[Senate Hearing 118-427]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-427
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-978 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Shaheen Hon, Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............. 1
Ricketts, Hon. Pete, U.S. Senator From Nebraska.................. 3
O'Brien, Hon. James, Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. James O'Brien to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jeanne Shaheen................................................. 27
Response of Mr. James O'Brien to a Question Submitted by Senator
Chris Van Hollen............................................... 29
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe
and Regional Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne
Shaheen presiding.
Present: Senators Shaheen [presiding], Cardin, Ricketts,
Murphy, and Van Hollen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. This meeting of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security
Cooperation will come to order.
I want to thank Ranking Member Ricketts for agreeing to sit
and hold this hearing on this important topic. Also, I want to
thank Chairman Cardin, who is the chair of the full committee,
for being here today, and I know that we have some Ukrainian
parliamentarians in the audience, so we very much appreciate
your visit here, and thank you for all of the work that you are
doing in your country.
And I understand that you are going to Manchester, New
Hampshire, when you leave here so we hope to give you a very
warm welcome in New Hampshire. Thank you.
Over the past 4 years there is perhaps no continent that
has experienced such significant political security and
economic shifts as Europe has. Putin's miscalculated decision
to launch a full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 upended the
world but not in the way that he thought it would.
Putin thought his efforts to drive divisions within Europe
and build its reliance on Russian oil and gas would thwart a
unified, coordinated response to its illegal invasion in
Ukraine.
Instead, it upended European policy toward Russia and its
attitudes toward the rest of the world. And today the
transatlantic alliance is stronger than ever. Most notably,
Ukraine is standing firm in its fight for freedom.
Putin thought Kyiv would fall in a day, but today much of
Ukraine is still standing strong in the face of Putin's
disillusional imperial campaign. For 2 and a half years Ukraine
has defied all odds by valiantly defending its sovereignty,
holding the Russian military to account for its actions, and
launching multiple successful military operations to degrade
Russia's naval assets and military capabilities in the Black
Sea.
And Europe has come together in other ways. In addition to
the United States, many European countries have signed
bilateral security agreements with Ukraine to provide long term
support as Ukraine defends its freedom.
The fight for Ukraine's independence has been championed by
NATO allies. The response to Russia's invasion, led by the
Biden administration in coordination with NATO, the European
Union, and our Indo-Pacific partners, waged the most effective
and coordinated response to Russian actions and made it clear
to President Putin that his unprovoked aggression to undermine
a sovereign country will come at a hefty price.
Despite Putin's efforts to prevent the enlargement of NATO,
he was directly responsible for the addition of Sweden and
Finland to our NATO family, increasing the alliance from 30 to
32 allies.
And since Putin's unjust invasion, NATO allies have
significantly increased defense spending. Twenty-three allies
are now meeting the 2 percent defense spending target with
others on pace to hit the goal in the coming years, compared to
just six countries prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Now, we recognize that the tough decisions undertaken by
our European allies and partners have had significant political
and economic costs. Europe's overdue decision to end its
reliance on Russian gas resulted in a significant hike in
energy prices in addition to record inflation rates due to
Russia's blockade of Ukrainian grain exports on the Black Sea.
And despite these significant economic shocks being felt
deeply by Europeans, there is strong continued public support
in Europe for Ukraine and a broader recognition that Putin must
be stopped in Ukraine before his imperialist ambitions threaten
other parts of Europe and NATO.
We recognize, however, that recent elections that have
taken place across Europe, from the European parliamentary
elections to the elections in France, illustrate that some
political groups are willing to capitalize on discontent to
fuel their far right agendas.
So although we should celebrate our achievements and
strengthening within our alliance, this hearing is an
opportunity to understand how we can further consolidate our
transatlantic unity to address future challenges such as
addressing the economic challenges faced by China.
Most importantly, we must continue to ensure that our
citizens see the benefit of alliance unity by strengthening
both our trade ties and our democracy.
In just my home State of New Hampshire, we do about $3
billion in exports to Europe each year, and that shows just how
much we are dependent on a stable and prosperous Europe.
Assistant Secretary O'Brien, in your testimony and in
questions from members today I hope you can address some of the
most pressing questions.
How can we ensure that our U.S. and EU citizens are both
informed and collectively benefit from our increased economic
coordination? How do we ensure that the U.S. public understands
the importance of addressing the threats faced by Russia and
China?
How can we continue to sustain strong support for Ukraine
so that victory is defined under its own terms and not by
dictators like Putin or Viktor Orban? And how can we continue
to support aspirant countries in the Western Balkans who are
withstanding significant domestic political headwinds in their
efforts to seek EU and NATO membership?
And how do we continue to support the spirit of democracy
in countries like Georgia where the government has taken
efforts to undermine its own EU membership ambitions despite
the overwhelmingly pro-EU aspirations of its people?
Assistant Secretary O'Brien, we are grateful that you have
agreed to testify today. Your role is critical to ensuring that
our partnerships with Europe continue to make the United States
more prosperous and more secure.
And before I end I just want to say thank you to Morgan
Kennedy, who is here, who has served in my office for the past
year as a Pearson Fellow on loan from the Department of State.
It is a great program, and we appreciate that, and we
appreciate all of the great work that Morgan has done in our
office.
So next month she will be rejoining the Department of State
focusing on Europe and support for Ukraine.
Now, before I introduce Assistant Secretary O'Brien, I will
turn it over to Senator Ricketts for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETE RICKETTS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We often refer to the war in Ukraine as Putin's war of
aggression, and that might have been true on February 24, 2022,
but that framing is not accurately really described now of the
war today. And it is because this war is not just about Putin's
war of aggression.
It is an opening salvo in a larger, protracted fight that
an axis of authoritarians is leading, including the PRC--
People's Republic of China--Russia, Iran, North Korea, and they
are waging on the West.
The winner will not only define the future of Europe but
also the future of the entire free world. For those in Europe
who want to focus squarely on Putin but not apply the same
level of fervor to the other partners in the axis, that would
be a strategic blunder.
Iran has supplied thousands of weaponized drones that have
been used to attack Ukrainian cities and exhaust Ukrainian air
defenses. But it does not end there. From plots targeting
Jewish and Israeli targets to devastating cyber attacks, Iran
wishes to inflict only terror and chaos across Europe.
Too frequently North Korea's role in the axis is minimized.
However, its new mutual defense treaty with Russia combined
with millions of artillery shells and ballistic missiles it has
sent to Putin showcases the true threat Kim Jong-un poses to
Europe.
Still, of Russia's partners, none of them pose a greater
threat to European security than the People's Republic of
China. Xi and Putin's no limits partnership has led the PRC
propping up Russia's war economy and delivering critical weapon
components necessary for Russia to maintain its aggression.
And while the PRC has not sent lethal aid yet, last month
we saw PLA soldiers conduct joint military exercises for the
first time in Belarus, mere miles away from NATO's border.
Let us be clear. Xi Jinping wants and is invested in Putin
winning. No amount of diplomacy from the U.S., Europe, or even
Ukraine will change this or make the PRC play a positive role
in ending this war.
I was pleased to see NATO allies strongly and unequivocally
call out the malign aggression of all four of these axis
members in a recent summit here in Washington. But strong words
do not deter dictators. Only strong actions do that.
That is why it is important that NATO allies spend more on
their defense and security. There are some who want to make a
victory lap that we have got 23 allies that met the 2 percent
target, and that is improvement.
Yet, it is unclear whether some of these allies, notably
Germany, have plans to be able to sustain this level of
spending for the long term. And we still have allies like Spain
and Belgium that 10 years after the 2 percent pledge can still
barely muster up 1.3 percent of their GDP on defense.
This is even more concerning given that 2 percent benchmark
made in 2014 does not come close to matching the new threat
environment that we have today or in the future.
The NATO alliance has been rejuvenated but its sustained
success comes down to increased capabilities, lethality, and
manpower, all of which can only be met with more spending.
We can no longer afford to give participation trophies to
free riding allies unwilling to do their part.
I want to address another theme expressed by some European
officials at the NATO summit, the need to Trump proof the
alliance.
Just like the recent elections in Europe, the upcoming
elections in November and a potential Trump administration
would bring about differences in policy and strategy.
That is how democracies work. However, if President Trump
does win, I would encourage Europe at this time to adopt a more
constructive approach.
It goes without saying that had Europe listened to the
Trump administration on the need to increase its defense
spending and end its dangerous reliance on Russian energy,
Europe would have been in a much stronger position both before
and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Trump administration earned a right to say to Europe, I
told you so. Regardless of the outcome of the election in
November, however, our collective success depends on uniting
against the threats posed by this burgeoning axis and comes
down to two facts.
First, the United States cannot win this fight alone, and
second, our allies, particularly in Europe, must radically
evolve their security posture against all access members to
match the nature of the threat.
This means ensuring Ukraine is successful instead of
allowing a Russian--a fear of a Russian escalation to force us
to maintaining the status quo.
This means aggressively derisking from the Chinese economy
instead of being enticed by short term economic gains at the
expense of long term security losses.
This means reimposing strong sanctions on Iran that deprive
it of the revenues it uses to fund terrorism in Europe and
around the globe instead of banking on the false hope that the
Iranian regime will fundamentally change.
And it means increasing our economic and diplomatic
pressure on Pyongyang instead of allowing Kim Jong-un's rogue
regime to grow more dangerous in the shadows.
Ultimately, Europe's future will be defined on whether we
can together adapt quickly enough to meet the moment. For the
sake of Europe, the transatlantic alliance and the future of
the free world, I hope and believe we can.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.
Now it is my pleasure to introduce our witness.
Jim O'Brien is Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasian Affairs, which is a position he began after being
confirmed last year.
Mr. O'Brien was previously a career State Department
officer and served two previous Administrations as a special
presidential envoy. Notably, he was the first presidential
envoy for hostage affairs from 2015 to 2017 and helped
establish the office and worked for the safe return of about a
hundred American citizens.
Over the course of his career at the State Department he
led a large and successful sanctions program and advised on a
range of issues including peace negotiations in Europe,
scientific and environmental agreements, and initiatives to
investigate and prosecute persons responsible for war crimes.
With that, Mr. O'Brien, I turn it over to you for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES O'BRIEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Ranking Member and Mr. Chairman, I know you have had a
long day of State Department testimony already, so I will try
to just add to what you both said in your excellent opening
statements.
With Europe we have built a platform that lets us project
power and promote our values and security. What we have been
doing over the last year is strengthening that platform and
extending it to new areas.
Now we see Russia pushing back hard against it, and that is
one theme in every country we will talk about. Sometimes Russia
is aided by local elites who find benefit in sitting just
outside the rule of law, and through all this, Senator
Ricketts, as you mentioned, China is looking to see if it can
benefit from weakening the platform that we have with our
allies, and it is important that we impress on our partners and
our allies that they have to face up to what China is doing,
and I think we are making some progress there, and I will talk
a bit about that.
So, I will mention three areas that are of special
importance, and I know the questions will take this much
deeper.
The first is Ukraine. As you noted, Russia is an
imperialist, aggressive revanchist power. Ukraine is fighting
to preserve its independence, in part so we do not have to have
this fight even though Putin threatens other allies of America.
So, we want Ukraine to win, and we are providing Ukraine
with the material to win. And in the last month or two the
platform we are discussing has gotten much stronger and has
reached out to Ukraine in three particular ways.
The EU has begun membership negotiations with Ukraine. That
will encourage reform of the kind Ukraine's people have
demanded and will begin to open up markets for Ukraine so that
it is able to participate in a much more lucrative, high value
economy than had been the case before.
The G-7 leaders together agreed that Ukraine would have the
benefit of earnings from Russian sovereign assets, giving it
this year we anticipate $50 billion to spend on defending
itself and rebuilding its society from the damage Russia has
brought.
And NATO, of course, has said Ukraine is welcome once it
takes a few steps across the bridge to NATO that was built at
this last month's summit in Washington.
This is the fastest way to peace, that Ukraine is able to
win the war or say to Putin, we are able to negotiate from
confidence. Everything else is a chimera.
So, with this we see Ukraine making some progress on the
battlefield, and I am happy to address that more in questions.
We have, at the same time, strengthened our platform and in
particular NATO, and you both mentioned the various ways in
which that is true.
And Senator Ricketts, I completely agree that we cannot win
this war alone. So, we are working with others, and we are
making sure that our spending is not just higher but smarter,
with regional defense plans so we can measure the progress that
we are making and hold each other to account.
NATO is also going to be developing a new strategy toward
Russia over the next months, and that will hold our allies
together as we will go forward in dealing with Russia, and here
all the NATO allies agreeing that the PRC is the decisive
enabler of Russia's war is a significant step and one that will
allow us to build on the platform that we have.
At the same time that we are focused on Ukraine we are
working to confront what I would call the arc from the Caspian
to the Adriatic, a group of states that are looking to have
less Russia but to be much closer to the rule of law that is
offered by membership in the EU and NATO or by closer
relationships, and across this area over the last 2 years we
have consistently seen a desire to have less Russia in place.
And now we are seeing some pushback, sometimes fueled by
Russia, sometimes by local elites who would like to be close to
European banks but not European rule of law.
And we are working in each one of those places, and each
one has its own particular idiosyncrasies, but we are working
in each one of those places to try to strengthen the platform
that we have built.
And finally, we are making sure that Americans benefit from
this work we do with Europe. Europe is our largest trading
partner.
We are half of global GDP. Five million Americans are
employed by European countries, and we will work through every
mechanism we have so that Americans see in their pocketbooks
the benefit of closer cooperation with Europe.
So, thank you for the time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Brien follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. James O'Brien
Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Ricketts, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the future of Europe. Your request comes at a pivotal time
for the region and on the heels of a hugely successful NATO 75th
Anniversary Summit that further strengthened Transatlantic unity. I am
deeply appreciative of the role that you and Members of this Committee
played during the Summit, and for your continued support for U.S.
policy in the region as a whole.
President Biden remarked that this was one of the most successful
Summits he has seen in his public service career, and I could not agree
more. Together with our Allies and under the leadership of outgoing
Secretary General Stoltenberg, the Summit delivered four critical
achievements:
First, by holding the Summit in Washington, DC, the site of the
signing of the Treaty 75 years ago, we celebrated and underscored the
leadership roles the United States and the Alliance played in bringing
the world out of the tragedy of the Second World War and creating the
modern rules-based international system, which remains the foundation
for peace and security today.
Second, we achieved extraordinary unity among the 32 NATO Allies on
a slate of practical and skillful solutions to some of the peace and
security challenges we face. Defense spending among Allies is at an
all-time high: at the beginning of this Administration, only nine
Allies had met the 2 percent of GDP targets. After considerable
diplomatic engagement, at the close of the Summit, 23 Allies had
reached this target, with more anticipated to reach this goal. Allies
agreed to collectively review NATO's strategic approach to Russia, and,
for the first time since 1989, to implement and resource NATO's new
regional defense plans to deter threats and defend every inch of NATO
territory. And critically, we met for the first time at 32 Allies with
the addition of Sweden in March, and reached consensus on a new NATO
leader.
Third, by welcoming the attendance of Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, we intensified NATO cooperation
with our Indo-Pacific partners, including agreeing on practical
approaches to address shared concerns about the growing cooperation
between the PRC and Russia.
And finally, we unequivocally demonstrated our support for Ukraine
by ensuring that Ukraine has the ability to fight back against Russia.
We just concluded 2 months of high-level, high-intensity diplomacy that
has underscored U.S. and Allied commitment to Ukraine's fight and
improved the international narrative on the war, culminating in a NATO
Summit that demonstrated long-term support for Ukraine across a huge
spectrum of Allies and partners. Within the Alliance, Allies agreed
NATO will stand up a new command to provide security assistance and
training support to Ukraine, deepen Ukraine's political relationship
with NATO, and announced long term financial support for Ukraine to
prevail. In addition to historic donations of air defense equipment and
F-16 fighters, President Biden and 25 other leaders signed the Ukraine
Compact: a mutually reinforcing framework that brings these countries
together in a unified, coordinated, and comprehensive architecture to
support Ukraine not just for now but for years in the future. As you've
heard President Biden say, these elements constitute a bridge to NATO
for Ukraine: a clear pathway leading to eventual membership as Ukraine
continues to implement domestic reforms. This Compact is a central
piece of that clear, strong, and well-lit bridge. As Russia is clearly
not ready to pursue peace, the United States and our Allies and
partners must ensure that Ukraine has the military capacity, a viable
energy grid, and a functioning economy to rebuff Russian aggression.
And it's working. Earlier this month, the last Russian patrol boat left
the Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea. Combined with the G7 commitment to
a loan of $50 billion secured by profits from immobilized Russian
sovereign assets, Ukraine can continue its fight effectively. This
confidence is the quickest route to peace. The Summit demonstrated the
NATO Alliance is now stronger, larger, and more fit for purpose than
before Putin's devastating war on Ukraine.
Across Europe, there has been a series of consequential elections
that will shape both the future of the region and our future relations
with Europe. We have a new government in the UK that is eager to work
with us, a new slate of elected EU leaders in Brussels who are focused
on security and prosperity, and a European parliament of changed
composition and political alliances, but one that I believe we can work
with in the coming months. We continue to actively facilitate
conclusion of a just and durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
and are working to foster deeper cooperation among the Black Sea
states.
But there remain challenges to democracy in some quarters, where
backsliding is a significant concern. We must maintain our focus on
countries like Georgia, working with likeminded partners to promote
measures that strengthen democracy and incentivize a return by these
governments to a Euro-Atlantic path.
In Russia's periphery, we seek to help those countries that have
struggled between the pull of EU accession and the pressure of Russia's
autocracy, and work with those leaders to get them out of the `grey
zone' and into western-style democracies. We are building a path for
countries in the Western Balkans, Moldova, and the Caucasus independent
of malign influence from the PRC and Russia. Some elites in that
periphery are bucking against making the hard reforms needed to join
the EU and NATO. We must work together to ensure those reforms are
done.
Looking ahead, I will strive in the coming months to solidify the
gains we made at the NATO Summit; support Ukraine to win the war and be
in a position of strength if it chooses to negotiate with Russia;
create opportunities for EU accession for those countries whose
citizens want to turn to the West and away from autocracy; and,
strengthen the gains we've made with our European allies and partners
these past three and a half years to ensure that our largest collective
trading partners can bring about and sustain peace and prosperity.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today and I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that testimony.
I am going to defer to Chairman Cardin for his questions.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Senator Shaheen, and thank
you for holding this hearing.
Senator Ricketts, thank you very much. We are very
fortunate the leadership we have on this subcommittee and the
work that you all do in a very bipartisan manner, so we
appreciate it very much.
Secretary O'Brien, welcome. Thank you for your service.
I want to welcome our Ukrainian parliamentarians who are
here. It is a pleasure to have you in our committee room.
It is clear to all of us that the future of Europe, the
subject of today's hearing, very much depends upon Ukraine's
success against Russia's invasion. That is our top priority and
will continue to be our top priority.
So, I want to talk a little bit about how we got here, and
it will connect to your last point, Secretary O'Brien, dealing
with places that want less reliance on Russia that are reaching
out to us.
What happened in this attack on Ukraine's sovereignty
started with the invasion of Crimea and taking over Crimea, and
we did not do anything about that. And before that Russia
invaded Georgia, and we did not do much about that at all.
Russia took over Moldova, Transnistria area. We did not do
much about that. So, we have seen Russia's aggression, and we
are drawing a line right now in Ukraine as we should because
they are trying to really take over the entire country.
But that is not the only place. Since the Russian invasion
of Ukraine we have found another area that Russia has been
engaged in, maybe not directly, but certainly as an enabler,
and that is Armenia.
I was recently in Armenia at the border of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Now, I cannot go to the border because in that area
of Armenia that is on the border is now controlled by the
Azerbaijanis.
How did they get control of that area? Through Russia,
Russia allowing them to take that control of territory. What
has the international community done about that? I have not
seen very much at all. I have not seen even a lot of comments
about it.
As you talk about countries that are trying to get closer
to the United States, Armenia is one of those countries, and
yet they now have a real security threat to their borders by
being taken by force by Azerbaijan with the complicity of
Russia.
Tell me what we are doing in order to show our support for
the principles that countries cannot change borders by force,
and that countries that are reaching out to the United States
or the West for a closer relationship such as Armenia are not
going to be subject to retaliation by Russia without the
support of the West.
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Armenia is a subject we spend a great deal of time on. So,
with Secretary Blinken and President von der Leyen we met with
Prime Minister Pashinyan several months ago, established a new
platform to help Armenia reduce its dependence on Russia.
It is almost entirely dependent on Russia for its energy
and its economy. We need to diversify that so that it is able--
--
Senator Cardin. And for its border security.
Mr. O'Brien. And I will come to security in just a second.
So, making it possible for them to make the brave steps
that Prime Minister Pashinyan is leading them on, which is a
break with Russia.
Now, as you point out, Russia had guaranteed Armenia's
security after the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and for a long time
before then, and it failed. It turned its back as Azerbaijan
retook the territory around Nagorno-Karabakh and that has led
to a severe break where much of the population of Armenia wants
to get further from Russia.
So, we are creating the conditions for that to happen. A
significant deadline will come later this week when several
thousand Russian troops--FSB troops--have been requested to
leave, and those are really significant for a number of
reasons, in part because they man the border at the
international airport, and that is where some of the sanctions'
smuggling evasion takes place.
So, we will see whether Russia is really willing to honor
the sovereign wishes of Armenia that it leave so that Armenia
can build the relationships that it wants.
We are also strongly supporting the peace effort that Prime
Minister Pashinyan has been developing with President Aliyev in
Azerbaijan----
Senator Cardin. Which Russia is trying to make sure does
not happen.
Mr. O'Brien. Russia is trying to make sure that anything
that happens there happens on its terms. And I think both of
those two countries are a bit frustrated by the involvement, to
be honest, and we are working very hard so that the expressed
desire of peace can be manifest in an agreement.
I will just say one more thing about why that matters so
much. You look at a map--from Central Asia, which is not a part
of this committee but Central Asia all the way through, the
Central Asian countries are incredibly rich and right now their
only options to the global markets, fundamentally, are through
Russia or China.
If we can open up a route that goes through Azerbaijan and
Armenia, then they will have access to global markets and much
less dependence on Russia and China.
So, this is all a part, again, of allowing countries to
choose their own paths to the global markets.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that, and I support everything
you just said, but it still begs the question that without much
complaint Azerbaijan is now occupying part of Armenia--
strategic part of Armenia--and there has been no real protest
about their controlling the highlands next to Nagorno-Karabakh
that puts Armenia at tremendous risk of the corridor that could
divide the country or lose its southern edge, and I have not
seen much of a fuss made by the international community.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, please go ahead.
Mr. O'Brien. OK. No, I appreciate it, and you are making a
fuss here and I appreciate that. It is good to lay down the
marker.
The two sides have agreed to a border demarcation process.
They have agreed on what the lines are, and you are right,
there are some territories that each side still occupies that,
according to the line they have agreed, will probably end up
going back the other way.
The highlands are of particular interest. But that is a
process that the two sides are working on. We have been very
clear that any adjustment in the border--that the border they
have agreed is the one that they should end up with unless the
two sides agree that they do not.
Senator Cardin. I will just--I do not want to----
Mr. O'Brien. Yes.
Senator Cardin. My understanding the peace process does not
deal with that--the peace agreement.
Mr. O'Brien. Well, it does. I mean, there is a peace
agreement under negotiation that defers the border demarcation
to another channel in the peace process so you cannot just--
yes.
Senator Cardin. And I support that, but whether we will
ever get to that point, my concern is it is going to be years
down the road, and we are going to have another Moldova and
another Georgia.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Chair.
Two years ago, President Biden issued a red line to the PRC
not to provide material support for Russia's war in Ukraine or
face consequences. And as I mentioned, while we do not see any
lethal aid yet, certainly, China is keeping the Russia economy
afloat with energy purchases and providing a number of dual use
materials and so forth to Russia to be able to continue this
war.
At the NATO summit the alliance made a clear rebuke of
Beijing for underwriting Putin's war in Ukraine. In the
Washington Declaration allies threatened that, quote, ``PRC
cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history
without this negatively impacting its interests and
reputation,'' end quote, and this level of clarity is
encouraging.
However, without subsequent actions to deter further PRC
support these words are likely to achieve little. Since the
start of the war the U.S. and the EU have sanctioned numerous
Chinese companies and individuals to stem the flow of PRC dual
use goods.
While this has led to a recent decline, it still is
estimated that hundreds of millions of dollars in dual use
goods continue to flow from the PRC to Russia.
Secretary O'Brien, NSA Sullivan recently said that the
Administration is prepared to tighten screws on the PRC's
support for Russia including potential sanctions against PRC
banks.
Given that time is of the essence, when can we expect a
decision to move forward on this? Will Chinese banks be
sanctioned?
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, Senator.
So, 2 years ago we talked to the Chinese not about just
material assistance but specifically focused on lethal
assistance, and that line has held. Now we are talking to them
about the material amounts of dual use goods that they are
providing, and it is disturbing and wrong.
They are providing 90 percent of the electronics that
Russia depends on, 70 percent of the machine tools. This has
had an effect of our European partners now recognizing that
China is stoking the war machine that threatens Europe and that
is forcing China now to recalibrate some of its basic policies.
How long it takes them to do that, that is something we
will work to hasten, but that is a real exercise in daily
diplomacy.
On sanctions, as you have said we have sanctioned--I do not
know the specific number--the Europeans earlier this summer
began sanctioning a few Chinese entities as well. That was a
significant step for them to take.
We will continue to work on this. We do not preview exactly
when we roll things out, but I assure you this is an area of
real focus, and any information you have got, please provide to
us, but it is something we will keep working on.
Senator Ricketts. All right. So but you cannot give me a
timeline for when there may be sanctions on Chinese banks that
are facilitating these transactions?
Mr. O'Brien. I am not going to promise a date, but I will
tell you we work on this every day.
Senator Ricketts. Well, also complicating this is the fact
that Chinese banks are--like, half the Chinese transactions
with these Chinese companies that Russia is doing are made
through intermediaries in the UAE, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
other countries.
What are you doing to address that aspect of this? Is this
also part of what you are working on?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes, it is--I mean, and someone from Treasury
can walk through some of the difficulties, but there has been a
real effort to reach out particularly, say, in the Emirates,
which has a deep banking sector.
One of the challenges is that a lot of this trade is kind
of closer to cash and carry. It is not like an infrastructure
project where there is lots of documentation and research. It
is just people kind of Venmo-ing each other money.
So, we have to make clear to banks that they have a higher
duty of care to know their customers, and there has been a real
effort in this. It began when I was in my previous role, and we
are seeing some progress on this in some of these third country
banks, particularly Turkiye and the Emirates.
Senator Ricketts. And you also mentioned about--for
example, I think you said 70 percent of the machine tools
imported to Russia are coming from the PRC. Where are the other
30 percent coming from?
Mr. O'Brien. Probably the U.S. and Europe. I do not have
the exact breakdown.
The difficulty with many of the products we are discussing,
whether it is electronics or machine tools, is that they are
sold on to brokers, and then they are sold on and sold on in
commerce. So, knowing the end user is difficult for the
companies.
We have been speaking with American companies, and our
European colleagues have been speaking with their companies
about understanding who they are really selling to so that
nothing new moves, and there are some new restrictions, and we
will take more steps to get at these shadow brokers.
Senator Ricketts. Can you give me an example just what some
of the new concrete steps we can take to cut off the supply
that is under 30 percent?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes. Well, the first thing is getting on--
having our companies understand that when they are getting new
customers, those may well just be proxies for an old customer
who is now illegal.
So, working our way through that is important. The second
is identifying some of the key brokers. This is maybe more an
issue for the electronics but often the sales are just made to
a giant wholesaler who then holds the goods and then sells them
on. And so having those held to a higher standard is important.
A third is in Europe particularly to deal with land
crossings. So, the EU just--what happens is somebody in a
Western European country makes a sale.
Their national authority will check it, but often not be
fully aware of the situation at the end point, and then the
goods will be routed through Belarus or Russia by land, and
they fall off the back of a truck.
So, we need those border crossings to be tough, and the EU
just gave those countries the authority to stop suspicious
trucks, and now it is an exercise of putting in the enforcement
muscle to make sure they can carry that out.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.
Earlier this year Congress passed the $95 billion national
security supplemental--$95 billion-plus. It passed with strong
bipartisan support, and much of the funding is critical to
supporting Ukraine to defend itself.
Now, with long range strike capabilities such as the ATACMS
provided by the U.S. and our allies, Ukraine has seen success
in halting Russia's advances on the front lines and destroying
Russian central command systems.
I personally believe we should allow Ukraine to conduct the
war in the manner that they see fit with our weapons.
But can you talk about how the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral
security agreement is allowing for increased intelligence
sharing to improve Ukrainian targeting, and is the
Administration considering a policy change to allow the
Ukrainian Armed Forces to service targets in range of the
ATACMS? And how does this compare with the U.K.'s policy on the
Storm Shadow?
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, Madam Chair.
So, the overall strategy, we want Ukraine to win so we want
them to use the weapons they have, both their own and the ones
that are provided in the way that is most effective.
Right now, that means holding in the east, and despite some
of the headlines in recent days--I was just talking to
Ambassador Brink--that we think those lines will stabilize. We
do not see Russia making a major breakthrough, but we will keep
watching it.
It means clearing away the Russian firing positions. During
the time that the supplemental did not pass, Russia really had
the opportunity to bring enormous weaponry up really close to
the front lines and use it to devastate Ukraine's defenses and
communities.
And it means keeping the economic centers open. That means
providing more air defense. So, President Biden announced
several weeks ago that the U.S. and our allies have agreed to
provide Ukraine with substantially more strategic air defense
systems.
That will let Ukraine's economic centers work, and that
then pays off because Ukraine, using its own weaponry with some
help from ours, has cleared out the ability to trade through
the Black Sea.
All of those things have to come together, and the weaponry
we are providing is a piece of doing those things. So, it is a
constant discussion about where the weapons can be best used,
and I realize some of this may be better done in another
setting, but what Ukraine has done to clear out a lot of the
Russian capacity that was in close has been very--has been
remarkable, using its weaponry and using weaponry we have
provided.
I do not have an exact comparison to what that is with the
Storm Shadows. I know I was just in London talking with their
government.
I think there is some public lack of clarity around how
they are using the Storm Shadow. So maybe we can--I will get an
answer and we can talk about that off----
Senator Shaheen. That would be great. Can you also talk
about how the national security supplemental bill has been
important to advancing our own economic and national security
interests?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes. Thank you for that question. And I
think--I testified before you just when the bill was first
submitted last year, and I think there are a few key points.
The most important is we are helping Ukraine fight for its
freedom so that we do not have to have this fight there or
sometime later. And I come from a family that has had several
generations of its men before me fight and in some cases die in
European wars. So, I appreciate how much that means to us.
The second thing is that has a direct economic impact on
the United States. So just one thing--Senator Ricketts and I
are both from Nebraska--grain prices, and I know it is not a
great year for farmers now anyway, but for 150 years they have
been really decided by the back and forth between the American
Midwest and Ukraine's exports through Odessa. That is kind of
the fundamentals of the global grain market.
And so if we allow Russia to control the Odessa or to
control Ukraine's grain markets then we have Russia in control
of more than 20 percent of the global grain market, able to
dump it at low prices when it wants or sell it at high prices
or take away--like, that is the kind of monopoly against us
that we really do not want to see.
And then, finally, a lot of the money in that bill is spent
in the United States in order to make the things that Ukraine
needs.
So, I think $30 billion was dedicated to buy things made in
the U.S. Another $15 billion or so was spent so that we were
able to provide the kind of advice and assistance that Ukraine
wanted.
And that is not profiteering. That is buying the best stuff
in the world and putting it to the best possible use.
Senator Shaheen. While we are still on this topic, can you
also talk about how much our European allies have contributed
to the war in Ukraine?
Because I think there is a misperception in some quarters
that the United States has given all of this equipment and
support and Europe has not done much.
Mr. O'Brien. So, the basic numbers, ours are--and we will
get you the precise numbers. I have got them in my voluminous
materials. We have provided around about $87 billion of
humanitarian, economic, and security assistance to Ukraine.
Our European allies alone have provided around, what is it?
$110 billion to this point, and that does not count much of
what they have done for Ukrainians. Millions of Ukrainians have
made second homes or first homes in Poland, Germany, and in
other countries across Europe, and that money is in addition.
So, we see our European allies spending much more than we
are, and going forward, the Europeans have committed to spend a
great deal of their money on defense to support Ukraine.
So as just one example in Germany--and Senator Ricketts,
you mentioned a concern about Germany--they are strong backers
of the plan to spend some of the Russian sovereign asset
windfall profit with Ukraine, and they say a majority of that
money likely will go for munitions, and frankly, a lot of that
will be spent on American munitions because ours is the best
stuff available.
But that is not the purpose, but that is what happens when
the Europeans come to support Ukraine.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to keep building upon one of the things we touched
upon a bit earlier with regard to missiles.
At the Washington NATO summit the Biden administration
announced they are going to start deploying long range missiles
to Germany beginning in 2026.
Secretary, do you agree that deploying these conventional
missile systems capable of threatening military targets deep
inside of Russia strengthens NATO's defense posture and
complicates Russian planning efforts?
Mr. O'Brien. Absolutely.
Senator Ricketts. So, since Putin began his illegal war in
Ukraine, Russia has fired numerous cruise and ballistic
missiles into Ukraine, oftentimes targeting civilians, from
deep inside Russian territory.
The Biden administration has actually prevented Ukraine
from using a lot of the U.S. weapons to strike back at these
military targets in Russia. In May the Administration
reluctantly eased some of these restrictions, allowing HIMARS
strikes on targets on the border, across the border, as Russia
was posing a significant threat and making gains in Kharkiv.
However, these restrictions on Ukraine's use of long range
ATACMS on targets inside of Russia remain. If deploying long
range missiles in Germany is critical to NATO's deterrence by
threatening military targets deep inside of Russia, then why
does not the same logic apply to Ukraine and its ability to do
the same with U.S. weapons and other West weapons--Western
provided weaponry?
Why should not they be allowed to strike these targets
inside of Russia?
Mr. O'Brien. Senator, I think some of this is probably best
for a military briefing, but I would just say as a general
principle we want Ukraine to use the weapons it has in the
places they can do the most damage.
For the last several months that has been driving Russian
firing positions back and denying it the ability to use Crimea
essentially as a giant aircraft carrier threatening Ukraine,
and Ukraine has been incredibly successful in that as a
strategy.
What the President said, and when asked about this at the
end of the NATO summit, was that we will continue to talk with
Ukraine about the best way to use the weapons given the
situation on the battlefield at the time.
Senator Ricketts. Well, you know, at the NATO summit the
President, I think, also said when he was defending his
unwillingness to expand this policy saying if Zelensky had the
capacity to strike Moscow, strike the Kremlin, that would not
make sense, would it?
But to your knowledge, has Ukraine asked to be able to use
U.S. weapons to strike Moscow?
Mr. O'Brien. If I knew that I could not talk about it in
this setting.
No, I think the conversation that happens in military
channels is very professional and focused on the actual
situation in the battlefield. And again, we are looking for the
use of these weapons, which there is not an infinite number of
these weapons, so we are looking for them to be used in the
sequence that does the most damage and in the places that will
protect the most people.
Senator Ricketts. Where I am going with those not
necessarily military. What I am talking about is how do we
deter Russia from these kinds of things in the first place?
And if we believe that having long range weapons is going
to help deter Russia, and we give Ukraine the ability to start
striking targets deep inside of Russia, does that not seem to
make sense that would also help deter Russia?
And if we provided them the ability to do this, does not
mean that they even have the capability to strike Moscow but
would give them the ability to strike targets such as air bases
and munitions and all that sort of thing that would help us
there.
And my question would then be by allowing some of these
things, are we seeing a significant escalation from Putin?
Do we see that with some of these things? Are we seeing an
escalation from Putin if we are giving the Ukrainians more
freedom to be able to prosecute the war?
Mr. O'Brien. To this point, the escalation we have seen
from President Putin is a willingness to strike civilian
targets including a children's cancer hospital, places that are
known to be schools. So that is the escalation we are seeing.
The reason we adopted the policy we have is--I know some
people talk about escalation ladder concern. I have got to say
inside the Government the conversation is about where can these
things be effective.
And Ukraine has its own weapons, which occasionally have
been used to strike well beyond the limitations, even the
physical limits--range limits of the weapons the U.S. has. And
there they choose sometimes to use them in these long range
areas and sometimes they focus nearer to hand because that is
the immediate need, and as the President said, we will keep at
this.
Senator Ricketts. Well, so what I hear you saying is that
it is really not about the escalation, though the President
said along the lines of it would not be a good idea to allow
Ukraine to be able to strike Moscow.
So to me, that says that is about escalation, even though I
do not believe Ukraine has plans to try to use our weapons or
even capability to strike Moscow with it, and I think what we
ought to do is allow the Ukrainians to be able to fight this
war so they can win by hitting those military targets deep
inside of Russia.
Let them use the ATACMS in a way that can be the most
effective as hitting those targets, and stop slow rolling this.
Give them the opportunity to be able to win. I encourage the
Administration to do that because I think that is the fastest
way to be able to get a victory here.
So I have run over my time. I will turn back over. Thank
you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Assistant Secretary, great to see you and in your new
capacity.
Let me first say that given the limited time there are some
questions I am going to submit for the record regarding Cyprus
and the fact that Turkey, under Erdogan, has made clear they do
not want to go back to U.N. negotiations which, in my view, is
something that the United States should be strongly opposing.
I also want to associate myself with some of the comments I
understand Senator Cardin made with respect to Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
But I would like to focus my questions on your current job
and also the connection to your previous one on sanctions
issues, and I understand we have some parliamentarians from
Ukraine here. Great to have them with us.
This morning in the full committee we had Deputy Secretary
Campbell before us, and I asked him about our efforts to enlist
support from our European allies, our NATO partners, EU
members, also partners in East Asia, with respect to imposing
sanctions on Chinese firms that are supporting the Putin war
industrial complex. Not direct arms shipments but high
technologies that are helpful to them.
Can you give us an update on how successful we are being in
terms of getting our European allies to impose sanctions?
Because, as you well know, they are far more effective when
they are done collectively than alone.
Mr. O'Brien. So, a couple of things, and Senator Ricketts
probed on this topic, so we will see if I improve the answer.
The first thing is to have a clear political commitment to
do so, and I think we have seen that over recent months,
evident in the NATO summit communique that said China is the
decisive enabler of this war, and we hear this privately from
all our European colleagues.
In Europe, the EU did put its first sanctions on some
Chinese entities. It is a difficult process, but they managed
to get through to it.
We will continue this work with them on all of the ways in
which China keeps Russia on the battlefield. We see our
European partners saying that they understand China is helping
Putin build a military machine that threatens Europe.
Now, there is a subtle distinction here in that sanctions
are sometimes difficult for Europe because they require
unanimity, and that allows one state, either out of actual
disagreement or posturing, to disrupt or delay an entire
package.
There is room to do some work around the export control
space because often that just requires a qualified majority and
so there may be some activities there.
Senator Ricketts asked when we will have the next package,
and that is something I will not try to predict in this
setting. But it is a process we work on every day, and we talk
to our European colleagues about every day.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it.
No, I appreciate that and look forward to following up with
you on that other secondary mechanism that you talked about
that does not require a unanimous agreement.
On the oil price cap that we have now had in place a couple
years now, my understanding from talking to Secretary Yellen
and others at Treasury has been overall we have succeeded in
driving down Russian oil revenues.
They still have an awful lot of oil on the market and
countries like India and others are benefiting from the lower
prices.
But I know there is--this is always constantly something
where there is efforts to get around our price cap, and that
includes development of the shadow fleet tankers, and I know
there is an ongoing discussion about whether or not we should
take that next step, pursue more measures against some of the
shadow fleet tankers.
Can you talk about how we can make that price cap more
effective? And I know it is partly in Treasury's jurisdiction,
but also obviously in yours as well.
Mr. O'Brien. It is an all of government approach. Our sense
is that the price cap drives down the price of Russian oil by
about $9 to $20 for each barrel. That is kind of on average,
and obviously, different grades and buyers may have a different
result.
That is, largely, because now Russia has to sell to two
very large buyers who are savvy negotiators, China and India.
So, with that we are lowering the amount of cash available to
Putin.
The harder side of the equation is that we believe we are
driving up the expenses Russia has to export as well so there
is less profit. That is more difficult for us to get our hands
on because of the opaque way that Russia sells its oil.
One thing that is true is Russia and Iran have built these
shadow fleets. They are almost entirely unregulated. A lot of
our work over the last years has been to try to build a system
of regulation to capture these ships because they--the way
sanctions work is that the--it is the insurance companies, the
crew registries, the flag registries that--who refuse to
service sanctions violators and these ships are old, creaky,
and often without any of those protections.
So, we are layering in new requirements for ships, new
warnings. Port cities are beginning to refuse to accept certain
ships.
India did with a particular Russian tanker, and just
yesterday the U.K. and EU, after a lot of discussions with us,
made some announcements about restricting access for the shadow
fleet to their ports--and I can get you more information on
that--and I think those are the kinds of things we will be
working on as we go forward.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. As you say, you want
to work at both ends of the equation, the expense as well as
the profit end. I appreciate your efforts, and I look forward
to following up.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
Assistant Secretary O'Brien, one of the things you did
early in your career was to help draft the Dayton peace
agreement. Now, 30 years later I think the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina is as dangerous as it has been at any time
since that agreement was signed, and one of the big reasons for
that is that Republic of Srpska--President Milorad Dodik--
continues to refuse to support a unified government in the
country, continues to talk about seceding with the republic
from the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, continues to deny the
genocide in Srebrenica, and not much seems to be happening to
him as the result of all of those efforts and antics.
So can you talk about what we are trying to do to hold him
accountable?
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, and thank you for your consistent
support of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the years.
In general, in the Western Balkans the last 2 years, there
is a real opportunity that was never there in the time since
Dayton. It is an opportunity to join at least the single market
of the EU but also have real progress toward accession.
So, I hope that we are able to see that our three NATO
members in the region, starting with Montenegro and Albania,
make real progress. So that will change the political situation
in the region considerably.
In Bosnia a difficulty is that Dayton was really a
ceasefire among three factions. Each one at the time dominated
as a kind of ethno-nationalist group, and we see Mr. Dodik has
decided that is a good model for him. He does not want to be
part of the single market or have more of the rule of law.
Where I disagree with you is that nothing has been done to
him. So he is, largely, isolated. He does not have political
support when he talks about secession. Croatia openly says it
will not recognize, and that is one neighbor gone, and quietly
Serbia says, no, we are not changing these borders. We stick by
original Dayton. And you have seen now President Vucic begin to
say something like that publicly.
So Dodik is alone, and if you just listen to him in his
most recent press conference today, he--the sanctions are
battering his finances, and so he has less and less money.
What he is forced to do, because he refuses to engage
through the central government mechanisms that should be part
of paying for governance he goes and tries to borrow money from
China, from Russia, from Hungary, and occasionally from Serbia,
and that is becoming more and more difficult for him.
He used to be able to get favored banks to run government
bonds, and that, he complained today, is shut off to him
because of our sanctions.
So, all of this has to come together in a political
strategy then that says Bosnia and Herzegovina has the chance
to move forward if they adopt the reforms that the EU is asking
for the single market.
They just missed their deadline last week because a
different one of the groups sought a little extra advantage and
would not sign off on the package.
But President Dodik is feeling a lot of pressure and I
think we can work using our sanctions, using the bond powers,
and using the pressure of this EU accession to begin to change
the political incentives.
Right now it rewards him, the more outrageous he is. He has
to be rewarded the more he delivers for his citizens.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. I think anything
that we can do to encourage him to behave in a way that is more
helpful to the central government and the people of the country
would be positive.
You talk about EU accession. Senator Ricketts and I and
some other Senators during the NATO summit had a chance to meet
with the prime ministers of Albania, Montenegro, and the
foreign minister from North Macedonia. Maybe it was the prime
minister of North Macedonia and the foreign minister of
Montenegro.
And what we heard from them was some real frustration with
the EU accession process, feeling like the boundary keeps
moving in terms of what they are being asked to do,
particularly with respect to North Macedonia.
So, can you talk about what more we can do to encourage the
Europeans to actually make good on the promise to help once
some of the Western Balkan countries have done the reforms that
were asked them to stop moving the goal posts and actually
allow the accession to move forward?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes, and thank you for having that meeting. It
was important to the countries.
This is a bit of a problem. So, the first--it is a daily
challenge to be a friend of the process while often not being
part of the process, but it means encouraging countries to make
painful reforms, political factions within countries not to
make outrageous demands that would derail the progress forward.
It also means suggesting alternative paths. So, one thing I
worked on in and out of government was an effort to bring
countries into a common regional market but also into the
single market ahead of full accession, because with accession
it is the sitting at the EU Council table that is so
problematic, whereas the economic side can come much earlier,
and that now is the EU's policy with the growth plan.
So that is an American effort that we support or American
encouraged idea that we fully support, and it brings reforms
and benefits early, and then in the accession process there are
two kinds of problems.
There is actually delivering the reforms that are required,
and then there are good neighborly relations.
So North Macedonia has suffered because of disagreements
with its neighbors, which does change the requirements for it
constantly, and part of our work diplomatically is to prepare a
path so that it maintains the agreement it has with Greece, and
I think your meeting and others have helped keep that there so
that Greece becomes a friend of North Macedonia's path forward
rather than a critic. Same with Albania.
But also the main issue is an agreement North Macedonia has
with Bulgaria, and once Bulgaria has a more stable government
there will have to be discussions about the exact way that gets
implemented.
So that will be an area where I expect us to be very active
as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Secretary, as the leaders were meeting in
Washington for the NATO summit the People's Republic of China
and Belarus were holding military exercises just a few miles
from the Polish border, and I might note Belarus is the newest
member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well.
This signals not only increased cooperation between the PRC
and Belarus but also China's increased ambition militarily in
Europe, and since 2015 the PRC and Russia have had joint naval
exercises both in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic Seas.
The PRC is using dual use activities and partnering with
Russia to expand its military presence and capabilities in the
Arctic region. In fact, now it is declaring itself an Arctic
power.
What does this China participation in these exercises so
close to NATO's border during the NATO summit signal about its
military ambitions in and around Europe?
Mr. O'Brien. Interpreting China's perception of this, I
might send you back to Deputy Secretary Campbell, who has a lot
more insight to that than I do. So, I will get back to you with
an answer on that.
But what I will say is it was the most counterproductive
thing China could do if it was attempting to say to our
European partners that China poses no threat.
So, China's entire strategy coming out of COVID was to
separate the U.S. from our European partners, and with actions
like that it has told them that China is an active threat.
So, it makes it much easier for us now to advance issues
like trusted vendors, like making sure critical infrastructure
is free from surveillance and from illegally subsidized goods.
All of the things that we have been working across
administrations on we are able now to make the case because of
what China did.
What possessed them to think this was a real show of
strength I think is something I will get back to you with an
answer on. I do not want to speculate.
Senator Ricketts. Well, I also want to build on that just a
little bit as well. With regard to these military exercises,
was this something that is reducing Russia's sphere of
influence in Europe, or is this something that Putin and Xi
coordinated as part of their no limits partnership?
I mean, is this something that was planned? How do you
assess that?
Mr. O'Brien. I do not know what discussions they had on
this, and we will get back to you on that. I think it is hard
to imagine that if President Xi wanted to assert his power in
Europe or assert a new capability that seems an odd thing to do
over the objections or to the surprise of President Putin.
But why do we not--we will get you something more.
Senator Ricketts. OK.
What about Belarus's entrance into the SCO? What are the
implications for that?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes. It is a suggestion that Belarus wants to
be part of this bloc that is not moving away from Russia.
I think part of our effort with Belarus is to make clear--
remember, just a few years ago the people of Belarus opposed
the stolen election and went out in the hundreds of thousands,
and there are 1,500 political prisoners left whom we try to get
out of prison regularly.
There is a very active democracy movement in exile with, we
think, a legitimate president, and we strongly support their
efforts to prepare Belarus for the day when it, like Ukraine
has, turns against this Russian effort to create an eastward
looking bloc.
Senator Ricketts. President Erdogan recently said Turkey
was interested in joining the SCO. What would that mean for a
NATO ally to join that, and what can we do to discourage that?
Mr. O'Brien. Well, so Turkiye is a very interesting ally.
We have at the moment really effective cooperation in a number
of fields, and a move like that would be very difficult to
accept.
So, I do not know what he had in mind, if there was some
element of it. We have not seen a serious sign, at least
expressed to us, and we have been very clear that sharing the
kinds of information that NATO allies have to share with each
other is incompatible with belonging to some other group.
The same thing with Turkiye. Its primary trading partner is
Europe. That is 70 percent of its trade. It is in a customs
union with Europe.
So, joining a trading group that looks another direction is
incompatible with the undertakings it has already made, and I
do not know if that was just a rhetorical slip or more, but it
is not something that would be easy to tolerate.
Senator Ricketts. So by your comments, though, I take it we
have been engaging with President Erdogan with regard to the
things you just covered about why that would be unacceptable
for a NATO ally?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes. We speak with Turkiye often on a lot of
subjects and I think in the last months we have been very
effective in having discussions even about issues where we
disagree, and I am encouraged by the direction of the
partnership. A step like that is one that would be hard to
reconcile with where we are headed.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen. I would like to do one more round of
questions. I am not sure what Senator Ricketts would like to do
but----
Senator Ricketts. Oh, I have got lots of questions.
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Brien. I was hoping I had tired you out.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Nice try.
Since you mentioned Belarus, one of the concerns I wanted
to raise is that Lukashenko has allowed Belarus to be used by
Russia to transfer Ukrainian children kidnapped from their
families in Ukraine through Belarus and into Russia.
Are we working with Ukraine and our European partners to
track those Ukrainian children who have been kidnapped? And I
use the word kidnap because I think the term that is being used
is the filtration of Ukrainian children, which I think very
much underplays what is really happening.
These are children who have been kidnapped from their
families. And can you speak to how Belarus is contributing to
Putin's efforts in that respect?
Mr. O'Brien. The particular issue was that at least a few
summers ago Belarus ran summer camps for Ukrainian children who
were taken from their families, and then later often renamed as
Russian and forcibly adopted, and as far as I know Belarus
continues that kind of engagement.
So, this is a crime. It is, in fact, the reason that
President Putin was indicted by the International Criminal
Court.
We work to promote accountability for Russia's crimes
through a number of mechanisms, both ones that are established
by certain international bodies and Ukraine's domestic ones.
So, we try to provide support to Ukraine's activities wherever
we can, including with the children.
I can get you a more comprehensive breakdown. But I think
that this is a great example of why this war matters. The
people who say we should have peace now are signing up for
everyone in the occupied territories being filtered into
becoming Russian citizens.
So, we saw in Bucha that meant torture and random killings.
We see thefts of children, and we see thefts of property and
grain and resettlement of Russian populations into occupied
territory.
All of those are crimes. So peace is not quiet. Peace is a
violence that goes on by a state against the citizens who live
there, and that I think is unacceptable.
Senator Shaheen. I totally agree, and I appreciate your
being so focused on that.
I am also very concerned about Georgia, about the
backsliding in Georgia, about the Georgian parliament's passage
of the Foreign Agents Law that really mirrors a similar Russian
law. They have done that despite the opposition from the
Georgian people.
Now, I think it is really important that we are clear, and
I think we have been. In Congress there is bipartisan
opposition to what is happening in Georgia, and I hope that the
government of Georgia understands that this is a bipartisan
issue.
But I think it is important that our Government use the
authorities at its disposal to impose financial sanctions on
individuals who are responsible for corruption and other
actions that have contributed to the situation there.
Can you provide an update on this effort and where we are
in that and whether there is more that Congress should be
doing?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes. This was an issue we discussed in my
confirmation hearing last summer. I think it was a year ago
just a couple days ago.
We seem to have in Georgia some elites who are looking for
a different population. They are turning their backs on a path
to EU and NATO.
This party, in fact, wrote commitments to join the EU and
NATO into their constitution and now is turning the other
direction, and why is a little bit difficult to sort out.
We are trying to be very clear about what must be done and
how important it is because Georgia is asking to join clubs,
one of which we are a member and the other one is our key
partner, and they do not get to rewrite the rules of those
clubs so they get to join.
Now, we are first off reviewing all of our assistance to
Georgia. We very much want to support everything that will
contribute to free and fair elections this fall when they have
parliamentary elections but we need to make clear to the
governing party that there will be real consequences.
So, we have already postponed a major military exercise,
and we will continue to review what we are doing as
opportunities arise, and I expect we will have something to say
about that soon.
The EU has said that Georgia's path to joining the EU is,
largely, suspended now, and that may be then formally reviewed
in a couple of months.
You asked about sanctions. We are actively considering our
options there. I will not preview anything but we are looking
at it.
It is not only those who benefited from corruption, but
those who are involved in violations of human rights as under
the Global Magnitsky Act that Chairman Cardin has championed
for so long.
But all of those--we have announced a policy that restricts
access to the United States already in that area.
Two things. One is it should be clear to the governing
party in Georgia that there is a path back, that having free
and fair elections without violence against civil society,
making whatever transparency requirements they want.
This Foreign Agent Law, make it compatible with EU law
rather than compatible with Russian law, and not have China
develop a deep water port in Anaklia.
These are steps that are really important for Georgia to
take. Now, what can Congress do? I know you are developing
legislation, and when that makes its way through the process we
will, of course, work with you on this just as we will work
with you on the broader Black Sea strategy where Georgia could
be an important part if it is a reliable partner.
But also I want to praise the effort of Members of Congress
to get out there and deliver the message that on a bipartisan
matter long time friends of Georgia believe this is the wrong
path.
A year ago we saw signs of the wrong path, and then the
governing party reversed its course and made enormous strides,
and I am hopeful that that can happen again in the next months.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
It is particularly hard to understand why the government is
taking this approach, given how much of their territory is
being occupied by Russia, and what I heard in the time that I
was in Georgia was great concern about the security of the rest
of the country from Russia, about the poverty and the
depression of human dignity and benefits and rights that
existed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
And it is really hard for me to understand why the
government is not listening to the people of Georgia who
clearly do not want the path that they are headed down.
Mr. O'Brien. And I should have mentioned--I think you are
absolutely right--the one group that seems very happy about
this turn is Russia. If you look at the recent statements by
their chief propagandists they are welcoming this turn, and
Russia has moved its Black Sea fleet into Abkhazia.
The suggestion by the leadership that this is a neutral
move is, I think, belied by what is happening.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Mr. Secretary, when you mentioned Bucha
you reminded me you were talking earlier about the escalation
from Russia in targeting civilians. But Putin was targeting
civilians from the moment this war began.
It is not an escalation for them to start firing at schools
and hospitals and things like that. They have been targeting
the civilian population for--since this war began, since they
invaded Ukraine, and since the invasion of Ukraine they have
had this no limits partnership with China, and we have seen
European relations shift with regard to the PRC.
However, Europe is slowly awakening to these threats that
the PRC poses to European security and understands now that
they have got to de-risk.
Its policy to support Taiwan has been a bit slower to
materialize than some of us would hope, and despite the fact
that PRC's malign aggression and hostile rhetoric toward Taiwan
has only increased many European countries are reluctant to
outwardly show support for Taiwan.
It is possible Xi takes military action against Taiwan this
decade, but it still remains uncertain what Europe's response
will be.
That is why I introduced the BOLSTER Act with Senator
Shaheen, which aims to increase the coordination with the EU
and European countries on sanctions in various Taiwan
contingencies and encourage stronger European support for
Taiwan's democracy, economy, and self-defense.
As a part of her bid for a second term in the European
Commission, President Ursula von der Leyen said--she was very
clear. She said she will deploy the full range of EU combined
statecraft to deter China from unilaterally changing the status
quo by military means, particularly over Taiwan.
How do you assess both the EU and individual European
governments' evolving postures toward the threats posed by the
PRC and toward Taiwan? How do you see this going?
Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, Senator.
I would say it is a work in progress but moving the right
direction, and I want to thank you for your strong advocacy of
having our European allies and partners be with us as we stand
up against security threats in the Asia Pacific.
We saw at the NATO summit, the one session that was not
about Europe was about the Asia Pacific with New Zealand,
Australia, Korea, Japan there, and the increasing comfort and
communication, cooperation, that we will see in those areas I
think will make it easier to have discussions about the threat
posed by China.
We, obviously, will stand with Taiwan. Our policy is very
clear, and there has been no wavering on that. I think a
measure of how far Europe has come when the Biden
administration began, it was part of the official EU agenda to
have a new investment treaty with China, and this was after
years of American criticism of European work with China.
That stopped soon after, I think, in part because of strong
American engagement and now you have President von der Leyen
making clear that it will be EU policy to stand with Taiwan,
and for that kind of a change in just a few years is, I think,
a remarkable statement of what focused leadership and attention
to the kinds of problems China poses can bring.
Senator Ricketts. And so what are some other things we can
do to encourage the EU to continue down this path of de-risking
with China, and what are some of the things we can do with NATO
along the same lines?
So, for example, there has been talk about opening up an
office, for example, in Japan for NATO to be able to help
increase communication.
Can you give me some examples of things that the
Administration wants to push forward on both the EU level and
the NATO level?
Mr. O'Brien. On NATO I think coming out of this NATO summit
we now have agreement on a much more robust Asia Pacific
engagement strategy.
We agreed on four--we call them flagship projects that will
allow allies to get comfortable working with our key partners
in the Asia Pacific, and these touch on areas that may seem
removed from the immediate kinetic threat but actually are very
important for the way that we work together. So areas like
cyber, actually, frankly, battlefield medical care, several
other items like that.
Whether that will turn into some institutional framework
like an office is something we will have to keep talking about
within the alliance.
With the EU we have a really active discussion about the
approach toward China, and I have already indicated one of the
key markers is where do people look for investment.
I think President Xi's trip to Europe this past May
produced some reams of paper but very little in the area of
actual investments.
And so keeping Chinese investment away from critical
infrastructure, working toward trusted vendors, working with
our European partners to develop alternatives to Chinese
technology.
I mean, one of the real problems we had was allowing cheap
Chinese technology to become the industry standard all the way
from renewable energy to telecommunications, and now we are
addressing that, and that is part of the investments in our own
manufacturing base.
With that, we can show ordinary European citizens the
benefit of bringing the jobs home, the work home, and keeping
it in this sphere where we share a platform, share an
agreement, with our European partners as well as Canada, Japan,
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. That space is where we can
make enormous strides with the EU.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary
O'Brien.
Senator Shaheen. I think both Senator Ricketts and I could
spend all afternoon with questions and a back and forth, but we
will not.
Senator Ricketts. I am willing.
Senator Shaheen. We have votes coming up soon, and so we
will have to let you go. But I want to again thank Ranking
Member Ricketts for his partnership on this issue and this
hearing.
Thank you to Assistant Secretary for your testimony and to
all of the Senators who were here with the questions.
The record will remain open until the end of the day
tomorrow, Wednesday, the 31st of July.
Again, thank you. This hearing is now closed.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. James O'Brien to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
eufor
Recently, the current EUFOR commander said publicly that EUFOR is
simply a second responder, and that he will act in the event of an
incident only if local authorities request EUFOR's assistance. This
appears to be a change in mandate for EUFOR, which is concerning given
the increasingly destabilized environment.
Question. What is the United States doing about a possible change
in interpretation of EUFOR's mandate?
Answer. In 2004, when NATO handed command of the peace
stabilization mission to the EU, EUFOR was charged with enforcing the
military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The United States
supports a strong, capable, and visible EUFOR Althea that has the force
posture and capabilities necessary to defend the Dayton Peace Agreement
and provide for a safe and secure environment across Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The language in the annual U.N. Security Council resolution
authorizing EUFOR's Operation Althea and providing it with its Chapter
VII mandate has not changed. The EU has stated that it supports the
authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure
environment. We work with troop contributors, EUFOR, the EU, and NATO
to see that EUFOR and the reserve are prepared and able to act robustly
across the whole mandate. The current EUFOR Althea Commander has
publicly said on multiple occasions that EUFOR's mandate is to act as a
``second responder'' behind Bosnia and Herzegovina security
authorities.
We have expressed our concerns with these statements and will
continue to discuss with EU officials given the increasingly
destabilized environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Question. Is contingency planning in place if EUFOR will not
response to a crisis? How will the United States to use its position in
NATO to make sure NATO is prepared to step in?
Answer. The United States continues to prioritize security and
stability in the Western Balkans. The United States supports NATO's
role under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, which allows for NATO-EU
cooperation in crisis management and provides principles and procedures
for EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities. As
Secretary General Stoltenberg made clear in November 2023 while in
Sarajevo, NATO will not allow a security vacuum in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and strongly supports the UNSC mandated renewal of EUFOR.
NATO has remained committed to doing what is necessary to reduce
tensions and to prevent any escalation of regional conflict.
f-16 deliveries to ukraine
U.S. efforts to provide advanced capabilities to Ukraine, such as
F-16s and Patriot air defense systems, are appreciated; however these
capabilities come with significant sustainment costs.
Question. What is the administration's plan to relax restrictions
on sustainment support in-country for U.S. and allied F-16 aircraft?
Answer. The Administration acknowledges and appreciates the concern
regarding the significant sustainment costs associated with providing
advanced capabilities such as F-16s to Ukraine. These costs are a
necessary investment in Ukraine's defense and stability.
The United States is working with our Air Force Capability
Coalition and industry partners to support maintenance and sustainment
of Ukraine's F-16 aircraft. We are committed to ensuring Ukraine
possesses operational F-16s and further enhancing Ukraine's air
capabilities. This collaborative effort involves leveraging expertise
and resources from multiple partners to create a sustainable and cost-
effective sustainment support system in-country. State is working
closely with DoD to ensure funding is available to support F-16
sustainment, including potentially through Foreign Military Financing.
russian oil price cap
The Administration's initiative to build a coalition of countries
to limit Russia's ability to fund its war machine with oil exports
initially achieved success in limiting Russian profits while
maintaining global supply to keep fuel costs stable. Now, however,
Russia and its enablers have increasingly been able to exploit
loopholes to increase oil profits. Relying on an extensive, illicit
network of aging, environmentally unfit ships--a ``ghost fleet''--
Russia has, according to some reports, been able to return to pre-war
levels of oil revenues.
Question. What is the Administration doing to tighten enforcement
of the price cap on Russian oil?
Answer. The Price Cap Coalition is working to tighten enforcement
of the price cap for trades that use Coalition services while
increasing the costs to the Kremlin of selling oil via its alternative
shipping ecosystem. The Coalition also worked with partners at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the December 2023
Resolution on the Dark Fleet. With the support of allies and partners,
the United States has imposed several rounds of sanctions on entities
that violated the oil price cap, most notably through the designation
of Russia's state-owned shipping company and fleet operator Joint Stock
Company Sovcomflot on February 23. The United States has now designated
a total of 18 entities and identified around 40 vessels owned by those
entities as blocked property. In October 2023, the Coalition released
an Advisory to the maritime oil industry identifying the safety,
environmental, economic, reputational, financial, logistical, and legal
risks posed by the shadow fleet, and recommending specific best
practices. The U.S. Government has engaged extensively with coastal
states, flag states, and industry participants to promote responsible
practices and counter the shadow fleet. The Coalition has also
implemented changes to the price cap policy to strengthen the
attestation and recordkeeping processes for certain covered service
providers. The United States is working with buyers of Russian oil to
encourage them to leverage the price cap to negotiate a discount on oil
imports.
eur/era, clear with eap and sca
Question. How have countries--such as China and India--used the
price cap to their advantage? Is this private profiteering, or are the
governments of these nations involved in evading the price cap?
Answer. We continue to see the price cap coalition's policies
constraining Russian revenues while limiting the impact of Russia's war
against Ukraine on global energy prices. The coalition's import bans
are forcing Russia to sell to more price-sensitive and distant
customers, including India and China, at lower prices and with higher
transportation costs, further cutting into Russia's profits. The price
cap provides leverage for third country buyers of Russian oil to
negotiate heavy discounts and capture the refining margin--thus
advancing the price cap's goals to maintain oil market stability while
reducing Russia's revenues. To date, these discounts have cost Russia
billions of dollars.
Question. What additional authorities does the Administration need
from Congress to make this policy effective?
Answer. Especially since launching the second phase of the price
cap in October, the United States has used various sanctions to both
(a) tighten enforcement of the price cap policy for oil trades that use
coalition services, and (b) increase Moscow's cost of selling oil via
its alternative shipping ecosystem. In service of this strategy, we
have designated traders, management companies, and tankers moving
Russian oil. Along with coalition partners, we are actively exploring
new actions to reduce Russia's oil profits while keeping a steady flow
of oil on the market. I defer to the Department of the Treasury on
whether specific additional authorities are needed to enforce the oil
price cap.
ukraine's economic impact
The European Union is the United States' largest trading bloc, and
Ukraine is one of the world's most significant economies. Through its
role as the ``breadbasket of Europe,'' Ukrainian grain feeds huge
percentages of the world's population.
Question. What economic benefits will Ukraine bring to the EU, and
therefore the United States, and how EU membership will strengthen and
benefit Ukraine's agricultural industry?
Answer. Ukraine's accession to the EU has the potential to be
mutually beneficial, though the impact on individual EU member states
would vary. Accession could augment the EU's defense capabilities,
enhance its technology and energy sectors, and increase both European
and global food security. Ukraine's large-scale natural gas storage
facilities could support European energy security and the clean energy
transition. Ukraine's population of 35 million could generate an
expanded market for EU goods while strengthening the EU's global trade
competitiveness.
EU accession has been shown to have an immediate and positive
impact on new member states. Ukraine's substantial yet underdeveloped
agricultural sector would benefit from single market access, EU
regulatory standards, and European investment.
______
Response of Mr. James O'Brien to a Question
Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Are we working with the U.N. Special Representative of
the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Colin Stewart, and our other key
partners to bring the parties back to the negotiating table under the
auspices of the United Nations? If so, please describe the details of
our efforts.
Answer. The United States has long supported UN-facilitated efforts
to advance negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus under the U.N.
Security Council framework for a bizonal, bicommunal federation with
political equality. Our efforts have included advocacy bilaterally and
as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. We welcomed
Secretary General Guterres' January 2024 appointment of former
Colombian Foreign Minister Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar as his Personal
Envoy on Cyprus. We engaged Personal Envoy Holguin on multiple
occasions to support her efforts and we continue to support the U.N.
Secretary General as he considers next steps for UN-facilitated
efforts.
We recognize UN-facilitated negotiations can only be achieved as
peace and stability prevail in Cyprus and therefore have continued to
support the annual renewal of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP), currently led by U.N. Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) Colin Stewart.
We also consistently engage the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities to foster bicommunal trust and cooperation. In March, U.S.
Ambassador Julie Davis Fisher joined Dr. Simos Ioannou and Dr. Suleyman
Ulucay in a bicommunal walking tour of the Famagusta Walled City that
included a number of historic sites restored or preserved with
contributions made by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). Noting that Ambassador Davis Fisher was the first U.S.
Ambassador to visit the center, Cypriot press reported the visit
demonstrated U.S. commitment to resolving the Cyprus problem.
[all]