[Senate Hearing 118-604]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-604
PROMOTING SAFETY, INNOVATION,
AND COMPETITIVENESS IN U.S.
COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACE ACTIVITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 18, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-861 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona, Chair ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri, Ranking
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
GARY PETERS, Michigan J. D. VANCE, Ohio
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 18, 2023................................. 1
Statement of Senator Sinema...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 3
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 44
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 48
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 49
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 51
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Witnesses
Caryn Schenewerk, President, CS Consulting, LLC.................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Brigadier General (USAF ret) Wayne Monteith, Former FAA Associate
Administrator, Office of Commercial Space Transportation....... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Sirisha Bandla, Vice President of Government Affairs and
Research, Virgin Galactic...................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
William H. Gerstenmaier, Vice President, Build & Flight
Reliability, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX)..... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Phil Joyce, Senior Vice President, New Shepard Business Unit,
Blue Origin.................................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Appendix
Response to written questions to Caryn Schenewerk submitted by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 59
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 60
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 62
Hon. J. D. Vance............................................. 65
Response to written questions submitted to Wayne Monteith by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 68
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 69
Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 70
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 70
Hon. J. D. Vance............................................. 73
Response to written questions to Sirisha Bandla submitted by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 75
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 77
Hon. J. D. Vance............................................. 78
Response to written questions submitted to William H.
Gerstenmaier by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 80
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 82
Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 82
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 83
Hon. J. D. Vance............................................. 86
Response to written questions submitted to Phil Joyce by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 88
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 90
Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 91
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 91
Hon. J. D. Vance............................................. 94
PROMOTING SAFETY, INNOVATION,
AND COMPETITIVENESS IN U.S.
COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACE ACTIVITIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Space and Science,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Kyrsten
Sinema, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Sinema [presiding], Cantwell, Peters,
Lujan, Hickenlooper, Schmitt, and Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Sinema. This subcommittee is now in order. Welcome,
everyone, to our hearing of the U.S. Senate Space and Science
Subcommittee. Thank you to each of our witnesses for their
participation today.
Thanks to Subcommittee Ranking Member Schmitt for working
with me on these issues, and to Chair Cantwell and Ranking
Member Cruz for their collaboration. Today's hearing comes at a
critical time for the commercial space industry. Bold,
flexible, bipartisan policies have fostered U.S. commercial
space from its infancy to the world's gold standard of today.
It is not a coincidence that the United States is about the
only country where private companies are engaged in human
spaceflight and the world leader in space innovation and
development.
Continued American leadership depends on a robust private
sector. Space innovation is no longer the exclusive domain of
the Government. As private companies bring private citizens to
space, we can see the immense potential of commercial human
spaceflight.
Commercial space activities can now go from theoretical to
very real at lightning speed. Commercial space companies right
now employ thousands of Americans, have nationwide supply
chains, and leverage the already immense economic impact of
Government space operations.
America's private space efforts are all the more critical,
with increasing global investments in space, including from
foreign competitors and adversaries like Russia and China. My
home State of Arizona continues its space leadership with
significant commercial space investment.
Virgin Galactic's massive manufacturing complex in Mesa is
set to be operational next year, and I am looking forward to
seeing the new Delta fleet roll out in time for 2025 flight
testing. That means meaningful careers for Arizonans and a
tremendous boost to the local economy.
Earlier this year, Blue Origin opened a 43,000 square foot
office in Phoenix, taking advantage of the region's excellent
engineering talent to further its avionics systems engineering
and supply chain management, and I am sure the breathtaking
mountain views don't hurt.
Along with hundreds of employees, Blue Origin is also
investing hundreds of millions of dollars in local Arizona
firms to support all of its programs, including commercial
human spaceflight. These investments follow recent large scale
expansions of existing facilities by Northrop Grumman and
Boeing.
My alma mater, Arizona State University, launched New
Space, an unprecedented collaboration effort integrating
academic and commercial space enterprises. Now, SpaceX may not
yet have Arizona facilities, but it did successfully launch the
ASU led Psyche spacecraft on one of its Falcon heavy rockets
just last Friday, and all of this investment benefits from
public space projects.
In Arizona alone, NASA accounted for over $700 million and
over 3,800 jobs in 2021. Progress in commercial space finds us
at the dawn of a new space age. Much of the industry,
particularly human spaceflight, is just now entering phases of
rapid development.
Commercial human spaceflight did not become a regular
occurrence until the last few years, and I am glad to have all
three private companies currently flying humans into space here
today so we can hear how the Government can help boost and
safeguard your operations.
Congress finds itself with a unique opportunity to help
grow an industry with vast potential and important
responsibility to do so carefully. We must maintain U.S.
leadership by ensuring our space industry retains the freedom
to innovate without compromising safety.
We must draw on prior experience and take the same
enterprising, pioneering approach to commercial space that has
served us so well in earlier generations. We need to streamline
authorization processes, enable a workable safety framework for
in-space operations, and clearly define proper responsibilities
for Government agencies in commercial space.
I believe this requires a flexible regulatory environment
able to attack the issues of today head on without compromising
adaptability for the issues of tomorrow. We must address the
learning period, mission authorization, and other pressing
matters in a way that looks ahead to the future with unknown
capabilities.
To do this, we need to account for the diversity of
operations in commercial space and the human spaceflight
industry. Our three industry representatives today show how
there is no singular approach to human spaceflight. Laws and
regulations must account for diversity without sacrificing
efficiency.
To maintain our leadership and competitiveness in the
growing commercial space economy, we will also need a strong
workforce to support it. I am passionate about making sure that
Americans and Arizonans have rewarding careers to choose from
when graduating either from a certificate program, vocational
school, or with advanced degrees.
Encouraging public, private partnerships and leveraging
existing expertise of entities like NASA will be critical.
Regulators must also be given proper resources to keep pace
with growing industry. We cannot expect any regulatory
framework to function without the necessary expertise to
oversee such a complex industry.
So, thank you. And I will now turn to Ranking Member
Shitt--Schmitt for this opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
[Laughter.]
Senator Schmitt. It is not the first time that has
happened.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sinema. It is actually----
Senator Schmitt. It is the first time here.
Senator Sinema. It is actually not the first time today.
[Laughter.]
Senator Schmitt. You are right. I have been called worse.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sinema. You are recognized.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to
the witnesses for joining us here today. My home State of
Missouri has helped chart the path of human exploration.
As the gateway to the West, Lewis and Clark set out from
Saint Charles, Missouri, at the confluence of the Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers to further our Nation's Westward expansion
to the Pacific Ocean.
Additionally, Marshfield, Missouri's native son Edwin
Hubble, proved that there were galaxies beyond the Milky Way,
offering new realms of discovery. America's drive for exploring
the unknown has always been a unifying force for our country,
and our Nation has and always should be at the forefront of
exploration, period.
Dating back to the advent of the space race and human
exploration in the Mercury missions, the need for the U.S. to
be the preeminent leader in space has been critical to our
national and economic security.
Then Russia was our key adversary. Today it is China. The
U.S. is privileged to have some of the foremost aerospace
companies in the world, with three of them represented in front
of us here today.
As Ranking Member of the Space and Science subcommittee, I
want to do everything in my power to leverage the abilities and
innovation of the U.S. company--of those U.S. companies in
order to maintain American space dominance.
When considering new frameworks for regulation in space, it
is imperative that the appropriate agencies develop thoughtful,
light touch standards for the development and deployment of
technologies of suborbital, orbital, cislunar, and lunar
commercial operations.
Innovation thrives under light touch regulations, not the
heavy hand of Government. The FAA's moratorium on regulating
commercial spaceflight operations, otherwise known as the
learning period, is set to expire on January 1, 2024.
The learning period has afforded us the robust commercial
spaceflight industry we have here today. It is important that
that learning period be extended to provide both industry and
the FAA enough time and data to establish an appropriate off
ramp to a more permanent framework for the commercial space
industry.
We must also streamline and reform existing regulations
within the FAA and the Department of Commerce to refocus our
Federal agencies' core functions on top of timely licensing and
safety to ensure that the American companies lead the world.
I have led efforts here in the Senate with my colleagues,
Senator Hickenlooper, to streamline the FCC's role in spectrum
licensing for commercial space launch and reentry to provide a
more certain and timely licensing process that keeps pace with
the increased launch and reentry demands of the commercial
space industry.
That bill has passed committee and I hope we can get it
passed on the floor actually this week. I intend to take that
same approach in an approach that emphasizes timely review and
approval of licenses and certifications when it comes to the
processes at the FAA and the Department of Commerce.
Additionally, it is important that the larger commercial
space industry has regulatory certainty and clarity to plan for
the future, to head off the larger threat of China and our
adversaries in space.
If Federal agencies continue to stray from their core
functions or add to the current bureaucratic mess, we could
very well see valuable American companies leave our shores. I
for one, and I know my colleagues join me in not wanting to see
that happen.
I believe that those agencies play an important and
critical role in commercial space development. However, when
agencies start stepping in overreach, it becomes unclear what
the agency guidance actually is and who is in charge of what.
We only further put ourselves at a disadvantage. Congress
should not stand idly by and watch agency turf wars. We must be
clear eyed about the goal, stopping China through American
space dominance.
To me, nothing could be more important. Madam Chair, as we
look to the new frontier of space exploration and future
generations, America must be the first back to the moon. The
first nation to set foot on Mars. The first nation to capture
and harness the resources of the galactic asteroids.
These goals are vital to the next stage of human curiosity.
Our future generations depend on us to get this right. I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses here today to ensure this
committee develops a thoughtful and balanced approach to any
future commercial space exploration bill or commercial space
bill that promotes, not hinders, American industry. I yield
back.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. I am now going to introduce our
witnesses for today's hearing. Our first witness is Caryn
Schenewerk. Ms. Schenewerk is the President of CS Consulting
and an adjunct Space Law Professor at Georgetown University Law
Center.
She was formerly the Vice President for Government Affairs
at Relativity Space and spent 10 years at SpaceX. You are
recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CARYN SCHENEWERK, PRESIDENT,
CS CONSULTING, LLC
Ms. Schenewerk. Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to share my perspective on the U.S. commercial space
industry.
I am honored to appear before the Committee in my personal
capacity, and I am not representing any company or client's
views. My testimony is focused on a few key points regarding
U.S. space law and policy governing private space activities.
I hope to convey that space is highly regulated and that
maintaining America's competitive edge in space is increasingly
dependent on improving and streamlining existing regulatory
processes. It also depends on our ability to develop an
efficient and effective approach to authorizing exciting new or
so-called novel space activities.
My first point, the U.S. space industry is highly regulated
and encompasses a diverse range of activities with different
levels of maturity and customers. As such, it operates in
accordance with a multitude of local, State, and Federal laws,
and depending on where companies operate, they may also be
subject to foreign laws. U.S. space companies are licensed
based on their primary activities, launch, reentry, remote
sensing, and telecommunications, by the FAA, NOAH, and FCC,
respectively.
That said, each of those activities may also require
licenses from one or both of the non-primary agencies.
Importantly, we do not have a one stop shop approach to
licensing space activities. Second, launch and reentry
companies are subject to U.S. law no matter where they operate,
and an efficient approach to regulating them is crucial to
their success.
Such jurisdiction was established in the 1994 Commercial
Space Launch Act and conforms to the United States'
international treaty obligations. The primary focus of the CSLA
based licensing regulations and review for launch and reentry
is public safety, which requires the FAA to review the design,
operation, and testing of a vehicle's flight safety system, as
well as aspects like vehicle hazards, including debris, toxic
release, and overpressure.
As outlined in my written statement, obtaining a launch or
reentry license is an extensive, multi-year effort. Recent
changes to the FAA's regulations have not resulted in
streamlined licensing reviews. Instead, Part 450 has proven
more cumbersome and costly. To date, only four licenses have
been issued under Part 450, and at least two of those exceeded
the FAA's 180 day statutory timeline.
With respect to human spaceflight, the learning period or
moratorium does not limit all regulatory oversight. For
example, the FAA regulates to protect crew members because they
are part of a vehicle's flight safety system, which falls
within FAA's public safety authority.
There are regulations regarding spaceflight participants as
well, including their training and their acceptance of risk.
Given the limited number of private human spaceflights, 3
orbital and 10 suborbital, the ongoing opportunities for
thoughtful engagement between the FAA and industry, as well as
the FAA's challenges with implementing its existing
regulations, the original premise underpinning the learning
period still appear solid.
Next, I would like to focus on novel activities, an
emerging aspect of the space market. These include in-space
servicing, assembly and manufacturing, in-space destinations
such as private LEO space stations, and Moon or Mars based
capabilities.
These are exciting endeavors that do not clearly fall
within FAA, FCC, or NOAA's licensing regimes. Significant
support exists for the Commerce Department's Office of
Commercial Space having mission authority over novel space
activities. I recommend that this committee support efforts to
clarify agency authorities in a manner that is appropriate to
the in-space activities and ensure that any regulatory regime
is well-defined.
Continued uncertainty will diminish U.S. space leadership
and is costly to companies developing these novel and necessary
capabilities. Last, effective regulatory regimes require
resourced, trained, and organized regulators who engage
meaningfully with cutting edge innovations.
U.S. space law and policy--U.S. space policy and legal
oversight is extensive, and we must continuously work to make
sure its implementation is keeping pace with industry's rapid
technological and scientific advances. Sometimes the safest
approach may not look like the status quo.
As the Committee considers commercial space legislation, it
has the opportunity to continue U.S. leadership in diminishing
regulatory uncertainty, while facilitating continued space
safety, innovation, and competitiveness.
Thank you for the time you are investing in developing
balanced and thoughtful legislation. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schenewerk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Caryn Schenewerk \1\, President, CS Consulting,
LLC
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\1\ This testimony is provided in my personal capacity; it does not
represent any company or clients' views. It does rely, in part, on
Steve Mirmina & Caryn Schenewerk, International Space Law and Space
Laws of the United States (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar, 2022).
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Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, and distinguished members of
the Committee: thank you for inviting me to share my perspective on the
U.S. commercial space industry, particularly the importance of
effective, streamlined regulations that promote safety, innovation and
competitiveness.
The U.S. commercial space industry is rapidly innovating and on a
growth trajectory relative to the world-wide space market.\2\ The
commercial space market includes international and domestic space
services, which are dominated by in-space activities, namely satellite-
based services and their supporting ground systems.\3\ The U.S. segment
of that market is growing as is the U.S. segment of the launch services
market.\4\
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\2\ State of the Satellite Industry Report, SIA (2022) https://
sia.org/news-resources/state-of-the-satellite-industry-report/.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ The commercial launch market includes launch services provided
to international commercial companies as well as foreign governments in
accordance with U.S. export control laws.
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U.S. space companies are represented in all aspects of the
international space economy as well as in the U.S. civil and national
security space markets. U.S. commercial space companies are providing
Astronaut carriage and cargo delivery to the International Space
Station under contract with NASA. Notably the U.S. is the only country
where private human spaceflight activities are currently occurring. The
U.S. is also leading in the development of novel, space technologies,
including commercial human destinations in Earth's orbit; in-space
satellite servicing, assembly and manufacturing; lunar landers and
rovers; and nuclear thermal propulsion.
Forward-looking policies that were implemented decades ago and
thoughtfully extended and expanded, particularly the Commercial Space
Launch Act, have significantly contributed to the U.S. commercial space
industry's success. When the CSLA was originally codified in 1994, it
was in anticipation of commercial launch, it did not yet include
reentry or human spaceflight. Congress focused on the near-term issue
and devised a tailored solution that has since been updated as the
industry has evolved. As this Committee contemplates the oversight of
emerging, commercial endeavors in space, a similarly tailored, flexible
approach that can be updated as innovation and space exploration evolve
will continue to serve the country's interest in maintaining its
competitiveness, developing capabilities that advance our national
security, and fostering safety.
The focus of my testimony will be U.S. Government oversight of
commercial space activities, particularly the authorities granted under
the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA), as amended. The intent is to
provide the Committee with historical and legal context as well as a
review of key space regulations and their implementation in order to
inform its efforts to develop legislation that results in balanced and
thoughtful regulations.
The U.S. space industry is highly regulated.
The companies that comprise the U.S. commercial space industry are
regulated by a multitude of Federal agencies as well as state and local
governments. They may also be regulated by foreign governments,
depending on where they are operating or providing services. The
jurisdictions and resulting U.S. Federal regulations are defined for
certain companies based on their primary activities--launch, reentry,
remote sensing, and telecommunications are regulated by the FAA, NOAA
and FCC, respectively. That said, each of those activities may also
require licenses from one or both of the non-primary regulating agency.
In other words, an activity that is licensed by the FAA may also
require a FCC and/or NOAA license.
If the space activity is ``novel'' such as in-space servicing,
assembly, manufacturing or in-space destinations, such as LEO habitats
or based on the moon or Mars, then it does not clearly fall within the
licensing regimes of the three above-listed agencies. These novel
activities have been the focus of National Space Council discussions in
this and the last Administration. Significant support exists for the
Department of Commerce's Office of Commercial Space having ``mission
authority.'' I recommend that this Committee support efforts to clarify
agency authorities in a manner that is appropriate to the in-space
activities and ensure that any regulatory regime is clearly defined.
Continued uncertainty will diminish U.S. space leadership and is costly
to companies developing these novel and necessary capabilities.
In addition to regulations governing companies' space activities,
their manufacturing activities, facilities and test sites are regulated
by federal, state and local regulations governing environmental, labor
and transportation activities, among others. For example, when
companies ship space systems \5\ by road, air or sea, they are subject
to state and Federal transportation and safety regulations overseen by
state departments of transportation, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Federal Aviation
Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard. When companies utilize legacy
U.S. government capabilities such as launch sites or test stands on
U.S. Space Force or NASA facilities, for example, they are subject to
the controlling agency's rules and requirements.
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\5\ Launch vehicle, reentry vehicles, satellites, and other space
hardware.
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U.S. space companies are also subject to Federal laws governing
international trade in goods and services as well as foreign
investment. U.S. export control laws governing space activities include
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which controls
the export and import of defense-related articles and services on the
United States Munitions List (USML) and is administered by the
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the U.S. State
Department. Activities and aerospace hardware not subject to the ITAR
may be subject to Export Administration Regulations (EAR) under the
Commerce Control List (CCL) administered by the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Companies must also
comply with the Office of Foreign Assets Control's various sanctions
programs as well as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States' regulations.
International Space Law History & Context
In 1958, one year after Sputnik 1, the United Nations (UN) created
an Outer Space Affairs Division. Also in 1958, the UN convened a
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which was made
a permanent committee of the UN General Assembly one year later and
still functions. COPUOS has been the primary source for the drafting of
international space Law.
The UN Outer Space Treaties
COPUOS began drafting a series of UN General Assembly resolutions
in the early 1960s regarding outer space, culminating in what
crystallized in 1967 as the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty or
OST).\6\ More than 100 States are Party to the OST,\7\ including major
spacefaring nations such as Russia and China. The OST is the primary
international legal instrument governing activities in outer space.
This Treaty also provides the impetus for most nations around the world
to draft their own domestic space laws and regulations.
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\6\ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (1967), 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 18 U.S.T. 2410.
\7\ The list on the status of international agreements relating to
activities in outer space is compiled and distributed by the United
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, available online at https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html.
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The Treaty establishes several fundamental principles:
the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interests of all States and shall be
the province of all humankind;
outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all
States;
outer space is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means;
States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station
them in outer space in any other manner;
the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes;
astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of humankind;
States shall be responsible for national space activities
whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental
entities;
States shall be liable for damage caused by their space
objects; and
States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and
celestial bodies.
The OST does not contain a definition or delimitation of ``outer
space.'' It does, however, make clear that many of its terms apply to
not only the celestial bodies themselves, but also to all of the
``space'' between them.
The OST was followed by four additional Space Law treaties over the
next 13 years. The first of these, which concluded in 1968, was the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement).\8\
The OST and Rescue Agreement were followed by the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability
Convention) in 1972.\9\ This Convention addresses the question of
liability for damage caused by space objects--absolute liability for
damage ``on the surface of Earth or to an aircraft in flight,'' versus
fault-based liability for damage caused in space.\10\ In 1974, another
space-related treaty came into force, the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention).\11\ The
Registration Convention creates an obligation to register spacecraft as
a means to assist in the identification of space objects.
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\8\ Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968),
672 U.N.T.S. 119; 19 U.S.T. 7570; 7 I.L.M. 149 (1968).
\9\ The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (1972), 961 U.N.T.S. 187; 24 U.S.T. 2389; 10 I.L.M. 965
(1971).
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (1974), 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; 28 U.S.T. 695; 14 I.L.M. 43 (1975).
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United States Space Laws
The U.S. supervises the activities of its nationals in outer space
through a combination of statutes and regulations. These laws implement
the international obligations undertaken pursuant to the Outer Space
Treaties, including the requirement in Article VI of the OST that
States must provide ``authorization and continuing supervision'' of
their nationals' activities in outer space.
As noted previously, there are numerous Federal statutes that
govern activities in outer space. For example, the Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), which governs commercial space
launch and reentry activities and is the primary focus of my
testimony.\12\ Other statutes include the Land Remote-Sensing Policy
Act, which governs commercial remote sensing regulations by the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the 1934 Communications Act, which created
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
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\12\ See e.g., 51 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 50902-50923.
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These various statues authorize regulations that are found in the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and dictate the process for obtaining
U.S. licenses to conduct space activities from the FAA, NOAA and FCC.
U.S. space activities are also overseen by NASA and the Department of
Defense (DOD), neither of which regulate commercial activities, though
they do promulgate regulations governing their own activities.
Commercial Space Launch Act and FAA AST
The Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (FAA AST)\13\ within the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) licenses commercial launch and reentry activities,
as well as spaceports. Unlike the rest of FAA, which is authorized
under Title 49 ``Transportation,'' of the United States Code, authority
for FAA AST is located in Title 51, ``National and Commercial Space
Programs'' and was established by the Commercial Space Launch Act of
1984 (CSLA).\14\ The CSLA was amended in 1988 to add an indemnification
regime to limit exposure to third party liability claims. The first
licensed commercial launches occurred in 1989.\15\ Significant
amendments to the CSLA followed in 1998,\16\ 2004 \17\ and 2015,\18\ to
address reusable launch vehicles and reentry licensing; private human
spaceflight; and resource utilization, respectively.
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\13\ The Office of Commercial Space Transportation originally
reported directly to the U.S. Transportation Secretary. In November
1995 during an agency reorganization, the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (FAA AST) was transferred from the Secretary's office to
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as the FAA's only space-
focused line of business.
\14\ About the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration [hereinafter FAA], https://www.faa.gov/about/
office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/. See, 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50901-50923;
Pub. L. No. 98-575; H.R. 3942, Commercial Space Launch Act, (Oct. 30,
1984) https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/3942.
\15\ Origins of the Commercial Space Industry, FAA, https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/mile
stones/media/commercial_space_industry.pdf.
\16\ Pub. L. 105-303.
\17\ Pub. L. 108-492.
\18\ Pub. L. 114-90.
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Licensing for Launch, Reentry and Spaceports
A license is required for a person or entity subject to the FAA
AST's jurisdiction ``to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a launch
site or reentry site, or to reenter a reentry vehicle, in the United
States.'' \19\ A license is also required for a ``citizen of the United
States'' \20\ when they are operating a launch, reentry or launch/
reentry site outside the United States.\21\ Launch and reentry sites
are also referred to as spaceports.\22\
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\19\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50904(a)(1).
\20\ The definition for who is a ``citizen of the United States''
is uniquely defined by 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50902(1)(A)-(C) as: ``(A) an
individual who is a citizen of the United States; (B) an entity
organized or existing under the laws of the United States or a State;
or (C) an entity organized or existing under the laws of a foreign
country if the controlling interest (as defined by the Secretary of
Transportation) is held by an individual or entity described in
subclause (A) or (B) of this clause.''
\21\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50904(a).
\22\ Part 420 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
governs launch site operator licenses (LSOL) site and Part 433 governs
reentry site operator licenses (RSOL). A spaceport operator can obtain
a LSOL and a RSOL for the same spaceport. A license to operate a launch
and/or reentry site authorizes the licensee to offer its site to
multiple operators. It does not include the license to perform the
launch or the reentry. The vehicle operator seeking to conduct either
of those activities must apply and receive a separate license under
Part 450.
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FAA's regulations are largely focused on protecting the public.
Commercial launches, reentries and spaceports may only be regulated,
``to the extent necessary [. . .] to ensure compliance with
international obligations of the United States and to protect the
public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States.'' \23\ The primary focus
of the licensing regulations and review is public safety, which
requires the FAA to review the design, operation, and testing of a
vehicle's flight safety system as well as vehicle hazards, including
debris, toxic release and overpressure.\24\ Launches, reentries and
spaceports are not regulated to protect the entities or people involved
with the operations--the statute states that the FAA AST is not
responsible for regulating to ensure mission success or to protect
those people who are not defined as public.\25\ That is intentionally
different from the FAA's regulation of aviation activities, which are
regulated to protect the public as well as everyone involved in the
flight, particularly paying passengers.\26\ Additionally, FAA AST does
not have statutory authority to regulate activities conducted on orbit;
its authority is focused on public safety on Earth and in Earth's
navigable airspace.\27\
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\23\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50901(a)(7).
\24\ The Section 450.101 safety criteria include four categories:
individual risk, collective risk, aircraft risk, and risk to critical
assets. For example, the risk associated with launch or reentry to an
individual member of the public must be less than one in one million
(Ec 1 x 10-6). Applicants must demonstrate how they will ensure that
the public is excluded from the hazard area for the FAA to grant the
license.
\25\ The FAA defined ``public'' in Sec. 401.5 of 14 C.F.R. 450, to
mean ``for a particular licensed or permitted launch or reentry, people
that are not involved in supporting the launch or reentry and includes
those people who may be located within the launch or reentry site, such
as visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to
launch or reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its
personnel.''
\26\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Sec. 106(g).
\27\ H. Rept. 108-492, Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of
2004; See, 150 Cong. Rec. H703, 2004.
Figure 1. Process for Issuing Launch and Reentry Licenses.\28\
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\28\ Getting Started with Licensing, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
space/licenses/licensing_
process/
The requirements for receiving a launch or reentry license are
detailed in Chapter III, Part 450 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
``Launch and Reentry License Requirement.'' \29\ Part 450 was published
as a Final Rule in 2020 to streamline regulations that dated back to
1988. Members of industry raised significant concerns with certain
aspects of Part 450 when it was published as a Proposed Rule as well as
with the FAA's approach to the rulemaking.\30\
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\29\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 450.
\30\ See Docket Number FAA-2019-0229, StrZeamlined Launch and
Reentry Licensing Requirements.
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FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)
was tasked with reviewing Part 450 to identify aspects of the
regulations that require additional clarification or a regulation
change. That review identified a list of regulations that warrant
clarification or change. Equally important, COMSTAC and industry
members reported that Part 450 implementation is proving a significant
challenge for the FAA and industry. Some of those issues are reflective
of the downside of performance-based regulations, which require the
Federal agency to have the expertise and resources to efficiently
review innovative approaches that may result in a higher level of
safety, but deviate from past, more familiar approaches.
Recommendations to address these problems include support for FAA's
investment in process improvements and staffing in order to improve
engineering and analysis expertise, communication, and accountability
with regard to application review and status.
The elements of a Part 450 licensing process are shown in Figure 1.
The time frame for Stages 1 and 2 regularly span two to three years or
longer. To date, the FAA has only issued four licenses under Part 450
and has exceeded the 180-day review period for at least two of the four
licenses, resulting in CSLA-required notices to this Committee.
Financial Responsibility and Indemnification
The Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) of 1984 included a
requirement for licensees to carry liability insurance in an amount
``necessary for the launch or operation, considering the international
obligations of the United States.'' \31\ In the 1994 CSLA updates, the
insurance requirements were expanded and an indemnification regime was
added.\32\ That bill clarified the license requirement for obtaining
insurance to cover third party and certain U.S. Government claims
arising from the licensed activities as codified in 51 U.S.C. 50914,
``Liability Insurance and Financial Responsibility.'' The required
insurance is for claims by third parties--the uninvolved public--and
for damage to United States Government property. Damages have never
exceeded the required insurance coverage, but if they did, the
indemnification regime would be triggered. That regime currently
expires September 30, 2025.
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\31\ Pub. L. 98-575, Sec. 16.
\32\ Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 70112.
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The financial responsibility regulations are codified in Part 440,
Financial Responsibility for Licensed Launch Activities.\33\ Earlier
this year, the FAA recognized the challenges that industry and
government stakeholders have faced with applying aspects of Part 440
and initiated an Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (SpARC). I commend the
FAA in taking this step and am honored to serve as the industry lead
for the Part 440 SpARC. Our efforts are focused on developing
recommendations for regulatory reforms to Part 440 to address
challenges such as launch cadences, innovative operations, a
specialized and limited insurance market and missions that were not
originally contemplated. The SpARC has the opportunity to help the FAA
as it prepares to draft updates to the Part 440 regulations. A
successful outcome will modernize requirements and ensure that the
FAA's approach protects the public and U.S. Government interests while
taking a rational approach to calculating financial responsibility
requirements and implementing reciprocal waivers of claims.
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\33\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 440.
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Regulation of Human Spaceflight
In 1996, the X Prize Foundation offered $10 million for the first
non-government organization to launch a reusable crewed spacecraft into
space twice within two weeks. In light of the interest in human
spaceflight generated by the X Prize, as well as the successful
demonstration by Scaled Composites,\34\ Congress passed the 2004
CSLAA.\35\ The CSLAA required that the FAA issue regulations relating
to crew, space flight participants (SFPs), and permits for launch or
reentry of reusable suborbital rockets. Additionally, the CSLAA
introduced the concept of the ``learning period.'' \36\ Although the
CSLAA granted the FAA authority over the safety of launch vehicles
designed to carry humans, the ``learning period'' limited the FAA's
ability to propose requirements governing the design or operation of a
launch vehicle to protect the health and safety of certain people on
board. The learning period was set to expire eight years after
enactment, but has most recently been extended to January 1, 2024.\37\
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\34\ In 2004, Scaled Composites won the X Prize by being the first
to finance privately, build, and launch a vehicle able to carry three
people to an altitude of 100 kilometers (62 statute miles). Launching A
New Space Industry, X Prize, https://www.xprize.org/prizes/ansari.
\35\ For a discussion of the law and political landscape
surrounding the 2004 Space Act, see, Timothy Robert Hughes & Esta
Rosenberg, Space Travel Law (and Politics): The Evolution of the
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 31 J. Space L. 1
(2005).
\36\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(9).
\37\ Pub. L. 118-15 Sec. 2202(k)
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The CSLAA learning period does not limit all regulations regarding
human spaceflight. For example, the FAA may regulate to protect crew
members because they are part of a vehicle's flight safety system,
which falls within FAA's public safety authority. In accordance with
the CSLAA, the FAA developed 14 C.F.R. part 460, which prescribes the
human space flight requirements an operator must follow if a launch or
reentry will occur with people on board the launch or reentry vehicle.
For launch and reentry with crew, crew members must complete training
in nominal and off-nominal conditions on how to carry out their role on
board or on the ground so that the vehicle will not harm the public,
demonstrate certain abilities during spaceflight and meet medical
requirements.\38\ Pilots and remote operators must satisfy certain
additional requirements focused on an understanding of the vehicle and
an understanding of operating safely in the National Airspace System
(NAS). Finally, an operator is required to provide environmental
control and life support systems adequate to sustain life and
consciousness for all inhabited areas within a vehicle.\39\
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\38\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.5(a), (b) & (e).
\39\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.11. See also, Environmental Control and
Life Support Systems for Flight Crew and Space Flight Participants in
Suborbital Space Flight, FAA (Apr. 2010) https://
www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/
final_ECLSS_guide.pdf.
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For launch and reentry with SFPs, an operator must train each SFP
before flight on how to respond to emergency situations, including
smoke, fire, loss of cabin pressure, and emergency exit.\40\ Before
receiving compensation or making an agreement to fly an SFP, an
operator must inform the SFP in writing about the risks of launch and
reentry, including the safety record of the launch or reentry vehicle
type.\41\ The operator must also provide the SFP an opportunity to ask
questions orally to better understand the risks and hazards of the
mission.\42\ The SFP must provide consent in writing.\43\ Finally, an
SFP must execute a reciprocal waiver of claims with the FAA and the
licensee in accordance with Part 440 \44\ and 51 U.S.C. 50914.\45\
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\40\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.51.
\41\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.45(a).
\42\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.45(f).
\43\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.45(f).
\44\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.49.
\45\ As part of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
passed in 2015, Congress added SFPs as applicable parties with whom a
licensee must make a reciprocal waiver of claims. The FAA has not yet
updated its regulations to reflect this addition. P.L. 114-119
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During the learning period, the FAA may also adopt regulations to
restrict or prohibit design features or operating practices that (1)
have resulted in a serious or fatal injury to persons on board during a
licensed or permitted launch or reentry; or (2) contributed to an
unplanned event or series of events during a licensed or permitted
commercial human space flight that posed a high risk of causing a
serious or fatal injury to persons on board.\46\
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\46\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(2)(C).
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In 2015, the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA)
extended the learning period to October 1, 2023, and directed the
Secretary to ``continue to work with the commercial space sector,
including the [COMSTAC. . .], to facilitate the development of
voluntary industry consensus standards based on recommended best
practices to improve the safety of crew, government astronauts, and
space flight participants as the [sector] continues to mature.'' \47\
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\47\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(3) & (9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those efforts have been underway--industry has been developing
consensus standards in the ASTM F47 Committee on Commercial Space.
Additionally, the FAA has taken a step toward the development of
regulations by initiating the Part 460 SpARC to review the existing
regulations governing human space flight activities and in preparation
for the learning period's possible expiration. That Committee will
develop consensus recommendations regarding future human space flight
occupant safety regulations that will inform the FAA's drafting of a
future Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).
The 2015 CSCLA also clarified FAA's ability ``to discuss potential
regulatory approaches, potential performance standards, or any other
topic related to [Section 50905(c)] with the commercial space industry,
including observations, findings, and recommendations from the
[COMSTAC], [. . .] prior to the issuance of a notice of proposed
rulemaking.'' \48\
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\48\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(4).
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Today, the United States is home to the only commercial human
spaceflight activities currently carrying private citizens on orbital
and suborbital flights, as represented by the three companies
participating in this hearing. Given the still limited developments in
commercial human spaceflight, the on-going opportunities for thoughtful
engagement between the FAA and industry as well as the FAA's challenges
with implementing its existing regulations, a learning period extension
with direction for the FAA to engage meaningfully with industry to
prepare for oversight responsibilities is warranted.
Mission Authorization for Novel Activities
U.S. space companies are rapidly innovating to bring new space
capabilities to market for U.S. Government and non-government customers
and, in many cases, leading the world in those efforts. Across the
nation, there are a plethora of companies developing and demonstrating
exciting in-space capabilities such as satellite servicing and
maneuverability, private space stations, in-space manufacturing,
nuclear power and propulsion technologies, and lunar rovers. U.S.
policymakers should be preparing for these activities to evolve from
being ``novel'' to defining our space capabilities. To foster those
capabilities and U.S. competitiveness, companies are requesting
regulatory certainty. This is not a new problem, but delays in solving
it are having real consequences for the U.S. space industry and could
affect our future space leadership.
The 2020 National Space Policy, as well as industry representatives
and congressional legislation, have supported granting the Commerce
Department's Office of Space Commerce (OSC) the authority to approve
U.S. commercial in-space and in-situ operations, referred to as novel
or nontraditional activities.\49\ The rationale supporting OSC as the
primary authorizing agency is sound. The Commerce Department is already
a regulator of in-space activities that focuses on fostering a robust
U.S. industry while protecting national security and complying with our
international treaty obligations.
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\49\ The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 81755 Sec. 5.3.a (Dec.
9, 2020); Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer
Space Treaty Will Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (May 23,
2017) https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2017/5/reopening-the-american-
frontier-exploring-how
-the-outer-space-treaty-will-impact-american-commerce-and-settlement-
in-space; American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, H. R. 2809, 115
Cong. Sec. 3 (2017).
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Efficient and effective interagency interactions and consultations
will be key to a minimally burdensome regime for authorizing in-space
missions. The interagency process must involve significant
accountability and transparency married with clear timeframes. The
widely-supported self-certification approach is a good starting place
as we guard against an approach that encourages companies to leave the
United States. As stated earlier, it is vital that agency authorities
be delegated in a manner that is appropriate to the in-space activities
being authorized. Modeling an approach on the CSLA would be
beneficial--it would ensure that near-term capabilities are
appropriately reviewed in a timely and efficient manner and allow for
expanding authorities as the industry develops. Instead of trying to
predict all possible future technologies and potential risks, a
flexible approach will ensure compliance with our treaty obligations,
avoid being overly burdensome and foster our national security. Lastly,
I encourage this Committee to continue to support a streamlined
approach that avoids duplicative agency oversight, as it has since the
1994 CSLA.
* * *
I appreciate the invitation to testify before the Subcommittee
today. These are exciting times for the U.S. space industry. My
testimony has only scratched the surface of the space regulatory and
policy landscape. U.S. space policy and legal oversight is extensive
and is at its best when it effectively facilitates rapid technological
and scientific advances while protecting public safety and national
security interests. As the Committee considers commercial space
legislation, it has the opportunity to continue U.S. leadership in
diminishing regulatory uncertainty while facilitating continued space
safety, innovation and competitiveness.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Our second witness today is
Wayne Monteith. Mr. Monteith is the President and General
Manager of National Aerospace Solutions and the Vice President
of Bechtel National.
He was formerly the FAA Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation and a Commander of Air Force
Space launch activities. You are recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE MONTEITH, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER,
NATIONAL AEROSPACE SOLUTIONS
Mr. Monteith. Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to appear before this committee once again and share my
perspectives on this important topic.
I am appearing today in my personal capacity, and I am not
representing the views of any company, client, or Government
entity. My views are heavily influenced by my 29 years of
active duty service in the United States Air Force, culminating
as the Commander of the 45th Space Wing in Florida, the
busiest, most successful spaceport in the world, and my time as
the previous FAA Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation.
I last appeared before this committee in 2019. The number
of FAA licensed commercial launch and reentry activities
increased from 29 that year to 96 already this calendar year,
more than tripling the cadence of activity. In terms of
commercial human spaceflight, we went from one in 2019 to eight
so far in 2023.
As impressive as these increases are, I expect it to be
even more dramatic going forward as we continue to place more
and more satellites on orbit, move from human adventure flights
to on orbit habitats to the moon and beyond.
During the same timeframe, the FAA published a new
streamlined launch and reentry regulation that was envisioned
to enhance safety and have a lighter regulatory touch, while
also being more flexible, accommodating to innovation, more
responsive to the rapid pace of industry change and operational
timelines, and less burdensome than the existing four
regulations it was replacing.
Unfortunately, there are many in industry that would say
this goal was not achieved. So, I remain concerned that
continued growth will be negatively impacted by an overly
burdensome or inefficient regulatory construct or a very public
catastrophic event involving humans.
Sound or even perfect regulations and good intentions
cannot eliminate all risk, but hastily develop regulations or
an overly risk averse or understaffed regulator can sub-
optimize or eliminate innovation, new entrants, and U.S. global
leadership.
As the Committee considers the near and long term future of
U.S. commercial spaceflight, I would like to offer three
recommendations for consideration. First, I am not advocating
for additional regulatory oversight on human spaceflight, but I
do recommend that any change to the regulatory landscape be
provided ample time for meaningful collaboration with industry,
meaningful coordination within the interagency, and enough
staff for the regulator to meet current obligations while
providing the appropriate level of effort on the new
regulation.
This would be a multi-year process to do correctly. Second,
I believe a more efficient, one stop shop approach to
authorizing and licensing space activities is necessary. In
January 1984--in a January 1984 speech, then Secretary of
Transportation Elizabeth Dole explained the President wanted to
stimulate interest in commercial space ventures by removing
regulatory barriers.
Secretary Dole said that companies trying to operate in
space must go through as many as 17 agencies to get appropriate
permits and licenses. A one stop service would help them cut
through the thicket of clearances, licenses, and regulations
that keep industrial space vehicles tethered to their pads. I
suggest we may not have completely solved the original problem
that led to the creation of FAA AST.
Therefore, the Committee may wish to consider exploring
opportunities to consolidate Government oversight
responsibilities. Finally, as the Committee is well aware, the
current regulatory construct for commercial human spaceflight
is limited by the moratorium or learning period, originally
established in 2004 and scheduled to sunset yet again in
January.
The moratorium for the still nascent sector appropriately
limits the FAA's regulatory oversight of the health and safety
of commercial human spaceflight participants. Instead of
extending the moratorium, I recommend that the Committee
consider establishing a date in which a new regulation on
commercial human spaceflight activities may not be published
sooner than, and then establish a subsequent future date before
the regulation could actually become effective.
The process can begin soon to fully and thoughtfully
develop a regulation with industry, should it be needed, and
allows Congress the option of delaying the effective date
should the new rule be early to need.
Madam Chair, I appreciate your invitation to testify before
the Committee. It is important that we work through these
complex issues to ensure an appropriate level of safety and a
light regulatory touch.
It is also important that whatever regulatory approach is
taken, it enables our current industry leaders to continue to
be safe and successful and allows for the next disruptive
innovator to successfully enter the market. This will foster
competition and help ensure the United States continues its
global leadership in this vital transportation sector.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Monteith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brigadier General (USAF ret) Wayne Monteith,\1\
Former FAA Associate Administrator, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation
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\1\ This testimony is provided in my personal capacity; it does not
represent the views of my current employer, any company, client, or
government entity. It does rely on my experience as the former Federal
Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, and as the former Commander of the United States Air
Force 45th Space Wing.
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Chairwoman Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, and distinguished
Members of the Committee: thank you for inviting me to appear before
this Committee once again and share my perspectives on this important
topic.
When I last appeared before you in 2019, I commented that in 2018
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, or FAA AST, licensed a
record number of launches and reentries at 35. I stated that I believed
future growth in this sector would be even more impressive going
forward as companies like SpaceX significantly expanded their launch
rates and new companies like Rocket Lab and Firefly entered the sector.
And because of this we needed a new, responsive, and flexible
regulatory construct. One that would enhance safety while enabling
innovation and continued U.S. global leadership. But also, one that
would reduce administrative burden and enable rapid change and
streamline timelines to keep pace with a burgeoning space industry.
This prediction of future growth has come to fruition.
The number of FAA AST licensed activities increased from 35 in 2018
to 84 in 2022, and 95 already in 2023. In 2019 there was one FAA
licensed commercial human spaceflight mission; so far in 2023 there
have been 8 flights, and that's even with a major contributor like Blue
Origin temporarily pausing flight operations. My opinion of the future
of this sector remains optimistic and I remain confident of continued
innovation and dramatic growth in commercial human spaceflight.
However, this continued growth will be negatively impacted by
either a catastrophic event or an overly burdensome regulatory
construct. It will also be impacted by an overly risk-averse regulator,
or even an understaffed regulatory office. These have the potential to
unnecessarily restrict the success of the U.S. commercial space
transportation industry, to include commercial human spaceflight. And
while good regulations and intentions, and even overly conservative
regulator interpretations of those regulations, cannot eliminate all
risk, they can sub-optimize or eliminate innovation, new entrants, and
U.S. global leadership. As the Committee considers the near-and long-
term future of U.S. commercial human spaceflight, I would like to offer
three recommendations to consider.
First, in May 2018 Space Policy Directive-2 directed the Department
of Transportation to issue a new streamlined launch and reentry
regulation. Just two and a half years later 14 CFR Part 450, the
Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements regulation, or
SLR2, was published. Part 450 encompassed four existing regulations
(Parts 415, 417, 431 and 435) and was an unprecedented space regulatory
effort. But based on the short development timeline, industry
involvement in the regulatory process was severely limited. And because
of this compressed schedule some constructs within Part 450 were not as
thoroughly vetted as would have been ideal. Based on my experience
during this effort, the Committee may wish to consider that any new
regulations concerning commercial human spaceflight should be provided
with ample time for full and open industry collaboration and
interagency coordination, and sufficient government resources (i.e.,
staffing) to meet required timelines without negatively impacting
current regulatory responsibilities.
Second, there is another potential impediment to continued U.S.
leadership in this sector and it is what appears to be a movement away
from the concept of a ``one stop shop'' to receive a license or
authorization to get to or operate in space. At just a casual glance
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, the Office of Space
Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
Federal Communications Commission, the National Transportation Safety
Board, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration all have some role in
commercial space activities. In my experience, the more organizations
involved in an effort, the more likely seams, gaps, and overlaps are
created. Additionally, there is an increase in administrative burden on
both government and U.S. industry without a similar increase in safety.
There is also the potential for greater government inefficiency, which
will likely cause industry costs to increase, preventing new smaller,
innovative companies from entering the market. Therefore, the Committee
may wish to consider exploring whether or not there are opportunities
to consolidate government oversight responsibilities.
Finally, as the Committee is well aware, the current construct for
commercial human spaceflight is limited by the moratorium (learning
period) originally established in 2004, extended four times by
Congress, and scheduled to sunset again on 1 January 2024. Under this
construct, Congress, with few exceptions, limits the FAA's regulatory
oversight of the health and safety of commercial human spaceflight
occupants. The FAA operates under an Informed Consent regime to ensure
participants are fully aware of the risks and hazards involved. To
support this learning period Congress prohibited the Secretary of
Transportation from promulgating any regulations governing the design
or operation of a launch vehicle intended to protect the health and
safety of crew, government astronauts, and space flight participants
absent serious or fatal injury, or an unplanned event that posed a high
risk of serious or fatal injury. To be clear, the FAA does not certify
launch or reentry vehicles as safe for carrying humans.
Instead, the FAA with help from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) just produced an updated Recommended Practices
for Human Spaceflight Occupant Safety. Recommended practices are
divided into four categories: general, design, manufacturing, and
operations. The FAA is working with Standards Development Organizations
to facilitate development of consensus standards for industry to use
which can form the foundation for any future rulemaking efforts. My
observation is that while worthwhile, progress has been slow.
While I believe there is value in the consensus development
process, I also believe that without a ``forcing function'' progress
will remain slow, and the moratorium will continue until a catastrophic
event occurs. That ``forcing function'' should drive greater industry/
government participation and should include an increase in staffing for
the appropriate regulatory agency to properly build the foundation for
an expanded regulatory construct. Based largely on my experience with
Part 450, my concern remains a very public catastrophic event may drive
a rush to regulate, and potentially over-regulate, this still nascent
part of the industry. With this in mind, rather than a moratorium, the
Committee may wish to consider a ''forcing function'' that instead
establishes a date in which the FAA may not publish a more robust
regulation on commercial human spaceflight activities sooner than,
i.e., in approximately five years (Phase 1). And then establish a
subsequent date, a minimum of eighteen months later, before the updated
regulation becomes effective (Phase 2). This approach allows time for
an updated regulation to be fully and thoughtfully developed (Phase 1)
and allows for the option of delaying the effective date (Phase 2)
should Congress decide the regulation is ``early to need.'' This
approach may mitigate the downsides of publishing a hurried regulatory
update as Phase 1 would potentially be complete.
Madam Chair, I appreciate your invitation to testify before the
Committee. This is indeed the new renascence of space, so it is
important that we work through these complex issues to ensure an
appropriate level of safety and a ``light regulatory touch.'' It is
also important that whatever the regulatory approach taken it enables
our current industry leaders to be successful, and allows for the next
disruptive innovator to successfully enter the market. This will foster
competition and help ensure the United States continues its global
leadership in this vital transportation sector.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Our next witness is Sirisha
Bandla. Ms. Bandla is the President of Government Affairs and
Research Operations for Virgin Galactic.
She is also the only panelist here today to have gone to
space, flying on Virgin Galactic's Unity 22 mission. You are
recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SIRISHA BANDLA, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS AND RESEARCH, VIRGIN GALACTIC
Ms. Bandla. Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, thank you
so much for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of Virgin
Galactic.
The importance of this hearing is significant in furthering
the progress of the commercial spaceflight industry, and we
appreciate the scope and the attention of the Committee. Now, I
have wanted to go to space since I was little.
I wanted to adventure out into the unknown as the captain
of my own starship and follow in the footsteps of those that
explored the stars before me, you know, Neil Armstrong, Sally
Ride, Kalpana Chawla, Jean-Luc Picard.
But I have very bad eyesight and going to space in the way
I had known it growing up through the NASA's astronaut corps
was just not achievable until the advent of commercial human
spaceflight, companies creating accessible and frequent access
to space for anyone that wanted to experience it.
I joined Virgin Galactic in 2015. Galactic is the world's
first commercial space line, pioneering human spaceflight for
private individuals and researchers with its advanced air and
space vehicles.
Galactic's vehicles have been designed to set new standards
for human spaceflight safety, frequency, flexibility, and cost.
Our company's mission is to democratize access to space to--by
providing frequent private astronaut journeys, microgravity
research, and space flight training opportunities.
Now, spaceflight is an experience that changes your
perception and your view of life on Earth. I was lucky enough
to embark on that experience with Virgin Galactic when I flew
with five of my crew members aboard our spaceship, VSS Unity,
fulfilling a lifelong dream.
And that is the hope, the mission, the vision of why we are
all here to discuss current and future policies that could
shape the growth of this industry, an industry that has the
potential to open space access for researchers and scientists,
that will further our understanding of our universe, our
planet, and our place in it. An industry that has the potential
to send more of our national and international astronaut corps
to explore further destinations as humanity reaches further
into the cosmos.
And an industry that can open space up for all, artists,
educators, lawyers, Members of Congress and their staff, for
anyone who wants to embark on the journey. While the U.S. has
over 60 years of history in spaceflight and an immense database
of spaceflight technology that many in industry, including
Virgin Galactic, utilize, the commercial human spaceflight
industry is relatively new.
Until recently, human spaceflight has primarily been in the
domain of Governments, and access to space for humans was
largely reserved for those in the national astronaut corps. To
date, only 670 people have gone to space, and of those 670,
only 64 were non-Government astronauts who flew on commercial
vehicles, and many of them flew within the last 2 years. And
the world is paying attention, though often with mistaken
assumptions.
So, while one of the important discussions today will
center around the learning period and human occupant safety, it
is important for us to remember through our discussions that
this industry is indeed regulated.
The FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation regulates
commercial space operations to protect public safety and
property, and currently has a perfect safety record. This
includes rules that cover the licensing and landing--the launch
and landing operations, as well as governing the establishment
of spaceports.
Intrinsically, regulating the vehicle for public safety
does create a safer vehicle for the occupant. In addition, as
the basis of our business, VG's highest priority is the safety
of that of our crew and of our spaceflight participants.
Now, Congress acknowledged that it is impossible for
regulators to create effective regulations for diverse,
innovative vehicles without sufficient data and created a
regulatory learning period during which the FAA may only
regulate for the safety of the public or in response to an
incident.
The rationale was that FAA regulatory burdens on a
relatively new industry and rapidly evolving industry could
slow innovation, particularly when it remains clear which areas
FAA should regulate. And that is still true today. The learning
period is currently scheduled to expire on January 1st, 2024.
However, due to technical and economic challenges of space
flight and the industry's emphasis on safety above all,
commercial space companies have proceeded at a more cautious
pace than envisioned in the original bill.
And because of this, Galactic proposes extending the
learning period to provide for a transition period utilizing
collection of data and a standard development process to
properly inform future safety frameworks and what areas the FAA
should indeed regulate.
The U.S. is leading the world in commercial human
spaceflight, and the industry, while still in its infancy, is a
beacon of innovation on and off this planet. I am looking
forward to discussing those policies that will prioritize
safety, while protecting the innovation that got us here today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bandla follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sirisha Bandla, Vice President of Government
Affairs and Research Operations, Virgin Galactic
Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on behalf
of Virgin Galactic, the world's first commercial spaceline. The
importance of this hearing is significant in furthering the progress of
the commercial spaceflight industry, and we appreciate the scope and
attention of the Committee.
About Virgin Galactic
Founded in 2004, Virgin Galactic (VG) is the world's first
commercial spaceline, pioneering human spaceflight for private
individuals and researchers with its advanced air and space vehicles.
Its vehicles are suborbital space labs for governments, researchers,
and commercial industry to conduct research and test their innovations
for the betterment of Earth and space exploration. VG's vehicles have
been designed to set new standards for human spaceflight safety,
frequency, flexibility, and cost. With a presence in California, New
Mexico, and Arizona, our company's mission is to democratize access to
space by providing frequent private astronaut journeys, microgravity
research, and spaceflight training opportunities.
VG owns and operates its suborbital spaceflight system and draws
its flight heritage from the historic SpaceShipOne spacecraft, which
was the first private space vehicle to safely carry human beings into
space claiming the Ansari X PRIZE in 2004. VG's spaceflight system
opens frequent access to space and provides a transformational
spaceflight experience to our astronauts.
VG's suborbital spaceflight system consists of two piloted
vehicles, Mothership and Spaceship. Mothership is a four-engine, dual-
fuselage jet aircraft capable of high-altitude, heavy-lift missions,
including but not limited to fulfilling its role in carrying Spaceship
to altitude. VG's spaceship is an air-launched, suborbital spaceplane
designed to transport people and payloads safely and routinely to space
and back. Spaceship's cabin comfortably seats four to six passengers or
an equivalent mass and volume of science and technology payloads. In
conjunction, these two vehicles allow access to space and regions of
the atmosphere ranging from the troposphere to the thermosphere.
VG's current spaceship, VSS Unity, has flown nine private astronaut
and research spaceflights. This includes the historic Unity 22 mission,
which was the first fully crewed commercial spaceflight in the world,
and Galactic 01, a dedicated research mission for the Italian Air Force
(ItAF) and National Research Council of Italy, which flew three Italian
government research specialists and over a dozen payloads to suborbital
space. In addition, since beginning work with NASA's Flight
Opportunities program, VG has flown a dozen research payloads for the
agency.
2023 has been an exciting time for our company and for commercial
human spaceflight, as we have flown five successful missions in five
months, with a mix of research-dedicated, international partner, and
private astronaut missions. VG's three private astronaut spaceflights
for private astronaut purposes in 2023 included a flight with the first
mother-daughter duo that have gone to space, an astronaut with
Parkinsons, the first Pakastani to go to space, and the first
astronauts from Antigua and Barbuda.
Our future will see VG expand our fleet of spaceships to increase
access to space. In 2025, our new fleet of Delta class spaceships is
expected to begin flight testing. Our new facility outside Phoenix,
Arizona, will serve as the final assembly and checkout facility for the
Delta fleet. The Delta class vehicle design is expected to increase
performance and reduce time between flights. The introduction of these
next-generation vehicles is an important milestone in Virgin Galactic's
multi-year effort that targets flying 400 flights per year.
Commercial Human Spaceflight Activities
While the U.S. has more than 60 years of history in spaceflight,
and an immense database of lessons learned on spaceflight technology
and vehicle operations that many in industry, including VG, utilize,
the commercial human spaceflight industry is still relatively new.
Until recently, human spaceflight has been primarily in the domain of
governments and access to space for humans has largely been reserved
for those in national astronaut corps. To date, only 670 people have
gone to space, and of those 670, only 64 were non-government astronauts
who flew on commercial vehicles--the majority of which only flew within
the last two years.
The emergence of commercial human spaceflight companies is changing
the paradigm and aiming to democratize access to space for tourism and
research purposes for private citizens, researchers, and government
astronauts. The current human spaceflight industry is small and
diverse--with vehicle systems ranging from spaceplanes to capsules.
Companies are innovating not only through spaceflight technologies, but
through manufacturing capabilities, ground operations, training
programs, and more. The U.S. is leading the world in commercial human
spaceflight and the industry, while still in its infancy, is a beacon
of innovation on and off planet.
Current regulatory environment for human spaceflight is encouraging
innovation and growth without compromising safety
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (AST) regulates commercial space operations to
protect public safety and property, and currently has a prefect safety
record. This includes rules that cover licensing of launch and landing
operations, as well as governance over the establishment of spaceports.
Virgin Galactic has worked closely with the FAA throughout its
licensing process and continues to do so during commercial spaceflight
operations. As the basis of our business, VG's highest priority is the
safety of our crew and spaceflight participants (SFPs).
Virgin Galactic operates a licensed human spaceflight system, with
both mothership and spaceship always operating with two pilots onboard
each vehicle. The spaceflight system is licensed under Title Part 400
regulations carried out by AST. VG's spaceflight system was first
granted an Operator's license in 2016, which was later expanded in 2021
to allow the company to fly Spaceflight Participants (SFPs). This
license--which is maintained throughout our operations for continued
accuracy--is a clear and ongoing validation of our spaceflight system,
which must meet the verification and validation criteria required by
the FAA.
Virgin Galactic's mothership and spaceship also operate under Title
49 Part 91 airworthiness certificates administered by the FAA Flight
Standards District Office, which include annual reviews and inspections
of the vehicles, their operating limitations, and the FAA approved
maintenance inspection program.
Congress acknowledged the emergence of the commercial human
spaceflight industry, recognizing that it is in the dynamic, iterative,
and development cycle, and is not yet ready for the full-scale
regulation that characterizes today's commercial air travel.
Understanding that it is impossible for regulators to create effective
and efficient regulations for diverse, innovative vehicles without
sufficient data, Congress created a regulatory learning period during
which the FAA may regulate for the safety of the public, or in response
to an incident. The rationale was that ``FAA regulatory burdens on the
relatively new and rapidly evolving commercial space launch industry
could slow innovation, particularly when it remains unclear which areas
the FAA should regulate.''
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 established this
regulatory learning period to enable human spaceflight operations to
mature prior to FAA issuance of occupant safety regulations and to
ensure that the agency had adequate time to develop the expertise and
resources required for such regulations. Spaceflight participants
operate under an informed consent and indemnification regimen that
acknowledges the inherent risk and complexity of spaceflight,
consistent with many other activities in the United States. The intent
of the learning period is to allow the industry and the FAA to collect
data that will allow for safe and effective human spaceflight
regulations in the future. It is important to note that the current
regulations that cover operations and public safety also provide
indirectly for occupant safety. During this period, the FAA is still
able to issue regulations governing the design or operation of a
vehicle to protect the health and safety of crew, government
astronauts, and spaceflight participants (under certain conditions).
Commercial human spaceflight readiness indicators for regulation
indicate that the industry is not yet mature enough to drive a
data-based regulatory framework
In Title 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(6), Congress directed the FAA to
submit a report specifying key industry metrics that might indicate a
proper level of maturity for the commercial space industry to be fit
for regulation. Section 50905(c)(7) of that same legislation also
directed the FAA to submit another report every two years on ``the
commercial space activities most appropriate for regulatory action, if
any, and a proposed transition plan for such regulations.''
On October 20, 2017, the FAA submitted its first report to Congress
initially identifying the key metrics that may indicate the commercial
space sector's readiness for regulations. The FAA divided the
indicators into three sets. In each of these three sets, it is clear
the emerging commercial spaceflight industry is not yet mature enough
for human occupant safety regulations.
1. The first set of indicators looks to the industry's readiness to
enter a safety framework by focusing on the purpose for which
people are flying, the size and complexity of the industry, and
its safety.
The size and complexity of the industry is still maturing. For
suborbital flights, the global industry only has one horizontal
launch company, Virgin Galactic, and one vertical launch
company, Blue Origin. So far, Virgin Galactic has nine human
suborbital flights to space, while Blue Origin has conducted
six. SpaceX is the U.S.'s only orbital commercial human
spaceflight system and was primarily developed under contract
to NASA to carry government astronauts to the International
Space Station. Orbital spaceflight subjects human occupants to
a much different spacecraft environment when compared to
suborbital spaceflight. The industry is still small and diverse
in its systems--and while commercial spaceflight has been
around for many years, commercial human spaceflight is still
very much nascent, with frequent flights only occurring in the
last two years. Defining regulations that span diverse systems
without first building a knowledge database has the potential
to do more harm than good.
2. The second set are indicators of the industry's progress in
developing a safety framework and focuses on voluntary safety
reporting, voluntary consensus standards, and compliance.
While the spaceflight industry, with active participation from
the FAA and NASA,is making strong progress in developing
consensus, performance-based safety standards that document
industry and government-derived best practices for the benefit
of the commercial space industry, there is more work to do. As
industry grows and continues to collect data on human
spaceflight operations, an organization and a process exists to
continue the development of safety standards. ASTM
International is a leading standards development organization
with over 120 years of experience, and ASTM's F47 Committee on
Commercial Spaceflight is comprised of a variety of experts
from government, industry, and academia. Subcommittees within
the committee are working on multiple standards related to
human spaceflight. However, with many companies have only
recently begun frequent commercial operations, additional time
is needed to continue to collect and analyze data for the
purpose of developing a safety framework through industry
consensus standards.
3. The final set of indicators relate to the FAA's readiness to
enter into a safety framework and focuses on the FAA's
authority and expertise.
FAA AST is tasked with licensing and permitting commercial space
launch and reentry. In recent years, commercial space industry
growth has stretched AST's licensing resources, and recent
budget requests have included increased amounts to reflect this
need. As launch demand increases, AST needs the resources,
funding, and personnel to carry out the necessary workload for
its primary authority. Until FAA is resourced and able to
perform its principal duty effectively and in a timely manner,
adding additional scope and workload has the potential to delay
commercial spaceflight operations, risking the rapid growth the
industry is undergoing.
Looking at the indicators FAA AST identified themselves, industry
is not yet mature enough for effective and efficient human occupant
safety regulations--but VG believes that it is the right time for
government and industry discussions on future safety frameworks. VG,
itself, has a robust framework for human occupant safety within our
spaceflight system, built on industry and government best practices and
the experience of our team. We look forward to participating and
continuing to share best practices in the proper cross-cutting forum.
Extension of the Learning Period will allow industry time to develop a
standards-based safety framework and create a transition period
to a permanent future framework
This learning period is currently scheduled to expire on January 1,
2024, however, due to the technical and economic challenges of
spaceflight and the industry's emphasis on safety above all, commercial
space companies have proceeded at a more cautious pace than envisioned
in the original bill. As a result, there are only three companies
currently carrying humans to space, and it would be premature to base
occupant safety regulations on this extremely small set of data at this
time.
VG proposes extending the learning period to provide for a
transition period utilizing the collection of data and for the
standards development process to properly inform future safety
frameworks. This transition period should incorporate the development
of an initial set of industry consensus standards that covers
appropriate aspects of spaceflight participant safety, an evaluation of
the practical applications of these standards, and an evaluation of FAA
AST's readiness to transition to a safety framework, including their
execution of existing statutory requirements like launch and reentry
licensing.
The transition period process would create a deadline for
developing an initial set of industry consensus standards that covers
appropriate aspects of spaceflight participant safety. The road mapping
for an initial set of human occupant safety standards should be done
through a standards development organization, such as those currently
being developed by standards development organizations, primarily ASTM,
and/or industry/government advisory group and would include FAA AST
participation in the development and balloting process.
After the initial safety framework is completed through voluntary
safety standards, operators will have a period of time to utilize and
evaluate their effectiveness. Throughout the development and monitoring
periods of this standards-based approach, FAA AST would engage with
operators to collect feedback on the practical application of these
standards to prepare for follow-on regulatory efforts. This will help
the agency develop expertise and a roadmap. At the conclusion of the
transition period, the learning period would be allowed to expire.
Increased funding for FAA AST is needed for AST to keep up with the
growth of the commercial spaceflight industry and effectively
transition to future regulatory reforms
Congress should reaffirm its commitment to safeguarding America's
leadership in commercial space launch and authorize the funding of the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation at the level necessary to
successfully fulfill its mission in an efficient and timely manner.
Additionally, Congress should authorize research, engineering, and
development funding for AST to develop a suite of tools to automate
parts of the licensing process and help license evaluators handle the
growing workload. Due to lack of additional resources, current
resources are rightfully focused on licensing upcoming launch and re-
entries--and should continue to do so. AST should first be adequately
resourced to effectively and efficiently fulfill its current authority
before looking to address future reforms.
Industry & government dialogue is important for the continued success
of the commercial spaceflight industry
In the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (CSLCA),
Congress directed the FAA to ``continue to work with the commercial
space sector, including the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory
Committee (COMSTAC) . . . to facilitate the development of voluntary
consensus standards based on recommended best practices to improve the
safety of crew, government astronauts, and space flight participants as
the commercial space sector continues to mature.'' \1\ Congress further
clarified that ``nothing'' in Title 51 Sec. 50905 ``shall be construed
to limit the authority of the Secretary to discuss potential regulatory
approaches, potential performance standards, or any other topic related
to this subsection with the commercial space industry.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L.
114-90, Sec. 111; 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(5) as amended [hereinafter
CSLCA].
\2\ Id. Sec. 50905(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For many years, both FAA AST and COMSTAC have recognized the
important role that the development of voluntary consensus standards
can play to not only ``improve the safety of the commercial human
spaceflight industry as a whole,'' \3\ but to also ``help provide a
baseline for compliance with potential future regulations covering
human spaceflight'' \4\ once the industry has reached sufficient
operational cadence and technological maturity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Kelvin B. Coleman, Jennifer Bailey, Tara Halt, Rachita Puri,
John Sloan, Regulatory Preparation for U.S. Commercial Human
Spaceflight, 73rd International Astronautical Congress, Sept. 18-22,
2022, available at https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
Regulatory_Prepara
tion_Commercial_HSF%20_FAA%20_Coleman_IAC_Paris_B3_2%20_Sept_2022.pdf.
\4\ FAA, COMSTAC Recommendations for Human Spaceflight (HSF)
Regulation, at 2, Nov. 2021, available at https://www.faa.gov/space/
additional_information/comstac/media/HSF_
Recommendation_Summary_Final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VG has worked with FAA AST since the company's inception to secure
and maintain the licensing of its spaceflight system. In addition, VG
has participated in multiple advisory councils for AST to continue
industry-government partnership in identifying and advancing policies
and regulations that keep up with the ever-evolving industry. This
includes participating in multiple Aerospace Rule-Making Committees
(SpARCs) and advisory committees, such as COMSTAC.
In addition, FAA AST must continue to participate in industry
dialogue and standards organizations. Nothing must be construed in
future policies to restrict AST's ability to engage in discussion on
human spaceflight occupant safety while the learning period is still in
effect.
Conclusion
This is an exciting time for not only Virgin Galactic, but for the
entire industry as it continues to achieve milestones in human
spaceflight. The Committee's tireless work and progress on national and
civil space policy is imperative and much appreciated by the public,
the commercial spaceflight industry, and stakeholders. Thank you for
holding this important hearing and Virgin Galactic looks forward to
working with the Committee.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Our next witness is William
Gerstenmaier. Chair Sinema has Gerst in quotes. Is that
appropriate? This is not my copy, but I am going to go ahead
with Gerst. Take a leap of faith here. And is the Vice
President of Build and Flight Reliability at SpaceX.
He previously spent over 40 years in public service,
including overseeing human spaceflight efforts at NASA. Mr.
Gerstenmaier, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,
VICE PRESIDENT, BUILD & FLIGHT RELIABILITY,
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP. (SPACEX)
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Madam Chair and Mr. Ranking Member, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today. This is a critically
important hearing. We are at an inflection point with
incredible innovation in commercial space launch.
The criticality is especially true in the face of strategic
competition from state actors like China. SpaceX is under
contract with NASA to use Starship to land American astronauts
on the moon before China does.
We are undertaking a campaign that requires many early test
flights to rapidly mature and prove out the critical systems
needed to safely land NASA astronauts on the lunar surface. We
understand the vital importance of this national mission and
the absolute need to protect the public during every phase of
development.
Starship has been ready for its next flight test for more
than a month, but we are waiting for an FAA license and
accompanying interagency review. The Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, known as AST, must recognize where the industry
is, where the industry is going, and its role in regulating
this emerging industry.
Promote, encourage, enable, and protect public safety, this
was Congress's direction to the Commercial Space Act when it
was written. To do this, the pace of American regulation must
match the pace of American innovation.
We are falling behind. I am privileged to lead a team of
outstanding safety and reliability engineers at SpaceX. I also
serve in the control room as SpaceX's Chief Engineer for three
private Dragon flights with spaceflight participants.
Safety and reliability are everyone's responsibility at
SpaceX and enables our current flight rate at about one launch
every 4 days. Safety and reliability enable flight rate and do
not inhibit. Regulations likewise can also be an enabler.
As it relates to the topic of this hearing, I want to be
clear that Congress should pass a multiyear extension for the
human spaceflight learning period. Human spaceflight represents
a tiny fraction of all space launches and is properly regulated
today under a responsible and balanced framework given the
nascent state of the industry.
Much work is being done to think through what the future
regulation may look like. We must get this right and it will
take time. It would be premature by several years to let the
learning period lapse, so I call on Congress to extend it.
With that said, I want to focus my testimony on AST's
regulatory framework for launch and reentry licensing, which is
in great distress. I want to state clearly that AST is an
outstanding and important organization that needs more
resources and immediate regulatory direction from Congress.
AST's role is critical to enabling safe space
transportation, but we are at a breaking point. AST has neither
the resources nor the flexibility to implement its regulatory
obligations. Licensing, including environmental approval, often
takes longer than rocket development. This should never happen,
and it is only getting worse.
Our Starship, Falcon, and Dragon programs are
encountering--are encountering regulatory headwinds and
unnecessary bureaucracy that has nothing to do with public
safety. Regulation is important, but so are the technical
challenges associated with developing and operating
transformative vehicle systems like Starship.
In my written statement, I offer several specific proposals
for the Committee's consideration. As a summary, first, the AST
Licensing Division needs at least twice the resources that they
have today. We also recommend expedited hiring authority for
AST to onboard additional qualified technical experts with an
innovative mindset or to bring in outside help.
Second, AST's role is to promote--protect public safety,
not to ensure success of rocket launches. Congress has been
very clear about this. Space is not aviation. In space launch,
as long as failure occurs safely, safe failure and rapid
learning are often the fastest path to successful development.
Third, AST's Part 450 regulations need to change. When it
comes to projects of national interest such as the Artemis
program, Congress should establish a regulatory regime
consistent with the national program objectives and schedules.
Other Government agencies that participate in AST
licensing, like those with environmental responsibilities,
should also be required to complete their work consistent with
the national program schedules. I thank the Committee for
convening this important hearing, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Gerstenmaier, Vice President, Build &
Flight Reliability, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX)
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, Chair Sinema, Ranking Member
Schmitt, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify about modernizing and improving America's commercial
spaceflight regulatory framework. The Committee's efforts and this
timely hearing are critical particularly now as they relate to the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Commercial Space
Transportation's (AST) current approach to managing launch and reentry
activities. This is a pivotal time for the commercial spaceflight
industry and for American leadership. Your efforts in overseeing human
spaceflight regulations and the transition to the new launch and
reentry regulatory environment are critical. National policy for
spaceflight must correctly recognize where the industry is, where it's
going, and the role of regulators in this emerging and rapidly
developing industry. Most of all, the pace of regulation must match the
pace of American innovation.
As the world's leading space transportation and services provider,
SpaceX maintains safe operations and public safety as our top priority.
We share the Committee's commitment to ensuring the United States
remains the world's leader in space. Unfortunately, under AST's present
regulatory framework, serious problems are quickly mounting that will
undermine American innovation while doing nothing to enhance public
safety. Further, development of human spaceflight regulations also
requires careful thought. Continuing the current learning period while
smartly preparing for the eventual future of more expanded commercial
human spaceflight activity is critical. At the same time, we must
acknowledge the shortcomings of the present system and the volume of
work coming, while reforming the regulatory process to move more
efficiently. We urge the Committee to move quickly to address these
challenges and facilitate an improved licensing framework and provide
additional resources for AST.
I. Introduction
As Vice President for Build and Flight Reliability at SpaceX, my
job is to ensure that SpaceX conducts its operations across the Falcon,
Dragon, Starship, and Starlink programs safely and reliably for all of
our U.S. Government and commercial customers. Prior to joining SpaceX
in 2020, I served as the Associate Administrator of NASA's Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD), where I oversaw
all of NASA's human spaceflight efforts, including the International
Space Station (ISS), the Space Shuttle Program, Commercial Crew and
Cargo, and many others, with a career in public service spanning over
40 years.
Today, I am privileged to lead the outstanding safety and
reliability engineers who enable SpaceX to successfully launch our
Falcon rockets every four days on average; to operate Dragon, the only
operational orbital U.S. human spaceflight system, multiple times per
year--enabling continued U.S. and International Partner presence in
orbit without having to rely on Russia; and to help lead the next-
generation of space launch technology development with Starship to land
the next American astronauts on the Moon in the coming years. At
SpaceX, safety and reliability is not just the responsibility of one
organization; each employee carries a responsibility for safe and
reliable operations. My organization's primary responsibility is to
provide tools and a framework that the company's employees can use for
safe and reliable spaceflight operations. Safety is at the core of
SpaceX's ethos, and no company could successfully execute at our
cadence and reliability without a fundamentally robust safety and
mission assurance culture. Reliable system development and operations
enable our current flight rate and diverse portfolio of activities.
We bring this culture and expertise to bear in our partnerships
across the Government, including with AST. As a general matter, AST
should be recognized for its hardworking, dedicated, and professional
staff that work diligently to protect public safety during space
launches and reentries. AST has an outstanding record of success in its
core mission to protect the uninvolved public, and for this it should
be commended. Its role in commercial space launch and reentry is
critical to the success of the industry. If the U.S. is to continue to
lead the world in space innovation; outmatch aggressive, state-backed
Chinese competition; and enable new revolutionary technologies like
Starship, the regulatory framework and AST will need to fundamentally
change. The current system cannot match the pace of technological
leadership required by the private sector to keep the U.S. a leader in
space exploration and national security. Innovation has returned launch
capability to the U.S. and has provided new technologies that benefit
national security. Starship has the potential to revolutionize launch,
but regulations must be amended to allow for Starship to be successful.
The technical challenges for Starship are significant, and the
regulatory environment needs to enable technical innovation and not add
undue burden to development that does not contribute to public safety.
To be clear, SpaceX has an outstanding relationship with AST and highly
respects the work it does for the industry and the country. However,
much improvement is needed if the U.S. is to remain a leader.
Indeed, AST is the ``gate'' through which all U.S. commercial space
launches and reentries must pass to achieve operational success. The
line at this gate has become unsustainably long, and AST is now facing
the very real prospect that it is slowing rather than enabling U.S.
progress in spaceflight capability. As such, it is imperative that
Congress take quick action to address very specific challenges
inhibiting AST's ability to more efficiently perform its core function.
It should be quickly provided with the necessary resources to do its
job more efficiently and in keeping with industry progress. And AST
itself must embrace responsible improvements to its processes in order
to meet its growing mandate. Otherwise, the United States faces
regulatory paralysis that will stifle the abundant innovation and
capability that the private sector is bringing to market. This
paralysis will harm programs of national significance like Artemis and
threaten the current U.S. leadership in launch and reentry
capabilities.
II. SpaceX in 2023
SpaceX was founded in 2002 to expand space access and to improve
the reliability and affordability of space transportation. Today,
SpaceX is the world's most active launch services provider, having
successfully launched spacecraft to orbit and beyond 270 times,
including 73 launches in 2023 to-date. SpaceX has also conducted 41
orbital reentries with our Dragon spacecraft and 235 successful first
stage landings. At present, we launch a rocket roughly every four days
from U.S. soil. This is an unprecedented pace in the history of
rocketry. The recent Falcon Heavy launch of NASA's Psyche mission to a
metallic asteroid with both boosters returning to safely land at Cape
Canaveral continues to inspire. Reusability is a key enabler for
SpaceX. Starship's fully reusable first and second stages will be a
significant advancement in reusability. Starship needs both reusability
and reliability to be successful. In order to gain reliability, a rapid
flight pace is needed.
SpaceX is proud to serve the Nation's space enterprise with
satellite launches for NASA, DOD, the IC, and other Federal agencies,
and is certified to conduct 100 percent of U.S. Government mission
requirements under the NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) and the
National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Program. In close partnership
with NASA, SpaceX developed the Dragon spacecraft to support crew and
cargo transportation to and from the ISS. Since 2012, we have performed
28 un-crewed cargo resupply flights to and from ISS. In 2020, SpaceX
restored America's human spaceflight access after nearly a decade of
national reliance on Russia. We have successfully conducted seven
crewed missions for NASA to and from ISS since then, with another six-
month mission underway today and more planned in the years to come.
All of SpaceX's innovation occurs in the United States, creating
tens of thousands of direct and indirect jobs, advancing technology,
and generating substantial economic activity. SpaceX invests billions
of dollars across the country in development, test, operations, and
supplier purchasing from crucial (and largely small business) vendors
across America. We maintain manufacturing and engineering facilities in
Hawthorne, CA; Starlink satellite system design and manufacturing
facilities in Redmond, WA; a rocket development and test facility in
McGregor, TX; and launch pads and rocket processing facilities within
Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, NASA Kennedy Space Center, and
Vandenberg Space Force Base; and production, test, and launch
facilities at Starbase in South Texas. SpaceX maintains a network of
more than 7,000 American suppliers--supporting 150,000 small business
jobs--and vendors in all 50 states.
To advance the next generation of space transportation technology,
SpaceX is developing Starship, the largest, most powerful space vehicle
system in history. With its unique, revolutionary design, Starship will
be fully and rapidly reusable, capable of delivering astronauts and
more than 100 tons of usable cargo to orbit, the Moon, and Mars. This
capability is an order of magnitude more than any other launch system
previously developed. The Starship program is ambitious, by design. To
prove out the system, SpaceX has conducted 12 low-and high-altitude
test flights since 2019 from our Starbase development, production, and
launch site near Brownsville, Texas, including the first fully
integrated flight in April 2023. We are prepared to conduct Starship's
second integrated test flight as soon as the end of this month, pending
only FAA license approval, which includes the reviews of supporting
agencies. Critically, the vehicle has been ready to fly since mid-
September. The current regulatory process is not keeping up with the
pace of innovation.
In 2021, NASA competitively awarded SpaceX the Human Landing System
(HLS) contract to help return American astronauts to the Moon as part
of the Artemis Program, and subsequently awarded a follow-on crewed
lunar mission in 2022.\1\ SpaceX is diligently working to maintain
schedule for NASA in the face of global competition with China. NASA
Administrator Bill Nelson has urged expediency, noting: ``[i]t is a
fact: we're in a space race [with China].'' \2\ Though these launches
are for NASA, the FAA is responsible for licensing all test and
operational launches. SpaceX is also under contract with the U.S. Air
Force to use Starship to support the Vanguard Rocket Cargo Program.\3\
Starship represents an area where the U.S. Government does not appear
to be aligned across agencies with its own objectives. While NASA and
DOD are rightly focused on development schedule and national need,
SpaceX faces continual and increasing test and operational headwinds as
it relates to AST and other Federal agencies. Various regulatory
agencies must be aligned on mission to truly enable critical and timely
advancements in space technology that are required for the U.S.
Government to be successful in reaching its own objectives.
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\1\ ``NASA Awards SpaceX Second Contract Option for Artemis Moon
Landing,'' NASA.gov, November 15, 2022, accessed at https://
www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/nasa-awards-spacex-second-contract-option-
for-artemis-moon-landing/
\2\ ``We better watch out: NASA boss sounds alarm on Chinese moon
ambitions,'' POLITICO, January 1, 2023, accessed at https://
www.politico.com/news/ 2023/01/01/we-better-watch-out
-nasa-boss-sounds-alarm-on-chinese-moon-ambitions-
00075803#: :text=So%20says%20NASA%20
Administrator%20Bill,astronaut%20said%20in%20an%20interview.
\3\ ``Rocket Cargo--FA8650-22-9-9301,'' SAM.gov, January 14, 2022,
accessed at https://sam.gov/opp/1bd5d826c1e74a4abee083dde1652348/view
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Starship is further critical to the deployment of next-generation
Starlink and Starshield capability, which are crucial to expanding
broadband access and to U.S national security and foreign policy
objectives abroad. Starlink and Starshield build on the company's
experience in launch vehicle and spacecraft design, development,
production, and on-orbit operations. Operating in low Earth orbit
(LEO), Starlink provides high-speed, low latency broadband to
commercial users in all 50 states and around the world, and today
serves over two million households and businesses. By focusing service
on households that previously lacked access to reliable broadband
service, Starlink is helping to rapidly address the digital divide. And
with Starshield, SpaceX is applying Starlink technology and launch
capability to support vital national security efforts for the DOD.
By operating in LEO, systems like Starlink provide much faster
speeds and lower latency than traditional satellite communications
systems operating in higher orbits, and can support far more users.
However, this closer altitude necessitates deploying thousands of
satellites over hundreds of launches to provide consistent global
coverage, which requires a regulatory regime capable of consistently
and efficiently licensing launches at unprecedented scale. Other
countries are moving forward with significant investment in LEO space
systems, and are clearing regulatory obstacles to allow for their
state-backed networks to rapidly launch and deploy. For example, China
is aggressively pursuing a satellite constellation with plans to launch
approximately 13,000 satellites in the coming years.\4\ The European
Union is also pursuing its own Secure Connectivity LEO system, as are
Russia and India. Launch licensing regulatory challenges are not ``top
of mind'' for these countries as they race to compete with U.S.
commercial technology--regulatory challenges only appear to be an
obstacle for launch companies in the U.S. To be clear, the United
States does not need to set aside its regulatory obligations or its
commitment to public safety; a smart, appropriately resourced system
can both meet these needs and facilitate innovation.
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\4\ ``China is developing plans for a 13,000-satellite
megaconstellation,'' SpaceNews, April 21, 2021, accessed at https://
spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-commu
nications-megaconstellation
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In order to successfully execute on its commitments, SpaceX plans
to conduct at least two more Starship flights this year, with a higher
flight rate in 2024 and beyond, plus an estimated 30 more Falcon
flights for various customers, including the U.S. Government, before
the end of the year. This test and flight cadence across multiple
vehicle families for SpaceX alone is almost certainly not possible if
Congress does not provide AST with additional resources, direction, and
legislative guidance. Unnecessary overhead will delay the technology
advances needed to keep the U.S. as a leader in space. The public needs
to be protected, but the private sector needs to be enabled to explore,
learn, and develop new technologies at a rapid pace. As the human
spaceflight industry emerges, care must be taken to not overburden
development with new regulations. The U.S. public needs to protected
both by regulation and innovation. If the U.S. loses it technological
advantage to other countries, the public is also at risk. The nation
that leads in technology sets the standards for all others to follow.
We cannot risk loss of technical leadership because of an antiquated
regulatory environment. An innovative and agile approach to regulations
is as important as technological advancement.
III. AST Modernization and Change
The Committee is taking on important work across the full range of
space policy issues from establishing a balanced, responsible mission
authorization process to maintaining a sustainable orbital environment.
SpaceX strongly supports all of this work and looks forward to working
with the Committee as it formulates policy. As noted, however, the
Committee must first place its focus on AST and launch and reentry
licensing reforms, which is the sine qua non for every other regulated
activity related to U.S. space activities.
While nearly the entire rest of the world relies on state-owned or
state-sponsored entities, the United States derives nearly all of its
competitiveness in space from the domestic commercial sector. Indeed,
U.S. Government launch capability for NASA, DOD, and the IC is almost
exclusively provided by commercial launch providers as a service. The
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 established the Nation's launch and
reentry regulatory framework, which appropriately prioritized
protecting public safety while maximizing innovation:
``the United States should encourage private sector launches
and associated services and, only to the extent necessary,
regulate such launches and services in order to ensure
compliance with international obligations of the United States
and to protect the public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security interests and foreign policy
interests of the United States.'' \5\
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\5\ Emphasis added. ``H.R. 3942--98th Congress (1983-1984):
Commercial Space Launch Act,'' Congress.gov, October 30, 1984, accessed
at https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/3942
Congress has consistently recognized over several decades that
``there is an inherent risk in spaceflight.'' \6\ Accordingly, it has
directed that the regulatory regime for commercial space launch and
reentry focus on protecting public safety, rather than attempting to
perform mission assurance or otherwise ensure the success of a space
launch or reentry. To be clear, it is expressly not the purpose of AST
to prevent launches or reentry from failing. Commercial space
regulations are not akin to aviation regulations and have been
developed purposefully to limit AST's role in this respect. The fact
that commercial space is regulated by FAA versus any other Federal
agency is incidental, but the comingling of AST within FAA's broader
priorities of regulating commercial aviation--where FAA must regulate
to ensure the success of airline flights--creates undue confusion
regarding AST's role.
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\6\ ``H.R. 5382--108th Congress (2003-2004): Commercial Space
Launch Amendments Act of 2004,'' Congress.gov, December 23, 2004,
accessed at https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/
5382; ``H.R. 2262--114th Congress (2015-2016) Spurring Private
Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015: Report,''
Govinfo.gov, May 18, 2015, accessed at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/CRPT-114hrpt119/pdf/CRPT-114hrpt119.pdf
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While AST has achieved admirable success ensuring public safety, it
is reaching a breaking point as it relates to timely license issuance,
even for ``routine'' missions on mature launch vehicle systems like the
Falcon 9. With respect to innovative systems in development, including
those that are critical to key national objectives like NASA's Artemis
program, AST licensing is now the critical path watch item that is at
risk of slowing the pace of innovation and program execution. For
example, the Starship Flight 2 launch vehicle has been ready to fly
since mid-September in order to test critical systems needed to meet
NASA objectives, and is simply awaiting AST licensing approval. This is
the consequence of several concurrent challenges, including:
(1) AST's transition to ``streamlined,'' performance-based
regulations under Part 450 has resulted in delayed agency
guidance, confusion, and uncertainty both for the regulated
entity and the regulator. In September 2020, AST updated its
regulations in an attempt to reform the licensing process and
keep pace with the growth of the launch industry. While well-
intentioned, the Part 450 effort has not succeeded in
accomplishing a streamlined process. AST's ability to process
licenses in a timely fashion has declined rather than
improved--indeed, as evidenced by licensing for the handful of
applicants under Part 450, approval timelines are not
improving. For example, the Starship license for Flight 1 took
nearly three years. These delays are contrary to the intent of
Part 450 itself, and this situation is untenable.
AST's delay in issuing clear guidance results largely from
resource constraints--its overburdened staff have rightly
focused on the growing pile of license applications, and have
little time to think cohesively about implementation and policy
development with respect to Part 450. The Commercial Space
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) issued consensus
recommendations to AST on this issue, and Congress should
encourage AST to move forward on those recommendations.
(2) AST as a whole--and particularly its Licensing Division--is
substantially under-resourced. With its limited staff, the AST
Licensing Division is often constrained as to how it allocates
its resources and must pull qualified analysts from one
application or internal program to focus on another--resulting
in delays for both. Currently, AST is only able to review
license material sequentially (rather than in parallel). A
license applicant is forced to ``pick and choose'' which of its
programs should be prioritized in order to help manage AST's
workload. This places both AST and its licensees in an
impossible position, particularly for licensees who work
multiple programs important to the Government--what should be
prioritized? Vehicle operators should not be in a position of
deferring license work or disrupting business operations in
order to alleviate AST workload.
(3) AST's regulatory approach is often non-agile and inflexible,
contrary to national policy which requires both. Indeed, the
National Space Policy mandates that agencies must ``[c]reate
transparent regulatory processes that minimize, consistent with
national security and public safety, the regulatory burden and
uncertainty for commercial space activities and that are
flexible. . .'' \7\ AST must do more to enable flexibility in
its regulations, particularly for mature launch and reentry
systems and launch sites. In many cases, both have been
otherwise approved by NASA or the United States Space Force
(USSF), but AST's interpretation of its regulatory compliance
obligations forces duplicative and unnecessary paperwork that
does not contribute to public safety and is not in the national
interest.
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\7\ ``National Space Policy of the United States of America,''
Office of Space Commerce, December 9, 2020, accessed at https://
www.space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy/
The above reflect status quo challenges. But, as AST transitions
licenses for vehicles previously approved under legacy regulations to
Part 450 over the next two years, the entire regulatory system is at
risk of collapse. AST is struggling to fulfill its responsibilities
today and simply does not have the bandwidth to process the significant
additional paperwork of this transition without materially reducing its
responsiveness to applicants. This is not a hypothetical--AST's
workload over the next 12-24 months could result in the grounding of
U.S. space launch capability if action is not taken immediately.
SpaceX recommends Congress take steps immediately to modernize the
current launch and reentry licensing regime and provide additional
resources and tools to aid AST in its mission.
IV. Rapid Technology Development
America's greatest strength against well-organized, state-sponsored
foreign competition that has no respect for intellectual property is
its entrepreneurial system that enables and encourages rapid,
continuous private sector innovation. Here, SpaceX takes a spiral
development approach across all of our programs, which prioritizes
rapid design, early test article build, and frequent real-world flight
testing early in the development process. SpaceX uses this approach
across all of our complex space system development programs, including
Falcon 9, Dragon, Falcon Heavy, Merlin and Raptor engine development,
and Starlink. And it has yielded unprecedented successes. In every
case, this approach proved to be less expensive, faster, and more
successful than any comparable aerospace development approach, in most
cases by orders of magnitude.
Testing development hardware in a flight environment enables our
teams to quickly learn and execute design changes and hardware upgrades
necessary to improve the probability of success in the future. At all
phases of development and operation, SpaceX takes every precaution to
ensure public safety, but we will take programmatic risk during testing
to advance technology--just as the United States did through much of
the Space Race. Public risk and programmatic risk are not the same and
are not in conflict--we (and our customers) are responsible for
programmatic risk. AST is responsible for ensuring that our efforts to
protect public safety are verified and appropriate. Both are achieved
with success simultaneously.
SpaceX works closely with federal, state, and local agencies,
including AST, to protect public safety and the safety of the SpaceX
workforce. This philosophy has proven highly successful. Our Falcon
family of launch vehicles are now the most flown in the United States
by far and the most reliable space vehicles in history.\8\ Globally,
Falcon is the only vehicle system able to keep pace with a similar high
cadence of launch in China. And, from a mass-to-orbit perspective,
which is the most important metric when evaluating capability, Falcon
alone outperforms China three to one. Without this speed of innovation,
China would outperform the United States by far today. Excluding
SpaceX, China launched nearly three times more than the rest of U.S.
industry combined in the first half of 2023, and carried almost eight
times more mass to orbit than all other U.S. launch operators.\9\
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\8\ ``The Falcon 9 may now be the safest rocket ever launched,''Ars
Technica, February 3, 2022, accessed at https://arstechnica.com/
science/2022/02/spacexs-falcon-9-rocket-has-set-a-record-for-most-
consecutive-successes/
\9\ ``Global Orbital Space Launches Q1 2023,'' BryceTech, n.d.,
accessed at https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/
Bryce_Briefing_2023_Q1.pdf; ``Global Orbital Space Launches Q2 2023,''
BryceTech, n.d., accessed at https://brycetech.com/reports/report-
documents/Bryce_Briefing_2023_Q2.pdf
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Most recently, however, this paradigm seems to be failing. AST's
approach to Starship appears out of family with its general approach
for both SpaceX and other vehicle licensing among U.S. systems that
SpaceX is aware of. For example, with Falcon, the iterative design
process was aptly demonstrated by SpaceX's approach to learn how to
recover and reuse rockets, which is a huge advantage to the United
States. Here, from 2012 to 2015, SpaceX undertook a development effort
to prove out orbital vehicle reusability, a capability long held to be
impossible for an orbital-class rocket stage. This development
campaign, which progressed from suborbital to orbital experiments (much
like Starship) included at first many low and high-altitude flight
tests in quick succession across several hardware versions of the
launch system, some of which resulted in a loss of vehicle, and then
recovery attempts following successful orbital launches of Falcon 9. At
every stage of the process, we widely publicized and celebrated these
tests--including failures--which we used to learn and then apply those
learnings to the vehicle.\10\
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\10\ ``How Not to Land an Orbital Rocket Booster,'' SpaceX,
September 14, 2017, accessed at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bvim4rsNHkQ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SpaceX conducted all of these tests safely. We were permitted to
learn through flight. We implemented learnings quickly, returned to
flight quickly, and learned more. And then we achieved success with
Falcon. Today, since the first successful recovery of a Falcon first
stage in December 2015, SpaceX has now successfully recovered a Falcon
booster 235 times and re-flown our rockets 207 times, transforming the
economics of space access. The United States is the only country that
has this capability today--not China, not Russia, not Europe. This
success would not have been possible without rapid development, rapid
flights, and timely licensing from AST. SpaceX is following the same
approach with Starlink and Starship today, but we are not experiencing
the same licensing approach from AST.
V. Launch and Reentry Licensing
To address these challenges, SpaceX proposes specific improvements
to the regulatory process for launch and reentry that are vital to
ensuring America's continued global leadership and competitiveness in
space. Specifically:
(1) Provide AST with significantly more resources (at least 2x) and
expedited hiring authority to move quickly to bring onboard
additional, qualified technical experts to keep pace with
license review. These resources should be specifically (and
only) authorized and appropriated for the AST Licensing
Division. Additionally, more resources will be for naught if
AST is unable to timely and efficiently hire--Congress should
empower AST to use expedited hiring authorities to rapidly grow
its workforce.
(2) Provide AST with new authorities to enable license applicants
to self-fund qualified, third-party technical organizations to
bolster and expedite AST license review where needed.
(3) Provide AST with additional resources and direct AST personnel
to travel to launch operator locations to conduct in-person
Technical Interchange Meetings (TIM) on-site with license
applicants. In-person TIMs are a highly productive and
efficient mechanism to clarify technical matters associated
with license applications, and to see hardware and launch
infrastructure in order to gain an understanding of proposed
activities and verifications.
(4) Establish shorter mandatory timelines to initiate review,
conduct interagency consultations, and complete license
applications, and eliminate the tolling loophole. The license
application process should be electronic and automated to the
maximum extent possible.
(5) Direct clarity updates to Part 450 and establish standard,
expedited processes for regular and routine license application
review, especially for mature vehicles that launch or reenter
frequently. Each license application review today is a bespoke
effort, even for vehicles and profiles that have flown many
times previously. AST should have tiers of review based on
operator and vehicle experience and maturity. AST's advisory
circulars (ACs) relating to Part 450 are intended to provide
guidance to both applicants and reviews, but in many cases they
either do not exist or simply reincorporate processes from
legacy regulations--which are overly conservative and
prescriptive. The regulatory uncertainty associated with Part
450 implementation is driving unnecessary burden for both
industry and AST. And, the prescriptive and conservative nature
of the Part 450 ACs that have been published render them
inapplicable when evaluating unique, innovative vehicle
features that companies are introducing to add capability,
reduce costs, and improve safety. Properly structured
regulations should instead encourage technical progress by
laying out a clear, responsible path to applicants in advance
to achieve compliance.
(6) Direct AST to focus only on public safety, not mission success.
This is an absolutely critical element of space launch and re-
entry licensing that has been lost in interpretation. As noted,
AST is not responsible for mission assurance, nor is it
qualified to perform this function. Congress has specifically
identified public safety as the sole objective of launch and
reentry licensing, but the vague and interpretive nature of
Part 450 has led to regulatory over-reach, where reviewers now
devote significant time and resources to consider factors
unrelated to public safety and outside the scope and intent of
Part 450.
(7) Provide authority to expediently issue waivers to outmoded
requirements that do not impact public safety.
(8) Accelerate environmental reviews by extending existing
authority used for airports to space launch and reentry
infrastructure, and to provide expedited review for projects of
national interest and national security.
(9) Establish an accelerated regulatory path, potentially
independent of AST, for development and for experimental
missions that support national requirements like the Artemis
Program. This option would align AST's mission with that of
broader national priorities. AST's current experimental
authorities should be enhanced to capture innovative system
development, particular for those under contract to perform
work for the U.S. Government.
(10) Align external regulatory timelines and reviews. Under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other relevant
laws, AST is often responsible for conducting environmental
consultations relating to its licensed activities with other
Federal and state agencies. Here, review timelines and
requirements are misaligned and incongruent. Congress should
implement common sense procedural changes to align inter-agency
review schedules, enforce deadlines, and provide expedited
review for commercial space projects of national interest or
national security.
VI. Human Spaceflight Regulations
Following the first SpaceShipOne flights in 2004, Congress passed
the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA) of 2004.\11\ This
legislation appropriately established a comprehensive framework
intended not to regulate for mission success, but rather ``to put in
place a clear and balanced regulatory regime that promotes the
development of the emerging commercial human space flight industry,
while protecting the public health and safety.'' \12\ This structure,
which remains in place today, incorporated three key elements:
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\11\ H.R. 5382 (108th)
\12\ Id.
-- An informed consent regime. The bill affirmed the ``inherent
risk'' of any type of spaceflight--commercial or Government--in
acknowledgement of the fundamental differences between space
launch and reentry and any mode of common carriage
transportation (e.g., commercial aviation). Space vehicle
operators must provide significant information to prospective
space flight participants about general risks, the vehicle in
question, and the operator's safety record. Space flight
participants must accept these risks in writing. Informed
consent is a common legal practice, and it is in use for many
adventure sports, including skydiving with more than 3.9
million jumps in the United States in 2022. \13\ The informed
consent regime has been very effective in both ensuring public
safety and allowing industry development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``How safe is skydiving?,'' United States Parachute
Association, n.d., accessed at https://www.uspa.org/discover/faqs/
safety#: :text=Skydiving%20is%20a%20popular%20sport,of%2092
%20jumps%20per%20member).
-- Occupant safety regulations intended to protect public safety.
The 2004 CSLAA requires DOT to issue regulations to ensure safe
operation of a vehicle in order to protect public safety. To-
date, AST has published regulations relating to training and
medical condition, environmental control and life support
systems, fire suppression and smoke detection, and various
other human factors. AST's approach has been appropriate to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
date based on regulatory authority and industry development.
-- Learning Period. The CSLAA properly established the human
spaceflight ``learning period,'' often colloquially (and
incorrectly) referred to as a ``moratorium,'' that
appropriately limits AST from promulgating additional
regulations relative to occupant safety during launch and
reentry until both industry and AST have sufficient experience
and data to consider whether a different safety framework is
required. The learning period originally ran through 2012, but
has been subsequently extended several times and now is set to
expire January 1, 2024. Even with the learning period in place,
the law permits AST to promulgate regulations to restrict or
prohibit design features that resulted in a serious or fatal
injury or that posed a high risk of causing a serious or fatal
injury during a licensed or permitted commercial human
spaceflight. The law also does not require AST to promulgate
human spaceflight regulations on any particular timeline, or at
all for that matter.
SpaceX recommends that Congress extend the human spaceflight
learning period. The current learning period expiration date of January
1, 2024 is premature by several years, and the same factors that led
Congress to extend the learning period in 2012 and 2015 remain true
today. As an initial matter, based on the above, AST is simply not in a
position to effectively regulate in this area, nor should it. Both the
scope of the industry and the number of flights with private
individuals remain very low, and the existing occupant safety
requirements under FAA Part 460 effectively protect the public. At this
stage of development, informed consent is appropriate and protects the
occupants since spaceflight today is completely unlike commercial
passenger aircraft transport. Industry is still developing concepts and
hardware with orbital, sub-orbital, and balloon systems.
Additionally, not only does AST lack specific expertise in human
spaceflight systems, it is completely overwhelmed in executing its core
launch and reentry mission. AST has neither the resources nor the
expertise to develop regulations in the near-future, and transferring
funds or personnel from its public safety obligations would serve only
to compound the challenges AST is facing in licensing launch and
reentry operations and would not improve safety. If anything, Congress
should reiterate and reinforce that AST must exclusively focus on
protecting the public during launches and reentries, and hold AST
accountable for doing so. Congress should approve a multi-year
extension of the learning period and support the consensus standards
development effort underway today on human spaceflight safety.
Even if AST were adequately processing applications for launches
and reentries in a timely fashion, it is unprepared to implement human
spaceflight regulations today or in the next several years. DOT only
just formally established an Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (SpARC)
designed to initiate consultation with industry and other experts in
this area. The process to produce a report alone is expected to take at
least two years, and most likely longer, plus additional time for
Congress, AST, and stakeholders to evaluate any recommendations. The
very reason DOT convened a SpARC is to learn what it should potentially
do as it relates to human spaceflight, which could include extending
the learning period further. A lapse in the learning period at the very
time this SpARC is conducting its work would be the wrong policy
outcome.
The Committee should understand that AST's execution of its public
safety obligations for launch and reentry licensing is totally
dissimilar from FAA's implementation of aircraft safety statutory
obligations under a completely unrelated set of statutes, regulations,
and mission objectives. While FAA has technical authority in aviation
safety and the protection of airline passengers, it does not have
similar expertise in spaceflight technical systems beyond public
safety. It has never been AST's job to evaluate the flightworthiness of
space systems--nor should it be. AST's job is to ensure that, if a
failure with a spaceflight system occurs, it does not harm the
uninvolved public, either persons or property. The differences from
aircraft worthiness in one case to public safety in the other are vast
and will remain so for many years.
Regulations on commercial space were very deliberatively
constructed in this way. The accompanying bill report to the 2015 CSLCA
noted that ``[w]ithout launching and operating commercial human
spaceflights, industry. and regulators have limited data to inform
safety regulations, which could lead to uninformed or unnecessary
regulations that would stifle the growing industry.'' \14\ This remains
true today--indeed, not much has changed since 2015 except a handful of
flights from a total of three operators, only one orbital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ H.R. 2262 (114th)
-- While SpaceX has conducted many uncrewed satellite launches for
commercial customers, the broader U.S. launch industry is
primarily still developing new systems, which have only
recently begun launches or may begin to do so over the coming
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
years.
-- There have been very few commercial human spaceflight missions
without government astronauts--a total of three to orbit, and
all on a system (Dragon) certified by NASA. While Congress and
industry anticipated many missions with paying private
customers to occur in the years immediately following the
passage of the 2004 CSLAA, this did not occur. In reality,
there were zero private human spaceflights to sub-orbit or
orbit between 2005 and 2021. SpaceX remains the only domestic
provider of operational human spaceflight to orbit and has
conducted three total missions with a total of 12 space flight
participants since 2021. There are only two operational
providers of sub-orbital private missions (Blue Origin and
Virgin Galactic), who collectively have conducted 11 missions
with spaceflight participants since 2021.\15\ This is the very
definition of a nascent industry. By comparison, there are more
than 45,000 commercial aviation flights in the United States
every day that collectively carry 2.9 million passengers, and
evidently 3.9 million sky dives annually that remain regulated
under an informed consent regime.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``List of human spaceflights, 2021-present,'' Wikipedia, n.d.,
accessed at https://en.wiki
pedia.org/w/
index.php?title=List_of_human_spaceflights,_2021%E2%80%93present&oldid=1
17
8938297
\16\ ``Air Traffic by the Numbers,'' FAA.gov, April 2023, accessed
at https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers
-- Human spaceflight vehicle designs remain fundamentally different
from each other--including capsules, winged vehicles, lifting
bodies, balloons, automated systems, manually-piloted systems,
and others. Unlike aircraft, there is no consensus on space
vehicle design or operation, making any common regulatory
approach untenable today to both the operator and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government.
-- Both launch vehicles and spacecraft are early in their design
cycles and continue to see significant changes in design and
operational concepts. This rapid iteration is necessary to
eventually get to a future with airplane-like operations.
Otherwise, premature occupant safety regulations risk freezing
the industry in an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the
development of technologies that would materially improve
safety.
-- There are no accepted metrics to evaluate the readiness of either
FAA or industry to proceed to a different regulatory structure,
as noted by COMSTAC.
-- The 2015 CSLCA encouraged the commercial space sector, with AST
facilitation, to develop voluntary industry consensus
standards. This development has been far slower than Congress
anticipated due to limited market, operational experience, and
vehicle systems, including zero flights with space flight
participants until six years after the law was passed. However,
development has accelerated over the past year. There are now
10 published human spaceflight standards, and others that are
in development. A comprehensive set of consensus standards may
be available by the end of the decade. Congress should allow
this process to unfold before providing AST with preemptory
authority that would be ill-informed without the completion of
this process.
Continued industry development, completion of consensus standards,
and the ongoing work of the Part 460 SpARC, and AST's fundamental lack
of resources all demonstrate the need for Congress to pass a multi-year
extension of the learning period.
VII. Conclusion
SpaceX respectfully urges the Committee to take action to keep the
U.S. as the world's leader in spaceflight during this pivotal time.
Action is important not only to SpaceX, but to the industry as a whole.
U.S. leadership and the well-being of all Americans hinge on
appropriate action. The private sector is working hard to support the
Nation, but it needs the help of Congress and regulatory agencies. AST
can be both an enabler of safe spaceflight and one of innovation. Its
role in executing its licensing functions and promoting the U.S.
commercial launch industry has never been more important, and it is at
a crossroads. SpaceX respectfully urges the Committee to help AST
perform its statutory obligations given the rapid pace of growth in
this industry. Given the challenges of its limited workforce and
inflexible interpretation of regulatory requirements, U.S. leadership
in space will suffer without action. SpaceX thanks the Committee for
convening this hearing. We stand ready to help the Committee take
productive action on these issues in the remaining months of this year.
Please contact [email protected] with any questions or if
we can provide any additional information.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Our final witness is Phil
Joyce. Mr. Joyce is the Senior Vice President of the New
Shepard Business Unit at Blue Origin.
He has spent over four decades in aerospace and defense
working, including a focus on human spaceflight and launch
vehicle development. Mr. Joyce, you are recognized for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PHIL JOYCE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE NEW
SHEPARD BUSINESS UNIT, BLUE ORIGIN
Mr. Joyce. Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you today. Blue Origin's team
is focused on radically reducing the cost of access to space,
harnessing its vast resources, and inspiring future
generations.
We build and operate reusable rocket engines and launch
vehicles, in-space systems, and lunar landers. The products we
create will enable our vision of millions of people living and
working in space for the benefit of Earth, a vision that must
be built on a foundation of safety, innovation, and
competition.
At Blue Origin, we recognize that the U.S. Government is a
critical partner in advancing our vision. On July 20th, 2021,
our new Shepard suborbital rocket completed its first
commercial human spaceflight, safely caring four humans above
the Karman line and back to Earth.
This milestone was made possible by a deliberate step by
step test and verification program conducted over many years
with a singular focus on safety. Since then, New Shepard has
flown 5 percent of the world's population of astronauts above
the Karman line, and almost 9 percent of the women, and many
firsts for humans in space.
Our astronauts return to Earth forever transformed by their
experience and share this with the rest of the world to inspire
positive change. Since the dawn of the space age, humans in
space have united the planet and there is no time like the
present to remind us how critical this is for humanity.
The first step to an enduring human presence in space is
launch. The FAA's authority in this area is clear and its
regulatory powers are extensive. Blue Origin and the other
companies here provide the FAA with comprehensive data about
our systems and processes to ensure the safety of the
uninvolved public and property.
A recent experience partnering with the FAA to investigate
a mishap on an uncrewed New Shepard flight is an example of the
effectiveness of the current regulations. Our flight safety
systems worked as designed, and the FAA was able to efficiently
verify this due to the insights we have provided through the
licensing process.
To continue promoting safety and innovation, the FAA needs
three things. First, the FAA needs a more streamlined process.
To keep pace with industry, both the substance and
administration of launch regulations should be improved.
We encourage Congress to support the FAA's effort to
generate guidance, process, tools, and training. This will
allow the FAA to use their staff more efficiently without
adding unnecessary burdens to operators.
Second, the FAA needs sufficient resources to keep up with
licensing. Congress and the FAA helped accelerate the
development of the commercial spaceflight industry, and now the
FAA is struggling to keep pace.
Streamline processes will help, but the FAA needs more
funding to deal with the increase in launches. This is a great
problem to have. It is why you passed the Commercial Space
Launch Act in the first place.
Third, the FAA needs time. The learning period is an
opportunity for the FAA to gain experience in human spaceflight
before it regulates further. The learning period should be
extended. The FAA should be encouraged to talk to industry,
build consensus, and scale up its licensing capabilities. In
the meantime, launch operations such as New Shepard will
continue, and this will provide valuable insight to the FAA and
the industry.
Beyond the FAA, Congress should think broadly about how to
build a framework for mission authorization that should be
correctly scoped and draw clear boundaries between agencies. We
also recommend Congress designate a single agency as the hub
for authorization of commercial space activity.
In conclusion, commercial human spaceflight is an American
success story in progress. Congress has an opportunity to help
write the next chapter and spur continued innovation in the
space economy. From launch to the moon and beyond, U.S.
leadership is a necessity.
To cement our role, we need a competitive regulatory
environment, one that realizes the potential for commercial
investment alongside our civil and national security
initiatives. We look forward to making progress toward the
dream of millions of people living and working in space for the
benefit of Earth. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joyce follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phil Joyce, Senior Vice President,
New Shepard Business Unit, Blue Origin
Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today
about commercial human spaceflight, a topic that is fundamental to Blue
Origin's near and long-term vision.
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT AT BLUE ORIGIN
Blue Origin is building a road to space for the benefit of Earth.
Our team is focused on radically reducing the cost of access,
harnessing its vast resources, and inspiring future generations. We
build and operate reusable rocket engines and launch vehicles, in-space
systems, and lunar landers. Blue Origin has grown into a company of
more than 10,000 employees, with facilities in seven states and a
nationwide supply chain. The vehicles and in-space systems we create
will enable our vision of millions of people living and working in
space, a vision that relies on the principles of safety, innovation,
and competition. Blue Origin's astronauts return to Earth forever
changed by their experience and share this with the rest of the world
as champions of space for the benefit of Earth.
NEW SHEPARD--SUBORBITAL LAUNCH
On July 20, 2021, Blue Origin's New Shepard suborbital rocket
completed its first commercial human spaceflight, safely carrying four
humans above the Karman line and back to Earth. Since then, New Shepard
has flown 5 percent of the world's astronauts above the Karman line, 9
percent of the women, and many firsts for humans in space. We expect to
fly more than 1,000 humans to space in the coming years.
Safety is--and always will be--Blue Origin's highest priority.
These milestones in human flight were preceded by years of a
deliberate, step-by-step test and verification program with a singular
focus on safety. Blue Origin has been flight testing the New Shepard
rocket and its redundant safety systems since 2012. The program has had
22 successful consecutive missions, including three successful escape
tests, showing that the crew escape system can activate safely in any
phase of flight. This safety system was activated during the most
recent uncrewed New Shepard mission in an unplanned event and performed
flawlessly.
The foundation of New Shepard's safety architecture is a design and
verification process that incorporates best industry practice from
aerospace and other safety-critical industries. New Shepard's crew
capsule was designed with numerous redundant safety systems that
provide layers of protection to our astronaut crews. For example, the
capsule can land with only one of its three parachutes deployed, as the
landing deceleration system, crushable ring on the bottom of the
capsule, and seats designed to absorb g-forces all act as back-up
systems to slow the capsule and allow it to land astronauts safely.
This attention to detail in our safety system design is a result of our
culture, which puts safety at the forefront of all our operations.
NEW GLENN--ORBITAL LAUNCH
As the New Shepard program gains experience through design, build,
test, and operation, lessons learned have been and continue to be
applied to New Glenn, Blue Origin's orbital launch vehicle. These
lessons have been particularly beneficial in the areas of autonomy,
guidance, vertical landing architecture, powerful and throttleable
liquid engines, and lean operations. New Glenn's reusable first stage
is built for a minimum of 25 missions and though early operations are
devoted to payload launch, the vehicle is also engineered with the
safety and redundancy required to fly humans. New Glenn is purpose-
built to deliver high volume and mass to orbit and is a key to
unlocking our long-term vision--a future where people and heavy
industries can work in space to preserve Earth, humanity's blue origin.
ORBITAL REEF--COMMERCIAL SPACE STATION
Orbital Reef will revolutionize human spaceflight in low Earth
orbit (LEO). This unique destination will provide the essential
infrastructure needed to scale economic activity and open new markets
in space. The next era of the space station will go beyond research to
include entertainment, tourism, and so much more. Attached modules of
many types can experiment with any type of business, including:
government-sponsored space research; industrial operations ranging from
entertainment and advertising to filmmaking, sports, and gaming, to
applications research and manufacturing; passenger travel starting with
adventure travel, then evolving to tourism and orbital living.
In the near future, LEO will be the logical place to mature
technology, train astronauts, conduct science, and inspire students.
This means we need to assure access for crew and cargo, preserve a
sustainable working environment free of orbital debris, and prioritize
investments in next-generation research capabilities.
LUNAR LANDER
Lunar permanence has been core to Blue Origin's vision since the
beginning. We are a proud partner with NASA on the Artemis program,
building the Sustaining Lunar Development lander to take astronauts
back to the Moon and create a sustainable human presence.
Blue Origin's lunar lander and supporting systems are the
foundational elements of our broader architecture to enable our vision
of building a road to space for the benefit of Earth. To realize the
value of the Moon's potential, secure a sustained lunar presence, and
achieve Blue's goal of lunar permanence, we need reliable, recurring
lunar transportation.
GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS IN HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
LAUNCH
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (AST) is responsible for regulating the U.S.
commercial space transportation industry, ``to ensure compliance with
international obligations of the United States, and to protect the
public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States.'' \1\
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\1\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50901(a)(7). See also ``About the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation'' https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ast
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Human Spaceflight Regulation
In 2004, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA) was
passed by Congress and granted the Secretary of Transportation the
authority to regulate launch and reentry of commercial spacecraft
carrying humans.\2\ This legislation provided limitations to ensure
that a nascent industry and its regulator were able to build experience
in human spaceflight safety. These limitations, known as the `learning
period,' require that no safety regulations for design features or
operating practices can be promulgated unless they are created after an
event resulting in a serious or fatal injury (or the risk of such an
injury). In response to this congressional action, the FAA published
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 460.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Pub. L. 108-492
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Part 460 does address some aspects of occupant safety, including
requirements to protect crew members who are essential to a vehicle's
flight safety system and therefore public safety. These include
training and environmental controls that guard the crew's ability to
carry out safety-critical tasks, as well as additional requirements for
pilots and remote operators.\3\ Space flight participants (SFPs) are
required to be trained for emergency conditions and are informed in
detail as to the risks of spaceflight.\4\ This process, known as
`informed consent,' requires operators to communicate safety records
throughout the history of spaceflight, including all known hazards and
risks associated with their mission, and acknowledge there are unknown
hazards associated with spaceflight. Written documentation is followed
by an opportunity to ask oral questions to ensure risks are well
understood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.5 through Sec. 460.5-13
\4\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 460.45 and Sec. 460.51,
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Launch & Reentry Regulations
All launch activity, regardless of humans on board, requires a
license from the FAA. Licensing is performed under the regulations
found in 14 CFR Part 450, though legacy operators may hold active
licenses under the legacy requirements of Part 431 (Reusable Launch
Vehicles) and Part 415 (Expendable Launch Vehicle). Part 450 is a
result of Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2)\5\ published in 2018 which
directed a review and revision of launch and re-entry licensing for the
purpose of streamlining. The policy requires a single license for all
operations and the use of primarily performance-based criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See ``Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations on
Commercial Use of Space'', May 24 2018 https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-
directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blue Origin and many other industry stakeholders were, and continue
to be, extremely supportive of the goals of SPD-2. After an accelerated
rulemaking process, the FAA published the Part 450 regulations which
became effective in March 2021. As of July 2023, only four licenses
have been granted.\6\ The implementation of these regulations is
discussed in the policy recommendations of this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See ``COMSTAC Regulatory Working Group Report, Part 450--
Challenges and Recommendations'' July 11, 2023 https://www.faa.gov/
media/68016
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IN-SPACE ACTIVITY
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states that ``[t]he activities
of non-governmental entities in outer space . . . shall require
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party
to the Treaty.'' \7\ The United States currently does not vest a single
agency with that authority.
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\7\ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (1967), 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 18 U.S.T. 2410.
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Activities in space are currently monitored and licensed by
numerous U.S. government agencies to satisfy this obligation. The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licenses satellites and earth
stations for space-based services and is responsible for allocation of
spectrum for all public and private actors. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs Office (CRSRA) licenses operations of commercial imaging
satellites. The Department of Defense (DoD) currently provides
monitoring and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) services for
commercial operators on orbit. The Office of Space Commerce (OSC) has
begun work on a parallel SSA service in anticipation of transitioning
these responsibilities from the DoD. Lastly, FAA commercial space
launch licenses require advanced review of all payloads for potential
impacts to national security, international obligations, and foreign
policy through an interagency process known as a Payload Determination.
NASA
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) does not
have regulatory authority over commercial human spaceflight, but NASA
plays an important role as a stakeholder in U.S. space activity. NASA's
Commercial Crew Program has successfully utilized commercial services
for launch to the International Space Station (ISS) since 2020. While
these launches are licensed by the FAA, NASA maintains responsibility
for Crew Safety outside of the FAA's Part 460 Regulations.
NASA is also engaging with commercial industry's suborbital vehicle
programs through an effort known as Suborbital Crew (SubC). For this
program, NASA has changed its approach to managing the safety of their
personnel.\8\ Rather than requiring formal certification programs,
companies must present a ``safety case'' that explains their internal
safety processes, which NASA will evaluate to make a determination.
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\8\ See ``Commercial Programs'' NASA Advisory Committee Meeting,
May 2023 Slide 14 https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/csd-
nac-briefing-may-2023-tagged.pdf
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENABLE CONTINUED SAFETY, INNOVATION,
COMPETITION
EXTEND THE LEARNING PERIOD
The learning period has had a positive impact on the development of
commercial human spaceflight, including at Blue Origin. This provision
is set to expire on January 1, 2024 and Congress should act with
urgency to provide an extension that will allow industry and the FAA to
demonstrate readiness for potential next steps.
Industry Learning & Readiness
The human spaceflight learning period has been in statute since
2005, but the first FAA-licensed launch with a paying customer on board
was New Shepard's first human flight in July 2021. As of October 18,
2023, only 22 commercial human flights have been licensed for three
providers, along with seven NASA human spaceflight missions.\9\ Blue
Origin is proud to be a part of this onset of activity, but it does not
by itself demand further regulation. Instead, gathering invaluable
flight data and experience from multiple providers and technologies
begins a critical phase of learning under the learning period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Number of licensed flights updated for recent activity, See
Report to Congress ``U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of
Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New
Safety Framework'' Sept. 2023, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
PL_114-
90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activities.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety frameworks for spaceflight can be robust while also
evolving. As flight and test experience grows, new data can validate
requirements or identify areas for improvement. The ability to react to
new information and iterate within tools, processes, and criteria,
strengthens the commercial industry's contributions toward innovation.
Gains in both efficiency and safety are the spirit of innovation that
can open access to space and maintain U.S. leadership.
FAA Learning & Readiness
A dynamic, evolving industry needs to be supported by an equally
agile regulator. Congress made it clear that the FAA has a
responsibility to use the learning period to prepare:
``Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Secretary to discuss potential regulatory
approaches, potential performance standards, or any other topic
related to this subsection with the commercial space industry,
including observations, findings, and recommendations from the
Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, or its
successor organization, prior to the issuance of a notice of
proposed rulemaking.'' \10\
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\10\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(5)
The FAA, through the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory
Committee (COMSTAC) and their exposure to commercial operations, has
begun to engage with industry, but Congress should continue to
encourage and support these actions. Blue Origin advocates that the
following two forums for should be leveraged further by the FAA.
First, the FAA should continue to increase its engagement in the
industry consensus standards process as required in statute.\11\ While
operators, academics, and associations develop content, the FAA can
facilitate discussions on how standards might be used in the future,
and where they have successfully been used in the past. The FAA has
insights into safety procedures across the industry, giving them an
opportunity to nudge industry in the most helpful directions. This
could have a powerful impact on prioritization of efforts for the
commercial space voluntary consensus standards.
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\11\ 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50905(c)(3)
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Second, the FAA AST recently chartered an Aerospace Rulemaking
Committee (``SpARC'') to request industry guidance on occupant
safety.\12\ Blue Origin is proud to be a member of this committee and
looks forward to contributing our thoughts. The charter is open for 24
months, and initial industry recommendations are due after the first
year. We recommend that the FAA take advantage of the full charter
duration, review report content, ask questions, debate with industry,
and conclude the process with a well understood path forward.
Recommendations from the SpARC should feed into measurable FAA AST
plans for future regulatory action. These plans should include
workforce needs, tool improvements, and a roadmap for guidance
documents, including industry standards and Advisory Circulars (AC).
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\12\ See ``Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Aerospace Rulemaking
Committee Charter'' March. 24, 2023 https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents
/media/Final-ARM-220523-001_S1%20Signed.pdf
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The three U.S. commercial human spaceflight launch providers
operating today have three fundamentally different architectures:
suborbital and orbital; piloted, autonomous, and hybrid; vertical and
horizontal takeoff and landing. There is no one-size-fits-all criteria
for safety in a market as diverse as human spaceflight. A prospective
regulatory framework needs to be results-oriented rather than
prescriptive because the means of compliance to meet the requirement
are likely to vary by mission profile and design choices.
As more operators apply for, or transition to, licenses under the
newest regulations in Part 450, the FAA AST has an opportunity to
demonstrate success of a flexible, performance-based regime. Metrics
from this process can be regularly reported to Congress to evaluate
readiness for the sunset of the learning period. The learning period
should remain in place until reports show decreasing review timelines,
increasing throughput in all licensing phases (i.e., pre-application,
complete enough, final review), increasing cadence of AC publication
and AC updates, and increasing transparency into the licensing process.
CONDUCT STREAMLINING EFFORTS FOR LAUNCH LICENSING
The FAA faces near-term challenges with implementing these critical
public safety regulations given the increasing volume of prospective
launch providers and cadence of launches. During the December 2022
COMSTAC meeting, it was indicated there was a backlog in licensing and
that the FAA AST will need to prioritize work and put some license
applications in a queue prior to assessment.\13\ Difficulties in
implementing Part 450 regulations only exacerbate this workload. The
FAA requested specific feedback from the COMSTAC on potential
improvements to the Part 450 regime in May of 2023. \14\
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\13\ See summary of remarks made by Associate Administrator
Coleman, ``Meeting Minutes'' Dec. 15 2022 https://www.faa.gov/sites/
faa.gov/files/COMSTAC_Meeting_Minutes_Fall-2022
.pdf
\14\ See ``COMSTAC'' May 15 2023, p. 55-63 https://www.faa.gov/
space/additionalinformation
/comstac/May_15_2023_PM.pdf
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Blue Origin greatly appreciates FAA's desire to continuously
improve processes, eliminate duplication and inefficiencies, and
appropriately allocate limited resources. Congress can support these
efforts by allowing the FAA to invest in and develop a suite of tools
to automate the most cumbersome manual tasks done today by license
evaluators. These tools could be the fastest way to realize a reduction
in processing timelines and provide transparency to applicants. Further
review of Part 450 implementation should include identification of key
roles and expertise required to evaluate license applications in a
performance-based framework. Solutions must consider a strategy for
hiring and training of these roles while considering attrition
estimates and availability of personnel with the requisite
qualifications in the larger workforce.
Innovation needs to exist in our vehicles and our regulatory
processes if the U.S. is to maintain our competitiveness in the global
launch market. Blue Origin looks forward to continuing to work with
Congress and the FAA to identify these opportunities.
DEFINE MISSION AUTHORIZATION & APPLY LESSONS LEARNED
Despite the need for continued streamlining and modernization of
their role, the FAA's launch and reentry authority has been clear for
over 30 years, providing commercial entities clarity and certainty as
they enter the market. The same cannot be said for the growing body of
capabilities being developed for orbital, cislunar, and lunar
ecosystems, which go far beyond transportation. The lack of a single
authority over space objects and activities other than launch,
telecommunications, or remote sensing has led to several challenges as
executive agencies attempt to exercise partial authority in the absence
of congressional clarity. Where interagency processes have been used to
compensate, they have failed to create approval processes that are
transparent and have meaningful deadlines.
Blue Origin's human-centric vision of space will require clarity as
we pursue initial capabilities in LEO and on the Moon. We urge Congress
to define the authorization framework for in-space activities and
ensure that every effort is taken to eliminate duplicative
requirements, limit unstructured interagency processes, and draw clear
boundaries between agencies with related authorities. Any in-space
activity authorization regime should have a single government owner and
include the following three key aspects:
1) Strict Timelines. An activity should be automatically authorized
within 180 days unless a specific procedural, regulatory,
treaty or national security prohibition is found. This provides
a permissive system for innovation and can be scaled more
readily than overly restrictive or prescriptive requirements.
Where a proposed activity requires inter-agency review to
ascertain impacts or overlaps with the regulating authority of
another agency, these dependencies should be identified to the
operator within a short interim deadline.
2) Self-certification. Mission authorization should be granted for
categories of potential activities rather than specific
instances, where appropriate. Non-governmental entities would
file an outline of their proposed activities and the
authorization under which they fall, not unlike a flight plan.
Each operator would be responsible for updating this register
as needed to satisfy continuing supervision requirements.
3) Transparency. Maintaining transparency to the authorization
process is important for commercial service providers to build
confidence in an industry that necessitates long lead planning.
Clear and expedient deadlines should be implemented so that
non-governmental entities are not caught in regulatory limbo
indefinitely. Active communication paths between operators and
the authorizing agency should be encouraged during a review
period as each new proposed activity will present a unique
challenge.
RESOURCE AGENCIES WITH AUTHORITY IN SPACE
A competitive and innovative regulatory framework for commercial
space activities will need resources that support scaling with the
industry. We encourage Congress to provide appropriate funding to
agencies with authorities in-space. Congress and the FAA helped
accelerate the development of the commercial space launch industry, and
now the FAA is struggling to scale with the cadence of operation.
Streamlining regulations and administrative processes and exploring the
possibility for increased training opportunities will help utilize
resources more efficiently, but more funding is required to get the
right people and process in place. Similarly, as mission authorization
requirements are clarified, Congress should ensure that resources match
the scope of activities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the committee
today. The United States is a global leader in human spaceflight. Blue
Origin is proud to be a part of this legacy.
Senator Sinema. Thank you so much, Mr. Joyce. I am now
going to recognize myself for a first round of questions. It
took 16 years to launch the first commercial human spaceflight
after the commercial learning period came into effect in 2005.
There have been just 64 total private astronauts sent to
space between three total companies, with most of those
occurring in the last couple of years. A lack of flight data
and widely diverse operations have made it difficult to find
consensus on workable industry wide passenger safety standards
during the learning period.
Ms. Bandla, you highlight in your testimony that Virgin
Galactic's Mesa manufacturing complex is intended to accelerate
progress from conceptual design to production to final assembly
in order to reach a target of 400 flights per year. I am not
sure that the industry can reach this kind of scalability fast
enough if we just extend the learning period without thinking
through changes.
So, in your view, how should Congress best extend the
learning period while ensuring sufficient collaboration between
the FAA, industry, and other stakeholders so the FAA is
prepared to holistically regulate human spaceflight safely? And
what do you believe to be a proper timetable?
Ms. Bandla. Madam Chair, thank you for the question, and
you are absolutely right. The intent of the learning period was
to allow commercial companies to look at space flight in a way
that does not have bounds on prescribed regulation.
So, they had the ability to develop, to test new
capabilities, new innovations, collect data, create a knowledge
base of lessons learned to inform a future safety framework.
And again, you are correct, it did--it took us a longer time
than envisioned in that original bill because commercial
spaceflight companies do hold safety above all and are cautious
in proceeding forward because we are carrying humans.
But we are at an inflection point. The companies here on
the panel have entered commercial operations for human
spaceflight and are starting to fly for commercial purposes and
at that regular cadence that we all envision. So, it is now the
time to have those discussions.
And I completely agree, we should not be moving the
goalposts just to move the goalposts. But now is the time,
because we have data, we have operators, to discuss what that
framework looks like. That is the important part.
The learning period should not lapse without having a
blueprint for what a safety framework looks like for human
spaceflight so that we can look at what areas need to be
regulated, what are the consequences of that, making sure it is
still light touch to allow innovation, and also importantly,
that the FAA is resourced with the funds and the expertise to
carry out that framework.
So, I completely agree. We shouldn't just extend. And there
is ways to rather extend, but to transition the industry
without a lapse of the learning period. We take this time to
get industry and Government stakeholders together to look at
what that blueprint is, and that could include milestones such
as looking at safety standards, how safety standards are
working, what area of safety standards are being developed in
industry, and how we can transfer that to a blueprint that,
again, I must state, needs to be in place before the learning
period lapses. And in terms of timeline, this is going to take
a few years.
While we are entering commercial operations, Galactic has
flown nine times, and we still--I still believe that there
should be more flights to collect data. So about 8 years is our
timeline for, ideal timeline for having these discussions.
Senator Sinema. And do our other industry representatives
have anything to add here before I move on to the next
question?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think to your point, one thing we are
working with AST on right now is we are in a--committee thing
where the industry gets together and we work together as a
team, and we are going to make some recommendations to AST for
what those regulations might look like.
So, I think it is inappropriate to say we are not working
forward on those regulations right now. We are actively
starting to work those together as an industry team and making
recommendations.
I think the first step we are doing is we are trying to
understand what is the benefit of regulations, why are we doing
regulations? Are they to help the industry? Are they to fill in
a safety hole gap? What is the purpose of the regulations?
And then once we understand that purpose for the
regulations, then I can think we can start to build some
consensus about what those regulations should be. So, I think
it is important to recognize that we are already actively
working that, and it is appropriate to extend this learning
period for a significant period of time while we have these
discussions amongst ourselves, and we can make coherent and
complete recommendations back to the FAA.
Mr. Joyce. Yes. Just one point I would like to add. It is a
great question. You pointed out that we just started flying
commercial astronauts just a couple of years ago.
So, we are still learning. So, the learning period is
appropriate. And extending the learning period for the kind of
time that we are talking about here is not only going to allow
us to develop experience through operations and improve our
safety systems. It is also going to allow new entrants into
this industry.
We don't want to shut the door behind us because the lead
we have is remarkable and we need to continue that going
forward.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. I now recognize Senator Schmitt
for his first set of questions.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Gerstenmaier,
Mr. Joyce, this is for you two primarily. An example of I think
some really intriguing--a development here in potentially
critical technology is nuclear propulsion. Talked a little
about--this a little bit yesterday. You both talk about how
important sustained testing is to the organization of--and
further development of your vehicles.
Can you all talk about how just a one-day delay in the
mission, or the result of a delayed FAA license can set back,
you know, missions for months, right. I mean, how does that
work for you? And I think, I guess the second part of that, and
I will just ask and let you guys go.
As you look to potentially integrate nuclear propulsion
into Starship, or New Glenn, or future vehicles, can you talk
about how the delays in that, you know, the launch or testing
of these vehicles jeopardizes future integration of
technologies, like I mentioned, nuclear propulsion in getting
us to Mars specifically?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. First of all, I would say that, you know,
our approach to the way we do development is we have a very
aggressive test program where there is no humans on the
spacecraft, and we test the spacecraft in an environment to
understand how it actually flies and operates.
We also do that consistent protecting the public. We want
to make sure that no one gets hurt. Nothing is damaged except
maybe our own facilities. But we use that as a series of test
flights. With that approach, it is important we fly as soon as
we can--the hardware is really ready to go fly.
When we have regulatory delays, such as we are facing right
now, that slows down this developmental test flight and
ultimately slows down our support to NASA and slows down our
support to what we need to do for the--to return humans back to
the surface of the moon again.
So, it is critically important that these delays may seem
small in the big scheme of things, but a delay--continuous
delay of each and every test flight just adds up and eventually
we will lose our lead and we will see China land on the moon
before we do. And it would be a shame if we did that only
because of regulatory burden and we didn't do it because we
were not technically ready to go achieve and innovate.
So, I think it is absolutely critical we get a regulatory
framework that allows us to fly at the fastest flight rate that
we can fly on and fly still safely--protect the public and
protect people on board. In terms of nuclear propulsion, I
think that is a very interesting technology that is coming
online. I think research from other agencies like NASA and
other organizations are appropriate to go look at that.
When that technology kind of gets developed by some of the
other Government agencies, then we on the private sector can
pull that in and start using that in our operational vehicles.
But I think our focus right now is trying to push the
capability to bring this next generation of heavy lift launch
vehicles in place, Starship, that can support multiple
destinations to the moon and ultimately to Mars and help us
have this vision of moving human presence into the solar
system.
Mr. Joyce. I guess what I will add--that nuclear propulsion
is a game changer for in-space operations. It is an incredibly
attractive technology. It obviously needs careful consideration
for safety considerations. We think it is important that--you
asked the question about delays in launch.
And so, for commercial endeavors where private investment
is being brought to bear, significant private investment,
delays in the process are very expensive. We want to enable
industry to move as quickly as possible in a safe way, working
with the Government agencies that are appropriate, an
interagency process, because really it all starts with launch.
And getting through those regulations and streamlining
these processes is important for this kind of a game changer
technology going forward.
Senator Schmitt. And as both of you notice, as a followup,
we discussed yesterday sort of, you know, on this committee and
then also on the Armed Services committee, and both your
companies contract with DOD and support vital national security
efforts.
Can you talk a little bit about the balance between truly
national security missions and truly commercial missions and
why it is important that one not limit the other?
Mr. Joyce. Well, at Blue Origin, and I think my colleague
here will say the same thing, that a lot of the commercial
activity enables the defense activity and vice versa.
Private investment, significant private investment in
commercial human spaceflight at Blue Origin is enabling
technologies that are being applied to our DOD contracts.
Specifically, the technologies that I work on New Shepard are
being utilized on the New Glenn heavy launch vehicle that is
the launch vehicle that the Space Force is looking at and we
are excited to hopefully participate in that program going
forward.
These investments, these technologies, processes, and
people provide a coupling between the two and provide a more
rapid delivery of capability to the Space Force in particular.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. And I would totally agree that they are
very synergistic to commercial, and your national security
activities really feed off of each other.
Starship, which we are doing for commercial activities
predominantly, will have tremendous benefit to the national
security space side. We will have a new capability to launch
extremely large satellites to low-Earth orbit and also sponsor
missions around the moon and other areas.
So again, there is a natural synergy between the two. Even
Starlink that we are using for commercial Internet services has
applications in the secure--national security domain. So, there
is a very strong synergy between that.
To be a leader and technology allows you to be a leader in
the commercial activities, but also in national security
activities.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Senator Cruz is the Ranking
Member of the full Commerce subcommittee, and he is now
recognized for his opening statements. Thanks so much, Senator
Cruz.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member
Schmitt. Thank you both for the terrific job you are doing with
this very important subcommittee. And welcome to each of the
witnesses.
Since I was first elected to the Senate 11 years ago, I
have been proud to help lead nearly every major piece of space
legislation that has been signed into law. Just last year as
part of my NASA Authorization Act, which I led alongside
Senator Sinema, Senator Wicker, and Senator Cantwell.
That legislation was included in the CHIPS and Sciences
Act, securing, among other things, an extension of the
International Space Station to 2030. I am especially proud that
Texas is at the forefront of American leadership in space, from
NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston, home to our astronaut
corps and mission control, to the myriad of commercial space
companies across the State, including SpaceX and Blue Origin,
who are both here today. The road to the final frontier runs
through Texas.
But we can't rest on our laurels. As the pace of commercial
space activity has picked up, our regulatory system has started
to strain and is now showing serious cracks. Some of our
witnesses have hit on this point today.
But it is worth noting that if the system breaks and the
commercial space industry grinds to a halt, the risk is far
more substantial than a few billionaires losing their ability
to take joyrides in space.
The Government relies on a vibrant domestic commercial
space sector for access to space, whether that is transporting
our astronauts to the ISS, sending rovers to Mars, launching
national security missions, or any of the other myriad space
missions.
On most policy issues, my philosophy is quite clear, get
Government out of the way to the greatest extent possible and
let the private sector roar. I believe the commercial space
sector holds tremendous potential and I have long said that I
think the first trillionaire will be made in space.
Previously a domain exclusively of Governments, upstart
commercial companies have helped democratize space in a way
that very few thought possible even a decade ago. Along the
way, they have helped drive down the price point of launch,
which has helped save the taxpayer money, and has led to a
proliferation of new technologies and plans for in-space
activities.
But to accommodate this growth and to enable the future
potential, the regulatory framework must be clearly defined,
allow for innovation and be accountable for the actions it does
or does not take.
As we think about regulation and commercial space, top of
mind for many is the expiration of the learning period. This is
understandable and an issue we need to, and I believe will
address. But we need to answer the broader and more
definitional questions about what the future of regulation
looks like, not just for the next 2 years, but for the next 20.
The prior Administration did good work to try to update and
modernize launch and reentry regulations, but there is a lot of
work still to be done. Similarly, we need to address the still
burdensome remote sensing regulations, and we need to cut red
tape around all the various types of permitting that permeate
commercial space.
This hearing today is an opportunity to learn from those in
industry, and the academy, and from a former policymaker about
the state of commercial space, and to reflect on how the
current regulatory scheme is or is not working.
In my opinion, too many agencies are involved. It slows
technological and scientific advancements, and it puts us at a
disadvantage compared to our international competitors and
rivals. It is long past time that we create a true one stop
shop for the regulation and licensing of commercial space
activities and make the United States the destination of choice
for commercial space companies looking to set up shop.
That all starts with regulatory certainty, transparency,
and accountability. Finally, I mentioned the ISS. It is
imperative that the United States maintain a human presence in
low-Earth orbit. With ISS's mission extended until 2030, it is
important to talk about what is next.
Not only is LEO the tip of the spear on commercialization
of space, but more fundamentally it is a strategic domain where
we cannot afford to cede our leadership, especially to
communist China.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and to
continuing to work with Chairwoman Cantwell, subcommittee
Chairwoman Sinema, Ranking Member Schmitt, as we together craft
a bipartisan, bold, and forward looking commercial space bill.
Thank you.
Senator Sinema. Senator Cruz, you are recognized for your
questions, if you would like to.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Gerstenmaier,
welcome. Thank you for being here today. Thank you for your
many years of service with NASA.
I think I can speak for many members of this committee when
I say that we were all watching with excitement as Starship
made its first test flight at Boca Chica earlier this year, and
we look forward to you all proceeding with your next launch and
more as you get ready to help put American boots back on the
lunar surface.
I also greatly appreciated the opportunity recently to
visit Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, over the August recess to
see firsthand the incredible work that SpaceX is doing in South
Texas. And I don't want to exclude Mr. Joyce here. Van Horn is
on my list, and I am planning to get out and see the great work
Blue is doing in West Texas as well.
Look, the commercial space industry is at an inflection
point. Industry, with some Government support, but also
leveraging immense amounts of private capital has brought new
novel technologies into production that hold the potential to
do everything from closing the digital divide in broadband
Internet to making the human race truly multiplanetary.
They are ready for--to take off, if only we will let them.
And Mr. Gerstenmaier, you have extensive experience with space
vehicle development and space operations.
I want to ask you what may seem like a simplistic question,
but it gets at something you raised in your testimony. In your
experience, and obviously there are caveats, are flight proven
vehicles and hardware more or less reliable than vehicles and
hardware that aren't flight proven?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think there is a tremendous advantage
of a flight proven vehicle. You see that in the reusability of
the Falcon program. You know, we have flown 74 flights this
year. We learn from every one of those flights.
And that learning, if we are open and transparent and we
see where problems are, we can fix those small problems before
they become big problems. So sometimes it is seen as we are
rushing to flight, but we are actually by flight testing--we
are effectively flight testing the vehicle every time we fly,
and we are learning, and we are developing. We are doing the
same thing with Starship.
Starship's test flight may to some have looked like a
failure. It was not a failure. It was a huge learning
experience for us. We gained more data from that flight, more
knowledge that helps us advance than we could have through a
thousand years of an analysis and mathematical studies and
tests.
Going to flight, still protecting the public, keeping the
environment safe allows us to move at the fastest pace we can.
So, I am a strong supporter of active flight test.
Senator Cruz. Well, thank you. I very much agree, and I
think that is objectively correct. But to pull on this thread,
articles in The Washington Post and Ars Technica yesterday
discussed how SpaceX has been ready for its second Starship
launch for weeks but is now apparently waiting on the Fish and
Wildlife Service, who, just to be crystal clear, they don't
launch rockets, but Fish and Wildlife needs to finish its
consultation next month.
I can't help but be concerned that bureaucratic red tape at
AST and Fish and Wildlife, and from other agencies, have
injected themselves into the launch licensing process. All of
these agencies have already conducted and approved an
environmental review for the first launch of Starship.
But since SpaceX is going to keep trying, now the Federal
Government wants to do another entirely duplicative
environmental review. Do you think other agencies' involvement
is speeding up or slowing down SpaceX's ability to test,
launch, and iterate vehicle development?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I mean, as we are--it is a shame when our
hardware is ready to fly, and we are not able to go fly because
of regulations or re-review. The fact that we can get the
launch pad repaired and get it ready to go fly, support of
flight.
The fact that I can get a vehicle manufactured and ready to
go fly. We have three or four other vehicles also ready to go
fly. The pace of our test flight should not be governed by the
regulation.
We need to be safe. We need to protect the environment. We
don't dismiss those, but we need to fly at the fastest pace
that we can do hardware development to do this active
development process and this test flight experience that we
described.
Senator Cruz. Well, again, I agree with that. At AST's
current speed, what is the earliest HLS will be ready?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It is hard to say. We have got to, you
know, the--we need to fly at the fastest pace. To be fair, we
also have huge technical challenges, right. This is a large
spacecraft we are building. You got to see it when you went
down to Boca. It is an amazing vehicle.
But 33 engines, the staging, all this is new technology. We
need to test that soon, learn what is wrong, fix it, and go fly
again. And we cannot be held up by regulation. So, it is hard
for me to give a specific date of where we are. But the current
pace where regulation is driving, that should not be the case.
The burden should be put on us as a private company, put it
on SpaceX, and let us develop at the fastest pace. We should be
the ones that are driving the development, not being driven by
regulatory oversight.
Senator Cruz. And having seen firsthand what you are doing
in South Texas, it is extraordinary and very, very impressive.
My final question, if you were still at NASA, would this delay
be acceptable? Would schedule delays like this be something
that makes a NASA program successful?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Simply, it would not be acceptable.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome
to each of our witnesses. Happy to have you here and thanks for
helping us better understand the opportunities as well as the
challenges for this industry.
I want to take my time for at least my first question and
talk a little bit about a key aspect to a successful commercial
space industry, and that is having a domestic supply chain that
is vibrant and resilient. I am proud that Michigan is a top 10
State in aerospace manufacturing.
We have over 600 aerospace related companies, and I am very
proud to say we are continuing to grow at a very robust rate. I
have heard it in some of your testimony here today, and
certainly I have heard from my former colleague Bill Nelson,
who is now the NASA Administrator, who I think is a dream job
for him given his passion, that we are basically in a space
race with China.
And I think all of you will agree. And certainly, if we are
in that race, we need to support a robust domestic supply chain
to win that race. And that is why I authored two bills about
domestic aerospace supply chains that were actually signed into
law last Congress through the CHIPS and Science Act.
But my question for you, Mr. Maier and Mr. Joyce, and
anybody else who would like to join in, if give me--if you
would like to comment basically on what your companies are
doing to ensure that you are indeed relying on a strong
domestic supply chain for commercial space activities.
And also, if you could address if there are any bottlenecks
in the supply chain that we should be aware of and perhaps
could be helpful in addressing. Mr. Joyce, if you want to
start, and Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Joyce. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Blue
Origin is heavily dependent on a robust supply chain for all of
our operations, New Shepard, New Glenn, and our in-space
systems. We have multiple partnerships with companies around
the United States that are supporting us, including in your
State, Senator.
So, the robustness of the supply chain, particularly coming
out of the pandemic when we are all challenged to meet our
commitments and to support our development schedules with a
supply chain that was struggling, kind of highlighted our need
to better engage and to go deeper with that supply chain.
That is what we are doing today at Blue Origin, developing
long term partnerships, long term agreements with a number of
ours. We are also partnering with local manufacturing companies
in all the States where we operate.
So, it lifts the entire industry beyond the direct
expenditures at Blue and the people that we employ, to hundreds
or thousands of people throughout the country throughout our
supply base.
Senator Peters. And that supply chain, how much of that is
domestic?
Mr. Joyce. Almost all of it, sir. There are very few things
that we have to go overseas for, and we are focused first on
domestic supply.
Senator Peters. Right. Great. Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. And I would say that, you know, this year
we are going to attempt to fly 100 flights. We have a very
strong dependence upon the supply chain for a lot of parts that
we put together and assemble into parts for our vehicles.
As we look to next year, we want to increase that flight
rate to about 12 flights per month, or 144 flights is our goal.
We have already reached out now where we are offering multiyear
contracts to suppliers to provide us hardware. We are also
pushing some of the reliability aspects to the suppliers.
Where we used to do inspections when the hardware came in-
house, we are now pushing that inspection back to the
suppliers. So, they are becoming more of an active participant
with us moving forward. So, the supply chain is critical to us
as we move forward and try to achieve these higher flight
rates.
Senator Peters. So, I guess the second question--sorry, I
didn't hear. Are there any bottlenecks out there that we--
certainly, we identified a lot of those after the pandemic. You
have been working through those. Are there other things that
you are concerned about that we should be aware of?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think for us it has been just to keep
up with the rate of demand we have for the parts and pieces.
And I think before we didn't order in a larger quantity as we
are now, and we think we are--that is going to help remove some
of that bottleneck. If we let the suppliers know what the
anticipated demand is, they can then spool up and get ready to
supply at the higher rates.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you. Mr. Joyce.
Mr. Joyce. Yes, I don't think I would point to a single or
even a few supply chain issues that really drive us. There
traditionally have been things that we have scrambled and
recovered from. But we can take that question and get you an
answer----
Senator Peters. Yes, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Joyce.--with some detail.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Anybody else have anything? If
not, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank all
of you for kindly giving us your time today and for all your
work in terms of promoting space, and the incredible
acceleration we have seen in our aerospace industry in the
country and in the world.
Ms. Schenewerk, I will start--I have a question for each of
you, so if I don't--hopefully keep your answers short, and I
will get as far as I can. As our Nation's aerospace economy
continues to grow, the private sector--we have heard all
through this hearing, the private sector needs clear and
predictable rules to govern outer space activities. Colorado
obviously also has a strong aerospace component.
A lot of companies working on everything from new
commercial space stations that can host research and tourism in
space, to technologies that will remove orbital debris or
manufacture parts in space.
These new activities do not fall under any singular
agency's regulatory purview. Ms. Schenewerk, what lessons
should Congress learn from the most recent regulatory reform
efforts in terms of developing the mission authorization
framework?
Ms. Schenewerk. So, first and foremost, Senator
Hickenlooper, I will start by commending you and your staff
because you are doing exactly what I would recommend, which is
engaging with industry.
So, I think that the effort to engage with industry is
really important. And what--on some of the other topics that we
have addressed today, like the regulation of launch, the
oversight of nuclear thermal propulsion, for example, there is
a need to have that deep engagement with industry in order to
make sure that we are tailoring legislation and then the
regulations to follow so that they can be flexible and
appropriate to the core aspect of what we are trying to
address, which generally speaking is public safety or a
national security need.
So how do we define what we are trying to address, make
sure that we are getting to that core root concern, and then
tailoring the legislation in a timely manner to that issue. And
making sure that as we move forward, we are not overreaching,
or thinking about what we are doing today, making sure we can
pressure test against that, and then prepare for a future state
where we can address future opportunities.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier,
this is something I have been talking about for a couple of
years. There are over 900,000 pieces of dangerous orbital
debris traveling faster than the speed of a bullet hurtling
through space right now.
It not only threatens the International Space Station, but
it threatens our human exploration programs, commercial space
activities, satellite constellations, go down the list of. So,
Mr. Gerstenmaier, what are the consequences for a commercial
in-space activities if we don't quickly mature our capabilities
to be able to track down and remove dangerous debris objects?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think it is important that we recognize
that the debris environment is there. We design our spacecraft
to be protective of that to some extent for the smaller
particles.
For the larger objects, for example, on Starlink, we have
automatic collision avoidance in the satellites themselves, so
they actually maneuver on their own based on data to avoid
collisions with other aspects.
And that is another advance, I think, that can help prevent
generation of debris. But I think we need to recognize that
debris environment is there.
I think it is just naturally there in some extent, and we
can protect for it as much as we can through spacecraft design.
But also make sure that the systems we deploy in space limit
the amount of debris that are generated as we deploy other
spacecraft.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, certainly debris is naturally
there, but it is growing at a--you know, it threatens
exponential growth if we are not careful. Ms. Bandla, as in-
space activities and new spacecraft enter orbit, so does
congestion in LEO.
And again, I think the activity and the acceleration of
activity is a good thing for our leadership in space. The
Government Accountability Office and other agencies have noted
though, these activities also increase collision risks.
It is not just the increase in objects that are out there,
but it is the traffic and in many cases pose potential impacts
to astronomy. How should the U.S. balance maintaining our
leadership in space with our obligations to making sure that we
are maintaining a safe and operable space environment?
Ms. Bandla. Thank you, Senator, for the question. So,
Virgin Galactic is a purely suborbital operations, but I think
you touch on a very important point.
When we talk about regulations that don't hinder innovation
and allow for companies to innovate and create new
capabilities, that is also for creating capabilities, not just
technologies that are, excuse the pun, out of this world, but
creating capabilities that enhance safety and efficient
operations.
If I can just make a quick example in the aviation world,
actually. Experimental aircraft were way ahead in avionics
systems than certified aircraft and they were able to--and
certified aviation companies were not able to adapt because
going back and taking the time and resources for changing the
certification did not provide them incentive and allowed them
to say this was safe enough.
So, regulations that are light touch, that promote
innovation, but do not hinder say--that keep safety as
priority, also enhance safety as an efficient operations for
the entire industry as well.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, that is something we have heard
consistently from all of you, that this priority is--safety in
space, and I think we are hearing that loud and clear. I yield
back to the Chair.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Lujan.
Senator Lujan. I yield to the Chair of the Committee----
The Chair. No, no. Senator Lujan, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that
very much. Ms. Bandla, it is good to see you today, and my
first question is directed toward you and your expertise. I
think all of the companies here today agree that the commercial
space industry is poised for explosive growth.
That is clearly a consensus here in the U.S. Senate as
well, but specifically at the spaceport in New Mexico. And so
those of you looking to grow a little bit, come visit New
Mexico. We have a space for you, so come on down.
Now, the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
has maintained an outstanding record of protecting public
safety according to their statutory mandate. But as the cadence
of launches and number of applications continue to grow, the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation, also known as AST,
face challenges with its workforce and licensing capacity.
So here is the question, are there ways that Congress can
help AST keep up with the growing number of license
applications while maintaining its excellent public safety
record?
Ms. Bandla. Thank you, Senator. And it has been such a
great year. We have flown five times in 5 months from Spaceport
America.
The State has been an incredible partner in being able to
hit that cadence of operations, and of course, our partnership
with the FAA as well enabled that. Absolutely, it is natural.
As the industry grows, we are at this inflection point where
you are seeing a higher cadence of flight, more frequent
flights, diverse vehicles. It is natural to also have the
regulatory agency grow as well and be provided with the
adequate amount of resources and expertise to keep up with that
pace.
And these resources will allow FAA to process licenses,
allow companies to operate at this cadence, and especially take
a look at their licensing process now and look at ways to make
it more efficient and more effective.
Not just add bodies, but look at the licensing portal, how
we can make it electronic, how companies can track their
licenses and status in a much more efficient way to relieve
that stress on the actual bodies at the agency as well.
So, there is a lot of conversations we can have on how we
make that agency more effective in licensing, but it starts
with giving them the adequate resources to be able to do so.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that, Ms. Bandla. Just as a
reminder, it doesn't get too hot, it doesn't get too cold, and
once you climb above the hot air balloons, you are good to go.
And the food is pretty good, so come on down.
Now, Ms. Schenewerk, the FAA has restricted--or was
restricted from enforcing regulations specific to safeguarding
the well-being of paying and nonpaying customers or occupants
aboard commercial space launches and reentries to allow
emerging spaceflight companies to gather experience, data,
statistics, and other information.
Since this learning period began, emerging commercial space
flights have provided--have proceeded at a cautious pace. Given
that as the commercial human spaceflight industry works up to
full scale regulation, how can Congress help the FAA and
commercial spaceflight industry leaders begin to work together
to compare their initial data and statistics to share lessons
learned, to outline a regulatory plan that addresses the safety
of paying and not paying customers, and other occupants aboard
commercial spaceflight?
Ms. Schenewerk. Senator, thank you for the opportunity to
comment on this. So, I think first and foremost is that no
people get to space without having the launch vehicle license.
So I really want to reiterate the points that my colleagues
have made today about the importance of making sure that the
FAA's launch and reentry regulations that govern launch,
whether it is a satellite for national security, civil
commercial space, or it is a human spaceflight participant,
that that launch licensing regime and reentry regime needs to
be improved and the resources that need to go into that for
training, the implementation of better processes, all of that
will benefit any activity that involves human spaceflight.
So, I think first and foremost, those improvements need to
occur. The second is an aspect that is ongoing and that is the
engagement through the Space Advisory Rulemaking Committee,
specifically on Part 460 right now, which addresses the
regulations that are existing now, because despite a lot of
thought to the contrary, the contrary is true, which is there
are regulations addressing both the crew, so the humans that
are on board that are involved in flying or even off the ship
that are flying the space vessel, as well as the spaceflight
participants.
So, there are regulations and those are part of discussion
with industry through an FAA advisory rulemaking committee
today. I also want to highlight the work of COMSTAC. So, the
Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, which is a
FACA that advises the FAA.
That is an important organization, an entity that can
provide inputs and review of FAA documents and plans. And I
will note that recently the FAA released a document on occupant
safety. Unfortunately, the COMSTAC wasn't able to review and
opine on that document ahead of its release. And I think that
the document and the engagement with the FAA and the outcome
would have benefited from that industry engagement.
So, we think there are a number of steps. Also, ASTMs, the
work that is happening with standard writing with industry.
That pace has increased as we have seen a pace of human
spaceflight and experience increase.
All that said, to my colleagues' prior points, very few
flights are happening right now in terms of the numbers. We
have the opportunity to start getting it right, to start
establishing a plan, and that plan really calls upon true
engagement between the experts in industry who are developing
this diverse set of capabilities, and the folks within the
regulatory agency that need to get smart and need to deeply
engage with those activities.
But first, they need to get good at doing the regulations
that they have on the books today.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. And Mr. Joyce, I have a
question I am going to have to submit into the record because I
have exceeded my time. But I want to commend your team over at
Blue Origin.
I had the honor to visit facilities in Washington State
recently, and it is quite incredible what is been built there,
the expertise of that team as well, but quite an impressive
facility. So, I look forward to visiting more about that and
getting those questions submitted. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Lujan. And I want to thank
Senator Sinema and Schmitt for holding this Subcommittee
hearing and all of you for participating today. Thank you so
much.
I appreciate all my colleagues obviously being here and
asking important questions. We have reached new heights,
including the striking images of new galaxies from the James
Webb telescope.
The U.S. space program continues to evolve and forge ahead
with partnerships between the public and the private sector.
SpaceX's Falcon 9 was the first to take the NASA astronauts to
the International Space Station, and now civilians are riding
on the edge of space in commercial aircraft.
So, we are very excited about all of this in the State of
Washington. We like to say that Seattle is the Silicon Valley
of space. That is the intersection of software and hardware and
probably Boeing engines and other things all coming together.
And I think we have something like $4.6 billion in economic
activity and 13,000 jobs. So, we had the NASA Administrator out
this past summer to talk about some of that innovation and a
little sharper focus on workforce issues, very concerned about
workforce needs at FAA, at NASA, in the space sector in
general, and what we need to do to further incent or encourage
young people and people of diversity, particularly women, to go
into that field.
And certainly wanted to continue the R&D, innovation, and
collaboration, but really start thinking about what one might
consider a high rate piece part manufacturing juxtaposed to
where we have been thus far.
So, how do you speed up the next level of aviation,
aerospace construction and what do we need to do to be really
good at that. So, those were some of the conversations we had
in Seattle with the Administrator and a great group of
participants from a variety of segments. And I wanted to follow
up today first with that question about STEM and workforce.
Very excited that NASA continues to play a very big role
for the FAA, and we are really with the FAA safety bill that we
passed a couple of years ago, trying to increase the technical
expertise at the FAA in next generation technology issues.
What do we need to do to get this right at NASA and in the
private sector in encouraging a very, very robust space
workforce? And just go right down the panel.
Ms. Schenewerk. So, I think you are right to focus that
there is a need within the FAA to make sure that we are able to
attract and retain excellent talent there.
So, you know, some ideas have been put forward about the
idea of expediting hiring opportunities. I also think
collaboration between industry and Government with regard to
employees.
So, we have employees that go from one agency to another
agency, but in some instances there are opportunities, for
example, with this former Air Force, Space Force, there were
embeds from Government with industry, and that really does
foster a technical interchange and understanding, and that also
can help understand the opportunities that are in Government to
stay in Government.
So, you know, for example, I will commend my colleague
here, Mr. Monteith, who left the Air Force then, and then went
into Government service again to work with the space industry
at the--at AST, and those kinds of exchange of impressions,
even from Government agency to Government agency, but
particularly where we can foster from industry movement and
exchange there.
The Chair. OK. We will have to go more quickly on answers
down the panel.
Mr. Monteith. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. I would simply put
it in two buckets. Number one, I think we have--need to have a
much more robust intern program to get them--the college grads
or future college grads interested early into Government
service and there is technical fields.
And number two, tagging on to Ms. Schenewerk's comments,
when I was in FAA, we had started looking at how do we move
back and forth, not from Government agency to Government
agency, but from Government agency to industry and back,
because I think the entire system would be better served from
having more technically knowledgeable and advanced employees on
both sides.
The Chair. OK.
Mr. Monteith. Thank you.
Ms. Bandla. I completely agree with both my colleagues. I
just--talk about the underrepresented group. Look at programs
that invest in demographics that don't--you don't typically see
in industry, women, people of color. They don't have the same
opportunities as others.
So, programs that do reach that group. And it is
interesting because I am a woman, person of color. I joined
this industry and believed I could succeed in this industry
because I met people from this industry doing incredible things
and that made it real and made it a possibility.
So, let's look at programs that reach out to those
communities that don't have those opportunities.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. You know, I would add that if there is an
exciting mission, that people can get really excited about it,
and they can see a sense of the future that is brighter, and a
chance to really open their horizons. Space gives you that
opportunity to think about a better future.
And I think we can entice the young people to get excited
about that. And then if we can also be open to new technology.
If we can take what they have learned in gaming, what they have
learned in computer world, and bring that into our world, we
can expedite manufacturing. And I think we also need to be
extremely open in the diverse areas.
We need to be open to all ideas and not assume that anyone
doesn't have an idea that has value and cannot be used. We need
to be open to every idea. Look for innovation. And the same
thing even with a regulatory environment.
We can no longer continue the same process. We need to look
for ways to be innovative and creative, and open the aperture
so we can accept diverse opinions and different ways of doing
business. We keep doing things the same way, we won't get the
results we want. But I think that excites the young generation.
The Chair. Thank you. Mr. Joyce.
Mr. Joyce. Yes, I think the only thing I would add, and my
colleagues have made some of these points, is play the long
game, expand the workforce, right. How do you do that?
You get more women, more people of color engaged, and you
start that at an incredibly early age to make it more
attractive, more appealing to those groups to join the type of
workforce that we need in this industry and the FAA needs to
regulate. Make the pool bigger. Start early.
Blue is sponsoring a Club for the Future, which is a STEM
program. It starts in preschool. It starts in elementary
school. I think we need more of that to encourage----
The Chair. It starts in preschool?
Mr. Joyce. It starts in kindergarten, actually.
The Chair. OK.
Mr. Joyce. We have a number of--close enough. So, but yes,
but why not, right. It is one of those things where you want
that culture. You want these people to grow with that
opportunity, to see people, like my colleague, Ms. Bandla here,
doing what she is doing and be able to do that themselves. So,
I think that is how we do it.
The Chair. Yes. Definitely as an application of STEM
occupation, I don't think you can get something more exciting
or more interesting, so we would hope.
But I do think we--as I have traveled to various facilities
around the country, it is clear to me that there are a lot of
technical people at our space facilities. They don't have 4
year degrees.
And we need to send out a big, loud message everywhere that
these are technical jobs that are well-paying jobs, but that we
need to--I don't know if there is this--if we are missing a
space at the community college where we are saying this is your
space technician program or something like that, but I feel
like we should be doing more in this particular area.
As I said, my region, very interested in this as we
transfer more to large scale--I mean, more rapid pace
manufacturing and production. And then I am going to send for
the record, Madam Chair, this question, you know, which today's
hearing isn't squarely on, but--well, I just want to make one
more point about this.
I literally believe that we have to start thinking about
CTOs, and maybe even CTOs by sector. By that, I mean, if you
think about it, you know, within the FAA, there may be a CTO
specific to certification and there may be a CTO specific to
commercial space.
I just think the changes in technology are so rapid that
you need somebody who is the overall guidance when it comes to
the types of innovations we are seeing. How else do we keep a
whole workforce at the FAA up to speed on that?
I ran into a gentleman in my community, Edmonds,
Washington, but that is where you will run into a lot of Boeing
engineers just walking around on a Saturday afternoon. But he
said, you know, we used to have chief engineers and he said
there is never a way to fool the chief engineer. You always
were afraid to go in front of them because you knew you were
never going to fool them.
And so, the point is that now we have all this
technological change, and it is so big. And as the FAA grapples
with still certifying commercial airplanes, but then trying to
figure out how to certify space travel, how are we going to do
that without some key technology leaders at key posts within
the FAA?
OK, so I will submit some questions for the record on that.
But I thank the witnesses for this hearing and appreciate the
input, particularly on the safety side, but also on how we come
back to this issue of the certification that is expiring--the
learning period that is expiring and what we need to do for the
future. So, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington
The United States is the world leader in Space Exploration. We were
the first to have a pilot-controlled space flight and the first to land
a man on the moon.
Today, we continue to reach new heights including the striking
images of the formation of new galaxies from the James Webb telescope.
The U.S. space program continues to evolve and forge ahead with new
partnerships between NASA and private companies.
Space-X's Falcon 9 rocket was the first to take NASA astronauts to
the International Space Station as a commercial service. And now
civilians are riding to the edge of space on commercial spacecraft.
My home state of Washington has been called the ``Silicon Valley of
Space.'' The space industry contributed an estimated $4.6 billion in
economic activity to Washington communities in 2021 and supports over
13,000 jobs.
Notably, our regional businesses are at the forefront of commercial
human spaceflight. These workers are helping maintain America's
position of leadership in space applications, space science, and space
exploration.
However, our leadership position in the future of space operations
is not guaranteed.
We face significant challenges in ensuring the safety of commercial
spaceflight participants and the public as we increase the frequency
and complexity of human space operations.
As we chart a path forward, we need to ensure that our safety
regulations are based on sound data and best practices, that they
protect the health and well-being of our crew members and spaceflight
participants, and that they minimize the risks of orbital debris and
collision.
We need to establish clear roles and responsibilities for the
Federal agencies involved in regulating various aspects of commercial
human space activities.
That is why we need a clear and consistent regulatory framework
that balances the interests of all stakeholders and fosters a stable
and predictable business environment without compromising safety.
We also need to support the continued innovation and
competitiveness of our commercial human space sector and the space
industry by investing in research and development, infrastructure and
workforce development.
At a Space Summit I had in Seattle in July, experts from academia
and industry discussed the urgent need to attract talented workers to
fill today's aerospace jobs as well as the in-space jobs of the future,
where traditional trades such as mining, construction and facility
maintenance will need to be adapted to activities on-orbit and on the
surface of the Moon and celestial bodies.
Maintaining our focus on STEM education will enable the United
States to leverage the capabilities and expertise of the private sector
to achieve our national goals and priorities in space exploration and
science, and ensure our economic and national security.
To continue to be a world leader in the aerospace industry we must
also be the leader in safety.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on your insights
into the current state of the industry, the opportunities and
challenges ahead, and how to ensure both safety and competitiveness.
Senator Sinema. Well, thanks so much, Chair Cantwell. And
with that, we have reached the end of today's hearing.
And once again, thank you to all of our witnesses for their
participation. The hearing record will remain open for four
weeks until November the 15th of 2023.
Any Senators that would like to submit questions for the
record should do so within two weeks from now, by November 1,
2023, and I ask that witness responses be returned to the
Committee by November 15, 2023.
And that concludes today's hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Caryn Schenewerk
Mission Authorization
Current FAA regulatory authority covers launch and re-entry of
crewed and uncrewed spacecraft but does not extend to on-orbit
operations with or without humans. Yet the United States Government,
under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, must authorize and supervise these
activities conducted by U.S. entities. I am aware that some in the
space community believe that we should extend the FAA's licensing
authority to cover all human space activities while providing the
Department of Commerce with authority over all in-space mission areas
and activities that do not involve humans.
Question 1. What do you view as the most effective division of
regulatory responsibility between Federal agencies?
Answer. Instead of further division of regulatory responsibility
between Federal agencies for space activities, it is important to
recognize the importance of consolidating regulatory oversight,
avoiding duplication of efforts and inefficient processes. U.S. space
companies are increasingly engaging in innovative activities like
satellite servicing, private space stations, in-space manufacturing,
and lunar rovers. They are not designing their operations, nor should
they, to align with burdensome divisions of responsibility among
multiple agencies.
The 2020 National Space Policy, along with industry representatives
and congressional legislation, have proposed granting the Department of
Commerce's Office of Space Commerce (OSC) the authority to approve
commercial in-space and in-situ operations. This recommendation
acknowledges the Commerce Department's existing role in regulating in-
space activities and its focus on fostering a robust U.S. space
industry while protecting national security and complying with
international treaty obligations. Such an approach aims to provide a
minimally burdensome regime for authorizing in-space missions,
emphasizing the need for significant accountability, transparency, and
clear timeframes.
To some degree, modeling the legislative approach on the Commercial
Space Launch Act (CSLA) makes sense--creating a flexible statute that
can effectively review near-term capabilities in a timely and efficient
manner, with the flexibility to expand authorities as the industry
develops. This strategy avoids trying to predict all future
technologies and risks, instead opting for a flexible approach that
ensures treaty compliance and fosters national security. That said, the
text of the CSLA is not my suggested starting point, nor do I think the
launch and reentry regulations are appropriate--that bill and those
regulations are intended to protect the uninvolved public on Earth.
They were not drafted to address in-space activities.
An efficient and effective interagency process involving
appropriate consultations will be key to a minimally burdensome regime
for authorizing in-space missions in a responsible and timely manner. A
well-designed and effectively implemented approach will be able to
review a variety of applications for in-space activities and
appropriately undertake an analysis of their compliance with
international treaty obligations and U.S. interests. I encourage
Congress to consider an approach modeled more on the commercial remote
sensing regulations and less on the launch and reentry regulations. The
remote sensing regulations focus on the core capabilities and
technologies that are of concern--they are narrowly scoped and intended
to be streamlined. Further, the Department of Commerce is experienced
with in-space activities whereas such oversight would significantly
expand the already stretched capabilities at the FAA, in addition to
vastly expanding their scope beyond those activities that may impact
the uninvolved public on Earth.
Congress should take action to grant the Department of Commerce
authority to review and adjudicate novel space activities in a manner
that complies with our treaty obligations. The kinds of activities
currently contemplated offer significant economic, space
sustainability, civil and national security benefits, including the
ability to remove debris, refuel or reposition satellites, conduct
manufacturing in-orbit and even move industrial activities that are
detrimental to Earth into space.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Caryn Schenewerk
Mission Authorization
I am excited that Blue Origin has partnered with Arizona State
University on the Orbital Reef commercial space station project. This
project seems to epitomize ``novel'' space activities--all the
potential applications of a space station with attachable modules
cannot possibly be known. The ability for private companies to train
non-government astronauts and conduct commercial operations in low
Earth orbit is a true game changer.
Of course, under current law there is no defined regulator with
such a new ``mission authorization'' authority.
Question 1. As Congress works to clarify agency authority and
remove uncertainty over novel space activities, what are the critical
components to create a workable, efficient, and safe regulation?
Answer. The U.S. government should take action to grant the
Department of Commerce authority to review and adjudicate novel space
activities in a manner that complies with our treaty obligations. The
kinds of activities currently contemplated offer significant economic,
space sustainability, civil and national security benefits, including
the ability to remove debris, refuel or reposition satellites, conduct
manufacturing in-orbit and even move industrial activities that are
detrimental to Earth into space. An efficient and effective interagency
process involving appropriate consultations will be key to a minimally
burdensome regime for authorizing in-space missions in a responsible
and timely manner. A well-designed and effectively implemented approach
will be able to review a variety of applications for in-space
activities and appropriately undertake an analysis of their compliance
with international treaty obligations and U.S. interests. I encourage
Congress to consider an approach modeled more on the commercial remote
sensing regulations and less on the launch and reentry regulations. The
remote sensing regulations focus on the core capabilities and
technologies that are of concern--they are narrowly scoped and intended
to be streamlined. Further, the Department of Commerce is experienced
with in-space activities whereas such oversight would significantly
expand the already stretched capabilities at the FAA, in addition to
vastly expanding their scope beyond those activities that may impact
the uninvolved public on Earth. Here are some principles to consider:
Flexibility and Adaptability: Regulations must be flexible
enough to adapt to the rapid pace of technological innovation
in space activities. The regulatory framework should allow for
the incorporation of new technologies and operational models as
they develop, without necessitating frequent legislative
changes.
Clear Definition of Agency Roles and Responsibilities: It is
vital to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of
different agencies. A streamlined approach should identify
which agency has authority over which aspects of space
activities, such as mission authorization, traffic management,
and safety compliance. This reduces the risk of overlapping
jurisdictions and conflicting regulations.
Stakeholder Involvement: Engaging with industry
stakeholders, including private space companies and academic
institutions, is crucial. Their insights can help shape
regulations that are practical and conducive to innovation
while maintaining safety and compliance standards.
Compliance with International Treaties: U.S. regulations
must be compatible with international treaties and agreements,
like the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. This ensures that U.S. space
activities are globally recognized and legally sound.
Certification and Licensing Procedures: Develop clear and
efficient processes for the certification and licensing of
spacecraft, operators, and activities. This process should
balance thoroughness with efficiency to avoid unnecessary
delays.
Transparency and Public Engagement: Ensuring that the
regulatory process is transparent and accessible to the public
can help build trust and understanding of space activities.
Public engagement also provides a platform for addressing
societal concerns related to space exploration.
Ongoing Review and Update Mechanisms: The regulatory
framework should include mechanisms for regular review and
updates to keep pace with the evolving nature of space
activities and address unforeseen challenges.
Diversity of Activities/Regulatory
One thing that our witnesses made clear during the hearing is the
diversity of activities in commercial space and human spaceflight. We
want that diversity to continue to grow and remain competitive for a
robust space economy. An effective regulatory framework will require
more than just avoiding duplication and closing gaps between different
regulators.
You have noted the rapid pace of companies developing new
capabilities in commercial space with varying degrees of human
involvement and risk to participants. It is going to require more than
clearly defining the proper regulator to ensure a workable regulatory
framework keeps up with innovation.
Question 1. What should Congress do to achieve this workable
regulatory flexibility that both addresses pressing issues directly and
remains adaptable to future issues?
Answer. AI think it is important to ensure that the regulating
agency has the resources and structure to adapt to innovative
technologies. That flexibility is as much a cultural aspect as it is a
structural one. Congress can facilitate flexibility by assigning
responsibility to an agency that has proven its ability to engage with
industry to modernize its regulations effectively. The Department of
Commerce Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs office has done
that in the course of updating its regulations--it effectively utilized
its FACA as well as tools such as advanced notices of proposed
rulemaking to receive input on its regulations that were then reflected
in its reform efforts.
Commercial Learning Period Ending
We all know that commercial human spaceflight is a heavily
regulated industry, especially concerning launch and reentry. Returning
to the importance of the learning period, there is a significant
uncertainty around the precise impact of the learning period ending.
Question 1. From your perspective as a legal and regulatory expert,
what specifically would happen should the learning period expire
without Congressional action?
Answer. One risk is that the FAA would delay processing licenses
involving human spaceflight while they rushed to write and finalize
regulations without adequate engagement with industry or adequate
information on which to base the regulations. That could be further
detrimental to U.S. commercial human spaceflight if the agency
continues to lack the resources and processes to effectively adjudicate
license applications. Another risk is a negative impact on innovation.
Insurance/Part 440 Regulations
A vital but often overlooked aspect of commercial human spaceflight
is insurance requirements and indemnification. Thankfully damages have
not yet exceeded statutorily required insurance coverage for commercial
space companies, but the current indemnification rules expire in 2025.
Question 1. Can you explain why it is so critical for investment
and protecting the public to modernize the FAA's approach to insurance
and indemnification as commercial space grows?
Answer. The public is meant to be protected by the FAA's
significant ground and flight safety reviews ahead of granting a launch
or reentry license. The insurance and indemnification are a back-up to
those thorough safety reviews, which is largely why claims have never
threatened to exceed the insurance policies that the FAA prescribes in
launch and reentry licenses. It is also important to note that the
FAA's insurance and indemnification regime protects the uninvolved
public as well as U.S. Government personnel and property. It does not
cover property owned or operated by the launch or reentry operator or
its customers involved in the launch or reentry. The insurance
requirements also satisfy the U.S. Government's interests in not being
liable for claims for damages domestically or internationally in
compliance with the Outer Space Treaty and Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. The U.S. has one of the
less generous launch indemnification regimes in comparison to China and
Russia, where insurance requirements are significantly less and
indemnification does not seemingly expire. Launch and reentry customers
and investors are interested in an extension as an indication that the
U.S. Government is invested in ensuring that a launch or reentry does
not become a ``bet the company'' situation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Caryn Schenewerk
Government Oversight of Commercial Space Industry
The current commercial space industry is required to interact with
several government agencies depending upon the specific mission they
are performing. These agencies may include the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Space Force, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Federal
Communications Commission.
Question 1. How many agencies and different sets of regulations
does a company have to go through to launch and reenter a commercial
spacecraft?
Answer. In order to conduct a launch and/or a reentry, a company
will likely need to engage with the following regulatory entities: the
FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation for the launch and/or
reentry license, which includes the safety and environmental review;
the Federal Communication Commission, and possibly the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration in the Dept. of
Commerce for spectrum use approval; the Dept. of Commerce's Commercial
Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs depending on the type and use of
remote sensing capabilities and its Bureau of Industry and Security if
an export license is required under the Export Administration
Regulations; the Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls if an export license or technical agreement is needed; the
Dept. of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration for transportation approval if the launch or reentry
vehicle is shipped with any hazardous materials on board such as
batteries; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives if
the vehicles utilizes any explosive materials; and the U.S. Coast Guard
if maritime vessels are involved in launch or recovery operations. If
the activities occur from a NASA or U.S. Space Force facility, then the
operator will be subject to that agency's requirements and oversight.
The list above excludes any state or local approvals that may be
required.
Question 2. Do you think this system of regulatory fragmentation is
efficient?
Answer. No.
Question 3. Do you think the proliferation of agencies involved in
the licensing process is helpful for industry in building, testing, and
validating new space launch vehicles? For example, is it helpful in
proving the safety and reliability of a rocket, or in building a record
of reliability and predictability of a rocket, to have testing put on
hold for months while a non-safety-critical agency like the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service conducts reviews?
Answer. No. Such an approach risks unnecessary increased costs for
companies and negative impacts for our national security and civil
space interests.
Question 4. What recommendations do you have to improve government
efficiency in the licensing of commercial space activities? What are
some potential improvements that could be made to create more efficient
commercial and government interactions?
Answer. The commercial sector benefits immensely from the use of
software solutions for tracking deliverables, processing information,
quality control and high-quality results. The licensing of commercial
space activities would benefit from implementing similar solutions to
track applications, conduct analysis and store and process significant
amounts of data in a timely and efficient manner. License review would
benefit from more people who are trained and familiar with the
technologies and able to engage regularly and meaningfully with
applicants. Today, license review is hindered by the lack of automated
processes and the small number of people available to review and
adjudicate the applications.
Question 5. What do you see as the highest priority areas to be
addressed for improvements in the government's role in commercial
spaceflight?
Answer. The most pressing need is for revision of FAA's launch and
reentry regulations based on industry input as well as investment in
the processes and tools used by the FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST) to accept and review launch and reentry license
applications. The FAA should initiate engagement with industry,
including through an ``Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking'' and
reverse industry days to gather direct feedback and recommendations for
revisions to 14 CFR Part 450.
Question 6. To your knowledge, does China or Russia have its own
version of National Environmental Policy Act\1\, or NEPA, under which
Chinese or Russian citizens or perhaps an obscure conservation group
can sue the government and stop space launches or space vehicle
development?
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\1\ See 42 U.S.C. 4331(a)
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Answer. I cannot claim significant familiarity with China or
Russia's environmental laws. It is my impression that the level of
environmental scrutiny and the power given to the public and interest
groups to challenge government decisions in the United States is not
commonly paralleled in either China or Russia, especially in areas like
space exploration that are closely tied to national security and
technological prestige. While China and Russia have environmental laws,
it appears as though the scope for public or organizational
intervention, particularly in the context of space exploration and
technology, is considerably less than what is provided under NEPA in
the United States.
Question 7. If a vehicle has already shown that it creates no
severe environmental damage or significant environmental impact, do you
think that vehicle should have to undergo a new environmental review
for every new launch?
Answer. No, the family of launch vehicles and operations should be
reviewed as efficiently as possible in a singular review.
Question 8. Mr. Gerstenmaier testified that he saw an inconsistency
across the government where NASA is pushing SpaceX to quickly advance
vehicle development and the FAA's licensing process is drastically
slowing development. Do you think the government adequately harmonizes
its national goals, like returning American astronauts to the Moon for
example, with its regulatory systems? If not, what do you think is the
source of that disconnect?
Answer. The testimony from Mr. Gerstenmaier highlights a
significant issue in the realm of U.S. space policy and regulation: the
potential misalignment between the ambitious national goals set by
entities like NASA and the regulatory processes overseen by bodies such
as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This dichotomy brings
into question whether the government effectively harmonizes its
aspirational objectives, such as returning American astronauts to the
Moon, with the practical realities of its regulatory frameworks. The
U.S. has also indicated its interest in increasingly utilizing
commercial services to support its national security goals. The risk to
our national goals should create even more urgency to ensure that we
have streamlined licensing processes in place that are well-resources,
efficient and effective in facilitating safety and a thriving, diverse
industry.
Question 9. If AST were to establish a ``fast lane'' regulatory
review process for systems directly tied to U.S. capability--like
Artemis or national security capability, do you believe this would help
ensure a holistic Government approach and ensure continued U.S.
leadership in space?
Answer. In my estimation, there are currently few, if any, FAA
licensees or license applicants that are not working to provide the
U.S. with capabilities that offer national security or civil space
benefits. The best solution is an FAA AST that can adjudicate license
applications in a timely and efficient manner and, most importantly, in
a manner that allows for review of multiple applications and operations
in parallel. The current review process appears to operate in series,
which is an untenable situation for U.S. national security, civil and
commercial space interests.
Question 10. Mr. Gerstenmaier also discussed the need to at least
double the resources of FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(AST) to meet the growing workload. What are your views on requiring
launch providers to `pay into the system,' similar to the way in which
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund works, to help pay for this growth?
Answer. The significant challenges faced by FAA AST must be
addressed. This is an idea that warrants thorough discussion among
established and emerging launch providers as well as a study of the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund history. Such a review could be a good
topic for FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
(COMSTAC) and for the Congressional Research Service with regard to the
Trust Fund's history.
Question 11. What specific areas at AST and the Office of Space
Commerce do you think need to be addressed to improve government's role
in commercial spaceflight?
Answer. The following are suggestions for FAA AST:
Resource Enhancement: AST requires a significant increase in
resources, including funding and personnel, to handle the
growing number of commercial space activities. This would
enable the implementation of software and automation solutions
to support more timely processing of licenses and permits.
Regulatory Streamlining: Simplifying and streamlining Part
450 is necessary. This should be prioritized and undertaken
with significant industry engagement.
Risk Management and Safety Standards: Continuously updating
safety standards and risk management strategies is essential to
keep pace with new technologies and mission types. This
involves adopting a balanced approach that ensures safety
without stifling innovation.
Industry Collaboration and Stakeholder Engagement: Engaging
more actively with industry stakeholders can help AST
understand and address the industry's needs and challenges,
leading to more informed and effective regulations.
Technological Expertise: Investing in the technological
expertise of AST personnel is crucial. This includes continuous
training and development to ensure that the staff is equipped
to assess and understand the latest advancements in space
technology.
The Office of Space Commerce should be given oversight of novel
space activities and the authorities and resources to engage with
industry as it develops regulations that are effective and efficient in
their substance and implementation.
Question 12. What should NASA's role be, if any, in the future
regulation of commercial human spaceflight?
Answer. NASA is poised to continue to be a valuable customer for
commercial human spaceflight and, as such, will play a vital role in
shaping some of those capabilities. NASA also has expertise that will
be beneficial in formal industry efforts to develop and adopt human
spaceflight standards.
Commercial Manned Spaceflight Moratorium and Regulation
Question 1. At the October 18th hearing, Brig. Gen. Wayne Monteith
of National Aerospace Solutions who was also the last head of FAA AST,
suggested a two-phase approach to the regulation of human spaceflight.
Phase 1 would be setting a date before which FAA may not publish new
regulations but is allowed to start working on them during that period,
and phase 2 would be setting an effective date for those regulations
that would occur years after the regulations are published. This gap
between the publishing of final regulations and their becoming
effective would provide a fail-safe, allowing Congress to intervene in
case industry was still not mature enough for the new regulations. In
his view, a forcing function is necessary to keep industry and
regulators working toward consensus rules. What is your view on this
two-phase approach?
Answer. Whether it is a two-phased approach or a single step, the
most important aspect is industry engagement and active efforts by the
FAA to not over-reach. It is vital that lessons learned from Part 450
be integrated into any regulatory process at FAA AST--the industry
should be fully engaged and their input should be significantly
reflected in the outcome, not dismissed. The agency must also be fully
prepared to engage in regulating the activity. With Part 450, the rule
was adopted and FAA AST's team was not prepared nor trained to apply
those rules. When the agency regulates, it must have adequate resources
and processes to effectively adjudicate license applications. The FAA
AST should be engaging with industry, but as long as we still have so
few human spaceflights, the ability to regulate as can be done today,
and such unique designs, the moratorium should stay in place.
Question 2. In the long term, do you think FAA is the best home for
the regulation of commercial spaceflight, or should Congress consider
standing up a new, independent entity?
Answer. Instead of further division of regulatory responsibility
between Federal agencies for space activities, it is important to
recognize the importance of consolidating regulatory oversight,
avoiding duplication of efforts and inefficient processes. U.S. space
companies are increasingly engaging in innovative activities like
satellite servicing, private space stations, in-space manufacturing,
and lunar rovers. They are not designing their operations, nor should
they, to align with burdensome divisions of responsibility among
multiple agencies.
The 2020 National Space Policy, along with industry representatives
and congressional legislation, have proposed granting the Department of
Commerce's Office of Space Commerce (OSC) the authority to approve
commercial in-space and in-situ operations. This recommendation
acknowledges the Commerce Department's existing role in regulating in-
space activities and its focus on fostering a robust U.S. space
industry while protecting national security and complying with
international treaty obligations. Such an approach aims to provide a
minimally burdensome regime for authorizing in-space missions,
emphasizing the need for significant accountability, transparency, and
clear timeframes.
To some degree, modeling the legislative approach on the Commercial
Space Launch Act (CSLA) makes sense--creating a flexible statute that
can effectively review near-term capabilities in a timely and efficient
manner, with the flexibility to expand authorities as the industry
develops. This strategy avoids trying to predict all future
technologies and risks, instead opting for a flexible approach that
ensures treaty compliance and fosters national security. That said, the
text of the CSLA is not my suggested starting point, nor do I think the
launch and reentry regulations are appropriate--that bill and those
regulations are intended to protect the uninvolved public on Earth.
They were not drafted to address in-space activities.
An efficient and effective interagency process involving
appropriate consultations will be key to a minimally burdensome regime
for authorizing in-space missions in a responsible and timely manner. A
well-designed and effectively implemented approach will be able to
review a variety of applications for in-space activities and
appropriately undertake an analysis of their compliance with
international treaty obligations and U.S. interests. I encourage
Congress to consider an approach modeled more on the commercial remote
sensing regulations and less on the launch and reentry regulations. The
remote sensing regulations focus on the core capabilities and
technologies that are of concern--they are narrowly scoped and intended
to be streamlined. Further, the Department of Commerce is experienced
with in-space activities whereas such oversight would significantly
expand the already stretched capabilities at the FAA, in addition to
vastly expanding their scope beyond those activities that may impact
the uninvolved public on Earth.
Congress should take action to grant the Department of Commerce
authority to review and adjudicate novel space activities in a manner
that complies with our treaty obligations. The kinds of activities
currently contemplated offer significant economic, space
sustainability, civil and national security benefits, including the
ability to remove debris, refuel or reposition satellites, conduct
manufacturing in-orbit and even move industrial activities that are
detrimental to Earth into space.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. J. D. Vance to
Caryn Schenewerk
Proprietary Data and Intellectual Property
Reluctance to share data has been flagged in several reports as a
barrier to standards development and the implementation of voluntary
safety systems. These reports point to a variety of solutions,
including statutory data protection, programs to facilitate sharing
proprietary data, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and individual companies.
I understand this reluctance to share data. These reports indicate
that companies are concerned that any shared data could be traced back
to the company due to the small number of providers and the significant
differences between their vehicles. Companies view the protection of
their data as important for their commercial competitiveness.
Question 1. While commercial companies need to protect their
proprietary information, data-sharing between commercial providers will
be vital for standards development, collaborative research, and
voluntary safety systems. What protections could be implemented to
facilitate data-sharing between companies while protecting proprietary
data and intellectual property? Would legislation best address this
issue, or could agency-led or industry-led measures be effective?
Answer. Agency and industry-led efforts can be effective. That
said, the number of entities is still very small (single digits) and
the number of operations also small (barely double-digits). The
industry is also populated with unique, one-of-a-kind designs, so it's
worth considering the fact that the industry has not achieved a level
of maturity that would facilitate rapid standard development.
Question 2. How can Congress and the FAA encourage collaboration
between industry while protecting proprietary data?
Ohio's Space Capabilities
Ohio is the birthplace of aviation and has a rich tradition of
excellence in aerospace. It started with the Wright Brothers, continued
with Neil Armstrong and John Glenn, and lives on today with so many
people, companies, and universities on the cutting-edge of innovation.
Following in this tradition, Ohio is home to world-class
spaceflight testing capabilities not available anywhere else on the
globe. But I hear they are often underutilized by commercial partners
or even non-NASA Federal partners.
Question 1. NASA/Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has the
Agency's lead assignment for future space communication. How best
should NASA/Glenn work with the rest of the Federal Government as part
of its leadership role in this area, to help fortify commercial space-
flight in areas from spectrum licensing to technology advancement, and
does NASA/Glenn have the resources it needs to accomplish this role?
Answer. Ohio's rich heritage in aerospace and its current standing
as a hub for spaceflight innovation position it well to contribute
significantly to the future of commercial spaceflight. NASA's Glenn
Research Center in Cleveland, with its lead assignment in space
communication, plays a crucial role in this landscape. For NASA/Glenn
to effectively lead in space communication and support commercial
spaceflight, a multifaceted approach involving Federal collaborations,
technology partnerships, resource optimization, educational
initiatives, and innovation promotion is essential. By leveraging its
unique capabilities and fostering strong partnerships both within the
Federal government and with commercial entities, NASA/Glenn can
significantly contribute to advancing space communication technologies
and supporting the broader commercial spaceflight sector. Additionally,
ensuring that NASA/Glenn is adequately resourced will be pivotal in
enabling it to fulfill this leadership role effectively. Specifically,
NASA centers can support commercial partners in the following ways:
Technology Transfer and Commercial Partnerships: NASA/Glenn
can offer its advanced communication technologies to commercial
space entities through technology transfer agreements or
partnerships. This can accelerate technological advancements in
the commercial sector. To facilitate these agreements, the
Center should consider flexibility in its terms and conditions
to meet the needs of diverse space companies from start-up to
established.
Collaborative Research and Development: Engaging in joint
R&D projects with commercial partners can foster innovation in
space communication technologies. This could include developing
new communication systems for deep space exploration, satellite
communications, and more.
Question 2. On October 16, UC Berkeley announced participation in a
new $2B space research park at NASA/Ames in California. In my home
State of Ohio, Voyager/Airbus have announced the establishment of the
George Washington Carver Science Park on the campus of The Ohio State
University, as an integral part of their efforts on Starlab, one of
NASA's commercial low-Earth orbit destination replacements for the ISS
after 2030. What key roles do you see Universities--especially public
Universities--playing, in order to maximize the potential success of
commercial spaceflight in low-Earth orbit and beyond?
Answer. The involvement of universities, particularly public
universities, is pivotal in maximizing the potential success of
commercial spaceflight, both in low-Earth orbit and beyond. Their roles
span from research and development to workforce training and policy
development, forming a cornerstone in the advancement of space
exploration and technology. Here are some key roles that universities
can play:
Research and Development
Cutting-edge Research: Universities are often at the
forefront of scientific research and technological
innovation. They can conduct groundbreaking research in
areas crucial for space exploration, such as propulsion
systems, life support technologies, materials science, and
space communication.
Collaborative Projects: Universities can collaborate
with commercial space companies and government agencies
like NASA on specific research projects, leveraging their
expertise and facilities to advance space technologies.
Workforce Development and Training
Education and Training: Preparing a skilled workforce
is crucial for the space industry. Universities can offer
specialized programs in aerospace engineering, space
sciences, and related fields to train the next generation
of space professionals.
Internships and Co-ops: Partnership with commercial
space companies for internships and cooperative education
programs can provide students with hands-on experience,
making them valuable assets to the industry upon
graduation.
Technology Transfer and Commercialization
From Lab to Industry: Universities can play a key role
in technology transfer, where research innovations are
developed into commercial products or technologies for
space applications.
Startup Incubation: Many universities have incubators
and accelerators that can support startups focused on space
technologies, providing them with resources, mentorship,
and networking opportunities.
Policy Development and Advocacy
Policy Research and Analysis: Universities can
contribute to space policy development through research and
analysis, helping to shape policies that are conducive to
the growth of commercial spaceflight.
Public Advocacy: As respected academic institutions,
universities can advocate for policies and funding that
support the space sector, both at the state and Federal
levels.
Public Engagement and Outreach
Educating the Public: Universities can engage in
outreach activities to educate the public about space
exploration and commercial space endeavors, fostering
public interest and support.
Hosting Conferences and Forums: Universities can host
conferences, workshops, and forums that bring together
industry, government, and academic experts to discuss and
strategize on the future of space exploration.
International Collaboration
Global Partnerships: Universities often have strong
international connections. They can facilitate global
research partnerships and student exchanges, contributing
to international collaboration in space exploration.
On-Orbit Authority
Question 1. To what extent does the lack of regulatory authority
for on-orbit activities affect the commercial human spaceflight
industry, if at all?
Answer. The human spaceflight activities that have occurred to date
have not been negatively impacted.
Question 2. As the industry prepares for commercial space stations,
should a Federal agency be given on-orbit authority that addresses
commercial human spaceflight? If so, which agency should be tasked with
this authority and why?
Answer. Yes, there is interest in clarifying oversight of future
commercial human destinations in Earth's orbit. Those activities are
considered in the discussion of a ``mission authorization'' regulatory
regime with wide-spread support for oversight by the Department of
Commerce (DOC). Proposals for legislation that have been circulated
would continue to have the FAA responsible for launch and reentry and
grant the DOC authority over the on-orbit activities. Progress on
mission authorization legislation would provide industry-desired
certainty regarding the agency with oversight and the opportunity to
engage meaningfully in the development of appropriate and efficient
regulations.
Question 3. In discussions regarding on-orbit authority or mission
authorization, many disagree on whether Commerce or FAA should have
this authority. How does commercial human spaceflight factor into these
discussions?
Answer. There is wide-spread support for granting the Department of
Commerce (DOC) oversight of on-orbit or mission authorization for all
activities beyond those regulated by the FAA (launch and reentry) and
FCC (telecommunications). The DOC should have clear authority to review
and grant approvals for a diverse set of activities, including those
that involve human spaceflight. Any legislation granting the authority
should include clear timeframes and direction to engage meaningfully
with industry to develop appropriate and efficient regulations. Such
authorities would allow DOC to lead an inter-agency process and benefit
from expertise across various agencies related to the regulated
activity.
Miscellaneous
Question 1. The U.S. government is focused on ensuring our
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty for mission authorization and
supervision under Article 6 are met. With the increase of commercial
activities in space, do you believe that this authority should be
vested in one Federal agency?
Answer. That would be idea. Instead of further division of
regulatory responsibility between Federal agencies for space
activities, it is important to recognize the importance of
consolidating regulatory oversight, avoiding duplication of efforts and
inefficient processes. U.S. space companies are increasingly engaging
in innovative activities like satellite servicing, private space
stations, in-space manufacturing, and lunar rovers. They are not
designing their operations, nor should they, to align with burdensome
divisions of responsibility among multiple agencies.
The 2020 National Space Policy, along with industry representatives
and congressional legislation, have proposed granting the Department of
Commerce's Office of Space Commerce (OSC) the authority to approve
commercial in-space and in-situ operations consistent with the United
States' obligation under Article 6 of the Outer Space Treaty. This
recommendation acknowledges the Commerce Department's existing role in
regulating in-space activities and its focus on fostering a robust U.S.
space industry while protecting national security and complying with
international treaty obligations. Such an approach aims to provide a
minimally burdensome regime for authorizing in-space missions,
emphasizing the need for significant accountability, transparency, and
clear timeframes.
Question 2. As humans look to operate on orbit and beyond can you
speak to lessons learned from commercial launch and how the U.S.
government should approach working with commercial companies operating
human activities in space moving forward?
Answer. It is vital that lessons learned from the FAA AST's
adoption of Part 450 be integrated into any regulatory process at FAA
AST or elsewhere--the industry should be fully engaged and their input
should be significantly reflected in the outcome, not dismissed. The
agency must also be fully prepared to engage in regulating the
activity. With Part 450, the rule was adopted and FAA AST's team was
not prepared nor trained to apply those rules.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Wayne Monteith
Safety Regulatory Framework for In-Space Human Activities
Since 2000, we've seen a constant human presence on-orbit, with
astronauts living and working in the International Space Station. In
2021, we saw the first sub-orbital commercial flights from Virgin
Galactic and Blue Origin, and the first successful orbital commercial
flight with SpaceX's Inspiration4. The space economy is growing rapidly
and the landscape for commercial human spaceflight will continue to
evolve. Soon we will see commercial destinations in Low Earth Orbit,
on-orbit manufacturing and R&D, and potential human habitation on the
Moon and Mars.
Question 1. Is it possible to develop a human spaceflight safety
framework that would be applicable to all types of vehicles and all
operational regimes, or will specific safety approaches and subsequent
regulation need to be tailored to specific missions?
Answer. I do not believe a single safety framework for all space
vehicle types and orbital regimes is appropriate or possible at this
time. An attempt to do so would likely disadvantage some sector of the
industry. There are however aspects of the safety equation that can be
the same or similar across vehicles, such as requiring a sufficient
breathable atmosphere with an appropriate safety margin without
mandating the delivery system. Subsequent regulations are likely best
suited to vehicle types, or classes, and mission types rather than
being overly broad. For example, the regulatory requirements may be
vastly different for a low earth orbit (LEO) mission vice a lunar
mission.
Mission Authorization
Current FAA regulatory authority covers launch and re-entry of
crewed and uncrewed spacecraft but does not extend to on-orbit
operations with or without humans. Yet the United States Government,
under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, must authorize and supervise these
activities conducted by U.S. entities. I am aware that some in the
space community believe that we should extend the FAA's licensing
authority to cover all human space activities while providing the
Department of Commerce with authority over all in-space mission areas
and activities that do not involve humans.
Question 1. What do you view as the most effective division of
regulatory responsibility between Federal agencies?
Answer. Fewer regulatory responsibility overlaps are critical,
which means fewer regulatory agencies vying for scope within the space
regime. In the current regulatory construct AST is responsible during
launch and reentry activities, but between those points a literal and
figurative void exists. Ideally, DOT would be responsible for all space
transportation activities and another agency, such as DOC, would be
responsible for all other space activities (i.e., on-orbit servicing,
asteroid mining, mission authorization, etc.). With that said I believe
in the future a single agency should be responsible for all human
related space activities for (theoretically) a consistent, predictable,
and safer regulatory approach. If a single agency is given authority
for all phases of human spaceflight activities then ideally seams are
mitigated which should lead to a safer approach and in an ideal
regulatory environment, a streamlined licensing process. By default
this agency would be DOT.
FAA's Needs for Commercial Regulation
It is clear that the Federal government must prepare to regulate
the commercial human spaceflight industry. This means ensuring our
agencies are well staffed, knowledgeable, and ready to regulate. We
have heard from stakeholders that the FAA does not have personnel or at
least not enough personnel with the right skill sets to begin
regulating commercial human spaceflight occupant safety on January 1,
2024.
Question 1. Would adding a key technology leader, such as a Chief
Technical Officer or ``CTO'' at the FAA specific to commercial
spaceflight be an effective way to keep its workforce up to speed on
the rapid technology changes in industry?
Answer. I do not see a scenario where the FAA would be prepared to
fully regulate commercial human spaceflight activities within the next
3-5 years, regardless of number/skills of personnel, because developing
a good regulation will take time to be done right. When I was leading
AST we had the equivalent of a Chief Engineer and while knowledgeable
and hard working a single individual would find it challenging to make
a meaningful difference. I do not believe adding a CTO would be
sufficient to change the risk averse culture of FAA AST which is a more
immediate impediment.
Question 2. Given your experience with FAA/AST from the Federal
side, what do you believe the FAA needs to do ensure the safe
transportation of humans into, through, and back from space?
Answer. FAA will need to embrace the expertise of the industry they
regulate and will need to work closely with industry to develop a
minimally sufficient regulatory construct, or ``light touch,'' to
foster public safety while not disadvantaging U.S. industry. They will
also need sufficient time to develop the new regulation and should be
mandated to work closely with industry and the interagency partners.
They would also benefit from a rewrite of the outdated Administrative
Procedures Act which can and has been interpreted as precluding full
and open dialogue with industry.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Wayne Monteith
Commercial Learning Period Ending
We all know that commercial human spaceflight is a heavily
regulated industry, especially concerning launch and reentry. Regarding
the importance of the learning period, there is a significant
uncertainty around the precise impact of the learning period ending.
Question. From your perspective as a regulatory expert and previous
experience as the lead of the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, what specifically would happen should the learning
period expire without Congressional action?
Answer. I believe the FAA would be put into a position to rush to
develop a regulatory construct for commercial human spaceflight that
would likely be overly burdensome, without significantly adding to
safety. While commercial space transportation is highly regulated,
human spaceflight is not. Part 450 was envisioned to provide a much
wider spectrum of technologies and approaches to meet regulatory safety
requirements, but it does not appear FAA has embraced the opportunity
to meaningfully streamline. I believe this would be consistent
regardless of how long the learning period is extended as long as there
is no firm sunset date. In other words, industry appears to count on
the period being extended while AST notionally works to be ready to
regulate. In this situation very little actually gets done to prepare
for a new regulation. This is why I've suggested instead of
establishing an extension to the learning period Congress should
consider establishing a date in which a regulation cannot be published
before. This forces industry and the regulator to do the hard work to
develop a new regulation and gives Congress the ability to decide when
the regulation should become effective. As I recall during testimony,
Virgin Galactic suggested extending the learning period another seven
years. If you extend for that time and then begin writing a new
regulation you are likely eleven to twelve years out from being ready
to regulate. If you establish a no earlier than date you could
theoretically be ready by the end of the initial seven years and at
that point Congress will decide whether it is the appropriate time for
DOT to issue the regulation.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to
Wayne Monteith
Mission Authorization Framework
During the hearing you stated, ``Based largely on my experience
with Part 450, my concern remains a very public catastrophic event may
drive a rush to regulate, and potentially over-regulate, this still
nascent part of the industry.'' You also stated continued growth of
commercial human spaceflight will be ``negatively impacted by either a
catastrophic event or an overly burdensome regulatory construct.''
Question. What are examples of targeted regulations that would be
constructive in maintaining human safety in space travel to prevent
catastrophe?
Answer. My experience with Part 450 taught me that no matter how
grand the intentions, either insufficient time to develop a new
regulation or insufficient collaboration with industry leads to a less
than ideal outcome. Part 450 was envisioned to streamline the
regulatory landscape, instead it mostly appears to have created new
barriers to entry for U.S. companies or ideas, without adding to public
safety. Even though a herculean effort went into developing Part 450, I
believe the shortened timeline led to flaws in the regulation and the
lack of collaboration with industry further entrenched an ``us vs
them'' mentality with the regulator. Should this same accelerated
approach be followed for human spaceflight I would expect an even more
draconian approach, again, without a significant increase in safety. If
a targeted approach is taken, I would recommend starting with vehicle
classes (i.e., winged or traditional rocket) and potentially
environmental regimes (i.e., sub-orbital, orbital, cislunar, etc.).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Wayne Monteith
Regulatory Reform
Question 1. You provide a unique perspective given your extensive
experience with space launch as the Commander of the 45th Space Wing
and Director of the Eastern Range, and most recently as the head of the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST). Do you believe the Part 450 regulations you
helped write at AST are working as intended?
Answer. I do not believe the Part 450 regulation is working as
intended. The primary purpose of Part 450 was to combine and streamline
existing regulations while enhancing safety. It is not obvious that the
licensing process has been streamlined, nor that it is faster or less
burdensome on U.S. industry, nor that safety has actually been
enhanced. I believe it is not just the regulation itself that has some
latent issues, but also the way it is being interpreted by FAA.
Question 2. Given your experience serving in the Air Force and
later Space Force, rising to the rank of Brigadier General before
retiring and going to AST, do you agree rapid and reliable access to
space is a critical national security concern?
Answer. I do agree. It is an absolute imperative to national
security that the United States have robust, responsive, reliable
access to space and a successful commercial space industry in general.
One that is not only allowed but is rewarded for innovation and rapid
technology development rather than the opposite. The regulator cannot
guarantee safety or eliminate risk, no matter how hard they work, but
left unchecked they can stifle innovation and disadvantage U.S.
industry and national security.
Question 3. In your written testimony, you expressed your concern
that movement away from the concept of a regulatory ``one stop shop''
would impede U.S. leadership in space. What do you think has led to the
increase in regulatory fragmentation we've seen the last few years and
what can Congress do to reverse this trend?
Answer. While I believe commercial space transportation safety is a
responsibility of the Department of Transportation, I've seen firsthand
where having the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) reside
in the FAA has led to an overly risk averse regulatory approach that
does not add additional safety to a perfect public safety record and
may degrade safety. Unfortunately, commercial space transportation
licensing responsibility residing within the FAA has proven to be
problematic. As industry, Congress and the previous Administration
noted prior to the release of SPD-3 FAA AST could not keep up with
their existing licensing workload and therefore would likely fail at
implementing a manageable space traffic management construct. So,
rather than address the problem with either FAA or AST, the safety
responsibility was given to DOC's Office of Space Commerce, further
moving away from the ``one-stop-shop'' construct. We still have failed
to solve the original problem statement that led to the creation of
AST.
I would recommend the following for consideration:
not adding any additional Federal agencies to oversee
commercial space transportation
evaluating the current utilization of staff within AST and
then only if necessary, adding limited additional staff for the
express purpose of increasing licensing capacity and speed
move AST back to DOT and report directly to the Secretary
for accountability
designate AST as the responsible agency for space
transportation operations and all commercial human spaceflight
activities
move U.S. spaceport licensing responsibility and support to
DOC
make DOC the lead Federal agency for mission authorization,
and for all activities other than space transportation and
human spaceflight
ensure DOS are DOC are the lead agencies for U.S.
international space efforts, this would enable AST to focus on
licensing and supporting the domestic commercial space
transportation industry and be in a support role as resources
permit
Question 4. Do you think the proliferation of agencies involved in
the licensing process is helpful for industry in building, testing, and
validating new space launch vehicles? For example, is it helpful in
proving the safety and reliability of a rocket, or in building a record
of reliability and predictability of a rocket, to have testing put on
hold for months while a non-safety-critical agency like the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service conducts reviews?
Answer. I do not believe having so many agencies involved in the
licensing process increases safety, but it does negatively impacts both
a robust U.S. space transportation industry and national security. The
recent Starship anomaly could not have been much more ``spectacular,''
but even in this catastrophic event no member of the public was injured
or killed and I have not seen evidence that a single animal was killed
either. If Federal agencies are left unchecked U.S. industry will have
little choice but to look to overseas locations to launch new
innovative, disruptive technologies thus ceding U.S. global leadership.
The environment is important, but there needs to be a balance based on
national priorities.
Question 5. In your experience at AST, to what extent did
regulators give any consideration to whether an activity was a national
priority or part of the development of capabilities for a program of
national significance? That is, did FAA AST ever use any discretion to
speed up the licensing or regulating of nationally important
capabilities or infrastructure?
Answer. When I served as the head of AST we did prioritize both
national security and NASA licensing and mission operations when
appropriate. But, I believe this occurred largely because of my
previous experience in launch and space operations in the DoD.
a. Could AST even exercise that kind of discretion if it wanted to?
Answer. Yes, workload management and priorities are a call that the
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation can make.
Question 6. In your experience, does AST currently consider the
level of international competition from our adversaries such as China
and Russia, or the need to maintain U.S. global leadership in space
launch capabilities and advanced spaceflight hardware as part of its
approach to licensing? If not, do you think they should be as part of
either an obligation to protect national security or statutory duty to
``encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and
reentries by the private sector?''
Answer. I do not have current insight into the priorities of the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation, but my experience suggests
this approach would be unlikely. I do believe, consistent with public
safety, U.S. global leadership in this sector is imperative for
national security and this should be included in FAA AST's mandate to
help prioritize their licensing efforts.
Question 7. Do you think AST correctly balances its safety mandate
with fostering innovation, or is AST too risk averse when it comes to
the development of new and novel space transportation vehicles?
Answer. I do not believe AST correctly balances its safety mandate
with fostering innovation. My experience within AST was that safety was
paramount to all licensing activities with no consideration given to
the research and development (R&D) type activities. Where I believe the
agency fails is that it is too risk averse and attempts to eliminate
almost all safety risk at the expense of speed and fostering
innovation. The culture of AST is highly influenced by the appropriate
safety culture of the mature aviation industry with little
acknowledgement of the still nascent stage of development of the
commercial space industry. As a reminder, there has never been a death
or injury to a member of the uninvolved public as a result of a
commercial space mishap. To many this would suggest the record suggests
the current system of safety standards is correct, I believe a more
relaxed safety standard could have achieved the same results.
Question 8. My belief is vehicles that have launched hundreds of
times encounter a smoother and faster time obtaining a launch license
than a brand new vehicle or one which has only launched a few times. Do
you believe the proven reliability of a vehicle should factor into the
speed of the licensing process?
Answer. I believe that a vehicle's proven reliability should
absolutely factor into an expedited licensing process, just as the
proven success of a company in this sector should factor into the
licensing process for their new vehicles. Instead, I encountered many
instances where the regulators considered companies that iterated
quickly and safely following an anomaly and then improved their
vehicles to be reckless and in need of additional oversight rather than
less.
Question 9. In the current regulatory environment, with all the red
tape mandates such as the National Environmental Policy Act, do you
think the United States could stand up a space program and put a man on
the moon in under a decade if we were starting from scratch? What about
Mars?
Answer. Given the historically overly burdensome behavior of some
Federal agencies I would see no path forward to successfully put an
American on the moon or Mars in a timely manner if we started from
scratch. It will be difficult enough to put an American on Mars within
this decade given the heavy hand of the regulators.
Moratorium on Manned Spaceflight Regulation
Question 1. In the long term, do you think FAA is the best home for
the regulation of commercial spaceflight?
Answer. I do not believe FAA is the right ``home'' for regulating
commercial spaceflight. At a minimum, Congress should consider moving
FAA AST back to DOT reporting directly to the Secretary. Additionally,
if the question is specifically referencing commercial human
spaceflight I believe the responsibility for all operations should
reside with AST so as not to further complicate the licensing process.
a. Should Congress consider moving AST out of FAA or even standing
up a new, independent entity?
Answer. See previous response. Additionally, much like the DoD's
Space Force, I believe there is merit in exploring a new independent
entity for all licensing, supporting, and regulating of commercial
space activities . . . truly enabling a ``one-stop-shop'' for U.S.
industry with an eye towards streamlined, expeditious licensing that
accepts the idea of ``reasonable risk,'' enables and encourages
innovation, fosters a robust U.S. industrial base to enhance national
security and ensures continued U.S. global leadership in this sector.
Question 2. If AST were to establish a ``fast lane'' regulatory
review process for systems directly tied to U.S. capability, like
Artemis or national security capability, do you believe this would help
secure a holistic government approach and ensure continued U.S. global
leadership in space?
Answer. I do, but only if Congress is clear on its expectations for
the priorities, processes, and timelines within AST and provides
oversight to ensure its direction is being effectively implemented.
Question 3. Are there any historical or international precedents
for aligning government regulations and agency activities with the
schedules of large-scale national space programs, and if so, what
lessons can be drawn from these examples?
Answer. I believe the most relevant example is the original human
space program. The goal from government was clear and there was a
national imperative to move ahead of the Soviet Union. I also believe
we face the same challenge today, but primarily from the Chinese
government. From my perspective, this means we need to establish the
national imperative to be the global leader and then hold all
government agencies accountable to program success. If that means being
the first to safely establish a human presence on the Moon and Mars
then we should be ``all in.''
Question 4. Do you think there is a way to better organize
government oversight and regulation of the commercial spaceflight
industry to make it more efficient?
Answer. Any consolidation of oversight responsibilities would
likely be helpful. Today there are too many agencies with a stake in
the approval process. I believe reasonable licensing timelines for the
agency would also be appropriate and if the deadline is missed then the
license should be automatically approved. A good first step would be
for DOT to oversee all space transportation responsibilities and human
spaceflight, and then DOC would oversee all other aspects.
Question 5. What recommendations do you have to improve commercial
spaceflight oversight and regulations?
Answer. I believe Part 450 has the potential to be the streamlined
regulation it was intended to be. So, the issue comes down to the
quality of the licensing submission by industry and the interpretation
of the regulations by the agency and of the quality of the submission.
It would help to more clearly define the regulatory/oversight
responsibilities of each agency that has the ability to delay a
mission.
Question 6. What do you see as the highest priority areas to be
addressed for improvements to the Federal government's role in
regulation of commercial spaceflight?
Answer. Culture and process. A more reasonable approach to risk
assessment (safety management system) in the license application
process would be beneficial and clear timelines that must be met to
issue a license. In other words, ``good enough'' now, is often better
than ``perfect'' months or years later.
Question 7. What specific areas at AST and the Office of Space
Commerce need to be addressed to improve the Federal government's role
in the regulation and licensing of commercial spaceflight?
Answer. AST should focus solely on the licensing process and until
the process is improved the office should not be focused or involved in
any other perceived responsibilities such as international
collaboration, public engagements, etc. This may seem draconian, but
with an assertion that current resources are insufficient then national
priorities (like NASA's Artemis program) and national security should
be their highest licensing priority. DOIC should also focus on their
core responsibilities.
Question 8. What should the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's role be, if any, in the regulation or licensing of
commercial spaceflight?
Answer. NASA should not become a regulator, but instead have a
supporting role in the development of any new regulation on human
spaceflight given their long and storied history and deep bench of
subject matter experts. FAA should be required to closely and fully
collaborate with NASA to utilize and leverage their expertise.
Question 9. At the October 18th hearing, Mr. Gerstenmaier of SpaceX
discussed the need for substantially increasing resources at the FAA,
advocating for at least doubling the resources of AST to meet the
growing workload. What are your views on requiring launch providers to
`pay into the system,' similar to the way in which airlines pay into
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, to help pay for this growth?
Answer. While adding more staff to AST may, or may not, help in the
short term it will likely not solve the problem. When I arrived at FAA
AST, I believed we had sufficient staff, but we were ineffectively
organized, processes were broken, there was a distinct lack of
accountability and the team lacked focus. We ``fixed'' most of the
structural and personnel issues, but culture change takes years and
continuous attention.
Question 10. In your estimation, are resource constraints at FAA
AST the biggest challenge for industry in terms of licensing for
commercial space activities?
Answer. No. While resources may be one factor, I believe the risk
averse and process focused culture is the limiting factor in licensing
efficiency. It is also difficult to determine whether the office is
focused on the ``right'' priorities. If, you accept the argument that
additional staff is needed it should only come after an assessment of
internal priorities and focus, and workload management is completed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. J. D. Vance to
Wayne Monteith
Proprietary Data and Intellectual Property
Reluctance to share data has been flagged in several reports as a
barrier to standards development and the implementation of voluntary
safety systems. These reports point to a variety of solutions,
including statutory data protection, programs to facilitate sharing
proprietary data, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and individual companies.
I understand this reluctance to share data. These reports indicate
that companies are concerned that any shared data could be traced back
to the company due to the small number of providers and the significant
differences between their vehicles. Companies view the protection of
their data as important for their commercial competitiveness.
Question 1. While commercial companies need to protect their
proprietary information, data-sharing between commercial providers will
be vital for standards development, collaborative research, and
voluntary safety systems. What protections could be implemented to
facilitate data-sharing between companies while protecting proprietary
data and intellectual property? Would legislation best address this
issue, or could agency-led or industry-led measures be effective?
Answer. A third party, like an FFRDC, holding and sanitizing the
information could be one approach. Establishing an industry safety
sharing organization which meets twice a year with an FAA chair to
facilitate and provide logistics, but the meeting would entail no
recording or minutes, no significant government or public presence, and
legislative protections on safety data shared with the government. This
would allow industry to come together and freely share data and
encourage cross-industry dialogue. Legislative protections would be
required to be established in Title 51 similar to the protections in
Title 49 for aviation.
Question 2. How can Congress and the FAA encourage collaboration
between industry while protecting proprietary data?
Answer. See previous response. I would also add that during my
tenure in AST industry expressed concerns that the more data they
provided to FAA, the deeper FAA analyzed the new data, and all too
often FAA required even more data creating a seemingly endless loop in
the licensing process. This occurred without a corresponding increase
in safety.
Ohio's Space Capabilities
Ohio is the birthplace of aviation and has a rich tradition of
excellence in aerospace. It started with the Wright Brothers, continued
with Neil Armstrong and John Glenn, and lives on today with so many
people, companies, and universities on the cutting-edge of innovation.
Following in this tradition, Ohio is home to world-class
spaceflight testing capabilities not available anywhere else on the
globe. But I hear they are often underutilized by commercial partners
or even non-NASA Federal partners.
Question 1. NASA/Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has the
Agency's lead assignment for future space communication. How best
should NASA/Glenn work with the rest of the Federal Government as part
of its leadership role in this area, to help fortify commercial space-
flight in areas from spectrum licensing to technology advancement, and
does NASA/Glenn have the resources it needs to accomplish this role?
Answer. While I could provide an answer through analogy, this
specific question is outside my area of expertise.
Question 2. On October 16, UC Berkeley announced participation in a
new $2B space research park at NASA/Ames in California. In my home
State of Ohio, Voyager/Airbus have announced the establishment of the
George Washington Carver Science Park on the campus of The Ohio State
University, as an integral part of their efforts on Starlab, one of
NASA's commercial low-Earth orbit destination replacements for the ISS
after 2030. What key roles do you see Universities--especially public
Universities--playing, in order to maximize the potential success of
commercial spaceflight in low-Earth orbit and beyond?
Answer. Graduates of Public Universities will become the next
generation of innovators and STEM scientists, moving us all into the
next frontier. Public Universities provide a wealth of professional
research while encouraging student research in vital areas of space
transportation and provides excitement building opportunities to
encourage United States students to take up the mantel of space
exploration, including the potential for a true ``space university
campus'' in LEO.
On-Orbit Authority
Question 1. To what extent does the lack of regulatory authority
for on-orbit activities affect the commercial human spaceflight
industry, if at all?
Answer. At this time, it does not affect the industry, because
there is little regulatory authority currently exercised. As authority
is provided to regulate this portion of the industry, then ensuring
that one regulatory regime applies from launch to landing will be
critical to providing operators with a seamless and clear licensing
scheme.
Question 2. As the industry prepares for commercial space stations,
should a Federal agency be given on-orbit authority that addresses
commercial human spaceflight? If so, which agency should be tasked with
this authority and why?
Answer. DOT should be given this authority and responsibility so
that there is one and only one license required, and one set of
requirements covering space flight participants.
Question 3. In discussions regarding on-orbit authority or mission
authorization, many disagree on whether Commerce or FAA should have
this authority. How does commercial human spaceflight factor into these
discussions?
Answer. Unlike space transportation and other space activities, I
believe human spaceflight should be regulated by a single government
agency to ensure a single licensing process and a consistent approach
to safety.
Miscellaneous
Question 1. As humans look to operate on orbit and beyond can you
speak to lessons learned from commercial launch and how the U.S.
government should approach working with commercial companies operating
human activities in space moving forward?
Answer. Update the APA to allow more effective dialogue between
government and industry. Encourage collaboration across all of
government and industry to collect and provide results of research into
the effects on humans in space. Many research organizations,
universities, and companies are working diligently, but the results
need to be available to not only the government regulator, but also to
industry.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Sirisha Bandla
Human Spaceflight Occupant Safety
We are entering a golden age for commercial spaceflight. As we see
the sharp increase in space launches and witness the first of many
fully civilian spaceflights, the safety of those onboard must be a top
priority, just as public safety is. In just over a year, we have
experienced two significant mishaps with launch vehicles intended for
human spaceflight. On September 12, 2022, the Blue Origin New Shepard
suborbital rocket suffered a failure a little more than a minute after
launch, resulting in the vehicle's emergency abort system jettisoning
the capsule away from the booster. On April 20, 2023, SpaceX's first
attempt to launch Starship resulted in the catastrophic loss of the
vehicle and damage to the launch pad that sent debris as far as five
miles from the Boca Chica, Texas launch site.
Question 1. Do your companies have a process for reviewing critical
human-safety systems onboard vehicles that have successfully completed
commercial human flights to ensure they worked properly?
Answer. As the basis of our business, VG's highest priority is the
safety of our crew and spaceflight participants (SFPs). To ensure the
safety of our SFPs, VG has created a thorough SFP training program that
spans multiple days and goes above and beyond the emergency training
required by 14 CFR Sec. 460.51.
To continuously improve our SFP training program, VG collects and
uses flight test data, Subject Matter Expert (SME) input, and other
information to identify and mitigate safety risks. The following are
some examples of the data and actions VG collects and takes to
constantly develop our training program (the list is not exhaustive):
Frame-by-frame analysis of movement in the cabin,
identifying if any hazards are presented that have previously
gone undocumented.
SFP safety data collection by flying mannequins ahead of
human flights followed by cabin-safety checkouts with trained
employees ahead of customer flights.
A medical screening process for potential SFPs including
medical analysis and one-on-one time between a potential SFP
and VG's Chief Medical Officer and/or Flight Surgeon
FAA's Needs for Commercial Regulation
It is clear that the Federal government must prepare to regulate
the commercial human spaceflight industry. This means ensuring our
agencies are well staffed, knowledgeable, and ready to regulate. We
have heard from stakeholders that the FAA does not have personnel or at
least not enough personnel with the right skill sets to begin
regulating commercial human spaceflight occupant safety on January 1,
2024.
Question 1. Given your experience with FAA/AST from the commercial
side, what do you believe FAA needs to do to ensure the safe
transportation of humans into, through, and back from space?
Answer. FAA must work with industry to determine what a regulatory
environment looks like for commercial human spaceflight. Looking at
safety frameworks through historical learnings, current lessons
learned, and industry consensus standards will help determine a
regulatory framework for occupant safety that prioritizes safety
without compromising innovation and industry growth. Without those
discussions occurring and a process to look at data and industry
standards, it will be hard to determine what the FAA needs to do, as
opposed to what it can do.
In addition, FAA also only has authority for launch and re-re-
entry. When there is regulatory framework for occupant safety in the
future, it should still be limited as such unless future authority is
expanded by Congress.
Washington Space Workforce
The launches that we've seen from the companies here today would
not have been possible without the engineers, mechanics, and
technicians who made these systems possible. My home state of
Washington is a prime example of the aerospace and space ecosystem. Our
space industry supports more than 13,000 workers, with an economic
impact of $4.6 billion annually. About 5,000 of those workers work at
Blue Origin, and more than 1,300 work at SpaceX, creating Starlink
satellites. As we move forward in the rapidly changing field of
commercial space, we know that these numbers will only grow. It is key
that we ensure we have the domestic workforce to keep up with that
growth. We're seeing shortages across the STEM fields, with a 60,000-
workforce shortage in Washington alone by 2026. Ensuring we have a
strong domestic space workforce is key to remaining internationally
competitive.
Question 1. What workforce needs and challenges do you see for the
commercial space industry?
Answer. The industry needs an increased pipeline of diverse
engineering graduates to keep pace with the growing commercial space
industry, and especially the government jobs that play a role in
industry success--such as FAA, DoC, and others. There should be
incentives for government jobs, as they need innovative, technical
people in those roles.
Commercial Human Spaceflight Learning Period
While I am a strong proponent of rapid innovation and competition,
safety is my top priority. The FAA has the authority to regulate
commercial human spaceflight, but Congress instituted a statutory
``learning period'' that limits the agency's regulatory authority. The
learning period for commercial human spaceflight was intended to
promote rapid innovation in a nascent industry with few players. And
Congress has seen fit to extend this ``learning period'' three times -
in 2012, 2015, and most recently, the latest Continuing Resolution. The
learning period will end on January 1st, 2024. Since the 2015 learning
period extension, Virgin Galactic and Washington's Blue Origin have
carried out successful sub-orbital civilian human spaceflights. And so
far, there has only been one purely commercial orbital civilian human
spaceflight, SpaceX Inspiration 4--but this is expected to change
according to the testimony we have heard today. As we've seen from the
rapidly increasing cadence in flights and in testimony today, the
commercial space industry is poised to go far beyond the industry we
saw in past learning period extensions.
Question 1. Can you explain what your company still needs to learn
about keeping your spaceflight participants safe? How much longer do
you believe the current learning period should be extended beyond
January 1, 2024?
Answer. The learning needed for a successful transition to a
permanent safety framework for occupant safety is not company specific
but collective. It requires FAA and industry to work together to
discuss what a safety framework looks like and determine the resources
necessary to successfully enact it--these discussions have not yet been
completed. If the Learning Period were to expire--it would basically be
an unfunded mandate; stretching AST's resources even further and
competing with its current primary authority of protecting the
uninvolved public and property. Underfunded, under resourced, and
potentially under pressure to get rules out in case an incident
happened when there is no learning period could lead to regulations
that may have unintended consequences on the growth of this industry.
VG proposes extending the learning period 8 years to provide for a
transition period utilizing the collection of data and for the
standards development process to properly inform future safety
frameworks. This transition period should incorporate the development
of an initial set of industry consensus standards that covers
appropriate aspects of spaceflight participant safety, an evaluation of
the practical applications of these standards, and an evaluation of FAA
AST's readiness to transition to a safety framework, including their
execution of existing statutory requirements like launch and reentry
licensing.
The transition period process would create a deadline for
developing an initial set of industry consensus standards that covers
appropriate aspects of spaceflight participant safety. The road mapping
for an initial set of human occupant safety standards should be done
through a standards development organization, such as those currently
being developed by standards development organizations, primarily ASTM,
and/or an industry/government advisory group and would include FAA AST
participation in the development and balloting process.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Sirisha Bandla
Question 1. As the only company to go through the accident
investigation process with the VSS Enterprise crash, Virgin has a
unique perspective on the moratorium on Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) promulgating regulations for human spaceflight. Do you think the
current system ensures the safety of the general public, as well as
spaceflight participants, while giving commercial space companies
enough flexibility to innovate?
Answer. The current system has a proven and perfect safety record
for the safety of the general public.
For human spaceflight, Congress aptly acknowledged the emergence of
the commercial industry, recognizing that it is in a dynamic and
iterative, development cycle, and is not yet ready for the full-scale
regulation that characterizes today's commercial air travel.
Understanding that it is impossible for regulators to create effective
and efficient regulations for diverse, innovative vehicles without
sufficient data, Congress created a regulatory learning period during
which the FAA may regulate for the safety of the public, or in response
to an incident. During this period, the FAA is still able to issue
regulations governing the design or operation of a vehicle to protect
the health and safety of crew, government astronauts, and spaceflight
participants (under certain conditions). It is important to note that
the current regulations that cover operations and public safety also
provide indirectly for occupant safety--creating a vehicle that
operates with no impact to public safety, inherently creates a vehicle
that is safe for its occupants to an extent.
Question 2. At the October 18th hearing, Brig. Gen. Wayne Monteith
of National Aerospace Solutions, who was also the last head of the FAA
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), suggested a two-phase
approach to the regulation of human spaceflight. Phase 1 would be
setting a date before which FAA may not publish new regulations but is
allowed to start working on them during that period, and phase 2 would
include setting an effective date for those regulations, which would
occur a number of years after the regulations are published. This gap
between the publishing of final regulations and their becoming
effective would provide a fail-safe, allowing Congress to intervene in
case industry was still not mature enough for the new regulations. In
his view, a forcing function is necessary to keep industry and
regulators working toward consensus rules.
a. What does Virgin Galactic think of this proposal?
Answer. While we don't oppose the thought process behind the
proposal, it is important that the learning period not expire ahead of
setting a plan for a future safety framework the learning period is
needed for a successful transition to a permanent safety framework. It
requires FAA and industry to work together to discuss what a safety
framework looks like and determine the resources necessary to
successfully enact it. These discussions have not yet been completed.
If the Learning Period were to expire--it would represent an unfunded
mandate; stretching AST's resources even further and competing with its
current primary authority of protecting the uninvolved public and
property. Underfunded, under resourced, and potentially under pressure
to get rules out in case an incident happened when there is no learning
period could lead to regulations that may have unintended consequences
on the growth of this industry.
Question 3. As Mr. Gerstenmaier testified, SpaceX is facing
significant licensing challenges as it works to test and certify its
next generation launch vehicle. Does Virgin Galactic have any similar
challenges currently, or foresee any challenges with the government
licensing process as it looks to increase your flight rate?
Answer. As commercial launch cadence increases and commercial
operators transition to Part 450, AST's resources should increase
accordingly. The FAA is not currently resourced to process launch and
reentry applications in a timely manner while working on the Part 450
transition. Due to lack of additional resources, current resources are
rightfully focused on licensing upcoming launch and re-entries--and
should continue to do so.
Congress should authorize research, engineering, and development
funding for AST to develop a suite of tools to automate parts of the
licensing process and help license evaluators handle the growing
workload. Virgin Galactic also recommends authorizing resources for
additional FTEs to work through the increased launch cadence in the
pipeline and Part 450 transition.
Question 4. Mr. Gerstenmaier also discussed the need to at least
double the resources of FAA's AST to meet the growing workload. As a
commercial launch company working to certify launch vehicles and obtain
licenses for launch and reentry from FAA AST, what are Virgin
Galactic's views on requiring launch providers to `pay into the
system,' similar to the way in which the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
works, to help pay for this growth?
Answer. Aviation taxes that pay into the AATF are often passed to
consumers and spread across a high volume of passengers and flights.
While the frequency and volume of commercial space operations is
increasing, it will not likely support sufficient revenue generation
without significantly increased burdens on providers and customers. At
this time, Virgin Galactic believes that a revenue structure based on
aviation taxes and fees may jeopardize the competitiveness and growth
of the U.S. commercial launch sector. However, as institutions evaluate
future budgetary needs and revenue structures--it is imperative to look
at equitable ROI for all operators involved.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. J. D. Vance to
Sirisha Bandla
Proprietary Data and Intellectual Property
Reluctance to share data has been flagged in several reports as a
barrier to standards development and the implementation of voluntary
safety systems. These reports point to a variety of solutions,
including statutory data protection, programs to facilitate sharing
proprietary data, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and individual companies.
I understand this reluctance to share data. These reports indicate
that companies are concerned that any shared data could be traced back
to the company due to the small number of providers and the significant
differences between their vehicles. Companies view the protection of
their data as important for their commercial competitiveness.
Question 1. While commercial companies need to protect their
proprietary information, data-sharing between commercial providers will
be vital for standards development, collaborative research, and
voluntary safety systems. What protections could be implemented to
facilitate data-sharing between companies while protecting proprietary
data and intellectual property? Would legislation best address this
issue, or could agency-led or industry-led measures be effective?
Answer. The purpose of data-sharing is to look at lessons learned
and provide for collaborative standards development that could be used
for future safety frameworks. However, the number of commercial
operators is small, and the diversity among the vehicles is
significant.
Virgin Galactic believes that there are already collaborative
methods in place to achieve the same end objective through discussion
forums within SpARCs via the FAA, and standard-making bodies like ASTM.
These discussions will yield standards development, identify areas for
collaborative research, and provide guidance for future safety systems.
Question 2. How can Congress and the FAA encourage collaboration
between industry while protecting proprietary data?
Answer. Congress should continue to encourage collaboration in
current established channels--each of which provide an opportunity for
industry and government to discuss future human spaceflight frameworks
and interim work that needs to be done. These established channels
include COMSTAC, SpARCs, and standard making organizations such as
ASTM's F47 committee. All of these channels are sufficient enough for
industry and government to engage in dialogue and exchange the needed
information to formulate recommendations for future safety frameworks,
policies, and regulations.
Ohio's Space Capabilities
Ohio is the birthplace of aviation and has a rich tradition of
excellence in aerospace. It started with the Wright Brothers, continued
with Neil Armstrong and John Glenn, and lives on today with so many
people, companies, and universities on the cutting-edge of innovation.
Following in this tradition, Ohio is home to world-class
spaceflight testing capabilities not available anywhere else on the
globe. But I hear they are often underutilized by commercial partners
or even non-NASA Federal partners.
Question 1. NASA/Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has the
Agency's lead assignment for future space communication. How best
should NASA/Glenn work with the rest of the Federal Government as part
of its leadership role in this area, to help fortify commercial space-
flight in areas from spectrum licensing to technology advancement, and
does NASA/Glenn have the resources it needs to accomplish this role?
Answer. NASA/Glenn should continue to participate through NASA HQ
on industry collaboration initiatives and road-mapping. NASA has done a
great job conducting industry round-tables to identify any general and
unique needs--and this is a great venue to continue to do so and
identify any specific areas of interest for NASA Glenn.
Question 2. On October 16, UC Berkeley announced participation in a
new $2B space research park at NASA/Ames in California. In my home
State of Ohio, Voyager/Airbus have announced the establishment of the
George Washington Carver Science Park on the campus of The Ohio State
University, as an integral part of their efforts on Starlab, one of
NASA's commercial low-Earth orbit destination replacements for the ISS
after 2030. What key roles do you see Universities--especially public
Universities--playing, in order to maximize the potential success of
commercial spaceflight in low-Earth orbit and beyond?
Answer. Universities have played and continue to play a role in R&D
surrounding technologies and science for further exploration and
expansion of our knowledge base. Universities have utilized suborbital
capabilities--through the NASA Flight Opportunities program--to test
technologies ahead of flights to Earth orbit and beyond. This
utilization has created a robust pipeline from suborbit to orbit--
allowing for technologies to be tested at a higher rate and potentially
creating a higher probability for success when deployed on a longer
(and more permanent) spaceflight journey.
On-Orbit Authority
Question 1. To what extent does the lack of regulatory authority
for on-orbit activities affect the commercial human spaceflight
industry, if at all?
Answer. Commercial space companies are well underway in designing
technologies and business plans for on-orbit and beyond operations. Now
is the time to for an agency to start discussions with industry on what
future light-touch regulatory approaches should look like for an
effective future regime. Unexpected regulations in the future when
companies are already invested and continuously operating on-orbit
could be costly and slow the growth of the industry.
Question 2. As the industry prepares for commercial space stations,
should a Federal agency be given on-orbit authority that addresses
commercial human spaceflight? If so, which agency should be tasked with
this authority and why?
Answer. While VG does not have any current plans for on-orbit
activities, VG is part of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation--a
trade association of commercial spaceflight companies, and is aligned
with the association's position that these types of activities fall
outside the regulatory authority and expertise of the FAA. Any entity
that manages these activities should utilize the interagency process
and incorporate presumed approval, self-certification, and defined
timelines to foster a vibrant and innovative U.S. commercial space
industry. The Office of Space Commerce is uniquely positioned to do
that.
Question 3. In discussions regarding on-orbit authority or mission
authorization, many disagree on whether Commerce or FAA should have
this authority. How does commercial human spaceflight factor into these
discussions?
Answer. Commercial human spaceflight does not need to specifically
factor into these discussions as any process being discussed should
look at a streamlined authority that allows for all range of activities
being planned on-orbit.
Miscellaneous
Question 1. As humans look to operate on orbit and beyond can you
speak to lessons learned from commercial launch and how the U.S.
government should approach working with commercial companies operating
human activities in space moving forward?
Answer. The commercial space industry has seen incredible growth in
the past two decades--rapidly advancing technologies, growing
commercial markets, supporting critical USG missions, and reclaiming
market share from foreign competitors like China. This, along with the
perfect public safety record of the industry, demonstrates that a
light-touch, performance-based regulatory structure works. As the
industry continues to advance technologies and capabilities with
commercial human spaceflight, we should:
Engage in industry-government dialogue whenever possible
ahead of rule-making activities
Pursue performance-based, light-touch regulation wherever
possible that prioritizes safety without discouraging
innovation
Continue to revisit established regulations at a regular
cadence to ensure they are keeping up with evolving industries
and,
Ensure that regulatory agencies are properly resourced to
keep up with the growth of the industries for which they are
responsible.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Human Spaceflight Occupant Safety
We are entering a golden age for commercial spaceflight. As we see
the sharp increase in space launches and witness the first of many
fully civilian spaceflights, the safety of those onboard must be a top
priority, just as public safety is. In just over a year, we have
experienced two significant mishaps with launch vehicles intended for
human spaceflight. On September 12, 2022, the Blue Origin New Shepard
suborbital rocket suffered a failure a little more than a minute after
launch, resulting in the vehicle's emergency abort system jettisoning
the capsule away from the booster. On April 20, 2023, SpaceX's first
attempt to launch Starship resulted in the catastrophic loss of the
vehicle and damage to the launch pad that sent debris as far as five
miles from the Boca Chica, Texas launch site.
Question 1. If humans had been aboard these missions, what safety
measures would have prevented loss of life?
Answer. Starship Flight 1 was an uncrewed experimental test flight
with specific goals to learn about new technology employed on the
vehicle, including new engines and operational approaches, and was not
in a configuration designed to carry humans. SpaceX openly communicated
prior to this test flight that the objective was to gather data to
inform and improve vehicle design and operations. SpaceX would not put
crew on such a vehicle or an experimental flight like Starship Flight
1.
For Starship Flight 1, all vehicle operations were conducted in
full compliance with FAA licensing requirements, which protect the
safety and property of the uninvolved public. The long-standing goal of
the U.S. regulatory system has, appropriately, been to protect public
safety, not to ensure mission success, especially for uncrewed test
flights. In experimental test flights, things may not go as planned,
and it is not unexpected that a loss of vehicle occurs. This is
inherent to any valid test regime. The ultimate objective should be to
maximize learning, while ensure the public is protected. SpaceX has
developed a robust, hardware-rich test approach to meet these
objectives. This appropriate balance allows for rapid, responsible
innovation that improves the long-term safety of vehicle systems.
Continued U.S. competitiveness and the success of NASA's Artemis
Program are directly tied to this framework.
SpaceX is committed to operating the safest vehicles systems
possible, and uses early vehicle tests to demonstrate operations and
rapidly mature capabilities well in advance of any crewed missions.
This rapid iteration is necessary to eventually get to a future with
airplane-like operations. Premature regulations inappropriately focused
on mission success, rather than protecting public safety, risk freezing
the industry in an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the development
of technologies that would ultimately materially improve safety.
Question 2. Do your companies have a process for reviewing critical
human-safety systems onboard vehicles that have successfully completed
commercial human flights to ensure they worked properly?
Answer. Yes. We carefully review every flight and make sure that
the vehicle and systems operate as designed. This learning enables
important ongoing improvements to system reliability and is enhanced at
SpaceX by a high flight rate that provides tremendous insight into
vehicle design and operations. All systems and modifications to systems
are flown and proven on uncrewed flights, prior to any flight with
humans on board.
Regulating Spaceflight Occupant Safety
While I am a strong proponent of innovation and competition, safety
is my priority. The potential for a catastrophic incident on a
commercial tourism spaceflight could have a significant negative impact
on not just the human spaceflight industry, but on the economic
competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space industry as a whole.
Question 1. You say in your testimony that it is not the
responsibility of the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
to ``ensure the success of a space launch or reentry.'' Do you believe
that the Federal government plays no role in ensuring commercial space
flights do not result in the death of anyone on board?
Answer. Both the Government and industry share a common goal:
ensuring safety. It is a question of timing as to if and when it would
be appropriate to establish a more expansive regime of occupant safety
regulations. As noted in my testimony, both launch vehicles and
spacecraft are early in their design cycles and continue to see
significant changes in design and operational concepts. This rapid
iteration is necessary to eventually get to a future with airplane-like
operations. Premature occupant safety regulations risk freezing the
industry in an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the development of
technologies that would materially improve safety.
Importantly, the present framework appropriately requires a robust
informed consent process that provides space flight participants with
highly detailed insight into vehicle operations, as well as
requirements on environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS),
training, and more. Additionally, this is a much-strengthened form of
informed consent than is used in many adventure sports, like skydiving.
Industry is committed to developing and strengthening consensus
safety standards. The Government should continue to facilitate and
promote this effort to improve safety.
Question 2. What would the impact be on the commercial spaceflight
industry should a death occur during a commercial space tourism flight
while the moratorium is in effect?
Answer. I cannot speculate on hypotheticals. SpaceX is committed to
making human spaceflight as safe as possible. However, spaceflight is
inherently a high-risk activity, as Congress has previously noted, and
any spaceflight participants need to be informed of the risks, as is
required under FAA's Part 460 regulations today. Spaceflight
participants must make an educated decision, with full recognition of
the risks involved in any launch or reentry. The current regulatory
regime is appropriate for the state of the industry and technology.
Washington Space Workforce
The launches that we've seen from the companies here today would
not have been possible without the engineers, mechanics, and
technicians who made these systems possible. My home state of
Washington is a prime example of the aerospace and space ecosystem. Our
space industry supports more than 13,000 workers, with an economic
impact of $4.6 billion annually. About 5,000 of those workers work at
Blue Origin, and more than 1,300 work at SpaceX, creating Starlink
satellites. As we move forward in the rapidly changing field of
commercial space, we know that these numbers will only grow. It is key
that we ensure we have the domestic workforce to keep up with that
growth. We're seeing shortages across the STEM fields, with a 60,000-
workforce shortage in Washington alone by 2026. Ensuring we have a
strong domestic space workforce is key to remaining internationally
competitive.
Question 1. What workforce needs and challenges do you see for the
commercial space industry?
Answer. Both in Washington and more broadly across the United
States, it is vital that there are responsible policies to expand a
qualified, diverse technical workforce for vehicle design,
manufacturing, and processing. A workforce shortage is impacting all
facets of the space industry, as well as the Government. For example,
FAA AST has acknowledged it requires significantly more employees with
technical backgrounds to support the cadence of licensing in a timely
manner. We also need to expose students at an earlier age to the
opportunities available for them in spaceflight.
Commercial Human Spaceflight Learning Period
While I am a strong proponent of rapid innovation and competition,
safety is my top priority. The FAA has the authority to regulate
commercial human spaceflight, but Congress instituted a statutory
``learning period'' that limits the agency's regulatory authority. The
learning period for commercial human spaceflight was intended to
promote rapid innovation in a nascent industry with few players. And
Congress has seen fit to extend this ``learning period'' three times -
in 2012, 2015, and most recently, the latest Continuing Resolution. The
learning period will end on January 1st, 2024. Since the 2015 learning
period extension, Virgin Galactic and Washington's Blue Origin have
carried out successful sub-orbital civilian human spaceflights. And so
far, there has only been one purely commercial orbital civilian human
spaceflight, SpaceX Inspiration 4--but this is expected to change
according to the testimony we have heard today. As we've seen from the
rapidly increasing cadence in flights and in testimony today, the
commercial space industry is poised to go far beyond the industry we
saw in past learning period extensions.
Question 1. Based on your years of experience with human
spaceflight, what is your answer to this question? How do you think we
should provide government oversight of in-space commercial human
activities?
Answer. There is little evidence that commercial human spaceflights
will dramatically increase in the near-term, particularly orbital human
spaceflights. This segment of the industry remains exceptionally
nascent in both technology and market demand. The Government has
significant insight and oversight of commercial human spaceflight
activities today. The current regulatory regime appropriately balances
public safety with innovation, while providing for reasonable,
responsible occupant safety requirements within the existing Part 460
framework. Additionally, FAA should continue to facilitate and promote
the development of consensus industry safety standards that strengthen
safety while providing a flexibility pathway that allows for necessary
technological development.
Notably, the only orbital human spaceflight system currently in
operation in the U.S. is SpaceX's Dragon system, which is certified by
NASA.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Mission Authorization
While working closely with NASA to launch government astronauts to
the International Space Station, SpaceX has also invested in launching
private astronauts into space. In working with Axiom and launching the
Inspiration 4 crew, SpaceX is clearly thinking ahead on commercial
operations in space that are privately led, rather than contracted by
the government. However, this has opened a new facet of the industry
when we think about classification of human spaceflight participants.
The ability for private companies to train non-government astronauts
and conduct commercial operations in low Earth orbit is a true game
changer.
Of course, under current law there is no defined regulator with
``mission authorization'' authority or a clear understanding of how
different classifications of astronaut's impact how in-space activities
should be regulated.
Question. As Congress works to clarify agency authority and remove
uncertainty over novel space activities, what are the critical
components to create a workable, efficient, and safe regulation
regardless of who is participating, such as a private citizen or
government astronaut?
Answer. Any mission authorization regime must be light-touch with a
presumed approval model that enables the next-generation of American
space exploration and commerce to thrive, while ensuring compliance
with national security objectives and international treaty obligations.
It would be premature to establish on-orbit regulation of occupant
safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Mission Authorization Framework
A recent FAA assessment states by 2035, if the expected large
constellation growth is realized and debris from satellites survive
reentry, satellites disposed from these constellations could injure or
kill one person on the planet every two years.
Question 1. How should Federal agencies consider ``safety'' as an
aspect of licensing or authorizing in-space activities? How should
agencies consider the possibility of satellites or spacecraft
reentering our atmosphere without disintegrating?
Answer. The recent assessment performed by the Aerospace
Corporation for FAA is deeply flawed, lacks fundamental technical
rigor, and should be disregarded. SpaceX submitted a letter to the FAA
identifying the flaws in the Aerospace Corp. analysis. SpaceX
understands Aerospace is reviewing and likely revising its report.
SpaceX has generally called for zero casualty risk and full
demisability in relation to satellite reentry. If a satellite does not
demise, reentry should be targeted to an unpopulated region of the
Earth, consistent with long-standing practice. Current regulations are
appropriate for disposal.
SpaceX recommends standards be developed and a single agency--the
Department of Commerce--be charged with working with technical
authorities and industry to develop best practices and standards as it
relates to space safety.
Human Spaceflight Safety
There are several ways to calculate collision risk- in aggregate
over all of LEO, or individual-satellite basis. The Federal
Communications Commission has examined this issue in recent years, as
growth in satellite constellations for communications purposes
continues to rise and expand connectivity on Earth.
Question 1. How should Federal agencies accurately calculate
collision risk to maintain the safety of all operators, assets, and
humans in space?
Answer. Aggregating collision risk is a flawed approach because it
makes the incorrect assumption that a smaller constellation with
unreliable, low-performing satellites is less risk than a larger
constellation of highly reliable, high-performing satellites.
In general, SpaceX recommends that an independent technical
authority (e.g., NASA) work in tandem with satellite owners/operators
to establish technical metrics for different types of satellite systems
and different orbital regimes. Satellite systems are not identical, and
there is no ``one size fits all'' approach that ensures space safety.
Rather, Congress should provide resources that facilitate the
development of specific, measurable requirements that adequately
consider multiple relevant factors, including operating altitude,
propulsion capability, etc. to ensure a performance-based regulatory
system. This approach far more effectively categorizes risk than
utilizing a single factor--for example, number of satellites. NASA has
specifically opposed in technical papers efforts to apply a single risk
calculation across satellite systems for this reason.
At SpaceX, all Starlink satellites have highly sophisticated
onboard collision avoidance capabilities, and Starlink has set the
industry standard by openly publishing the location of all of our
satellites. SpaceX has also worked with industry and the AIAA to
publish best practices: https://www.ascend.events/outcomes/satellite-
orbital-safety-best-practices-by-iridium-oneweb-spacex-aiaa/.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Starship
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) awarded
the human landing system (HLS) contract to SpaceX in April 2021. The
testing and development of Starship is critical to SpaceX having a
human-rated lander ready for NASA's Artemis 3 mission when it intends
to put astronauts back on the Moon. Earlier this summer, NASA expressed
concerns over meeting timelines and key targets for the Moon to Mars
program. At the hearing, I asked you, if you were still at NASA, would
these delays to HLS be acceptable, to which you stated they would not.
Question 1. How much of a factor is the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)'s slow licensing process in the development of
Starship and, consequently, HLS?
Answer. Continued FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(AST) licensing delays, including for environmental approval, are
highly consequential and harmful to the development of Starship and
SpaceX's ability to support NASA in the HLS Program. These delays are
slowing the HLS effort and American technological progress. SpaceX's
and the HLS Program's developmental approach requires a high flight
rate and fast learning. SpaceX has the hardware ready and engineering
expertise in place to support this national objective. The technical
work to successfully return Americans to the Moon is highly challenging
and operating in an uncertain regulatory environment makes it almost
impossible to make efficient progress.
Question 2. Given NASA's Artemis 3 mission target date for 2025,
how will FAA's continued licensing delays impact SpaceX's Starship cost
and schedule?
Answer. Continued AST license delays materially impact the Artemis
3 mission target date. As I noted in my oral testimony, China may beat
the United States back to the Moon if changes are not made to reform
the AST launch and reentry license regime.
SpaceX has a series of developmental objectives and flights planned
with NASA for this program. In order to safely land astronauts on the
Moon in a time-frame that meets NASA's needs, we must demonstrate
reliable Starship operations. The path to reliability involves a steady
pace of flight tests. We have the hardware ready, but cannot
efficiently test in an uncertain regulatory regime.
Question 3. Given the disparate treatment from NASA and the FAA,
where NASA is pushing SpaceX to quickly advance vehicle development and
the FAA's licensing process is drastically slowing development, is
SpaceX concerned these two agencies are misaligned in advancing
Starship?
Answer. The Part 450 regulatory framework is disconnected from
national priorities, including Artemis. Launch and reentry licensing--
whether for test flights or operational missions--should never take
longer than rocket development. Urgent improvements to Part 450 are
required, including opportunities to expedite licensing reviews for
projects of national importance, to appropriately re-align these
regulations with key national objectives. We share NASA's desire for
advancing development and returning to the Moon as soon as possible.
Rapid, safe development is required to keep the U.S. a leader in space.
Question 4. On October 31, FAA announced it had completed the
safety review portion of the SpaceX Starship-Super Heavy license
evaluation for the Starship 2 license. However, the FAA stated it is
``continuing to work on the environmental review'' and ``as part of its
environmental review, the FAA is consulting with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) on an updated Biological Assessment under the
Endangered Species Act.\1\ The FAA and the USFWS must complete this
consultation before the environmental review portion of the license
evaluation is completed.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Neumann, Daniel G. `SpaceX Starship-Super Heavy License
Evaluation.' FAA. E-mail to Senate Commerce Committee, 2023.
\2\ Ibid.
a. Is any part of this environmental review critical to the safe
flight of the rocket?
Answer. No.
Question 5. How much of a delay does SpaceX anticipate from this
additional environmental review?
Answer. The additional environmental review for Starship Flight 2
was concluded the week of November 13. However, action must be taken to
ensure that future reviews do not add continued delays, which if taken
in the aggregate could be significant over the course of Starship
development and operation. SpaceX is committed to protecting the
environment, but the serial review and bureaucratic process involved in
licensing today are not helping to protect the environment or advance
national priorities in space.
Question 6. Does SpaceX think this cadence of review for every
Starship launch is sustainable?
Answer. The present cadence of regulatory review is not
sustainable, and the regulatory framework is at a breaking point. NASA
and its partners will not be able to meet national goals in space with
the current regulatory process.
Question 7. How much of an additional delay will such a prolonged
licensing process cause for vehicle development?
Answer. Without improvement, continued licensing delays could add
years to vehicle development for SpaceX and the broader national launch
and reentry enterprise--during which America's geopolitical rivals,
including China, will continue to rapidly develop their own
capabilities without a similar regulatory burden. The country that
develops new technology first sets the rules engagement for all others
that follow. Ongoing U.S. licensing and environmental delays could let
China set the future environmental and spaceflight rules and norms.
Allowing China to take leadership on these decisions will be
unacceptable for the free world.
National Security and Programs of National Interest
Question 1. Reporting shows that China plans to send at least two
rockets to the moon by the end of 2030, with one carrying a spacecraft
that will transport astronauts and the other landing on the surface of
the moon.\3\ Further, China is developing its own super-heavy carrier
rocket to meet their intended goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``China plans to send two rockets for crewed moon landing.''
Reuters. July 12, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/china-
plans-send-two-rockets-crewed-moon-landing-2023-07-12/
a. Does SpaceX see significant competition on the horizon from
China given their goal to outpace the United States in lunar
exploration?
Answer. Yes.
Question 2. In your estimation, does this kind of direct
competition present a national security threat?
Answer. Yes. We will lose our global competitive advantage. Space
exploration is critical to a country's ability to maintain `soft
power'.
Question 3. To your knowledge, does China or Russia have its own
version of National Environmental Policy Act \4\, or NEPA, under which
Chinese or Russian citizens or perhaps an obscure conservation group
can sue the government and stop space launches or space vehicle
development?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See 42 U.S.C. 4331(a)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. To my knowledge, regulations are not a concern for the
national space programs of China and Russia, or for any state-sponsored
``commercial'' entities operated by their citizenry. China's orbital
debris policy and past anti-satellite test are in direct opposition to
appropriate policy. The slowness in our regulatory processes is
allowing China's non-policy to effectively set the policy for the
future. We need to compete with effective and agile policies.
Question 4. In your testimony, you mentioned that for programs of
national interest, such as NASA's Artemis missions, it is necessary for
Congress to establish a regulatory regime consistent with our national
program objectives and schedules. Which key aspects of Part 450
regulations do you believe require modification to accommodate
timelines of national interest and associated schedules?
Answer. SpaceX has provided specific areas for legislative
consideration to the Committee that would address this issue.
Additionally, SpaceX agrees with the Part 450 recommended updates and
clarifications put forward by the Commercial Space Transportation
Advisory Committee (COMSTAC). AST should be empowered to evaluate
programs directly related to USG programs of national interest or
capability with different tiers of risk, accelerated review schedules,
and accelerated timelines for environmental reviews.
Question 5. If AST were to establish a ``fast lane'' regulatory
review process for systems directly tied to U.S. capability--like
Artemis or national security capability, do you believe this would help
ensure a holistic Government approach and ensure continued U.S.
leadership in space?
Answer. Yes, this is a critical action. I strongly support this
holistic approach. It is necessary to properly align all stakeholders
in the regulatory process in support of national priorities and
leadership.
Question 6. Are there any historical or international precedents
for aligning government regulations and agency activities with the
schedules of large-scale national space programs, and if so, what
lessons can be drawn from these examples?
Answer. Foreign competitors, notably China and Russia, do not
consider government regulations in any meaningful sense when proceeding
through national space programs. While the United States should have a
regulatory regime that appropriately protects public safety, it needs
to ensure that these regulations are being considered as part of the
national prerogative to remain a leader in space.
The most important historical precedent is the Apollo Program, in
which the U.S. Government--across every agency--holistically worked to
achieve this national space priority less than seven years after it was
announced. Without this alignment of resources and intent, this triumph
and subsequent victory over the Soviet Union in the Space Race may not
have occurred. The United States would do well to ensure it maintains
this shared urgency of purpose today across all agencies, including
regulatory authorities.
Question 7. In the current regulatory environment, with all the red
tape mandates such as the National Environmental Policy Act, do you
think the United States could stand up a space program and put a man on
the moon in under a decade if we were starting from scratch? What about
Mars?
Answer. It would be highly unlikely unless changes are made. The
Apollo Program was recognized as national priority and key to U.S.
leadership. Formal congressional recognition of the criticality of the
Artemis Program could be helpful. The present launch and reentry
regulatory regime is not capable of facilitating the rapid innovation
necessary to return Americans to the Moon, let alone of ensuring
America is the first nation to send its citizens to Mars. Implementing
the regulatory improvement recommendations offered in the Oct. 18
hearing is key to make Artemis successful.
Rocket Reusability
Question 1. Rocket reusability allows SpaceX to repeatedly fly the
most expensive parts of its rocket by driving down the cost of space
and paving the way for new entrants to follow the SpaceX model. For
instance, SpaceX's Falcon 9 is the world's first orbital, reusable two-
stage rocket designed and built for safe transport of people and
payloads into Earth orbit and beyond.
a. Does SpaceX's rocket reusability factor into the reliability of
the rocket for licensing purposes? That is, does a flight proven system
have an easier time getting cleared quickly for launch? If not, should
it?
Answer. Yes. Reusing rockets and high flight rates significantly
enhance vehicle reliability for many reasons, and AST should establish
an expedited licensing pathway for mature vehicle systems with a proven
flight history. Such a pathway does not exist today. The key to
reliable reusability is examining the flown hardware and learning about
life-sensitive components. An initial test program to understand
projected life is also important. The post-flight monitoring confirms
the reusable design is operating as designed. The FAA current
regulations do not handle reuse well and do not recognize the
advantages of a well-executed reuse approach.
FAA Launch and Licensing
Question 1. In your written statement, you said AST needs to at
least double the resources of FAA's AST to meet the growing workload.
What are SpaceX's views on requiring launch providers to `pay into the
system,' similar to the way in which the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
works, to help pay for this growth?
Answer. SpaceX recommends that Congress establish new authority for
FAA to allow applicants to pay for external technical reviewers to
ensure license reviews are completed in a timely fashion when the FAA
lacks internal technical capabilities. Ensuring timely and appropriate
review is important. More resources with no emphasis on timeliness
would not be helpful.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. J. D. Vance to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Proprietary Data and Intellectual Property
Reluctance to share data has been flagged in several reports as a
barrier to standards development and the implementation of voluntary
safety systems. These reports point to a variety of solutions,
including statutory data protection, programs to facilitate sharing
proprietary data, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and individual companies.
I understand this reluctance to share data. These reports indicate
that companies are concerned that any shared data could be traced back
to the company due to the small number of providers and the significant
differences between their vehicles. Companies view the protection of
their data as important for their commercial competitiveness.
Question 1. While commercial companies need to protect their
proprietary information, data-sharing between commercial providers will
be vital for standards development, collaborative research, and
voluntary safety systems. What protections could be implemented to
facilitate data-sharing between companies while protecting proprietary
data and intellectual property? Would legislation best address this
issue, or could agency-led or industry-led measures be effective?
Answer. FAA should continue to facilitate the development and
evaluation of voluntary industry consensus standards/guidelines. The
Department of Transportation has convened the Part 460 Space Aerospace
Rulemaking Committee (SpARC) to review the broader commercial human
spaceflight safety framework. One of the topics of discussion both
there and within the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
(COMSTAC) is the facilitation of non-proprietary data sharing between
companies to enhance safety. The Part 460 SpARC aims to complete its
review by late 2025.
Question 2. How can Congress and the FAA encourage collaboration
between industry while protecting proprietary data?
Answer. Congress and the FAA should support the development of
voluntary industry consensus standards, including for data sharing, and
efforts of the Part 460 SpARC in determining opportunities for non-
proprietary data sharing to enhance safety. It is also important to
note that much information related to launch and reentry systems is
export controlled under the International Trafficking in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), which must be considered when evaluating the
release and sharing of information.
Ohio's Space Capabilities
Ohio is the birthplace of aviation and has a rich tradition of
excellence in aerospace. It started with the Wright Brothers, continued
with Neil Armstrong and John Glenn, and lives on today with so many
people, companies, and universities on the cutting-edge of innovation.
Following in this tradition, Ohio is home to world-class
spaceflight testing capabilities not available anywhere else on the
globe. But I hear they are often underutilized by commercial partners
or even non-NASA Federal partners.
Question 1. Can you update us on testing done by SpaceX at the Neil
Armstrong Testing Facility in Sandusky, for example rocket fairing
separation tests done in the large vacuum chamber there, and how these
tests in Ohio are helping you accomplish your various commercial space
projects?
Answer. SpaceX has maintained a long and fruitful partnership with
NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) and the Neil Armstrong Testing
Facility. SpaceX recently conducted payload fairing testing within the
Space Environments Complex, and has performed similar testing on other
occasions over the last decade. SpaceX also tested the Crew Dragon
vehicle--which provides all of NASA's orbital human spaceflight access
today--within the In-Space Propulsion Facility at Armstrong, and
Starlink satellites, which provide high-speed, low-latency broadband
across Ohio and around the world. The unique facilities and expertise
offered by NASA in Ohio have been vital to space vehicle development
and testing at SpaceX and across the industry.
SpaceX also continues to maintain a strong programmatic partnership
with GRC in support of the Artemis Human Landing System (HLS) Program
to return Americans to the Moon and in support of the Communications
Services Project (CSP) to provide high-speed, low-latency commercial
data to NASA spacecraft.
Question 2. What could space centers in Ohio--specifically the Neil
Armstrong Testing Facility in Sandusky, NASA Glenn in Cleveland, or
Space Force assets at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base do better, to
further support commercial spaceflight, for example through more
testing of hardware? Is this a matter of cost for SpaceX or is there
some other reason? How can we better promote the utilization of these
key National resources? NASA/Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has the
Agency's lead assignment for future space communication. How best
should NASA/Glenn work with the rest of the Federal Government as part
of its leadership role in this area, to help fortify commercial space-
flight in areas from spectrum licensing to technology advancement, and
does NASA/Glenn have the resources it needs to accomplish this role?
Answer. SpaceX is proud to maintain a strong partnership with NASA
GRC for the Communications Services Project and the Human Landing
System Program. Each program will continue for many years.
Much of the hardware testing that is performed within the vacuum
facilities at GRC tends to be one-off qualification testing, rather
than recurring work between missions. SpaceX intends to continue to
partner with GRC and Armstrong for future vehicle testing.
Question 3. On October 16, UC Berkeley announced participation in a
new $2B space research park at NASA/Ames in California. In my home
State of Ohio, Voyager/Airbus have announced the establishment of the
George Washington Carver Science Park on the campus of The Ohio State
University, as an integral part of their efforts on Starlab, one of
NASA's commercial low-Earth orbit destination replacements for the ISS
after 2030. What key roles do you see Universities--especially public
Universities--playing, in order to maximize the potential success of
commercial spaceflight in low-Earth orbit and beyond?
Answer. Universities are key to stimulating direct science and low-
cost technology demonstrators, and in cultivating the next generation
of skilled engineers to support continued American leadership in space.
With SpaceX's reusable Falcon vehicle systems significantly reducing
the cost of space access, universities are now far more able to launch
small satellites into orbit--proving out new technologies and providing
vital technical training to engineering students.
On-Orbit Authority
Question 1. To what extent does the lack of regulatory authority
for on-orbit activities affect the commercial human spaceflight
industry, if at all?
Answer. The present regulatory regime is sufficient for commercial
human spaceflight.
Question 2. As the industry prepares for commercial space stations,
should a Federal agency be given on-orbit authority that addresses
commercial human spaceflight? If so, which agency should be tasked with
this authority and why?
Answer. The Department of Commerce is the most appropriate
authority to oversee any light-touch, presumed-approach mission
authorization regime that protects national security and ensures treaty
compliance.
Question 3. In discussions regarding on-orbit authority or mission
authorization, many disagree on whether Commerce or FAA should have
this authority. How does commercial human spaceflight factor into these
discussions?
Answer. Human spaceflight should not be considered in a mission
authorization framework. The goal of any such framework should be to
protect public safety, ensure treaty compliance, and further national
security. Neither the Department of Commerce nor FAA have the technical
expertise or the resources to contemplate on-orbit commercial human
spaceflight. Developing regulations early-to-need would inhibit
continued development of American human spaceflight systems and
national competitiveness.
Miscellaneous
Question 1. As humans look to operate on orbit and beyond can you
speak to lessons learned from commercial launch and how the U.S.
government should approach working with commercial companies operating
human activities in space moving forward?
Answer. The United States Government has derived tremendous value
from its partnerships with the commercial launch and reentry industry.
As has been noted by NASA, the Space Force, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and the NASA Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), the Government has saved billions of dollars through
these partnerships, while unlocking new capabilities like the Falcon 9,
Falcon Heavy, Dragon, and Starship that are furthering American
leadership in space. The U.S. Government should continue to maximize
firm, fixed-price contracting for commercial launch services and focus
any internal development efforts on areas with limited or no commercial
value (e.g., probes to distant planets, etc.).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Phil Joyce
Human Spaceflight Occupant Safety
We are entering a golden age for commercial spaceflight. As we see
the sharp increase in space launches and witness the first of many
fully civilian spaceflights, the safety of those onboard must be a top
priority, just as public safety is. In just over a year, we have
experienced two significant mishaps with launch vehicles intended for
human spaceflight. On September 12, 2022, the Blue Origin New Shepard
suborbital rocket suffered a failure a little more than a minute after
launch, resulting in the vehicle's emergency abort system jettisoning
the capsule away from the booster. On April 20, 2023, SpaceX's first
attempt to launch Starship resulted in the catastrophic loss of the
vehicle and damage to the launch pad that sent debris as far as five
miles from the Boca Chica, Texas launch site.
Question 1. If humans had been aboard these missions, what safety
measures would have prevented loss of life?
Answer. New Shepard is designed to rapidly remove astronauts from a
hazardous booster condition via our highly redundant and fault-tolerant
Crew Capsule (CC) escape system. On the flight referenced in the
question, the escape system functioned as designed throughout the
flight, successfully propelling the CC away from the booster to safety.
The capsule and all payloads onboard landed safely and will be flown
again. Blue Origin's NS-23 telemetry data shows the astronauts would
have experienced no more than the expected dynamic forces for a capsule
escape event and likely would not have been injured. This unplanned and
successful test of New Shepard's safety architecture in addition to
three prior successful escape tests confirms that Blue Origin's top
priority is the safety of those on board.
Question 2. Do your companies have a process for reviewing critical
human-safety systems onboard vehicles that have successfully completed
commercial human flights to ensure they worked properly?
Answer. Yes. Safety assurance is built into every phase of our
operation.
FAA's Needs for Commercial Regulation
It is clear that the Federal government must prepare to regulate
the commercial human spaceflight industry. This means ensuring our
agencies are well staffed, knowledgeable, and ready to regulate. We
have heard from stakeholders that the FAA does not have personnel or at
least not enough personnel with the right skill sets to begin
regulating commercial human spaceflight occupant safety on January 1,
2024.
Question 1. Given your experience with FAA/AST from the commercial
side, what do you believe FAA needs to do to ensure the safe
transportation of humans into, through, and back from space?
Answer. The most impactful actions that FAA can take are those that
improve the administration of the current set of regulations for launch
and reentry. Demonstrating the ability to scale the existing framework
will yield lessons learned that will be critical for any future
requirements related to occupant safety. To achieve this scale, AST
will require a laser focus on efficiency in the utilization of their
resources.
An example of an opportunity for streamlining is the duplication of
detailed analysis for flight safety even after validation of
procedures. Subject matter experts spend time recreating every analysis
despite a robust approval process for all methods & tools used. This is
unnecessary and time-intensive for personnel whose time could be better
used evaluating other complex processes.
Efficiency gains may also be found by focusing on the development
of tools and trainings that support a limited workforce. Significant
recent efforts in recruiting and university engagement by the FAA have
been helpful in driving new talent to the agency. Blue Origin has
recommended developing a training curriculum so that lessons learned
throughout the application review are more easily transferred to all
employees. Blue Origin also recommends building tools to support
project management of license applications, tracking inputs, comments,
and results.
Washington Space Workforce
The launches that we've seen from the companies here today would
not have been possible without the engineers, mechanics, and
technicians who made these systems possible. My home state of
Washington is a prime example of the aerospace and space ecosystem. Our
space industry supports more than 13,000 workers, with an economic
impact of $4.6 billion annually. About 5,000 of those workers work at
Blue Origin, and more than 1,300 work at SpaceX, creating Starlink
satellites. As we move forward in the rapidly changing field of
commercial space, we know that these numbers will only grow. It is key
that we ensure we have the domestic workforce to keep up with that
growth. We're seeing shortages across the STEM fields, with a 60,000-
workforce shortage in Washington alone by 2026. Ensuring we have a
strong domestic space workforce is key to remaining internationally
competitive.
Question 1. What workforce needs and challenges do you see for the
commercial space industry?
Answer. Blue Origin's mission is to build a road to space for the
benefit of Earth. Achieving our goals will require a sustained pipeline
of talent to all our sites, including our headquarters in Kent, WA.
Blue Origin is working to overcome challenges in developing a diverse,
steady pipeline.
One area of concern is the limited volume of the skilled technician
workforce required to support manufacturing and assembly of our
products, including sub-orbital and orbital rockets, rocket engines,
lunar landers, and in-space systems. Among other roles, Blue is
especially challenged to hire skilled machinists and welders. We are
working to pair concentrated recruiting efforts with an expansion of
our relationships to the sources of these pipelines: community
colleges, trade schools, and apprenticeship programs.
Another challenge is growing the level of diversity in all areas of
our workforce, especially technical roles. Blue is working diligently
to hire and retain diverse talent. We have made strides in improving
our early career pipeline by engaging directly with universities and
minority organizations like the Society of Women Engineers and National
Society of Black Engineers, but continued work is needed to secure the
same success in the mid-and late-career populations.
A growing industry needs a growing workforce, and we are challenged
to increase awareness of the space industry as a career path that is
desirable and rewarding. Blue Origin's Club for the Future nonprofit
targets K-12 students to inspire the next generation to pursue careers
in STEM and help invent the future of space. Over 20,000 students in WA
have been reached by this program, but investment in continued
engagement of students throughout their educational career continues to
be critically important for the future of the space workforce.
Commercial Human Spaceflight Learning Period
While I am a strong proponent of rapid innovation and competition,
safety is my top priority. The FAA has the authority to regulate
commercial human spaceflight, but Congress instituted a statutory
``learning period'' that limits the agency's regulatory authority. The
learning period for commercial human spaceflight was intended to
promote rapid innovation in a nascent industry with few players. And
Congress has seen fit to extend this ``learning period'' three times -
in 2012, 2015, and most recently, the latest Continuing Resolution. The
learning period will end on January 1st, 2024. Since the 2015 learning
period extension, Virgin Galactic and Washington's Blue Origin have
carried out successful sub-orbital civilian human spaceflights. And so
far, there has only been one purely commercial orbital civilian human
spaceflight, SpaceX Inspiration 4--but this is expected to change
according to the testimony we have heard today. As we've seen from the
rapidly increasing cadence in flights and in testimony today, the
commercial space industry is poised to go far beyond the industry we
saw in past learning period extensions.
Question 1. Can you explain what your company still needs to learn
about keeping your spaceflight participants safe? [original questions
separated below for ease of response]
Answer. Increased flight experience allows us to continuously
improve. As we fly more, our flight results can inform product updates
that enhance our safety performance, and the current model allows us to
rapidly introduce these improvements to achieve safer systems faster.
This process is what makes any industry competitive and ensures a
market for human spaceflight activities remains viable. To date, only
14 commercial launches have carried paying civilian space flight
participants. The industry needs to continue to innovate and upgrade to
achieve a sustained commercial human spaceflight cadence that can open
access to space for more, and more diverse, astronauts. The existing
crew regulations found in Part 460 and the informed consent
requirements for space flight participants ensure that the public is
not at increased risk due to these activities, and customers are
robustly informed of the risks associated with their mission.
An extended learning period would benefit the FAA. We are also
looking at the volume of uncrewed launch licenses being processed by
the FAA and believe that the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(AST) needs to learn how to streamline those operations before adding
additional responsibilities. The resources, tools, and training that
AST needs to keep pace with industry today are important inputs to
building new safety framework in the future.
How much longer do you believe the current learning period should
be extended beyond January 1, 2024?
Answer. The Commercial Spaceflight Federation has advocated for 8
years. This is a reasonable timeline to expect to see the continued
innovation & improvements enabled by the current regulatory
environment. Congress can and should continue to monitor progress
within the industry and within the FAA and encourage communication
between the two.
Can you then focus on maintaining the safety of humans working and
living on-orbit or even on the surface of the moon or Mars?
Answer. These efforts are not sequential, and we will apply lessons
learned and best practices across all our products and programs
including those on-orbit, lunar, and beyond.
Can NASA's experience be immediately applied to defining
appropriate safety standards and regulations?
Answer. NASA's human spaceflight experience and associated
documentation are valuable inputs that our programs have leveraged to
build our safety systems and processes, but those do not represent a
single solution to safety. It is important to evaluate all data sources
based on applicability to the mission and architectures being
developed. It is also equally important to consider lessons learned
from other safety-critical industries to continually expand our
understanding and improve best practices.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Phil Joyce
Mission Authorization
I am excited that Blue Origin has partnered with Arizona State
University on the Orbital Reef commercial space station project. This
project seems to epitomize ``novel'' space activities--all the
potential applications of a space station with attachable modules
cannot possibly be known. The ability for private companies to train
non-government astronauts and conduct commercial operations in low
Earth orbit is a true game changer.
Of course, under current law there is no defined regulator with
such a new ``mission authorization'' authority.
Question 1. As Congress works to clarify agency authority and
remove uncertainty over novel space activities, what are the critical
components to create a workable, efficient, and safe regulation?
Answer. The following are critical components to a workable system
of authorization and supervision:
defining a clear, single agency responsible for new and
novel activities;
publishing a transparent, focused set of requirements for
approval;
providing defined timelines for review; and
minimizing overlap or duplication between mission
authorization and the existing licensing regimes.
From this foundation, the commercial space industry and its Federal
regulation can evolve over time as the need arises for new oversight
mechanisms to maintain U.S. leadership in space.
NASA Partnerships
The NASA Commercial Crew program has used commercial services to
launch astronauts to the International Space Station since 2020. The
Suborbital Crew or SubC program leverages commercial companies to send
NASA personnel to space using a ``system qualification'' system rather
than formal certification process.
Question 1. How do innovations like the SubC program further
efficiency for both private and government entities? How can we learn
from programs like this and scale them up as the commercial sector
expands?
Answer. Innovations like the SubC program allow NASA to benefit
from, rather than compete with, the robust domestic commercial space
industry that gives the United States an advantage relative to global
competitors. NASA should continue to embrace the commercial space
industry by taking advantage of existing capabilities like commercial
suborbital launch vehicles through Suborbital Crew while also utilizing
public-private partnerships to develop new capabilities like the
Commercial Crew & Cargo program and the Human Landing System program.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to
Phil Joyce
Commercial Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Destinations
Colorado aerospace companies have been at the forefront of
designing commercial space stations of the future. Currently, NASA's
Federal research takes place at the International Space Station (ISS),
which will be retired later this decade.
Question. In the near-future, how are commercially-operated space
stations going to host Federal research experiments that used to be
done on the ISS?
Answer. NASA is working with U.S. companies to develop designs of
commercially operated space stations through NASA's Commercial Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) Development Program. Per NASA's ISS Transition plan,
these companies are developing commercial LEO destinations (CLDs) to
begin operations in the late 2020s to ensure operational overlap with
the ISS before its retirement. This will facilitate the transition of
new and existing Federal research experiments from ISS to operational
CLD capacity.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Phil Joyce
ISS Extension/Commercial LEO
Ensuring the U.S. maintains a presence in low Earth orbit (LEO)
after the eventual decommissioning of the International Space Station
(ISS) is a priority of mine. It is vital for both America's national
security and for the next generation of exploration and science
missions.
Question 1. As one of the early participants in the Commercial LEO
Development (CLD) program, what is the prognosis for getting a
commercial space station in orbit by 2030?
Answer. It will be a challenge to have a commercial space station
in orbit by 2030 with the funding levels forecasted for the CLD program
in NASA's FY24 budget request. Increased outyear funding for the CLD
program would increase the likelihood that NASA is able to execute its
ISS Transition Plan.
Question 2. How can industry and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration collaborate to leverage the expertise of the existing
workforce, such as those involved in ISS mission support, to help speed
up the CLD program?
Answer. Blue Origin's Orbital Reef team has benefited greatly from
leveraging NASA expertise under Phase 1 of Commercial LEO Destinations,
for example conducting technology demonstrations of new materials
onboard the ISS. It will be essential that under Phase 2 of the program
NASA continues to provide opportunities that align with its next phase
vision for commercial LEO.
Question 3. Do you believe there is enough of a truly commercial
market to support more than one commercial space station?
Answer. NASA will be an essential anchor tenant for the commercial
space station that replaces ISS after ISS retirement. We do not believe
there is sufficient commercial demand to support more than one
commercial space station in the years immediately following ISS
retirement.
Question 4. What are the biggest challenges you are facing in
meeting the 2030 goal?
Answer. The outyear funding levels forecasted for the CLD program
in NASA's FY24 budget request and the level of regulatory certainty for
operating a commercial space station are both insufficient to ensure a
commercial space station is in orbit by 2030.
a. Do you believe the 2030 date is achievable?
Answer. Yes, with effective collaboration and partnership between
NASA and industry and sufficient policy and funding support from
Congress, the 2030 date is achievable.
Question 5. In your opinion, what is the best way for the United
States to ensure there is no gap between the ISS and whatever the
follow-on capability is in LEO?
Answer. The United States must take a whole of government approach
to provide the policy, funding, and regulatory certainty required to
meet NASA's ISS Transition Plan and avoid a gap between the ISS and a
United States-led follow-on capability in LEO. NASA and industry must
work together to ensure that our international partners utilize a U.S.-
led space station post ISS.
FAA Launch and Licensing
Question 1. At the October 18th hearing, Mr. Gerstenmaier of SpaceX
discussed the need for substantially increasing resources at the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), advocating for at least doubling
the resources of FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST)
to meet the growing workload. As a commercial launch company working to
certify launch vehicles and obtain licenses for launch and reentry from
FAA AST, what are Blue Origin's views on requiring launch providers to
`pay into the system,' similar to the way in which airlines pay into
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, to help pay for this growth?
Answer. Commercial aviation is heavily reliant on shared services
as an industry, from exhaustive airport infrastructure to air traffic
control that supports over 16 million flights per year, 24 hours a day.
In stark contrast, the commercial space industry has invested heavily
in its own launch site infrastructure without FAA support and the 106
licensed launches in FY23 each transited the airspace for only minutes
at a time. Commercial launch licensing also supports launches where the
government itself is a customer. Implementing significant fee
structures could cripple the industry and pass costs back to the United
States itself.
AST Operations represents 0.16 percent of the requested FAA budget
in FY24, but the relative size of AST funding does not imply that
resources should be provided in an unbounded or unmeasured way.
Increased resources should be paired with accountability mechanisms to
ensure that Federal investment is being used to improve its
capabilities in supporting its public safety mandate and continued
industry growth.
Question 2. In your estimation, are resource constraints at FAA AST
the biggest challenge for industry in terms of licensing for commercial
space activities?
Answer. Resources are a big challenge for FAA AST, but resources
should be paired with increased focus on using personnel more
efficiently and identifying ways to train and retain its workforce.
Resource increases and other process improvements should be evaluated
regularly against metrics that demonstrate increasing cadence of review
throughout the lifecycle of an application.
An example of an opportunity for streamlining is the duplication of
detailed analysis for flight safety even after validation of
procedures. Subject matter experts spend time recreating every analysis
despite a robust approval process for all methods & tools used. This is
unnecessary and time-intensive for personnel whose time could be better
used evaluating other complex processes.
Commercial Manned Spaceflight Moratorium and Regulation
Question 1. One of your fellow witnesses, Brig. Gen. Wayne Monteith
of National Aerospace Solutions who was also the last head of the FAA
AST, suggested a two-phase approach to the regulation of human
spaceflight. Phase 1 would be setting a date before which FAA may not
publish new regulations but is allowed to start working on them during
that period, and phase 2 would include setting an effective date for
those regulations, which would occur a number of years after the
regulations are published. This gap between the publishing of final
regulations and their becoming effective would provide a fail-safe,
allowing Congress to intervene in case industry was still not mature
enough for the new regulations. In his view, a forcing function is
necessary to keep industry and regulators working toward consensus
rules.
a. What does Blue Origin think of this proposal?
Answer. The activities for which Brig. Gen. Monteith is advocating
are all possible and encouraged under the learning period as it is
defined today. The visibility gained through the launch and reentry
licensing process and participation in industry standard forums are
substantial avenues for regulator learning. We would encourage the FAA
to continue to evaluate these efforts and seek feedback from operators
during an extended learning period. The active Part 460 Aerospace
Rulemaking Committee (SpARC) is a good example of industry and the
regulator's mutual commitment to moving the conversation forward.
Question 2. In the long term, do you think FAA is the best home for
the regulation of commercial spaceflight, or should Congress consider
standing up a new, independent entity?
Answer. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) should
remain solely focused on its role in licensing launch and reentry
operations in service of public safety and safety of property. This
focus could be better supported by positioning AST under the Secretary
of Transportation rather than embedded in the FAA, where the critical
distinction from commercial aviation is more difficult to
operationalize.
National Security
Question 1. Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket has been under
development for a number of years. In November 2022, U.S. Space Systems
Command and Blue Origin signed a cooperative research and development
agreement, which Big. Gen. Stephen Purdy said ``marks the restart of
certification activities for Blue Origin's New Glenn that began in 2018
when Blue Origin won a Launch Service Agreement.'' \1\ New Glenn will
potentially provide a third launch option for the National Security
Space Launch (NSSL) program, which will be incredibly important for
providing guaranteed access to space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Wolfe, Frank. ``US Space Force Signs CRADA with Blue Origin to
Restart Certification of New Glenn Rocket.'' Via Satellite. (November
22, 2022). https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2022/11/
22/us-space-force-signs-crada-with-blue-origin-to-restart-
certification-of-new-glenn-rocket/
a. What hurdles remain for New Glenn development and when does Blue
Origin expect New Glenn to launch?
Answer. Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket is a reusable workhorse
purpose-built to deliver high volume and mass to orbit. Its simple
design--and game-changing seven-meter fairing--continue to make steady
advancement along our pre-planned development path toward a first
launch in 2024. We are proud that of the progress we have made thus
far, including a successful Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) flight, BE-4
engine development and qualification testing, booster and second stage
qualification testing, payload fairing jettison testing, and successful
tests of our transport erector. We remain on path to achieve National
Security Space Launch (NSSL) certification and, if selected, we look
forward to supporting Phase 3 of the NSSL Program.
Question 2. Of the hurdles that remain for New Glenn, how many of
them are regulatory in nature and how can those be sped up or
addressed?
Answer. Blue Origin is committed to building a strong partnership
with the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and is
proceeding through our New Glenn license application to ensure that
regulatory framework supports our ability to launch.
FAA statements and actions indicate that the FAA has not been
provided the resources needed to succeed in their mission. License
application reviews are taking longer than the statutory 180-day review
time and application tolling is becoming more common than in the
previous decade. Application document reviews get delayed because the
task-saturated FAA subject matter experts are tied up supporting the
evaluations of other applications--sometimes causing a month or more
delay.
Despite having regulations that are meant to govern all forms of
vehicles from suborbital space planes to orbital rockets, it too
frequently appears that the means of compliance may curtail
innovation--with FAA looking for the same material from one operator to
the next. This creates a challenging prospect for operators--no matter
how you plan to ensure public safety, through historical or novel
methods, you need to mold it into the format the FAA wants to see,
creating additional and superfluous work for operators. If given the
appropriate resources discussed in the previous question, AST may be
able to address novel means of compliance more efficiently both to
ensure public safety and U.S. national security interests.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. J. D. Vance to
Phil Joyce
Proprietary Data and Intellectual Property
Reluctance to share data has been flagged in several reports as a
barrier to standards development and the implementation of voluntary
safety systems. These reports point to a variety of solutions,
including statutory data protection, programs to facilitate sharing
proprietary data, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and individual companies.
I understand this reluctance to share data. These reports indicate
that companies are concerned that any shared data could be traced back
to the company due to the small number of providers and the significant
differences between their vehicles. Companies view the protection of
their data as important for their commercial competitiveness.
Question 1. While commercial companies need to protect their
proprietary information, data-sharing between commercial providers will
be vital for standards development, collaborative research, and
voluntary safety systems. What protections could be implemented to
facilitate data-sharing between companies while protecting proprietary
data and intellectual property? Would legislation best address this
issue, or could agency-led or industry-led measures be effective?
Answer. The commercial space industry features a broad range of
architectures and mission profiles, leading to unique designs and
operations, particularly for human spaceflight activities. The amount
of data generated by the small number of operators has been limited,
and primarily useful for validating proprietary design features under
nominal conditions. This data is generally less useful for
architectures that do not utilize the same systems and is unlikely to
lead to broad industry findings.
The FAA maintains visibility to all operations, including human
spaceflight activities, through the licensing process. This unique
viewpoint can allow them to observe safety-related patterns between
operators. Where significant commonality is observed, the FAA may
encourage prioritization of certain standards or research so that any
potential data-sharing is impactful. They should also leverage industry
data to validate and improve existing analysis processes used for
launch license approvals today.
Question 2. How can Congress and the FAA encourage collaboration
between industry while protecting proprietary data?
Answer. As noted in the previous answer, the FAA does have broad
visibility of industry designs and processes. They have a role to play
in ensuring that safety conversations are prioritized appropriately to
topics that have industry-wide impacts and represent real lessons
learned from licensing operations. Their participation in industry
standards efforts could be strengthened by understanding this potential
role.
Ohio's Space Capabilities
Ohio is the birthplace of aviation and has a rich tradition of
excellence in aerospace. It started with the Wright Brothers, continued
with Neil Armstrong and John Glenn, and lives on today with so many
people, companies, and universities on the cutting-edge of innovation.
Following in this tradition, Ohio is home to world-class
spaceflight testing capabilities not available anywhere else on the
globe. But I hear they are often underutilized by commercial partners
or even non-NASA Federal partners.
Question 1. NASA/Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has the
Agency's lead assignment for future space communication. How best
should NASA/Glenn work with the rest of the Federal Government as part
of its leadership role in this area, to help fortify commercial space-
flight in areas from spectrum licensing to technology advancement, and
does NASA/Glenn have the resources it needs to accomplish this role?
Answer. NASA Glenn Research Center plays a critical role in
advancing technologies across multiple Blue Origin programs. For
example, Blue Origin recently conducted rocket fairing jettison testing
for our New Glenn orbital launch vehicle in the largest thermal vacuum
chamber in the world at NASA Glenn's Armstrong Test facility. We also
have a substantial scope of work planned with NASA Glenn in support of
the Blue Origin-led National Team's crewed lunar lander for the Artemis
Human Landing System program. Additionally, Glenn's space communication
capabilities offer an exciting future for networking in-space, one
where utilization of Blue Origin's Blue Ring spacecraft can help
establish an internet-like network throughout space. It is essential
that NASA maintain its critical resources at NASA Glenn.
Question 2. On October 16, UC Berkeley announced participation in a
new $2B space research park at NASA/Ames in California. In my home
State of Ohio, Voyager/Airbus have announced the establishment of the
George Washington Carver Science Park on the campus of The Ohio State
University, as an integral part of their efforts on Starlab, one of
NASA's commercial low-Earth orbit destination replacements for the ISS
after 2030. What key roles do you see Universities--especially public
Universities--playing, in order to maximize the potential success of
commercial spaceflight in low-Earth orbit and beyond?
Answer. Universities play a key role in building the workforce
needed to support commercial spaceflight in LEO and beyond.
Universities must be supported in building deeper partnerships with
industry, to ensure students gain the specialized knowledge required to
succeed in our unique industry. Supporting priority research areas,
technical student competitions and providing opportunities for
internships can help industry leverage the enthusiastic and diverse
talent found in universities across the US. Aligning with our
commitment to the Space Workforce 2030 pledge, Blue Origin offers
internships in the Spring, Summer, and Fall to maximize our ability to
expose young talent to the industry. This year we hosted 129 summer
interns, each given substantive work and mentorship.
Programs like this generate both experienced young talent and
ambassadors for the space workforce within their universities.
On-Orbit Authority
Question 1. To what extent does the lack of regulatory authority
for on-orbit activities affect the commercial human spaceflight
industry, if at all?
Answer. As we develop platforms like our Orbital Reef commercial
space station in support of NASA's CLD program, it is important to
understand how authorization and supervision of activities that may
take place on board will be carried out in the U.S. government. The
lack of clarity around these novel activities makes it difficult to
identify stakeholders that might benefit from awareness of our intended
programs prior to application. This has also led to debates about
whether the U.S. is fulfilling treaty obligations as compared to other
countries. This uncertainty has led to legal questions within the
investor and customer communities that would benefit from clear
authority.
Question 2. As the industry prepares for commercial space stations,
should a Federal agency be given on-orbit authority that addresses
commercial human spaceflight? If so, which agency should be tasked with
this authority and why?
Answer. Authorization of novel space activities is required to meet
our international treaty obligations and any authorization regime
should have a single government owner. The range of potential
activities is wide, so every effort should be taken to eliminate
duplicative requirements, limit unstructured interagency processes, and
draw clear boundaries between agencies with related authorities. While
available expertise should be mined from other stakeholders in the
government, the Department of Commerce would be an appropriate entity
to carry out these authorizations.
Question 3. In discussions regarding on-orbit authority or mission
authorization, many disagree on whether Commerce or FAA should have
this authority. How does commercial human spaceflight factor into these
discussions?
Answer. The broad range of human-centric in-space activity should
be categorized and regulated as commerce. The Department of Commerce
remains the appropriate owner for these activities. As discussed in the
question above, like other novel activities, it is likely Commerce will
need to be capable of seeking stakeholder inputs for these activities
without leading to unbounded interagency processes.
Miscellaneous
Question 1. As humans look to operate on orbit and beyond can you
speak to lessons learned from commercial launch and how the U.S.
government should approach working with commercial companies operating
human activities in space moving forward?
Answer. The launch licensing framework offers good lessons for any
regulatory regime:
Regulate only to the extent necessary--the goals of a
regulatory regime should be clearly stated. The public safety
focus of the FAA's launch licensing process is used to draw
boundaries around what is required in an application. The U.S.
government will need to approach novel on-orbit activities with
a light touch for some time, until it is clear additional steps
are necessary.
Regulations should be streamlined and flexible to novel
approaches--Driving specific means of compliance into
regulatory text limits innovation and improvement in a complex
environment. A minimal set of performance or process-based
regulations should be prioritized only if necessary to achieve
the clearly authorized goals.
Communicate with industry--companies pursuing on-orbit
activities are building a robust pipeline of talent and
experience that should be leveraged by the U.S. government
rather than expecting to be an independent, disconnected source
of expertise. Commitment to building these relationships is
critically important.
Rulemakings should consider industry feedback without an
expectation of full consensus--the most recent Part 450
rulemaking convened a diverse set of operators to provide
feedback in a short window via a Rulemaking Committee. Some of
this critical feedback was unable to achieve 100 percent
consensus through this process and was ignored in the drafting
of rules. This process cannot be repeated in diverse
industries.
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