[Senate Hearing 118-433]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-433
FISCAL YEAR 2025 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 10, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-034 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Power, Hon. Samantha, Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 38
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 43
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Tim Scott...................................................... 70
`Lavender': The AI machine directing Israel's bombing spree in
Gaza, 972mag.com, April 3, 2024, submitted by Senator Chris Van
Hollen......................................................... 72
Cindy McCain says Gaza on `the edge' of going `over the cliff
with famine and not being able to recover,' The Hill, April 7,
2024, submitted by Senator Tim Kaine........................... 110
(iii)
FISCAL YEAR 2025 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BUDGET REQUEST
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Shaheen,
Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Romney, Ricketts,
Paul, and Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
The Chairman. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Our hearing today is for the United States Agency for
International Development budget request for fiscal year 2025.
We welcome the Honorable Samantha Power with us today.
The director is doing an incredible job with all the
challenges we have around the world so we thank you very much
for your public service.
From the civil war in Sudan to terror attacks and coups in
western Africa and the Sahel region to the famine in Gaza to
the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, there are more and more
challenges in the world today.
[Disturbance in the hearing room.]
The Chairman. There will be no outbreaks. You will be asked
to leave. I am going to have to ask you to leave. I have to ask
you to leave.
And yet despite the best efforts of our colleagues on the
Appropriations Committee--I know that we have Senator Shaheen
here with Senator Coons, who chairs the subcommittee--the
foreign assistance budget for this year enacted 6 months into
the year declined by 5 percent and some parts of USAID budgets
by as much as 10 percent. The result is that when we try to
address one crisis we often have to use money from somewhere
else.
We should not have to choose between addressing the climate
crisis or helping vulnerable communities adapt to our rapidly
changing world, or housing refugees fleeing violence, or
funding anti-corruption programs, or strengthening our global
health initiatives. We need to expand the pie.
Administrator Power, I know you deal with these daunting
challenges every day at USAID. I appreciate your leadership,
and thank you for appearing before us today.
I recognize that you and your team work in some of the
toughest and dangerous places in the world by supporting
economic development in the Pacific Island nations to Latin
America, USAID is pushing back against China's growing
influence.
By helping Ukraine with direct budget support you are
keeping the government open while it fights back against
Putin's brutal attacks. Our nation's generosity is a stark
contrast to programs like China's Belt and Road Initiative.
The United States international development strategy is
about supporting the aspirations of millions of average
citizens around the world. It is about promoting prosperity,
independence, and peace, as opposed to the debt trap diplomacy
Beijing uses to exert tremendous influence to weaken democracy,
foment corruption, and assert control over decisionmaking in
sovereign nations.
This is why the success of USAID is so central to the
United States' national security interests, because the more
free and thriving democratic nations that exist in the world
the safer and more prosperous we will be at home.
I think good governance and anti-corruption efforts must be
at the heart of USAID's mission on the ground, and I hope you
will give us an update in this regard. I also look forward to
hearing about the progress USAID is making in putting local
communities in the lead of delivering programs as you pledged
to do 2 years ago, and we had a pretty healthy discussion about
that during your testimony at that time.
Localizing our assistance is critical to building
sufficiency and getting the most bang for our buck. I also want
your assessment of USAID's humanitarian relief around the
world. Sudan faces a famine. I know Senator Booker was just
recently in Sudan and reported to some of us the circumstances
he saw, which are extremely dire.
Haiti is a challenging environment, although the World Food
Programme supported by Food for Peace has an enormous warehouse
in Port-au-Prince with grain stacked to the ceiling, and yet we
have a crisis in Haiti.
We need to get to people before they go hungry. Even as we
respond to the world crisis and natural disasters we also need
to plan for the long term--energy security, infrastructure,
water and sanitation, improving opportunity for women and
girls, democracy and good governance assistance.
Many of these issues USAID handles will boomerang back at
us in the future if we do not make real progress on addressing
these challenges today. Your work is critically important to
the United States' national security interests.
So, Administrator Power, we have a lot to cover, and I look
forward to your testimony.
At this time I will recognize my distinguished ranking
member, Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
Administrator Power, thank you for being here today, and let me
say before I launch into my in depth criticisms I fully
appreciate the position you are in.
You have got one of the toughest jobs in the
Administration. There is never enough money for anything that
we do. But this is really tough, and particularly when you are
making choices that are life and death choices. We understand
that, and believe me, the criticisms I have here are meant to
move us forward as opposed to backward. So thank you for that.
In theory, we are here today to discuss a budget for fiscal
year 2025. Unfortunately, Congress only passed a budget for
fiscal year 2024 19 days ago and are still debating the
supplemental budget request that was submitted 8 months ago.
Meanwhile, Putin's war machine has been hammering Ukraine
for more than 2 years. Hamas has been holding innocent
civilians hostage and using humanitarians as human shields for
more than 6 months. A brutal civil war has been raging in Sudan
for 10 months, pushing 25 million people to the brink of
starvation, and these are just a few of the challenges USAID
has been forced to confront.
Obviously, there is many others--the chairman made
reference to a number of those. The pressures on the
international affairs budget have become too great, and our
process is overwhelmed.
We are at a point really where it is time to start making
some difficult choices, ones we have to make, and to
prioritize.
I really feel, unfortunately, this budget does not do that.
For example, for the third year in a row the Administration has
requested billions of dollars in mandatory spending to
outcompete China.
Well, I agree it is imperative to find ways to compete with
and counter China around the world. Congress has already
rejected requests for mandatory funding not one once but twice,
because by law it really offsets from other critical programs,
as we all know.
It is painfully obvious that these funds are being pushed
into a mandatory request so the Administration can prioritize
its favored projects in climate and gender within the
discretionary budget. These budget gimmicks are a dangerous
game and need to stop if we are all going to pull the wagon
together.
It is time for the Administration to take seriously the
threat China poses to American values and interests and align
our discretionary budget priorities accordingly.
Administrator Power, I would like to hear, based on
reality, how USAID will adapt its budget to address this threat
after I am sure Congress will reject the third mandatory
funding request.
The proposed budget also fails to include funding to meet
the U.S. obligations of the Budapest agreement relating to
Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. It is clear
that this obligation cannot be met through a supplemental
appropriations request.
It needs to be part of a comprehensive strategy, and more
importantly, be included in the regular budgeting process. On
the situation in Gaza it is clear UNRWA is a morally bankrupt
institution beyond the point of redemption, and this has been
so for years. That is why Congress has prohibited funding for
UNRWA in 2025 by law.
It is essential USAID accelerate the scale up of trusted
implementers without ties to terrorism to replace UNRWA in the
West Bank and Gaza. We cannot keep wasting time burying our
heads in the sand hoping UNRWA will magically change. It will
not. It has not.
You have got to move faster on getting hooked up with our
trusted implementers in the region.
Turning to Afghanistan, the Taliban have erased the rights
of women and girls. It is imperative we keep educational
opportunities open, including through distance learning models
for vulnerable Afghan women and girls. I understand the
American University of Afghanistan is prepared to scale up to
meet the need and will be interested in your thoughts on this
matter.
In Syria both State and USAID continue to pour funds into
early recovery and stabilization activities including in regime
held area. There is a lot of us that are greatly opposed to
this. This is unacceptable and is opening doors for some of our
Gulf partners to embrace the regime, again, which we oppose.
We must ensure all U.S. activities are compliant with
Caesar sanctions and continue to isolate this regime. I look
forward to Senate movement on the Assad anti-normalization act
at its first opportunity.
Finally, in Africa there are critical issues that require
USAID's immediate collaboration and partnership with African
nations and organizations.
These include deteriorating democracies, more military
coups and authoritarian rule, unprecedented humanitarian
emergencies and escalating insecurities that drive armed
conflict, terrorism, unparalleled levels of displacement. I
think all of us are disappointed with the direction that the
conflict is going.
Not only are these issues causing widespread suffering and
instability, but importantly, they harm our national interest.
The President's budget needs to adequately resource USAID and
other agencies to help address these critical issues. It is
regrettable the budget request, again, lacks discipline.
If the Administration cannot prioritize, Congress will have
to do it. You, USAID, are in a better position to prioritize,
but it requires very, very tough choices. We know that. I get
it. Someone has to do it, and it really should be you and not
us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Administrator Power, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Ranking Member Risch, and thanks for all the collaboration that
we have--you, your teams and the committee. It is absolutely
invaluable. It really feels like whatever our differences, that
we are on the same team, on Team America, in a really, really
difficult set of circumstances in the world.
I just want to start with a reflection on something that
right now is sitting in the lobby of the Republic of Korea's
development agency, which is their equivalent of USAID.
In the lobby they have chosen to display an old bag of
flour from the 1940s, which is marked with the words ``From the
American people'' and this is a reminder of how the United
States supported them when they were one of the poorest
countries on the planet to help them fight hunger and disease
and to kick start the remarkable journey toward the kind of
economic growth that we see today.
South Korea is today one of the world's richest nations,
and last year--and this should be really heartening to
everyone--it spent nearly $4 billion providing aid to other
nations. This year the Republic of Korea plans to spend nearly
$5 billion. That is a 30 percent increase.
The decades that the United States has supported countries
in charting their own paths of development have in fact brought
extraordinary results for our partners and for our own people.
We have helped stop the spread of diseases that threaten us
all. We have helped develop more resilient high yield crops
that can feed growing populations. Some of this innovation also
shows up on American farms subsequently.
We have helped people and nations rise from poverty, and in
doing so we have invested billions in U.S. small businesses,
and we have opened up new markets for American products.
Eight of America's top 10 trading partners were once
recipients of U.S. assistance. Under President Biden's
leadership and in partnership with this committee, we are
building on that remarkable legacy.
In Ukraine, USAID has helped farmers withstand Putin's
attempts to destroy the agricultural sector. We have gotten
farmers the seeds, equipment, and worked with European Union
and the Ukrainians to get them the alternative export routes,
particularly when the Black Sea was almost entirely out of
commission--the alternate export routes that they needed.
The results of this are actually staggering, and I feel in
light of the debate, particularly and the need to get the
supplemental across the finish line the Senate supplemental
passed in the House, it is really worth noting that Ukraine's
grain exports now are very near their prewar export levels.
That is remarkable. It is a tribute above all to the
courage and the ingenuity of Ukrainians, but it is also a
tribute to the decisions made up here to provide USAID with the
resources to support the agricultural sector, to crowd in the
private sector, and to get farmers planting, harvesting, and
exporting again.
Global food prices, of course, are related to what happens
in Ukraine on those farms. They are now down 26 percent from
their 2022 peak, and again, that comes from work on the ground
helping Ukrainians do what they had every intention of doing
before Putin began brutalizing their people and their economy.
In Nigeria we are providing community health workers with
technologies to spot diseases like tuberculosis early, which
helped increase TB diagnoses by a third in a single year, so
that patients can get treatment and outbreaks do not spread
across the planet.
Across Africa we are working to connect African and
American companies and reduce barriers to trade through the
PROSPER Africa Initiative, efforts that since 2019 have
generated some $86 billion in trade and investment, and that is
work that builds prosperity for both our African partners, and
again, for businesses here at home.
Bipartisan support for these efforts makes Americans safer
and more prosperous and provides a critical foundation for
American influence and leadership in a world where other global
powers are working aggressively to erode U.S. alliances, to
undermine democracy, and to diminish basic rights and freedoms.
For example, the PRC's global lending spree has made it
now, and this really bears repeating, the world's largest debt
collector. That is what the PRC has become. For every dollar of
assistance it provides to low income and middle income
countries, the PRC has provided around $9 in debt, so a dollar
in grant for every $9 in debt.
The opposite is true of the United States. For every dollar
of debt that we provide, we provide at least $9 of assistance.
The PRC's assistance tends to be negotiated behind closed
doors, fueling corruption, and it can demonstrate a flagrant
disregard for human rights.
Many of you are familiar with the PRC's Safe Cities
Initiative whereby they have provided surveillance and facial
recognition technology that can monitor critics, journalists,
and activists, that technology provided so far to at least 80
countries.
We need American leadership to advance models of
development and governance that honor freedom, transparency,
and dignity, as well as economic opportunity for all.
The Biden-Harris administration's fiscal year 2025 request
of $28.3 billion for USAID's fully and partially managed
accounts would give us the resources to continue that
leadership.
With these funds we will help nations around the world
strengthen food security, improve health, and--and this is a
particular area of emphasis for us, particularly coming out of
the COVID--is driving economic growth.
We will respond as well to historic levels of humanitarian
need. USAID teams have been working day and night to address
the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza, where nearly the
entire population is living under the threat of famine.
Add to that the ongoing crises in Ukraine, Sudan, and
beyond, and continued battering from a growing number of
natural disasters, and the number of people requiring
humanitarian assistance--and this is really a staggering
statistic--has increased by nearly a third from 274 million in
2022 to 363 million at the end of 2023.
That is--I do not know that there has ever been a time in
history where you have seen that amount of growth in under 2
years, in basically just over a year.
To meet these needs we will need both the $10 billion in
this budget as well as the $10 billion in emergency
humanitarian assistance in the pending national security
supplemental request.
Otherwise, we are going to have to make draconian cuts to
rations all around the world. The fiscal year 2025 request
recognizes the need for tradeoffs, and it is a very, very
important point. We really do embrace that reality.
Crucially, this budget gives us specific resources to help
us deliver better results and better value for money. We have
worked really closely with your teams inaugurating our new
Office of the Chief Economist last July, growing that team.
That team is helping us expand the use of rigorous data
analysis across the agency to identify the programs with the
highest impact per dollar invested so that those programs can
be scaled.
I will give you one brief example. They identified a
poverty reduction program our Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance
has piloted in Uganda, and this is a program that offers a
sequenced set of supports like training and financial services
that help refugees move from requiring humanitarian assistance
to earning sustainable livelihoods of their own. We want to do
much more of this around the world, and we have to because of
the chronic refugee populations.
For every dollar that we invest households are seeing over
four times the return in economic benefits in that program, and
so now we are expanding it to other nations.
Beyond maximizing our own resources we are drawing in new
partners through tools like our Edge Fund, and thanks to this
Congress for resourcing the Edge Fund. Again, we would like to
see those resources grow over time.
But this is exactly what we need to be doing at a time
where the private sector has to drive a lot of development and
where we have to leverage any resources you give us and turn it
into more.
So the Edge Fund is an incentive fund that basically
applies the private sector's unique comparative advantages to
some of the world's largest development challenges. We are
working with companies like Citibank, Wal-Mart, Johnson &
Johnson, to boost our impact and drive progress beyond our
narrow programs.
From fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2023 alone, and this
is really something that has mattered a great deal to us and I
hope a great deal to you, private sector partner contributions
to USAID activities jumped by more than 60 percent, and that is
the trajectory that we need to remain on. We need to keep
investing in order to do so in a work force that is nimble,
able to embrace private sector partnerships, trained
accordingly, and empowered to pursue catalytic change, to view
USAID as a hustler and a broker also have other development
investments.
If we do make these investments in our work force--and
thanks for the support for operational expenses--I have no
doubt that we can continue America's extraordinary legacy of
leadership in building a more stable and prosperous world for
all.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Power follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Samantha Power
Thank you Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and other
distinguished members of the Committee.
In the lobby of the Republic of Korea's development agency--their
equivalent of USAID--they display an old bag of flour from the 1940s,
marked with the words: ``From the American People.'' It's a reminder of
how the U.S. supported them when they were one of the poorest countries
on the planet to fight hunger and disease and kickstart economic
growth. Today, of course, South Korea is one of the world's richest
nations--and last year spent nearly four billion dollars providing aid
to other nations. This year they plan to spend nearly five billion.
The decades that the United States has supported countries in
charting their own paths of development have brought extraordinary
results--for our partners and for our own people. We've helped stop the
spread of diseases that threaten us all and develop more resilient,
high-yield crops that can feed growing populations. We've helped people
and nations rise from poverty, and in doing so invested billions in
American small businesses and opened up new markets for American
products; eight of our top ten trading partners were once recipients of
U.S. assistance.
Under President Biden's leadership and in partnership with this
Committee, we are building on that remarkable legacy. In Ukraine, for
example, USAID has helped farmers withstand Putin's attempts to destroy
the agricultural sector by getting them the seeds, equipment, and
alternative export routes they need--efforts that have helped Ukraine
rebound their grain exports to near pre-war levels and helped bring
global food prices down 26 percent from their 2022 peak. In Nigeria,
we're providing community health workers with technologies to spot
diseases like tuberculosis early, which helped increase TB diagnoses by
a third in a single year--so patients can get treatment and outbreaks
won't spread across the planet. Across the African Continent, we are
working to connect African and American companies and reduce barriers
to trade through the Prosper Africa Initiative--efforts that since 2019
have generated some $86 billion in trade and investment that builds
prosperity for both our African partners and businesses here at home.
Bipartisan support for these efforts makes Americans safer and more
prosperous--and provides a critical foundation for American influence
and leadership in a world where other global powers are working
aggressively to erode U.S. alliances, undermine democracy, and diminish
basic rights and freedoms.
For example, the PRC's global lending spree has made it the world's
largest debt collector. For every dollar of aid it provides to low-
income and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt,
while the opposite is true of the U.S.: for every dollar of debt we
provide, we provide at least $9 of aid. The PRC's assistance tends to
be negotiated behind closed doors, fueling corruption, and can
demonstrate a flagrant disregard for human rights. To offer one
chilling example, through the PRC's efforts to help countries build so-
called ``Safe Cities,'' they have provided surveillance and facial
recognition technology that can monitor critics, journalists, and
activists to at least 80 countries.
We need American leadership to advance models of development and
governance that honor freedom, transparency, human dignity, and
opportunity for all.
The Biden-Harris administration's fiscal year 2025 request of $28.3
billion for USAID's fully and partially managed accounts give us the
resources to continue that leadership.
With these funds, we will help nations around the world strengthen
food security, improve health, and drive economic growth. And we will
respond to historic levels of humanitarian need. USAID teams have been
working day and night to address the catastrophic humanitarian crisis
in Gaza, where nearly the entire population is living under the threat
of famine. Add to that ongoing crises in Ukraine, Sudan, and beyond,
and continued battering from a growing number of natural disasters
during this particularly strong El Nino, and the number of people
requiring humanitarian assistance has increased by nearly a third--from
274 million in 2022 to 363 million at the end of 2023. To meet these
needs, we will need both the $10 billion in this budget as well as the
$10 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance in the pending
national security supplemental request. Otherwise, we will be forced to
make draconian cuts to rations all around the world.
The fiscal year 2025 request recognizes the need for tradeoffs even
as global needs are escalating. And crucially, this budget gives us
specific resources to help us deliver even better value for money.
Since we inaugurated our new Office of the Chief Economist last July,
the team is already expanding our use of rigorous data analysis across
the agency to identify the programs with the highest impact per dollar
invested so they can be scaled. For instance, they identified a poverty
reduction program our Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance is piloting in
Uganda, which is offering a sequenced set of supports like trainings
and financial services that help refugees move from requiring
humanitarian assistance to earning sustainable livelihoods for
themselves. For every dollar we invest, households are seeing over four
times the return in economic benefits. We are now expanding the program
to other nations.
And beyond maximizing our own resources, we are drawing in new
partners through tools like our EDGE Fund--an incentive fund designed
to apply the private sector's unique edge to some of the largest global
development challenges. We're working with companies like Citibank,
Walmart, and Johnson & Johnson to boost our impact and drive progress
beyond our programs. From fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022 alone,
private-sector partner contributions to USAID activities jumped by 31
percent. To continue to drive this progress, we need to keep investing
in a workforce that's nimble and empowered to pursue truly catalytic
change.
If we do make these investments, I have no doubt that we can
continue America's extraordinary legacy of leadership in building a
more secure, prosperous, and stable world for all.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your comments, but
more importantly thank you very much for your service.
I just really want to first underline the point you made
about PRC, China, and their debt diplomacy--debt traps, I would
say--to other countries.
It points out how we have to strengthen our own tools in
order to deal with that issue, but also we need to do a better
job in public relations and explaining the difference between
partnerships with the United States and partnerships with the
People's Republic of China because, as you point out, we
leverage so that the country can control its fate.
The PRC leverages so that China can control their fate, and
that point I think needs to be underscored a lot more than we
have in the past. I just point that out.
We are here to talk about the fiscal year 2025 budget but
we have to first talk about the fiscal year 2024 budget. You
made reference to the importance of the supplemental
appropriation bill that passed the U.S. Senate that is now in
the House of Representatives.
We have had a lot of discussions in the press and publicly
about the importance to Ukraine and their military defense
against Putin's aggression. We have had conversations here
about the aid in the Middle East to Israel in regards to
Hamas's attack against Israel.
We have had discussions here about the importance in the
Indo-Pacific area against PRC's aggression, particularly as it
relates to Taiwan.
We need to concentrate today on the importance in regards
to humanitarian needs and your ability to carry out your
mission for the remainder of this year and into next fiscal
year.
So I want to concentrate in three areas. We have a
humanitarian crisis in Sudan. I mentioned that Senator Booker
was just recently in the country and told many of us about just
the dire needs that are there. We see every day the challenges
in Gaza.
We know we have to do more on the humanitarian front, and
that requires U.S. leadership and U.S. dollars, and we know
that in Ukraine we have the humanitarian crisis because of the
war.
So tell us how important it is to pass the funds that are
in the supplemental. We passed the fiscal year 2024 budget. Is
that enough to deal with these concerns, or do you need the
supplemental, and how critically important is the supplemental
to deal with those incredibly challenging crises that we see
every day?
Ms. Power. Thank you. I know we do not have a lot of time
but this is such an important question so let me first start by
saying that the word supplemental for the countries and the
crises that you mentioned is in many ways a misnomer.
Why is that? Because a lot of the resource, and Senator
Risch alluded to some of this maybe in a different way, but a
lot of the resources that we had previously channeled through
the regular budget were moved in previous years to the
supplemental.
So if the national security supplemental were not to pass
or were not to pass at the current level that was sent over by
the Senate, you would basically be seeing, in terms of
humanitarian needs including in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine, the
three places you mentioned, you would be seeing in this year an
increase of, roughly, 40 percent in humanitarian need, and a
decrease, roughly, of between 35 and 40 percent of humanitarian
funding.
So, and that is because, again, we were generously funded
in the past. We were able to lead in response to crises as the
numbers of people displaced and in dire need of food to survive
increased because Congress stepped up, but stepped up also by
moving resources that had been in the base to the supplemental.
On Ukraine, without the supplemental we actually have no
resources to do the kind of energy, agriculture, anti-
corruption work, the core development work that everybody up
here, I think, supports us doing, but many assume that we have
resources to do under the regular budget.
So this just gets to sort of how the budget was organized,
but it also gets, of course, to the indispensability of these
needs.
So on Sudan, on Gaza, on Ukraine, as Putin pulverizes
communities, as he again tries to weaponize winter and take out
energy infrastructure with really an unprecedented spate of
attacks just in recent weeks, it is just heartbreaking that
resources that Ukrainians need on the ground to be able to
repair that energy infrastructure, for us to procure far enough
in advance also so we can look ahead to next winter, because we
know he is going to pursue the same approach if the war is not
over by then, that those resources would be so close to passage
in principle, and yet, where a vote cannot even be taken that
is--on the package that reflects a bipartisan majority here in
the Senate is--the human consequences cannot be overstated.
The Chairman. I would just make one last point on this. We
all know we need to do more in all three of the areas that I
mentioned. We see that every day. More has to be done.
The United States has been the leader in providing the
resources for these humanitarian responses. If the United
States does not provide the expected leadership in providing
resources, what happens with the global community's response to
these humanitarian needs?
Ms. Power. Well, as you know, in Ukraine for every dollar
that the U.S. has provided, other donors have provided $2.
As we have been stalled on our ability to provide direct
budget support to the government of Ukraine as Putin seeks to
destroy its economy and destroy its ability to finance health,
education, other things, we have asked our partners to front
load their funding and to step up.
They have done so with a calculated view on the basis of
recent history over the last 2 years that America will show up,
that we cannot abandon freedom, and we cannot leave Ukraine to
be the victim of aggression at a time like this.
There is absolutely no guarantee that we would be able to
continue to leverage our leadership if we are not exercising it
sufficiently, and that is what is at stake here, and Ukraine is
just one example.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of things you said were really impressive. That
Korea story is something that needs to be repeated again and
again in America. We always beat ourselves up and do not talk
about the successes. That is a tremendous success, and it is
kind of lost in the fog of stuff that goes on here.
But to be able to say that not only did we do that, and
admittedly, we spent a lot of blood and a lot of treasure
getting there, but not only did we do that, but the fact that
the Koreans recognize that we did that and give credit to the
United States for doing that is really an impressive fact.
The second one that struck me in the comments that you made
was the comparison of what we do compared to what China does
and your characterization of China as being the largest debt
collector in the world I had never heard before, but is
obviously true because of the tremendous amount of debt that
they have got out there and that they are collecting in many
cases from, like, a loan shark collecting it from people that
cannot afford to pay it.
And as the chairman pointed out, China uses that to
actually bolster their national security by controlling what
happens in another country, which is 180 from what we do.
So I think both of those points you made are really, really
good points and really need to be underscored for all of us in
the United States when we get to feeling badly about how things
are degrading, and they are degrading in a lot of places as we
know.
I do want to talk about a couple of things that you and I
have talked about before, and that is, look, for years I have
been saying we need to put UNRWA out of business, and we
defunded them, as you know, in the 2025 budget, and I have got
to tell you that is the majority view in Congress. I understand
there is others that think that UNRWA is--somehow there is some
good parts of UNRWA.
If there are I have not seen them yet. It is going to be
really important, because I really believe Congress is going to
continue down that line.
Now, the things that UNRWA does that we have them do--we
pay them to do and provide the resources for them to do--are
really important. They need to be done. The best example of
that is in Jordan.
What UNRWA does in Jordan is--with our money, is absolutely
imperative with the millions of refugees that have there. The
Jordanian government cannot stand without that.
So tell me about your efforts in that regard to identify
other implementers, and I assume it is a begrudging transfer to
other implementers. Tell me what you are doing. Give me some
hope here.
Ms. Power. First of all, thank you for recognizing a couple
of points that I made in my opening comments, and I agree with
also your implied point, which is that our communications game
lags behind the facts, and that is a challenge that all of us
are facing in an environment of misinformation and a very
cluttered media environment.
But it is just so important. I think notwithstanding that
point, which is a very good one, it is interesting to see the
polling and the turn in public opinion as it relates to PRC
lending and investment.
It is also noteworthy that the PRC, in part because they
are the debt collector and a lot of the debts are not able to
be collected because the interest rates were so high or because
of COVID or for whatever reason, they are also pulling back a
lot.
If you look at Belt and Road investments they are way, way
down over the last few years, creating a huge opening for
America's model of development.
To UNRWA I think--to answer your question, first of all,
USAID does not fund UNRWA. The State Department does, but we
are one U.S. Government trying to mobilize a humanitarian
response.
USAID partners like World Food Programme, UNICEF, Save the
Children, International Medical Corps, are implementing
partners. They are the ones out there, of course, getting--
seeking to get convoys in to reach people who are facing
desperate conditions.
They do rely, as you well know, on the humanitarian
infrastructure, and there is no ready substitute, and I think
even maybe just pivoting to Jordan for a second--we can come
back to Gaza.
But it is not like another international organization or
another NGO in the sense that it is the school system for
refugees in Jordan who, as you know, I think it is 2 million
kids are cared for by UNRWA run schools.
So you are talking not about what international
organizations or NGOs normally--it is not like there is
hundreds of thousands of teachers from elsewhere who are on
standby waiting to get the call.
It is an extremely complex question. But as you note, this
is something that the Jordanian government does not have the
fiscal space or the human capacity to take on.
And so right now other donors, notwithstanding the deeply
alarming allegations and the investigations that are underway,
most of them have resumed funding because of the
indispensability of the services and because of the view that
notwithstanding, again, very, very problematic allegations
against specific individuals in Gaza that those allegations do
not extend across UNRWA funding across the region.
So right now the UNRWA infrastructure is still being relied
upon including by USAID's partners. I would note that the
government of Israel even a month or 2 ago or a month ago said
UNRWA cannot be involved in convoys inside Gaza because of, of
course, the allegation infiltration with those individuals
potentially, and they have had to change that position because
there is no way to deliver food to prevent further famine
without UNRWA at the heart of the response.
So now UNRWA is able to be not leading convoys but part of
convoys in terms of how the government of Israel is engaging
with that question. I am not pretending that the government of
Israel is embracing UNRWA, but I am making a point more about
necessity and the indispensability of meeting the humanitarian
imperative.
Senator Risch. Well, thanks for that. I got to tell you I
understand all the arguments. But look, if UNRWA is in I am
out, period. I understand the arguments that oh, they got to be
there, blah, blah, blah.
Look, you have seen the texts like I have seen the texts.
It is U.S. taxpayer money teaching these young kids, these
young Palestinian kids, how to be a terrorist, and not only how
to be a terrorist but that it is their obligation under their
religious practices and everything else.
It is just sickening, to be honest with you. Then, of
course, this thing that happened on October 7 where they
actually had members of UNRWA included in the attack on Israel.
We have got to go a different direction. So if UNRWA cannot
do it too bad. I am out. But I have had it with UNRWA, and I
think a lot of my colleagues are in the same position.
But in any event, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Madam Administrator, it is fair to say
from your testimony that if you do not get the $10 billion in
the supplemental that you will not be able to meet your
humanitarian mission across the globe as it is presently
challenged?
Ms. Power. Yes, that is true.
Senator Menendez. Which means that every day that House
Republicans wait, people die.
Ms. Power. There are going to be catastrophic humanitarian
effects to not bring in more resources to bear, for sure.
Senator Menendez. They will die on the battlefield in
Ukraine, and they will die of hunger in various parts of the
world, and so this is not an esoteric exercise.
In a bipartisan way the Senate sent a package that would
meet not only Ukraine's needs, meet our challenge in the Indo-
Pacific, but at the same time meet our humanitarian challenge
and obligation in the world and the ability to leverage other
countries.
And so people are dying. They are dying on the battlefield.
They are dying of hunger, and for some reason House Republicans
cannot put a simple vote on the floor, and it is pretty
outrageous.
How will you get assistance, assuming you get the money,
into Gaza? I just heard your whole conversation with Senator
Risch. Succinctly, please, because I know you have a
professorial way about you from your history.
But can you--and since I have limited time how will you be
able to get assistance into Gaza?
Ms. Power. Well, the gating issue up to this point--because
we are drawing on the resources that we do have because we are
where we are in the fiscal year, we still have resources--but
the gating issue has not yet been resources. It has been
access. It has been the restrictions on moving----
Senator Menendez. So if the gating systems are resolved, if
the access is resolved, you will----
Ms. Power. No. No. The access is not resolved.
Senator Menendez. If the access is resolved, you will have
the wherewithal to get what aid----
Ms. Power. For a certain period of time. But I mean, there
are 20,000 metric tons of flour sitting in Ashdod Port right
now that we have been trying to get out. That is a thousand
trucks worth of flour, and that has not been resolved.
There have been important steps, I think, taken in the last
few days, and indeed, I think we have more than 400 trucks got
into Gaza today, which is the second time we have been able to
cross the 400 truck number.
So things have improved a bit, and of course, we are trying
to get food in through multiple entrance points including
hoping that the government of Israel moves very quickly to open
the Erez Crossing, but there are still really profound access
issues.
Senator Menendez. OK. Let me move to something else.
Last year I published something I called the Menendez plan,
which is a framework that would address the cycle of mass
migration at the southwestern border of the United States
through the development of a sustainable and structural
response to migration in the region.
I think all of our immigration challenges that we have at
the southern border deny one fact, that there are 25 million
people in the southern hemisphere presently displaced from
their country of origin, refugees seeking asylum or just being
displaced.
Right now they are in other countries within the
hemisphere. Unless we work with those countries to assimilate
those individuals, I do not care what we do at the border, but
we will have 25 million feet marching northwards.
So part of what I outlined is an effort to expand
humanitarian assistance and development of financing to better
integrate migrants and refugees in those countries across the
Americas. Capacity building, economic resilience, are paramount
to that.
Can you tell me some specifics on how you will utilize the
funds requested in fiscal year 2025 to address those root
causes of migration and to help those countries assimilate
individuals so they are not marching northward?
Ms. Power. Well, first, this is one of these points that
does not get made enough, which is just how countries who are
on the path for migrants who--and we are very focused on those
who come to our border, understandably, but countries like
Colombia, Brazil, Peru, just how many, for example, Venezuelans
have landed on their doorsteps.
They have maintained open borders. There have been
regularization or integration rules put on the books in
countries like Colombia that have been incredibly important
allowing kids to go to school, get health benefits and the
like, and there are already now proven economic benefits. A
huge number of businesses in Colombia created by Venezuelans--
--
Senator Menendez. That is what they have done. What will we
do to help them?
Ms. Power. No. No. USAID is doing a huge amount. For
example, in Peru we created a program to support the government
in accrediting professional degrees of migrants who have
arrived so that they can come and work as doctors.
In Colombia those programs in the border region that--and
the migrant centers for regularization, those are ones that
have been supported with USAID funding. But a lot of these
programs they have closed their registration eligibility, or
they have closed down registration, so we are also working
through development diplomacy to try to urge those governments
to reopen registration because the vast majority of people who
come to this country are those who have been unable to access
regularization.
Senator Menendez. My time is up.
Could I ask you to have someone from your agency come and
sit with our office to discuss what you intend to do? Because
we have some ideas about how we achieve those goals.
And finally, if I may, Mr. Chairman, in 2023 Azerbaijan
launched a military assault on the Artsakh region. It caused
120,000 Armenians to be ethnically cleansed from what was known
as their homeland. You activated a disaster assistance response
team. You have approximately given $15.6 million to Armenia to
address this. This is $130 per displaced person. It just does
not work.
Do you have intentions of doing more?
Ms. Power. Yes. I was just meeting with the Armenian
president or prime minister, excuse me, in Brussels along with
the European Union and Secretary Blinken on Friday, and we
announced a number of new initiatives there including work with
the Armenian government and financial support as they attempt
to provide permanent housing to those people from Nagorno-
Karabakh who have come and have just been in stopgap housing
since last year.
As you know, I was at the border trying to greet those
desperate families who had been forced from their homes, and
this is something of personal importance to me as is supporting
the Armenian government in their reform efforts, because
fundamentally their ability to use also their own resources to
cater to that population, to integrate that population for
those who are not able to go home, will turn on them continuing
to grow their economy, which they have been doing at a fierce
clip over the last 2 years.
Senator Menendez. If you could have somebody--when you send
me somebody on the other who can address this issue, too, I
would appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Power. Absolutely. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Ms. Power, on April 26, 2023, you testified
before this committee that USAID did not fund gain of function
research. I would like to give you a chance to correct the
record. Is it still your position that USAID did not fund gain
of function research?
Ms. Power. We have no evidence that USAID has funded gain
of function research, and we certainly have not authorized gain
of function research.
Senator Paul. Well, I will help you.
Behind me we will list a paper from 2015. This is a paper
produced by the Wuhan Institute of Virology and also by Dr.
Baric from UNC. In this paper, if you will see, the funding
aspect that is highlighted, it says USAID EPT predict funding
from Eco Health Alliance.
So this paper was one where they took a virus--the SARS
virus, the backbone of the SARS virus--and then took an S
protein from an unknown virus they found in the wild and put
them together.
Are you aware that these experiments in the study were
supported by USAID Predict and grant through Eco Health
Alliance?
Ms. Power. As I said, USAID has not authorized gain of
function research. This is the first I am seeing this. We will
be happy to look into it and engage----
Senator Paul. All right. This has been around since 2015.
We have been over it numerous times. It has been in the public
record. We have repeatedly said that, yes, USAID did fund gain
of function research--here is the evidence.
But here is some comments from some different people about
this study, because some will try to argue this still is not
gain of function. Simon Wain-Hobson is a virologist at the
Pasteur Institute in Paris.
He points out that the researchers have created with this
research funded by USAID a novel virus that grows remarkably
well in human cells. If the virus escaped, nobody could predict
the trajectory.
Richard Ebright from Rutgers says the only impact of this
work is the creation in a lab of a new nonnatural risk to
humanity.
So is your position that this study was not gain of
function, or that you did not fund it? Which is your position?
Ms. Power. We have had an awful lot of back and forth and
provided thousands of pages of documents on this. This article
I cannot--it looks like it is from 2015.
Senator Paul. Right.
Ms. Power. So we will have to look into the specific
claims. But again, to put on the record USAID has not and will
not authorize gain of function research.
Senator Paul. It is a big point. That is your--I know that
is your position but the record will show that you did. And
this was before your time.
I do not know why we cannot just admit it. It did happen,
and the reason this is important is many people want to collect
all these viruses from around the world. But they do not want
to just collect the viruses to sort of have them and have a
library of viruses.
They take the virus, and then they take an S protein from
another virus, and they create a virus that does not exist in
nature, that often has ramifications that could be quite
different or quite serious.
I will give you the words of the authors of this paper. On
the basis of these findings scientific review panels may deem
similar studies building chimeric viruses based on circulating
strains too risky to pursue.
So this was funded by USAID. It was funded through the
Predict program. There is no question of that, and even the
authors admit that it was gain of function. So we have to get
beyond sort of quibbling over whether it was because we have to
make sure in the future we are not doing this and that we do
not fund this, going forward.
Now, the Predict program was going to be surpassed by
another program going after viruses and that has been
suspended. That is all good. But we have to admit the past, be
truthful about the past in order to go forward because millions
of people died from COVID-19.
The FBI has concluded it came from a lab in Wuhan. The
Department of Energy has concluded that. Even the CIA
initially--their scientific board voted six to one. Until they
were overturned by higher ups at the CIA to say otherwise, they
voted to say that this thing came from the lab as well.
It only comes from the lab if we are in favor of creating
these things. We cannot control everything China does, but we
certainly should not be funding it. So we have to be honest
that this was funded.
Now, there was a warning sign to us that this was going on.
There was something called the Diffuse Project in 2018 that was
presented to DARPA once again by Baric and by Dr. Shi in Wuhan.
The Diffuse Project was to create a coronavirus with a
furin cleavage site, which does not exist in nature but makes
it incredibly more infectious in humans.
There was a briefing to 15 agencies. One of the agencies
was USAID. There was a briefing about this Diffuse Project.
But nobody from USAID and nobody from all 15 agencies ever
told anyone about this project. It was hidden for years and
years and only revealed by a brave lieutenant colonel Marine
working at DARPA who exposed this when everybody else had
hidden this.
And my question is, USAID was in this briefing about a
research project that had incredible danger to our country and
finally was not funded.
Will you provide the names of the people from USAID who
were in this meeting so they can be interviewed so we can find
out why did not they tell anyone, or did they tell their
superiors and nobody--and people ignored them?
Why was the public never made aware that they were trying
to do dangerous research to create a virus very similar to what
COVID-19 became, and how could 15 agencies show up for a
briefing and no one exposed it to the public, and we only hear
about it by a whistleblower? Will you provide for us the name
of the persons at USAID who attended this briefing in 2018 and
let us interview them to find out what happened? Why was this
never revealed to the public?
Ms. Power. So I think within the 10,000 pages of documents
you have from USAID are whatever documents we have on this
DARPA proposers meeting. I received the letter--we received the
letter from your staff yesterday. We will certainly look at the
request.
But just to give a little context, U.S. Government agencies
often on good days show up for one another, go to each other's
meetings. This is not something that USAID ever considered
funding or was ever engaged on in some substantive way. So----
Senator Paul. But the point is is that after hearing that
somebody wanted to put a furin cleavage site in the virus,
alarm bells go off, and then when you see the virus in 2020,
and you say, oh, my goodness, they did what they were asking,
someone should have said, wow, I was in that hearing, and I did
not think anything of it at the time.
But now I am, like, maybe I should tell somebody. Maybe I
should call up the President. Maybe I should call up Anthony
Fauci. Maybe somebody should be informed that we learned about
this, and I did not think anything of it at the time.
You are right, it could have been inconsequential in 2018.
In 2020 it becomes profoundly important. Why did not anybody
from Government come forward and warn us that this could be a
virus not from nature, which is not very infectious usually,
and was incredibly infectious because it had been preadapted in
a lab for human transmission?
Ms. Power. Look, I just want to come back to your earlier
point. All of this ended at USAID in 2020. It is before my
time. We do not feel defensive about these engagements. We have
appreciated digging into----
Senator Paul. That is all we are asking is that we would
like to interview the person who was at that meeting.
Ms. Power. I understand. I understand. We will look at that
request.
But what I just want to make clear is that in a
collaborative spirit we also understand the stakes, the human
stakes, of recent history and the risks, and you have raised
flags in a manner that has required us to dig in, I think, in
important ways on top of what we had been doing previously.
And so we will continue the back and forth with you and
your office, and certainly do not ever want to be in a position
to do anything ourselves using taxpayer resources to create
risks.
Senator Paul. Thank you. And I do appreciate the
cooperation that your agency has given us.
Ms. Power. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Administrator, for being here
today and for the work that you do every day on behalf not just
of the United States but of so many people around the world.
I appreciated your opening story about the Republic of
Korea and the bag of flour because I just got back from the
Indo-Pacific during break where we visited the Republic of
Korea. We had a chance to personally thank them for their
support for what is happening in Ukraine, the effort to fight
back against the autocratic and horrendous behavior of Vladimir
Putin and the Russians in Ukraine.
And you talked--we also heard that they are following very
closely not just in the Republic of Korea but in Japan and the
Philippines and in Vietnam where we also visited what is
happening with the supplemental because it does affect what
happens in the Indo-Pacific, and it does affect how the PRC
views the United States and our willingness to stick with our
allies.
And you mentioned, I think, very clearly the importance of
passing the supplemental, and you talked about what it would
mean for humanitarian efforts in Gaza. But you did not talk
about some of the other places around the world where they are
also depending on the passage of that supplemental.
Can you talk about a couple of the other areas that you are
very concerned about that if we--and what will happen if the
supplemental is not passed by the House?
Ms. Power. Well, we just had an exchange with Senator
Menendez about migration. Venezuelan refugees--I mean, such a
huge share of the population has tumbled into neighboring
countries, leaving everything behind. Those countries, as I
mentioned, had been very generous.
But those countries also depend on the humanitarian
assistance that agencies like the World Food Programme, UNICEF,
and others provide. It is asking double if you both ask for
integration and then ask for all humanitarian needs to be borne
by the communities and the countries in which those migrants
land. So it would be horrific if we had to cut rations or
support to agencies supporting Venezuelan refugees.
Second, Sudan--a number of people rightly have mentioned
Sudan. I am looking forward to hearing from Senator Booker
about his trip.
But we have been privileged to be able to provide over the
last year close to a billion dollars in support. That
privilege, of course, is the perverse consequence of two
military men who are destroying their country and leaving their
people, who were able to provide largely for themselves except
in core conflict areas like Darfur over the last decades but
has left those people almost entirely in certain communities
dependent on humanitarian aid.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
I think it is safe to say, as Senator Menendez did so
directly and you acknowledge, that millions of lives are on the
line here and if this supplemental package does not get passed
by the House people are going to die.
They are going to die in Ukraine, they are going to die in
South America, they are going to die in Africa, and they are
going to die all over the world, and I hope that those people
who are holding up that package in the House understand what is
at stake.
I want to switch to another part of Europe. I was very
concerned by last week's news that the Georgian parliament,
reintroduced the foreign agents law, which would tighten
restrictions on civil society. That is similar to what Russia
has passed.
Can you talk about what the consequences would be for U.S.-
funded civil society organizations if that foreign agents law
is passed in Georgia?
Ms. Power. Well, we have seen the cut and paste version of
the Russia foreign agents bill pop up in multiple places, and
the effects are less accountability for corruption, a chilling
effect on speech.
Certainly, Georgia, which is now on a path or seeks to be
on a path to Europe and has gotten some recognition of late and
an embrace of that ambition, fundamentally a foreign agents law
like that has no place in Europe. The human rights and
democratic principles need to be not only respected but also
protected.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope that the
government of Georgia will decide to support what the people of
Georgia want, which is the move toward Europe and the rights
that come with a full democracy.
I am out of time but I want to make just one more point
about the trip that we took to the Indo-Pacific because one of
the things I was very interested in was hearing from President
Marcos in the Philippines, from the officials we met in
Vietnam, the concern about climate change and the impact of
climate change on the countries in the Indo-Pacific.
President Marcos told us that the Philippines is the most
threatened country because of climate change, and they talked
about the importance of the U.S. leadership on that issue.
So, I am out of time, as I said, but I hope that you will
continue to support our efforts to lead on climate change.
Thank you.
Ms. Power. Maybe just one point in response, which is one
of the investments that we have made that we are probably most
proud of at the agency, particular our humanitarians, is in the
Philippines' disaster response capabilities, and if you just go
back 10 years even and look at how much, for example, the
Defense Department, USAID, and other outside partners were
doing in order to support humanitarian response and now look at
the extent to which the Philippines has built out its own
capabilities in a really impressive way, including a civ-mil
partnership between the civilian agencies and the military is
really impressive.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen, I appreciate you mentioning
the Georgia efforts to adopt the Russian style--Putin style
foreign agent. We have been very supportive of Georgia's
integration into Europe and to moving in the right path.
This is certainly moving in the wrong path, and we have put
them on notice. I have contacted their Ambassador to let them
know of our concerns that this really could affect Georgia's
movement into integration to Europe.
Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like Senator Menendez indicated I am sometimes overwhelmed
by the degree of starvation, the migration, as associated with
climate change, and the problems in the world are so enormous.
How do you decide where to intervene, and where to spend
the money? How do you prioritize all the things? I mean,
because we do not have enough money to get everybody out of
poverty, to solve all the hunger problems of the world, to
solve all the migration problems in the world, to solve all the
awful things that are going on in the world.
We are not there. There was a time when the U.S. economy
was half that of the world today. Today it is 15 percent. So we
simply cannot do everything we would like to do. How do you
decide where to spend the resources? What is your priority for
tackling their various challenges?
Ms. Power. Thank you, and I do not have time, I think, to
do justice to the full sort of way that we do prioritization.
We are also 90 percent earmarked so some of that prioritization
is taken out of our hands.
But it is only really by sector so your question is still
very valid in terms of what we do. Even if we have X amount for
malaria and X amount for TB, where do you do it?
And there, I think, governance and where that dollar is
likely to go further matters a great deal, particularly for
working with state and local government.
USAID has just last year launched an Office of the Chief
Economists to actually bring--we have done measurement
evaluation learning about particular programs for a long time,
but we are now bringing a best buy mindset, literally doing
cost effectiveness studies, randomized controlled trials, for
example a programmatic intervention where we hire a contractor
or give a grant to an organization--how does that compare
against giving cash in a particular community and seeing--there
are some studies that show that through cash benchmarking that
actually giving just small amounts of cash allows, for example,
somebody to start a business or get the access to capital that
they need locally.
So we want to make sure we do a cost effectiveness filter
through the work that we do everywhere. We, of course, look at
the nexus with U.S. security, pandemic prevention, lab
surveillance, global health security. That is an example of
investments that have really increased, although unfortunately,
are down in the 2024 budget that was just passed.
That is an investment in our lives. The same with our clean
energy work. Of course, it is one thing to have the Inflation
Reduction Act here and be lowering emissions over time. But we
know that there are many big players like South Africa,
Indonesia, countries in which we work, where their emissions
affect Americans just as much as ours do.
Senator Romney. Yes, I actually would hope to have a more
clear priority that, yes, there has to be an enormous
humanitarian need, but there also has to be a very clear U.S.
interest in intervening in that particular area.
And yes, we do not want to waste money and so forth, and
you mentioned those things, but there has to be some
prioritization. My impression is that the Chinese--for
instance, their economy is about the same size as ours.
Particularly if you look at purchase power parity, their
economy is larger than ours on that basis.
But they are not spending anywhere near where we are in the
world other than to support Chinese interests. Hopefully, we
will apply the same metric to decide where we are going to be
spending our funding.
Has there been work done at USAID to compare, here is what
China does? And if there is I would love to see a report or
some--if there is work like that that is around to say, here is
how they do it.
I know they do things with that. They loan the money. We
say no, we do not do that. We give them money, except we borrow
the money from others to give the money away.
Which is smarter? Us borrowing to give it away, or them
just loaning it? And I think we may have something to learn
from a country that says they are going to make those
investments where there is humanitarian need and where it is in
their national interest, and two, to do it in a way that is
economically the most frugal.
Ms. Power. Yes. I mean, I think that there is a fair point
there, of course, around prioritization, but the PRC does not,
as you are noting, is not motivated by the humanitarian
imperative that moves so many Americans. The service impulse,
the kind of compassion that we have shown----
Senator Romney. The challenges----
Ms. Power. No, no, I understand. But I am just talking
specifically about humanitarian.
Senator Romney. The needs of the world are so enormous----
Ms. Power. I understand.
Senator Romney [continuing]. That when you look at those
needs, you have to say we have more interest, for instance, in
Haiti than we might in someplace far, far away, in part because
it is in our neighborhood. All right. So we are going to show
priority there.
We have interest in Ukraine because we know that the old
Soviet Union did some really bad things that we fought for
decades, and so we want to keep that from happening again.
I mean, there are national interests that would strike me
as being high in the priority. I know my time is up. So, Mr.
Chairman, I will stop.
Ambassador Power, if there is something you want to say,
fine, but I will pull back.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
Just simply to say that I believe that that filter is
applied. I also believe that we play a long game, and had we
been narrowly transactional in the way that the Chinese are 40
years ago, many of the countries that are now huge markets for
U.S. goods would not be markets for U.S. goods.
Many of the diseases that have been prevented would not
have been prevented had we just gone, again, in that what
matters in the here and now and what is our national security
matrix on this particular day or this particular year.
We have to have the right balance between absolutely
looking for that nexus, making sure that our dollars go where
they are intended, looking out for things that are happening in
the hemisphere that have a direct bearing, or things that
relate to disease or the health of Americans for sure.
But we are also making investments now whose payoff may not
be evident for some years in the future.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Power, good to see you for the second day in
a row, and thanks again, to you and your entire AID team for
what you do for our country around the world.
I have some questions on Gaza and some on Sudan, two areas
where we are experiencing humanitarian crises.
First on Gaza, I am glad people are still at the table in
Cairo on a ceasefire and release the hostages deal. It is
essential that the world put pressure on Hamas to accept the
deal that is on the table.
In the meantime, we also need to address, as we discussed
yesterday, the humanitarian crisis being experienced by over 2
million Palestinians in Gaza.
Yesterday I asked you what changes the President and the
Biden administration want to see from the Netanyahu
government's approach to the war in Gaza, and you mentioned the
need to lift unnecessary restrictions on humanitarian aid, and
you mentioned the need to maximize civilian protection.
As you know, under the National Security Memorandum No. 20,
signed by the President the Administration must submit a report
to Congress by May 8, and that report must determine whether
Israel, Ukraine, and other countries using U.S. weapons in
conflicts now have over the last 14 months been sufficiently
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, whether
they have been complying with international law, and whether
they are using best practices to reduce civilian harm.
In that regard, I want to know whether you have seen a very
troubling article written by an Israeli investigative reporter
about the Netanyahu's government use of artificial intelligence
systems for targeting in Gaza, one called ``Lavender,'' the
other called ``Where's Daddy.''
Have you seen that investigative report?
Ms. Power. I have not, Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the report be placed in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
section at the end of this hearing document.]
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
So, look, if this report is true it has very troubling
implications regarding targeting issues, the kind of issues we
discussed yesterday.
So I ask two things. One is if you will read it--I have got
a copy here--and whether you will bring it to the attention of
your colleagues at the State Department. Can I get your
commitment to do that?
Ms. Power. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
On Sudan, and you know, I was there a number of years ago
when there was hope that there would be that transition to
democracy. Obviously, we have seen a complete deterioration in
the situation there.
We have, you know, at least two warring parties, one of
them headed by Hemeti with the Rapid Support Forces, as you
well recall because you have written about these things was
part of the Janjaweed and the really genocide in Darfur years
ago.
Can you talk about what AID is doing to help displaced
people in Sudan specifically with respect to those who are
coming across the border with Chad?
Ms. Power. I traveled last year back to Chad, all those
years after the genocide in Darfur when I was last there
meeting with Sudanese who had been targeted by Hemedti's
Janjaweed, and the conditions in Chad are very difficult for
Chadians in that area. It is extremely remote, not a lot of
access to water, really afflicted by climate change.
So of the billion dollars nearly in humanitarian support
USAID or the U.S. Government of which $600 million from USAID
has provided, a significant share has gone to U.N. agencies and
others working in Chad.
I will say, though, that the Sudanese Armed Forces, General
Burhan, has done something very problematic on top of all the
other problematic things he and Hemedti have done, which is
basically make it much more difficult for the U.N. to move
those convoys across the border to people who haven not been
able to make it to Chad, and so basically saying this is an
international border--you know, we get to decide what crosses
it--fine, but decide that humanitarian aid should cross and
reach your people, and he has authorized now one crossing
point, but it is very remote and not nearly sufficient to meet
the needs because people in Darfur, again, many would like to
get to Chad but have no means of making the long journey and
need food and resources where they are.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I look forward to
following up with you and your team on that as well.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of my colleagues today have talked about the
supplemental and the consequences of not getting the
supplemental, saying people are going to die.
I would reply to all my colleagues, both the House and the
Senate, that Americans are dying today of drug overdose. The
leading cause of death of young Americans in this country today
is drug overdose, the biggest part of that fentanyl, 70,000.
And I am talking about young Americans. I am talking 18 to 45,
leading cause of death.
Since the Biden administration's open border policy, in my
State, Nebraska, we have seen the impact of this. When I was
Governor, law enforcement in 2019 took 46 pills laced with
fentanyl off our streets. Just 2 years later that number had
skyrocketed to 151,000--2021, 151,000.
For the first 2 years of the Biden administration we saw
the amount of methamphetamine in our State double, fentanyl
triple, cocaine up by 10 times.
So yes, we want to take care of people around the world. We
need to take care of our people, and it is foolish, in my
opinion, to think that we can pass the supplementals additional
aid if we cannot get something done with our southern border.
To switch topics, I want to build on what Ranking Member
Risch was talking about with regard to UNRWA because, again, we
see a huge problem here with an organization that, as the
ranking member talked about, its textbooks preach hate and
killing Jews.
The schools were hiding weapons. We saw that the IDF
discovered in February that Hamas had an intelligence hub right
under UNRWA's headquarters in Gaza, which UNRWA denied knowing
anything about. Like you did not hear the people digging? It
seems incredulous to me that they could deny that.
So given the problems that UNRWA has had and not only has
with this current attack by Hamas in Israel on October 7, but
previously under the Trump administration they cut off funding
to UNRWA because of similar type problems--so this is not a
surprise.
This is an ongoing problem. So Administrator Power, my
question to you is there is an investigation going on. There is
an independent panel that has a final report yet to be released
but its interim report found that ``UNRWA has mechanisms in
place to ensure its neutrality,'' quote/unquote.
If those mechanisms are in place, why is this still a
problem, and how confident are you in the efficiency or
efficacy of these investigations and the U.N.'s ability to
properly and unbiasedly investigate itself?
Ms. Power. Well, let me say there, and just, again, USAID
does not fund UNRWA, and so there are others in our Government
who are more versed in the investigation and procedures.
But there are the two investigations, one, into the initial
list of 12 to 15 individuals who were named in these horrific,
despicable allegations, and then an outside investigation that
I think is independent and of which I think we have reason to
think it is independent looking at the policies and procedures
of UNRWA that could have given rise to a situation whereby
individuals who were plotting an attack and such horrors could
be members of an international organization or employees of an
international organization.
So those are the two investigations. I think the only thing
I would say is that, as I said in one of the earlier exchanges
but maybe just to elaborate, is UNRWA has the trucks, the
staff, the infrastructure, and a large number of UNRWA
employees are serving selflessly to try to address the famine
conditions in certain parts of Gaza and the imminent famine
conditions in other parts of Gaza.
And so I think that is just the other imperative here that
we are being very sensitive to, and again, USAID, the U.S.
Government, we are going to follow U.S. law. There should be no
question about that.
But it is hard to imagine how humanitarian needs can be met
even if access improves at the scale it needs to improve
without these workers, those who are not implicated in these
allegations being part of the solution.
The other thing I would say is that Hamas was the governing
authority in Gaza prior to October 7. I suppose we can have
some hope--I am not sure now we yet know the details of how
this will transpire--but that if Hamas is dismantled that the
governing structure who would be involved in decisions, for
example, around school textbooks and the like, that they would
go into a fundamentally different direction.
But at this point that is a long ways off, and that is with
regard to some of the things that caused the Trump
administration to cut off funding in the past like issues with
textbooks.
Senator Ricketts. Are there some recommended reforms that
you would recommend to UNRWA? Can you think of things that
maybe you have seen in your experience that UNRWA is not doing
that they ought to be doing, or things, given the what has
coming to light with regard to what UNRWA employees have been
doing with regard to perpetrating these horrible atrocities?
Can you think of some reforms?
Ms. Power. Again, first thing I would say is that I would
disaggregate UNRWA and look at UNRWA in Jordan, UNRWA in
Lebanon, UNRWA in Syria, UNRWA in the West Bank, UNRWA in Gaza.
Of course, there are procedures and policies across those
different areas, but I think it is really important to
understand, again, how completely unusual this is compared to
other international organizations or NGOs.
We do not have NGOs filled with teachers or doctors, but
UNRWA has taken on a kind of quasi-state role in some of the
places that I have mentioned.
I think clearly the vetting--if you have members of Hamas
who are perpetrating or alleged to have perpetrated attacks or
involvement in horrific terrorism of the kind that transpired
on October 7 and lives on through the hostages that are still
in custody, clearly, that is something that they are going to
want to think very differently about.
Senator Ricketts. One of the UNRWA employees was involved
in an attack on a kibbutz that killed 97 people and resulted in
26 being taken hostage. I mean, this is very, very serious
stuff for the UNRWA people.
So I know that I am out of time, but thank you,
Administrator Power.
Ms. Power. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Administrator
Power, good to see you. I want to stick with the discussion
about Gaza.
Mr. Chair, I would like to enter into a record an article
from The Hill that was from Sunday titled ``Cindy McCain says
Gaza on the edge of going over the cliff with famine and not
being able to recover.''
Cindy is the widow of our former Senate Foreign Relations
colleague John McCain, a dear friend.
I know, Administrator Power, you----
The Chairman. Without objection it will be included in
record.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
section at the end of this hearing document.]
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
I know you work closely with the World Food Programme and
you know Cindy McCain. Do you share that concern that she
expressed just 3 days ago that Gazans are on the verge of very
serious risk of famine?
Ms. Power. Yes. I mean, I think the report that was done,
which drew on, really, the gold standard of how we measure
these things is very clear on this matter, and WHO is already
reporting deaths related to conditions stemming from
malnutrition.
And to just put this in some context because it is clear
that the humanitarian circumstances were not great in Gaza
before October 7, but before October 7 there was almost no
child malnutrition whatsoever and now close to one in three in
northern Gaza.
And if you look at the severe acute malnutrition where you
measure with the circumference access is very difficult for
organizations that measure these things. But just from January
to February, not taking account the last 6 weeks, severe acute
malnutrition doubled among under five kids.
So we are and Cindy, of course, are USAID's great
collaborator, and her teams were very eager to get food in
there but also very specifically to address the under five
needs, which require ready to use therapeutic food so very
specific kind of assistance, and we are hopeful that some of
the changes that have been made and are being contemplated but
need to be made urgently by Israel will allow us to flow in
resources to nip what is a famine fundamentally in the bud.
Senator Kaine. I asked Secretary Austin yesterday at an
Armed Services Committee hearing whether growing famine or
medical catastrophe in Gaza would escalate violence in the
region, and he said absolutely it would.
The activities of Hezbollah in the north, the activities of
the Houthis in the Red Sea, the activities of Iranian backed
militias in Iraq and Syria, possibly activities of Iran itself,
will only escalate at a time when we need to be looking for
deescalation, a hostage deal, a ceasefire, deescalation in the
region.
So we have a compelling interest, we, the United States,
the world, Israel, Gaza, Palestine, to avert this widening
humanitarian catastrophe. Israel, of course, must defend itself
against any who would annihilate it, including Hamas, Hamas,
who carried out the attack, who celebrated it, who says they
will do it again.
But this should not be a war against Gazans or
Palestinians. It should be a war against Hamas, and one of the
main bits of evidence about what is it is the access to
humanitarian supplies, especially food and medicine.
We were getting about 500 trucks a day of supplies into
Gaza before October 7. It was in the single digits or dozens
for months and months and months. It took long to open the
Kerem Shalom border crossing.
I do applaud President Biden in his conversations last week
with Prime Minister Netanyahu subsequently. Kerem Shalom has
been opened wider in terms of more supplies in. There has been
a commitment to open the Erez border crossing, and we see the
pace picking up.
Israel has restored water service into the north of Gaza.
Israel has allowed bakeries to open again to make bread and
food for Gazans. The pace of the trucks per day exceeded 300
for the first time on Sunday and got near 500 on Monday.
But it has taken way too long, way too long, to get
supplies to suffering Gazans. Gazans are suffering under Hamas
not--they are not all Hamas.
And so I would just like to ask you, I know as USAID you
work with these NGOs, many of which were troubled, frightened,
scared, backed off of their activities after the attack on the
World Central Kitchen convoy.
Talk to me about what USAID can do in your remit to provide
more confidence that humanitarian aid can be delivered at
scale.
Ms. Power. Uh-oh. The poster board----
The Chairman. That is the next----
Ms. Power. Yes. No, no, I know. I know. I am just--he makes
an entrance.
The Chairman. You got to get through Senator Kaine first.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Power. So, look, what I would say is that I traveled to
the region last month, and the nature of my engagement kind of
mirrors the way you have played back some of the progress that
has been made lately which is saying to the IDF and to the
prime minister and to the government these things are going to
be done.
The situation is going to get so bad that these additional
steps are going to be taken. Just take them--take them now hard
as it is and understanding the domestic politics and public
opinion after what Hamas did, and unfortunately, a lot of time
has been lost. And the commitments are really welcome but the
commitments need to be executed including an additional
crossing into the north--not just the agreement to do it but
the actual crossing.
And you are right that the number of trucks is up, and that
is incredibly important, but I think we also need to give some
context here which is you are also right that 500 trucks were
entering before October 7.
But that was commercial. That was humanitarian. It was not
as if every family was in need of humanitarian assistance. Now
every family pretty much, I think, is in need of humanitarian
assistance, and if you think of the destruction of anything
that one had in their home, markets, granaries, arable land--
the bulldozing of arable land--and what you describe, which is
how few trucks were getting in over such a long period of time,
we just have so much catch up to do.
Apart from the fact that whole towns where people lived no
longer exist in the way that they did where more than half of
the buildings have been destroyed or damaged or are
uninhabitable in some fashion.
So this is just unlike any of the environments that I have
worked in in the past or our partners have worked in where
there is some kind of reliable place where people can either
start to rebuild their lives or imagine that the war ends, and
they can return to the lives they had and begin to grow their
land again.
I mean, all of that is going to take so long. So it just
underscores, again, the importance of passing the national
security supplemental request so we have the resources to help,
but understanding that the access issues and the protection
issues where humanitarians can actually do their work safely,
that those are commitments that have been made or followed
through on.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chair.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Power, welcome. You are here today asking the
committee to authorize USAID to receive and spend American
taxpayer money.
In your prepared testimony you noted that USAID teams have
been working day and night to send some of those resources to
the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip.
How much money has USAID sent to the Gaza Strip during the
Biden administration?
Ms. Power. Just first let me say that the Hamas controlled
Gaza Strip I think is not--I think the IDF would disagree at
this point that that is an accurate characterization. I would--
--
Senator Cruz. Who was the elected leadership in Gaza?
Ms. Power. No. No. That is, again----
Senator Cruz. That would be Hamas, right?
Ms. Power. Correct. But would you say that Hamas is
controlling the Gaza Strip now?
Senator Cruz. Well, thankfully, no----
Ms. Power. So I am--that is the whole point.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. Because the Israelis are killing
terrorists and the Biden administration is doing everything
they can to try to stop the Israelis from killing the Hamas
terrorists.
So my question, how much money has USAID sent to Gaza
during the Biden administration?
Ms. Power. I have not tabulated year to year what the
investments have been. But we--as you know, the previous
Administration cut off assistance to the West Bank and Gaza so
it took a year and a half for us to begin to----
Senator Cruz. I think it is an exceptionally bad idea to
give money to people who want to kill us.
Ms. Power. That is not USAID's approach.
Senator Cruz. I just want to be clear. You are testifying
today. You do not know how much American taxpayer money you
have already spent in Gaza but you want more.
Ms. Power. No. No, you are asking a question a specific
way, and I will get you the specific numbers.
Related specifically to Gaza, our resources often go to
grantees or contractors who are working in the West Bank and
Gaza. So you are slicing it narrowly to Gaza. I just do not
want to say something that is inaccurate.
Senator Cruz. OK. Well, let us try this from another
direction. Since Hamas's October 7 attacks the Biden
administration has surged aid into the Gaza Strip. Now, you are
not able to tell us how much.
Ms. Power. No, that was not your question.
Senator Cruz. But--well, OK, if you can tell us how much
since October 7 I will take that too.
Ms. Power. OK. We, I think, have announced between USAID
and the State Department somewhere around $100 million. But
that money has not necessarily moved into Gaza if you know what
I mean. I mean, this is to get money into the pipeline to get--
--
Senator Cruz. So how much has moved into Gaza since October
7?
Ms. Power. That I cannot say.
Senator Cruz. Well, there are U.N. and American Government
data bases that lists some of the aid. When you take a look at
the data bases for 2023 and 2024, you find about $40 million in
grants to NGOs and U.N. agencies that are marked confidential,
and you will also find that millions of dollars of that aid was
actually cash. Which NGOs and U.N. agencies received that
money?
Ms. Power. Again, I would want to go through and give you
the proper breakdown. But the partners that we rely on and
provide the most assistance to would be the World Food
Programme, UNICEF, International Medical Corps who, for
example, are running a hospital in southern Gaza seeing 600
patients a day.
The partners--if we are talking about the humanitarian
assistance, which is where we have surged assistance, we are
talking about trusted partners that USAID works with all over
the world.
Senator Cruz. So who are the individuals who have received
cash?
Ms. Power. The individuals would be, in the case of the
World Food Programme, which in order to keep markets going so
that people are not forever dependent on humanitarian
assistance, or to give people the ability to make it possible
for markets to exist, these are voucher assistance programs,
and they go to lists of beneficiaries who are identified by the
World Food Programme on the ground. So Gazans. Gazan civilians.
Senator Cruz. Well, when you say Gazan civilians how much
of the aid, cash or otherwise, do you assess that has been
diverted directly to Hamas?
Ms. Power. We do not have reports from our partners about
diversion by Hamas, and I would say as well that the government
of Israel is not shy about presenting to us evidence of things
that it finds problematic, UNRWA being the most glaring
example, and this is not something that has come to our
attention in other ways as well, and they are monitoring----
Senator Cruz. Well, I will say----
Ms. Power. To be very clear, Senator, just if I could say
one more thing. The government of Israel has eyes on everything
that goes into Gaza.
There is no other way in that does not go through COGAT,
and so it is really important to bear that in mind that the
system that has been in place since October 7 is the most
stringent and vigilant form of surveillance that I have ever
seen in my----
Senator Cruz. OK. So you say you do not have any evidence,
but if you take a look--you mentioned the poster board and let
us look. USAID's own inspector general says that Hamas diverts
humanitarian assistance. Specifically that the entire Gaza
Strip is a, quote, ``high risk for potential diversion and
misuse of U.S. funded assistance.''
The State Department makes the very same assessment. When
they restarted aid in 2021 over my objections and the
objections of many others, they made an internal assessment
that there was a, quote, ``high risk the aid would benefit
Hamas.'' That is the Biden State Department. That is the USAID
Office of the Inspector General.
What are you doing to stop this money from going to Hamas?
And to be clear, if you go online right now you can see videos
of Hamas terrorists riding on top of aid trucks. And so saying,
we do not have any evidence this is happening, when your own
agency says there is a high risk of this happening, that is not
credible.
Ms. Power. No. No. This is an entirely appropriate fraud
alert in the most complex operating environment on planet
Earth, which calls on USAID, the OIG staff themselves, and our
partners to be excessively vigilant and to remind partners that
they have to report----
Senator Cruz. Do you agree with the inspector general that
there is a high risk of Hamas diverting the aid?
Ms. Power. There is a high risk in any environment where
you have armed elements. That risk is there, and in, again,
this really, really unprecedented situation where you have such
a small number of crossing points and such intense focus not
only on the aid as it crosses, but also on what happens to the
aid with IDF soldiers patrolling through Gaza----
Senator Cruz. I have to say it is remarkable. You cannot
tell us how much money has gone into Gaza.
Ms. Power. No. No. You did not ask the question. That is
not fair, Senator.
Senator Cruz. You cannot tell us what has happened to stop
it from going to Hamas.
Ms. Power. You asked a totally different question at the
beginning. You said how much over the duration of the Biden
administration.
Senator Cruz. I asked it both ways.
Ms. Power. No, no. And then I answered. I said, roughly,
around $100 million, which it looks like is on your poster
board saying--this looks like that is what the inspector
general, the figure that he used as well.
So my point is this is exactly the right set of questions.
This is our responsibility to prevent diversion, to look into
any allegation. Our partners know that when something like that
happens they have to report it to the OIG and to USAID, and we
have a set of investigation measures and remediation measures
that we have to take when that happens.
Look, what you have is severe hunger, desperate civilians.
You definitely have--and again, the government of Israel
itself--this is something I talked to the prime minister
about--recognizes that the level of food scarcity in Gaza has
made civilians act in a manner that has undermined the
traditional humanitarian system, where it is very hard for
trucks even to get to their destinations because civilians come
and charge the trucks as you would and I would if our kids--or
we might if our kids were as hungry as kids in Gaza are.
So I think the main--I do not want to call it assurance
because we have to verify, then trust. But the main point I
would underscore is that the IDF is omnipresent in Gaza.
The Israeli government is omnipresent in the humanitarian
pipeline going to Gaza, and they retain the ability to keep
track of what is happening on the ground, and they recognize
that there is also a security and a huge stability risk--they
appear to recognize, I hope they recognize--of allowing so
little food to reach civilians who are in such dire straits.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. I had mentioned earlier, Senator Booker, we
thank you for your visit to Sudan and briefing many of us as to
the current humanitarian crisis in that area. So we thank you
for that, and you are recognized.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for this committee, and Administrator Power, it is great to
see you but even more it has just been great to work with you
and your extraordinary team who probably does not get the kind
of attention and gratitude they deserve as well.
I am grateful for that you are here. Listening to some of
my colleagues I share their urgency and an urgency I know you
share to deal with this gruesome, awful, tragic humanitarian
crisis in Gaza.
The urgencies are paramount to deal with the challenges not
just with the food insecurity and the near famine like
conditions, but also the medical needs, the trauma. There is no
way we can ever get to the peace and strength in that region
that that we urgently need or the independence and strength of
the Palestinian people relies upon us addressing this crisis,
and I am grateful for your focus.
But so many of the things that I am saying also could be
said about what is going on in Sudan right now, and it is a
crisis in terms of proportion that is perhaps the fastest
growing humanitarian crisis on the planet right now at a scale
and number that are even difficult to get your head around.
As you know, the conflict is causing a spiraling toward
mass famine in the Darfur region, which is accelerating the
refugee problem into surrounding nations.
As the chairman just said, I was in Sudan and have now
talked to many leaders within the State Department as well as
other aid workers who have been to that--where I have been, and
all of us have the same thing.
We have seen refugee camps from Syrian refugees in Jordan
to--I have been around this globe, but none of us have seen
anything like the level, the scale, the ocean of human crisis
that we witnessed there.
And what compounds this problem is it is not just the
hunger crisis and the famine like conditions, increasing
numbers. About 90 percent of the people you see are women and
children and the growing numbers of people that are
malnourished, facing starvation, who come but the endemic
nature of the sexual violence that is also really apparent.
And so we have talked about this in private conversations,
but the desperation of the aid workers I encountered who do not
know where the next resources are going to come from. Their
needs are less than 10 percent funded, and I am wondering if
you can speak to that.
And then the other area of questioning I want to do is, you
are dealing with a population that has been so traumatized and
victimized and brutalized that the need is not just food and
water, which is so apparent in that area that I witnessed in
Adre, but I am wondering how we can begin to address some of
the larger issues of trauma that are so destabilizing the Sahel
in general that really put us into a crisis after Niger,
Burkina Faso, Mali, that had everybody that I visited in that
region really concerned about how this crisis is going to
further destabilize the region if we do not begin to address
the full needs of the of the community of people who are
suffering.
Ms. Power. Well, I thank you, Senator, for traveling there,
for also the number of Senators who have spoken while you were
out of the room about your trip and you briefing on the trip
and the impression you have made on your colleagues is part of
what we need more of.
There is not enough focus. It is a very hard time now to
get attention irrespective of the gravity of harm that you are
suffering on planet Earth because the needs are so substantial,
up 40 percent this year from last year, and they were up last
year from the year before, and it is--the level, the pace of
increase, is really staggering. There is very little good news
or positive I can say, I guess, about Sudan except I think you
have engaged a lot with our new Special Envoy.
Fundamentally, there has to be a political agreement. We
are not going to humanitarian aid our way out of this
humanitarian crisis. The guns have to fall quiet. Even a
ceasefire--a protracted ceasefire would be something, would
allow more access.
So I am grateful that Special Envoy Perriello is on the
case, and U.N. Special Representative also now have an
empowered Special Envoy Lamamra. So that is politically--I
think it is, again, just a process point. It does not get us
anywhere until it does.
But I think it is better than not having that senior
engagement. There is also a pledging conference that the French
are convening in Paris, as you probably know, on April 15.
So I mentioned that the U.S. Government has given almost a
billion dollars over the last year, $600 million of which is
from USAID. But we have not seen other donors step up and do
their share.
Again, everything is connected to everything else with the
war in Gaza. They might be funding UNRWA in a way that we are
not, and they may say when we say what about Sudan.
And so it is very, very complicated just given the level of
global need, but I absolutely share your assessment and sense
of urgency.
And on the psychosocial just briefly, this is the--again,
the challenge, which is the sheer number of people dependent
on, as you said, basic food and water or medicine to stay
alive, and all programs come out of the same pot of money.
In order not to carry their trauma and become potentially
destabilizing members of their own community or be susceptible
to recruitment or just to suffer for the rest of their lives,
we need to supplement these life saving interventions with life
changing and healing psychosocial support.
We have programs like that in Sudan, but they are quite
modest, again, given the access issues and the primacy of
keeping people alive to get to the point where we can hopefully
do some of that follow on care.
Senator Booker. And I just want to be respectful of my
colleague from Illinois but just ask one more question. But in
the town of Adre on the border of Sudan and in Chad--Chad is
already one of our top 10 lowest income countries--less than 10
percent of the country is even electrified--and it is so urgent
for me to let folks understand that you even have Chad folks
suffering such poverty going to see if they can get aid from
the places that are being set up to deal with Sudan and Sudan
refugees.
It is such an interwoven a crisis that could really affect
that region, and so investments in humanitarian aid are really
investments in economic security, political security, and
basically dollars invested in supporting these populations save
tremendously more dollars, not to mention the efforts of global
competitors like Russia trying to exploit these areas.
And so I guess the one thing I will ask you and then yield
to my colleague, if you could just--I am trying to get you on
the record, and this implication for the world as well as for
what I saw in Chad in the town of Adre is the supplemental, and
a lot of people are casting the supplemental in terms of Indo-
China, in terms of Israel/Gaza, in terms of Ukraine, and these
are all incredibly urgent moments that capture a lot of the
attention of the public.
But when it comes to the supplemental's urgency for what we
see on the continent of Africa and the urgent importance of the
continent of Africa, could you just speak to that, why keeping
the humanitarian aid is so critical in the global context, but
specifically for Africa?
The Chairman. If you could be brief we would appreciate it.
We have covered it before.
Ms. Power. I will. Just to reinforce a point I made
earlier, which is that the word supplemental in the context of
humanitarian assistance is a misnomer because our base
humanitarian budget is down 40 percent in the 2024 bill from
what it was as enacted in fiscal year 2023 and needs.
We did not have the war in Sudan a year ago. A year and a
week ago, I guess, we got it. But this supplemental is not only
a life and death issue for the kinds of refugees we have been
able to sustain since that war began, but as you said, there
are all these dogs that are not barking because of U.S.
leadership, and it is very hard to do the counterfactuals and
so forth.
But how many of the people who receive humanitarian
assistance funded by the United States at these higher levels
that we had last year, what happens when those rations get cut,
when they cannot show up and get access to resources?
Where do they go? Where do the young men among them go?
There are plenty of players on the scene including Boko Haram,
who had a horrific spate of attacks in Chad as well as in
Nigeria and elsewhere.
ISIS and its affiliates--I mean, this is a pool of
individuals and who are themselves displaced but also those
host communities that have nothing to begin with that we have
to find ways to support to get through this crisis.
But we cannot just focus on the humanitarian without
attention to the political, because the real challenge right
now is wars are not ending. They keep getting added to the
ledger. Funding is actually going down, not up, even as needs
are going up, and even with the supplemental our funding will
be down commensurate to the need.
But investment in the diplomacy and the political processes
as well to put enough pressure on those players who are causing
this havoc and this devastation in the first place is key.
Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning, Administrator Power.
As someone who focuses a great deal on the Indo-Pacific, I
want to applaud the agency's focus on boosting economic growth,
economic resilience, and economic connectivity between our
allies and partners in the region, and I know firsthand that
this economic work is important, and it is what our partners
want.
The request submitted includes $2 billion in mandatory
funding over 5 years for State and USAID to support our
economic strategy in the region, and I wanted to invite you to
comment on how funding this request can provide real impact for
countries like the Philippines and Vietnam who are on the
frontlines of increasing PRC aggression.
Ms. Power. Well, only because I have traveled not that long
ago to Vietnam I would just highlight the strategic upgrade in
the relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and we
mentioned earlier Cindy McCain, and I often think of Senator
McCain, Senator Kerry, and the work that was done to plant
those seeds long ago, and now you have a comprehensive
strategic partnership with Vietnam, investments in young
people, in education, in their tech sector.
I just met with senior Vietnamese officials here a couple
weeks ago about their interest in building a semiconductor
industry that can have profound impacts for us and our supply
chain resilience.
I mean, really, the sky is the limit, and the opening by
the people, which is an incredible thing to experience going to
Vietnam all these decades after war and being so welcomed.
One of the things USAID has done is invested in the war
legacy issues including remediation of the toxins that were
left by Agent Orange in the war and addressing communities who
have been afflicted with disabilities and trying to support
them, but just the potential for that relationship to move
forward, the Philippines as well.
A major upgrade, I think, we are seeing in those dynamics,
and USAID's investments are in marginalized communities, people
who maybe have not been part of economic growth. But as those
countries seek to move toward more inclusive economic growth,
for us to be there to build their national capacities to deal
with disasters, particularly in light of climate change and all
the extreme weather events.
But again, I think we have come a long way, and a free and
open Indo-Pacific is so entirely in the interests of the
American people that it is something that we must continue to
pursue.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
And sort of moving on from your comments about the post-war
work that you are doing and the relationships that you are
building, I am interested in your perspective on interagency
cooperation on the ground especially across the three Ds of
diplomacy, development, and defense in places where USAID's
public servants are working in challenging and often hostile
environments.
Those of us who have had boots on the ground appreciate the
challenges of coordinating among multiple U.S. Government
agencies in conflict affected areas. But despite the challenges
our National Security Strategy requires the effective and
efficient use of all the elements of national power including
development assistance.
Can you provide examples of successful interagency
cooperation particularly between USAID and the Department of
Defense in recent humanitarian or developmental efforts?
Ms. Power. Well, let me say I think we and the interagency
progress every year on this and get stronger and stronger. I
think the civ-mil ties among our agencies you might even find
unrecognizable from the time of your service in the sense that
they are much stronger.
Just some examples--the number of detailees that we have
from the Defense Department at USAID. We have a senior
development advisor in each of the combatant commands around
the world.
And you asked for examples--the example of the large
airlifts of supplies into Al Arish in the early days of the
Gaza war by DOD. USAID funded supplies on DOD planes working
that through, obviously, the collaboration now on creating a
maritime corridor into Gaza.
I had mentioned earlier the number of natural disasters
that afflict the Philippines. It is just--and growing, it
appears. every year. The work that DOD has done with its
counterparts in building disaster resilience and we, USAID,
have done with our civilian counterparts, and I think the real
testament to a 3D mindset is DOD being the one to consistently
send the message of the importance of a civilian led response
when a national emergency--obviously, militaries can have
capabilities that need to be turned to in a difficult
circumstance but making sure that the response does not get
overly militarized.
Those kinds of messages coming from USAID is one thing, but
coming from our Defense colleagues just makes an enormous
difference.
Senator Duckworth. And I think it is also critically
important in places like Africa where you have some real
security challenges for your personnel on the ground as well, I
would expect.
Ms. Power. Yes. I mean, absolutely the--unfortunately,
between coups and conflicts the collaboration on basic
questions of the security of USAID staff, U.S. personnel more
broadly, but also questions around evacuations and contingency
planning, all of that is required and needs to be constantly
updated in light of the circumstances.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and thank you for your
continued service.
Ms. Power. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, Ambassador Power, let me make one
comment here about the humanitarian crisis we have in Gaza. It
is urgent. We have got to get aid in there. We have got to do a
better job.
But I mention that because currently there is active
negotiations in regards to a pause in hostilities and the
release of hostages, and it appears that Hamas is being
extremely difficult.
I would hope we would see more international pressure on
Hamas to release the hostages so that we can move forward with
closure for many Israeli families and many international
families.
There are 133 individuals that are still not accounted for.
We know some are deceased. We know some are alive. We do not
have--we never had international organization accountability on
these individuals.
I mention that because it is just a horrific humanitarian
crisis for the families of these hostages, of the hostages
themselves, and if we can get that resolved, and we can get a
pause, then we have a real chance to see major progress made in
regards to the humanitarian crisis within Gaza.
So we recognize we all need to do more. We need to pass our
supplemental so that you have the resources you need. We
recognize that may not be the immediate need in Gaza, but it is
still affecting all the other programs that you have, and you
do not have enough resources to do your basic international and
humanitarian assistance.
We have to do that. The Israelis have to be more
understanding on the gates into Gaza and to allow for the
distribution to take place. There has got to be more effective
international presence in order to deliver that aid, which a
pause in hostilities will allow us to be able to get all that
done and to bring closure in regards to the hostages that Hamas
took on October 7 in a horrific attack on Israel.
So I just really want to underscore the point. We are all
concerned about getting humanitarian assistance in. We have to
deal with that.
But let us also concentrate on Hamas that was the--the
terrorist attacks on October 7, the taking of hostages, which
was outrageous to start off with, including young children and
including women, in many cases civilians, not soldiers, and yet
they still keep from getting home these individuals and
allowing for closure for families on which we have had a
deceased individual. They are responsible for their safety, and
they are responsible for their immediate release.
The record of the committee will remain open until end of
the day tomorrow and the end of Thursday. We would ask that the
members get their questions in, and we ask, Madam
Administrator, if you would respond promptly to those
questions.
We started this hearing by offering our thanks for what you
do, and we recognize you operate in an extremely challenging
environment. Every day there is new challenges that you have to
confront.
I was very impressed by your comments that we direct the
pots of dollars as to where you can spend them for about 90
percent of the aid.
So that makes it challenging for you to make certain
adjustments, and we look forward to the fiscal year 2025 budget
to give you the resources you need to meet the challenges of
America.
With that, if there is nothing further from my colleagues
the hearing will be adjourned.
Ms. Power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
anti-corruption
Question. Corruption seriously disrupts the effectiveness of
development assistance. Corrupt actors frequently redirect aid funds
away from projects that benefit the majority of the population toward
smaller groups of people connected to corrupt officials and aid
intermediaries.
Where do you think anti-corruption activities are most important
and anti-corruption programs need enhancing, and are there certain
sectors where corruption is more prevalent in developing countries?
Answer. USAID agrees that corruption poses a serious threat to
development. It undermines national security and the rule of law,
stunts development, and saps governments of legitimacy, eroding faith
in democracy itself. That is why tackling corruption has been elevated
on USAID's agenda and why this Administration is prioritizing efforts
to promote accountability for corruption around the world.
Corruption has significantly evolved in recent decades to become a
globalized, networked, and pernicious problem. In response, USAID has
modernized and transformed its approach by pivoting to confront
transnational corruption, grand corruption, and kleptocracy. USAID's
programmatic efforts are aimed at addressing contemporary corruption
threats, while keeping pace with the drivers, enablers, and
manifestations of corruption today, especially transnational
corruption. The Agency marshals a range of capabilities during pivotal
moments for anti-corruption reform and backsliding--for which flexible
and timely sources of funding are critical--working to preserve or
enhance development gains, and to forge new partnerships and coalitions
to spur and sustain anti-corruption progress. Anti-corruption
activities are particularly impactful where there are opportunities to
support democratic openings, stop democratic backsliding, and preserve
or enhance development gains.
Countering corruption across sectors that impedes development
progress is another USAID priority. Corruption is deeply challenging in
developing countries, particularly where there are significant
resources and procurements involved, with substantial impacts on
individuals, households, communities, and countries. For example:
In the economic growth sector, 46 percent of companies
surveyed in 2022 experienced corruption, fraud, or other economic
crimes in the last 2 years.
In the health sector, over 80 percent of people in low-
income countries have experienced corruption--at an estimated loss of
$500 billion per year.
In the environment sector, corruption facilitates
poaching, the illegal timber and fisheries trade, and wildlife
trafficking, generating billions in illicit income every year.
In extractive industries, a country's national wealth is
frequently subject to misuse and corruption, particularly as the energy
transition creates unprecedented demand for critical minerals.
USAID is committed to countering corruption across our development
and humanitarian assistance efforts.
Question. How is foreign malign influence exacerbating corruption
in developing countries where USAID is working?
Answer. Foreign malign actors engage in transnational corruption as
a means to achieve their policy goals, but modalities vary by the actor
and the targeted country. In some places, a malign actor might exploit
weaknesses in political finance systems to fund a political party or
movement that is tailor-made to advance their interests. Elsewhere, a
malign actor may use kickbacks and bribes to gain control over a
critical sector of the economy, which it can then use as a lever of
influence against the target government. In other cases, inducements
and other tactics are used to influence media outlets and bias the
information a population receives. The strategic use of corruption by
foreign malign actors is deepening the already-pervasive challenge of
corruption in many of the environments in which USAID works.
However, there are strategies showing promise. For example, USAID
is supporting transparency measures that include beneficial ownership
registries, asset disclosure regimes for public officials and
candidates for public office, e-procurement systems, and the
publication of contracts and the terms of loans to increase citizens'
knowledge of the harmful impacts of transnational corruption.
USAID is committed to continue investing in research and analysis
to better understand the challenge posed by foreign malign actors and
develop evidence-based strategies for countering their corrupting
influence.
out-compete-china
Question. This is the second year that the Administration has
submitted an ``Out-Compete-China'' mandatory funding request, which
seeks $4 billion over 5 years to support international strategic
infrastructure projects and our efforts in the Indo-Pacific.
Why is the ``Out-Compete-China'' mandatory funding critical for
USAID's programming as we look toward fiscal year 2025? Can you explain
how this funding, if authorized by this committee, is a unique effort
to address strategic competition with China?
What opportunities would this mandatory funding create for USAID
to address the challenges posed by China in the Indo Pacific?
Answer. In response to the tremendous challenges and unprecedented
opportunities we face in the Indo-Pacific, the fiscal year 2025
President's Budget requests both mandatory and discretionary resources
to out-compete China, strengthen the U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific, and
advance American prosperity globally through new investments.
The PRC is the United States' only competitor with both the intent
to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Discretionary
resources alone cannot meet the need as the U.S. works to out-compete
China; it is crucial to our national security that we have mandatory,
reliable funding.
We have designed this mandatory package primarily as a vehicle to
innovate new ways to support our allies and partners around the world
by providing a viable alternative to the PRC's predatory and coercive
practices and expanded presence and offer alternatives at a scale that
discretionary spending simply cannot meet. The mandatory package also
provides us the ability to make longer-term investments that complement
and bolster our programming funded on the discretionary side.
The mandatory proposal includes $4 billion that will enable the
United States to invest in new ways to out-compete China and focus on
the following new and critical investments to:
Create a new International Infrastructure Fund, which will
out-compete China by providing a credible, reliable alternative to PRC
options, while also expanding markets and opportunities for U.S.
businesses. This fund will support transformative, quality, and
sustainable ``hard'' infrastructure projects, including along strategic
economic corridors.
Make game-changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to
strengthen partner economies, bolster connectivity between partner
countries, and support their efforts, including through multilateral
fora, in pushing back against coercive actions.
We are requesting $2 billion over 5 years to enable the United
States to make game-changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to out-
compete China that will allow for new initiatives in strategic sectors
that base discretionary funding alone cannot support. This funding will
advance U.S. interests and leadership in the region and demonstrate our
enduring commitment to our Indo-Pacific partners. We will support
competitive connectivity in the Indo-Pacific, making Indo-Pacific
economies more connected and resilient through transformative
investments in emerging technologies, supply chains, and
transportation, while also increasing opportunities for American
businesses.
These mandatory funds will allow us to work with our Indo-Pacific
partners to implement a robust regional approach to secure Open Radio
Access Network (ORAN) digital technology and other secure, high-
standards technologies that provide like-minded alternatives to the
PRC's predatory and coercive economic practices. Additionally, this
funding will enable the United States to coordinate strategic
investments with like-minded partners and incentivize lasting
commitments from host governments that advance longer-term, deeper
cooperation in countries most at risk of coercion and predatory
influence. Funding would be authorized and appropriated to State and
USAID (via the Economic Support Fund), with transfer authority to other
agencies such as DFC, EXIM, and USTDA.
The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-
Pacific, and while its ambitions span the globe, it is most acute in
the Indo-Pacific. In February 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration
released a new Indo-Pacific Strategy, focused on advancing a free and
open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to strengthen our long-term position
in and commitment to the region by building connections within and
beyond the region; driving regional prosperity; bolstering regional
security; and developing resilience to transnational threats.
While resourcing all elements of our Indo-Pacific Strategy is an
Administration priority, funding to advance our economic strategy in
the region is our top resource need.
democracy and elections
Question. 2024 is poised to be a consequential year for democracy,
with more than 60 countries holding national elections.
How will USAID--particularly through the newly established Bureau
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance--promote democratic and
transparent elections?
Answer. USAID began preparing well in advance--as early as 2020 in
some countries--for this pivotal year of elections. USAID is supporting
election-related activities in 25 countries holding elections in 2024,
involving an estimated 700 million registered voters.
USAID's elections and political processes support in 2024 spans a
wide range of programming, including: strengthening election management
bodies and political parties, supporting electoral reform and election
observation, enhancing voter education, promoting a more resilient
information environment, mitigating electoral violence, and bolstering
electoral justice. USAID's electoral assistance programming emphasizes
addressing barriers to the safe and meaningful political and electoral
participation of women, youth, and other marginalized populations.
The newly established DRG Bureau is strategically using its
resources to enhance and expand USAID's bilateral assistance for a
number of crucial electoral processes in 2024 and beyond. Utilizing
fiscal year (FY 2023) appropriated funds, USAID is providing
approximately $57 million to Missions through rapid response mechanisms
and direct funding aimed at enhancing the integrity of electoral
processes, responding to unanticipated openings or electoral events,
political transitions, and increasing women's political participation
and leadership. This includes the following in fiscal year 2023
resources: $27,279,000 under the Elections and Political Processes
(EPP) Fund, $15,900,000 under the Defending Democratic Elections (DDE)
Fund, $10,000,000 under the Advancing Women's and Girls' Civic and
Political Leadership Initiative, as well as approximately $4,700,000
under our Rapid and Flexible Response (RFR) capabilities under the
Democratic Elections and Political Processes (DEPP) global mechanism,
implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes
(CEPPS).
DRG is also leveraging its technical knowledge and engaging
interagency colleagues to better link electoral assistance with
diplomatic engagement for maximum impact.
For example, the DRG Bureau is collaborating with the Department of
State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to expand and
update an internal U.S. Government Interagency Elections Toolkit, which
helps Missions and Posts assess and oversee elections and political
processes support throughout the electoral cycle. The new toolkit
resources launched this year focus on emerging issues, including
countering foreign electoral interference and policy tools to promote
democratic elections.
USAID's DRG Bureau has also recently played a key role in helping
form and launch the Global Network for Securing Electoral Integrity
(GNSEI), which is the first standing platform promoting coordination
and cooperation among roughly 30 leading election integrity
stakeholders.
Question. How will USAID bolster support for the work of democracy
activists, human rights defenders, and other reformers on the ground?
Answer. Around the world, human rights defenders (HRDs), democracy
activists, anti-corruption champions, elections observers, and other
reformers on the ground are subject to frequent harassment, attacks,
threats, and intimidation. USAID has a role to play in enhancing their
protection.
USAID has a comprehensive approach to supporting human rights
defenders by preventing violations they face; addressing their
physical, digital, and mental health needs; and responding to abuses
after they occur. At the second Summit for Democracy in March 2023,
USAID committed to enhance the security, safety, and well-being of
implementing partners (IPs) and program participants (PPs). To
implement this commitment, the DRG Bureau had over 200 consultations
with Missions and with 100 HRDs and their supporters to identify best
practices and lessons learned. DRG compiled all these best practices
into a Risk Mitigation, Prevention, and Response Toolkit for USAID
Missions and USAID staff to use when designing and implementing foreign
assistance, especially in closing and closed spaces. USAID is in the
process of finalizing this toolkit for dissemination.
USAID/DRG offers substantial support to HRDs and other reformers
through various initiatives including:
The Justice, Rights, and Security Rapid Response
Assistance Activity (JRS-RRA) provides support to HRDs to meet urgent
and unforeseen human rights, justice, and security-related needs and
windows of opportunity.
The DRG Bureau's Human Rights Grant Program (HRGP) enables
Missions to address emergent human rights challenges, including
preventing and responding to human rights violations against HRDs.
Through the Powered by the People (PxP) activity, USAID's
partners launched the BETA version of a Global Activist Help Desk, a
secure, one stop shop for civic actors around the world to request a
wide range of support including short and long-term grants, training,
rapid response, relocation assistance, digital safety, and psychosocial
support.
For at-risk journalists and media outlets, the Media
Viability Accelerator (MVA) aims to enhance media sustainability by
building longer term media financial viability, and includes a Flexible
Response component designed to tackle emergencies like economic crises
or political instability. The International Fund for Public Interest
Media (IFPIM) supports independent journalism globally with substantial
funding from various sources, ensuring the continuation of trustworthy
media in hostile environments.
The Empowering the Truth Tellers (ETT) initiative
strengthens investigative journalism worldwide, including by enhancing
national mechanisms for journalist and activist protection and
attending to investigative journalists' physical, digital, and legal
needs.
In addition, a new global activity, Civic DEFENDERS,
launching this year, will support local civil society, independent
media, and human rights defenders to better prevent, mitigate, and
respond to digital repression in their own contexts, particularly in
closed and closing spaces.
USAID provided input into the Human Rights Defender Protection Act
of 2024 draft legislation, that you and your office are leading, by
incorporating language on preventing attacks against HRDs, protecting
their physical security and well-being, and responding to abuses when
needed. We look forward to continuing conversations about what we are
doing to protect HRDs globally.
localization of aid and programs
Question. The fiscal year 2025 budget request hardly details any
specifics on the advancement of USAID's localization of assistance
efforts.
How is USAID advancing localization across programs and is this
still a priority for the Agency?
Does localizing of assistance compromise the effectiveness (or
outcomes) of USAID's programs?
Answer. Localization remains one of USAID's key priorities and cuts
across the work of all the Agency's sectors and geographies. USAID is
planning to release its Localization Progress Report for Fiscal Year
2023 by the end of June. The report will provide updates on USAID's
direct local funding progress as well as lessons from the pilot of a
new metric designed to track how USAID is elevating local leadership
across all of its programs. Once the report is out, the Agency would be
happy to have a conversation with your staff to discuss progress and
priorities around this critical work moving forward.
Over the last year, USAID has undertaken a number of efforts to
underpin future progress on our localization goals of shifting more
funding and decisionmaking power to local actors. These include:
Updating existing guidance and developing new tools and
resources to support staff to work in more locally led ways, including
through teams like Local Works, the New Partnerships Initiative, and
localization working groups formed across all Agency bureaus and
missions.
Developing new and updating existing policies and
associated tools to bring greater coherence to why and how to invest in
the Agency's local partners. For example, USAID's Local Capacity
Strengthening Policy has both set a new standard for approaching local
capacity strengthening among our OECD-DAC partners, but it is also
being recognized for how USAID policies should be created in the first
place--with strong consultations among our local partners.
Reducing barriers to entry for local partners through
increased outreach, expanded use of local languages, more flexible and
tailorable pre-award assessments for local partners, and more.
Focusing on partnering better, such as by expanding the
use of mechanisms with fewer compliance burdens, taking steps to
support partners' full cost recovery, and encouraging staff to reduce
reporting burdens.
There is considerable agreement among those who work in
development, as well as some academic literature (e.g., Honig 2018,
Campbell 2018, Andrews et al, 2015, USAID 2022) that suggests that the
incorporation of local priorities, local knowledge, and local
accountability and feedback structures is a key contributor to more
effective and successful programs. Studies of individual projects that
look specifically at issues around ownership also often bear this out.
There are a range of approaches that can advance locally led
development. To the extent that the question posed is about the
approach of funding local partners directly, evidence does not suggest
that direct local funding compromises USAID's effectiveness. For
example, a study comparing international and local partners' delivery
of PEPFAR programs in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 found that
while programs by local partners exceeded some targets and performed
somewhat less well than international partners on other targets, the
overall quality of service delivery was comparable between local and
international partners.
USAID's Mission in Serbia also recently conducted an evaluation
examining the development benefits of working through local partners.
They highlight contextual knowledge, relationships and connections,
high motivation, and sustained engagement in the local system even
after the award ends as key values of direct local partnerships.
Indeed, when we articulate that the outcomes of interest are not just
sectoral indicators but investment in local systems, the calculus for
more engagement of local partners becomes even stronger.
That said, funding a local partner directly may not always enable
sustainable outcomes and development. Context matters enormously, which
is why USAID defers to Missions to set their own targets for local
partnerships, bearing in mind factors like the operating environments
for local organizations (i.e., civic space), the capacity and appetite
of local organizations to manage U.S. Government funding, Mission
capacity, and a range of other contextual factors. This is also why
USAID frames its localization goals not just around direct local
funding, but also around the many ways we can structure our work to
elevate local voices regardless of the type of implementing partner.
climate and the budget
Question. U.S. leadership on climate action is essential to solving
the climate crisis and meeting the universal goal of keeping global
temperatures from increasing by 1.5 degrees Celsius.
Please explain how USAID accounts for spending on climate programs
and how you may delineate budget items that have a reasonable climate
action component, but not exclusively or directly serve efforts to
combat or adapt to the effects of climate change?
Answer. The U.S. Government (USG) international climate assistance
funding falls in two categories:
``Direct'' climate investments through activities
supported by funds allocated specifically for one of the three pillars
of our climate change assistance funding: Adaptation, Clean Energy, and
Sustainable Landscapes.
``Indirect'' climate investments through activities
supported by funds allocated for other primary purposes, and which
deliver climate benefits. For example, a program that helps farmers who
are vulnerable to climate change access and use drought-tolerant seeds
would be categorized primarily as a direct food security activity, and
as an indirect climate activity, as the secondary benefits are
attributable to USAID's climate adaptation objectives.
The President's fiscal year 2025 request includes $3 billion total
for direct and indirect climate programs. The Department of State and
USAID request direct climate adaptation, clean energy and sustainable
landscapes funding as well as the planned scope of indirect adaptation,
clean energy, and sustainable landscapes programming that complement
the other sectoral funding requests. The direct climate programs
request of $1.36 billion is balanced along with other Administration
priorities and represents programs whose first objective is to achieve
climate adaptation, clean energy, and sustainable landscapes outcomes.
The indirect climate request of $1.67 billion is aligned with
Administration priorities and is built into the President's fiscal year
2025 request. These Mission requests are reviewed by Washington
stakeholders, including USAID and the Department of State, and
represent attributable, secondary climate objectives complementing the
primary objectives of other USG foreign assistance programs.
regional migrant integration
Question. More than 500,000 people crossed the dangerous Darien
jungle region between Colombia and Panama in 2023, and early estimates
showing an increase to more than 700,000 in 2024, our assistance and
partnerships in the region.
Where can you demonstrate that increasing our investments in legal
pathways and supporting migrants to integrate across the Hemisphere
bring tangible results that can stem irregular migration flows to
reduce pressure at the U.S. border?
What are the risks of not expanding this aspect of USAID's work?
Answer. There is some preliminary evidence that investing in legal
labor pathways and helping migrants integrate across the hemisphere may
reduce the need for irregular migration. For example, a 2023 study \1\
comparing communities in Guatemala found that when more temporary
worker visas are available, more individuals take advantage of those
legal pathways rather than migrating irregularly. \2\ In addition, the
study found that families of regular migrants have a better general
economic situation--lower levels of poverty and food insecurity, access
to diverse food, among other development outcomes--and that more
frequent and larger remittances sent by regular migrants are channeled
into investments that improve quality of life and generate income and
development in the migrants' communities of origin over the long term.
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\1\ https://reliefweb.int/attachments/4952a588-ee56-4604-a143-
94360e592b93/Impact-of-regular-temporary-migration-to-Canada-and-the-
U.S.-FINAL-INFORM-2023.pdf
\2\ Specifically, the percentage of households with irregular
migrants in communities with greater access to temporary worker visas
was 19 percentage points lower than communities with fewer temporary
worker visas: 11 percent of households in communities with more
temporary worker visas compared to about 30 percent in communities with
fewer temporary worker visas.
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Helping regularize and integrate migrants across the countries
where we work in the Western Hemisphere is another critical element of
the USAID approach to addressing migration. Research confirms that
regularized migrants are less vulnerable to exploitation due to their
ability to seek help or access services that are designed to protect
them. And when migrants have legal status, they can access jobs,
schools and education programming where they are, reducing their need
to move elsewhere to meet their needs. Further, according to an April
2024 UNHCR report, just 19 percent of migrants surveyed transiting the
Darien between January and March reported having valid documentation in
another country.
The risks of not expanding this work include the potential that
more migrants may opt to go to the U.S. irregularly. Additionally, not
expanding this work may also increase the vulnerability and possible
onward migration of the 9.8 million migrants in the region who are
already forcibly displaced outside of their home country and who would
potentially see their access to services and legal protection
inhibited.
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
presence and risk management
Question. Do you believe that the Agency's current risk tolerance
in medium- to-high-threat posts is appropriately tailored? Do you
believe that it should be improved, and if so, how? What will you do to
bring about that improvement?
Answer. The Agency's core mission and role in support of U.S.
foreign policy and national security objectives requires that USAID
work in a wide variety of fragile, non-permissive environments (NPEs).
Risks range from state failure, armed conflict, and other types of
violent instability due to corruption, susceptibility to natural
disaster, and political or macroeconomic disruptions, with many country
contexts vulnerable to multiple risks at the same time.
Through USAID's Enterprise Risk Management Framework, USAID
considers these risks as part of an interrelated portfolio and applies
the Agency's Risk Appetite Statement (RAS) which provides broad based
guidance on the level and type of risk the Agency is willing to
accept--based on an evaluation of opportunities and threats--to achieve
the Agency's mission and objectives.
In 2022, USAID conducted a full review and revision of our Risk
Appetite Statement (RAS) to ensure alignment with the Agency's
organizational priorities and operating context, including in medium-
to-high-threat posts. The revised document outlines eight different
risk categories: Programmatic/Development Outcome, Fiduciary,
Reputational, Legal, Security, Human Capital, Information Technology
and Operational (each with their own varying appetite of high, medium,
and low).
The RAS also defined the difference between risk appetite and risk
tolerance for the workforce. While risk appetite provides a higher
Agency-level statement on the levels of risk USAID deems allowable,
risk tolerance is the acceptable level of variance from the risk
appetite in performance relative to the achievement of objectives,
which can be set at a project/activity level. This means the risk
tolerance at the project/activity level in medium- to-high-threat posts
can be appropriately tailorable to each context.
With regard to maintaining presence in Non-Permissive Environments
(NPEs), USAID has a Medium risk appetite. USAID maintains Missions,
field offices, and temporary duty presence in conflict, post-conflict,
natural disaster, health emergency, or other insecure and/or high risk
environments. In these instances, USAID balances the likelihood for
security breaches and/or need to suddenly evacuate staff or allocate
additional security resources with the NPE's impact on U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives. In addition, USAID facilitates
mission critical travel in line with the U.S. Government guidelines on
health, safety, and security to address major overseas disruption in
Agency operations.
USAID operates with as much transparency as possible, while
balancing the imperative to protect workforce members, contractors,
partners, and beneficiaries who could face significant risks from
association with the United States. USAID supports workforce members
undertaking field visits coordinated and approved in accordance with
post management policies and by Regional Security Officers (RSOs) for
the purposes of: designing programs, monitoring implementation, or
providing oversight, among other mission critical purposes. However,
USAID harmonizes this desire with the discretion of the RSO, the
likelihood of security incidents, and the availability of effective
alternatives, including those that deploy technologies which reduce
risks (e.g., virtual site visits).
USAID also has a Medium risk appetite with respect to support for
USAID staff at hardship posts and in other difficult operating
environments. USAID staff can be assigned to hardship posts with
difficult operating environments to carry out the Agency's mission.
Staff in these situations must continually balance these assignments
with the potential for severe and unsustainable levels of stress that
might arise from exposure to threats, unprecedented workloads,
separations from family, and inadequate rest. To address these
challenges, USAID has expanded Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
services, particularly for those serving in high threat and/or high
stress, complex environments. EAP services provide enhanced tools,
knowledge, skills, and resources (with slight variations across hiring
mechanisms in the level of services available) to help staff and their
families increase stress awareness, develop resilience skills, stay
healthy, and continue supporting the USAID mission. Additionally, in
the event of major disruptions in overseas Agency operations, our first
priority is the safety and wellbeing of USAID staff while ensuring
adequate staffing at post to fulfill the Agency's mission.
USAID employs a variety of risk mitigation measures to counter the
risk of diversion as standard practice when making awards to
organizations implementing programs and can employ heightened risk
mitigation in the form of partner vetting when appropriate.
(SBU) To assist staff in identifying the inherent security risk
exposure associated with the operating context of a specific country,
the Office of Security (SEC) has developed a Country Threat Matrix
which scores the criticality of terrorist presence. This resource is
used in conjunction with the Risk Based Assessment (RBA) process to
reduce the likelihood of interference from sanctioned groups and
mitigate the risk of diversion of resources.
The Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention (CVP), located in
USAID's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS), helps
USAID Missions and staff overseas to design and deliver state-of-the
art conflict mitigation, violence prevention, and peacebuilding
interventions. The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) is
also part of the CPS and serves as USAID's primary point of contact
with the Department of Defense (DOD). The CMC also responds to the
National Security Strategy demand that development be a strong and
equal partner with diplomacy and defense in the collective pursuit of a
world that promotes peace, security and opportunity for all.
At the Assessable Unit (AU) level, USAID bureaus and missions
providing assistance overseas have controls to prevent and detect
fiduciary, counterterrorism- or sanctions-related, and security issues.
In parallel, the ERM function also identifies and mitigates potential
risks that may be associated with delivering aid related to a program
or activity. Despite these inherent risks, USAID meets this challenge
by using a variety of risk management techniques because the U.S.
Government has determined that the risk of inaction, or inadequate
action, outweighs the risk of providing assistance.
In conclusion, the Agency has a strong commitment to assisting
those in conflict-prone states and works through its various bureaus
and missions to determine the best course of action in each situation.
The current RAS enables Operating Units to assess risks associated with
the various components of their operating context, and tailor their
approach to risk management to both mitigate risk and capitalize on
opportunities with informed decisionmaking, aligned with U.S. foreign
policy objectives and the specific needs of the communities in conflict
zones.
Question. What lessons has USAID learned from its evacuations from
Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Sudan that may be applied in future
circumstances in which security conditions rapidly deteriorate,
particularly with regard to: early warning; staff evacuations, care and
support (including locally engaged staff and American Implementing
Partners); and remote monitoring to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse?
Answer. USAID is committed to taking steps to improve the
evacuation process to keep our workforce and Implementing Partners safe
and strengthen our operational readiness posture globally. This work is
coordinated through the Critical Coordination Structure in our Bureau
for Management which provides technical support for Mission readiness
planning, oversees the development of Mission Continuity Plans, and
evaluates Bureau and Mission readiness. More broadly, the Department of
State leads the relevant Emergency Action Committee at each post and
oversees all evacuations of American personnel, including USAID staff.
The following are specific examples of how USAID responds to
emerging crises and applicable lessons from such events, as well as
ways USAID is adapting our approach for when future circumstances may
necessitate an evacuation.
early warning and preparedness
In high threat posts, USAID has established or is
establishing Partner Liaison Security Officers to coordinate with and
support Implementing Partners through steady state and crisis events.
Mission leaders are encouraged to advocate for specific
Locally Employed Staff security requirements to be discussed and
included as part of the Emergency Action Committee and continuity of
operations.
USAID's Command Center and Critical Coordination Structure
(CCS) are constantly monitoring world events and U.S. Government
reporting/cables to scenario plan and determine when to facilitate the
coordination of key crisis support teams in Washington to respond to
various crises. These pre-planning calls include key Washington
stakeholders, as well as Mission leadership, and have been invaluable
in some of the aforementioned country contexts.
USAID continues to provide specialized personnel recovery
and preparedness training to staff at high-risk missions that includes
locally employed staff.
staff evacuations
In high threat posts, USAID is increasing preparedness
requirements, testing, and exercises to include periodic Mission
assessments, specific evacuation training, enhanced contingency
planning including surge staff support, and standardization of
administrative processes (e.g., travel authorizations and vouchering).
USAID continues to increase engagement and socialization
of operational readiness with USAID specific requirements via readiness
resources, products, and services to include Mission Continuity Plans,
tabletop exercises, and emergency preparedness training to build a
strong culture of readiness.
USAID developed guidance for extraordinary duties and
responsibilities staff must perform during evacuations to minimize
disruption and complete actions in rapid timeframes (e.g., records
destruction).
Staff at Posts are regularly engaged in accountability
drills to improve the consolidation process and ensure crisis
communications channels are functional.
USAID leaders and Mission leaders are encouraged to set
transparent expectations around evacuation processes to manage the
disruptive impacts on the workforce.
care and support--locally employed (le) staff
USAID is updating its Readiness Playbook for LE staff to
expand and clearly communicate the preparedness and crisis management
guidance issued in the Agency's internal operational policy.
USAID is developing clear policy and guidance for LE staff
on the support, special considerations, and potential financial offsets
that can be provided during a crisis.
Missions are fostering a culture of readiness at the
community level by developing warden systems, skills banks, go bag or
emergency kits, and other preparedness activities for LE staff.
USAID's Staff Care has available culturally responsive
psychosocial and emotional support services for LE staff to address
mental health and promote staff welfare.
USAID is developing standard operating procedures and
agreements so Missions can establish in advance which neighboring
Missions can assist them during a crisis with surge support or be an
alternate location to establish interim operations should evacuation
from post occur.
care and support--u.s. implementing partners
Although the duty of care for Implementing Partners is beyond
USAID's legal purview, the Agency is committed to ensuring Implementing
Partners can safely operate in disruptive environments and are provided
flexibilities to operate in alternate modalities based on country
context:
USAID's Partner Liaison Security Officers liaise,
communicate, and support Implementing Partners through steady state and
crisis events.
USAID is examining Agency policy based on past evacuations
to develop a matrix of options for authorizing evacuation costs and
allowances for Implementing Partners that aligns with USAID's fiduciary
risk posture.
USAID is ensuring all new acquisition and assistance
awards include language on safety and security plans that addresses
crises. For existing awards, USAID is working with the chiefs of party
on known flexibilities or crisis modifiers.
USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance has prepared
a Crisis Playbook to enhance operational readiness. This guide
consolidates lessons learned and transforms them into practical
recommendations for Contracting and Agreement Officers (COs/AOs) and
Washington leadership. It serves as a reference guide for preparing for
and responding to an emergency or evacuation. This playbook
consolidates long-term planning and award management recommendations as
well as considerations and messaging for effective coordination with
implementing partners.
remote monitoring
The fluidity of evacuations and removal of staff from post require
adaptive protocols to manage USG resources and taxpayer dollars:
USAID is developing protocols under two workstreams during
evacuation: (1) the first with a focus on operations and the safety and
security of the workforce; and (2) a separate workstream for
programming oversight, monitoring, and program pivots.
USAID's efforts to build monitoring capacity of trusted
local partners and interlocutors enables alternative oversight and
information in the case of evacuated personnel and program staff.
Question. With at least 22 different hiring mechanisms and outdated
assumptions about how specific missions, bureaus, and offices should be
supported, the agency is in desperate need of a modernized strategic
staffing plan that is flexible and adaptive to today's challenges.
When will I finally see USAID's comprehensive strategic staffing
plan that aligns positions, skills, and resources across the agency,
transparently and effectively streamlines hiring mechanisms, and
reduces reliance upon program funds, costly institutional contracts,
and Participating Agency Service Agreements (PASAs) to meet modern
staffing needs?
Answer. Given the complexities you noted, we are addressing this
through several significant efforts:
strategic workforce planning reform
The Workforce Planning and Program (WPP) Division in the Office of
Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) has been working steadily
and systematically to implement a realistic, practical, and sustainable
approach to workforce planning at USAID. As of April 2024, the Agency
is on track to have in place a new policy, i.e. ADS, on workforce
planning to establish the process for an ongoing, annual workforce
planning cycle. Understanding that workforce planning is a shared
responsibility between senior leaders, each operating unit, and HCTM,
USAID has built a stakeholder-supported approach that actively engages
all involved in an ongoing process to align the workforce, human
capital management strategies, and budget to cost-effectively advance
USAID's development and humanitarian assistance policy and programming
priorities.
This work has included:
Developing, piloting, and using workforce data and
analysis to provide insight into the current workforce and to provide
workforce data for decisionmaking.
Engaging senior leadership in developing the workforce
planning approach and their role in setting strategic direction to
obtaining buy-in and support for a more holistic and collaborative
workforce planning approach
Developing a workforce planning governance structure,
policy, procedures, and guidance; using senior leader direction,
stakeholder input, and lessons learned from pilot projects has resulted
in a more realistic, practical, and sustainable approach
In early 2024, USAID established the first-ever Agency Strategic
Workforce Planning (SWFP) Council as an advisory board to set strategic
direction, strengthen workforce planning at every level, and
institutionalize workforce planning governance, policy, procedures and
guidance. The SWFP Council is chaired by the Deputy Administrator for
Management and Resources with Assistant Administrator-level
representation from each Bureau and Independent Office.
The SWFP Council will contribute to developing a new Strategic
Workforce Plan in 2024. This Strategic Workforce Plan will align
positions, skills, and resources across the agency, with most (if not
all) of the following elements:
Direct hire position levels by FS and CS
Region and B/IO of those staff
Major workforce drivers
Overseas presence
Future look for next 3 years
Current overseas gaps
Changes to criteria to determine overseas presence and
assignments
Diversity initiatives
skills and competencies reform
Through the Skills and Competencies Reform initiative USAID is
transforming the way we capture and utilize skills data across all
talent management processes. This effort will enable the Agency to
associate skills with direct hire and Personal Services Contractor
(PSC) positions throughout the organization. By keeping skills data
current on positions, the Agency's employees, supervisors, leaders of
Missions, Bureaus and Independent Offices (B/IOs) will have up-to-date
information about the skills needed for specific roles across USAID.
This initiative will enable us to understand USAID's supply and demand
of skills, and therefore improve alignment of workforce planning
strategies, optimize the assignments process, focus upskilling and
recruiting efforts, and give more precise guidance to the workforce
regarding learning and development.
We have finalized a pilot of skills tagging by supervisors and
employees, with the goal of having a comprehensive view of the skills
makeup of our workforce and of the skills needed in the organization in
late 2024. After that collection, USAID will use the insights gained to
influence all aspects of the employment lifecycle, including career
path development, recruitment, and training. This holistic approach
will allow for data-driven decisionmaking, targeted learning
opportunities, and strategic talent allocation based on organizational
needs.
workforce composition
Our current workforce composition stems directly from a bifurcation
of our appropriations, with the requirement that our career Federal
employees be solely funded with Operating Expenses (OE) funds. While we
recognize that there are budgetary dynamics at play, in the past 4
years, our programming has grown by nearly 70 percent--but our
operating expenses have increased at half that rate. As a result, our
global workforce of over 13,000 staff includes approximately 30 percent
direct hire Federal employees and 70 percent contracted staff spanning
an array of staffing mechanisms: Civil Service (CS), Foreign Service
(FS), Civil Service Excepted (CSE), Foreign Service Limited (FSL), U.S.
Personal Services Contractor (USPSC), Third-Country National PSC
(TCNPSC), Cooperating Country National PSC (CCNPSC) also referred to as
Foreign Service Nationals (FSN), FSN Direct Hire, and Institutional
Support Contractor (ISC), as well as fellows, interns, and other short-
term staffing mechanisms.
The Agency is maximizing its use of available resources and
authorities to make progress toward effectively streamlining our hiring
mechanisms. For instance, we have used small increases in OE funds in
fiscal year (FY) 2022 and fiscal year 2023 to add nearly 300 new career
positions and created nearly 600 non-career Federal employee positions
using program accounts authorized by Congress for that purpose. Of
these 900 total new Federal employee positions, approximately 400
replace positions that were previously designated as contractors,
helping grow the proportion of our direct-hire Federal employee
workforce.
crisis operations staffing
Congress included language in the fiscal year 2023 Omnibus
Appropriations bill that allows USAID to use program funds for a civil
service excepted (CSE) mechanism for Crisis Operations Staffing (COS).
The $86 million appropriated will fund between 300 and 350 positions--
including salaries, benefits and other direct costs to support the
Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), Bureau for Global Health (GH),
and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Bureau for
Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS). The initial pilot
positions are intended to replace existing program-funded contract and
interagency agreement positions in these three bureau/offices. With
this authority, we can use existing program funds that we would have
used for Personal Service and other contractors to hire time-limited,
US-based staff in the Federal excepted service, to manage crisis
operations. This is not a permanent authorization and so USAID needs to
request this authority every year in appropriations.
Since we received the OPM authority last spring, we have hired over
100 positions: 71 in OTI, 18 in Global Health, and 17 in BHA. Through
COS, OTI has been able to hire back 81 percent of its qualified PSC
staff in non-contract positions. The government benefits have also
attracted more people from across the country to fill vacancies. We
have received over 30,000 applications for jobs in BHA, GH and OTI.
Many individuals would not have applied to the PSC jobs because of
fewer benefits (e.g., no retirement contributions, no group life
insurance, and limited health insurance options).
Question. Will the request for authority to hire under the Personal
Service Agreement (PSA) mechanism result in a reduction of Personal
Services Contractors (PSCs)? If not, why not?
Answer. The use of the PSA mechanism is anticipated to result in a
significant reduction of Cooperating Country National (CCN) Personal
Service Contractors (PSCs) overseas. The PSA mechanism will be piloted
in select countries beginning in September 2024. After the pilots are
completed and evaluated, USAID anticipates rolling out the PSA
mechanism worldwide over the next 18-24 months.
Question. If authorized, will PSA authority be applied exclusively
overseas? Are all Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) expected to be
converted from PSC to PSA? If not, where will PSA positions be
prioritized?
Answer. If further authorized, USAID anticipates many Cooperating
Country National (CCN) PSC positions will be converted from PSC to PSA
over the next 24 months. USAID will pilot the PSA mechanism in select
countries beginning in September 2024. After the pilot is completed,
USAID anticipates rolling out the PSA mechanism on a broader basis
starting in the next 18-24 months applying lessons learned from the
pilots.
USAID has a limited number of Foreign Service Nationals that are
employed as direct-hires. FSNs that are non-U.S. citizen direct-hire
employees are appointed under the authority of the Foreign Service Act
of 1980, as amended. Current FSN direct-hires remain in this status
until they leave the Agency or retire.
The current authorizing statute is applicable to individuals who
are providing ``services abroad''; thus, the rollout of the PSA
authority is limited to overseas positions.
Question. To date, USAID has exercised dangerously poor oversight
of its partners engaged in research of pathogens of pandemic potential.
What safeguards have you put in place to ensure that the resources
in the fiscal year 2025 budget request, as well as prior-year funding
that has yet to be obligated, are not directed toward partners that
have demonstrated poor compliance with U.S. requirements relating to
research of dual-use concern, data quality, data sharing, performance
standards, and fiscal controls?
Answer. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, USAID--and the U.S.
Government as a whole--has assessed its priorities and approach to
pandemic preparedness. This includes aligning resources to achieve the
commitments within the National Biodefense Strategy, weighing the
relative risks and impact of our programming (including biosafety and
biosecurity capacity), as well as determining how to optimally allocate
global health security resources.
Based on this prioritization and informed by ongoing engagement
with key stakeholders, in 2023 USAID determined that investments that
focus on the search for and characterization of unknown viruses, prior
to spillover to humans, do not effectuate USAID's current global health
security program priorities. USAID has issued guidance to GHS programs
worldwide to communicate this decision.
Further, USAID does not fund dual-use research of concern (DURC) or
gain of function research, and no fiscal year 2025 funds will be used
for DURC or gain of function research.
In addition, prior to making any assistance award, USAID conducts a
risk assessment in accordance with ADS 303.3.9, Pre-Award Risk
Assessment, which includes a review of the applicant's history of
performance. Typically, this is accomplished through past performance
references provided by AOR/CORs of previous government projects.
USG policies, processes, and guidelines on biodefense, health
security, laboratory biosafety/security, and non-proliferation
objectives inform USAID decisions on funding/support in other
countries.
Question. Does EcoHealth Alliance continue to receive funding from
USAID for any purpose, whether as a prime, sub-, or sub-sub awardee? If
so, where and for what purposes?
Answer. On May 15, 2024, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) suspended and proposed the debarment of EcoHealth
Alliance from participating in United States Federal Government
procurement and nonprocurement programs. Following this action, USAID
has taken the necessary steps to terminate the Agency's only active
award with EcoHealth Alliance--a conservation program in Liberia titled
Conservation Works. The activity supported biodiversity and
conservation efforts in Liberia by establishing and improving the
management of protected areas and supporting ecotourism and income
generation.
USAID has notified EHA that the Agency unilaterally terminated the
USAID/Liberia award with EcoHealth Alliance with an end date of August
15, 2024 and directed EHA to commence closeout procedures immediately.
Since the suspension, USAID has not obligated any additional funding to
EcoHealth Alliance.
Question. Does the term ``sexual and reproductive health'', as it
relates to USAID assistance, programs, and engagement in development
forums, include access to ``safe and legal'' abortion?
Answer. USAID does not fund abortions. The Agency takes statutory
restrictions related to abortion seriously and works to ensure
compliance with all applicable laws, including the Helms and Siljander
amendments.
Question. Can you confirm that all USAID grants and contracts,
including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for the
utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of account
and regardless of targeted health sector, include specific prohibitions
on the use of funds to perform or promote abortion, or lobby for or
against the legalization of abortion overseas?
Answer. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and USAID's
annual appropriations acts set forth a number of statutory restrictions
related to abortion, including the Helms, Leahy, Siljander and Biden
Amendments. These restrictions apply to all U.S. foreign assistance
funds, including through subawards and subcontracts, across all sectors
and partners, and have been in place for a number of decades. USAID
implements the restrictions related to abortion through mandatory
standard provisions and contract clauses included in our grants and
contracts.
Question. Can you confirm the same for all USAID grants and
contracts, including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for
the utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of
account, to promote human rights and gender equality?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Is access to ``safe and legal'' abortion included among
the health, human rights, and/or gender equality initiatives that USAID
seeks to advance through utilization of U.S. foreign assistance
funding?
Answer. USAID does not fund abortions. The Agency takes statutory
restrictions related to abortion seriously and works to ensure
compliance with all applicable laws, including the Helms and Siljander
amendments.
Question. What reforms are you seeking to through the Farm Bill
process, in order to make U.S. food aid more efficient and effective?
Please be specific.
Answer. USAID continues to be grateful for Congress' commitment to
combating global hunger, including by ensuring that the Food for Peace
Act remains fit-for-purpose to address current humanitarian challenges.
During this Farm Bill reauthorization process, USAID is proposing
technical changes to the Food for Peace Act to make U.S. food aid more
efficient and effective.
First, USAID is proposing to increase the efficiency of both
emergency and non-emergency food assistance programs by shifting some
U.S. commodities from Title II non-emergency programs to emergency
programs. This change would maintain the same level of commodity
procurements from U.S. producers while offering implementing partners
more choice in designing non-emergency programs to address the root
causes of hunger.
Additionally, current law requires our partners to use commodities
in non-emergency food assistance programs even when other forms of
assistance would be more effective or appropriate. Giving partners more
choice in programming would improve the outcomes of these programs and
help decrease reliance on U.S. assistance in the long term. For
example, partners can address chronic food consumption gaps caused by a
lack of agricultural productivity in communities by providing training
and tools to farmers.
USAID is also proposing that Congress consolidate the complex
accounting requirements within the Food for Peace Act. Current law not
only requires that USAID partners assign costs to specific categories,
but also requires USAID staff to track and validate expenditures on a
real-time aggregate basis to stay within specific statutory earmarks,
on top of determining that costs are allowable as reasonable and
necessary expenses on an award-by-award basis, as is done for most US
Government expenditures. Determining how each cost should be
categorized, or how costs should be divided across categories for the
current, complex accounting process is a massive burden on our staff
and partners, often requiring custom-built accounting systems. We
estimate that streamlining cost categories could save USAID more than
1,600 staff hours per year. This change would make Title II operate
more similarly to other accounts administered by USAID, such as
International Disaster Assistance, which do not have cost categories.
Under current law, one USAID partner estimated that the cost of
administering this system for their organization is about $1.3 million
per year per nonemergency program. Streamlining the cost categories
would reduce these administrative costs, translating to up to 20,000
additional people receiving food assistance each year or up to 10,000
additional people benefiting from livelihood activities like seeds,
livestock feed, or other inputs.
Question. What are the current cost differentials between USAID's
existing food aid modalities, including: (1) food aid provided in the
form of ``market-based assistance,'' such as biometrically verified
electronic transfers and vouchers; (2) food aid commodities procured
locally or regionally; and (3) food aid commodities procured and
shipped from the United States?
Answer. Decisions on modality are largely driven by context to
achieve the best efficiency and effectiveness of program options. Costs
vary by the country, the size of the food basket/ration being targeted,
the partner, and market conditions at the time of purchase. The Bureau
for Humanitarian Assistance country teams include cost analysis in the
decisionmaking process. A number of local factors affect cost-
efficiency at the response level. As an example, in South Sudan, to
meet half of a person's caloric needs for 1 month through the World
Food Program would cost $18.26 using market-based transfers, $14.22
using locally procured sorghum, and $18.29 using Title II commodities
as of November 2023. In this example, there is a particularly expensive
environment for market-based transfers due to the low capacity of the
banking system. Additionally, the in-kind options in this example use
very large purchases due to the high number of beneficiaries, taking
advantage of some economies of scale.
Other examples include:
In Niger, a basket to meet 65 percent of a person's
caloric needs for a month cost $21.97 for Title II, $13.09 for Local,
Regional, and International Procurement (LRIP), and $7.98 for market
based transfers in November 2023.
In Madagascar, in March 2024, to meet 50 percent of a
person's caloric needs for a month cost $12.05 with Title II, $12.23
with LRIP, and $7.94 using cash transfers.
In Burkina Faso, costs are very high due to the air
operation into the north and the transitional authorities not allowing
the use of cash or vouchers, but to meet 100 percent of a person's
caloric needs for a month cost $64.06 using Title II and $63.53 using
LRIP in January 2024.
In Somalia, in April 2024, to provide 80 percent of a
person's caloric needs for a month cost $25.35 for Title II and $17.52
for either market-based transfers or food vouchers.
Question. What is the current cost differential between U.S.-
flagged and foreign-flagged ocean transport vessels carrying U.S. food
aid commodities overseas?
Answer. In fiscal year 2023, the average freight cost per metric
ton (MT) for a US flagged vessel was $170.53/MT for bulk vessels and
$255.81/MT for liner vessels ($196.19/MT cumulatively). In contrast,
the average cost per MT for foreign flagged vessels was $70.34/MT for
bulk vessels and $176.71/MT for liner vessels ($88.81/MT cumulatively).
US flagged vessels were, on average, 142 percent more costly than
foreign flagged vessels for bulk vessels and 45 percent more costly for
liner vessels (121 percent cumulatively).
Question. To your knowledge, how many U.S.-flagged ocean transport
vessels carrying U.S. food aid overseas remain in the U.S. commercial
fleet? By whom are they owned?
Answer. There are currently only four U.S.-flagged dry bulk vessels
eligible to participate in the food aid program: Liberty Grace, Liberty
Glory, Liberty Eagle, and Schuyler Line Navigation Company's (SLNC)
Severn. The three Liberty vessels are owned by the Liberty Maritime
Corporation. The SLNC Severn is owned by Oldendorff Carriers GMBH co.
For non-bulk vessels, the following 13 U.S.-flagged vessels
transported U.S. food aid in fiscal year (FY) 2023 and fiscal year 2024
to April: Maersk Atlanta, Maersk Chicago, Maersk Columbus, Maersk
Denver, Maersk Detroit, Maersk Hartford, Maersk Idaho, Maersk
Kensington, Maersk Kinloss, Maersk Pittsburgh, Missouri Express,
National Glory, and President Wilson. The Maersk vessels are owned by
Maersk Line Ltd, Missouri Express is owned by Hapag-Lloyd AG, National
Glory is owned by National Shipping of America NSA, and President
Wilson is owned by APL/CMA.
Question. In fiscal year 2023, how many Ocean Transportation
Requests for Proposal (RFPs) were issued by USAID? fiscal year 2024, to
date?
Of those RFPs, how many received bids from more than one U.S.-
flagged carrier? How many received no bids from U.S.-flagged carriers?
Answer. Requests for Proposal (RFP) are defined as individual
freight solicitations issued by USAID. There are multiple parcels to
several destinations on an individual RFP.
1. RFPs issued
FY 2023. Packaged RFPs: 17. Bulk RFPs: 11.
FY 2024 to date (as of end of April 2024). Packaged RFPs: 8. Bulk
RFPs: 5.
2. RFPs receiving more than one U.S. flag offer
Identifies the number of RFPs where two or more U.S. flag (P1)
offers were received on a single parcel. Other parcels within the same
RFP may have received only one or zero U.S. flag offers.
FY2023. Packaged: 1. Bulk: 3.
FY 2024 to date (as of end of April 2024). Packaged: 0. Bulk: 0.
2a. RFPs receiving no bids from U.S.-flagged carriers
Identifies the number of RFPs where zero U.S. flag (P1) offers were
received on a single parcel.
FY 2023. Packaged: 0. Bulk: 2.
FY 2024 to date (as of end of April 2024). Packaged: 0. Bulk: 0.
Question. Does USAID play a role in the Vision for Adapted Crops
and Soils (VACS) initiative? If so, what role does it play?
Answer. USAID invests significantly in crop improvement, building
healthy soils, and improving agricultural practices through Feed the
Future, which the objectives of the Department of State's VACS align
with. As such, some of the activities and funding announced as part of
VACS are managed by USAID and implemented through its partners. Climate
smart varieties of seeds and productive soils are needed to tackle the
long-term challenges to resilient food systems and agriculture-led
growth. As a global movement seeking to mobilize resources from
multiple public and private sector sources for resilient seeds and
healthy soils, VACS builds on the U.S. government's work in these areas
through Feed the Future. Moving forward, USAID and the Department of
State will continue to coordinate on these issues.
Question. According to the World Food Program, there are nearly 800
million people currently facing chronic hunger around the world. USAID
is requesting a total of $171 million in fiscal year 2025 for its
global nutrition programs, an increase of $6 million over the fiscal
year 2024 enacted.
If approved, how will these additional resources be deployed?
Answer. USAID nutrition programming is centered on supporting
governments in improving the quality, coverage, and financing for high-
impact, evidence-based nutrition interventions. The fiscal year (FY)
2025 Request for global nutrition programs includes $160 million in
Global Health Programs-USAID resources, as well as $11 million in ESF
and $500,000 in AEECA funds. If approved, the requested additional
fiscal year 2025 resources will be deployed in support of nutrition
programming in Afghanistan and Jordan (ESF) and Kyrgyz Republic
(AEECA). Consistent with the priorities outlined in USAID's Global
Malnutrition Prevention and Treatment Act of 2021 (GMPTA)
implementation plan, requested GHP-USAID resources will be prioritized
to bring critical, high impact nutrition services to vulnerable
populations, especially children under 5, and pregnant and lactating
women. This includes scaling up coverage of nutrition-specific
interventions. All efforts to strengthen nutrition service delivery
will be supported by collection of better nutrition data at all levels
and rigorous monitoring and evaluation of programs.
Question. How is nutrition being elevated within Feed the Future
and Food for Peace development programs?
Answer. Guided by USAID's Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Strategy, USAID
takes an integrated approach to nutrition under the USG Feed the Future
Initiative (FTF). USAID's recent appointment of Chief Nutritionist Dr.
Patrick Webb underscores USAID's steadfast commitment to elevating
nutrition with Feed the Future and Food for Peace development programs.
In the USG's updated Global Food Security Strategy, as a key
pathway to achieving our overarching nutrition related goal of reducing
stunting, we have explicitly stated our intention to expand access to
safe, affordable and healthy diets as a central aim of FTF. Globally,
11 million deaths per year are associated with poor diets, which is
unacceptable. For the first time, we have set a global target for FTF
of improving women's dietary diversity. Requiring ourselves to report
on this key outcome reflects a renewed commitment to doing and
achieving the things that really matter for nutrition and healthy
diets. And we know we can achieve the impact we seek. A good example
comes from our FTF programming in Uganda. At the end of 2022, we
implemented a population-wide survey in our geographic target zone. We
found both a significant improvement over time in both young children
and women's diets. We are also making greater investment in food
systems, as these systems safeguard the way that we produce, process,
move and consume food. And when these systems fail, we see it directly
in the poor diets of vulnerable families and communities.
Additionally, FTF programming is tackling the interrelated
challenges of nutrition and climate change. A good example of this is
our increasing investments in food safety and reducing food loss and
waste. We need food to be safe and nutritious, and we must
significantly reduce food loss and waste, particularly of nutrient-rich
perishable foods that are fundamental to a diverse, nutrient-rich diet.
This focus expands access to and affordability of nutritious foods. In
September 2023, we announced a new $10 million food loss and waste
accelerator fund focused on supporting small businesses to address
food, loss, and waste in their supply chains.
Nutrition has historically played a significant role in USAID's
Resilience and Food Security Activities, as well as the resilience
activities funded in part through Title II Food for Peace and targeted
toward populations at frequent risk of shocks impacting food
insecurity. Nutrition objectives have been integrated into the design,
implementation, and monitoring of these activities, with an aim of
preventing malnutrition in the most vulnerable subgroups of the target
population, namely children under five and pregnant and lactating
women. Activities are designed around the local nutritional context and
address the contextual determinants of malnutrition, including access
to safe and nutritious foods, care and feeding practices, and access to
health care. These components are integrated within a larger model,
ensuring that nutrition remains central to a larger food security
focus. We know that this holistic, tailored approach works to improve
nutrition outcomes for the poorest of the poor. For example, recent and
ongoing Resilience and Food Security Activities in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe,
and Kenya demonstrate that combining intensive nutrition interventions
with livelihood programming can improve key nutrition outcomes,
including children's diet quality, wasting, and stunting.
Question. When, if ever, will USAID make available information on
contractors and subgrantees on the foreign assistance dashboard,
www.foreignassistance.gov?
Answer. The most effective approach to enhancing publicly reported
data quality for first-tier subawardees under USAID prime awards would
be for enhancements to be made to the Federal Funding Accountability
and Transparency Act Subaward Reporting System (FSRS.gov) for which the
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) serves as the business
owner. Prime contractors and grant recipients report first-tier
subcontracts and subawards in FSRS under the parameters included in
their award terms (e.g., FAR 52.204-10, 2 CFR 170 Appendix A).
The Office of Management and Budget has designated FSRS as the
system of record for Federal department and agency subaward reporting.
USAID does have two other systems in which prime partners may directly
enter data. These are the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)
and the Development Information Solution (DIS). The primary purpose of
the DEC is to serve as the repository of USAID's collective development
experience over the past 60 years.
Amongst other documentation, the DEC includes annual reports,
assessments and evaluations.
The primary purpose of the DIS is to serve as USAID's portfolio
management platform--including the submission of performance data
directly from prime partners. Subaward information is sometimes
reported in documents USAID partners upload to the DEC; however, the
DEC is unlikely to provide comprehensive information on first-tier
subawards as there is no requirement that primes include subaward
reporting in such documents. USAID would need additional time to
determine if there are technical methods that could reliably extract
extant subaward information from the DEC, and then would need to
estimate associated cost. We would also need additional time to
generate a cost estimate for a first-tier subaward reporting
functionality in the DIS that includes enhanced subaward reporting. The
current legal framework would not permit a separate USAID reporting
requirement, additional to FSRS, for first-tier subawards.
USAID shares concerns about the quality of subaward data in FSRS as
well as the need for greater data transparency and accessibility. As it
relates to data quality, USAID undertook strategic efforts to improve
the quality of the data in two key ways. As detailed below, we have
advocated for changes to improve data through several FSRS working
groups with GSA over the past several years and continue to advocate
for features in the forthcoming new system in the System for Award
Management (SAM.gov). More recently, USAID launched data quality
improvement efforts, publishing a new FSRS Reporting Guidance one-pager
to supplement FSRS instructions that specifies that primes must report
subcontracts and subawards based on their obligated amount. As a result
of these communications, internal review of the data and outreach to
partners to remedy data quality issues, the quality of the data in FSRS
has improved and reduced over-reporting above total obligation amounts.
Over time, USAID has provided input to GSA on changes to FSRS that
would be beneficial for improving the accuracy of first-tier subaward
data reported in FSRS. These include: (1) an automated system user
warning when a subaward obligation total is not aligned with a prime
award obligation total; (2) removal validation rules that would flag
and address instances where the subaward date entered in SFRS is prior
to the award signed date; (3) system user instructions that provide
clearer guidance on how primes should enter changes in subaward
obligations into the system; and (4) requiring that subaward reporting
match prime award reporting at the ``action'' level, enabling greater
transparency into subaward obligations by fiscal year and maintaining
consistency in reporting level with prime awards. GSA has recently
advised that it intends to address the first three changes in a future
iteration of the system, which it plans will take shape as a new module
in SAM.gov. GSA has indicated it does not plan to pursue the fourth
change. This is based on the rationale that it would require statutory
and/or regulatory changes.
Understanding the importance of strengthening first-tier subaward
data for USAID's mission and recognizing it is not the business owner
of FSRS, the Agency has made a number of efforts to strengthen the
reporting of its prime partners in FSRS. First, USAID issued multiple
communications to our contractors and recipients to remind them of
their reporting responsibilities. USAID also routinely monitors and
analyzes data reported in FSRS to proactively identify potential
discrepancies. Based on certain reporting anomalies identified through
this analysis, USAID has conducted direct outreach to multiple
implementing partners to discuss further and request corrections to
improve quality of the data.
More recently, in January 2024, USAID issued a series of new tools
to further improve the quality of data reported in FSRS. USAID
published a new guidance page on WorkwithUSAID.gov, which highlights
FSRS guidance documents, provides a ``one-pager'' with tips and best
practices on entering and updating data in FSRS, and links to an Agency
webinar, one of several we have offered to the partner community.
Internally, for agency staff, USAID developed a new ``Subaward/
Subcontract Data Quality Dashboard'' in our agency Enterprise Reporting
Portal for monitoring partners' compliance with FSRS reporting. This
dashboard populates with data from FSRS in a user-friendly format,
empowering USAID staff to review subcontract and subaward information,
drill down on potential data quality discrepancies, and follow up with
implementing partners to request they make corrections in FSRS. One
option the Agency could pursue, provided it receives new funding, is to
make the internal Subaward/ Subcontract Data Quality Dashboard
available to the public as part of the Explore USAID in Action website
that presents a USAID-specific view of USAID's information which is
already published on foreignassistance.gov. The effort to present USAID
data reported in FSRS and foreignassistance.gov in a more user-friendly
format on a USAID website would require additional one time development
costs of approximately $250,000 and ongoing annual operating costs of
approximately $100,000 that are not currently funded.
Finally, USAID's Systems Support team has provided troubleshooting
assistance to our implementing partners experiencing technical
difficulties with the FSRS system itself. Many prime contractors and
recipients report challenges in maintaining the accuracy of their
reported data in GSA's FSRS system, as it is a legacy system that
requires significant updates by GSA to improve its functionality.
To improve quality of data, USAID plans to add a section in the
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) that the
partner complied with mandatory sub-award reporting.
Question. What is the average Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate
Agreement (NICRA) rate for USAID's implementing partners working in the
humanitarian space, including for international organization,
international non-governmental organizations, local non-governmental
organization, and contractors? Please note that this response, if
deemed procurement sensitive, may be shared in a Committee Confidential
manner.
Answer. Based on a sample of current contracts with our 15 largest
implementing partners (and representing an illustrative range of
countries and programs), it is typical for USAID to reimburse for
overhead costs ranging between 10 percent and 30 percent. For example,
for U.N. organizations, it is typical for USAID to reimburse for
overhead costs ranging between 6 percent and 13 percent. The World Food
Program and UNICEF, for example, are at 6 percent and 7 percent
respectively.
USAID operates in 100 countries and across a very wide range of
sectors--context matters for fully understanding the ranges presented
here. These rates, for example, tend to be higher in war and conflict-
heavy zones, and lower in more stable areas. But no matter the country,
security situation, or specific local context, our processes for
negotiating and overseeing these rates are always based on Federal
regulations and aligned with all other US government agencies.
Organizations independently select the accounting structures and
accounting methodologies best suited to recover indirect costs under
Federal awards. The type and the number of indirect cost rates vary by
organization. Some of the factors that can impact an organization's
indirect cost rates include but are not limited to:
Size of Organization
Type of Organization (e.g., nonprofit, for-profit, PIO,
type of business/service provided)
Age of Organization
Location of Organization
The rate structure used by the Organization
The indirect cost base(s) used by the Organization
Because of the various factors listed above, any average, if
calculated, is not meaningful without context when applied across
multiple awards under differing circumstances and structures.
Question. You've previously stated that: ``We support . . . natural
gas programming in instances where it can create energy access while
not delaying plans toward clean energy because again the collective
carbon emissions even from developing countries, we are all part of the
solution when it comes to mitigation.''
Please provide a list and description of all natural gas projects
that USAID has supported since January 1, 2022.
Answer. USAID does not centrally track specific gas projects
supported by USAID. Around the world, the majority of USAID assistance
typically supports th eenabling environment for the provision of
improved energy services rather than the direct acquisition or
construction of energy technologies. A description of technical
assistance supporting the gas sector is listed below, by country and/or
region.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Unit Activity Name End Year USAID Activity Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power Africa West Africa Energy 2023 Expanded the supply of and access to affordable and
Program (WAEP) reliable grid-connected electricity services in West
Africa. Provided technical assistance and capacity
building to power utilities and generation entities,
and transaction support to achieve Power Africa's
objectives. Helped partners convert existing diesel,
heavy fuel oil, and coal plants to run on natural
gas in the short term as they worked to introduce
more renewables into their generation mix in the
medium term. Through this award, USAID supported
nine natural gas projects since 2022. Projects are
located in Benin, Gabon, Mauritania, Cameroon,
Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone and have
the capacity to generate over 1,500 MW of power
collectively, enough to power over 1.5 million homes
and businesses.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power Africa Southern Africa Energy 2023 Increased investment in electricity supply and access
Program (SAEP) in Southern Africa by strengthening the regional
enabling environment and facilitating transactions.
This included a regional strategy for natural gas,
support to individual gas transactions, and coal-
based methane projects in Botswana, Namibia,
Mozambique, and South Africa. Since 2022, through
this award, Power Africa supported a 145 MW natural
gas project in Mozambique.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power Africa Nigeria Power Sector 2023 Under this activity, the Nigeria Gas Flare
Program (NPSP) Commercialization Program (NGFCP) sought to mitigate
gas flaring from the petroleum industry to utilize
the captured gas for gas-to-power and industrial
uses. Since 2022, through this same project, USAID
supported two natural gas projects with capacity to
generate over 1,200 MW of power, enough to power 1.2
million homes and businesses.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power Africa East Africa Energy 2023 The program covered nine countries in the Eastern
Program (EAEP) Africa region and provided technical assistance,
transactions advisory services, capacity building,
and investment promotion to utilities and power
generators. The program provided ongoing support to
governments and IPPs to develop frameworks and
strategies for fuel substitution of existing diesel
and heavy-fuel-oil based generation facilities to
natural gas.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Africa Pay Go Liquid 2023 This activity focused on replacing charcoal used for
Regional Petroleum Gas (LPG) cooking with liquid petroleum gas (LPG).
Program in the Congo
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zambia Alternatives to 2026 The USAID Alternatives to Charcoal (A2C) Activity
Charcoal works to reduce dependence on charcoal for household
energy in Zambia and catalyze the increased use of
low emission alternative technologies and fuels
through innovation and increased private sector
engagement.
================================================================================================================
ASIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Asia Power Central Asia 2025 Strengthen the capacity of energy sector regulatory
authorities to liberalize national energy markets,
develop clean and renewable energy, and establish a
regional power market. Support modeling of gas
supply infrastructure to facilitate gas ramping and
flexibility auctions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vietnam V-LEEP II 2025 Will help Vietnam continue its transition to a clean,
secure and market-based energy sector by increasing
the deployment of advanced energy systems, improving
energy sector performance, and expanding competition
in the energy sector. Strengthen the legal framework
and increase the market competition for LNG trading,
including setting up the standards for LNG
terminals, building capacity for the policy makers
and market regulators (including methane management
requirements and safety specifications). V-LEEP II
also supports increased system flexibility through
LNG-to-power to maximize renewable integration and
reduce coal in the power mix.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Philippines Energy Secure 2025 Improve performance of energy utilities, deploy
Philippines advanced energy systems, and enhance competition in
the energy sector. Advancing retail competition in
the power sector may include fossil fuels (natural
gas) as part of power sector planning.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Dev. Mission U.S.-Asia Gas 2022 A public-private partnership involving government and
Asia Partnership industry representatives from the U.S. and Indo-
Pacific countries to stimulate gas demand growth by
optimizing gas network infrastructure development
and developing domestic gas markets in Asia.
================================================================================================================
EUROPE AND EURASIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bosnia and Herzegovina USAID Energy Policy 2024 Improves coordination, management, and transparency
Activity at all levels of BiH's regulatory framework,
simplifies the energy policy environment, and
provides targeted technical assistance. Improves the
efficiency of gas sector oversight operations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Georgia Securing Georgia's 2026 Enhances Georgia's energy security by increasing
Energy Future domestic power production, developing a modern,
competitive electricity market to incentivize
private investment, improving local energy system
planning capacity, improving critical infrastructure
cybersecurity, and advancing regional energy trade.
Assists Georgia in establishing market rules that
encourage alternate natural gas supply. This work
complements renewables programming and is directly
tied to efforts to increase renewable penetration.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moldova Moldova Energy 2026 Addresses core vulnerabilities of Moldova's energy
Transition Activity sector: (1) physical and market integration, aligned
with the EU's Third Energy Package; (2) increased
domestic power generation; and (3) improved natural
gas supply diversification. Supports EU market
integration and diversification away from Gazprom.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ukraine Energy Security 2023 The project establishes competitive energy markets in
Project electricity, gas, and district heating; improves
Ukraine's energy policy and strategy; and
diversifies Ukraine's energy supply. ESP will
improve the legal and regulatory frameworks to
comply with European Union (EU) energy legislation.
The activity supports adoption of EU gas market
rules and support to diversify the region's gas
supply away from Gazprom. It provides gas turbines
for electricity generation.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E&E Regional U.S.-Europe Energy 2026 The activity: (1) builds partner country capacity to
Bridge participate in competitive energy markets and trade
with central European markets; (2) facilitates
investment to diversify regional energy supplies and
upgrade critical infrastructure to improve
reliability and security; and (3) empowers
utilities, governments, telecommunications
providers, regulators, and other critical
infrastructure operators to prepare for and respond
to threats, such as natural disasters and
cyberattacks. The activity supports adoption of EU
gas market rules and support to diversify the
region's gas supply away from Gazprom.
================================================================================================================
MIDDLE EAST
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Energy Sector Support 2027 ESSA is designed to improve the financial and
Activity (ESSA) environmental sustainability of the energy sector in
support of USAID's strategic objectives related to
economic growth and economic competitiveness. ESSA
has four subobjectives:
Power sector technical and financial
problems reduced
Regulatory system strengthened
Energy sector services increased
Energy sector opportunities optimized
It supports the feasibility analysis for oil to gas
conversions for industrial heat applications, as
well as market design/development and regulatory
oversight of natural gas and downstream petroleum
markets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. In light of the ongoing constriction of operational space
in Zimbabwe and the Government of Zimbabwe's harassment, detention, and
deportation of US officials and contractors, how is USAID modifying its
programming across all sectors to adapt to these circumstances?
Answer. Our bilateral assistance program in Zimbabwe is focused on
democracy, human rights, and governance; health; agriculture and food
security; and adaptation and environment, as well as on humanitarian
assistance. USAID development and humanitarian assistance is for the
benefit of the people of Zimbabwe and delivered through international
and local implementing partners--not through the Government of Zimbabwe
via government-to-government assistance.
USAID has in place a range of measures applicable to all sectors
that are able to be continually adapted to the operational environment.
These include:
An extensive Mission Continuity Plan that includes a tool
to track in-country and international travel for mission staff and TDY
visits, as well as communication plans to account for all employees,
including contractors.
A Partner Liaison Security Officer (PLSO) that works
closely with the Regional Security Officer and USAID implementing
partners on security. PLSO support to partners includes establishing
and managing an implementing partner security incident reporting
system; creating communication platforms for Chiefs of Party and
security POCs; assisting to develop partner security plans and
training; and holding regular meetings with partners on security
issues.
The Victims of Torture & Abuse Emergency Response (VOTAER)
program that provides protection and rehabilitation services to
individuals at risk of falling or who have fallen victim to organized
violence, torture, and other human rights abuses and to help victims
hold perpetrators to account. VOTAER provides legal, medical, and other
protection, rehabilitative, and support services to victims of
political violence and torture, as well domestic relocation support and
referral to domestic and international protection mechanisms. While we
now view this activity as a core support activity in Zimbabwe--
providing comprehensive legal, medical, and other protection,
rehabilitative, and support services and available to partners and
civil society--it is not something that is done in all countries and
contexts. This was begun in 2020 and continually supported in
recognition of the risks and challenges in Zimbabwe.
USAID also continues to work with local organizations in Zimbabwe
that advocate for human rights and the rule of law. Amid the ongoing
crackdown on civil society and a range of other challenges, it is
important that the international community continue to support the
Zimbabwean people who are fighting for transparency, accountability,
and the rule of law.
Question. Could you please inform me when my office might
anticipate receiving a response from USAID regarding the plans for
future Democracy, Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming in Nigeria,
as outlined in my letter dated September 5, 2023, and committed to in
the agency's subsequent response?
Answer. Your office should have received an initial response to the
September 5 letter in November 2023, and you can expect a response on
future programming after May 2024.
Additionally, USAID will send you the IFES Post Election Survey in
Nigeria, 2023 document. This nationwide post-election survey explores
the opinions and perspectives of Nigerian citizens on the 2023
Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Nigeria. Please also
find attached a final copy of the review of the Independent National
Electoral Commission's performance by IFES. USAID also expects to
receive the final third-party evaluation of our election work, which
includes an examination of political party strengthening, by
approximately the end of May 2024. USAID plans to examine the findings
of the requested evaluations, along with other data, to inform, adapt,
and implement future programming.
Question. Could you share your viewpoint regarding the arrangement
whereby USAID and State Department officials, displaced from Sudan, are
stationed separately (with USAID personnel in Nairobi and State
Department staff in Addis Ababa) under the administration of the Sudan
Affairs Office?
Answer. Communication and collaboration between the State
Department and USAID is strong and effective, and while it would be
ideal to house the State Department Office of Sudan Affairs and USAID/
Sudan in a single location, our teams are making the best of a
difficult situation given the circumstances.
USAID's current operational platform for our work in Sudan is
spread out across several locations. Nairobi, Kenya is the base of
operations and includes the Mission Director and support staff as well
as the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance's Disaster Assistance
Response Team and Office of Transition Initiatives offices. Cairo,
Egypt and Kampala, Uganda are locations where our Foreign Service
National Staff self-evacuated.
USAID is undertaking a process to evaluate options for
consolidating the USAID/Sudan mission presence over the next year. Key
factors in this process include determining where our Sudanese staff
can gain and maintain the necessary legal status to continue their
employment with USAID, and where we can be best positioned to oversee
our substantial foreign assistance investments in Sudan. In this
process, we are consulting closely with our State colleagues and we
will continue to engage with the relevant staff and committees as this
process continues.
Question. How can USAID effectively address the growing crises in
Africa, particularly in Sudan, Eastern Congo, and the Sahel, given the
agency's limited resources to reduce human suffering, instability, and
the erosion of democracy?
Answer. In Sudan, where it is safe and possible to deliver
assistance, USAID continues to support programs focused on building
peace, reducing the need for humanitarian assistance, protecting human
rights, promoting democracy, empowering civil society, and providing
psycho-social support. USAID also supports and works through local
partners in difficult crisis contexts. We have focused on scaling up
life-saving activities through existing international partners' support
to local Sudanese organizations and are increasing levels of assistance
to local organizations, including by encouraging our implementing
partners to support civil society organizations, youth groups, health
care workers, and other community groups. These local groups are a
vital link to Sudanese communities, helping assess and respond to
urgent needs and delivering life-saving assistance such as medical
supplies, water and sanitation, lifesaving nutrition, market-based
assistance, shelter, and protection services including gender-based
violence prevention and response to people in the most affected areas,
especially Khartoum. Local groups not only enable USAID to reach
otherwise inaccessible populations in need, but also provide a cost
effective vehicle for assisting them.
Local organizations provide critical support for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in Sudan because of their unique capacities,
local knowledge, important networks, and trust and acceptance by the
communities they serve. To leverage those local capacities, USAID's
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance provided an estimated $29 million to
support nearly 40 local partner organizations in fiscal year 2023. The
bulk of this funding is going to Sudanese NGO's that function as
implementing partners for many international NGO's and U.N. agencies. A
smaller portion goes directly to small civil society groups to meet
critical humanitarian needs in their communities. We also supported
more than 100 local Sudanese organizations with over $6 million in
small grants through our transition assistance and democracy and
governance portfolios.
With support from USAID and other donors, USAID's partner the World
Food Program reached an estimated 6.5 million people across Sudan with
food assistance between April 15, 2023, and January 31, 2024, reaching
approximately 728,000 people in January alone. Between April 15, 2023
and January 31, 2024, USAID partner UNICEF and other nutrition actors
screened 3.7 million children aged 5 years and younger for malnutrition
and admitted more than 231,000 children for treatment of severe acute
malnutrition in Sudan.
USAID and the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration are supporting the International Organization for
Migration, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, World Health
Organization, and NGO's to improve access to safe drinking water and
sanitation infrastructure for crisis-affected communities across Sudan
to reduce the spread of infectious diseases, such as cholera and
measles. With U.S. and other donor support, UNICEF and other water,
sanitation, and hygiene actors provided safe drinking water to an
estimated 8.4 million people across Sudan between April 15, 2023, and
January 31, 2024. To prevent the spread of cholera, U.S. Government
partners are also supporting affected and at-risk populations with
emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies, such as chlorine for
water purification, hygiene kits, and water containers. USAID partners
UNICEF and the World Health Organization reached 2.2 million people in
Sudan's Gedaref and Gezira states with oral cholera vaccines in
November and December 2023.
USAID partner UNICEF helped 186,000 women and children access
gender-based violence prevention, risk mitigation, and response
interventions in 2023. Mobile clinics supported by USAID partner UNFPA
provided health and gender-based violence prevention and response
services to more than 73,000 internally displaced persons and host
community members across 11 of Sudan's 18 states between April 15, 2023
and February 5, 2024. USAID also supports the U.N. Mine Action Service
to provide critical mine risk awareness information for populations
residing in or returning to conflict-affected areas potentially
affected by explosive remnants of war.
In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where fighting has
displaced millions of people, USAID's humanitarian partners have been
providing life-saving assistance to address critical shelter, emergency
food, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection, and health needs among
the most vulnerable populations. USAID is the largest provider of
humanitarian assistance to DRC, and in this fiscal year to date, has
committed more than $360 million of humanitarian assistance to respond
to the crisis. In 2023, 5.3 million people across DRC were reached by
food assistance funded, in large part, by USAID.
USAID also supports peacebuilding and people-to-people
reconciliation programs in eastern DRC. USAID's humanitarian activities
address the drivers of conflict that gave rise to and continue to fuel
the activities of armed groups and community militias; support progress
toward an eventual transition from humanitarian assistance to
development; and empower marginalized communities.
In the Sahel, USAID continues to implement activities not subject
to 7008 restrictions or that have received waivers: supporting the
delivery of health, food, and humanitarian assistance that saves lives
and reduces human suffering. USAID delivers emergency food to countries
in the Sahel, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Nigeria, that are facing acute food insecurity. USAID
support has improved maternal and child health, and reduced infections,
disease, and supported livelihoods. In Cameroon, USAID works with the
Ministry of Public Health on the free distribution of antiretroviral
medications through private pharmacies. In Chad, USAID's Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance partners with the International Organization
for Migration to provide shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene
services to more than 78,000 returnees affected by the Sudan crisis. In
addition, USAID supports Chad's National Malaria Control Program to
control the spread of Malaria, and supports routine vaccinations,
including polio, to decrease infant and child mortality. In Mauritania,
USAID's humanitarian assistance supports 110,000 Malian refugees, via
the provision of an integrated assistance package, including food
assistance, school meals, and specialized nutritious food to children,
pregnant women, and girls for malnutrition treatment. In Mali USAID
supports the provision of emergency food assistance to reach at-risk
populations--including internally displaced persons and host community
members--in food-insecure regions. In Nigeria, USAID funding is
enabling deliveries of emergency food assistance and vital health care,
among other services, to crisis and conflict-affected areas. In Niger,
USAID uses a context-specific approach to help farmers and micro,
small, and medium-sized enterprises, particularly women and youth-owned
or managed businesses, move toward livelihood development, financial
prosperity and job security. Finally, in Burkina Faso, USAID programs
improve skills and offer economic opportunities for marginalized youth
and women, which reduces their vulnerability to recruitment and
exploitation by extremist groups.
Question. The escalating crises and instability in Africa demand
more humanitarian aid from USAID, significantly as famine risks rise.
With food being weaponized in conflicts, as seen in Ethiopia and
Sudan, and U.S.-funded food aid diverted, as in Ethiopia and Somalia,
how is USAID addressing increasing needs while ensuring that aid
reaches those who need it most, particularly in conflict zones like
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sahel, Somalia, and South
Sudan?
Answer. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) provides
humanitarian assistance in Africa, and throughout the world, through
independent and trusted non-governmental organizations (NGO) and public
international organization (PIO) implementing partners. BHA-funded
programs addressing food and other humanitarian needs are subject to
BHA's established internal risk assessment process, which includes
internal and external due diligence processes. For example, all of our
partners are required to submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan
(RAMP) as part of their applications for funding, which are then
reviewed by our technical risk management staff. The RAMP details the
partner's plans for risk mitigation and includes their internal
controls to prevent loss, theft, and broader fraud, waste, and abuse,
including diversion of humanitarian assistance. Partners are also
required to report all incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse to USAID's
Office of Inspector General (OIG). In addition to partner risk
mitigation measures, BHA staff conduct site visits, as security
conditions allow. BHA also utilizes third-party monitoring contracts in
22 countries to monitor programs. These monitors are trained to detect
and report on program irregularities to USAID. In the case of Ethiopia,
BHA directed a pause in food aid programming in order to immediately
halt diversion and put in place critical reforms so that food
assistance reached those for whom it was intended.
In light of recent incidents of diversion in Africa, and
recognizing that humanitarian crises often occur in high-risk
environments, BHA is launching a new action plan to assess and mitigate
diversion risks across all of our programs. We take very seriously any
allegation of diversion of humanitarian aid, and we have zero tolerance
for inaction in the face of fraud, waste, and abuse.
As part of this action plan, BHA has taken the following steps:
We have stood up a working group of experts in
humanitarian assistance and risk management to develop and implement a
comprehensive roadmap to address diversion risks around the world.
We are engaging our staff around the world and partners to
identify the most up-to-date issues and best practices, and ensure that
our oversight mechanisms adapt to how diversion attempts have evolved.
We're reviewing the locations and levels of our third-
party monitors around the world so that we are well positioned to
address risks globally.
We are reviewing field staffing levels across programs,
developing new guidance for staff and partners, and creating new
training for staff across the globe.
We expanded our annual internal risk analysis process for
identifying high-risk countries to include diversion risk factors. With
this new process will come greater oversight on such risks.
In coordination with the USAID OIG, we implemented a
mandatory annual fraud awareness briefing for all staff. Additionally,
we are coordinating with the OIG to target field-based training for
humanitarian partners.
Agency leadership have also engaged with the heads of key partners
on these reform initiatives. We are implementing some steps now, but
others will take additional time to develop. As a whole, the action
plan will put us in a much better position to ensure aid is getting to
those who need it and help us continue to be good stewards of taxpayer
dollars.
The diversion of food assistance in East Africa last year also
served to highlight the need for reform and enhanced accountability to
affected populations in WFP operations. BHA is prioritizing eight areas
of reform with WFP, six of which are directly linked to mitigating the
risk of diversion.
In 2023, WFP's Deputy Executive Director launched a high-level task
force, activating the whole organization in order to put ``end-to-end''
assurance and internal control measures in place across all high-risk
operations. This work includes clarifying accountability where
necessary, strengthening systems, streamlining processes and making
sure that country offices are getting the advice and support that they
need.
In September 2023, WFP presented its global Assurance Framework and
Reassurance Action Plan to its Executive Board, in which the U.S.
Government participates through BHA. These efforts signaled WFP's
recognition of the need to accelerate reforms in a number of areas
including monitoring, identity management, cooperating partners, and
supply chain operations.
BHA is strongly supportive of WFP's reforms efforts, and plans to
closely follow implementation, including through close monitoring at
the field level and field-headquarters consultations to share lessons
learned across high-risk environments.
Question. In the Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request,
Somalia was the recipient of the second-largest bilateral allocation
for Democracy, Rights, and Governance (DRG) funding in Africa,
amounting to $26 million, following Ethiopia's request of $30 million.
1. Could you provide the reasons behind Somalia's consistent
position as the top beneficiary of DRG funding in Africa regarding
annual requests?
2. Could you specify the types of programs that USAID plans to
support with this DRG allocation for Somalia?
Answer. Given the threat that al-Shabaab (AS) plays in Somalia and
across the region and its importance to U.S. national security, Somalia
remains one of the top priorities for Africa DRG programming,
especially given that it encompassess our support for stabilization
activities in areas previously held by AS. With the U.S. Government's
broader approach to advance the Government of Somalia's active efforts
to erode AS' influence, USAID has made meaningful investments to its
peace and stability.
USAID plans to support DRG-funded programs that address the
underlying conditions that allow violent extremism to flourish. USAID
will continue to work with the federal, state, and local governments
across South-Central Somalia to promote stability in communities
liberated from al-Shabaab rule, rebuild trust between citizens and
their government, foster reconciliation between communities, and help
establish and strengthen systems of governance. Our planned programming
includes efforts to promote more inclusive and responsive governance
institutions at the federal, state and local levels, address long-
standing grievances that drive communities toward al-Shabaab, increase
citizen participation in political processes, and support broader
efforts to finalize Somalia's state building process. These diverse
programs are designed to reduce the influence of al-Shabaab as the
largest al-Qaeda affiliate in the world, and in doing so, advance a top
U.S. foreign policy priority in Somalia.
Question. Since the inception of the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
administration and the Federal Government of Somalia's intensified
efforts to combat the terrorist group al-Shabaab, USAID has primarily
directed its non-humanitarian initiatives in Somalia toward
stabilization efforts in areas recently liberated from al-Shabaab's
control.
1. Could you provide an overview of the accomplishments of USAID's
programming in this domain thus far?
2. In light of the recent challenges encountered by Operation Black
Lion, are there any considerations for modifying the current approach?
Answer. A decade ago, the federal government of Somalia was barely
formed and al-Shabaab (AS) controlled vast swaths of territory, and the
government's security forces consisted of disparate militia groups.
There has been significant progress toward securing the country.
USAID's stabilization efforts have been focused in liberated areas, and
are closely coordinated across the interagency so that defense,
diplomacy, and development efforts remain aligned as we work to provide
for a lasting expansion of government authority. USAID has addressed
fragility in the context of Somalia not just focused on degrading al-
Shabaab or retaking territory, but also on how relationships--within
communities, between communities, and between local, state, and federal
structures--are rebalanced so they are more peaceful and stable. When
communities joined forces to dislodge al-Shabaab from areas of Middle
Shabelle and Galmudug, USAID was among the first donors to deliver
support to these communities. As a result, the Somali state has now
established authority in areas previously under al-Shabaab rule for
more than a decade.
Phase 2 operations, previously known as `Operation Black Lion,'
have encountered setbacks in recent months due to infighting between
federal, state and local elites, a resurgence of clan conflict, and
long-standing weaknesses within security forces. With new military
operations on hold for the time being, USAID plans to work on
consolidating security gains from Phase 1 and addressing key grievances
in order to prevent the resurgence of al-Shabaab in previously
liberated communities. USAID will continue to work closely with local
authorities in communities recently liberated from AS to advance inter-
communal reconciliation, promote more legitimate and effective
governance institutions, and strengthen conflict mitigation processes,
in order to provide a more credible alternative to AS rule. In light of
liberated communities' expectations for better services after years of
neglect, helping manage and respond to these expectations and needs is
crucial.
Question. South Sudan is scheduled to hold elections in 2024, yet
many questions remain outstanding regarding basic preparation and
political will to enact vital reforms for an inclusive and democratic
process.
Please confirm that USAID will not provide support of any kind to
South Sudan's anticipated electoral process.
Answer. USAID will not provide support of any kind to South Sudan's
anticipated electoral process. We share your concern that the
conditions, institutions, and resources for conducting credible
elections through an inclusive, transparent, and democratic process in
December 2024 remain elusive. We do provide training to journalists on
elections related issues to help prepare and enable them to serve as a
source of transparency for the population and a force for
accountability of government actions. We continue to remind the
government of its obligations, including making resources available to
fund electoral institutions with adequate time to make the appropriate
preparations.
Question. The budget request does not include sufficient funding to
address the urgent needs of Ukraine in its fight against Russian
aggression. I have made clear to the administration that it needs to
incorporate funds for Ukraine into the base budget accompanied by a
comprehensive strategy, instead of relying on emergency supplemental
appropriations. It is uncertain whether further supplemental funds will
be passed for fiscal year 2024, and it is extremely unlikely that any
supplemental funds will be passed in fiscal year 2025.
How does USAID plan to address the dire needs of Ukraine in fiscal
year 2025, given that the fiscal year 2025 budget request for Ukraine
is much smaller compared to the supplemental funds passed in prior FYs?
Answer. The President's Budget Request for fiscal year (FY) 2025
was developed with the expectation that the National Security
Supplemental would be enacted, and we are enormously appreciative of
Congress' leadership and bold action in that regard. In combination
with Supplemental resources, the fiscal year 2025 request includes
funding levels that begin the path toward normalization of a base
budget for Ukraine, as well as for other needs that stem from Russia's
invasion, such as strengthening Ukraine's economy, improving food
security, countering misinformation, and enhancing energy security.
Our economic assistance helps Ukraine's private sector and tax base
grow, reducing reliance on humanitarian assistance and budget support.
Our budget support will continue to be conditioned on policy reforms.
Question. Previous emergency supplemental appropriation packages
for Ukraine have included funds that have been obligated for purposes
unrelated to the war in Ukraine.
1. Why was funding for these non-Ukraine related purposes requested
through emergency supplemental appropriations requests instead of the
base budget?
2. Does USAID recognize the risks of relying on off-budget
emergency supplemental appropriations to fund regular annual
programming?
Answer. Putin's unjustified war continues to cause catastrophic
loss of life and has undermined the security of Europe and the global
economy, far beyond the borders of Ukraine itself. USAID works to
support the people of Ukraine and counter Russia's political and
economic aggression and malign influence throughout Europe and Eurasia
(E&E).
As the Kremlin continues targeting democratic institutions and
civil society in the E&E region, USAID assistance provided by the
supplemental is strengthening connections between citizens and their
governments, and strengthening civil society and independent media to
hold governments accountable. This includes support for a Russian-
language news cooperative with partners from Belarus, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine to increase trusted, engaging,
and fact-based news and information for local citizens and improve the
ability of the news cooperative members to become a more financially
viable, innovative, and competitive alternative news base to Kremlin-
supported news sites, which spread propaganda and hate speech, and
manipulate news and information about the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine.
The generous support of Congress through several Ukraine
supplemental appropriations acts--and their broad authorization to
utilize humanitarian assistance funding to meet the global needs
stemming from Russia's war against Ukraine--was instrumental to USAID's
ability to reach people with lifesaving, multi-sectoral humanitarian
assistance. In addition to the humanitarian assistance, some of the
funds from the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act
(AUSAA) were allocated to bolster Ukraine's global agricultural
exports, thereby improving both global food security and Ukraine's
economic situation through increased export revenue.
USAID is also focused on building E&E partners' capacities to blunt
the Kremlin's ability to use energy as a weapon for political goals.
Thanks to Congress' bipartisan support, USAID assistance enabled
Moldova to secure natural gas supply from European and other regional
suppliers to meet all of the natural gas demand for the Right Bank of
the Nistru River (the territory controlled by the Moldovan government
in Chisinau, excluding the breakaway separatist region of Transnistria)
since December 2022. Additionally, USAID was able to help Moldova
secure a share of the first shipment of U.S. Liquified Natural Gas
(LNG) through the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification
Unit (FSRU) Terminal in April this year.
In combination with the Supplemental resources generously provided
by Congress, the President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2025
includes funding levels that begin the path toward normalization of a
base budget for Ukraine, as well as for other needs that stem from
Russia's invasion, such as food security, countering information
manipulation, supporting transition initiatives, and strengthening
energy security. USAID recognizes the risk of relying on emergency
supplementals, hence the request to normalize base budgets that would
fulfill other needs related to the war in Ukraine.
Question. Requested funding for programs in Georgia across multiple
accounts has been reduced compared to prior years.
What is the rationale for this reduction in the request?
Answer. The President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2025
reflects shifting needs across the region.
Question. Has USAID observed an increase or decrease in the
effectiveness of Georgia programming in recent years?
Answer. USAID programming is flexible in many respects to adapt to
new opportunities or challenges and USAID actively monitors its
programs to determine that investments are yielding intended outcomes.
USAID's investments in Georgia have helped to build critical public
support toward integration with the West. Georgians overwhelmingly hold
positive views of the U.S. and do not see their future with Russia.
USAID programming has remained effective in Georgia, including by
helping civil society build capacity and by strengthening inclusive
economic growth and economic linkages with the West.
Question. Does USAID believe that assistance to Georgia should be
conditioned on the fulfillment of certain standards or benchmarks? Why
or why not?
Answer. The beneficiaries of most of USAID assistance in Georgia
are predominantly non-governmental, private sector, and sub-national
actors. Conditioning such assistance on benchmarks reached by the
government of Georgia would potentially allow the ruling party to
deprive mostly non-governmental, sub-national, and private sector
actors of U.S. support that is used, for example, to advance greater
government transparency and build westward trade linkages. Our
development assistance remains a critical tool for supporting the
people of Georgia as they seek Western integration and to hold their
government accountable.
Question. The war in Ukraine initially dealt a blow to Russia's
regional credibility and opened up a window of opportunity for the U.S.
to increase bilateral ties and influence with countries in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia over which Russia has historically exerted
influence.
How is this budget request designed to take advantage of this
window of opportunity to increase U.S. ties with partners in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia?
Answer. In response to Russia's brutal war and diminished standing,
USAID is adapting its bilateral and regional assistance to the South
Caucasus and Central Asia to mitigate and weaken Russia's malign
influence in political and economic spheres in the region.
Recognizing this window of opportunity, USAID is prioritizing
support for Armenia as the government proceeds to institute democratic
reforms and pursue closer ties with the U.S. and European Union (EU).
Fiscal year (FY) 2025 funding will help strengthen Armenia's food and
energy security, reducing the country's structural reliance on Russian
exports to meet its basic needs and depriving the Kremlin of a critical
tool which it could leverage to derail Armenia's democratic transition.
USAID programming will also support initiatives to counter corruption
and support independent media, consolidating recent democratic gains
that Armenia has made since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, as well as
bolster regional connectivity.
In Georgia, fiscal year 2025 funding will continue to work to
strengthen Georgia's resilience to external malign influence, civil
society, independent media, human rights, accountable governance, and
diversify Georgia's economy away from Russia. USAID will continue to
build on prior development progress and leverage public sentiment, with
approximately 80 percent of the population seeking to join the EU, to
anchor the country's future in the West politically and economically.
In addition, USAID is increasing its support for the development of
the `Middle Corridor,' an economically transformative corridor running
from Central Asia through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe. USAID
support for the Middle Corridor will provide businesses in Central Asia
and the South Caucasus an alternative to Russian trade routes in
transporting goods to Western Europe, reducing the Kremlin's economic
influence over both regions and depriving it of additional transit
revenue that could be used to support its military operations in
Ukraine.
In Central Asia, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
the five Central Asian countries (C5) (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are exhibiting a greater
openness to diversifying their political and economic partnerships,
both through closer cooperation with each other and through closer
engagement with the United States and the West. Simultaneously, with
half of the region's population under the age of 30, the C5 governments
are under intense pressure to ensure widespread economic prosperity and
rethink their prevailing economic systems that favor large, state-owned
enterprises focused on resource extraction. USAID is adapting to this
time-limited window of opportunity to expand our partnerships and
provide critical development assistance to Central Asia in ways that
help strengthen independence, sovereignty, and prosperity.
Demonstrating our commitment to greater partnership, I traveled to
the region and convened a `C5+1' Ministerial at which the governments
signed memoranda of understanding with commitments to key reforms to
standardize and digitize customs, and to support the clean energy
transition. Our regional development assistance is an engine of the
C5+1 platform, focused on increasing trade connectivity (including
through support to the Middle Corridor mentioned above), facilitating
transboundary energy sharing between the C5, promoting regional water
security, and advancing collective efforts to counter violent extremism
and combat trafficking in persons. At the same time, our bilateral
missions across the region are supporting market-based economic
development for small and medium enterprises, increasing the region's
human capital through US-modeled education curricula and modernized
healthcare systems, promoting civil society and a free media as an
integral part of the C5's development process, and amplifying political
reforms--especially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where the countries'
respective leaders are undertaking gradual political modernization and
other reforms. Through this development assistance, the United States
is demonstrating that we are a reliable partner and building on an
already-strong foundation in the region to advance shared national
interests with the C5.
Question. While direct bilateral and regional engagement with these
countries is important, how is USAID also ensuring that assistance to
Ukraine supports an image of the U.S. as a credible partner in the eyes
of these nations?
Answer. The passage of the National Security Supplemental package
for Ukraine reinforces the image of the U.S. as a credible, steadfast
partner, narrowing opportunities for China and Russia to expand their
regional influence. For example, USAID's Ukraine programming places
special emphasis on the strategic sectors of democracy, energy, and
trade, all with an eye toward deepening Ukraine's interconnections to
European markets and institutions. Those same themes are essential in
our work in the South Caucasus. In Armenia, for example, USAID is
focused on consolidating democratic gains and diversifying the
country's economy and energy supplies away from Russia to make both
sectors more resilient to malign influence.
In Central Asia, USAID promotes the creation of a safe, vibrant
information space and improves access to quality news content espousing
diverse viewpoints. For instance, USAID supported a January 2024 forum
in Uzbekistan where activists, bloggers, public organizations, and
high-ranking government officials responsible for information policy
developed recommendations to improve digital information space in
Uzbekistan and promote TV channels from friendly neighboring countries.
In similar ways across the region, USAID programming is actively
expanding the suite of media available to Central Asians. As a result,
we are strengthening the capacity, independence, and reach of local
media to reduce the reliance on Russian media that uses Kremlin news
sources and propaganda to actively malign the U.S. Government's role in
Ukraine and throughout the region.
countering russia in africa
Question. Please describe USAID's plans for the new programs to
counter Russian influence in Africa in detail and explain which
accounts will fund these efforts.
Answer. The fiscal year 2025 request includes $25.0 million in
Economic Support Fund resources for the Counter Russian Malign Actors
in Africa (CRMMA) fund. The CRMAA will provide additional, flexible
support to counter disinformation, build resistance to Kremlin-linked
disinformation, strengthen institutional resilience, revitalize civil
society, and improve electoral systems and processes across Africa.
Our programs will strengthen the capacity of journalists and civil
society to identify, track, and respond to information manipulation,
limit the spread of information manipulation to multiple distribution
networks both offline and online, and improve digital and media
literacy and security.
New activities across the continent include the following:
Supporting regional networks of organizations working on
information manipulation (e.g. fact checking organizations,
journalists, influencers, technologists) to collaborate and share
content and research.
Providing local organizations with the tools, knowledge,
models, and resources to track and respond to information manipulation.
Promoting peace, tolerance, good governance, and human
rights as well as combating information manipulation through a range of
media channels, including social media and community radio at regional,
national, and local levels.
Engaging youth at risk of being mobilized by false
information through truthful and interactive content on radio and
social media.
Expanding relationships with radio stations to develop
information products and programming to inform citizens on the issues
and how they can get involved.
Building local resilience to information manipulation by
partnering with community leaders to strengthen communications and
relations with municipal authorities.
countering prc influence in europe
Question. Please describe USAID's plans for the programs to counter
PRC influence in Europe in detail and explain which accounts will fund
these efforts. Please describe the different purposes for which funds
from different accounts will be used. Will CPIF funds be used in
Europe?
Answer. USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) helps enable
our partner countries to make informed decisions regarding the People's
Republic of China (PRC), understand the risks, and build the tools to
mitigate these risks. We focus on building long-term resilience and the
ability to respond to evolving and increasing foreign influence by the
PRC. Our programming strengthens democratic governance and rule of law,
resilience in the information space, independence and security of
energy and infrastructure, and our partners' economic prosperity.
E&E's programming addresses information manipulation in the E&E
region by supporting our partner countries to identify and address
narratives from the PRC, the Kremlin, and Iran that aim to build
support for authoritarian values and governance models, while weakening
democratic governments. Our programming also fosters economic
environments that enable competition and fair and transparent
investment environments, which in turn incentivizes trade and gives way
to more opportunities and reduced dependence on predatory PRC loans and
high risk PRC-funded digital infrastructure or services. To support
these on-going, cross-cutting efforts, E&E's programming is primarily
funded by Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, but the
region also receives targeted Countering PRC Influence Fund funding
from economic support fund and development assistance funding accounts.
Question. This budget request is once again very heavy on climate
and gender programming. It says far less about China and strategic
competition--which should be the top priority around which we determine
our resourcing.
In your view, how does a focus on climate and gender advance U.S.
interests with respect to China and the threats it poses to the United
States and our allies and partners?
Answer. The security challenges around the Indo-Pacific region are
inextricable from development challenges like food insecurity, global
health security and the potential for new pandemics, economic
fragility, weakening democratic systems--and increasingly, the grave
security threat posed by climate change. As Secretary of Defense Austin
said, ``no nation can find lasting security without addressing the
climate crisis.'' Climate change fuels conflict, creates competition
for resources, exacerbates food scarcity, disrupts economic stability
and growth, and drives the displacement of tens of millions of people
each year, which in turn has the potential to make people more
vulnerable to exploitation and radicalization. USAID's work responds to
the severe, high-priority concerns voiced by our allies and partners
about climate change and its impacts. In order to address the
priorities of our partner countries and reduce dependency on the PRC,
USAID has worked to build new climate-finance partnerships to
accelerate the flow of capital into climate change-related investments
in partner countries, support climate-aligned infrastructure projects,
and design activities promoting greater climate adaptation and
mitigation.
Our work on gender equality is a clear distinguishing factor
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. USAID's
focus on women's economic empowerment and the role of women in the
economy writ-large, for example, contrasts significantly with the PRC's
economic development model. McKinsey estimates that women's economic
contributions could add up to $28 trillion to global GDP and $484
billion to South Asia's GDP, if full gender parity in the workforce was
reached. Yet an analysis of the thousands of Belt and Road Initiative
projects across the world shows that empowering women economically is
not part of the PRC development playbook. An analysis of the Chinese
Development Finance Database collected by the AidData team at the
College of William and Mary found only 91 women's development projects
out of the entire data base of nearly 21,000 projects. These projects
were mostly very small-scale, with a combined value of only $9 million,
a tiny fraction of the over $1 trillion in commitments recorded in the
data base. A 2021 publication by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
suggests that there have only been 60 projects since 2013 that empower
women. The United States government and USAID, conversely, invest in
women's economic empowerment and make the explicit case that supporting
women in this regard enables more prosperity in our partner countries.
Undertaking development work that accounts for women's rights and
opportunities reflects our commitment to be responsive to the needs and
priorities of local actors and communities--a commitment that stands in
clear contrast to the PRC, and which creates a stronger foundation for
U.S. partnerships and influence in the countries where we work. It also
reflects a large body of evidence that ties gender equality to better
development outcomes, such as improved food security and stronger
economic growth. The visible difference--between the commitment of the
U.S. to listen to partners and advance mutual interests, including on
issues like women's economic empowerment, and the PRC's motivations of
deepening trade and resource dependency with emerging economies--plays
a major role in helping nurture relationships, deepening and expanding
networks, and building goodwill toward the United States.
Importantly, our work on issues such as addressing climate change
and the challenges women face in their lives builds dignity--not by
approaching development as a transaction, or as a means to an end--but
by seeking to improve people's lives in ways that they can see and
feel. This affirmative approach to international development and to
advancing our nation's broader national security goals continues to
distinguish the United States in critical ways from the PRC.
Question. I agree that infrastructure is an important priority in
the Indo-Pacific and globally, but it depends on how we do it.
How does the $2 billion in mandatory funding requested for the
Infrastructure Investment Fund and the $2 billion requested for the
Indo-Pacific Strategy align with USAID's existing workstreams focused
on competing with PRC investments in ``hard'' infrastructure? Why does
this need to be mandatory?
Answer. In response to the tremendous challenges and unprecedented
opportunities we face in the Indo-Pacific, the fiscal year 2025
President's Budget requests both mandatory and discretionary resources
to out-compete China, strengthen the U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific, and
advance American prosperity globally through new investments, including
for infrastructure. Discretionary resources alone cannot meet this
need. We have designed this mandatory package primarily as a vehicle to
innovate new ways to support our allies and partners around the world
by providing a viable alternative to the PRC's predatory and coercive
practices and expanded presence, and offer alternatives at a scale that
discretionary spending simply cannot meet. This mandatory funding would
align with the existing infrastructure-adjacent work that USAID already
implements, including the Countering PRC Influence Fund, DFC
transaction support, support for MCC threshold programs, and economic
growth and resilience-related programming.
The mandatory package also provides us the ability to make longer-
term investments that complement and bolster our programming funded on
the discretionary side. Mandatory funding is needed to enable us to
make strategic programmatic investments over a longer time horizon. The
mandatory proposal includes $4 billion that will enable the United
States to invest in new ways to out-compete China and focus on the
following new and critical investments to:
Create a new International Infrastructure Fund, which will
out-compete China by providing a credible, reliable alternative to PRC
options, while also expanding markets and opportunities for U.S.
businesses. This fund will support transformative, quality, and
sustainable ``hard'' infrastructure projects, including along strategic
economic corridors.
Make game-changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to
strengthen partner economies, bolster connectivity between partner
countries, and support their efforts, including through multilateral
fora, in pushing back against coercive actions.
Question. Can you provide some specifics on what the ``new and
innovative funding streams'' not currently funded through discretionary
resources would look like?
Answer. We are requesting $2 billion over 5 years to enable the
United States to make significant investments in the Indo-Pacific to
out-compete China. These investments will allow for new initiatives in
strategic sectors that base discretionary funding alone cannot support.
This funding will advance U.S. interests and leadership in the region
and demonstrate our enduring commitment to our Indo-Pacific partners.
We will support competitive connectivity in the Indo-Pacific, making
Indo-Pacific economies more connected and resilient through
transformative investments in emerging technologies, supply chains, and
transportation, while also increasing opportunities for American
businesses. These mandatory funds will allow us to work with our Indo-
Pacific partners to implement a robust regional approach to secure Open
Radio Access Network (ORAN) digital technology and other secure, high-
standards technologies that provide like-minded alternatives to the
PRC's predatory and coercive economic practices. Additionally, this
funding will enable the United States to coordinate strategic
investments with like-minded partners and incentivize lasting
commitments from host governments that advance longer-term, deeper
cooperation in countries most at risk of coercion and predatory
influence. Funding would be authorized and appropriated to State and
USAID (via the Economic Support Fund), with transfer authority to other
agencies such as DFC, EXIM, and USTDA. In the Philippines, USAID's
efforts to counter the negative influences of the PRC include a focus
on the deployment of Open Radio Network Access (ORAN) so the
Philippines and or other countries in the region have competitive
options for mobile and internet technologies that are secure and
transparent. We are preparing to conduct ORAN trials in partnership
with the private sector in the near future to ultimately crowd in
technology from the U.S. and like minded partners like Japan.
Question. How does USAID measure success in competing with PRC
``hard'' infrastructure investments?
Answer. USAID has been able to achieve success competing with the
PRC and other non-transparent actors in the infrastructure realm
through programs, including Transaction Advisory Funds and legal
support facilities, that increase open, transparent and private sector
led procurement that deliver alternatives to the PRC's infrastructure
offer to our partner countries. For example, these programs, including
USAID's technical advisory services, successfully prevented PRC efforts
to control the Port of Manzanillo in the Dominican Republic. USAID
measures the results of our programs that support infrastructure deals
that engage US-based or like minded partner companies and financing
options through our Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning processes.
These processes systematically collect and analyze information to
support evidence-based decisionmaking, and generate learning to inform
the adaptation of an activity based on evidence.
Question. What portion of the $2 billion requested mandatory
funding for ``programming aligned with the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment'' will be going to USAID?
Answer. This funding would be jointly managed by the State
Department and USAID to support time-sensitive project design and
provide advisory and delivery support to advance strategic
infrastructure projects around the globe. The exact dollar amount of
this split would be determined at a later point.
Question. Are there specific projects, priorities, or initiatives
that USAID expects to fund with this mandatory spending? In other
words, please provide a list of things that you believe USAID cannot do
today on infrastructure unless Congress approves mandatory spending.
Answer. The International Infrastructure Fund mandatory request
focuses on later-stage support for larger ``hard'' infrastructure
projects that we cannot undertake within our current programming. These
could build on support from the PGI Fund to catalyze greater investment
in PGI-aligned strategic infrastructure projects. Mandatory funding is
designed to support new and innovative ways to provide alternatives to
PRC options, especially in international infrastructure and in the
Indo-Pacific region. Through transfers to U.S. Government agencies such
as USAID, MCC, USTDA, DFC, and EXIM, the mandatory Infrastructure Fund
will support hard, strategic infrastructure projects, which could
include investment in: critical mineral mining and processing; fiber,
mobile, and wireless networks; subsea cables, landing stations, and
data centers; ports, roads, and railroads; and water and sanitation
infrastructure.
Question. Please provide a list of all USAID projects affiliated
with or branded as Project for Global Infrastructure and Investment
(PGI) projects. Please provide the location, dollar figure, and a
description of each such project.
Answer. USAID engages in several ways to align, attribute, and
directly fund projects and activities that support priority, identified
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) economic
corridors.
ECONOMIC CORRIDORS--The following projects are aligned with and
directly support the development of key economic corridors under PGI.
Lobito Corridor--Angola
Building Infrastructure Capacity ($1 million). USAID will
assist the Angolan Ministry of Transportation to develop their planned
Public-Private Partnership Unit for transportation infrastructure. The
support will enable the Ministry to replicate the successful and
transparent Lobito Rail concession for additional rail and port
investments.
Legal Equity and Equality for Angolan Women Farmers (LEE-
AWF) ($5.5 million). USAID will support agricultural development along
the Lobito Corridor in Angola, focusing on linking female smallholder
farmers to value chains that will use access to the rail line as a
critical component of sustainability.
Digital Money Is Better ($4.875 million). USAID launched a
digital money project with Africell, a U.S.-owned telecoms company,
which will provide an equivalent in-kind contribution to the
partnership on top of their existing mobile network.
Luzon Corridor--Philippines
Energy Security and Independence Program ($3 million).
Subject to congressional notification, USAID will work with the
Philippine government to regain control of transmission development
that is currently heavily controlled by the PRC and develop a nuclear
energy policy framework to support U.S.-Philippines civil nuclear
cooperation. These efforts will be funded through CPIF, and will be
carried out through USAID's ongoing Energy Secure Philippines Activity.
Regulatory Reform Support Program for National Development
(RESPOND). In March 2024, USAID's RESPOND activity signed an MoU with
Clark International Airport Corporation (CIAC) to provide technical
assistance to the CIAC in implementing programs and pursuing policies
that seek to improve regulatory quality in the Philippines that can
contribute to the Three-Year Food Logistics Agenda.
OTHER GLOBAL PGI ACTIVITIES
Additionally, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 653(a) report transmitted
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and others in the summer of
2023 included funding for a PGI Fund. State and USAID identified $30
million to support implementation of identified PGI economic corridors.
This money will be obligated to two long-standing USAID managed
mechanisms: the Architecture & Engineering IDIQ (managed by USAID's
Bureau for Resilience, Environment, and Food Security) and Trade
Central Asia (managed by USAID's Central Asia Regional Mission).
Pending resolution of existing congressional holds, we anticipate that
these PGI activities will be used for quick release technical advisory
support to remove discrete barriers to strategic infrastructure
investments.
Prosper Africa will use fiscal year 2023 funds to support PGI
activities in Africa. Support will include project advisory services in
the ``Lobito Corridor countries'' across sectors, such as agriculture,
critical minerals, and information and communication technology. This
work will enable other investments by the U.S. Government to mobilize
private capital, including by the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC) and Export-Import Bank (Ex-im).
Similar to Prosper Africa, Power Africa's fiscal year 2023 funds
will support PGI activities across Sub-Saharan Africa. Funds will
accelerate the development of generation, transmission and distribution
infrastructure by facilitating specific projects to reach financial
close and commissioning. Specific support will include project advisory
and investor matchmaking services to the private sector, as well as
training for and planning and policy development with African
governments to improve the enabling environment for private sector
energy investment. Work will also facilitate, and leverage investments
and technical assistance provided by Power Africa interagency partners
as well as bilateral and multilateral development partners.
As a final note, USAID and the Department of State plan to
attribute nearly $3.8 billion to the Partnership for Infrastructure and
Investment in fiscal year 2023. These attributions will contribute to
the United States goal of mobilizing $200 billion for the PGI by 2027
through grants, Federal financing, and private sector investments under
the broad sector pillars of PGI (gender, climate, digital, health and
health security, and agriculture). These attributions reflect USAID
programming that would have existed regardless of whether PGI was
established or not, with much of this programming being planned prior
to the development of PGI. This funding enables the United States to
help meet the objective set out at the G7 Summit in 2022 to mobilize,
with G7 partners and other like-minded partners, $600 billion in global
infrastructure investments by 2027.
Question. One of PGI's four pillars is gender. According to USAID,
what qualifies as a gender-related infrastructure project?
Answer. Under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment (PGI), the United States and its G7 partners identified four
core pillars: digital connectivity, climate and climate security,
health and health security, and gender. The G7 has committed to
mobilizing $600 billion in financing by 2027 to achieve the goals of
PGI. The United States will meet $200 billion of this by using grants
and Federal financing to mobilize private sector investment.
PGI builds on the long-standing U.S. approach to inclusive
development ensuring that infrastructure investments support economic
growth for all people, including women and girls. This approach stands
in direct contrast to the one taken by the People's Republic of China
and other strategic competitors. In practice, this means seeking to
include gender as a design consideration, e.g., by designing projects
to allow women and girls to benefit similarly to men and boys; combat
gender-based violence risks; promote women's leadership and employment;
address infrastructure challenges that disproportionately affect
women's time use, ability to engage in productive work, or health and
safety; and/or promote women's entrepreneurship in competition for and
awarding of contracts. Examples of projects that can be pursued with a
gender-alignment lens include but are not limited to the following:
Expanding mobile and internet access, including digital
infrastructure projects that account for large gaps in access for women
in many regions of the world (over a billion women in low- and middle-
income countries do not have access to mobile internet).
Expanding and improving water and sanitation
infrastructure, as the majority of the burden for water collection
around the world falls on women and girls, who spend 200 million hours
every day collecting water. Reducing this time burden enables women and
girls to participate in schooling, agriculture activities, work, and
entrepreneurship, delivering clear economic benefits.
Care infrastructure, which is essential to advance women's
economic security and that of their families.
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
Question. Instability is rising around the world, leading to new
conflicts and the risk for mass atrocities. According to the 2024
annual report from the Early Warning Project at the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum, 30 countries are at risk for mass killings this year,
half of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The President's fiscal year 2025 budget for USAID requests
additional funding for Development Assistance above fiscal year 2023
enacted levels to support atrocity prevention programming in key focus
countries. Could you please provide a more detailed explanation on how
these resources would be allocated, if provided?
Answer. These funds would support analysis and resulting
recommendations in countries at risk for atrocity events, especially
countries not at imminent/immediate risk in which USAID would have time
to pivot programming. For example, if analysis points to human rights
defenders as a particularly vulnerable group, funds could be used to
shore up protections of these individuals and their work.
USAID works to detect, prevent, and respond to atrocities in four
main ways.
Recognize and communicate: Information and analysis about mass
atrocities
This includes supporting early warning systems and both
supporting and conducting research and analysis to determine localities
at the most risk and the context-specific factors relevant to each
situation as well as their trendlines.
Prevent: Mitigating risks and bolstering resilience
A number of USAID focus areas are utilized to prevent
atrocities, including (1) activities to prevent armed conflict
outbreak, (2) activities that promote human rights, rule of law , and
democratic governance, (3) activities that strengthen civil society and
independent media, especially their ability to call attention to risk
factors and warning signs, and (4) activities that build capacity and
legitimacy of weak states.
Respond: Limit consequences of atrocities
While atrocities are ongoing there are several approaches
USAID takes to limit and mitigate their impact, such as (1) supporting
mitigation or resolution of armed conflict, (2) providing and improving
protection and support services for targeted groups in survivor-
centered and trauma-informed ways, (3) dissuading potential
perpetrators, including through legal accountability, and (4)
monitoring, documenting, and supporting advocacy to increase
information about ongoing atrocities and to debunk atrocity related
disinformation.
Support recovery: Dealing with the aftermath of mass atrocities
In addition to the focus areas above that prevent the
recurrence of mass atrocities, USAID works to: (1) support justice and
accountability, (2) support psychological well-being, recovery, and
reconciliation, (3) support political transition, and (4) support
economic recovery, including through strengthened resilience to socio-
economic shocks.
Question. Conflict prevention is an interagency task. How is USAID
coordinating between various Federal partners to implement conflict
prevention and stabilization programming in the field?
Answer. USAID coordinates with other Federal partners using the
principles of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 and the related U.S.
Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS). SPCPS aims
to use an integrated, whole-of-government approach to conflict
prevention and stabilization that is evidence-based, innovative, long-
term, and locally driven. In four partner countries (Haiti, Libya,
Mozambique, Papua New Guinea) and one region (Coastal West Africa--
Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo) USAID worked with the
Department of State, Department of Defense, and other departments and
agencies in the field to develop 10-year country or regional plans that
aim to leverage the full range of U.S. Government (USG) tools across
new and existing diplomatic, defense, and development efforts while
also deepening partnerships with like-minded countries, multilaterals,
and civil society. USAID Missions also work with the full Country Team
at Embassies to address conflict prevention and stabilization through
Integrated Country Strategies, Country Development Cooperation
Strategies, and other strategies. In addition, USAID coordinates with
the interagency to implement the Administration's Women, Peace and
Security Action Plan and to identify and address atrocity risk factors,
early and late warning signs, and options for USG programming in
countries at high risk for atrocities.
As an example, USAID's Peace Action for Rapid and Transformative
Nigerian Early Response (PARTNER) activity (2021-2026) helps Nigerian
communities, government, security, and civil society actors to
collaborate more effectively with each other and the USG interagency in
order to increase the effectiveness, local ownership, and
sustainability of an inclusive early warning early response system to
prevent violent conflict in Nigeria.
Question. In December, Secretary Blinken issued an atrocities
determination on the conflict in Sudan, but he stopped short of
designating the crisis in Darfur as a genocide. Several of my
colleagues and I disagree with this assessment. How is USAID monitoring
the ongoing atrocities in Darfur? What tools and technologies are being
used to monitor the situation in real time?
Answer. Secretary Blinken's determination of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing committed against the Sudanese
people is a necessary step toward accountability for survivors and
victims of this and previous conflicts in Sudan. The Secretary's
Atrocity Determination does not prevent further such determinations in
the future about other international crimes, including genocide. USAID
and other parts of the interagency continue to monitor the crisis
through a variety of means. One such example that has provided
tremendous insight into the ongoing atrocities is the Sudan Conflict
Observatory, which uses commercial satellite imagery and open-source
data analysis to report on the ongoing horrors in Darfur and across
Sudan. Additionally, we regularly receive reports from trusted partners
that are still able to report on the events on the ground due to
continued and heroic local presence. The United States has imposed
costs on individuals and entities escalating the conflict and
committing atrocities, and we will continue to increase pressure on
Sudanese and external actors who stand in the way of good faith
negotiation.
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