[Senate Hearing 118-411]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-411
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-765 WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey MARCO RUBIO, Florida
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut.......... 1
Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana...................... 3
Leaf, Hon. Barbara, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Pryor, Jeanne, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for
the Middle East, United States Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 10
Prepared Statement........................................... 11
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 29
Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by Senator
Todd Young..................................................... 30
Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by Senator
Chris Van Hollen............................................... 31
Response of Ms. Jeanne Pryor to a Question Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 32
Response of Ms. Jeanne Pryor to a Question Submitted by Senator
Todd Young..................................................... 33
(iii)
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Murphy presiding.
Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Kaine, Van Hollen,
Young, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. We are going to convene the subcommittee
today to discuss the fiscal year 2025 budget request for the
Middle East and North Africa.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here. We are going to
start with some opening statements for myself and the ranking
member and then we will get to statements from witnesses and
questions.
From the unconscionable terrorist attacks of October 7 to
increasing threats to traffic in the Red Sea to the spiraling
humanitarian disaster inside Gaza to rising tensions on the
Israel-Lebanon border to the unforeseen transition of power in
Iran, the Middle East has been in an unusual amount of tumult
and violence since this subcommittee last met to review the
State Department's regional budget.
Amidst this chaos I have one thought that dominates all
others. Thank goodness at this moment that we have Joe Biden's
steady hand on the wheel.
Since October 7 President Biden and his team, including our
witnesses, in particular, Secretary Leaf, have been tirelessly
working the phones and crisscrossing the region to secure a
comprehensive deal that ends the conflict in Gaza and releases
the hostages.
And let me underscore how critical it is that this conflict
come to a close. I want Hamas's ability to launch another
terrorist attack destroyed.
I want our sacred ally Israel to live without the threat of
violence or attack. And it is important to note that this
conflict could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders.
But they will not, because they do not give a damn about
the Palestinian people.
But I do not understand how Israel's current military
strategy in Gaza or their current lack of a strategy for what
to do once the military campaign ends effectuates either of
those goals.
Right now, to me, it appears that Israel's Gaza policy is
guaranteeing that the threats to Israel continue, not that they
are eliminated.
Leveling Gaza to the ground and unnecessarily killing
thousands of innocent civilians in the process has a short term
moral cost, but it has a long term strategic cost. The long
term strategic cost is that the carnage can become a boon to
terrorist recruiting.
That is what we saw in the aftermath of our invasions to
Iraq and Afghanistan, and I do not understand why we are not
learning those lessons.
But just as important as bringing the violence to an end is
planning for the day after because without a plan for how to
rebuild and secure Gaza under viable new political leadership,
terrorist groups like Hamas are just going to fill the vacuum,
feeding on the despair of the Palestinian people and posing a
continued threat to Israel.
It is no secret that right now there is not a viable plan
for the day after in Gaza. I am glad that the Administration is
prioritizing planning with regional partners and like minded
allies in the EU and the G-7. I would like to hear more about
that today.
Part of this day after plan has to include the creation of
an independent Palestinian state, not just vague promises of a
pathway to a state that never really come to fruition but a
concrete, irreversible timeline that culminates in statehood
for the Palestinian people.
Connected to a Palestinian state are recent discussions
between Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations.
Normalized relations would be a very good thing.
Reports suggest, though, that the price the Saudis are
seeking for such an agreement is a NATO-like security guarantee
from the United States as well as control over the cycle of
nuclear enrichment.
That is an extraordinarily high price to command, and I am
skeptical that such commitments would ultimately benefit the
United States.
We only give those commitments to our most trusted allies
and over and over again, most recently just last week when the
Saudis refused to sign the Ukraine peace statement, we watch as
Saudi Arabia plays us off against our adversaries.
Pulling back to look at the region more broadly, there are
other key questions this committee needs to ask today about how
we allocate funding.
For instance, does it make sense to habitually renew
Egypt's military aid package of $1.3 billion, the exact same
amount we have provided every year to Egypt since 1987?
Does it make sense to provide just $6.5 million to civil
society in Tunisia when those organizations are striving to
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in an
increasingly forbidding environment?
What crisis will we create in Jordan or Syria or Lebanon if
we go another year without U.S. funding to UNRWA?
Now, of course, our assistance dollars can have real
impact, and there is no shortage of success stories that we
should talk about as well.
Support to our Arab partners and to Israel's Iron Dome
system were critical in repelling Iran's unprecedented missile
and drone attack on April 13.
In Lebanon, our support for the Lebanese Armed Forces has
been instrumental in maintaining stability as political and
economic elites push that country to the brink of collapse.
And while there is always room to do more, our humanitarian
aid has saved tens of thousands of lives in Gaza, Syria, and
Yemen over the last decade.
So we convene the subcommittee to review the State
Department and USAID's budget in the region at a critical
moment, and I look forward to our discussion today.
With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last week's nominations hearing was a good opportunity to
look at some of the challenges in the Middle East and North
Africa.
I am very much looking forward to going deeper into these
issues today with our witnesses who lead State and USAID's
current policies and realities of what is perhaps the hottest
of spots in a world full of them, and I hope that this deeper
examination in it we can have a frank discussion about what is
working and what is not working.
The reality is that a nearly nuclear Iran is as bellicose
as ever. Russia and China are ascendant in the region. In
Europe there are growing voices urging disengagement.
Maritime security challenges in the Red Sea are
constraining global commerce. Nascent alliances of our partners
are at risk of crumbling while those of our adversaries are
being strengthened.
Humanitarian assistance principles of neutrality and access
are at their lowest post-World War II levels. Terrorist
organizations are on the rebound, and smuggling of drugs, arms,
and people is rampant, among other challenges.
That is the bad news. Fortunately, there is some good news
as well, and perhaps, even more, opportunity. Gulf countries
have been eager to normalize relations with each other and
Israel.
Energy diplomacy managed properly is a generational
opportunity to drive out Russian influence. Iraq is on stronger
footing. In the recent potent and impotent displays of Israeli
and Iranian respectively missile and anti-missile capabilities
are among those positives.
State and USAID's joint regional strategy for the MENA
region is now 2 years old. A lot has happened in that time, and
we do not need to dwell on how goals like enhanced prospects
for a viable two state solution for Israel-Palestine look in
hindsight.
But we do want to hear how this budget request reflects an
updated view of that strategy's viability. I would also like to
get the Administration's take on the relative priority areas in
the region in terms of stability, countering violent extremism,
supporting civil society, bolstering democracy, economic
growth, et cetera.
Obviously, the preferred answer is always all of the above
everywhere. We hear that a lot. But that is an aspiration--an
aspiration, not a strategy.
To the extent you can provide some specifics today we are
eager to hear them. We will have specific questions for each of
you, and I look forward to turning to that in a moment.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. It is now my pleasure to introduce Barbara
Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs.
Assistant Secretary Leaf, well known to this committee,
previously served as U.S. Ambassador to the UAE and senior
director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National
Security Council.
Also joining us today is Ms. Jeanne Pryor, Deputy Assistant
Administrator of the Bureau for the Middle East at USAID.
Ms. Pryor previously served as director for the Office of
Afghanistan Affairs and deputy director for the Office of Iraq
Reconstruction.
I will hand the floor to both of you for 5 minutes of
opening comments, and then we will engage in discussion.
Ambassador Leaf.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA LEAF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ms. Leaf. Thank you.
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the
President's fiscal year 2025 budget request for the Middle East
and North Africa, a region that remains of vital importance to
U.S. interests.
While the Israel-Hamas conflict and escalation by Iran and
its proxies complicate our work substantially, the
Administration is fully committed to leading the collective
action necessary for a secure and stable region responsive to
the needs of its people.
Diplomacy is the best means to address the issues at hand,
and your support will undergird our vigorous diplomatic
engagements to advance U.S. interests and contest strategic
competitors seeking to exploit post-October 7 instability.
On May 31 President Biden presented a comprehensive
ceasefire and hostage deal accepted by Israel that can end the
conflict in Gaza.
This deal would bring all the hostages home, ensure
Israel's security, lead to a complete ceasefire, facilitate a
surge of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, begin the
refurbishment of essential services, and set the stage for the
long term recovery of Gaza.
I just returned from a trip to the region with Secretary
Blinken where we announced new humanitarian assistance response
to the conflict and pressed key partners to do what they can to
get Hamas to accept the deal. We are currently reviewing
Hamas's response.
We are pursuing an end to the conflict that must be built
on conditions of enduring security for both Israelis and
Palestinians.
Our fiscal year 2025 request includes crucial lifesaving
aid for Palestinians in Gaza as well as for millions of
refugees and internally displaced persons in Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, and Yemen.
Our unrivaled network of partnerships, including those
forged through the Abraham Accords, bolsters integrated defense
and deterrence to counter malign actors.
Israel, with the help of the U.S. and our allies, was able
to defend itself from Iran's unprecedented missile and drone
attack in April.
To hold Iran accountable we engage with EU partners to
secure expansion of sanctions authorities and work jointly with
the G-7 and others to impose sanctions.
Our regional partners play a critical role ensuring
regional stability and security. Egypt remains a vital partner
for addressing the Israel-Hamas conflict and preventing
regional spillover. It serves as a key staging ground and entry
point for humanitarian aid and as a throughput for those
evacuating Gaza.
Qatar is indispensable to our efforts to secure the release
of hostages. Jordan too has played a leading role in promoting
peace and security in the region, and that cooperation remains
critical to our regional security priorities.
In 2022 we signed the 7 year MOU on assistance. Jordan is
making good progress toward its benchmarks, and we will be with
them every step of the way to implement them.
We are concerned with the escalating hostilities along the
Blue Line in Lebanon. Diplomacy is the only path for Lebanese
and Israeli citizens on both sides of the Blue Line to return
home, and it is the way that we can support the Lebanese Armed
Forces in its role of providing security there.
We were grateful for the role the LAF played in protecting
our embassy perimeter in Beirut during violent protests last
October and in responding most recently to a terrorist attack
on our embassy.
Our request also calibrates support for the Tunisian people
to address their needs in, as you said, Senator Murphy, an
increasingly forbidding environment.
Targeted U.S. investments in the Tunisian Armed Forces have
promoted professionalism and accountability there, and counter
strategic competitors attempting to gain influence by
exploiting Tunisia's security challenges.
Your support for the department's plan to establish an
interim diplomatic facility in Libya allows us to scale up our
diplomacy amid an intensification of Russia's destabilizing
influence.
Libya's funding under the Global Fragility Act and our
$19.25 million in bilateral assistance request supports our
work to move Libya to an eventual transition to a democratic,
stable, and unified state.
We seek a durable resolution to the conflict in Yemen
through an inclusive peace process under U.N. auspices. Houthi
attacks in the Red Sea threaten the regional and global economy
and undermine prospects for that peace.
The $41.6 million Yemen request advances our priorities of
lasting peace in Yemen and economic security for the Yemeni
people. Our commitment to greater regional stability includes
the enduring defeat of ISIS, which continues to pose a
significant threat.
With funds raised through the coalition and the continued
support of Congress, we can improve security and reduce the
populations in al-Hol and Roj camps.
Our $118.5 million request in ESF for Syria supports
vulnerable populations who might be vulnerable to ISIS
recruitment and works against ISIS's ability to reconstitute
and threaten the U.S.
Our goal is a stable and sovereign Iraq integrated
regionally and within the global economic system. Our work with
Iraq to diversify and grow its economy helps the Sudani
government deliver better opportunities for the Iraqi people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's
fiscal year 2025 budget request and I want to close by thanking
the subcommittee for your continued support for our efforts in
the region.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Leaf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Barbara Leaf
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to testify on the President's fiscal year
budget request for the Middle East and North Africa and our priorities
in the region, which remains of vital importance to U.S. interests.
While the Israel-Hamas conflict and escalation by Iran and its proxies
complicate our work, the Administration is fully committed to leading
the collective action necessary for a secure and stable region
responsive to the needs of its people.
Diplomacy is the best means to address the issues at hand, and your
support for this request will undergird our vigorous diplomatic
engagements to advance U.S. goals and interests in the Middle East and
North Africa and contest strategic competitors seeking to exploit post-
October 7 instability.
ending and mitigating conflict
Our regional engagement is anchored by a resolute effort to
reinforce our partnerships as they are tested by conflict. The
Secretary has worked tirelessly, engaging regional partners to reach a
ceasefire and the release of all of the hostages held in Gaza. On May
31, President Biden presented the comprehensive ceasefire and hostage
deal that is now on the table. The deal offers a roadmap for ending the
conflict in Gaza. This deal would bring all the hostages home, ensure
Israel's security, open a way to a complete ceasefire, facilitate a
surge of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, begin the refurbishment of
essential services, and set the stage for the long-term reconstruction
of Gaza. We have engaged Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Turkey,
Qatar, and others to continue putting pressure on Hamas to accept this
deal.
We are pursuing an end to the conflict that must be built on
conditions of enduring security--for Israelis, who otherwise fear a
repeat of October 7, and for the Palestinians of Gaza, who need and
deserve to rebuild their lives free from fear and insecurity. We are
committed to building a broader enduring peace and security for and
between Israelis and Palestinians--including through practical,
timebound, and irreversible steps to establish a Palestinian state
existing side-by-side with Israel. As Secretary Blinken has said,
``it's time to stop all of this haggling and back and forth and start a
ceasefire.''
On the humanitarian front, we are working to address the
humanitarian access issues. It is critical that border crossings are
open for humanitarian aid to enter Gaza, especially as we risk imminent
famine for affected civilian populations. Even prior to the start of
the Rafah operation and the closure of the Rafah border crossing that
had served as one important hub for humanitarian aid, more assistance
was needed inside Gaza and humanitarian actors needed to be able to
reach civilians wherever they are. This is why it is so critical that
Hamas agree to the Israeli proposal to end the fighting in Rafah and
throughout Gaza, and allow a surge of humanitarian aid.
President Biden's and the Secretary's direct engagement with Prime
Minister Netanyahu in April resulted in Israel's pledge to take
specific, concrete steps to surge aid and address civilian harm. We
have seen some positive steps, but we continue to urge Israel to do
more to improve deconfliction and take tangible steps to allow the
entry of more aid and facilitate distribution throughout Gaza. We are
pushing to accelerate delivery of assistance on all fronts: by air,
land, and sea. Israel has opened a northern crossing and the Ashdod
port, and critical crossings, including Kerem Shalom, must remain open.
We are also working urgently with both Israel and Egypt to establish
arrangements for re-opening the Rafah crossing. The U.S. Government and
international partners have engaged in air drops, and we have opened a
humanitarian maritime corridor, fulfilling the President's directive
for the U.S. military to construct a temporary pier to facilitate
exclusively the delivery of humanitarian aid directly into Gaza.
As the President and the Secretary have noted, these efforts are
not enough. Deconfliction remains a major challenge for humanitarian
workers and experts alike--exemplified by the more than 190 U.N. staff
and the more than 270 aid workers who have been killed since the
beginning of this conflict. We will closely monitor the implementation
of Israeli commitments in the immediate term, seeking impact soonest.
President Biden has been very clear with Israel: We want to see a plan
that speaks to how Israel is going to ensure innocent civilian lives
are protected. Our fiscal year Request includes crucial life-saving aid
for Palestinians in Gaza, as well as for millions of refugees and
internally displaced persons in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkiye, and
Yemen. While we support refugees around the region, we have made clear
that we oppose any forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza.
These efforts are no substitute for a negotiated settlement between
Israelis and Palestinians. A two-state solution is the best way to
ensure Israel's future as a Jewish, democratic state, living in peace
alongside a viable, sovereign, and democratic Palestinian state. We are
engaging the new Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership to press for
credible reform. The international community, including the EU, G7, and
others are working on all aspects of Gaza post-conflict planning,
including security, governance, and early recovery. And we are engaging
key partners to mobilize the political support and resources needed to
enable recovery.
Our unrivaled network of partnerships bolsters integrated defense
and deterrence to counter malign actors. Israel, with the help of the
United States and our allies and partners in the region and in Europe,
was able to defend itself from Iran's unprecedented missile and drone
attack on April 13. To hold Iran to account for this reckless attack,
the Administration spearheaded an international diplomatic response in
close coordination with our European and G7 partners. We identified and
sanctioned additional individuals and entities connected to Iran's
problematic and dangerous behavior, adding to the over 700 Iran-related
individuals and entities the United States has sanctioned during the
Biden-Harris Administration. We actively engaged with our EU partners
to expand EU sanctions authorities to include Iran's drone and missile
proliferation to Russia and regional proxies and partners, and worked
with G7 and other partners to undertake joint sanctions actions. The
United States continues to conduct diplomacy, training, and other
engagements to advance multilateral security approaches to shared air
and maritime threats across the region. These steps are part and parcel
of the broader U.S. effort to disrupt Iran's destabilizing activities
and dismantle its financial and logistics networks.
Our regional partners also play an important role in ensuring
regional stability and security. Egypt remains a critical partner for
addressing the Israel-Hamas conflict and preventing regional spillover,
including by playing a key role to help negotiate the release of
hostages held by Hamas. Egypt has served as a key staging ground and
entry point for humanitarian aid into Gaza, and also served as a
throughput for over 1,900 American citizens, legal permanent residents
(LPRs), their families, and others as they evacuated Gaza. Despite its
own economic challenges, Egypt hosts more than 500,000 refugees from
Sudan. Our request reflects Egypt's important regional role and our
longstanding security partnership, including on border and maritime
security and counterterrorism.
This year marks the 75th anniversary of U.S.-Jordan bilateral
relations. Jordan has been a leader in delivering and coordinating
life-saving humanitarian aid into Gaza, and we continue to work
together to support Jordan as a humanitarian hub to deliver overland
aid. Jordan has also played a leading role in promoting peace and
security in the region, and countering terrorism, including in our
efforts to defeat ISIS. Our security cooperation reaches back more than
50 years, and that cooperation remains critical to our regional
security priorities in the Middle East today.
At the same time, Jordan is not shying away from its ambitious
political and economic reform agenda. In 2022, we signed the 7-year
U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on assistance. Jordan
is making progress toward benchmarks on water and public sector
reforms. We will be with Jordan every step of the way as they increase
civic engagement, promote good governance, advance gender equality, and
support political reform and participation.
advancing diplomatic solutions
We are working continuously to prevent Iran and its proxies in
Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen from exploiting the crisis in Gaza and seeking
to expand conflict. Diplomatic engagement and solutions that build
resilient institutions are the only viable path toward restoring and
maintaining stability.
We are concerned with the escalating hostilities along the Blue
Line and continue to make clear a diplomatic resolution is the only
path to allow Lebanese and Israeli civilians on both sides of the Blue
Line to return home and to live in peace and security. U.S. security
assistance allows the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to maintain joint
patrols and coordinate with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
and support the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions
1559, 1680, and 1701. Our support enables the LAF's expanded role
providing stability and security for those living on both sides of the
Blue Line and we were grateful for the role the LAF played in
protecting our Embassy perimeter in Beirut during violent protests in
October and during the attack in June.
We have long-standing concerns about Lebanon's domestic political
and economic crises. Lebanon's political elite have the agency and
indeed the responsibility for taking steps to elect a president
empowered to form a government and implement reforms, including those
proposed by the IMF. While difficult, reforms are the only way out of
the country's economic collapse. The Lebanese people deserve better
than this. The time for action is now.
Our request calibrates support for the Tunisian people to address
the needs of the economically vulnerable and to support those
contributing to an inclusive political future in an increasingly
forbidding environment. We are rigorously reviewing U.S. efforts and
programs in Tunisia to ensure they are fit to purpose for the Tunisian
people--targeting the needs of the economically vulnerable and
contributing to an inclusive future. Following the events of July 2021,
reduced security assistance has re-focused on our vital national
interests of protecting U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities,
promoting the welfare of American citizens in Tunisia, and sustaining
effective counterterrorism pressure, while promoting accountability and
respect for the rule of law. We remain intensively engaged with the
Tunisian government at all levels in support of human rights and
freedom of expression--universal rights that are explicitly guaranteed
in Tunisia's own constitution. Targeted U.S. investments through
Foreign Military Financing have promoted professionalism and
accountability within the Tunisian Armed Forces and counter strategic
competitors attempting to gain influence by exploiting Tunisia's
security challenges.
Your support for the Department's plan to establish an interim
diplomatic facility in Libya allows us to scale up our diplomacy amid
an intensification of Russia's destabilizing influence. Resuming more
regular diplomatic activities inside Libya will improve our ability to
protect the safety and security of U.S. citizens, promote Libyan
economic stability and contributions to global energy security, and
support Libyan aspirations for national elections. Over 2 years of
extensive internal planning reinforce our goal of ensuring these
diplomatic operations are undertaken prudently and safely.
Amid the ongoing political impasse in Libya, political and security
leaders from all regions support the principle of safeguarding the
country's sovereignty and recognize the importance of practical steps
to prevent Libya's further enmeshment in regional conflict. Libya's
funding under the Global Fragility Act and our $19.25 million bilateral
assistance request supports Libya's eventual transition to a
democratic, stable, and unified state as well as stability in Libya's
long-marginalized south where malign actors take advantage of fragile
local governance systems.
security and stability
We seek a durable resolution to the conflict in Yemen secured
through an inclusive peace process under U.N. auspices. The recent
Houthi detention of United Nations, diplomatic, and NGO staff in Yemen,
including U.S. embassy personnel, jeopardizes both progress toward
reaching a comprehensive settlement to the conflict and the delivery of
life-saving humanitarian assistance to the Yemeni people. In addition,
Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways, enabled by
Iran's technical and material support, threaten the regional and global
economy and undermine prospects for peace. Intensive regional and
multilateral diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and other
partners can de-escalate conflict. Simultaneously, we work in coalition
with dozens of countries, including Bahrain, to defend the freedom of
navigation in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. Reckless Houthi
attacks cause delivery delays and price increases for badly needed food
and medicine for populations across the Middle East, including in Yemen
itself. The $41.6 million Yemen request advances our twin priorities of
lasting peace in Yemen and stability and economic security for the
Yemeni people.
Our commitment to greater regional stability includes the enduring
defeat of ISIS. Despite the great successes of the Global Coalition,
ISIS continues to pose a real threat in Syria, Iraq, and the wider
region. Last year, the Coalition's Stabilization Working Group raised
$599 million for stabilization in areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq and
Syria. With the funds raised from partners and continued support of
Congress, the Administration will continue crucial stabilization
activities, including to address challenges emanating from al-Hol and
Roj camps. The fiscal year Request of $118.5 million in ESF for Syria--
particularly efforts related to al-Hol--helps ensure ISIS cannot
leverage instability in Syria or recruit vulnerable populations to
reconstitute and threaten the United States.
A more integrated Middle East and North Africa--in economic,
security, and diplomatic terms--would benefit everyone in the region.
Whether that is connecting Iraq to the Gulf's energy grid to bolster
its sovereignty and independence of action, or promoting better trade
connectivity within North Africa, the Department is committed to
supporting our partners working together to address shared challenges.
Through our Iran assistance program, we maintain active and
unprecedented support for Internet freedom in Iran as a central pillar
of our efforts to support human rights in Iran. During the height of
the protests in 2022 and 2023, as many as one in three Iranians used
U.S.-supported anti-censorship and digital security tools, such as
VPNs, to stay connected. Millions in Iran continue to use U.S.-
supported tools every day.
Our goal is a stable and sovereign Iraq integrated regionally and
with the global economic system. U.S. support to strengthen Iraq's
security, provide economic opportunities for its people, and support
Iraq's energy independence all bolster Iraq's sovereignty and counter
Iranian influence.
We work with Iraq on financial reforms, strengthening its
democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law, and improving
services for the Iraqi people. Our investments are tailored to ensure
Iraq is an inclusive state for all the country's religious and ethnic
minorities, including those who suffered at the hands of ISIS.
The United States remains the largest provider of humanitarian and
development assistance to Iraq. Our work with Iraq to diversify and
grow its economy helps the Sudani government deliver better
opportunities for the Iraqi people.
Morocco remains a critical partner on security, stability, and
regional integration. The fiscal year request maintains and deepens our
partnership with Morocco through bilateral assistance supporting shared
priorities in education, health, and climate, as well as an additional
$11 million to support Morocco's earthquake reconstruction plan.
Our strong relationship with Algeria is crucial to producing
significant contributions to European energy security and regional
stability. In the U.N. Security Council, we work together on the
toughest global challenges, including the crisis in Gaza and urgent
need to end the fighting in Sudan. Our programs in Algeria support our
growing collaboration by focusing on climate objectives, economic
diversification, and good governance.
Successful regional integration also demands the inclusion of
women. The region loses hundreds of millions of dollars every year due
to the gender gap in labor force participation. Through the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), we invest in women's economic inclusion
through regional programs that empower women in the workforce, enhance
economic growth, and develop future leaders through training,
scholarships, and fellowships. These programs focus on entrepreneurship
in emerging markets such as cybersecurity and digital economies. Women
across the Middle East and North Africa are highly educated, and we
encourage our partners to energize this largely untapped labor market.
While events over the last year have dramatically changed the
Middle East and North Africa, our commitment to the region remains
steadfast. We will continue to build sustainable and integrated
partnerships and develop shared solutions to the region's most pressing
challenges in search of the better future that we and our partners
seek.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's fiscal
year Budget Request. I want to close by thanking this Subcommittee for
your continued support for our efforts in the region. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
Ms. Pryor.
STATEMENT OF JEANNE PRYOR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE BUREAU FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Pryor. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify today at this incredibly difficult time
in our region.
We all know that the Middle East and North Africa are at a
critical inflection point. Hamas's abhorrent attack on Israel
and the ongoing conflict in Gaza have taken center stage across
the globe.
The challenges of the moment offer an opportunity in which
the relatively modest amounts in our fiscal year 2025 request
might play an outsized role in shaping a peaceful and
prosperous future for the region.
While we remain focused on the immediate response, we must
also examine the entire scope of the region's challenges in
order to envision a path forward.
Water and food insecurity, high numbers of displaced
persons from conflicts and national disasters, corruption and
economic mismanagement already strained the region's resources
prior to October 7.
The region's fragile economies have been further set behind
by the ongoing violence. Palestinian gross domestic product in
2023 declined by $1 billion compared with 2022, all of that in
the fourth quarter. And earlier this year the International
Monetary Fund lowered its growth forecast for the region to 2
percent, significantly below the 5.6 percent growth rate seen
in 2022.
Our fiscal year 2025 request proposes critical investments
to address the region's needs. In response to the conflict we
have requested an increase of $10.3 million to mitigate post-
conflict needs in Gaza and the West Bank and $5 million for
Lebanon.
We have also requested an $11 million increase in funding
to support Morocco's recovery from last year's earthquake and
an additional $22 million to reintegrate returnees from al-Hol
into their communities.
We will use these increases and our other requested
investments to build on our previous accomplishments. More
recently, USAID supported the departure of 66 families from al-
Hol camp to Deir ez-Zour governate where we are supporting them
and their communities with legal assistance, transitional
shelter, psychosocial support, and job opportunities.
And a few weeks ago in Morocco, Administrator Samantha
Power announced our partnership with the government of Morocco
and an NGO to give direct cash grants to 180 cooperatives whose
livelihoods were compromised by the earthquake.
Our peacebuilding work deserves particular attention given
the growing divisions in the region. Although tensions remain
high, we continue to see signs of hope in the dedicated peace
builders in the region.
Our partners through the Nita M. Lowey Middle East
Partnership for Peace Act remain committed to their work, and
our Middle East regional cooperation program has likewise seen
positive signals for continued cross-border collaboration from
its participants.
Proposals for collaboration between Palestinian and Israeli
researchers remain among the top proposed MERC partnerships.
Our fiscal year 2025 request continues funding for these
critical activities to continue the work of building enduring
peaceful ties between Israel and its neighbors. Despite the
numerous regional challenges, space remains to influence the
trajectory of the region.
The region's young population will play a critical role in
shaping their future. We must invest in helping these young
people develop a Middle East and North Africa region that is
integrated into the global economy.
With the funds requested we will not only empower the
people of the Middle East and North Africa to forge a more
promising and prosperous future, but also ensure security for
America and its allies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pryor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Jeanne Pryor
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today at
this incredibly difficult time in our region. Prospects for peace and
stability in the region feel farther away than when we last met, but
these current challenges only increase the urgency of our work.
We all know that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are at a
critical inflection point. Hamas' abhorrent October 7 attack on Israel
and the ongoing conflict in Gaza have taken center stage across the
globe.
The dynamics of the current moment may shape the next several
decades in the region. Our efforts should lay the foundation for a road
to lasting peace and stability and offer viable alternatives to the
narratives presented by malign actors seeking to radicalize the
impressionable and vulnerable. The challenges of the moment offer an
opportunity in which the relatively modest amounts requested in our
Fiscal Year 2025 Request might play an outsized role in shaping a
peaceful, prosperous, and interconnected future for the region.
pre-existing regional pressures
It is difficult to look beyond the current conflict in Gaza as
Hamas still holds innocents hostage and more than two million
Palestinians face grave humanitarian conditions. While we remain
focused on the immediate response, we must also examine the entire
scope of the region's challenges in order to envision a path forward.
Water and food insecurity, high numbers of displaced persons from
conflicts and natural disasters, corruption, and economic mismanagement
already strained the region's resources prior to October 7. The
conflict has exacerbated many of these elements further. In addition,
the malign influences of regional and global adversaries and
competitors--whether Iran and its proxies, Russia, or the People's
Republic of China (PRC)--promulgate misinformation and challenge our
efforts to tackle these difficulties head on.
Sufficient water for consumption, agriculture, and sanitation
remains out of reach in many areas of this most water-scarce region in
the world. The increasing frequency of droughts combined with shrinking
water resources results in lower domestic crop yields, adding to the
problems of high food and agricultural input prices, which had already
risen as imports became more expensive due to Russia's war on Ukraine.
The frequency and severity of droughts also increase the severity
of floods as Libyans experienced this past year when floods breached
dams, resulting in more than 6,000 deaths and displacing more than
44,000 people from their homes. Unfortunately, 2023 also saw natural
disasters strike Turkiye, Syria, and Morocco, as earthquakes destroyed
entire cities and claimed more than 60,000 lives. USAID was able to
rush lifesaving assistance to the most vulnerable, but for those in
northwest Syria already suffering from assaults from Bashar al-Assad's
brutal regime, true recovery will remain out of reach while the
regime's violence continues with support from Russia.
While USAID continues to help countries conserve limited water
resources through improved irrigation technology, water management, and
infrastructure, rising regional tensions increase the difficulty of
addressing shared issues across borders. Conflicts throughout the
region are expected to displace nearly 11.7 million people within their
own countries in 2024. The impacts of this violence will inevitably
drive more refugees across borders and into U.S. partner countries such
as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, which are already struggling to support
their current refugee populations.
Across these countries and many others of the region, corruption,
economic mismanagement, and democratic backsliding aggravate the
situation. Governments in Lebanon and Tunisia have not fully embraced
essential reforms aimed at stabilizing their economies, and a bloated
public sector in Iraq drains crucial resources.
countering malign actors
As the world witnessed in Hamas' horrifying attacks, malign
organizations in the region can exploit the region's population to dire
ends if left unchallenged. The current conflict between Israel and
Hamas and tensions between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah didn't begin
on October 7. For years, the terrorist organizations Hamas and
Hizballah, along with other malign actors, have exploited the region's
challenges and tensions to gain economic and political influence and
wield power at the expense of the people they claim to serve. Russia
continues its campaigns of meddling in Libya and support for Assad's
brutality in Syria.
In addition, strategic competitors such as the PRC, have sought to
increase their engagements and to distort U.S. policy in the region.
The PRC has attempted to capitalize on the perceived unpopularity of
the United States to make inroads through predatory loans and
investments in Chinese-aligned technological infrastructure across the
region and to paint the PRC as the Middle East's benevolent political
benefactor.
positioning for the future
The region's already fragile economies have been set further behind
by the ongoing violence. Palestinian gross domestic product in 2023
declined by $1 billion compared with 2022, all of that in the fourth
quarter, and is projected to decline $7 billion in 2024 from pre-
conflict levels. Tourism revenue in Jordan and Egypt has declined. And
earlier this year the International Monetary Fund lowered its growth
forecast for the region to 2 percent, significantly below the 5.6
percent growth seen in 2022.
The rapidly growing population of young people in the MENA region
adds a complicating dimension across these challenges. Youth under the
age of 24 make up nearly half the region's population, but the youth
unemployment rate in the MENA region has long been the highest in the
world, particularly among women. Addressing the needs of this sizable
population offers fertile ground where modest U.S. investments may make
outsized impacts.
Our fiscal year (FY) 2025 Request proposes critical investments to
address these needs. In response to the conflict, we have requested an
increase in economic assistance of $10.3 million to mitigate post-
conflict needs in Gaza and the West Bank and $5 million in Lebanon to
address agriculture and basic education needs in southern Lebanon where
the conflict has caused school closures, shuttered businesses, and
damaged crops, increasing communities' vulnerability to Hizballah's
influence. This Request sustains our commitment to a two-state solution
and prioritizes and leverages the value of long-term strategic
partnerships.
The Request also includes an $11 million increase for Morocco to
support their recovery from last year's earthquake. In Morocco, USAID
is working with a non-governmental organization partner GiveDirectly
and Morocco's National Initiative for Human Development to provide
direct cash grants to 180 cooperatives whose livelihoods were
compromised by the earthquake. This is in addition to more than 1,400
grants previously awarded to support cooperatives devastated by COVID-
19, drought, and inflation.
The Request includes an additional $22 million in Syria to further
a core objective of the al-Hol Action Plan: reintegrating people to
their communities and decreasing their vulnerability to radicalization.
USAID programs in this space are already delivering results. In Syria,
when 87 Syrian families returned from al-Hol camp to Raqqa this past
September, more than 1,350 total referrals were made for economic and
social services through the Case Management System, such as legal
support, transitional shelter, and psychosocial support services thanks
to USAID's assistance. As recently as May 8, USAID supported the
departure of 66 families from al-Hol camp to Deir ez-Zour Governorate.
USAID will support the same referral services for these families in the
coming weeks. This comes in addition to the support USAID has provided
for the communities to which they are returning, such as increasing job
opportunities and revitalizing agriculture for all residents.
In addition to these increases, this Request continues critical
investments to build on previous advances in stability and security
across the region. In Iraq, to drive economic growth, USAID supported
more than 10,000 entrepreneurs and leveraged $42 million in investments
and $80 million in new loans to small and medium enterprises (SME),
creating over 5,000 new jobs and an 80 percent growth in SMEs revenues.
In Tunisia, USAID helped 49,000 small businesses in underserved regions
increase sales by $610 million and create 56,000 jobs. We also continue
other critical investments in the private sector and Tunisian civil
society, although we have decreased our assistance given the
government's continued democratic backsliding.
USAID supported Libya's electric company to develop improved
systems resulting in the first full year of uninterrupted electricity
production since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. This aims to diminish
the influence of exploitative actors and mitigate the impacts of
conflict on the private sector. USAID continues to support the
internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government based in Aden
in south Yemen which opposes the Houthis. USAID created the ongoing
Yemeni Foreign Exchange auction to stabilize the currency and is
supporting the Republic of Yemen Government in Aden's Central Bank, the
Ministry of Finance, the Customs Authority, and the Tax Authority
implement more than 11 monetary and fiscal reforms that are vital to
the Government's ability to govern, raise revenues, and provide
essential services to its struggling people.
Thanks to Congress' support, USAID has allocated over $200 million
to award full undergraduate scholarships to more than 1,900 deserving
yet disadvantaged Lebanese and refugee students. More than 68 percent
of these students graduate with honors. In Jordan, which is also home
to large numbers of regional refugees, USAID supported the construction
of the Zara Ma'in Water Treatment Plant, which provides drinking water
to an estimated 1.7 million residents in Amman and the As Samra
Wastewater Treatment Plant, which treats almost 70 percent of Jordan's
wastewater.
Our fiscal year Request will allow us to continue these and other
such vital efforts to stimulate the private sector, reinvigorate civil
society, invest in youth, and improve basic services for millions.
regional peacebuilding
Our peacebuilding work deserves particular attention given the
growing divisions in the region. Although tensions remain high, we
continue to see signs of hope in the dedicated peacebuilders in the
region. Our partners through the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership
for Peace Act (MEPPA) remain committed to their work connecting
Israelis and Palestinians across borders. Despite the logistical
difficulties posed by security constraints, they continue to seek ways
to advance their work and maintain connections.
For example, in April MEPPA's Interfaith Peacebuilding Initiative
brought together about 80 Muslims, Jews, and Christians from throughout
Israel and the West Bank for an interfaith iftar in Jerusalem. For most
partners, in-person events have been difficult to sustain due to
security constraints and travel restrictions, but all of our partners
are looking for ways to adapt. The Palestinian-Israeli Specialist
Nursing Hub activity with Project Rozana initially paused its work
bringing together 450 Palestinian and Israeli nurses for training, but
they have since resumed work in the West Bank. Additionally, in
response to the participants' requests, they are continuing to provide
language training in Hebrew and Arabic, so Palestinian and Israeli
nurses can better understand each other.
Our Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) program has likewise
seen positive signals for continued cross border collaboration from its
participants where proposals for collaboration between Palestinian and
Israeli researchers remain among the top proposed partnerships.
Likewise, Moroccan, Jordanian, and Egyptian researchers' interest in
collaboration also remained strong. Among our ongoing research
activities, our team continues to see scientists in both Israel and
Arab nations committed to supporting each other through continued
professional and collegial collaboration. For example, MERC-supported
researchers recently hosted a virtual workshop on agrivoltaics which
attracted over 60 Israeli, Emirati, Jordanian, and Palestinian
participants.
Our fiscal year Request maintains funding for these critical
activities to continue the work of building enduring peaceful ties
between Israel and its neighbors.
conclusion
Despite the numerous regional challenges, space remains to
influence the trajectory of the region. The region's young population
will play a critical role in shaping their future.
Investing in these young people will develop a Middle East and
North African region that is integrated into the global economy.
Education and training will empower them to create meaningful
industries and careers to start and support their own families. Through
our assistance, we can ensure they have access to the full range of
ideas in an increasingly interconnected world.
The investments in our fiscal year budget request are critical to
underwrite a more transparent, stable, hopeful, and peaceful future for
the people of the region. With the funds requested, we will be able to
offer the region's youth opportunities and alternatives that counter
the false promises of actors who would exploit the region and its
people. We will not only further empower the people of the Middle East
and North Africa to forge a more promising and prosperous future, but
also ensure security for America and its allies.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, both, for your
testimony. We will now undergo a round of 5 minute questions.
Ambassador Leaf, let me first talk to you about day after
planning in Gaza. The fiscal year 2025 request, largely
maintains recent funding levels for the West Bank and Gaza
despite the fact that we know we have a huge bill ahead of us.
But we cannot spend money effectively in Gaza if we do not
have a governance structure that keeps Israel safe and
understands political realities on the ground in Gaza. My
understanding is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has essentially
refused to start post-war planning in Gaza, not because he does
not believe it is important to do so but because he has
pressure from his far right coalition partners who want to
reoccupy Gaza with Jewish settlements.
So can you just talk for a moment about the status of
planning for what the governance structure looks like once this
conflict comes to a close?
Because we are keeping our fingers crossed that with or
without an agreement, we are potentially weeks, maybe a month
or two, away from the formal military operations coming to a
close, and it is just extraordinary that we have no viable plan
from the Israeli government as to what comes next.
Ms. Leaf. Senator, this question of what comes next, what
comes after this conflict, is one that we have discussed
extensively with our Arab partners, with the Palestinians, with
the Israeli government, over the course of the last 4 or 5
months, and you are right, there is still insufficient
planning, to say the least, on the part of the Israeli
government.
I would say, however, that that has not kept us from doing
the work on our side in consulting extensively and also drawing
up some concepts that, as Secretary Blinken said last week, we
will be prepared to share with partners here shortly.
I just got back on Thursday from the trip that the
Secretary took to Cairo, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Doha,
and I will probably leave again this weekend to continue those
discussions and to drill in deeper.
But suffice to say there are some essential points of
agreement notwithstanding, and that is that everyone is joined
by the resolve to see Hamas removed from a governance role, and
a governance role in particular at the point of a gun.
Now, how we get there is going to be exceptionally
difficult, and in no small part because of the conditions that
prevail now in Gaza. But we are discussing this with our
partners and looking at a variety of different concepts.
I do not really want to go into those details in this
public setting because as you can imagine it is all pretty
sensitive. These get to the heart of politics for every one of
these governments, and for the Palestinians and the Israelis as
well.
But I think reality has a way of pushing even those who
cannot imagine a concept such as the PA returning to Gaza.
Reality has a way of intruding, and I think, as the Secretary
frequently says, you cannot beat something without something as
an alternative for Palestinians.
Senator Murphy. I understand the sensitivity about
discussing particular plans. Let me just share a skepticism
with you.
There are lots of smart people in the foreign policy
consensus in this town who believe that there is going to be an
Arab force--an Arab-funded force. I worry that that greatly
misunderstands the risk tolerance of our Arab friends.
That, certainly, in your head or on paper makes all sorts
of sense for the Saudis and the Emiratis, others, to either
populate or front a governance structure or a security force.
They have never been willing to take a chance that big and
it probably overestimates how much they care about the future
of the Palestinian people.
Ms. Leaf. I would just say we are intimately acquainted
with their thinking on all of this, and so I would say there is
no magical thinking on the part of this Administration.
We are well aware of how tough a piece this is, because we
have to remind ourselves this has been a piece of territory
run, ruled, governed, if you will, at the point of a gun for 17
years by a foreign terrorist organization.
That is not easy to deconstruct and we have, obviously,
made the point publicly and privately that you cannot do it all
by military means alone. There will have to be a political
alternative, and that is what we are in the process of putting
together--these concepts.
Senator Murphy. Ms. Pryor, I am at the end of questions but
just say a word about the consequences of another year of
prohibition on U.S. funding for UNRWA.
Most or all countries almost without exception that had
temporarily turned off funding for UNRWA as the investigation
was ongoing have started that funding again, and I just do not
understand how these fragile places like Jordan and Lebanon and
Syria survive if UNRWA has only 2 months of funding at any
given time without the United States playing a role, and
without, frankly, a lot of our Gulf allies stepping up and
filling the vacuum.
Ms. Pryor. Thank you for that question.
USAID does not fund UNRWA. However, we are looking
especially in places like Jordan or Lebanon in which you do
have refugee populations dependent upon UNRWA on how we can
better use our own assistance to help mitigate that impact.
In both Jordan and Lebanon we do a lot of work with host
communities, which also has the added benefit of helping
refugee populations as well.
So we will take a look and see what is it that we can do
from our side given that we do not fund UNRWA to help soften
the blow of the loss of our funding.
Senator Murphy. Right. But you are partners with all sorts
of organizations that do work with UNRWA. You are in the same
business. You must have a view as to the seriousness about
UNRWA working on a budget right now that does not have enough
cash flow to last more than 60 days.
Ms. Pryor. Yes, it is very concerning because this is not
something we were able to budget for to be able to compensate
for that.
Senator Murphy. But you cannot fill in. USAID cannot fill
in for the gap that has been created.
Ms. Pryor. It would be extremely difficult for us to do
that with the resources that we have.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Assistant Secretary Leaf, you referenced
this concept of the Palestinian Authority returning to Gaza,
something some senior Administration officials including the
President of the United States has mentioned, discussing a
revitalized Palestinian Authority.
Assistant Secretary, what specific parameters will meet the
threshold for a revitalized Palestinian Authority?
Ms. Leaf. So the PA government, the new government that was
established in April, has a reform agenda of its own and one
that we are pressing them to implement, and that goes to
accountability, transparency, rooting out corruption, enabling
services to the public, basically the kind of thing--bread and
butter things that any government owes its people and also owes
its donors.
The problems it is facing right now is a severe financial
crisis. That is one that has been in part the product of
October 7 and the closure of the West Bank in large part to
traffic to--and a shrinking of the economy.
It is also the withholding of clearance revenues by the
Israeli government at this point. The reform it needs to
undertake is to make it fit and proper for governance where it
is now, let alone the ability to govern a larger portion of the
public.
Senator Young. Right. So if you could briefly speak to what
specific actions are needed to meet the criteria of a reformed
PA. Political and financial reforms? Would it be a total
abolition, I would hope, of pay for slay programs? What else?
Ms. Leaf. Yes, that is exactly right. It is a mix of
administrative reforms, administrative reforms that go to the
issue of accountability of the money that it has, and where it
is going, and how it is being spent.
But you are right, prisoner payment--pay for slay--that is
a key piece of a discussion that we have been having for some
time, and I think we are very near a conclusion to that.
Senator Young. What steps, if any, do we know that regional
partners may be willing to take in furtherance of this reformed
PA?
Ms. Leaf. All of them want to see the same thing. All of
them recognize the declining legitimacy and credibility of that
governing structure in the West Bank. They all, every one of
them, want to see the PA assume its responsibilities in Gaza,
but they are very aware of the weaknesses of the organization.
Senator Young. OK.
Moving to Hamas, Secretary Blinken confirmed last week that
Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire and hostage exchange
proposal. So trying to get a sense of where that leaves us.
What steps is the U.S. prepared to take to increase
pressure in Hamas and if necessary its external enablers?
Ms. Leaf. So I think what you heard the Secretary say was
something short of reject. It was a yes but, with a lot of buts
to it--the response that we saw on Tuesday night when we were
out in the region.
So some of those changes to the text were things that you
could manage. Others were less apparently so, and we are in
intensive discussions right now with the mediators and Israel
about the way forward.
We do believe, ultimately, this proposal is the best
roadway to get an end to the conflict now that would enable a
multitude of things and that would ultimately be offered the
prospect for an end to the conflict altogether, ensuring
Israel's security, of course, and ensuring the security,
frankly, of the people of Gaza who have labored under this
terrible regime.
Senator Young. Last, Assistant Secretary Leaf, I am asking
when the U.S. withholds arms from Israel or seeks to enact
arbitrary red lines on Israel, how does this not embolden Hamas
and lead to them thinking they can outlast the war without
releasing hostages?
Ms. Leaf. Senator, let me be really clear on this point.
Senator Young. Please.
Ms. Leaf. There is exactly one case that the President
asked us to hit pause on. There is no larger pause or cessation
of security assistance to Israel, and the President, the
Secretary, have been absolutely clear----
Senator Young. He is taking that off the table?
Ms. Leaf. Sorry?
Senator Young. He is taking that off the table?
Ms. Leaf. There is one. There is one case. There is one
case right now, and that----
Senator Young. And is he taking it off the table?
Ms. Leaf. I am sorry?
Senator Young. He is taking that prospect off the table?
Ms. Leaf. Of that case? I mean, it is under review, but it
is only one case.
Senator Young. Prospectively. Then I will ask you if the
U.S. were to withhold arms from Israel how would that not
embolden Hamas and lead to them thinking--finish the question,
yes.
Ms. Leaf. So, Senator, I do not want to deal in a
hypothetical, but what this President has been clear about is
we absolutely have Israel's back.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Senator Murphy. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to the chair and ranking member,
and thank you to our witnesses for being here. I am going to
continue on Israel.
Gaza--Israel has a right to defend itself, and the U.S.
needs to be a partner with Israel in defending itself against
those who would annihilate it: Hamas, Iranian backed militias,
Hezbollah, Houthis, Iran itself.
I celebrated on April 14 when the U.S. helped Israel,
together with other nations, knock down drones and missiles
fired from Iran into Israel.
Palestinians have a right to live. Palestinians have a
right to live and not to be collectively treated as if they are
part of a terrorist group when they are not. Most in Gaza are
not Hamas.
The vast majority in the West Bank are not Hamas, and while
I support the U.S. effort to give Israel tools to defend itself
against those who would annihilate it, I have been disappointed
and expressed it publicly that the Israeli effort to support
humanitarian aid to civilians, Israeli discussion about a
future for Palestine, the slow pace of allowance of aid, the
commission of violence against Palestinians on the West Bank,
in some instances escorted by IDF reservists and border patrol
officials, make this look to many that it is not just a defense
against Hamas, but that it is a larger effort to target
Palestinians.
The Administration at Senator Van Hollen's request--and
others of us joined in that request--in February announced a
new policy, National Security Memorandum 20, that required
recipients of U.S. military aid to meet two criteria: First,
that the military aid would be used in accord with
international law, and second, those receiving military--any
nation receiving military aid had to cooperate with U.S.
supported humanitarian efforts.
The Administration certified that Israel was meeting both
of those pillars of NSM-20. The first pillar about whether
military aid is being used in accord with international law is
a murky one because of the way Hamas embeds in civilian
populations.
But I will be blunt. I do not think the second pillar
regarding humanitarian aid is that murky, and this is what I
want to engage with you on.
If Israel was engaged in sufficient effort to provide
humanitarian aid, the U.S. would not have to be building a
jerryrigged pier off the coast of Gaza, deploying Virginians
from Fort Eustis and elsewhere to do it.
You would see a higher pace of humanitarian aid being
delivered through border crossings in Israel into Gaza. You
would not see Cindy McCain, the widow of a former Senate
Foreign Relations Committee member, executive director of the
World Food Programme, saying that there is, quote, ``full blown
famine'' in northern Gaza.
I do not think you would see USAID Administrator Power
publicly stating that it is credible to assess that there is
famine in Gaza.
The news since Sunday has been that the Israeli Defense
Forces want to do a strategic pause in some military operations
in Gaza every day to allow humanitarian aid to get to more
Palestinians, and they are being attacked by Prime Minister
Netanyahu and members of the cabinet for their effort to do
some pauses in Gaza to allow humanitarian aid.
So as the leaders of our State Department and USAID in this
remit, how can we conclude that there is sufficient
humanitarian aid being allowed by Israel into Gaza on this set
of facts?
Ms. Leaf. Senator, thank you for that set of comments and
questions.
I would not say there is sufficient humanitarian aid going
into Gaza, by no stretch of the imagination, but it is not
because Israel is trying to impede it.
There are a whole set of complex factors at work, among
which is the extremely poor security conditions, for instance,
on the other side of Kerem Shalom. I was on a long discussion--
a phone call this morning with our embassy in Jerusalem as well
as our special envoy Lise Grande, and she and we are working
assiduously to help untangle some of the issues, and some of
them are quite difficult to get at because as the IDF has
stepped back, various violent actors have stepped in to the
point that even the much diminished Hamas enforcers cannot get
control of independent families and gangs and so forth.
So that is a huge piece of what is going on right now. The
risk factors for humanitarian workers are at the very uppermost
levels of intolerability for the U.N. and other NGOs, but we
are working across the board on these issues with the Israeli
government, with the IDF, with COGAT, and they are doing these
pauses.
There is, obviously, a lot of politics at play around many
issues related to Gaza, but the fact is we are getting
partnership and cooperation. It is just a fraught situation.
Senator Kaine. I am over my time, and I do not want to
belabor the point, but I do not want us to lose credibility. We
cannot control the activities of other nations, but we can
control our own, and when we render a conclusion that Israel is
sufficiently cooperating with the United States on the delivery
of humanitarian aid at the same time as we are having to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars on a star crossed effort to
build an unworkable pier to get humanitarian aid into Gaza, and
if we render a conclusion that Israeli actions are sufficient
when the Israeli government is engaged in a significant war of
words against their own IDF trying to deliver humanitarian aid
to Gaza, I worry it makes us look like that we lose our own
credibility by blessing an effort that is thus far entirely
insufficient.
I yield back.
Senator Murphy. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for your testimony and service.
I want to begin with a question about an Egyptian man,
Mahmoud Hussein, who was arbitrarily detained for wearing an
anti-torture t-shirt in 2014. He was released after 2 years on
arbitrary pretrial detention but then rearrested in April 2023.
He is now free on bail.
We are pursuing this case because he has family in
Baltimore and also because he has been unjustly detained. My
question, Madam Assistant Secretary, is a very simple one on
this.
Number 1, are you familiar with the case, but number 2,
when do we expect the Egyptian parliament to finally pass the
proposed legislation to change the arbitrary detention rules? I
am just looking for a straight factual answer here.
Ms. Leaf. I am generally familiar with his case but not in
the details that you have just cited. To the second question, I
cannot give you an answer, but I will be happy to come back
with that answer.
Senator Van Hollen. If you could. Yes, we have been in
touch with Egyptian authorities, and this is something they
keep saying is going to happen but it never seems to actually
happen.
I am just going to read a post from--on this humanitarian
situation in Gaza. I may come back to it, but I do not think
anybody can question the credibility of UNICEF's global
spokesman, James Elder. This was a post he put up just a few
days ago when things have allegedly improved.
``This was my Wednesday in Gaza. Thirteen hour mission to
go just 40 kilometers. Eight hours held at checkpoints. Despite
approvals, our truck carrying UNICEF medicines and nutrition
supplies for 10,000 children got turned back.''
He adds to that note, ``And two fishermen seeking food for
their families shot dead on the beach in front of us.''
So, Madam Assistant Secretary, I do not think that the
humanitarian situation in Gaza has gotten better. We saw more
goods coming in through the Erez crossing, and it was improving
slightly. But then, of course, the Rafah operation shut off
anything coming across the Rafah crossing.
In Kerem Shalom--you can cross from Kerem Shalom into Gaza,
but if you cannot actually get to the people who need the help,
obviously, that does not achieve the goal.
I want to associate myself with the comments of my friend
Senator Kaine both in terms of Israel's clear right--in fact, I
would argue duty--to defend itself but also the importance of
the conduct of the war. The President has talked about this.
But I want to turn to the West Bank for a moment because
the West Bank is growing more unstable by the day. You have had
over 122 children die, killed in the West Bank since October 7
alone, and there are lots of people who are responsible for
overseeing the West Bank, but one of them, as you know, is
finance minister Smotrich who also has an important portfolio
within the ministry of defense over civil affairs in the West
Bank.
And there are numerous reports indicating that he has used
his position to assist extremist settlers including many who
have been sanctioned under the Administration's EEO, and I
commend the Administration for its EEO.
In addition, as reported in a New York Times magazine piece
with longtime investigative reporters, IDF officials have said
that Smotrich has undermined efforts to limit construction of
settlements illegal under Israeli law, quote, ``to the point
where it has disappeared,'' unquote.
He then boasted about this--he, Smotrich--saying, ``We will
do everything to prevent a Palestinian state that will endanger
our existence here. I am proud to fight and prevent the Arab
takeover of territories and help legitimize the Jewish heroes
who settle the West Bank,'' unquote.
And I do not know if you were with Secretary Blinken back
in March, but at that time Smotrich announced the largest
single seizure of Palestinian lands in 1 day.
He also talked about--has been withholding funds. You, the
Secretary, the President, have talked about this. You would
agree that these are all destabilizing to the West Bank, would
you not?
Ms. Leaf. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. And so my question is this. The EEO is
very clear. What the EEO says is that any individuals or
entities who have engaged in actions including directing,
enacting, implementing, enforcing, or failing to enforce
policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the
West Bank are subject to this set of sanctions under the EEO.
Why has the Administration not sanctioned Smotrich, given
the clear violations of the terms of the President's executive
order?
Ms. Leaf. Senator, if I can quickly turn back to the HA--
the humanitarian situation in Gaza. I want to be clear about
one point. I am not suggesting that it has improved.
We were beginning to see an improvement, a gentle trend
upwards in April. That was reversed with the Rafah operation,
and so we were--we are working against that.
On the West Bank you are absolutely right that there are a
whole constellation of factors and actors that are taking
things to a very precarious position, and I would agree with
you on all of those points that those are relevant to that
picture.
You can appreciate that we do not discuss publicly who we
put on our list for consideration. It is an ongoing process.
Senator Van Hollen. I thank you.
And just in closing, Mr. Chairman, again, I would really
urge the Administration to take this action and take it
immediately because the situation's getting worse, not better,
and Smotrich continues to threaten more illegal outposts and
withholding or some combination of those.
So if we want to send a signal that we are serious it
cannot just be sanctioning some extremist settlers and some
settler farms. It has to get to the root of the issue and this
is one of those roots.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
Deputy Assistant Administrator Pryor, I am going to start
with you.
When Secretary Blinken appeared before the Appropriations
Committee in October of last year I asked him a very simple
question, and that was whether he could guarantee that no U.S.
taxpayer funding had been, and this included in aid to Gaza,
had been used to fund or support the Hamas attacks on October 7
of 2023.
I asked him repeatedly, and repeatedly he declined to make
that guarantee. That week I also sent a letter both to
Secretary Blinken and USAID Administrator Power asking how much
in U.S. taxpayer funded foreign assistance has been sent
specifically to Gaza and to list each recipient in Gaza whether
at the awardee level or the subawardee level. I have that
letter right here.
That was months ago. Eight months later USAID has failed to
give me a complete answer. In particular, the agency has
refused to disclose recipients at the subawardee level.
The responses that I received from AID have made it clear
that the agency has the information about subawardees that it
has not classified, but the agency is not providing it.
So, Ms. Pryor, why 8 months later, after I sent a letter
with a very simple request, has the Administration refused to
provide the U.S. Senate with basic transparency about who is
receiving U.S. taxpayer dollars, especially at the subawardee
level so we can see where it is being spent?
Ms. Pryor. Thank you for your question, sir.
So the safety of our implementing partners' staff is our
utmost paramount concern, and this is such a high risk
environment where Hamas can target our implementing partners'
staff.
I am not familiar with this. I believe this is on the
humanitarian assistance side. So I am happy to go back to my
colleagues on humanitarian assistance and see what is the
status of this response and how we get you the information you
are asking.
Senator Hagerty. I certainly want the information, deserve
the information. It has been 8 months. I think I know why you
are hesitating.
I raised this with Administrator Power. I shared with her
one of the subawardees that is doing just what we are concerned
about. I think that is the reason you are not sharing this
information is because this sort of activity--Hamas supporting
activity--is occurring among subawardees. You all are going to
be back in front of us on the Appropriations Committee where I
sit next month. I expect to have this information before then.
Ms. Pryor. Noted, sir.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary Leaf, I would like to turn to you now.
The Biden administration has declined to unilaterally recognize
a Palestinian state and has stated that a Palestinian state
should be established through, quote, ``direct negotiations
between the parties involved in the conflict.'' Will this
remain the Administration's position through January 20, 2025?
Ms. Leaf. Yes, Senator. Absolutely. That is longstanding
policy and it is--it has been the President's own approach to
this issue set throughout his career.
Senator Hagerty. I am pleased to hear you say that
unequivocally because here is the reason for my concern. Back
in December 2016 in the lame duck Obama administration we saw
the Obama administration betray Israel and allow the infamously
anti-Israel U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 2334 to go in
effect.
And as I fast forward to today, the Biden administration
has been pushing Israel to agree to a normalization agreement
with Saudi Arabia and that agreement would require Israel to
agree to, quote, ``a credible pathway to a Palestinian state.''
And my concern would be that if Israel were to agree to
this, quote, ``credible pathway'' that the Biden administration
might turn around and do just as the Obama administration did
back in 2016 and unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state
with East Jerusalem as its capital while falsely claiming that
this is what Israel had already agreed to.
So I just want to be clear again. Is there any scenario
between now and January 20 where the Biden administration would
recognize a Palestinian state in the absence of Israel's
official recognition of a Palestinian state?
Ms. Leaf. That would be the subject of direct negotiations,
sir. Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Senator Hagerty. And only then. There would be no
recognition after that.
Ms. Leaf. Yes. That is right. That is right.
Senator Hagerty. I just want to make sure and make clear.
Ms. Leaf. Yes.
Senator Hagerty. Thanks very much. Thanks for putting that
on the record for me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much. And Senator Hagerty, I
will be glad to work with you on that request you made for
information. There may be some reasons why it should be done in
a classified setting but be happy to work with you on that. Be
happy to work with you on that.
We will open it to a second round of questions here, at the
very least from myself and the ranking member.
Ambassador Leaf, Qatar has come under a lot of scrutiny for
good reason since October 7. But I misunderstand a lot of the
animosity.
Yes, they host Hamas, but my understanding is that that has
been at our request. Yes, they have relations with the Taliban,
but that has accrued to the benefit of the United States,
utilized by Democratic and Republican administrations.
They have previously been the conduit that flows funds into
Gaza, done at the request of the Israeli government. So just
speak for a moment about how the status of the U.S.-Qatar
relationship right now and what the world would look like if we
did not have Qatar's ability to allow us to speak to our
adversaries in the region.
Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator, for that really important
question, and having gone to Israel I think nine times since
October 7, and actually my first 2 years in office I did a lot
of work with the Israelis on especially the Israeli security
establishment, and I would say that there has been--even before
October 7 there were very mixed feelings about the logic of
using Qatar as a conduit for funds.
But after October 7, of course, there has been the just
really terribly traumatic--the trauma that endures as long as
hostages are kept by Hamas and other actors in Gaza.
So there has been frustration from the same folks who
understand that Qatar is a really critical channel, just as you
say, alongside Egypt. But it has just gifts that it brings and
influence it brings to bear on this.
I would just say the following. Qatar, really, to use that
somewhat tired expression really does punch above its weight,
and it has a nimbleness of approach with a variety of actors
that we do not have relations with, but that we need to
communicate with, and regimes as well as nonstate actors, and
they have worked tirelessly on this hostage piece.
There has been very understandable frustration from the
families, from the Israeli government. Can Qatar not do more?
Can you not put--you, the U.S., put more pressure on Qatar to
put more pressure on Hamas.
And I would just say, as I did a few weeks ago before HFAC,
there is the cadre of political officials of Hamas in Doha, and
boy, do they squeeze them. I can assure you they squeeze them.
But at the end of the day, there is one guy 10 stories
below the ground, a psychopath, messianic in his own belief
that he has established himself in history, and there is sort
of a sunk cost having lost thousands of fighters and caused
carnage in Gaza.
So Qatar's ability to do the indirect mediation is critical
to our interests and to Israel's. But I would say they have
become a very trusted partner of ours.
Senator Murphy. There are other allies of the United States
that have relations with Hamas. Qatar is the only one that
seems to be willing to do the hardest work of convening these
conversations.
Ms. Leaf. Yes.
Senator Murphy. So, an imperfect ally----
Ms. Leaf. Yes.
Senator Murphy [continuing]. And a human rights record that
needs to get better. But appreciate your comments.
Let me ask you one bigger picture question. We have the
outlines of a very important potential agreement in Lebanon to
be able to move Hezbollah back off the border and maybe even
get in a conversation about border demarcation.
We have a political standstill in Yemen with the added
complication of Houthi provocations into the Red Sea. Both seem
static until the Gaza conflict comes to a close.
I just think it is important for this committee to
understand that the end of the conflict in Gaza is important to
be able to ultimately bring about a long term security
settlement with respect to Hamas's ability to hit Israel ever
again.
But it is also right now standing in the way of moving
forward on a Yemen political process, on a deescalation with
the Houthis, and a potential breakthrough--potential
breakthrough--in Lebanon. Am I right about that?
Ms. Leaf. You are absolutely right about all of that, and
the diplomacy continues even while we are working to get to
that ceasefire agreement.
So Amos Hochstein is out in the region. He has been out
there for several days essentially working to calm things down.
Things are quite volatile, alarmingly so, and we heard that in
stereophonic sound last week on our trip to the region.
So he is doing his work even ahead of a formal pause. Tim
Lenderking is doing his work relentlessly both in terms of the
work with our partners on Red Sea security, but importantly, on
the piece to get regional partners to really lean in hard on
the Houthis.
So all of this continues apace, but you are right, the Gaza
ceasefire will be the break point where we can do something
really important in both directions.
Senator Murphy. Let me sneak in one last question on Egypt.
The State Department waived certification requirements tied
to human rights improvements on the $235 million of Egypt's
fiscal year 2022 FMF, but upon becoming chair of the full
committee Senator Cardin put a hold on that funding.
My impression is that since the chairman's hold has been in
place the Egyptian government has really failed to engage in
any meaningful cooperation with the United States on any of our
core interests and that we have, further, not seen any real
progress with respect to the pretrial detention reforms or the
release of significant numbers of political prisoners.
Feels like, just like the amount of funding to Egypt has
been stuck in place since the mid-1980s, progress with Egypt
has been stuck at least for the past 6 months.
Ms. Leaf. The one thing I would say that is really, really
important in this picture is the final resolution wrapping up
entirely of Case 173 and the dismissal of charges, the release
of freezes and detentions, and so forth.
So this is a really significant step forward for all of the
people and the organizations that were caught up in that years
long case.
I asked just a couple of days ago for a status report on
the pretrial detention legislation, and I plan to go back to
our post and see where we stand with that.
The discussions that we had, as I recall dimly, crested in
September, and of course, we had the events of October 7, which
have thoroughly preoccupied our government, Egypt's government.
They have been preoccupied both with the conflict right across
their border with Sudan.
But I assure you we have not lost sight of that, and I will
come back to you with some more comments on that.
Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Secretary, two questions--two lines of
questioning. One, I am going to touch on drones and then subsea
cables. So you know where I am headed with this.
So Iran's drone production--a lot has been said and written
about that, but recent reports that are based on an analysis of
some downed Iranian drones found multiple components
originating from U.S. manufacturers--microchips, circuit
boards, GPS modules, some other components.
I understand it is nearly impossible to completely cut off
Iran from attaining these parts, but what if anything are we
doing to try and interrupt some of these flows?
Ms. Leaf. It is a really critical issue because, of course,
the drones are a threat throughout the region and now they are
fully in the battlefield in Ukraine.
So we have designated dozens of entities involved in the
UAV program, and we have imposed comprehensive export controls
to try to restrict Iran's access to key technologies insofar as
possible, and we are enlisting the help of our European and
other partners in this effort.
It is, as you say, exceptionally difficult to get at
everything because some of these things are just off the shelf
kind of components which can be used for a multiplicity of
things.
Senator Young. Do you have sufficient personnel? I know
this has been an issue over at Commerce with respect to the
monitoring of our export controls on microprocessors, and we
are looking at so many different fronts right now and so many
different technologies of a dual use nature, that might be
something to look into if you do not have that information at
the ready.
Ms. Leaf. I would be happy to look into that.
Senator Young. There are a number of members of this
committee that would like to be helpful. Thank you.
So with respect to subsea cables what diplomatic efforts
are underway to get some of the subsea cables, like those in
the Red Sea that had been directly or indirectly damaged by
Houthis--underway to get these cables repaired?
Ms. Leaf. I do not have an answer for you on that, but I
will be happy to take that back.
Senator Young. Well, I believe that we need to be
monitoring this situation very closely. Ninety-five percent of
the world's internet traffic occurs through subsea cables.
These are strategic assets obviously critical to our
commerce and every bit as important as the above water goods
and services that traffic every day and we take great care to
secure.
So, yes, kindly report back to me on any activities
underway to restore service there.
And then as the leader of a regional bureau at the
department what if any additional authorities or resources
would you or your counterparts in other bureaus need to
prioritize security of undersea cables within your areas of
responsibility?
There again, if you need to report back, I would certainly
welcome that. Do you have any initial thoughts that you would
like to----
Ms. Leaf. I do not. I do not, sir, but I will be happy to
take that one back as well. So additional authorities, yes.
Senator Young. OK.
Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ambassador Leaf, you are the Administration's point person
on the Middle East. How is that working out?
Ms. Leaf. I love my job, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Have things in the Middle East gotten better
or worse since Joe Biden became President?
Ms. Leaf. We have had a series of black swan events. So no
doubt the region is in a very difficult state.
Senator Cruz. Is your answer things have gotten worse?
Ms. Leaf. My answer is that a series of black swan events
have crowded----
Senator Cruz. Have they gotten better? You are not
suggesting things have gotten better, are you?
Ms. Leaf. No, I am not.
Senator Cruz. If fact, they have gotten a lot worse.
Ms. Leaf. That is the nature of black swan----
Senator Cruz. So it is black swans. You guys had nothing to
do with it. It is not mistakes you made. It is just something
that happened externally?
Ms. Leaf. Well, I think an assessment of the events of
October 7 is still to be done. I cannot speak to that.
Senator Cruz. OK. So did you all make any mistakes that led
to it?
Ms. Leaf. I am not sure.
Senator Cruz. All right. Here is one. How about giving
hundreds of millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip, much of
which ended up in the hands of Hamas? Was that a mistake now
that we saw what happened on October 7?
Ms. Leaf. I am going to defer to my colleague from USAID. I
am not aware of hundreds of millions of dollars going to Hamas
from U.S.----
Senator Cruz. All right. How about a hundred billion
dollars to Iran? Was that a mistake?
Ms. Leaf. I am not sure what you are referring to, Senator.
Senator Cruz. You tell me. How much money has this
Administration flowed to Iran?
Ms. Leaf. We have not flowed money to Iran.
Senator Cruz. Really?
Ms. Leaf. We have money in accounts that are restricted for
humanitarian use only.
Senator Cruz. And money is not fungible?
Ms. Leaf. This regime will always spend money on these
kinds of activities--the proxy activity.
Senator Cruz. When Joe Biden became President how much was
Iran selling in oil a day?
Ms. Leaf. I do not have that figure for you, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Of course you do not. The answer is about
300,000 barrels a day. How much is Iran selling in oil a day
now?
Ms. Leaf. Somewhere short of 2 million.
Senator Cruz. So it went from 300,000 barrels a day to 2
million barrels a day. That is about $80 billion that the
Ayatollah has made because your Administration refuses to
enforce oil sanctions.
Ms. Leaf. No, we do enforce oil sanctions, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Well, you do so terribly because the number
has increased almost tenfold.
Ms. Leaf. But because of the strictures that we have put on
the sanctions, that we put on the targeting that we have done,
230 alone directed toward those who traffic in Iranian oil,
that has imposed a heavy cost on Iran, and we estimate that it
is not----
Senator Cruz. Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait.
You are saying it is a heavy cost they went from 300,000
barrels a day to 2 million barrels a day. Where is the heavy
cost? That is an extra 1.7 million barrels a day. That is $80
billion. True or false, 90 percent of Hamas's funding comes
from Iran?
Ms. Leaf. No, not 90 percent. It is a large--it is a
substantial amount.
Senator Cruz. OK. How much is it then?
Ms. Leaf. I do not know at this--of this exact----
Senator Cruz. Of course. You are in charge of the damn
region, and you do not--what do you mean you do not know?
Ms. Leaf. At this exact moment I cannot tell you because of
the strictures----
Senator Cruz. All right. How much of Hezbollah's funding
comes from Iran?
Ms. Leaf. Huge--a huge amount.
Senator Cruz. It is about 90 percent. Both of those are
about 90 percent. Do you think it made the world safer or less
safe to take a theocratic lunatic like the Ayatollah who
chants, ``Death to America'' and ``Death to Israel'' and to
flow a hundred billion dollars? Did that make us more safe or
less safe?
Ms. Leaf. The U.S. is not flowing money to Iran, Senator.
Senator Cruz. What about the $6 billion in hostage
payments?
Ms. Leaf. Not a penny has moved.
Senator Cruz. And money is not fungible? They cannot put
that up for credit facilities?
Ms. Leaf. Not a penny has moved.
Senator Cruz. You are aware you are under oath?
Ms. Leaf. I am.
Senator Cruz. And could they put that money up for credit
facilities to use money to fund their terror activity?
Ms. Leaf. I am not sure who would be in the position of
lending them money at this point. Senator, we do have plenty of
sanctions. Iran is one of the most heavily sanctioned regimes.
Senator Cruz. But you are not enforcing them. This
Administration--every lunatic on Earth that wants to kill us
this Administration gives money to.
All right. Let me ask you this. Israel has said it is their
policy to utterly eliminate Hamas. Does this Administration--
does President Biden support Israel in its commitment to
utterly eliminate Hamas?
Ms. Leaf. Of course.
Senator Cruz. Of course? Then why are you calling for an
immediate ceasefire before they eliminate Hamas?
Ms. Leaf. Israel has accepted that proposal.
Senator Cruz. No, they have not.
Ms. Leaf. They have.
Senator Cruz. Is there a ceasefire that has happened?
Ms. Leaf. Hamas has not yet fully accepted that.
Senator Cruz. Is there a cease--Israel most certainly has
not. I am aware the Biden administration has told the press
that Israel has.
Ms. Leaf. The Israeli leadership----
Senator Cruz. So, I asked you a question. Do you support
Israel's military objective of utterly eliminating Hamas? You
said yes. In the next sentence you said, but they should
ceasefire right now and not eliminate Hamas.
Ms. Leaf. No, I agree with the way that the President
characterized it, Senator, on May 31, which is to say that we
agree with the objective that Hamas never again control the
Gaza Strip or threaten Israel. That will not be achieved by
military means alone.
Senator Cruz. So, it is not--we said their military
objective was to defeat Hamas. So you just said it is
impossible to defeat Hamas. Is that right?
Ms. Leaf. When you first posed the question, you said
eliminate Hamas. Over time----
Senator Cruz. I said utterly eliminate Hamas. I did not say
over time, not over a thousand years.
Ms. Leaf. No.
Senator Cruz. I said defeat an enemy because they are
murderers who murdered 1,200 people, who raped women and little
girls.
Ms. Leaf. It will not be done by military means alone.
Senator Cruz. OK. So it is the position of this
Administration it is impossible by military means to defeat
Hamas?
Ms. Leaf. Yes, it is.
Senator Cruz. Let me ask you, you also want to see
essentially as a reward for October 7 a Palestinian state.
Ms. Leaf. It is not a reward.
Senator Cruz. It is not a reward. It just achieves what
they want as a benefit for these murders.
Ms. Leaf. Hamas--Hamas----
Senator Cruz. Let me ask you something. If Hamas is
governed by--if Hamas governs Gaza how is Israel safe and
protected?
Ms. Leaf. Shall I--shall I----
Senator Murphy. The gentleman's time has expired.
Senator Cruz. It is an impressive job, Mr. Chairman. Bang
bang.
Senator Murphy. Let the witness finish answering the
question.
Senator Cruz. She should not be frightened of these
questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Leaf. Hamas has never supported a two state solution.
So, indeed, a Palestinian state that has negotiated with Israel
that lives in peace side by side----
Senator Cruz. And governed by Hamas.
Ms. Leaf [continuing]. Is not a reward to Hamas. Hamas does
not support such a thing. Does not recognize Israel's right to
exist.
Senator Cruz. Your policy has been an utter disaster.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much to both of our
witnesses for being here today. What we are going to do is keep
the record open until 5 p.m. on Thursday, and we will
appreciate any answers to questions that come in before then.
With that, this subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. The United States and some members of the Israeli
military establishment have envisioned a postwar role for an overhauled
Palestinian Authority, which administers parts of the West Bank. Prime
Minister Netanyahu's government, however, has repeatedly rejected any
role for it, and the Foreign Ministry Israel Katz recently started a
social media campaign to discredit the idea. The rift between Netanyahu
and the country's military leadership is becoming increasingly apparent
for their civil society and the international community.
Given the clear and concerning misalignment of Netanyahu's and
Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) objective on the threat and elimination of
Hamas, particularly as their military operations are assumed to end
soon, how is the United States engaging with Israel and our Arab allies
to devise a comprehensive postwar plan in Gaza? I welcome the
opportunity to learn more about these plans in greater detail as they
become accessible.
Answer. For months we have been engaging in conversations with
Israel, the Palestinian Authority and partners throughout the region on
such issues. Our goal is to turn a ceasefire into an enduring end to
the conflict, but also turning an end of war into a just and durable
peace and using that peace as a foundation for building a more
integrated, stable, and prosperous region.
Question. In your view, what type of support does the United States
seek in combatting Hamas and restoring regional peace and stability for
Israel and our regional allies?
Answer. We have been engaging partners in the region about post-
conflict Gaza since early on in this conflict. Many of them share our
concerns and a willingness to play a constructive role when conditions
allow. There will be an ongoing need for the international community to
step up to support Gaza's governance, security, and humanitarian
issues.
Question. The declining legitimacy and credibility of Palestinian
Authority (PA) in the West Bank--including the potentiality of a ``re-
envisioned'' PA, are challenging relations between Palestinian factions
and regional neighbors such as Jordan and Egypt, given the uncertainty
of end of the Israeli-Hamas conflict.
In this vein, can you describe our regional strategy to mitigating
the war's ramifications in the diplomatic, security, and financial Arab
space?
Answer. We are working with regional partners on elements to get to
a sustained peace, which must ultimately lead to a pathway to Israelis
and Palestinians living side by side in states of their own, with equal
measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity. It must
include Palestinian-led governance and Gaza unified with the West Bank
under the Palestinian Authority, with support from the United States,
the region, and partners around the globe. Even as we focus intensely
on addressing these urgent challenges, we believe that the time is now
to start the conversation about the future--not tomorrow, not after the
war, today--because identifying the longer-term objectives and a
pathway to get there will help shape our approach to addressing
immediate needs.
Question. According to a recent survey published by the Pew
Research Center, Israelis are more confident in their military than in
their government. Further, Israelis were recorded to be more supportive
of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant than of Netanyahu.
How do you view this growing social unrest in Israeli civil
society? What do they indicate to you regarding the prospects of a re-
envisioned relationship between Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza
Strip?
Answer. The U.S.-Israel relationship has remained strong across
administrations in both of our countries--and this continues today.
Israel is a vibrant democracy, and the question of who is best to serve
as the leadership of Israel--and what policies they should adopt to
ensure Israel's security--is for the Israeli people to decide. The
United States also supports the freedom of speech, the freedom of
assembly, and the right to peaceful protest.
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Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. I'm concerned about reports that the Moroccan royal
family is attempting to criminalize a civil dispute which stems from
the management of the Royal Mansour Hotel in Casablanca. During his
confirmation hearing in July 2022, Ambassador Talwar told me that he
would advocate for the U.S. business community directly with the
Moroccan government. Can you tell me what the State Department has done
to address this issue since the Ambassador committed to me that he
would work to improve the business climate in the country?
Answer. The U.S. Government--including through the tireless
diplomacy led by Ambassador Talwar and U.S. Mission Morocco--is
continuing at all levels to advocate with the Moroccan government on
behalf of U.S. businesses while supporting efforts to improve the trade
and investment climate in Morocco. U.S. Mission Morocco leverages a
range of programs, including the Department of Commerce's Commercial
Law Development Program, to strengthen the judiciary, increase
transparency, and contribute to a more open commercial environment.
On the specific litigation involving the Royal Mansour Hotel in
Casablanca, U.S. officials continue to closely follow this dispute,
remain in regular contact with representatives for the U.S. firm
involved, and will continue to utilize all avenues to advocate for a
favorable resolution.
Question. As we near the 2-year anniversary of Ryan Corbett's
detention in Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly important that we
secure his release. What is the status of the Department's effort to
bring him home?
Answer. U.S. officials have continuously pressed, including in
meetings with Taliban representatives, for the immediate and
unconditional release of Americans detained in Afghanistan, noting that
these detentions are a significant obstacle to positive engagement. We
continue to press both in public and in private with Taliban
representatives that their relationship with the international
community depends entirely on their actions.
Question. With the State and USAID's Joint Regional Strategy for
the MENA region now being 2 years old, please give an update on
implementation and any plans you have going forward.
Answer. Interagency country-specific reviews that assess progress
toward achieving the five JRS Goals were conducted just after the
outbreak of the Israel/Hamas conflict. The review included the
recommendation that we must position ourselves throughout the region
for day-after planning, reaffirm our partnerships, restore U.S.
credibility, and emphasize what the U.S. brings to the region.
It also recommended that, despite consistent, long-term funding to
advance women's livelihoods, and high rates of education among women
and girls, women's workforce participation in the region is only 18
percent, the lowest globally. As a next step, we agreed to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of gender programming, particularly in places
like Jordan and Egypt, where there are large, long-standing gender
programs.
We continue to tailor our approaches to address the current
regional context. Since the strategy will expire in early 2026, work to
develop a new JRS is expected to begin mid to late 2025.
Question. Will this Administration enter into a 123 Agreement with
Saudi Arabia and submit it to Congress for consultation?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has made clear, any nuclear
cooperation agreement that we conclude with Saudi Arabia will need to
be consistent with advancing our nonproliferation goals. The United
States has long stressed its support for the responsible development of
civil nuclear power in a manner consistent with the highest standards
of safety, security, and nonproliferation.
Question. Given recent reports of increased cooperation between the
Houthis and al-Shabaab, how is State working to isolate the Houthis now
to ensure that this increased terrorist cooperation doesn't continue to
spread?
Answer. We are tracking reports of increased cooperation, and we
are engaged in ongoing discussions with our regional partners in the
Middle East and Africa in relation to this issue. We are utilizing
multiple channels to press the Houthis to avoid this dangerous
escalation and to cease such contacts immediately.
Question. While we have been working with our allies in the region
to push for peace and stability, the U.S. continues to play an outsized
role, especially in foreign assistance. Have GCC, Turkish, and French
partners agreed to increase their humanitarian and development
assistance in Lebanon?
Answer. Our team at Embassy Beirut works closely with international
partners, including GCC countries and France, to address humanitarian
needs in Lebanon and to promote economic development as well as
security and stability.
The State Department continues to press allies and partners at
senior-most levels to increase their assistance to Lebanon, both to
support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces as
well as to provide for humanitarian needs and economic development. We
continue to urge the Government of Lebanon to make much needed economic
reforms, as outlined by the IMF, to bring Lebanon out of its ongoing
economic crisis.
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Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions
Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Has the State Department heard similar reports of doctors
being denied the ability to bring medical equipment and medicine into
Gaza?
Answer. As of May 7, the Israeli Defense Forces control the Gaza
side of the Rafah Crossing and, since then, the Rafah Crossing between
Egypt and Gaza has remained closed. Before and after the closing of the
Rafah Crossing, the Department heard from NGO's and doctors returning
from Gaza regarding the difficulties they have faced in bringing
medical supplies into Gaza.
In the interim, new entry-exit arrangements have been agreed upon
by the Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt. These involve
a UN-led rotation mechanism through the Kerem Shalom crossing with
transit across the Allenby Bridge into Jordan. Under these
arrangements, we understand the Government of Israel has imposed
additional restrictions on personal items. Amidst these challenges, we
continue to raise our concerns with the Government of Israel.
Question. To your knowledge, does the Israeli government have an
existing list of medical supplies and medicines that it considers
``dual use''? If so, does the State Department or USAID have access to
this list?
Answer. The Department is aware of and has access to the existing
2008 list of medical supplies and medicines that the Government of
Israel considers ``dual use.'' The Department continues to engage
Israeli officials at the highest levels to ensure greater and quicker
access to necessary medical resources for civilians in dire need.
Question. Does the State Department have access to a list of items
Israeli authorities will not allow foreign medical professionals to
bring into Gaza?
Answer. The Department has the existing 2008 list of ``dual-use''
items, as do humanitarian actors. However, the Government of Israel has
made commitments to lift restrictions on certain items critical for
life-saving assistance and to take measures to further clarify
guidelines for partners.
Relief organizations continue to encounter some issues at points of
entry, and efforts are being made to open more land routes to further
surge the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza. This issue is
raised in every conversation with our Israeli counterparts.
Question. Has the United States government engaged with Israeli
authorities on increasing access to medical supplies that medical
professionals can bring with them when treating patients in Gaza? If
so, please describe your efforts and results, if any.
Answer. The United States government regularly engages with the
Government of Israel--and when relevant the governments of Egypt and
Jordan--on all issues related to the safe rotation of humanitarian
staff in and out of Gaza, including medical personnel and supplies.
This includes engagement by senior officials from the State Department,
the National Security Council, and USAID. The United States continues
to engage the GOI on restrictions that impact the flow of medical
supplies into and out of Gaza.
Question. Is the State Department aware of any cases in which
American medical professionals with Palestinian ancestry (individuals
whose fathers or grandfathers were born in the Palestinian territories)
have been denied entry into Gaza to treat Palestinians by COGAT as part
of WHO-approved medical missions, such as with the Palestinian American
Medical Association (PAMA)? If so, what is the stated justification for
this policy change?
Answer. While the Department is aware of reports of some American
medical professionals with Palestinian ancestry who have been denied
entry into Gaza, our embassy has not been contacted about specific
cases. At this time, we refer you to the Government of Israel for
specifics pertaining to particular cases and the policy as it currently
stands.
We continue to remind U.S. citizens of our Level 4 Travel Advisory
to not travel to Gaza. As a result of the armed conflict, the security
environment within Gaza and on its borders is extremely dangerous and
volatile.
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Response of Ms. Jeanne Pryor to a Question
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. The debate over the future of the Israeli operation in
Gaza comes as aid agencies report a worsening humanitarian situation
after the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) incursion into the southern city
of Rafah that started in May, severely disrupting humanitarian
activities.
Amid the growing disruption of humanitarian operations in Gaza, how
do you view our humanitarian programs in Gaza, particularly through our
maritime humanitarian corridor? I welcome the opportunity to learn more
about the efficiencies and or inefficiencies of our current strategy
and efforts, including those conducted alongside our regional allies.
Answer. Our continued support is critical now more than ever
following over 8 months of sustained hostilities. The protracted
closure of Rafah Crossing, the increase in fighting, large-scale
displacement and the collapse of law and order mean that humanitarian
partners continue to operate in an extremely challenging environment
hindering the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Since October 7, the USG has announced over $674 million to
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, with $265 million from USAID's
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance. We are prioritizing life-saving
assistance, including food; health; shelter; protection; and water,
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance as part of a comprehensive,
multi-sectoral approach in this response.
USAID, in close coordination with the Department of State and other
interagency partners, continues to advocate for the Government of
Israel to ensure a predictable and needs-based supply of assistance
from all routes, particularly through all existing land crossings.
Multiple routes--from inside Gaza, neighboring countries, and through
the maritime corridor--are required so our partners are not relying on
just one route that can easily become too congested and turn into a
single point of failure.
Through the humanitarian maritime corridor, USAID has facilitated
the delivery of 978 metric tons of life-saving aid, including nutrient
rich food to support thousands of Gaza's most vulnerable children and
adults and critical supplies such as plastic sheeting for shelter,
jerry cans to hold clean water, and hygiene kits. An additional 5,228
metric tons have been delivered to shore and are pending improvements
in security conditions before the U.N. resumes distribution. Assistance
includes not only commodities from the United States, but also the UAE,
EU, UK, Cyprus, IOM, and WFP. The humanitarian maritime corridor
augments--not replaces--land crossings into Gaza, every one of which
needs to operate at maximum capacity and efficiency.
We are encouraged by the continued support of our partners for the
maritime corridor. It is our view that we must capitalize on all
avenues possible to deliver aid into Gaza and into the hands of the
Palestinians. We also continue to advocate for regular, safe
facilitated movement for humanitarian actors and increased access
throughout Gaza, to ensure humanitarian assistance not only crosses
into Gaza but also is able to move once inside, to reach the most
vulnerable in need of critical assistance.
The ability of humanitarian actors to safely deliver and distribute
humanitarian assistance is essential in this and every humanitarian
response.
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Response of Ms. Jeanne Pryor to a Question
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. With the State and USAID's Joint Regional Strategy for
the MENA region now being 2 years old, please give an update on
implementation and any plans you have going forward.
Answer. Interagency country-specific reviews that assess progress
toward achieving the five JRS Goals were conducted after the outbreak
of the Israel/Hamas conflict in October 2023. The review concluded the
following recommendations:
We must position ourselves throughout the region for day-
after planning, reaffirm our partnerships, and emphasize what the U.S.
brings to the region.
Despite consistent, long-term funding to advance gender
equity, and high rates of education among women and girls, women's
workforce participation in the region is only 18 percent, the lowest in
the world. As a next step, we agreed on a comprehensive assessment of
gender programming, particularly in places like Jordan and Egypt, where
there are large, long-standing gender programs.
Although the ongoing conflict has changed priorities and created
additional challenges across the region that are not reflected in the
current regional strategy, no formal updates have been made to the JRS
at this point. Since the strategy will expire in early 2026, work to
develop a new JRS is expected to begin in mid to late 2025.