    [Senate Hearing 118-489]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-489

                     THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S
                      NOTAM SYSTEM FAILURE AND ITS IMPACTS
                        ON A RESILIENT NATIONAL AIRSPACE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 15, 2023

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    57-389 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                       MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair

    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
    GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
    JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          J. D. VANCE, Ohio
    RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                     Virginia
                                         CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming

                       Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
                     Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
                         Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
                     Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
               Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                         Liam McKenna, General Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on February 15, 2023................................     1
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Cruz........................................     2
    Statement of Senator Moran.......................................     4
    Statement of Senator Schatz......................................    12
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    15
    Statement of Senator Thune.......................................    17
    Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................    19
    Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    20
    Statement of Senator Peters......................................    22
    Statement of Senator Budd........................................    24
        NOTAM Briefing dated February 14, 2023 by the Federal
          Aviation Administration....................................    25
    Statement of Senator Markey......................................   117
    Statement of Senator Vance.......................................   119
    Statement of Senator Baldwin.....................................   121
    Statement of Senator Schmitt.....................................   122
    Statement of Senator Duckworth...................................   124
    Statement of Senator Capito......................................   126
    Statement of Senator Lummis......................................   129
    Statement of Senator Rosen.......................................   131
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................   133
    Statement of Senator Warnock.....................................   135

                                   Witnesses

    Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation
      Administration.................................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     7

                                    Appendix

    Response to written questions submitted to Billy Nolen by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   139
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   144
        Hon. Gary Peters.............................................   145
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................   146
        Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................   147
        Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................   149
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................   155
        Hon. Ted Budd................................................   157

                     THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S
                      NOTAM SYSTEM FAILURE AND ITS IMPACTS
                        ON A RESILIENT NATIONAL AIRSPACE

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2023

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
    SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria Cantwell,
    Chairwoman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar, Schatz,
    Markey, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, Rosen, Hickenlooper,
    Warnock, Cruz, Thune, Moran, Fischer, Budd, Schmitt, Vance,
    Capito, and Lummis.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        The Chair. The Senate Commerce Committee will come to
    order. I appreciate all my colleagues being here this morning.
    For the United States to be a leader in aviation, we must set
    the gold standard for aviation safety.
        We know there is work to do, and we have a number of recent
    incidents that highlights the importance of continuing to make
    safety the top priority. Last week we saw how technology issues
    can impact airlines and the traveling public.
        Today, we welcome acting FAA Administrator Billy Nolen to
    the Committee to help understand what went wrong with the NOTAM
    system and what actions the FAA is taking to make sure this
    never happens again.
        How do we make sure the agency has the necessary resources
    to modernize its IT infrastructure? And how do we ensure a
    safe, and efficient, and reliable network? How can we ensure
    our global competitive edge? Mr. Nolen understands these
    challenges.
        On January 11, he ordered the first national ground stop
    since 9/11, and this was a significant event. More than 1,300
    flights were canceled and more than 9,500 were delayed. Prior
    to leading the FAA, Mr. Nolen served as the head of the FAA's
    Office of Aviation Safety. With over 1 million registered
    aircraft, over 1 million active pilots, and over 50,000 flights
    every day, the Aviation Safety Office has a very big job.
        As an experienced airline pilot, Mr. Nolen understands the
    importance of the NOTAM system. These notices provide real time
    safety information, flight operations, and without access to
    this information, safe aircraft operations really are not
    possible. This hearing, like last week's, which I believe still
    shows the investment in technology that needs to be made--
    Southwest could have updated their system, and didn't, and a
    critical event happened.
        Now we want to make sure a critical event like happened
    with our NOTAM system also doesn't happen, and how do we keep
    our economy moving forward. These incidents are concerning.
    They impact Americans' confidence in our aviation system and
    our aviation infrastructure is critical to American safety and
    security.
        So, we need to accelerate building a national airspace
    system for the 21st century, something this committee is going
    to work on as it relates to the FAA reauthorization bill. And
    the 2023 authorization bill will give us many opportunities to
    talk not just about this issue, but other issues that our
    appropriator colleagues also have to do their job. Over the
    last several years, Congress has met or exceeded the
    Administration's budget requests for the FAA facilities and
    NOTAM.
        But Mr. Nolen will talk today about additional funds, why
    Congress needs to paint--why a clear picture needs to be
    painted about the needs of our airspace system for the future.
    To be sure, the FAA must have redundancies and not a single
    point where a failure can happen in a key system like we just
    saw.
        And we have to have responsibilities to ensure that every
    taxpayer provides--that every taxpayer is provided a maximum
    value on return. Therefore, we must see clearly the obstacles
    ahead and what a path to make sure that we have this most
    modernized system.
        Today's discussion on NOTAM and national airspace are
    really part of a bigger picture. I am sure there will be other
    issues that come up today as events of the last several weeks
    have pointed out the roles of FAA in our airspace system,
    working with DOD and others.
        So, I look forward to the questions and opportunities to
    have you before the Committee to address these important,
    timely questions on. I will turn to the Ranking Member, Senator
    Cruz.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Acting
    Administrator Nolen, for being here. While I look forward to
    hearing from you, I have to say I am disappointed by the
    absence of a Senate confirmed witness like Secretary Buttigieg
    who ultimately oversees the agency responsible for the NOTAM
    failure.
        And I would note that Secretary Buttigieg, in my view,
    instead of engaging in politics, should be focused on the job
    he has now and addressing the very serious transportation
    crises we are seeing playing out across the country. On the
    afternoon of January 10, the FAA's notice to air mission system
    failed.
        About 15 hours later, after failing to reboot the system,
    the FAA ordered a full ground stop of the national airspace
    system for the first time since September 11, 22 years ago. The
    ground stop was because America was under attack. But this
    time, this ground stop was the result of the Federal agency's
    inability to modernize despite Congress providing the required
    resources to do so.
        The Washington Post called the ground stop, ``almost
    unprecedented'' and said the FAA, ``learned long ago their
    systems were dependent on rickety foundations but didn't do
    enough to update technology.'' Despite a similar outage in
    2008, the FAA still has not improved the system. A technology
    specialist involved in the 2008 outage blamed, ``organizational
    inertia,'' something I have heard many times before when people
    describe problems at the FAA.
        The Wall Street Journal said, ``given the importance of the
    FAA's mission, this kind of failure is hard to excuse.'' If
    glitches happen all the time, why doesn't the FAA have
    redundancy. Canada's NOTAM system offer--operated by a
    nonprofit, experienced apparently unrelated problems the same
    day as the United States.
        The planes there kept flying. The NOTAM breakdown last
    month was clearly a mistake. I fear it is emblematic of a
    culture afraid to innovate, stuck operating inefficiently, and
    illustrative of why President Biden needs to choose an
    administrator for the FAA with a proven ability to manage
    change within large organizations, and with the requisite
    aviation and safety experience.
        The current nominee that is pending lacks that aviation
    experience. The FAA safety mission, Mr. Nolen, as you know
    well, is too important to take for granted. There is a front-
    page story in The Wall Street Journal today on the FAA's
    inability to modernize NOTAM. In that story, an FAA
    spokesperson claims that prioritizing NOTAM upgrades wouldn't
    guarantee funding from Congress. That is simply not true.
        Congress has fully funded NOTAM modernization for more than
    10 years. Every year since 2013, Congress has given as much or
    more than the amount requested by the Executive agency for 10
    years now. And yet, full modernization is still several years
    away. After investing millions of dollars, I am wondering why
    this bureaucracy is taking so long to do its job.
        And is the system worth modernizing at this point, because
    the status quo simply isn't acceptable. There must be
    accountability when an agency is not using taxpayer funds
    efficiently. And that, of course, starts with an accountable
    leader. Now in his third year as Secretary of Transportation,
    Secretary Buttigieg has failed to deliver any meaningful reform
    at the FAA.
        Although NOTAM modernization started a decade ago, this
    Administration seems focused on semantics. Whether it is
    replacing the term mother with birthing person or creating a
    new checkbox on passports for people who claim to be neither a
    man or woman, this Administration's desire to signal its virtue
    seems to know no limits. It has even infected the FAA.
        Instead of it focusing on safety, the FAA and DOT were
    working hard to change NOTAM's name from notice to airmen to
    notice to air missions. I would suggest instead, the focus
    should have been on making sure the damn thing worked.
    Shockingly, renaming NOTAM didn't prevent an outage. You know,
    way back in 1994, Al Gore proposed to reform the FAA into a
    self-funding, more efficient organization.
        Today, the flying public is stuck with a self-regulating
    and flailing agency stuck in the 20th century. It is my hope
    that we can use this hearing and the 2023 FAA reauthorization
    bill to explore meaningful reforms to the FAA and its air
    traffic organization. And let me say finally, in recent weeks,
    we have seen several very concerning near misses that were
    almost mass fatality crashes.
        We have seen them in New York. We have seen them in Austin,
    Texas. We just recently saw one outside of Hawaii. I know
    Texans and Americans across this country are deeply concerned
    about these near misses.
        And I hope, in addition to addressing the failure of the
    NOTAM system, that Mr. Nolen, you will also address these near
    misses, why they almost killed hundreds of people, and what
    more can be done to make sure that the next near miss doesn't
    become a horrific tragedy. Thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Now we will hear from
    the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Senator Moran.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

        Senator Moran. Chairwoman, thank you. Thank you, to you and
    Senator Cruz, for this hearing. I am pleased to work beside
    you, and with you, and the other members of this committee as
    the Ranking Member of the Aviation subcommittee on Commerce,
    Science and Transportation. Kansas is the aviation capital of
    the world, with over a century's worth of rich aviation
    history.
        Whether manufacturing the first bomber in the B-52 or the
    next generation bomber in the B-21, Kansas, has driven and
    carried the aviation industry. Clusters of manufacturing
    navigation alongside academia and research in Kansas leads the
    aviation industry into the future. Yet the FAA is at a crucial
    junction, and we must do everything in our power to ensure the
    United States remains a leader in the aerospace innovation and
    safety. It is imperative for this committee to pass a long-term
    reauthorization.
        Prior to 2018, we had short-term reauthorizations totaling
    28. It is no wonder there is uncertainty at the FAA and in the
    industry when we are so challenged in getting our work done.
    Multi-year reauthorizations is necessary for long-term planning
    and growth in the civil aviation industry, including
    maintenance and modernization of aviation infrastructure and
    technology. I look forward to addressing the current backlog at
    the FAA.
        I agree with Senator Cruz that the FAA needs a Senate
    confirmed leader. We need to be able to address new
    technologies that are rapidly advancing so that the United
    States remains at the forefront and remains competitive in this
    world.
        I have worked with the Chairwoman of this subcommittee on
    advanced air mobility in the past, and further, we have worked
    together in advancing the aviation work force. We have
    significant challenges in the area of general aviation and
    aviation in general.
        The FAA is a significant component of that circumstance. It
    needs our help, but it also needs to get its act together.
    Madam Chairman, I have altered my subcommittee assignments
    within the Committee on Appropriations to add T-HUD,
    transportation to this opportunity to try to make a difference
    in this arena.
        And so, I look forward to really working with what I think
    is the kind of both points of view that has been expressed so
    far, leadership at the FAA, and the necessary resources for
    them to do their job well. Thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you. Well, we will definitely look forward
    to that leadership and working with all of us. I just want to
    note before we go to the witness that NOTAM stood for notice to
    airmen. And I know while people are somewhat bothered or think
    that this is not a change, or some people are saying that it
    is, you know, being too politically correct, we have a barrier
    problem here.
        We need more women in aviation. And fewer than 10 percent
    of the licensed pilots are women. About 5 percent of airline
    pilots, 3.6 percent of airline captains. So, I just want to say
    how proud I am that the two naval aviators that flew over the
    Super Bowl were from Whidbey Island and Whidbey Island Air
    Station.
        But I do think the changing is in the right direction, and
    we need to do more to encourage more women in aviation. So, Mr.
    Nolen, welcome to today's hearing. Your opening remarks. Thank
    you.

        STATEMENT OF BILLY NOLEN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
                        AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Cruz, and
    members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    provide clarity on the FAA's management of the Notices to Air
    Mission system, share details on recent events, and explain our
    efforts to modernize the NOTAM system.
        Today is also an opportunity to discuss the modernization
    needs of the national airspace system overall, some of the
    challenges we face and some of the opportunities on the
    horizon. We are experiencing the safest period in aviation
    history, but we do not take that for granted. Recent events
    remind us that we cannot and must not become complacent and
    must continually invest in our aviation system.
        I know we are here to discuss the challenges we experienced
    with our NOTAM system last month, so I want to provide a brief
    background about what we know so far. Late on January 10, NOTAM
    applications and services became unreliable.
        Technical experts attempted to address the issue by, among
    other things, switching to the backup data base. While
    technical experts worked through the night, the FAA activated a
    hotline to provide real time status updates to airspace users.
        During this time, there were no reports of operational
    impacts. In the early morning, hours of January 11, the system
    appeared to have been restored, but formatting issues were
    persistent.
        To resolve this, FAA air traffic leadership directed the
    rebuild of the data bases. As the morning air traffic rush
    approached and work on the system continued, I ordered a ground
    stop at approximately 7:15 a.m. eastern time, pausing all
    departures in the United States in order to maintain safety and
    preserve predictability.
        I did so after consulting with the airlines and safety
    experts. Once resiliency testing on the system was conducted, I
    lifted the ground stop at 9:07 a.m. eastern time. The FAA's
    preliminary findings are that contract personnel
    unintentionally deleted files while working to correct
    synchronization issues between the live primary database and
    the backup data base. We have found no evidence of a
    cyberattack or other malicious intent.
        After the incident, we implemented a synchronization delay
    to ensure that bad data from one database cannot affect the
    backup data base.
        Additionally, we have implemented a new protocol that
    requires more than one individual to be present and engage in
    oversight when work on a database occurs. As part of our review
    of the root cause of this incident continues, please know that
    the FAA will keep the Committee apprised of our findings. As
    you are well aware, 2023 is a big year for aviation.
        Our current authorization expires on September 30th and
    there is sustained energy, from both industry and Government,
    around the development of ideas and proposals to modernize the
    NAS and the FAA's approach to managing it. As we delve into
    that reauthorization process, there are several important
    points we would like to highlight for the Committee.
        Right now, the FAA is managing three airspace systems to
    serve the diverse users of the NAS. The first is the classic or
    legacy system that many users still count on. The second is the
    system that relies on the next generation of technology for
    improved communication, navigation, and surveillance. The FAA
    has operationalized the foundational pieces of this system, and
    we continue to deploy services as operator equipage and Federal
    resources allow.
        The third is the future, a future that has already arrived.
    It is the system that must accommodate new entrants in all
    their forms, including drones, advanced air mobility aircraft,
    commercial spacecraft, and other new aircraft yet to be
    imagined.
        For us to sustain, implement, and plan for all of these
    systems, we have a lot of work ahead. We look forward to
    partnering with the Committee to ensure that the FAA's
    oversight and regulation of the NAS continues to deliver the
    level of aviation safety and efficiency expected by the
    American public.
        Before we get to questions, I want to take a moment to
    acknowledge some of the recent incidents that we have talked
    about, we have seen throughout the system. I am sure that you
    and the public have seen some of the news reports and close
    calls on runways and other operational events.
        Because I want to make sure we are giving the right amount
    of attention to all of these recent occurrences, I formed a
    safety review team to examine the U.S. aerospace system's
    structure, culture, processes, systems, and integration of
    safety effort. The initial focus will be to hold a safety
    summit to examine what additional actions the aviation
    community needs to take to maintain our safety record.
        A group of commercial and general aviation leaders, labor
    partners, and other will examine what mitigations are working
    and why others do not appear to be as effective. I can say
    without reservation that the aviation professionals who
    comprise the American aerospace industry are proud of our
    safety record.
        But we all know that complacency has no place in air
    transportation, whether it is on the flight deck, in the
    control tower, the ramp, or the dispatch center. We are
    confident that we are taking the right steps here, and we look
    forward to working with the Committee and this Congress in
    developing a long-term FAA reauthorization bill that
    accelerates the next era of aviation, one that is safe,
    efficient, sustainable, and open to all. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Nolen follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator,
                        Federal Aviation Administration
        Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to provide clarity on the Federal
    Aviation Administration's (FAA) management of the Notice to Air
    Missions (NOTAM) system, share details on recent events, and explain
    our efforts to modernize the NOTAM system.
        Today is also an opportunity to discuss the modernization needs of
    the national airspace system (NAS) overall, some of the challenges we
    face, and some of the opportunities on the horizon.
        We are experiencing the safest period in aviation history, but we
    do not take that for granted. Recent events remind us that we cannot
    become complacent and that we must continually invest in our aviation
    system.
    NAS Modernization
        2023 will be a big year for aviation. Our current authorization
    expires on September 30th, and there is sustained energy from both
    industry and government around the development of ideas and proposals
    to modernize the NAS and the FAA's approach to managing it. As we delve
    into that reauthorization process, there are several important points
    we would like to highlight for the Committee. Right now, the FAA is
    managing three airspace systems to serve the diverse users of the NAS.
    The first is the classic or legacy system that many users of the NAS
    still count on. The second is the system that relies on the next
    generation of technology for improved communication, navigation, and
    surveillance. The FAA has operationalized the foundational pieces of
    this system, and we continue to deploy additional services as operator
    equipage and Federal resources allow. The third is the future--a future
    that has already arrived. It is the system that must accommodate new
    entrants in all their forms, including drones, advanced air mobility
    aircraft, commercial spacecraft, and other new aircraft yet to be
    imagined. It will involve autonomous aircraft, data exchanges, and a
    dynamic airspace. For us to sustain, implement, and plan for all of
    these systems, we have a lot of work ahead. We look forward to
    partnering with the Committee to ensure that the FAA's oversight and
    regulation of the NAS continue to deliver the level of aviation safety
    and efficiency expected by the American public, as new entrants come
    into service.
        On our end, we must work with stakeholders and make strategic
    investments, and create an agile regulatory structure that maintains
    safety, ensures efficiency, and facilitates access for new entrants. We
    are committed to this work and need Congress to be a supportive partner
    both in terms of enacting a long-term reauthorization measure, and
    funding our modernization needs. We look forward to working with you on
    these challenges and assure you that safety will always guide our
    actions no matter the challenge.
    The NOTAM System
        A NOTAM contains essential information for airspace users providing
    safety information about particular aspects of the NAS that are not
    operating under normal status. FAA's NOTAM system is a dynamic system
    that captures recent changes to conditions in the NAS. For example,
    NOTAMs frequently provide pilots and operators with information about
    an anomaly with a particular navigational aid, airport runway, or
    taxiway, or about an air space closure or a temporary flight
    restriction.
        The FAA's overall NOTAM system consists of two systems--an older
    U.S. NOTAM System (legacy system) and a newer Federal NOTAM System. The
    older portion of the NOTAM system relies on 30-year-old software and
    architecture. This portion collates NOTAM data from all sources and
    distributes it to some airspace users. The Federal NOTAM System portion
    is newer and serves as part of the foundation for the FAA's ongoing
    NOTAM modernization effort.
        NOTAM information comes from a variety of places: an airport or air
    traffic control tower that observes local changes, an FAA technician
    planning to work on a system, or an air service provider, to name a
    few. Airspace users enter and access the information from applications
    sitting on both portions of the FAA's NOTAM system. Most airlines
    download NOTAMs from the FAA into their internal databases for
    dispatching aircraft. Users can also get NOTAMs from third party
    providers who get it from the FAA, or they can go to the primary source
    for specific NOTAM information, by calling a flight service station,
    air traffic control tower, or airport, for example.
    NOTAM Service Interruption and Response
        Late on January 10, 2023, NOTAM applications and services became
    unreliable. Technical experts attempted to address the issue by, among
    other things, switching to a backup database. There are three NOTAM
    backup databases--one in Oklahoma City and two in Atlantic City. While
    technical experts worked through the night, the FAA activated a hotline
    to provide real-time status updates to system users. During this time,
    there were no reports of operational impacts. In the early morning
    hours of January 11, 2023, the system appeared to have been restored,
    but formatting issues persisted. To resolve this, FAA's air traffic
    leadership directed the rebuild of the databases.
        As the morning air traffic rush approached, and work on the system
    continued, I ordered a ground stop at approximately 7:15 a.m. EST,
    pausing all departures in the United States in order to maintain safety
    and preserve predictability. I did so after consulting with the
    airlines and safety experts. Once resiliency testing on the system was
    conducted, I lifted the ground stop at 9:07 a.m. EST on January 11,
    2023.
        The FAA's preliminary findings are that contract personnel
    unintentionally deleted files while working to correct synchronization
    between the live primary database and a backup database. We have found
    no evidence of a cyber-attack or other malicious intent. After the
    incident, we implemented a synchronization delay to ensure that bad
    data from a database cannot affect a backup database. Additionally, we
    have implemented a new protocol that requires more than one individual
    to be present and engaged in oversight when work on the database
    occurs. As our review of the root causes of this incident continue,
    please know that the FAA will keep the Committee apprised of our
    findings.
    NOTAM Modernization
        Beginning in 2012 with the Pilot's Bill of Rights (Public Law 112-
    153) and continuing in 2018 with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
    (Public Law 115-254), which further amended the Pilot's Bill of Rights,
    Congress directed the FAA to continue developing and modernizing the
    NOTAM repository, in a public central location, in a manner that is
    Internet-accessible, machine-readable, and searchable. Since those
    enactments, the FAA has made progress modernizing the NOTAM system.
    This progress includes improvements not only to the NOTAM content and
    presentation/publication, but also to the information technology
    architecture that supports and delivers this vital safety information.
    The nearly decade-long modernization work includes transitioning away
    from the legacy portion of the system mentioned earlier. We expect that
    a significant portion of the modernization work will be complete by
    mid-2025. We continue to assess the feasibility of accelerating the
    current schedule.
        The goal of the FAA's NOTAM modernization effort is to provide
    NOTAMs that are complete, accurate, timely, and relevant to safe flight
    operations. The FAA has made great progress in fulfilling the
    congressional mandates for modernization, including close coordination
    with industry and the adoption of recommendations from industry
    stakeholders that use NOTAMs. Specifically, the FAA is working in
    coordination with the Aeronautical Information Services Reform
    Coalition (coalition), whose members include representatives from,
    among others, air carriers, aircraft owners, pilots, airport
    executives, labor interests of air carriers, general and business
    aviation, and international operators. Our continued work with the
    coalition is one of the many examples where a government-industry
    partnership has helped to significantly inform and improve the
    direction and quality of our work.
        We are working to face the challenges in maintaining our systems
    while keeping pace with new and emerging technologies and entrants.
    However, we are committed to improving and securing our systems,
    finding new ways to be agile in order to face these challenges, and
    continuing to achieve the highest levels of safety and efficiency. We
    look forward to working with the Committee and this Congress in
    developing a long-term FAA reauthorization bill that accelerates the
    next era of aviation--one that is safe, efficient, sustainable, and
    open to all.

        The Chair. Thank you, Acting Director Nolen, and appreciate
    that. Let's drill down on the NOTAM system. One of the issues,
    from my understanding and you are saying that this involved an
    individual deleting the wrong set of files. We have a backup
    redundant system, why couldn't we just go to that system?
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the question. So, we
    do have a backup system. A part of how the system works is that
    as you do updates to the system, as you delete outdated NOTAMs,
    it synchronizes across both the primary backup and the other
    two backups. So, part of that is synchronization, once we
    realize it, once we come----
        The Chair. So, the structure of the architecture is not
    favorable to true redundancy.
        Mr. Nolen. Which is one of the reasons we are in the middle
    of this whole modernization effort. We have got----
        The Chair. You are agreeing with me, is that right?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I am agreeing with you that we have
    a 30-year-old system. We have a new system. Let me just say to
    the point. 80 percent of the users are already on our newer
    system, which is the Federal NOTAM system.
        We still have some critical users on the U.S. NOTAM system,
    which is this 30-year-old. Primarily you have DOD, you have the
    Alaska, aviation in Alaska, and our international users are
    still on that system. But again, we are working to be off of
    that system by Fiscal Year 2025.
        The Chair. So, I think, you know, the NTSB is--you know,
    the authorization bill, we wanted to make progress on this, and
    so they are basically saying that we aren't making progress on
    this. What is your response to how we are going to fill not
    waiting until 2025?
        I get that you are saying now I am going to back up on the
    human factor, really, is what you are saying. I am going to
    back up on the human factor and make sure that this never
    happens because of an individual, one individual being on the
    spot.
        But really, it is the architecture of the system that
    doesn't give us true redundancy. So, is there a way to solve
    that before we, you know, go 2 years into the modernization?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, we will continue on this journey of
    modernization. I have asked and I have directed our teams to
    look at what is our ability to accelerate that timeline. Can we
    pull it into--?
        The Chair. I am asking you, what can you do about the
    existing system today to give you true redundancy? You are
    trying to give me human factor redundancy in another
    individual, but when in reality I am pointing out that the
    architecture of the system isn't true redundancy because if the
    deletion impacted both systems--.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes--.
        The Chair. Then you don't really have redundancy. You don't
    have a separate, you know, reboot. You know, our electricity
    goes off on our house, we go to the generator, if you have one,
    right.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes.
        The Chair. So, in this case, the backup didn't work either
    because it was affected by the same deletion. So, you don't
    have to answer all of it right here, but I need an answer on
    this issue of redundancy to the system.
        Because while we want to modernize, and we want to have the
    right resources, and we got a pretty good offer from our
    colleague to drill down with this on the Appropriations side to
    make sure that we have a clear understanding--and I really do
    think this has been an issue in the past.
        I really do think that appropriators need to understand the
    technology needs of the FAA and support them. But what can we
    do now to make sure this doesn't happen again?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you. Several things that we have
    done. Number one, we have instituted a 1-hour synchronization
    delay between the primary database and the backup data base.
        That gives us time to make sure that we have no issues
    there. Second, we have increased the level of oversight to
    ensure the more than one person is available when work or
    updates are being done on the live data base, along with an
    upgrading or up leveling our level of oversight within the
    Command Center to ensure that we have got leadership present.
        So those, of course, are more in the area of administrative
    controls. But the work continues to get off of the U.S. NOTAM
    system and on to the Federal----
        The Chair. I am going to come back at you and ask that you
    work with contractors to find out how to get us true redundancy
    in the short term in a backup database that is truly
    independent and could operate at the same instance if this
    happens again.
        Before I--so my sense of this near-miss with Southwest
    Airlines and a cargo carrier, was Southwest in a position
    earlier than their slot? Is that what happened?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, what happened in Texas, in Austin, is that
    something we would not expect to happen during a low visibility
    operation where Southwest was cleared for take-off, and FedEx,
    who was cleared for approach, in close proximity to each other.
        That investigation is underway by the National
    Transportation Safety Board and the FAA. So, we are looking at
    every aspect of it and we will certainly provide updates. But
    it is not something we expected to have taken place. Rightfully
    so, the FedEx crew, Southwest----
        The Chair. I am asking if you have an answer today about
    why this occurred?
        Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am. That investigation is still ongoing,
    but we will certainly provide an update.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Acting Administrator
    Nolen, the FAA has been charged with modernizing NOTAM for 10
    years. Why has it taken 10 years, and why isn't it done yet?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Cruz, for the question.
    We have been on a journey of modernization. Starting back in
    2009, as we began the scoping and we brought on, in 2013, we
    brought on the Federal NOTAM system.
        So that process, and we have had enhancements along the
    way. We are about for--the substantive part of that
    modernization.
        Senator Cruz. Let me ask again, why has it taken 10 years
    and why is it still not done that?
        Mr. Nolen. It does take a while. These systems--the
    complexity of our NAS. The NOTAM is just one of thousands of
    systems that comprise how we oversee the NAS, how we
    communicate, how we are given NOTAMs. This is how----
        Senator Cruz. And if I heard you right, your current plan
    is not to have it modernized until Fiscal Year 2025. So, 2 to 3
    years from now. What is to prevent another ground stop in the 2
    to 3 years between now and then?
        Mr. Nolen. When I say we are moving to 2025, the work is
    ongoing. We do have 80 percent of the users onto the Federal
    NOTAM system. We have added redundancies to ensure that----
        Senator Cruz. But the 80 percent of users, if I understand
    you correct, that didn't stop a ground stop of everybody, is
    that correct?
        Mr. Nolen. It did. When we did a ground stop, that was a
    ground stop for all departing traffic on Des Moines.
        Senator Cruz. So, the 80 percent didn't help. It is not
    like it was only a 20 percent ground stop. Everyone shut down,
    the first time since 9/11. Let me ask you, I agree very, very
    strongly with the questions that the Chairwoman Cantwell raised
    about redundancy. And do the fixes that you proposed remove the
    risk of a similar single point of failure for knocking the
    NOTAM system offline?
        Mr. Nolen. We believe the fixes that we have in place today
    will prevent a recurrence of the event that we saw on January
    the 11th.
        Senator Cruz. Mr. Nolen, you are not answering the
    question. Will the fixes remove the risk of a similar single
    point of failure from knocking the system out? Is there
    redundancy being built into it, or can a single screw up ground
    air traffic nationwide?
        Mr. Nolen. We have--when we think about the age of our
    system and the age of systems we have, we do have redundancy
    there. Could I sit here today and tell you there will never be
    another issue on the NOTAM system?
        No, sir, I cannot. What I can say is that we are making
    every effort to modernize and look at our procedures. In fact,
    part of this investigation has us working with MITRE and other
    entities to look at the across the totality of our systems, how
    they interrelate, what is the level of redundancy, and is there
    any additional thing that we need to do?
        And certainly, we will have more as an investigation
    ensues.
        Senator Cruz. Well, I think you are going to see, as you
    have seen, bipartisan interest in assisting the FAA in ensuring
    redundancy so that we don't see air traffic grounded again. And
    in focusing more broadly, I hope, on modernization of air
    traffic control. I want to shift to the near crashes we have
    had.
        And understandably, I am particularly focused on what
    happened in Austin. Two weeks ago, there was a near collision
    on the runway at Austin-Bergstrom Airport. A Southwest flight
    was taking off from that runway, a FedEx plane was preparing to
    land. They came incredibly close to crashing. Millions of
    Texans fly every year.
        I have flown on Southwest flights out of Austin literally
    hundreds, if not thousands, of times. I actually have a video
    that was created that is a reproduction of what happened. It is
    a recreation, but it is based on the flight data, so if we
    could play that video and I would like to get your reaction to
    it.
        [Video playing.].
        Senator Cruz. So, I know the incident is under
    investigation. If you are sitting in that Southwest flight, you
    knew how close you came to having a plane land on top of you,
    killing every person on that plane, you would understandably be
    horrified. It is only through, as I understand it, the heroism
    of the pilots being alert and seeing what was happening, that
    that tragedy was averted.
        And yet my question is, how can this happen? How did air
    traffic control direct one plane onto the runway to take off
    and another plane to land, and have them both within 100 feet
    of each other? And what can we do to make sure that doesn't
    happen again?
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Senator Cruz, for the question.
    Certainly, we are letting the investigation play itself out.
    Having been an airline captain and having been a pilot for more
    than 42 years and an accident investigator, we will go where
    the facts take us.
        What is not represented on the video there, it appears to,
    you know, eye clear, below in 22 days is what we would say in
    pilot jargon. But actually, when the tower of visibility was
    zero, it was a low visibility day, it is not what we would
    expect to have happen.
        But when we think about the controls, how we train both our
    controllers and our pilot, the system works as it is designed
    to avert what you say could have been a horrific outcome. The
    pilots saw, the FedEx pilots saw----
        Senator Cruz. Well, let me just underscore the urgency of
    preventing that sort of incident from happening again.
        Mr. Nolen. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Schatz. Oh, I am sorry,
    Senator Klobuchar. I am sorry. Oh, Senator Schatz. OK, thank
    you.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

        Senator Schatz. Thank you, Madam Chair, Vice Chair--Ranking
    Member. Administrator Nolen--and I want to welcome Senator
    Moran to the T-HUD Committee, because I think it is important
    to note that we did fully fund the budget request for NOTAM
    modernizations efforts in the last spending bill, but there are
    efforts to cut Federal spending.
        And I want to ask you a very simple question, should we
    expect flight delays and cancellations going forward if we
    defund or underfund these transformations?
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, Senator Schatz for the question. It
    is clear, as I said in my opening comments, that as we are on
    this modernization journey, we are on it with you.
        So having the funding that we need, and yes, certainly we
    get to places where either we have got starts and stops, or we
    are into CRs, et cetera, having that funding there so that that
    ongoing work can be done. And where we have the capability and
    ability, we want to be able to accelerate that.
        Senator Schatz. So here is my question for you, we do our
    job, you do your job. If we pass a proper appropriations bill,
    fully funding your request, can you commit to meeting the
    deadlines and schedules already established for the
    improvements to NOTAM?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. We remain on track to get that done.
        Senator Schatz. Thank you very much. You have got a bunch
    of ongoing projects, and I want to talk to you about how you
    prioritize. You have modernizing NOTAM, Next Gen, and then
    integrating unmanned aircraft commercial space launches, urban
    air mobility technologies.
        How are you--I mean, the money is one thing, but you also
    have a throughput capacity problem in terms of leadership and
    analysis and all the rest of it. How are you racking and
    stacking those priorities? I know you are going to say, look,
    we got to do it all, but in reality, agencies have to
    prioritize. I am wondering how you are doing that?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you for the question. You are
    absolutely right. Our first priority has been and always will
    be safety, and the safety of the NAS. So, when we think about
    things that contribute to the safety of the NAS, that is at the
    top of the list. And then we think about there is a security
    aspect.
        And certainly, we work in partnership with TSA and other
    authorities to ensure that our airspace is secure. Last, when
    we think about, you know--or not really last, but when we think
    about the efficiency.
        So those pieces of modernization that provides efficiency,
    which the flying public enjoys as well, those are the things we
    work on. So, when we think about Next Gen, what we are doing
    there, and from a enterprise risk perspective as it relates to
    the NAS, that is really what informs which programs and
    priorities rise to the top of our list.
        Senator Schatz. I want to move to another topic. NORAD has
    adjusted its radars to be more sensitive to detecting potential
    UAPs, leading to an uptick in picking up potential incursions.
    Is the FAA adjusting status of airspace quickly, as regularly
    as NORAD may need to respond to incidents?
        And I guess more generally, can you tell us how you are
    transforming your systems to be integrated into what we know
    from our national security folks and the Department of Defense?
    A lot of this has FAA implications. I do think increasing--and
    increasing the sensitivity of the radars makes perfect sense.
        I also do think that there may be instances now where we
    are going to--you are going to get a ping on the radar that is
    a flock of birds or some other not particularly dangerous--I
    shouldn't say birds are not dangerous.
        I am aware of bird strikes. But the point is it doesn't
    rise to the national security level. And so how are you sorting
    this and what changes are you currently in the middle of? I
    don't expect you to have a fully formed answer, but I would
    like to be reassured that you are working with our partners in
    DOD to get this right.
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you very much for the question.
    Again, we are indeed. We coordinate, collaborate, partner on
    everything that you are talking about. We have a liaison
    officer embedded at NORAD, and we also have DOD folks at our
    National Operation Command Center.
        So, if you were to be at the Command Center, you would see
    that you have got representatives, certainly from the industry,
    but you have got representatives from Government. We are
    looking at cyber.
        We are looking at UAS. All the things that you speak about,
    there is a high level of coordination across the whole of
    Government when it comes to the security of our airspace.
        Senator Schatz. Final question. It has been publicly
    reported, and I don't know that it is true, that the changing
    the dials on the sensitivities of the radars is something that
    can be done retroactively. In other words, for the past that
    you have data sets that you could actually tweak and then that
    might inform our national security folks in terms of how many
    of these UAPs were flying and over what period of time. Can you
    tell us anything about that?
        Mr. Nolen. We have capabilities within our commands and we
    have capabilities in terms of our radar, in terms of what we
    can see, where we don't see. Again, it is a partnership effort
    and it is a whole of Government approach.
        Senator Schatz. The specific question is, do you have the
    capability to go backward?
        Mr. Nolen. Go backward? I am sorry, could you----
        Senator Schatz. Go backward in time and say, look, I want
    to know in 2018, let's say, the extent of these UAPs by taking
    the data that you have, that probably nobody is looking at,
    understandably, because it is in the past, and changing the
    sensitivity on the data set. And then that would tell us
    something about what was happening in the past. Do you know if
    we have that capability?
        Mr. Nolen. I do not. And certainly, I would be happy follow
    up.
        Senator Schatz. If you would get back to us. Thank you.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Moran.
        Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Nolen, thank you
    for your presence here today. Thank you for the conversation
    you had with me by phone on January 11, January 12. I
    appreciate that.
        There has been conversations at the FAA and within the
    industry whether the agency should change the systems
    classification from, the NOTAM systems classification, from
    mission support to safety critical. Comments or thoughts?
        Mr. Nolen. Senator Moran, thank you for that question.
    Certainly, that is one of the directions that I have given our
    team. Let's go back.
        And so, part of this look is taking a look at all of our
    enterprises and those we consider critical to the NAS versus
    the support, so we are absolutely taking a look at the
    classification there and make sure that we have got it right.
        Senator Moran. And what would be the difference, if it was
    reclassified? What would be the consequences?
        Mr. Nolen. Some of the differences are just the levels of
    controls and engineering controls that you would have in place
    for a critical system, and those added levels of redundancy
    that you would expect to have given the criticality of them.
        Senator Moran. Senator Klobuchar and I have introduced the
    NOTAM Improvement Act. Any thoughts on whether that would be of
    assistance to you and the FAA?
        Mr. Nolen. We fully support the goals that you have both
    put forward here. And I--it is much of what we are working
    toward, so we are very supportive of that.
        Senator Moran. Let me talk about a specific technology
    update. Spotlight on FAA's aging infrastructure. Would you
    comment on the status of replacing instrument landing systems
    located at hundreds of airports across the country? My
    understanding, at the current pace, FAA's current pace of
    modernization, it will take more than 100 years to replace
    those critical systems.
        Mr. Nolen. We have undertaken a body of work to say, you
    know, again, I have talked about these three NASs that we
    support. And so, when you look at that, we would love to be
    able to sunset some technology. Sunset systems where that have
    been replaced by satellite, GPS satellite-based navigation.
        And our ability to go do that--so we do have a plan in
    place to see how can we draw down where we have more than
    adequate replacement for that. So that is a piece of work that
    we are undertaking.
        Senator Moran. In 2017, I was part of a bipartisan group
    that introduced legislation that became law. It is called
    Modernizing Government Technology Act, and it creates a fund
    for Federal agencies to use savings obtained through
    streamlining its IT systems, replacing legacy products, and
    transition to cloud computing for additional modernization
    efforts.
        So, it allows an incentive for agencies, departments to
    utilize, take those steps, and then they have the money to
    acquire additional latest technology. To date, that fund has
    invested in 35 Government IT modernization projects across 19
    Federal agencies. The largest project investment was $187
    million.
        Considering NOTAM modernization is to--the goal is to
    transition to entirely new platform, has the--has the
    Department of Transportation, FAA has ever considered utilizing
    that modernization fund to improve NOTAM, and is there a why or
    why not?
        Mr. Nolen. I certainly have to follow up with you on that
    question, sir.
        Senator Moran. Perhaps I am just pointing out there is an
    opportunity for assistance.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
        Senator Moran. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
        The Chair. Senator Klobuchar.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell.
    And thank you for this hearing. And thank you, to you, Mr.
    Nolen. Senator Moran mentioned our work on this bill, which I
    am going to get to, but I did appreciate you talking to both of
    us after that 2-hour ground stop and the work that needs to be
    done with our air traffic system. What do you see as some of
    the biggest challenges in strengthening the resiliency and
    reliability of the system right now?
        Mr. Nolen. Our focus is, number one, is always ensure that
    the system is operating every day. So, every day in our
    Nation's airspace, we have 45,000 flights. That is just over 16
    million a year. And we do it very safely, day in and day out.
    And we have gone 15 years--14 years, I am sorry, without a
    fatal accident.
        That is nearly 230 million flights, nearly a $1 billion in
    payments a year. So, our system is very safe. At the same time,
    we don't take that safety for granted. And we recognize we have
    to continue this journey of modernization. So, if I--when I
    look out and I look for risk, overall, I have a good sense
    about where we are.
        Can I say to the American public that we are safe? The
    answer is that we are. If the question is, can we better be
    better? The answer is absolutely, and that is the piece we are
    working on.
        Senator Klobuchar. And so, you are looking at transitioning
    out of this legacy system, and what are your biggest obstacles
    to do that?
        Mr. Nolen. It is all about ensuring, again, that we have
    that funding there. And we will look forward to having, you
    know, what comes forward in the President's budget. Our goal is
    to take every dollar that we are given, and we are--our goal is
    to be good stewards of that and move forward to modernization.
        So again, we are talking thousands of systems that NOTAM is
    just one of, and so we don't want to leave the Committee with
    the impression that if we fix NOTAMs and we are done. And I
    know, you know, that is not where we are. But we will certainly
    have a prioritization about how we get there. NOTAMs is a big
    one. We want to continue to deliver on the benefits of NextGen.
        Everything we have done there, even as we stare into the
    future to say, how do we enable all these new entrants that are
    coming in?
        Senator Klobuchar. Right. And we mentioned, Senator Moran
    mentioned the bill we have with Senator Capito. And the point
    there is that it would create a task force, as you know, to
    bring everyone to the table. It actually passed the House, for
    my colleagues to note, led by represents Stauber of Minnesota.
        He is got the Duluth Airport up there. And it passed the
    House in the 116th and 117th Congress last time, 424 to 4. So,
    I am hoping we can get that done, and whatever input you have,
    I think the sooner we do that, the better. And then as we work
    toward the FAA reauthorization on a separate track.
        And I have the last question. And the focus I want to make
    here is just the workforce issue. We know that every industry
    practically in America is having workforce issues, including
    airlines and including you guys.
        And I know that Senators Duckworth, Thune, Moran, Fischer,
    Kelly, and many others, the leadership of Chair Cantwell, are
    working to expand the FAA's workplace development grant
    programs to boost investments. Could you talk about that
    pipeline of skilled aviation workers, and what you think we
    should do?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes. It is a great question. We look out and
    say, how do we become a more inclusive agency? How do we really
    reach out and touch underrepresented group? It is one of our
    absolute top priorities for the agency. When we think about it,
    I know there is part of that narrative, are we seeing a younger
    work force?
        The answer to that is yes. Are we attracting the kind of
    talent that we need? The answer to that is also yes. As we were
    looking to bring on more air traffic controllers, we reached
    out with a campaign of finding folks who are wanting to be part
    of the FAA and we expect that about 10,000, wound up with about
    87,000 applications.
        So, we are doing, you know, we are heavily involved in STEM
    and AVSED, and our outreach to both universities, as well as
    minority serving institutions, are all part of our ongoing
    effort across the agency and the department to ensure that we
    are really leaning in there.
        Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much.
    Appreciate it, Mr. Nolen.
        The Chair. Senator Thune.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

        Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
    important hearing. During my time as Chairman of this
    committee, we considered and enacted the FAA Reauthorization
    Act of 2018, which included several provisions related to
    bolstering the Nation's air traffic control system and
    improving the experience of the flying public.
        As the next FAA reauthorization approaches, it is essential
    that modernizing the Nation's air traffic control system
    remains a top priority. As I have said before, I am deeply
    concerned about the FAA's slow progress on NextGen.
        Despite robust funding from Congress and numerous
    legislative directives from this committee to complete such an
    essential modernization initiative in a timely manner. Travel
    disruptions, especially those related to recent ATC issues and
    the failure of the NOTAM system in January, have only
    highlighted the critical importance of technology
    modernization, especially as it relates to improving management
    of the national airspace system.
        So, I look forward to this discussion, and Acting
    Administrator Nolen, thank you for being here to testify. As I
    previously mentioned, the implementation of NextGen is going to
    be crucial in the coming years.
        These investments, as well as employing concepts such as
    dynamic airspace management, will allow the United States and
    better utilize existing infrastructure, increasing the capacity
    and efficiency of the NAS.
        Recent ATC issues at airports across the country have
    certainly highlighted the need for modernization. So, could you
    describe how FAA is working to get back on schedule to
    implement the various priorities of NextGen in a timely manner?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, Senator
    Thune. So, we continue to work and to deliver on the benefits
    of NextGen. When we think about the work we have done, again,
    around navigation, around communication, one of the--a couple
    of those successes is by going from voice to data, where we
    have been able to eliminate, we believe, over 130,000 misread
    clearances.
        And we understand that is a big issue. We continue to work
    on metroplexes that we have around the country. That has been a
    big effort. 11 of those in places. When we think about, we have
    optimized profile descents.
        So that ability to descend now the altitude without the
    stepped downs that were a thing of the past, those have become
    more a thing of the past now, that allows certainly as a fuel
    saving and as an efficiency piece.
        That ability for us to be able to have airlines know when
    the push off to the gate so that you are off the gate and to
    the runway. All of those are efforts that we are doing and we
    continue to do.
        We work closely with the NextGen Advisory Committee. We got
    the Advanced Aviation Advisory Committee, we have the Drone
    Advisory Committee, and all of those committees inform the work
    that we do. And we are looking--we continue to look for
    opportunities. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, one of the
    challenges we face and will continue to face with NextGen is
    that level of equipage.
        Not everyone is equipped to the same level. And so that
    ability to take advantage of all that NextGen can deliver in
    the moment in many respects will depend on what the industry
    has equipped to. So that is a challenge for, and we will
    continue to work through it.
        Senator Thune. So, I mean, and it is just been--it has been
    a very slow process with lots of delays. And I am concerned
    that by the time many of these initiatives that you are talking
    are completed, they are going to be already outmoded or
    obsolete in comparison to the latest technology. So what
    actions is the FAA taking to avoid this issue as NextGen
    implementation continues?
        Mr. Nolen. It is one of continued, you know, partnership
    and collaboration. We are an ongoing, almost on a daily, weekly
    basis with the airline industry, and with, you know, partners
    around the world in terms of how do we get better at that.
        The journey we are on is there and airlines, the industry
    are seeing the benefits of it. There is more work to be done,
    undoubtedly. Again, back to the equipage piece there, there are
    just certain things you have to have to be able to do a
    particular approach, for example.
        Our ability to sunset some of the legacy systems, some
    ILSs, NDVs, things like that, now that we have GPS based
    navigation, right. So, it is our ability to work collectively
    and have that--a similar vision between us in the industry
    about what we want to achieve and how quickly we can get there.
        Senator Thune. So, as this committee looks toward
    developing this FAA reauthorization bill, do you believe there
    are opportunities for the FAA to incorporate adaptive or
    dynamic airspace management technologies into its NextGen
    initiative, or otherwise enhance real time inter-agency
    coordination with the Pentagon and other stakeholders?
        And I tell you that because we have an Air Force base in a
    training area, the Powder River Training Complex, and the B-1
    currently operates there, B-21 is coming in. We are going to
    get the first training unit, formal training unit and first
    operations unit there. And we really need the FAA's help on
    this. And it is something we have been focused on for a long
    time. Can you comment on that?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, I would say we are strong partners, not
    only with the DOD, to ensure that we can work together and that
    we are aligned. And when we think about airspace in the
    airspace uses, we are a strong partner and we really, we
    welcome the suggestion and we look forward to seeing how do we
    do more of it.
        Senator Thune. Well, I hope we can count on your help on
    that, because it has become--it is one of the biggest obstacles
    to large force training exercises and the types of, you know,
    capabilities that we can use or would benefit from in that
    airspace. So I hope you can help us.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Hickenlooper, then Senator
    Fischer, then Senator Markey.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

        Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Nolen,
    thank you for your time and your public service. As space
    transportation becomes more common in the U.S., integrating
    space data, international airspace system operations is going
    to become increasingly more and more important.
        Maintaining a safe and efficient shared airspace and
    mitigating delays caused by commercial space launches become
    more--increasingly more important, as I said. So, Mr. Nolen,
    can you describe the FAA's efforts to coordinate with the
    commercial space industry, to integrate space data into
    national airspace operations?
        Why is the status of the FAA's Space Data Integration
    Program, or what is the state, status of the FAA's Space Data
    Integration Program to improve airspace safety and efficiency?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes. Well, thank you very much, Senator, for the
    question. We, our work there with the space data integrator is
    ongoing and certainly already bearing fruits. It has provided
    us, meaning the FAA, the ability to reduce the airspace that we
    need to block off for flights.
        This year, we saw--last year, I am sorry, we saw a record
    number of space launches and we are expecting to see at least
    one and a half time, if not double the amount that we saw last
    year.
        So this is a key technology that we are working to make
    sure--that will help us make our airspace more efficient and
    reduce the amount of closures, and the ability to reopen
    airspace faster. So that is a piece that we are working on.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
        Senator Hickenlooper. And I have my requisite NOTAM
    question as well. At Denver International Airport alone, the
    NOTAM failure resulted in 800 delayed or canceled flights.
    Smaller regional airports in Colorado also experienced delays
    and cancellations, significantly impacting airport operations,
    airport customers, and commerce.
        So, Mr. Nolen, can you describe what technical operational
    improvements the FAA is taking to make sure this kind of
    operation disruption does not occur again in those smaller
    markets, as well as the large airports?
        Mr. Nolen. We attempt to do our very best job, and
    certainly we will make sure--we will take away the point about
    how well we communicate and coordinate.
        It should be noted for the Committee that on just any given
    day, every 2 hours, there is an update from the National
    Command Center that airports, airlines, and others can tune
    into. We also have stakeholders who are present in the Command
    Center on the floor. So our goal is to make sure that we have
    got good communication.
        I do know from my team that this particular outage was
    indeed communicated out to airports and in a timely manner. But
    we will look for opportunities to say, can we make that even
    faster and more efficient.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Got it. Great. I appreciate that.
    Last, the FAA is facing a number of critical issues ranging
    including technical upgrades, the new entrance into the
    national airspace, as I mentioned, growing the aviation work
    force, a critical issue, making sure that there is more
    diversity, more equity in that work force.
        Based on your experience as Acting Administrator, what
    skills and experiences do you think are critical to lead an
    agency like FAA?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, you know, as we think about that, and
    whoever leads FAA, that choice belongs to the President. And I
    know the President has made a choice, and I certainly support
    the President's choice in that.
        Senator Hickenlooper. Right. I wanted to--giving you an
    opportunity to do what I will now do and just say that I think
    Phil Robb--Phil Washington, who is the nominee to become the
    Administrator, really does have the skills and capabilities
    necessary to really turn around our aviation system.
        He rose to the rank of Command, made Sergeant Major in the
    Army, 24 years in the Army. And I think he is someone who is
    used to getting things done, coming in, helping get people all
    on the same page and really focused. He was the CEO of the
    Regional Transportation District in metropolitan Denver for
    almost 12 years and helped turn around a major transportation
    initiative.
        And then he has also been CEO of Los Angeles County
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and for a number of
    years now, the CEO of Denver International Airport, the third
    busiest airport in the world.
        And I think that array of experience, while not all in
    aviation, is all transportation connected and so many of these
    same situations that come up again and again in the aviation
    sector. Anyway, comment if you want, or I will just leave it
    there and say, we need to get a permanent Administrator in
    place as soon as we can.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
        The Chair. Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Administrator
    Nolen, welcome. Thank you for your service.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. This past week, we have seen NORAD track
    numerous unidentified objects in the North American airspace. I
    served on the Armed Services committee as well, and I am the
    ranking Republican on strategic forces, which has oversight
    over missile defense, so I am interested in protocol.
        And I visited with NORTHCOM and NORAD about that. But I
    would like to know if there is any process in place where
    civilian pilots that detect an unknown object while in flight,
    do they report the incident to FAA? Do you have any connection,
    then, with DOD on it? What are the protocols that you have?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Fischer, for the
    question. I will just relay to, you know, from my own time when
    I was an airline captain, there have been times of fire where
    you see a balloon and certainly that typically as a pilot you
    would report that to air traffic control. It may be something
    they already know about.
        And to the extent of they are worried about, there have
    been times when I have flown where it would say, be advised
    that we have a high altitude balloon, yes, x distance, x place.
    So there are processes in place to report.
        And then we have, as I mentioned earlier, an embedded team
    with NORAD. We have strong connections with the Department of
    Defense, Homeland Security, TSA, et cetera. So there is this
    whole of Government approach to protecting the homeland and
    protecting our skies.
        Senator Fischer. And as far as you know, those protocols
    are followed?
        Mr. Nolen. The protocols for reporting? It depends. You
    know, I am going to say that may be spotty. Just, and I take
    that just from my own personal experience. You know, will
    everybody report that they saw a balloon? The answer there is
    probably, no.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. In 2021, the Inspector General
    report, it was cited that the FAA struggles to carry out its
    role to integrate new technologies and capabilities across
    various offices within the agency.
        Integrating new technologies and certification will be a
    priority as I work on the FAA reauthorization. How is FAA
    addressing concerns in the IG report in regards to the NextGen
    office and integrating new technologies? I know you have
    visited some with Senator Moran about that and also NextGen
    with Senator Thune, but could you address that specifically?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am, I would--firstly, I would push back
    against the notion that the FAA is in any way wavering on our
    mission to make our airspace, which is the most complex in the
    world, as efficient as we can, even as we embrace new entrants.
        We have already set in place processes to say, how do we
    enable new entrants, what is the regulatory framework they will
    need to operate, and then how do we get them integrated into
    our airspace.
        Senator Fischer. Is it going as quickly as you had hoped?
        Mr. Nolen. It is going with speed. And I think if you
    reach--so if you reach out to a couple of the air, advanced
    mobility companies, they will tell you they feel that we are on
    step. It is--this is fairly complex work.
        And we, what we have said and what we continue to say,
    technology can never trump safety. And this is one that the
    public expects and rightfully so, that we get it right. So we
    are moving.
        I can tell you, though, categorically we are moving with a
    strong sense of purpose to enable these new entrants in the
    market. And that is one of the things we are truly passionate
    about.
        Senator Fischer. Will you commit to working with my office,
    keeping us informed on the integration of those technologies?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I would be happy to continue to
    give--provide updates.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. The FAA has completed its
    preliminary investigation on the recent NOTAM malfunction. Will
    a more in-depth investigation and assessment be conducted? And
    will you share those findings with Congress?
        Mr. Nolen. We do have. We will certainly share as much
    information as we are able to. But to your point, and I welcome
    the question, the investigation is ongoing. So a couple of
    things there. We are working our Office of IT and Technology.
    We are working with MITRE to assess all of these systems.
        Again, we are talking thousands. We are looking at levels
    of redundancy. What is our, you know, give us a sort of a
    resiliency score, if you will. So that work is underway. And we
    are thinking in terms from a safety management system
    perspective, what are the controls we have in place?
        If they--did they work? What should have been done? What
    didn't happen? What are the areas and opportunities for us to
    improve?
        Senator Fischer. Have you got in depth on looking at the
    controls and how quickly they were implemented?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. You know, we have assigned that to a
    couple of our offices, our Office of Safety Investigations, our
    Office of Security to say, again, what happened in the moment.
    It is pretty dynamic.
        A lot of things happen that should have happened in terms
    of reporting. But we certainly look to say, how can we do this
    better to make sure we don't have a repeat.
        Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam
    Chair.
        The Chair. Senator Peters. Senator Markey, I had called on
    him, but Senator Peters was ahead of him, and he has been so
    gracious to allow Senator Peters to go. So, thank you, Senator
    Markey. Senator Peters.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you,
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Nolen, for being here today
    before the Committee.
        You know, like many Americans and Michiganders, I am
    certainly concerned as well by the recent incursions into our
    airspace of a Chinese surveillance balloon, as well as several
    as yet unidentified objects, the most recent one that flew
    across the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and was neutralized over
    Lake Huron.
        I have been in contact with the Department of Defense, the
    Department of Homeland Security, your agency, to monitor these
    currents. And I have called for greater transparency into these
    incidents. So I certainly do appreciate some of your comments
    that you have made here today about FAA's coordination with
    NORAD.
        So I don't want to belabor those points. You have covered
    those well through the hearing so far. But I did want to ask
    you one thing related to that. Earlier this week, the White
    House announced the creation of an interagency team to study
    the broader policy implications for detection, analysis, and
    disposition of unidentified aerial phenomena, and especially
    those that could pose potential security risks.
        So my question for you, does the FAA expect to be a part of
    that team, and has that task force actually met and is starting
    to work?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you for the question, Senator
    Peters. Yes, the FAA is part of that team. Our COO, Tim
    Morrell, will be our representative on their team, and that
    team has already met and continues to meet.
        Senator Peters. Good. Good. You also mentioned to Senator
    Schatz, the FAA currently has people embedded in NORAD to
    improve coordination. But given these specific events, are
    there any additional bureaucratic or inoperability improvements
    that you can share with Congress to ensure that these
    concerning breaches of airspace are basically met with a
    seamless and immediate response?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, what I can tell you in an open forum is
    that there is a whole of Government approach to this from an
    interagency standpoint to make sure not only that we are
    aligned on policy, we are aligned on response, that that level
    of coordination is absolutely there.
        Senator Peters. Good, good. Mr. Nolen, Gerald, our Ford
    International Airport in Grand Rapids in Michigan, is the
    second--Michigan's second largest airport. Over 200 aircraft
    operations per day, and it serves a growing part of the state
    of Michigan.
        However, even as Grand Rapids serves record numbers of
    passengers, it has been stymied in its efforts to expand and
    modernize a 60-year-old FAA air traffic control tower.
        Last year, I secured $5 million in Congressionally directed
    spending for the airport to begin the design process and to
    replace that tower, but it is still not done. And I would just
    like to ask you, would you commit to working with me and the
    Grand Rapids Airport to ensure that a plan to replace their
    tower is done in a timely fashion?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir. What I can commit is, we will
    definitely work with your staff in terms of, I know there is
    work that is ongoing there. We will commit to giving you
    regular updates on it and what our progress is.
        Senator Peters. Right. Well, thank you. The unmanned aerial
    systems are beyond visual line of sight, Aviation Rulemaking
    Committee has published its report in March of 2022. The report
    laid the foundation for providing regulatory certainty to
    stakeholders looking to safely and swiftly deploy and scale
    unmanned aerial systems.
        However, the FAA's rulemaking agenda notes that a draft
    rule for UAS deployment outside the visual line of sight isn't
    expected until February 2024, 23 months from the report to the
    draft rule.
        And that is, as you know, not even a final rule at that
    point. Between the long wait for this rulemaking and difficult
    to navigate current exemption and waiver process, I am afraid
    advancements in commercial drone industry have stalled,
    frustrating communities and states like Michigan, who are
    looking to take advantage of this cutting-edge technology and
    economic opportunity it represents.
        So my question for you, Mr. Nolen, do you commit to doing
    everything you can to ensure that the U.S. maintains its global
    leadership in advanced aviation? And certainly, this type of
    aircraft that represents the future, we need to lean into,
    making sure we are facilitating that.
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, sir, for the question. Let me
    say, the U.S. is and remains the world's leader when it comes
    to this type of technology. To date, we have licensed over a
    million drones. Our projections are that we will have 2.5
    million by Fiscal Year 2025. So we are working. With respect to
    beyond visual line of sight, we stood up an aviation rulemaking
    arc and a committee.
        We received thousands of reports. We are going--comments,
    if you will. We are going through the process of going through
    those. But in the meantime, even as we are doing that, we have
    things like waivers and exemptions that we are using to enable
    UAS operations, some of which we have already done.
        So we will commit that this is, again, part of our top
    priority for our drones, for advanced air mobility, to make
    sure that we stay the world's leader.
        Senator Peters. Good. Thank you, Mr. Nolen. Senator Markey
    and Chair Cantwell, thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Budd.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Senator Budd. I thank the Chair. Mr. Nolen, welcome. It was
    good to chat with you earlier. You know, I was listening to a
    colleague from across the aisle a few minutes ago from
    Colorado, and, you know, it struck me how much I appreciated
    your aviation experience, your service to our military.
        You know, it would just make sense, common sense seems not
    so common anymore, but, you know, it would just makes sense
    that somebody leading the Federal Aviation Administration would
    actually have aviation experience, so I appreciate the
    experience that you bring to the table.
        You know, on the morning when this issue occurred, an
    exchange between air traffic control and a pilot at Newark
    Airport sums up some of the broader issues with the NOTAM
    system that go beyond this specific outage. ATC was talking to
    an airplane, that was to a pilot of an airplane that was
    taxiing out for departure and told the pilot about the
    nationwide ground stop.
        ATC asked the pilot if he had heard anything about the
    NOTAM issue before departure. The pilot responded, no, nobody
    reads NOTAMs. Well, maybe that is because the NOTAM system is
    not designed in a user-friendly way.
        The FAA's new Federal NOTAM website, it is a little better,
    but it does not prioritize important NOTAMs, and it delivers it
    in a printed code that is optimized for teletype machines
    instead of plain English. I will give you an example, as you
    would know, so I printed this out.
        No environmental impact study was done before, but I
    printed out the NOTAM from the Federal NOTAM system for a
    flight from D.C. back to my home airport near Winston-Salem. It
    is a 90-page document for a simple flight about an hour long.
        If I didn't review the list closely, I might have missed
    the NOTAM for a runway closure in my designated alternate
    airport. The NOTAM is buried on page four, somewhere in here
    between 13 other runway and taxiway NOTAMs.
        So, Chair, I would like to ask for unanimous consent that
    this briefing be included in the record.
        The Chair. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Budd. Thank you. Your pilots can consult other free
    resources provided by the FAA-like Leidos' Flight Service. That
    system does have a summary of important NOTAMs, like temporary
    flight restrictions or TFRs, and runway closures.
        But that system missed the runway closure NOTAM on the
    summary page. Here is the summary page, and it doesn't have
    that important NOTAM.
        So I would have had to find that runway closure NOTAM on
    page 53 of a 276 page briefing. So, Mr. Nolen, aside from the
    issues faced last month, what is the FAA doing to bring NOTAMs
    into the 21st century?
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Budd, for the question.
    This is exactly--you know, again, we share that we are both
    pilots, so we operate in the Nation's airspace here. This is
    part of our modernization effort.
        We committed that we will align our NOTAM with the ICAO
    standard. That we will make them timely, we will make them
    relevant, and the ability to prioritize by, as you say, by
    route of flight. So that is a part of the work is ongoing.
    Where we are today, we are--call it half way there. They are
    searchable.
        You can find the ones that are relevant to your flight. But
    this is a one we have just got to do better, and that better
    means getting off of the U.S. NOTAM system, onto the Federal
    NOTAM system, and the last part of that is ensuring now that
    our NOTAM systems comports to the ICAO standard.
        Senator Budd. Thank you very much for that answer. So it
    makes sense to have flight restrictions around major games like
    last week in Super Bowl or, you know, the upcoming Daytona 500.
    And those TFRs are announced well in advance and cover much
    more airspace to provide appropriate security for those special
    events.
        But stadium TFRs and the exception of those TFRs, they seem
    designed to trip up small planes flying VFR. So, Mr. Nolen, are
    you aware of any instances where a 3 mile, 3,000 foot TFR
    thwarted a threat from the air?
        Mr. Nolen. I am not.
        Senator Budd. OK. Well, Mr. Nolen, my time is short, but
    again, I want to just again, thank you for what you bring to
    the table, for your expertise in the aviation field, and your
    leadership of the FAA.
        As a pilot myself, I am glad that a fellow aviator is at
    the helm of this important agency, and I hope that we can get a
    permanent head of the FAA that has a deep understanding of the
    issues facing aviation today. Thank you so much. I yield back.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Markey.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your
    service, sir. Obviously, the outage of the NOTAM system just
    shows how fragile our aviation system has become. And we heard
    in testimony last week that Southwest Airlines suffered its own
    operational meltdown due to inadequate amounts of winter
    equipment, which was exacerbated by its own limited
    technological system.
        Southwest told us that they didn't have enough deicing
    equipment in Chicago or in Denver, which is like saying you
    don't have enough baseballs to open the season at Fenway Park.
    You know, so obviously, they didn't anticipate what was
    unfolding. And a lot of it is as a result of climate change, as
    a result of global warming.
        Burlington, Vermont, for example, in a report out just this
    past month, but it is a good example of what is happening
    across the country, is seven degrees warmer in the winter than
    it was just 50 years ago.
        Burlington, Vermont, seven degrees warmer. So it is not
    just global warming, it is global weirding that is taking
    place, and therefore, you have to adjust, adapt the system to
    the craziness of the weather. And the aviation system has to
    make the investment in order to deal with this dramatically
    changing weather environment due to global warming, due to
    climate change.
        So there is a dangerous connection between climate change
    and outdated technology and infrastructure, with extreme
    weather events like winter storm Elliot stressing the IT
    systems at the core of our aviation system. So, Administrator
    Nolen, do you agree that climate change poses new challenges
    for airlines, airports, and the FAA?
        Mr. Nolen. Senator Markey, thank you for the question. Just
    given my long time airline experience, I can say, number one, I
    have operated in all kind of conditions. The airlines, when we
    think about how they operate, they all have what they call
    winter operation plan. I am not an expert on climate. I
    certainly believe there are things we must do to continue as we
    think about what----
        Senator Markey. Do you think you have to become an expert
    on climate? Do you think the aviation system has to become
    expert on climate? What do you think?
        Mr. Nolen. Absolutely. The more we know, the better.
        Senator Markey. So that is what I would like to hear. I
    would like to hear that there is an understanding,
    appreciation, you know. That if you are not an expert, other
    people have to be experts.
        Mr. Nolen. We do have--we do that have that level of
    expertise within the agency.
        Senator Markey. And that, I think, is very important
    because we are going to obviously have to harden our aviation
    systems against extreme storms, heat, and other weather events.
    Do you think that the FAA needs to require a greater investment
    in resiliency at airports?
        Mr. Nolen. That is certainly the path we are on. And so,
    you know, and that is a wonderful way of describing it, right.
    It is how resilient are our systems. And the extent to which we
    build that in and bake that in, certainly the industry globally
    is investing in technology to be more resilient. And it is an
    absolute priority for us.
        Senator Markey. And I am working on legislation to improve
    the resiliency of our aviation system, particularly at our
    airports. We worked hard to include $25 billion for our
    airports in the bipartisan infrastructure law.
        But these critical investments will be wasted if we don't
    address the climate related risks. And we are just going to
    have to work together in order to make sure that they are not
    in denial about what is happening. And just one final point,
    which is related to airport resiliency, which is airport
    service workers.
        These individuals are the unsung heroes of our aviation
    system, but they often are overworked and underpaid. And just
    as our aviation system literally came to a stop due to a NOTAM
    outage, our airports would similarly stop functioning if the
    airport workers, the wheelchair attendants, the concessions
    workers, ramp agents, baggage handlers did not do their jobs.
        So I just think it is absolutely essential that we
    recognize, and you do agree, they are essential to keeping
    these airports functioning?
        Mr. Nolen. I do, indeed.
        Senator Markey. Yes, and I think it is important for us,
    which is why I introduced the Good Jobs for Good Airports Act,
    which would ensure that airport workers are paid a living wage
    and benefits. They are underappreciated, underpaid, under
    supported, they are black, brown, immigrant disproportionately.
    And during the pandemic, they showed up. They couldn't zoom to
    work. And we just have to make sure they get the resources
    which they need. So thank you, sir, for the work that you do.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Markey. Thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you. Before I go to our next member to ask
    questions, I just want to clarify that the video that we saw
    earlier was a simulation done by Senator Cruz, I think, and his
    team. That was not a real video of the incident. There seems to
    be some confusion about that, so.
        Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am. I knew it was a simulation.
        The Chair. Yes, OK. You clearly stated that, but not
    everybody may have captured that, so we just want to reiterate
    that. Next, I have Senator Vance.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. J.D. VANCE,
                         U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

        Senator Vance. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Nolen, thank you
    for being here. I am going to ask just a little bit about some
    of the unusual increases in obsession with the vocabulary and
    language that we are seeing in some of the FAA guidance and
    related documents related to our aviation industry. I want to
    ask, did the FAA issue a 176 page guidance document changing
    notices to airmen to notices of air mission in December 2021?
        Mr. Nolen. We did.
        Senator Vance. This was in part to avoid using the gender
    term airmen, correct?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir, I believe so.
        Senator Vance. OK. On November 10, 2021, the FAA held an
    inclusive language summit. Are you familiar with this effort?
        Mr. Nolen. I am familiar with it.
        Senator Vance. During the summit, which had a solicitation
    published in the Federal Register, Deputy Administrator Mims
    stated that when we use terms like airman or unmanned aircraft,
    so I am laughing because this has to be a joke, we are sending
    a message that only men belong in the aerospace community. Do
    you agree with that statement?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, Senator, what I could say is that having
    been a pilot for 42 years and seeing the evolution of our
    aerospace industry, I started out in helicopters and have flown
    as a captain in big jetliners. Not everyone is a pilot today.
    We have drones. We have spaceships--spacecraft, I am sorry.
        And so I do believe going to notices to air missions is
    absolutely the right thing to do. It is a accurate reflection
    of where airspace system is today. Fully supportive of that.
    And none of that, by the way, detracts from our mission, which
    is the safety of our airspace. And that will always be our
    North Star.
        Senator Vance. The point is, if it makes sense for some
    aviation reason, that is fine. If it makes sense purely to
    avoid gendered language, it seems like an unnecessary
    preoccupation with the words that you are using and that we are
    using rather than the work that we are doing.
        I want to just ask a couple of additional questions about
    this summit. The public notice for the meeting stated, ``if any
    individual employer, contractor, or industry partner feels
    excluded or marginalized because of language or words, the work
    of the agency suffers.'' Do you agree that the feelings of FAA
    employees about language are this important?
        Mr. Nolen. What I agree is that as we seek to attract the
    next generation of people into aerospace, mostly they won't
    look like the people sitting in this room. And so it is our
    ability to say, how do we bring tomorrow into today into an
    industry that is evolving right before our eyes. So our ability
    to find inclusive ways of reaching underrepresented groups is a
    right path to be on.
        Senator Vance. OK. I guess unanimous consent enter into the
    record the Drone Advisory Committee Public E-Book. I have it
    right here. This document uses the term wife as an example of
    the type of language that we need to eliminate. Is that
    something you support?
        Mr. Nolen. I am sorry, could you restate the question? I am
    sorry, sir.
        Senator Vance. So I am asking to give consent, first of
    all, to enter this into the record. But it explains that wife,
    the word wife is an example of the type of language that we
    need to eliminate. And I am just asking if that is something
    you think is necessary or something you support?
        Mr. Nolen. I would have to give that one some more thought.
        Senator Vance. Well, I would hope that the word wife is not
    something that we--or is something that we could all agree is a
    reasonable vocabulary word that most Americans use in their
    daily life. It is not something that we need to eliminate.
        I don't have much time here, so let me just ask here, at
    this same summit, during a panel called, How the FAA is Pushing
    Gendered Language Boundaries, the panelists stated that FAA
    leadership brought us to where we are here today. We see the
    recommendations from the Committee as a foundation, but it is
    also just the beginning of the conversation?
        It strikes me that preoccupying ourselves so much with the
    words that we use rather than the work that we do, especially
    as our infrastructure appears to be crumbling and we have had
    major flight outages in the last couple of years, is at best a
    distraction, and at worst a thing that takes attention away
    from focusing on the real problems.
        I worry--well, I especially I represent the people of Ohio,
    and I am very confident that the majority of Ohioans, if there
    is a pilot who is offended by the word wife or the word
    cockpit, maybe that person shouldn't be a pilot.
        So rather than kowtowing to people who are fragile, maybe
    we should actually say, if you are so worried about the words
    that we are using, you shouldn't be flying, you know, multi-ton
    metal engines through the sky.
        And I just ask all of us to maybe try to focus as much on
    real problems, like the fact that our aviation system seems to
    not be working as well as it used to, than the fact that we may
    use un-inclusive or under inclusive language. Thank you, Mr.
    Nolen. I appreciate it.
        The Chair. Senator Baldwin.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

        Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Madam Chair. So welcome,
    Administrator Nolen. Thank you for coming before the Committee
    and I know you will be back again, although that will not stop
    me from going beyond the stated topic of this hearing. But I am
    going to start with the stated topic of this hearing.
        So the NOTAM failure happened right on the heels of a
    failure with Southwest Airlines. We had Southwest leadership
    testify last week about their meltdown during the holidays. And
    I want to raise a similar concern for the FAA that I raised
    with Southwest.
        When something goes wrong and flights are canceled or
    delayed to the degree that they were during both of these
    situations, airports need to hear from you. They need to hear,
    in the case of Southwest, from Southwest, I learned from
    several Wisconsin airports, they just did not receive any type
    of proactive communication from the agency about the impacts of
    the NOTAM failure.
        They only received information necessary to respond to
    confused and frustrated travelers after reaching out, you know,
    themselves to FAA's local regional office. It is my expectation
    in situations like these that FAA should provide proactive and
    real time updates and guidance to our Nation's airports.
        Can you commit to that moving forward, and tell me how you
    would approach that, should we ever have a failure like this or
    similar disruption that requires this type of communication?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, Senator Baldwin, thank you so much for the
    question there. Let me say, just to set the record straight,
    throughout the course of every day, there are industry calls
    from our National Command Center every 2 hours.
        In addition, on the January 10th, we also opened up a
    hotline at 8 p.m. on the night of January 10th, and we had
    anyone could call into that, meaning airlines, airports, and
    other users of the system.
        So that was open. And then we were talking with our
    industry stakeholders throughout the night. On the following
    morning, when I instituted the ground stop, that information
    also went out nationwide to all airports. And we have roughly
    5,000 airports in the country.
        And so all of that, and as well, our office of airports
    also reached out to provide updates on the NOTAM outages that
    morning, early that morning of January 11th. And certainly we
    also updated that once the NOTAM was canceled. But your point
    is well taken.
        We will go back and just scrub to say, can we even improve
    our communication process, and we will commit to you that we
    will do just that.
        Senator Baldwin. I appreciate that. Congress took action in
    the last FAA reauthorization or the 2018 FAA reauthorization to
    move airports away from firefighting foams that contain PFAS,
    yet airports are still without any approved alternatives.
    Airports in my state are eager to transition away toward safer
    alternatives and are anxiously awaiting an approved alternative
    from the FAA.
        I will note that there are now numerous communities in
    Wisconsin whose groundwater has been contaminated with PFAS,
    and they are, in many cases, immediately adjacent to an
    operating airport.
        I am aware that the Department of Defense, which has a
    strong role to play here, of course, recently released a
    military specification outlining its requirement for
    firefighting foams that do not contain PFAS.
        So given that update, what can you tell me and what do you
    see as the likely timeline for finally giving airports PFAS-
    free alternatives? And how does the agency see its role in
    assisting airports throughout this transition process that we
    hope will be forthcoming?
        Mr. Nolen. Good question there. We are still working
    through that. So our Associate Administrator for Airports is on
    point in terms of working through this issue with PFAS. We
    recognize is one of supply as we look to an alternative.
        As you mentioned, the new mil-spec is out. Airports are
    allowed to use for an actual emergency, and then we have got
    procedures where they can test without discharging PFAS onto
    the ramp and, you know, keeping that from getting into the
    water tables.
        So we are working through the process of how we get there.
    We recognize it will take us some time. What I can commit to
    you is, we will follow up with you, with your staff in terms of
    what that those actual timelines are as they become available
    to us.
        Senator Baldwin. I just would want to stress and press for
    all due but considered speed on this. The resources that we are
    committing at the Federal level to try to assist communities
    with getting a clean and safe water supply after contamination
    are in the billions, and we shouldn't be prolonging this in any
    way.
        So I certainly want to press for, you know, timely action
    on this. I know at the local fire department's--fire department
    level, which obviously is different than aviation firefighting,
    but they are finding various firefighting foams that are
    working very effectively that do not contain PFAS.
        It seems to me that those tests--that that testing can be
    happening at the Federal level and get something in the queue
    as soon as possible.
        The Chair. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. Senator Schmitt.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of
    questions. And you may have addressed this already, but I do
    want to ask because I get a lot of questions about this from
    back home.
        So you were aware of this the night before on the NOTAM
    failure in January, but the public was not made aware until the
    next morning, right, including when people were sitting on
    planes and flights were delayed? I mean, there was no real
    transparency with the public, you would agree with that?
        Mr. Nolen. What I would agree with, sir, is that we, the
    system on the night before was operating, and also airlines
    were not reporting that there were any operational impacts on
    the night of the 10th.
        Senator Schmitt. OK. So how long until you knew that this
    actually wasn't working, until the public knew?
        [Technical problems.]
        The Chair. I think that was one of our colleagues trying
    to--next in line------
        Senator Schmitt. That is OK. Can I have my 10 seconds back?
        The Chair. Yes, sure.
        Senator Schmitt. I am just kidding.
        [Laughter.].
        Senator Schmitt. Right. OK, I just want to move on to
    something else. So in the President's budget that has been
    submitted, there is $2.4 million proposed to address climate
    change.
        In the conclusion of that budget, it says, and I quote,
    ``the FAA's budget request for Fiscal Year 2023 embodies the
    Administration's priorities of mitigating climate change and
    increasing equity.''
        Do you believe that that is your mission at the FAA, to
    mitigate climate change and increase equity? Is that your job
    at the FAA?
        Mr. Nolen. I believe it is all of our jobs here to address
    climate change, and is one that we take seriously.
        Senator Schmitt. OK. In that report, there is further
    commentary about it as a response to the accelerating climate
    crisis. Do you believe we have a climate crisis?
        Mr. Nolen. I was just at the ICAO convention where the
    majority in an overwhelming fashion supported moving to net
    zero carbon emissions by 2050. So if you look out across the
    global community, it is one that is staring us in the face and
    it is one we must address.
        Senator Schmitt. I am not really interested in the global
    community's view. I am interested in the FAA's view, whose
    mission is supposed to be safe and affordable travel for the
    American public.
        And what I have noticed with agencies, and this was
    particularly heightened in COVID and I think is now the
    playbook, we went from global warming to climate change to now
    a climate crisis. And as you have indicated, words matter. And
    in my view, that is meant to stoke fear and empower unelected
    bureaucrats to do things that are not authorized by law because
    it is an ``emergency.''
        And so I have deep concerns with spending $2.4 million on--
    it is not really clear, but I want to read you something from
    this. It says the FAA, this is the same budget request, the FAA
    will need to continue supporting maintenance and implementation
    of ICAO's Carbon Offsetting And Reduction Scheme for
    International Aviation, CORSIA, the international standard.
        CORSIA is a market based measure that allows international
    operators to achieve carbon neutral growth through the use of
    carbon offsets and sustainable aviation fuel. Is the FAA
    currently supportive of CORSIA?
        Mr. Nolen. Of course, Yes, sir, we are. And we are
    supportive of our move to sustainable aviation fuels.
        Senator Schmitt. OK. I am distressed and troubled that the
    Secretary Buttigieg, Pete Buttigieg, is not here today. Do you
    know if Pete Buttigieg, when he flies private, uses that same
    system, that same measurement of CORSIA?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, first, let me say, sir, that what you
    speak of is private Government aircraft that are used across
    the Government. We use aircraft for testing. The FAA has a
    fleet of 42 aircraft that are primarily used for en route
    testing, et cetera. And so in those, without having to sort of
    qualify this, we are talking about public resources and not
    private resources.
        Senator Schmitt. Right. Does he, does the Secretary use
    market based carbon offsets when he flies private?
        Mr. Nolen. Sir, I can't speak to that.
        Senator Schmitt. Can you get back to me on that, because I
    am very interested. Or maybe actually, if you could get the
    message to the Secretary the next time we have a hearing
    dealing with the Department of Transportation, the FAA, we
    would like to see him here. And if he could give an answer to
    that.
        Because he flies private a lot. He tells hardworking
    Americans they need to pay more for things that he is not
    willing to pay for, and people are frustrated. Could you relay
    that message to him?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Madam Chair. As a Senator
    from the great state of Illinois where we produce a lot of
    ethanol, my farmers are very supportive of the aviation fuel,
    sustainable aviation fuel movement.
        As a pilot, and we both actually started off as rotor
    heads, so welcome. It is good to see a fellow the rotor head.
    And I know your background in aviation actually also includes a
    long history of aviation safety.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. All the way back to your days as an Army
    pilot. One of the things that you learn is that a safety system
    should never be left vulnerable to a single point of failure,
    never.
        Redundancy saves lives. We know that. That is why I am very
    alarmed that a single contractor could crash the automated
    NOTAM system by simply deleting files. That sounds like a
    single point of failure to me and I would love to understand it
    better.
        And this is on the heels of the deadly Boeing 737 MAX
    crashes that were caused by the grossly irresponsible decision
    to place passengers' lives at risk at the mercy of a single
    angle of attack sensor.
        What is striking about these incidents is that America's
    largest commercial aircraft manufacturer, and the world's most
    important aviation regulator, both betrayed a fundamental
    aviation safety principle, operational redundancy.
        It is the FAA's job to keep our airspace safe, but it is
    impossible for FAA to do this unless its systems have
    appropriate redundancies, and you generally have redundancies
    across the system.
        Administrator Nolen, when was the last time that the FAA
    reviewed its air traffic organization's facilities and
    equipment to ensure that there are no potential single points
    of failure?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, Senator Duckworth. And I
    applaud you for your service as well. It is great to talk to a
    fellow Army person. Let me just say, we have an ongoing look in
    terms of where we are.
        So the whole journey of modernization for the FAA is
    exactly to what you are describing, how do we continue to build
    in redundancy and resiliency in the system, and expand it to be
    able to accommodate new entrants in what we have today? That
    work is ongoing.
        Senator Duckworth. When was the last time before the NOTAM
    system crashed that a review was conducted?
        Mr. Nolen. We did reviews in 2020, 2021, and we have done
    three reviews in 2022.
        Senator Duckworth. I would love to see any report from
    those reviews, if possible.
        Mr. Nolen. We will certainly follow up with them.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. The Boeing 737 MAX
    investigation discovered that at least one employee
    specifically cautioned against relying on a single angle of
    attack sensor in the airframe, but that concern went unheeded.
    How often, if ever, are you briefed on concerns that FAA
    employees may have about the resiliency of the air traffic
    organization's facilities and equipment? Do you get those
    briefings? Do those come up to you at your level?
        Mr. Nolen. We do. We have several processes. Certainly, we
    have a whistleblower program. We have got a for our safety
    organization. We have a voluntary safety confidential reporting
    program.
        So there are multiple avenues for FAA employees to get
    information to me. I have a biweekly with my audit team in
    terms of----
        Senator Duckworth. And they lift up individual?
        Mr. Nolen. They do come to me for individual reports.
        Senator Duckworth. OK. I am going to go to my next question
    just simply because I have a limited amount of time. As you
    know, last week, Airlines for America urged FAA to extend its
    proposed deadline to June 2024 to retrofit aircraft with
    altimeters that won't experience interference from 5G wireless
    technology.
        While a 4-month delay may not be a huge disruption, it is a
    reminder that this process has been and remains a seat of the
    pants operation. Had the FAA and FCC better cooperated during
    the development of 5G, wireless customers would have benefited
    from a smooth, predictable rollout of this new technology
    without risks to air passengers.
        Instead, we were treated to delays, negotiations, and
    uncertainty, all because the FAA and the FCC failed to
    meaningfully collaborate with each other early and often over
    the years. We should never have reached a situation where the
    FAA had to seriously consider halting flights at certain
    airports because it could not rule out the risk of 5G
    interference causing a crash, even if such a risk was low.
        I have several questions I think I am going to ask you--I
    am going to submit for the record. But really, you know, what I
    need to know is, is the FAA receiving all the technical
    information it needs from the FCC and the wireless carriers to
    ensure that 5G does not interfere?
        Does the FAA have the resources that it needs to ensure
    that all passenger aircraft are equipped with the technology to
    prevent 5G from interfering with flight operations? And this is
    both commercial but also general aviation.
        Is the FAA sharing all relevant information with FCC and
    air carriers to prevent 5G from interfering with flight
    operations? So I have a series of questions I am going to
    submit for the record, and I will ask for you to please submit
    your answers in writing.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you. I would be happy to respond.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        The Chair. Thank you. Senator Capito.

                STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

        Senator Capito. Thank you, and welcome, Mr. Nolen. Thank
    you for your service, and long years of service. Let me ask
    just a quick question. Is your--is the FAA workforce in the
    office 5 days a week now?
        Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am, they are not.
        Senator Capito. Do you know how that breaks out? 20 percent
    are?
        Mr. Nolen. I don't have the numbers. I would be happy to
    follow up with you on that. But we do have, we have got folks
    who are in the office and there is coverage every day. Let me
    qualify that. Our operational people are indeed in the office
    every day or, you know, in their control rooms every day.
        Senator Capito. Do you anticipate the rest of the workforce
    will come back every day?
        Mr. Nolen. We are working through, I believe, across all of
    Government to, say, as we come out of the back side of the
    pandemic to make sure that we have got that tempo. What I want
    to make sure for the American public is that the what the work
    we do is accomplished no matter where the person is sitting.
        Senator Capito. Understood. Yes. I would hope everybody
    would eventually get back there. As you know, and I think this
    was addressed, Senators Klobuchar and Moran and I have
    introduced the Note of Improvement Act, S. 66, I think you have
    addressed this, establishing a task force of experts to come up
    with recommendations to make the important pilot notification
    system better.
        While I know you have been trying to improve the system for
    years, can you tell us the benefits of having this legislation
    and assembling these experts with a clear list of objectives
    and deadlines to give recommendations? Could you address that?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you. What I can say about that is we
    support the goals of this legislation, and we are working in
    that level. We are working with industry, stakeholders, we work
    with an earlier group as we started the journey of modernizing
    our NOTAM system.
        Senator Capito. Do you think that having that stronger
    NOTAM system would cut down on this 1,732 runway incursions we
    saw in 2022?
        Mr. Nolen. I certainly think getting to that advanced
    system, prioritizing all the things that we have talked about
    here this morning, will make the system more resilient. And so,
    I would love to see us get there quicker.
        Senator Capito. Let me ask you this about contractors. We
    have noticed, and you have you noted, cybersecurity are a major
    issue. And we are also concerned that as Senator Duckworth was
    talking about, the contractor unintentionally deleting files,
    causing the outage.
        And on January the 11th, you say to that new protocol
    requires more than one person to be present when database work
    occurs. Can you tell us how many contracts or have contractors
    have access to the NOTAM system? And does the other person that
    needs to be present? Is that an FAA person or is it--could they
    be a contractor?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. So let me say firstly, for the
    contractors that were directly involved in the unintentional
    deletion, they no longer have access to either FAA facilities
    or the NOTAM system. So we do have other contractors. I don't
    have the exact number in front of me, but would be happy to
    follow up there. And we also have a level of FAA oversight. And
    so part of that----
        Senator Capito. So it could be either/ or?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. No, there will always--there is
    always FAA oversight.
        Senator Capito. OK. OK. I was going to ask you a question
    about 5G. We have had hearings in this committee on the issues
    between the FAA and the FCC. And I note Senator Duckworth
    introduced some questions for the record, but what is your
    communications strategy with the FCC on this so we don't run up
    against another deadline, and have another hearing, and then
    everything seems to break down?
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you for the question. We are working very
    closely with the FCC and the NTIA, as well as the industry on
    all things 5G. We have got a regular cadence of meetings with
    the FCC on this, and we are in a position where we have better
    alignment and we have got an absolute sense of transparency
    going there.
        Senator Capito. Well, I would encourage that. Let me ask
    you a question coming from a rural state with smaller airports.
    What would you say the biggest challenge moving forward the
    next 10 to 20 years is going to be for our smaller regional
    airports?
        Mr. Nolen. What gives me, you know, a lot of hope is as we
    start to see advanced air mobility, I mean, it really excites
    me. And that ability to not only go between cities, but to
    connect smaller cities as well.
        When we think about urban air taxis and what the
    possibilities are there, I think is fascinating, to be quite
    honest. We continue to look at how, you know, what is that
    level of support. I can't speak to the economics of it.
        That is not my, within my purview. But we are a strong
    supporter of our system. We look for ways how do we support
    certainly from a Federal Aviation Administration.
        Senator Capito. Thank you. And I would like to just thank
    you and your representatives that are in West Virginia. We have
    a lot of contact with them. We have some--you have probably
    flown into West Virginia.
        Mr. Nolen. I have.
        Senator Capito. It takes a little bit of skill, I think.
    And in some cases a lot of skill. So they are very responsive
    to us and reply and help us in a short period of time. So I
    please convey my appreciation.
        Mr. Nolen. Yes's, ma'am. Thank you for the feedback. We
    will certainly pass it on.
        Senator Capito. Thank you.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you.
        Senator Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        The Chair. Thank you so much. So my intention is to ask a
    follow up question, and if anybody else shows up, we will give
    them an opportunity to ask a question. If they don't, we are
    going to close out the hearing and move on.
        But, Mr. Nolen, I found it very concerning that the same
    day we had this NOTAM system issue, so did Canada. I just feel
    like this can't be a coincidence, that we have no incidents,
    and then on the same day, the same system has a problem in two
    different countries. Do you know about the Canadian outage, and
    what is your make of this situation?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. I do know about the Canadian outage.
    We have talked with our counterparts at NAV, Canada.
    Absolutely, there was no connection between what they
    experienced based on everything they told us and what we
    experienced.
        That being said, one of the very first things I directed
    our investigation teams to do, to look at this from both a
    human error, but also from a cyber. We also had the Department
    of Homeland Security working with us to--what is our level of
    cyber resilience there. So, again, the investigation is
    ongoing.
        Everything we have to date showed no sign of this being
    cyber related, but the investigation still continues there.
        The Chair. And so what is--what was the outage in Canada?
    What was the----
        Mr. Nolen. There was in a--my understanding from them,
    theirs was a database, but they have a different system,
    different architecture. It was not related to our system in any
    way, shape, or form.
        The Chair. I am sure it wasn't related to our system, but I
    still find it ironic that two, you know, of the biggest systems
    in the world are outed at the same time. And there has been no
    problems with these NOTAM systems, and all of a sudden, on the
    same day, there was a problem.
        Just I think we will look forward to more data and
    information from you on that. Back to the question, though, on
    redundancy. I don't think we have true redundancy here. So I
    want to see a plan from the FAA that examines the fact that the
    backup systems are still subject to the same kind of, if you
    want to call it human error, of deletion of files.
        You are building a system to try to firewall that from not
    happening again, but it could be a different problem, and we
    still have a backup system that would be affected.
        So until we get the true modernization system, I would like
    you to go back and see what level of redundancy that you really
    have a truly separate system that would not be impacted by
    this.
        Mr. Nolen. We appreciate the concern, and that is indeed
    one of the first paths I directed as well, is to this
    overarching look by our IT team working with MITRE is to do
    exactly what you are asking for.
        The Chair. And so, what did you come up with since you went
    down this road sooner than I did? What did you come up with?
        Mr. Nolen. That is still ongoing. They have got still a bit
    to do because, you know, as I said, we have got thousands of
    systems, and so our ask for them is to once that work is done,
    we will certainly be happy to provide an update to the
    Committee.
        The Chair. You mean we have contractors with too much stuff
    and they can't get things done, is that what you are saying?
        Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am.
        The Chair. Oh, OK. So why can't they give us an analysis of
    the system and keeping a duplicate system.
        Mr. Nolen. That's the body of work that is ongoing. It is
    not just the NOTAM system, but I think what you are asking for
    is looking across all of our critical systems that underpin our
    national airspace and the levels of redundancy there. That is
    the work that we have, our IT and MITRE.
        The Chair. No, I am asking just now. Not the NOTAM system.
    I want to get an answer within a week about the NOTAM system
    having a separate backup, totally separate backup, that could
    be used.
        You are saying what happened here is somebody infected the
    file and basically ended up deleting something that then caused
    the outage to the system. So, the question is, you are now
    trying to put human redundancy there so that this won't happen
    again.
        But if the same system is a network, including the backup
    to servers and other places, and whatever action somebody
    mistakenly takes on files still affects the whole system, what
    would be important to understand is can the FAA set up a true
    redundant server system that would allow for that file
    corruption that happened not to happen across the entire
    system? And that is what we need to know the answer to.
        So, I do see you a few colleagues have arrived, which means
    we have some questions to answer. So, I am going to go and vote
    and I will turn it over to my colleague from Wyoming, Ms.
    Lummis, and then my colleague from Georgia, Mr. Warnock, and
    then we will see who else shows up. But thank you very much.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, ma'am.
        The Chair. Senator Lummis.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA LUMMIS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING

        Senator Lummis. Thank you, Chairman Cantwell. This is an
    important hearing. We appreciate your being here very much.
    Looking forward to your testimony today and your willingness to
    serve and continuing this important dialog. Before I go to my
    questions, I want to highlight several issues that I believe
    should be at the top of this committee's priority list as we
    look to reauthorize the FAA.
        Obviously, there is no doubt that both the Southwest and
    the NOTAM system failures have shown the need for a reliable
    air service ecosystem, both in the public and the private
    sector. But I must note that reliability of air service is an
    issue that my home state of Wyoming faces every day, whether
    there is a system outage or not.
        Factors such as a lack of pilots, high jet fuel prices, a
    consolidation of air carriers, and the up gauging of aircraft
    capacity have left many rural communities across the country at
    risk of losing their air service.
        So, as we move into this FAA reauthorization, this
    committee must not lose sight of the main goal of our national
    aviation policy, creating a truly national network that safely
    connects all regions together.
        So, I am looking forward to the discussions today. Acting
    Administrator Nolen, it is my understanding that many in the
    aviation industry feel that NOTAM system does not provide
    useful information. I happened to be sitting on an airplane
    when NOTAM went down and the pilot was trying to explain to us
    what NOTAM does.
        Often air crews are bombarded with information, some of
    which is critical, while others are repetitive or even
    irrelevant for the specific route the aircraft will be flying.
        As the FAA looks to recover from this outage and modernize
    the IT infrastructure, I am curious to hear if the FAA has
    heard similar concerns, and if there are plans to
    simultaneously modernize NOTAM so that it can better prioritize
    the information it is sending to air crews?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. What I
    would say--so, two things. Number one, the journey that we are
    on, and we are about halfway through it in terms of our
    modernization of the NOTAM system, is designed to do exactly
    what you are describing and what the general concern is, how do
    we ensure that the NOTAMs deliver to pilots? Being a pilot
    myself, are relevant, they are timely, they are prioritized,
    and they speak to the route of flight.
        Now, there are times when you may have to divert, so we
    can't always say they are irrelevant. And, you know, if you are
    deviating around the weather system sometime, that could take
    you hundreds of miles off your present course. And there might
    be a relevant NOTAM there.
        But we are moving. We have already got some functionality
    built into the system today, especially on the Federal NOTAM
    system. And by the time we get to 2025, when we will have
    everybody onto the Federal NOTAM system, we will continue to
    improve that. And following that, we will ultimately get to an
    ICAO standard.
        All of that takes time, of course, but we are working
    through it very purposefully.
        Senator Lummis. So how would it work if it's a more
    localized issue? For example, I have been on planes in Wyoming
    where there were antelope on the runway or a coyote on the
    runway. So, it only affects a few planes in a very localized
    area. Can NOTAM be calibrated to address those sort of very
    isolated individual issues?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, so maybe to speak a little bit about
    NOTAMs, right. So, for your flight that you are on departure,
    yes, you have got NOTAM's that are appended to the flight plan
    if you are on a commercial flight.
        But the other thing you do as a pilot is you would call for
    DH's automatic thermal information, which gives you weather,
    which gives you taxiway closures, which gives you other things
    relevant that may not be working in the moment. In the same
    thing for your route of flight and the same thing for your
    destination airport.
        Pilots, you would call prior to the top of the descent and
    say what is happening at my airport? It may say it is in Booz
    or in Montana, or it is in, you know, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
    Those are the ``in the moment'' types of information, relevant
    information you would get from the airport itself.
        Our goal is to, again, to continue down this journey of
    streamlining the NOTAM system, making it ICAO compliant, and
    getting it to a point where it is indeed relevant to each route
    of flight.
        Senator Lummis. So recently you announced that upgrades to
    the NOTAM system would not be completed for almost a decade.
    And I assume it is because of the complexity of making the
    updates. But is there a way to expedite that timeframe?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, that is one of the directions I have given
    my team, is come back to me with what it would take resources
    wise for us to accelerate. And we would love this to see if
    that is possible.
        Right now, we substantially, the bulk of the work will be
    done by Fiscal Year 25. I would like to see if we could bring
    that forward, and then there are some other pieces that work
    into that.
        Senator Lummis. One more quick question. I understand the
    FAA has taken steps to prevent another NOTAM malfunction, such
    as decoupling the system and requiring that two people be
    presented when performing work on the system or be present.
        Since the issue with NOTAM was caused by contractors
    accidentally deleting critical code, does the FAA plan to
    restrict access to the NOTAM system moving forward to FAA
    employees?
        Mr. Nolen. No, ma'am, we do not. So, we have a NOTAM system
    that is overseen by the FAA and maintained by contractors.
    These folks are indeed the experts there. What I have ensured
    that we have is the level of oversight for the FAA team, and
    that the requisite level of leadership that oversees that.
        Senator Lummis. Thank you very much, Acting Director Nolen.
    We appreciate your being here. I yield to the gentleman from
    Georgia, Senator Warnock.
        Senator Warnock. Far be it for me to go ahead of the
    gentlewoman from Nevada.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Senator Warnock. [Technical
    problems]--and thank you for being here today for this really
    important hearing. I am just going to go quickly right into it,
    because for Nevada, of course, you know, big tourism
    destinations all up and down our state, robust, safe, and
    reliable air travel, it is, like I said, essential for our
    tourism driven economy to thrive.
        In 2022, passenger volume at Harry Reid International
    Airport, it broke an all-time record. The airport welcomed more
    than 52.6 million passengers. And while business travel, of
    course, still recovering in 2022, leisure travel to Las Vegas
    exceeded expectations with visitors drawn to our newly expanded
    sports offerings, I am just saying Super Bowl next year, Las
    Vegas, and other large scale entertainment events.
        And the NOTAM system's outage last month, it did make clear
    to actually all Americans how dependent the world's largest
    economy is on air travel and how dependent air travel is on
    antiquated computer systems.
        Fortunately for our Harry Reid International Airport, the
    immediate impacts of the outage were manageable as we have
    amazing and dedicated employees, and the NOTAM outage happened
    on a Wednesday, which is actually one of our lighter travel
    days. I worry, however, about this happening again and our
    ability as a nation to deal with it.
        So, I want to talk about preparing for a cyber-attack. The
    incidents spanning January 10th and 11th was determined not to
    be a result of a cyber-attack, but it did publicly really
    reveal critical vulnerabilities like some of the other Senators
    have mentioned, in our security and our system architecture,
    and we just have to continue raising these concerns.
        So, do you feel in your estimation, that the FAA systems,
    that they are resilient enough to detect, to counter, and
    defeat a major cyberattack, including by other nation states?
    And does the FAA, do you have the proper infrastructure, and
    most importantly, the properly trained cyber workforce to
    swiftly support that effort?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, we do. So, thank you for the question,
    Senator Rosen. We have a very capable cyber resilience staff.
    We undertake biannual cyber response plan, when we practice
    that plan on a biannual basis.
        We work in close concert in coordination with our other
    agencies, TSA, Homeland Security, et cetera, and we continue
    it. And certainly, the work of modernizing the FAA, which is--
    --
        Senator Rosen. I was going to ask, what investments are you
    planning for? What can we expect to see in the coming months to
    maintain this level?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, certainly we want to get on to the Federal
    NOTAM system. That has increased levels of redundancy versus
    the U.S. NOTAM system, but we still got some critical users who
    are using the U.S. NOTAM system.
        So that is the work that will take us to get there. But
    back to the question of cyber resilience. We are. We look
    forward to that. And we think the controls we have in place
    will prevent a repeat of the event that happened on January 11.
        Senator Rosen. And thank you for that. And I want to ask,
    as we move forward into IT modernization, not just in this
    area, but in really every area, we have to do that, how are you
    working with other Federal agencies to manage and prevent
    cyberthreats? And is there something that we can do? Any
    Congressional support you need in order to be sure that those
    collaborations are taking place?
        Mr. Nolen. I would say at a high level, I know the
    Committee has been briefed on many things in and around cyber.
    Currently, well, it has been a while, but we have a whole of
    Government approach to that.
        So, we are working across every agency and every department
    within the Government, around cyber, around cyber resilience.
    That there is that level of interconnectivity is absolutely
    there, and it is one of our top priorities, one of the top
    priorities for the Administration.
        Senator Rosen. And I want to build on that a little bit
    because we know that we are using telephones as a backup,
    right. And so, like the outage again in January, the flight
    crews, they utilized this backup phone system.
        Now, I would say that is--I love my phone and but I would
    say that that is not the best use of our technology. And so,
    considering the added time requirement, the potential for
    error, and inherent in using outdated rudimentary system, is it
    sufficient that a phone is the reliable backup in 2023 to the
    NOTAM system? And what can we do to have a more reliable
    backup?
        Mr. Nolen. Well, a phone is--there are multiple streams of
    getting NOTAMs. One is by calling, one is talking to air
    traffic control, one is talking to the facilities that you may
    be going to or are en route. So that backup that is there, our
    goal is indeed to have a system that is highly resilient and
    redundant, and that is the piece that we are working toward.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I think I yield to--let me yield
    to Senator Sullivan from Alaska.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, Mr. Nolen,
    thank you for being here. You know, my state has very unique
    problems and challenges, 258 communities with no roads, think
    about that, 82 percent of the communities in my state you can't
    get to by a road, so you need an airplane.
        And yet we have the oldest infrastructure and technology of
    any state in the country when it comes to FAA issues. We have
    remote mountainous terrain. We know it presents technical
    challenges for the FAA in installing and maintaining robust
    communications and navigation and satellite systems.
        In the FAA's own words in 2021, the FAA, Alaska Aviation
    Safety Initiative, they said, ``maintaining the extensive
    Alaska national airspace infrastructure, which consists of a
    mixture of old and new components, is a daunting task for FAA
    engineers and technicians.''
        Now, I know we are focused on modernizing the NOTAM system,
    but can I ask you, will the FAA--would the FAA, recognizing the
    huge needs in Alaska, with this Alaska Aviation Initiative,
    which we appreciate from the FAA, are any of these going to be
    addressed in the effort to modernize the NOTAM system?
        Mr. Nolen. Senator Sullivan, thank you so much for the
    question. Yes, indeed. We recognize the criticality of our
    systems with respect to Alaska and all of the challenges that
    you spoke to.
        And Alaska is still one of the areas that remain on the
    U.S. NOTAM system. So that is a part of our goal as well. When
    you think about Alaska international operator, or some parts of
    the DOD, is to get everybody onto the Federal NOTAM system.
    And, you know, that will happen by 2025 unless we can
    accelerate it, and we are looking at what that might take.
        Senator Sullivan. OK. Well, this effort then will result in
    more timely NOTAMs, outages of navigational aids and
    communications. So, will you be able to be able to surge that
    capacity that we need there?
        Mr. Nolen. That is our expectation that we will have, you
    know, better stream, better reliability there.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask more specifically, what is the
    FAA focused on in terms of doing soon to address the challenges
    to maintain navigational aids and communications equipment in
    Alaska and then upgrade it?
        Mr. Nolen. We are still working through that. I mean, there
    are things we are doing like around runways, around approaches.
    We have done a lot in terms of GPS approaches. We have got some
    you know, some other approaches, other approaches that we are
    doing in Alaska.
        So, our commitment there is high and everything that we are
    doing, the FAASI, is working and we are making the kind of
    progress.
        Senator Sullivan. OK. Again, I appreciate the FAASI effort.
    I mentioned, 350 communities. All this technology I also
    mentioned, unfortunately, you know, highest death rate per
    capita in terms of flying for all these reasons. Can the FAA,
    and this is a simple idea, store more spare parts in the state
    and provide more technicians?
        Mr. Nolen. Well thank you for the idea, sir. Let me, if you
    allow me to take that back to our team, and we are certainly
    happy to follow up.
        Senator Sullivan. OK, good. Let me ask one final question.
    I know we have a vote here. I want to be respectful to my
    colleague, Senator Warnock. The FAA has a policy that we are
    kind of baffled by right now that is requiring--and to be
    honest, I still don't even really understand it.
        A shorter runways throughout the state of Alaska. That is
    antithetical to what we need right now, which is actually
    longer runways. Remember these communities, the airport is
    off--is the only thing that connects them to, unless you are on
    a river and then it is a boat.
        But the river is frozen in the winter, so why are we
    requiring, in order to be eligible to reconstruct runways using
    Federal funds, that the FAA is forcing Alaska to shorten the
    length of its runways?
        To be honest, you should be helping us lengthen runways.
    This is baffling to me. And my team has tried to explain it to
    me and I don't understand. So, what is happening? This is nuts.
        Mr. Nolen. Well, thank you, sir, for the question. Let me
    just caveat, correct a couple of things here. There is a caveat
    in the AIP funding that, you know, that requires--when we talk
    about an additional 500 feet is what we are talking about. We
    are working through in Noatak, if I have got that right,
    Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes.
        Mr. Nolen. So that work is in progress. There is--it is
    also caveated that if it provides critical services----
        Senator Sullivan. Or how about there is no road to that----
        Mr. Nolen. Exactly. So those are things that play into
    that. So that piece is underway.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I would like to work with you and
    your team with my team to make sure we are not--we are not
    telling Alaskan communities they have got to shorten the runway
    when it is their only lifeline to the rest of the state in the
    rest of the world. OK, thank you.
        Mr. Nolen. Thank you, sir.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

        Senator Warnock. Thank you so very much, Administrator
    Nolen, for being here. Families rely on the FAA to ensure their
    flights will take off safely and efficiently. The FAA's NOTAM
    system plays a critical role in this effort, and its recent
    outage is concerning, to say the least, as me and my colleagues
    have already said, and unacceptable.
        I think you know that. It doesn't just hurt passengers, it
    also poses a national security risk, signaling to our
    adversaries that even a minor computer error can bring down
    domestic commercial flights for hours.
        According to your testimony, this outage resulted from a
    contractor accidentally deleting files that were necessary to
    maintain the synchronization between the live and backup NOTAM
    data bases.
        Administrator Nolen, as of January 10th--and if you can
    answer yes or no, I have got to go and vote. They are always
    doing multiple things around here. We are always doing multiple
    things, I should say. Did FAA staff understand that deleting
    these files could cause this outage as of January 10?
        Mr. Nolen. There was an understanding. If the question is,
    did they understand the result of deleting files, yes, the
    Administrator knew that it was an unintentional deletion. And
    so, as they were working to repair that error, they did
    understand the magnitude of what they had done.
        Senator Warnock. How many contractors had security
    permission to access and delete those files that day?
        Mr. Nolen. On that day, the contractors all had--just let
    me say that our NOTAM system is overseen by the FAA and
    maintained by contractors. They were our database
    administrators, so they had access. The ones directly involved
    in this event on January 10 and 11 no longer have access to our
    system while the investigation is underway. And we are taking a
    look at that.
        Senator Warnock. So how many had access that day?
        Mr. Nolen. That day, I don't have an exact number at the
    moment. That day there were two people working in the system.
        Senator Warnock. So, can you follow up with me and answer
    it in writing?
        Mr. Nolen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warnock. How many contractors had access that day?
    How many contractors still can disrupt the database connection?
        Mr. Nolen. If you think about it, whether it is a
    contractor or an FAA employee, our goal is to build in a level
    of resilience no matter who is in the system. And we have put
    controls in place to make sure that we have the levels of
    redundancy with oversight, ensuring that two people or more, at
    least two people are there when working on the live data base.
        Senator Warnock. So, you are saying the answer zero now?
        Mr. Nolen. That the answer is zero? I am sorry----
        Senator Warnock. The question was how many contractors
    still can disrupt the database connection? And you are saying
    to me that based on systems you have put in place now with
    redundancies, that answer is now zero?
        Mr. Nolen. You would expect, that is right, with oversight.
    We would not expect to see a repeat of this kind of error.
        Senator Warnock. So, and thank you, if you would follow up
    with the first--the answer to the first question in writing. I
    believe it is essential that FAA award single points of
    failure, which I think I am hearing you say that that should
    not happen again. Is that correct?
        Mr. Nolen. That is correct.
        Senator Warnock. So, no one contractor who hasn't had their
    morning coffee can accidentally or intentionally ground
    commercial air travel for the whole country. How many other
    single points of failure does the FAA have within its system?
        Mr. Nolen. That is a piece of work that we are undertaking.
    So, part of the effort that we have going with our Office of IT
    and Technology working with MITRE is to assess the totality of
    our systems, of which there are thousands, to make sure what we
    have from a resilience perspective, and we expect that work to
    be completed here in the coming weeks.
        Senator Warnock. So right now, we don't know how many other
    single points of failure we have within our system, and that is
    work you are doing right now?
        Mr. Nolen. That is work that we are doing now.
        Senator Warnock. All right. What steps are you taking the
    audit security and access permissions across all of these
    points of failure to prevent both accidental mistakes and
    malicious intruders?
        Mr. Nolen. This is part of what the investigation is
    designed to do. We are looking at every part of our process,
    from procedures, from access, from control, from resilience to
    redundancy. All of that is in the scope of the investigation.
        Senator Warnock. Well, obviously, all of us were deeply
    troubled by what we witnessed. Its impact on air travel and the
    implications are deeply concerning. This year is, of course,
    FAA reauthorization.
        It is a good time for us to be focused on these issues, and
    I look forward to collaborating with you and with my colleagues
    as we modernize the FAA to increase security, to reduce risk so
    that all of us, certainly my constituents in Georgia and people
    all across the country can fly safely.
        Mr. Nolen. We appreciate the support.
        Senator Warnock. So, I guess--oh, the Chair is back.
        The Chair. Well, Senator Warnock, do you have further
    questions?
        Senator Warnock. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am done. I am
    going to go vote.
        The Chair. OK. Well, maybe we will coordinate here
    together, but thank you. You represent such a big aviation
    state and look forward to working with you on the
    reauthorization bill.
        Administrator Nolen, thank you for your participation. The
    hearing will remain open for 4 weeks until March 15, 2023. Any
    Senators that would like to submit questions for the record
    should do so two weeks from now, by March 1, 2023.
        And we ask the witnesses--witness to respond by March 15,
    2023. So, with that, our hearing is concluded.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                  Billy Nolen
        Ensuring True Redundancy in the NOTAM System. As FAA moves forward
    with a modernization of the NOTAM system, it will be important to
    ensure system redundancy, protection from cyber threats, and resiliency
    for the future. FAA must have redundancies in place to prevent single
    points of failure in key systems. Technology modernization has been a
    challenge for everyone, but we can't lead and uphold the gold standard
    in aviation safety if we aren't prepared for the information age.
        I want to see a plan from the FAA that examines the fact that the
    backup systems are still subject to the same kind of, if you want to
    call it human error, of deletion of files. You're building a system to
    try to prevent that from happening again. But it could be a different
    problem, and we still have a backup system that would be affected. So,
    until we get a fully modernized system, I would like you to go back and
    see what level of redundancy you currently have, to ensure that you
    really have a truly separate backup system that would not be impacted
    by future disruptions.

        Question 1. What plans does the FAA have for ensuring true
    redundancy in the NOTAM system to ensure outages do not occur? And when
    will these plans be fully implemented?
        Answer. The current NOTAM System has both an active and
    geographically separate disaster recovery site providing protection
    against a site failure. In addition, each site also has local
    redundancy to prevent a single point of failure.
        The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
    been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy. At the
    disaster recovery site, one database is kept in near real-time sync
    with the active site, and a second one is configured to apply changes
    with a one-hour delay. This mitigates the risk of data deletions/
    corruption that recently occurred.
        The ongoing NOTAM Modernization project will consolidate two NOTAM
    systems into a single NOTAM system and transition them to a highly
    resilient NAS operational environment. This new environment will
    provide high-availability services at geographically separate
    locations.

        Question 2. What is FAA's practice with regard to keeping systems
    and software incrementally up to date, which could prevent them from
    becoming outdated and requiring a total replacement?
        Answer. Updating the systems and software in the FAA includes both
    an operations and maintenance (O&M) and enhancement/modernization
    component. All the reported issues are logged and reviewed, and
    approved by a Change Control Board (CCB) consisting of stakeholders.
    Based on the available operational budget, these approved changes are
    planned, developed, tested, and deployed to the operational environment
    as part of the operations and maintenance work. Major changes or
    modernizations that are beyond the realm of operations and maintenance
    are managed via the FAA's Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The capital
    programs are reviewed and prioritized by the FAA executives on the
    Joint Resources Council (JRC).
        FAA's practice with regard to keeping software incrementally up to
    date entails Software Asset Management (SAM) tracking, reporting
    ownership and optimization of software acquisition, deployment,
    maintenance, and utilization within the agency. Policies and practices
    are in place across the FAA to ensure alignment and compliance with SAM
    guidance and mandates issued by the executive and legislative branches
    of the Federal government. FAA is in the process of enhancing its
    software inventory tracking to include all of the FAA domains to
    maintain an accurate, agency-wide software inventory and software
    license/subscription database to ensure knowledge of software assets,
    manage and mitigate risk, and implement Federal guidance and mandates
    associated with software.

        Question 3. What steps if FAA taking to strengthen its oversight of
    contractors associated with maintaining and working on the NOTAM
    system?
        Answer. The FAA updated the standard operating procedures (SOPs) to
    ensure that all changes to the NOTAM operational environment require
    approved documentation. The FAA updated the on-site monitoring and
    staff supervision procedures. The FAA has implemented system protocols
    to reinforce security and resiliency for NAS Aeronautical Information
    Management Enterprise System (NAIMES) and strengthened oversight of
    contractors as follows:

       Written consent is required by the FAA NAIMES Services
            Manager or designated FAA employee for all NAIMES access to the
            production database(s).

       A two-person system was implemented which requires another
            employee or designated contract member to accompany any
            Database Administrator, System Administrator, or Network
            Engineer who has been granted access (in writing) to perform
            any work in the NAIMES Production System. (This is in addition
            to the bullet above).

       If a contract employee is called in (after hours) to restore
            services and the two-person construct cannot be adhered to, the
            responding contract employee should contact the FAA manager or
            staff. System restoral will take precedence to ensure the
            safety of the NAS.

        Cuts to Discretionary Spending. Our colleagues in the House have
    been discussing cutting Federal expenditures, primarily non-Defense
    discretionary spending. Some estimates of cuts under considering go as
    high as 10 to 15 percent below enacted levels for this Fiscal Year. The
    FAA's budget for modernizing the air traffic systems comes from this
    discretionary spending.

        Question 1. How would a 10 to 15 percent budget cut impact FAA's
    timeline for implementing NextGen and other air traffic modernization
    efforts?
        Answer. NextGen investments are funded in the FAA's Facilities and
    Equipment appropriation, which funds the acquisition and deployment of
    communications, navigation, surveillance, and related capabilities
    within the National Airspace System (NAS) and air traffic control
    facilities. Under this scenario, the appropriation would be reduced by
    as much as $442 million.
        FAA would cancel and defer system modernization efforts, including
    NextGen programs, system sustainment, and replacement programs.
    Additionally, facility infrastructure programs would be deferred, as
    would any new terminal facility replacement projects.

        Question 2. Do you think there would be an operational safety
    degradation if FAA budgets were cut?
        Answer. For the FAA to operate approximately $2.4 billion below the
    FY 2023 enacted level, it would be forced to immediately cut back on
    its core functions, impacting services to the flying community. A
    reduction of this size would require furloughs and Reduction in Force
    (RIFs) across all of the FAA workforce, safety critical and non-safety
    critical.
        FAA would need to implement an immediate hiring freeze for its
    entire operations and facilities workforce, including air traffic
    controllers and safety inspectors, causing delays in air traffic
    services and certification of aircraft, pilots, drone operators, and
    commercial space licensing. FAA would need to furlough all FAA
    employees, including air traffic controllers and safety inspectors, for
    approximately 22 days and potentially implement a RIFs of up to 10
    percent.
        FAA would need to shut down services at 125 lower activity towers
    and over 250 Federal contract towers resulting in 2/3 of airports
    losing the safety benefits provided by air traffic control towers. FAA
    would also be required to terminate contracts that support air traffic
    safety, including air traffic control training, flight services,
    contract weather observers, system maintenance, and cybersecurity.

        Question 3. Aside from safety impacts, can you forecast other
    impacts to FAA systems if budgets were cut?
        Answer. In addition to the safety impacts, the modernization of
    FAA's telecommunications networks to meet the transition to Internet
    Protocol (IP) technologies would be delayed resulting in possible
    outages that could not be restored as service providers no longer
    support time-division multiplexing (TDM) technology.

        Question 3a. Could those impacts possibly translate into
    inconveniences for the traveling public?
        Answer. Funding cuts of this magnitude would cause substantial
    disruptions to the flying public; including cancelled and delayed
    flights across the country. This would have devastating impacts to the
    National Airspace System, affecting every state and territory through
    reductions in air traffic services.

        Status of NextGen Implementation. In the last FAA Reauthorization
    bill, Congress directed the DOT Office of Inspector General to audit
    NextGen implementation. The DOT OIG audit found FAA was too optimistic
    about program benefits and did not account for complexities in
    implementation.
        FAA now claims that NextGen benefits to be $8.5 billion through
    2021. That is lower than the $9 billion FAA has already spent on
    NextGen and nowhere near the original estimates of the $213 billion in
    benefits by 2025.

        Question 1. Has NextGen failed to deliver on expected results and
    benefits? DOT OIG found that operations were less efficient, with
    average taxi time, departure delays, and arrival delays all increasing
    since the start of NextGen in 2008.
        Answer. Through 2022, NextGen has implemented more than $9.4B in
    benefits (FY22$). The benefits from more than 20 implemented
    capabilities will continue to grow in the future. New implementations
    like En Route DataComm across the NAS will bring additional future
    benefits. Details can be found on the NextGen website at: https://
    www.faa.gov/nextgen/reporting-benefits/details.
        Flight times and delays are driven by increases or decreases in
    traffic demand levels. NextGen benefits include adjustments for changes
    in demand. Methodologies for evaluating NextGen benefits have been
    evaluated through the FAA/Industry Joint Analysis Team (JAT) supporting
    the NextGen Advisory Committee.

        Question 2. Could you clarify how updating the NOTAM system fits
    into NextGen modernization? What can we do to get NextGen back on track
    or should Congress focus on new ways to modernize the National Airspace
    System?
        Answer. Although, much of the NextGen infrastructure is in place
    and operationalizing NextGen is well underway, there is much more work
    to be done. As FAA continues to operationalize NextGen and realize
    Trajectory Based Operations, we will build on these two foundations to
    evolve into a modern, information-centered or ``info-centric'' National
    Airspace System (ICN) built for diverse operations and supported by a
    resilient and evolving infrastructure to enhance safety and efficiency.
        Modernization of the NAS requires a significant and consistent
    investment in sustaining the current capabilities, while also funding
    modernization integrating new capabilities. These steps are necessary
    to make sure the foundational operational services, such as voice and
    data communications, surveillance, automation, navigation,
    telecommunications, and weather systems are modernized and to ensure
    the NAS is efficient.
        Specifically for NOTAMs, the three pillars of an Info-Centric NAS
    are Operations, Supporting Infrastructure, and Integrated Safety
    Management. NOTAMs provide dynamic changes in the state of NAS features
    affecting flight operations, which is critical for flight safety.
        The updates to the NOTAM System include consolidating legacy system
    capabilities into the new NOTAM system that is built using digital
    NOTAM as the foundation. Digital NOTAMs allow the dissemination of
    dynamic changes in a globally harmonized message format called AIXM
    (Aeronautical Information Exchange Model), which allows machine
    interpretation and graphical display of the underlying hazard.
        This modernization completely aligns with NextGen Modernization as
    the objective is to provide near real-time machine interpretable NOTAM
    (dynamic changes), which enables real-time situational awareness for
    all stakeholders.

        Question 3. FAA has said it is moving to ``info-centric'' National
    Airspace System by 2035. What exactly does this involve and how does
    this implicate NextGen?
        Answer. As FAA continues to operationalize NextGen and realize
    Trajectory Based Operations, we will build on these two foundations to
    evolve into an information-centered or ``info-centric'' National
    Airspace System (ICN) built for diverse operations and supported by a
    resilient and evolving infrastructure to enhance safety and efficiency.
        ICN will be building on the NextGen foundation in three areas:
    operations, infrastructure and integrated safety management. This
    involves establishing an integrated information regime with
    interoperable sharing of information to enable enhanced collaboration
    with diverse traffic management services that includes new vehicles and
    operations. This will be accomplished by infrastructure modernization
    by leveraging new technologies and, where necessary, establishing
    public-private partnerships to not only ensure resiliency and agility
    to respond to future user needs but also to meet unique government
    requirements through commercial services and technologies. In addition,
    Safety Assurance for traffic management and real-time safety will be
    established through continuous monitoring, modeling, and verification
    including the use of the Safety Management System for compliance to
    assure organizational accountability.

        Chinese Balloon & Airspace Incursions. We have seen a recent string
    of extraordinary incursions into U.S. airspace including a Chinese
    surveillance balloon shot down by our military on February 4. Uncrewed,
    high-altitude objects were shot down over Alaska, Michigan, and Canada.
        The North American Air Defense Identification Zone (``ADIZ'') is
    jointly administered by the civilian air traffic control authorities
    and militaries of the United States and Canada. By law, civilian
    aircraft entering this zone must provide proper notification to air
    traffic controllers.

        Question 1. What more does our Nation need to do in order to
    strengthen the defense of our national airspace? How can we make sure
    FAA has the tools necessary to detect these aircraft intruding upon and
    ultimately entering U.S. airspace?
        Answer. Defense of our national airspace is a complex topic and
    requires much collaboration between the FAA, the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). The FAA long range
    RADARs (Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR-4) and CARSR) did detect the
    Chinese balloon. These RADARs are optimized to delete high altitude and
    slow detections in order to provide professional air traffic
    controllers with the optimal air traffic RADAR presentation. The FAA
    did not monitor the Chinese balloon, but the FAA staff embedded with
    DOD did have awareness. The Chinese balloon was operating at an
    altitude above 60,000 feet and presented no threat to the National
    Airspace Systems.
        While the current FAA tools detected the balloon, the FAA's ARSR-4
    are past their life expectancy. The agency, with the support of
    Congress, will need to work in collaboration with DOD and DHS on the
    replacement program.

        Question 2. FAA has closed parts of the U.S. airspace to support
    military action against these aircraft. Can you describe the effect
    that these aerial intrusions have had on civilian air travel?
        Answer. Closing parts of the U.S. Airspace system is a key tool
    used by the FAA to protect the flying public and by-standers on the
    ground when military action is required. The closure of airspace
    routinely impacts civilian air travel by necessitating re-routes and
    ground stops at airports underlying FAA's Temporary Flight Restriction
    (TFR). These impacts result in arrival, departure, and en route delays.
    Any airspace restrictions levied are continuously evaluated to ensure
    they are in place no longer than required to execute the national
    defense mission and to preserve safety while minimizing the impact to
    civilian air travel. A mechanism the FAA employs to facilitate this
    action is having senior FAA staff embedded with key DOD air defense
    commands to advise DOD Flag Officers. The senior FAA embeds provide
    recommendations to the military decision makers and seek to preserve
    access to the National Airspace Systems for all public users. These
    embeds have immediate reach back to the FAA at the executive level
    (SES2) to resolve any national airspace issues that may arise.

        Question 3. How is FAA, as the owner of our national airspace
    management, coordinating with other agencies such as NASA, NOAA, DHS,
    and DOD who have shared interests in protecting our national security?
        Answer. The FAA regularly collaborates with NASA, NOAA, DHS, and
    DOD. The FAA has several directorates that coordinate with NASA to
    support the planning/scheduling of space launches as well as providing
    support for airspace security requirements. NOAA maintains a watch
    position within the Air Traffic Organization's (ATO) Joint Air Traffic
    Operations Command (JATOC) located in the Air Traffic Control System
    Command Center facility. These NOAA personnel have 24-hour access to
    National Operations Managers and NOAA is part of multiple daily
    briefings. The FAA continuously coordinates with DHS concerning air
    domain homeland security issues, including UAS, Counter-UAS, and law
    enforcement matters. This coordination is facilitated by the FAA's
    embedding of operational personnel who specialize in Air Traffic
    Management security matters within the Transportation Security
    Administrations (TSA) Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
    in Herndon, VA, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine
    Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, CA.
        The FAA has advisors embedded with DOD Flag Officer Level leaders
    at NORAD/NORTHCOM headquarters; the Continental NORAD Region (CONR);
    Alaskan NORAD Region; Western Air Defense Sector; Eastern Air Defense
    Sector; and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). Moreover, FAA SES
    leadership engages with DOD regularly to discussion concerns and future
    threats and FAA supporting staff engages with Pentagon staff on a
    routine basis.
        The national security shared interests are primarily between FAA,
    DOD, and DHS. This common interest results in the sharing of RADAR
    data, the protection of sensitive and classified information, and the
    coordination of real-time national security concerns. The coordination
    across FAA, DOD, and DHS happens at many levels and continuously, but
    the previously discussed Senior FAA embeds are critical elements to our
    successful real time collaboration and support for national security.

        Question 4. Did the FAA, in association with the DOD, identify,
    detect, and monitor the Chinese surveillance balloon when this object
    entered the ADIZ as identified in 14 C.F.R. Subpart B? Did the Chinese
    surveillance balloon, comply with the requirements of 14 C.F.R. Part
    99? If not, what action is FAA taking to enforce the ADIZ requirements?
        Answer. The FAA long range RADARs (ARSR-4 and CARSR) did detect the
    Chinese balloon. These RADARs are optimized to delete high altitude and
    slow detections in order to provide professional air traffic
    controllers with the optimal air traffic RADAR presentation. The FAA
    did not monitor the Chinese balloon, but the FAA staff embedded with
    DOD did have awareness. The Chinese balloon was operating at an
    altitude above 60,000 feet and presented no threat to the National
    Airspace Systems.
        The Chinese Balloon did not operate in accordance with 14 CFR Part
    99 in that no position reports were made in accordance with 14 C.F.R.
    99.15.
        To enforce ADIZ requirements, the FAA staffs operational positions
    at the NORAD NORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), CONR's 601st Air and Space
    Operations Center (AOC), and CBP's AMOC. FAA and DOD work
    collaboratively to identify and determine threats associated with RADAR
    tracks approaching the ADIZ. Balloons specifically pose a challenge due
    to slow speed and in case of the Chinese balloon, the high altitude
    coupled with slow speed. That said, the FAA is working to determine how
    a comprehensive inventory of all unmanned airborne objects can best be
    developed. The agency's exploration includes seeking to implement
    further measures to improve capacity to detect objects in our airspace.

        Recent Runway Incursions. There have been five runway incursions
    over the last couple of weeks at airports in the United States, raising
    serious concerns about aviation safety and congestion in the airspace.
    Additionally, there is a projected increase in demand from current and
    future users of the NAS, which will place further strain on the system.

        Question 1. How can NextGen technology reduce the risk of runway
    incursions at airports?
        Answer. NextGen technology including Automatic Dependent
    Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Airport Surface Detection System Model
    X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), and Runway
    Status Lights (RWSL) have reduced the risk of runway incursions at
    airports. ASDE-X and ASSC allow air traffic controllers to track
    surface movement of aircraft and vehicles enhancing air traffic
    controller situational awareness. These systems alert air traffic
    controllers of potential runway conflicts by providing detailed
    coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. Runway Status Lights
    (RWSL) is a fully automatic, advisory system designed to reduce the
    number and severity of runway incursions and prevent runway accidents
    while not interfering with airport operations.
        The FAA's Office of NextGen through the Runway Incursion
    Reduction--Advanced Technology Development and Prototyping (ATDP)
    Program, is currently researching technologies to reduce the risk to
    people and property caused by collisions in the runway environment.
    This program is designed to identify different types of affordable
    surveillance system technologies, that are suitable for small-to-medium
    sized airports with scheduled passenger service that do not currently
    have existing runway incursion detection technologies such as Airport
    Surface Detection System Model X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance
    Capability (ASSC), and Runway Status Lights (RWSL). Runway Incursion
    Prevention through Situational Awareness (RIPSA) is aimed at
    reinforcing protection of the Runway Safety Area (RSA), by utilizing
    ``direct-to-pilot'' alerts to the individual(s) who can take corrective
    action, for all aircraft or vehicles at Runway Incursion (RI) hotspot
    locations.

        Question 1a. What other actions are being taken by the FAA to
    address these safety concerns?
        Answer. In response to the recent runway incursions, we have taken
    the opportunity to verify and update our data resources. One of these
    resources includes our Runway Safety Dashboard. Since 2022, the
    Dashboard has been a source of information showing trends in runway
    incursions throughout the National Airspace System (NAS). It identifies
    which facilities have a runway incursion rate higher than the NAS wide
    runway incursion rate. Runway Safety Program Managers throughout each
    Service Area monitor the Dashboard on a weekly basis to determine which
    of their respective facilities may need Runway Safety support in
    developing possible mitigations in reducing surface risk.
        In addition to the Dashboard, FAA Order 7050.1B (Runway Safety
    Order) requires facilities to host a Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT)
    meeting on an annual basis. During this meeting, stakeholders from the
    area come together to discuss surface safety at the local airport.
    These stakeholders include, but are not limited to, Air Traffic
    Controllers, Pilots, Fixed Based Operators, and Airport Operators.
    During the meeting, previous runway incursions that occurred at the
    airport are reviewed and discussed, along with any other issues that
    may not be previously known to all users. The team determines what
    mitigations, if any, need to be developed to prevent future occurrences
    or improve surface safety.
        The Surface Safety Group (SSG) and Runway Safety Council (RSC) are
    made up of FAA and Industry personnel who have a duty and desire to
    increase surface safety in the NAS. These two groups meet on a
    quarterly basis and develop action items based on trends in the NAS.
    Each party represents their organization and provides input to any
    topics that are discussed during the meeting. Once in agreement, the
    group creates an action item, which once completed, will effect a
    change in the NAS that will improve surface safety on a National Level.
        Lastly, our outreach efforts include our From the Flight Deck
    (FTFD) videos, Pilot Handbooks, and an annual Safety Summit focused on
    General Aviation pilots. The FTFD videos provide airport specific
    issues that provide pilots a tool that they can use prior to landing or
    departing from that airport. The video provides information to warn
    pilots of hot spots or identified problem areas on the airport that
    pilots may not be aware of. Furthermore, Pilot Handbooks are created as
    a supplement to the FTFD video to provide information to the pilot from
    the control tower perspective. The Handbook includes information that
    Air Traffic Controllers want a pilot to be aware of and may not know
    prior to using the airport. Our annual Safety Summit, which was just
    held on March 22, discusses National trends that the Runway Safety
    Office is seeing from General Aviation users. It is meant to refresh
    those pilots who have possibly not flown in a few months due to their
    airplane being in storage for the winter months. This year's topics
    included, pre-flight procedures, wrong surface, and airport signage and
    markings.

        Question 2. How is the FAA proactively preparing for the future
    growth in demand while maintaining a safe and efficient NAS?
        Answer. The FAA is proactively preparing for future growth in
    demand while maintaining a safe and efficient NAS by addressing the
    maintainability and obsolescence issues with the surveillance systems.
    This will ensure continued functionality of all surveillance
    capabilities into the future that have led to increased runway safety,
    improved efficiency in air traffic, and increased airport throughput.
        The agency's FY2024 budget request addresses critical obsolescence,
    life cycle support challenges for our systems, and helps maintain
    continuity of the services the systems provide. The majority of the
    radar inventory is over 40 years old, and all have passed their 20-year
    life cycle. This means many essential parts are no longer manufactured,
    available, or eligible for redesign and our work to support these aging
    systems has taken on a new urgency to bridge the gap to implementing
    modernization efforts.
        We are committed to our mission and moving forward to sustain radar
    surveillance services by implementing safety, security, and
    technological enhancements to bridge critical system capabilities until
    replaced or divested. We continue to do this work while simultaneously
    planning to acquire cooperative radar systems, non-cooperative radar
    systems, and other specialty solutions to sustain radar surveillance
    capabilities.
        Additionally, the FAA is developing more precise success metrics
    and predictive analytics, including improvements to the Runway
    Incursion Mitigation (RIM) tool, which will enhance mitigation status,
    graphical AGIS interface for runway incursions and reports, program
    metrics tracking, etc.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                                  Billy Nolen
        FAA Contract Towers Program. Investing in our Nation's
    infrastructure includes continued investment in the FAA's contract
    tower program, which provides critical air traffic control safety
    benefits to 256 smaller airports across the country, including St.
    Cloud and Anoka County airports in Minnesota.

        Question. What can Congress do to ensure that contract tower
    airports have the updated infrastructure and facilities they need to
    accommodate rising air traffic levels?
        Answer. The infrastructure at some Federal Contract Towers (FCTs)
    are in need of repair or replacement. The Infrastructure Investment and
    Jobs Act (IIJA) included resources for FCTs and specifies that not less
    than $200 million of the IIJA F&E funding is for towers ``that are
    owned by the FAA and staffed through the contract tower program.'' In
    addition, the Airport Infrastructure Grants component of the IIJA
    includes a $20 million annual set aside to make competitive grants to
    sponsors of airports participating in the contract tower program and
    the contract tower cost share program. Last August, the FAA awarded the
    FY 2022 grants under this program, announcing the selection of 20
    projects across 18 states. Selected projects will rehabilitate and
    upgrade FCTs, replace obsolete equipment, and conduct planning,
    environmental, and design for future replacements. On March 31 2023,
    FAA announced this year's selection of 33 grant awards at 29 airports
    across 23 states and territories. These grants will sustain, construct,
    repair, improve, modernize, replace or relocate airport-owned towers,
    and install communications equipment.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
                                  Billy Nolen
        Question 1. Mr. Nolen, the reliability of the NOTAM system is
    essential to all of our National Airspace--but the ability to provide
    real-time data on runway conditions is especially essential for
    Michigan in winter, where our airports are dealing with constantly
    changing conditions and winter weather. During the NOTAM outage in
    January, Detroit Metropolitan Airport shared with me that they were
    told to ``utilize alternate means of compliance'' to share key flight
    and runway condition information with flight crews. However no such
    alternate means exist other than a 1-877 number that was quickly
    overwhelmed. Mr. Nolen, is FAA developing a more comprehensive
    contingency plan in case of future NOTAM outages that will allow
    participants in our national airspace to quickly divert to another
    agreed upon method for communicating this vital information?
        Answer. Yes, the agency has developed a comprehensive contingency
    plan intended to provide NOTAM information to all airspace users and
    allow them to maintain operations in the event of a future NOTAM system
    outage.
        The goal of this contingency plan is to provide a backstop during
    an unplanned, full outage to the primary NOTAM system while the system
    is being recovered. The contingency plan allows FAA and its
    stakeholders to maintain an accurate picture of the status of National
    Airspace System (NAS) components while the primary NOTAM system is
    recovered by allowing authorized personnel to issue ``candidate''
    NOTAMs--i.e., NOTAMs not yet entered into the official NOTAM system--
    and distribute them to the public using a standalone website. NAS users
    will be able to use this information to maintain their situational
    awareness until the NOTAM system is restored, after which any candidate
    NOTAMs will be reconciled with the primary NOTAM system.
        FAA is coordinating with our labor and industry partners on the
    details of this contingency plan.

        Question 2. Mr. Nolen, GAO recently released a report (GAO-23-
    105189) detailing some of the FAA's shortcomings when it comes to
    integrating UAS into our national airspace. GAO's first recommendation
    tasked the FAA with developing a comprehensive drone strategy. Can you
    provide the committee with an update on the status of FAA's
    implementation of this and the other recommendations in the report?
        Answer. The FAA is working collaboratively to address the GAO's
    concerns to develop a comprehensive drone strategy that also
    incorporates lessons learned for its drone integration activities. The
    FAA also currently provides part 107 waiver safety explanation
    guidelines on our public website.

        Question 3. In the 116th Congress, my Drone Advisory Committee
    (DAC) for the 21st Century Act was signed into law as P.L. 116-280. The
    bill directed the FAA to take appropriate steps to encourage direct
    representation of county and tribal governments, as well as
    agriculture, forestry, rangeland sectors, and other rural interests on
    the Drone Advisory Committee. Can you provide an update on what steps
    the FAA has taken to implement this bill?
        Answer. The Drone Advisory Committee was re-chartered as the
    Advanced Aviation Advisory Committee (AAAC) in June 2022 to better
    reflect the evolving ecosystem of new aviation entrants. The FAA has
    conducted significant outreach to numerous organizations to encourage
    them to submit requests to provide direct representation of county and
    tribal governments, as well as agriculture, forestry, rangeland
    sectors, and other rural interests on the AAAC. Currently, three
    individuals represent the Local, State, Tribal and/or Territorial
    stakeholder group and two individuals represent the Agricultural
    Interests stakeholder group on the AAAC.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                                  Billy Nolen
    Topic: 5G Wireless Interference
        Airlines for America recently urged the FAA to extend its proposed
    deadline to June 2024 to retrofit aircraft with altimeters that won't
    experience interference from 5G wireless technology. This four month
    delay highlights the years of communication breakdown between FAA and
    FCC during the development and rollout of 5G.

        Question 1. Is the FAA receiving all the technical information it
    needs from the FCC and wireless carriers to ensure that 5G does not
    interfere with aircraft altimeters or any other technology needed for
    aviation safety? If not, what information is FAA not yet receiving?
        Answer. Yes, the agency is in receipt of all the required technical
    information on the performance and operating characteristics of 5G
    equipment that are needed to ensure compatibility with aviation safety.
    Since late 2021, the FAA has engaged in regular and direct technical
    interchanges with the 5G wireless carriers and FCC in order to better
    understand the potential impact of 5G systems on radio altimeters.
    These exchanges proved invaluable to the FAA's ability to directly
    assess the impact of 5G operations and to make rapid decisions that
    ensured the short-term compatibility of these technologies.
        From July 2022 to March 2023, the FAA has used information learned
    about 5G characteristics to secure long-term arrangements that ensure
    the compatibility of these two technologies. The FCC and 5G wireless
    carriers have been faithful and positive contributors to the process,
    with the FAA and wireless carriers forging new collaborative working
    relations that we expect to build upon in the coming years.

        Question 2. Does the FAA have the resources it needs to ensure that
    all passenger aircraft equipped with technology to prevent 5G from
    interfering with flight operations? Does it need anything additional
    from Congress?
        Answer. Yes, the agency has the resources to continue ensuring
    compatibility between 5G systems and radio altimeters that are required
    for successful flight operations. The aviation industry is currently
    engaged in a large-scale retrofit program that increases the 5G
    tolerance of the avionics systems that are impacted by 5G. This
    retrofit will continue into 2024. The FAA is finalizing a rulemaking
    that ensures aircraft are properly equipped to resist emissions from 5G
    equipment beginning in February 2024. Between now and February 2024,
    the FAA is managing safety through our existing process of Alternative
    Means of Compliance (AMOCs). These AMOCs assign an aircraft's allowed
    operational parameters on a per-runway basis using the known 5G
    environment at each airport. Through efficient management of aircraft
    tolerance to 5G and monitoring of the 5G environment as it continues to
    expand, the FAA is well positioned to ensure compatibility between
    these technologies. Additional resources from Congress are not required
    at this time.

        Question 3. Is FAA sharing all relevant information with the FCC
    and air carriers to prevent 5G from interfering with flight operations?
        Answer. Yes, the FAA has regular engagement with both the FCC and
    air carriers during which both groups are kept up-to-date on all
    relevant information required for the compatibility of 5G and radio
    altimeters. The FAA meets three times per week with the aviation
    industry in a task force that was stood up early in 2022 specifically
    to address the compatibility of these technologies. Additionally, the
    FAA has hosted several round table events with aviation stakeholders to
    share developments in the ongoing work to ensure compatibility. Since
    July 2022, the FAA has met directly with the FCC several times to work
    through technical discussions regarding potential interference to radio
    altimeters. The FAA has also been meeting weekly with the National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Office of
    Spectrum Management to share updates on the ongoing work to ensure
    short-term and long-term compatibility of these systems. The NTIA has
    served as a liaison between the FAA and FCC, sharing technical issues
    and soliciting feedback as necessary.

        Question 4. Based on the FAA's experience with 5G, do you have any
    concerns about the level of cooperation and information sharing the FAA
    will receive from the FCC in the future?
        Answer. The existing information-sharing structure between the FCC
    and FAA is sufficient in that the FAA is made aware of proposed
    spectrum repurposing efforts by the FCC and is provided an opportunity
    to supply feedback on the impact of those proposed changes.
        Unfortunately, it is often difficult for FAA to achieve a thorough
    and complete technical analysis of the potential impact to aviation in
    what is normally a relatively short period for comment. This has
    historically led to difficulties in providing nuanced engineering
    assessments of spectrum compatibility that can be used to
    collaboratively improve the outcomes of FCC proposed spectrum
    repurposing.
        The FAA's experience with 5G has demonstrated that true innovation,
    cooperation, and engineering problem-solving cannot efficiently occur
    without direct engagement between the key stakeholders/owners of
    wireless systems. When the wireless system stakeholders engage directly
    to share information and engineer systems that ensure compatibility,
    new opportunities emerge as a stronger understanding of the potential
    system interactions is achieved.
        FCC efforts to repurpose spectrum would likely experience more
    positive outcomes with longer timelines afforded for the impacted
    stakeholders to assess the technical parameters of each proposal with
    engineering studies, rapid-deployment interference testing, and
    industry feedback.

        Question 5. Will FAA commit to coordinating with the FCC and
    wireless carriers earlier in the development process of future
    technologies so this doesn't happen again?
        Answer. Yes, this is one of the primary lessons learned through the
    5G experience. The FAA has found that direct and early engagement
    between agencies and external stakeholders is critical to the success
    of any proposed spectrum repurposing efforts.
    Topic: Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
        According to the Department of Transportation Inspector General, as
    of 2017 NextGen was estimated to generate $100 billion in benefits
    against a $36 billion investment. However, back in 2007, NextGen was
    estimated to result in $213 billion in benefits.

        Question 1. Can you provide an update on NextGen's estimated
    benefits and is FAA still thinking it will be around $100 billion?
        Answer. The $100B estimate for NextGen Benefits was developed prior
    to the COVID pandemic. COVID has impacted both implementation schedules
    and air traffic demand making future benefit projections very
    uncertain.
        Through 2022, NextGen has now implemented more than $9.4B in
    benefits (FY22$). The benefits from more than 20 implemented
    capabilities will continue to grow in the future. New implementations
    like En Route DataComm across the NAS will bring additional future
    benefits. Details can be found on the NextGen website at: https://
    www.faa.gov/nextgen/reporting-benefits/details.
        With current funding levels, the FAA continues to make smart
    decisions in program prioritizations and calculations of the number of
    sites affordable.

        Question 2. How much longer is it going to take and how much more
    is it going to cost to finish NextGen?
        Answer. NextGen is a portfolio of programs, systems, and procedures
    at different levels of maturity that will provide enhanced capabilities
    for the movement and management of air traffic. The work in the
    portfolio is being deployed in stages. Many enhancements are currently
    in deployment, some are nearing implementation, and some of the
    capabilities of NextGen are being defined and matured, as the
    technology to support them becomes available (Pre-Implementation).

        Question 3. If Congress wants to accelerate the completion of
    NextGen what does Congress need to do in this year's FAA
    reauthorization to make that happen?
        Answer. We look forward to working with Congress on a long-term
    reauthorization proposal and adequate funding for FAA's modernization
    needs. The President's FY 2024 budget request supports NextGen
    capabilities. The budget proposal includes $701.9 million in support of
    NextGen programs, which aims to improve the safety, efficiency,
    capacity, and environmental impact of the Nation's air transportation
    system through the use of advanced technology, procedures, and
    infrastructure.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
                                  Billy Nolen
        NOTAM Failure. As you know, the failure of the nationwide Notice to
    Air Missions (NOTAM) system on January 11, 2023, led to the first
    nationwide ground stop of air traffic since the September 11, 2001
    terrorist attacks. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
    reported that a FAA contractor inadvertently deleted files while
    attempting to correct a synchronization issue involving the primary and
    backup NOTAM databases. This deletion ultimately led the entire NOTAM
    system to become compromised.

        Question 1. How did this issue occur? Was the FAA contractor
    following appropriate procedures and best practices when the file
    deletion took place?
        Answer. While performing unapproved corrective maintenance, the
    contractor inadvertently deleted files. This is not an approved
    procedure.

        Question 2. Can you explain any steps the FAA has taken in order to
    mitigate the risk that one accident could lead to the collapse of the
    NOTAM system? Are there new redundancies in effect?
        Answer. The FAA has taken steps to bring the NOTAM system in
    alignment with our current practices and procedures used in maintaining
    and modifying NAS systems. Additionally we have increased our
    monitoring capabilities in the enterprise environment.
        The current NOTAM System has both an active and geographically
    separate disaster recovery site. Each site also has local redundancy to
    prevent a single point of failure.
        The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
    been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy where one
    database is kept in near real-time sync with the active site, and a
    second one is configured to apply changes with a one-hour delay. This
    mitigates the risk of data deletions/corruption that recently occurred.
        The ongoing NOTAM Modernization project will consolidate two NOTAM
    systems into a single NOTAM system and also transition it to a highly
    resilient NAS operational environment by 2025. The infrastructure
    supporting NOTAM modernization will provide high-availability services
    at geographically separate locations.

        Question 3. This incident highlighted the vulnerability of the
    NOTAM system and brought U.S. air traffic to a halt. Though this
    incident was caused by human error, can you explain the safeguards the
    FAA has in place to prevent a cyberattack from disabling the NOTAM
    system?
        Answer. The current infrastructure architecture of the NOTAM
    operational environment follows a layered security approach for public-
    facing websites; operational IP (OPIP), and public-facing websites are
    continuously monitored by the NAS Cybersecurity Operations (NCO). The
    Mission Support network is also monitored 24/7 by a Security Operations
    Control Center for any suspicious or malicious activity. We assess
    security controls regularly and deploy patches and certifications
    regularly to ensure systems are up to date.

        Question 4. Why did United Airlines issue a nationwide ground stop
    for its network almost an hour before the FAA ordered a ground stop for
    all aviation traffic? Did United take different safety information into
    account?
        Answer. Late on January 10, 2023, NOTAM applications and services
    became unreliable. While technical experts worked through the night,
    the FAA activated a hotline to provide real-time status updates to
    system users. During this time, there were no reports of operational
    impacts. In the early morning hours of January 11, 2023, the system
    appeared to have been restored, but formatting issues persisted. To
    resolve this, FAA's air traffic leadership directed the rebuild of the
    databases. As the morning air traffic rush approached, and work on the
    system continued, a ground stop was ordered at approximately 7:15 a.m.
    EST, pausing all departures in the United States in order to maintain
    safety and preserve predictability.
        Although airlines and safety experts were consulted on the ground
    stop, we do not have specific information on the timelines for
    individual airlines. Once resiliency testing on the system was
    conducted, the ground stop was lifted at 9:07 a.m. EST on January 11,
    2023.

        Dual NOTAM Systems. There are two NOTAM systems currently in
    operation. The legacy U.S. NOTAM System is 30 years old while the
    modern Federal NOTAM System remains a work in progress as FAA
    modernization efforts continue. The FAA has been working to fully
    stand-up the Federal NOTAM system for years and expects full
    implementation to conclude by 2030.

        Question 5. Why do some airspace users continue to rely on the
    legacy NOTAM system?
        Answer. To clarify, the current NOTAM system has multiple means for
    NOTAMs to be provided to the NOTAM databases, and multiple output
    methods for various users.
        Both systems are required today to operate the full of the NOTAM
    capability. For example, the NOTAM System still provides a ``serial
    number'' for any NOTAM generated, whether it comes from the U.S. NOTAM
    System (USNS) or Federal NOTAM System (FNS) inputs. The applications
    for originating airspace NOTAMs, such as Temporary Flight Restriction
    (TFR), Altitude Reservation (ALTRV), and Special Activity Airspace
    (SAA), still depend on the legacy NOTAM System (USNS) because the
    required functionality is not available within the new system (FNS).
    This gap is being addressed partially in the ongoing NOTAM
    Modernization (FNS Sustainment) and fully in the next phase of AIM
    Modernization referred to as AIMM Enhancement 1 (E1).
        NOTAM origination applications are past their end of life and need
    to be replaced before they affect the safety of the NAS. The goal of
    AIMM E1 is to consolidate all these functionalities which today are
    supported via three different applications, into a single application
    and also enable digital NOTAMs, so they can not only be disseminated
    via a globally harmonized message standard enabling machine
    interpretation and enabling graphical visualization, a key requirement
    from the industry.
        Some users, like DOD, and some legacy search tools still used by
    some airports and consumers, use distribution systems connected to the
    older software system, USNS. Modernization of both systems into one
    modern architecture will move all origination and all distribution
    services and consumers into one system.

        Question 6. What resources does the FAA need to complete the
    Federal NOTAM system? Can you commit to the 2030 timeline for Federal
    NOTAM implementation? If not, what obstacles may the FAA encounter that
    could affect that timeline?
        Answer. The investment that is currently being implemented (Federal
    NOTAM System Sustainment) addresses two aspects of NOTAM modernization:
    the consolidation of the legacy NOTAM system (United States NOTAM
    System) functionality into the Federal NOTAM System and the transfer of
    the NOTAM system off the outdated hardware platform onto an Integrated
    Enterprise Services platform.
        With full support of the President's Budget, Congress can reduce
    the funding and timing obstacles that the FAA may encounter with
    implementing a large, long-term project.

        Question 7. In addition, when can the FAA sunset the legacy U.S.
    NOTAM system? Are there steps Congress can take to encourage legacy
    NOTAM users, including the Department of Defense, to migrate to the
    Federal NOTAM system?
        Answer. To comply with the legislative requirement, in 2019, the
    FAA began developing an acquisition strategy to consolidate the
    multiple platforms into a single Federal NOTAM System (FNS). The plan
    includes retiring legacy components and moving FNS to a more reliable
    and resilient environment built specifically to support critical NAS
    operations. The President's FY 2024 budget request for NOTAM
    modernization seeks resources to ensure legacy NOTAM users have the
    necessary capabilities to migrate along with the FAA.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
                                  Billy Nolen
        Infrastructure Investment and Cybersecurity. Thank you for
    discussing cybersecurity protections regarding the NOTAM system, which
    plays a critical role in aviation safety. I am glad you agreed to
    follow up with several of my questions in writing.

        Question 1. In response to my question of whether as of January 10,
    2023, FAA officials were aware that deleting certain files could
    disrupt the synchronization between the live and primary NOTAM
    databases, you responded that ``Yes, the Administrator knew that.'' \1\
    How many FAA staff were aware that deleting these files would disrupt
    the synchronization, resulting in a NOTAM outage?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2023/2/the-federal-aviation-
    administration-s-notam-system-failure-and-its-impacts-on-a-resilient-
    national-airspace at 02:10:08.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Answer. The event on January 10 was an accidental deletion/movement
    of what is called a data file of an Oracle database. The Oracle data
    file is a physical file that stores data. It is a critical component of
    the Oracle database that holds the data from tables, indexes, and other
    database objects. It is equivalent to a critical operating system file
    on all our desktop machines. Moving and/or deleting the data file while
    the system is running can lead to errors and, in the worst scenario,
    complete system failure.
        The deletion of files did not disrupt synchronization. Lack of
    synchronization existed before the outage, and was not caused by
    deleting the files. During our investigation, it was discovered the
    synchronization had not been occurring with all secondary databases.
    The deletion of files removed the only set of files from the
    operational system.
        To prevent such issues in the future, several procedural steps have
    been taken to monitor activities when staff need to work on the
    operational NOTAM system.

        Question 2. How long were these FAA officials aware of this
    specific vulnerability?
        Answer. Although human error is never completely avoidable, the FAA
    has maintained the NOTAM system for years with support from the current
    vendor. We have taken steps to transition the NOTAM system to
    traditional NAS maintenance and change management oversight. Preventive
    measures have been put in place to prevent such issues in the future
    for this system, including oversight by an FAA lead for all maintenance
    and changes. Additionally, the FAA conducted an assessment of the
    configuration and change management practices for all systems and
    services that could impact the NAS and we are in the process of
    determining what additional system design or controls are needed to
    close any gaps. No immediate high risks have been identified in that
    analysis and the lower level risks are being addressed on the few
    contractor maintained systems that exist. No additional systems have
    been identified that could have nationwide implications or even
    significant localized impacts.

        Question 3. Since FAA officials, including the Administrator
    (according to your testimony), were aware of this vulnerability, why
    were there not additional safeguards to ensure that contractors could
    not inadvertently delete those files?
        Answer. Careful handling of data files is part of database
    administrator training. We have hired qualified and certified database
    administrators to support the program and expect them to follow the
    basic requirements. To prevent such issues in the future, several
    procedural steps have been taken when staff need to work on the NOTAM
    system.

        Question 4. When I asked how many contractors had access to the
    NOTAM system, you stated there were two people working in the system
    but that you did not have an exact number of how many individuals had
    sufficient access to delete those specific files.\2\ Thank you agreeing
    to following up with me in writing on this point. In addition to the
    two contractors who were involved in this specific incident, how many
    other contractors and FAA staff had sufficient permissions to access
    and delete those files, as of January 10, 2023?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Id. at 02:11:05.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Answer. Access to the NOTAM system would include all approved and
    authorized staff on the contract that includes System Administrators
    and Database Administrators (DBA) (total eight contractors) who have
    complete access to the system.

        Question 5. In your testimony, you stated that some of the new
    controls that FAA has installed include requiring two people to delete
    critical files that could disrupt the database synchronization,
    resulting in a NOTAM outage.\3\ As of today, what is the total number
    of individuals who are eligible to be one of the two individuals under
    the new controls? How many of these are contractors, and how many are
    FAA staff?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Id. at 02:11:48.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Answer. New controls are in place, to have Federal employees
    directly oversee and provide approvals for all eight contractors while
    maintaining and/or modifying the system.

        Question 6. In addition to the new control listed above, what other
    new protocols has FAA implemented to strengthen procedures, access,
    controls, resilience, and redundancies to limit the effects of SPOF?
        Answer. The NOTAM System has both an active and geographically
    separate disaster recovery site providing protection against a site
    failure. In addition, each site also has local redundancy to prevent a
    single point of failure.
        The current database architecture in the disaster recovery site has
    been modified to take advantage of the local redundancy. At the
    disaster recovery site, one database is kept in near real-time sync
    with the active site, and a second one is configured to apply changes
    with a one-hour delay. This mitigates the risk of data deletions/
    corruption that recently occurred.
        Additional controls have been added to monitor database
    synchronization. The FAA has taken steps to transition the NOTAM system
    to traditional NAS maintenance and change management oversight.
        The FAA has also developed a backup ability for operators to access
    new/modified NOTAMs in the event of a complete failure (disaster)
    affecting the primary and secondary systems as well as the disaster
    recovery site. The FAA is continuing to look at additional controls,
    tests, improved system monitoring to respond to load, and demand issues
    proactively.

        Question 7. As I stated, I believe that it is unacceptable for the
    FAA to have single points of failure (SPOFs) within critical systems
    like NOTAM. As your review of the root causes of this incident has
    continued, how many SPOFs has the FAA discovered within its NOTAM
    systems?
        Answer. The FAA has taken steps to rectify any SPOFs. The
    contractor error in deleting the active database, compounded by a
    synchronization failure, was a failure that spanned multiple, normally
    redundant, systems and processes.
        Additional mitigations have been put in place to mitigate the risk
    of data deletions/corruption being distributed to all redundant
    databases.

        Question 8. You stated that the FAA is currently working with the
    MITRE Corporation to investigate the causes of the NOTAM outage.\4\
    What is the status of this work? When do you expect it to be complete,
    and what will be the timeline for implementing any recommendations that
    result?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Id. at 02:12:35-02:12:54.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Answer. The MITRE investigation has completed, and briefings to FAA
    leadership are in progress. Once the FAA receives the final report, we
    will review and analyze the recommendations.

        Question 9. To the extent this audit with the MITRE Corporation has
    produced preliminary findings, which of those have been most actionable
    at avoiding similar outages in the future?
        Answer. The MITRE investigation has completed, and briefings to FAA
    leadership are in progress. Once the FAA receives the final report, we
    will review and analyze the recommendations.

        Aviation Workers in Georgia. Georgia is home to a thriving aviation
    industry, including the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International
    Airport--the world's busiest for passenger traffic. Georgia is home to
    tens of thousands of aviation workers who show up daily to ensure
    passengers get to where they need to go.

        Question 1. How many aviation workers in Georgia were affected by
    this outage? For example, how many aviation workers had to work extra
    hours or take on additional duties to respond to the NOTAM outage and
    associated disruptions? Please describe what steps FAA has undertaken
    to understand the effect of the NOTAM outage on workers.
        Answer. The FAA does not have any direct insight into the impact of
    the outage on aviation workers in Georgia. From an agency perspective,
    the FAA workforce was actively engaged in the NOTAM outage and worked
    around the clock, as the public would expect us to, to ensure that
    operations were brought back to normal as soon as possible. We have
    discussed the impacts of this with our many stakeholders and have
    included them in our status of mitigations and the development of a
    contingency operations capability and procedures to ensure we
    collectively are able to avoid any similar event in the future.

        Question 2. Does current law give FAA the authority and resources
    to compensate passengers or aviation workers directly for its mistakes?
        Answer. The FAA is unaware of any authority or resources to
    directly compensate passengers or aviation workers for an FAA
    ``mistake.'' If a party has a valid claim of alleged negligence or
    other tortious conduct of FAA employees, these type of lawsuits are
    controlled by the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
    U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1346, 2671, et seq. Pursuant to the FTCA, before any
    such lawsuit can be filed, the claimant(s) must timely file an
    administrative tort claim with the FAA and otherwise comply with the
    regulations pertaining to such tort claims. The filing of
    administrative tort claims against the FAA is governed by Federal
    regulations 28 C.F.R. Parts 14, 15.

        Type Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems (UAS) are an emerging entrant into the National Airspace System
    (NAS) with potential practical applications such as expedited package
    delivery. The FAA has established a UAS Integration Office responsible
    for leading the agency's efforts to safely integrate UAS into the NAS,
    and I am interested in learning more about the activities and progress
    of the Integration Office.

        Question 1. What, if any, type certifications regarding UAS has FAA
    made to date?
        Answer. The FAA has type certificated a few UAS, and is continuing
    work on several type certification projects using an existing process
    tailored to UAS. Notably, the FAA issued a standard type certificate
    for Matternet in September 2022.

        Question 2. Is there a backlog of type certifications for UAS at
    FAA?
        Answer. While applicants may have specific certification timelines
    in mind, the FAA works certification projects as efficiently as
    possible while maintaining the appropriate considerations for safety.

        Question 3. Are there any staffing and funding challenges that are
    affecting FAA's ability to address type certifications for UAS?
        Answer. The FAA appreciates continued congressional support of our
    certification efforts. At this time, the FAA is sufficiently equipped
    and trained to manage the type certification for UAS.

        Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management. The NAS is becoming
    more dynamic through the digitization and automation of aeronautical
    information. The FAA's modernization of its systems, including legacy
    systems such as the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system, is a
    critical step towards ensuring the NAS remains safe and efficient,
    particularly as it welcomes new entrants into the airspace.

        Question 1. What efforts has the FAA made to update its
    aeronautical information, including, but not limited to, its NOTAM
    data?
        Answer. Multiple efforts have been completed and more are planned
    to modernize the collection and dissemination of aeronautical
    information-foundational data required for all operations. NOTAM
    Modernization will continue as we are updating the older systems.
        We have made some improvements to the legacy database and functions
    in recent years. Modernization with NOTAM Aeronautical Information
    Management Modernization (AIMM) Segment 2 built the Aeronautical Common
    Service (ACS), which provides an enterprise machine-to-machine
    interface containing integrated aeronautical information over System
    Wide Information Management (SWIM) in the globally harmonized message
    format of AIXM (Aeronautical Information eXchange Model). Combining
    static and dynamic data enables near real-time situational awareness of
    the NAS for all stakeholders.
        The planned AIMM Enhancement 1 is the next phase of this
    modernization plan. The NOTAM System will be transitioned to support
    the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) NOTAM standards,
    an enterprise airspace management platform for originating and
    distributing the critical airspace NOTAMs, and finally, providing
    additional filtering and distribution mechanisms for the aeronautical
    information. This phase will also complete the FAA Reauthorization Act
    of 2018 requirements for NOTAM Modernization.

        Question 2. Is the FAA operationalizing drone safety services and
    the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management environment? If so,
    how?
        Answer. To establish the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic
    Management (UTM) system, the FAA is developing a Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems (UAS) regulatory and traffic management framework that is
    compatible with the evolution of the technology required to support
    UTM. UTM infrastructure will evolve so that the use of a mature UTM
    ecosystem will support planned commercial operations.
        Section 377 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254)
    requires the FAA to develop a process to permit, authorize, or allow
    the use of UTM Services. The FAA is developing a review process for UTM
    services that ensures national airspace system safety and reduces UAS
    risk. This approach is intended to expedite (third-party service
    supplier) approvals in low-risk areas and will allow for test and
    evaluation of standards, technologies, and capabilities. The FAA is
    hoping to launch this system soon and will use information gathered
    through this program to inform policy and decision-making.

        Question 3. What role does the modernization of airspace data
    sources play in the operationalizing of drone safety services and the
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management environment?
        Answer. The Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management system
    (UTM) is a ``traffic management'' ecosystem for uncontrolled Unmanned
    Aircraft System (UAS) operations that is separate from, but
    complementary to, the FAA's Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. UTM
    development will ultimately identify services, roles and
    responsibilities, information architecture, data exchange protocols,
    software functions, infrastructure, and performance requirements for
    enabling the management of low-altitude uncontrolled drone operations.
    The UTM consists of a group of enterprise systems that exchange data
    with external partners, called UAS Service Suppliers (USSs), for the
    purpose of processing flight authorization requests from individual UAS
    (aka drone) operators. Modernization and shared data will enable near
    real-time situational awareness of the NAS for all stakeholders.

        Remote Identification. Remote identification of drones is one of
    the new technologies and systems that FAA is adopting in order to
    ensure the safe integration of UAS into the NAS. The FAA final
    rulemaking on remote identification requires drones to locally
    broadcast identifying information, though other jurisdictions have
    remote identification standards that allow either local broadcast or a
    network solution.

        Question 1. Are there benefits of a network remote identification
    solution? Why did FAA not include a network solution in its final
    rulemaking on drone remote identification?
        Answer. Though the FAA recognizes that there are potential benefits
    associated with establishing a network of remote ID UAS Service
    Suppliers (USS), the FAA believes that, for the time being and given
    the types of unmanned aircraft operations that are currently allowed,
    the broadcast remote identification solution fulfills agency and law
    enforcement needs to maintain the safety and security of the airspace
    of the United States. The FAA received significant feedback about the
    network requirement identifying both public opposition to, and
    technical challenges with, implementing the network requirements. After
    careful consideration of these challenges, informed by public comment,
    the FAA decided to eliminate the requirement in this rulemaking to
    transmit remote identification messages through an Internet connection
    to a remote ID USS.

        Advanced Air Mobility. Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) envisions an
    aviation transportation system that will use automated aircraft to
    operate and transport passengers or cargo at lower altitudes beyond
    urban environments. The FAA has incorporated AAM into its planning
    efforts and is collaborating with the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) on their AAM National Campaign, yet there is much
    more to be done before adopting AAM into the current aviation
    ecosystem.

        Question 1. Does the FAA have the technical knowledge, tools, and
    appropriate staff to review AAM applicants in a safe and timely manner?
        Answer. Yes. The FAA has the necessary training and technical
    background to review AAM applicants. This is a new type of aircraft and
    the FAA will utilize the safety continuum and leverage existing
    guidance, where applicable, to ensure AAM applicant review is safe and
    timely.
        The FAA has established innovation teams (iTeams) that cover key
    focus areas: aircraft certification, operational certification,
    airspace and air traffic management, vertiports, infrastructure,
    environment, security, community outreach, safety, and people. Many of
    these iTeams are already engaged in activities required for the
    operationalization of AAM including with AAM Original Equipment
    Manufacturers and operators to work through certification and other
    associated processes.

        Question 2. Would the FAA benefit from a dedicated office to
    coordinate the certification and implementation progress of AAM
    applicants into the National Airspace System? If so, what authority
    should this office have?
        Answer. At this time, the FAA has the appropriate organizational
    structure to address AAM applicants. The cross-line of business
    communication plans have been established and we are working at an
    appropriate cadence and structure to bring AAM applicants into the NAS
    in a safe and efficient manner.

        Question 3. What specific steps is the FAA taking in the next 3, 6,
    and 12 months to ensure it will meet the deadline to issue the first
    type certificates for electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL)
    aircraft in 2024? Who is in charge of these efforts at FAA?
        Answer. While the FAA is making every effort to work with
    applicants on their type certifications projects in a timely and
    expeditious manner, the FAA does not set timelines for certification.
    The FAA is working to finalize airworthiness criteria, publish a
    Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) for powered-lift operations,
    and refine means of compliance with several applicants.

        Question 4. Will FAA prioritize Letters of Authorization (LOAs) for
    initial AAM operations in National Airspace?
        Answer. The FAA plans to support manufacturers and operators in the
    establishment of their operations programs by coordinating efforts
    during operational certification, including the issuance of any Letters
    of Authorization (LOA). Consistent with the way the FAA engages with
    stakeholders of other aircraft categories, the FAA will work
    collaboratively with AAM manufacturers and operators through training
    and operations certification processes until completion.

        Question 5. Is there a backlog for Part 135 air carrier and
    operator certifications? If so, what is the FAA doing to address this
    backlog?
        Answer. The FAA plans to take a number of actions to assist in
    reducing the backlog for Part 135 certification requests. Efforts
    include redistributing and reprioritizing work within the FAA to assist
    with certification activities, aligning and establishing policy to
    reduce the timeline for certification projects, and partnering with
    industry organizations to explore opportunities for initial screening
    and standardization prior to submission to the FAA.

        Airplane Fuel Efficiency Certification. In June 2022, the FAA
    issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Airplane Fuel Efficiency
    Certification. This proposal aligns with aircraft CO2
    emission standards established by the United Nations' International
    Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and with Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA)'s regulations implementing the ICAO standard. Once this
    rule is adopted, all U.S. aircraft will have to be certified to these
    new standards in order to be delivered to their customers after 2027. I
    know that many U.S. manufacturers of large and small aircraft are
    anxious to have a final FAA rule released as soon as possible in order
    to begin certifying aircraft to the standard.

        Question 1. When will this rule be finalized?
        Answer. On January 11, 2021, EPA published a final rule adopting
    the ICAO standard into U.S. regulations as a new 40 CFR Part 1030. On
    June 15, 2022, in accordance with its requirements under the Clean Air
    Act, the FAA proposed new certification regulations for certain
    airplanes to ensure compliance with EPA standards. The comment period
    for FAA's proposal closed on August 15, 2022, and the FAA received a
    total of sixty-two comments on the rule. The FAA is currently working
    on a final rule, which the FAA anticipates will publish in September
    2023.

        NOTAM Outage and Ground Stop. The NOTAM outage and 2-hour ground
    stop highlighted the sensitivity and vulnerability of our air traffic
    system. I am pleased that we are collectively looking at what needs to
    be done to prioritize and update the NOTAM system; however, I am
    concerned that the NOTAM system is just one of many critical air
    traffic programs that are outdated and at risk of failure. While the
    ground stop during the NOTAM outage was only about two hours, I worry
    about another system failures that could lead to longer operational
    impacts.

        Question 1. Could you please provide an update on the Terminal Flow
    Data Manager, Flow Management Data & Services, En-Route Automation
    Modernization, and other critical programs and modernization efforts?
        Answer. During COVID, the FAA established a new program called Flow
    Management Data and Services (FMDS) to replace the aging Traffic Flow
    Management System. The new FMDS program went from definition by the
    Federal Acquisition Executive (February 2022) to Investment Analysis
    Readiness Decision (January 2023) in just 11 months. The program
    continues in accordance with the FAA's Acquisition Management System
    toward a Final Investment Decision in January 2025. COVID has not
    impacted this program's cost, schedule, or ability to complete the
    required investment analysis work.

        Question 2. What are biggest challenges in strengthening the
    resiliency and reliability of the air traffic system?
        Answer. The agency's ability to strengthen the resiliency and
    reliability of the air traffic system is dependent on maintaining an
    adequate and stable funding stream and long-term authorizations.
        Events such as continuing resolutions, government shutdowns, and
    sequestration, can affect the implementation schedules, thus affecting
    system resiliency and reliability. These events not only directly
    affect program schedules, but they can disrupt Federal hiring and
    retention and affect vendor ability to keep the required skills on
    staff.

        Question 3. Would changes in the Congressional funding structure,
    such as expanding the Airport & Airway Trust Fund (AATF) and extending
    Congressional budget authority longer than a year help the FAA support
    the safety, reliability, and resiliency of our Nation's aviation
    system, including its critical air traffic programs?
        Answer. Congress has provided some flexibility for the FAA's
    budget, including multi-year budget authority, and the President's FY
    2024 Budget request includes robust investment in system modernization.
    We look forward to working with Congress on the next FAA
    reauthorization act to ensure that the FAA has stable and sufficient
    funding in the years to come.

        Question 4. Would streamlining the Federal contract and acquisition
    processes help FAA improve and modernize its air traffic programs and
    systems?
        Answer. The FAA's Acquisition Management System (AMS) was formed
    with the flexibilities required to pivot and respond to mission need.
    While these flexibilities are available, we look forward to working
    with Congress on the enactment of a long-term reauthorization, and
    adequate funding for our modernization needs to efficiently and
    effectively field capabilities under AMS.

        Question 5. Does the FAA plan to keep allowing backup systems such
    as WMSCR and AIDAP to continue transmitting NOTAM information while the
    agency updates the primary system, and should air carriers continue to
    invest in connecting to these backup systems?
        Answer. WMSCR will continue to transmit NOTAM information for the
    foreseeable future. The AIDAP system will be sunset as part of the
    NOTAM Modernization effort.

        Question 6. Can you please describe the NextGen Advisory Committee
    (NAC)'s work and how you will ensure that the NAC incorporates industry
    input in order to help FAA fix its foundational legacy systems and
    modernize programs for operational and environmental benefits?
        Answer. The NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC) provides independent,
    consensus-based advice and recommendations to the FAA in response to
    specific ``taskings'' received directly from FAA. The NAC is currently
    engaged with the FAA on several commitments: the Northeast Corridor,
    Surface and Data Sharing, Data Communications, and Performance Based
    Navigation focus areas through the NextGen Joint Implementation Plan.
    For example, the FAA issued NAC Tasking 23-1: National Airspace System
    (NAS) Airspace Efficiencies, requesting advice on identifying and
    leveraging airspace efficiencies. As part of this task, the NAC will
    review current usage of legacy systems and NextGen procedures and
    provide advice on divesting and leveraging efficiencies across the NAS.

        5G. Air carriers have raised concerns regarding the next milestone
    of July 1, 2023, for 5G deployment and Group 3 aircraft. These concerns
    include delays in manufacturing, supply chains, and regulatory
    approval.

        Question 1. Are you aware of the challenges I mentioned for
    manufacturers and air carriers?
        Answer. The FAA is fully aware of the challenges to retrofit. We
    hold regular meetings with airframe manufactures such as Boeing,
    Airbus, Embraer, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the radio
    altimeter manufacturers like Collins, Honeywell, and Thales. We meet
    with the airframe and radio altimeter manufacturers as a group and meet
    with them individually to make sure we understand any challenges to
    completing the retrofit.

        Question 2. Do you anticipate there will be impacts to airline
    operations after July 1?
        Answer. Based on information from the airframe manufacturers and
    the airlines, FAA is estimating that less than 15 percent of U.S.
    domestic registered airplanes will not have completed retrofit on July
    1. The proposed Airworthiness Directive states that airplanes not
    equipped with a 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeter after July 1, when
    the voluntary wireless mitigations end, will be subject to operational
    restrictions. These potential impacts to airlines operations will
    almost exclusively happen during periods of very low visibility (less
    than one-half (1/2) statute mile) at the destination airport. Some
    operators of these unretrofitted airplanes will not be affected because
    they have chosen not to operate in visibility this low. These
    visibility conditions are very infrequent but it is possible that some
    airlines without suitably equipped 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeter
    airplanes will have operational impacts.

        Question 3. Do you commit to having full transparency with air
    carriers on the challenges that lie ahead, and will the FAA help make
    adjustments as necessary, so they can continue to transport passengers
    without operational disruption?
        Answer. The primary mission of the FAA is to ensure the safety of
    the National Airspace System (NAS) and the traveling public. When the
    wireless voluntary mitigations around airports end on July 1, airplanes
    without 5G C-Band tolerant radio altimeters will be subject to
    interference resulting in an unsafe condition. To ensure the safety of
    the NAS, the FAA must restrict unretrofitted airplanes from certain
    operations after July 1.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                                  Billy Nolen
        Question 1. In December 2017, the bipartisan Modernizing Government
    Technology Act, established the Technology Modernization Fund, which
    provides IT working capital funds to Federal agencies and allows them
    to use savings obtained through streamlining IT systems, replacing
    legacy products, and transition to cloud computing for additional
    modernization efforts. To date, TMF has invested in 35 government IT
    modernization projects across 19 Federal agencies, the largest project
    investment so far being $187 million.

       Mr. Nolen, considering the NOTAM modernization goal of
            transitioning to an entirely virtual platform by 2025, can you
            tell me if the Department of Transportation and the FAA has
            considered using the Technology Modernization Fund to improve
            the NOTAM system? Please explain why or why not.
        Answer. To date, the FAA has limited experience with the use of the
    Technology Modernization Fund. FAA leadership has identified
    opportunities to leverage this fund for selected modernization planned
    activities.
        The Technology Modernization Fund has awarded funds to the FAA for
    a non-NOTAM related project. The FAA's Office of the Chief Information
    Officer submitted a proposal to the Technology Modernization Fund's
    Program Management Office for consideration to modernize 22
    applications hosted in the FAA's Mission Support Operating Environment.
    These applications will be refactored to a Cloud native architecture
    over the course of three years and will be free of technical debt.
        At this time, the FAA has not considered using the Technology
    Modernization Fund to improve the NOTAM system.

       Could DOT and FAA better utilize the Technology
            Modernization Fund to ensure situations like the NOTAM system
            failure that occurred in January does not occur again?
        Answer. Yes. The Technology Modernization Fund mission may be a
    possible option to help address the agency's growing technical debt.

        Question 2. Mr. Nolen, you have spoken recently about your
    excitement around Advanced Air Mobility. Last Congress, my Advanced Air
    Mobility Coordination and Leadership Act became law, which instructs
    the Department of Transportation to lead a working group comprised of
    members of Federal agencies to provide recommendations on the
    coordination and integration of this new entrant into our civil
    airspace. The recommendations from this working group will be
    instrumental in crafting this year's FAA Reauthorization bill.

       Can you provide a status update on the establishment of this
            interagency group and other concrete steps the FAA is taking on
            leading the world in the adoption of AAM?
        Answer. In response to the Advanced Air Mobility Coordination and
    Leadership Act, the DOT established the Interagency Working Group
    (IWG), which officially kicked off on February 22, 2023, with a follow-
    up working group meeting on March 21-22, 2023. The FAA is playing a key
    role in the IWG to identify cross-agency gaps and activities. Led by
    DOT, the IWG is ensuring an all of government approach to AAM to ensure
    aircraft, air traffic, safety, security, frequency spectrum,
    infrastructure, automation, and other areas of focus, to include areas
    outside of the FAA authority (e.g., electrification and local land use
    issues) related to AAM are being taken into consideration.
        In addition to the IWG, the FAA is creating an ecosystem of
    technologies, systems, processes, and organizational structures that
    will help safely integrate AAM operations in an efficient, sustainable,
    and repeatable manner. To do so, the FAA has established innovation
    teams (iTeams) that cover key focus areas such as aircraft and
    operational certification, airspace and air traffic management, and
    vertiports. In addition to leading research efforts to establish AAM
    standards, the iTeams are developing an implementation plan that will
    contain a Concept of Use for the FAA's vision of AAM operations, as
    well as an Integrated Master Schedule. The agency is also building a
    structured approach to support the expected evolution of AAM. This
    includes preparing for near-term early entry-into-service operations
    based on industry plans, mid-term operations such as the
    operationalization of AAM at a key site in 2028 (Innovate28), and fully
    mature AAM operations.

        Question 3. I am a strong supporter of the FAA contract tower
    program and recognize the essential role of the program in keeping
    small and rural communities safe and connected to the broader aviation
    system. The FAA has proposed to revise the boundaries of the service
    areas for the contract tower program, and I am concerned that the
    proposed realignment could impact aviation safety.

       Mr. Nolen, has the FAA conducted a safety risk assessment of
            the proposed revisions of the contract tower service areas to
            ensure there aren't any unacceptable or unintended safety
            consequences?

       Since contract towers are operational by nature, should the
            FAA conduct a safety risk assessment before moving forward with
            the proposed realignment of the service areas?
        Answer. Safety is of the utmost concern to the FAA. The FAA
    followed all applicable safety management processes in determining the
    new Federal Contract Tower (FCT) contract area boundaries. A safety-
    risk assessment was not required as the administrative change does not
    impact the quality of air traffic services at FCT locations. The newly
    established boundaries are an administrative change that only affects
    the organizational structure of the towers and high industry safety
    standards will be maintained.
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
                                  Billy Nolen
        Question 1. Since December 2001, the FAA has restricted flights
    within three miles and 3,000 feet of every major league baseball and
    NFL football stadium during games. But the FAA does not issue NOTAMs
    for these events. Air Traffic Control and electronic flight bag
    applications like ForeFlight must resort to using commercial ticketing
    websites to find out the times for these sporting events. Mr. Nolen,
    how does the FAA expect pilots to comply with these TFRs if they cannot
    get reliable information about the restrictions directly from the FAA?
        Answer. As you noted, shortly after September 11, 2001, the FAA
    began restricting flights within three miles and 3,000 feet of every
    major league baseball and NFL football stadium. The scope is actually
    much greater than that. This action was taken because Congress enacted
    legislation that restricted civil aircraft operations over sporting
    events such as NASCAR, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
    Football League (NFL), National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
    Division I Football, and other open-air events containing more than
    30,000 people.
        Contemplating how to effectively implement Congress' direction and
    prior to implementing the first ``Sporting Event'' Temporary Flight
    Restriction (TFR), a determination was made that the FAA NOTAM's system
    would be overwhelmed by the sheer number of events covered under the
    TFR:

            MLB = 4913 (includes possible playoff games), NFL = 589
            (including playoffs), NCAA Div 1 Football--1,603 (includes bowl
            games), and NASCAR = 100 (estimated) for a total of up to 7,115
            individual events that would require a unique TFR each year.

        The TFR contains language that states it is in effect one hour
    prior to the event until one hour after the event. With delays and
    unforeseen occurrences that impact the start and stop times of covered
    events it would be impractical, at best, for the FAA to publish
    individual TFRs accurately.
        This was a discussion item during the development of this
    legislation in 2001.
        Knowing the challenges this legislation placed on the FAA, we
    embarked on an unending outreach campaign to bring awareness to the
    flying public. In that vein, the FAA expects pilots to comply with
    these congressionally mandated protections implemented through the use
    of TFRs. Pilots have the ability to gain awareness by thorough and
    effective preflight planning, which may include planning a flight path
    to avoid a covered event by three miles or being above 3000 feet.
    Additionally, pilots could seek airborne clarity that can be provided
    by local air traffic controllers that are monitoring the airspace.

        Question 2. The FAA has been working to expand the availability of
    Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) and Tower Data Link
    Services (TDLS). As you know, this technology enables pilots to receive
    some ATC clearances without having to speak to a controller on the
    radio. Receiving written clearances saves time and reduces the chance a
    pilot or controller will misstate the clearance. While the equipment
    required to receive these clearances enroute is expensive, nearly every
    pilot has access to a cell phone or tablet. This presents an
    opportunity for every pilot to have an option to receive electronic
    pre-departure clearances before they leave the ground. What is the FAA
    doing to expand the number of airports, TRACONs, and ARTCCs with CPDLC
    and TDLS capabilities (as appropriate), and in particular, those able
    to deliver electronic pre-departure clearances to general aviation
    pilots?
        Answer. FAA has deployed CPDLC and TDLS to 65 towers. We are in the
    process of deploying En Route initial and Full Data Comm capabilities
    to the 20 ARTCCs that will be used to cover the contiguous U.S.
    Currently 11 ARTCCs are using En Route Data Comm capabilities.

        Question 3. Is the FAA developing the capability to receive
    electronic pre-departure clearances from subscription-free services
    (such as Flight Service) that could be accessed from a cell phone or
    tablet?
        Answer. The FAA has been exploring a concept to allow pre-departure
    clearances to be sent to pilots over commercial networks using a
    personal mobile device. The vision is that the service will be
    available to pilots through apps from companies such as flight plan
    service providers. The concept is still several years away from
    implementation. When it is ready for technology transfer to industry,
    the capability will be available for licensing to any service provider
    who wishes to provide the service. The FAA has not taken a position on
    whether the pre-departure clearance capability will be available
    subscription-free or only offered through fee-for-service providers.

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