[Senate Hearing 118-489]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-489
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S
NOTAM SYSTEM FAILURE AND ITS IMPACTS
ON A RESILIENT NATIONAL AIRSPACE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-389 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on February 15, 2023................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 2
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 4
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 15
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 17
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 19
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 20
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 22
Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 24
NOTAM Briefing dated February 14, 2023 by the Federal
Aviation Administration.................................... 25
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 117
Statement of Senator Vance....................................... 119
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 121
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 122
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 124
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 126
Statement of Senator Lummis...................................... 129
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 131
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 133
Statement of Senator Warnock..................................... 135
Witnesses
Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Billy Nolen by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 139
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 144
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 145
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 146
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 147
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 149
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 155
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 157
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S
NOTAM SYSTEM FAILURE AND ITS IMPACTS
ON A RESILIENT NATIONAL AIRSPACE
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Chairwoman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar, Schatz,
Markey, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, Rosen, Hickenlooper,
Warnock, Cruz, Thune, Moran, Fischer, Budd, Schmitt, Vance,
Capito, and Lummis.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. The Senate Commerce Committee will come to
order. I appreciate all my colleagues being here this morning.
For the United States to be a leader in aviation, we must set
the gold standard for aviation safety.
We know there is work to do, and we have a number of recent
incidents that highlights the importance of continuing to make
safety the top priority. Last week we saw how technology issues
can impact airlines and the traveling public.
Today, we welcome acting FAA Administrator Billy Nolen to
the Committee to help understand what went wrong with the NOTAM
system and what actions the FAA is taking to make sure this
never happens again.
How do we make sure the agency has the necessary resources
to modernize its IT infrastructure? And how do we ensure a
safe, and efficient, and reliable network? How can we ensure
our global competitive edge? Mr. Nolen understands these
challenges.
On January 11, he ordered the first national ground stop
since 9/11, and this was a significant event. More than 1,300
flights were canceled and more than 9,500 were delayed. Prior
to leading the FAA, Mr. Nolen served as the head of the FAA's
Office of Aviation Safety. With over 1 million registered
aircraft, over 1 million active pilots, and over 50,000 flights
every day, the Aviation Safety Office has a very big job.
As an experienced airline pilot, Mr. Nolen understands the
importance of the NOTAM system. These notices provide real time
safety information, flight operations, and without access to
this information, safe aircraft operations really are not
possible. This hearing, like last week's, which I believe still
shows the investment in technology that needs to be made--
Southwest could have updated their system, and didn't, and a
critical event happened.
Now we want to make sure a critical event like happened
with our NOTAM system also doesn't happen, and how do we keep
our economy moving forward. These incidents are concerning.
They impact Americans' confidence in our aviation system and
our aviation infrastructure is critical to American safety and
security.
So, we need to accelerate building a national airspace
system for the 21st century, something this committee is going
to work on as it relates to the FAA reauthorization bill. And
the 2023 authorization bill will give us many opportunities to
talk not just about this issue, but other issues that our
appropriator colleagues also have to do their job. Over the
last several years, Congress has met or exceeded the
Administration's budget requests for the FAA facilities and
NOTAM.
But Mr. Nolen will talk today about additional funds, why
Congress needs to paint--why a clear picture needs to be
painted about the needs of our airspace system for the future.
To be sure, the FAA must have redundancies and not a single
point where a failure can happen in a key system like we just
saw.
And we have to have responsibilities to ensure that every
taxpayer provides--that every taxpayer is provided a maximum
value on return. Therefore, we must see clearly the obstacles
ahead and what a path to make sure that we have this most
modernized system.
Today's discussion on NOTAM and national airspace are
really part of a bigger picture. I am sure there will be other
issues that come up today as events of the last several weeks
have pointed out the roles of FAA in our airspace system,
working with DOD and others.
So, I look forward to the questions and opportunities to
have you before the Committee to address these important,
timely questions on. I will turn to the Ranking Member, Senator
Cruz.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Acting
Administrator Nolen, for being here. While I look forward to
hearing from you, I have to say I am disappointed by the
absence of a Senate confirmed witness like Secretary Buttigieg
who ultimately oversees the agency responsible for the NOTAM
failure.
And I would note that Secretary Buttigieg, in my view,
instead of engaging in politics, should be focused on the job
he has now and addressing the very serious transportation
crises we are seeing playing out across the country. On the
afternoon of January 10, the FAA's notice to air mission system
failed.
About 15 hours later, after failing to reboot the system,
the FAA ordered a full ground stop of the national airspace
system for the first time since September 11, 22 years ago. The
ground stop was because America was under attack. But this
time, this ground stop was the result of the Federal agency's
inability to modernize despite Congress providing the required
resources to do so.
The Washington Post called the ground stop, ``almost
unprecedented'' and said the FAA, ``learned long ago their
systems were dependent on rickety foundations but didn't do
enough to update technology.'' Despite a similar outage in
2008, the FAA still has not improved the system. A technology
specialist involved in the 2008 outage blamed, ``organizational
inertia,'' something I have heard many times before when people
describe problems at the FAA.
The Wall Street Journal said, ``given the importance of the
FAA's mission, this kind of failure is hard to excuse.'' If
glitches happen all the time, why doesn't the FAA have
redundancy. Canada's NOTAM system offer--operated by a
nonprofit, experienced apparently unrelated problems the same
day as the United States.
The planes there kept flying. The NOTAM breakdown last
month was clearly a mistake. I fear it is emblematic of a
culture afraid to innovate, stuck operating inefficiently, and
illustrative of why President Biden needs to choose an
administrator for the FAA with a proven ability to manage
change within large organizations, and with the requisite
aviation and safety experience.
The current nominee that is pending lacks that aviation
experience. The FAA safety mission, Mr. Nolen, as you know
well, is too important to take for granted. There is a front-
page story in The Wall Street Journal today on the FAA's
inability to modernize NOTAM. In that story, an FAA
spokesperson claims that prioritizing NOTAM upgrades wouldn't
guarantee funding from Congress. That is simply not true.
Congress has fully funded NOTAM modernization for more than
10 years. Every year since 2013, Congress has given as much or
more than the amount requested by the Executive agency for 10
years now. And yet, full modernization is still several years
away. After investing millions of dollars, I am wondering why
this bureaucracy is taking so long to do its job.
And is the system worth modernizing at this point, because
the status quo simply isn't acceptable. There must be
accountability when an agency is not using taxpayer funds
efficiently. And that, of course, starts with an accountable
leader. Now in his third year as Secretary of Transportation,
Secretary Buttigieg has failed to deliver any meaningful reform
at the FAA.
Although NOTAM modernization started a decade ago, this
Administration seems focused on semantics. Whether it is
replacing the term mother with birthing person or creating a
new checkbox on passports for people who claim to be neither a
man or woman, this Administration's desire to signal its virtue
seems to know no limits. It has even infected the FAA.
Instead of it focusing on safety, the FAA and DOT were
working hard to change NOTAM's name from notice to airmen to
notice to air missions. I would suggest instead, the focus
should have been on making sure the damn thing worked.
Shockingly, renaming NOTAM didn't prevent an outage. You know,
way back in 1994, Al Gore proposed to reform the FAA into a
self-funding, more efficient organization.
Today, the flying public is stuck with a self-regulating
and flailing agency stuck in the 20th century. It is my hope
that we can use this hearing and the 2023 FAA reauthorization
bill to explore meaningful reforms to the FAA and its air
traffic organization. And let me say finally, in recent weeks,
we have seen several very concerning near misses that were
almost mass fatality crashes.
We have seen them in New York. We have seen them in Austin,
Texas. We just recently saw one outside of Hawaii. I know
Texans and Americans across this country are deeply concerned
about these near misses.
And I hope, in addition to addressing the failure of the
NOTAM system, that Mr. Nolen, you will also address these near
misses, why they almost killed hundreds of people, and what
more can be done to make sure that the next near miss doesn't
become a horrific tragedy. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Now we will hear from
the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairwoman, thank you. Thank you, to you and
Senator Cruz, for this hearing. I am pleased to work beside
you, and with you, and the other members of this committee as
the Ranking Member of the Aviation subcommittee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation. Kansas is the aviation capital of
the world, with over a century's worth of rich aviation
history.
Whether manufacturing the first bomber in the B-52 or the
next generation bomber in the B-21, Kansas, has driven and
carried the aviation industry. Clusters of manufacturing
navigation alongside academia and research in Kansas leads the
aviation industry into the future. Yet the FAA is at a crucial
junction, and we must do everything in our power to ensure the
United States remains a leader in the aerospace innovation and
safety. It is imperative for this committee to pass a long-term
reauthorization.
Prior to 2018, we had short-term reauthorizations totaling
28. It is no wonder there is uncertainty at the FAA and in the
industry when we are so challenged in getting our work done.
Multi-year reauthorizations is necessary for long-term planning
and growth in the civil aviation industry, including
maintenance and modernization of aviation infrastructure and
technology. I look forward to addressing the current backlog at
the FAA.
I agree with Senator Cruz that the FAA needs a Senate
confirmed leader. We need to be able to address new
technologies that are rapidly advancing so that the United
States remains at the forefront and remains competitive in this
world.
I have worked with the Chairwoman of this subcommittee on
advanced air mobility in the past, and further, we have worked
together in advancing the aviation work force. We have
significant challenges in the area of general aviation and
aviation in general.
The FAA is a significant component of that circumstance. It
needs our help, but it also needs to get its act together.
Madam Chairman, I have altered my subcommittee assignments
within the Committee on Appropriations to add T-HUD,
transportation to this opportunity to try to make a difference
in this arena.
And so, I look forward to really working with what I think
is the kind of both points of view that has been expressed so
far, leadership at the FAA, and the necessary resources for
them to do their job well. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Well, we will definitely look forward
to that leadership and working with all of us. I just want to
note before we go to the witness that NOTAM stood for notice to
airmen. And I know while people are somewhat bothered or think
that this is not a change, or some people are saying that it
is, you know, being too politically correct, we have a barrier
problem here.
We need more women in aviation. And fewer than 10 percent
of the licensed pilots are women. About 5 percent of airline
pilots, 3.6 percent of airline captains. So, I just want to say
how proud I am that the two naval aviators that flew over the
Super Bowl were from Whidbey Island and Whidbey Island Air
Station.
But I do think the changing is in the right direction, and
we need to do more to encourage more women in aviation. So, Mr.
Nolen, welcome to today's hearing. Your opening remarks. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF BILLY NOLEN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Cruz, and
members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
provide clarity on the FAA's management of the Notices to Air
Mission system, share details on recent events, and explain our
efforts to modernize the NOTAM system.
Today is also an opportunity to discuss the modernization
needs of the national airspace system overall, some of the
challenges we face and some of the opportunities on the
horizon. We are experiencing the safest period in aviation
history, but we do not take that for granted. Recent events
remind us that we cannot and must not become complacent and
must continually invest in our aviation system.
I know we are here to discuss the challenges we experienced
with our NOTAM system last month, so I want to provide a brief
background about what we know so far. Late on January 10, NOTAM
applications and services became unreliable.
Technical experts attempted to address the issue by, among
other things, switching to the backup data base. While
technical experts worked through the night, the FAA activated a
hotline to provide real time status updates to airspace users.
During this time, there were no reports of operational
impacts. In the early morning, hours of January 11, the system
appeared to have been restored, but formatting issues were
persistent.
To resolve this, FAA air traffic leadership directed the
rebuild of the data bases. As the morning air traffic rush
approached and work on the system continued, I ordered a ground
stop at approximately 7:15 a.m. eastern time, pausing all
departures in the United States in order to maintain safety and
preserve predictability.
I did so after consulting with the airlines and safety
experts. Once resiliency testing on the system was conducted, I
lifted the ground stop at 9:07 a.m. eastern time. The FAA's
preliminary findings are that contract personnel
unintentionally deleted files while working to correct
synchronization issues between the live primary database and
the backup data base. We have found no evidence of a
cyberattack or other malicious intent.
After the incident, we implemented a synchronization delay
to ensure that bad data from one database cannot affect the
backup data base.
Additionally, we have implemented a new protocol that
requires more than one individual to be present and engage in
oversight when work on a database occurs. As part of our review
of the root cause of this incident continues, please know that
the FAA will keep the Committee apprised of our findings. As
you are well aware, 2023 is a big year for aviation.
Our current authorization expires on September 30th and
there is sustained energy, from both industry and Government,
around the development of ideas and proposals to modernize the
NAS and the FAA's approach to managing it. As we delve into
that reauthorization process, there are several important
points we would like to highlight for the Committee.
Right now, the FAA is managing three airspace systems to
serve the diverse users of the NAS. The first is the classic or
legacy system that many users still count on. The second is the
system that relies on the next generation of technology for
improved communication, navigation, and surveillance. The FAA
has operationalized the foundational pieces of this system, and
we continue to deploy services as operator equipage and Federal
resources allow.
The third is the future, a future that has already arrived.
It is the system that must accommodate new entrants in all
their forms, including drones, advanced air mobility aircraft,
commercial spacecraft, and other new aircraft yet to be
imagined.
For us to sustain, implement, and plan for all of these
systems, we have a lot of work ahead. We look forward to
partnering with the Committee to ensure that the FAA's
oversight and regulation of the NAS continues to deliver the
level of aviation safety and efficiency expected by the
American public.
Before we get to questions, I want to take a moment to
acknowledge some of the recent incidents that we have talked
about, we have seen throughout the system. I am sure that you
and the public have seen some of the news reports and close
calls on runways and other operational events.
Because I want to make sure we are giving the right amount
of attention to all of these recent occurrences, I formed a
safety review team to examine the U.S. aerospace system's
structure, culture, processes, systems, and integration of
safety effort. The initial focus will be to hold a safety
summit to examine what additional actions the aviation
community needs to take to maintain our safety record.
A group of commercial and general aviation leaders, labor
partners, and other will examine what mitigations are working
and why others do not appear to be as effective. I can say
without reservation that the aviation professionals who
comprise the American aerospace industry are proud of our
safety record.
But we all know that complacency has no place in air
transportation, whether it is on the flight deck, in the
control tower, the ramp, or the dispatch center. We are
confident that we are taking the right steps here, and we look
forward to working with the Committee and this Congress in
developing a long-term FAA reauthorization bill that
accelerates the next era of aviation, one that is safe,
efficient, sustainable, and open to all. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nolen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to provide clarity on the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) management of the Notice to Air
Missions (NOTAM) system, share details on recent events, and explain
our efforts to modernize the NOTAM system.
Today is also an opportunity to discuss the modernization needs of
the national airspace system (NAS) overall, some of the challenges we
face, and some of the opportunities on the horizon.
We are experiencing the safest period in aviation history, but we
do not take that for granted. Recent events remind us that we cannot
become complacent and that we must continually invest in our aviation
system.
NAS Modernization
2023 will be a big year for aviation. Our current authorization
expires on September 30th, and there is sustained energy from both
industry and government around the development of ideas and proposals
to modernize the NAS and the FAA's approach to managing it. As we delve
into that reauthorization process, there are several important points
we would like to highlight for the Committee. Right now, the FAA is
managing three airspace systems to serve the diverse users of the NAS.
The first is the classic or legacy system that many users of the NAS
still count on. The second is the system that relies on the next
generation of technology for improved communication, navigation, and
surveillance. The FAA has operationalized the foundational pieces of
this system, and we continue to deploy additional services as operator
equipage and Federal resources allow. The third is the future--a future
that has already arrived. It is the system that must accommodate new
entrants in all their forms, including drones, advanced air mobility
aircraft, commercial spacecraft, and other new aircraft yet to be
imagined. It will involve autonomous aircraft, data exchanges, and a
dynamic airspace. For us to sustain, implement, and plan for all of
these systems, we have a lot of work ahead. We look forward to
partnering with the Committee to ensure that the FAA's oversight and
regulation of the NAS continue to deliver the level of aviation safety
and efficiency expected by the American public, as new entrants come
into service.
On our end, we must work with stakeholders and make strategic
investments, and create an agile regulatory structure that maintains
safety, ensures efficiency, and facilitates access for new entrants. We
are committed to this work and need Congress to be a supportive partner
both in terms of enacting a long-term reauthorization measure, and
funding our modernization needs. We look forward to working with you on
these challenges and assure you that safety will always guide our
actions no matter the challenge.
The NOTAM System
A NOTAM contains essential information for airspace users providing
safety information about particular aspects of the NAS that are not
operating under normal status. FAA's NOTAM system is a dynamic system
that captures recent changes to conditions in the NAS. For example,
NOTAMs frequently provide pilots and operators with information about
an anomaly with a particular navigational aid, airport runway, or
taxiway, or about an air space closure or a temporary flight
restriction.
The FAA's overall NOTAM system consists of two systems--an older
U.S. NOTAM System (legacy system) and a newer Federal NOTAM System. The
older portion of the NOTAM system relies on 30-year-old software and
architecture. This portion collates NOTAM data from all sources and
distributes it to some airspace users. The Federal NOTAM System portion
is newer and serves as part of the foundation for the FAA's ongoing
NOTAM modernization effort.
NOTAM information comes from a variety of places: an airport or air
traffic control tower that observes local changes, an FAA technician
planning to work on a system, or an air service provider, to name a
few. Airspace users enter and access the information from applications
sitting on both portions of the FAA's NOTAM system. Most airlines
download NOTAMs from the FAA into their internal databases for
dispatching aircraft. Users can also get NOTAMs from third party
providers who get it from the FAA, or they can go to the primary source
for specific NOTAM information, by calling a flight service station,
air traffic control tower, or airport, for example.
NOTAM Service Interruption and Response
Late on January 10, 2023, NOTAM applications and services became
unreliable. Technical experts attempted to address the issue by, among
other things, switching to a backup database. There are three NOTAM
backup databases--one in Oklahoma City and two in Atlantic City. While
technical experts worked through the night, the FAA activated a hotline
to provide real-time status updates to system users. During this time,
there were no reports of operational impacts. In the early morning
hours of January 11, 2023, the system appeared to have been restored,
but formatting issues persisted. To resolve this, FAA's air traffic
leadership directed the rebuild of the databases.
As the morning air traffic rush approached, and work on the system
continued, I ordered a ground stop at approximately 7:15 a.m. EST,
pausing all departures in the United States in order to maintain safety
and preserve predictability. I did so after consulting with the
airlines and safety experts. Once resiliency testing on the system was
conducted, I lifted the ground stop at 9:07 a.m. EST on January 11,
2023.
The FAA's preliminary findings are that contract personnel
unintentionally deleted files while working to correct synchronization
between the live primary database and a backup database. We have found
no evidence of a cyber-attack or other malicious intent. After the
incident, we implemented a synchronization delay to ensure that bad
data from a database cannot affect a backup database. Additionally, we
have implemented a new protocol that requires more than one individual
to be present and engaged in oversight when work on the database
occurs. As our review of the root causes of this incident continue,
please know that the FAA will keep the Committee apprised of our
findings.
NOTAM Modernization
Beginning in 2012 with the Pilot's Bill of Rights (Public Law 112-
153) and continuing in 2018 with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
(Public Law 115-254), which further amended the Pilot's Bill of Rights,
Congress directed the FAA to continue developing and modernizing the
NOTAM repository, in a public central location, in a manner that is
Internet-accessible, machine-readable, and searchable. Since those
enactments, the FAA has made progress modernizing the NOTAM system.
This progress includes improvements not only to the NOTAM content and
presentation/publication, but also to the information technology
architecture that supports and delivers this vital safety information.
The nearly decade-long modernization work includes transitioning away
from the legacy portion of the system mentioned earlier. We expect that
a significant portion of the modernization work will be complete by
mid-2025. We continue to assess the feasibility of accelerating the
current schedule.
The goal of the FAA's NOTAM modernization effort is to provide
NOTAMs that are complete, accurate, timely, and relevant to safe flight
operations. The FAA has made great progress in fulfilling the
congressional mandates for modernization, including close coordination
with industry and the adoption of recommendations from industry
stakeholders that use NOTAMs. Specifically, the FAA is working in
coordination with the Aeronautical Information Services Reform
Coalition (coalition), whose members include representatives from,
among others, air carriers, aircraft owners, pilots, airport
executives, labor interests of air carriers, general and business
aviation, and international operators. Our continued work with the
coalition is one of the many examples where a government-industry
partnership has helped to significantly inform and improve the
direction and quality of our work.
We are working to face the challenges in maintaining our systems
while keeping pace with new and emerging technologies and entrants.
However, we are committed to improving and securing our systems,
finding new ways to be agile in order to face these challenges, and
continuing to achieve the highest levels of safety and efficiency. We
look forward to working with the Committee and this Congress in
developing a long-term FAA reauthorization bill that accelerates the
next era of aviation--one that is safe, efficient, sustainable, and
open to all.
The Chair. Thank you, Acting Director Nolen, and appreciate
that. Let's drill down on the NOTAM system. One of the issues,
from my understanding and you are saying that this involved an
individual deleting the wrong set of files. We have a backup
redundant system, why couldn't we just go to that system?
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the question. So, we
do have a backup system. A part of how the system works is that
as you do updates to the system, as you delete outdated NOTAMs,
it synchronizes across both the primary backup and the other
two backups. So, part of that is synchronization, once we
realize it, once we come----
The Chair. So, the structure of the architecture is not
favorable to true redundancy.
Mr. Nolen. Which is one of the reasons we are in the middle
of this whole modernization effort. We have got----
The Chair. You are agreeing with me, is that right?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I am agreeing with you that we have
a 30-year-old system. We have a new system. Let me just say to
the point. 80 percent of the users are already on our newer
system, which is the Federal NOTAM system.
We still have some critical users on the U.S. NOTAM system,
which is this 30-year-old. Primarily you have DOD, you have the
Alaska, aviation in Alaska, and our international users are
still on that system. But again, we are working to be off of
that system by Fiscal Year 2025.
The Chair. So, I think, you know, the NTSB is--you know,
the authorization bill, we wanted to make progress on this, and
so they are basically saying that we aren't making progress on
this. What is your response to how we are going to fill not
waiting until 2025?
I get that you are saying now I am going to back up on the
human factor, really, is what you are saying. I am going to
back up on the human factor and make sure that this never
happens because of an individual, one individual being on the
spot.
But really, it is the architecture of the system that
doesn't give us true redundancy. So, is there a way to solve
that before we, you know, go 2 years into the modernization?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, we will continue on this journey of
modernization. I have asked and I have directed our teams to
look at what is our ability to accelerate that timeline. Can we
pull it into--?
The Chair. I am asking you, what can you do about the
existing system today to give you true redundancy? You are
trying to give me human factor redundancy in another
individual, but when in reality I am pointing out that the
architecture of the system isn't true redundancy because if the
deletion impacted both systems--.
Mr. Nolen. Yes--.
The Chair. Then you don't really have redundancy. You don't
have a separate, you know, reboot. You know, our electricity
goes off on our house, we go to the generator, if you have one,
right.
Mr. Nolen. Yes.
The Chair. So, in this case, the backup didn't work either
because it was affected by the same deletion. So, you don't
have to answer all of it right here, but I need an answer on
this issue of redundancy to the system.
Because while we want to modernize, and we want to have the
right resources, and we got a pretty good offer from our
colleague to drill down with this on the Appropriations side to
make sure that we have a clear understanding--and I really do
think this has been an issue in the past.
I really do think that appropriators need to understand the
technology needs of the FAA and support them. But what can we
do now to make sure this doesn't happen again?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you. Several things that we have
done. Number one, we have instituted a 1-hour synchronization
delay between the primary database and the backup data base.
That gives us time to make sure that we have no issues
there. Second, we have increased the level of oversight to
ensure the more than one person is available when work or
updates are being done on the live data base, along with an
upgrading or up leveling our level of oversight within the
Command Center to ensure that we have got leadership present.
So those, of course, are more in the area of administrative
controls. But the work continues to get off of the U.S. NOTAM
system and on to the Federal----
The Chair. I am going to come back at you and ask that you
work with contractors to find out how to get us true redundancy
in the short term in a backup database that is truly
independent and could operate at the same instance if this
happens again.
Before I--so my sense of this near-miss with Southwest
Airlines and a cargo carrier, was Southwest in a position
earlier than their slot? Is that what happened?
Mr. Nolen. Well, what happened in Texas, in Austin, is that
something we would not expect to happen during a low visibility
operation where Southwest was cleared for take-off, and FedEx,
who was cleared for approach, in close proximity to each other.
That investigation is underway by the National
Transportation Safety Board and the FAA. So, we are looking at
every aspect of it and we will certainly provide updates. But
it is not something we expected to have taken place. Rightfully
so, the FedEx crew, Southwest----
The Chair. I am asking if you have an answer today about
why this occurred?
Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am. That investigation is still ongoing,
but we will certainly provide an update.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Acting Administrator
Nolen, the FAA has been charged with modernizing NOTAM for 10
years. Why has it taken 10 years, and why isn't it done yet?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Cruz, for the question.
We have been on a journey of modernization. Starting back in
2009, as we began the scoping and we brought on, in 2013, we
brought on the Federal NOTAM system.
So that process, and we have had enhancements along the
way. We are about for--the substantive part of that
modernization.
Senator Cruz. Let me ask again, why has it taken 10 years
and why is it still not done that?
Mr. Nolen. It does take a while. These systems--the
complexity of our NAS. The NOTAM is just one of thousands of
systems that comprise how we oversee the NAS, how we
communicate, how we are given NOTAMs. This is how----
Senator Cruz. And if I heard you right, your current plan
is not to have it modernized until Fiscal Year 2025. So, 2 to 3
years from now. What is to prevent another ground stop in the 2
to 3 years between now and then?
Mr. Nolen. When I say we are moving to 2025, the work is
ongoing. We do have 80 percent of the users onto the Federal
NOTAM system. We have added redundancies to ensure that----
Senator Cruz. But the 80 percent of users, if I understand
you correct, that didn't stop a ground stop of everybody, is
that correct?
Mr. Nolen. It did. When we did a ground stop, that was a
ground stop for all departing traffic on Des Moines.
Senator Cruz. So, the 80 percent didn't help. It is not
like it was only a 20 percent ground stop. Everyone shut down,
the first time since 9/11. Let me ask you, I agree very, very
strongly with the questions that the Chairwoman Cantwell raised
about redundancy. And do the fixes that you proposed remove the
risk of a similar single point of failure for knocking the
NOTAM system offline?
Mr. Nolen. We believe the fixes that we have in place today
will prevent a recurrence of the event that we saw on January
the 11th.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Nolen, you are not answering the
question. Will the fixes remove the risk of a similar single
point of failure from knocking the system out? Is there
redundancy being built into it, or can a single screw up ground
air traffic nationwide?
Mr. Nolen. We have--when we think about the age of our
system and the age of systems we have, we do have redundancy
there. Could I sit here today and tell you there will never be
another issue on the NOTAM system?
No, sir, I cannot. What I can say is that we are making
every effort to modernize and look at our procedures. In fact,
part of this investigation has us working with MITRE and other
entities to look at the across the totality of our systems, how
they interrelate, what is the level of redundancy, and is there
any additional thing that we need to do?
And certainly, we will have more as an investigation
ensues.
Senator Cruz. Well, I think you are going to see, as you
have seen, bipartisan interest in assisting the FAA in ensuring
redundancy so that we don't see air traffic grounded again. And
in focusing more broadly, I hope, on modernization of air
traffic control. I want to shift to the near crashes we have
had.
And understandably, I am particularly focused on what
happened in Austin. Two weeks ago, there was a near collision
on the runway at Austin-Bergstrom Airport. A Southwest flight
was taking off from that runway, a FedEx plane was preparing to
land. They came incredibly close to crashing. Millions of
Texans fly every year.
I have flown on Southwest flights out of Austin literally
hundreds, if not thousands, of times. I actually have a video
that was created that is a reproduction of what happened. It is
a recreation, but it is based on the flight data, so if we
could play that video and I would like to get your reaction to
it.
[Video playing.].
Senator Cruz. So, I know the incident is under
investigation. If you are sitting in that Southwest flight, you
knew how close you came to having a plane land on top of you,
killing every person on that plane, you would understandably be
horrified. It is only through, as I understand it, the heroism
of the pilots being alert and seeing what was happening, that
that tragedy was averted.
And yet my question is, how can this happen? How did air
traffic control direct one plane onto the runway to take off
and another plane to land, and have them both within 100 feet
of each other? And what can we do to make sure that doesn't
happen again?
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Senator Cruz, for the question.
Certainly, we are letting the investigation play itself out.
Having been an airline captain and having been a pilot for more
than 42 years and an accident investigator, we will go where
the facts take us.
What is not represented on the video there, it appears to,
you know, eye clear, below in 22 days is what we would say in
pilot jargon. But actually, when the tower of visibility was
zero, it was a low visibility day, it is not what we would
expect to have happen.
But when we think about the controls, how we train both our
controllers and our pilot, the system works as it is designed
to avert what you say could have been a horrific outcome. The
pilots saw, the FedEx pilots saw----
Senator Cruz. Well, let me just underscore the urgency of
preventing that sort of incident from happening again.
Mr. Nolen. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Schatz. Oh, I am sorry,
Senator Klobuchar. I am sorry. Oh, Senator Schatz. OK, thank
you.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Madam Chair, Vice Chair--Ranking
Member. Administrator Nolen--and I want to welcome Senator
Moran to the T-HUD Committee, because I think it is important
to note that we did fully fund the budget request for NOTAM
modernizations efforts in the last spending bill, but there are
efforts to cut Federal spending.
And I want to ask you a very simple question, should we
expect flight delays and cancellations going forward if we
defund or underfund these transformations?
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Senator Schatz for the question. It
is clear, as I said in my opening comments, that as we are on
this modernization journey, we are on it with you.
So having the funding that we need, and yes, certainly we
get to places where either we have got starts and stops, or we
are into CRs, et cetera, having that funding there so that that
ongoing work can be done. And where we have the capability and
ability, we want to be able to accelerate that.
Senator Schatz. So here is my question for you, we do our
job, you do your job. If we pass a proper appropriations bill,
fully funding your request, can you commit to meeting the
deadlines and schedules already established for the
improvements to NOTAM?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. We remain on track to get that done.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much. You have got a bunch
of ongoing projects, and I want to talk to you about how you
prioritize. You have modernizing NOTAM, Next Gen, and then
integrating unmanned aircraft commercial space launches, urban
air mobility technologies.
How are you--I mean, the money is one thing, but you also
have a throughput capacity problem in terms of leadership and
analysis and all the rest of it. How are you racking and
stacking those priorities? I know you are going to say, look,
we got to do it all, but in reality, agencies have to
prioritize. I am wondering how you are doing that?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you for the question. You are
absolutely right. Our first priority has been and always will
be safety, and the safety of the NAS. So, when we think about
things that contribute to the safety of the NAS, that is at the
top of the list. And then we think about there is a security
aspect.
And certainly, we work in partnership with TSA and other
authorities to ensure that our airspace is secure. Last, when
we think about, you know--or not really last, but when we think
about the efficiency.
So those pieces of modernization that provides efficiency,
which the flying public enjoys as well, those are the things we
work on. So, when we think about Next Gen, what we are doing
there, and from a enterprise risk perspective as it relates to
the NAS, that is really what informs which programs and
priorities rise to the top of our list.
Senator Schatz. I want to move to another topic. NORAD has
adjusted its radars to be more sensitive to detecting potential
UAPs, leading to an uptick in picking up potential incursions.
Is the FAA adjusting status of airspace quickly, as regularly
as NORAD may need to respond to incidents?
And I guess more generally, can you tell us how you are
transforming your systems to be integrated into what we know
from our national security folks and the Department of Defense?
A lot of this has FAA implications. I do think increasing--and
increasing the sensitivity of the radars makes perfect sense.
I also do think that there may be instances now where we
are going to--you are going to get a ping on the radar that is
a flock of birds or some other not particularly dangerous--I
shouldn't say birds are not dangerous.
I am aware of bird strikes. But the point is it doesn't
rise to the national security level. And so how are you sorting
this and what changes are you currently in the middle of? I
don't expect you to have a fully formed answer, but I would
like to be reassured that you are working with our partners in
DOD to get this right.
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you very much for the question.
Again, we are indeed. We coordinate, collaborate, partner on
everything that you are talking about. We have a liaison
officer embedded at NORAD, and we also have DOD folks at our
National Operation Command Center.
So, if you were to be at the Command Center, you would see
that you have got representatives, certainly from the industry,
but you have got representatives from Government. We are
looking at cyber.
We are looking at UAS. All the things that you speak about,
there is a high level of coordination across the whole of
Government when it comes to the security of our airspace.
Senator Schatz. Final question. It has been publicly
reported, and I don't know that it is true, that the changing
the dials on the sensitivities of the radars is something that
can be done retroactively. In other words, for the past that
you have data sets that you could actually tweak and then that
might inform our national security folks in terms of how many
of these UAPs were flying and over what period of time. Can you
tell us anything about that?
Mr. Nolen. We have capabilities within our commands and we
have capabilities in terms of our radar, in terms of what we
can see, where we don't see. Again, it is a partnership effort
and it is a whole of Government approach.
Senator Schatz. The specific question is, do you have the
capability to go backward?
Mr. Nolen. Go backward? I am sorry, could you----
Senator Schatz. Go backward in time and say, look, I want
to know in 2018, let's say, the extent of these UAPs by taking
the data that you have, that probably nobody is looking at,
understandably, because it is in the past, and changing the
sensitivity on the data set. And then that would tell us
something about what was happening in the past. Do you know if
we have that capability?
Mr. Nolen. I do not. And certainly, I would be happy follow
up.
Senator Schatz. If you would get back to us. Thank you.
Mr. Nolen. Yes.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Nolen, thank you
for your presence here today. Thank you for the conversation
you had with me by phone on January 11, January 12. I
appreciate that.
There has been conversations at the FAA and within the
industry whether the agency should change the systems
classification from, the NOTAM systems classification, from
mission support to safety critical. Comments or thoughts?
Mr. Nolen. Senator Moran, thank you for that question.
Certainly, that is one of the directions that I have given our
team. Let's go back.
And so, part of this look is taking a look at all of our
enterprises and those we consider critical to the NAS versus
the support, so we are absolutely taking a look at the
classification there and make sure that we have got it right.
Senator Moran. And what would be the difference, if it was
reclassified? What would be the consequences?
Mr. Nolen. Some of the differences are just the levels of
controls and engineering controls that you would have in place
for a critical system, and those added levels of redundancy
that you would expect to have given the criticality of them.
Senator Moran. Senator Klobuchar and I have introduced the
NOTAM Improvement Act. Any thoughts on whether that would be of
assistance to you and the FAA?
Mr. Nolen. We fully support the goals that you have both
put forward here. And I--it is much of what we are working
toward, so we are very supportive of that.
Senator Moran. Let me talk about a specific technology
update. Spotlight on FAA's aging infrastructure. Would you
comment on the status of replacing instrument landing systems
located at hundreds of airports across the country? My
understanding, at the current pace, FAA's current pace of
modernization, it will take more than 100 years to replace
those critical systems.
Mr. Nolen. We have undertaken a body of work to say, you
know, again, I have talked about these three NASs that we
support. And so, when you look at that, we would love to be
able to sunset some technology. Sunset systems where that have
been replaced by satellite, GPS satellite-based navigation.
And our ability to go do that--so we do have a plan in
place to see how can we draw down where we have more than
adequate replacement for that. So that is a piece of work that
we are undertaking.
Senator Moran. In 2017, I was part of a bipartisan group
that introduced legislation that became law. It is called
Modernizing Government Technology Act, and it creates a fund
for Federal agencies to use savings obtained through
streamlining its IT systems, replacing legacy products, and
transition to cloud computing for additional modernization
efforts.
So, it allows an incentive for agencies, departments to
utilize, take those steps, and then they have the money to
acquire additional latest technology. To date, that fund has
invested in 35 Government IT modernization projects across 19
Federal agencies. The largest project investment was $187
million.
Considering NOTAM modernization is to--the goal is to
transition to entirely new platform, has the--has the
Department of Transportation, FAA has ever considered utilizing
that modernization fund to improve NOTAM, and is there a why or
why not?
Mr. Nolen. I certainly have to follow up with you on that
question, sir.
Senator Moran. Perhaps I am just pointing out there is an
opportunity for assistance.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
The Chair. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell.
And thank you for this hearing. And thank you, to you, Mr.
Nolen. Senator Moran mentioned our work on this bill, which I
am going to get to, but I did appreciate you talking to both of
us after that 2-hour ground stop and the work that needs to be
done with our air traffic system. What do you see as some of
the biggest challenges in strengthening the resiliency and
reliability of the system right now?
Mr. Nolen. Our focus is, number one, is always ensure that
the system is operating every day. So, every day in our
Nation's airspace, we have 45,000 flights. That is just over 16
million a year. And we do it very safely, day in and day out.
And we have gone 15 years--14 years, I am sorry, without a
fatal accident.
That is nearly 230 million flights, nearly a $1 billion in
payments a year. So, our system is very safe. At the same time,
we don't take that safety for granted. And we recognize we have
to continue this journey of modernization. So, if I--when I
look out and I look for risk, overall, I have a good sense
about where we are.
Can I say to the American public that we are safe? The
answer is that we are. If the question is, can we better be
better? The answer is absolutely, and that is the piece we are
working on.
Senator Klobuchar. And so, you are looking at transitioning
out of this legacy system, and what are your biggest obstacles
to do that?
Mr. Nolen. It is all about ensuring, again, that we have
that funding there. And we will look forward to having, you
know, what comes forward in the President's budget. Our goal is
to take every dollar that we are given, and we are--our goal is
to be good stewards of that and move forward to modernization.
So again, we are talking thousands of systems that NOTAM is
just one of, and so we don't want to leave the Committee with
the impression that if we fix NOTAMs and we are done. And I
know, you know, that is not where we are. But we will certainly
have a prioritization about how we get there. NOTAMs is a big
one. We want to continue to deliver on the benefits of NextGen.
Everything we have done there, even as we stare into the
future to say, how do we enable all these new entrants that are
coming in?
Senator Klobuchar. Right. And we mentioned, Senator Moran
mentioned the bill we have with Senator Capito. And the point
there is that it would create a task force, as you know, to
bring everyone to the table. It actually passed the House, for
my colleagues to note, led by represents Stauber of Minnesota.
He is got the Duluth Airport up there. And it passed the
House in the 116th and 117th Congress last time, 424 to 4. So,
I am hoping we can get that done, and whatever input you have,
I think the sooner we do that, the better. And then as we work
toward the FAA reauthorization on a separate track.
And I have the last question. And the focus I want to make
here is just the workforce issue. We know that every industry
practically in America is having workforce issues, including
airlines and including you guys.
And I know that Senators Duckworth, Thune, Moran, Fischer,
Kelly, and many others, the leadership of Chair Cantwell, are
working to expand the FAA's workplace development grant
programs to boost investments. Could you talk about that
pipeline of skilled aviation workers, and what you think we
should do?
Mr. Nolen. Yes. It is a great question. We look out and
say, how do we become a more inclusive agency? How do we really
reach out and touch underrepresented group? It is one of our
absolute top priorities for the agency. When we think about it,
I know there is part of that narrative, are we seeing a younger
work force?
The answer to that is yes. Are we attracting the kind of
talent that we need? The answer to that is also yes. As we were
looking to bring on more air traffic controllers, we reached
out with a campaign of finding folks who are wanting to be part
of the FAA and we expect that about 10,000, wound up with about
87,000 applications.
So, we are doing, you know, we are heavily involved in STEM
and AVSED, and our outreach to both universities, as well as
minority serving institutions, are all part of our ongoing
effort across the agency and the department to ensure that we
are really leaning in there.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much.
Appreciate it, Mr. Nolen.
The Chair. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
important hearing. During my time as Chairman of this
committee, we considered and enacted the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, which included several provisions related to
bolstering the Nation's air traffic control system and
improving the experience of the flying public.
As the next FAA reauthorization approaches, it is essential
that modernizing the Nation's air traffic control system
remains a top priority. As I have said before, I am deeply
concerned about the FAA's slow progress on NextGen.
Despite robust funding from Congress and numerous
legislative directives from this committee to complete such an
essential modernization initiative in a timely manner. Travel
disruptions, especially those related to recent ATC issues and
the failure of the NOTAM system in January, have only
highlighted the critical importance of technology
modernization, especially as it relates to improving management
of the national airspace system.
So, I look forward to this discussion, and Acting
Administrator Nolen, thank you for being here to testify. As I
previously mentioned, the implementation of NextGen is going to
be crucial in the coming years.
These investments, as well as employing concepts such as
dynamic airspace management, will allow the United States and
better utilize existing infrastructure, increasing the capacity
and efficiency of the NAS.
Recent ATC issues at airports across the country have
certainly highlighted the need for modernization. So, could you
describe how FAA is working to get back on schedule to
implement the various priorities of NextGen in a timely manner?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, Senator
Thune. So, we continue to work and to deliver on the benefits
of NextGen. When we think about the work we have done, again,
around navigation, around communication, one of the--a couple
of those successes is by going from voice to data, where we
have been able to eliminate, we believe, over 130,000 misread
clearances.
And we understand that is a big issue. We continue to work
on metroplexes that we have around the country. That has been a
big effort. 11 of those in places. When we think about, we have
optimized profile descents.
So that ability to descend now the altitude without the
stepped downs that were a thing of the past, those have become
more a thing of the past now, that allows certainly as a fuel
saving and as an efficiency piece.
That ability for us to be able to have airlines know when
the push off to the gate so that you are off the gate and to
the runway. All of those are efforts that we are doing and we
continue to do.
We work closely with the NextGen Advisory Committee. We got
the Advanced Aviation Advisory Committee, we have the Drone
Advisory Committee, and all of those committees inform the work
that we do. And we are looking--we continue to look for
opportunities. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, one of the
challenges we face and will continue to face with NextGen is
that level of equipage.
Not everyone is equipped to the same level. And so that
ability to take advantage of all that NextGen can deliver in
the moment in many respects will depend on what the industry
has equipped to. So that is a challenge for, and we will
continue to work through it.
Senator Thune. So, I mean, and it is just been--it has been
a very slow process with lots of delays. And I am concerned
that by the time many of these initiatives that you are talking
are completed, they are going to be already outmoded or
obsolete in comparison to the latest technology. So what
actions is the FAA taking to avoid this issue as NextGen
implementation continues?
Mr. Nolen. It is one of continued, you know, partnership
and collaboration. We are an ongoing, almost on a daily, weekly
basis with the airline industry, and with, you know, partners
around the world in terms of how do we get better at that.
The journey we are on is there and airlines, the industry
are seeing the benefits of it. There is more work to be done,
undoubtedly. Again, back to the equipage piece there, there are
just certain things you have to have to be able to do a
particular approach, for example.
Our ability to sunset some of the legacy systems, some
ILSs, NDVs, things like that, now that we have GPS based
navigation, right. So, it is our ability to work collectively
and have that--a similar vision between us in the industry
about what we want to achieve and how quickly we can get there.
Senator Thune. So, as this committee looks toward
developing this FAA reauthorization bill, do you believe there
are opportunities for the FAA to incorporate adaptive or
dynamic airspace management technologies into its NextGen
initiative, or otherwise enhance real time inter-agency
coordination with the Pentagon and other stakeholders?
And I tell you that because we have an Air Force base in a
training area, the Powder River Training Complex, and the B-1
currently operates there, B-21 is coming in. We are going to
get the first training unit, formal training unit and first
operations unit there. And we really need the FAA's help on
this. And it is something we have been focused on for a long
time. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, I would say we are strong partners, not
only with the DOD, to ensure that we can work together and that
we are aligned. And when we think about airspace in the
airspace uses, we are a strong partner and we really, we
welcome the suggestion and we look forward to seeing how do we
do more of it.
Senator Thune. Well, I hope we can count on your help on
that, because it has become--it is one of the biggest obstacles
to large force training exercises and the types of, you know,
capabilities that we can use or would benefit from in that
airspace. So I hope you can help us.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Hickenlooper, then Senator
Fischer, then Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Nolen,
thank you for your time and your public service. As space
transportation becomes more common in the U.S., integrating
space data, international airspace system operations is going
to become increasingly more and more important.
Maintaining a safe and efficient shared airspace and
mitigating delays caused by commercial space launches become
more--increasingly more important, as I said. So, Mr. Nolen,
can you describe the FAA's efforts to coordinate with the
commercial space industry, to integrate space data into
national airspace operations?
Why is the status of the FAA's Space Data Integration
Program, or what is the state, status of the FAA's Space Data
Integration Program to improve airspace safety and efficiency?
Mr. Nolen. Yes. Well, thank you very much, Senator, for the
question. We, our work there with the space data integrator is
ongoing and certainly already bearing fruits. It has provided
us, meaning the FAA, the ability to reduce the airspace that we
need to block off for flights.
This year, we saw--last year, I am sorry, we saw a record
number of space launches and we are expecting to see at least
one and a half time, if not double the amount that we saw last
year.
So this is a key technology that we are working to make
sure--that will help us make our airspace more efficient and
reduce the amount of closures, and the ability to reopen
airspace faster. So that is a piece that we are working on.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. And I have my requisite NOTAM
question as well. At Denver International Airport alone, the
NOTAM failure resulted in 800 delayed or canceled flights.
Smaller regional airports in Colorado also experienced delays
and cancellations, significantly impacting airport operations,
airport customers, and commerce.
So, Mr. Nolen, can you describe what technical operational
improvements the FAA is taking to make sure this kind of
operation disruption does not occur again in those smaller
markets, as well as the large airports?
Mr. Nolen. We attempt to do our very best job, and
certainly we will make sure--we will take away the point about
how well we communicate and coordinate.
It should be noted for the Committee that on just any given
day, every 2 hours, there is an update from the National
Command Center that airports, airlines, and others can tune
into. We also have stakeholders who are present in the Command
Center on the floor. So our goal is to make sure that we have
got good communication.
I do know from my team that this particular outage was
indeed communicated out to airports and in a timely manner. But
we will look for opportunities to say, can we make that even
faster and more efficient.
Senator Hickenlooper. Got it. Great. I appreciate that.
Last, the FAA is facing a number of critical issues ranging
including technical upgrades, the new entrance into the
national airspace, as I mentioned, growing the aviation work
force, a critical issue, making sure that there is more
diversity, more equity in that work force.
Based on your experience as Acting Administrator, what
skills and experiences do you think are critical to lead an
agency like FAA?
Mr. Nolen. Well, you know, as we think about that, and
whoever leads FAA, that choice belongs to the President. And I
know the President has made a choice, and I certainly support
the President's choice in that.
Senator Hickenlooper. Right. I wanted to--giving you an
opportunity to do what I will now do and just say that I think
Phil Robb--Phil Washington, who is the nominee to become the
Administrator, really does have the skills and capabilities
necessary to really turn around our aviation system.
He rose to the rank of Command, made Sergeant Major in the
Army, 24 years in the Army. And I think he is someone who is
used to getting things done, coming in, helping get people all
on the same page and really focused. He was the CEO of the
Regional Transportation District in metropolitan Denver for
almost 12 years and helped turn around a major transportation
initiative.
And then he has also been CEO of Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and for a number of
years now, the CEO of Denver International Airport, the third
busiest airport in the world.
And I think that array of experience, while not all in
aviation, is all transportation connected and so many of these
same situations that come up again and again in the aviation
sector. Anyway, comment if you want, or I will just leave it
there and say, we need to get a permanent Administrator in
place as soon as we can.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
The Chair. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Administrator
Nolen, welcome. Thank you for your service.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. This past week, we have seen NORAD track
numerous unidentified objects in the North American airspace. I
served on the Armed Services committee as well, and I am the
ranking Republican on strategic forces, which has oversight
over missile defense, so I am interested in protocol.
And I visited with NORTHCOM and NORAD about that. But I
would like to know if there is any process in place where
civilian pilots that detect an unknown object while in flight,
do they report the incident to FAA? Do you have any connection,
then, with DOD on it? What are the protocols that you have?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Fischer, for the
question. I will just relay to, you know, from my own time when
I was an airline captain, there have been times of fire where
you see a balloon and certainly that typically as a pilot you
would report that to air traffic control. It may be something
they already know about.
And to the extent of they are worried about, there have
been times when I have flown where it would say, be advised
that we have a high altitude balloon, yes, x distance, x place.
So there are processes in place to report.
And then we have, as I mentioned earlier, an embedded team
with NORAD. We have strong connections with the Department of
Defense, Homeland Security, TSA, et cetera. So there is this
whole of Government approach to protecting the homeland and
protecting our skies.
Senator Fischer. And as far as you know, those protocols
are followed?
Mr. Nolen. The protocols for reporting? It depends. You
know, I am going to say that may be spotty. Just, and I take
that just from my own personal experience. You know, will
everybody report that they saw a balloon? The answer there is
probably, no.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. In 2021, the Inspector General
report, it was cited that the FAA struggles to carry out its
role to integrate new technologies and capabilities across
various offices within the agency.
Integrating new technologies and certification will be a
priority as I work on the FAA reauthorization. How is FAA
addressing concerns in the IG report in regards to the NextGen
office and integrating new technologies? I know you have
visited some with Senator Moran about that and also NextGen
with Senator Thune, but could you address that specifically?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am, I would--firstly, I would push back
against the notion that the FAA is in any way wavering on our
mission to make our airspace, which is the most complex in the
world, as efficient as we can, even as we embrace new entrants.
We have already set in place processes to say, how do we
enable new entrants, what is the regulatory framework they will
need to operate, and then how do we get them integrated into
our airspace.
Senator Fischer. Is it going as quickly as you had hoped?
Mr. Nolen. It is going with speed. And I think if you
reach--so if you reach out to a couple of the air, advanced
mobility companies, they will tell you they feel that we are on
step. It is--this is fairly complex work.
And we, what we have said and what we continue to say,
technology can never trump safety. And this is one that the
public expects and rightfully so, that we get it right. So we
are moving.
I can tell you, though, categorically we are moving with a
strong sense of purpose to enable these new entrants in the
market. And that is one of the things we are truly passionate
about.
Senator Fischer. Will you commit to working with my office,
keeping us informed on the integration of those technologies?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I would be happy to continue to
give--provide updates.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. The FAA has completed its
preliminary investigation on the recent NOTAM malfunction. Will
a more in-depth investigation and assessment be conducted? And
will you share those findings with Congress?
Mr. Nolen. We do have. We will certainly share as much
information as we are able to. But to your point, and I welcome
the question, the investigation is ongoing. So a couple of
things there. We are working our Office of IT and Technology.
We are working with MITRE to assess all of these systems.
Again, we are talking thousands. We are looking at levels
of redundancy. What is our, you know, give us a sort of a
resiliency score, if you will. So that work is underway. And we
are thinking in terms from a safety management system
perspective, what are the controls we have in place?
If they--did they work? What should have been done? What
didn't happen? What are the areas and opportunities for us to
improve?
Senator Fischer. Have you got in depth on looking at the
controls and how quickly they were implemented?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. You know, we have assigned that to a
couple of our offices, our Office of Safety Investigations, our
Office of Security to say, again, what happened in the moment.
It is pretty dynamic.
A lot of things happen that should have happened in terms
of reporting. But we certainly look to say, how can we do this
better to make sure we don't have a repeat.
Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
The Chair. Senator Peters. Senator Markey, I had called on
him, but Senator Peters was ahead of him, and he has been so
gracious to allow Senator Peters to go. So, thank you, Senator
Markey. Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you,
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Nolen, for being here today
before the Committee.
You know, like many Americans and Michiganders, I am
certainly concerned as well by the recent incursions into our
airspace of a Chinese surveillance balloon, as well as several
as yet unidentified objects, the most recent one that flew
across the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and was neutralized over
Lake Huron.
I have been in contact with the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security, your agency, to monitor these
currents. And I have called for greater transparency into these
incidents. So I certainly do appreciate some of your comments
that you have made here today about FAA's coordination with
NORAD.
So I don't want to belabor those points. You have covered
those well through the hearing so far. But I did want to ask
you one thing related to that. Earlier this week, the White
House announced the creation of an interagency team to study
the broader policy implications for detection, analysis, and
disposition of unidentified aerial phenomena, and especially
those that could pose potential security risks.
So my question for you, does the FAA expect to be a part of
that team, and has that task force actually met and is starting
to work?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you for the question, Senator
Peters. Yes, the FAA is part of that team. Our COO, Tim
Morrell, will be our representative on their team, and that
team has already met and continues to meet.
Senator Peters. Good. Good. You also mentioned to Senator
Schatz, the FAA currently has people embedded in NORAD to
improve coordination. But given these specific events, are
there any additional bureaucratic or inoperability improvements
that you can share with Congress to ensure that these
concerning breaches of airspace are basically met with a
seamless and immediate response?
Mr. Nolen. Well, what I can tell you in an open forum is
that there is a whole of Government approach to this from an
interagency standpoint to make sure not only that we are
aligned on policy, we are aligned on response, that that level
of coordination is absolutely there.
Senator Peters. Good, good. Mr. Nolen, Gerald, our Ford
International Airport in Grand Rapids in Michigan, is the
second--Michigan's second largest airport. Over 200 aircraft
operations per day, and it serves a growing part of the state
of Michigan.
However, even as Grand Rapids serves record numbers of
passengers, it has been stymied in its efforts to expand and
modernize a 60-year-old FAA air traffic control tower.
Last year, I secured $5 million in Congressionally directed
spending for the airport to begin the design process and to
replace that tower, but it is still not done. And I would just
like to ask you, would you commit to working with me and the
Grand Rapids Airport to ensure that a plan to replace their
tower is done in a timely fashion?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. What I can commit is, we will
definitely work with your staff in terms of, I know there is
work that is ongoing there. We will commit to giving you
regular updates on it and what our progress is.
Senator Peters. Right. Well, thank you. The unmanned aerial
systems are beyond visual line of sight, Aviation Rulemaking
Committee has published its report in March of 2022. The report
laid the foundation for providing regulatory certainty to
stakeholders looking to safely and swiftly deploy and scale
unmanned aerial systems.
However, the FAA's rulemaking agenda notes that a draft
rule for UAS deployment outside the visual line of sight isn't
expected until February 2024, 23 months from the report to the
draft rule.
And that is, as you know, not even a final rule at that
point. Between the long wait for this rulemaking and difficult
to navigate current exemption and waiver process, I am afraid
advancements in commercial drone industry have stalled,
frustrating communities and states like Michigan, who are
looking to take advantage of this cutting-edge technology and
economic opportunity it represents.
So my question for you, Mr. Nolen, do you commit to doing
everything you can to ensure that the U.S. maintains its global
leadership in advanced aviation? And certainly, this type of
aircraft that represents the future, we need to lean into,
making sure we are facilitating that.
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, sir, for the question. Let me
say, the U.S. is and remains the world's leader when it comes
to this type of technology. To date, we have licensed over a
million drones. Our projections are that we will have 2.5
million by Fiscal Year 2025. So we are working. With respect to
beyond visual line of sight, we stood up an aviation rulemaking
arc and a committee.
We received thousands of reports. We are going--comments,
if you will. We are going through the process of going through
those. But in the meantime, even as we are doing that, we have
things like waivers and exemptions that we are using to enable
UAS operations, some of which we have already done.
So we will commit that this is, again, part of our top
priority for our drones, for advanced air mobility, to make
sure that we stay the world's leader.
Senator Peters. Good. Thank you, Mr. Nolen. Senator Markey
and Chair Cantwell, thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Budd.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Budd. I thank the Chair. Mr. Nolen, welcome. It was
good to chat with you earlier. You know, I was listening to a
colleague from across the aisle a few minutes ago from
Colorado, and, you know, it struck me how much I appreciated
your aviation experience, your service to our military.
You know, it would just make sense, common sense seems not
so common anymore, but, you know, it would just makes sense
that somebody leading the Federal Aviation Administration would
actually have aviation experience, so I appreciate the
experience that you bring to the table.
You know, on the morning when this issue occurred, an
exchange between air traffic control and a pilot at Newark
Airport sums up some of the broader issues with the NOTAM
system that go beyond this specific outage. ATC was talking to
an airplane, that was to a pilot of an airplane that was
taxiing out for departure and told the pilot about the
nationwide ground stop.
ATC asked the pilot if he had heard anything about the
NOTAM issue before departure. The pilot responded, no, nobody
reads NOTAMs. Well, maybe that is because the NOTAM system is
not designed in a user-friendly way.
The FAA's new Federal NOTAM website, it is a little better,
but it does not prioritize important NOTAMs, and it delivers it
in a printed code that is optimized for teletype machines
instead of plain English. I will give you an example, as you
would know, so I printed this out.
No environmental impact study was done before, but I
printed out the NOTAM from the Federal NOTAM system for a
flight from D.C. back to my home airport near Winston-Salem. It
is a 90-page document for a simple flight about an hour long.
If I didn't review the list closely, I might have missed
the NOTAM for a runway closure in my designated alternate
airport. The NOTAM is buried on page four, somewhere in here
between 13 other runway and taxiway NOTAMs.
So, Chair, I would like to ask for unanimous consent that
this briefing be included in the record.
The Chair. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Budd. Thank you. Your pilots can consult other free
resources provided by the FAA-like Leidos' Flight Service. That
system does have a summary of important NOTAMs, like temporary
flight restrictions or TFRs, and runway closures.
But that system missed the runway closure NOTAM on the
summary page. Here is the summary page, and it doesn't have
that important NOTAM.
So I would have had to find that runway closure NOTAM on
page 53 of a 276 page briefing. So, Mr. Nolen, aside from the
issues faced last month, what is the FAA doing to bring NOTAMs
into the 21st century?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Budd, for the question.
This is exactly--you know, again, we share that we are both
pilots, so we operate in the Nation's airspace here. This is
part of our modernization effort.
We committed that we will align our NOTAM with the ICAO
standard. That we will make them timely, we will make them
relevant, and the ability to prioritize by, as you say, by
route of flight. So that is a part of the work is ongoing.
Where we are today, we are--call it half way there. They are
searchable.
You can find the ones that are relevant to your flight. But
this is a one we have just got to do better, and that better
means getting off of the U.S. NOTAM system, onto the Federal
NOTAM system, and the last part of that is ensuring now that
our NOTAM systems comports to the ICAO standard.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much for that answer. So it
makes sense to have flight restrictions around major games like
last week in Super Bowl or, you know, the upcoming Daytona 500.
And those TFRs are announced well in advance and cover much
more airspace to provide appropriate security for those special
events.
But stadium TFRs and the exception of those TFRs, they seem
designed to trip up small planes flying VFR. So, Mr. Nolen, are
you aware of any instances where a 3 mile, 3,000 foot TFR
thwarted a threat from the air?
Mr. Nolen. I am not.
Senator Budd. OK. Well, Mr. Nolen, my time is short, but
again, I want to just again, thank you for what you bring to
the table, for your expertise in the aviation field, and your
leadership of the FAA.
As a pilot myself, I am glad that a fellow aviator is at
the helm of this important agency, and I hope that we can get a
permanent head of the FAA that has a deep understanding of the
issues facing aviation today. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your
service, sir. Obviously, the outage of the NOTAM system just
shows how fragile our aviation system has become. And we heard
in testimony last week that Southwest Airlines suffered its own
operational meltdown due to inadequate amounts of winter
equipment, which was exacerbated by its own limited
technological system.
Southwest told us that they didn't have enough deicing
equipment in Chicago or in Denver, which is like saying you
don't have enough baseballs to open the season at Fenway Park.
You know, so obviously, they didn't anticipate what was
unfolding. And a lot of it is as a result of climate change, as
a result of global warming.
Burlington, Vermont, for example, in a report out just this
past month, but it is a good example of what is happening
across the country, is seven degrees warmer in the winter than
it was just 50 years ago.
Burlington, Vermont, seven degrees warmer. So it is not
just global warming, it is global weirding that is taking
place, and therefore, you have to adjust, adapt the system to
the craziness of the weather. And the aviation system has to
make the investment in order to deal with this dramatically
changing weather environment due to global warming, due to
climate change.
So there is a dangerous connection between climate change
and outdated technology and infrastructure, with extreme
weather events like winter storm Elliot stressing the IT
systems at the core of our aviation system. So, Administrator
Nolen, do you agree that climate change poses new challenges
for airlines, airports, and the FAA?
Mr. Nolen. Senator Markey, thank you for the question. Just
given my long time airline experience, I can say, number one, I
have operated in all kind of conditions. The airlines, when we
think about how they operate, they all have what they call
winter operation plan. I am not an expert on climate. I
certainly believe there are things we must do to continue as we
think about what----
Senator Markey. Do you think you have to become an expert
on climate? Do you think the aviation system has to become
expert on climate? What do you think?
Mr. Nolen. Absolutely. The more we know, the better.
Senator Markey. So that is what I would like to hear. I
would like to hear that there is an understanding,
appreciation, you know. That if you are not an expert, other
people have to be experts.
Mr. Nolen. We do have--we do that have that level of
expertise within the agency.
Senator Markey. And that, I think, is very important
because we are going to obviously have to harden our aviation
systems against extreme storms, heat, and other weather events.
Do you think that the FAA needs to require a greater investment
in resiliency at airports?
Mr. Nolen. That is certainly the path we are on. And so,
you know, and that is a wonderful way of describing it, right.
It is how resilient are our systems. And the extent to which we
build that in and bake that in, certainly the industry globally
is investing in technology to be more resilient. And it is an
absolute priority for us.
Senator Markey. And I am working on legislation to improve
the resiliency of our aviation system, particularly at our
airports. We worked hard to include $25 billion for our
airports in the bipartisan infrastructure law.
But these critical investments will be wasted if we don't
address the climate related risks. And we are just going to
have to work together in order to make sure that they are not
in denial about what is happening. And just one final point,
which is related to airport resiliency, which is airport
service workers.
These individuals are the unsung heroes of our aviation
system, but they often are overworked and underpaid. And just
as our aviation system literally came to a stop due to a NOTAM
outage, our airports would similarly stop functioning if the
airport workers, the wheelchair attendants, the concessions
workers, ramp agents, baggage handlers did not do their jobs.
So I just think it is absolutely essential that we
recognize, and you do agree, they are essential to keeping
these airports functioning?
Mr. Nolen. I do, indeed.
Senator Markey. Yes, and I think it is important for us,
which is why I introduced the Good Jobs for Good Airports Act,
which would ensure that airport workers are paid a living wage
and benefits. They are underappreciated, underpaid, under
supported, they are black, brown, immigrant disproportionately.
And during the pandemic, they showed up. They couldn't zoom to
work. And we just have to make sure they get the resources
which they need. So thank you, sir, for the work that you do.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Before I go to our next member to ask
questions, I just want to clarify that the video that we saw
earlier was a simulation done by Senator Cruz, I think, and his
team. That was not a real video of the incident. There seems to
be some confusion about that, so.
Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am. I knew it was a simulation.
The Chair. Yes, OK. You clearly stated that, but not
everybody may have captured that, so we just want to reiterate
that. Next, I have Senator Vance.
STATEMENT OF HON. J.D. VANCE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Vance. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Nolen, thank you
for being here. I am going to ask just a little bit about some
of the unusual increases in obsession with the vocabulary and
language that we are seeing in some of the FAA guidance and
related documents related to our aviation industry. I want to
ask, did the FAA issue a 176 page guidance document changing
notices to airmen to notices of air mission in December 2021?
Mr. Nolen. We did.
Senator Vance. This was in part to avoid using the gender
term airmen, correct?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Vance. OK. On November 10, 2021, the FAA held an
inclusive language summit. Are you familiar with this effort?
Mr. Nolen. I am familiar with it.
Senator Vance. During the summit, which had a solicitation
published in the Federal Register, Deputy Administrator Mims
stated that when we use terms like airman or unmanned aircraft,
so I am laughing because this has to be a joke, we are sending
a message that only men belong in the aerospace community. Do
you agree with that statement?
Mr. Nolen. Well, Senator, what I could say is that having
been a pilot for 42 years and seeing the evolution of our
aerospace industry, I started out in helicopters and have flown
as a captain in big jetliners. Not everyone is a pilot today.
We have drones. We have spaceships--spacecraft, I am sorry.
And so I do believe going to notices to air missions is
absolutely the right thing to do. It is a accurate reflection
of where airspace system is today. Fully supportive of that.
And none of that, by the way, detracts from our mission, which
is the safety of our airspace. And that will always be our
North Star.
Senator Vance. The point is, if it makes sense for some
aviation reason, that is fine. If it makes sense purely to
avoid gendered language, it seems like an unnecessary
preoccupation with the words that you are using and that we are
using rather than the work that we are doing.
I want to just ask a couple of additional questions about
this summit. The public notice for the meeting stated, ``if any
individual employer, contractor, or industry partner feels
excluded or marginalized because of language or words, the work
of the agency suffers.'' Do you agree that the feelings of FAA
employees about language are this important?
Mr. Nolen. What I agree is that as we seek to attract the
next generation of people into aerospace, mostly they won't
look like the people sitting in this room. And so it is our
ability to say, how do we bring tomorrow into today into an
industry that is evolving right before our eyes. So our ability
to find inclusive ways of reaching underrepresented groups is a
right path to be on.
Senator Vance. OK. I guess unanimous consent enter into the
record the Drone Advisory Committee Public E-Book. I have it
right here. This document uses the term wife as an example of
the type of language that we need to eliminate. Is that
something you support?
Mr. Nolen. I am sorry, could you restate the question? I am
sorry, sir.
Senator Vance. So I am asking to give consent, first of
all, to enter this into the record. But it explains that wife,
the word wife is an example of the type of language that we
need to eliminate. And I am just asking if that is something
you think is necessary or something you support?
Mr. Nolen. I would have to give that one some more thought.
Senator Vance. Well, I would hope that the word wife is not
something that we--or is something that we could all agree is a
reasonable vocabulary word that most Americans use in their
daily life. It is not something that we need to eliminate.
I don't have much time here, so let me just ask here, at
this same summit, during a panel called, How the FAA is Pushing
Gendered Language Boundaries, the panelists stated that FAA
leadership brought us to where we are here today. We see the
recommendations from the Committee as a foundation, but it is
also just the beginning of the conversation?
It strikes me that preoccupying ourselves so much with the
words that we use rather than the work that we do, especially
as our infrastructure appears to be crumbling and we have had
major flight outages in the last couple of years, is at best a
distraction, and at worst a thing that takes attention away
from focusing on the real problems.
I worry--well, I especially I represent the people of Ohio,
and I am very confident that the majority of Ohioans, if there
is a pilot who is offended by the word wife or the word
cockpit, maybe that person shouldn't be a pilot.
So rather than kowtowing to people who are fragile, maybe
we should actually say, if you are so worried about the words
that we are using, you shouldn't be flying, you know, multi-ton
metal engines through the sky.
And I just ask all of us to maybe try to focus as much on
real problems, like the fact that our aviation system seems to
not be working as well as it used to, than the fact that we may
use un-inclusive or under inclusive language. Thank you, Mr.
Nolen. I appreciate it.
The Chair. Senator Baldwin.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Madam Chair. So welcome,
Administrator Nolen. Thank you for coming before the Committee
and I know you will be back again, although that will not stop
me from going beyond the stated topic of this hearing. But I am
going to start with the stated topic of this hearing.
So the NOTAM failure happened right on the heels of a
failure with Southwest Airlines. We had Southwest leadership
testify last week about their meltdown during the holidays. And
I want to raise a similar concern for the FAA that I raised
with Southwest.
When something goes wrong and flights are canceled or
delayed to the degree that they were during both of these
situations, airports need to hear from you. They need to hear,
in the case of Southwest, from Southwest, I learned from
several Wisconsin airports, they just did not receive any type
of proactive communication from the agency about the impacts of
the NOTAM failure.
They only received information necessary to respond to
confused and frustrated travelers after reaching out, you know,
themselves to FAA's local regional office. It is my expectation
in situations like these that FAA should provide proactive and
real time updates and guidance to our Nation's airports.
Can you commit to that moving forward, and tell me how you
would approach that, should we ever have a failure like this or
similar disruption that requires this type of communication?
Mr. Nolen. Well, Senator Baldwin, thank you so much for the
question there. Let me say, just to set the record straight,
throughout the course of every day, there are industry calls
from our National Command Center every 2 hours.
In addition, on the January 10th, we also opened up a
hotline at 8 p.m. on the night of January 10th, and we had
anyone could call into that, meaning airlines, airports, and
other users of the system.
So that was open. And then we were talking with our
industry stakeholders throughout the night. On the following
morning, when I instituted the ground stop, that information
also went out nationwide to all airports. And we have roughly
5,000 airports in the country.
And so all of that, and as well, our office of airports
also reached out to provide updates on the NOTAM outages that
morning, early that morning of January 11th. And certainly we
also updated that once the NOTAM was canceled. But your point
is well taken.
We will go back and just scrub to say, can we even improve
our communication process, and we will commit to you that we
will do just that.
Senator Baldwin. I appreciate that. Congress took action in
the last FAA reauthorization or the 2018 FAA reauthorization to
move airports away from firefighting foams that contain PFAS,
yet airports are still without any approved alternatives.
Airports in my state are eager to transition away toward safer
alternatives and are anxiously awaiting an approved alternative
from the FAA.
I will note that there are now numerous communities in
Wisconsin whose groundwater has been contaminated with PFAS,
and they are, in many cases, immediately adjacent to an
operating airport.
I am aware that the Department of Defense, which has a
strong role to play here, of course, recently released a
military specification outlining its requirement for
firefighting foams that do not contain PFAS.
So given that update, what can you tell me and what do you
see as the likely timeline for finally giving airports PFAS-
free alternatives? And how does the agency see its role in
assisting airports throughout this transition process that we
hope will be forthcoming?
Mr. Nolen. Good question there. We are still working
through that. So our Associate Administrator for Airports is on
point in terms of working through this issue with PFAS. We
recognize is one of supply as we look to an alternative.
As you mentioned, the new mil-spec is out. Airports are
allowed to use for an actual emergency, and then we have got
procedures where they can test without discharging PFAS onto
the ramp and, you know, keeping that from getting into the
water tables.
So we are working through the process of how we get there.
We recognize it will take us some time. What I can commit to
you is, we will follow up with you, with your staff in terms of
what that those actual timelines are as they become available
to us.
Senator Baldwin. I just would want to stress and press for
all due but considered speed on this. The resources that we are
committing at the Federal level to try to assist communities
with getting a clean and safe water supply after contamination
are in the billions, and we shouldn't be prolonging this in any
way.
So I certainly want to press for, you know, timely action
on this. I know at the local fire department's--fire department
level, which obviously is different than aviation firefighting,
but they are finding various firefighting foams that are
working very effectively that do not contain PFAS.
It seems to me that those tests--that that testing can be
happening at the Federal level and get something in the queue
as soon as possible.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. Senator Schmitt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of
questions. And you may have addressed this already, but I do
want to ask because I get a lot of questions about this from
back home.
So you were aware of this the night before on the NOTAM
failure in January, but the public was not made aware until the
next morning, right, including when people were sitting on
planes and flights were delayed? I mean, there was no real
transparency with the public, you would agree with that?
Mr. Nolen. What I would agree with, sir, is that we, the
system on the night before was operating, and also airlines
were not reporting that there were any operational impacts on
the night of the 10th.
Senator Schmitt. OK. So how long until you knew that this
actually wasn't working, until the public knew?
[Technical problems.]
The Chair. I think that was one of our colleagues trying
to--next in line------
Senator Schmitt. That is OK. Can I have my 10 seconds back?
The Chair. Yes, sure.
Senator Schmitt. I am just kidding.
[Laughter.].
Senator Schmitt. Right. OK, I just want to move on to
something else. So in the President's budget that has been
submitted, there is $2.4 million proposed to address climate
change.
In the conclusion of that budget, it says, and I quote,
``the FAA's budget request for Fiscal Year 2023 embodies the
Administration's priorities of mitigating climate change and
increasing equity.''
Do you believe that that is your mission at the FAA, to
mitigate climate change and increase equity? Is that your job
at the FAA?
Mr. Nolen. I believe it is all of our jobs here to address
climate change, and is one that we take seriously.
Senator Schmitt. OK. In that report, there is further
commentary about it as a response to the accelerating climate
crisis. Do you believe we have a climate crisis?
Mr. Nolen. I was just at the ICAO convention where the
majority in an overwhelming fashion supported moving to net
zero carbon emissions by 2050. So if you look out across the
global community, it is one that is staring us in the face and
it is one we must address.
Senator Schmitt. I am not really interested in the global
community's view. I am interested in the FAA's view, whose
mission is supposed to be safe and affordable travel for the
American public.
And what I have noticed with agencies, and this was
particularly heightened in COVID and I think is now the
playbook, we went from global warming to climate change to now
a climate crisis. And as you have indicated, words matter. And
in my view, that is meant to stoke fear and empower unelected
bureaucrats to do things that are not authorized by law because
it is an ``emergency.''
And so I have deep concerns with spending $2.4 million on--
it is not really clear, but I want to read you something from
this. It says the FAA, this is the same budget request, the FAA
will need to continue supporting maintenance and implementation
of ICAO's Carbon Offsetting And Reduction Scheme for
International Aviation, CORSIA, the international standard.
CORSIA is a market based measure that allows international
operators to achieve carbon neutral growth through the use of
carbon offsets and sustainable aviation fuel. Is the FAA
currently supportive of CORSIA?
Mr. Nolen. Of course, Yes, sir, we are. And we are
supportive of our move to sustainable aviation fuels.
Senator Schmitt. OK. I am distressed and troubled that the
Secretary Buttigieg, Pete Buttigieg, is not here today. Do you
know if Pete Buttigieg, when he flies private, uses that same
system, that same measurement of CORSIA?
Mr. Nolen. Well, first, let me say, sir, that what you
speak of is private Government aircraft that are used across
the Government. We use aircraft for testing. The FAA has a
fleet of 42 aircraft that are primarily used for en route
testing, et cetera. And so in those, without having to sort of
qualify this, we are talking about public resources and not
private resources.
Senator Schmitt. Right. Does he, does the Secretary use
market based carbon offsets when he flies private?
Mr. Nolen. Sir, I can't speak to that.
Senator Schmitt. Can you get back to me on that, because I
am very interested. Or maybe actually, if you could get the
message to the Secretary the next time we have a hearing
dealing with the Department of Transportation, the FAA, we
would like to see him here. And if he could give an answer to
that.
Because he flies private a lot. He tells hardworking
Americans they need to pay more for things that he is not
willing to pay for, and people are frustrated. Could you relay
that message to him?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Madam Chair. As a Senator
from the great state of Illinois where we produce a lot of
ethanol, my farmers are very supportive of the aviation fuel,
sustainable aviation fuel movement.
As a pilot, and we both actually started off as rotor
heads, so welcome. It is good to see a fellow the rotor head.
And I know your background in aviation actually also includes a
long history of aviation safety.
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. All the way back to your days as an Army
pilot. One of the things that you learn is that a safety system
should never be left vulnerable to a single point of failure,
never.
Redundancy saves lives. We know that. That is why I am very
alarmed that a single contractor could crash the automated
NOTAM system by simply deleting files. That sounds like a
single point of failure to me and I would love to understand it
better.
And this is on the heels of the deadly Boeing 737 MAX
crashes that were caused by the grossly irresponsible decision
to place passengers' lives at risk at the mercy of a single
angle of attack sensor.
What is striking about these incidents is that America's
largest commercial aircraft manufacturer, and the world's most
important aviation regulator, both betrayed a fundamental
aviation safety principle, operational redundancy.
It is the FAA's job to keep our airspace safe, but it is
impossible for FAA to do this unless its systems have
appropriate redundancies, and you generally have redundancies
across the system.
Administrator Nolen, when was the last time that the FAA
reviewed its air traffic organization's facilities and
equipment to ensure that there are no potential single points
of failure?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Duckworth. And I
applaud you for your service as well. It is great to talk to a
fellow Army person. Let me just say, we have an ongoing look in
terms of where we are.
So the whole journey of modernization for the FAA is
exactly to what you are describing, how do we continue to build
in redundancy and resiliency in the system, and expand it to be
able to accommodate new entrants in what we have today? That
work is ongoing.
Senator Duckworth. When was the last time before the NOTAM
system crashed that a review was conducted?
Mr. Nolen. We did reviews in 2020, 2021, and we have done
three reviews in 2022.
Senator Duckworth. I would love to see any report from
those reviews, if possible.
Mr. Nolen. We will certainly follow up with them.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. The Boeing 737 MAX
investigation discovered that at least one employee
specifically cautioned against relying on a single angle of
attack sensor in the airframe, but that concern went unheeded.
How often, if ever, are you briefed on concerns that FAA
employees may have about the resiliency of the air traffic
organization's facilities and equipment? Do you get those
briefings? Do those come up to you at your level?
Mr. Nolen. We do. We have several processes. Certainly, we
have a whistleblower program. We have got a for our safety
organization. We have a voluntary safety confidential reporting
program.
So there are multiple avenues for FAA employees to get
information to me. I have a biweekly with my audit team in
terms of----
Senator Duckworth. And they lift up individual?
Mr. Nolen. They do come to me for individual reports.
Senator Duckworth. OK. I am going to go to my next question
just simply because I have a limited amount of time. As you
know, last week, Airlines for America urged FAA to extend its
proposed deadline to June 2024 to retrofit aircraft with
altimeters that won't experience interference from 5G wireless
technology.
While a 4-month delay may not be a huge disruption, it is a
reminder that this process has been and remains a seat of the
pants operation. Had the FAA and FCC better cooperated during
the development of 5G, wireless customers would have benefited
from a smooth, predictable rollout of this new technology
without risks to air passengers.
Instead, we were treated to delays, negotiations, and
uncertainty, all because the FAA and the FCC failed to
meaningfully collaborate with each other early and often over
the years. We should never have reached a situation where the
FAA had to seriously consider halting flights at certain
airports because it could not rule out the risk of 5G
interference causing a crash, even if such a risk was low.
I have several questions I think I am going to ask you--I
am going to submit for the record. But really, you know, what I
need to know is, is the FAA receiving all the technical
information it needs from the FCC and the wireless carriers to
ensure that 5G does not interfere?
Does the FAA have the resources that it needs to ensure
that all passenger aircraft are equipped with the technology to
prevent 5G from interfering with flight operations? And this is
both commercial but also general aviation.
Is the FAA sharing all relevant information with FCC and
air carriers to prevent 5G from interfering with flight
operations? So I have a series of questions I am going to
submit for the record, and I will ask for you to please submit
your answers in writing.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you. I would be happy to respond.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Capito.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Capito. Thank you, and welcome, Mr. Nolen. Thank
you for your service, and long years of service. Let me ask
just a quick question. Is your--is the FAA workforce in the
office 5 days a week now?
Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am, they are not.
Senator Capito. Do you know how that breaks out? 20 percent
are?
Mr. Nolen. I don't have the numbers. I would be happy to
follow up with you on that. But we do have, we have got folks
who are in the office and there is coverage every day. Let me
qualify that. Our operational people are indeed in the office
every day or, you know, in their control rooms every day.
Senator Capito. Do you anticipate the rest of the workforce
will come back every day?
Mr. Nolen. We are working through, I believe, across all of
Government to, say, as we come out of the back side of the
pandemic to make sure that we have got that tempo. What I want
to make sure for the American public is that the what the work
we do is accomplished no matter where the person is sitting.
Senator Capito. Understood. Yes. I would hope everybody
would eventually get back there. As you know, and I think this
was addressed, Senators Klobuchar and Moran and I have
introduced the Note of Improvement Act, S. 66, I think you have
addressed this, establishing a task force of experts to come up
with recommendations to make the important pilot notification
system better.
While I know you have been trying to improve the system for
years, can you tell us the benefits of having this legislation
and assembling these experts with a clear list of objectives
and deadlines to give recommendations? Could you address that?
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you. What I can say about that is we
support the goals of this legislation, and we are working in
that level. We are working with industry, stakeholders, we work
with an earlier group as we started the journey of modernizing
our NOTAM system.
Senator Capito. Do you think that having that stronger
NOTAM system would cut down on this 1,732 runway incursions we
saw in 2022?
Mr. Nolen. I certainly think getting to that advanced
system, prioritizing all the things that we have talked about
here this morning, will make the system more resilient. And so,
I would love to see us get there quicker.
Senator Capito. Let me ask you this about contractors. We
have noticed, and you have you noted, cybersecurity are a major
issue. And we are also concerned that as Senator Duckworth was
talking about, the contractor unintentionally deleting files,
causing the outage.
And on January the 11th, you say to that new protocol
requires more than one person to be present when database work
occurs. Can you tell us how many contracts or have contractors
have access to the NOTAM system? And does the other person that
needs to be present? Is that an FAA person or is it--could they
be a contractor?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. So let me say firstly, for the
contractors that were directly involved in the unintentional
deletion, they no longer have access to either FAA facilities
or the NOTAM system. So we do have other contractors. I don't
have the exact number in front of me, but would be happy to
follow up there. And we also have a level of FAA oversight. And
so part of that----
Senator Capito. So it could be either/ or?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. No, there will always--there is
always FAA oversight.
Senator Capito. OK. OK. I was going to ask you a question
about 5G. We have had hearings in this committee on the issues
between the FAA and the FCC. And I note Senator Duckworth
introduced some questions for the record, but what is your
communications strategy with the FCC on this so we don't run up
against another deadline, and have another hearing, and then
everything seems to break down?
Mr. Nolen. Thank you for the question. We are working very
closely with the FCC and the NTIA, as well as the industry on
all things 5G. We have got a regular cadence of meetings with
the FCC on this, and we are in a position where we have better
alignment and we have got an absolute sense of transparency
going there.
Senator Capito. Well, I would encourage that. Let me ask
you a question coming from a rural state with smaller airports.
What would you say the biggest challenge moving forward the
next 10 to 20 years is going to be for our smaller regional
airports?
Mr. Nolen. What gives me, you know, a lot of hope is as we
start to see advanced air mobility, I mean, it really excites
me. And that ability to not only go between cities, but to
connect smaller cities as well.
When we think about urban air taxis and what the
possibilities are there, I think is fascinating, to be quite
honest. We continue to look at how, you know, what is that
level of support. I can't speak to the economics of it.
That is not my, within my purview. But we are a strong
supporter of our system. We look for ways how do we support
certainly from a Federal Aviation Administration.
Senator Capito. Thank you. And I would like to just thank
you and your representatives that are in West Virginia. We have
a lot of contact with them. We have some--you have probably
flown into West Virginia.
Mr. Nolen. I have.
Senator Capito. It takes a little bit of skill, I think.
And in some cases a lot of skill. So they are very responsive
to us and reply and help us in a short period of time. So I
please convey my appreciation.
Mr. Nolen. Yes's, ma'am. Thank you for the feedback. We
will certainly pass it on.
Senator Capito. Thank you.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
Senator Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you so much. So my intention is to ask a
follow up question, and if anybody else shows up, we will give
them an opportunity to ask a question. If they don't, we are
going to close out the hearing and move on.
But, Mr. Nolen, I found it very concerning that the same
day we had this NOTAM system issue, so did Canada. I just feel
like this can't be a coincidence, that we have no incidents,
and then on the same day, the same system has a problem in two
different countries. Do you know about the Canadian outage, and
what is your make of this situation?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I do know about the Canadian outage.
We have talked with our counterparts at NAV, Canada.
Absolutely, there was no connection between what they
experienced based on everything they told us and what we
experienced.
That being said, one of the very first things I directed
our investigation teams to do, to look at this from both a
human error, but also from a cyber. We also had the Department
of Homeland Security working with us to--what is our level of
cyber resilience there. So, again, the investigation is
ongoing.
Everything we have to date showed no sign of this being
cyber related, but the investigation still continues there.
The Chair. And so what is--what was the outage in Canada?
What was the----
Mr. Nolen. There was in a--my understanding from them,
theirs was a database, but they have a different system,
different architecture. It was not related to our system in any
way, shape, or form.
The Chair. I am sure it wasn't related to our system, but I
still find it ironic that two, you know, of the biggest systems
in the world are outed at the same time. And there has been no
problems with these NOTAM systems, and all of a sudden, on the
same day, there was a problem.
Just I think we will look forward to more data and
information from you on that. Back to the question, though, on
redundancy. I don't think we have true redundancy here. So I
want to see a plan from the FAA that examines the fact that the
backup systems are still subject to the same kind of, if you
want to call it human error, of deletion of files.
You are building a system to try to firewall that from not
happening again, but it could be a different problem, and we
still have a backup system that would be affected.
So until we get the true modernization system, I would like
you to go back and see what level of redundancy that you really
have a truly separate system that would not be impacted by
this.
Mr. Nolen. We appreciate the concern, and that is indeed
one of the first paths I directed as well, is to this
overarching look by our IT team working with MITRE is to do
exactly what you are asking for.
The Chair. And so, what did you come up with since you went
down this road sooner than I did? What did you come up with?
Mr. Nolen. That is still ongoing. They have got still a bit
to do because, you know, as I said, we have got thousands of
systems, and so our ask for them is to once that work is done,
we will certainly be happy to provide an update to the
Committee.
The Chair. You mean we have contractors with too much stuff
and they can't get things done, is that what you are saying?
Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am.
The Chair. Oh, OK. So why can't they give us an analysis of
the system and keeping a duplicate system.
Mr. Nolen. That's the body of work that is ongoing. It is
not just the NOTAM system, but I think what you are asking for
is looking across all of our critical systems that underpin our
national airspace and the levels of redundancy there. That is
the work that we have, our IT and MITRE.
The Chair. No, I am asking just now. Not the NOTAM system.
I want to get an answer within a week about the NOTAM system
having a separate backup, totally separate backup, that could
be used.
You are saying what happened here is somebody infected the
file and basically ended up deleting something that then caused
the outage to the system. So, the question is, you are now
trying to put human redundancy there so that this won't happen
again.
But if the same system is a network, including the backup
to servers and other places, and whatever action somebody
mistakenly takes on files still affects the whole system, what
would be important to understand is can the FAA set up a true
redundant server system that would allow for that file
corruption that happened not to happen across the entire
system? And that is what we need to know the answer to.
So, I do see you a few colleagues have arrived, which means
we have some questions to answer. So, I am going to go and vote
and I will turn it over to my colleague from Wyoming, Ms.
Lummis, and then my colleague from Georgia, Mr. Warnock, and
then we will see who else shows up. But thank you very much.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, ma'am.
The Chair. Senator Lummis.
STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA LUMMIS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING
Senator Lummis. Thank you, Chairman Cantwell. This is an
important hearing. We appreciate your being here very much.
Looking forward to your testimony today and your willingness to
serve and continuing this important dialog. Before I go to my
questions, I want to highlight several issues that I believe
should be at the top of this committee's priority list as we
look to reauthorize the FAA.
Obviously, there is no doubt that both the Southwest and
the NOTAM system failures have shown the need for a reliable
air service ecosystem, both in the public and the private
sector. But I must note that reliability of air service is an
issue that my home state of Wyoming faces every day, whether
there is a system outage or not.
Factors such as a lack of pilots, high jet fuel prices, a
consolidation of air carriers, and the up gauging of aircraft
capacity have left many rural communities across the country at
risk of losing their air service.
So, as we move into this FAA reauthorization, this
committee must not lose sight of the main goal of our national
aviation policy, creating a truly national network that safely
connects all regions together.
So, I am looking forward to the discussions today. Acting
Administrator Nolen, it is my understanding that many in the
aviation industry feel that NOTAM system does not provide
useful information. I happened to be sitting on an airplane
when NOTAM went down and the pilot was trying to explain to us
what NOTAM does.
Often air crews are bombarded with information, some of
which is critical, while others are repetitive or even
irrelevant for the specific route the aircraft will be flying.
As the FAA looks to recover from this outage and modernize
the IT infrastructure, I am curious to hear if the FAA has
heard similar concerns, and if there are plans to
simultaneously modernize NOTAM so that it can better prioritize
the information it is sending to air crews?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. What I
would say--so, two things. Number one, the journey that we are
on, and we are about halfway through it in terms of our
modernization of the NOTAM system, is designed to do exactly
what you are describing and what the general concern is, how do
we ensure that the NOTAMs deliver to pilots? Being a pilot
myself, are relevant, they are timely, they are prioritized,
and they speak to the route of flight.
Now, there are times when you may have to divert, so we
can't always say they are irrelevant. And, you know, if you are
deviating around the weather system sometime, that could take
you hundreds of miles off your present course. And there might
be a relevant NOTAM there.
But we are moving. We have already got some functionality
built into the system today, especially on the Federal NOTAM
system. And by the time we get to 2025, when we will have
everybody onto the Federal NOTAM system, we will continue to
improve that. And following that, we will ultimately get to an
ICAO standard.
All of that takes time, of course, but we are working
through it very purposefully.
Senator Lummis. So how would it work if it's a more
localized issue? For example, I have been on planes in Wyoming
where there were antelope on the runway or a coyote on the
runway. So, it only affects a few planes in a very localized
area. Can NOTAM be calibrated to address those sort of very
isolated individual issues?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, so maybe to speak a little bit about
NOTAMs, right. So, for your flight that you are on departure,
yes, you have got NOTAM's that are appended to the flight plan
if you are on a commercial flight.
But the other thing you do as a pilot is you would call for
DH's automatic thermal information, which gives you weather,
which gives you taxiway closures, which gives you other things
relevant that may not be working in the moment. In the same
thing for your route of flight and the same thing for your
destination airport.
Pilots, you would call prior to the top of the descent and
say what is happening at my airport? It may say it is in Booz
or in Montana, or it is in, you know, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Those are the ``in the moment'' types of information, relevant
information you would get from the airport itself.
Our goal is to, again, to continue down this journey of
streamlining the NOTAM system, making it ICAO compliant, and
getting it to a point where it is indeed relevant to each route
of flight.
Senator Lummis. So recently you announced that upgrades to
the NOTAM system would not be completed for almost a decade.
And I assume it is because of the complexity of making the
updates. But is there a way to expedite that timeframe?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, that is one of the directions I have given
my team, is come back to me with what it would take resources
wise for us to accelerate. And we would love this to see if
that is possible.
Right now, we substantially, the bulk of the work will be
done by Fiscal Year 25. I would like to see if we could bring
that forward, and then there are some other pieces that work
into that.
Senator Lummis. One more quick question. I understand the
FAA has taken steps to prevent another NOTAM malfunction, such
as decoupling the system and requiring that two people be
presented when performing work on the system or be present.
Since the issue with NOTAM was caused by contractors
accidentally deleting critical code, does the FAA plan to
restrict access to the NOTAM system moving forward to FAA
employees?
Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am, we do not. So, we have a NOTAM system
that is overseen by the FAA and maintained by contractors.
These folks are indeed the experts there. What I have ensured
that we have is the level of oversight for the FAA team, and
that the requisite level of leadership that oversees that.
Senator Lummis. Thank you very much, Acting Director Nolen.
We appreciate your being here. I yield to the gentleman from
Georgia, Senator Warnock.
Senator Warnock. Far be it for me to go ahead of the
gentlewoman from Nevada.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Senator Warnock. [Technical
problems]--and thank you for being here today for this really
important hearing. I am just going to go quickly right into it,
because for Nevada, of course, you know, big tourism
destinations all up and down our state, robust, safe, and
reliable air travel, it is, like I said, essential for our
tourism driven economy to thrive.
In 2022, passenger volume at Harry Reid International
Airport, it broke an all-time record. The airport welcomed more
than 52.6 million passengers. And while business travel, of
course, still recovering in 2022, leisure travel to Las Vegas
exceeded expectations with visitors drawn to our newly expanded
sports offerings, I am just saying Super Bowl next year, Las
Vegas, and other large scale entertainment events.
And the NOTAM system's outage last month, it did make clear
to actually all Americans how dependent the world's largest
economy is on air travel and how dependent air travel is on
antiquated computer systems.
Fortunately for our Harry Reid International Airport, the
immediate impacts of the outage were manageable as we have
amazing and dedicated employees, and the NOTAM outage happened
on a Wednesday, which is actually one of our lighter travel
days. I worry, however, about this happening again and our
ability as a nation to deal with it.
So, I want to talk about preparing for a cyber-attack. The
incidents spanning January 10th and 11th was determined not to
be a result of a cyber-attack, but it did publicly really
reveal critical vulnerabilities like some of the other Senators
have mentioned, in our security and our system architecture,
and we just have to continue raising these concerns.
So, do you feel in your estimation, that the FAA systems,
that they are resilient enough to detect, to counter, and
defeat a major cyberattack, including by other nation states?
And does the FAA, do you have the proper infrastructure, and
most importantly, the properly trained cyber workforce to
swiftly support that effort?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, we do. So, thank you for the question,
Senator Rosen. We have a very capable cyber resilience staff.
We undertake biannual cyber response plan, when we practice
that plan on a biannual basis.
We work in close concert in coordination with our other
agencies, TSA, Homeland Security, et cetera, and we continue
it. And certainly, the work of modernizing the FAA, which is--
--
Senator Rosen. I was going to ask, what investments are you
planning for? What can we expect to see in the coming months to
maintain this level?
Mr. Nolen. Well, certainly we want to get on to the Federal
NOTAM system. That has increased levels of redundancy versus
the U.S. NOTAM system, but we still got some critical users who
are using the U.S. NOTAM system.
So that is the work that will take us to get there. But
back to the question of cyber resilience. We are. We look
forward to that. And we think the controls we have in place
will prevent a repeat of the event that happened on January 11.
Senator Rosen. And thank you for that. And I want to ask,
as we move forward into IT modernization, not just in this
area, but in really every area, we have to do that, how are you
working with other Federal agencies to manage and prevent
cyberthreats? And is there something that we can do? Any
Congressional support you need in order to be sure that those
collaborations are taking place?
Mr. Nolen. I would say at a high level, I know the
Committee has been briefed on many things in and around cyber.
Currently, well, it has been a while, but we have a whole of
Government approach to that.
So, we are working across every agency and every department
within the Government, around cyber, around cyber resilience.
That there is that level of interconnectivity is absolutely
there, and it is one of our top priorities, one of the top
priorities for the Administration.
Senator Rosen. And I want to build on that a little bit
because we know that we are using telephones as a backup,
right. And so, like the outage again in January, the flight
crews, they utilized this backup phone system.
Now, I would say that is--I love my phone and but I would
say that that is not the best use of our technology. And so,
considering the added time requirement, the potential for
error, and inherent in using outdated rudimentary system, is it
sufficient that a phone is the reliable backup in 2023 to the
NOTAM system? And what can we do to have a more reliable
backup?
Mr. Nolen. Well, a phone is--there are multiple streams of
getting NOTAMs. One is by calling, one is talking to air
traffic control, one is talking to the facilities that you may
be going to or are en route. So that backup that is there, our
goal is indeed to have a system that is highly resilient and
redundant, and that is the piece that we are working toward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I think I yield to--let me yield
to Senator Sullivan from Alaska.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, Mr. Nolen,
thank you for being here. You know, my state has very unique
problems and challenges, 258 communities with no roads, think
about that, 82 percent of the communities in my state you can't
get to by a road, so you need an airplane.
And yet we have the oldest infrastructure and technology of
any state in the country when it comes to FAA issues. We have
remote mountainous terrain. We know it presents technical
challenges for the FAA in installing and maintaining robust
communications and navigation and satellite systems.
In the FAA's own words in 2021, the FAA, Alaska Aviation
Safety Initiative, they said, ``maintaining the extensive
Alaska national airspace infrastructure, which consists of a
mixture of old and new components, is a daunting task for FAA
engineers and technicians.''
Now, I know we are focused on modernizing the NOTAM system,
but can I ask you, will the FAA--would the FAA, recognizing the
huge needs in Alaska, with this Alaska Aviation Initiative,
which we appreciate from the FAA, are any of these going to be
addressed in the effort to modernize the NOTAM system?
Mr. Nolen. Senator Sullivan, thank you so much for the
question. Yes, indeed. We recognize the criticality of our
systems with respect to Alaska and all of the challenges that
you spoke to.
And Alaska is still one of the areas that remain on the
U.S. NOTAM system. So that is a part of our goal as well. When
you think about Alaska international operator, or some parts of
the DOD, is to get everybody onto the Federal NOTAM system.
And, you know, that will happen by 2025 unless we can
accelerate it, and we are looking at what that might take.
Senator Sullivan. OK. Well, this effort then will result in
more timely NOTAMs, outages of navigational aids and
communications. So, will you be able to be able to surge that
capacity that we need there?
Mr. Nolen. That is our expectation that we will have, you
know, better stream, better reliability there.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask more specifically, what is the
FAA focused on in terms of doing soon to address the challenges
to maintain navigational aids and communications equipment in
Alaska and then upgrade it?
Mr. Nolen. We are still working through that. I mean, there
are things we are doing like around runways, around approaches.
We have done a lot in terms of GPS approaches. We have got some
you know, some other approaches, other approaches that we are
doing in Alaska.
So, our commitment there is high and everything that we are
doing, the FAASI, is working and we are making the kind of
progress.
Senator Sullivan. OK. Again, I appreciate the FAASI effort.
I mentioned, 350 communities. All this technology I also
mentioned, unfortunately, you know, highest death rate per
capita in terms of flying for all these reasons. Can the FAA,
and this is a simple idea, store more spare parts in the state
and provide more technicians?
Mr. Nolen. Well thank you for the idea, sir. Let me, if you
allow me to take that back to our team, and we are certainly
happy to follow up.
Senator Sullivan. OK, good. Let me ask one final question.
I know we have a vote here. I want to be respectful to my
colleague, Senator Warnock. The FAA has a policy that we are
kind of baffled by right now that is requiring--and to be
honest, I still don't even really understand it.
A shorter runways throughout the state of Alaska. That is
antithetical to what we need right now, which is actually
longer runways. Remember these communities, the airport is
off--is the only thing that connects them to, unless you are on
a river and then it is a boat.
But the river is frozen in the winter, so why are we
requiring, in order to be eligible to reconstruct runways using
Federal funds, that the FAA is forcing Alaska to shorten the
length of its runways?
To be honest, you should be helping us lengthen runways.
This is baffling to me. And my team has tried to explain it to
me and I don't understand. So, what is happening? This is nuts.
Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, sir, for the question. Let me
just caveat, correct a couple of things here. There is a caveat
in the AIP funding that, you know, that requires--when we talk
about an additional 500 feet is what we are talking about. We
are working through in Noatak, if I have got that right,
Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Nolen. So that work is in progress. There is--it is
also caveated that if it provides critical services----
Senator Sullivan. Or how about there is no road to that----
Mr. Nolen. Exactly. So those are things that play into
that. So that piece is underway.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I would like to work with you and
your team with my team to make sure we are not--we are not
telling Alaskan communities they have got to shorten the runway
when it is their only lifeline to the rest of the state in the
rest of the world. OK, thank you.
Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Warnock. Thank you so very much, Administrator
Nolen, for being here. Families rely on the FAA to ensure their
flights will take off safely and efficiently. The FAA's NOTAM
system plays a critical role in this effort, and its recent
outage is concerning, to say the least, as me and my colleagues
have already said, and unacceptable.
I think you know that. It doesn't just hurt passengers, it
also poses a national security risk, signaling to our
adversaries that even a minor computer error can bring down
domestic commercial flights for hours.
According to your testimony, this outage resulted from a
contractor accidentally deleting files that were necessary to
maintain the synchronization between the live and backup NOTAM
data bases.
Administrator Nolen, as of January 10th--and if you can
answer yes or no, I have got to go and vote. They are always
doing multiple things around here. We are always doing multiple
things, I should say. Did FAA staff understand that deleting
these files could cause this outage as of January 10?
Mr. Nolen. There was an understanding. If the question is,
did they understand the result of deleting files, yes, the
Administrator knew that it was an unintentional deletion. And
so, as they were working to repair that error, they did
understand the magnitude of what they had done.
Senator Warnock. How many contractors had security
permission to access and delete those files that day?
Mr. Nolen. On that day, the contractors all had--just let
me say that our NOTAM system is overseen by the FAA and
maintained by contractors. They were our database
administrators, so they had access. The ones directly involved
in this event on January 10 and 11 no longer have access to our
system while the investigation is underway. And we are taking a
look at that.
Senator Warnock. So how many had access that day?
Mr. Nolen. That day, I don't have an exact number at the
moment. That day there were two people working in the system.
Senator Warnock. So, can you follow up with me and answer
it in writing?
Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warnock. How many contractors had access that day?
How many contractors still can disrupt the database connection?
Mr. Nolen. If you think about it, whether it is a
contractor or an FAA employee, our goal is to build in a level
of resilience no matter who is in the system. And we have put
controls in place to make sure that we have the levels of
redundancy with oversight, ensuring that two people or more, at
least two people are there when working on the live data base.
Senator Warnock. So, you are saying the answer zero now?
Mr. Nolen. That the answer is zero? I am sorry----
Senator Warnock. The question was how many contractors
still can disrupt the database connection? And you are saying
to me that based on systems you have put in place now with
redundancies, that answer is now zero?
Mr. Nolen. You would expect, that is right, with oversight.
We would not expect to see a repeat of this kind of error.
Senator Warnock. So, and thank you, if you would follow up
with the first--the answer to the first question in writing. I
believe it is essential that FAA award single points of
failure, which I think I am hearing you say that that should
not happen again. Is that correct?
Mr. Nolen. That is correct.
Senator Warnock. So, no one contractor who hasn't had their
morning coffee can accidentally or intentionally ground
commercial air travel for the whole country. How many other
single points of failure does the FAA have within its system?
Mr. Nolen. That is a piece of work that we are undertaking.
So, part of the effort that we have going with our Office of IT
and Technology working with MITRE is to assess the totality of
our systems, of which there are thousands, to make sure what we
have from a resilience perspective, and we expect that work to
be completed here in the coming weeks.
Senator Warnock. So right now, we don't know how many other
single points of failure we have within our system, and that is
work you are doing right now?
Mr. Nolen. That is work that we are doing now.
Senator Warnock. All right. What steps are you taking the
audit security and access permissions across all of these
points of failure to prevent both accidental mistakes and
malicious intruders?
Mr. Nolen. This is part of what the investigation is
designed to do. We are looking at every part of our process,
from procedures, from access, from control, from resilience to
redundancy. All of that is in the scope of the investigation.
Senator Warnock. Well, obviously, all of us were deeply
troubled by what we witnessed. Its impact on air travel and the
implications are deeply concerning. This year is, of course,
FAA reauthorization.
It is a good time for us to be focused on these issues, and
I look forward to collaborating with you and with my colleagues
as we modernize the FAA to increase security, to reduce risk so
that all of us, certainly my constituents in Georgia and people
all across the country can fly safely.
Mr. Nolen. We appreciate the support.
Senator Warnock. So, I guess--oh, the Chair is back.
The Chair. Well, Senator Warnock, do you have further
questions?
Senator Warnock. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am done. I am
going to go vote.
The Chair. OK. Well, maybe we will coordinate here
together, but thank you. You represent such a big aviation
state and look forward to working with you on the
reauthorization bill.
Administrator Nolen, thank you for your participation. The
hearing will remain open for 4 weeks until March 15, 2023. Any
Senators that would like to submit questions for the record
should do so two weeks from now, by March 1, 2023.
And we ask the witnesses--witness to respond by March 15,
2023. So, with that, our hearing is concluded.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Billy Nolen
Ensuring True Redundancy in the NOTAM System. As FAA moves forward
with a modernization of the NOTAM system, it will be important to
ensure system redundancy, protection from cyber threats, and resiliency
for the future. FAA must have redundancies in place to prevent single
points of failure in key systems. Technology modernization has been a
challenge for everyone, but we can't lead and uphold the gold standard
in aviation safety if we aren't prepared for the information age.
I want to see a plan from the FAA that examines the fact that the
backup systems are still subject to the same kind of, if you want to
call it human error, of deletion of files. You're building a system to
try to prevent that from happening again. But it could be a different
problem, and we still have a backup system that would be affected. So,
until we get a fully modernized system, I would like you to go back and
see what level of redundancy you currently have, to ensure that you
really have a truly separate backup system that would not be impacted
by future disruptions.
Question 1. What plans does the FAA have for ensuring true
redundancy in the NOTAM system to ensure outages do not occur? And when
will these plans be fully implemented?
Answer. The current NOTAM System has both an active and
geographically separate disaster recovery site providing protection
against a site failure. In addition, each site also has local
redundancy to prevent a single point of failure.
The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy. At the
disaster recovery site, one database is kept in near real-time sync
with the active site, and a second one is configured to apply changes
with a one-hour delay. This mitigates the risk of data deletions/
corruption that recently occurred.
The ongoing NOTAM Modernization project will consolidate two NOTAM
systems into a single NOTAM system and transition them to a highly
resilient NAS operational environment. This new environment will
provide high-availability services at geographically separate
locations.
Question 2. What is FAA's practice with regard to keeping systems
and software incrementally up to date, which could prevent them from
becoming outdated and requiring a total replacement?
Answer. Updating the systems and software in the FAA includes both
an operations and maintenance (O&M) and enhancement/modernization
component. All the reported issues are logged and reviewed, and
approved by a Change Control Board (CCB) consisting of stakeholders.
Based on the available operational budget, these approved changes are
planned, developed, tested, and deployed to the operational environment
as part of the operations and maintenance work. Major changes or
modernizations that are beyond the realm of operations and maintenance
are managed via the FAA's Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The capital
programs are reviewed and prioritized by the FAA executives on the
Joint Resources Council (JRC).
FAA's practice with regard to keeping software incrementally up to
date entails Software Asset Management (SAM) tracking, reporting
ownership and optimization of software acquisition, deployment,
maintenance, and utilization within the agency. Policies and practices
are in place across the FAA to ensure alignment and compliance with SAM
guidance and mandates issued by the executive and legislative branches
of the Federal government. FAA is in the process of enhancing its
software inventory tracking to include all of the FAA domains to
maintain an accurate, agency-wide software inventory and software
license/subscription database to ensure knowledge of software assets,
manage and mitigate risk, and implement Federal guidance and mandates
associated with software.
Question 3. What steps if FAA taking to strengthen its oversight of
contractors associated with maintaining and working on the NOTAM
system?
Answer. The FAA updated the standard operating procedures (SOPs) to
ensure that all changes to the NOTAM operational environment require
approved documentation. The FAA updated the on-site monitoring and
staff supervision procedures. The FAA has implemented system protocols
to reinforce security and resiliency for NAS Aeronautical Information
Management Enterprise System (NAIMES) and strengthened oversight of
contractors as follows:
Written consent is required by the FAA NAIMES Services
Manager or designated FAA employee for all NAIMES access to the
production database(s).
A two-person system was implemented which requires another
employee or designated contract member to accompany any
Database Administrator, System Administrator, or Network
Engineer who has been granted access (in writing) to perform
any work in the NAIMES Production System. (This is in addition
to the bullet above).
If a contract employee is called in (after hours) to restore
services and the two-person construct cannot be adhered to, the
responding contract employee should contact the FAA manager or
staff. System restoral will take precedence to ensure the
safety of the NAS.
Cuts to Discretionary Spending. Our colleagues in the House have
been discussing cutting Federal expenditures, primarily non-Defense
discretionary spending. Some estimates of cuts under considering go as
high as 10 to 15 percent below enacted levels for this Fiscal Year. The
FAA's budget for modernizing the air traffic systems comes from this
discretionary spending.
Question 1. How would a 10 to 15 percent budget cut impact FAA's
timeline for implementing NextGen and other air traffic modernization
efforts?
Answer. NextGen investments are funded in the FAA's Facilities and
Equipment appropriation, which funds the acquisition and deployment of
communications, navigation, surveillance, and related capabilities
within the National Airspace System (NAS) and air traffic control
facilities. Under this scenario, the appropriation would be reduced by
as much as $442 million.
FAA would cancel and defer system modernization efforts, including
NextGen programs, system sustainment, and replacement programs.
Additionally, facility infrastructure programs would be deferred, as
would any new terminal facility replacement projects.
Question 2. Do you think there would be an operational safety
degradation if FAA budgets were cut?
Answer. For the FAA to operate approximately $2.4 billion below the
FY 2023 enacted level, it would be forced to immediately cut back on
its core functions, impacting services to the flying community. A
reduction of this size would require furloughs and Reduction in Force
(RIFs) across all of the FAA workforce, safety critical and non-safety
critical.
FAA would need to implement an immediate hiring freeze for its
entire operations and facilities workforce, including air traffic
controllers and safety inspectors, causing delays in air traffic
services and certification of aircraft, pilots, drone operators, and
commercial space licensing. FAA would need to furlough all FAA
employees, including air traffic controllers and safety inspectors, for
approximately 22 days and potentially implement a RIFs of up to 10
percent.
FAA would need to shut down services at 125 lower activity towers
and over 250 Federal contract towers resulting in 2/3 of airports
losing the safety benefits provided by air traffic control towers. FAA
would also be required to terminate contracts that support air traffic
safety, including air traffic control training, flight services,
contract weather observers, system maintenance, and cybersecurity.
Question 3. Aside from safety impacts, can you forecast other
impacts to FAA systems if budgets were cut?
Answer. In addition to the safety impacts, the modernization of
FAA's telecommunications networks to meet the transition to Internet
Protocol (IP) technologies would be delayed resulting in possible
outages that could not be restored as service providers no longer
support time-division multiplexing (TDM) technology.
Question 3a. Could those impacts possibly translate into
inconveniences for the traveling public?
Answer. Funding cuts of this magnitude would cause substantial
disruptions to the flying public; including cancelled and delayed
flights across the country. This would have devastating impacts to the
National Airspace System, affecting every state and territory through
reductions in air traffic services.
Status of NextGen Implementation. In the last FAA Reauthorization
bill, Congress directed the DOT Office of Inspector General to audit
NextGen implementation. The DOT OIG audit found FAA was too optimistic
about program benefits and did not account for complexities in
implementation.
FAA now claims that NextGen benefits to be $8.5 billion through
2021. That is lower than the $9 billion FAA has already spent on
NextGen and nowhere near the original estimates of the $213 billion in
benefits by 2025.
Question 1. Has NextGen failed to deliver on expected results and
benefits? DOT OIG found that operations were less efficient, with
average taxi time, departure delays, and arrival delays all increasing
since the start of NextGen in 2008.
Answer. Through 2022, NextGen has implemented more than $9.4B in
benefits (FY22$). The benefits from more than 20 implemented
capabilities will continue to grow in the future. New implementations
like En Route DataComm across the NAS will bring additional future
benefits. Details can be found on the NextGen website at: https://
www.faa.gov/nextgen/reporting-benefits/details.
Flight times and delays are driven by increases or decreases in
traffic demand levels. NextGen benefits include adjustments for changes
in demand. Methodologies for evaluating NextGen benefits have been
evaluated through the FAA/Industry Joint Analysis Team (JAT) supporting
the NextGen Advisory Committee.
Question 2. Could you clarify how updating the NOTAM system fits
into NextGen modernization? What can we do to get NextGen back on track
or should Congress focus on new ways to modernize the National Airspace
System?
Answer. Although, much of the NextGen infrastructure is in place
and operationalizing NextGen is well underway, there is much more work
to be done. As FAA continues to operationalize NextGen and realize
Trajectory Based Operations, we will build on these two foundations to
evolve into a modern, information-centered or ``info-centric'' National
Airspace System (ICN) built for diverse operations and supported by a
resilient and evolving infrastructure to enhance safety and efficiency.
Modernization of the NAS requires a significant and consistent
investment in sustaining the current capabilities, while also funding
modernization integrating new capabilities. These steps are necessary
to make sure the foundational operational services, such as voice and
data communications, surveillance, automation, navigation,
telecommunications, and weather systems are modernized and to ensure
the NAS is efficient.
Specifically for NOTAMs, the three pillars of an Info-Centric NAS
are Operations, Supporting Infrastructure, and Integrated Safety
Management. NOTAMs provide dynamic changes in the state of NAS features
affecting flight operations, which is critical for flight safety.
The updates to the NOTAM System include consolidating legacy system
capabilities into the new NOTAM system that is built using digital
NOTAM as the foundation. Digital NOTAMs allow the dissemination of
dynamic changes in a globally harmonized message format called AIXM
(Aeronautical Information Exchange Model), which allows machine
interpretation and graphical display of the underlying hazard.
This modernization completely aligns with NextGen Modernization as
the objective is to provide near real-time machine interpretable NOTAM
(dynamic changes), which enables real-time situational awareness for
all stakeholders.
Question 3. FAA has said it is moving to ``info-centric'' National
Airspace System by 2035. What exactly does this involve and how does
this implicate NextGen?
Answer. As FAA continues to operationalize NextGen and realize
Trajectory Based Operations, we will build on these two foundations to
evolve into an information-centered or ``info-centric'' National
Airspace System (ICN) built for diverse operations and supported by a
resilient and evolving infrastructure to enhance safety and efficiency.
ICN will be building on the NextGen foundation in three areas:
operations, infrastructure and integrated safety management. This
involves establishing an integrated information regime with
interoperable sharing of information to enable enhanced collaboration
with diverse traffic management services that includes new vehicles and
operations. This will be accomplished by infrastructure modernization
by leveraging new technologies and, where necessary, establishing
public-private partnerships to not only ensure resiliency and agility
to respond to future user needs but also to meet unique government
requirements through commercial services and technologies. In addition,
Safety Assurance for traffic management and real-time safety will be
established through continuous monitoring, modeling, and verification
including the use of the Safety Management System for compliance to
assure organizational accountability.
Chinese Balloon & Airspace Incursions. We have seen a recent string
of extraordinary incursions into U.S. airspace including a Chinese
surveillance balloon shot down by our military on February 4. Uncrewed,
high-altitude objects were shot down over Alaska, Michigan, and Canada.
The North American Air Defense Identification Zone (``ADIZ'') is
jointly administered by the civilian air traffic control authorities
and militaries of the United States and Canada. By law, civilian
aircraft entering this zone must provide proper notification to air
traffic controllers.
Question 1. What more does our Nation need to do in order to
strengthen the defense of our national airspace? How can we make sure
FAA has the tools necessary to detect these aircraft intruding upon and
ultimately entering U.S. airspace?
Answer. Defense of our national airspace is a complex topic and
requires much collaboration between the FAA, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). The FAA long range
RADARs (Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR-4) and CARSR) did detect the
Chinese balloon. These RADARs are optimized to delete high altitude and
slow detections in order to provide professional air traffic
controllers with the optimal air traffic RADAR presentation. The FAA
did not monitor the Chinese balloon, but the FAA staff embedded with
DOD did have awareness. The Chinese balloon was operating at an
altitude above 60,000 feet and presented no threat to the National
Airspace Systems.
While the current FAA tools detected the balloon, the FAA's ARSR-4
are past their life expectancy. The agency, with the support of
Congress, will need to work in collaboration with DOD and DHS on the
replacement program.
Question 2. FAA has closed parts of the U.S. airspace to support
military action against these aircraft. Can you describe the effect
that these aerial intrusions have had on civilian air travel?
Answer. Closing parts of the U.S. Airspace system is a key tool
used by the FAA to protect the flying public and by-standers on the
ground when military action is required. The closure of airspace
routinely impacts civilian air travel by necessitating re-routes and
ground stops at airports underlying FAA's Temporary Flight Restriction
(TFR). These impacts result in arrival, departure, and en route delays.
Any airspace restrictions levied are continuously evaluated to ensure
they are in place no longer than required to execute the national
defense mission and to preserve safety while minimizing the impact to
civilian air travel. A mechanism the FAA employs to facilitate this
action is having senior FAA staff embedded with key DOD air defense
commands to advise DOD Flag Officers. The senior FAA embeds provide
recommendations to the military decision makers and seek to preserve
access to the National Airspace Systems for all public users. These
embeds have immediate reach back to the FAA at the executive level
(SES2) to resolve any national airspace issues that may arise.
Question 3. How is FAA, as the owner of our national airspace
management, coordinating with other agencies such as NASA, NOAA, DHS,
and DOD who have shared interests in protecting our national security?
Answer. The FAA regularly collaborates with NASA, NOAA, DHS, and
DOD. The FAA has several directorates that coordinate with NASA to
support the planning/scheduling of space launches as well as providing
support for airspace security requirements. NOAA maintains a watch
position within the Air Traffic Organization's (ATO) Joint Air Traffic
Operations Command (JATOC) located in the Air Traffic Control System
Command Center facility. These NOAA personnel have 24-hour access to
National Operations Managers and NOAA is part of multiple daily
briefings. The FAA continuously coordinates with DHS concerning air
domain homeland security issues, including UAS, Counter-UAS, and law
enforcement matters. This coordination is facilitated by the FAA's
embedding of operational personnel who specialize in Air Traffic
Management security matters within the Transportation Security
Administrations (TSA) Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
in Herndon, VA, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine
Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, CA.
The FAA has advisors embedded with DOD Flag Officer Level leaders
at NORAD/NORTHCOM headquarters; the Continental NORAD Region (CONR);
Alaskan NORAD Region; Western Air Defense Sector; Eastern Air Defense
Sector; and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). Moreover, FAA SES
leadership engages with DOD regularly to discussion concerns and future
threats and FAA supporting staff engages with Pentagon staff on a
routine basis.
The national security shared interests are primarily between FAA,
DOD, and DHS. This common interest results in the sharing of RADAR
data, the protection of sensitive and classified information, and the
coordination of real-time national security concerns. The coordination
across FAA, DOD, and DHS happens at many levels and continuously, but
the previously discussed Senior FAA embeds are critical elements to our
successful real time collaboration and support for national security.
Question 4. Did the FAA, in association with the DOD, identify,
detect, and monitor the Chinese surveillance balloon when this object
entered the ADIZ as identified in 14 C.F.R. Subpart B? Did the Chinese
surveillance balloon, comply with the requirements of 14 C.F.R. Part
99? If not, what action is FAA taking to enforce the ADIZ requirements?
Answer. The FAA long range RADARs (ARSR-4 and CARSR) did detect the
Chinese balloon. These RADARs are optimized to delete high altitude and
slow detections in order to provide professional air traffic
controllers with the optimal air traffic RADAR presentation. The FAA
did not monitor the Chinese balloon, but the FAA staff embedded with
DOD did have awareness. The Chinese balloon was operating at an
altitude above 60,000 feet and presented no threat to the National
Airspace Systems.
The Chinese Balloon did not operate in accordance with 14 CFR Part
99 in that no position reports were made in accordance with 14 C.F.R.
99.15.
To enforce ADIZ requirements, the FAA staffs operational positions
at the NORAD NORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), CONR's 601st Air and Space
Operations Center (AOC), and CBP's AMOC. FAA and DOD work
collaboratively to identify and determine threats associated with RADAR
tracks approaching the ADIZ. Balloons specifically pose a challenge due
to slow speed and in case of the Chinese balloon, the high altitude
coupled with slow speed. That said, the FAA is working to determine how
a comprehensive inventory of all unmanned airborne objects can best be
developed. The agency's exploration includes seeking to implement
further measures to improve capacity to detect objects in our airspace.
Recent Runway Incursions. There have been five runway incursions
over the last couple of weeks at airports in the United States, raising
serious concerns about aviation safety and congestion in the airspace.
Additionally, there is a projected increase in demand from current and
future users of the NAS, which will place further strain on the system.
Question 1. How can NextGen technology reduce the risk of runway
incursions at airports?
Answer. NextGen technology including Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Airport Surface Detection System Model
X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), and Runway
Status Lights (RWSL) have reduced the risk of runway incursions at
airports. ASDE-X and ASSC allow air traffic controllers to track
surface movement of aircraft and vehicles enhancing air traffic
controller situational awareness. These systems alert air traffic
controllers of potential runway conflicts by providing detailed
coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. Runway Status Lights
(RWSL) is a fully automatic, advisory system designed to reduce the
number and severity of runway incursions and prevent runway accidents
while not interfering with airport operations.
The FAA's Office of NextGen through the Runway Incursion
Reduction--Advanced Technology Development and Prototyping (ATDP)
Program, is currently researching technologies to reduce the risk to
people and property caused by collisions in the runway environment.
This program is designed to identify different types of affordable
surveillance system technologies, that are suitable for small-to-medium
sized airports with scheduled passenger service that do not currently
have existing runway incursion detection technologies such as Airport
Surface Detection System Model X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance
Capability (ASSC), and Runway Status Lights (RWSL). Runway Incursion
Prevention through Situational Awareness (RIPSA) is aimed at
reinforcing protection of the Runway Safety Area (RSA), by utilizing
``direct-to-pilot'' alerts to the individual(s) who can take corrective
action, for all aircraft or vehicles at Runway Incursion (RI) hotspot
locations.
Question 1a. What other actions are being taken by the FAA to
address these safety concerns?
Answer. In response to the recent runway incursions, we have taken
the opportunity to verify and update our data resources. One of these
resources includes our Runway Safety Dashboard. Since 2022, the
Dashboard has been a source of information showing trends in runway
incursions throughout the National Airspace System (NAS). It identifies
which facilities have a runway incursion rate higher than the NAS wide
runway incursion rate. Runway Safety Program Managers throughout each
Service Area monitor the Dashboard on a weekly basis to determine which
of their respective facilities may need Runway Safety support in
developing possible mitigations in reducing surface risk.
In addition to the Dashboard, FAA Order 7050.1B (Runway Safety
Order) requires facilities to host a Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT)
meeting on an annual basis. During this meeting, stakeholders from the
area come together to discuss surface safety at the local airport.
These stakeholders include, but are not limited to, Air Traffic
Controllers, Pilots, Fixed Based Operators, and Airport Operators.
During the meeting, previous runway incursions that occurred at the
airport are reviewed and discussed, along with any other issues that
may not be previously known to all users. The team determines what
mitigations, if any, need to be developed to prevent future occurrences
or improve surface safety.
The Surface Safety Group (SSG) and Runway Safety Council (RSC) are
made up of FAA and Industry personnel who have a duty and desire to
increase surface safety in the NAS. These two groups meet on a
quarterly basis and develop action items based on trends in the NAS.
Each party represents their organization and provides input to any
topics that are discussed during the meeting. Once in agreement, the
group creates an action item, which once completed, will effect a
change in the NAS that will improve surface safety on a National Level.
Lastly, our outreach efforts include our From the Flight Deck
(FTFD) videos, Pilot Handbooks, and an annual Safety Summit focused on
General Aviation pilots. The FTFD videos provide airport specific
issues that provide pilots a tool that they can use prior to landing or
departing from that airport. The video provides information to warn
pilots of hot spots or identified problem areas on the airport that
pilots may not be aware of. Furthermore, Pilot Handbooks are created as
a supplement to the FTFD video to provide information to the pilot from
the control tower perspective. The Handbook includes information that
Air Traffic Controllers want a pilot to be aware of and may not know
prior to using the airport. Our annual Safety Summit, which was just
held on March 22, discusses National trends that the Runway Safety
Office is seeing from General Aviation users. It is meant to refresh
those pilots who have possibly not flown in a few months due to their
airplane being in storage for the winter months. This year's topics
included, pre-flight procedures, wrong surface, and airport signage and
markings.
Question 2. How is the FAA proactively preparing for the future
growth in demand while maintaining a safe and efficient NAS?
Answer. The FAA is proactively preparing for future growth in
demand while maintaining a safe and efficient NAS by addressing the
maintainability and obsolescence issues with the surveillance systems.
This will ensure continued functionality of all surveillance
capabilities into the future that have led to increased runway safety,
improved efficiency in air traffic, and increased airport throughput.
The agency's FY2024 budget request addresses critical obsolescence,
life cycle support challenges for our systems, and helps maintain
continuity of the services the systems provide. The majority of the
radar inventory is over 40 years old, and all have passed their 20-year
life cycle. This means many essential parts are no longer manufactured,
available, or eligible for redesign and our work to support these aging
systems has taken on a new urgency to bridge the gap to implementing
modernization efforts.
We are committed to our mission and moving forward to sustain radar
surveillance services by implementing safety, security, and
technological enhancements to bridge critical system capabilities until
replaced or divested. We continue to do this work while simultaneously
planning to acquire cooperative radar systems, non-cooperative radar
systems, and other specialty solutions to sustain radar surveillance
capabilities.
Additionally, the FAA is developing more precise success metrics
and predictive analytics, including improvements to the Runway
Incursion Mitigation (RIM) tool, which will enhance mitigation status,
graphical AGIS interface for runway incursions and reports, program
metrics tracking, etc.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Billy Nolen
FAA Contract Towers Program. Investing in our Nation's
infrastructure includes continued investment in the FAA's contract
tower program, which provides critical air traffic control safety
benefits to 256 smaller airports across the country, including St.
Cloud and Anoka County airports in Minnesota.
Question. What can Congress do to ensure that contract tower
airports have the updated infrastructure and facilities they need to
accommodate rising air traffic levels?
Answer. The infrastructure at some Federal Contract Towers (FCTs)
are in need of repair or replacement. The Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (IIJA) included resources for FCTs and specifies that not less
than $200 million of the IIJA F&E funding is for towers ``that are
owned by the FAA and staffed through the contract tower program.'' In
addition, the Airport Infrastructure Grants component of the IIJA
includes a $20 million annual set aside to make competitive grants to
sponsors of airports participating in the contract tower program and
the contract tower cost share program. Last August, the FAA awarded the
FY 2022 grants under this program, announcing the selection of 20
projects across 18 states. Selected projects will rehabilitate and
upgrade FCTs, replace obsolete equipment, and conduct planning,
environmental, and design for future replacements. On March 31 2023,
FAA announced this year's selection of 33 grant awards at 29 airports
across 23 states and territories. These grants will sustain, construct,
repair, improve, modernize, replace or relocate airport-owned towers,
and install communications equipment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Billy Nolen
Question 1. Mr. Nolen, the reliability of the NOTAM system is
essential to all of our National Airspace--but the ability to provide
real-time data on runway conditions is especially essential for
Michigan in winter, where our airports are dealing with constantly
changing conditions and winter weather. During the NOTAM outage in
January, Detroit Metropolitan Airport shared with me that they were
told to ``utilize alternate means of compliance'' to share key flight
and runway condition information with flight crews. However no such
alternate means exist other than a 1-877 number that was quickly
overwhelmed. Mr. Nolen, is FAA developing a more comprehensive
contingency plan in case of future NOTAM outages that will allow
participants in our national airspace to quickly divert to another
agreed upon method for communicating this vital information?
Answer. Yes, the agency has developed a comprehensive contingency
plan intended to provide NOTAM information to all airspace users and
allow them to maintain operations in the event of a future NOTAM system
outage.
The goal of this contingency plan is to provide a backstop during
an unplanned, full outage to the primary NOTAM system while the system
is being recovered. The contingency plan allows FAA and its
stakeholders to maintain an accurate picture of the status of National
Airspace System (NAS) components while the primary NOTAM system is
recovered by allowing authorized personnel to issue ``candidate''
NOTAMs--i.e., NOTAMs not yet entered into the official NOTAM system--
and distribute them to the public using a standalone website. NAS users
will be able to use this information to maintain their situational
awareness until the NOTAM system is restored, after which any candidate
NOTAMs will be reconciled with the primary NOTAM system.
FAA is coordinating with our labor and industry partners on the
details of this contingency plan.
Question 2. Mr. Nolen, GAO recently released a report (GAO-23-
105189) detailing some of the FAA's shortcomings when it comes to
integrating UAS into our national airspace. GAO's first recommendation
tasked the FAA with developing a comprehensive drone strategy. Can you
provide the committee with an update on the status of FAA's
implementation of this and the other recommendations in the report?
Answer. The FAA is working collaboratively to address the GAO's
concerns to develop a comprehensive drone strategy that also
incorporates lessons learned for its drone integration activities. The
FAA also currently provides part 107 waiver safety explanation
guidelines on our public website.
Question 3. In the 116th Congress, my Drone Advisory Committee
(DAC) for the 21st Century Act was signed into law as P.L. 116-280. The
bill directed the FAA to take appropriate steps to encourage direct
representation of county and tribal governments, as well as
agriculture, forestry, rangeland sectors, and other rural interests on
the Drone Advisory Committee. Can you provide an update on what steps
the FAA has taken to implement this bill?
Answer. The Drone Advisory Committee was re-chartered as the
Advanced Aviation Advisory Committee (AAAC) in June 2022 to better
reflect the evolving ecosystem of new aviation entrants. The FAA has
conducted significant outreach to numerous organizations to encourage
them to submit requests to provide direct representation of county and
tribal governments, as well as agriculture, forestry, rangeland
sectors, and other rural interests on the AAAC. Currently, three
individuals represent the Local, State, Tribal and/or Territorial
stakeholder group and two individuals represent the Agricultural
Interests stakeholder group on the AAAC.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Billy Nolen
Topic: 5G Wireless Interference
Airlines for America recently urged the FAA to extend its proposed
deadline to June 2024 to retrofit aircraft with altimeters that won't
experience interference from 5G wireless technology. This four month
delay highlights the years of communication breakdown between FAA and
FCC during the development and rollout of 5G.
Question 1. Is the FAA receiving all the technical information it
needs from the FCC and wireless carriers to ensure that 5G does not
interfere with aircraft altimeters or any other technology needed for
aviation safety? If not, what information is FAA not yet receiving?
Answer. Yes, the agency is in receipt of all the required technical
information on the performance and operating characteristics of 5G
equipment that are needed to ensure compatibility with aviation safety.
Since late 2021, the FAA has engaged in regular and direct technical
interchanges with the 5G wireless carriers and FCC in order to better
understand the potential impact of 5G systems on radio altimeters.
These exchanges proved invaluable to the FAA's ability to directly
assess the impact of 5G operations and to make rapid decisions that
ensured the short-term compatibility of these technologies.
From July 2022 to March 2023, the FAA has used information learned
about 5G characteristics to secure long-term arrangements that ensure
the compatibility of these two technologies. The FCC and 5G wireless
carriers have been faithful and positive contributors to the process,
with the FAA and wireless carriers forging new collaborative working
relations that we expect to build upon in the coming years.
Question 2. Does the FAA have the resources it needs to ensure that
all passenger aircraft equipped with technology to prevent 5G from
interfering with flight operations? Does it need anything additional
from Congress?
Answer. Yes, the agency has the resources to continue ensuring
compatibility between 5G systems and radio altimeters that are required
for successful flight operations. The aviation industry is currently
engaged in a large-scale retrofit program that increases the 5G
tolerance of the avionics systems that are impacted by 5G. This
retrofit will continue into 2024. The FAA is finalizing a rulemaking
that ensures aircraft are properly equipped to resist emissions from 5G
equipment beginning in February 2024. Between now and February 2024,
the FAA is managing safety through our existing process of Alternative
Means of Compliance (AMOCs). These AMOCs assign an aircraft's allowed
operational parameters on a per-runway basis using the known 5G
environment at each airport. Through efficient management of aircraft
tolerance to 5G and monitoring of the 5G environment as it continues to
expand, the FAA is well positioned to ensure compatibility between
these technologies. Additional resources from Congress are not required
at this time.
Question 3. Is FAA sharing all relevant information with the FCC
and air carriers to prevent 5G from interfering with flight operations?
Answer. Yes, the FAA has regular engagement with both the FCC and
air carriers during which both groups are kept up-to-date on all
relevant information required for the compatibility of 5G and radio
altimeters. The FAA meets three times per week with the aviation
industry in a task force that was stood up early in 2022 specifically
to address the compatibility of these technologies. Additionally, the
FAA has hosted several round table events with aviation stakeholders to
share developments in the ongoing work to ensure compatibility. Since
July 2022, the FAA has met directly with the FCC several times to work
through technical discussions regarding potential interference to radio
altimeters. The FAA has also been meeting weekly with the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Office of
Spectrum Management to share updates on the ongoing work to ensure
short-term and long-term compatibility of these systems. The NTIA has
served as a liaison between the FAA and FCC, sharing technical issues
and soliciting feedback as necessary.
Question 4. Based on the FAA's experience with 5G, do you have any
concerns about the level of cooperation and information sharing the FAA
will receive from the FCC in the future?
Answer. The existing information-sharing structure between the FCC
and FAA is sufficient in that the FAA is made aware of proposed
spectrum repurposing efforts by the FCC and is provided an opportunity
to supply feedback on the impact of those proposed changes.
Unfortunately, it is often difficult for FAA to achieve a thorough
and complete technical analysis of the potential impact to aviation in
what is normally a relatively short period for comment. This has
historically led to difficulties in providing nuanced engineering
assessments of spectrum compatibility that can be used to
collaboratively improve the outcomes of FCC proposed spectrum
repurposing.
The FAA's experience with 5G has demonstrated that true innovation,
cooperation, and engineering problem-solving cannot efficiently occur
without direct engagement between the key stakeholders/owners of
wireless systems. When the wireless system stakeholders engage directly
to share information and engineer systems that ensure compatibility,
new opportunities emerge as a stronger understanding of the potential
system interactions is achieved.
FCC efforts to repurpose spectrum would likely experience more
positive outcomes with longer timelines afforded for the impacted
stakeholders to assess the technical parameters of each proposal with
engineering studies, rapid-deployment interference testing, and
industry feedback.
Question 5. Will FAA commit to coordinating with the FCC and
wireless carriers earlier in the development process of future
technologies so this doesn't happen again?
Answer. Yes, this is one of the primary lessons learned through the
5G experience. The FAA has found that direct and early engagement
between agencies and external stakeholders is critical to the success
of any proposed spectrum repurposing efforts.
Topic: Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
According to the Department of Transportation Inspector General, as
of 2017 NextGen was estimated to generate $100 billion in benefits
against a $36 billion investment. However, back in 2007, NextGen was
estimated to result in $213 billion in benefits.
Question 1. Can you provide an update on NextGen's estimated
benefits and is FAA still thinking it will be around $100 billion?
Answer. The $100B estimate for NextGen Benefits was developed prior
to the COVID pandemic. COVID has impacted both implementation schedules
and air traffic demand making future benefit projections very
uncertain.
Through 2022, NextGen has now implemented more than $9.4B in
benefits (FY22$). The benefits from more than 20 implemented
capabilities will continue to grow in the future. New implementations
like En Route DataComm across the NAS will bring additional future
benefits. Details can be found on the NextGen website at: https://
www.faa.gov/nextgen/reporting-benefits/details.
With current funding levels, the FAA continues to make smart
decisions in program prioritizations and calculations of the number of
sites affordable.
Question 2. How much longer is it going to take and how much more
is it going to cost to finish NextGen?
Answer. NextGen is a portfolio of programs, systems, and procedures
at different levels of maturity that will provide enhanced capabilities
for the movement and management of air traffic. The work in the
portfolio is being deployed in stages. Many enhancements are currently
in deployment, some are nearing implementation, and some of the
capabilities of NextGen are being defined and matured, as the
technology to support them becomes available (Pre-Implementation).
Question 3. If Congress wants to accelerate the completion of
NextGen what does Congress need to do in this year's FAA
reauthorization to make that happen?
Answer. We look forward to working with Congress on a long-term
reauthorization proposal and adequate funding for FAA's modernization
needs. The President's FY 2024 budget request supports NextGen
capabilities. The budget proposal includes $701.9 million in support of
NextGen programs, which aims to improve the safety, efficiency,
capacity, and environmental impact of the Nation's air transportation
system through the use of advanced technology, procedures, and
infrastructure.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Billy Nolen
NOTAM Failure. As you know, the failure of the nationwide Notice to
Air Missions (NOTAM) system on January 11, 2023, led to the first
nationwide ground stop of air traffic since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
reported that a FAA contractor inadvertently deleted files while
attempting to correct a synchronization issue involving the primary and
backup NOTAM databases. This deletion ultimately led the entire NOTAM
system to become compromised.
Question 1. How did this issue occur? Was the FAA contractor
following appropriate procedures and best practices when the file
deletion took place?
Answer. While performing unapproved corrective maintenance, the
contractor inadvertently deleted files. This is not an approved
procedure.
Question 2. Can you explain any steps the FAA has taken in order to
mitigate the risk that one accident could lead to the collapse of the
NOTAM system? Are there new redundancies in effect?
Answer. The FAA has taken steps to bring the NOTAM system in
alignment with our current practices and procedures used in maintaining
and modifying NAS systems. Additionally we have increased our
monitoring capabilities in the enterprise environment.
The current NOTAM System has both an active and geographically
separate disaster recovery site. Each site also has local redundancy to
prevent a single point of failure.
The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy where one
database is kept in near real-time sync with the active site, and a
second one is configured to apply changes with a one-hour delay. This
mitigates the risk of data deletions/corruption that recently occurred.
The ongoing NOTAM Modernization project will consolidate two NOTAM
systems into a single NOTAM system and also transition it to a highly
resilient NAS operational environment by 2025. The infrastructure
supporting NOTAM modernization will provide high-availability services
at geographically separate locations.
Question 3. This incident highlighted the vulnerability of the
NOTAM system and brought U.S. air traffic to a halt. Though this
incident was caused by human error, can you explain the safeguards the
FAA has in place to prevent a cyberattack from disabling the NOTAM
system?
Answer. The current infrastructure architecture of the NOTAM
operational environment follows a layered security approach for public-
facing websites; operational IP (OPIP), and public-facing websites are
continuously monitored by the NAS Cybersecurity Operations (NCO). The
Mission Support network is also monitored 24/7 by a Security Operations
Control Center for any suspicious or malicious activity. We assess
security controls regularly and deploy patches and certifications
regularly to ensure systems are up to date.
Question 4. Why did United Airlines issue a nationwide ground stop
for its network almost an hour before the FAA ordered a ground stop for
all aviation traffic? Did United take different safety information into
account?
Answer. Late on January 10, 2023, NOTAM applications and services
became unreliable. While technical experts worked through the night,
the FAA activated a hotline to provide real-time status updates to
system users. During this time, there were no reports of operational
impacts. In the early morning hours of January 11, 2023, the system
appeared to have been restored, but formatting issues persisted. To
resolve this, FAA's air traffic leadership directed the rebuild of the
databases. As the morning air traffic rush approached, and work on the
system continued, a ground stop was ordered at approximately 7:15 a.m.
EST, pausing all departures in the United States in order to maintain
safety and preserve predictability.
Although airlines and safety experts were consulted on the ground
stop, we do not have specific information on the timelines for
individual airlines. Once resiliency testing on the system was
conducted, the ground stop was lifted at 9:07 a.m. EST on January 11,
2023.
Dual NOTAM Systems. There are two NOTAM systems currently in
operation. The legacy U.S. NOTAM System is 30 years old while the
modern Federal NOTAM System remains a work in progress as FAA
modernization efforts continue. The FAA has been working to fully
stand-up the Federal NOTAM system for years and expects full
implementation to conclude by 2030.
Question 5. Why do some airspace users continue to rely on the
legacy NOTAM system?
Answer. To clarify, the current NOTAM system has multiple means for
NOTAMs to be provided to the NOTAM databases, and multiple output
methods for various users.
Both systems are required today to operate the full of the NOTAM
capability. For example, the NOTAM System still provides a ``serial
number'' for any NOTAM generated, whether it comes from the U.S. NOTAM
System (USNS) or Federal NOTAM System (FNS) inputs. The applications
for originating airspace NOTAMs, such as Temporary Flight Restriction
(TFR), Altitude Reservation (ALTRV), and Special Activity Airspace
(SAA), still depend on the legacy NOTAM System (USNS) because the
required functionality is not available within the new system (FNS).
This gap is being addressed partially in the ongoing NOTAM
Modernization (FNS Sustainment) and fully in the next phase of AIM
Modernization referred to as AIMM Enhancement 1 (E1).
NOTAM origination applications are past their end of life and need
to be replaced before they affect the safety of the NAS. The goal of
AIMM E1 is to consolidate all these functionalities which today are
supported via three different applications, into a single application
and also enable digital NOTAMs, so they can not only be disseminated
via a globally harmonized message standard enabling machine
interpretation and enabling graphical visualization, a key requirement
from the industry.
Some users, like DOD, and some legacy search tools still used by
some airports and consumers, use distribution systems connected to the
older software system, USNS. Modernization of both systems into one
modern architecture will move all origination and all distribution
services and consumers into one system.
Question 6. What resources does the FAA need to complete the
Federal NOTAM system? Can you commit to the 2030 timeline for Federal
NOTAM implementation? If not, what obstacles may the FAA encounter that
could affect that timeline?
Answer. The investment that is currently being implemented (Federal
NOTAM System Sustainment) addresses two aspects of NOTAM modernization:
the consolidation of the legacy NOTAM system (United States NOTAM
System) functionality into the Federal NOTAM System and the transfer of
the NOTAM system off the outdated hardware platform onto an Integrated
Enterprise Services platform.
With full support of the President's Budget, Congress can reduce
the funding and timing obstacles that the FAA may encounter with
implementing a large, long-term project.
Question 7. In addition, when can the FAA sunset the legacy U.S.
NOTAM system? Are there steps Congress can take to encourage legacy
NOTAM users, including the Department of Defense, to migrate to the
Federal NOTAM system?
Answer. To comply with the legislative requirement, in 2019, the
FAA began developing an acquisition strategy to consolidate the
multiple platforms into a single Federal NOTAM System (FNS). The plan
includes retiring legacy components and moving FNS to a more reliable
and resilient environment built specifically to support critical NAS
operations. The President's FY 2024 budget request for NOTAM
modernization seeks resources to ensure legacy NOTAM users have the
necessary capabilities to migrate along with the FAA.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Billy Nolen
Infrastructure Investment and Cybersecurity. Thank you for
discussing cybersecurity protections regarding the NOTAM system, which
plays a critical role in aviation safety. I am glad you agreed to
follow up with several of my questions in writing.
Question 1. In response to my question of whether as of January 10,
2023, FAA officials were aware that deleting certain files could
disrupt the synchronization between the live and primary NOTAM
databases, you responded that ``Yes, the Administrator knew that.'' \1\
How many FAA staff were aware that deleting these files would disrupt
the synchronization, resulting in a NOTAM outage?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2023/2/the-federal-aviation-
administration-s-notam-system-failure-and-its-impacts-on-a-resilient-
national-airspace at 02:10:08.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. The event on January 10 was an accidental deletion/movement
of what is called a data file of an Oracle database. The Oracle data
file is a physical file that stores data. It is a critical component of
the Oracle database that holds the data from tables, indexes, and other
database objects. It is equivalent to a critical operating system file
on all our desktop machines. Moving and/or deleting the data file while
the system is running can lead to errors and, in the worst scenario,
complete system failure.
The deletion of files did not disrupt synchronization. Lack of
synchronization existed before the outage, and was not caused by
deleting the files. During our investigation, it was discovered the
synchronization had not been occurring with all secondary databases.
The deletion of files removed the only set of files from the
operational system.
To prevent such issues in the future, several procedural steps have
been taken to monitor activities when staff need to work on the
operational NOTAM system.
Question 2. How long were these FAA officials aware of this
specific vulnerability?
Answer. Although human error is never completely avoidable, the FAA
has maintained the NOTAM system for years with support from the current
vendor. We have taken steps to transition the NOTAM system to
traditional NAS maintenance and change management oversight. Preventive
measures have been put in place to prevent such issues in the future
for this system, including oversight by an FAA lead for all maintenance
and changes. Additionally, the FAA conducted an assessment of the
configuration and change management practices for all systems and
services that could impact the NAS and we are in the process of
determining what additional system design or controls are needed to
close any gaps. No immediate high risks have been identified in that
analysis and the lower level risks are being addressed on the few
contractor maintained systems that exist. No additional systems have
been identified that could have nationwide implications or even
significant localized impacts.
Question 3. Since FAA officials, including the Administrator
(according to your testimony), were aware of this vulnerability, why
were there not additional safeguards to ensure that contractors could
not inadvertently delete those files?
Answer. Careful handling of data files is part of database
administrator training. We have hired qualified and certified database
administrators to support the program and expect them to follow the
basic requirements. To prevent such issues in the future, several
procedural steps have been taken when staff need to work on the NOTAM
system.
Question 4. When I asked how many contractors had access to the
NOTAM system, you stated there were two people working in the system
but that you did not have an exact number of how many individuals had
sufficient access to delete those specific files.\2\ Thank you agreeing
to following up with me in writing on this point. In addition to the
two contractors who were involved in this specific incident, how many
other contractors and FAA staff had sufficient permissions to access
and delete those files, as of January 10, 2023?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Id. at 02:11:05.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Access to the NOTAM system would include all approved and
authorized staff on the contract that includes System Administrators
and Database Administrators (DBA) (total eight contractors) who have
complete access to the system.
Question 5. In your testimony, you stated that some of the new
controls that FAA has installed include requiring two people to delete
critical files that could disrupt the database synchronization,
resulting in a NOTAM outage.\3\ As of today, what is the total number
of individuals who are eligible to be one of the two individuals under
the new controls? How many of these are contractors, and how many are
FAA staff?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Id. at 02:11:48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. New controls are in place, to have Federal employees
directly oversee and provide approvals for all eight contractors while
maintaining and/or modifying the system.
Question 6. In addition to the new control listed above, what other
new protocols has FAA implemented to strengthen procedures, access,
controls, resilience, and redundancies to limit the effects of SPOF?
Answer. The NOTAM System has both an active and geographically
separate disaster recovery site providing protection against a site
failure. In addition, each site also has local redundancy to prevent a
single point of failure.
The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy. At the
disaster recovery site, one database is kept in near real-time sync
with the active site, and a second one is configured to apply changes
with a one-hour delay. This mitigates the risk of data deletions/
corruption that recently occurred.
Additional controls have been added to monitor database
synchronization. The FAA has taken steps to transition the NOTAM system
to traditional NAS maintenance and change management oversight.
The FAA has also developed a backup ability for operators to access
new/modified NOTAMs in the event of a complete failure (disaster)
affecting the primary and secondary systems as well as the disaster
recovery site. The FAA is continuing to look at additional controls,
tests, improved system monitoring to respond to load, and demand issues
proactively.
Question 7. As I stated, I believe that it is unacceptable for the
FAA to have single points of failure (SPOFs) within critical systems
like NOTAM. As your review of the root causes of this incident has
continued, how many SPOFs has the FAA discovered within its NOTAM
systems?
Answer. The FAA has taken steps to rectify any SPOFs. The
contractor error in deleting the active database, compounded by a
synchronization failure, was a failure that spanned multiple, normally
redundant, systems and processes.
Additional mitigations have been put in place to mitigate the risk
of data deletions/corruption being distributed to all redundant
databases.
Question 8. You stated that the FAA is currently working with the
MITRE Corporation to investigate the causes of the NOTAM outage.\4\
What is the status of this work? When do you expect it to be complete,
and what will be the timeline for implementing any recommendations that
result?
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\4\ Id. at 02:12:35-02:12:54.
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Answer. The MITRE investigation has completed, and briefings to FAA
leadership are in progress. Once the FAA receives the final report, we
will review and analyze the recommendations.
Question 9. To the extent this audit with the MITRE Corporation has
produced preliminary findings, which of those have been most actionable
at avoiding similar outages in the future?
Answer. The MITRE investigation has completed, and briefings to FAA
leadership are in progress. Once the FAA receives the final report, we
will review and analyze the recommendations.
Aviation Workers in Georgia. Georgia is home to a thriving aviation
industry, including the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International
Airport--the world's busiest for passenger traffic. Georgia is home to
tens of thousands of aviation workers who show up daily to ensure
passengers get to where they need to go.
Question 1. How many aviation workers in Georgia were affected by
this outage? For example, how many aviation workers had to work extra
hours or take on additional duties to respond to the NOTAM outage and
associated disruptions? Please describe what steps FAA has undertaken
to understand the effect of the NOTAM outage on workers.
Answer. The FAA does not have any direct insight into the impact of
the outage on aviation workers in Georgia. From an agency perspective,
the FAA workforce was actively engaged in the NOTAM outage and worked
around the clock, as the public would expect us to, to ensure that
operations were brought back to normal as soon as possible. We have
discussed the impacts of this with our many stakeholders and have
included them in our status of mitigations and the development of a
contingency operations capability and procedures to ensure we
collectively are able to avoid any similar event in the future.
Question 2. Does current law give FAA the authority and resources
to compensate passengers or aviation workers directly for its mistakes?
Answer. The FAA is unaware of any authority or resources to
directly compensate passengers or aviation workers for an FAA
``mistake.'' If a party has a valid claim of alleged negligence or
other tortious conduct of FAA employees, these type of lawsuits are
controlled by the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1346, 2671, et seq. Pursuant to the FTCA, before any
such lawsuit can be filed, the claimant(s) must timely file an
administrative tort claim with the FAA and otherwise comply with the
regulations pertaining to such tort claims. The filing of
administrative tort claims against the FAA is governed by Federal
regulations 28 C.F.R. Parts 14, 15.
Type Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) are an emerging entrant into the National Airspace System
(NAS) with potential practical applications such as expedited package
delivery. The FAA has established a UAS Integration Office responsible
for leading the agency's efforts to safely integrate UAS into the NAS,
and I am interested in learning more about the activities and progress
of the Integration Office.
Question 1. What, if any, type certifications regarding UAS has FAA
made to date?
Answer. The FAA has type certificated a few UAS, and is continuing
work on several type certification projects using an existing process
tailored to UAS. Notably, the FAA issued a standard type certificate
for Matternet in September 2022.
Question 2. Is there a backlog of type certifications for UAS at
FAA?
Answer. While applicants may have specific certification timelines
in mind, the FAA works certification projects as efficiently as
possible while maintaining the appropriate considerations for safety.
Question 3. Are there any staffing and funding challenges that are
affecting FAA's ability to address type certifications for UAS?
Answer. The FAA appreciates continued congressional support of our
certification efforts. At this time, the FAA is sufficiently equipped
and trained to manage the type certification for UAS.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management. The NAS is becoming
more dynamic through the digitization and automation of aeronautical
information. The FAA's modernization of its systems, including legacy
systems such as the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system, is a
critical step towards ensuring the NAS remains safe and efficient,
particularly as it welcomes new entrants into the airspace.
Question 1. What efforts has the FAA made to update its
aeronautical information, including, but not limited to, its NOTAM
data?
Answer. Multiple efforts have been completed and more are planned
to modernize the collection and dissemination of aeronautical
information-foundational data required for all operations. NOTAM
Modernization will continue as we are updating the older systems.
We have made some improvements to the legacy database and functions
in recent years. Modernization with NOTAM Aeronautical Information
Management Modernization (AIMM) Segment 2 built the Aeronautical Common
Service (ACS), which provides an enterprise machine-to-machine
interface containing integrated aeronautical information over System
Wide Information Management (SWIM) in the globally harmonized message
format of AIXM (Aeronautical Information eXchange Model). Combining
static and dynamic data enables near real-time situational awareness of
the NAS for all stakeholders.
The planned AIMM Enhancement 1 is the next phase of this
modernization plan. The NOTAM System will be transitioned to support
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) NOTAM standards,
an enterprise airspace management platform for originating and
distributing the critical airspace NOTAMs, and finally, providing
additional filtering and distribution mechanisms for the aeronautical
information. This phase will also complete the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018 requirements for NOTAM Modernization.
Question 2. Is the FAA operationalizing drone safety services and
the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management environment? If so,
how?
Answer. To establish the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic
Management (UTM) system, the FAA is developing a Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) regulatory and traffic management framework that is
compatible with the evolution of the technology required to support
UTM. UTM infrastructure will evolve so that the use of a mature UTM
ecosystem will support planned commercial operations.
Section 377 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254)
requires the FAA to develop a process to permit, authorize, or allow
the use of UTM Services. The FAA is developing a review process for UTM
services that ensures national airspace system safety and reduces UAS
risk. This approach is intended to expedite (third-party service
supplier) approvals in low-risk areas and will allow for test and
evaluation of standards, technologies, and capabilities. The FAA is
hoping to launch this system soon and will use information gathered
through this program to inform policy and decision-making.
Question 3. What role does the modernization of airspace data
sources play in the operationalizing of drone safety services and the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management environment?
Answer. The Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management system
(UTM) is a ``traffic management'' ecosystem for uncontrolled Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) operations that is separate from, but
complementary to, the FAA's Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. UTM
development will ultimately identify services, roles and
responsibilities, information architecture, data exchange protocols,
software functions, infrastructure, and performance requirements for
enabling the management of low-altitude uncontrolled drone operations.
The UTM consists of a group of enterprise systems that exchange data
with external partners, called UAS Service Suppliers (USSs), for the
purpose of processing flight authorization requests from individual UAS
(aka drone) operators. Modernization and shared data will enable near
real-time situational awareness of the NAS for all stakeholders.
Remote Identification. Remote identification of drones is one of
the new technologies and systems that FAA is adopting in order to
ensure the safe integration of UAS into the NAS. The FAA final
rulemaking on remote identification requires drones to locally
broadcast identifying information, though other jurisdictions have
remote identification standards that allow either local broadcast or a
network solution.
Question 1. Are there benefits of a network remote identification
solution? Why did FAA not include a network solution in its final
rulemaking on drone remote identification?
Answer. Though the FAA recognizes that there are potential benefits
associated with establishing a network of remote ID UAS Service
Suppliers (USS), the FAA believes that, for the time being and given
the types of unmanned aircraft operations that are currently allowed,
the broadcast remote identification solution fulfills agency and law
enforcement needs to maintain the safety and security of the airspace
of the United States. The FAA received significant feedback about the
network requirement identifying both public opposition to, and
technical challenges with, implementing the network requirements. After
careful consideration of these challenges, informed by public comment,
the FAA decided to eliminate the requirement in this rulemaking to
transmit remote identification messages through an Internet connection
to a remote ID USS.
Advanced Air Mobility. Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) envisions an
aviation transportation system that will use automated aircraft to
operate and transport passengers or cargo at lower altitudes beyond
urban environments. The FAA has incorporated AAM into its planning
efforts and is collaborating with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) on their AAM National Campaign, yet there is much
more to be done before adopting AAM into the current aviation
ecosystem.
Question 1. Does the FAA have the technical knowledge, tools, and
appropriate staff to review AAM applicants in a safe and timely manner?
Answer. Yes. The FAA has the necessary training and technical
background to review AAM applicants. This is a new type of aircraft and
the FAA will utilize the safety continuum and leverage existing
guidance, where applicable, to ensure AAM applicant review is safe and
timely.
The FAA has established innovation teams (iTeams) that cover key
focus areas: aircraft certification, operational certification,
airspace and air traffic management, vertiports, infrastructure,
environment, security, community outreach, safety, and people. Many of
these iTeams are already engaged in activities required for the
operationalization of AAM including with AAM Original Equipment
Manufacturers and operators to work through certification and other
associated processes.
Question 2. Would the FAA benefit from a dedicated office to
coordinate the certification and implementation progress of AAM
applicants into the National Airspace System? If so, what authority
should this office have?
Answer. At this time, the FAA has the appropriate organizational
structure to address AAM applicants. The cross-line of business
communication plans have been established and we are working at an
appropriate cadence and structure to bring AAM applicants into the NAS
in a safe and efficient manner.
Question 3. What specific steps is the FAA taking in the next 3, 6,
and 12 months to ensure it will meet the deadline to issue the first
type certificates for electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL)
aircraft in 2024? Who is in charge of these efforts at FAA?
Answer. While the FAA is making every effort to work with
applicants on their type certifications projects in a timely and
expeditious manner, the FAA does not set timelines for certification.
The FAA is working to finalize airworthiness criteria, publish a
Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) for powered-lift operations,
and refine means of compliance with several applicants.
Question 4. Will FAA prioritize Letters of Authorization (LOAs) for
initial AAM operations in National Airspace?
Answer. The FAA plans to support manufacturers and operators in the
establishment of their operations programs by coordinating efforts
during operational certification, including the issuance of any Letters
of Authorization (LOA). Consistent with the way the FAA engages with
stakeholders of other aircraft categories, the FAA will work
collaboratively with AAM manufacturers and operators through training
and operations certification processes until completion.
Question 5. Is there a backlog for Part 135 air carrier and
operator certifications? If so, what is the FAA doing to address this
backlog?
Answer. The FAA plans to take a number of actions to assist in
reducing the backlog for Part 135 certification requests. Efforts
include redistributing and reprioritizing work within the FAA to assist
with certification activities, aligning and establishing policy to
reduce the timeline for certification projects, and partnering with
industry organizations to explore opportunities for initial screening
and standardization prior to submission to the FAA.
Airplane Fuel Efficiency Certification. In June 2022, the FAA
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Airplane Fuel Efficiency
Certification. This proposal aligns with aircraft CO2
emission standards established by the United Nations' International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and with Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)'s regulations implementing the ICAO standard. Once this
rule is adopted, all U.S. aircraft will have to be certified to these
new standards in order to be delivered to their customers after 2027. I
know that many U.S. manufacturers of large and small aircraft are
anxious to have a final FAA rule released as soon as possible in order
to begin certifying aircraft to the standard.
Question 1. When will this rule be finalized?
Answer. On January 11, 2021, EPA published a final rule adopting
the ICAO standard into U.S. regulations as a new 40 CFR Part 1030. On
June 15, 2022, in accordance with its requirements under the Clean Air
Act, the FAA proposed new certification regulations for certain
airplanes to ensure compliance with EPA standards. The comment period
for FAA's proposal closed on August 15, 2022, and the FAA received a
total of sixty-two comments on the rule. The FAA is currently working
on a final rule, which the FAA anticipates will publish in September
2023.
NOTAM Outage and Ground Stop. The NOTAM outage and 2-hour ground
stop highlighted the sensitivity and vulnerability of our air traffic
system. I am pleased that we are collectively looking at what needs to
be done to prioritize and update the NOTAM system; however, I am
concerned that the NOTAM system is just one of many critical air
traffic programs that are outdated and at risk of failure. While the
ground stop during the NOTAM outage was only about two hours, I worry
about another system failures that could lead to longer operational
impacts.
Question 1. Could you please provide an update on the Terminal Flow
Data Manager, Flow Management Data & Services, En-Route Automation
Modernization, and other critical programs and modernization efforts?
Answer. During COVID, the FAA established a new program called Flow
Management Data and Services (FMDS) to replace the aging Traffic Flow
Management System. The new FMDS program went from definition by the
Federal Acquisition Executive (February 2022) to Investment Analysis
Readiness Decision (January 2023) in just 11 months. The program
continues in accordance with the FAA's Acquisition Management System
toward a Final Investment Decision in January 2025. COVID has not
impacted this program's cost, schedule, or ability to complete the
required investment analysis work.
Question 2. What are biggest challenges in strengthening the
resiliency and reliability of the air traffic system?
Answer. The agency's ability to strengthen the resiliency and
reliability of the air traffic system is dependent on maintaining an
adequate and stable funding stream and long-term authorizations.
Events such as continuing resolutions, government shutdowns, and
sequestration, can affect the implementation schedules, thus affecting
system resiliency and reliability. These events not only directly
affect program schedules, but they can disrupt Federal hiring and
retention and affect vendor ability to keep the required skills on
staff.
Question 3. Would changes in the Congressional funding structure,
such as expanding the Airport & Airway Trust Fund (AATF) and extending
Congressional budget authority longer than a year help the FAA support
the safety, reliability, and resiliency of our Nation's aviation
system, including its critical air traffic programs?
Answer. Congress has provided some flexibility for the FAA's
budget, including multi-year budget authority, and the President's FY
2024 Budget request includes robust investment in system modernization.
We look forward to working with Congress on the next FAA
reauthorization act to ensure that the FAA has stable and sufficient
funding in the years to come.
Question 4. Would streamlining the Federal contract and acquisition
processes help FAA improve and modernize its air traffic programs and
systems?
Answer. The FAA's Acquisition Management System (AMS) was formed
with the flexibilities required to pivot and respond to mission need.
While these flexibilities are available, we look forward to working
with Congress on the enactment of a long-term reauthorization, and
adequate funding for our modernization needs to efficiently and
effectively field capabilities under AMS.
Question 5. Does the FAA plan to keep allowing backup systems such
as WMSCR and AIDAP to continue transmitting NOTAM information while the
agency updates the primary system, and should air carriers continue to
invest in connecting to these backup systems?
Answer. WMSCR will continue to transmit NOTAM information for the
foreseeable future. The AIDAP system will be sunset as part of the
NOTAM Modernization effort.
Question 6. Can you please describe the NextGen Advisory Committee
(NAC)'s work and how you will ensure that the NAC incorporates industry
input in order to help FAA fix its foundational legacy systems and
modernize programs for operational and environmental benefits?
Answer. The NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC) provides independent,
consensus-based advice and recommendations to the FAA in response to
specific ``taskings'' received directly from FAA. The NAC is currently
engaged with the FAA on several commitments: the Northeast Corridor,
Surface and Data Sharing, Data Communications, and Performance Based
Navigation focus areas through the NextGen Joint Implementation Plan.
For example, the FAA issued NAC Tasking 23-1: National Airspace System
(NAS) Airspace Efficiencies, requesting advice on identifying and
leveraging airspace efficiencies. As part of this task, the NAC will
review current usage of legacy systems and NextGen procedures and
provide advice on divesting and leveraging efficiencies across the NAS.
5G. Air carriers have raised concerns regarding the next milestone
of July 1, 2023, for 5G deployment and Group 3 aircraft. These concerns
include delays in manufacturing, supply chains, and regulatory
approval.
Question 1. Are you aware of the challenges I mentioned for
manufacturers and air carriers?
Answer. The FAA is fully aware of the challenges to retrofit. We
hold regular meetings with airframe manufactures such as Boeing,
Airbus, Embraer, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the radio
altimeter manufacturers like Collins, Honeywell, and Thales. We meet
with the airframe and radio altimeter manufacturers as a group and meet
with them individually to make sure we understand any challenges to
completing the retrofit.
Question 2. Do you anticipate there will be impacts to airline
operations after July 1?
Answer. Based on information from the airframe manufacturers and
the airlines, FAA is estimating that less than 15 percent of U.S.
domestic registered airplanes will not have completed retrofit on July
1. The proposed Airworthiness Directive states that airplanes not
equipped with a 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeter after July 1, when
the voluntary wireless mitigations end, will be subject to operational
restrictions. These potential impacts to airlines operations will
almost exclusively happen during periods of very low visibility (less
than one-half (1/2) statute mile) at the destination airport. Some
operators of these unretrofitted airplanes will not be affected because
they have chosen not to operate in visibility this low. These
visibility conditions are very infrequent but it is possible that some
airlines without suitably equipped 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeter
airplanes will have operational impacts.
Question 3. Do you commit to having full transparency with air
carriers on the challenges that lie ahead, and will the FAA help make
adjustments as necessary, so they can continue to transport passengers
without operational disruption?
Answer. The primary mission of the FAA is to ensure the safety of
the National Airspace System (NAS) and the traveling public. When the
wireless voluntary mitigations around airports end on July 1, airplanes
without 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeters will be subject to
interference resulting in an unsafe condition. To ensure the safety of
the NAS, the FAA must restrict unretrofitted airplanes from certain
operations after July 1.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Billy Nolen
Question 1. In December 2017, the bipartisan Modernizing Government
Technology Act, established the Technology Modernization Fund, which
provides IT working capital funds to Federal agencies and allows them
to use savings obtained through streamlining IT systems, replacing
legacy products, and transition to cloud computing for additional
modernization efforts. To date, TMF has invested in 35 government IT
modernization projects across 19 Federal agencies, the largest project
investment so far being $187 million.
Mr. Nolen, considering the NOTAM modernization goal of
transitioning to an entirely virtual platform by 2025, can you
tell me if the Department of Transportation and the FAA has
considered using the Technology Modernization Fund to improve
the NOTAM system? Please explain why or why not.
Answer. To date, the FAA has limited experience with the use of the
Technology Modernization Fund. FAA leadership has identified
opportunities to leverage this fund for selected modernization planned
activities.
The Technology Modernization Fund has awarded funds to the FAA for
a non-NOTAM related project. The FAA's Office of the Chief Information
Officer submitted a proposal to the Technology Modernization Fund's
Program Management Office for consideration to modernize 22
applications hosted in the FAA's Mission Support Operating Environment.
These applications will be refactored to a Cloud native architecture
over the course of three years and will be free of technical debt.
At this time, the FAA has not considered using the Technology
Modernization Fund to improve the NOTAM system.
Could DOT and FAA better utilize the Technology
Modernization Fund to ensure situations like the NOTAM system
failure that occurred in January does not occur again?
Answer. Yes. The Technology Modernization Fund mission may be a
possible option to help address the agency's growing technical debt.
Question 2. Mr. Nolen, you have spoken recently about your
excitement around Advanced Air Mobility. Last Congress, my Advanced Air
Mobility Coordination and Leadership Act became law, which instructs
the Department of Transportation to lead a working group comprised of
members of Federal agencies to provide recommendations on the
coordination and integration of this new entrant into our civil
airspace. The recommendations from this working group will be
instrumental in crafting this year's FAA Reauthorization bill.
Can you provide a status update on the establishment of this
interagency group and other concrete steps the FAA is taking on
leading the world in the adoption of AAM?
Answer. In response to the Advanced Air Mobility Coordination and
Leadership Act, the DOT established the Interagency Working Group
(IWG), which officially kicked off on February 22, 2023, with a follow-
up working group meeting on March 21-22, 2023. The FAA is playing a key
role in the IWG to identify cross-agency gaps and activities. Led by
DOT, the IWG is ensuring an all of government approach to AAM to ensure
aircraft, air traffic, safety, security, frequency spectrum,
infrastructure, automation, and other areas of focus, to include areas
outside of the FAA authority (e.g., electrification and local land use
issues) related to AAM are being taken into consideration.
In addition to the IWG, the FAA is creating an ecosystem of
technologies, systems, processes, and organizational structures that
will help safely integrate AAM operations in an efficient, sustainable,
and repeatable manner. To do so, the FAA has established innovation
teams (iTeams) that cover key focus areas such as aircraft and
operational certification, airspace and air traffic management, and
vertiports. In addition to leading research efforts to establish AAM
standards, the iTeams are developing an implementation plan that will
contain a Concept of Use for the FAA's vision of AAM operations, as
well as an Integrated Master Schedule. The agency is also building a
structured approach to support the expected evolution of AAM. This
includes preparing for near-term early entry-into-service operations
based on industry plans, mid-term operations such as the
operationalization of AAM at a key site in 2028 (Innovate28), and fully
mature AAM operations.
Question 3. I am a strong supporter of the FAA contract tower
program and recognize the essential role of the program in keeping
small and rural communities safe and connected to the broader aviation
system. The FAA has proposed to revise the boundaries of the service
areas for the contract tower program, and I am concerned that the
proposed realignment could impact aviation safety.
Mr. Nolen, has the FAA conducted a safety risk assessment of
the proposed revisions of the contract tower service areas to
ensure there aren't any unacceptable or unintended safety
consequences?
Since contract towers are operational by nature, should the
FAA conduct a safety risk assessment before moving forward with
the proposed realignment of the service areas?
Answer. Safety is of the utmost concern to the FAA. The FAA
followed all applicable safety management processes in determining the
new Federal Contract Tower (FCT) contract area boundaries. A safety-
risk assessment was not required as the administrative change does not
impact the quality of air traffic services at FCT locations. The newly
established boundaries are an administrative change that only affects
the organizational structure of the towers and high industry safety
standards will be maintained.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Billy Nolen
Question 1. Since December 2001, the FAA has restricted flights
within three miles and 3,000 feet of every major league baseball and
NFL football stadium during games. But the FAA does not issue NOTAMs
for these events. Air Traffic Control and electronic flight bag
applications like ForeFlight must resort to using commercial ticketing
websites to find out the times for these sporting events. Mr. Nolen,
how does the FAA expect pilots to comply with these TFRs if they cannot
get reliable information about the restrictions directly from the FAA?
Answer. As you noted, shortly after September 11, 2001, the FAA
began restricting flights within three miles and 3,000 feet of every
major league baseball and NFL football stadium. The scope is actually
much greater than that. This action was taken because Congress enacted
legislation that restricted civil aircraft operations over sporting
events such as NASCAR, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
Football League (NFL), National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
Division I Football, and other open-air events containing more than
30,000 people.
Contemplating how to effectively implement Congress' direction and
prior to implementing the first ``Sporting Event'' Temporary Flight
Restriction (TFR), a determination was made that the FAA NOTAM's system
would be overwhelmed by the sheer number of events covered under the
TFR:
MLB = 4913 (includes possible playoff games), NFL = 589
(including playoffs), NCAA Div 1 Football--1,603 (includes bowl
games), and NASCAR = 100 (estimated) for a total of up to 7,115
individual events that would require a unique TFR each year.
The TFR contains language that states it is in effect one hour
prior to the event until one hour after the event. With delays and
unforeseen occurrences that impact the start and stop times of covered
events it would be impractical, at best, for the FAA to publish
individual TFRs accurately.
This was a discussion item during the development of this
legislation in 2001.
Knowing the challenges this legislation placed on the FAA, we
embarked on an unending outreach campaign to bring awareness to the
flying public. In that vein, the FAA expects pilots to comply with
these congressionally mandated protections implemented through the use
of TFRs. Pilots have the ability to gain awareness by thorough and
effective preflight planning, which may include planning a flight path
to avoid a covered event by three miles or being above 3000 feet.
Additionally, pilots could seek airborne clarity that can be provided
by local air traffic controllers that are monitoring the airspace.
Question 2. The FAA has been working to expand the availability of
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) and Tower Data Link
Services (TDLS). As you know, this technology enables pilots to receive
some ATC clearances without having to speak to a controller on the
radio. Receiving written clearances saves time and reduces the chance a
pilot or controller will misstate the clearance. While the equipment
required to receive these clearances enroute is expensive, nearly every
pilot has access to a cell phone or tablet. This presents an
opportunity for every pilot to have an option to receive electronic
pre-departure clearances before they leave the ground. What is the FAA
doing to expand the number of airports, TRACONs, and ARTCCs with CPDLC
and TDLS capabilities (as appropriate), and in particular, those able
to deliver electronic pre-departure clearances to general aviation
pilots?
Answer. FAA has deployed CPDLC and TDLS to 65 towers. We are in the
process of deploying En Route initial and Full Data Comm capabilities
to the 20 ARTCCs that will be used to cover the contiguous U.S.
Currently 11 ARTCCs are using En Route Data Comm capabilities.
Question 3. Is the FAA developing the capability to receive
electronic pre-departure clearances from subscription-free services
(such as Flight Service) that could be accessed from a cell phone or
tablet?
Answer. The FAA has been exploring a concept to allow pre-departure
clearances to be sent to pilots over commercial networks using a
personal mobile device. The vision is that the service will be
available to pilots through apps from companies such as flight plan
service providers. The concept is still several years away from
implementation. When it is ready for technology transfer to industry,
the capability will be available for licensing to any service provider
who wishes to provide the service. The FAA has not taken a position on
whether the pre-departure clearance capability will be available
subscription-free or only offered through fee-for-service providers.
[all]