia
    and Vietnam to work out their territorial disputes, this is
    what we have to clarify for countries in other regions.
    European countries are stepping up to try to make this point
    too.
        It is the point that Finland and Sweden are making as they
    seek to join NATO. Poland, the Baltic states, other countries
    are expressing their deep concern, and that this is also a
    problem in the Indo-Pacific region.
        India, for example, is a really important country to engage
    on this, and I hope that Members of this Committee will think
    about going to India. I know you already have had meetings with
    Indian officials, because India faces territorial disputes, not
    just with Pakistan, but also with China in the Himalayas.
        India is wondering what are we going to do in the event of
    another outbreak of conflict there, for example, just as other
    countries around Asia wondering what our posture is going to be
    on these issues? That's what we have to clarify.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. Senator Schmitt is recognized.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would say that I
    am very proud to be on this committee. This committee in
    Missouri has had a long history of service on this committee
    and look forward to working with all my fellow committee
    members.
        As you know, there has been a lot of discussion of China,
    and rightfully so. As part of their ambition to project power
    across the world, they have been more aggressive in building
    military bases and partnerships with countries like Sri Lanka
    and the Solomon Islands and Cambodia.
        A lot of Chinese firms now own and operate assets in 96
    ports in 53 countries, all of which can be used to establish
    logistics and intelligence networks in strategic locations,
    enabling China to project its power globally.
        This network poses significant threat to the United States
    and our allies, there is no doubt about that, particularly if
    China can cutoff access that our military needs during
    difficult times or times of conflict.
        I guess Mr. Zakheim, maybe direct this to you initially
    because they don't have a ton of time. I want to get through at
    least a couple of questions. What specific actions should the
    Department of Defense undertake to ensure that China does not
    gain further access to ports throughout the world, especially
    in the South China Sea?
        Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator. I think the critical thing
    for the Department of Defense or other pieces for government to
    deal with China's reach globally in the ways you have described
    is that we need to push out our logistics capability.
        The notion that somehow, we are going to rely on shipping
    or transport aircraft to deliver forces, material to the
    battlefield like we did in the last century is not going to
    happen. That is why I think you see some of these memos coming
    out for those military leaders focused on pre-positioning, on
    the TRANSCOM type issues are most concerned because it is about
    getting there first with speed and making sure the kill chain
    is not reliant on pulling back the capability, you know, an
    ocean plus away.
        Senator Schmitt. Then, while we are talking about China,
    which I certainly believe is our biggest threat, what do they
    believe is their biggest weakness in a potential conflict with
    a foreign adversary, particularly the United States? How do
    they view that?
        Mr. Zakheim. I continue to believe, and I defer to Dr. Lin
    here and her studies of this as well, is that our undersea
    capability is something that I think spooks them. That is the
    one I would start with. It is why think we need to double down
    on it. They don't have the answer.
        The quicker we can move from manned to unmanned, as well as
    sustaining the current man capability is our comparative
    advantage, and we should be investing that in a significant,
    urgent, speedy fashion.
        Dr. Lin. Senator, I think one of--the Chinese don't say
    this quite easily. I think one of their biggest weaknesses that
    they see is actually their personnel because they don't do it--
    unlike the United States, where we have had significant
    experience fighting different types of wars, they have had very
    limited fighting experience.
        Even though they have the equipment, there is no guarantee
    that transitioning from even a large-scale exercise to a minor
    conflict, they would be successful, much less a very high end
    contingency, one of the most complex operations we can think
    about in terms of the Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
        Senator Schmitt. I will just open this up to all three of
    you for probably the last question that I have time for, but
    you have all spoken about threats of foreign actors, especially
    in Western Asia.
        One concern that I have is that we remain focused on
    obviously, those important threats, but may ignore threats
    closer to home, to our own borders. What actions should the
    department take to protect our national interests in the
    Western Hemisphere, specifically the Southern border and in the
    Panama Canal Zone?
        By the way, how should we engage South--Central and South
    America in some of these efforts?
        Dr. Hill. Yes. I mean, this obviously picks up on the
    question that Senator Kaine raised, and I analyze the problem
    that actually, Mr. Zakheim came up with a few solutions here in
    terms of our relationships with some of those critical
    countries.
        I think we need to assess the strength of our relationships
    with our Western Hemisphere allies, thinking about how we can
    capitalize on the recent Presidential visit to Brazil and how
    Brazil can play a larger role not just in the region, but
    internationally because of its role in the BRICS.
        Our relationship with China and Russia and India. Thinking
    about our relations with Mexico, that helps that relationship
    overall, not just as Mexico a problem, but how this can be
    strengthened as an alliance and as a relationship going
    forward.
        I think we need to have a whole scale assessment of the
    nature of our military, diplomatic trade, as Mr. Zakheim,
    relationships, said, and be paying particular attention to
    those countries where China and also Russia have penetrated in
    terms of their military or intelligence investments, for
    example.
        Mr. Zakheim. I will just add, Senator, that Plan Colombia
    was a great success. I think what I have read and the
    conversation that is at risk, that is a model that needs to be
    replicated and we need to strengthen it in Colombia. That is
    coming out the military security cooperation plane, and I think
    it would have the effects that you rightfully point out we need
    in the Western Hemisphere.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Let me recognize Senator
    Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we often talk
    about the role of aircraft carriers and hypersonic weapons,
    excuse me, in the great power competition, but I would like to
    zero in on what people bring to the fight, specifically, our
    military personnel. Leaders in the People's Republic of China
    have repeatedly raised concerns that they lack personnel who
    are both capable and highly skilled for modern warfare.
        A report for the United States-China Economic and Security
    Review Commission found that, ``many People's Liberation Army
    commanders are still judged as incapable of properly assessing
    situations, making operational decisions, deploying forces or
    leading forces.'' We don't want to underestimate China's
    capabilities, but that is a pretty sorry State of affairs.
        Dr. Lin, you are an expert on China and you were the Senior
    Advisor advising the Department of Defense in both the Obama
    and Trump administrations. So tell me, Dr. Lin, how important
    are personnel in winning on the battlefield?
        Dr. Lin. Thank you, Senator Warren. Personal is absolutely
    important. As you indicated and as I mentioned earlier to
    Senator Schmitt, I think that is one of the major weaknesses
    that the Chinese assess to be within their PLA.
        They aren't worried about whether they can get another, for
    example, Dongfeng-41 missile or another submarine. They are
    worried about whether their personnel can perform. So it is
    absolutely critical.
        Senator Warren. Okay. People, people, people. But after
    years of having forces that have little more than a 9th grade
    education, PRC is now starting to attract significantly more
    educated recruits. Dr. Lin, how successful has the PLA been at
    retaining more skilled troops?
        Dr. Lin. So you are correct in saying that China, the PLA
    is attracting more educated PLA recruits, but I am not--we
    don't really have really good statistics on how they are in
    terms of retaining them. But I would say that the respect for
    the PLA broadly in China is nowhere close to the respect for
    the United States military in the United States.
        Senator Warren. It is an interesting point on this, because
    unlike the Chinese government, we actually care about our
    people. Still we have our own recruiting and retention
    challenges here at home. For example, U.S. military families
    living in unsafe housing or struggling to access health care
    that they need.
        I am looking forward to working on the personnel
    subcommittee with Senator Scott to tackle these problems. Dr.
    Lin, if the United States substantially disinvested in the
    programs we have to support our military workforce, things like
    access to child care and violence prevention programs, would
    that help us or hurt us in our effort to maintain a competitive
    advantage over China when it comes to the quality of our
    personnel?
        Dr. Lin. I think it would definitely hurt us. Having worked
    with many military officers, I know how difficult it is to be
    able to sacrifice for the Nation while also taking care of
    needs at home. So without that, without the U.S. Government
    helping them with their child care, the home portion, I think
    it makes their day jobs much more difficult.
        Senator Warren. Good, and I see our other witnesses both
    nodding yes as well. Do I take it you both agreed on this?
        Dr. Hill. We certainly do, and look, we can see the
    performance of the Russian military at this moment is a case in
    point, a country that does not care about the quality of its
    personnel, only the quantity that can be thrown at the
    battlefield. All of the issues that you have just raised are
    one of the reasons why Russia has not been performing as we
    might have expected.
        Senator Warren. You know--go ahead, Mr. Zakheim.
        Mr. Zakheim. I completely agree, Senator Warren. One of the
    things this committee does annually when they report out the
    defense authorization bill, what it has done for the men and
    women in uniform, I think that is the example and why we are
    able to realize these benefits.
        Senator Warren. Yes. I raised this today in this context
    because some Republicans want to cut programs that support our
    troops and our military families. They talk about fiscal
    responsibility, but I see two big problems.
        First, anyone who is using a debate over the Nation's debt
    limit to crash our economy in order to extract massive spending
    cuts is being reckless, not responsible. Second, make no
    mistake, the same folks who claim to care about the size of the
    Pentagon budget will continue to get a blank check for weapons
    programs that go to billions of dollars of cost and not to our
    personnel.
        The Pentagon funding these Republicans want to cut is the
    part that goes to safe housing and medical care for our troops.
    I get it. There is plenty of waste to cut in the Pentagon's
    budget, but programs that support our troops and inspire them
    to continue to put their lives on the line for our country
    aren't waste. They protect our greatest strength as a Nation,
    our people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Wicker,
    you have additional questions, please.
        Senator Wicker. Right. I am going to take a short second
    round. You have all been extremely helpful and it has been a
    very informative but long two and a half hours for you, and I
    know you are anxious to get up. In terms of--Mr. Zakheim, in
    terms of our stake as American families in the Ukraine
    conflict.
        We have heard arguments, this is an assault on the global
    rules based order, that Russia has violated the U.N. chapter.
    It is a violation of international law. In addition, there is
    the 1994 agreement that the United States made when Ukraine
    gave up their nuclear weapons. There are going to be a lot of
    families who say, that is not enough for me. I am trying to get
    my kids ready for college.
        My spouse and I both work. I am furious about the border.
    Inflation is killing me. Why should any--why should my tax
    dollars--that doesn't affect me and my family where I live,
    that we are so interested in in Ukraine defeating Russia in
    this. What is our stake?
        Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I think the
    response is let's not be pennywise and pound foolish. Ukraine
    winning means that we do not have a broader armed conflict in
    Europe. History is clear, the cost to America with a war on the
    continent could be so consequential, it takes over the entire
    country in the form of some world war like effort.
        That is the difference, in my judgment, between allowing
    Vladimir Putin and his revanchist ambitions to have whatever
    they want in Europe versus not putting a single United States
    boot on the ground, investing in the Ukrainians along with our
    allies, to allow them to do essentially our work for us, that
    is to defeat an adversary.
        Senator Wicker. So it is going to save that family tax
    money down the road?
        Mr. Zakheim. Potentially lives, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Dr. Hill.
        Dr. Hill. I agree completely with Mr. Zakheim about this as
    well, and Senator Cotton, while he was opening up for his
    question, invoked Winston Churchill. This August buddy had
    debates about whether the United States should continue to
    support the United Kingdom before the United States entry into
    World War II back in the period from 1939 to 1941, in fact.
        Senator Wicker. Indeed, it was controversial.
        Dr. Hill. Exactly. So I think it is the same kind of debate
    about the knock on effects for all of us, and just one issue
    about the borders. The kinds of attacks that Russia has made on
    another country and its borders lead to more refugees and
    migrants. We have seen that.
        In fact, we do have Russians, Ukrainians, and others coming
    over the Southern border who have taken roundabout routes to
    get here. We are now going to face on a global scale more of
    these kinds of violations. We have got a massive refugee and
    migration problem across the entire globe. Climate change is
    going to exacerbate this. We are going to be dealing with
    problems on the border from----
        Senator Wicker. I have to hurry. Mr. Zakheim, you make a
    point that one of the worst wastes of money being pound foolish
    is a CR, a continuing resolution. Would you explain why that
    is?
        Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, and thank you for giving a chance.
    I didn't get to your reform question earlier. This Congress is
    all about how you deal with waste and inefficiency in
    Department of Defense enterprise of $100 billion with the
    Congress year over year.
        I know this is not the choice of this committee, but going
    on a CR, not allowing that the budget that the Department of
    Defense has requested to be executed, and forcing them, boxing
    them in their previous year's request, it raises inefficiency
    where you are spending money, authorize and appropriated funds
    in things that the Congress doesn't want them to spend on, the
    Department of Defense doesn't want them to spend on, all
    because of this larger context has happened for decades, year
    over year.
        The exception is when we don't have a CR and it translates
    into tens of billions of dollars annually of inefficient
    spending of taxpayer money, sir.
        Senator Wicker. One other thing. It seems to me the Russian
    offensive of this late winter has bogged down and is not likely
    to succeed any further. Would you comment on that?
        Mr. Zakheim. I think that is still a question. It is
    certainly hasn't proceeded at the pace that Vladimir Putin
    would have liked, but as Dr. Hill and others pointed out, Putin
    keeps on putting people, personnel, and capability forward.
        What the Ukrainians need is the ability to strike through
    it and attack it from the rear, if I understand from military
    professionals, and they don't have that capability right now.
    It risks allowing the Russians to advance inch by inch, foot by
    foot. Vladimir Putin has the patience, so far, the ability, to
    do just that.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I want to thank
    the panel for an excellent hearing and presentation and commend
    you for your work. Thank you very, very much. With that, let me
    call this hearing to be adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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