[Senate Hearing 118-380]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-380

  TEHRAN'S SHADOW ARMY: ADDRESSING IRAN'S PROXY NETWORK IN THE MIDDLE 
                                  EAST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 28, 2024
                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
56-429 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024                     
                  

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

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                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Maloney, Dr. Suzanne, Vice President and Director, Foreign 
  Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC..............     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Hook, Hon. Brian H., Former Special Representative for Iran and 
  Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................    12
    Prepared Statement...........................................    14

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Letter to Senators Benjamin L. Cardin and James E. Risch from 
  United Against Nuclear Iran, February 28, 2024, submitted by 
  Senator Risch..................................................    43

Opinion: A Brief History of the Netanyahu-Hamas Alliance, 
  Haaretz, October 20, 2023, submitted by Senator Chris Van 
  Hollen.........................................................    50

Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years--with Israel's backing. 
  Here's what we know about the controversial deal, CNN.com, 
  updated December 12, 2023, submitted by Senator Chris Van 
  Hollen.........................................................    58

`Buying Quiet': Inside the Israeli Plan That Propped Up Hamas, 
  the New York Times, December 10, 2023, submitted by Senator 
  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    63

Israel Found the Hamas Money Machine Years Ago. Nobody Turned It 
  Off, the New York Times, updated December 28, 2023, submitted 
  by Senator Chris Van Hollen....................................    73

                                 (iii)

  

 
  TEHRAN'S SHADOW ARMY: ADDRESSING IRAN'S PROXY NETWORK IN THE MIDDLE 
                                  EAST

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2024

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin J. 
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, Young, 
Barrasso, Cruz, and Hagerty.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 
come to order.
    In January an attack by Iranian proxies in Jordan killed 
three American service members and injured more than 30 others. 
We mourn with their loved ones this incredible loss.
    The Biden administration's response was pragmatic, it was 
resolute, and given the loss of American life it was entirely 
justified.
    U.S. strikes send a clear message that we will not be 
pushed out of the region by these attacks. From Syria to Yemen 
to Iraq to Lebanon, Iranian proxies are a serious lethal threat 
to our allies globally, to our partners in the region, and to 
the United States' national security interests.
    Hezbollah has as many as 150,000 rockets, some of them 
highly precise and sophisticated, pointed at Israel. Its elite 
forces on Israel's border continue to play a dangerous tit for 
tat game with the IDF.
    Iranian proxies have fired drones and rockets at American 
and coalition facilities more than 180 times since October 17.
    The Houthis in Yemen have wreaked havoc on commercial 
shipping through the Red Sea, using weapons provided by the 
Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard.
    I want to thank Senator Murphy and Senator Young for the 
hearing they held yesterday on the subcommittee that dealt with 
the Houthi issues and at that hearing I expressed my support 
for Senator Murphy and Senator Kaine's concerns that there 
needs to be an AUMF in regards to our military operations in 
the Red Sea.
    But while Iran backs these groups, gives them weapons and 
training, Iran does not have complete command and control of 
their operations. That makes this a very precarious situation, 
one that requires careful, clear eyed American leadership.
    The risks of miscalculation will not only lead to another 
deadly attack against U.S. service members, it could lead to a 
full scale regional war.
    The Biden administration has not taken the bait on every 
attack. Instead, it has focused on significantly degrading 
proxies' capabilities and interdicting their resupply.
    It has made clear that while the United States will do what 
is necessary to protect our people and interests we do not seek 
a wider war in the Middle East or a direct confrontation with 
Iran.
    This hearing, I hope, will help us better understand Iran's 
intentions and how it is using its proxy network. There has 
been a lull in recent attacks in Syria and Iraq, but not in the 
Red Sea.
    Does Iran want to avoid an escalation, and if so to what 
extent do its proxies share that sentiment? Or is it laying the 
groundwork for something else?
    As you walk us through the expert assessment of Iran's 
calculations I would like to hear what might have changed in 
recent months.
    Has the risk to U.S. personnel and facilities changed? 
Where does it go from here, and importantly, what should we in 
Congress consider doing as our next steps to respond to these 
potential shifts over the longer term?
    I believe we need to do everything in our power to protect 
our allies and the United States from the Iranian threat. That 
means responding to proxy attacks in a way that defends our 
people and our interests without escalating conflict.
    That means fully funding our diplomatic and security 
efforts with proxy forces--where proxy forces operate, and it 
means not only imposing sanctions against Iranian proxies but 
enforcing existing sanctions.
    At the same time we need a long term plan to deal with the 
Iran proxy network. Tehran is playing a long game. Its Supreme 
Leaders favor strategic patience. Iran thrives on chaos and 
suffering.
    The best way to undermine the Iranian threat in the long 
term is to offer an alternative, a comprehensive and lasting 
peace that allows for real regional integration.
    I realize this is no easy task, but that does not mean we 
should not make our efforts, and that is what the President and 
Administration are doing.
    We all know the horrific attack by Hamas in Gaza on Israel. 
We also know that part of that was to disrupt the normalization 
in the region.
    So the best way to counter these threats is for us to move 
forward with peace and normalization. It is critical that the 
United States continue to be a force for security and 
prosperity in the region.
    We cannot let Iran succeed in pushing us out of the Middle 
East or undermining the hard work of charting a path toward 
peace.
    With that let me turn to my distinguished ranking member, 
Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Certainly those facts are undeniable and that you have laid 
out. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. We have two 
very good witnesses on this subject with somewhat divergent 
views, but certainly people that know this subject.
    Let me start by saying at the beginning of the Biden 
administration the President's Iran policy was abundantly clear 
and that was an attempt to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal 
regardless of the cost.
    The Administration chose engagement and appeasement over 
containment and isolation. Three years later Iran is more 
emboldened and empowered than before, and the Middle East is in 
turmoil.
    Iran has dramatically expanded operations against the 
United States. Israel has decisively engaged against Iranian 
proxies in Gaza, and Lebanese Hezbollah is poised to enter the 
conflict.
    The Houthis are being fueled and directed by the Iranians, 
and Iran is moving into the Horn of Africa. Iran is building 
its proxy network in Sudan and backing the Sudanese Armed 
Forces.
    Threats are multiplying, and attacks against Americans are 
at an all time high. While nuclear negotiations have collapsed 
the Administration has failed to enforce sanctions, unfrozen 
Iranian assets in exchange for Americans, allowed Iranian 
drones and ballistic missiles to fuel Russia's aggression in 
Ukraine, and stood by while Iran uses its oil and its oil 
reserves to fund its lifestyle.
    As Iran marches across the Middle East the Biden 
administration has still not articulated a coherent Iran policy 
outside of the nuclear negotiations. It is time to change 
course.
    Iran is an enduring national security challenge and 
requires a serious policy that uses all instruments of national 
power.
    First, we must adopt a policy of containment. Iran does not 
think like the West, and it cannot be talked or charmed into a 
change of conduct.
    While the regime may make tactical concessions we must 
recognize and accept Iran's longstanding strategic hostility 
toward the United States.
    Second, we must better deny the regime the resources it 
uses to support terrorism. It is really straightforward. We 
must enforce existing Iran sanctions to include stopping 
Chinese purchase of Iranian oil, and we must permanently freeze 
Iranian assets around the world.
    Iran has earned a shocking $80 billion in oil revenues 
since 2021. Its once meager exports at the end of the last 
Administration are now over 2 million barrels a day. Let me say 
that again--2 million barrels a day--in the face of our 
sanctions.
    Not only does this supercharge Iran's support for 
terrorists, but the lack of sanctions enforcement provides Iran 
with greater resources to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 
and China with greater access to oil to pursue its dominance in 
the Pacific.
    Third, we must restore deterrence. There have been, as the 
chairman noted, at least 170 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, 
Syria, and Jordan since October 7. It is clear the Iranian 
regime doubts Biden's will to impose serious costs. It is time 
to do things differently. We must dial up deterrence and force 
the regime to take notice.
    Fourth, we must demonstrate American leadership. Iran's 
support for Russia, quashing of protests at home, and attack 
against Israel have forced many of our partners to rethink 
their approaches to Iran. We should be leading those efforts.
    Finally, we must better support the aspirations of the 
Iranian people. The Iranian people are disillusioned and at a 
breaking point. The lack of concrete response from the 
Administration has missed an opportunity.
    I cannot overstate how bad policy has allowed Iran, Russia, 
China, and North Korea to move from being transactional 
partners to strategic allies with each other. This is a failure 
of American policy that will have consequences for years to 
come.
    This committee has a clear role in shaping Iran policy. We 
have several pieces of legislation in front of us including my 
bill to better enforce oil sanctions.
    Many of these Iran related bills like the SHIP Act have 
already passed the House, and I look forward to working with 
the chairman to push these over the finish line.
    In closing, I would particularly like to thank Mr. Hook for 
being here. The threats against you and your family in 
connection with your past work as the U.S. Iran envoy are 
unacceptable and underscore the threat that Iran poses to 
Americans.
    With that, I will turn back to the chair.
    The Chairman. Let me thank Senator Risch.
    We are in total agreement that Iran's intentions are 
against our national security interests, that we need to 
enforce our sanctions particularly in the energy sector, and 
the importance of U.S. leadership.
    So I look forward to working with Senator Risch and all 
members of this committee on legislation that addresses those 
important issues and strengthens our resolve against Iran's 
nefarious activities.
    I also agree with Senator Risch that we have two 
distinguished witnesses here today, and I want to thank both of 
them for being with us.
    Let me introduce both of you.
    First, Suzanne Maloney, who is the vice president and 
director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings 
Institution where she served as the deputy director of the 
Foreign Policy program for 5 years. Her research focuses on 
Iran and Persian Gulf energy.
    Ms. Maloney also advised both Democrats and Republican 
administrations on Iran policy including as an external adviser 
to senior State Department officials during the Obama 
administration, and a member of Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice's policy planning staff.
    Mr. Brian Hook, who is well familiar with the members of 
this committee, I appreciate very much the relationship I have 
had with Mr. Hook when he was part of the Administration, and 
we had a chance to talk about issues sometimes in this hearing 
room, sometimes in a classified setting, and I thank him for 
his service to our country.
    He is currently vice chairman of the Cerberus Global 
Investments and former State Department Special Representative 
for Iran during the Trump administration.
    Prior to his appointment as Special Representative he 
served as the director of the policy planning staff from 2017 
to 2018, and from 2009 to 2017 he managed a international 
strategic consulting firm based in Washington, DC.
    So we will start first with Dr. Maloney.

STATEMENT OF DR. SUZANNE MALONEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, 
   FOREIGN POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Maloney. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members, it is an honor for me to address this 
committee today.
    As noted I am vice president and director of foreign policy 
at the Brookings Institution but my views today represent only 
my own.
    Iran is a profound and enduring threat to American national 
security as a result of its nuclear ambitions, its terrorism 
and hostage taking, its military support to Russia's war in 
Ukraine, and brutality toward its own people.
    One of the most valuable tools in the Iranian arsenal is 
the network of militias that Tehran has cultivated, 
coordinated, trained, and supplied with advanced weaponry. This 
adaptive layered so called axis of resistance extends across 
the Middle East and around the world.
    Through opportunistic and flexible arrangements Tehran has 
built partnerships of enduring value that provide strategic 
depth and insulate its government from the full risk of its 
militancy.
    Increasingly Tehran supplies the means of production and 
modification to enable independent weapons manufacturing as 
well, providing redundancy, innovation, and deniability.
    Iran's leaders have exploited the shocking Hamas massacres 
on October 7 and the war in Gaza to elevate their own regional 
status, block normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, 
incapacitate and delegitimize Israel, and test America's spine.
    They also seek to precipitate American mistakes. 
Historically, Iran's most valuable openings have come as a 
result of strategic missteps by Washington or our regional 
partners such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
    [Disturbance in the hearing room.]
    Dr. Maloney. Such as the invasion of Iraq and the 
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. For Tehran the 
prospective advantages and rewards of its regional aggression 
are huge.
    Iran does not actually have to achieve anything. Chaos and 
pressure on Israel and the United States itself constitute a 
victory for the Islamic Republic.
    On that basis the Iranian leadership escalated hostile 
actions by its proxy militias resulting in at least 186 deaths 
or injuries to American troops, and the Iran backed Houthis 
have launched at least 57 attacks on commercial shipping in the 
Red Sea, prompting the rerouting of international maritime 
freight traffic with significant delays and costs to the global 
economy.
    Additional threats loom large. Any miscalculation by any of 
the actors could ignite a wider and much more dangerous war, 
and in the long run Iran's proxies erode governance and 
security across the Middle East.
    The Biden administration has been resolute and pragmatic in 
managing these threats. The rapid deployment of American 
military assets to the region, together with the tireless 
diplomatic engagement by President Biden and senior U.S. 
officials, has succeeded in averting the wider war that Hamas 
hoped to precipitate.
    U.S. retaliatory strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have 
degraded militia capabilities and leadership and signaled to 
Tehran's partners that they will pay a price for their 
militancy.
    The calibrated use of force is having a positive effect. 
The pace and scope of attacks emanating from Iraqi militias has 
waned. The combination of deterrence and diplomacy has 
succeeded in preventing the eruption of a wider war.
    Still, Iran's militias are tenacious and adaptable with a 
plentiful and inexpensive arsenal, especially compared with the 
costs entailed in shooting them down. So we must remain 
vigilant.
    The use of force alone will not eliminate the threat posed 
by Tehran or its militia network, and overreach or over 
reliance on military instruments could undermine our objectives 
in the region, including objectives for stability and good 
governance in our partners there.
    Together with our regional partners Washington must plan 
meticulously for the day after the war in Gaza. We must ensure 
that civilian authorities independent of Hamas and other Iran 
backed militias are resourced for rapid and effective 
reconstruction and governance.
    Getting this right has been a high priority for the White 
House since October 7, but the obstacles to effective 
implementation remain staggeringly high. We must also craft and 
execute a new strategy that addresses the totality of the 
challenges posed by Tehran to its neighbors and the world.
    Contesting and containing the Islamic Republic's most 
dangerous policies will create time and space for Iran's 
century old movement for representative democracy to gain 
strength.
    This can and should be a bipartisan effort. As noted, I 
have had the opportunity, the privilege, to work with both 
Republican and Democratic administrations on Iran, and I 
believe there is substantial alignment around both the nature 
of the threat and the most effective tools for countering 
Tehran's malign policies across both sides of the aisle.
    And we need not go it alone internationally. As noted, the 
U.S. military response in the Red Sea reminds us that 
investments in coalition building require time and energy to 
mature and be effective.
    But the crisis in the Middle East has laid bare several 
hard truths. Like it or not, the United States remains an 
indispensable player in the region.
    No other world power can surge military and diplomatic 
capability to manage a spiraling conflict and avoid the worst 
outcomes, and even if Americans are weary of our commitment, 
they are standing by our allies, and protecting our interests 
requires that commitment and readiness.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Maloney follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Dr. Suzanne Maloney

    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members, 
thank you for inviting me to contribute my views on the intensifying 
threats posed by Iran's proxy network across the Middle East and how 
U.S. policy might counter these threats most effectively. It is an 
honor for me to address this committee.
    I am Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings 
Institution, a U.S. nonprofit organization devoted to independent 
research and policy solutions. Brookings's mission is to conduct high 
quality, independent research and provide innovative, practical 
recommendations based on that research for policymakers and the public. 
My testimony represents solely my personal views and does not reflect 
the views of Brookings, its other scholars, employees, officers, and/or 
trustees.
    The Islamic Republic of Iran presents a serious and abiding threat 
to American national security through its decades long bid to achieve 
nuclear weapons capability, its extensive track record of terrorism, 
hostage taking, and violent subversion, its deepening involvement in 
Russia's barbaric and illegal war in Ukraine, and its brutality toward 
its own citizens. One of the most valuable tools in the Iranian arsenal 
is the network of militias that its leadership has cultivated, 
coordinated, trained, and supplied with advanced weaponry. The network 
extends across the broader Middle East from Lebanon to Pakistan, and 
these proxies have proven integral to Tehran's security, longevity, and 
influence. They provide the Islamic Republic with strategic depth and 
wide regional influence and access while insulating Iran's leadership 
from the full risk of their actions.
    Since the shocking massacres perpetrated by Hamas in Israel on 
October 7, hostile actions by Iran's proxy militias have dramatically 
escalated in ways that pose a complex challenge for Washington and the 
world. Already, militia attacks have resulted in at least 186 injuries 
or deaths to American troops serving in the Middle East, including 130 
who have suffered traumatic brain injuries and the tragic loss of three 
U.S. service members in Jordan, as well as two U.S. Navy SEALs killed 
in a mission to interdict illicit Iranian weapons. \1\ And the Iran 
backed Houthi movement in Yemen has launched at least 57 attacks on 
commercial shipping in the Red Sea, prompting the re-routing of 
maritime freight traffic with significant delays and additional cost.
    The persistence of deadly militia violence augurs even greater 
risks. A miscalculation by any of the actors involved could ignite a 
much wider and more intense conflict across the Middle East, with 
profound damage to regional stability and the global economy. And over 
the long term, the empowerment of these non-state armed actors 
contributes to the erosion of governance and security across the region 
to the advantage of Iran and other bad actors.
    Over the past four and a half months, the Biden administration has 
been resolute and pragmatic in managing the threats posed by Tehran and 
its self-described ``axis of resistance'' in the wake of Israel's war 
in Gaza. The rapid deployment of American military assets to the 
region, together with tireless diplomatic engagement by President Joe 
Biden and a host of senior U.S. officials, have thus far succeeded in 
averting the wider war that Hamas had hoped to precipitate. And a 
series of U.S. retaliatory strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen since 
October have degraded militia capabilities and leadership and signaled 
to Tehran's partners that they will pay a steep price for continued 
aggression against Americans. Still, the post-October 7 strategic 
landscape demands more from both the United States and its allies and 
partners in the Middle East and beyond.
                iran's proxy network in the middle east
    One of the most important elements of Iran's regional and 
international power projection is its deployment of proxy militias. 
Over decades, and with only limited effective pushback from regional 
states or the international community, Tehran has assembled an 
adaptive, layered network of regional militias with discrete 
organizational structures and leadership and overlapping interests and 
ties to Iran's security and religious establishments. This proxy 
infrastructure has enabled the Islamic Republic to wield significant 
sway and sow instability across the broader Middle East and beyond, 
while preserving plausible deniability. Although these relationships 
are often highly opportunistic, that does not invalidate their utility 
for either side of the equation; in many respects, it reflects shared 
preferences for autonomy and self-interest. And the evolutionary nature 
of Iranian investments in its clients has worked to its advantage, 
enabling Iran's security establishment to build partnerships of 
enduring strategic value.
    Over four decades, militant proxy groups have become a core 
component of the Islamic Republic's regional and international 
strategy, which relies on asymmetric warfare to gain leverage against 
more powerful adversaries, including and especially the United States. 
In seeking to entrench its own influence at the expense of its 
adversaries, Iran's power projection via proxies is purposeful rather 
than wanton, conscious of the balance of costs and benefits, determined 
to exploit openings or weakness, inventive in its implementation, and 
wide ranging in scope. Iran's access has been boosted by the 
elimination of its historic competitors among the radical camp in the 
Middle East. As deep pocketed dictators with Saddam Hussein and Moammar 
Gaddafi were eliminated from the scene, the Islamic Republic has become 
one of the only games in town.
    Tehran's operational governance of its proxies has proven versatile 
and dynamic, utilizing umbrella groups and joint operation rooms to 
coalesce and direct diverse factions, while at other times fragmenting 
existing groups as a means of maintaining its sway. \2\ While Iran's 
provision of funding as well as materiel support has long been a 
central dimension of sustaining its relationships with individual 
militias, increasingly, Tehran is equipped to transfer not just 
weaponry, but the means of production and modification to enable 
independent manufacturing as well. Any risks of obsolescence seem to be 
outweighed by the opportunity to build redundancy of supply, seed 
innovation, and enhance deniability. \3\
    A brief review of Iran's ``shadow army'' will focus on its most 
prominent and effective components--Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestine 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the panoply of Iraqi Shia militias, and the 
Houthis in Yemen. These groups have emerged as the most powerful nodes 
of Iran's militia network, but they represent only a small minority of 
the multitude of groups across the world that Tehran has patronized 
over the past 45 years.
    Iran's proxy network emerged organically from the transnational 
operational and ideational networks that facilitated the 1979 
revolution. From the inception of the Islamic Republic, its leadership 
has harbored expansive ambitions. The ideology that shaped Iran's post-
revolutionary state was explicitly universalist, and its first leader, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, maintained that exporting the revolution 
was necessary for its survival, arguing that ``(i)f we remain in an 
enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat.'' \4\ Determined 
to spark a wider wave of upheavals, its leaders developed an 
infrastructure dedicated to toppling the status quo across the Muslim 
world through proxy groups, Islamist propaganda, and instrumental use 
of extraterritorial violence. To extend the regime's vision of an 
Islamic order, Tehran sought to subvert its neighbors through attempted 
coups, assassinations, and bombings.
    Despite wide ranging efforts, the anticipated revolutionary wave 
failed to materialize. Still, the Islamic Republic's early investments 
yielded one enduring asset--the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah. Iran's 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) played a foundational role in 
forging the organization after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
building on communal and clerical ties between the two states, as well 
as collaboration among militants during the 1970s. Hezbollah's long and 
bloody track record includes a devastating series of suicide bombings 
in 1983 and 1984 that targeted American and French government 
facilities in Lebanon, as well as kidnappings, hijackings, as well as 
actions further afield, such as the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural 
center in Argentina and the 2012 suicide bombing that killed 5 Israeli 
tourists in Bulgaria. It has fought and survived multiple wars with 
Israel, maintains tens of thousands of active fighters, and with 
Tehran's help has amassed a massive arsenal estimated to include 
150,000 rockets and missiles, mostly short range and unguided, as well 
as drones, precision missiles, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-ship 
missiles. \5\
    Through its political wing, Hezbollah has insinuated itself firmly 
in the fraught Lebanese government, with members serving in parliament 
and in the cabinet. This political role has not tempered the group's 
reliance on coercion; several Hezbollah members have been convicted in 
the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
    Today, Hezbollah is the jewel in the crown of the Iranian proxy 
network; as Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, who heads Israeli military 
intelligence, has noted, ``for a while now Hezbollah has not been a 
proxy of Iran; it is an inseparable part of the decisionmaking process 
in Tehran . . . It is no longer a discussion of whether Hezbollah is 
the defender of Lebanon, the defender of the Shiites, or the defender 
of Iran and just one part of the axis. It is the axis.'' \6\ [Emphasis 
added.] Its ideological affinity with Tehran is unique, its commitment 
to ``resistance'' unyielding, and it proved central to the Islamic 
Republic's existential struggle to sustain Bashar Assad's regime after 
the eruption of the Syrian civil war. That conflict elevated Hezbollah 
to first among equals, working closely with the IRGC to provide 
training and coordination among a wider transnational network of Shia 
militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.
    Tehran's deep involvement in Lebanon also provided the springboard 
for its patronage of various Palestinian groups, which also built on 
extensive pre-revolutionary interactions. The Palestinian issue has 
always loomed large for the Islamic Republic's leadership, but 
historically, their inroads with Palestinian groups have been limited 
by sectarian and doctrinal differences, as well as by Yasser Arafat's 
embrace of Tehran's mortal enemy, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. One key 
exception to that estrangement was Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a 
small Sunni group that fused Muslim Brotherhood doctrine with an 
affinity for the Iranian revolution. Embraced by the IRGC, Islamic 
Jihad's commitment to militancy made it a valuable partner for Tehran 
in its efforts to sabotage U.S. led efforts to advance peace between 
Israelis and Palestinians.
    In its outreach to the Palestinians, Tehran has consistently sought 
to court Hamas, which emerged in the 1980s as the most influential 
opponent of Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. With strong roots in the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hamas leaders traditionally kept Tehran at 
greater distance than PIJ, although they too were receptive to Iranian 
funding and arms supplies. But the relationship shifted in the mid-
2000s, with the assassination of the group's founder, the fallout from 
the war in Lebanon, and the Hamas victory in Palestinian parliamentary 
elections and subsequent seizure of control in Gaza. Munitions, 
training, and suitcases full of cash began flowing from Tehran to 
Hamas.
    A few years later, as Iran mobilized Shia groups from across the 
region to fight on behalf of Bashar Assad, its relations with both 
Hamas and PIJ would once again become strained. But the frictions were 
soon repaired and by 2018, Hamas leader Yahyah Sinwar lauded Hamas's 
``strong, powerful and warm'' ties with Iran and boasted that ``we have 
excellent relations with our brothers in Hezbollah . . . We work 
together and coordinate and are in touch on an almost daily basis.'' 
\7\ In particular, Iranian backing facilitated the very capabilities 
that enabled the October 7 attacks, as well as Hamas's stockpile of 
thousands of rockets utilized on that terrible day and persisting 
still. In turn, both PIJ and Hamas have enabled the proliferation of 
violent resistance among Palestinians, nurturing smaller affiliated 
cells of violent rejectionists.
    A key factor in the convergence over the past 15 years among a 
diverse array of Iraqi Shia militias under Iranian coordination was the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which eliminated its longtime Baathist 
government and unleashed waves of violent insurgency that mobilized 
both Shia and Sunni extremists. Tehran was well situated for this 
transition; since Baghdad's 1980 invasion of the fledging revolutionary 
state, Iranian leaders had cultivated Iraqi Shia opponents of Saddam 
through the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and its 
military wing, the Badr Corps.
    The underlying pragmatism of Iran's leadership worked to its 
advantage, as its initial allies cooperated closely with Washington in 
the run up to and in the years after the invasion. Still, Iran's 
partners were steadily eclipsed as a political and military force in 
post-Saddam Iraq by an array of other paramilitaries. The militias 
initially flexed their muscles to provide security in the post-war 
vacuum; many quickly aligned with Iran to undermine U.S. dominance and 
eventually to contest Sunni extremists, including the Islamic State. 
Tehran developed powerful operational and financial relationships with 
a wide variety of Iraqi militias, which continue to have outsized 
influence on the political, economic, and security trajectory of the 
state.
    The most recent addition to Iran's militia lineup is Ansar Allah, 
more commonly known as the Houthi movement, in Yemen. The Houthis, a 
Zaydi Shia group, launched an insurgency against Yemen's government 
nearly 20 years ago, and have been fighting against internal and 
regional adversaries ever since. In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a 
military intervention, with cooperation from its regional partners in 
the Gulf as well as the United States. The operation failed to unify 
the country or restrain the Houthis, but precipitated a horrific 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as well as the deepening of Iranian 
support to the insurgents. Over subsequent years, it became clear that 
the Houthis had developed sophisticated capabilities to strike civilian 
infrastructure. Since the 2022 cease fire, hostilities remained at a 
low ebb, but a lasting political settlement proved elusive, and Iran 
continued to provide lethal support to the Houthis, including ballistic 
and cruise missiles, sea mines, UAVs, and unmanned marine vehicles.
        iran backed militias and u.s. responses since october 7
    For the Islamic Republic's leadership, the October 7 attacks and 
the war in Gaza provides an opportunity for to advance its long 
cherished goal of crippling its most formidable regional foe. Iran's 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has never wavered in his 
feverish antagonism toward the United States and Israel. He and those 
around him are profoundly convinced of American immorality, greed, and 
wickedness; they revile Israel and clamor for its destruction, as part 
of the ultimate triumph of the Islamic world over what they see as a 
declining West and illegitimate Israel.
    The attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military campaign 
in Gaza have served several important Iranian objectives--elevating 
Tehran's stature as a regional interlocutor and heavyweight; 
emboldening its proxy network; blocking nascent efforts to achieve 
formal normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have 
further isolated Iran; and weakening its adversaries, especially Israel 
which was left with little choice but to embark on a ferocious 
offensive that has resulted in immense civilian casualties in Gaza and 
inflicted damage on its international standing. And Tehran and its 
proxies sensed an opportunity to seize the initiative and test the 
spine of U.S. leaders in the face of an unanticipated crisis.
    The Iranian leadership has exulted in Israelis' terror and grief 
and exploited the immense suffering of Palestinian civilians trapped in 
Gaza in a bid to elevate the Islamic regime as a key regional power 
broker. In October 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman placed 
his first ever phone call to Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi, who later 
participated in a regional summit in Riyadh the following month. Other 
Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, 
have shuttled around the region and the world, posturing as a 
peacemaker and honest broker even as the regime maintains full throated 
support for Hamas and continues to stoke the flames of instability 
across the region.
    At the same time, Iran's network of proxies quickly and 
significantly ramped up hostile activity targeting Israel directly as 
well as U.S. presence in the region. Predictably, Hezbollah was the 
first to join the fight, with a barrage of rockets, missiles, and 
drones from across the border in Lebanon, aimed at Israeli military and 
civilian infrastructure. Over the course of subsequent weeks, Iraqi 
militias began targeting U.S. forces scattered across Iraq, Syria, and 
Jordan, with at least 170 missiles, rockets, and drone strikes. The 
third front emerged from Yemen, with initial attempts by the Houthis to 
strike Israel directly with ballistic and cruise missiles as well as 
drones. By late November 2023, the group had shifted its focus closer 
to home, mounting a series of sophisticated attacks against commercial 
shipping in the Red Sea that have forced more than 540 ships to reroute 
at considerable additional time and expense.
    The Biden administration has engaged in active defense, utilizing 
both military and diplomatic tools to contain or dissuade the extension 
of the conflict beyond Gaza. The earliest U.S. steps, including the 
dispatch of two battle carrier groups to the region and high level 
official engagement, signaled the strength of American resolve, and 
together with a steady tempo of Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, 
prevented the expansion of a full fledged conflict on Israel's northern 
front. The administration's intense efforts to secure an agreement that 
would enforce the terms of past United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and ensure the redeployment of Hezbollah north of the 
Litani River remain a critical aspect of averting further escalation 
and enabling some semblance of normal life to resume in northern 
Israel.
    To counter Iran backed militias, the U.S. has struck more than 100 
targets in Iraq and Syria associated with the Revolutionary Guard and 
its assets in those countries since late October. And to address the 
ongoing threats posed by the Houthis in the Red Sea, the Pentagon has 
stepped up efforts to intercept Iran's supplies of advanced weapons to 
the Houthis and launched two new initiatives aimed a blunting in the 
region--Operation Prosperity Guardian, \8\ a multinational security 
mission intended to protect safe transit through the Red Sea, and 
Operation Poseidon Archer, an operation led by U.S. Central Command to 
degrade the Houthis' strike capabilities. The administration has also 
resumed the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist Organization, and reportedly launched a cyberattack against 
Iranian ships that have helped facilitate the Houthi attacks.
                the path forward on iran and its proxies
    The Biden administration's use of force against Iran's proxies 
appears to be having a salutary effect on the crisis, with some early 
evidence that individual militias may have been weakened and that 
attacks emanating from Iraq have slowed and/or halted altogether. \9\ 
And more broadly, deterrence is working, at least in forestalling the 
eruption of a wider war. Still, the tenacity and adaptability of Iran's 
various militias is prodigious and time tested, and the weapons at 
their disposal are relatively plentiful and inexpensive, especially as 
compared to the costs entailed in shooting them down. So Washington 
must remain vigilant.
    But it is also clear that the use of force alone will not eliminate 
the threat posed by Tehran or its militia network, and overreach or 
overreliance on military instruments could undermine the ultimate 
objectives of U.S. policy in the region and elsewhere. Even a 
spectacular U.S. strike, such as the January 2020 assassination of Qods 
Force commander Qasem Soleimani along with a key Shia militia leader in 
Iraq, has had relatively limited long term impact on the strength, 
durability, or efficacy of Iran's ``axis of resistance.''
    For Tehran, the prospective advantages for its regional aggression 
are huge. Iran doesn't actually have to achieve anything; chaos and 
pressure on Israel and the United States will itself constitute a 
victory. By contrast, the stakes for American success are high. With 
their attacks, Iranian leaders seek to precipitate U.S. mistakes. 
Historically, its most valuable openings have come as a result of 
missteps by the United States and our regional partners, such as the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the 2018 withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
    Together with our regional partners, Washington must begin planning 
meticulously for the day after the war in Gaza. It will be critical to 
ensuring that civilian authorities that are independent of Hamas and 
other Iran backed militias are resourced to undertake the 
reconstruction effort effectively and quickly. In the aftermath of the 
2006 war in Lebanon, Iranian aid enabled Hezbollah to snatch victory 
from the jaws of defeat and outmaneuver the Lebanese government with 
almost instantaneous compensation and rebuilding programs. \10\ While 
U.S. led diplomatic efforts to coalesce leaders in the Gulf around 
post-war plans for Gaza's governance and reconstruction have been 
underway for some time, the obstacles to effective implementation 
remain staggeringly high.
    In addition, the United States must craft and execute a new 
strategy that addresses the totality of the challenges Iran poses to 
its neighbors and the world. The assumptions underlying Obama era 
diplomacy toward Tehran--a conviction that the Islamic Republic could 
be persuaded to accept pragmatic compromises that served its country's 
interests--are no longer credible. Today's Iranian leaders have 
assessed that the strategic landscape incentivizes a more aggressive 
posture and an embrace of the authoritarian alternatives to the West. 
In turn, they have reverted to the regime's foundational premise, a 
determination to upend the regional order by any means necessary. We 
can contest and contain the Islamic Republic's most dangerous policies, 
and in doing so create time and space for Iran's century old movement 
for representative democracy to gain strength.
    This can and should be a bipartisan effort. The past decade has 
witnessed an immensely problematic polarization of the debate around 
Iran policy, both here in Washington and around the country. I've had 
the privilege to work with Republican and Democratic administrations on 
Iran, and there is substantial alignment around the nature of the 
Iranian threat and the most effective tools for countering Tehran's 
malign policies among the American people and their representatives and 
leaders across both sides of the aisle. Unfortunately, it is also 
evident that the fierce disagreements in Washington have at times 
stymied opportunities to enhance our deterrence.
    We need not go it alone, and the U.S. military response in the Red 
Sea is a reminder that investments in coalition building require time 
and energy to germinate and mature. But the crisis in the Middle East 
has laid bare several hard truths. Like it or not, the United States 
remains an indispensable player in the Middle East, despite a dubious 
track record of limited success in the region over the past several 
decades. However, no other world power can surge military and 
diplomatic capacity to help manage a spiraling conflict to avoid the 
worst outcomes. And even if Americans are weary of the military, 
economic, and human toll of our commitment there, standing by our 
allies--even when that requires a careful balance of support and 
restraint--and preserving access to the energy that, at least for now, 
remains vital to the world economy requires that commitment and 
readiness. Several American Presidents have hoped to downsize our role 
in the Middle East on the cheap in order to focus on Russia's urgent 
threat and China's pacing challenge. Instead, Americans will have 
generate the fortitude to lead on both, while also endeavoring to 
extinguish a dangerous fire in the Middle East and construct the 
diplomatic pathway that can enable the region to navigate toward a more 
peaceful and prosperous future.
                               references
     \1\ Meghann Myers, ``Most casualties from recent attacks in Middle 
East are brain injuries,'' Military Times, February 13, 2024. https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/02/13/70-of-casualties-
from-recent-middle-east-attacks-are-brain-injuries/

     \2\ Phillip Smyth, ``The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and 
Managed a Palestinian `Axis of Resistance','' CTC Sentinel 16:11 
(December 2023), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-path-to-october-7-how-
iran-built-up-and-managed-a-palestinian-axis-of-resistance/

     \3\ ``Missile Multinational: Iran's New Approach to Missile 
Proliferation,'' International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 
2021, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-
library_content_migration/files/research-papers/irans-new-approach-to-
missile-proliferation.pdf

     \4\ R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in 
the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
p.24.

     \5\ David Daoud, ``Breaking down Hezbollah's rocket strategy: the 
Short-Range Threat,'' Long War Journal, February 26, 2024, https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/02/breaking-down-hezbollahs-
rocket-strategy-the-short-range-threat.php

     \6\ Ofer Shelah and Carmit Valensi, ``The Campaign Between Wars at 
A Crossroads: CBW, 2013-2023: What Lies Ahead?'' Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, November 1, 2023, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2023/11/Memo_227_ShelahValensi_ENG.pdf

     \7\ Sue Surkes, ``Hamas chief boasts of Tehran's support, close 
ties to Hezbollah,'' The Times of Israel, May 23, 2018, https://
www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-chief-boasts-of-tehrans-support-close-ties-
to-hezbollah/

     \8\ Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on 
Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea, Department of Defense, 
December 18, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/
Article/3621110/Statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-
on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

     \9\ Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, ``After 
U.S. Strikes, Iran's Proxies Scale Back Attacks on American Bases,'' 
New York Times, February 27, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/
world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html See also comments on the 
reduction in sophistication and lethality of Houthi attacks in the Red 
Sea, ``On-the-Record Press Gaggle by White House National Security 
Communications Advisor John Kirby,'' February 23, 2024, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/02/23/on-the-
record-press-gaggle-by-white-house-national-security-communications-
advisor-john-kirby-3/

     \10\ Aurelie Daher, Hezbollah: Mobilization and Power (London: 
Hurst, 2019), pp. 227-9.

    The Chairman. Thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Hook.

      STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRIAN H. HOOK, FORMER SPECIAL 
   REPRESENTATIVE FOR IRAN AND SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR TO THE 
  SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Hook. Chairman Cardin and Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify.
    I was last here in 2019, as Senator Cardin noted, and here 
we are 5 years later, and so this is a good opportunity to 
share some reflections on where we are.
    In 2019 I explained that our Iran strategy had three 
objectives, and that is to deny the regime the revenue it needs 
to fund its proxies. We did that through oil and banking 
sanctions principally.
    We defended our interests with the credible threat of 
defensive military force, but we also kept the lines open for 
diplomacy and engagement. To achieve that first objective of 
denying Iran the revenue it needs to fund its proxies, we 
vigorously enforced the oil sanctions, and we reduced Iran's 
oil exports by more than 80 percent.
    We did that while holding energy prices steady for American 
families. My office created an interagency team that tracked 
and countered Iran's oil sanctions evasion, and Secretary 
Pompeo and I tracked these numbers on a daily basis.
    The regime lost $30 billion per year as a result. President 
Rouhani said that our sanctions cost the regime over $200 
billion.
    Now, why does Iran's oil matter? Iran spends its oil 
revenue on proxies who then kill and terrorize American troops. 
As Iran's funds dried up during our Administration, so too did 
the money to its proxies.
    In 2019 Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly 
appealed for donations for the first time ever. Hezbollah 
officials told the Washington Post that their fighters are 
being furloughed, withdrawn from Syria, and having their pay 
cut.
    In 2019 Iran proposed a 28 percent cut to its defense 
budget--a 28 percent cut to its defense budget--because of our 
sanctions. During the Iran nuclear deal, Iran's defense budget 
achieved record highs.
    I believe that an Iran strategy without the goal of zero 
oil exports is not an effective strategy. The proxies that are 
the subject of this hearing all bank at the same address. It is 
in Tehran.
    That bank's deposits depend on oil revenue, and as the 
leader of Hezbollah said in 2016, as long as Iran has money, we 
have money.
    So to achieve our second objective of deterrence when 
American interests abroad were threatened by Iran and its 
proxies, and we did not make a distinction between Iran and its 
proxies, we responded with targeted force.
    President Trump, supported by a unanimous national security 
cabinet, took Iran's most dangerous terrorist off the 
battlefield, Qasem Soleimani, when he was plotting to kill 
Americans in the region.
    The regime understood very clearly that we would always 
take decisive action when we are faced with credible threats to 
American lives.
    Now, looking to the present I think this Administration has 
shown how quickly deterrence can be lost, and how rapidly 
diplomatic leverage can be lost, and how swiftly a region can 
slide from stability into chaos.
    Part of this is because the U.S. sanctions on oil are, 
largely, unenforced. Exports have increased--oil exports have 
increased by almost 80 percent.
    This has netted the regime, as Senator Risch mentioned, 
this has netted the regime as much as $90 billion in revenue. 
That is since February 2021.
    On top of this, some of the deals that the Biden 
administration has negotiated with Iran have unfrozen billions 
more with $6 billion in funds sitting in Qatari banks, and as 
much as $10 billion in accessible funds sitting in Oman.
    A recent poll shows that a plurality of the American people 
believe that President Biden has not been aggressive enough in 
his dealings with Iran.
    I believe that Iran knows that it can safely expand its 
axis of resistance because of the Biden administration's deep 
aversion to defensive military action.
    The Biden administration deescalates to deescalate. The 
Iranian regime thrives under this strategy. American troops do 
not. They have been attacked 165 times by Iranian proxies since 
October, and the United States has responded 11 times.
    This imbalance is untenable. Directly or indirectly through 
its proxies Iran has attacked the United States, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, and Iraq.
    In the Red Sea the Houthis are using Iranian missiles, 
rockets, and training and intelligence to bring international 
shipping to a grind. Our military response to 45 Houthi attacks 
has failed to achieve deterrence.
    The Iran policy of the United States over many 
administrations has a lot of facets. It should not be over 
simplified. I think people can be very dogmatic on this 
subject. A lot of slogans do not get us very far.
    I have tried to present a respectful critique of the Biden 
administration's approach to Iran. I think that we share a lot 
if not all of the same objectives, but I do not think the 
Administration has calibrated its means to achieve its ends, 
and I think members of this committee can help lead the way in 
regime accountability.
    There are several good bills before this committee to 
accomplish this. The bipartisan SHIP Act has more than 36 
bipartisan co-sponsors. This bill would target Iran's illicit 
oil trade with new sanctions on foreign ports and refineries.
    There was a companion bill that passed the House in 
November with 133 Democrats voting in favor. There is another 
measure, the End Iranian Terrorism Act, which was recently 
introduced by Senator Risch.
    I think it is a smart approach to target Iran's illegal oil 
smuggling to China. That is, Chinese imports make up the 
majority of Iran's illicit exports, a number that was as high 
as 1.5 million barrels per day. It will creep up to 2 million.
    I think on the subject of Iran both sides of the aisle 
agree on more than they disagree. Listening to Chairman Cardin 
and Ranking Member Risch, there is so much that we agree on, 
and I think that is the foundation of a very good and sound 
Iran policy.
    I think Republicans and Democrats are very clear eyed about 
the threats that we face, and I think Congress uniting to send 
a very clear message and helping the Biden administration match 
its means and ends is the right and responsible course of 
action on our foreign policy.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hook follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian H. Hook

    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the 
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify. I previously spoke 
before this committee in 2019 as the U.S. Special Representative for 
Iran, and I am honored by the opportunity today to share my reflections 
more than 5 years later.
    In 2019, I explained our Iran strategy had three objectives: Deny 
the regime revenue for its proxies through oil and banking sanctions, 
defend our interests with the credible threat of military force, and 
keep the lines open for diplomacy.
    To achieve our first objective, we vigorously enforced oil 
sanctions and reduced Iran's oil exports by more than 80 percent, while 
holding energy prices steady for American families. My office created 
an interagency team to counter Iran's sanctions evasion. Secretary 
Pompeo and I tracked oil sanctions metrics on a daily basis. The regime 
lost well over $30 billion per year as a result. President Rouhani said 
that our sanctions cost the regime $200 billion.
    Why does Iran's oil matter? Iran spends its oil revenue on its 
proxies who then kill and terrorize American troops. As Iran's funds 
dried up under our Administration, so too did the money to its proxies. 
One fighter in Syria complained to the New York Times, that ``the 
golden days are gone and will never return--Iran doesn't have enough 
money to give us,'' he said. In 2019, Iran proposed a 28 percent cut to 
its defense budget because of our sanctions.
    An Iran strategy without a goal of zero oil exports is 
fundamentally unserious. The proxies that are the subject of this 
hearing all bank at the same address: Tehran. That bank's deposits 
depend on oil revenue.
    To achieve our second objective of deterrence, when American 
interests abroad were threatened by Iran and its proxies, we responded 
with targeted force. President Trump, supported by his national 
security cabinet, took Iran's most dangerous terrorist off the 
battlefield, stopping Qassem Soleimani as he plotted to kill Americans 
in the region. The regime understood we would always take decisive 
action when faced with credible threats to American lives.
    Turning to the present, the Biden administration has shown how 
quickly deterrence can be lost, how rapidly diplomatic leverage can be 
squandered, and how swiftly a region can slide from stability into 
chaos.
    Today, U.S. sanctions on Iran's oil exports are largely unenforced. 
Exports have increased by more than 80 percent. This has netted the 
regime as much as $100 billion in revenue since February 2021. Lobsided 
deals negotiated by the Biden administration with Iran have unfrozen 
billions more, with $6 billion in funds now sitting in Qatari banks and 
as much as $10 billion in accessible funds in Oman.
    It is obvious to me and to a plurality of the American people that 
President Biden has not been aggressive enough in his dealings with 
Iran. Iran knows it can safely expand its axis of resistance because of 
the Biden administration's immense aversion to defensive military 
action. The Biden administration deescalates to deescalate. The Iranian 
regime thrives under this strategy. American troops do not. They have 
been attacked over 200 times by Iranian proxies during the Biden 
presidency.
    Directly or indirectly through its proxies, Iran has attacked the 
United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, 
and Iraq.
    In the Red Sea, the Houthis are using Iranian missiles, rockets, 
training, and intelligence to bring international shipping through the 
Bab-Al-Mandeb to a grind. Their latest adventure at our expense is 
cutting subsea cables. Our military response to 45 Houthi attacks has 
failed to achieve deterrence.
    The Biden administration's policy of diplomacy without pressure, of 
talks without the credible threat of military force is failing. We 
simply cannot lower the costs of Iran's violent extremism and expect to 
see less of it--we will only get more.
    Admittedly, Iran policy has many facets and should not be 
oversimplified. Dogma and tired slogans will not get us anywhere. I 
have endeavored to present a respectful critique of this 
Administration's approach to Iran. Members of this committee can help 
lead the way in restoring accountability to the Iranian regime.
    There are several good bills before this committee to accomplish 
this. The bipartisan SHIP Act, introduced by Senators Rubio and Hassan, 
has more than 36 bipartisan cosponsors. This bill would target Iran's 
illicit oil trade with a raft of new sanctions on foreign ports and 
refineries. A companion bill passed the House in November. 133 
Democrats joined 209 Republicans to pass the bill. America's Iran 
policy can truly be bipartisan.
    Another measure, the End Iranian Terrorism Act, was recently 
introduced by Senator Risch. It is a smart approach to target Iran's 
illegal oil smuggling to China, which today makes up the majority of 
Iran's illicit exports, a number that was as high as 1.5 million 
barrels per day in 2023.
    When it comes to Iran, both sides of the aisle agree on more than 
they disagree. Republicans and Democrats are clear eyed about the 
threats we and our allies face. Congress should unite to send a message 
to Tehran that its terrorism comes at a significant cost. This is the 
right and responsible course of action.
    I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you, and I 
look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you for your testimony.
    We will now have 5-minute rounds.
    Dr. Maloney, I want to start with your assessment as to 
what Iran's strategies are about in regards to its proxies and 
whether there has been a shift during the last 4 months on the 
Iranian strategies.
    We saw the loss of U.S. servicemen in regards to the proxy 
attacks. The U.S. responded and that response has resulted in a 
significant reduction in the militias' attacks against U.S. 
interests.
    My question to you is we see concerns with this tit for tat 
in the northern border of Israel with Hezbollah, but it has 
prevented the civilian populations from being able to live 
safely in that region on both sides of the border.
    How much control does Iran have over the activities of 
Hezbollah in regards to these attacks that are preventing the 
civilian populations from being able to live in that region?
    Yes, they have not invaded Israel but it is certainly 
disruptive to the civilian population. We know that the Houthis 
in the Red Sea are creating havoc with the commercial shipping.
    We have a international coalition that is--the targets are 
not Israel. The targets are international, and we have an 
international coalition that is responding to that. How much is 
Iran encouraging those types of activities, and has their 
strategy changed during the last 4 months?
    So I would like to get an understanding as to what Iran's 
game plan is here. We have been told they do not want to get 
into direct conflict, but they certainly are enabling a 
significant amount of challenges in the region that could 
escalate the conflict.
    Dr. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think you have characterized Iran's behavior and its 
motivations very accurately. Ultimately, what the Iranians are 
looking to do is to try to drive the United States out of the 
region. That has been their goal since 1979, and it has not 
wavered.
    But they adapt over time, they look for opportunities, and 
they often try to test the resolve of the American leadership, 
and so what we have seen since October 7 is the Iranians 
stepping up the tempo in hopes of creating more pressure from 
within the United States to pull American troops out of those 
places where they are currently stationed.
    They have also sought to try to further delegitimize Israel 
and to put additional pressure on Israel and to create doubt 
within the Israeli public.
    They watch very closely the domestic politics, and they are 
seeking to take advantage of that as well. I think they 
recognize that they are outmatched by the United States and by 
Israel and so that they are very hesitant to get into a direct 
conflict.
    But they will push the envelope because they presume that 
our willingness to push back is less than theirs, and our 
willingness to take risks is less than theirs.
    With respect to Hezbollah and the Houthis they have very 
longstanding and organic relationships. They are not puppets of 
Iran by any stretch of the imagination.
    They have a considerable amount of strategic autonomy, but 
they also have shared interests, and I think that there is 
nothing that Hezbollah nor the Houthis have done that is in any 
way opposed to what the Iranians would like them to be doing.
    It has been successful to date. I think in terms of how to 
secure the northern border of Israel the diplomacy that Amos 
Hochstein is engaged in is the best prospect that we have to 
try to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
    The Chairman. In regards to that, that is an area of 
immediate interest because he is trying to get Hezbollah to 
pull back and have a safe zone so that the civilian populations 
can return to the border areas.
    How much is Iran influencing those decisions by Hezbollah 
as to whether to respond to the actions to get them to move off 
the border, recognizing that Israel at any time could be taking 
kinetic action on their own?
    Dr. Maloney. Well, Iran has an interest in trying to 
preserve Hezbollah as a deterrent against any future Israeli 
action against Iran's nuclear program, and so I think that is 
why Hezbollah has been both reluctant to get too far into the 
fight as well as at least somewhat open to diplomacy under the 
current circumstances.
    Pulling Hezbollah back from the border has been a 
requirement since the 2006 war. They have not respected it. The 
international community has not enforced it, and if we are able 
to do so through diplomacy then we have a better prospect of 
ensuring that Israel does not face the same level of 
devastating attacks from the north.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, first of all, let me say yours and Secretary 
Pompeo's efforts against Iran are legendary, and of course, 
thus you are suffering the consequences of it today with 
threats against you and your family.
    It is hard for me to sit here and believe that a country 
all the way around the world and the nature Iran is that they 
can actually deliver threats to you and your family here in the 
United States, which is just a despicable act. So thank you for 
your service, and thank you for what you have done.
    Let me ask, as you pointed out things have changed 
dramatically in the last 3 years, and with all of the money 
that is flowing into Iran now, are you surprised at all that 
they are firing up the proxies to do the kinds of things that 
they are doing?
    Mr. Hook. I had hoped in light of the hand that the Biden 
administration inherited that there would be sort of a greater 
continuity of peace. In the last 4 months of the Administration 
we negotiated--in the last 5 months we negotiated four peace 
deals between Israel and Arab nations.
    I think that we had put Iran in a very defensive position, 
and we were a very good friend to our partners, and we were 
very tough on the Iranian regime.
    I think that is a winning formula for the region, and I 
think that the United States over the last 20 something years 
has struggled to find the right calibration, the right--get the 
pendulum somewhere in the right place, and I think this 
Administration inherited a pretty good hand.
    I think they put all of their focus on getting back into 
the Iran nuclear deal, and as a consequence of that they wanted 
to create, I think, positive negotiating atmospherics for that, 
and that meant relaxing all of the oil sanctions that we had so 
vigorously enforced.
    And I think it also meant looking the other way on a lot of 
Iranian aggression. In light of the understandable objective to 
deal with the nuclear problem, that is number one. That is the 
biggest problem that we face.
    Proxies are secondary. I think my view on the Iranian 
regime is that you are more likely to get the deal you want 
with crippling sanctions, and that if you create this sort of 
positive environment Iran is going to play cat and mouse with 
you for as long as you will let them.
    And then I think at some point the Administration sort of 
figured out that they were not going to be able to get back 
into the Iran deal. There has been some increase in sanctions.
    I think the Administration should have announced that talks 
are dead. By always leaving that door open I think it prevents 
them from doing the necessary things on oil and banking 
sanctions that would dry up the revenue for Iran and its 
proxies.
    Hamas receives 93 percent of its finances from Iran. 
Hezbollah receives 70 percent. Iran is--the first check that 
Hamas was written was in 1992 when Yasser Arafat said that the 
Iranian regime gave them $30 million. In a very short time that 
number went up to $100 million, then to $300 million.
    And they have trained thousands of fighters. The IRGC has 
done that. Money is the sinews of war. Iran understands that. 
If you do not go after the money, it is just not a serious 
strategy.
    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. Has anybody from 
the current Administration consulted with you after you left, 
your thoughts as to how we might achieve what I think is the 
goal, as you noted, of everybody on this committee and should 
be everybody in this Administration and the last 
Administration?
    Has anybody talked to you about how they could ratchet up 
their efforts to match what you guys were doing in the last 
Administration?
    Mr. Hook. There was one meeting I had that was suggested by 
a friend, and I do not want to say who that was but it was a 
senior person in the Administration, and we got together and 
had dinner and talked about it. So there was one occasion.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    My time is almost up.
    But Ms. Maloney, I wanted to touch bases with you on 
something. On your website there is a quote from you saying 
that we have a rare opportunity with Iran and that is an 
Iranian consensus on the benefits of engagement with the U.S.
    My feeling is your thoughts have evolved on this to maybe a 
little different position than what is stated there, but it 
does not indicate when you had those thoughts. Has your 
thinking evolved on this?
    Dr. Maloney. Yes. I think that there was a period in time 
in which negotiations with Iran proved that they could be 
fruitful in terms of getting concessions on real security risks 
that we have with respect to the regime.
    I think that time is now firmly over. The current 
leadership within Iran has no interest in making concessions to 
the United States.
    Much of that has to do with the changes in the 
international environment since that time, their very close 
relationship with Russia, and the increasing reliance on China 
as an economic partner.
    Those were not the conditions that were in place at the 
time of the negotiation of the 2015 nuclear deal. At that time 
we had consensus from both the Russians and the Chinese as well 
as the wider international community on the need to apply 
pressure to Iran in order to achieve these concessions.
    We no longer have that international consensus. It is a 
much harder row to hoe.
    Senator Risch. So are you now in agreement with those of us 
who believe that we need to turn the screw really, really tight 
if we are going to get something done?
    Dr. Maloney. I believe that pressure will achieve results 
with respect to Iran. I think that it is more difficult because 
it does invoke other interests.
    We should be working with the Chinese to try to persuade 
them that it is not in their interest to see a wider conflict 
in the Middle East, and that Iran is a bad actor and not a 
useful partner.
    But we have many other interests with respect to the 
Chinese, and I understand why the Biden administration was 
reluctant to try to go after Chinese firms as aggressively as 
it should have in order to try to achieve those results.
    I think, again, in the situation that we are in today it 
makes very good sense to try to continue to reduce Iran's oil 
exports and its revenues.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    My time is up.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator----
    Senator Risch. Before we do that, I would ask unanimous 
consent to--we have a letter from a group, United Against a 
Nuclear Iran, which I think is pretty instructive. I would like 
to include that.
    The Chairman. Without objection, that will be included in 
the record.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Would it be fair to say that without Iran's financing, 
without its missile supplies, without its strategic support, 
that Iran's proxies either would not exist, at least not as 
they are today, or would not have the reach and ability that 
they have today?
    Mr. Hook. Who would you like----
    Senator Menendez. Both of you, actually.
    Mr. Hook. Suzanne.
    Dr. Maloney. Absolutely yes.
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. OK. So then if that is the case and 
reading from Dr. Maloney's written testimony where she says the 
assumptions underlying Obama era diplomacy toward Tehran, a 
conviction that the Islamic Republic could be persuaded to 
accept pragmatic compromises that served its country's 
interests, are no longer credible.
    And if that is the case, and I believe I agree with your 
assessment, then the question of the financing, which has been 
a big part of Mr. Hook's testimony, I think is incredibly 
important.
    The reality is that if Iran is dramatically curtailed in 
its flow of revenue, it has domestic consequences in terms of 
those who wish to see a change in their own country, and we 
have seen elements of that which had been snuffed out and which 
the world has largely not embraced to try to create such 
peaceful change, and at the same time it fuels its missile 
technology with the end of U.N. Security Council resolutions 
this past October and it provides the resources and the 
missiles to its proxies, and of course, of late providing drone 
technology to the Russians in the war in Ukraine as well as 
continues to fuel its nuclear program for which it has failed 
to meet to the IAEA safeguards and standards and inspection 
requirements.
    We know less today, at least through the IAEA, than we did 
before. So all of that brings to my mind, and taking the last 
point you made, Dr. Maloney, about China, I think the Chinese 
have shown that they are happy to see conflict in the world, 
because if they did not, they would do something differently in 
supporting Russia in Ukraine.
    Conflict for the Chinese, especially when the West is 
involved in that conflict, inures to their benefit, and I wish 
that they saw it as a global power to be part of an 
international order that would seek to avoid conflict.
    But I believe the Chinese--I believe Xi Jinping--has a 
different view. If that is the case is it not time to do two 
things, one, internationalize--get our allies who were 
resistant to joining us on a sanctions regime to now 
multilateralize those sanctions, and two, to ratchet up those 
sanctions dramatically in terms of enforcement including--
including--toward the Chinese? Because that is the biggest 
spigot by which Iran is receiving huge amounts of money.
    Mr. Hook.
    Mr. Hook. Senator, I fully agree with everything you said.
    Senator Menendez. You can stop there.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Menendez. I am just kidding. We have to have a 
little humor here at times. Go ahead. I am sorry.
    Mr. Hook. It would be good if we could multilateralize the 
sanctions. The problem is that if we go to New York to the U.N. 
Security Council, China and Russia will veto that.
    Senator Menendez. Without looking through U.N. because that 
is not going to fly.
    Mr. Hook. Right. So I think it has to be done bilaterally, 
and that is something that was a huge focus for me. When I was 
in office building a coalition of people, we were able to get a 
number of countries to designate Hezbollah as a foreign 
terrorist organization.
    We worked with Treasury under Secretary Mnuchin. We worked 
a lot with the Financial Action Task Force in Paris and FATF-
imposed sanctions on Iran. We worked with SWIFT. SWIFT de-
SWIFTed 33 Iranian banks.
    Mahan Air and Iranian Air, they fly all over the world. We 
worked with airports and governments to stop Iranian planes 
from landing in other countries.
    Senator Menendez. Those are all examples of how you 
ultimately bite off the flow of money.
    Mr. Hook. I think so. But it has got to be----
    Senator Menendez. I would like to get in my last few 
seconds Dr. Maloney's view on this.
    Dr. Maloney. I think there is far more that we could be 
doing to enforce our existing sanctions, especially with 
respect to the oil that flows to China. That is the lifeblood 
for the Iranian regime, and it has been what has enabled Iran 
to have the resources to provide to its proxies around the 
region.
    Senator Menendez. And finally, Mr. Chairman, with the 
expiration of Security Council Resolution 2231 this past 
October, new restrictions on Iran's ballistic missiles and 
drones have to be implemented, which is why I introduced the 
MISSILES Act, and I hope that as the chairman and the ranking 
member work toward, develop a mutual Iran legislation that the 
chair will consider that.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Cardin.
    Mr. Hook, I would like to start with you, and first, I 
would like to echo the sentiment that was reflected by Ranking 
Member Risch.
    Your service as special envoy was exceptional, and I think 
a mark of that, unfortunately, is the fact that you have 
extraordinary threats against your life and your family's life 
right now.
    In fact, I just received reports from the State Department 
that there remains serious and credible threats against Mr. 
Hook and his family.
    I regret you have to live through this, but I would take it 
as a badge of honor in terms of the effectiveness of the role 
that you played.
    And I want to talk about the role that you played, and the 
role that was played in the Trump administration because we 
took a very different approach than what has been undertaken 
today.
    We moved our embassy to Jerusalem. No war. We acknowledged 
Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. No war. We withdrew 
from the JCPOA. No war. We entered the Abraham Accords. No war.
    In fact, what happened? Iran felt the pressure. We kept 
their enrichment below 4 percent. We took the pallets of cash 
delivered by the Obama administration and Jack Lew himself--we 
took those pallets of cash to a reserve level below $8 billion.
    Hamas and Hezbollah were widely reported as broke. You 
mentioned the connection there. Somehow the strategy changed. 
Three years into this new strategy, where are we? Iran is 
enriching now greater than 60 percent. Sudan falling into civil 
war. Israel, on October 7, saw the greatest loss of Jewish 
lives since the Holocaust.
    The Houthis have taken control over shipping in the Red 
Sea, driving up inflation here, endangering lives around the 
world, disrupting supply chains. And we have a situation right 
now where Iran backed terrorists in Iraq and Syria are 
attacking U.S. personnel, and they killed three U.S. heroes.
    So, Mr. Hook, I would like to ask you what has changed? 
What has changed in these 3 years?
    Mr. Hook. I think what has changed is a return to the sort 
of the Obama administration focus on the Iran nuclear deal at 
the expense of regional stability, and I understand the premise 
that you need to focus on the biggest threat which is the 
nuclear piece.
    But you cannot relax your vigilance and your deterrence 
against this regime, and you are more likely to get the deal 
you want if you take a very strong approach as we did around 
financial sanctions, credible threat of military force, 
diplomatic isolation.
    And earlier when Senator Menendez asked about alliance 
building, Senator, when you were our Ambassador to Japan we 
worked closely--you worked closely with Prime Minister Abe to--
Japan has a 60 year relationship history with Iran.
    Senator Hagerty. They were tough discussions, I will tell 
you.
    Mr. Hook. And while Prime Minister Abe was in Iran, they 
blew up Iranian oil tankers, and I think that was a wakeup call 
for the regime--I mean, for the Japanese.
    They then started to get on their front foot and impose 
sanctions, and so I think it is vital to do alliance building 
in this regard. An Iranian regime with a nuclear weapon 
dominating the Middle East is in the interest of almost no 
country in the world.
    Senator Hagerty. I cannot agree with you more. I can tell 
you the conversations with Prime Minister Abe were quite 
difficult. He talked about the length--the decades long 
relationship.
    But it was a simple question. You can do business with the 
United States, or you can do business with Iran, but you cannot 
do business with both.
    And as tough as it was, we got to the right solution, and 
we did isolate Iran, and we brought their revenues down--their 
cash reserves down to below $8 billion. We brought their 
production down to below 300,000 barrels a day.
    And now with another person taking the job, a guy named Rob 
Malley who is now under Federal investigation, stopped 
enforcing the sanctions wholeheartedly. What we see now is an 
Iranian regime with over $100 billion that have flowed back in.
    You mentioned Rouhani talking about the $200 billion impact 
that we had with our sanctions. They have gotten more than half 
of that back with Malley forcing the Administration to look the 
other way.
    It is a disgrace. We have seen the results in the Middle 
East. We have got to bring Iran back under maximum pressure. I 
agree with what Senator Menendez said, too. We need to get our 
allies on board with this.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you to our witnesses today.
    I have just returned from Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, and 
Israel, where I spent the last week in a variety of meetings. 
Senator Blumenthal joined me in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan.
    I am very concerned about the increasing malign influence 
of Iran throughout the region. I think this has been a steadily 
growing challenge for decades, and more recently the attacks by 
Iranian proxies throughout the region, again, the Houthis in 
the Red Sea, Hezbollah into the north of Israel, obviously, the 
brutal terrorist attack by Hamas and the attacks by militias in 
Iraq. There have been no more attacks in the last 3 weeks since 
we took a fairly aggressive and forceful set of strikes against 
Iranian interests in Iraq and Syria.
    But I am concerned by the meetings that I had throughout 
the region with partners and allies, almost all of whom 
uniformly said, even those who are gravely concerned, alarmed 
about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, still did not want the 
United States to leave the region.
    So we are at a key point in Lebanon. As referenced by the 
chairman, there is some possibility for a resolution to the 
Hezbollah challenge in the south of Lebanon. In Iraq there is 
active negotiations in the higher military commission about the 
future of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
    Even in Oman, the Switzerland of the Middle East, there is 
boycotts of American businesses and products and protests in 
the streets.
    If you would both, please, talk to what you think should be 
our path forward in Iraq. We have been there since 2014 as the 
leader in many ways of Operation Inherent Resolve, the counter 
ISIS mission.
    There is an active debate following our forceful strikes 
about our future in Iraq, and I would be interested in your 
thinking on that and how we can most effectively contain Iran 
in Iraq.
    And I would be interested in how you view the prospects for 
a better future in Jordan and in Lebanon if we continue to 
support Israel in its campaign in Gaza, and if there is no 
change in the current trajectory of the prime minister's 
strategy with regards to Rafah.
    Please, Dr. Maloney first, and then if you would, Mr. Hook.
    Dr. Maloney. I think it is very important that we maintain 
our presence in Iraq. Obviously, it has come under significant 
pressure and we have to work closely with the government and 
ensure that we are not taking steps that in any way undermine 
the stability of either the government or the overall social 
and political environment in Iraq.
    But we have important interests there in preventing the 
resurgence of ISIS and in ensuring that we are able to protect 
both our broader interests across the Middle East by having 
small force presence in a variety of countries.
    So I think it is quite important that we do stay, but that 
we do it in cooperation with Prime Minister Sudani and with the 
government there.
    In terms of how we look to the future in the region I think 
that the Biden administration has, in fact, invested an 
enormous amount of effort in taking forward the Abraham Accords 
which the prior Administration actually produced and really 
bringing them to the fruition of seeing a Saudi-Israeli 
normalization.
    That would be an absolute game changer for the region. It 
would be fundamentally transformative for the politics, for the 
economy, and for the security scenario. And I think it is a 
critical piece of the puzzle of moving beyond this terrible 
conflict that is currently underway in Gaza.
    There can be no future unless there is a political and 
economic horizon for the Palestinian and the Israeli people, 
one that is based--grounded in real security and opportunity 
and the only way to achieve that is through this kind of a 
breakthrough moment.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Dr. Maloney.
    Mr. Hook.
    Mr. Hook. I think on the subject of Iraq I mentioned in my 
testimony the number of attacks since October, but I think you 
also note, Senator, during this Administration there have been 
over 250 attacks in Iraq and Syria against American troops, and 
since October we have responded 11 times.
    I think the attacks that we have done are necessary but 
insufficient. This is defensive military action.
    Senator Coons. How would you account for the lack of any 
attacks in the last 3 weeks?
    Mr. Hook. It is a positive development, but I just think 
that there is----
    Senator Coons. What do you think caused that?
    Mr. Hook. Well, certainly, our attacks, but I think that if 
we had established deterrence sooner, three Americans who were 
killed in Jordan may be alive today.
    Senator Coons. Having been briefed on the underlying facts 
of the Tower 22 attack I will simply say it is a little more 
complicated.
    But I am very concerned about the vulnerability of our 
forces in Iraq and Syria, and I will more broadly agree that I 
think we have to restore a deterrence against Iran.
    Iran is one of the leading human rights violators in the 
world. The people of Iran deserve a positive path forward, and 
to Dr. Maloney's point, in conclusion, I could not agree more 
that if we can find a path toward Israeli-Saudi reconciliation, 
recognition, that is the most important strategic advance 
building on the Abraham Accords that we could make.
    But the Saudi--the Crown Prince is very clear, there has to 
be an end to fighting in Gaza and there has to be a path toward 
Palestinian self-determination. I only hope that the Israeli 
government can recognize the historic moment that we are at.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
the witnesses for your testimony. It has been most instructive, 
and I want to join my words with those of others with regards 
to the threats against Mr. Hook and against others in the prior 
Administration as a result of taking a brave action to protect 
American lives by taking out General Soleimani.
    It is outrageous, in my view, that the fatwa continues to 
be heralded by Iran, and how we can have anything other than a 
most hostile relationship with Iran when that continues is 
beyond me.
    I find it unfortunate that we do not have a member of the 
Administration here. I would like to understand the logic for 
their current position, how it may have changed, what their 
views are for going forward.
    It is helpful to hear from experts such as yourselves but 
you raise questions that really need to be responded to by the 
current Administration.
    I do understand--Mr. Hook, you made the point that given 
the Administration's interest in getting a renewed discussion 
on the JCPOA that they want to create a friendly environment, 
and therefore, soften the oil sanctions to create that 
environment.
    But surely at this point, given what is going on in the 
Middle East and the attacks by these various proxy groups, the 
Administration is no longer trying to have a friendly 
environment with Iran.
    But what do you imagine accounts for the fact that we have 
not dramatically tightened our oil sanctions? I do not 
understand what the logic could be for not engaging now in 
crippling sanctions against Iran and their oil revenue.
    And I will ask you, Ms. Maloney, first and then--Dr. 
Maloney, rather--and then Mr. Hook.
    Dr. Maloney.
    Dr. Maloney. We do have in place ostensibly crippling 
sanctions on Iran's oil exports, and as Mr. Hook noted at the 
outset, they were respected by the international community 
because of the recognition that it would complicate doing 
business in the United States.
    So it is the power of the reach of the U.S. dollar. Over 
time the Chinese began to test that resolve, to test those 
opportunities. They also worked with the Iranians in a very 
sophisticated set of smuggling and evasion tactics.
    The Chinese have companies that are not banked--in any way 
connected to the U.S. financial system, and so they are less 
vulnerable to American financial pressure, and over time this 
has created a vast network that has enabled Iran to export 
illicitly in violation of current U.S. sanctions without a very 
easy way for us to impose severe costs on the companies that 
are in fact importing.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Hook.
    Mr. Hook. I had this sort of conversation with countries 
around the world and is what Senator Hagerty mentioned earlier.
    I said that you can either do business with Iran and buy 
their oil and buy their metals and buy their petrochem, or you 
can do business with the United States. And any country faced 
with that choice, it will be the easiest decision they have 
ever made.
    They are going to side with the United States. That is the 
economic leverage we have that Dr. Maloney mentioned.
    I think the Biden administration hesitated to enforce the 
oil sanctions at a level that they should be until like the 
summer of 2022 when it became clear that the Iranians were 
toying with our negotiators.
    I think since then, the Biden administration has done some 
sanctions against WMD proliferators and human rights violators 
but they have not done it against oil.
    They have shown an interest in energy sanctions in the 
context of Russia, but they need that sort of level of sort of 
vigor and enforcement in Iran, and that is going to--I mean, 
look, Iran represents about 3 percent of the world's oil 
supply, and they--maximum around 2.5 million barrels.
    We took them down to 300,000 barrels of oil in about 12 
months. Now, China, China is most of it. You have to drive up 
the costs in the bilateral relationship with China to get that 
number lower.
    That will impose an economic crisis on Iran, and it causes 
them to start changing their thinking around their proxies and 
their nuclear program.
    Senator Romney. You make the point that China is the major 
provider of the funds in purchasing the oil from Iran. Cutting 
off a relationship with China, and saying to China, hey, it is 
either Iran or us is that what you are proposing saying to 
China, we will shut you off?
    The challenge, of course, is that our economy depends on a 
lot of things coming from China. So this is--it is one thing to 
say that to Lebanon or other countries, but to say that to 
China is a very different matter.
    Mr. Hook. Well, Senator, I remember when I was in office. 
When we started our oil sanctions after we got out of the Iran 
nuclear deal--I will just mention when you are in the Iran 
nuclear deal you cannot touch the oil, and that is an enormous 
handicap.
    And so getting out of the Iran nuclear deal allowed us then 
to go after the oil revenue, which funds their proxies. And so 
when we were looking at China and its imports, we did sanction 
a lot of Chinese banks, but it was not enough, and I think that 
you can have--there are many aspects to our bilateral 
relationship with China.
    This has to be a big part of it. When we started our oil 
sanctions the price of Brent crude was 74. We lowered it to 72, 
even after taking off almost 3 percent of the world's oil 
supply.
    And I worked with oil ministers around the world to 
increase production to offset the loss of Iranian crude on the 
global energy markets.
    So you can zero out Iran's oil exports and still not have 
an energy shock if you work with other oil ministers to 
increase production.
    Senator Romney. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Let me just point out that we did have a 
classified briefing with the Administration on Iran not too 
long ago, and we also had the Secretary before the Senate on 
the Middle East--Secretary of State. So we have had 
opportunities to hear from the Administration. Admittedly, they 
were in classified settings.
    And let me also point out that there has been no sanctions 
removal since the Biden administration took office. In fact, 
there has been additional sanctions that have been imposed. 
There is an enforcement issue. There is no question about it.
    But I do not want to give the impression that there has 
been any sanction relief given to Iran during the Biden 
administration.
    With that, let me recognize Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. We also had two Administration witnesses 
before the subcommittee yesterday on this exact topic.
    Mr. Hook, I appreciate your service to the country. I 
believe you are a deep patriot. But frankly, I thought your 
opening remarks sounded a lot more like a campaign speech for 
Donald Trump's reelection than a sober analysis of the 
situation on the ground in the region.
    Charitably, they were an attempt to rehabilitate President 
Trump's Iran policy that was a complete, total failure by every 
available metric.
    I was not coming to this hearing to rehash our policy 
toward Iran from 2017 to 2020, but I think it is really 
important to set the record straight. Because if this committee 
or the American public gets the impression that what President 
Trump was doing was working and should be brought back as 
policy going into the future, we are in real trouble.
    Here are the facts. When Donald Trump came into office, 
Iran was over a year from being able to achieve a nuclear 
weapon. By the time President Trump left office, that breakout 
time had dropped to months.
    When President Trump came to office, proxies of Iran were 
strong. When he left office, they were just as strong if not 
stronger.
    This idea that Iran stopped sending money to Hezbollah 
during Trump's presidency is just wrong. Seven hundred million 
was the annual amount of support delivered to Iran in the 
middle of Trump's presidency. That is what was being delivered 
at the end of the presidency.
    [Editor's note.--We endeavor to publish accurately the 
spoken and written words of Senators and witnesses in each 
hearing published. The paragraph above reflects what Senator 
Murphy said. The Senator intended to say, ``Seven hundred 
million was the annual amount of support delivered from Iran in 
the middle of Trump's presidency.'']
    Senator Murphy. There were no attacks on U.S. forces in 
Iraq when Donald Trump became President. From 2019 to 2020 
attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq increased by 400 percent. It got 
so bad that Secretary Pompeo started to close down the embassy 
in Baghdad because it had become so dangerous.
    Attacks on U.S. forces raised to epidemic levels from the 
beginning of Trump's presidency to the end. The anti-Iran 
coalition was not strengthened. It was shattered.
    We had Russia and Iran on board with the JCPOA. By the end 
of the Trump presidency Europe was not supporting our Iran 
policy, they were undermining it.
    [Editor's note.--We endeavor to publish accurately the 
spoken and written words of Senators and witnesses in each 
hearing published. The paragraph above reflects what Senator 
Murphy said. The Senator intended to say, ``We had Russia and 
China on board with the JCPOA.'']
    Senator Murphy. President Trump's policy toward Iran was a 
disaster. They got closer to a nuclear weapon. Their proxies 
did not get any weaker. U.S. troops came under attack in a way 
that they were not prior to Trump's presidency. And our 
coalition that had been carefully built around the nuclear 
agreement but ready to be used to go after Iran's ballistic 
missile program or their support for proxies had vanished.
    And so, Mr. Hook, let me just ask you about these metrics, 
and I will give you a chance to respond and tell me why I am 
wrong.
    I mean, let me just give you four and just tell me why I am 
wrong about this. Iran was closer to a nuclear weapon at the 
end of Trump's presidency than at the beginning. Iran's proxies 
were at least just as strong if not stronger.
    Here is another stat. In 2016 there were five Houthi 
attacks against Saudi Arabia and UAE. By 2020 those attacks 
were averaging 25 a year.
    Third, Iran was threatening U.S. troops in the region by 
the end of Trump's presidency in a way that did not exist in 
2016, and fourth, the anti-Iran coalition was weaker, not 
stronger.
    Am I wrong about any of those things? I do not think I am.
    Mr. Hook. I would say--I can go through these four points. 
On the 1 year breakout when we left the deal Iran then did what 
it is allowed to do when the deal expires, and we pulled 
forward the expiration date of the Iran deal because Iran was 
getting stronger financially during the deal.
    They were expanding their missile proliferation during the 
deal. They were increasing their aggression during the deal, 
and I think Iran understood that under the Iran nuclear deal 
they had a green light to be expansive in the region as long as 
they complied with modest and temporary nonproliferation 
benefits.
    And so whether we did it in our Administration, or another 
Administration did it later, or we waited to expire Iran is 
going to start enriching at that level.
    And what I would say is what does it say about the Iran 
nuclear deal that it is able to achieve the purity that it did 
when we left the deal? I think the Obama administration went 
into the deal with the goal of no enrichment but they gave that 
away. And the right standard is no enrichment.
    Anytime we are talking about how close Iran is to nuclear 
breakout is the problem because as long as they are allowed to 
enrich we are going to have this discussion.
    UAE has a civil nuclear program. They do not enrich. That 
should be the standard. And unfortunately, as soon as you 
concede on enrichment, you are going to have other countries 
that are going to say, we would like the same deal you gave the 
Iranians; we would like to enrich.
    And so I think that is the problem.
    On the proxies being as strong, we never claimed that we 
solved the proxy problem. But there is no question--I would 
refer you to the New York Times and the Washington Post.
    These are articles that said Hezbollah is weaker because of 
our sanctions. The Washington Post ran it. There were fighters 
in Syria saying to the Washington Post the golden days are 
over. Iran does not have the money that it used to.
    Fighters were being furloughed. You had a massive--
Hezbollah had to undertake a fundraising drive for the first 
time in its history because Iran did not have the money that it 
used to.
    And so I think the historical record presents a different 
picture of much weaker proxies.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Iran's proxies are a threat to American national security, 
and yet the Biden administration's appeasement first foreign 
policy has emboldened Iran, not only emboldened them but 
enriched them as well.
    The world's leading sponsor of state terrorism has more 
money now in its coffers than it did before, and I think that 
is what you were talking about. I think the payments, for 
example, to Hezbollah have gone up from--or Hamas have gone up 
from $100 million to $350 million, and that is the point you 
were just making there, Mr. Hook, around the amount of money 
and why it is so important that we enforce these sanctions.
    I want to hit a topic, though, that we have not talked 
about, but Iran is a theocracy. Is that correct?
    Mr. Hook. Yes. Iran has been a theocratic regime since 
1979.
    Senator Ricketts. And so do you think it follows then that 
they do not necessarily share the same goals we would in, say, 
a republic like the United States where we elect our officials? 
This is an administration and regime that is based on religious 
philosophy. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, that is accurate.
    Senator Ricketts. And so they do not think like us?
    Mr. Hook. They do not think like us. They are a 
revolutionary expansive regime that is committed by its 
constitution to death to the United States, death to Israel, 
and overthrowing Sunni governments in the Middle East.
    Senator Ricketts. So is it naive to think there is any 
amount of money we can give Iran, and they are going to be nice 
to us?
    Mr. Hook. I do not think that money or talking nicely is 
going to get us anywhere with Iran.
    Senator Ricketts. Right.
    And I think, Dr. Maloney, you said their goal since 1979 
has been to kick us out of the Middle East. Is that correct?
    Dr. Maloney. Yes, it is.
    Senator Ricketts. Right. So we have a regime that wants us 
out of the Middle East, that thinks differently than we do. 
There is no amount of money that we can give them and they are 
going to play nice with us.
    So let us change topics here a little bit. In Gaza--since 
the war in Gaza began, Houthis have attacked--I think you 
referenced 45 attacks. The military has shot down 95 drones and 
missiles, and of course, we have also seen the attacks on U.S. 
forces in Iraq and Syria have tapered off recently, but 
certainly that had been a big increase.
    In January, President Biden when asked whether the strikes 
are working responded, ``When you say working, are they 
stopping the Houthis? No.'' That was his quote. And then he 
said, ``Are they going to continue? Yes.''
    If this is not emblematic of a failed exercise in 
deterrence and failed Iran policy, I do not know what is. It is 
also unsustainable. The defense munitions the U.S. is expending 
to interdict the Houthi attacks are costly, more so than the 
cheap drones the Houthis are using, and to make matters worse 
the Biden administration has overturned the Trump 
administration's designation of the Houthis as a foreign 
terrorist organization and recently made a specially designated 
terrorist organization.
    It is only partially reversing course to designate it SDTG, 
and let us not forget the Iran support that is going on with 
them.
    Mr. Hook, why did the Trump administration designate the 
Houthis as an FTO, and do you believe the Biden administration 
should relist them as such?
    Mr. Hook. We listed the Houthis as a foreign terrorist 
organization because they met the definition under almost every 
criteria according to the lawyers in the State Department.
    I thought it was a mistake for the Biden administration to 
delist them very early on. It was one of the--sort of the early 
policy decisions of the Administration.
    They have since done a redesignation of the Houthis. That 
is necessary. It is important to do. You need to do other 
things. I am very happy that we did, because they are a foreign 
terrorist organization.
    Senator Ricketts. So when it comes to deterring the 
Houthis, clearly, the strikes we have been doing have not been 
doing that. They continue to attack the shipping, as you point 
out, in the Red Sea.
    What can we do to deter or establish credible deterrence? 
Do we need to start targeting Houthi leaders? Do we need to 
start providing direct military support to the anti-Houthi 
faction in Yemen? What should we be doing?
    Mr. Hook. The Houthis are a tribal militia that are 
fighting at a level entirely beyond their natural capability. 
And Iran has organized, trained, and equipped the Houthis for 
many years now, I am not privy to the intelligence that would 
drive decisions like targeting in terms of assets or 
individuals that enable the Houthis to have shut down 
international shipping.
    The Houthis did not shut down international shipping when 
we were in office. We worked very closely with our partners to 
put the Houthis in a defensive position. It is not--it was not 
perfect but it is much better than what we have today.
    So I would strongly encourage the Biden administration to 
do the defensive military measures that will achieve 
deterrence. I do not think we are there yet.
    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
each of our witnesses for being here.
    Iran continues to stage proxy attacks on U.S. forces from 
Syria. It is also emerging as a new front in the Israel-Hamas 
war.
    So should we have a more comprehensive strategy to address 
the threats that are stemming from Syria and to look at the 
long term status of Syria and the continued opportunity that it 
presents for Iranian proxies to attack the U.S. from there?
    Dr. Maloney, I will ask you to go first, and then Mr. Hook.
    Dr. Maloney. We absolutely need a real Syria policy. We 
have not had one for about a decade now under several 
Administrations, and that is because it is a pretty hard issue 
to deal with.
    Senator Shaheen. So talk, if you would, about what that 
Syria policy ought to look like.
    Dr. Maloney. I think we have to be working much more 
closely with the region. There has been an effort by some of 
our partners in the region to try to normalize with Bashar 
Assad, essentially overlook a decade of just horrific abuse of 
his own people, and we have not really been able to manage that 
process.
    We have not really been able to shape a better alternative 
to that process. Our approach has been to kind of see no evil, 
hear no evil, and that has left us in a position where Bashar 
Assad has been able to commit unspeakable evil.
    Senator Shaheen. Never mind Iran and Russia there as well.
    Dr. Maloney. It has been a very useful staging ground for 
both the Iranians and the Russians, and it really provided the 
seeds of the strategic partnership between them that is now 
being played out in an even more horrific way on the 
Ukrainians.
    Senator Shaheen. I just came back with Senator Murphy from 
a visit to Turkey, and we had a chance to meet with President 
Erdogan and talked a little bit about the potential to work 
together in the future in Syria where, obviously, Turkey has 
interests as well.
    Mr. Hook, can you speak to what that kind of coordination 
might look like and whether you believe there is an opportunity 
to work more closely with Turkey on the future of Syria?
    Mr. Hook. All of our options in Syria are bad, and it is a 
matter of choosing between the best of worst options. I mean, 
we are so late into this.
    I think what is, unfortunately, missing, as Dr. Maloney 
said, it is unclear what the Syria strategy is. But the Syria 
strategy needs to nest within a larger Middle East strategy, 
and I wish President Biden coming into office had given a major 
speech with a Middle East policy and how everything fits 
together.
    I wish he had appointed an envoy for the Middle East like 
President Obama did, like President Trump did. I also wish that 
he had put forward an economic and political vision between 
Israel and Palestine.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, can you----
    Mr. Hook. But these two things have not been done, and 
until you have a broader strategy it is reactive.
    Senator Shaheen. Right. I understand that.
    But I guess what I am asking you is what do you think that 
kind of policy should look like. What should it include, and 
how does Syria fit into that?
    Mr. Hook. Yes. It fits into it, Senator--and it is the 
right question to ask. It fits into it--I remember during the 
Syria civil war Qasem Soleimani was overseeing 10,000 fighters 
in Syria, and that same network of fighters, many of them, are 
still available to be part of an attack against Israel, as you 
mentioned.
    And so I am very glad that we recognized Israeli 
sovereignty over the Golan Heights. There are other things that 
we need to be doing to--the subject of this hearing is relevant 
because the proxies that Iran commands in Syria need to lose 
their banker, and they also need to--I think our military can 
play a bigger role in driving the risk of miscalculation on the 
part of all these proxies. I think right now the proxies in 
Syria feel like it is a very permissive environment. Same in 
Iraq.
    Senator Shaheen. Yes. I was among those who was very 
disappointed when we withdrew our forces from northeastern 
Syria.
    Dr. Maloney, do you have anything to add to that in terms 
of a broader strategy that would recognize addressing Syria and 
the problems that it presents?
    Dr. Maloney. I just did want to take the opportunity to 
point out that I do not think the problem of our Middle East 
policy is the lack of a presidential speech, and I am not 
really convinced that success or failure rests on that 
particular barometer, nor could one point to one coherent 
speech during the Trump administration that would have set 
forward a coherent policy and effective policy toward the 
region.
    I think, in fact, the Biden administration and the 
President's visits to Israel with the Jerusalem declaration has 
in fact put forward a vision that is one that builds on some of 
the few positives that the Trump administration actually 
achieved during his time in office, which were the Abraham 
Accords, and if we can in fact continue to make progress toward 
normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, then we are in a 
much better position to deal with the challenge of a country 
like Syria.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As this hearing attests there is no doubt that Iran exerts 
its malign influence throughout the Middle East by supporting 
various proxies. It is also true that these proxies have 
different origin stories and have different relationships with 
Tehran.
    One of them is Hamas, the terror group responsible for the 
horrific October 7 massacre in Israel. Now, Iran, of course, 
did not create Hamas nor does it exercise command and control 
over Hamas, but they do provide support to Hamas primarily 
because of Hamas's despicable goal of destroying Israel and the 
overall goal of Iran of weakening U.S. influence in the region.
    I am one who believes that we should have been doing more 
all along to weaken Hamas. We have talked about Iran today. We 
have not discussed the inconvenient truth of the fact that 
Prime Minister Netanyahu himself saw it in his interest to keep 
Hamas in control in Gaza.
    Do not take my word for it. He told us this back in 2019 at 
a Likud party meeting where he said, and I quote, ``Anyone who 
wants to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state needs to 
support strengthening Hamas. This is part of our strategy to 
divide the Palestinians between those in Gaza and those in 
Judea and Samaria.'' End quote. Netanyahu.
    After all, so long as Hamas was in control in Gaza, how 
could anybody ask Israel to accept a Palestinian state that 
included Gaza and the West Bank? Good question.
    So Prime Minister Netanyahu and his extreme right wing 
partners have embarked on a concerted strategy to weaken the 
Palestinian Authority, which recognizes Israel's right to 
exist, and to strengthen Hamas, which does not.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record a piece 
that appeared in Haaretz in October of last year, ``A brief 
history of the Netanyahu-Hamas alliance.''
    The Chairman. Without objection it will be included in the 
record.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    Senator Van Hollen. We also have heard a lot of talk since 
October 7th about Qatari funds going to Hamas.
    Ms. Maloney, is it not true that those funds flowed with 
the concurrence of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Israel?
    Dr. Maloney. Yes, that is true.
    Senator Van Hollen. That is true. So when I hear all my 
colleagues talk about this Qatari money, please recognize that 
this was done with the consent and encouragement of Prime 
Minister Netanyahu.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record a CNN 
article, ``Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years--with Israel's 
backing.''
    The Chairman. Without objection it will be included in the 
record.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    Senator Van Hollen. And Mr. Chairman, I would also like to 
enter into the record a New York Times article from December of 
last year entitled ``Buying quiet: Inside the Israeli plan that 
propped up Hamas,'' subheadline ``Prime Minister Netanyahu 
gambled that a strong Hamas (but not too strong) would keep the 
peace and reduce pressure for a Palestinian state.''
    The Chairman. Without objection it will be included in the 
record.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    Senator Van Hollen. And Ms. Maloney, have you also seen the 
reports about how Prime Minister Netanyahu was informed about 
various sources of Hamas's moneys kept overseas including some 
in Turkey and decided to ignore those warnings?
    Dr. Maloney. I have seen those reports.
    Senator Van Hollen. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter 
into the record a New York Times piece, again from December of 
last year, headline, ``Israel found Hamas money machine years 
ago. Nobody turned it off.''
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    Senator Van Hollen. And I want just to quote from Mr. Levy, 
who was the Mossad chief in charge of economic policy, who 
says, and I quote, ``I can tell you for sure that I talked to 
him''--referring to Prime Minister Netanyahu--``about this,'' 
unquote, quote, ``but he did not care that much about it.''
    The article goes on to point out that Mr. Netanyahu's 
Mossad chief shut down Mr. Levy's team, the Task Force Harpoon 
that focused on disrupting the money flowing to groups 
including Hamas.
    So, Mr. Chairman, as we watch what is happening in Gaza in 
the aftermath of the terrible Hamas attacks of October 7 and we 
try to bring that conflict to an end and President Biden talks 
about the importance about providing some light at the end of 
this very dark tunnel by creating a two state solution to 
provide security for Israel including normalization, 
ultimately, from Saudi Arabia and Arab states but also a state 
for Palestinians to live in dignity of their own, let us 
remember the lengths that Prime Minister Netanyahu has gone to 
try to prevent that from happening including--as all of these 
articles in fact attest, including going to the lengths of 
strengthening Hamas to try to in turn weaken the Palestinian 
Authority and prevent those negotiations from going forward.
    It is well documented. He always opposed the Oslo Accords. 
He has always been opposed to a two state solution. His 
coalition right now, and it is in their founding documents, 
want the entire West Bank effectively annexed by Israel.
    So we need to go into this with clear eyes as to all the 
factors that are at play here, Iranian influence and malign 
efforts certainly being a factor across the Middle East. But it 
is a complicated story, and if we are going to find a way out 
that brings any hope to anybody in the Middle East and more 
stability, we need to look at this full story.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here today.
    Mr. Hook, so the Trump administration pursued a maximum 
pressure campaign designed to choke off revenues that the 
Iranian regime used to fund terrorist activities. We now 
learned last week from the New York Times that a lot of the oil 
has now been moving from Iran to China--I think 59 million 
barrels worth over--almost close to $3 billion.
    The tankers ended up in China, the money ended up in Iran, 
and the Biden administration said they are doing everything 
they can. I think they have looked the other way and completely 
been outplayed.
    So the Biden administration decided to pursue what I 
describe as a maximum concession campaign as opposed to a 
maximum pressure campaign, and it was aimed at appeasing Iran, 
letting Iran do more and more.
    So we have the crippling sanctions from the Trump 
administration, Joe Biden lifting sanctions. Do you believe the 
Biden administration's approach to Iran has worked or has 
failed?
    Mr. Hook. I think they relaxed enforcement in order to try 
to get back into the Iran nuclear deal, and I think that that 
was probably a bad gamble because this--the Iran nuclear deal 
started to expire when I was in office, and it is going to keep 
expiring in successive years.
    And so I know there was talk about a longer and stronger 
deal and a number of things like that, but they should not have 
relaxed their enforcement as a tactical negotiating matter.
    They would have been more likely to achieve their results 
by continuing maximum pressure than by relaxing it.
    Senator Barrasso. So along that line, and you used the word 
tactical negotiating approach, what lessons will other 
adversaries around the world learn about the U.S. in the light 
of Biden's concessions campaign toward Iran?
    Mr. Hook. What happens in places like Iran is a teaching 
moment in places like North Korea and Venezuela and Cuba and 
other governments around the world, and so I think that if we 
show weakness and unnecessary concessions to the world's 
leading state sponsor of terrorism it has ripple effects around 
the world.
    It certainly, I think, could signal to somebody like 
President Xi after Afghanistan, after another war in the Middle 
East, that the United States does not have the stomach to do 
what is necessary to maintain deterrence.
    And so I would have much rather seen them continue the 
deterrence that we--when we came into office it is clear from 
talking with our partners--with our Sunni Gulf partners and 
with the Israelis--that we had lost deterrence against Iran, 
largely because of the Iran nuclear deal.
    It took a while to regain it. It is hard to restore 
deterrence. You can lose it very quickly. And so I think the 
Biden administration was in a great position to pursue its 
nuclear objectives, but they needed to continue the maximum 
pressure campaign.
    Senator Barrasso. So you mentioned President Xi by name, 
and there is talk of the concerns of, perhaps, China's 
involvement with an invasion at some point potentially of 
Taiwan.
    Does this also send a message that makes that more likely 
that they view weakness on behalf of the United States as an 
invitation for a time to go after something that they have been 
wanting for a long time?
    Mr. Hook. In a similar way of not enforcing our red lines 
in Syria, it just sends the wrong message to tyrannical 
regimes, autocratic regimes, that would like to displace us and 
our allies whether that is in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East 
or Africa.
    And so I think it is very important for the United States 
to be, as the old saying in the military goes, no better friend 
and no worse enemy.
    Senator Barrasso. So then following up on that, talk a 
little bit about the extent that the maximum pressure campaign 
previously actually worked, succeeded in achieving the stated 
objectives regarding Iran's nuclear program.
    Mr. Hook. I think on the nuclear piece there was--the Iran 
nuclear deal was going to expire, and as I said earlier we 
pulled forward the expiration date, and then we put in place 
what we thought were the standards for a new and better deal.
    I think if given more time, given the political and 
economic pressure we were putting on the regime, I think 
eventually we would have created an atmosphere to get a much 
better deal than was negotiated under the Iran nuclear deal.
    I know for a fact that we dried up enormous amounts of 
funding for the Iranian regime and its proxies, and it worked.
    Senator Barrasso. Let me ask a final question. September 
2023 the President's National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, 
said the Middle East region is quieter today than it had been 
in two decades.
    A few days later we see Hamas terrorists, Iran backed 
financially, coming in to Israel. How has the Biden 
administration's Iran strategy led to chaos and instability 
throughout the Middle East?
    Mr. Hook. I think it would have been much better off for 
the Administration to not delist the Houthis, to have better 
relations with our Sunni partners. It is very--when I was in 
office we worked to organize not only our Sunni partners and 
Israel against the common threat of Iran, but we also did it in 
Europe and other parts of the world.
    And so I think when you come in to office, and you alienate 
your Sunni partners and Israel, and you then relax your 
sanctions against Iran that is exactly the kind of environment 
that Iran thrives in, and you need to be doing the opposite.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Hook. I 
understand your family and you have all been subjected to 
threats because of the role that you have taken previously in 
the previous Administration, your willingness to continue to 
speak out forcefully and truthfully.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    Mr. Hook, you and I sat here and listened to Senator Murphy 
attempt to muddy the water here using some unrelated 
statistics, and for those who he may have confused, let us you 
and I try to clear this up a little bit.
    Would you agree with me that the central cause of 
difficulties in the Middle East today is Iran?
    Mr. Hook. Iran is the principal driver.
    Senator Risch. Number two, would you agree with me that 
Iran's ability to do that is totally related to its oil 
revenues?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Risch. Number three, what did you have--when you 
left office after your attempts to constrain the flow of oil 
from Iran, what did you have it to when you left office?
    Mr. Hook. We took it from about 2.2 million barrels down to 
300,000.
    Senator Risch. What is it today? Since you left office, and 
the Biden administration has taken over, what is their flow 
today?
    Mr. Hook. I think it is between 1.5 and 2.
    Senator Risch. And that cash is being used to do what we 
have all been talking about all day in the Middle East. Is that 
a fair statement?
    Mr. Hook. Yes. The oil revenue goes to the IRGC and Quds 
Force, and then they use that money to spend on its proxies to 
kill and terrorize American soldiers.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    Dr. Maloney, you said that Iran is using the war in Gaza to 
weaken Israel's international standing. I noted in yesterday's 
Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing that Iran's bloody 
fingertips are all over the region, both before October 7 and 
even more so on that day and since then.
    From your perspective, Doctor, is the Administration doing 
enough to engage with partners and skeptical nations to remind 
the world about Iran's destabilizing efforts in the region?
    Dr. Maloney. I think the Administration has become more 
vocal on that issue over the past several months for obvious 
reasons. I think that Iran's behavior is well known to many 
partners in the region and elsewhere, and I think that it is 
absolutely critical for us to continue to shine a light on 
Iranian aggression.
    Senator Young. What about emphasizing Iran's support for 
Hamas? Is this something where the Administration is doing 
enough communicating that?
    Dr. Maloney. I believe that, again, it is very well known 
that Iran is the primary financial backer, that Iran has 
provided absolutely critical access to rockets and missiles and 
the means of production to Hamas, that Iranian support has 
essentially helped to build the tunnel structure that has 
enabled Hamas to survive.
    Senator Young. Mr. Hook, I would ask you basically the same 
questions. How would you grade the Administration's efforts to 
demonstrate to the world Iran's malign actions and intentions?
    Mr. Hook. Well, Senator, as I mentioned earlier the leader 
of Hezbollah has said publicly as long as Iran has money we 
have money, and that is the same for Hamas. Hamas--93 percent 
of its money comes from Iran, and we have to get serious about 
oil sanctions, banking sanctions, petrochemical sanctions, 
metals, all of it.
    And if you undertake a focused, sustained effort in that 
regard you are going to dry up funding for Hamas and Hezbollah, 
and you are going to make Iran choose between guns in Damascus 
or butter in Tehran. That is the choice that we have to have 
them make.
    Senator Young. So it sounds as though right now that the 
grade would be for pass/fail. It might be failing, but it is 
incomplete.
    So tell me what can the U.S. be doing to better demonstrate 
to Iran's proxies, many of whom thirst for international 
legitimacy, that no such reward will come as long as they 
willingly refrain in Iran's orbit, perpetrate attacks, and sow 
unrest?
    Mr. Hook. I think it is a combination of maximum economic 
pressure, political isolation. I think we need to improve our 
military cadence to restore deterrence, which we have lost.
    As I was talking earlier with one of the Senators, we have 
not had any attacks in the last 3 weeks. That is good. But we 
are going to need to keep up this tempo and increase it if we 
are going to protect the 30,000 American troops that are in the 
Middle East today.
    Senator Young. So hit our adversaries more frequently?
    Mr. Hook. As a defensive military action, yes.
    Senator Young. As a defensive military action.
    Mr. Hook. Yes. Our troops are very exposed. As I was saying 
earlier, since I think November you have had 165 attacks 
against American troops in Iraq and Syria, and we have 
responded 11 times.
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Mr. Hook. It is insufficient. That imbalance is untenable.
    Senator Young. Well, I think we are also going to have to 
wrestle with the legal implications of some of the military 
actions that are occurring and are being contemplated.
    This was a focus of the subcommittee hearing that we held 
yesterday as well. So when you are attacking Houthis, for 
example, in response to attacks they have made on partner 
nation commercial shipping, I think there are legitimate 
questions to be asked about whether or not congressional 
authorization is required.
    Mr. Hook, I believe that imposing costs on Iran's terrorist 
proxies is just one necessary response to their continued 
attacks across the region against the U.S. and our interests.
    We have to also actively seek to break their network. This 
in part requires the U.S. to force the leadership of these 
groups to question the risks they individually and collectively 
are willing to take, and sow doubt that either their partners 
of convenience or their masters in Tehran are going to leave 
them holding the bag if they choose further escalation, whether 
it be in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or elsewhere.
    Mr. Hook, how might you suggest that we act in this area?
    Mr. Hook. Iran has for its 42 something year history 
operated in the gray zone, and they let the proxies do the 
dying for them, and they have been very effective at building 
out this Shi'a crescent, this axis of resistance that has 
imposed massive costs on the United States, Israel, and our 
Sunni partners.
    And so I think that if we are going to degrade and disrupt 
these networks in the gray zone, the Biden administration 
should announce that they make no distinction between Iran and 
its proxies, and anything that a proxy does we will attribute 
agency to the Iranian regime, and they will be held accountable 
as if it were a direct attack.
    And I do not think that Iran itself has endured sufficient 
costs directly. We have gone after things like--the Biden 
administration has gone after Hezbollah and some other proxies.
    But Iran is not feeling any of the pain and until the 
regime starts feeling it, they are going to continue to operate 
with impunity in the gray zone.
    The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, I am deeply concerned that the Biden 
administration systematically downplays Iran's aggression 
against America and against Americans. Sometimes they do it by 
downplaying the aggression. They act, essentially, as Iran's 
lawyers. Other times they simply hide information from Congress 
or the public.
    For instance, as Senator Risch mentioned in his opening 
remarks, you are personally threatened by this regime. As 
anyone here can see you have a security detail because the 
Iranian regime is targeting you for the service that you have 
provided our country.
    It is not just you. Former Secretary of State Pompeo, 
former National Security Adviser Bolton, are also being 
targeted for assassination, as are other former officials.
    What Americans do not know is that the Biden administration 
has gone to great lengths to hide the extent and persistence of 
those threats, including abusing the classification system. 
They find public discussion of Iran's aggression politically 
inconvenient because it gets in the way of their appeasement of 
the regime.
    Americans understandably do not like their government 
sending billions of dollars to theocratic thugs trying to 
murder fellow Americans. For instance, the Administration is 
required to regularly notify Congress of threats to former U.S. 
officials such as yourself.
    But when they were negotiating their $6 billion ransom deal 
last summer, they took the unprecedented step for the first 
time before or after of classifying their notification to limit 
who could see it and who could discuss it.
    I would like to give you the opportunity to comment on the 
significance of these threats.
    Mr. Hook. Senator, I do not have access to the intelligence 
anymore. I also do not have any visibility into the process 
whereby the persistent threat determination is made.
    What I can say is that I am grateful to the committee and 
to the Senate and to the Congress for its funding that provides 
protection for me and my family.
    I am grateful to the Office of Diplomatic Security at the 
State Department that provides that protection. I wish we were 
in a place that it was not necessary, but that is where we are, 
and again, I am grateful to this committee for its support on 
that matter.
    Senator Cruz. Well, let me say, Mr. Hook, I want to say to 
you and your family, thank you. You should not have to endure 
this as the price of public service. And I think it is 
completely unacceptable that the current Administration has 
flowed $100 billion to a regime that is actively trying to 
murder former senior U.S. officials.
    I want to turn--you were saying a moment ago about how Iran 
has not felt any of the pain despite its actively directing and 
funding proxies.
    I want to talk about how the Iranian regime funds the 
proxies that are attacking Americans, that are attacking 
Israel, that are attacking our allies.
    During the Trump administration you were part of the team 
responsible for imposing a maximum pressure campaign against 
the Iranian regime. That was the right strategy.
    That is how you deal with enemies that are trying to kill 
you, and you specifically targeted Iran's energy exports. That 
was very successful.
    The Trump administration, through focusing sanctions, was 
able to reduce their exports from a million barrels a day down 
to approximately 300,000 barrels a day.
    However, when the Biden administration came into office 
they dismantled that pressure. Today Iran's oil exports are, 
roughly, 2 million barrels a day, largely sold to communist 
China, and uncountable billions of those dollars have flowed 
toward the Ayatollah to be used for terrorism to murder 
Americans and murder our allies.
    Biden administration officials say they are doing their 
best, but they simply cannot do anything at all about this, 
that they are helpless to stop the billions from flowing to 
Iran to be used to attack our country.
    Is that your assessment? Are they in fact helpless? Is 
there nothing they can do to impose costs on Iran and to cut 
off their cash?
    Mr. Hook. Senator, the Biden administration is in a perfect 
position to announce zero oil exports of Iranian crude. And I 
would also say they should do the same thing on petrochemicals 
and industrial metals, and that would have a measurable impact 
on Iran's funding for its proxies.
    We have proven that it can be done. Secretary Pompeo and I 
announced the goal of zero, right. Even if you do not meet that 
goal, and we had metrics every day that----
    Senator Cruz. And can you explain from a foreign policy 
perspective is there any national security justification for 
the Biden administration hating oil and gas production in 
America and relentlessly assaulting domestic energy production, 
but at the same time giving a theocratic lunatic a green light 
to mint money and refusing to act against their energy exports?
    Mr. Hook. I think there is a way to impose crippling oil 
sanctions on the Iranian regime without driving up the price of 
oil for American families at the gasoline pump.
    We have done it. We did it. It can be done again, and it 
can be done----
    Senator Cruz. So what specifically should they do? And my 
time has expired so but please explain specifically if the 
Biden administration wanted to cut off the cash and impose zero 
oil on Iran how would they do it?
    Mr. Hook. They would explain to every country that imports 
Iranian crude oil that they would be cut off from the 
international financial system because of our sanctions.
    Now, China has ways to circumvent that, but you have to 
look for other pressure points in the bilateral relationship 
with China so that you drive up the costs of their importing of 
Iranian crude.
    Then you bring that down, and if you can deal with China 
and some other imports that are leaking--ship to ship 
transfers--we set up an interagency team that monitored every 
single act of Iranian sanctions evasion on oil, and we 
countered it.
    And so we were very aggressive, and we were very 
successful. It can be done again.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Let me thank--Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Very briefly.
    We never talked about it, and I am not going to get into 
the details here but one of the real things that we really need 
to focus on is not a drop of oil moves without it going into a 
ship, and that ship has to have insurance or the ship does not 
move, and those insurance companies are all international 
companies.
    Do you agree that that is a focus that we really ought to 
have as far as trying to enforce the sanctions?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, we did that. We made clear to every company 
that was insuring Iranian oil tankers that they need to get out 
of that business, and we had a dramatic reduction in that.
    What we did is we did a systematic analysis from production 
to export, and we looked for every single node in that process, 
and then we put pressure on it. And insurance is a big part of 
this.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. So let me make just one or two observations.
    First, yes, we have to enforce our sanctions, particularly 
on the energy sector, and I think there is going to be 
consensus in this committee to strengthen those tools, and 
China is going to clearly be a focus of our attention as to how 
we can better enforce the energy sector sanctions in China.
    But let me just make an observation. Iran will find ways to 
finance its proxies to the detriment of its own people. The 
first priority of their budget is this terrorist activities and 
their military to the detriment of the welfare of the people of 
Iran.
    And then, second, let me point out that what Iran's proxy 
Hamas was about was to stop normalization in the region, the 
expansion of the Abraham Accords, and that anything we can do 
to strengthen normalization in the region by giving hope for 
the Palestinians and Israelis for peace, to deal with the 
moderate Arab states that we have relationships in the region, 
particularly the Saudis in regards to normalization with 
Israel, all that will undermine the capacity of Iran to have 
influence and its proxies to have influence in the region.
    So these are areas I think we need to work on in addition 
to cutting off the support for Iran through the enforcement of 
sanctions.
    So I thank our witnesses. I see----
    Mr. Hook. Senator, I love that observation, tying this all 
together back to normalization. When Jared Kushner was leading 
our efforts on the Abraham Accords--what became the Abraham 
Accords--we were working on the Middle East peace plan.
    It was very clear to us in hindsight, and even at the 
present time that unifying our Sunni partners in Israel against 
the common threat of Israel, against Iran, created the 
conditions--it was part of the conditions that enabled the 
Abraham Accords.
    And if your Sunni partners and Israel understand what you 
are doing on Iran, it increases trust and confidence. But if 
you have the wrong Iran strategy it makes normalization very 
hard.
    The Chairman. That is the reason why we are having this 
hearing on Iran to be----
    Dr. Maloney. Might I say one very brief----
    The Chairman. Absolutely.
    Dr. Maloney [continuing]. Remark as well, which is that 
maximum pressure has had a lot of attention in today's 
conversation, and it is true that the Trump administration was 
very successful in bringing down Iran's oil revenues and 
exports for a period of time.
    However, part of the price of that strategy was an increase 
in Iran's attacks across the region, shipping, and an increase 
in Iran's nuclear malfeasance. And we are closer today to an 
Iranian nuclear weapons capability as a result of the decision 
to walk away from the deal.
    Even though the Trump administration actually had an 
opportunity to strengthen the deal, the decision was to simply 
scuttle it, walk away, and leave us with no real way to impose 
those kinds of constraints and restrictions on Iran's nuclear 
activities.
    The Chairman. I whispered to Senator Risch that I thought 
we had two outstanding witnesses here for this presentation. 
Not that I agreed with either of your total observations; in 
some cases, I have some strong disagreements.
    But I think you have really added to the debate, and your 
commitment to these policies and your commitment to public 
service is incredible. So we thank you.
    Mr. Hook, I also want to add my deep concern for your 
safety and for your courage in what you have been able to do in 
public service. We will stand by you and make sure that you 
have adequate resources in that regard.
    Mr. Hook. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. The committee record will remain open until 
close of business tomorrow for questions for the record. We 
would ask that if members submit questions that you would 
respond in a timely way so that we can have the benefit of your 
knowledge as we go forward with this subject matter.
    With that, the hearing stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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