[Senate Hearing 118-563]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-563
STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH THE PRC:
ASSESSING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
BEYOND THE INDO-PACIFIC
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
58-679 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 4
Campbell, Hon. Kurt, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Kurt Campbell to Questions Submitted by:
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin................................... 38
Senator James E. Risch....................................... 42
Response of Mr. Kurt Campbell to a Question Submitted by Senator
Tim Kaine...................................................... 45
Responses of Mr. Kurt Campbell to Questions Submitted by Senator
Tim Scott...................................................... 45
(iii)
STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH THE PRC:
ASSESSING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
BEYOND THE INDO-PACIFIC
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Shaheen, Coons,
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, Duckworth,
Risch, Rubio, Young, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order.
Let me welcome the Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
to our committee.
It is always a pleasure to have you here.
Before I give my comments in regards to the global
influences of the PRC, I want to comment on the elections in
Venezuela. Extremely disappointing, and that is putting it
mildly.
The Barbados understandings were not met. We knew that
going into the elections. The votes are very clear. The Machado
opposition won the popular vote, and yet Maduro is going to
hold on to power. At least he is going to try to hold on to
power.
I think it is absolutely essential that we be very clear
that Maduro was not elected as president of Venezuela. I think
we have to work with our partners in the region, particularly
Brazil and Colombia, to make it clear that in this election
Maduro was not the winner.
And Mr. Secretary, if there is anything we can do to assist
in that regards please let us know. We are going to be very
clear in our comments, and we think the United States has to
work with our partners in South America to make it clear that
that was not an election where Maduro won.
The topic for today's hearing is the PRC's global
influence. From the construction of a 290 mile railroad in
Kenya to the sale of armored vehicles, jets, and anti-ship
missiles to Venezuela, to their attempt to broker a Saudi-Iran
deal, to creating fake commentators whose pro-Beijing writings
have been published across Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
China is competing with the United States for influence in
every region of the world and across every domain.
And yet, last year, Xi Jinping claimed, and I quote,
``China does not seek spheres of influence. China will never
impose its will on others.'' I find that hard to believe, given
all the evidence we have to the contrary.
Look at Beijing's economic coercion of countries like
Lithuania, who expanded their trade relations with Taiwan, or
South Korea after Seoul deployed a U.S. missile defense system
in response to the threat from North Korea.
In fact, China is a country with a decade long, well
documented track record of suppressing fundamental freedoms and
abusing human rights.
For those of us who value freedom and liberty and human
rights and democracy, China is one of the most significant
challenges we face on the global stage today.
In a speech outlining the Biden administration's approach
to the PRC, Secretary Blinken said, and I quote, ``China is the
only country with both the intent to reshape the international
order and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, military and
technological power to do it.''
NATO observed just recently that China is an enabler for
Putin's war against Ukraine.
So, Secretary Campbell, thank you for joining us to discuss
this important topic. I support the Biden-Harris administration
approach to Beijing's global influence.
The Administration has shored up our relationships with
allies and partners in Europe and Asia, but the competition is
on, particularly in the Global South.
It is not clear to me that we are committing the time,
attention, or resources to win the war of ideas. We should be
making a compelling case for the kind of world that we seek to
foster.
Secretary Campbell, you have been clear eyed about
Beijing's agenda when it comes to its pursuit of military
basing and security agreements, its economic influence through
their predatory terms of its infrastructure projects, the
spread of its technologies that enable authoritarians around
the world, and their disinformation campaigns.
In order to address these challenges, the United States
should not only be investing in our military but also our
diplomatic and economic development tools.
That is why every year the Biden administration has
requested additional resources to outcompete China. The
committee has spent a lot of time in this Congress talking
about that competition.
We have had four classified briefings directly related to
China or Taiwan. This is the seventh hearing on aspects of our
strategic competition.
But we have not yet been able to put this rhetoric into
action by passing legislation to fund and modernize the U.S.
foreign policy toolkit. I am willing to work with any willing
partner on the other side of the aisle to make this happen. It
is simply that important.
We have a lot of bipartisan legislation that has been
written by members of this committee and other committees that
deal with this.
The only way we are going to get to the finish line is if
we generally work together, listen to each other, are willing
to compromise, and are willing to get to the finish line to get
this agenda done. That is the only way we are going to be able
to fund and modernize our U.S. foreign policy toolkit.
I will make it clear, as chairman of this committee I am
willing to sit down with any member to try to find that common
path. I am willing to compromise. I think it is that important
we get to the finish line in this Congress.
We should be providing an alternative to the infrastructure
development that the PRC offers. We should be harnessing
multilateral finance and development institutions like the DFC
to provide flexibility and agility, to be responsive to an
increasingly contested strategic environment.
Now, I am going to tell you members--staff on both sides of
the aisle have worked together. They are very close to having a
modernization of the DFC to meet these new challenges.
Let us complete the task. Let us get it done. Let us bring
it to the committee, to a business meeting for a markup. We
should be better at resourcing our efforts to secure critical
mineral supply chains that will help power artificial
intelligence and facilitate the clean energy transition, and we
should be promoting U.S. values and protecting human rights
defenders from transnational oppression.
We also need to talk about nominations and I have a map
behind me to sort of illustrate this point. There are more than
20 countries where China has an ambassador in place and the
United States does not.
That means we are not playing on a level playing field.
That means we are giving up a strategic ability to compete in
those countries. The PRC does not have to deal with advice and
consent of the Senate. We do, but we have to carry out our
responsibility.
Nonetheless, China's ambassadors are pressing the flesh,
cutting deals, getting their narrative out in local media
outlets, and the United States is not.
We have 25 ambassadors pending in the committee and four on
the floor waiting for a vote. Most of them have been nominated
for missions where strategic competition is most fierce. Most
of these are career nominees who are highly qualified experts.
This committee works best when we work together. We believe
in comity. We believe in working together because we know that
is the only way we are going to get work done on the floor of
the U.S. Senate.
But I just urge my colleagues, let us come together for the
sense of our strategic competition with the PRC and the
fairness to our career ambassadors. Let us have hearings and
business meetings to move the career ambassadors that are
pending in this committee.
Secretary Campbell, these are important issues, and I look
forward to your candid views about where we are doing well and
where we have to do better.
And with that, I turn it over to my friend and our
distinguished ranking member, Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say regarding the elections in
Venezuela, I share many of your concerns, and I am going to
have another venue where I will be responding to that further.
But certainly it is a real concern.
Secretary Campbell, thank you for being here today. It is
obvious to all that China's ambitions are global. It is
proactive in every region and reaps strategic benefit from
chaos in Europe and the Middle East.
China's support for fentanyl trafficking and its spy post
in Cuba demonstrate a desire to target the United States and
undermine our efforts to prioritize resources to compete with
them.
That said, the Administration wrongfully insisted it is
winning the competition with China. Not so. Let us start with
the Indo-Pacific.
The balance of power in the region continues to move in
China's favor. The Administration's response to China's
escalation against the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal has
been limited to verbal assurances, but no concrete action.
Talking about a treaty without strong action only
encourages China to further test U.S. resolve.
On AUKUS we have not realized the bright promise of this
partnership. It was supposed to be a game changer, but State's
exclusion of the exact technologies we need to advance AUKUS
has inhibited this partnership from moving aggressively to
reality.
On Europe, yesterday I published a report that evaluated
the Administration's policies to strengthen transatlantic unity
on China across the board, especially on trade and African
policy.
The Administration's record is dismal. China is tightening
its linkages with our adversaries, and the Administration is
doing almost nothing about it. China is providing material
support to Russia's war effort.
Secretary Blinken often repeats that 70 percent of machine
tools and 90 percent of microelectronics used in Russian
weapons come from China. He is right, but the Administration
has not acted in proportion to the scale of these sins.
Recent actions on some Chinese microelectronics companies
are ridiculously inadequate. Aggressively targeting China
should be the top priority in U.S. sanctions policy.
Mr. Campbell, in your confirmation hearing you assured me
you understood the risks of inviting China into a peace process
for Ukraine. You recall that, I am sure.
Since then, the department officials have told this
committee that China must be at the table because its presence
will somehow create daylight between it and Russia.
I find this preposterous. So today I am going to ask you
what is our policy. Do you and the Administration really
believe China should have a say in European security affairs?
On Iran, because the Administration has failed to curb
Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, Congress had to pass new
legislation to sanction China. We expect the Administration to
pursue sanctions in compliance with the law.
To date, we do not see much enthusiasm. Despite all these
issues, the President welcomed Xi to the United States in
November.
The Biden-Harris administration agreed, without getting any
reciprocal commitments--any reciprocal commitments--to
facilitate Chinese engagement on climate with state and local
actors in the United States, even though China clearly uses
this subnational diplomacy for malign purposes.
The Administration then supported this initiative's first
events at Berkeley, a university that has failed to report
hundreds of millions in research funding from China.
Last year I predicted China would agree to new dialogues to
placate us only to use these initiatives against us later. They
just did that by canceling arms control talks yet again.
How did State Department respond? By publishing--
publishing--our U.S. nuclear stockpile totals so Xi knows that
we are reducing our capabilities while China grows, and of
course, reciprocity did not follow.
The only thing it did was save China with the expense of
going through the usual spy proceedings to get the size of our
U.S. nuclear stockpile. Ridiculous.
This is not competing. This is pandering. We cannot keep
making these mistakes. China must be an American issue, not a
Republican or Democrat issue.
Congress has tried for more than a year to negotiate a
bipartisan China bill, but efforts have failed because the
Administration and some up here love to talk about tougher
policies to limit China's aggressive behavior, but only talk
and will not act to actually take tough action.
They do not want to limit PRC's money in our universities.
They do not want to reform foreign lobbying laws. They do not
want to stop nuclear dialogues to give China clear insight into
our nuclear programs, and they support international energy
policies that actually undermine our partners' economic reality
and needs.
It is time for our Government to wake up to the real
challenges China presents and start taking concrete action. The
days of admiring the problem from afar must be over.
Congress needs to update the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, reduce foreign influence in universities and think tanks,
punish China for abuse of U.S. diplomats, advance real economic
agendas with our partners, oppose China's growing clout at the
IMF and much, much more.
It is past time we take a tougher line to stop Chinese
malign influence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I noticed that we had a lot of interest for visitors to be
in the committee room today, and we welcome that. This is an
extremely important subject.
We just caution that we cannot tolerate any disruption of
the hearing itself. You are more than welcome to be here and
listen to the debate, but we ask that you respect the process
of this committee.
And with that, let me introduce our witness for today, and
I have the honor of introducing Kurt Campbell. He is a well
known figure inside the Beltway when it comes to U.S. foreign
policy, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, who is now serving as
the deputy secretary of the Department of State.
Deputy Secretary Campbell has served our country in a
number of roles including as an assistant secretary for State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013, and more
recently as deputy assistant to the President and coordinator
for Indo-Pacific affairs at the National Security Council.
He played a lead role in conceptualizing AUKUS, the
critical trilateral partnership between the U.S., Australia,
and the U.K., and he worked to strengthen the Quad and deepen
trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and
South Korea.
Your full statement, Secretary Campbell, will be made part
of the record. You may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT CAMPBELL, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Campbell. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, first
of all, let me thank you both and thank the committee for the
confidence you placed in me when I was first presented to this
committee 6 months ago.
I have been in the job here at the State Department about 5
months, and I thought it would be useful in terms of the
context of the discussion today to give you a kind of update on
the particular issues that we discussed with respect to global
competition as it relates to China.
Let me just also say that I do appreciate that the work of
this committee has been, largely, bipartisan when it comes to
China and the challenge it presents. I also fully agree that
the most intense regional arena for that competition is the
Indo-Pacific, but it is increasingly global, and it is not
limited to any one area. It spans every area of American
pursuit, strategic technology, business, military, across the
board, and it will require a full scale, intense engagement on
the part of the United States to match that challenge.
And I will say I think the key ingredient in that is
bipartisan purpose, but it is also working with allies and
partners, and I am proud of the fact that I have worked closely
across the aisle and tried to build those partnerships with key
countries.
So let me just give you a few updates, if I can. First of
all, I fully support what you both have said about Venezuela.
We have already been in deep consultations with the countries
in the regions. There is deep anxiety in the region more
directly. I will promise to you that we will be in
consultation--close consultation with you as we develop our
plans of action in the time ahead.
A few things that I have been directly involved in over the
course of the last couple of months, last 5 months or so. Deep
engagement with European partners--I share deeply the concern
that China's support to Russia--Russia's defense industrial
base--has not only changed the context of the conflict in
Ukraine, but it will be a long term security challenge to the
Indo-Pacific.
I actually share very much what Senator Risch said here. I
would simply say that I think the steps that we have taken with
respect to financial institutions, I would offer--I think those
steps are more significant than is widely understood.
But the most important thing we need to do is to get
partners in Europe behind this effort, and I will note you
mentioned this, Senator Cardin.
If you look at the statement of NATO, this was the most far
reaching statement of concerns of European partners about what
China is doing in Europe, and I will tell you that the work
that we have done, you have done, others, I think the battle
for hearts and minds in Europe and the concerns that are rising
about China's deeply provocative steps to support Russia's war
machine are bearing fruit.
I also want to underscore this is a recommendation from
Senator Coons. I have now been to Africa twice, two extended
trips. This is the place where we need to step up our gains
substantially, and this means across the board.
I was able to see first hand the work of our development
agencies--the DFC, the Millennium Challenge, USAID. Very
impressed by what they are doing on the ground.
But we need to do more, and we have to contest China's
actions not only in terms of their forward basing strategy but
their desire to go after Africa's rare earths that will be
critical for our industrial and technological capabilities.
Also, I promised this committee that I would do what I can
to step up our diplomatic and our overall game in the Pacific.
I have good news there.
I think by the end of this term we will have advanced
substantially the number of diplomatic outposts and our aid and
assistance across the Pacific. I can go into that in greater
detail.
I will also just indicate that for me the greatest vehicle
for building the partnerships that are going to be necessary is
to advance partnerships around technology, which increasingly
is what countries both in the Global South and elsewhere are
facing.
And then, last, I would just simply say I have tried to
double down on our work in the Indo-Pacific. You will have just
seen historic developments in Japan, stepping up our bilateral
relationship.
We have done a number of things in our unofficial
relationship with Taiwan, which I am happy to discuss, and I
would also say I share with Senator Risch, I do believe AUKUS
is game changing, and the number of steps that have taken gives
me confidence that this will be the most important strategic
military engagement between the United States and Australia and
brings Britain into the context of what we are engaging with in
the Indo-Pacific.
I would simply say to you guys that are looking for a
scorecard I cannot tell you exactly how to evaluate everything,
but I can tell you that this will be never ending.
We will have to invest substantial resources, build
internal capacities in our government and with our institutions
to contest everywhere.
I do believe the most important ingredient in what the
Biden administration has done has been working with allies and
partners in ways that I think are deeply consequential--AUKUS,
the Quad, trilaterals, a number of other things, building
bridges between the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
I stand by those efforts. I hope they will continue. I
deeply appreciate the support of this committee.
Thank you, Senator. I am sorry to go on a little longer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Kurt Campbell
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members, thank
you very much. I always appreciate the opportunity to testify before
this committee.
And I especially want to note appreciation for your partnership and
the bipartisan focus you bring to our efforts to advance American
leadership in the world, and in particular to the defining geopolitical
challenge confronting modern American diplomacy--strategic competition
with the People's Republic of China.
Since I appeared before this committee as a nominee in December,
and officially started as Deputy Secretary of State in February, we
have--with your support--continued to drive forward the core pillar of
our approach to the PRC: to ``invest, align, and compete.''
As two Pacific Powers, our competitiveness with the PRC is often
thought of in the locus of the Indo-Pacific. And while much of the
history of the 21st century will be written in the Indo-Pacific, the
PRC's pursuit of military, economic, and geopolitical preeminence is
truly undertaken in every region.
The PRC is the only country with both the intent to reshape the
international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do so. We see this play out across
the globe, in every arena, on every continent--in cyber, biotechnology,
critical minerals, winning hearts and minds, in issues across the
board--as President Xi and the PRC seek to establish dominance in these
strategic areas.
The PRC's military buildup, the biggest ever undertaken in
peacetime, is upsetting the regional balance. It seeks to dominate
sectors in technology, and corner the market on certain minerals. And
it is increasing economic coercion as a feature of the PRC's strategy
in every region we work in, weaponizing trade to pressure countries.
It is a generational challenge that requires us to meet it with
equal determination. And in each of these arenas, we are coordinating
with our allies and partners--what I view as the essential feature to
any competitive strategy with the PRC.
That said, competition is not the sole feature of our engagement
with other countries. Indeed, we are seeking to meet the needs of
countries through an affirmative strategy that builds enduring
alliances and partnerships.
In fact, Secretary Blinken is in the region today moving that
agenda forward as part of his 18th trip to the Indo-Pacific, visiting
Vietnam, Laos, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Mongolia.
Our far-reaching national investments--with your help--in
infrastructure, chips, research and development, and other key sectors
have strengthened our ability to lead in areas of strategic importance
and purpose.
We are strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific in ways that
previously would have seemed blue-sky, or impossible. We elevated the
Quad with Australia, India, and Japan. We upgraded our relationships
with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others. The
President launched a historic trilateral at Camp David with our two
closest friends in Northeast Asia--Japan and the Republic of Korea.
This is all on top of multiple summits with the leaders of the
Pacific Islands and ASEAN, among many innovative engagements.
We've also worked to weave our Indo-Pacific and European allies and
partners together, as evidenced 2 weeks ago when our Indo-Pacific
Partners--Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand--
attended the NATO Summit here in Washington.
We launched AUKUS with Australia and the UK--what I view as a
signal achievement--the first time in seventy years that the United
States has taken steps to provide an ally a nuclear powered submarine
capability.
To take a step back, it was only in 2016 that the European Union
recognized the Indo-Pacific as a strategic priority. Now, we've held
dozens of Indo-Pacific dialogues with our European allies, in every
part of the continent--and they've developed their own strategies
strengthening their focus and alignment in the region.
Together with our G7, European, and Indo-Pacific partners, we are
aligning approaches on the protection of critical technology and on
derisking and diversifying supply chains.
And we're intensifying our diplomacy on shared values and
opportunities with emerging partners in the Americas, the Middle East,
and in Africa, where I just visited earlier this month.
The proof of effectiveness is that the PRC views our cross-
continental partnerships with growing concern. And it's why they see
the alliance and partner systems as a singular American asymmetric
advantage, which we intend to continue and expand.
This challenge is ever present in everything we are doing.
In some ways, our competition with the PRC is more intense, more
multifaceted than it has been with any other country in any era. It
requires deep reservoirs of thoughtful and intensive diplomacy on the
part of the United States to step up our game everywhere.
To meet this test, we are developing an elevated level of expertise
at the State Department, including through--and this is thanks to
bipartisan support in Congress--the Department's China House. Every
diplomat, no matter where posted, is able to effectively engage on key
issues related to the PRC.
When my predecessor Wendy Sherman met with this committee last
year, she rightly noted that for our country, the PRC is a generational
challenge, and there is no higher priority at the State Department than
answering it. That is even more true today.
This is a region and a challenge where we've seen unprecedented
bilateral cooperation, and I am grateful to you for that model--and for
recognizing it is essential to U.S. success.
Thank you for the opportunity to meet today, and for your steadfast
support in advancing America's interests in meeting this moment to
ensure a free, open, secure, and prosperous world order.
I look forward to our discussion.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Campbell.
We will now have 5 minute rounds. Let me start, if I might.
What really differentiates the United States from the PRC
is the way that we conduct our foreign policy wrapped in our
values.
They conduct foreign policy based upon transactional
objectives, and President Biden has made it clear that our
foreign policy will be wrapped within our values. So we promote
democracy, good governance, respect for human rights.
China uses corruption and force if need be as they are
threatening to Taiwan to try to carry out their foreign policy.
So my question to you, as we develop our relationship with
the PRC, how do you balance our commitment to advance the
values that our foreign policy is based in, not just with our
direct bilateral relations with China, but in countries in
which we are competing with China, how do we balance the
advancement of our values that are critical to our national
security with the realities that we are dealing with regimes
that differ from us and are prepared to do things that we find
very objectionable?
Mr. Campbell. Senator, it is a great question, and I think
you understand the context of it very well.
I would simply say that a number of countries where we are
contested--contesting intensively, countries like Vietnam, even
a country like India, a close partner, there are occasionally
challenges that are presented in terms of the conduct of
domestic affairs.
I think the truth is that the United States, it is just
intrinsic both Democrats and Republicans raise issues of
concern in every endeavor. I think that is critical. Most of
our partners understand that and appreciate the need to address
the issues that we raise.
I would simply say that we cannot go back to a period where
we place strategic interest at such a premium that we look the
other way at egregious acts that cause concern to us. And I do
not think that has been done.
I do believe that in almost every case the United States
has been able to balance our strong foreign policy, national
security interests with, as you put it, our key inherent
interests in promoting democracy and human rights.
And so ultimately what we are looking to do in some of
these very challenging circumstances is to bend their
trajectory, sometimes slightly, sometimes transformationally,
in directions that support freedom, that support democracy and
closer association with like minded nations that we are working
with on the global stage.
The Chairman. I appreciate that. Congress has been your
partner. Sometimes we can, as an independent branch, help you
advance our values where diplomats have a hard time pursuing.
We have done that in trafficking in humans with our TIP
reports.
We have done that in the sanctions, the Magnitsky and
others, that require you to consider personal sanctions as well
as sectorial sanctions. We did that with anti-corruption in the
last Congress.
So we look for you to give us additional ways in which we
can be helpful to advance American values, western values,
global values, in our relationship with other countries.
You have to set priorities. We have to set priorities. We
have a limited amount of time left in this Congress, and I want
you to give me how high a priority is it for the U.S. Senate to
confirm particularly career ambassadors where we have so many
that are vacant today.
If we do that it takes floor time. It takes committee time.
There are other issues we need to deal with. How high of a
priority is it for you to accomplish your missions to represent
us in the State Department, for us to take up and confirm the
vacant positions we have now in the State Department?
Mr. Campbell. So, look, it is a good point, and I do want
to just underscore clearly your first issue.
When Congress, when Senators, engage internationally, it
helps us enormously. To the extent that we have had any
assistance, and it has been modest at best, from China on
fentanyl related issues it is largely because of delegations
from Congress, from the Senate, going over, making the case
powerfully about that this is not just an executive branch
issue. It is broadly shared with the American people.
When delegation Senator Shaheen was in Britain recently
engaging the new British government, they were able to hear
directly bipartisan interests for why the special relationship
is so important.
So I will tell you that we are much more effective when you
guys are engaged internationally. I support it. I very much
want to see you guys out on the playing field. It helps us
consequentially.
To your very good point, look, I would say that politics is
a tough game. Take it out on us, the political guys. I work
with wonderful people, professionals, and frankly, they deserve
to be confirmed. Dorothy Shea is up in front of your committee
now. She has been waiting almost 2 years.
The place that really the Chinese are taking it to us is in
international organizations. We have to be able to contest
there. I do not like going to a country in which we sit down
with the leader, and we do not have an ambassador there. Has
not been there for a couple years. I find it embarrassing. I
think it is antithetical to our strategic interests.
And so, yes, I do believe we should put these folks on the
field. Look, no one quarrels with strong military engagements.
We have to do that. We have to invest in our military.
But I think there sometimes is a tendency to underestimate
how important our diplomats are in international organizations
in the Global South, particularly when in small countries in
Africa they view the ambassador as the representative of the
United States. Washington is distant.
And so getting those people in place, I would say, is among
our most important priorities. I am sorry to go on so long on
that, Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks so much for being here, and I always appreciate your
understanding of these issues and frankness.
At your confirmation hearing we talked about the situation
of inviting China into the peace process for Ukraine, and you
expressed your agreement with me that this was not a good idea,
which is an understatement.
In the meantime, the State Department officials have told
this committee that China must be at the table. I am assuming,
like a lot of things, there is not complete agreement. But help
me understand this. Where are we on this, and how hard are we
going to have to push to get this done right?
It seems that our European partners get this, and for
whatever reason the place where you work does not seem to get
this. So help me out.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator.
To be honest, I am not aware of those consultations that
you have had. I will also tell you that I would generally say
any kind of discussion like that is premature.
The dominant arena of engagement is on the battlefield. I
see no sign of Russians in any way easing up on their brutal
offensives with Ukraine. If you signal too early your interest
in getting to the negotiating table, I think it sends the wrong
message, and it is a signal of weakness more generally.
Ultimately, I had extensive discussions with your team
about this. Senator, I must say I found those arguments quite
persuasive, and I am personally troubled by China's actions
publicly stating that we are in favor of peace--we are not
taking sides--but then privately providing the support for
their industrial base in ways that will change the balance of
military power not just in Ukraine, Senator, but in Europe for
decades to come.
So I find those quite troubling. I think they have to be
accounted for more directly. I believe the United States, with
its key partners in Europe, have to play the dominant role if
we find ourselves in a situation which we hope for, that we can
arrive at a just peace with Ukraine and Russia.
We are nowhere near that right now, Senator, and so talk
about what the nature of the table looks like and who is
sitting around it, that is premature.
Senator Risch. Great thoughts.
It seems to me that Europeans and the rest of the world
made a huge mistake with Russia over recent decades thinking
they were something that they were not, and now the price is
being paid for that.
And I think the problem is there is some people making the
same mistake right now with China, thinking that they are is
something that they are not, and your observation that that
mistake could carry consequences that goes into generations, I
agree with 100 percent.
I think the Europeans, because of their experience with
Russia, are very, very reluctant to make the same mistake with
China. So, and I think China has not helped either.
Europe's experience with the Lithuanians with China has
really, really woken up the Europeans as to what they are
dealing with as far as China is concerned.
Look, Congress recently passed legislation on a bipartisan
basis to sanction China for the oil purchases, and I am not
seeing--there was a lot of enthusiasm up here in the Hill for
that.
I am not seeing the same enthusiasm for the Administration,
which is not surprising because whenever we talk about
sanctions Treasury always pushes back to a degree. State always
pushes back. We up here seem to be a little more ready to draw
that weapon and use it. Your thoughts?
Mr. Campbell. Look, Senator, we have engaged on this quite
a bit. I really understand and take your points to heart. I
would point out, and I think you know it--you have heard so
many times--of the hundreds of other sanctions that we have
undertaken more directly.
I do think, and I will just state clearly that Iran is an
implacable foe of the United States. We have to contest them
everywhere, not just in the Middle East, not just with respect
to the Houthis, but increasingly the role that they are also
playing on the battlefields of Europe in Ukraine.
So I take that very seriously. I understand the points.
Sanctions policy, as you underscore, Senator, and you
understand, are complex. There are often concerns about certain
steps that you might take in a financial arena could have
secondary, tertiary effects.
I do not mean that as an excuse, but these are complex
matters. I do think we have taken consequential steps, but I
need to take back to the building a specific set of
recommendations that you carry.
I do also want to just point to something that you raised
at the outset. Europe has had two major challenges. One is the
Russia energy and national security challenge.
Many of these countries had hoped for a deeper economic and
commercial relationship with China. I will tell you, after
substantial discussions both in my previous job, Senator, and
this job, Europeans understand the risks. They are coming
around. We are working much more consequentially with them, not
just on Russia but China as well.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for your leadership on shaping our
policies with regards to China and the rest of the world and
thank you for investing your time in going to the African
continent and seeing this critical sphere of competition, of
potential conflict between the United States and China.
Let me just first ask about partners and allies. I think
President Biden's leadership in responding to Russia's
aggression in Ukraine, pulling together, strengthening and
expanding NATO, mobilizing 50 countries, including in the Indo-
Pacific to support Ukraine has been critical.
How relevant is it to our global competition with China
that we continue to support Ukraine, that we send a strong and
consistent and bipartisan message that when we say we are with
Ukraine, we mean it?
Mr. Campbell. Thanks, Senator, and I want to thank you for
your leadership on this.
I will just simply say that before the state visit of Prime
Minister Kishida he had an opportunity to appear before
Congress and give a major address. It surprised people that the
number one issue that he raised and asked the American people
in Congress to do was to stand by Ukraine. To continue the job,
and it does suggest we think of Europe and the Indo-Pacific as
separate theaters.
We should not. They are strategically aligned. Everyone in
the Indo-Pacific is watching how Ukraine turns out. The United
States standing firmly with allies and partners, being
unequivocal in our support for Ukraine gives courage and a
sense of determination to our allies and partners.
Senator Coons. In my recent visit to Taiwan following their
election to the Shangri-La Conference in Singapore, I got
exactly the same sense. Yes, standing firm with the Philippines
and the Second Thomas Shoal was critical for the region.
But if we step back one inch from supporting Ukraine, that
sends an even stronger message, and something that there is
some real risk that in our elections this fall the message will
go out that we have national leaders who do not support
Ukraine.
Mr. Campbell. Could I say just one other thing, Senator?
I also wanted to personally thank you for the encouragement
to engage directly on Africa. So I have been in the job 5
months. I have been to Africa twice.
I will go a third time, and I will tell you quite directly,
it is the part of my job that I feel the strongest about and I
am most committed to, and I ask for the support of this group.
So I would say we need more in a couple of different
arenas. I think more in terms of our ability at the DFC and the
Millennium Challenge account, more congressional visits.
You would be amazed at how much some of these small
countries appreciate, and I got to just tell you, Africa right
now we have 14 noms that are waiting for votes across the
continent, and I would just simply say I think it helps us in
terms of really making the case for Americans.
Senator Coons. Let me pick a relatively obscure one,
Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, one of the very few
countries on the continent that still maintains relations with
Taiwan, not the PRC.
We do not have an ambassador. We have not had an
ambassador. There have been major challenges in terms of human
rights and other issues. Without an ambassador we are just
absent.
This is true across a dozen other--14 to be specific--major
countries across the continent. Russia is there. China is
there.
The scope of China's trade with Africa has increased
tenfold in the time I have been here, while ours has barely
grown. Their trade with Africa $240 billion last year. Ours now
just $48 billion.
How important is the timely reauthorization of AGOA for us
to use the tools of trade in Africa?
Mr. Campbell. I think it is critical, and there is a lot of
gamesmanship about whether to wait, and I would get it done.
Senator Coons. I would, too.
Mr. Campbell. I think it is one of the few tools we have. I
would get it done----
Senator Coons. Before I run out of time, if I could.
Mr. Campbell. Yes, please. Sorry.
Senator Coons. We just moved out of the Appropriations
Committee with a very strong bipartisan vote this year's State
and Foreign Operations. It includes an investment in a
countering PRC influence fund, $425 million. It includes
significant aid for Ukraine for the coming year, not what they
need, but hundreds of millions of dollars.
It, importantly, includes a new fund that allows Treasury
to leverage the multilateral development banks that will unlock
more than $4 billion in more transparent, more effective,
higher standard investing in infrastructure so that we can
directly compete with China's Belt and Road Initiative on the
continent and around the world.
It invests in our work force at the U.N. and all the
different U.N. entities where the Chinese have grown and grown
and grown their influence, and it invests in combating
corruption.
When we say we need to have and we must have a foreign
policy that reflects our values, whether it is in the
Caribbean, the Global South, Africa, it is important for us to
stand up for democracy and human rights, but it is also
important for us to combat corruption because one of the
biggest features of China's foreign policy is buying and
extending their influence through corruption.
The average person in the Global South sees the resources
of their country being stolen to benefit their national
leaders. The fight for critical minerals, the fight for supply
chains, is essential, and this is one other area we cannot
neglect.
Mr. Campbell. I am just going to say one thing if I can,
quickly, that I agree with everything that you have said. I
will say I was in Senegal about 2 weeks ago. I was able--very
proudly able to go to a project site which was just being
launched backed by the DFC.
And just for folks that do not understand why that is
important, most of African financing are projects from China.
Chinese bring their own laborers in.
They do not allow for very much training. They are
secretive. There is a lot of corruption. This particular
project all Senegalese based workers, capacity building,
everything--this was our partnership with them, and I will tell
you, being able to see the commitment of--this is French
Africa. We struggle there sometimes to build influence, but it
was substantial commitment.
And so I just want to fully support the ability to leverage
financing the DFC and also do debt backed finance. Incredibly
important. I think this is a very good use of capital and
engagement.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just observe--I thank Senator Coons
and Senator Graham for your work on the appropriations issues.
I would just make an observation. The caps that you have been
given are unrealistically low, particularly USAID numbers.
There are cuts this year, and that is unfortunate. It is
just not a large enough pie. But I thank you for the work that
you have done.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to pull a bit on that thread about the importance of
having ambassadors in place. It is unbecoming of a great power.
It is, indeed, embarrassing to our professionals like Secretary
Campbell and to Members of Congress alike, and it is injurious
to our foreign policy.
So if we cannot somehow persuade colleagues to operate
within the existing rules, maybe we need to change the rules.
It is something that has been discussed for a long period of
time.
I know a number of my colleagues on the committee agree,
but I would just encourage them and others who are listening to
let us give this another run as we approach year's end and see
if we can improve this situation, moving forward.
Mr. Secretary, I am so grateful for your service, your
accessibility. Thank you for all you are doing and all you have
done to serve our country.
The PRC continues to be defined as a developing country
defined by international financial institutions, development
banks. This hampers our ability to get China to pay its fair
share of contributions to multilateral institutions.
It ensures their access to generous loans and financial
terms from these selfsame institutions that they should not
have, and it presents a normative challenge.
They refuse to demonstrate the leadership that a global
power would. So they want all the benefits of being a global
power, but they do not want to put forward the same sort of
work and resources that we would expect of a global power.
So what do we do about this? How are we trying to deal with
the hypocrisy of they are not really a developing country, but
they claim that status, and are there steps that we can take
here in Congress or within the Administration that have not yet
been exploited to strip them of this developing nation status?
Mr. Campbell. So, first of all, before I answer that
question I do want to thank you and commend you, Senator Young.
I would say the most important thing that we have been able
to do is to understand that the strategic high ground that is
necessary for us to continue to command is in technology, and I
do not think we would be able to do this.
You taught me a lot. I have tried to extend that not only
what we are doing domestically but internationally with
partners. It is a hugely consequential area that we need to do
more on, and I just thank you for your leadership on this.
You said it perfectly. I would say this. You cannot have it
both ways. You cannot demand to be a great power and then in
certain circumstances say, oh, I am just a developing country.
We have sought to reform certain issues in the multilateral
development banks and the international financial institutions.
We need more help along the road.
My biggest concern, Senator, is not that China is not
providing resources globally. They do, but they are outside of
these institutions actually.
They are doing it in bilateral contexts where they can
extract a quid pro quo. They are doing it outside of the
appropriate mechanisms that allow for a degree of transparency,
which we think are essential.
And so I think just simply making the case more in
international financial institutions about the challenges this
presents--that is the World Bank, that is the EBRD, that is the
Asian Development Bank--this is an essential fight that we need
to, frankly, raise the awareness on more substantially.
Senator Young. Well, we have a role to play there as do, of
course, all our diplomats. So we will continue to focus on this
important area.
With respect to technology, most especially our movement
toward green energy, we need critical minerals. I am glad it is
something you brought up in your opening comments.
If we cannot get them through our deep sea beds by
ratifying the Laws of the Sea Treaty, which looks to be a
challenge based on current circumstances, then we should look
to Africa, which is where the preponderance of these minerals
are.
How can we help foster the public-private partnerships
bringing American capital and expertise and standards to Africa
so that we can keep exploiting so that--exploring where we can
get these minerals?
Mr. Campbell. So if you look at a balance sheet of the top
40 trace elements and minerals that are necessary for batteries
or for semiconductors, the vast lion's share of those supplies
are now controlled by China and we start behind the eight ball.
We were late understanding that while we were playing a
globalized game the Chinese were basically cornering markets.
Now, we have responded with a number of arrangements with
specific countries. We have a critical minerals agreement with
Japan, with Australia. We have worked with other countries in
Africa. The Lobito corridor will help us in this context.
I would simply say this is an area--these mines are often
dirty. The processing is challenging. It is going to take
resourcing. We have to do this with allies and partners more,
and frankly, we have got to scour the globe. And it will not be
just Africa, Senator. It is Mongolia.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Campbell. It is countries in Southeast Asia, and it
will be our intent to continue to prosecute this.
Senator Young. One last point I think it is important to
make, because I did not support the Inflation Reduction Act,
but the reason we pursued the CHIPS and Science Act and a
handful of Republican colleagues joined me on that effort, was
in part for purposes of economic resiliency.
The Inflation Reduction Act took the opposite approach. We
have become far more dependent on these upstream critical
inputs, and that was never, I think, seriously wrestled with
before we took this approach to mitigating climate change.
Thank you.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Young.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you so much for your work, Secretary Campbell.
Two pieces I wanted to address. First is the Chinese
strategy of transnational repression. They have greatly
expanded their effort to suppress dissent abroad, particularly
among the Chinese diaspora.
They have a host of tools. They persuade governments to
detain individuals who have been critical of China, to deport
individuals back to China.
They spy on those dissidents. They threaten them. They
blackmail them by saying that their family members will be
affected back in China, and they will execute on that threat as
well.
What is the State Department doing to help nations resist
the pressure to detain or deport dissidents, and very
importantly, to protect freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly here in the United States when China is threatening
Chinese diaspora?
Mr. Campbell. Senator Merkley, extremely well worded and
concise and exact challenge that we are facing.
I would say the most important first step that we have
sought to do is actually help countries understand the nature
of the problem that they are facing.
So you would be surprised at how many countries, until they
examine sort of the circumstances inside their own borders,
were unaware of some of these challenges. Frankly, even the
United States, it has taken time to fully understand what has
taken place among diaspora communities, Chinese language
speaking.
So I think we worked with a number of countries to help
understand the nature of this transnational challenge. We have
helped countries strengthen a variety of law enforcement and
other steps to assist them in contesting these actions.
We have been very principled and direct in our diplomacy
with China. I would simply say that this is a challenge that is
not just a few countries. We have seen it in Canada. We have
seen it in Australia, the United States, New Zealand,
Australia, other parts of Europe.
Frankly, the ability to compare notes and to compare
strategies about how to identify and contest that has been very
important.
Senator Merkley. Yes, thank you.
Freedom House has now documented Chinese transnational
repression in 36 countries, so it really is spreading in an
effort to shape how they are viewed around the world.
Another area where China is expanding its influence is
within the United Nations. They have proceeded to increase
their contributions. They have increased their support for
peace teams from the United Nations--peacekeepers.
They have gotten more Chinese nationals into leadership
positions, and they are trying to change the dialogue around
human rights.
In terms of the Universal Periodic Review this last
January, they submitted false information about many of the
actions of China in the domain of human rights. They blocked
independent civil society representatives from providing
information.
They have suppressed the mention of political, civil, and
religious rights in U.N. resolutions and debates, and they are
trying to convey the philosophy that human rights are country
specific. That is, that there is no universal human right, and
basically whatever country decides, well, that is what human
rights are.
We have been really a voice in the world to identify,
promote the vision of fundamental human rights. But this is a
contest for ideas, and Chinese influence in the U.N. is part of
that.
What is our strategy?
Mr. Campbell. Look, you have identified it exactly, and the
truth is this is part of a coherent strategy of China,
redefining what democracy means, what human rights means, and
they have done that substantially in international
organizations, particularly in places like the United Nations.
Their ultimate goal, I think, Senator, is to step up their
game substantially in the Global South. That is where they are
playing for advantage.
I would simply say that would be the arena if you ask me
where do we need to do much more. I am actually quite proud and
satisfied. The work will never be done, but what we have done
in Europe and dominant partners in the Indo-Pacific, I think
the partnership with India is robust. It is critical. It is, I
think, probably our most or one of our most important
partnerships for the 21st century.
Where we really need to step up our game is the Global
South, and that means on the field in these various countries
with robust programming, USAID, DFC, our diplomats.
But it also means, Senator, really understanding the nature
of the challenge in organizations like the United Nations in
which the action increasingly is not just at the Security
Council but the General Assembly, and that is where China is
manifesting a strategy exactly as you lay down, and we need to
understand how important that arena is for us, going forward.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you for being here.
On this issue of China one of the things that makes it such
a unique competitor and adversary in many ways is, unlike the
Soviet Union, they are not just a military and diplomatic
adversary.
They are a technological, industrial, commercial adversary
as well, and it is the one I want to focus on because I do
think it challenges us in our foreign policy apparatus to
combine commerce and trade and technological matters with
geopolitics, which are clearly important.
They have always been important. The technological and
industrial high ground has always been a precursor of global
power. So if you look at what China has achieved in the--10
years ago, maybe even less, they led in none of the cutting
edge fields.
Today they dominate the world's electric vehicle markets,
and primarily this is a challenge because they are dumping
these cars now or threatening to dump these cars and eviscerate
automakers beyond just electric cars outside of China.
They are dominant in energy fields, particularly--I think
80 percent of the global supply chain for solar. They are
technologically a leader in nuclear power in ways that have
surpassed our own, and unfortunately, despite the electric cars
and nuclear power leadership, they are also the world's largest
polluter. So just think about that.
But the two I really want to focus on is that I think
really go to the heart of power, number one is by far they are
the world's leading shipbuilder. They are building aircraft
carriers. They are building this fleet of LNG ships. They are
even building cruise ships.
And we all understand that shipbuilding is at the core of
the ability to project power, not just military but commercial,
and they are the undisputed king of basic industrial inputs,
steel and cement.
And these things that are not glamorous--they do not have
Netflix miniseries about steel and cement or shipbuilding--but
these are at the core of national power. They used to be at the
core of our national power. We do not win World War II without
industrial power.
So how does that fit this whole view of this domination
that they are establishing in these key core industries within
our broader confines of something that is not simply military
or diplomatic?
I mean, how are we melding that into our strategy? Because
some of these are going to require us to lean heavily into our
alliances, in essence, make sure that our allies in some sort
of a consortium fashion are not just protecting their domestic
industries but protecting the existence of non-Chinese
Communist Party controlled sources of steel, cement,
shipbuilding, and the other fields that they seek domination
in.
So how does this fit into the broader construct of our
strategic approach to this challenge?
Mr. Campbell. Great. Senator, I accept and deeply support
that general worldview that you have just laid out. I would
just add one or two things on the first part.
You know, there is a huge debate in the kind of
intellectual foreign policy, whether this is another cold war.
The one thing I worry about sometimes about that debate is
that when you say cold war it conjures up views of the struggle
we had with the Soviet Union, which as you described, is really
monochromatic. It was really in a couple of different sectors.
And in truth, our economies were not linked at all in any way.
One of the biggest challenges for the United States as it
constructs a strategy, and I am going to try to answer the
second part of your question, is that there are very few
countries that are more interdependent than the United States
and China, and at the same time there are very few countries
that are more uncomfortable with that interdependence.
Both the United States and China are both taking steps to
ease, to remove elements of that connectivity financially,
manufacturing, lines of communication.
So that is one of the biggest challenges, how do you take
steps that then do not hurt your own economy. But the point
that you make, I could not agree with you more. If I look--in
government it is about just surveying a list of challenges--how
can you figure out what to do about it.
If I would ask the two things that we really need to get
our act together on, naval shipbuilding--both surface ships but
submarines as well. When I came into the White House I thought,
and I believe--still do--that our submarine program is the
jewel in the crown.
But one of the things that became clear looking at AUKUS is
how much more, and I think the people at this committee that we
had to invest in our own industrial base just to keep up, just
to get subs back in the water that are in dry dock, we just
have to do better.
And the truth is there are a lot of reasons why
shipbuilding is challenging. We have got strong shipbuilding in
the Northeast. We do not have enough workers. We do not have
enough capacity.
Generally, there are a thousand reasons why naval
shipbuilding is challenging. I would like us to think there
might be ways that we could work with allies and partners here,
but it is extremely difficult--a lot of domestic legislation.
But I will tell you, when I look at the balance sheet--you
went through several things, Senator, but the one thing you did
not mention but you think about it often--I know I have heard
you speak about this--look at the difference in shipbuilding
between the United States and China. Deeply concerning.
We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the
great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century.
I will say one last thing. The 20 year engagement in the
Middle East was, largely, about ground forces, about army,
about special forces. We made all the appropriate investments.
We modernized. We innovated.
Now is the Navy and the Air Force's time. They have to step
up. They have to invest more. They have to be more innovative.
They have to be more intrepid, and they have got to understand
that the Indo-Pacific arena requires the most capable naval and
advanced long range air capabilities that the United States has
ever needed before, and that is where we have to put our focus.
Sorry, I did not mean to go on so long.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I appreciate it.
I want to talk to you about surveillance and the Internet
of Things. As you know, the PRC is exporting facial recognition
AI technology, enabling repression from Ecuador to Kenya to
Pakistan.
This has huge implications, and I think this is one of the
spaces where they are quietly building partnerships for
surveillance and controlling the domestic political situation,
and it is not obvious to me what the tools are in our toolkit
to provide an alternative.
It is not like we are going to say, hey, use our company
for AI and surveillance and repression, but this is an area of
expansion both economic and political for the PRC, and I am
wondering how you see it and what we should be doing about it.
Mr. Campbell. So for a while--Senator Schatz, first of all,
thank you. I appreciate the question.
There was a big debate, does China have a model of
development or a model of governance that they are promoting
that is comparable to their own, and lots of debates about that
for years.
But now it becomes clear that there are certain ingredients
to authoritarian leadership that they are promoting in a
variety of the countries. You mentioned several, but I would
add others--the Solomons, frankly, elements in Afghanistan.
And as part of that is that they often support a vulnerable
elite who is in power. They provide assistance to that leading
group and the people around it. They provide praetorian support
that allow them, through police and others, to be protected
from domestic threats, and they provide technological
capacities for----
Senator Schatz. So the bad news is that is pretty good
value proposition. So what do we do about it?
Mr. Campbell. So it--and I will get it. The value
proposition is that we have to be purposeful about recognizing
how challenging it is to make the argument about why democratic
institutions, elections--free and fair elections--and support
to governments that emerge through that process.
A lot of times--I will give you a classic example. We have
a new leader in Senegal. Extremely hopeful. But he has raised
expectations, and now we are going to have to see whether we
can help meet them as he goes against both forces in his own
countries and others that would seek to advance this
authoritarian model.
And so, look, I cannot tell you, Senator, that there is a
perfect answer to every situation, but I will tell you I have
been to many of these countries, and that model is often
domestically extremely unpopular, and if we are able to work
with key groups in various countries, we can put up an
effective challenge.
Senator Schatz. I think it is two things. First of all, you
are right, it is unpopular, and second of all, a lot of times
it is a trap, and it takes some amount of time for the leader
to figure out that it is a trap, that they are going to be
under the thumb of a country overseas, and then they come back
to us and are a little bit more willing to dialogue.
Mr. Campbell. Can I just--two things on that.
That is exactly right, and I will give you an example. When
China negotiates these foreign basing, and they often initially
describe them as just, oh, it is just a little, you know, kind
of a little dock here, before long, local authorities of host
nations are unable to get on these bases. They are not able to
actually control their own territory. That is number one.
Number two, yes, the Belt and Road has been substantial,
but many of the processes that the Chinese used in terms of
financing in particular, the bill is coming due in many of
these countries.
These were not gifts, and some of the concessional loans
are substantial, and they have real interest payments, and the
Chinese are not interested in renegotiating.
We can use some of those to our advantage.
Senator Schatz. So on Belt and Road, just a quick final
question. It seems to me--I mean, look, we as a country started
to be alert to Belt and Road, and I think it precipitated a lot
of smart foreign policy actions.
On the other hand, there is part of me that thinks that
what China did was two things--debt trap diplomacy and what you
are talking about, but also just simply over promising--and I
think we have got to get in the habit of talking about not Belt
and Road as if it is some insurmountable, perfect strategy, but
a little bit of an over extension of political--like an
overreach here that we can take advantage of.
Mr. Campbell. I agree with that.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Deputy Secretary, for being here today and for your work.
Senator Kaine and I just came from a hearing at the Armed
Services Committee on the presentation on the Commission on our
National Defense Strategy. They said two things that I think
are really relevant for this conversation. First, that we are
facing the most dangerous global environment at any time since
World War II--the end of World War II, and second, that we need
an approach that coordinates all elements of our national
power, which has been part of the discussion that we have heard
this morning.
And at the risk of beating a dead issue, I want to go back
to the nominations, and I am sorry that our colleagues on the
other side of the aisle are not here, because China continues
to prioritize their diplomatic engagement, their ambassadors
around the world, particularly in the Global South, as you
pointed out.
And yet, we cannot get our ambassadors approved, even the
career ambassadors, not just in Africa and South America but
also in places like Albania and Montenegro, in the Western
Balkans where many in Albania see it as a direct affront that
we still do not have an ambassador in Albania after they have
been willing to take Afghans when we needed to evacuate
Afghanistan, when they have been willing to take Iranians from
Camp Ashraf to help us out.
And we still have our career ambassadors to Albania and
Montenegro being held up on the other side of the aisle.
Senator Barrasso, I am glad you got here because this is a
conversation that I think is important for everybody. I would
echo what you had to say about Dorothy Shea, who I had the good
fortune to work with when she was ambassador to Lebanon.
She is the reason, I believe, we were able to get out a New
Hampshire citizen who was being held, detained by the Lebanese
government for months, who got cancer while he was in the
detention, and to have a career ambassador like Dorothy Shea
being held up for partisan political reasons is antithetical to
the national security of the United States.
So is this not a concession to the PRC that we should never
be making?
Mr. Campbell. Yes. Look, I could not agree more with that.
First of all, let me say it was great to see you in London,
Senator. I also appreciated meeting your husband. We are going
to the Celtics game. Sorry, only two tickets. So that is the
way it is going to be.
Just to your particular question, I do want to just say the
effect that it has on morale of the people that I work with.
If you are in government, or you kind of walk down the
street and you are a military officer, every single person
tells you thank you for your service, a little salute and such.
Almost every week I get a letter from someone who is
somewhat surprised that a Foreign Service officer has helped
them in a time of difficulty, when they are ill or something,
and they write a note, and they are like, I am surprised by
this.
I do not know why I am surprised, but this person went
beyond the call to help me and my family in their time of need.
And I think there is a tendency not to recognize the
unbelievable competence and patriotism of these people, and no
one tells them thank you for your service.
I think we should do that for the military folks,
absolutely, but we need to recognize that these people are
often working in harm's way, lesser resources, under enormous
duress.
You see them yourself. You are out there traveling.
As I tried to say, I think there are often real issues.
Take it out on the political people. Take it out on me.
Our career people deserve to be able to serve. When I meet
with them, and it has been 2 years as they are waiting, I do
not have a good answer for that, and I also think it makes me
feel like I cannot do my job persuading people that I respect
to get on with this, to move this on.
And trust me, there is not one country where we are
contesting China where we go to that country and we have got a
strong ambassador and China does not have someone. They are out
there, and we need more people on the field.
Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more.
I do have a question about China, just with the little bit
of time I have left, and that is as we are looking at the
potential for an expansion of a broader war in the Middle East
with Israel targeting southern Lebanon because of the horrible
acts of Hezbollah, where is China going to come down on this,
and what role are they going to play?
Mr. Campbell. So I will say this, Senator.
Before this--this is a horrible, tragic war. There were a
lot of concerns about how China's influence had grown. Yes,
they played a role between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
You will note that since the conflict has begun--tragic,
horrible--the country that people call to engage to be involved
directly is the United States, and China is, largely, absent.
Their engagement has been, largely, shallow.
I would say I do not believe, Senator, that they do not
want to see an enlargement in the war, and I think they are
worried about the potential for escalation. But at the same
time, they really have not weighed in with their diplomatic
might in the situation involving the Houthis. They have not
been as direct about their concerns about escalation to Iran.
They have raised it in certain circumstances, but not with the
power and influence of a great power like China.
I think we would expect them to do more, and we continue to
call on them as we do on other countries to make sure that
their voices are felt.
I do acknowledge that this is an extremely delicate and
worrisome time, and we are doing--Secretary Blinken, in
addition to--he is on this long trip through the Indo-Pacific.
He is on the phone every night with the countries in Latin
America to basically figure out our best way forward on
Venezuela.
But he is also working the phones in the Middle East to try
to prevent an escalation, and frankly, to move us toward a
hostage exchange and a better set of circumstances in Gaza.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for being here today.
We had a briefing last week that many of us attended on the
committee on basically who is helping Russia and what roles
there are in that, and I wanted to go along that area of
questioning because I am concerned about China's support for
our adversaries.
Clear China is actively helping both Russia and Iran evade
U.S. sanctions. In fact, oil revenues from China are propping
up Russian and Iranian economies. They get to buy them at a
discount so China benefits from that, and then Iran and Russia
get the money from China.
I view China as using Russia as a wrecking ball. I am
sorry, China using Russia as a wrecking ball. Iran right now is
exporting almost 1.3 million barrels of oil to China every day
when there is supposed to be sanctions in place. The Treasury
secretary says, well, they cannot do any more.
But the New York Times pointed out just how much oil we are
allowing--that the U.S. is allowing and the sanctions that are
being evaded, the Chinese Communist Party providing the
materials, the technology, the components that Russia and Iran
need to wage their wars.
So it just seems to me the Administration has failed to
prevent China from purchasing Russian and Iranian energy
resources. Do you agree?
Mr. Campbell. So, first of all, let me just underscore I
completely accept your proposition. Increasingly, we are seeing
a group of nations and nations of aggrieved actors that are
challenging the United States and its partners globally, and
that includes China, Iran, North Korea, occasionally others
associated with that effort.
My own sense is the most important arena, Senator, that we
need to contest that, frankly, is currently in Ukraine, and you
mentioned this, but what China has done in supporting the
Russian defense industrial base is a subject of deep concern.
Now, we have sanctioned hundreds of firms, but the most
important sanctions, frankly, are around financial
institutions. And I would just have you note that if you look
at the trajectory that Europe has traveled in just 8 to 10
months, 8 to 10 months ago almost no mention of what China is
doing in Russia.
Look at the NATO statements that took place in Washington
with many Senators supporting that effort and being deeply
engaged in the 75th anniversary.
Increasingly, Europe is on side and taking their own steps
with respect to sanctions, and I believe that this is an arena
that our efforts are paying off.
I think it is absolutely clear what you are describing,
this association between Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran
increasingly purposely challenging us everywhere.
I think our primary answer, yes, we have taken sanctions.
But Senator, I would tell you that the most important thing
that we have done is build a comparable group of allied nations
working together.
So I would just simply say not only is NATO probably
stronger than ever before. I think you have to give credit to
the previous Administration focusing on investing in the
military, and we followed through with that, and lot of
countries are now at 2 percent, well over half approaching two-
thirds.
It is deeply important. The connections, though, between
Europe and the Indo-Pacific, what countries are supporting
Ukraine to the hilt now? Japan, South Korea, Australia.
This is unprecedented, and that is largely through the
support and encouragement of the United States. So I would
simply say that I think the best remedy to the challenges that
you accurately describe is our ability to work with allies and
partners.
Earlier in the discussion we talked about bringing new
partners into the fray, countries like India, Vietnam, others
in Southeast Asia.
I am proud of the work we have done in the Philippines. But
this is something that we are going to have to contest across
the board.
Senator Barrasso. Well, let me just add to that because I
agree with what you are saying. I mean, I view China as the
puppet master here, pulling the strings with what is happening
in Iran and North Korea as well as Russia in their efforts, and
the concern is that with our involvement in a number of
locations around the world, whether it is Ukraine, whether it
is in Israel, that this is an effort by China to ultimately
have us engaged in a number of places and ultimately make it
easier for them to take Taiwan, which I believe is one of their
single goals.
Mr. Campbell. So I would just say this, though. The
relationship between these authoritarian countries is very
complex, Senator, and I would only offer to you is do not
underestimate Russian agency here.
Putin is a master at even playing the weak hand. He has his
own interests. He has been very effective at maneuvering China
in this respect.
But I would simply say each are playing their--subtly
trying to advance their interests. For the United States we
need to realize that our associations are deeper. They are
based on democracy, largely, people to people, a large
consensus of the people that elect the leadership.
These countries are animated by leaders who are
distrustful, often deeply distrustful, and they are often
subtly maneuvering against each other. I will give you an
example.
China and Russia are competing now for influence in North
Korea, and China is anxious about some of the steps that Russia
has taken with North Korea.
China is competing with Russia in the Arctic and the Stans.
It does not mean that there is a division or gulf, but it just
means that there is a complex diplomacy among these various
countries that are aggrieved by us, and we have to keep that in
mind as we construct our own diplomacy toward them.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murphy. I am going to ask you two questions, one on
disinformation and one on China and the Middle East.
So one of China's most effective national security tools is
propaganda and misinformation. Their investment dwarfs the
investment the United States makes.
Estimates are China is spending somewhere in the
neighborhood of $7 billion per year. The United States,
clearly, does some of this work through the Department of
Defense, but inside the Department of State exists the Global
Engagement Center, which is funded at a relatively paltry $61
million, but over the course of the last half-decade has done
some pretty extraordinary work to track Chinese misinformation
and to help local actors be able to fight back.
The Global Engagement Center is set to expire. The
authorization for the center is set to expire at the end of
this year. What would be the impact if we lost the capacity to
help coordinate with allies, help to fund efforts in and around
the Chinese theater to combat Chinese misinformation, if we
lost the authorization for the Global Engagement Center?
Mr. Campbell. Senator, first of all, thank you for the
question. Let me just say I think some of the work that the GEC
has done in the last couple of years is deeply innovative and
helpful to American purpose, and I commend the work under Jamie
Rubin, the leader of the organization--others who work
underneath him.
I will simply say this. What it has done that has been--
made a difference in a number of places is simply illuminating
the strategies--the actors and the strategy that both China and
Russia have undertaken.
And so the these countries' ability--China, Russia--to
manipulate and maneuver is done, largely, out of public view.
When you expose it, it actually can be quite purposeful and
effective.
I would simply say that you are absolutely right. It is a
small amount of money. We have a little bit at DOD that we are
working. But the challenge is enormous. I will just give you
one example, Senator.
When I was asked to go to the Solomons to basically contest
what the Chinese were doing there, I remember waking up in the
morning, getting the local newspaper. On the cover--this is
right after the war had started in Ukraine--was a long story
about the chemical and biological weapons facilities that the
United States maintained in Ukraine.
Clearly, effective Russian and Chinese disinformation, and
we just have to do a better job contesting this globally. A
first step would just be the GEC reauthorized. I think the GEC
has done more on Russia than China, but I think it is stepping
up its game substantially on China as well.
Senator Murphy. Yes. Just in the last year and a half 22
different reports produced by the GEC specifically naming
Chinese propaganda efforts, which as you state is sort of the
first and sometimes most effective tool.
Let me turn to the Gulf. Obviously, we have had a number of
conversations in this committee about the Administration's
conversation around extending a security guarantee to Saudi
Arabia. That would impact our broader security obligations in
the region toward all of our Gulf allies.
I want to ask you about the future of Gulf cooperation with
China. I think the history suggests that our Gulf allies are
sort of seeking to have it both ways, will play the United
States off against China fairly regularly, and there is very
recent evidence of that: Saudi Arabia's massive investment in
the leading Chinese AI company, certainly, contrary to U.S.
national security interests, the ongoing maturation of UAE's
defense relationship with China.
I guess I have two sort of simple questions for you on this
portfolio. One, do you agree that a security treaty with a
country like Saudi Arabia only makes sense if our China
policies are aligned, and two, is there any reason to be
optimistic that the Gulf nations are going to do anything other
than continue to play the United States and China off against
each other to get the best deals that they can get on economic
investment, security relationships, et cetera?
Mr. Campbell. So it is an important question, and I do
think when we are talking about some of these fundamental
decisions on the part of the United States security guarantees,
substantial investments in technology, we often say, look, we
do not ask countries to choose, but we want them to have
choice.
In certain circumstances where we are putting our stuff on
the line whether technology or our commitment to support you, I
am afraid it is a binary choice, and I think we would have to
insist on that as we go forward.
I will say the Middle East is complicated. Senator, you
talked about the whole region. There was a period not long ago
where Israel, also very deep engagements with China and the
United States, has chosen, largely, now to engage directly with
the United States because they understand the nature of what
they were doing had implications for their own security given
China's other actions.
I would not want to go through a taxonomy of each country
in the Gulf, but my guess is that we will have more luck with
some than others.
But ultimately the process of this all rests on other
issues being resolved, and it is just enormously challenging.
So I do think we are right to try to contest. It is an
important region.
But at the same time we also have to be clear that we have
some real advantages. Our technology, our security guarantee,
must not be given lightly, and we must demand many things in
response.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Campbell, good to have you.
A comment and two questions.
So the comment is in a response to an earlier question you
talked about the real importance of focusing on the Global
South, and of course, we should.
Africa and the Americas--32 of the 35 youngest countries in
the world are in Africa, and the population growth there as
well as a whole lot of other factors make it a really important
area of strategic focus.
And in the Americas the challenges we have at the border,
the challenges with fentanyl, just everyday Americans' concerns
about the globe often are issues related to the Americas and
political instability there.
And yet, we say that a lot but we are just not doing it.
The Article 1 branch, we have to own the absence of confirmed
ambassadors, more than 20 openings in the Americas and in
Africa.
But the Article 2 branch--I just came from the hearing
about the 2022 National Defense Strategy. That strategy has one
paragraph about the entire Western Hemisphere, not much more
about Africa.
We are actually reducing military investments in AFRICOM
and SOUTHCOM. They continually raise that they are under
resourced.
We had an opportunity in the area of the world I am most
familiar with, the Americas. We had a real opportunity in
Ecuador following a popular election that threw out a long time
pro-China government to step up and help Ecuador be a success
story--a pro-democracy success story.
The previous president said, all you got to do is put me in
a trade deal. I am the only nation on the Pacific coast of the
United States--of the Americas that does not have a trade deal
with the U.S.
Ecuador did not have one because of the pro-China
government that had been in place for 25 years. We did not do
it. We basically--the Administration, and I strongly support
this Administration but the view is that trade deals are not
good politics. We did not do the one thing that President Lasso
was asking us to do, and now we have a much more complicated
situation in Ecuador.
So the comment that I am going to make, and then I will
move to a question, is we talk about the Global South a lot but
if you measure it by resources, if you measure it by energy or
focus, we are going backward, not forward, and that really,
really troubles me.
Now, my question is this. On the fentanyl topic, in
November 2023 Presidents Biden and Xi met in Woodside,
California, and they talked about steps that China might take
to begin helping us interdict fentanyl by blocking precursors,
largely, from coming into Mexico.
Nine months later, what is the report card on whether those
commitments by China are being met or not?
Mr. Campbell. Yes, thank you.
First of all, just on your first questions, when you travel
around you are left with, particularly in the Global South,
with a sense of there is so much more to do, and there is a
concern, as you suggest, Senator, that maybe we are going the
other direction.
And I--as a person who has long supported the Indo-Pacific,
I recognize that we are moving more of our capacity there. But
I do not think we should be short shrifting, shortchanging, our
engagements in Africa or Latin America. It will come back to
haunt us.
So I share those issues. I believe in them as well. I will
also say that we talk about contesting narratives that the
Chinese and the Russians promulgate in the Global South.
The dominant one that the Chinese and Russians use is the
idea of American decline and that those views can be
pernicious, and frankly, they can use disinformation, and they
can also use headlines from our own newspapers.
I think one of the things that I would suggest is that when
we come together in bills or activities that suggest national
purpose and a degree of consensus, that is the area that we
have largely been the strongest.
I see that more, frankly, now in the Indo-Pacific than I do
in the Global South. My hope is this committee in the future
will help us think about bipartisan approaches that are not
just about military but are about our levers of ability to
invest, diplomats just across the board.
I think I am probably preaching to the choir here. So the
best grade I could give on the fentanyl--I was at Woodside, I
was involved in this diplomacy closely--would be an incomplete.
There are some modest steps that the Chinese have taken.
There are some criminal prosecutions they have undertaken. They
have wrapped up a few of the companies involved.
I do just want to underscore how challenging this is. These
are very--there are a large number of precursor chemicals and a
large number of companies. They are innovative. They are moving
around Asia.
I think one of the reasons that China is addressing this
issue is not just because we have asked but Congress has been
deeply engaged as well. Frankly, probably the visit of Senator
Schumer and the team to China in advance of that had as much of
impact than anything that we have done.
But I would also say it is the case that synthetic opioids
are not just affecting the United States. Europe and parts of
Asia and China as well. This is a global scourge. I think
increasingly the Chinese recognize that since so much of that
is coming from manufacturers in China that they have to take
more steps.
They have not done so to date, and we need to stay on them,
and this is a critical national security issue for us. I
commend you for raising it and focusing on it.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thanks so much.
I want to pick up on some of the themes that my friend Tim
Kaine brought up.
But so grateful that you are here. But I just want to pick
up on something because it--this concern about China and its
dealings with Saudi Arabia. Can we just be specific for a
second?
We are in negotiations with Saudi Arabia on a treaty right
now, correct?
Mr. Campbell. So I think it would be fair to say that we
are in deep negotiations right with the Saudis.
Senator Booker. Right. I just wanted----
Mr. Campbell. The ultimate manifestation there are many
features of--yes.
Senator Booker. Many permutations. I understand that. I do
not want to take all my time doing that.
I guess what I am trying to say is when I am in the region,
when I am sitting with leaders there, they want to deal with
the United States of America. They want deeper ties, deeper
relationships.
They know that from technology to economy to military we
are their preferred dance partner. But when we do not engage
with them, they are looking for other dance partners to hedge
their bets. That is a fair statement, correct?
Mr. Campbell. Yes.
Senator Booker. Now, when it comes to our competition with
China, if we find a way to move forward with Saudi Arabia, we
get a lot of advantages by locking them in to things that
benefit us, whether it is while China and Russia are trying to
undermine our currency, we secure the dollar being used for oil
trade. While we have a fierce competition going on militarily
we have shown that when we lean into partnerships not only with
our competitors in Russia or China but even with our
competition for military sales with European countries we lock
Saudi Arabia in.
And then when it comes to the economy or technology
transfers, we have been able to use our partnerships with other
countries to box out the Chinese.
And so this is a time that I see if we are really talking
about a global competition, to pick our partners and further
lock in American advantages. Would you not say that that is the
opportunity that we are at least seeking in these negotiations?
Mr. Campbell. Senator, that is exactly the strategy that we
have attempted. I think it has borne the most fruit in the
Indo-Pacific and that is--we have talked about this earlier.
That is the Quad. That is AUKUS. That is the trilateral
with Japan and South Korea, mending fences. It is bringing the
Philippines in. It is working with Southeast Asia, with
Thailand, with Vietnam, with India.
Senator Booker. Yes. So whether you are talking about
India, whether you are talking about Japan, whether you are
talking about Australia, whether you are talking about European
allies, whether you are talking about Africa or South America,
people are looking for strong partnerships, and when we step up
people prefer to deal with us because China has a really bad
reputation in these countries.
Is that correct?
Mr. Campbell. So, look, I would say that a job like mine,
probably a job like yours, there is lots of stuff that could
get you down.
But I will tell you that the thing that has encouraged me
everywhere I have gone is that the demand signal for American
engagement is high, and even though they have doubts sometimes
I can--I sometimes sense you walk into a meeting with a leader,
he is trying to size up, like, are these guys committed, and
are they going to be there.
If you are able to show them that you are going to engage
with sincerity, and that you are not coming alone, you are
working other agencies in the U.S. Government and with other
partners globally that believe in the things that you are
advancing, you can have a real impact on the ground.
And I have seen that throughout all the--one of the things
that--in my confirmation hearing you asked me you said, Kurt,
do not just do the Indo-Pacific. Go to Africa. So I have been
twice. I have found those countries are thirsty for a deeper
American engagement. I intend to do everything I can to support
that.
So I do think we tend to underestimate ourselves. Our value
proposition is strong--military, technologically, education,
everything--and I just think our most important thing is to
have confidence and our----
Senator Booker. And my time is running out.
Mr. Campbell. OK.
Senator Booker. Music to my ears to hear you say all that.
I guess two frustrations. One, not on you, on us. I have
seen the power of great ambassadors in the Global South to
extend the American influence, connection, opportunity.
I mean, if you look at Kenya as a great example of what an
ambassador can--so the fact that we have so many vacancies is,
to me, stunning.
It is shooting ourselves in the foot in many ways,
undermining our ability to compete. It is like Stanford trying
to play Notre Dame and benching three or four of its players
and playing with a shorthand.
I just want to add to that because I know other people have
said it. But for the final point I want to bring up here is
what is frustrating to me when I do travel to Africa is to see
how--obviously, important we see our military strength in
trying to counter what we are seeing in the Sahel terrorism.
Nobody can argue with that.
But the thing that inspires me the most is when I visit and
see the power of U.S. investments, not just in Feed the Future
or PEPFAR, but business investments and infrastructure
investments----
Mr. Campbell. Yes.
Senator Booker [continuing]. The unbelievable, just the
Lobito corridor investment----
Mr. Campbell. Yes.
Senator Booker [continuing]. Is, to me, how you really do
counter what China is trying to do and the urgencies for that.
And so I guess what I want to just have you finish on is
something as simple as the Development Finance Corporation,
which is an incredible tool to compete with, and Congress is
going to be considering reauthorizing the BUILD Act, which
created the DFC.
Just for the record, can you express the urgency for
something like this as well as improvements that we could be
making in the program as it stands right now?
Mr. Campbell. Great. Thank you, and great questions.
Can I just build on a point that you made?
So when you are in a job like mine you go to these
embassies, and you are constantly evaluating leadership there.
I was just in Gabon. Not a lot of Americans go to visit.
First time ambassador. Probably one of the most effective young
women, and I watched her engage her team. The State Department
occasionally can have highly hierarchical--these guys, young
people first tour, pitching in feeling they could talk in
meetings, hugely impressed, and small amount of assistance, but
taking it to the maximum.
So I left there, just like when you went to Kenya,
incredibly, unbelievably motivated, wanting to do more and
realizing that we can get that done.
The DFC is an unusually effective tool. It is incredibly
effective. Senator, before you came I got to be the person to
do the groundbreaking of a major DFC initiative in Senegal. It
was sensational because unlike Chinese projects that they build
their--bring their own people and their own equipment----
The Chairman. I think we are going to have to leave it at
that. Sorry. I would give 2 extra minutes but----
Mr. Campbell. OK. So I would completely support. This is
incredibly important. DFC--what you need to do is leverage
financing. They need more leverage. Like all finance
institutions, five to one, six to one, seven to one. That would
help. Thanks.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service. Thank you for
your strong backing for the men and women of the Foreign
Service and for the entire State Department team.
Appreciate all that you are doing on their behalf, and I do
want to just second the remarks made by some of my colleagues,
which you have underscored, which is we need all our players on
the playing field.
It makes no sense and undermines our interests every day
that we do not have ambassadors on post at places around the
world. Over 20 of them where China has an ambassador we do not,
but just in general to represent the values and interests of
the United States.
So it is a dereliction of duty, in my view, that we are not
moving these men and women through the process. You mentioned
our ambassador in Gabon and I think she is representative of
the great ambassadors that we have around the world.
Just to underscore a couple points that you have made and
my colleagues have made, first of all, in terms of engaging our
NATO and European partners and East Asian partners in support
of both our efforts to defend Ukraine against Putin but also to
counter China's efforts to support Russia and Putin and the war
machine, not with direct arms transfers but supporting the
military industrial base, thank you for your efforts to have a
collective initiative with our European partners.
I know we need to do more, and I know you are working on
that in terms of sanctions on Chinese firms there. Finally,
across the Global South you cannot beat something with nothing.
As you say, we do not ask everybody to choose between the
United States and China. We ask them to look at what we both
have to offer. We have a lot to offer in terms of our open
system, transparency, accountability, investment, but we are
not fully engaging in terms of the economic front.
DFC is a critical tool. Look, I support our military
efforts in Africa, China, but my view is that we are probably
over weighted there and under weighted when it comes to these
other areas of competition.
Now, some parts of the world do not need our direct public
investment. They do not need a subsidy. They do not need the
DFC, and that includes Saudi Arabia, some of the Gulf countries
like the UAE, and I just was 2 weeks ago on a trip that
included stops in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
In Saudi Arabia I met with the Crown Prince. I also met
with the minister of communications Abdullah Alswawa. He
mentioned that he had had a very productive meeting with you.
And then in the UAE lots of interest in moving forward in
this partnership with between G-42 and Microsoft. So I want to
go back a little bit to the question that Senator Murphy raised
and Senator Booker really alluded to.
On the one hand, we definitely want to be the players of
choice when it comes to investment in high tech, right. It was
very clear, both the Saudis and the folks in the UAE, they want
to engage, first and foremost, with U.S. companies because of
U.S. technological expertise.
On the other hand, we do want to make sure that our
partners are not transferring important technological secrets
to China and others.
Can you look through that lens a little bit--Saudi Arabia
and UAE--and tell me how we would balance those competing
interests?
Mr. Campbell. First of all, thank you, Senator.
I agree with the value proposition, and I think in many
respects it really comes down, if I can be so direct, to the
nature of the negotiation, and we need to understand that what
we are putting on the table in each of these relationships is
extraordinarily valuable.
It is our technological prowess which is unmatched in most
of these areas in AI and the like. We are the leader, and we
will continue to be, and there is a huge advantage to work more
closely with an American firm.
Second, our security engagement is stabilizing and
important to a number of these countries, and so recognizing
that in any set of engagements that are around the future of
our relationship, we probably have the ability to be quite
direct about what our expectations are and then follow through
on that.
And so I am very much of the view to explore and deepen
these partnerships. But yes, there has been a tendency in the
past to basically seek to have it both ways in certain
circumstances.
When it comes to these fundamental issues that are so
important to American strategic purpose we have to be
unambiguous about this. They are going to have to make some
choices.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Deputy Secretary Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Hi, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. It is so good to see you again.
I have really appreciated that over the course of our
relationship we have been able to be quite candid with one
another, particularly as I reflect on when I think the United
States has missed its mark on its past engagement.
So I want to ask you today to think critically about where
we can improve our efforts. And I think we can look outside the
Indo-Pacific to make these assessments when it comes to our
strategic competition with the PRC.
But I also think there are cases within the Indo-Pacific.
For example, I just got back from Laos and Vietnam where I was
the first U.S. Senator to visit Laos in 15 years, and I found a
country hungry for U.S. presence, and I found a country
littered with debt trap infrastructure projects that they will
never be able to pay back.
Crumbling roads that were built with borrowed money to the
tunes of billions of dollars that are not generating any
revenue. And yet, I saw so many opportunities, something as
simple as I went out and visited an ADB--an Asian Development
Bank--project where they help local villages next to major
natural resource tourist sites build a whole place where people
can go swimming in these beautiful lagoons, and they get over
500 visitors a day at each of these sites.
And in talking with them they said, when we have problems
with tourists in the lagoons getting into swimming trouble, and
they are about to drown, it is the American tourists who are
pulling them up because American tourists have lifeguard
training, many of them, and first aid training, and it would be
great if somebody could provide us with lifeguard training.
We would pay our young people, and they would not have to
move to the big cities or leave the country, and something as
simple as that, brainstorming with our ambassador to try to
find funding for simple U.S. lifeguard training which they
would love to have--low cost, high impact, really good projects
that could be happening.
And so I think in order for the United States to be seen as
a credible, reliable partner and provide an alternate choice to
the PRC where we do not have a strong track record of a
security relationship we need to at least be showing up--things
like this lifeguard training or some of this.
But I also think that there was an opportunity for capacity
building in public health in particular. So can you tell us
something about how the U.S. approach with partner nations in a
public health space and other areas like this can build trust
and enhance our presence in the region beyond--we rely too much
on security and defense, think.
Mr. Campbell. Yes. So, first of all, Senator, let me just
thank you. You have been a voice that has consistently asked
for more engagement of the United States in ASEAN and specific
countries, and I would also say I am grateful that you raise
cases of small countries like Laos and Cambodia.
There is a tendency sometimes to think that these countries
are just in the Chinese orbit, and that is that. But the truth
is that when we set up the first ASEAN summit, which you were a
key backer of 2 years ago, when we brought all the ASEAN
leaders to Washington, it was difficult to get agreement among
all these nations to come.
The two nations that were quietly some of the strongest
voices in having that happen were Laos and Cambodia because
they too want options. They want a deeper relationship.
I love the idea of lifeguards. Anything that you think we
could do that--high impact--I am all ears for. I am going to go
back to the building right now and see what is possible.
I will say this, Senator. Our greatest thing in Southeast
Asia is that we engage ASEAN as an institution as well as
individual countries. I think we have done very well in
Vietnam. We have done very well in the Philippines.
I think we have we have engaged effectively in Indonesia.
But I think we could do more in a number of countries--
Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. And I want to thank
you. You in particular have pushed us to do more.
I think we have a few things that we would like to do in
this arena as we approach the end of the Biden administration.
So I completely accept the proposition and am always looking to
do more for our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.
Senator Duckworth. Wonderful. I am almost out of time. I
would love to be able to meet with you and talk with you a
little bit about some of these initiatives later.
Mr. Campbell. Done.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
And also the Pacific Island countries. I am glad that
Congress finally funded and renewed COFA--the COFA agreement,
thank goodness.
Mr. Campbell. You have got to give yourselves a bigger pat
on the back than that. Let us be clear, in a period of
unbelievable division one thing got through, the COFA
agreement.
After 20 years, a negotiation that was really hard was
passed by the Senate and the House. A huge, huge achievement.
Made a big impression on our countries in the Pacific. So you
should not dismiss that. That was a big act of legislative
leadership and helped us enormously.
We are doing much better in the Pacific than we were 3
years ago, and that is largely because of the urging and
support of this committee.
Senator Duckworth. An expansion of more of our consular
activities in the region would be really helpful.
Mr. Campbell. So look----
Senator Duckworth. You touched on it earlier.
Mr. Campbell. We are doing this. Senator Risch and his team
have urged us. Look, the restrictions on new buildings and how
to build stuff is hard and difficult. We have sought
exceptions.
We are actually working with other like minded countries
that we can put our diplomats at their facilities. We need to
do more in the Pacific. This is--we have moral, historic,
strategic reasons. We are doing more. We are better. We are
working with our allies and partners.
Ultimately, we have got to be able to represent ourselves.
These island nations are proud. They have been with us for
decades. They vote with us. We should not take them for
granted.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you.
First of all, thanks for that recognition, and I agree,
this is a huge bipartisan victory, really, for Congress, and I
think probably most Americans do not have a full appreciation
of how important the Pacific Region is as far as our
competition with China is concerned.
China is incredibly active, as you know. So glad to have
been a part of that, and we will continue that.
Two quick things. I was happy to hear your assessment of
where the Europeans are as far as their view of China. It has
been evolving, fortunately.
I found that when I drafted the REPO bill, the first fight
I had was with our own Administration and finally brought them
along, kicking and screaming. But then the Europeans pushed
back really hard. I had real trouble with the Germans.
But they have reversed their position on that, much to the
credit of the Belgians who came up with some really outside the
box ideas about how to handle this, and I cannot tell you how
appreciative we are of that, and I have explained that to them
on a number of occasions.
So we need to continue to nurture that. I think we are on
the right track there, and I think it is really a good thing to
do.
As a last point, I really appreciate your remarks about
India and how they are important in our relationships.
But boy, I will tell you, that is a heavy lift sometimes.
We all have that picture emblazoned in our mind of Modi hugging
Putin, and that was within 24 hours of the time Putin had
pulled the trigger on attacking a children's hospital in
Ukraine and killing a bunch of little kids, and to see him on
the--Modi on the front page of the paper embracing Putin, man,
that is a bitter pill to swallow.
And I understand they are in a geographic location and have
a historical connection there but man, oh man, that is tough.
They are an important actor. There is no question about it. But
man, it is tough. Your thoughts?
Mr. Campbell. So, Senator, I would pretty much associate
myself with that. I actually believe it is probably the most
important relationship for the United States to get right. Huge
capacity, wonderful diaspora in the United States that connects
our two great countries.
I believe that the vast majority of people in India want a
better relationship with the United States. They are grateful
for our bipartisan attention. They like the work that we have
done together in education and technology.
We have supported them in intelligence and military along
the line of actual control, and in the Indian Ocean we have
stepped up in a variety of areas, and I think that is
important, and I do believe that we have bent India's
trajectory in ways that are consequential and very much in our
interests.
I will also say, though, Senator, one of the hardest things
to keep in mind is that India is also great power, and it has
its own beliefs, its own interests. They will never be a formal
ally or partner of the United States.
But it does not mean that we cannot have the strongest of
possible relationships as allied nations on the global stage.
I am not going to--you said it effectively about Russia--I
am not going to add to that directly. I will say I think we are
likely to hear news of India engaging more directly in Ukraine.
I am grateful for that.
I think India wants to play a responsible role globally and
there are very few other countries in the world that have such
an appeal to the Global South, and their ability to engage
there is unmatched and we are seeking to work with them there,
in Africa, and elsewhere.
So I think you have got to take--if I could just tell you
my own sense, you have got to take comfort in some of these
things and recognize fundamentally that in a number of things
that we are engaged in, India is an active and supportive
partner and build on those things, and over time hopefully we
will have less of those things that you point to that cause us
concern.
Senator Risch. Thanks for that assessment.
The Chairman. Well, Secretary Campbell, thank you very much
for your service to our country and for your being here today.
Several times you mentioned how China is portraying
information which is disinformation about the United States,
how they use our democratic systems and free media
availabilities and comments to use it against us.
It just underscores to me the importance for us to invest
more in regards to communication of our values and our beliefs
and our facts.
Senator Coons mentioned the work of his committee in the
Appropriations Committee. I strongly admire his leadership on
that committee, along with Senator Graham.
But the truth is we are not investing enough, and
communications is one area that we are not investing enough. We
have to be active globally now in communication.
There used to be a time with Radio Free Europe, that was
where the whole game is.
Mr. Campbell. Yes.
The Chairman. Now we got to be communicating around the
world because of misinformation, disinformation, so much being
given.
So I would just urge you in your planning to understand
that we recognize that, and we have tried to reform the model
on communication. But we also need to fund it and be more
nimble than we are today to respond to the challenges we have
around the world with disinformation, China being one of the
major purveyors of disinformation.
Mr. Campbell. Yes. If I can just say, Senator, I fully
accept that, and I also just want to underscore that if any
member of the committee or any member of the staff needs
support or needs to engage we will get back to them
immediately.
And I also want to thank you both. We have worked very
closely with your very strong teams--the staff--and I very much
appreciate the work that they have helped us with from AUKUS to
the Pacific through issues with Taiwan.
So grateful for the bipartisan efforts, and I will do
everything possible to make sure that our partnership is tight.
The Chairman. Well, your comments about supporting the
career people at the State Department, and we should beat up on
you instead, but we did not beat up on you very much.
Mr. Campbell. Yes, I am hopeful that will be the next one.
Senator Risch. We will catch up.
Mr. Campbell. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. The committee record will stay open until the
close of business tomorrow for questions that may be submitted
for the record. We would ask that you respond to them quickly.
And with that, this committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Kurt Campbell to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. How does the number of vacancies for diplomatic posts in
African countries compare to vacancies in other regions of the world?
Answer. When looking at average-sized embassies across regions,
diplomatic posts in African countries have a higher rate of vacancies
than other regional bureaus.
Question. Staffing in Africa: What are the key challenges to
filling these vacancies?
Answer. Insufficient infrastructure, inadequate schools, health
care challenges, a global shortage of mid-level Foreign Service
Officers, and the remote nature of many postings in Africa are inherent
impediments to getting our posts to full staffing. The Department
maintains robust monetary and non-monetary incentives in place to
encourage service in the region, and Africa Bureau leadership has
prioritized recruitment and retention of talented staff to U.S.
missions in Africa.
Question. Staffing in Africa: How will sun-setting the historically
difficult to staff designation and limiting the service needs
differential impact State's ability to fill posts in Africa?
Answer. Inclusion in the previous Historically Difficult to Staff
(HDS) program was based upon the number of bids a post received. With
the shortfall in foreign service personnel, many posts were designated
HDS which would not normally be considered difficult to fill. Under
Flex Bid, the Department changed the calculation to one based upon
vacancy rates to target those posts which have historically sustained
long staffing gaps. This reduced the number of posts which previously
qualified for the designation and incentivizes employees to bid on Flex
Bid assignments. The Bureau of African Affairs has nearly 50 percent of
all Flex Bid posts.
Question. Disinformation/Public Diplomacy in Africa: According to
the African Center for Strategic Studies, the PRC's StarTimes is the
second largest digital TV provider in Africa. The PRC trains a large
number of African journalists and then employs them at PRC-owned media
outlets. Furthermore, African reporters criticizing the PRC or their
government's interactions with officials from Beijing face threats,
article censorship, and direct criticism from the PRC embassy.
What have been the most successful initiatives that the Department
has led to bolster U.S. public diplomacy in Africa?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's global information
manipulation is not simply a matter of public diplomacy--but a
challenge to the integrity of the global information space. Through
exchange programs and grants at the mission-level to train journalists
on data verification and disinformation and fact checking, the
Department has been actively engaged with journalists, providing tools
to protect the integrity of factual reporting. Identifying mis- and
disinformation, writing impactful fact checked articles, and being
accountable to readers and listeners have been pivotal components to
ensure citizens trust their news sources.
Question. Economic Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean:
U.S. democratic partners in Latin America seek greater alignment with
the United States, particularly on commercial and trade issues, but
these partners often state that the United States is not showing up
like the PRC. The Administration's Americas Partnership for Economic
Prosperity (APEP) initiative has a vision to deepen integration, create
sustainable well-paying jobs, and promote more secure and resilient
supply chains. But APEP needs far greater resources to be effective and
does not provide preferential market access, which the PRC is actively
offering in the Hemisphere.
Please cite specific, recent success stories for U.S. economic
diplomacy in Latin America as well as any lessons learned to replicate
this success in the region.
Answer. We have coordinated two semiconductor symposiums that
convened governments, private sectors, and educational institutions
from all 12 Americas Partnership countries to galvanize economic
opportunities. Accelerator programs have begun training nearly 200
entrepreneurs, mostly women and Indigenous people, with the goal of
supporting more than 750 social impact startups. The Americas
Partnership Platform, which facilitates co-investment in critical
infrastructure with the private sector, has identified nearly $3
billion in potential projects.
Question. Diplomatic Expansion in the Caribbean: The Caribbean is a
strategically vital region to the United States, given its geographic
proximity and role as a key hub for commercial logistics. For the past
two decades, the PRC has been strategically targeting the region, which
is home to three of the world's 12 remaining countries that have
diplomatic ties with Taiwan--Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Caribbean has also seen an
eightfold increase in bilateral trade with the PRC and substantial
engagements with PRC security institutions. The success of the PRC's
efforts can be attributed in large part to its successful people-to-
people diplomacy and having embassies in most countries, vastly
outpacing the U.S. It is important that the Administration move forward
with its plan to establish two new embassies in the region, but there
is still a lot of catching up to do in terms of diplomatic competition.
What is the plan and timeline for opening new posts in the
Caribbean?
Answer. New post openings require a decisionmaking process laid out
in volume 2, section 411 of the Foreign Affairs Manual. The process for
expansion in the Eastern Caribbean moved to the final phase following
approval from the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs and
Management to do so. The Department sent teams to Antigua and Barbuda,
and St. Lucia to review commercially available facilities this summer.
The President's fiscal year 2025 budget request includes $20 million in
embassy security, construction, and maintenance funding and $1.5
million in WHA program funding for two potential Eastern Caribbean post
openings.
Question. The Inter-American Development Bank (IBD): The IDB has
announced a capital increase of $3.5 billion for the bank's private
sector arm, IDB Invest. The increase will double IDB Invest's ability
to channel resources to the Latin America region to around $19 billion
per year from the current approximate of $8 billion per year. While the
U.S. is the largest shareholder in both the IDB and IBD Invest, there
has been concern among some of my colleagues in recent years about PRC
influence and contract awards within the IBD. But if we really care
about countering such influence, the United States needs to show up.
Last time in 2016 when the IDB Invest had a capital increase there were
consequences when the U.S. failed to participate, namely the PRC
acquired additional shareholding power.
How important is it for Congress to authorize U.S. participation in
the capital increase?
Answer. Congressional support for the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) Invest capital increase would demonstrate U.S. leadership in
the Americas and help deliver both sustainable and inclusive long-term
growth and quality jobs. The People's Republic of China (PRC) wants to
expand its shareholding and influence at IDB Invest, and U.S. failure
to participate in the capital increase would give the PRC an opening to
do so, as it did when the United States declined to participate in the
2015 capital increase. Our absence then reduced our shareholding from
23 percent to 15 percent, while the PRC grew its stake from 0.2 percent
to 4.8 percent.
Question. Outer Space--Latin America: The PRC has expanded their
robust civilian space system in Latin America, with several ground
stations in Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina. Brazil and Chile
are home to additional research facilities that have launched joint
satellites. While the United States still maintains dominance over
space stations and facilities across the globe, the PRC's growing space
infrastructure in Latin America and its growing partnerships with Latin
American countries on space issues pose significant concerns to U.S.
national interests.
What is the scope of partnerships that the PRC maintains with Latin
American countries on space issues?
Answer. Latin America remains a key region for the People's
Republic of China (PRC) space situational awareness development. In
expanding space cooperation, the PRC seeks to strengthen ties with
strategic regional partners and undercut Western and American-led
alliances and institutions. For example, the PRC and Peru have
collaborated on projects within the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization. The PRC also expressed interest in space collaboration
with the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE) through the
creation of a China-ALCE Forum.
Question. Information Operations in Latin America and the
Caribbean: Growing levels of foreign information operations in Latin
America and the Caribbean pose a significant risk for democratic
governance, human rights, and U.S. national interests. While Russia is
perhaps the largest, most prominent purveyor of foreign disinformation
in the region, the Chinese Communist Party and PRC state-affiliated
media networks are increasing their efforts to undermine support for
Taiwan and spread other harmful narratives seeking to undermine U.S.
support. There have been a number of anecdotal examples of the PRC
engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior, getting state media
content regularly published with limited transparency in multiple local
outlets, and coopting journalists through robust exchange programs.
How do U.S. public diplomacy funds in Latin American compare to
other regions of the world?
Answer. Public diplomacy plays a vital role in combatting Russian
and People Republic of China's efforts to manipulate information and
undermine U.S. values and interests in the Western Hemisphere. Our
strategic messaging and programming in the region aim to reinforce the
ability of local populations to understand, resist, and recover from
disinformation, false and misleading content, and threats in the
information space. The Department's funding level for public diplomacy
programming and strategic messaging in the region stands at $56.9
million in fiscal year 2024 (17 percent of total regional fiscal year
2024 funding).
Question. India: The Administration has made great strides in
advancing the U.S. partnership with India, and India has often
portrayed itself as a leader of the global south.
Has India assisted in combatting Russian and PRC disinformation in
the global south as it relates to Russia's war in Ukraine? If so, can
you cite any specific instances?
Answer. While the Department is not aware of any specific efforts
by India to combat the People's Republic of China or Russian
disinformation in the Global South as it relates to Russia's war in
Ukraine, we work closely with India in combatting foreign information
manipulation through the Quad Countering Disinformation Working Group.
We continue to ask all our partners, including India, to support
Ukrainian efforts toward a just and lasting peace, consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and to urge
Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine's sovereign territory.
Question. Last month, the PRC issued guidelines to criminalize
activities that constitute ``a crime related to Taiwan independence,''
and have threatened the death penalty as the maximum punishment. As
written, this could include participating in quote ``Taiwan separatist
organizations'' or promoting Taiwan's participation in international
organizations. The guidelines even allow courts to try Taiwanese
individuals in absentia. Clearly this is yet another attempt to silence
those who express support for Taiwan both within and outside the
region.
How is the Administration engaging with countries on this issue,
particularly those who maintain extradition treaties with the PRC?
Answer. We strongly condemn the Peoples Republic of China's
promulgation of judicial guidelines aimed at intimidating the people in
Taiwan and advocates of Taiwan's constructive role in the world--
including American scholars--as provocative and dangerous. We have made
this clear publicly and in our private engagements with third
countries. At the same time, we continue to support Taiwan's
relationships around the world, both diplomatic and unofficial, as well
as Taiwan's meaningful participation in the United Nations system and
other multilateral fora.
Question. AI Competition and the Global South: As the United
States, China, Europe and other wealthy nations race to innovate and
establish rules and norms for AI, other countries, particularly those
in the global south, are increasingly voicing concern that they are
being left behind. If the United States isn't careful, we may find
ourselves in a similar situation as we did with Huawei some years ago,
except this time, many of these countries will begin reaching out to
the PRC for help standing up their own AI models and capabilities.
Is the State Department working with the U.S. private sector to
address this growing concern?
Answer. We work closely with the U.S. private sector to bring the
benefits of U.S. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology leadership to
developing countries. State led the March adoption of a landmark United
Nations General Assembly resolution on AI and sustainable development,
which positioned the United States as a leading partner for the
developing world. We are now working with U.S. companies to deliver on
efforts to bring AI solutions and capacity building to developing
countries, including $100 million in combined commitments from the
private sector and State through the Partnership for Global Inclusivity
on AI.
Question. CHIPS Funding and U.S. Values: The passage of the CHIPS
Act in 2021 was a generational investment in U.S. competitiveness and
an important first step at diversifying international supply chains for
semiconductors. Many countries have expressed their eagerness to
partner with the United States under CHIPS semiconductor supply chain
funding. However, these funds should be provided to those who have
truly demonstrated a willingness to make progress on values the United
States cares about, particularly democracy and human rights.
As the Administration identifies potential partners under CHIPS,
how does the Administration factor in a partner nation's commitment to
U.S. values?
Answer. We are implementing the International Technology Security
and Innovation (ITSI) Fund programming consistent with Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines related to
enhancing economic and social wellbeing. The Department assesses
prospective partners' commitment to a diversified global semiconductor
supply chain that safeguards this technology from malign end uses.
Current partners are participating in an OECD semiconductor ecosystem
review, which will be made public and inform potential future ITSI Fund
investments to increase market diversification and workforce
development needs.
Question. What initiatives has the Department led with U.S.
universities, particularly public universities, to make choosing to
study in the U.S. easier and more accessible to the large and growing
number of Southeast Asian foreign students?
Answer. We partner with a wide range of U.S. higher education
institutions (HEIs) on programs that support students and
administrators from Southeast Asian countries. Nearly 53,000 Southeast
Asian students studied in the United States in from 2022 through 2023.
Thirty-three EducationUSA advising centers in the region promote study
in the United States, including recruitment fairs that reached more
than 10,000 students in Southeast Asia last year. The Department
implemented the U.S.-ASEAN University Connections Initiative, which
convened university leaders to foster partnerships and student exchange
between U.S. and ASEAN HEIs.
Question. English Language Training: U.S. Ambassadors in Asia often
cite the transformative value of English language training. For places
like Mongolia or Central Asia, with historic ties to Russia, learning
English is the way to reach the next generation. In South and Southeast
Asia, learning English makes it more likely that a student will come to
the U.S., or go to Australia or the U.K. to study.
What are some of the Department's most successful programs today in
promoting access to English language education?
Answer. Our English language programs are a first line of
engagement for U.S. embassies. The English Language Fellow and
Specialist Programs place 400 U.S. expert educators at institutions in
more than 80 countries to train English educators and empower English
learners. Each year, the English Access Scholarship Program educates
approximately 15,000 underserved youth, providing educational and
economic opportunities. The Fulbright English Teaching Assistant (ETA)
Program places 64 ETAs in Southeast Asia, 40 in Central Asia, and seven
in Mongolia annually, reaching additional communities.
Question. English Language Training: U.S. Ambassadors in Asia often
cite the transformative value of English language training. For places
like Mongolia or Central Asia, with historic ties to Russia, learning
English is the way to reach the next generation. In South and Southeast
Asia, learning English makes is more likely that a student will come to
the U.S., or go to Australia or the U.K. to study. What is the
Department doing to expand the reach of these programs?
Answer. The Department has expanded English language engagement and
programs in these regions. In Central Asia, we created a growing
network of English educators from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Kyrgyzstan, bolstering regional cooperation and collaboration. In
Vietnam, we engaged nearly 1,000 English teachers with new materials
developed in partnership with the Vietnamese government. Secretary
Blinken recently launched the U.S.-Mongolia Excellence in English
initiative, benefiting hundreds of Mongolian teachers and tens of
thousands of Mongolian students.
Question. Are there legacy public diplomacy programs that can be
phased out to ensure we are getting the most impact out of U.S.
investments?
Answer. We continuously evaluate the effectiveness of public
diplomacy programs to ensure the maximum impact toward our foreign
policy goals around the world. When evaluating a public diplomacy
program, the Department considers our foreign policy goals and
priorities, embassy demand, type of participant/audience reached, cost,
participant outcomes, and stakeholder feedback. In the last 2 years,
the Department has sunset two programs: TechCamp and Center Stage.
Question. What ideas do you have to enhance public-private
partnerships to provide greater access to English language training in
the global south?
Answer. The Department is actively pursuing new public-private
partnerships (PPPs), in addition to established PPPs to support English
language programs across the global south, including in modernized
American Spaces. PPPs are collaborative relationships Department policy
governs and distinct from ``implementing partners,'' which are
recipients via grants of federally appropriated funds to administer
programs. PPPs expand the scope, reach, and effectiveness of programs,
including English language programs, especially in regions of strategic
importance.
______
Responses of Mr. Kurt Campbell to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The Biden-Harris administration has failed to curb
Chinese purchases of Iranian oil. Iran has earned a shocking 90 billion
dollars in oil sales since 2021, primarily sold to Beijing. Not only
does this oil revenue supercharge Iran's support for terrorism and its
support for Russia in Ukraine, it provides China with cheap source of
oil as it pursues its ambitions in the Pacific. Congress recently
passed a broad package of sanctions against China for these purchases
in the national security supplemental. In your testimony, you indicated
it was ``complicated.'' What are the barriers to enforcing sanctions
against China for purchases of Iranian oil??
Answer. We continue to vigorously enforce oil sanctions on Iran.
Iran is engaged almost exclusively in black market oil sales, receiving
only a fraction of the proceeds. We have seen increasingly
sophisticated evasion tactics, including Iran's utilization of a
``ghost fleet'' to evade detection and enforcement efforts as well as
use of complex financial networks designed to circumvent U.S.
sanctions. We continue to refine and expand our efforts to address
these challenges and deter companies vulnerable to being cut off from
Western financial institutions from participating in such tactics.
Question. China continues to pursue a military-to-military
relationship with the UAE, contrary to US interests. As the UAE and G42
work with Microsoft on AI initiatives, detail the steps the US and UAE
are taking to safeguard American technology from CCP pilferage.
Answer. We have had constructive discussions with the United Arab
Emirates, including G42, over connections to the People's Republic of
China and steps they must take to safeguard U.S. technology, which we
continue to evaluate. At the same time, we have developed our
technology protection policies, including export controls, to mitigate
the risk of U.S. technology being diverted to strategic competitors,
and we will continue to do so. We have an interest in working with the
U.S. private sector to bring countries into the U.S. tech ecosystem and
decreasing dependencies on strategic competitors.
Question. Has the Department of State ever invited or encouraged
China's participation in diplomatic or peace talks with respect to
Ukraine, such as the recent talks in Switzerland? If so, what U.S.
interests does it serve for China to be at the negotiating table?
Answer. We call on all countries to play a constructive role in
securing a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. However, I have no
illusions about the nature of the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s
strategic partnership with Russia, and we see no indications of that
changing. Beijing is not an honest broker, and I am realistic about
Beijing's willingness to play a constructive, transparent role. The
United States has warned the PRC against providing Russia economic and
material support that enables the Kremlin's war machine.
Question. In the hearing, you commented that U.S. steps against
Chinese financial institutions more significant than is known. Please
provide more detail on these comments, including concrete impacts of
such steps on the ability of China to support Russia's war in Ukraine.
Answer. President Biden made clear there would be consequences if
the People's Republic of China (PRC) supported Russia's war effort in
Ukraine. The United States has already sanctioned and listed more than
300 PRC-based entities that have provided dual-use material support to
Russia's defense industrial base. We saw a reduction in exports to
Russia early in 2024, and we know some PRC banks are refusing to
process Russian payments. That said, data suggests PRC exports of high
priority products are increasing again. The overall goal is for the PRC
to support Russia's defense industrial base, and the PRC will look for
ways to evade sanctions.
Question. What is the United States doing to provide competitive
alternatives to Ukrainian government and businesses who may see China
as a potential partner?
Answer. The United States continues to demonstrate that we are the
partner of choice for Ukraine. The United States has built a global
coalition of countries that are supporting Ukraine and united
democracies as never before. With U.S. leadership, more than 50
partners and allies have stepped up to support Ukraine and impose costs
on Russia in unprecedented ways. Our partners are providing more
assistance to Ukraine than we are, about $94 billion to our $74
billion. They have funded roughly twice as much humanitarian assistance
and budget support as we have and have hosted 4.5 million refugees,
costing billions more. The European Union is working to secure another
$54 billion for Ukraine's economic recovery, and U.S. leadership is
important to keep partners unified and engaged.
Question. Please define the United States' strategy and goals for
countering PRC influence in the Western Balkans.
Answer. Integrating the Western Balkans into the European Union and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as full regional economic
integration are the most effective bulwarks against the People's
Republic of China's influence. Our work accelerates reforms toward EU
accession, supports regional economic integration, stems brain drain,
and augments resilience to coercive influence. Our counter-PRC strategy
includes engagement by U.S. officials alongside assistance to support
the use of trusted vendors in critical infrastructure, develop
investment screening, strengthen information security and
cybersecurity, and increase energy diversification.
Question. Please define the United States' strategy and goals for
competing with PRC security, economic, and political engagement in
Central Asia.
Answer. The United States supports the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence of Central Asian countries. We
engage with Central Asian countries bilaterally to promote free trade,
reduce business corruption, and expand rule of law in order to
strengthen commercial ties and offer alternatives to People's Republic
of China investment. Through the C5+1 platform, we strengthen
cooperation among all five Central Asian countries to enhance economic
connectivity and trade, mitigate climate change and environmental
challenges, and jointly address security threats.
Question. Apart from making statements, what are State and DOD
doing to deter China's further escalation against the Philippines near
the Second Thomas Shoal in the near-term? Please note that we do not
consider announcing supplemental FMF funding for the Philippines as a
``near-term'' action since it will not bear fruit immediately in terms
of Philippine capability.
Answer. The United States stands with the Philippines as it resists
the People's Republic of China's dangerous and destabilizing actions
throughout the South China Sea. This extends well beyond verbal
assurances, and the Departments of Defense and State would welcome the
chance to brief the Committee in a classified setting. As the President
has made clear, the 1951 United States-Philippines Mutual Defense
Treaty extends to armed attacks against Philippine armed forces,
aircraft, and public vessels--including those of its Coast Guard--
anywhere in the South China Sea.
Question. Why is it in the U.S. interests to facilitate China's
engagement with subnational actors on climate change given all the
evidence of China using subnational diplomacy to exert malign influence
in the United States and other countries?
Answer. We are clear-eyed about the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) attempts to co-opt subnational and nongovernmental actors and are
determined to push back against malign influence that exploits our
openness. The Subnational Diplomacy Unit and the Office of China
Coordination collaborate to regularly conduct briefings with local
officials to raise awareness and bolster resilience to PRC influence.
The PRC is the largest emitter, and we cannot keep a safer 1.5 Celsius
future within reach unless the PRC acts faster to cut all its
greenhouse gas emissions. We use diplomacy to enhance climate action to
help ensure the world avoids the worst impacts of the climate crisis,
which includes leveraging the many U.S. States, cities, and other
subnational stakeholders that want to engage.
Question. Why did the United States support the inaugural event of
this initiative at Berkeley, which failed to notify the U.S. Government
of hundreds of millions of dollars in gifts and contracts from China,
despite being required to do so by law?
Answer. The California-China Climate Institute (CCCI) hosted the
U.S.-China High-Level Event on Subnational Climate Action. CCCI is a
University of California (UC)-wide initiative housed jointly at UC
Berkeley's School of Law and Rausser College of Natural Resources that
serves as the secretariat for several of the memorandums of
understanding the State of California has with PRC provinces and
national agencies on climate. State Department participation in the
event contributed to broader U.S. Government climate goals by hold a
subnational event in the first half of 2024, as outlined in the
Sunnylands Statement, and conveying the important role states,
provinces, and cities can play in avoiding the worst climate impacts.
Question. Given that both China and Russia are both failing to
uphold their commitments under the NPT, what is the strategic
justification for publishing our nuclear stockpile numbers now?
Answer. The United States' commitment to transparency is part of
the fabric of its democratic system; transparency into its nuclear
activities is not a concession but a demonstration of leadership and
fulfillment of our international obligations and commitments that
enhances strategic stability and mutual understanding. Russia and the
People's Republic of China have not matched the transparency
demonstrated by us, a fact noted by NPT states parties. We have called
upon them to do so and have encouraged international partners that
welcome U.S. transparency to press Beijing and Moscow to follow our
positive example.
Question. China has once again rejected arms control talks. How are
we strengthening deterrence with our allies in the region in response
to China's nuclear breakout and coercive behavior?
Answer. The United States continues to take prudent steps to ensure
its security and that of its allies and partners. We are strengthening
extended deterrence relationships with the Republic of Korea, Japan,
and Australia through frequent consultations, in which we sharpen joint
approaches and tools that leverage all elements of national power to
deter aggression. Meanwhile, we continue to increase diplomatic
pressure on the People's Republic of China to take practical measures
to reduce strategic risks, while preparing for the contingencies of
tomorrow through enhanced deterrence.
______
Response of Mr. Kurt Campbell to a Question
Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. AUKUS is a testament to both the strength of our
alliances and serves as a tool to counter the PRC. I look forward to
knowing more about how the Department assesses the future of this
partnership. Could you expand on the most productive, short-term
opportunities you have identified that would further build out and
augment the AUKUS partnership?
Answer. Under our Indo-Pacific Strategy, we are revitalizing U.S.
alliances and partnerships, deepening economic engagement, and
strengthening people--to-people ties. AUKUS is one of our commitments
to the region, modernizing existing partnerships with Australia and the
United Kingdom to better meet future security challenges. In the near
term, we must deepen industrial and supply chain connectivity,
streamline regulations, bolster people-to-people ties including through
academic partnerships, demonstrate tangible AUKUS progress, and better
communicate the strategic challenges at hand.
______
Responses of Mr. Kurt Campbell to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
Question. When it comes to competing with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) outside the Indo-Pacific, it is clear we are lagging,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. As China continues to gain
influence across the continent, we are frequently told that the United
States remains the partner of choice. Our values and the quality of our
investments remain an attractive option for African partners, but
unfortunately, I am also told that we're simply not there--from a
diplomatic perspective. We cannot provide an alternative option for our
partners if we do not have adequate staff on the ground to strengthen
relations with host governments. We cannot counter China's corrupt
practices or assist U.S. companies as they seek to enter African
markets with inflexible, arcane bureaucracy. In Section 6402 of the
fiscal year 2024 NDAA, Congress clearly articulated the national
security risks posed by the high number of hard-to-fill vacancies at
our diplomatic missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. This section also
required the State Department to report on ways to incentivize staff to
fill these vacancies and to conduct a study on the feasibility of
allowing non-consular FSOs, assigned to directed consular posts, to
volunteer to for hard-to-fill slots. The report was due 180 days after
passage and the Department was required to begin the feasibility study
by the same day. We are now well over a month past that date.
Mr. Campbell--Why hasn't the Section 6402 report been provided to
Congress? Can you provide an update on the status of the required
feasibility study?
Answer. The Department recognizes that to achieve our strategic
goals we must have the right people in the right places. Over the last
2 years, the Bureau of Global Talent Management has developed new
financial and non-financial incentives to further funnel bidder
interest in difficult to staff posts, but the Department still has more
positions than people available to fill them. The Department takes
congressional reporting requirements seriously and is working to send
the report on Efforts to Develop New Incentives for Hard-To-Fill
Positions at U.S. diplomatic missions as soon as possible.
Question. Last week, it was announced that China brokered an
agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions to
establish a ``unity government'' intended to oversee a post-war Gaza.
While I have serious doubts about the prospects of the so-called
``Beijing Declaration,'' it does raise questions about China's motives
in the region.
Many analysts believe that China does not have the ability or
desire to truly entrench itself in Middle East politics, and that such
stunts are merely designed to advance the PRC's public relations
campaign.
Apart from gaining access to critical resources, what do you
believe are China's aims in the Middle East?
Answer. In its activities throughout the world, including the
Middle East, the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to reshape the
international order to accommodate its own system and preferences while
making the world more dependent on the PRC and reducing its own
dependence on the world. We are engaged in a global contest with the
PRC for power and influence. The PRC seeks to reshape and redefine the
norms that underpin sustainable development, peace and security, and
cultural relations to reflect the PRC's priorities, as well as to
capture the swiftly developing frontier of artificial intelligence.
Question. In the lead up to the recent NATO summit, it seemed that
the administration was intentionally raising the alarm about China's
support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine in an attempt create a rift
between European powers and the PRC.
I firmly support the longevity of our transatlantic alliance, but I
also believe that some of our European partners need to have a more
realistic understanding of the very real risk that an aggressive PRC
poses, not just to our national security, but to theirs.
Without drastic improvements to our defense industrial base, if--
heaven forbid--we ever go to war with the PRC, we may not have the
means to simultaneously support Europe's defense and engage in a
conflict in the Indo-Pacific. It is imperative that our NATO allies
increase their defense spend and take efforts to revitalize their own
industrial base.
I've seen the statements that came from the NATO summit, but from
your perspective, do you believe the administration's efforts have
actually moved the needle?
Answer. The Administration remains committed to ensuring Allies
equitably share the responsibility of NATO's collective security and
consistently engages with Allies on the need to meet defense spending
commitments. The Vilnius Defense Investment Pledge set a higher level
of ambition for resourcing collective defense, while the Defense
Production Action Plan and NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge
have demonstrated the commitment of all Allies to build up our
industrial base. We will continue consulting with Allies and Congress
to ensure NATO has the capabilities, readiness, defense industrial
capacity, and force generation needed.
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