

**EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
LEADING TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON
FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP**

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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**EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
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ON FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP**

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
AND THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Garry Peters, and Hon. Richard Durbin, Chairmen of the Committees, presiding.

Present: Senators Peters [presiding], Carper, Hassan, Rosen, Blumenthal, Ossoff, Butler, Paul, Johnson, Lankford, Scott, Hawley, and Marshall.

And present: Senators Durbin [presiding], Klobuchar, Hirono, Padilla, Welch, Graham, Grassley, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz, Cotton, Kennedy, Tillis, and Blackburn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS¹

Chairman PETERS. The Committee will come to order.

Just over two weeks ago, a gunman fired shots at former president Donald Trump. This assassination attempt wounded the former president and caused the death of Corey Comperatore; a husband, father of two, and former fire chief who was attending the rally with his family. David Dutch and James Copenhaver were also attending the rally and were also injured in the attack.

Let me be clear. This was an attack on our democracy. Americans should be able to attend a political rally and express their political beliefs without fear of violence, and political candidates for our nation's highest office should be confident that their safety will never be compromised for their service. Although we are still learning about the shooter's motive, this attack was a shocking reminder that the threat of political violence is alive and well in our country.

By all accounts, this was an inexcusable security and planning failure, and we need to get all of the facts about what happened that day, and how we can ensure an attack like this is never allowed to happen again. Today's panel of witnesses leads the men and women who protect our top leaders and are investigating this crime, and I want to thank them both for being here today, as well as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and the Federal Bureau of Inves-

¹The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the Appendix on page 65.

tigation (FBI) for a very productive and informative briefing with our Committees last week.

Today, our witnesses will help us begin to answer critical questions, and get the information that we need to implement reforms that are clearly needed to strengthen security protocols for the U.S. Secret Service and the people who receive their protection.

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) has already begun that work. This discussion comes in the midst of a bipartisan investigation that Senator Paul and I launched shortly after the assassination attempt took place. Our teams are still collecting critical information, speaking to law enforcement, and piecing together the details of this event.

This past weekend, a bipartisan team of our investigators, along with key staff from Senators Blumenthal and Senator Johnson's offices, traveled to Pennsylvania to speak with local law enforcement officials, review critical information from security officials who were working alongside the Secret Service, and to see the site firsthand.

I want to thank the incredibly brave local law enforcement officers in and around Butler County who responded that afternoon and who met with my staff this past weekend. They have helped to answer tough questions, as well as discuss in detail how the event actually unfolded. I also want to thank the owners of Butler Farm Show and the American Glass Research for allowing my staff and law enforcement to walk the grounds and examine the roof of the building the gunman was able to assess. We greatly appreciate your assistance.

I have also requested documents along with Senators Paul, Blumenthal, and Johnson, related to security preparations, intelligence gathering on potential violence prior to the attack, and detailed explanations of the security response from Federal, State, and local authorities. As part of our ongoing investigation, we also seek to speak with additional Federal law enforcement personnel, including Secret Service agents who were responsible for securing the event.

Today's hearing is an important opportunity to ask critical questions, and to begin to give the American people the transparency and the answers that they certainly deserve. There are still many unanswered questions. We need additional information about the Secret Service's advanced planning efforts, the decisions surrounding sniper and counter-sniper team use, placement, and coordination. We also need answers about what appears to be a problematic communication system that limited efforts to relay information and respond to events as they unfolded real time.

While today is focused on asking difficult questions about what went wrong, I also want to thank the men and women of the Secret Service, who in an instant will, lay their lives on the line to protect our nation's leaders. They have incredibly challenging jobs, and they must continue their mission no matter what our hearing and investigation reveals.

I am also grateful to our Senate Judiciary Committee colleagues for joining us in this important discussion, given their key role in oversight of both of the agencies represented before us today. It is very clear that the U.S. Senate is focused on a productive conversa-

tion that will generate real answers and real reforms. I appreciate all the work from Members of both of our Committees to help us achieve this absolutely essential goal.

I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Paul for his opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL

Senator PAUL. Eighteen days ago, a would-be assassin managed to climb onto a roof 400 feet from the stage where the former president and leading Presidential candidate Donald Trump was speaking. The assassin's bullet struck President Trump nearly missing a fatal blow thanks to a last-minute head turn. Tragically, not everyone was so fortunate. A beloved husband and father in the audience was killed, his life stolen in an instant. Two others remain seriously injured. Their futures uncertain.

The lives of law enforcement officers working the event and those in the audience have been forever changed. Yet, the media has shamefully moved on to other stories, and Google has been caught trying to suppress iconic images of a bloody Donald Trump, images showcasing the resolve of our nation in the face of the attack.

But the American people have not forgotten, and we will not forget. There is no question that this was a monumental failure by the Secret Service. They had one job, and they failed. We know that. What remains unclear is who specifically failed, how they failed, and what must be done to ensure that something like this never happens again. America deserves to know that those responsible for this failure are frankly not going to be in charge of securing the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC). We need to know that someone's been placed on suspension, that someone won't be in charge of the next Donald Trump rally.

Now, I was encouraged to hear that the acting Director Rowe, has initiated a disciplinary investigation in addition to the ongoing Secret Service policy review. This is an important step. However, real accountability will require a comprehensive examination of all the facts, which still remain unclear.

This past Friday, my investigative team went to Pennsylvania to meet with local law enforcement and document the scene. One of the concerning things my team was told is that no one from Secret Service has talked to them since the shooting. I do not know how an investigation into what failed can be conducted without talking to the officers and agencies who were relied upon to do much of the work.

Many questions remain unanswered about the planning and performance of the security for July 13th. While a host of errors led to this security disaster, we now know local enforcement officers were suspicious of the shooter 90 minutes in advance of the shooting.

There are two glaring issues we need to focus on. First, why were the American Glass Research (AGR) grounds and the roof left unattended? Why was the AGR building, the shooter's perch, left outside the perimeter? Local law enforcement told my staff that they specifically flagged the vulnerability of the building to the Secret Service and were told that it would be taken care of. Clearly, these vulnerabilities were not addressed. Second, why was Donald

Trump allowed to take the stage and why was he not removed from the stage when a suspicious individual was taking increasingly suspicious activities?

Over 20 minutes before President Trump began his speech, the Secret Service Command Center had been made aware of an individual with a rangefinder. At least 10 minutes before it was confirmed, the Secret Service's Counter Sniper Team had been made aware of the suspicious subject, and provided a photograph and a detailed description. Why was the event not delayed until the individual was found and checked out?

Interviews with local law enforcement paint a different picture in critical places from what we have been told by the Secret Service in other briefings. Now we need to hear from the Secret Service agents responsible for security that day. Our Committee has formally requested interviews with those agents, but we have not yet been allowed to speak to them. I expect Director Rowe today to tell us when we will be allowed to talk to these people.

Finally, let me close with this. Grave mistakes were made on July 13th, but that does not take away from the bravery of dozens of Federal, State, and local officers that day. We are grateful for their sacrifices and professionalism. They deserve the truth. Now, also, it is our duty and our utmost responsibility to ensure that we learn from this failure and hold those responsible accountable.

Chairman PETERS. I would now like to recognize Chairman Durbin of the Senate Judiciary Committee for his opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Chairman DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Peters.

This is a rare joint meeting of the two committees, but we have matching jurisdiction, and I think it's the most efficient way to get to the truth. So, thank you for letting us join you today.

We have all seen the movies. We have read the books; the international assassin with sophisticated technology, elaborate plans, well-honed skills, sets out to kill a leading political figure in the United States. But how does that match the reality of what happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, when a 20-year-old, introverted college student outsmarted one of the most sophisticated American law enforcement agencies in history, came within an inch of killing a former president of the United States?

That's why we are gathered today to ask these hard questions. There's more to this story than other aspects that we ought to consider as well. We cannot lose sight of the factor that contributes to the violence on July 13th. Widespread, easy access to AR-15 military-style rifles. While we rely on the Secret Service to protect elected officials, we must acknowledge the unique challenges they face in light of the proliferation of weapons of war on our street.

Pennsylvania, like many States, allows individuals to openly carry a loaded rifle without a permit. To make matters worse, assault rifles can easily be purchased from unlicensed dealers without a background check because of dangerous loopholes on our gun laws. The same kind of firearm has been used to carry out mass shootings in Newtown, Uvalde, Las Vegas, and Highland Park, Illinois, killing dozens of children and adults, and injuring many more.

Looking across this dais, I recognize we have our differences on many issues, but when it comes to the protection of the President and the Presidential candidates, we should stand united. We know that protecting our elected officials is essential to a functioning democracy. I hope this hearing can be an example of how we will work together on a bipartisan basis, to not only understand this shocking event, but to ensure it never happens again. We must do this with or without the incendiary language and conspiracy mongering, that too often dominates our political discourse today.

Ongoing investigations by the Secret Service and the FBI are critical. But Congress, the victim's families, and the American people, deserve transparency and accountability now.

I will now turn to my partner on the Judiciary Committee, Ranking Member Lindsey Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Several of us are from the military and have a military background. If this happened in the military, a lot of people would be fired. If a lot of people are not fired, the system failed yet again. Having said that, the people who are brave and jumped on the stage to protect the President need to be applauded. We need to learn what happened, make corrective action, but somebody's got to be fired. Nothing's going to change until somebody loses their job. Thank you.

Chairman PETERS. It's the practice of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to swear in witnesses. If our two witnesses could please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. ROWE. I do.

Mr. ABBATE. I do.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you. You may be seated.

Our first witness is Ronald Rowe, Jr. Mr. Rowe is currently the Acting Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior to this role, Acting Director Rowe was the 23rd Deputy Director of the Secret Service. He has had a distinguished 25-year career in the Secret Service, from coordinating major security operations, to collaborating with other government and law enforcement agencies.

Additionally, he has served as the Chief of Staff to the Director as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of Protective Operations, and as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs.

Mr. Director, thank you for appearing before this Committee today. You are now recognized for your opening statement.

**TESTIMONY OF RONALD L. ROWE JR.,¹ ACTING DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY**

Mr. ROWE. Good morning, Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished Members of the Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

A critical part of the Secret Service Mission is protecting our nation's current and former government leaders. The attempted assassination of former president Donald J. Trump on Saturday, July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a failure on multiple levels.

I join you and all Americans in condemning the horrific assault on former president Trump, Corey Comperatore, James Copenhaver, and David Dutch. I extend my deepest sympathies to the Comperatore family, and my sincere wishes for Mr. Copenhaver and Mr. Dutch's continued recovery.

Before I begin, though, I want to commend the heroic actions of the men and women of the United States Secret Service on July 13th. Our special agents shielded the former president with their bodies while shots were still being fired, selflessly, willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without hesitation.

I am extremely proud of these actions and those taken by the counter sniper team to neutralize the threat that prevented further loss of life, and I applaud the actions of our tactical teams that responded so quickly. I would also like to express my gratitude to our Federal, State, and local partners. We rely on these critical relationships which have developed over decades of daily collaboration to secure protective events and conduct criminal investigations.

As you are aware, there are multiple ongoing investigations of the attack and the security failures that occurred that day. I pledge my full support to those inquiries so the Secret Service, your committees, and the American people have a thorough and complete understanding of what happened leading up to and during July 13th. I will not wait for the results of those findings to assess where we failed that day. I have taken and will continue to take immediate steps to ensure we do not repeat those failures.

Since my appointment as the Acting Director one week ago, I identified gaps in our security on July 13th and have implemented corrective actions. One of my first actions as acting director was traveling to the Butler Farm Show site to better understand how our protection failed. I went to the roof of the AGR building where the assailant fired shots, and I laid in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. What I saw made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer, and a 25-year veteran with this Secret Service, I cannot defend why that roof was not better secured.

To prevent similar lapses from occurring in the future, I directed our personnel to ensure every event site security plan is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it is implemented. It is clear to me that other protective enhancements could have strengthened our security at the Butler event.

¹The prepared statement with attachments from Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on page 67.

As such, I have directed the expanded use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at protective sites to help detect threats on roofs and other elevated threats. I have also directed resources to facilitate our protective site communications, particularly our communications with our State and local partners. In addition, I have instructed the asset requests for Secret Service Protective details to be approved expeditiously and afforded the maximum use of requested personnel at protective sites to address this heightened security environment.

I have heard your calls for accountability, and I take them very seriously. Given the magnitude of this failure, the Secret Services Office of Professional Responsibility is reviewing the actions and decisionmaking of Secret Service personnel in the lead-up to and on the day of the attack. If this investigation reveals that Secret Service employees violated agency protocols, those employees will be held accountable to our disciplinary process.

With respect to congressional investigations and request for information, I instructed my staff to provide full cooperation and respond expeditiously on a continuing basis to ensure you have the information you need to conduct your critical oversight.

In my testimony before you today, I will provide details on the Secret Services advance security planning for the Butler Farm Show site, facts as we know them regarding the incident itself, known breakdowns in executing the security plan, and corrective actions that the agency is taking to ensure that nothing like this happens again.

But I do not believe that inadequate time to plan for this event was a factor in the failure. As you saw in my written statement, I am prepared to provide an overview of the security planning leading up to and during the July 13th attack. However, I would like to point out that based on what I know right now, neither the Secret Service counter sniper teams nor members of the former president's security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building with a firearm.

It is my understanding those personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. Prior to that, they were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual prior to the shots being fired. I regret that information was not passed to Congress and the public sooner with greater frequency. I fear this lack of information has given rise to multiple false and dangerous conspiracy theories about what took place that day. I want to debunk these theories.

Let me address one conspiracy directly. The Secret Service counter sniper neutralized the assailant within seconds after the assailant fired his weapon. That counter sniper had full discretion to use deadly force to stop an attacker and did not need to seek authorization to fire. I am immensely proud of the selfless dedication of our employees to the mission. Every day, across the globe, the men and women answer the call to protect our nation's leaders, and the standard is no fail for a reason.

During our current high operational tempo, I want and I need to ensure that the Secret Service workforce are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission. They have my full support, and I am confident in their abilities to ensure the safety and security

of the people we protect. They are worthy of trusting confidence and they deserve your support as well as the support of the American people.

Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this joint hearing. I will submit the remainder of my statement for the record, and I will answer your questions.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Rowe.

Our second witness is Paul Abbate. Mr. Abbate is the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the Department of Justice (DOJ). In this role, Deputy Director Abbate oversees all FBI domestic and international investigative and intelligence activities.

Prior to his appointment as deputy director, he has had a distinguished three decades within the FBI leading counter-terrorism efforts, and most recently, as the Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, where he is responsible for the management of all FBI personnel, budget, administration, as well as infrastructure.

Mr. Abbate, thank you for appearing before the Committee here today. You are recognized for your opening remarks.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL ABBATE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. ABBATE. Thank you, sir.

Good morning, Chair Peters and Chair Durbin, Ranking Members, Paul and Graham, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the FBI's investigation of the attempted assassination of former president Trump on July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania.

Before going further, I want to again offer my and our condolences to the victims of this heinous attack to the family and loved ones of heroic firefighter and father, Corey Comperatore, to Mr. Dutch, to Mr. Copenhaver, who continued to recover, and to former president Trump, who was also struck by a bullet fired from the shooter's rifle. Our thoughts and prayers are with each of them, and their families, and loved ones.

Within minutes of the attack, the FBI field office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania received notification of the assassination attempt and responded to the scene immediately with a surge of resources, quickly moving forward on the investigation. From the outset, the FBI has been investigating this attack as an assassination attempt and an act of domestic terrorism. Our team continues to conduct a full, thorough, and objective investigation, and will continue to follow all leads and avenues of investigation to logical conclusion, leaving no stone unturned.

While it's not typical to provide details of an ongoing investigation, this, as we all know, is an extraordinarily tragic set of circumstances of the utmost national importance, making it essential to inform the American public and Congress what is known right now with full transparency. The investigation remains focused, of course, on determining motive, identifying any potential co-conspirators, or others with knowledge of the attack, and building out

a timeline of shooter Thomas Crook's actions in advance of and during the attack.

Thus far, though, absolutely nothing has been ruled out, the investigation has not identified a motive, nor any co-conspirators, or others with advanced knowledge. To date, the FBI team has conducted more than 460 interviews, executed search warrants, including at the shooter's residence, and seized electronic media to include phones, laptops, hard drives, and thumb drives.

Legal process has been issued to dozens of companies, and we have received more than 2,000 tips from the public. The full resources of the FBI have been brought to bear in furtherance of the investigation. Agents, analysts, professional staff, experts, I have personally visited the site of this horrific attack and seen firsthand the work of FBI Pittsburgh and our partners on the frontline, and want to thank all involved for their ongoing tireless efforts to get the answers that we need and to deliver justice.

Specialized resources deployed included evidence response teams, victim services specialists, laboratory, and operational technology division resources, to process physical and digital evidence, a shooting reconstruction team. Additionally, our explosive experts have analyzed the three improvised explosive device (IEDs) covered, two from the shooter's vehicle, one from the family residence, and our behavioral analysis unit, importantly is helping to build a profile of the shooter to include his mental state.

Next, I want to provide a brief highlighted overview of the timeline that has been established to date through witness interviews and other information. Again, this is our understanding at present and is subject to change and further refinement as more facts are collected.

On July 3rd, the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania was announced. On July 6th, the shooter registered to attend the rally and performed a search for "how far was Oswald from Kennedy." On July 7th, the shooter traveled from his home to the Butler Farm Show grounds and remained there for approximately 20 minutes. We assessed this show's advanced planning and reconnaissance on his part.

On July 12th, the shooter traveled from his home to the Clairton Sportsman Club where he practiced shooting. On the morning of July 13th. At approximately 10 a.m., the shooter returned to the farm show grounds and remained there for about 70 minutes before returning home again. At approximately 1:30 p.m., while at the residence, the shooter's father gave him a rifle for the purpose, he believed, of going back to the sportsman club.

About 25 minutes later, the shooter, purchased ammunition while in route to the Butler Farm Show grounds. The subject then arrived at the scene, was moving around the farm show grounds close to the American Glass Research building from which he ultimately committed the attack.

Shortly thereafter, at approximately 3:51 p.m., the shooter flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the farm show grounds for about 11 minutes. The drone and controller were later found in the subject's car. Analysis has not revealed any photos or video taken by the drone, but we can confirm that he was live streaming at the time, and would have been able to view it on his controller.

The first reported citing the shooter by local law enforcement was at approximately 4:26 p.m. At approximately 5:10 p.m., the shooter was again identified by local law enforcement as a suspicious person around the AGR building. At approximately 5:14 p.m., a local special weapons and tactics (SWAT) operator took a photo of the shooter.

At about 5:32 p.m., local SWAT observed the shooter next to the AGR building using his phone browsing news sites, and with a range finder. At approximately 5:38 p.m., the photo of the shooter taken earlier was sent to local SWAT operators in a text message group. Subsequently, approximately 25 minutes prior to the shooting, the U.S. Secret Service command post was notified of a suspicious person.

Officers lost sight of the subject from approximately 6:02 p.m. to 6:08 p.m., but continued to communicate with each other in an attempt to locate him. Recently discovered video from a local business shows the shooter pulling himself up onto the AGR building rooftop at approximately 6:06 p.m. And approximately 6:08 p.m., the subject was observed on the roof by local law enforcement.

At approximately 6:11 p.m., a local police officer was lifted to the roof by another officer, saw the shooter, and radioed that he was armed with a long gun. Within approximately the next 30 seconds, the shots were fired. The evidence recovery team found eight shell casings at the scene next to the shooter's body. We believe that the shooter fired eight rounds.

While the investigation has not determined motive, the investigative team continues to review information from legal returns, including online and social media accounts. Something just very recently uncovered that I want to share is a social media account, which is believed to be associated with this with the shooter in about the 2019–2020 timeframe. There were over 700 comments posted from this account. Some of these comments, if ultimately attributable to the shooter, appear to reflect anti-Semitic, and anti-immigration themes to espouse political violence, and are described as extreme in nature.

While the investigative team is still working to verify this account to determine if it did in fact belong to the shooter, we believe it important to share and note it today, particularly, given the general absence of other information to date from social media and other sources of information that reflect on the shooter's potential motive and mindset.

These are the facts, in part, that the investigation has revealed to date. While the shooter is dead, our work is very much ongoing and urgent.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any and all questions.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Abbate.

We will, now proceed. Chair Durbin and Ranking Member Graham will ask the first two questions. I will then ask question with Ranking Member Paul. Then after that, we will alternate between Members of the Judiciary recognized by Chair Durbin and Members of the Homeland Security Committee recognized by me.

With that, Senator Durbin, you are recognized for your questions.

Chairman DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Peters.

I would like to begin by making a statement that it's not in the form of a question, and you will understand why when I say it. In 20 days, we are going to start the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. I have been briefed by the law enforcement agencies plans for security for that event. Tens of thousands of people will be there, including some of the highest-ranking politicians in the United States. I trust that both of your agencies can answer in the affirmative if I ask you whether you are actively engaged in working with the development of security plan, taking into consideration the lessons of July 13th.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that is 100 percent yes from the Secret Service,

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, from the FBI as well, Senator. We have been working on this for well over a year in preparation.

Chairman DURBIN. I am not going to ask for details for obvious reasons, but I do want to ask a question about the Secret Service staffing. Congress has nearly doubled the budget for the Secret Service over the last 10 years, from \$1.8 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 to \$3 billion in Fiscal Year 2024. Despite this large increase in funding, the number of agents in product protective operations has fallen from 4,027 to 3,671 during that same time period, an approximate nine percent reduction.

Acting Director Rowe, what accounts for protective operations losing 356 agents over the past 10 years?

Mr. ROWE. Senator with respect to where we are today on staffing, and then I will address the 10 year point of where we were. In this year alone, we are going to end the year on the positive of 200-plus agents. That's the first time in a number of years that we have been able to do that. Part of that was gaining some efficiencies in our hiring process.

But what I want to re-emphasize is we have not dropped standards. Only two percent of every applicant actually makes it through the hiring process. We are filling our classes at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). We are doing this ramp up as part of what lies ahead of us with the Los Angeles (LA) Olympics in 2028.

With respect to what has happened in years prior. This is a difficult and challenging job being a Secret Service agent, living your life by somebody else's schedule, constantly away from your family, constantly having to meet increased operational and investigative demands, which we gladly do. But it's not for everyone.

I think there are times where people have to make tough choices and they decide to leave the agency, but that does not mean that they were any less of an agent or that they were not committed to the mission because we are all committed to being Patriots and serving our country and protecting our nation's highest leaders.

I think there was a variety of factors. Some of it was the pandemic, some of it was the economy, or other opportunities. We have people that are very skilled in cyber that often leave the job. Some of the protective skills that they acquire are also in demand in the private sector. But some of the mechanisms that we have put in place just in the last year is also retaining our workforce, and that's what we are focused on right now.

Chairman DURBIN. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has determined that restaffing from these losses have been slowed due to a number of factors, including the years-long background checks for prospective agents and the assignments agents must work through before being assigned to protection. Given these constraints, what steps have you taken to improve recruitment?

Mr. ROWE. We are actually putting out targeted recruitment opportunities. We have just recently put it out for within our uniformed division for our counter sniper unit, our hazardous agent medical emergency response unit, our counter assault team on the special agent side. We are actually trying to gather the best and the brightest.

I will tell you that we are having great success with a lot of these vacancies. But what I want to reiterate is that, for example, on the counter assault vacancy, we had 700 applicants that applied for this. Really, what we will glean after they make it through the process and they have to be able to hold a top secret sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) clearance, if we realize 15 out of that tranche, that's a two percent pass rate. It is very competitive, and we are trying to make sure that we are getting the best and the brightest without dropping standards.

Chairman DURBIN. One last question for either one of you. What is the purpose of a range finder? Once this assassin was identified as using a range finder, wasn't that proof positive that he was a dangerous individual?

Mr. ROWE. I will say, Senator, that obviously somebody is trying to determine where they are in proximity to a location, a fixed location. I will defer to my colleague here, but I believe it was a recreation-or sports-related. I thought I had read that it was a golf range finder. Nonetheless, it still would have provided him the ability to provide the distance that he was away from his intended target.

Chairman DURBIN. Wasn't that enough?

Mr. ROWE. As far as raising suspicion? Yes. I think he was identified as being suspicious by local law enforcement.

Chairman DURBIN. And nothing happened.

Mr. ROWE. I know that local law enforcement was attempting to locate him.

Chairman DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you. Member Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. Let's go back to the resources. Do you need more money?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, listen, there isn't a single branch, a single agency in the Executive Branch that does not need more money. Everyone would take more resources. We have had a great relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office Management and Budget (OMB)—

Senator GRAHAM. Do you feel constrained? Do you feel constrained to ask for more resources by anybody?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. We don't. Actually, we have a great relationship with our appropriators, and obviously, the authorizing committees. They have always looked out for the Secret Service.

Senator GRAHAM. I would encourage you to think big when it comes to resourcing the department in light of what happened

here. At the time of the shooting, the Iranians were threatening high level American officials, including President Trump. Right?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, it's widely known—

Senator GRAHAM. I am right, FBI?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. That's 100 percent correct.

Senator GRAHAM. Did that factor into the security footprint?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, what I will say is that it is widely known that the Iranians do not like us. I refer you to the National Security—

Senator GRAHAM. It's not that they do not like us. They threaten to kill certain people, and they named them.

Mr. ROWE. Correct, sir, but I cannot publicly comment.

Senator GRAHAM. It's not like, I hate America. I am going to kill these three guys. Right.

Mr. ROWE. I cannot publicly comment, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. They publicly comment on it.

Mr. ROWE. But Senator, what I am trying to say is I cannot publicly comment on what intelligence, but I can assure you that we do a threat-based protective model.

Senator GRAHAM. I would like to have that model provided to the Committee. Could you do that?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Could you also give us the protocols that are in place to secure a site like this?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. OK. Thank you. One, the protective detail around President Trump, I know them all very well, they are brave men and women. These questions are not to belittle anybody, they are trying to find out how the system failed so badly. You say you are not reluctant to ask for more money. What do we need to do to make it easier to hire people without lowering our standards? I know it's a hard job. Can we do anything to help you?

Mr. ROWE. I think we are willing to take that back, sir. I think we are working on our time to hire.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, if you had more people, you would have more time off.

Mr. ROWE. That's true, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. OK. Let's get more people more time off. These are tough jobs. I mean, people on this Committee know that.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, they are.

Senator GRAHAM. I don't know how they hold a family together doing what they are doing. It's the military really on steroids. The encrypted app. Paul, can you tell us about these apps? Have they been broken into? The guy had some apps that were encrypted.

Mr. ABBATE. I think we have experienced a range of returns on this. Some of the applications that he was using online were encrypted in nature.

Senator GRAHAM. Have we broken into them?

Mr. ABBATE. We have received returns that we have not been able to get information back because of their encrypted nature.

Senator GRAHAM. Is there any way to solve that problem,

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, we have talked about this before. We need a solution that provides lawful access to law enforcement.

Senator GRAHAM. You are telling me the guy that took eight shots at the former president, has apps that we cannot get into that may, if you could get into, reveal some relevant information?

Mr. ABBATE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. If he were talking to some foreign power, and I do not think any foreign power would hire this guy, by the way, so I am not overly worried this was some great plot by the Iranians because they could not even think of this. However, there could come a day where something like this is very important. How do we solve this problem?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, as we have been saying, we need a solution that provides lawful access when we go to a company.

Senator GRAHAM. I agree with you. I am not blaming you. We have encrypted apps of an assassin, a murderer, and we cannot get into them all these days after. That needs to be fixed. Folks, I am all for privacy, but to a point. What if in the future somebody's using these apps to communicate with a foreign power? I think we need to know these things. We need to know them in real time.

Lessons learned is that everything failed. Corrective action, seems to me you need more money, and more people, accountability. At the end of the day, how many people do you think will be relieved of their duties, Mr. Rowe, because of this?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I publicly cannot, and I cannot weigh in on that right now.

Senator GRAHAM. Sure.

Mr. ROWE. Right. It has to be a fair and neutral process. Right?

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely.

From a fair point of view, would you say this is a major system failure at every turn, and those in charge of the system in question, not only was it embarrassing, they failed?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, again, if there were policy violations, those individuals will be held accountable and they will be subject to our table—

Senator GRAHAM. Just send us the policies, if you could.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Mr. ROWE. We will. But they will be held to our table of penalties, which will include up to termination.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman PETERS. Director Rowe, in your testimony here today, as well as in your written testimony, you said very clearly that you cannot defend why that building with the shooter on top of it was not better covered. You were very clear; you cannot defend that.

My question to you is, my understanding is that there's a detailed site survey that is done prior to an event to identify potential threat points. Talk to me about that site survey. I am sure you have had a chance to look at it now after action. How did that site survey get approved when it was so clear that that was a major threat from that building?

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Senator. Our Pittsburgh field office did the advance. During that advance, not only were they discussing amongst themselves about mitigating the line of sight, but also, they were discussing with other agencies that were supporting it.

Our counter snipers met with their counterparts. The team lead and team lead met. They walked the site. They identified the AGR building. If I may, Senator, if I could point out something right now, if I may, and we will place this for the record.¹

But this is the point of view. This is from the second floor of the AGR building. This point of view where the counter sniper team, locally, was posted. The gold arrow indicates where the shooter fired from. Looking left, why was the assailant not seen when we were told that building was going to be covered, that there had been a face-to-face that afternoon that our team leads met. This was the view.

Let me show you another view, Senator Give me B.²

This view is a reenactment by one of my agents laying flat. There was a five-inch rise on the middle of that roof. The assailant would have had to present his boar over that to get his shot off. The view underneath reflects the perspective that he would have had. Again, I call your attention back to the first exhibit if they would have looked left. Give me C.³

This is what our counter sniper team saw. Shooter, no elbows. You barely make out the crown of his head. Below it, the assailant up prone. Let me just tell you, our counter sniper, this individual, I know him. I consider him a friend. He has covered me operationally in conflict zones. When I did my time on the President's detail, he exemplifies the courage, the skill, and the ability to respond under great stress in such short time to neutralize the threat and prevent further loss of life.

Getting back to your question, Senator. These were discussions that were had between the Pittsburgh field office, the local counterparts, and everyone supporting that visit that day. That's why when I laid in that position, I could not, and I will not, and I cannot understand why there was not better coverage, or at least somebody looking at that roof line when that's where they were posted.

Chairman PETERS. Director Rowe, the Secret Service State, and local law enforcement were on multiple communication channels, is my understanding, during that time. As a result, local law enforcement was only able to call in to a State command center that was then relayed from the Secret Service.

It seemed to be a recurring issue in emergency situations that we are finding with the Federal Government that there's not a seamless way to communicate, particularly if you are relying on local law enforcement to deal with what was clearly a major vulnerability. Local law enforcement in Butler told my staff that that they had no way of communicating directly with the Secret Service. If I listen to Mr. Abbate saying there was about 30 seconds between when the local law enforcement reported that there was a man on the roof with a gun 30 seconds. If it's communicated directly to a counter sniper team, would that be enough time to react prior to the firing of those shots?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, if we would had that information, they would have been able to address it more quickly. It appears that that in-

¹ The information referred by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on page 74.

² The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on page 76.

³ The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on page 77.

formation was stuck or siloed in that State and local channel. I will tell you, though, that our tactical elements not only did they have embeds from Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU) with them, but they also had radios on the tactical net.

It is troubling to me that we did not get that information as quickly as we should have. We did not know that there was this incident going on, and the only thing we had was that locals were working an issue at the 3 p.m., which would have been the former president's right-hand side, which is where the shot came. Nothing about man on the roof, nothing about man with a gun. None of that information ever made it over our net.

Chairman PETERS. So that will change?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir. We are working right now to figure out the interoperability, and also make sure that we do have access to those channels, whether through the counterpart system or some other means.

Chairman PETERS. Very good. Ranking Member Paul, you are recognized for your questions.

Senator PAUL. Director Rowe, I am encouraged by your attitude and what you brought here today; what you have talked about as far as immediate changes that you have made, and I hope you will follow through with that. I am encouraged by the fact that you acknowledge that it's indefensible, that the roof was unattended. Would you say the roof being unattended breaches standard protocol for setting up a security perimeter?

Mr. ROWE. What I would say, Senator, is that that roof should have had better coverage, and we will get to the bottom of if there were any policy violations.

Senator PAUL. I would think indefensible would go along with breaching protocol, and I cannot imagine how indefensible would not be breaching protocol. What I would caution, though, is that I sense, and you are the Secret Service, and these people are your friends, and they are heroic people who do good things, that we cannot let our friendships blind us from responsibility. Someone's in charge of the security at the zone.

Would the Secret Service be in charge of the entire operation and they work with law enforcement, but they are in charge. The person in charge of the entire operation is the Secret Service, not the local police?

Mr. ROWE. You are correct, sir. This is a failure of the Secret Service.

Senator PAUL. So that's what I mean. I don't wish anybody harm. I appreciate the bravery of the United States Capitol Police (USCP). I was at the shooting at the ball field. I have heard a hundred shots coming my way. Fortunately, none came to me. But I appreciate the bravery of all the people who protect us. But there's also the idea that there are certain mistakes that don't make you a bad person, but they are just inexcusable if you made that mistake.

For example, let's say you determine, well, local police should have been on there, and local police says, no, they did not tell us to do it. It's a he said, she said. Still, ultimately, the agent in charge should be walking the grounds and say there's a roof 100 yards away from the stadium with a clear sight. Someone's got to

be on the roof. Local police, I told you to get on the roof, get on the roof. Or you put the Secret Service. Ultimately the buck does not pass along to somebody. Whoever's in charge is in charge.

But really, I think it would be helpful to all of us. I know the process has to be meted out, but there needs to also be a process for protecting the next Trump rally. The fact that whoever was in charge in Butler, next week is not in charge of a rally in Las Vegas.

I think you really should simply say that the leadership from that event is going through a process. But until that process, they won't be in charge of the Democrat National Convention. That would reassure a lot of people that they won't be in charge of security until it's determined. Can you tell us something to that accord?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir. I can tell you that the team planning the Democratic National Convention, that is a national special security event. That team has been on the ground, that's from DC with support from our Chicago field office.

But I just want to reiterate that our Pittsburgh field office staff, they are wearing this harder than anybody right now in the Secret Service. They feel completely demoralized. What I am trying to do is also let them know that, listen, they need to be focused on the mission at hand. I also have to walk a tightrope here and make sure that I am not tainting any future, you know, disciplinary action.

Senator PAUL. I understand, and I have great respect for all the officers, but ultimately, someone had to be in charge, and someone made a terrible error. It's an error of judgment. The big error is the roof. But another big error is we have 90 minutes of a suspicious person.

Now, Senator Durbin mentioned the rangefinder. None of these things are enough to shoot a suspicious person, but they certainly would be enough to stop the proceedings. That's where I think you get to the second major management or judgment error of this.

Now, Trump's done probably 100 rallies like this. How often at one of his rallies are there 90 minutes of looking at one person and at least a half a dozen pictures of that person? How often does that happen? Is it against protocol to let a proceeding go on when you have a suspicious person, 90 minutes worth of people talking about this person and we don't stop the proceeding? Does that defy protocol?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, while there's 90 minutes in total from when he is first identified by local law enforcement, we have about a 30-minute window. But in no time is there anything ever communicated about weapon or harm? I think that's where the threat—

Senator PAUL. We are talking about a weapon. You shoot people with a weapon.

Mr. ROWE. Sure.

Senator PAUL. Without a weapon, we are talking about people you stop and say—he had a backpack, which was probably big enough to have the AR-15 in it. In all likelihood, the backpack has the weapon in it. A guy with a big backpack would never get through the perimeter. Once again, a big mistake was not having the perimeter wide enough to prevent people from shooting outside the perimeter.

But the thing is, he would have never gotten through the perimeter, right? His backpack would have been checked. But people with big backpacks are very suspicious, and I would think he's been seen six times, but you got 20 or 30 minutes of knowing about it. But the thing is, there's all kinds of chatter going on about this. You would think the chatter going on with the local police is on a police radio, and a policeman with that radio is standing in the control tent so you get that communication. So there's a huge and massive breakdown.

But really, my question is, how often has this happened at other rallies where there's a half a dozen pictures and 90 minutes of people talking about a suspicious person? I just cannot imagine it's real common.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, at rallies, there are people that come to the attention of law enforcement for a variety of reasons. If they come to our attention for some other activity that might, put it a little bit hey, we probably need to go check that individual out, this happens. That's why we attempt to locate them. That's why it's important for us to try to find them, and it's important to have the information. And so local law enforcement did their very level best to try to locate him. They did provide us the photos 30 minutes prior. It just, he evaded any detection by law enforcement.

Senator PAUL. But once again, it's the overall person in charge. It's a terrible breakdown. It's a terrible management decision not to have stopped it. There was a chance to stop the proceeding. The question is not whether there's enough information to take down an individual.

It's a much lower standard to say, hey, we are going to wait until we get this individual. The roof and the 90 minutes of it, both, I think, are failure of your protocol. I think when that's determined, the person who made these decisions cannot be in a position of authority again.

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Klobuchar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KLOBUCHAR

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it, Director Rowe, we had the classified briefing and also today the taking responsibility for the agency, and your own personal emotion, and reaction to your visit in what had gone wrong.

For the people in my State that keep asking me, "I just don't get how he got on the roof." I know we have gone through great details and a lot of examination. Could you just give a minute on what went wrong and how you think it can be fixed? Because I think it's just going to help to dispel the conspiracy theories.

There are some people that think it did not really happen, which of course is completely ridiculous. It did. There are some people that think all kinds of conspiracies went on within the government, which is also false. But could you just tell them what went wrong so they understand?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. Thank you, Senator. I thought long and hard about this. I think this was a failure of imagination. A failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous world where people do actually want to do harm to our protectees.

I think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions, the assumptions that we know our partners are going to do everything they can, and they do this every day. But we did not challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone's going to cover that. We assume that there's going to be uniform presence. We did not challenge that internally during that advance.

Moving forward, I have directed that when we are talking to people and we are making requests, we are very specific about what we want. We are providing explicit instructions on exactly what our expectation is, what we need them to do, and what we want them to do. That's the only way that we are going to be able to move forward beyond this.

Let me just tell you that our State and local law enforcement partners are the best. This belief that somehow, they are less than Federal law enforcement, or they are less than the Secret Service. They are out there patrolling communities every day. They are the ones out there going into hazardous conditions every day. They know their communities. They have the ability to enforce State and local laws. Our advanced agents do not. We need them and we need them to be partners with us. I think we need to be very clear to them, and that may have contributed to this situation.

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes. Appreciate that, and I have same respect. Next, one of the things you mentioned to me was, and to all of us, was in this other briefing, was just the texting protocol. I think a lot of us think about this in non-security settings about how people are just texting all the time instead of talking and how it takes our eyes off, in your case, the target. Could you talk about what might have gone wrong there, and how you think things could change when there's the hope is that their eyes are constantly on the scene, and on the potential targets, and risks?

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Senator. Again, we need people focused on the problem or on their area of responsibility. It was great that there was a text chain, but that communication needs to go over the net. It needs to go over a radio channel so that everyone has situational awareness of it. The point I was making in the closed-door briefing is that we have to get to a point now where we are using our radio systems to have that collective awareness of this.

I think, one of the things that I have directed is that in addition to the interoperability, we are going to roll out common operating picture or common operating platform that we utilize for national special security events. We have the ability to roll that out to the field that has a Blue Force Tracker in it, where you can put where all your State and local assets are, where our Federal assets are.

But in addition to that, I want people using the radio so it's great that the tactical elements are talking to each other. It's great that the shift is talking to each other, but we have to be able to make sure that whenever we come across a situation that everyone has situational awareness of this.

In my time when I was operational in the President's detail, we were given the explicit instruction, hey, if you are going to pass it, if it's relevant enough that you feel like you need to pass that information, do it over the radio. That was the protocol that we had.

I think over the years, perhaps with the advent of technology and smartphones, perhaps we have gotten away from that. But we

need to get people back on the scope, back on mission, back focused on what they need to be responsible for.

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. The next question I will put in writing, thank you very much, of you, Mr. Abbate. But it's just pointing out that we have seen this rise in threats against Members of Congress, which of course is relevant to this.

8,000 just last year, more than four times over the past seven years. I will want to ask you in writing about the steps that the Justice Department is taking to prioritize these cases.¹ I know there's been some changes made.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. It's of our highest priority, and we are urgently working on it 24/7 a day, every day to protect each and every one of you here.

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Appreciate it. Thank you, both of you.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Carper, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much.

Mr. Rowe, Mr. Abbate, thank you for joining us. Today I have the privilege of representing Delaware, the first State to ratify the Constitution. We did that over 200 years ago. The Constitution sort of outlines how we elect our leaders, and it changes with respect to technology over the years. But there for as long as we have been a country-threats to our leaders when they pursue elective office. We are going to be gathering in Chicago in just a few weeks.

There's been gatherings in other parts of the country to help make sure that what was adopted in that original Constitution is actually carried out faithfully. It's just incredibly important that those who aspire to elected office, and those who take on those challenges are protected, and their families are protected, as well as those who surround them. I share with my colleagues, my prayers for those who have been killed or injured on the July 13th. We are grateful that one of our Presidential candidates is OK.

But I have a question about what I still cannot get over how a 20-year-old loner could somehow outfox, outsmart two of the smartest Federal agencies, and State agencies, and law enforcement with odds of like 1,000 to 1 and be able to almost pull this off. It just blows my mind. Hopefully, we will get to the truth and all of that.

I am a Navy guy, spent 20-many years of my life in the Navy. I learned as a midshipman that when the ship runs on ground at sea, the commanding officer is held responsible. Whether the commanding officer's awake or asleep, at the helm, the commanding officer is held responsible. At the end of the day, I am not interested in a blame game, but I am sure interested in finding out who was responsible and making sure that they account for their responsibility.

My question is, what policies are currently in place to facilitate real time information-sharing between the Secret Service and local law enforcement during an event? What changes to information-sharing practices will the Secret Service make in light of the apparent breakdown in communications on July 13th?

¹The question from Senator Klobuchar appears in the Appendix on page 167.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you for that question, Senator. We are looking at our procedures. We rely on a counterpart system and the radio interoperability, it's a complex challenge. It's not just about being able to find whatever frequency our local counterparts are on and then just piping it in. There are some technical challenges that have to be there.

To alleviate that, we have always relied on a security room where we have representatives from the local agencies those individuals are there to, one, bring their own radio, and then relay relevant information that would impact our security plan. I think what I am looking at, and again, what I am in looking at this situation, is there was a unified command post, and we had our security room.

We had communications that day at the Butler Farm site we are challenging. Not just challenging for the Secret Service, but for challenging for locals. There were some cellular issues. There were radio issues. You saw that with the testimony from the colonel from Pennsylvania State Police last week in the House.

I think as I am thinking about this, I think we need to consider what is our model moving forward? I think we need to be where the greatest amount of partners are when that information is being discussed.

The other thing that I am looking at is we need to also make sure that we have redundancies as far as cellular on the ground or additional repeaters. I have directed our Chief Information Officer (CIO) to do that, and we are rolling assets out now supporting campaign sites.

Senator CARPER. Thank you for that. Mr. Abbate, quick question. Based on the initial information you have gathered from the investigation, do you believe there were any actions taken by the shooter in the weeks, days, or hours leading up to the shooting that should have caused alarm and grabbed the attention of law enforcement?

Mr. ABBATE. He did not have any interactions with law enforcement leading up to this, Senator? We have not found anything yet that would have alerted law enforcement, the FBI, or Secret Service to his intention, activities in advance of this event.

I will note, however, to your prior question, that we do have a very strong relationship, an integrated relationship between FBI, and Secret Service, and every other Federal, State, local agency. You can imagine we have constructs like the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Violent Crime Task Forces (VCTF) where we are cross-embedded with each other. When it comes to this event and others like it, we are always talking in advance.

In fact, with respect to this event, we did have a meeting between U.S. Secret Service and FBI in the days leading up to the event to determine, assess whether there was any information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the rally, or to former president Trump, or anyone else there. There was an absence of that in the lead-up, specifically. Again, none of us had any information in our holdings with regard to the ultimate shooter.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you for that. Thanks very much, both of you.

Chairman DURBIN. Next on the Senate Judiciary Committee is Senator Grassley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chair, I would like to introduce my oversight letters and investigative documents into the record.¹ This is information I have already made public.

Chairman PETERS. Without objection.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK, thank you. I would also like to call my colleagues' attention to a legislation that Senator Cortez Masto and I have introduced that would require Senate confirmation of the Director of the Secret Service. I think this is very important because no other agency has a no-fail mission.

Mr. Rowe, in your written testimony, you stated that to prevent similar lapses like the one on July 13th from happening again, you will ensure every event site security plan is surly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it's implemented. Based on your testimony, the security plan for the Butler event deviated from the security standards. How would vetting by multiple experienced supervisors fix that?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I think having many eyes on a particular problem set helps. That way you do not have tunnel vision. You are just focusing on one thing. That's why I think it's important not only at the field office level, but also at the detail level.

Part of what we had started doing with the former president's detail is having them send out site agents, having them send out supervisors. I think having that collaboration and having additional eyes to examine the problem, will make sure that we are not missing anything.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think you have answered my question.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me go on. Also, to you, in your written testimony, you stated that you, "regret that information was not passed to Congress and the public sooner, and with greater frequency. What's your communication plan going forward to ensure that the American people in Congress are fully informed?"

Mr. ROWE. Senator, we just started a rolling production that is bicameral. We made our first rolling production last week. We made one yesterday. We will continue to do that. My view is that sunshine is the best disinfectant, and we intend to provide information to Congress as it carries out its oversight function.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Also, I made public documents that show Secret Service deployed a counter unmanned aerial system operator on July the 13th. According to the Secret Service, the drone system was supposed to be operational at 3 p.m. that day. However, we have been told by Secret Service that because of cellular bandwidth problems, it was not operational until about 5:20 of that day.

If the system was operational, Secret Service would have had the ability to detect the shooter and his own drone use. Why is the Secret Service dependent upon local cell cellular network? Does the Secret Service have a backup plan in place?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. Thank you, Senator. That is something that I briefed in the closed door, and again, something that has cost me

¹The Oversight letters and Investigative documents submitted by Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on page 80.

a lot of sleep because of the eventual outcome of the assailant. That what if we had geolocated him because that counter UAS platform had been up?

It is something that I have struggled with to understand, and I have no explanation for it. It is something that I feel as though we could have perhaps found him, we could have maybe stopped him. Maybe, on that particular day, he would have decided this isn't the day to do it, because law enforcement just found me flying my drone. People fly drones all the time on the peripheries of our sites. We go out, and we talk to them, and we ascertain what their intentions are.

On this day, in particular, because of the connectivity challenge, as you noted, there was a delay and he flew his drone at 3:51, approximately. Moving forward, we are leveraging resources from the Department of Homeland Security and others to make sure that we have dedicated connectivity, so that we are not reliant on public domain, so that we can ensure that whatever assets we have in place, those assets are operational. That is my commitment to you, that we are going to make sure we are going to do that. That is something we are moving out on.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. I hope that you will answer some of my other questions in writing.¹

Chairman PETERS. Senator Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Acting Director Rowe, in our secure briefing last week, I made the point that if you do not want conspiracy theories to spread, you need to provide information. I appreciate these photos today. These things could have been released literally within days and a whole lot more information as well. Congress needs to provide oversight. We do not have certain investigatory tools like you have, but what we can do is do interviews. Acting Director Rowe, did you receive our letter from July 25th requesting interviews with 13 individuals of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWE. We are in receipt of that letter, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. Deputy Director Abbate, have you seen that letter as well? Do you know who we are requesting interviews with?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, I have not seen the letter.

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Do you know whether those individuals submitted to interviews with the FBI, acting Director Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. We are in the process. Those employees are being interviewed, if they have not already been interviewed, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Are those interviews being transcribed?

Mr. ABBATE. The FBI interviews, sir?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes. We have 302s on those.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. OK. When will Congress get those 302s? When will we get those transcriptions of those interviews?

¹The questions from Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on page 140.

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, I will take that back and we will get those to you as soon as possible.

Senator JOHNSON. Acting Director Rowe, when will those individuals be made available for Congress for this Committee to interview them?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, we will make them available

Senator JOHNSON. How soon? Because memories are short. They can be influenced by events. We need these transcribed interviews as soon as possible.

Mr. ROWE. We will get that done, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Does Secret Service use encrypted communications at events?

Mr. ROWE. On our radio nets? We do, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Those memorialized? Are those saved?

Mr. ROWE. The radio traffic from Butler, we did not have recordings.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you normally?

Mr. ROWE. Not on the road outside of DC or outside of a Presidential or vice-Presidential stop.

Senator JOHNSON. Communications between Secret Service agents will not be available like we have gotten the communications from local law enforcement.

Mr. ROWE. I am sorry, Senator—

Senator JOHNSON. We are not going to be able to get those communications. You did not save them?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir—

Senator JOHNSON. Which is very unfortunate.

Mr. ROWE. It is, sir. Moving forward, I have directed that we will now start recording those so that we will have them moving forward.

Senator JOHNSON. By the way, I am going to ask for a number of things at the very end to be entered in the record, but one of my preliminary findings is that the Secret Service did not attend the 9 a.m. briefing the day of the event. In your testimony, you said that a site briefing was conducted with Secret Service personnel and law enforcement partners supporting the event. Those both cannot be true. So local law enforcement do not believe Secret Service was present at the 9 a.m. briefing. Were they or were they not?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, with respect to the snipers that went on national television, and gave an interview and said that they did not get a briefing from the Secret Service, they were not. They were supporting through mutual aid, and our personnel briefed the tactical team leader that was leading that element, that was providing this counter sniper.

Senator JOHNSON. Acting Director Rowe, you said that the Secret Service provides explicit instructions to the locals. Were explicit instructions provided to cover the roof of the AGR building and locals just not follow it, or were those explicit instructions not provided?

Mr. ROWE. It's my understanding what was communicated is that the locals had a plan and that they had been there before.

Senator JOHNSON. An awful lot of the chatter in social media has to do with is there a partisanship in the Secret Service providing coverage for some individuals and none for others, about Secret

Service coverage or additional coverage enhancements being denied? Was there ever requested additional coverage for Mar-a-Lago

Mr. ROWE. Senator, we have provided additional resources to the Mar-a-Lago.

Senator JOHNSON. Was coverage asked for and denied ever?

Mr. ROWE. I will have to research that, Senator. But I am happy to tell you we have made significant investments since the former president has left office, over \$4 million of technology resources and arms.

Senator JOHNSON. Again, documents will come out eventually to make the point one way or the other. This is an important piece of information that Congress needs to have.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, Senator, we will make those available to you.

Senator JOHNSON. There's a report today by Susan Crabtree of RealClearPolitics, saying that you denied sniper coverage outside of driving distance to DC. Is that true?

Mr. ROWE. That is a false statement, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That is incorrect?

Mr. ROWE. That is incorrect.

Senator JOHNSON. OK. That's the kind of information you need to refute with documentation. Deputy Director Abbate, you said this was an assassination attempt and domestic terrorism. It's obviously an assassination attempt. Why make the distinction? What is different about that?

Mr. ABBATE. We think it's important to cover all the possibilities here in the reality of what we are dealing with and what we have all seen, Senator. We have learned lessons from the past. The tragic shooting at the baseball field was referenced here. We have learned the lesson from that. That was not opened properly. We have made changes in the Bureau, and it's reflected here in terms of how this investigation is being approached with a completely open mind and inclusive of all the possibilities, including domestic terrorism.

Senator JOHNSON. I fear that makes the investigation potentially partisan. Mr. Chair, I would like to request that my July 14th letter to Attorney General (AG) Garland, Mayorkas, and Wray be under the record.¹ It asks for all kinds of information, documentation. Asks a lot of questions. My preliminary findings of July 21st and July 23rd, including timelines, bunch of questions as well be under the record,² and then our updated timeline dated today. This goes not only by minute, by second, and we will continue to update this timeline as more information becomes public. This is the way you do investigation. We need to find out literally second by second what happens so the American public understands the truth.

Chairman PETERS. Without objection, so ordered.

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Butler.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUTLER

Senator BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both of our Chairmen and Ranking Members for holding this incredibly important hearing, critically, for the Amer-

¹ The letter submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 108.

² The documents submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 113.

ican people to understand the safety and security that is being provided to our national leaders. Thank you both for being here and for, again, answering the hard questions.

This is a time of, I think, heightened attention, deservedly so, not only for our national leaders, but for the teacher who decides that they are going to go and participate in their democracy, or the firefighter who wants to hear the voice and vision of the potential next leader of this country. My thoughts and prayers really are with those Pennsylvania families who have lost loved ones or have been critically injured. As I offer my questions today, it would be in service to those to preventing future incidents.

But in the one question of looking backward to the event on the 13th, Director Abbate, can you just talk a little bit about how did Mr. Crooks, how was he able to get an AR-15 onto the roof of that building? Does your investigation illuminate anything that we have learned to help to make that point more clear?

Mr. ABBATE. We do not have definitive evidence yet as to how he got the rifle up there. Based on everything that's been collected thus far, photos, video eyewitness accounts, we do believe he likely had it in the backpack.

Senator BUTLER. Broken down in the backpack?

Mr. ABBATE. We are still assessing that. Our laboratory has taken it, looked at the rifle itself and measured that against the backpack itself. And if placed in this backpack, it would extend outside. It would have been visible. But we do not have anyone who observed him with the backpack with a rifle barrel or other part of it sticking out of the backpack. But the rifle would not have fit fully into this backpack to be concealed in whole.

We have video that was recently found of the shooter walking in a distance from his car just before 6 p.m., at about 5:56, I believe. Based on everything we have, we assess that he returned to his vehicle at that time, got the backpack, and then proceeded back to the area into the AGR building. Then he's observed, of course, on the roof just minutes later holding the backpack in front of him.

In fact, there's dash cam footage from a police vehicle that shows him briefly traversing the roof with the backpack in front of him. Then it's just minutes after that that he's actually seen by the officer, who I described, with the rifle on the roof.

It's possible that he broke the rifle down, we do not have conclusive evidence of that, and took it out of the bag on the roof in those moments before, and reassembled it there. That's one of the theories we are looking at and working on right now.

Senator BUTLER. Thank you for that. Acting Director Rowe, thank you for your years of dedicated service and jumping in at a hot time. But you take me right to this point of communication. There's been a lot of conversation and even in your written and verbal testimony, you have talked a lot about the communication and the disparate nature in which it's happening across the different channels.

One sort of foundational question that I have is, are all elements of an event communicated on the same channel? If I lost my kid, and I am at a big rally, are local law enforcement talking on the same channel about me losing my kid? That they are talking about a suspicious individual?

Mr. ROWE. When it comes to the locals, they likely have some type of common channel that they work off of in a county or an adjoining municipality. When it comes to the Secret Service, we do have various channels for various agents and our uniform division officers working specific aspects of that advance.

Senator BUTLER. It's not possible that the delay in communication or the losing of the thread of tracking this individual was sort of lost in the commotion of all of the other communications that could have been, or maybe was sort of separate from the communication channels that were happening?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I can only speak to the Secret Service lines of communication and we did not have anything beyond suspicious person that was communicated to us.

Senator BUTLER. Sure.

Last question really quickly because I am out of time, but Acting Director, was there any communication with the Secret Service that was talking directly with the President's, the former president's detail. That feels like there's been some question by colleagues about why the call was not made to delay the event. Help us understand the communication that either was or was not happening directly with the former president's detail to make the call to delay 10 minutes, 20. We have all been to these events. They never happen on time, but to delay while this was being investigated.

Mr. ROWE. The detail, they were operating on their net, which our security room was monitoring. But again, having information of a suspicious individual. There were other calls that day of individuals that came to the attention of law enforcement, of people that needed medical attention. So that particular regarding the assailant, that never really rose to a level of we should not put him out there. Had we known that there was a dangerous individual out there, we would never let a protectee go out on stage.

Senator BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

Senator HASSAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I want to thank you, and Chair Durbin, and the Ranking Members for holding this joint hearing today. Thank you to our witnesses, not only for being here, but for your careers of service to our country, and to the men and women you lead.

I am really grateful that former president Trump is safe, and extend my sympathies to the family of Cory Comperatore, who was fatally shot at the rally. My sympathies to everyone who was injured.

On July 13th, major failures nearly led to the assassination of a Presidential candidate who is also a former president of the United States. The Secret Service has to be fully transparent about how this happened and how it's going to change moving forward, understanding there's also a need to balance Congress's engagement in oversight with allowing law enforcement to conduct an ongoing criminal investigation.

I want to thank the agents of the Secret Service for selflessly acting to protect elected officials, and their families, and our former presidents. We are grateful for their sacrifices and their service, and I want to thank all law enforcement, and particularly law enforcement officers and first responders, who worked to minimize harm to the crowd on July 13th.

Mr. Rowe, I want to start with you. New Hampshire hosts many political rallies. Protecting the speakers and attendees at these events requires extensive coordination between State and local law enforcement, the Secret Service staff, and obviously campaign event staff. As a former Governor, I have experienced some of the challenges that this type of coordination can create, but we know that this coordination is really essential to public safety.

It's clear that there were significant coordination failures on July 13th. You told us earlier that the local SWAT team told the Secret Service that local law enforcement had eyes on the AGR roof. But there are reports that members of a local SWAT team never met with the Secret Service in the days before the Butler rally.

What steps does the Secret Service take prior to political rallies to ensure that the agency is effectively coordinating with the candidate's security details with State and local law enforcement, and with campaign event staff?

Mr. ROWE. As part of the advance process, Senator, as happened in Butler as well, there's a police meeting. Basically, that initiates the advance, that's bringing not only emergency management officials, but all the State and local law enforcement agencies that may have aspects of supporting or assisting in that advance and on that visit. The focus of that police meeting, one, is to exchange numbers and business cards, and then coordinate times for walkthroughs.

There were walkthroughs of the Butler Farm site with local law enforcement agencies that were supporting that visit. That was directly as a result of having that police meeting to begin the process of figuring out, dividing up the labor, areas of responsibility.

Senator HASSAN. What you are telling me is that at that meeting, the first meeting, led to the walkthrough that the Secret Service does with local law enforcement, and that at least some members or directors of the local SWAT team would have been part of that process?

Mr. ROWE. As I understand it, the Beaver County, they were seconded to assist Butler, but the Butler ESU team were part of the advanced process.

Senator HASSAN. OK. How many agents did the Secret Service provide to plan and secure this event, and how many people from State and local law enforcement agencies supported the security of this event?

Mr. ROWE. In totality, between law enforcement, State, and local, and Federal, there are 155 personnel at the Butler Farm site that day. All combined, Secret Service, it's in the 70s. Then, we had support from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) that were providing post standards, and then we had approximately 70 or so various Pennsylvania State law enforcement.

Senator HASSAN. OK. Thank you. I want to go to one other issue before my time expires. You have talked today and in our secure briefing about the interoperability of the Secret Services counter

drone capability, that it failed early on, and so it did not catch the drone floating over the site by the shooter.

First, you have addressed this a little bit, what changes is the Secret Service making to ensure that it has backup technology, but also, what efforts did the Secret Service undertake to coordinate with other law enforcement regarding anti-drone capability at the rally site?

Mr. ROWE. We are working to determine that right now, Senator. We are getting the redundancies in place. Counter UAS authority, it is a little complex. State and locals do not necessarily have this ability to do that. It does require coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) , because it could impact commercial travel.

Senator HASSAN. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am just going to follow up. I think one of the things that you are hearing from a lot of folks, but I am not sure we are really clear on yet, is how is it that somebody who clearly is arousing concern from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious? How is it that that information doesn't get to the former president's detail? I will follow up in writing. Thank you.

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked?

Mr. ROWE. Because There was no counter UAS present, sir.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CORNYN

Senator CORNYN. You had a drone system, but you had bandwidth problems. The bandwidth apparently was adequate for the shooter's drone, but not for the Secret Service. Can you explain that?

Mr. ROWE. I have no explanation for it, sir.

Senator CORNYN. We also know that in the military context, electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on the battlefield. Does the Secret Service have jamming capabilities or drones?

Mr. ROWE. We have drones, sir. I have to be very careful about how I answer this one in an open forum. What I can tell you is that we have technical security measures, sir, to address, I think, what you are asking me.

Senator CORNYN. The question is, can you take down a suspicious drone? Because this can be used not only for surveillance by the shooter, which obviously it was here, but also drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the President, or in this case, to President Trump. Do you have the capacity to stop a weaponized drone?

Mr. ROWE. What I will tell you, sir, is that we have technical security measures that we utilize at permanently protective sites. We also have the ability in a limited fashion, at temporary sites. What I can tell you is that on this day, the counter UAS system had technical difficulties and did not go operational until after 5 p.m.

Senator CORNYN. In this case, the shooter had a rifle, but somebody who wanted to kill a President, or a former president, or a candidate for President, would not need a rifle. They could use a drone. Correct?

Mr. ROWE. It is a potential threat factor.

Senator CORNYN. This individual was identified as a suspicious person. Can you explain to us when a suspicious person becomes identified as a threat?

Mr. ROWE. I think it's also when a weapon or some other dangerous item is then presented.

Senator CORNYN. A range finder would not render someone a threat as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion?

Mr. ROWE. I think the rangefinder is what initially brought him to the attention of local law enforcement.

Senator CORNYN. Why would the President be allowed to take to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified, and before the Secret Service or local law enforcement were able to investigate the circumstances?

Mr. ROWE. At that time, Senator, suspicion had not risen to the level of threat or imminent harm.

Senator CORNYN. Ultimately, that suspicious person did become a threat. Do you think if the President had been asked not to take the stage, and during the time it took to investigate to eliminate that suspicion, wouldn't that have been the appropriate way to deal with it?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, it certainly is one way to do it. This is a challenge for law enforcement in general, is that being able to identify somebody that comes to your attention and you are trying to determine what are their intentions. This is a challenge for law enforcement.

The individual actually came to the attention for suspicion. He's on the outer perimeter adjacent the secured site. Law enforcement is circulating for him. But again, additional information at that point, we are not rising to the level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him.

Senator CORNYN. I am just suggesting that maybe President Trump's appearance should have been delayed while that suspicion could be adequately investigated. But I have always thought of the Secret Service as the best of the best when it comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to protect the life of their person. They are detailed to. I think you described the very rigorous process by which people are screened. I think you mentioned the two percent standard, people who are interested in serving. Only a very small fraction of those individuals are actually accepted in the Secret Service because of the high standards that your agency has.

But explain to me why the Secret Service being an elite law enforcement agency would delegate to local law enforcement or others who did not meet that same two percent standard. In other words, isn't that something that Secret Service should have covered as opposed to delegating it to local law enforcement?

Mr. ROWE. Senator again, this is where I went back to earlier when I said it was in a failure to challenge our assumptions. We assume that the State and locals had it. By no means do I want to diminish the commitment. I am sure you agree, State and local law enforcement do their jobs every day and protect the communities that you represent.

Senator CORNYN. No doubt about it.

Mr. ROWE. I think what we made an assumption that there was going to be uniform presence out there, that there would be sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be counters, sniper teams in the AGR building. I can assure you that we are not going to make that mistake again.

Moving forward, I have directed our Office of Protective Operations that when our counter snipers are up, their counter snipers are up, and they are on the roof as well. We do this all the time with our colleagues in the New York City Police Department when we cover the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). So that is our Trusted Traveler Programs (TTP) moving forward

Senator CORNYN. Director Rowe, I would just submit to you that those assumptions can be lethal.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Scott, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me just follow up with what Senator Cornyn has asked. Do you know who makes the drone that the Secret Service uses?

Mr. ROWE. That Secret Service uses?

Senator SCOTT. Yes. The one that you did not work. Who's the manufacturer? Is it American made, manufacturer?

Mr. ROWE. I believe it is, Senator.

Senator SCOTT. We talked about this the other day. Very few times in history do our Presidents get shot at. You would know that this is something that the American public is very interested in. As Senator Johnson said, there's a lot of questions being asked. I was at Church Sunday, and three people came up to me and asked me if there was a second shooter. There's all this information that you guys are not responding to.

When I was Governor of Florida, I had two mass shootings. I had the Pulse nightclub shooting. I had the Marjory Stoneman Douglas shooting. We did daily, we did two or three times a day, local, State, and Federal law enforcement, FBI, everybody involved, we answered questions.

What I asked you the other day is, why aren't you doing that? What both of you have allowed. You have allowed the public to assume the negative which I don't get and think you should be doing. I think you should be doing all along at least once a day press conference. I think that you have to tell the public what's going on.

Having a hearing is really nice. I mean, how often are we going to do this? You are clearly not going to do it here for another month and a half. I asked you the other day, why aren't you doing press conferences? And are you going to commit to doing press conferences? I think what you-all have said the other day, you are going to ask Secretary Mayorkas and Director Wray, if you guys could do those daily press conferences, and start giving the public information. You know, what's the answer?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that's why, one, I am here today. I am here today to provide information and answer those questions. We are moving toward doing more frequent releases of information. We are willing to do that press conference. Once we get through this hearing today, we are going to, in all likelihood, do one this week.

Senator SCOTT. OK? What's the commitment to the public that you are going to do press conferences? I mean, it's what, 17 days? We are sitting 17 days into this, and I am getting asked questions that I can't believe are true, but the public believes it's true.

What you-all are doing is you ruin your reputation, impact the integrity of the Federal Government. It makes no sense to me. Are you going to commit to it—are you going to do it once a month? The FBI, it's the same thing, not just you. What did Director Wray say? Did he say he could not do it?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, if I may jump in here. First, thank you all for your guidance in this regard. In fact, we have not done something every day, no doubt about that. But, we are focused from the FBI side on the investigation. In part, as we have laid out here today, we actually, based on your guidance, we did a media engagement, not a standup-type press conference, just yesterday, and laid out in full everything that I have shared here, and even beyond that, just in the interest of time.

But we are because of the intense interest in this, and the implications and the national importance, we have literally provided everything through media, and through journalists in here all of the information that we have derived from the investigation. Thus, sir, we remain committed to do that in full, answering all questions and sharing all information we obtain.

Senator SCOTT. Do you guys realize the value of going in front of the press and answering all their questions? You realize that if you don't do it that way, everything gets filtered. You get to put out all the information, and you should be providing—I mean, you should be saying every day this is what we know now. Like Senator Johnson said, put together a timeline. You should have put together a timeline. You should immediately put out, this is what we know right now, and this is what we don't know.

Like you have said, you don't know how the gun got up there, right? You have said it, but why that should have been out all along? Say we are looking at it, it does not make any sense. We have done this, we have done this, we have done this. I just don't get it. Why? Why what you are doing? I have said this about the FBI. I mean, the people who work at Secret Service, they are great people. You are a black hole, you lose the support of the American public because people do not believe you are being direct with them.

I completely disagree with your approach. I just want to finish. Like everybody else, I did a letter July 18th. I have not gotten any answers yet. I want to put it into the record,¹ and I would love to get the answers to this because this is what the public is asking for. They want more information. They want to know what happened, who's going to be held accountable, and how we are going to make sure this never happens again. Thank you.

Chairman PETERS. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Blumenthal.

¹The letter submitted by Senator Scott appears in the Appendix on page 127.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLUMENTHAL

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here to both of you and more important thank you for your professional dedication, your personal bravery, and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. I know for both of you, this moment is a painful one. Acting Director Rowe, I have heard you speak in a private setting very emotionally and passionately about the need to take responsibility and take action that will assure accountability. I know that you share a commitment along with Director Abbate to full public disclosure to the maximum extent possible.

We can make speeches at you, and I have made one myself in that private setting about the need for broader, fuller disclosure to the public, not just in press conferences, but in the course of your investigation about what you know and feel you can disclose without compromising your investigation.

Let me ask you, last week Senator Peters and Paul, along with Senator Johnson and myself, sent requests to both of your agencies to produce documents. We have only received a handful so far. Can you commit to when we can expect those documents?

Mr. ROWE. We will get them to you as quickly as we can, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Can we expect them this week?

Mr. ROWE. We will work to get to meet that deadline, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. When can we expect all the communications, the text messages that agents have sent to each other? Eventually, all of it is going to come out as you know. When can we expect all of those documents?

Mr. ROWE. We will gather them up and get them to you, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You, I think, took the position as to the local law enforcement responsible for the shooter on the roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to take him out. But ultimately, doesn't the buck stop with the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWE. It stops with us, sir. But let me just clarify the perspective that they had on that roof, when I show you the perspective from when our sniper saw, he's on the downside of that ridge roof. Their perspective from the AGR building, looking out their area of responsibility looking left, they should have been able to see.

You can see in that photo¹ in Exhibit A, which we will make part of the record and turn over to the Committee. He's already crossed over that bridge or the walkway and stepped up onto that roof. I am not saying that they should have neutralized him, but if they would have just held their post and looked left, maybe, and there's a lot of maybes there, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. A lot of maybes, but somebody needs to be held accountable. I think Senator Graham hit the nail on the head. We need to know who specifically was responsible for doing what. Who was responsible for saying to former president Trump, "Sir, it's not safe to go out there yet." Who was responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement were doing their job? Who

¹The photo referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on page 74.

was responsible for tracking down that suspicious person who fit the profile; 10 to 25 years old, young male.

The FBI has warned us about it year after year after year. Director Wray has come before us and said the threat is from domestic extremism, the lone gunman. We are all aware of it in law enforcement. I think we need individual accountability here, and people need to be held responsible, in fact, lose their jobs, if necessary, to send a message that this massive intelligence and surveillance failure as well as the enforcement failure cries out for accountability. Let me just ask, in the short time I have left, what is the nature of the Iran threat?

Mr. ABBATE. I am sorry, Senator, could you repeat the question?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What is the nature of the Iran threat, the threat to former president Trump that has been mentioned?

Mr. ABBATE. Let me be clear here. The terrorist regime of Iran has been targeting people our country for many years now. We have talked about that here before. I want to be clear about that. From the FBI standpoint, we know publicly they have targeted former president Trump. They have called for his assassination along with other current and former officials. That's public information. It's well known to everyone.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Was there a specific or imminent threat on July 13th?

Mr. ABBATE. We have no information that there are any co-conspirators or that foreign or domestic, including Iran, related to this. I want to be clear; we have no evidence of that. We are not ruling anything out. We are looking into all possibilities and leaving our minds open to that.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Was that on the minds of the Secret Service on July 13th, that there might be some threat from Iran?

Mr. ROWE. Sir, as Deputy Director Abbate just said, we are aware of the public sentiment and statements of the government of Iran to do harm to Donald J. Trump, and we use a threat-based model.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF

Senator OSSOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for your testimony today and for your service.

Mr. Rowe, I want to begin discussing Secret Service staffing, and the extent to which HSI or other personnel are augmenting, or backfilling inadequate Secret Service capacity, generally, and on the day of the assassination attempt. To what extent are HSI personnel, for example, filling close protection roles that would normally or optimally be filled by Secret Service personnel?

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As we have done, even back when we were with Treasury, we enlist during campaign years the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in that department. When we were in Treasury, we used Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), we used Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRSCI). When we transferred over

to the Department of Homeland Security, we have brought that practice with us.

So going into a campaign year or during a national special security event like the United Nations General Assembly, we will enter into a memorandum of assistance for the campaign with HSI. HSI will provide post standards. Essentially, Federal agents, law enforcement, to be able to help secure a site when it comes to close protection. The only time that we will utilize them is during a United Nations General Assembly where they may be utilized to protect low-level head of State or provide security at a hotel in New York City where those protectees are staying.

Senator OSSOFF. On the day in question, all of the former president's close protection detail were full-time Secret Service personnel?

Mr. ROWE. They were, and they were assigned to the Donald Trump detail.

Senator OSSOFF. OK. Interoperability with other Federal, and State, and local law enforcement agencies, specifically on communications, what have you determined to date played a role in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies, the suspicion or identification of a threat?

Mr. ROWE. I think there was a delay in reporting. Not having that real time. As they were closing in on him, as information is known as—

Senator OSSOFF. Be more specific. Who were closing in on him?

Mr. ROWE. Local law enforcement were closing in on him as he's seen scurrying across the roof, right? That information and we are getting to the bottom of that. We are working on trying to figure out what was the delay? Why didn't we hear that coming out of the unified command? So based on the information I have right now, what I can tell you, Senator, is that apparently not having that real time information is what really hindered us in being able to understand more than it was just the locals working an issue at the 3 p.m. There was actually a little bit something more urgent than that.

Senator OSSOFF. Does it appear that that is due to a lack of communications links between relevant officials and agencies, or poor communications practices and a failure to report?

Mr. ROWE. I don't want to rule out. I want to have a neutral opinion on that. I don't know if it was poor practices. I can tell you that the interoperability, having the not being able to have that technical fix, and which is a lofty goal to be able to do that, is something that has been a hindrance. But that's why we use a counterpart system.

Senator OSSOFF. In fact, is not the capability when an intergovernmental interagency team is deployed to secure a site like this and to mount, if necessary, a quick reaction. There is not currently the capability, for example, State law enforcement, SWAT personnel, or local law enforcement officers, to communicate directly with Secret Service officers onsite?

Mr. ROWE. Technically you could do it, but it would take a long time to get it done. For a one-day or an eight-hour operation it requires a lot. It would be months of planning of knowing that we are going to go to this particular jurisdiction, and that we are going

to need your frequencies, the keys, and we are going to need to load you into our radios, and you are going to be needed to load it into ours and vice versa.

Senator OSSOFF. Right. This presents potentially, I think, an opportunity for the Homeland Security Committee. I mean, not just in an executive protection context, but any complex incident response, any counter terrorism, any natural disaster context. The inability, swiftly, to link personnel from disparate jurisdictions at the local, State, and Federal level is a vulnerability for the Nation. Is it not?

Mr. ROWE. I would think and based on my experience, being able to talk to other agencies in real time, certainly would assist in that response.

Senator OSSOFF. Mr. Chair, do I have time for one more question?

Chairman DURBIN. Yes.

Senator OSSOFF. Thank you. I know others have touched on this. One of the things that's been most baffling to the public has been the failure to fully secure this structure, which even to a lay person's uninformed eye, clearly presents as a site from which an attack on the former president of this event could be mounted. It had particular characteristics that made it even more of potential value to an attacker.

Just walk us through one more time. Is there not an established doctrine, or practice, or checklist by which such sites are assessed for threat and determine whether or not to be within or without of the security perimeter?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, controlling high ground is something that is a must for us whenever we go into a location.

Senator OSSOFF. Yes. I know we are all eager for more information on why that task was not completed in this case. Thank you for your testimony.

Chairman DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEE

Senator LEE. Why was President Trump allowed to take the stage at 6:02 p.m., exactly 17 minutes after multiple suspicious person reports were provided, complete with photos, and information suggesting that the assailant had a rangefinder, something that ordinary people don't use in this kind of circumstance?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, again, it was suspicion not weapon, or there was never communication of that there was an individual with a gun, or threat, or other bad intentions.

Senator LEE. How many suspicious person reports did you receive that day?

Mr. ROWE. I will get back to you on the exact number, but there were other individuals that came to the attention of law enforcement that day.

Senator LEE. Would President Biden ever be allowed on stage under similar circumstances with an unresolved set of multiple suspicious person reports provided, including indicating that there was a range finder involved?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I can tell you that a suspicious person on the outer perimeter with local law enforcement attempting to locate is,

would happen. But I would need more information as far as whether or not we would allow the President to go on or off.

Again, for us, it comes down to weapon, a potential threat, is the individual carrying an IED, is there a weapon? Is there some other factor that now ramps up our attention to——

Senator LEE. Understood.

Mr. ROWE [continuing]. Let's hold off on this.

Senator LEE. If there were eight shell casings found next to the assailant's body, but he was neutralized after the first shot, where did those other shots come from? Where did the other shots go?

Mr. ROWE. As far as the assailant shooting?

Senator LEE. Yes. Did the assailant get out eight shots, or were those shell casings left from the day before? Where did they come from?

Mr. ABBATE. The shooter, Senator, we believe fired eight rounds. We had the shooting reconstruction team go out there for a period of days and collect all that. We have bullet holes, bullet fragmentation, all taken back, and there we are still putting together the trajectory and ballistic analysis. Although we do have fragments of the bullets and bullets had been collected in the distance from the shooter's weapon.

Senator LEE. Got you. It's my understanding there was a sniper team assigned to a window with complete overlook, complete view of the roof, the same rooftop, sloped rooftop where the shots were fired. It's also my understanding, according to some whistleblower accounts, that that post was abandoned. What can you tell me about that? Why was it abandoned?

Mr. ROWE. I saw that from the colonel's testimony, sir, and it's something that I have asked in our mission assurance is getting to the bottom of. There were two-man counter sniper teams from the local that were in that AGR building.

Senator LEE. At some point they just left?

Mr. ROWE. I do not have an answer for you on that, Senator. But it seems to me that if even one of them left, there should have been remaining some additional eyes left in that building.

Senator LEE. Yes. That seems like something that maybe should be one of the very first questions you address. I am actually surprised that you do not know that already. I would ask that you submit to us in writing¹ what you learn as soon as you learn it. Will you commit to that?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator LEE. Let me just state it this way. Multiple requests were made by Trump's protective detail and by Trump's campaign team to the Secret Service for additional resources. I am told that those were denied, and as I recall, the Secret Service spokesperson initially denied that such requests were made and denied. Why not tell the truth from the outset? What were they trying to do there?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I do not think there was any intention to mislead——

Senator LEE. Looks like a pretty material fact, isn't it?

Mr. ROWE. I saw that report. Go ahead, Senator.

¹The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the Appendix on page 152.

Senator LEE. Will you commit to me that you will submit to us in writing² what requests were made by whom, and to whom, and when they were denied?

Mr. ROWE. I will, sir.

Senator LEE. OK. Look, at the end of the day, we we are looking at a situation in which at a minimum, people knew that this guy had a gun at least two minutes before the shooting happened. I want to know what you can tell me about what happened during that final two-minute period where a whole bunch of people in the crowd saw and were shouting, "He's got a gun."

During that two-minute period, perhaps at the beginning of it, the local police started to climb the rooftop, and there was at least 30 seconds after which local police were able to personally observe the shooter with a gun, had the gun pointed at him. What happened during that time period? Why on earth was President Trump not removed from the stage at that moment?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, the reason why President Trump was not removed was, again, we did not have anything more than locals working an issue at the 3 o'clock. It was not determined as to whether or not it was the same individual or not, and there was no report of—

Senator LEE. The same individual as what?

Mr. ROWE. The same suspicious individual.

Senator LEE. Right. But we have left the category of suspicious individual at that point. You have a guy with a gun on a rooftop, 136 yards away from the stage, that he's got a gun at that point. What happened during that time period that did not result in President Trump is protective detail being notified of that, and him immediately being removed from the situation?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, what I will say, and then I will turn it over to Deputy Director Abbate, no information regarding a weapon on the roof was ever passed to our personnel.

Senator LEE. How is that even possible? Do you want to comment to that?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, again, I believe that information, and this is probably something my colleague can expound, on information that was in law enforcement, local law enforcement channels, but did not cross over and make it to Secret Service awareness.

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, just to clarify the timeline. The individual was first seen by law enforcement on the roof at about 6:08. We are still working to perfect the timeline based on the radio communications and all that. It was not until at 6:11, 03 seconds, the officer saw him and called out his arm. That was the first sighting where he had the rifle on the roof, and then he—

Senator LEE. That was relayed to the Secret Service Command Center at that point?

Mr. ABBATE. My understanding is no. Secret Service, it was not relayed to them. It's a narrower timeframe, though. It's probably about, maybe, up to half a minute between the time he's seen with the rifle and when the shots are fired.

Senator LEE. But there's still time at that point. If there were an open channel of communication in which they were able to tell

²The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the Appendix on page 152.

him, "He's got a gun, take him out." You could still take President Trump off the stage. You could have him duck. You could have the shooter neutralized. Do you not have a channel of communication by which they can say, "Gun. Take him out."

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that information stayed in local channels and did not make it over to Secret Service.

Senator LEE. They did not consider that relevant? You are saying that the local police did not consider that relevant enough to pass along to the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWE. Sir, I think that they were in the midst of dealing with a very critical situation, and they articulated that over the radio, as I understand it. However, it was never relayed over to us.

Thank you, Senator Lee. Senator Hawley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Director Rowe, can you put your first poster or your first demonstrative back up.

Mr. ROWE. Please put it up.

Senator HAWLEY. Just to make sure everybody can see it. This is the photograph I believe that you took, your team took of the roof. The AGR roof. Yes, that's the one. So, from this vantage point, as the law enforcement who are in those windows, as they look left, they should be able to see the shooter clearly there on the AGR second floor roof. My question is, why is there not a Secret Service counter Sniper on that roof?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, when we post up, it is our methodology is to look at things that can see in on our protectees so that they can provide that coverage.

Senator HAWLEY. But why is there not a Secret Service counters sniper there with clear line of sight? That roof has a clear line of sight to the former president. Why didn't you put a Secret Service counter sniper there?

Mr. ROWE. The Secret Service's counter sniper role is to neutralize those threats that are looking in on us from where the Protectee is, not necessarily his position.

Senator HAWLEY. You think maybe you might want to revise that protocol in light of what happened here?

Mr. ROWE. They were protecting the principle, and I think in the—

Senator HAWLEY. The principle got shot.

Mr. ROWE. I understand that, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. Do you think you might want to revise the protocol? Let me ask you this. Who is the lead site agent who made the decision to leave the AGR building completely outside of the security perimeter? Who was that?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I cannot give you that name. This person is operational. They are still doing investigations. They are still doing protective visits.

Senator HAWLEY. Have they been relieved of duty,

Mr. ROWE. Senator, they have not been relieved of duty.

Senator HAWLEY. I know their name, by the way.

Why have they not been relieved of duty?

Mr. ROWE. They are still cooperating, not only being interviewed by the FBI, but also by our Office of Professional Responsibility. We will let the facts of the mission assurance and any further investigations play out.

Senator HAWLEY. Isn't the fact that a former president was shot, that a good American is dead, that other Americans were critically wounded, isn't that enough mission failure for you to say that the person who decided that that building should not be in the security perimeter probably ought to be stepped down?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I think you are using the word decided, and I think we need to allow the investigation play out to include—

Senator HAWLEY. OK. Who did make the decision then if it was not the lead site agent who made the decision not to put that in the security perimeter?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, you are zeroing in on one particular agent. I want to find out exactly what was the entire decision process?

Senator HAWLEY. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. I want to be neutral and make sure that we get to the bottom of it, and interview everybody in order to determine if there was more than one person who perhaps exercised bad judgment.

Senator HAWLEY. Sure. My question is, why don't you relieve everybody of duty who made bad judgment? Yes, you are right. I am zeroing in on somebody. I am trying to find somebody who's accountable here,

Mr. ROWE. And we will.

Senator HAWLEY. You are telling me that the person who made the decision not to include this in the perimeter has not been relieved of duty. What about the person who's in charge of the interoperability of radio frequencies between local law enforcement and Secret Service? Has that person been relieved of duty?

Mr. ROWE. No, Senator, because interoperability is a greater challenge than just one person on that day. We had a counterpart system. It failed spectacularly.

Senator HAWLEY. Has the person who decided, who made the decision to send Donald Trump onto the stage knowing that you had a security situation, has that person been relieved of duty?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. They have not.

Senator HAWLEY. Has the person who decided not to pull the former president off of stage when you knew that, in your words, the locals were working a serious security situation, has that person been relieved of duty?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. Again, I refer you back to my original answer that we are investigating this through a mission assurance and as opposed to zeroing in on one or two individuals to find out exactly what the decisionmaking process was.

Senator HAWLEY. What would you need to investigate, to know that there were critical enough failures that some individuals ought to be held accountable? What more do you need to know?

Mr. ROWE. What I need to know is exactly what happened. I need my investigators to do their job, and I cannot put my thumb on the scale.

Senator HAWLEY. A lot of people did not do their job.

What do you mean put your thumb on the scale?

Mr. ROWE. You are asking me, Senator, to completely make a rush to judgment about somebody failing. I acknowledge this was a failure of the Secret Service——

Senator HAWLEY. Is it not prima facie that somebody has failed? A former president was shot.

Mr. ROWE. Sir, this could have been our Texas School Book Depository. I have lost sleep over that for the last 17 days.

Senator HAWLEY. Then fire somebody.

Mr. ROWE. I will tell you, Senator, that I will not rush to judgment. That people will be held accountable, and I will do so with integrity, and not rush to judgment and put people——

Senator HAWLEY. I can't believe——

Mr. ROWE. Unfairly persecuted.

Senator HAWLEY. Unfairly persecuted?

Mr. ROWE. Unfairly, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. We have people who are dead.

Mr. ROWE. We have to be able to have a proper investigation into this, Senator.

Senator HAWLEY. You said earlier that you have to make sure that your protocols are followed. Unless there's a protocol violation, people would not be disciplined. I would just say to you, I don't really care that much about your protocols. I think if your protocols don't provide for the fact that when a former president is shot, when an American is killed, when other rally goers, innocent people who just showed up on the day when they are shot at and critically wounded, if that isn't a protocol violation, prima facie, you should revise your protocols.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I think this is where you and I agree this was a failure, and we will get to the bottom of it.

Senator HAWLEY. I hope you are going to do something about it. Let me ask you something else. The RealClearPolitics reports this morning that you were directly involved in denying additional security resources and personnel, including counter snipers. Not just to this event, but over the last two years. That President Trump's team repeatedly asked for these additional resources, and you personally were involved in denying them. Is that true?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, as I stated earlier, that is not true.

Senator HAWLEY. You never denied any resources to former president Trump's team?

Mr. ROWE. No, not me. No, sir. Not personally.

Senator HAWLEY. You weren't involved in any of that?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. You were never involved in the decision-making?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. I was not.

Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you just one or two other things here quickly. Whistleblowers tell me that in fact, law enforcement were stationed to be on that roof, and that law enforcement abandoned their post because it was too hot. Is that accurate?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I have heard that as well. Again, they posted up inside. I think moving forward, as I said earlier, we are going to ensure that State and local counter snipers are on roofs.

Senator HAWLEY. But do you know if someone was supposed to be on the roof? Do you know if someone was, in fact—that's what

the whistleblowers tells me. That may or may not be accurate. Do you know that to be the fact? Was somebody posted to the roof, local law enforcement or whomever?

Mr. ROWE. I do not know that to be a fact.

Senator HAWLEY. Can I ask you why you don't know that?

Mr. ROWE. Again, Senator, we are looking at this, and they should have been on that roof. The fact that they were in the building is something that I am still trying to understand.

Senator HAWLEY. I just want to express my frustration, Director. Those 17 days, or whatever it's been, that whistleblowers are telling us more than you are, and you don't know, you haven't ascertained if there was supposed to be law enforcement on the roof. That seems like a pretty basic fact.

I am also told that local law enforcement suppliers offered the Secret Service drones and you declined them. Is that true?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, one, I have been very transparent and forthcoming.

Senator HAWLEY. Your agency has not been transparent and forthcoming. So please, let's not go there.

Mr. ROWE. I have been forthcoming, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. That remains to be seen. You have been on the job a few days so far. You have fired nobody.

Chairman DURBIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAWLEY. Were you offered drones?

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Hawley.

Mr. ROWE. No. There wasn't offered to fly a drone on that day.

Senator HAWLEY. Why did you deny it?

Mr. ROWE. Again, I think the ability of local law enforcement to provide an asset, we probably should have taken them up on it if it was offered.

Chairman DURBIN. Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CRUZ

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Rowe, thank you for being here. I agree with what you said at the outset, that the individual Secret Service agents demonstrated remarkable personal courage, putting their bodies in between the line of sight of the shooter and the President.

That being said, the bravery of the line agents is quite different from the decisions of Secret Service leadership. Secret Service leadership committed catastrophic security failures, indeed, the worst security failures for the Secret Service since 1981. Since the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan. It is incumbent upon this Committee to determine why those security failures happened.

Just after the shooting, Secret Service put out an official statement from your spokesperson that says, "There's an untrue assertion that me, a member of the former president's team, requested additional security resources, and that those were rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added protective resources, and technology, and capabilities as part of the increased campaign travel tempo." Was this tweet accurate?

Mr. ROWE. With respect to Butler, Pennsylvania, it is accurate, sir.

Senator CRUZ. It is accurate that the Trump team had not asked for additional security and had not been rebuffed.

Mr. ROWE. If you are talking about Butler, Pennsylvania, all assets requested were approved. If you are talking about the media reporting of assets requested, there were times when assets were unavailable and not able to be filled. Those gaps were staffed with State and local law enforcement tactical assets.

Senator CRUZ. I am reading from The Washington Post, July 20, 2024. Secret Service is said to have denied requests for more security at Trump events. The opening paragraph, "Top officials of the U.S. Secret Service repeatedly denied requests for additional resources and personnel sought by Donald Trump's security detail in the two years leading up to his attempted assassination according to four people familiar with the requests."

Is that right? That repeatedly, the Trump detail asked for more resources, and repeatedly, Secret Service leadership turned that down?

Mr. ROWE. That is not accurate, Senator. Assets are requested.

Senator CRUZ. How many requests did the Trump team or the Trump detail ask for?

Mr. ROWE. I can get you that number in—

Senator CRUZ. You do not know now.

Mr. ROWE. No. I can speak to the ones that reported in The Washington Post, and we can go through them if you like.

Senator CRUZ. But you do not know how many requests there were?

Mr. ROWE. In general, how many requests since 2021 that the former Trump detail has made a request for assets?

Senator CRUZ. You have had two weeks. You had a spokesperson, put something out that is false on its face. By the way, did you approve this statement when it went out?

Mr. ROWE. I do not know if I did or did not, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. Is this spokesperson still employed? Does he still have a job?

Mr. ROWE. He's still employed, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. He lied on behalf of the Secret Service. He still has a job. Did your predecessor, the former director, did she approve this statement?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, our communications team, they send out statements. They do deconflict them and they put them out.

Senator CRUZ. Did she approve this statement?

Mr. ROWE. I do not know if she did or did not, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. And you do not know if you did either?

Mr. ROWE. I do not recall approving it, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. Will you commit to provide this Committee in writing, every written request for additional resources from the Trump campaign or the Trump detail, and every response from Secret Service?¹

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I will commit to providing responses and getting you the information that you are seeking.

Senator CRUZ. May I ask you something? Who makes the decision to deny those requests? Did you make that decision?

¹The information requested by Senator Cruz appears in the Appendix on page 157.

Mr. ROWE. Which requests are you talking about?

Senator CRUZ. Any of them.

Mr. ROWE [continuing]. That were in The Washington Post?

Senator CRUZ. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. The process, sir, is that a detail will make a request for either staffing, technical assets. That is handled between the field office and the detail.

Senator CRUZ. OK. So, there's a bureaucracy. Is there a decision-maker?

Mr. ROWE. It's not a bureaucracy, Senator, it's a process.

Senator CRUZ. Give me the person that's a decisionmaker. Is there one?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, it's a conversation. It's not just an absolute yes or no.

Senator CRUZ. Let me tell you what I believe. I believe that the Secret Service leadership made a political decision to deny these requests. I think the Biden Administration has been suffused with partisan politics. Did the same person who denied the request for additional security to President Trump also repeatedly deny the request for security to Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Jr., whose father was murdered by an assassin and whose uncle was murdered by an assassin? Did the same person make that decision?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, what I will tell you is that Secret Service agents are not political—nor do they allow—

Senator CRUZ. OK. You are not answering my question.

But you know what? Leadership appointed—

Mr. ROWE. I will get to your answer, Senator, if you're allow me.

Senator CRUZ. Leadership appointed by the President is political. I have a simple question, yes or no. Did the same person deny the Trump request that also denied the RFK request? That's a yes or no question.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that is not a yes or no question. One, there is a process for a candidate nominee to receive protection.

Senator CRUZ. Does the buck stop anywhere?

Mr. ROWE. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process that there's no participant—

Senator CRUZ. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process. What cameral?

Mr. ROWE. For a candidate protectee—

Senator CRUZ. You are not a Congress. You do not have a cameral.

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Kennedy submitted a request that was referred over to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC).

Senator CRUZ. OK. You are refusing to answer the question. Let me ask because the failures on that day were catastrophic. By the way, is it true that on the day of the Butler event, that Secret Service transferred an agent from President Trump to the First Lady?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. That's not true.

Senator CRUZ. That's been widely reported.

Mr. ROWE. It's not true. There was one airport agent that actually went on the manpower request for the Trump detail. They handled the arrival at the airport for the First Lady and—

Senator CRUZ. What is the relative size of the Trump detail compared to the detail that is assigned to the President or the First lady?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, the former president travels with a full shift just like the President.

Senator CRUZ. The exact same size. Is that your testimony? That President Trump had the same size detail that President Biden has?

Mr. ROWE. On the day-of in Butler? The number of agents surrounding him? It is the same number of agents surrounding the President today. There is a difference between a sitting president who also not only has—

Senator CRUZ. Hold on. You are using President in a way that is not clear. Is it your testimony that in Butler, Pennsylvania, Donald Trump had the same number of agents protecting him that Joe Biden has at a comparable event?

Mr. ROWE. I am telling you the shift, the close protection shift surrounding.

Senator CRUZ. That's a yes or no.

Mr. ROWE. That's what you asked me, Senator, and I am trying to answer it.

Senator CRUZ. You are not answering it. Is it the same number of agents or not?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, there is a difference between the sitting President of the United States.

Senator CRUZ. What's the difference?

Mr. ROWE. The difference?

Senator CRUZ. 2X, 3X, 5X, 10X?

Mr. ROWE. National command authority to launch a nuclear strike, Sir. There are other assets—

Senator CRUZ. I am not asking other assets.

Mr. ROWE [continuing]. That travel with the President—

Senator CRUZ. How many more agents travel—

Mr. ROWE [continuing]. That the former president will not get.

Senator CRUZ. Sir, you are refusing to answer.

Mr. ROWE. But the number of Secret Service agents protecting him—

Senator CRUZ. Sir, stop interrupting me.

Mr. ROWE. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. You are refusing to answer clear and direct questions. I am asking the relative difference in the number of agents between those assigned to Donald Trump and those assigned to Joe Biden. I am not asking why you assign more to Joe Biden. I am asking is the difference. Is it 2X, 3X, 5X, 10X?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I will get you that number so you can see it with your own eyes.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Marshall, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARSHALL

Senator MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Director Rowe, there was probably 10 buildings within sniper range of President Trump on that afternoon. Why was the building being used by the sniper not in the security zone?

Mr. ROWE. That's a question that I have asked, Senator. There was a decision that we were going to construct the site and it was going to maintain within the Butler Farm Show site. That building, that AGR was right on the curtilage of our outer perimeter. It is something that I—again, having been there and walked it, I had a hard time understanding why.

Senator MARSHALL. There's no protocol that says anything within 300, 500 yards, or in direct line of the President should be in or out of the security zone. There's not a protocol that describes that?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, what we try to do is we try to either control the high ground or mitigate line of sight concerns.

Senator MARSHALL. OK. You have stated that on multiple occasions, President Trump's team was denied more of a detail, more assets. Who denies that? Who is the person that denies that, generally speaking?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, there's a process. Again, there's a conversation had with the detail.

Senator MARSHALL. There's got to be a buck stopping. There's got to be someone. Who is the person? Is it an individual within the DC agency? Is it someone in the Pittsburgh office who denies this?

Mr. ROWE. It has nothing to do with the Pittsburgh office, sir. It is a conversation between not only the detail, the field office, but also—

Senator MARSHALL. I do not want to know the conversation. I want to know who makes the decision.

Mr. ROWE. The decision, sir, it's our process between the Office of Protective Operations and the Office of Investigations.

Senator MARSHALL. Is there a title for this position?

Mr. ROWE. We affectionately call it the War Room, and it's where all of our logistics files into.

Senator MARSHALL. It's a room that makes the decision?

Mr. ROWE. It is a staffing and assignments officer.

Senator MARSHALL. OK. Is the Secret Service required to do a briefing with all entities of law enforcement involved in the event in the days leading up to the event and the day of the event?

Mr. ROWE. We do a police meeting, sir.

Senator MARSHALL. Is it required? Is it part of your standard operating procedure (SOP)?

Mr. ROWE. The police meeting is what initiates the advance, and that is what is required.

Senator MARSHALL. Was this meeting held on that day?

Mr. ROWE. The police meeting took place on the days prior to that.

Senator MARSHALL. Do you have documentation of that meeting actually happening?

Mr. ROWE. If we do, sir, I will get them to you.

Senator MARSHALL. But you are saying that it did not happen on the day of the event.

Mr. ROWE. Sir, I think what you are referring to is a briefing that the State and locals would have done with themselves. We did a briefing with our own folks.

Senator MARSHALL. Did your people meet with local law enforcement the day of the assassination attempt?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator MARSHALL. OK. You realize that local law enforcement says no. That that meeting never happened. That's why we need to get these people in to talk to us. This is why the FBI needs to be speaking up sooner than later and say whether that meeting did or did not happen. Surely, there's some type of documentation of that meeting one way or the other. Is there documentation of that meeting?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I can tell you that what you are referring to is the counter sniper team seconded to Butler ESU. Our personnel met with the team lead from Butler ESU, and they discussed areas of concern, areas of responsibility. That did in fact happen at the site on that day.

Senator MARSHALL. Director, I think you would agree with me that there were multiple individual and institutional failures the day of this assassination attempt. You have a \$3 billion budget, you are still 2,000 employees short, and in 2022, the Secret Service had a 48 percent departure rate. That tells me you either have a culture problem or just gross incompetence. Which one is it?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I would challenge that 48 percent departure rate. Let me get you some statistics that we have. It is not 48 percent.

Senator MARSHALL. But go back to the multiple failures that we saw on an individual basis, also systemic. I think it proves that there's either incompetence or some type of a culture problem within the ss.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I know you are not calling our workforce incompetent, and I know we do not have a culture problem. If anything, we are dedicated to making sure that we do not have mission failure. Let me get you the hiring numbers that we have because I think you will actually see that, no, we have actually done very well fairly recently. We are trying to make sure that we have the numbers that we need. Of course, we need more people. Everybody does. But let me get you those numbers, and I think let your own eyes see.

Senator MARSHALL. Would you also disagree with me when it's reported that almost 50 percent of the rank and file officers do not trust leadership within the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I think it's the right of every worker to talk bad about their boss.

Senator MARSHALL. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Hirono, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HIRONO

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Clearly there is a lot that the Secret Service has to, as answer for in this stunning security failure. But I do want to follow up on Mr. Abbate's testimony that an online profile of the shooter may have been found. You said it contains anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant postings. Can you elaborate, have you found anything further in that the shooter's profile?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, this was just discovered, as I mentioned, and it's being closely analyzed right now. We need to verify that it is in fact that it belonged to the now deceased shooter, and that he made these comments. That's why I felt it important in the interest of transparency to share that here, but add the caveat that we still have a lot of work to do which we are working on quickly to determine that.

It's of importance, I think, because if it is, in fact, the shooter that posted these comments, it's the first real indication where he's expressing what are described as extremist views and talking about political violence.

Senator HIRONO. I take it that once you determine that it was in fact that the shooter who posted these kinds of comments, that you will let the public know as well as this Committee.

Mr. ABBATE. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator HIRONO. I think, in fact, it is very important that many of the perpetrators of mass shootings, et cetera, have these kinds of postings online that are very anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, of anti-everything. It is really important as we determine the kind of profile for many of these shooters, that we understand how critical it is that we are careful how critically important it is that people are careful about what they are posting online, the misinformation, disinformation, everything else along those lines.

This is for Abbate, once again. What kind of firearm, what kind of weapon did Crooks use in the assassination attempt?

Mr. ABBATE. This was an AR-15-style rifle manufactured by a company named Panther Arms.

Senator HIRONO. Once again, many of the persons involved in these kinds of mass shootings use this particular kind of weapon. We know from similar hearings that the Judiciary Committee has had, that we are a nation awash in guns. In your view, shouldn't we be doing more to prevent the easy accessibility of these kinds of firearms in our country?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, we are focused on collecting the facts here, and I am not going to comment on something like that.

Senator HIRONO. I know that a hesitancy to ask about firearms and all of that. I should think that as a law enforcement person, that you probably have some opinions along those lines. But you do not want to articulate what to many people in our country, there's a causal factor here; the easy accessibility of guns.

I want to ask that question because I think it's important that the American people understand that, we are a nation that is awash in guns, and we have more mass shootings than any other country. Yet, we have been unable to pass the kind of laws that prevent these kinds of firearms to be easily available. That we have not done enough to promote gun safety in our country.

Mr. Chair, I wanted to articulate that as like the elephant in the room that nobody wants to address, including apparently, our law enforcement officers. I am disappointed in that, but obviously, we have work to do to create a much safer environment, and to prevent persons who have these kinds of ideological perspectives and who are—I would say, who have these kinds of profiles to have such easy accessibility to the kind of firearms that can cause mass death and destruction.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Lankford, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

Senator LANKFORD. Mr. Chair, thank you.

Thank you, to both of you, for the testimony today. Director Rowe, future Vice President JD Vance was in my State this past week in Oklahoma City. I talked with some of the Secret Service folks that are there. They are doing a terrific job. I got a chance to be able to thank them, personally, for the tasks they are doing. I know the Oklahoma folks in Secret Service, and they are very dedicated, incredibly sharp people on that team.

I know this is a challenge to all Secret Service. This is something every Secret Service agent wakes up every single day and wants to avoid. Please continue to be able to pass on our gratitude for the work they do every single day and for what's happening out there. I appreciate that.

Mr. Abbate, I want to ask you about some of the interviews that have happened. You-all have done more than 400 interviews at this point for the counter sniper team that was local law enforcement, that was on the second floor overlooking that rooftop. Have they been interviewed at this point?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. I believe that each of them have been interviewed.

Senator LANKFORD. Do you know offhand if they were at their post at that time able to look across? That they were at that post at some times—do we know they were at that post at 6:08 to 6:11?

Mr. ABBATE. My understanding, and I want to be fair, I have not read the reports directly, but I have been briefed on some of it. They were at times during the timeframe we are talking about here on-post within the AGR building. I do believe, but I would want to confirm this, at some point one or more did venture out in an effort to locate and isolate the shooter.

Senator LANKFORD. We understand from the timeline that they were also looking for this individual that was suspicious that they had left that post, to be able to try to look for him on the ground at different points to try to be able to see if they could get a different perspective. What we are trying to figure out is during that time period that he actually climbed on the roof, assembled a firearm, or took a firearm with him or picked one up, whatever, it might have been there, that they were able to actually see him if they were able to look left, has been acknowledged in the photos that are up there?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, I do not know the exact timing and the movements of each officer that was out there, but what I would de-

rive from it is they were all focused on locating the shooter, the suspicious person at the time. Then as we have all seen, the one officer attempted to get on the roof directly—there were efforts going on in those final minutes, right on the video to try to get to this person.

Senator LANKFORD. We have one officer being boosted up by another officer—

Mr. ABBATE. Yes.

Senator LANKFORD [continuing]. To look up on the roof because people on the ground had said there's someone up there and they have a gun that's crawling on that roof. They climbed up to be able to see it. He turned around with a rifle, he came down, and then at that point he gets on the local radio that he has and says there's someone on the roof with a gun. Is that correct?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. I believe that that's accurate.

Senator LANKFORD. What's the rest of the radio communication? We have heard that first call in, we know it's about 30 seconds from the time he called in until the actual first shot rang out. What else was discussed on the radio during that 30-second time period?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, we have the radio communications. The local radio communications were recorded and captured, and we do have that as part of the investigation. The key points to me, that local officer communicating that he sees the individuals he's armed, that's at about 6:11 and some seconds, I think it's three seconds. Then he identifies it as a long gun. About 6:11 and 11 seconds. Then, the shots, which all happened quickly together, I believe happened within probably 30 seconds of that.

Senator LANKFORD. We are talking about over the radio because there's a command center there.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes.

Senator LANKFORD. Were all radios, including the local, as they are all being listened to, to try to be able to review. There's a statement that has the word "gun" in it that's coming out across that radio. We only know that first communication. We do not know what came back and forth on that. We would like to get transcripts of that conversation that was done, local law enforcement.

But coming into that command center, there's also the word "gun" coming through one of the radio frequencies, I would think that would be communicated pretty quickly to everybody across the spectrum. 30 seconds is not long, but that's a National Football League (NFL) play, plus a huddle, plus the next play—

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, sir.

Senator LANKFORD [continuing]. That's quite a bit of time still to be able to respond when Secret Service moved to be able to protect the President once the first shots were fired within two seconds, they are gathered around him. So, trying to be able to figure out where the word gun got lost in radio communication here and what else was said.

Mr. ABBATE. We will share the communications with you and the Committees. Senator, I will note just from my notes, there was effort within those minutes and seconds once the gun was announced. There's other communications where the local police are talking about deploying a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and re-

sponding and that they have the building surrounded. It's not in avoid. I do not want to give you the impression.

Senator LANKFORD. Right, I understand. But typically, I would assume for Secret Service, if they hear over the radio over something gun, they are moving to be able to protect the detail, either the person they are protecting at that point, the protectee, that they are moving pretty quickly at that point, if that's what's actually coming out. That's what I am trying to be able to figure out how that did not get communicated out to the people that were directly in front of the former president at that point.

The last question I would have, I only have a second left, is just was there any overhead drone? We have talked about counter drone, but any visibility that Secret Service had to be able to see the field and all the operation and their own ability?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. As was asked by another Senator earlier, it appears that there was an offer by a State or local agency to fly a drone on our behalf. I am getting to the bottom as to why we turned that down.

Senator LANKFORD. OK. Thank you.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Kennedy, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, am I saying your name right?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. You are the Deputy Director of the FBI. Is that correct?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there any doubt in your mind or in the collective mind of the FBI that President Trump was shot in the ear by a bullet fired by the assassin, Crooks?

Mr. ABBATE. There is absolutely no doubt in the FBI's mind. It wasn't whether former president Trump was hit with a bullet and wounded in the ear. No doubt. There never has been. I have been part of this investigation since the very beginning and that has never been raised.

Senator KENNEDY. You are sure?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. It was not a space laser.

Mr. ABBATE. No.

Senator KENNEDY. It was not a Murder Hornet?

Mr. ABBATE. Absolutely not.

Senator KENNEDY. It was not Sasquatch.

Mr. ABBATE. No, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. It was a bullet?

Mr. ABBATE. It was a bullet, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Fired by Crooks.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. That hit President Trump in the ear and almost killed him?

Mr. ABBATE. 100 percent Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. OK. Glad we cleared that up. I do not want to get off the subject here. Did the FBI just settle two lawsuits?

One wholly, one in part in which the FBI agreed to give Peter Strzok \$1.2 million and Ms. Lisa Paige \$800,000.

Mr. ABBATE. It's my understanding, Senator, that the Department of Justice was involved in that. Not the FBI.

Senator KENNEDY. The FBI had nothing to do with it.

Mr. ABBATE. There may have been consultation with our General Counsel's office, but.

Senator KENNEDY. Does the FBI have to sign off on it?

Mr. ABBATE. I don't know the answer to that. I don't believe so, but I would want to confirm that.

Senator KENNEDY. I would like you to—this would be the same Lisa Paige who said to Mr. Strzok, "Trump's not ever going to become President. Right? To which Mr. Strzok said, "No, no, he won't. We will stop." That's the Peter Strzok and Lisa Paige I am talking about. I need to know if the FBI signed off on this lawsuit.

Mr. ABBATE. We will get that answer for you, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Then I need to know who signed off on it. Did you sign off on it?

Mr. ABBATE. I absolutely did not, and would never sign off on something like that.

Senator KENNEDY. Did Chris Ray sign off on it, the settlement?

Mr. ABBATE. I don't believe he did. Nor do I think you would have.

Senator KENNEDY. You need to let me know who signed off on this. If anyone at the FBI. Was Merrick Garland who agreed to do this? Is that right?

Mr. ABBATE. Senator, I do not know who signed off on that.

Senator KENNEDY. Hell, somebody had to agree to it. I have settled a lawsuit before. The client's got to agree to it. You are the client.

Mr. ABBATE. Understood. I am going to direct it to the Department of Justice to answer those questions.

Senator KENNEDY. Get me that information, if you would.

Mr. Rowe, help me understand this. The assassin, Crooks, fired his first shot, as I understand it, at 6:12 p.m. He was about 140, 150 yards away. It's been reported that the government snipers, saw him on the roof 20 minutes before. Not two minutes, 20 minutes before. Is that correct?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that's first time I am hearing this. That is not correct, based on the information I have right now, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. When did the FBI snipers see him on the roof?

Mr. ROWE. Just secret service snipers, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. I am sorry. You are right.

Mr. ROWE. That's an insult, sir. No, I am just kidding.

Senator KENNEDY. I understand. I apologize. When did the Secret Service snipers, one of whom ultimately shot the assassin, Crooks, first see him on that roof?

Mr. ROWE. Sir immediately upon the shots being fired are snipers.

Senator KENNEDY. I know that, but when did they first see him? You got a guy lying on a roof. You got snipers in an elevated position. They can look down on the roof. You have the guy lying there with a gun pointed at the former president of the United States.

They shot him. Good for them. He's now dead as Woodrow Wilson. That's a good thing. I am sorry. God forgive me, but it's a good thing. But when did the snipers first see him?

Mr. ROWE. As soon as he presented himself as a target and a threat to the President, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. When was that?

Mr. ROWE. He fires, initially, a volley. I believe it was three shots.

Senator KENNEDY. No, he fired at 6:12 p.m.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. OK. This first shot.

Mr. ROWE. Within 15.5 seconds of the first shot, he's neutralized.

Senator KENNEDY. Here's what people are asking.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Crooks was up there. The snipers at some point saw him.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Our snipers because they killed him.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. When did they first see him? It has been reported repeatedly that the snipers first saw him 20 minutes before. That's more than a quarter in an NFL football game.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You do not know the answer to that?

Mr. ROWE. I do know the answer, sir. I am telling you that—

Senator KENNEDY. What is the answer?

Mr. ROWE. No, they did not see him. They only saw him—

Senator KENNEDY. They never saw him.

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. They did not.

Senator KENNEDY. How could they not see the guy? How could they not see him? They are in an elevated position. They are checking rooftops. They are looking around.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. There are two government snipers. How could they not see him there? He was big as Dallas, lying there with a gun pointed at the President. How could they not see him?

Mr. ROWE. Because I believe he was obscured by that roof, sir. He did not pop up—

Senator KENNEDY. The roof is flat with ridges.

Mr. ROWE. He's below the line where they would have seen him, sir. He did have concealment. I am not going to say it's cover. He did have concealment, and then ultimately gets into firing position and fires. Within 15.5 seconds of his first shot, he's neutralized.

Senator KENNEDY. I am gone way over you. You gentlemen need to answer these questions. Mr. Deputy Director, get me that information about those lawsuits.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

Senator ROSEN. Thank you, Chair Peters, and Ranking Member Paul, for holding this important hearing on the attempted assassination of former president Trump.

I am grateful for everyone's service and dedication. However, it's critical that this Committee get to the bottom of what happened that day so that we can prevent any future catastrophic security failures, and ensure that nothing like this happens again.

Director Rowe, given that the event took place in a rural area, we have talked a lot about connectivity issues, was law enforcement at a disadvantage due to a lack of or limited connectivity? Why is the Secret Service not adopted a dedicated satellite-enabled Wi-Fi connection, which would facilitate integrated communication, enabled device connectivity to include drones and allowing for the sharing of real time intelligence?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, thank you for that question. Based on what I have seen, that radio connectivity, cellular was an issue that day. With respect to the satellite broadband, that is something that I have tasked our CIO and then we are getting some support from the Department of Homeland Security on. We will start to leverage whatever asset we have to ensure that connectivity.

Senator ROSEN. I can tell you that we have those Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) in Homeland Security, those special event ratings that we have for things like the Super Bowl. We have it a lot in Las Vegas. They do bring these mobile units to be sure that we have all the dedicated Wi-Fi cell service and integration that is absolutely necessary for securing a huge event. I look forward to hearing about that. Thank you.

I want to talk a little bit about intelligence for lone wolf actors. Because although we have not been made aware of any specific intelligence, the Secret Service or others had in the shooter before the event, we do know that we have intel on Iranian threats against the former president.

Again, Acting Director Rowe, could talk to us about how you utilize intelligence collection as a way of mitigating threats from State actors like Iran, compared to lone wolf actors, what it seems to be like the attempted assassin that we have here in Crooks.

What are the specific challenges with the intelligence collection as a mitigation tool against lone wolf actors versus state actors?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, first, let me preface by saying the Secret Service is not a member of the intelligence community (IC). However, we are their biggest consumers of information. We receive that information regularly, especially as it pertains to our protective mission and the people that we protect. We have embeds with the FBI through their national Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

Our agents are basically embeds and are able to not only receive information, but also follow up on investigations that may have a nexus or a direction of interest toward one of our protectees. We have an excellent working relationship with the FBI. We have an excellent working relationship with the intelligence community.

We are not collectors, we are consumers of finished analytic products that the intelligence community or the FBI produces. We ingest them, and then we use that to adjust our protective posture. We do this daily, weekly, all of the time. It's not only for protective for protectees, but also the events and sites that we protect on, on a permanent or temporary basis.

Largely, a lot of the people that come to our attention, and in the case of the assailant, to me, as I overlay him on over top of, say,

John Hinkley who tried to shoot President Reagan, I see an individual based on information that I have now. Some of the great work that the FBI has done, we have an individual who's a loner. We have an individual who was focused on Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Hinkley traveled the 1980 campaign. We know that he followed President Carter. On March 1981, he happened to show up in Washington, D.C. and he saw an opportunity to try to attack President Reagan.

When it comes to the Secret Service, 1981 was a watershed moment for us. We have people that are, for whatever reason, fixated on carrying out an attack against the President of the United States, or one of our protectees. In this instance, you have the assailant who was a loner, obviously. He was researching, he had researched the Democratic National Convention. He had researched, and Googled, or used a search engine about the former president. I think he had moved toward an idea that he was going to try to do something.

When I look at this, we do not have a challenge with the FBI or the intelligence community. I think what we always try to wrestle with is trying to line up and see people as they are starting to head down a pathway toward violence.

It's something that we have spent a lot of time and resources in with our National Threat Assessment Center to try to gain a better understanding so that we can help our agents in the field as they are doing these protective intelligence cases and these investigations to be able to make a determination. Is somebody generally a threat or do they need mental health, or do they need some other type of service?

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time's over. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you. Senator Cotton, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COTTON

Senator COTTON. At the onset, I want to express, as many Members have, as President Trump did, the admiration and respect for the bravery and skill of the officers who were onsite that day; Secret Service officers, as well as all the local law enforcement.

As it happened, my nine-year-old son was watching with me that afternoon, and it was hard to get him to turn away from it. He asked who all those men and women were who jumped on Mr. Trump. I said, in layman's terms, "Those are his bodyguards." He said, "What are they doing?" I said, "They are protecting him from a bullet." He said, "Actually?" I said, "Yes." He said, "For real?" I said, yes. It was hard for him to process that. But as a reminder, I told him that there are men and women in the Secret Service, in law enforcement, in the military who are willing to die for our country.

It's an important lesson that I think that everyone should take away from this. That you had very brave men and women on the ground there who were doing their job to protect this country, to protect a former president and a nominee for president as they do every day for so many other protectees. Obviously, there were failures in the planning and preparation for this event.

Mr. Rowe, we have heard that the shooter had a golf range finder. Was that not on the list of prohibited items at an event like this?

Mr. ROWE. Currently, it is not on the list of prohibitive items, but we are going to make that change. Senator.

Senator COTTON. John Kennedy cannot get into an Louisiana State University (LSU) football game with a flask.

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, I can.

Senator COTTON. He probably can, but he is not supposed to. It just seems like common sense that you do not need a laser range finder at an event like this. It feels like that a lot of that was just the lack of common sense being exercised. Are officers not empowered on the front line to use common sense to say, like, if a guy has a laser range finder, he should be detained or at least stopped. That's why he's carrying around.

If you have a building like this that's not secure from 150 meters away, someone, even the frontline lowest level, most junior officer should be able to kind of like send up the red flag immediately and say, like, we need to halt everything right now and figure out what the hell is going on. Do officers not feel empowered to use that kind of conversation?

Mr. ROWE. I would hope they would, Senator. I can tell you from our uniform division officers that run our magnetometer screening, they do a tremendous job. Even though something may or may not be on the prohibitive items list, they are well trained and they do exercise that that good common sense.

Senator COTTON. I want every one of your officers all around the country to hear that acting director wants them to exercise common sense. It does not have to be policy or protocol or procedure. They should exercise common sense. Thank you for that.

It was reported right before Ms. Cheatle's hearing last week that, in fact, President Trump's detail had requested more resources and those had been denied. She said that she did not deny those resources. You have testified this morning that you did not either. So, who did? The Secret Service is not the post office. It's not this vast bureaucracy. Right? Like I am not surprised to hear that you knew the counter sniper. It's a small agency and you have a lot of career officers. Like, surely, you have gotten to the bottom by now on whose desk this request landed and who denied it.

Mr. ROWE. Senator, sometimes when they make a request, they may not have the asset available. For example, the detail may say, hey, we want 15 magnetometers. What we will look at it based on what the event size, we will say, hey, listen, we are going to send 10 based on our protocols of screening. We have a flow rate of how many people we can put through.

When it comes to a counter sniper or something like that, because I know that's been the subject of some media reporting where they have requested counter snipers, we do have a finite number of counter snipers. What we try to do is, if we cannot fill that asset and that's where we will say, hey, we cannot fill this assignment.

However, through the field office, they will use local law enforcement resources. In those situations, for example in the one that has been the subject of a lot of reporting in South Carolina, they in fact did use local assets to be able to do that. There were three counter

sniper teams. One of them was formerly with the Secret Service Uniform Division. They actually use the same practices that we use.

It's not that there was a drop in the capability. They actually use the best practices that we would use. The asset may be denied by Secret Service between the War Room and that conversation with the detail in the field. But that does not equate to a vulnerability or a gap.

Senator COTTON. OK. One final question about the Iran threat. As you know, Iran made credible threats against several former Trump Administration officials, many of whom still have government-provided security details to this day. Ms. Cheatle removed Secret Service protection from Robert O'Brien last year. Were you involved in that decision?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, he was a memorandum protectee meaning that the President authorized protection for him. We do not weigh in on who gets protection.

Senator COTTON. You are still protecting some others. I won't reveal their names. You are still protecting others, and other personal security officers in the Federal Government are protecting other officials. Like, who made the decision that Robert O'Brien no longer needed a security detail despite Iran's ongoing credible threats?

Mr. ROWE. I can tell you, sir, it was not the Secret Service. We do not factor into that decision at all.

Senator COTTON. Can you take a look at why that happened now that you are in charge and consider the possibility that he might still need that protection given all of his counterparts in the Trump Administration still have protection?

Mr. ROWE. I will do so, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Again, I am not going to reveal the protective details, but I am pretty confident that the agency can get this done. I think it needs to get done if you look at the kind of ongoing threats that he and all these others face.

Mr. ROWE. I will, sir.

Senator COTTON. Despite all the resource constraints we have talked about today, he's not the President of the United States. He does not have an 18-car motorcade, nor do any of the others. I think he needs that protective detail. Now that you are in charge, I am asking you to take a new look at that and also talk to your supervisors inside the Department about whether you can spare just that small limited amount of resources. OK?

Senator COTTON. I will, sir.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Welch, you are recognized for your questions?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WELCH

Senator WELCH. Thank you very much.

First of all, thank you both for the tremendous work you do, and for all the folks behind you and under you. So thank you for that. I kind of want to follow up a little bit on Senator Cotton. There's three issues that have been raised. One is the selection of who gets protection. You have addressed that just now. The other is whether it's a budget issue which I do not think necessarily think it is.

But then there's the operational question. Was this an operational failure? It appears to me that's where the focus should be. One of the issues on the operations is the capacity of people who are part of the team, both Secret Service and also the local law enforcement. Their capacity to act on what they see.

This is what Senator Cotton, I think, was talking about with common sense. You mentioned that the sniper was authorized immediately to act, he was not checking in with anyone, right, and he took out the shooter as quickly as he could. But according to the time line, local law enforcement captured two photographs of the shooter at 5:10. At 5:32, local law enforcement officers a spot of suspicious of person who turned out to be the shooter with a phone and a range finder. And 5:46, the alert was so significant that sniper's text photo of the shooter from where he was initially spotted to the USSS lead sniper.

How is it that where you had these experienced law enforcement people who understood the gravity of the responsibility of protecting the former president, none of these actionable observations resulted in action. I will direct that first to you, Deputy Director Abbate.

Mr. ABBATE. Thank you, Senator. From the FBI standpoint, we are simply collecting the facts. We have interviewed most of the officers now.

Senator WELCH. OK. Acting Director Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. So, in that Senator, I think there was a sense of this guy is standing out and that's why he came to the attention of local law enforcement.

Senator WELCH. No, I get that. That's my point.

Mr. ROWE. Right.

Senator WELCH. He did stand out.

Mr. ROWE. Correct.

Senator WELCH. But nothing happened. There were alerts, but there was, like, you have somebody suspicious, why didn't somebody go interact with this suspicious person like right away?

Mr. ROWE. They were attempting to locate him. I cannot answer that question as to why. If they took a picture of him, and they thought he was unusual, suspicious, not acting normal, why there was not—and I think, again, there was probably an assumption on the part of that officer that took that picture that, oh, some uniform or somebody will go eventually and, and walk up to this—

Senator WELCH. See, that's what seems like an operational failure. Somebody else will do it. Is the responsibility of an officer to alert some other officer that they think somebody might be suspicious, or the first officer who sees a suspicious person can take the next step to actually engage that person or talk to someone very, very close to it and say, engage that person. This guy was wandering around for quite a while.

Mr. ROWE. He was. I cannot put myself in the mind of that officer.

Senator WELCH. I am not asking you to do that. I am asking, how does the process work? So that is the job of the leaders as opposed to the officers? Are they empowered to act immediately upon the observation of someone who looks very suspicious, particularly when they have the rangefinder? They were in a place where it

really was not about seeing the rally. It was, as we see, it was a place where you get a good view of former president Trump. I mean, that is a leadership issue, right?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, that officer did not work for me. That was a State and local officer that made that observation, took that picture. I can tell you from the Secret Service perspective, and we do this routinely, is that when people come to our attention, we locate them. We go up, we do a field interview, or we try to do a consensual encounter.

Senator WELCH. OK. That's the operational thing I am talking about. If you do it within Secret Service, you-all are in charge. You are relying on local law enforcement assets. Those folks, and they did their job here, up to a point where they identified this person passed information along, but nobody acted. The empowerment to that local officer, I would think has to come be transmitted through the Secret Service. Maybe in the earlier briefings, but you know, where you say, folks, you see somebody suspicious, you engage that suspicious person.

Mr. ROWE. I don't disagree, Senator. It goes back to my comments at the beginning of the hearing, that we need to be very direct to our local law enforcement counterparts so that they understand exactly what are their expectations.

Senator WELCH. I yield back. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you. Senator Tillis, you recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TILLIS

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, Mr. Rowe, thank you for being here.

Mr. Rowe, do you have a picture? I was watching your testimony earlier. Do you have a photograph of the vantage point from the Secret Service snipers?

Mr. ROWE. I do. Let's see.

Senator TILLIS. There were two. Is that correct?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir. Stage left and stage right.

Senator TILLIS. OK. I do not know if you have a vantage point of both of them or not.

Mr. ROWE. That's the vantage point of the sniper who neutralized the assailant.

Senator TILLIS. OK. Would they have also been impaired in terms of actually seeing him until he popped his head up?

Mr. ROWE. The sniper on the stage's right sides, Senator, they had an obstructive view because of that tree.

Senator TILLIS. They had an obstructive view.

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator TILLIS. The one thing, and this discussion that I do not believe that a sniper saw someone on the roof 20 minutes before just does not make sense to me. It sounds like the one who took the shot probably saw him for the first time about a split second before he pulled the trigger.

Mr. ROWE. That's my assessment, sir.

Senator TILLIS. First off, I would like to clarify the requests that have been made of a lot of people so that we get the information in a good form. I think it would be helpful at least all the way back

to, I think, November 5, 2022, I believe, when President Trump announced that he was running for reelection. I think it would be helpful if we could just get a matrix of any request for additional security.

The resolution of that request. Was it honored? Was it denied? Was it downsized? If you could give us that, I think that that's going to be the best way versus giving us mounds and mounds of paper. If you can do that, I know you are looking at the same thing. I have heard from you that any subsequent request for field requests are being honored. I believe that that's true. Is that your testimony?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator TILLIS. OK, thank you. I am more worried about the 24 to 30 seconds between the time, I believe, a local law enforcement officer was hoisted on the shoulders of another police officer, saw a person armed, less than 200 yards away from the President, who I believe jumped down. What happened in those 24 or 30 seconds.

Obviously, there's no such thing as a panic button. The first thing you would think is you had panic, you cover the President, get him off stage. None of that happened. What happened? Is it just that I hear a text message is what actually happened in the 30 seconds where a law enforcement officer knew that a gun was pointed in the direction of the President from a fairly short range.

What actually did those folks who did have knowledge of exactly what was happening and could probably infer what was about to happen, what did they do? Mr. Abbate or Mr. Rowe, either one, based on your interviews.

Mr. ABBATE. Thank you, Senator. From the interviews you know, the officers in the immediate vicinity were operating with urgency at that point to get to this person. But he was on the roof. The officer who had looked over the edge, based on what I have been told, the shooter turned toward him with the rifle. That's what the officer observed. He was under threat himself in that second. He had to retreat and step down and get back to the ground in order to protect himself and keep him safe from potential rifle fire. But once he got to the ground, along with other officers, there were Butler County local officers, Pennsylvania State Police, they were moving around trying to find to get to this guy.

Senator TILLIS. Clearly, we have an operational problem here, because we had more than 20 seconds to have somehow cut through all the crap and the communications, whatever impediments there were have to be removed. First off, I love law enforcement. I wear the blue pin every day. They do great work. Secret Service did phenomenal work on the stage, but they failed because their job is to protect the public, and they needed to put themselves in harm's way to stop him.

Now, I will let the interviews go through, but there was a massive failure. There were at least two law enforcement officers that knew a guy was about to pull the trigger at the President. I am just not really happy with the fact that we could not have communicated, covered President Trump, and try to secure the situation.

I am going to let the investigation go forward. I think it's very important to point out that we cannot let a scenario go in the future where 20 seconds can lapse when a law enforcement officer

within two football fields of a former president of the United States has material knowledge that somebody's about to get shot at on stage and we do not have instantaneous response. In the old days, maybe you would just shoot a gun in the air. I know for a lot of reasons why they did not do that, but there had to be some way to actually diffuse that situation. It did not happen on July the 13th.

I just want to end by saying, Mr. Rowe, I think you have been forthcoming in your answers. I know you are frustrated. I have seen you twice now. You are clearly embarrassed by what happened. You do not think there's any reasonable explanation. To my colleagues who are worried about communications, they should spend times in their local government and State legislatures to understand just how bad communication is between law enforcement and first responders. We need to invest in this infrastructure that was also a part of the failure.

But if you can please get to me and get to this Committee, a chronology of requests, accepted, denied, and the reasons for, I think that's going to be very helpful.

Mr. ROWE. I will, Senator. Thank you.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you.

Chairman PETERS. Senator Blackburn, you are recognized for your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLACKBURN

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to each of you for your patience and for being here today.

Director Rowe, I want to come to you first because a counter sniper has decided to speak out about the culture at your agency. I think it is very telling. He sent an email, and I am going to quote from that. "This agency needs to change, and if not now, when the next assassination in 30 days."

But here's what I want to talk with you about, because in this email, he says, and I am quoting again, "The motto of the USSS is CYA, and every supervisor is doing it." Now, that's the end of his quote. You are the guy in charge, and you are one of those supervisors. You have been a career guy there at the Secret Service. The public has lost trust in the ability to execute the mission to protect. I want to know how you feel about the fact that employees in your agency are worried about covering their behind and not worried about protecting a former president.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Senator. I am hurt by that email, but not in the way you think I am saying it. I am hurt because my people are hurting right now. We need them.

Senator BLACKBURN. Then why did somebody delete the email?

Mr. ROWE. I will get back to you on that, Senator.

Senator BLACKBURN. The agency deleted the email.

Mr. ROWE. But may I address your question?

Senator BLACKBURN. Yes, please.

Mr. ROWE. I will get back to you as to whether the email was deleted or not. My agency is hurting. Emotions are raw. I actually want to hear more from that duty officer. That technician in his email, he referenced that he had spent time serving our nation as a United States Marine. That he is a 20-year professional of the

Secret Service. I am committed to being a change agent. Meaning, I am committed to reviewing some of these things. I looked at the points in his email very quickly. I saw it as I was on my way over here this morning. I want to have further conversations, not only with him, but also the counter sniper supervisor——

Senator BLACKBURN. If I may step back in, sir?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, ma'am.

Senator BLACKBURN. All right. You want to talk with him? What about other whistleblowers? What about this culture? Are you going to allow these whistleblowers to speak out? Because it is troublesome if somebody went into the server and deleted that email, and I would hope you will get to the bottom of that and be able to provide some answers. Because this is, as you have heard from both sides, this is a situation that cannot be allowed to happen again.

Mr. ROWE. Yes, ma'am.

Senator BLACKBURN. Ever Mr. Abbate, and am I saying your name properly? We have heard it pronounced three different ways today in the hearing.

Mr. ABBATE. Abbate, Senator

Senator BLACKBURN. Abbate?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes. Thank you.

Senator BLACKBURN. You had mentioned a social media account that espoused anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic views, but you did not say what platform that was on and what the username was. This is Crooks that we are discussing.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. That's Crooks. I did not want to comment on it because we have not fully confirmed yet, and I thought that—as soon as we confirm and certify that——

Senator BLACKBURN. Would you provide that?

Mr. ABBATE. I will provide it to you.

Senator BLACKBURN. That, and also the age at which he had those feelings. Then we understand that the Gab account is pro-immigration, pro-lockdown, leftist views. Is that accurate?

Mr. ABBATE. I have not seen it directly, but I believe from what I have been told, that is accurate. With the Gab account, though that's been publicly revealed through the CIO and other things, we are still working to certify and verify that that's his account also. But it does have differing points of view it would appear.

Senator BLACKBURN. OK. What age and how fresh is that Gab account?

Mr. ABBATE. The Gab account, based on my recollection, the comments in there or the messaging is from about 2021, I believe.

Senator BLACKBURN. OK. The other preceded that, maybe he was age 14?

Mr. ABBATE. Yes, Senator. The other account that we talked about was in the 2019, 2020 timeframe. It would have been in the couple years right before the Gab——

Senator BLACKBURN. Right before that.

Mr. ABBATE. Yes.

Senator BLACKBURN. Are there other accounts that you-all are currently verifying and receiving information from?

Mr. ABBATE. As I mentioned, we have issued a bunch of legal processes and we are still awaiting returns from a number of the companies to include other social media companies as well.

Senator BLACKBURN. OK. My time has expired. Thank you for your patience today. Thank you for the information. We look forward to getting more information. Director Rowe, we are going to hold you to being a change agent because things at the Secret Service absolutely have to change. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman PETERS. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony here today. Certainly, what happened on July 13th, could and should have been prevented from what I have heard today. I am certainly grateful to our witnesses for their candid answers and for helping to provide additional clarity and new information about the circumstances surrounding this attack.

Acting Director Rowe, some of what you have said today conflicts with information and accounts that we have received from local law enforcement that we have had the opportunity to talk with. They have been voluntarily and I will say expeditiously cooperating with our bipartisan investigation, which we certainly appreciate.

But we now need to speak with Secret Service agents directly who are directly involved. I would say that you need to make them available as soon as possible. Those, those interviews cannot start weeks from now or months from now. Time is of the essence when memories are fresh, and you can get the information that is most important to us.

My question for you as we wrap up this hearing, acting Director Rowe, will you commit to having those agents available for this Committee to interview as soon as possible in a matter of days, not weeks, matter of days?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Chairman PETERS. Great. Thank you.

Certainly, the American people deserve to know what went wrong, and they deserve accountability for those security failures. As we continue our bipartisan investigation into security failures that day and any underlying systemic issues, we will continue working to follow the facts, get clear answers, and make important recommendations to ensure that a security failure like this never happens again.

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 5 p.m. on August 14, 2024, for the submission of statements and for the questions for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman PETERS. This hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

**Chairman Peters Opening Statement as Prepared for Delivery
Full Committee Hearing: Pennsylvania Shooting Investigation
July 25, 2024**

The Committees will come to order.

Just over two weeks ago, a gunman fired shots at former president Donald Trump. This assassination attempt wounded the former president and caused the death of Corey Comperatore – a husband, father of two, and former fire chief who was attending the rally with his family. David Dutch and James Copenhaver – who were also attending the rally – were injured in the attack.

Let me be clear – this was an attack on our democracy. Americans should be able to attend a political rally and express their political beliefs without fear of violence. And political candidates for our nation’s highest office should be confident that their safety will never be compromised for their service. Although we are still learning about the shooter’s motive, this attack was a shocking reminder that the threat of political violence is alive and well in our country.

By all accounts, this was an inexcusable security and planning failure – and we need to get all of the facts about what happened that day and how we can ensure an attack like this is never allowed to happen again.

Today’s panel of witnesses lead the men and women who protect our top leaders and are investigating this crime. I want to thank them for being here today, as well as the Secret Service and FBI for a very productive and informative briefing last week.

Today, our witnesses will help us begin to answer critical questions and get the information we need to implement reforms that are clearly needed to strengthen security protocols for the U.S. Secret Service and the people who receive their protection.

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has already begun that work. This discussion comes in the midst of a bipartisan investigation that Senator Paul and I launched shortly after the assassination attempt took place. Our teams are still collecting critical information, speaking to law enforcement, and piecing together the details of this event.

This past weekend, a bipartisan team of our investigators – along with key staff from Senator Blumenthal and Senator Johnson’s offices – travelled to Pennsylvania to speak with local law enforcement officials, review critical information from security officials who were working alongside the Secret Service, and see the site of the shooting firsthand.

I want to thank the incredibly brave local law enforcement officers in and around Butler County who responded that afternoon and who met with my staff this past weekend. They have helped to answer tough questions and discuss in detail how this event unfolded. I also want to thank the owners of the Butler County Farm Show and American Glass Research for allowing my staff and law enforcement to walk the grounds and examine the roof of the building the gunman was able to access. We greatly appreciate your assistance.

I have also requested documents – along with Senators Paul, Blumenthal and Johnson – related to security preparations, intelligence gathering on potential violence prior to the attack, and detailed explanations of the security response from federal, state and local agencies. As part of our ongoing investigation, we also seek to speak with additional federal law enforcement personnel – including Secret Service agents who were responsible for securing this event.

Today's hearing is an important opportunity to ask critical questions and begin to give the American people the transparency and the answers they deserve. There are still many unanswered questions. We need additional information about the Secret Service's advanced planning efforts, and decisions surrounding sniper and counter-sniper team use, placement, and coordination. We also need answers about what appears to be a problematic communications system that limited efforts to relay information and respond as events unfolded.

And while today is focused on asking difficult questions about what went wrong, I also want to thank the men and women of the Secret Service, who in an instant will lay their lives on the line to protect our nation's leaders. They have incredibly challenging jobs – and they must continue their mission no matter what our hearing and investigation reveals.

I am grateful to our Senate Judiciary Committee colleagues for joining us in this important discussion given their key role in oversight of both of the agencies represented before us today. It's very clear that the U.S. Senate is focused on productive conversations that will generate real answers and real reforms. I appreciate all of the work from members of both of our committees to help achieve that essential goal.



**RONALD L. ROWE, JR.
ACTING DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE**

**BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
AND
SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE**

**AT A JOINT FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ENTITLED
“EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES LEADING TO THE
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP”**

JULY 30, 2024

Good morning, Chairman Peters, Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished Members of the Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

A critical part of the Secret Service mission is protecting our nation's current and former government leaders. The attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump on Saturday, July 13, 2024, at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a failure on multiple levels.

I join you and all Americans in condemning the horrific assault on former President Trump, Corey Comperatore, James Copenhaver, and David Dutch. I extend my deepest sympathies to the Comperatore family and my sincere wishes for Mr. Copenhaver and Mr. Dutch's continued recovery. These Americans were attacked while participating in our open and free democratic process—a process that represents the greatest ideals on which our country was founded.

Before I begin, I want to commend the heroic actions of the men and women of the Secret Service on July 13th. Our special agents shielded the former President with their bodies while shots were still being fired, selflessly willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without hesitation. I am extremely proud of these actions and those taken by the counter sniper team and the tactical teams.

I would also like to express my gratitude to our federal, State, and local partners. We rely on these critical relationships, which have developed over decades of daily collaboration, to secure protective events and conduct criminal investigations. These dedicated men and women help strengthen our protective and investigative mission.

As you are aware, there are multiple ongoing investigations of the attack and the security failures that occurred that day. I pledge my full support to those inquiries so the Secret Service, your Committees, and the American people have a thorough and complete understanding of what happened leading up to and during July 13th. I welcome any conclusions and recommendations from those inquiries, particularly those recommendations that will help the Secret Service strengthen its protective operations.

However, I will not wait for the results of those findings to assess where we failed that day. I have taken, and will continue to take, immediate steps to ensure we do not repeat those failures. Since my appointment as the Acting Director one week ago, I identified gaps in our security on July 13th and have implemented corrective actions. I would like to take a moment to outline some of those actions.

One of my first actions as Acting Director was traveling to the Butler Farm Show site, which was no longer a crime scene, to better understand how our protection failed. I inspected the site and the AGR building. I went to the roof of the AGR building where the assailant fired shots and laid in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. What I saw made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer, and a twenty-five-year veteran with the Secret Service, I cannot defend why that roof was not better secured. To prevent similar lapses from occurring in the future, I directed

our personnel to ensure every event site security plan is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it is implemented.

It is clear to me that other protective enhancements could have strengthened our security at the Butler event. As such, I have directed the expanded use of Unmanned Aerial Systems, commonly referred to as drones, at protective sites to help detect threats on roofs and other elevated areas. I have also directed resources to facilitate our protective site communications—particularly our communications with our State and local partners where a delay, of even a few seconds in communication, can make the difference in life and death. These resources will provide enhanced radio interoperability and common operating picture communications that were not present in Butler.

In addition, I have instructed that asset requests for Secret Service protective details be approved expeditiously and have ordered the maximum use of Secret Service special agents, Uniformed Division officers, and technical support personnel at protective sites to address this heightened security environment.

Since July 13th, the Secret Service has implemented these and other enhanced protective measures to ensure the people and places we protect are safe. We have elevated the protective posture of all protectees and are reinforcing protective details appropriately. We are actively conducting threat assessments for each protectee and will continue to make operational adjustments as a result of this threat-based analysis. We have initiated the protection of six additional protectees, including Vice Presidential nominee Senator J.D. Vance and his family, as well as Presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. In addition, substantial federal, State, and local security assets will be deployed in a coordinated effort to safeguard upcoming National Special Security Events, and we will make sure our protection of the Democratic National Convention, like our recent protection of the Republican National Convention, is strong and effective.

I have heard your calls for accountability, and I take them very seriously. Given the magnitude of this failure, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility is reviewing the actions and decision making of Secret Service personnel in the lead-up to, and on the day of, the attack. If this investigation reveals that Secret Service employees violated agency protocols, those employees will be held accountable to our disciplinary process. These actions are not being taken lightly; my strong view is that mistakes involving life and death warrant accountability.

We also took effective action to ensure agency records concerning July 13th were safeguarded. Agencywide records retention and preservation instructions were promptly issued directing all employees to preserve and retain records regarding the agency's planning, operations, and response to the July 13th attack. This was done quickly in recognition that this information would be critical for investigators and others to understand how and why the attack occurred.

With respect to Congressional investigations and requests for information, I instructed my staff to provide full cooperation and to respond expeditiously, on a continuing basis, to ensure you have the information you need to conduct your critical oversight responsibilities. The Secret

Service's production of responsive materials began last Friday to committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Additionally, I have made clear to agency personnel the importance of full cooperation with pending investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, the independent review directed by President Biden and established by Secretary Mayorkas, and the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility's mission assurance review.

In my testimony before you today, I will provide details on the Secret Service's advance security planning for the Butler Farm Show site, facts as we know them regarding the incident itself, known breakdowns in executing the security plan, and corrective actions the agency is taking to ensure that nothing like this ever happens again. Our shared goal is to get to the bottom of what led to this failure and implement meaningful change, we will need a transparent, factual assessment of what went wrong.

While I will be candid about what I know occurred that day, please understand that there is information that we still do not know, to be learned from hundreds of interviews and the review of thousands of pages of emails, messages, and documents that the investigations have undertaken.

There may be instances where I will be unable to share sensitive information regarding ongoing investigations and security methodologies in a public forum. I assure you, I will only refrain from sharing information that, if publicly released, could be used by potential criminal actors to escape detection or to thwart protective measures designed to keep our protectees safe from harm. Rest assured that if I must withhold highly sensitive information during this hearing, I will make every effort to promptly provide it to your committees through secure means.

I want to emphasize that some of the facts I am providing are preliminary. Although I am confident that the information I am sharing with you today is accurate, facts may later come to light, particularly facts that may be revealed by the multiple ongoing and thorough investigations that are underway, that may contradict or supplement my current understanding. While I will be sure to correct the record if subsequent investigation reveals any information I provide today is inaccurate, I realize it is critical to share as much information as I can now to help deepen your committees' and the public's understanding of what I have learned—even if it is preliminary—about what happened on July 13th.

While I will elaborate in response to your questions, I want to summarize certain events leading up to and following July 13th to help place those events in context.

The Secret Service's mission is driven by the schedules of our protectees. To that end, the agency moves with maximum agility and in partnership with others to protect our nation's leaders whenever and wherever they go, be it a campaign rally or an active war zone. One of the most difficult aspects of the mission is the extensive travel our people are subject to throughout the year. This is particularly true in presidential campaign years as protectees traverse the country, often conducting multiple protective visits in a single day.

Similar to the thousands of protective sites the Secret Service secures each year, security planning for the campaign rally held at the Butler Farm Show site began with an advance planning process. I do not believe that inadequate time to plan for this event was a factor in the failure.

On July 8th, personnel assigned to the agency's Pittsburgh Field Office conducted planning meetings and a site walk-through with law enforcement partners and campaign staff. During this meeting, Secret Service exchanged telephone numbers with all known participating law enforcement entities and established lines of responsibility. This was a critical part of the planning process as the campaign staff identified the location of the stage and podium, bleachers, and video screens that they would build-out for the event. The information I have at this time is that potential line of sight security issues and mitigation plans were discussed during this process.

On July 10th, Secret Service counter sniper and technical security personnel arrived in Pittsburgh and began the specific advance planning for their teams.

On July 12th, the build-out of the campaign rally site began, which included identifying line of sight issues, challenges, and mitigation strategies. On the morning of July 13th, a site briefing was conducted with Secret Service personnel and law enforcement partners supporting the event. Secret Service personnel took their posts and a technical security sweep of the protective site commenced prior to the opening of the site to event staff, vendors, and the public.

Beginning at 12:30 p.m., the Secret Service opened the protective site to event staff and vendors. Magnetometer screening of the estimated 15,000 people attending the campaign rally, as well as event staff and vendors, began about 1:00 p.m.

Former President Trump arrived at the campaign rally site via Secret Service motorcade at approximately 5:30 p.m. At that time, he met with supporters in a secure backstage area within the protective site.

At 5:45 p.m., a local Butler County Emergency Services Unit counter sniper team member texted the Secret Service counter sniper team leader about a suspicious person and sent two photos of the individual, later identified to be the assailant.

At 5:53 p.m., the Secret Service counter sniper team leader emailed the Secret Service counter sniper teams that local law enforcement was looking for a suspicious individual outside of the perimeter, "lurking around the AGR building".

At 6:00 p.m., former President Trump took the stage to begin remarks.

Based on what I know right now, neither the Secret Service counter sniper teams, nor members of the former President's security detail, had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building with a firearm. It is my understanding those personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. At this time, Secret Service personnel were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual. The concept of local law enforcement working an issue is very common at sites, and

on July 13th there were over 100 calls to support issues including general help, medical issues, reports of a missing child, among other issues.

At 6:11 p.m., a member of former President Trump's protective detail contacted their Pittsburgh Field Office counterpart to inquire about the radio update that there was an issue local law enforcement was looking into near the perimeter. Within the same minute, at 6:11p.m., the first shots were fired.

Beginning at 6:11p.m., the assailant's first volley of three shots were fired. Within three seconds, the former President's detail rushed the stage and covered former President Trump, shielding him with their bodies. The fourth through eighth shots took place over the next several seconds. Fifteen and a half seconds after the assailant's first shot, a Secret Service counter sniper fired a single round that neutralized the assailant.

I regret that information was not passed to Congress and the public sooner and with greater frequency. I fear that this lack of information has given rise to multiple false and dangerous conspiracy theories about what took place that day. I want to debunk these conspiracies today by sharing the following confirmed details.

First, the Secret Service counter sniper neutralized the assailant within seconds after the assailant fired his weapon. That counter sniper had full discretion—which he promptly and decisively utilized—to use deadly force to stop an attacker who was placing others at risk of serious bodily injury or death. The counter sniper did not, and did not need to, await supervisory approval before stopping the assailant. No order to delay or “stand down” was given. As the FBI recently confirmed, former President Trump was injured by a bullet or bullet fragment. At this stage of the FBI's comprehensive investigation, there are no indications that the assailant acted in concert with co-conspirators or that his attack involved foreign influence. There is no known connection between the assailant and a bicycle that was found at the site. There is no indication that the assailant pre-staged his weapon in advance of the rally or that he used a ladder to access the roof. As the investigation proceeds, and further details will come to light, and I am committed to releasing that information as quickly as possible.

The Secret Service workforce is comprised of special agents, Uniformed Division officers, technical law enforcement employees, and administrative, professional, and technical employees. I am immensely proud of their selfless dedication to the mission. Every day, across the globe, the men and women of the Secret Service answer the call to protect our nation's leaders. The standard is no fail for a reason.


Since the tragic events on July 13th, the Secret Service has successfully completed a National Special Security Event, the Republican National Convention, as well as dozens of protective missions. We will continue to uphold our mission of protecting our nation's leaders and ensuring the safety and security for upcoming National Special Security Events including the Democratic National Convention and the United Nations General Assembly.

I want to again thank those partners for their invaluable support. It is well-established that the Secret Service cannot perform its mission without the daily support we receive from our federal,

State, and local partners. Just in these last few weeks, State and local law enforcement agencies across the country, and in Wisconsin, helped us secure the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee. Law enforcement agencies in the national capital region, with elements from the NYC Police Department, assisted the Secret Service with its security plan for the visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington, D.C. Additionally, law enforcement in Palm Beach County and South Florida provided tremendous support for the visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to Palm Beach, Florida, with very little notice. These are just a few examples of the essential support our State and local partners provide us to carry out our security planning.

During our current high operational tempo, I want and need to ensure the dedicated men and women of the Secret Service are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission. The men and women of the Secret Service have my full support, and I am confident in their abilities to ensure the safety and security of the people and places we protect. They are worthy of trust and confidence, and they deserve your support, as well as the support of the American public.

Chairman Peters, Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this joint hearing today. I will now answer your questions.



Subject prone


Subject prone on elbows






View from AGR second floor

H1 to shooter (no elbows)



H1 to shooter (w/elbows)





Anthony Guglielmi

@SecretSvcSpox

Follow

...

Theres an untrue assertion that a member of the former President's team requested additional security resources & that those were rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added protective resources & technology & capabilities as part of the increased campaign travel tempo

7:38 AM · Jul 14, 2024 · **5.7M** Views

Items for the Record
Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump
July 30, 2024

1. AGR Picnic Table
2. Beaver County Counter Sniper Position in AGR Building – Redacted
3. FPOTUS After Action Beaver County ESU/SWAT – Redacted
4. Beaver County ESU text to Butler County ESU Picture of Shooter-Redacted
5. Beaver County ESU Officers Assigned to Event Group Text – Redacted
6. Beaver County ESU Group Text Request for Officers to Cover the July 13 Event – Redacted
7. Beaver County ESU Group Text Message After Receiving Pictures of Gunman – Redacted
8. Beaver County Counter Sniper Position in AGR Building – Redacted
9. Beaver County and Butler County Snipers Assigned to AGR Building Group Text – ID Gunman as Suspicious Person
10. Beaver Butler and Washington County Sniper Group Text – Redacted
11. 2024-07-25 CEG TO GAO (Trump attempted assassination review)
12. 2024-07-23 CEG to DHS USSS (Operational Security Plan)
13. 2024-07-20 CEG to DHS USSS (Post Standings)
14. 2024-07-16 CEG to USSS (Trump Assassination Attempt)
15. 2024-07-18 CEG to PA State Police (Records Request)
16. 2024-07-18 CEG to Beaver County (Records Request)
17. 2024-07-18 CEG to Butler Township (Records Request)
18. 2024-07-18 CEG to Butler County (Records Request)
19. 2024-07-16 CEG to DOJ FBI (Trump Assassination Attempt)
20. 2024-07-17 CEG to DHS OIG (Trump Assassination Attempt)
21. 2024-07-13 Beaver Co ESU Bodycam 1
22. 2024-07-13 Beaver Co ESU Bodycam 2
23. 2024-07-13 Beaver Co ESU Bodycam 3

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 25, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Gene Dodaro
Comptroller General
U.S. Government Accountability Office

Dear Comptroller General Dodaro:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire in an assassination attempt against former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.¹ President Trump was almost killed and suffered injuries from the shooting. One attendee was killed and two others were critically injured by the shooter.² The gunman made his way to the top of a building and set up his sniper rifle merely 400 feet or so from the stage where President Trump spoke.³ Reports and photos that day indicate that witnesses saw the gunman in advance and on the roof and attempted to warn law enforcement officers of his position prior to him opening fire, but it's unclear when, if, or how these messages were communicated to Secret Service agents on duty.⁴ This was a monumental security failure. Former President Trump came within a centimeter of death because a gunman was able to get within hundreds of feet and in direct line of fire from where he spoke to his supporters.

A full and complete review must be done of this catastrophic security failure. Accordingly, I request that you begin a review as soon as possible that evaluates the topics outlined below. I ask that the review be completed in a way that will result in recommendations to ensure this catastrophic failure never happens again.

¹ Ellie Cook, *Donald Trump Shooting Raises Security Questions: 'Lapses'*, Newsweek (Jul. 14, 2024) <https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-shooting-security-questions-secret-service-fbi-pennsylvania-1924899>.

² Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

³ Katherine Donlevy, *Witnesses frantically tried to warn police of rifle-carrying sniper on roof before Trump assassination attempt*, New York Post (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://nypost.com/2024/07/13/us-news/witnesses-frantically-trying-to-warn-police-of-rifle-carrying-sniper-on-roof-before-trump-assassination-attempt/>.

⁴ *Id.* Associated Press. *AP PHOTOS: Shooting at Trump rally in Pennsylvania*, Updated July 14, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/trump-rally-shooting-photo-gallery-561478b3f90c950c741ceaa24c6dc159>; Isabel Keane, *Horrible Video Shows Would-be Assassin Open Fire on Former President Trump from Rooftop*, (July. 14, 2024). <https://nypost.com/2024/07/14/us-news/horrifying-video-shows-would-be-assassin-open-fire-on-former-president-trump-from-rooftop/>; New York Post. *Witness Describes Desperately Trying to Warn Police that Gunman was on Roof at Trump Rally*, (Jul. 14, 2024) <https://nypost.com/video/witness-describes-desperately-trying-to-warn-police-that-gunman-was-on-roof-at-trump-rally/>.

Comptroller General Dodaro
July 25, 2024
Page 2 of 2

- The policies, procedures, and mechanisms Secret Service has in place to coordinate with federal, state, and local partners when securing sites in advance of, during, and after protectee visits, campaign visits, or other stops not designated a National Special Security Event.
- The Secret Service delegating their protection duty to non-Secret Service personnel.
- The communications capabilities and coordination between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as a matter of practice and, specifically, at the July 13, 2024, rally.
- The steps Secret Service took to coordinate with federal, state, and local entities, such as the FBI and DHS Homeland Security Investigations, in advance of the July 13, 2024, rally to ensure effective security coordination.
 - Please report the number of personnel, and their roles, from all federal and state agencies that were present during the advance and at the July 13, 2024, rally.
- The technologies used to maintain operational awareness and coordination during protectee visits, campaign visits, or other stops not designated a National Special Security Event.
 - The use of Unmanned Aerial Systems and counter Unmanned Aerial Systems as a matter of practice.
 - Technologies available, proposed, and used by federal and state law enforcement entities.
 - Unmanned Aerial Systems used in advance of and during the July 13, 2024, rally.

Thank you for your prompt review and response. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 23, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

Mr. Ronald Rowe
Acting Director
United States Secret Service

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Acting Director Rowe:

I write to you to again request the Secret Service operational security plan, and related records, for the July 13, 2024, campaign event held by former President Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania. My office has received records related to the apparent location of some law enforcement posts during the July 13, 2024, event to include Butler County and Beaver County Emergency Services Units (ESU) with assignment at the AGR building. My office has also obtained the below color-coded document indicating what appears to be some state law enforcement sectors for the Trump rally and the document notes each sector is highlighted by "order of importance." Is this document accurate? Did local law enforcement have the shared responsibility with Secret Service to cover the AGR building? To better understand the full security posture of the event, the Secret Service must provide equivalent records.



On July 16, 2024, I wrote to DHS and the Secret Service requesting information and records about the catastrophic security failures that resulted in the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on former President Trump, which resulted in one person being killed and two others being seriously wounded.³ On July 20, 2024, I provided DHS and the Secret Service portions of emails relating to “post standers” and requested to know the total number of post standers at the Jill Biden and Trump events on July 13, 2024, as well as the total number of federal personnel present at the Trump rally. Recently, I have also obtained video footage of the aftermath of the shooting, in which local law enforcement can be heard discussing drone availability to clear the water tower.⁴

The Secret Service must provide its operational security plan showing the locations and roles of all federal personnel assigned to secure the July 13, 2024 event. Please provide answers to the following no later than July 30, 2024.

1. Did USSS, local, or state law enforcement deploy UASs or counter UASs for the July 13, 2024 rally? If not, why not? If yes, provide a detailed description of their use.
2. Did the USSS receive requests from local or state law enforcement agencies to operate UASs and/or counter UASs before or during the July 13, 2024, event? If yes, did the USSS approve these requests? If not, why not?
3. Was there an unauthorized UAS intrusion within the restricted airspace of the event? If so, when? Please provide all records.⁵
4. Was the Counter UAS operator aware of the intrusion and when? Did the Counter UAS operator deploy countermeasures in response to the unauthorized intrusion? If not, why not? If yes, provide records of the countermeasures deployed.
5. Who at USSS was responsible for making the final decision to deploy UAS or counter UAS for the July 13, 2024, event?
6. Provide all records between and among USSS, local law enforcement, state law enforcement, sheriffs, and federal law enforcement related to the use of UAS and counter UAS for the July 13, 2024 event with former President Trump.
7. Since January 2021, has the USSS deployed UASs or counter UASs during campaign events and rallies? If yes, provide a detailed description of their use, including but not limited to the date, location, event, protectee, and number of UASs or counter UASs deployed.
8. Provide all DHS and USSS guidance, policies, and similar documents concerning training requirements for UAS and counter UAS and a detailed description of the training.
9. Was the water tower cleared in advance of the rally? If not, why not?
10. Did the water tower have any role in the events at the Trump rally? Please describe.

³ Press Release, *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

⁴ The video was obtained from the Beaver County Emergency Services Unit in compliance with congressional requests.

⁵ “Records” include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (e-mails, email attachments, and any other electronically-created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether or not they resulted in final documents).

Secretary Mayorkas
Acting Director Rowe
July 23, 2024
Page 4 of 4

Thank you for your prompt review and response. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 20, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ms. Kimberly Cheatle
Director
United States Secret Service

Dear Director Cheatle:

My office has received legally protected whistleblower disclosures that include records of communications between and among Secret Service personnel.¹ The records include communications from July 11, 2024, that show First Lady Jill Biden received 12 Secret Service personnel for “post standing” for her event in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024. Those same communications show that former President Trump received three Secret Service personnel for “post standing” for his event in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024. The information does not include a list of Department of Homeland Security HSI personnel or a total list of Secret Service personnel that may have been assigned to former President Trump for the rally. I welcome any additional information you can provide relating to these communications and the total number of federal employees that were present that day. I’ve included a portion of the emails here:

MEM: 203.080 First Lady, Dr. Jill Biden to Pittsburgh, PA
The following 12 personnel have been selected for a temporary assignment as post standers in support of First Lady, Dr. Jill Biden to Pittsburgh, PA on July 13, 2024.

MEM: 203.080 Candidate Donald Trump to Pittsburgh, PA
The following 3 personnel have been selected for a temporary assignment as post standers in support of Candidate Donald Trump to Pittsburgh, PA on July 13, 2024.

On July 16, 2024, I wrote to the Secret Service and other agencies requesting records and information relating to the monumental security failure that resulted in the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt.² As part of my request, I asked for a list of all personnel from all federal agencies present that day. Accordingly, as a supplement to my initial request letter, I reiterate my request for records and information with emphasis on Questions 6, 7, 8 as it pertains to federal and state personnel present on July 13, 2024. And, finally, I request all communication records with the subject line, “203.080 Candidate Donald Trump to Pittsburgh, PA” and “203.080 First Lady, Dr. Jill Biden to Pittsburgh, PA” no later than July 26, 2024.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ The whistleblower disclosures were facilitated by Empower Oversight, counsel of record.

² Press Release, *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump* (July 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 16, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle
Director
United States Secret Service

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Director Cheatle:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire in an assassination attempt against former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.¹ President Trump was almost killed and suffered injuries resulting from the shooting. One attendee was killed and two others were critically injured by the shooter.² The gunman made his way to the top of a building and set up his sniper rifle merely 400 feet or so from the stage where President Trump spoke.³ Reports and photos that day indicate that witnesses saw the gunman in advance and later on the roof and attempted to warn law enforcement officers of his position prior to him opening fire, but it's unclear when, if, or how these messages were communicated to Secret Service agents on duty.⁴ At this time, the lack of information from your agencies is unacceptable. You owe Congress and the American people full and complete transparency on how this tragedy could possibly occur. Accordingly, I write today for information concerning whether USSS policies and procedures were followed prior to, during, and after the assassination attempt against former President Trump, including how the USSS was or was not alerted to the gunman's position when multiple reports provided that witnesses within the crowd attempted to alert local law enforcement of the gunman's location.

¹ Ellie Cook, *Donald Trump Shooting Raises Security Questions: 'Lapses'*, Newsweek (Jul. 14, 2024)

<https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-shooting-security-questions-secret-service-fbi-pennsylvania-1924899>.

² Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

³ Katherine Donlevy, *Witnesses frantically tried to warn police of rifle-carrying sniper on roof before Trump assassination attempt*, New York Post (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://nypost.com/2024/07/13/us-news/witnesses-frantically-tried-to-warn-police-of-rifle-carrying-sniper-on-roof-before-trump-assassination-attempt/>.

⁴ *Id.* Associated Press, *AP PHOTOS: Shooting at Trump rally in Pennsylvania*, (Updated Jul. 14, 2024)

<https://apnews.com/article/trump-rally-shooting-photo-gallery-561478b3f90c950c741eaa24c6dc159>; Isabel Keane,

Horrible Video Shows Would-be Assassin Open Fire on Former President Trump from Rooftop, New York Post (July. 14, 2024), <https://nypost.com/2024/07/14/us-news/horrifying-video-shows-would-be-assassin-open-fire-on-former-president-trump-from-rooftop/>; New York Post, *Witness Describes Desperately Trying to Warn Police that Gunman was on Roof at Trump Rally*, (Jul. 14, 2024) <https://nypost.com/video/witness-describes-desperately-trying-to-warn-police-that-gunman-was-on-roof-at-trump-rally/>.

Secret Service has confirmed that it worked with local police to fill out their ranks at the Butler, PA rally.⁵ Typically, Secret Service collaborates with local law enforcement teams, to include local police, state police and sheriff's offices, at these types of events for coordination and protection of the outer perimeter of a site.⁶ Anthony Gugliemi, Secret Service spokesman, told the Washington Post that the two additional counter-sniper teams that had been recommended for protection were staffed by local units rather than Secret Service counter-sniper personnel.⁷ These claims and statements come as news outlets have reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied repeated requests for more Secret Service protection for former President Trump, even though he has received several threats made against him in the past.⁸ Those reports have been publicly denied by the Secret Service but without details with respect to the service's assertion that additional resources were added.⁹ To put this matter to rest one way or the other, you must provide details with respect to what additional resources were added and when.

DHS special review panels and their Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) have identified a number of longstanding, serious issues concerning the USSS which threaten the agency's ability to carry out its core function and mission: protective detail.¹⁰ For example, following the September 29, 2014, incident when an intruder jumped the White House fence and entered the White House before being apprehended by Secret Service agents, DHS established the Protective Mission Panel (PMP) to review the USSS protective mission.¹¹ The PMP completed its review in December 15, 2014, and made classified recommendations, as well as 19 unclassified recommendations in their report.¹² In January 2022, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report analyzing the USSS

⁵ Carol D. Leoning, Isaac Stanley-Becker, and Josh Dawsey, *Secret Service under pressure for shooter who got clear shot at Trump*, The Washington Post (Jul. 14, 2024), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/07/14/secret-service-trump-rally-shooting/>.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Elizabeth Elkind, *Mayorkas denied 'repeated requests' for more Secret Service protection for Trump*, GOP lawmaker says, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mayorkas-denied-repeated-requests-more-secret-service-protection-trump-gop-lawmaker-says>; see CBS News, *Several threats made against Trump per day: Secret Service director*, Jun. 1, 2017) <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/several-threats-made-against-president-trump-secret-service-director-randolph-alles/>; The Guardian, *Chicago woman arrested over alleged threats to kill Trump and son Barron*, The Guardian (Aug. 21, 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/21/chicago-woman-arrested-trump-son-barron>.

⁹ See X account, formerly known as Twitter, of Anthony Gugliemi, Chief of Communications for the United States Secret Service. Post from July 14, 2024 at 7:38AM states "Theres an untrue assertion that a member of the former President's team requested additional security resources & that those were rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added protective resources & technology & capabilities as part of the increased campaign travel tempo". See: <https://x.com/SecretSvcSpos/status/1812451649387933912>. (last accessed: 7/16/24); Elizabeth Elkind, *Mayorkas Denied 'repeated requests' for more Secret Service protection for Trump*, GOP lawmaker says, Fox News (July 13, 2024), <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mayorkas-denied-repeated-requests-more-secret-service-protection-trump-gop-lawmaker-says>.

¹⁰ Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, *The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel*, (Nov. 10, 2016) <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-10-Nov16.pdf>; Joseph Hagin, Thomas Perrelli, Danielle Gray, Mark Filip, United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (USSSPMP). *Executive Summary to Report from the United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security*, (Dec. 15, 2014) See: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1218_ussp_pmp%281%29.pdf.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.* at 1.

implementation of the PMP recommendations.¹³ According to the GAO report, the PMP recommended that the Secret Service needs to align its operations with its priorities and the “Secret Service’s leadership must make those choices in a manner to ensure that its core protective mission remains first priority.”¹⁴ The GAO report states that at that time the “Secret Service [had] not fully aligned its operations with its priorities” because the agency hadn’t significantly increased the number of training hours for its special agents and “from fiscal years 2017 through 2020, Secret Service staffing levels fell short of its planned staffing levels for 3 of these 4 fiscal years by 275 individuals.”¹⁵ If the USSS has updates with respect to this matter, please explain.

Further, issues with inadequate USSS staffing levels is a long-recognized problem at the agency. In October 2015, the DHS OIG issued a Management Alert highlighting that USSS officer low staffing levels and scheduling contributed to officer fatigue and low morale which could impact USSS from carrying out its mission.¹⁶ In regards to training, the January 2022 GAO report provides that the implementation of the PMP recommendation that front-line supervisors consistently test the readiness of USSS officers continues to be in progress.¹⁷ GAO had previously reported in 2019 that the USSS planned to study whether to introduce a “random check” program to ensure their agents were prepared to handle different emergency scenarios.¹⁸ However, GAO found in its January 2022 report that since that 2019 review, “no significant changes have been made to ensure forces are held accountable for performance by using frontline supervisors to constantly test readiness” and USSS plans to take no further action on the recommendation.¹⁹ It is unclear if this, as well as other recommendations from the panel, have been implemented.²⁰

In addition, in December 2015 the DHS OIG published their review of the USSS handling of an incident where shots were fired from a rifle that hit the White House in 2011. That review noted that USSS did not conduct their own formal review of the incident to learn how their response and investigation could be improved.²¹ While the DHS OIG didn’t make formal recommendations, the report admonished the USSS for not conducting a review of the situation by stating that even though other law enforcement agencies were involved in the investigation “this does not relieve the Secret Service of its own responsibility to examine its role and build institutional knowledge by identifying and documenting both best practices and areas for improvement.”²² The DHS OIG report acknowledges that

¹³ Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Secret Service: Further Progress Made Implementing the Protective Mission Panel Recommendations*, GAO-22-105100 (Jan. 2022) <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105100.pdf>.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 33.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 34.

¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, *Management Alert- Secret Service Staffing and Scheduling Contributed to Officer Fatigue*, (Oct. 21, 2015) https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mga/2016/OIG_mga-102215.pdf.

¹⁷ GAO *supra* note 13 at 49.

¹⁸ Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations*, GAO-19-415 at 46-47 (May 2019), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699531.pdf>.

¹⁹ GAO *supra* note 13 at 49.

²⁰ *Id.* at 49.

²¹ Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, *The Secret Service did not Identify Best Practices and Lessons Learned from the 2011 White House Shooting Incident*, (Dec. 17, 2015) <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-16-Dec15.pdf>.

²² *Id.* at 10.

in 2014 the USSS implemented Mission Assurance Inquiries which allows the USSS Director or Deputy Director to “review a particular program or incident event to assess whether policies were followed and whether protective policies or investigative policies can be improved.”²³ Accordingly, have you begun a Mission Assurance Inquiry to review the actions taken during the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination attempt? If so, when did that begin? If not, why not?

On January 22, 2016, the DHS OIG reported that USSS did not adequately upgrade its radio systems to ensure they worked effectively to support its protection mission.²⁴ The DHS OIG stated “[i]n the case of radio communications, a single missed transmission or delay could result in a national incident.”²⁵ The DHS OIG found that USSS failed to ensure its radios were periodically updated over time and that failure “could inhibit communications in an emergency” and the USSS’s “top priority, protecting the President and other high-ranking national officials, allows no room for error and this means its technology cannot fail.”²⁶ According to the DHS OIG report, USSS agreed and said it would develop a strategy and timeline for continuous upgrades to its radio infrastructure and system.²⁷ Please provide the status of those continuous upgrades.

These past recommendations and reviews, which seek to improve the Secret Service’s protection capabilities, span back to events that occurred as early as 2011. The PMP recognized that “[f]ollowing through on reforms and recommendations has been an issue for the Secret Service in the past” and PMP made holding Secret Service accountable for following through on implementing changes within the agency its own recommendation.²⁸ As USSS stated in its most recent Secret Service Annual report, there “is little margin for error in the Secret Service mission.”²⁹ The USSS must provide a complete and thorough accounting to the American people to assure them that the Secret Service is correcting its past problems and is fully and effectively carrying out its core mission: protection.

Accordingly, so that Congress may conduct independent oversight concerning DHS and Secret Service carrying out its protection mission, please provide answers to the following no later than July 23, 2024:

1. Provide all records³⁰ between and among USSS, local law enforcement, state law enforcement, sheriffs, and federal law enforcement relating to the July 13, 2024, rally with former President Trump.

²³ *Id.* at 9.

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, *U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems*, (Jan. 22, 2016) at 2 <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-20-Jan16.pdf>.

²⁵ *Id.* at 5.

²⁶ *Id.* at 5.

²⁷ *Id.* at 6. The DHS OIG report states the recommendation will remain open until USSS provides documentation that these actions were taken.

²⁸ GAO *supra* note 13 at 46.

²⁹ U.S. Secret Service, *FY 2023 Annual Report*, USSS (2023) at 3,

<https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2024-01/fy23-annual-report-final-pages.pdf>.

³⁰ “Records” include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (e-mails, email attachments, and any other electronically-created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether or not they resulted in final documents).

2. Since January 2021, have all requests for additional Secret Service resources to protect President Trump or his family been fulfilled? If not, why not? Provide all records.
3. Provide all records relating to all threats USSS was aware of prior to the rally.
4. Provide a copy of the Secret Service advance plan assessing risks and establishing the security perimeter for the rally and a list of all meetings that took place as part of the advance planning, including dates, times, and attendees. In your response, also provide the established security procedures to screen individuals prior to entering the security perimeter.
5. Provide the names of all USSS supervisors who were responsible for reviewing and approving the security plan.
6. Provide a list of all law enforcement agencies that were present, including local police, state police, sheriffs, and all federal agencies, and a clear delineation of the physical area that each agency was responsible for securing.
7. Provide the names of all Secret Service personnel present that day, their titles, the unit they are were attached to (for example, the counter-assault team) and a description of their responsibilities.
8. For federal agencies present that day other than USSS, list each federal agency, the number of personnel who were assigned, and a description of their responsibilities.
9. Provide a complete list of all countermeasures, including drones, that were deployed at the rally and the agency responsible.
10. Was the building where the sniper was situated, including its roof, considered a potential threat? Which agency was responsible for securing that area? Was the building secured? If so, which agency secured it and when? Provide all records.
11. Provide all records regarding what was found on the gunman's body and in his vehicle.
12. Provide a full and complete timeline of events that transpired, beginning with the actions taken by the Secret Service advance team and ending with former President Trump's evacuation.
13. Were USSS communication equipment, such as radios, fully operational and actively receiving communications from law enforcement, including state and local law enforcement? Were these radio or similar communication transmissions recorded? If yes, provide the recordings. If not, why not?
14. Provide a detailed description on whether USSS followed all guidance, policies, and related procedures when securing the premises. Where guidance, policies, or procedures were not followed, explain what was not followed and why.
15. Provide USSS policies, guidance, and similar documents relating to the use of state and local law enforcement to supplement Secret Service protection of former presidents at public events, including documents relating to securing the site.
16. Provide a status update on each of the recommendations, both classified and unclassified, issued by the PMP in its 2014 report.
17. For each Secret Service agent on duty that day, provide the number of hours, including percentage of work time, used for training. How often did these agents take part in readiness test training as prescribed in the PMP recommendations?
18. Since January 2021, what actions has USSS taken to improve hiring and retention of Secret Service personnel?
19. Since January 2021, provide a detailed description of how USSS prioritizes its core mission of protection in relation to investigative responsibilities and diversity initiatives.

20. Was USSS alerted by state or local law enforcement, or members of the public that the suspected gunman was on top of the roof with a rifle prior to firing? Has USSS interviewed any individuals who attended the rally? Provide a timeline of events with respect to notification of the gunman and interviews conducted.
21. Was the suspected gunman known to the USSS prior to the shooting?
22. Do you commit to conducting a full and complete Mission Assurance Inquiry or other review of the actions taken before, during, and after the attempted assassination? If so, please provide a timeline for the review, as well as its scope. If not, why not?
23. Has USSS leadership informed all USSS personnel to preserve all records, such as text messages and emails, related to the assassination attempt? If yes, please provide a copy of the preservation request.
24. Provide a copy of the advance risk assessment and security plan and other documents related to President Trump's protection during his October 31, 2020, rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.³¹ Please include a description of any coordination with federal and local law enforcement for the rally.

I anticipate that your written reply and some responsive documents will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although the Committee complies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any handling restrictions.

Thank you for your prompt review and response. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symer on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

³¹ C-SPAN, *Campaign 2020 President Trump Holds Rally in Butler, Pennsylvania* (Oct. 31, 2020), <https://www.c-span.org/video/?477598-1/president-trump-holds-rally-butler-pennsylvania>. (last accessed: 7/16/24).

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 18, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Mr. William Rozier
Agency Open Records Officer
Pennsylvania State Police

Dear Mr. Rozier:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire attempting to assassinate former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at an event in Butler, Pennsylvania. This tragic attack resulted in one person killed, and two others critically injured.¹ I am keeping the innocent victims and their loved ones, along with the rest of your community, in my prayers. I am grateful to those in law enforcement and in the crowd who responded to help injured bystanders and protect former President Trump.

On July 17, 2024, I launched a congressional investigation into the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Secret Service following the attempted assassination of former President Trump.² According to reports, local law enforcement officers at the event identified the shooter as a suspicious person and notified the United States Secret Service prior to the gunman opening fire.³ Pursuant to Act 22 of 2017, I write to you requesting video and audio recordings in the possession of your law enforcement agency from the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania made before, during, and in the aftermath of the event.⁴ Pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, I request records, including but not limited to post and security assignments, perimeter assignments individual responsibilities, delegations of authority, cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, security planning, advance security inspections, and similar records related to the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania.⁵ I'm requesting these recordings and documents as part of my ongoing investigation.⁶

Thank you for your prompt review and response to this request. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

² See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

³ Dan Mangan, *Trump shooting: Secret Service changes story on local SWAT team position*, NBC News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.nbc.com/2024/07/17/trump-shooting-secret-service-swat.html>; Michael Dorgan, *Secret Service director backtracks as feds, local law enforcement point fingers over Trump rally security*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-director-backtracks-feds-local-law-enforcement-point-fingers-over-trump-rally-security>.

⁴ 2017 Act 22 (Jul. 7, 2017) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/ncsncsCheck.cfm?yr=2017&sessInd=0&act=22>; see also *Office of Open Records, REQUESTING POLICE RECORDINGS*, <https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm>; Chris Potter, *Donald Trump to hold rally in Butler, Pa. ahead of 2024 election*, WESA (Jul. 12, 2024) <https://www.wesa.fm/politics-government/2024-07-12/donald-trump-butler-pa-rally>.

⁵ See *Right-to-Know Law*, (Feb. 14, 2008) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2008/0/0003.HTM>.

⁶ See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 18, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ms. Stacey L. Householder
Agency Open Records Officer
Beaver County

Dear Ms. Householder:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire attempting to assassinate former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at an event in Butler, Pennsylvania. This tragic attack resulted in one person killed, and two others critically injured.¹ I am keeping the innocent victims and their loved ones, along with the rest of your community, in my prayers. I am grateful to those in law enforcement and in the crowd who responded to help injured bystanders and protect former President Trump.

On July 17, 2024, I launched a congressional investigation into the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Secret Service following the attempted assassination of former President Trump.² According to reports, local law enforcement officers at the event identified the shooter as a suspicious person and notified the United States Secret Service prior to the gunman opening fire.³ Pursuant to Act 22 of 2017, I write to you requesting video and audio recordings in the possession of your law enforcement agency from the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania made before, during, and in the aftermath of the event.⁴ Pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, I request records, including but not limited to post and security assignments, perimeter assignments individual responsibilities, delegations of authority, cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, security planning, advance security inspections, and similar records related to the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania.⁵ I'm requesting these recordings and documents as part of my ongoing investigation.⁶

Thank you for your prompt review and response to this request. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symber on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

² See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

³ Dan Mangan, *Trump shooting: Secret Service changes story on local SWAT team position*, NBC News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.nbc.com/2024/07/17/trump-shooting-secret-service-swat.html>; Michael Dorgan, *Secret Service director backtracks as feds, local law enforcement point fingers over Trump rally security*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-director-backtracks-feds-local-law-enforcement-point-fingers-over-trump-rally-security>.

⁴ 2017 Act 22 (Jul. 7, 2017) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?vr=2017&sessInd=0&act=22>; see also *Office of Open Records, REQUESTING POLICE RECORDINGS*, <https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm>; Chris Potter, *Donald Trump to hold rally in Butler, Pa. ahead of 2024 election*, WESA (Jul. 12, 2024) <https://www.wesa.fm/politics-government/2024-07-12/donald-trump-butler-pa-rally>.

⁵ See *Right-to-Know Law*, (Feb. 14, 2008) https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2008/0/0003_HTM.

⁶ See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 18, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Deputy Thomas Ochs
Agency Open Records Officer
Beaver County Sheriff

Dear Mr. Ochs:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire attempting to assassinate former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at an event in Butler, Pennsylvania. This tragic attack resulted in one person killed, and two others critically injured.¹ I am keeping the innocent victims and their loved ones, along with the rest of your community, in my prayers. I am grateful to those in law enforcement and in the crowd who responded to help injured bystanders and protect former President Trump.

On July 17, 2024, I launched a congressional investigation into the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Secret Service following the attempted assassination of former President Trump.² According to reports, local law enforcement officers at the event identified the shooter as a suspicious person and notified the United States Secret Service prior to the gunman opening fire.³ Pursuant to Act 22 of 2017, I write to you requesting video and audio recordings in the possession of your law enforcement agency from the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania made before, during, and in the aftermath of the event.⁴ Pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, I request records, including but not limited to post and security assignments, perimeter assignments individual responsibilities, delegations of authority, cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, security planning, advance security inspections, and similar records related to the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania.⁵ I'm requesting these recordings and documents as part of my ongoing investigation.⁶

Thank you for your prompt review and response to this request. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

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³ Dan Mangan, *Trump shooting: Secret Service changes story on local SWAT team position*, NBC News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.nbc.com/2024/07/17/trump-shooting-secret-service-swat.html>; Michael Dorgan, *Secret Service director backtracks as feds, local law enforcement point fingers over Trump rally security*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-director-backtracks-feds-local-law-enforcement-point-fingers-over-trump-rally-security>.

⁴ 2017 Act 22 (Jul. 7, 2017) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?vr=2017&sessInd=0&act=22>; see also *Office of Open Records, REQUESTING POLICE RECORDINGS*, <https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm>; Chris Potter, *Donald Trump to hold rally in Butler, Pa. ahead of 2024 election*, WESA (Jul. 12, 2024) <https://www.wesa.fm/politics-government/2024-07-12/donald-trump-butler-pa-rally>.

⁵ See *Right-to-Know Law*, (Feb. 14, 2008) https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2008/0/0003_HTM.

⁶ See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 18, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Mr. Thomas A. Knights
Agency Open Records Officer
Butler Township

Dear Mr Knights:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire attempting to assassinate former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at an event in Butler, Pennsylvania. This tragic attack resulted in one person killed, and two others critically injured.¹ I am keeping the innocent victims and their loved ones, along with the rest of your community, in my prayers. I am grateful to those in law enforcement and in the crowd who responded to help injured bystanders and protect former President Trump.

On July 17, 2024, I launched a congressional investigation into the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Secret Service following the attempted assassination of former President Trump.² According to reports, local law enforcement officers at the event identified the shooter as a suspicious person and notified the United States Secret Service prior to the gunman opening fire.³ Pursuant to Act 22 of 2017, I write to you requesting video and audio recordings in the possession of your law enforcement agency from the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania made before, during, and in the aftermath of the event.⁴ Pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, I request records, including but not limited to post and security assignments, perimeter assignments individual responsibilities, delegations of authority, cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, security planning, advance security inspections, and similar records related to the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania.⁵ I'm requesting these recordings and documents as part of my ongoing investigation.⁶

Thank you for your prompt review and response to this request. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

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³ Dan Mangan, *Trump shooting: Secret Service changes story on local SWAT team position*, NBC News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.nbc.com/2024/07/17/trump-shooting-secret-service-swat.html>; Michael Dorgan, *Secret Service director backtracks as feds, local law enforcement point fingers over Trump rally security*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-director-backtracks-feds-local-law-enforcement-point-fingers-over-trump-rally-security>.

⁴ 2017 Act 22 (Jul. 7, 2017) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/ncnsc/Check.cfm?yr=2017&sessInd=0&act=22>; see also *Office of Open Records, REQUESTING POLICE RECORDINGS*, <https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm>; Chris Potter, *Donald Trump to hold rally in Butler, Pa. ahead of 2024 election*, WESA (Jul. 12, 2024) <https://www.wesa.fm/politics-government/2024-07-12/donald-trump-butler-pa-rally>.

⁵ See *Right-to-Know Law*, (Feb. 14, 2008) https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2008/0/0003_HTM.

⁶ See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 18, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ms. Maria Malloy
Agency Open Records Officer
Butler County

Dear Ms. Malloy:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire attempting to assassinate former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at an event in Butler, Pennsylvania. This tragic attack resulted in one person killed, and two others critically injured.¹ I am keeping the innocent victims and their loved ones, along with the rest of your community, in my prayers. I am grateful to those in law enforcement and in the crowd who responded to help injured bystanders and protect former President Trump.

On July 17, 2024, I launched a congressional investigation into the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Secret Service following the attempted assassination of former President Trump.² According to reports, local law enforcement officers at the event identified the shooter as a suspicious person and notified the United States Secret Service prior to the gunman opening fire.³ Pursuant to Act 22 of 2017, I write to you requesting video and audio recordings in the possession of your law enforcement agency from the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania made before, during, and in the aftermath of the event.⁴ Pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, I request records, including but not limited to post and security assignments, perimeter assignments individual responsibilities, delegations of authority, cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, security planning, advance security inspections, and similar records related to the July 13, 2024, event held at the Butler County Farm Show grounds in Butler, Pennsylvania.⁵ I'm requesting these recordings and documents as part of my ongoing investigation.⁶

Thank you for your prompt review and response to this request. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

² See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

³ Dan Mangan, *Trump shooting: Secret Service changes story on local SWAT team position*, NBC News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.nbc.com/2024/07/17/trump-shooting-secret-service-swat.html>; Michael Dorgan, *Secret Service director backtracks as feds, local law enforcement point fingers over Trump rally security*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-director-backtracks-feds-local-law-enforcement-point-fingers-over-trump-rally-security>.

⁴ 2017 Act 22 (Jul. 7, 2017) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/ncsncsCheck.cfm?yr=2017&sessInd=0&act=22>; see also *Office of Open Records, REQUESTING POLICE RECORDINGS*, <https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm>; Chris Potter, *Donald Trump to hold rally in Butler, Pa. ahead of 2024 election*, WESA (Jul. 12, 2024) <https://www.wesa.fm/politics-government/2024-07-12/donald-trump-butler-pa-rally>.

⁵ See *Right-to-Know Law*, (Feb. 14, 2008) <https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2008/0/0003.HTM>.

⁶ See *Grassley Launches Secret Service Investigation Following Assassination Attempt Against Former President Trump*, (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-launches-secret-service-investigation-following-assassination-attempt-against-former-president-trump>.

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 16, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Merrick B. Garland
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dear Attorney General Garland and Director Wray:

I write today about the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt against former President Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania and the subsequent investigations into the incident.¹ That day, former President Trump was almost killed, one individual was killed and two others were critically injured in this heinous attack.² Following the assassination attempt, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that it “assumed the role of the lead federal law enforcement agency in the investigation of the incident involving former President Donald Trump that occurred earlier today in Butler, Pennsylvania... Special agents of the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office responded immediately, to include crisis response team members and evidence response technicians.”³ Further, on July 14, 2024, Attorney General Garland said that he “directed the FBI, the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] ATF, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the [Justice] Department’s National Security Division to bring every available resource to bear on this investigation.”⁴ Secretary Mayorkas reported on July 13, 2024 that “DHS and the Secret Service are working with law enforcement partners to ... investigate the shooting.”⁵ To-date, the lack of information from your agencies is unacceptable. As I stated to DHS and the USSS, you owe Congress and the American people full and complete transparency in this matter.

As DOJ and the FBI work on investigations and coordinate with other agencies, I request that you provide my staff with rolling updates on your work. This is in addition to any initial member-level briefings that your agencies provide. Along with the rolling updates, please provide a copy of any report produced on the investigative findings. It is critical that a full and thorough review be conducted regarding this attack and

¹ FBI National Press Office, *FBI Statement on Incident in Butler Pennsylvania*, (Update: July 14, 2024, published July 13, 2024), <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-incident-in-butler-pennsylvania>.

² Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

³ FBI National Press Office, *FBI Statement on Incident in Butler Pennsylvania*, (Update: July 14, 2024, published July 13, 2024), <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-incident-in-butler-pennsylvania>.

⁴ DOJ Office of Public Affairs, *Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Addresses Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump*, Speech (July 14, 2024), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-addresses-attempted-assassination-former-president>.

⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *Statement from Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas*, Press Release (July 13, 2024) <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/07/13/statement-secretary-homeland-security-alejandro-n-mayorkas>.

that the Congress be given information with respect to the scope of the investigation and its results. In the past, Justice Department personnel have destroyed records relating to the investigations they had worked on. For example, on September 11, 2020, I wrote to the DOJ and FBI and stated the following:

A recent Justice Department Freedom of Information Act release suggests that multiple members of Special Counsel Mueller's team may have wiped data from their government phones including text messages during their investigation of Russian collusion in the 2016 election. One team member, Andrew Weissmann, appears to have deleted all of the data on his phone more than once. On March 8, 2018, records show that Weissmann "[e]ntered [his] password too many times and wiped his phone." On September 27, another report reads, "AAW accidentally wiped cell phone – data lost." On two occasions, officials admitted to deleting data, and multiple individuals stated that the phone automatically wiped the data after they used the wrong password too many times.⁶

After that letter, on July 12, 2021, Senator Johnson and I wrote to Attorney General Garland noting that, at that time, the DOJ couldn't locate all phones from Special Counsel Mueller's investigation.⁷ Our letter also noted that at least 22 Special Counsel phones were not reviewed to ensure that official records were preserved.⁸ The improper conduct of the past cannot be repeated in this matter – all records must be preserved.

Accordingly, in addition to providing periodic investigative updates and as a preliminary matter, so that Congress may conduct independent oversight concerning DOJ and FBI's work investigating the attempted assassination of former President Trump, please provide the following documents and written responses to the questions listed below no later than July 23, 2024:

1. All records⁹ between and among FBI personnel, U.S. Secret Service personnel, and other law enforcement agencies related to the rally in Butler, PA.
2. Was the FBI aware of any threats relating to the rally in Butler, PA in advance of it? If so, please explain and provide all records.
3. A list of all weapons recovered, and explosives found at the crime scene, as well as in the gunman's home and vehicle, or that he may have been able to access, such as weapons belonging

⁶ Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Attorney General Barr and FBI Director Christopher Wray. (Sep. 11, 2020) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/doj-foia-release-members-mueller-team-repeatedly-wiped-phones-watchdog-sought>.

⁷ Letter from Senators Charles E. Grassley and Ron Johnson to Attorney General Garland, (Jul. 12, 2021) <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-and-johnson-request-more-information-from-justice-department-about-special-counsel-mueller-teams-missing-phones>.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ "Records" include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (e-mails, email attachments, and any other electronically-created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether or not they resulted in final documents).

to other members of his household. Also, please include a description of how the gunman obtained the weapon used that day.

4. Precisely when did local and federal law enforcement become aware of the explosives belonging to the gunman?
5. Provide all trace requests for the firearms used by or associated with the gunman in the assassination attempt against President Trump and the other victims.
6. Provide all FBI case files and records related to the gunman generated as part of this investigation.
7. Prior to the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, was the FBI made aware of the identity of the gunman?

If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Symbor of my Budget Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

cc: Director Steven Dettelbach, ATF
Matthew G. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General for National Security
Eric G. Olshan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Director Kimberly Cheatle, U.S. Secret Service

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 16, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Joseph V. Cuffari
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security

Dear Inspector General Cuffari:

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire in an assassination attempt against former President Trump as he spoke to his supporters at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.¹ President Trump was almost killed and suffered injuries resulting from the shooting. One attendee was killed and two others were critically injured by the shooter.² The gunman made his way to the top of a building and set up his sniper rifle merely 400 feet or so from the stage where President Trump spoke.³ Reports and photos that day indicate that witnesses saw the gunman in advance and on the roof and attempted to warn law enforcement officers of his position prior to him opening fire, but it's unclear when, if, or how these messages were communicated to Secret Service agents on duty.⁴ At this time, the lack of information from DHS, USSS, and the FBI is unacceptable. They owe Congress and the American people full and complete transparency on how this tragedy could possibly occur. Accordingly, I have written to the USSS for information concerning whether USSS policies and procedures were followed prior to, during, and after the assassination attempt against former President Trump, including how the USSS was or was not alerted to the gunman's position when multiple reports and videos provided that witnesses within the crowd attempted to alert local law enforcement of the gunman's location.

¹ Ellie Cook, *Donald Trump Shooting Raises Security Questions: 'Lapses'*, Newsweek (Jul. 14, 2024)

<https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-shooting-security-questions-secret-service-fbi-pennsylvania-1924899>.

² Sarah Rumpf-Whitten, Brooke Singman, and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, *Assassination attempt on Trump at Pennsylvania rally leaves 2 hurt, 2 dead, including shooter*, Fox News (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/assassination-attempt-trump-pennsylvania-rally-2-hurt-2-dead-including-shooter>.

³ Katherine Donlevy, *Witnesses frantically tried to warn police of rifle-carrying sniper on roof before Trump assassination attempt*, New York Post (Jul. 13, 2024) <https://nypost.com/2024/07/13/us-news/witnesses-frantically-tried-to-warn-police-of-rifle-carrying-sniper-on-roof-before-trump-assassination-attempt/>.

⁴ *Id.* Associated Press, *AP PHOTOS: Shooting at Trump rally in Pennsylvania*, Updated July 14, 2024.

<https://apnews.com/article/trump-rally-shooting-photo-gallery-561478b3f90e950c741eeaa24c6dc159>; Isabel Keane, *New York Post, Horrifying Video Shows Would-be Assassin Open Fire on Former President Trump from Rooftop*, (July. 14, 2024), <https://nypost.com/2024/07/14/us-news/horrifying-video-shows-would-be-assassin-open-fire-on-former-president-trump-from-rooftop/>; New York Post, *Witness Describes Desperately Trying to Warn Police that Gunman was on Roof at Trump Rally*, (Jul. 14, 2024) <https://nypost.com/video/witness-describes-desperately-trying-to-warn-police-that-gunman-was-on-roof-at-trump-rally/>.

This was a monumental security failure. Former President Trump came within a centimeter of death because a gunman was able to get within hundreds of feet and in direct line of fire from where he spoke to his supporters. Although investigations are ongoing, it's clear that a full and complete review must be done of this catastrophic security failure. Since the weekend, my office has made clear to yours that a review must be done.

Accordingly, I request that you begin that review immediately. In addition, given the historic importance that this review be done without restrictions and obstacles, and so that Congress is made aware of the same, has your office in the past faced any information access restrictions from DHS proper and/or its component agencies in the course of your reviews? I request an answer to my questions no later than July 19, 2024.

Thank you for your prompt review and response. If you have any questions, please contact Brian Randolph and Silvia Syber on my Committee staff at (202) 224-0642.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget

TIMELINE: Law Enforcement Awareness of Thomas Matthew Crooks on July 13, 2024
(as of July 30, 2024)
Entered into the Record by Sen. Ron Johnson

Text in Green is media reported information:

Text in Black is information learned from local law enforcement:

Text in Blue is from U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe's testimony:

Text in Brown from Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate's testimony:
and Text in Red is from Butler County radio communications.

- **4:26pm**—Per media reports, Beaver County officers first notice and send a text in a group chat about an individual later identified as Crooks.¹
- **5:10pm**—A local law enforcement sniper positioned in the American Glass Research (AGR) building (AGR sniper 1) first spots Crooks.
- **5:14pm**—AGR sniper 1 takes two pictures of Crooks.
- **5:30pm**—According to Acting Director of the Secret Service Ronald Rowe, former President Trump arrives at the Butler rally site.²
- **5:32pm**—AGR sniper 1 observes Crooks looking at his phone and using a rangefinder.
- **5:38pm**—AGR sniper 1 sends a message to a group of other local law enforcement snipers working the rally about Crooks.
 - Per media reports, AGR sniper 1 includes the pictures he took of Crooks and a description, along with that Crooks was observed using a rangefinder in the direction of the stage.³
- **5:40pm**—AGR sniper 1 is told to call into command about Crooks.
- **5:41pm**—AGR sniper 1 sends a description of Crooks and his use of a rangefinder to command over the radio.

¹ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten and Danielle Wallace, *Trump Assassination Attempt: Texts Reveal Officers were Aware of Thomas Crooks 90 Minutes Before Shooting*, Fox News, July 29, 2024, available at <https://www.foxnews.com/us/trump-assassination-attempt-texts-reveal-officers-were-aware-thomas-crooks-90-minutes-before-shooting>.

² *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (written testimony of United States Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe at 6).

³ Sarah Rumpf-Whitten and Danielle Wallace, *Trump Assassination Attempt: Texts Reveal Officers were Aware of Thomas Crooks 90 Minutes Before Shooting*, Fox News, July 29, 2024, available at <https://www.foxnews.com/us/trump-assassination-attempt-texts-reveal-officers-were-aware-thomas-crooks-90-minutes-before-shooting>.

- **5:45pm**—A sniper with Butler County sends the images and description given by AGR sniper 1 of Crooks to one of the Secret Service counter snipers at the rally, including that Crooks was seen using a rangefinder in the direction of the rally stage.
 - The Secret Service counter sniper responds, “**Roger. I’ll notify teams on AGR side.**”
 - Acting Director Rowe confirms the Butler County sniper sends the Secret Service counter sniper team leader a text with the images and description of Crooks.⁴
- **5:53pm**—According to Acting Director Rowe, the Secret Service counter sniper team leader emails the Secret Service counter sniper teams that “local law enforcement [is] looking for a suspicious individual outside the perimeter, ‘lurking around the AGR building.’”⁵
- **6:03pm**—Former President Trump takes the stage at the Butler rally.⁶
- **6:06pm**—According to Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, video shows Crooks pulling himself onto the AGR building rooftop.⁷
- **6:08:20pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio that there is someone on the roof of the AGR building.
- **6:08:32pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports there is an individual on the roof of the AGR building wearing white shorts.
- **6:10:04pm – 6:10:19pm**—A rally goer records a video that appears to show Crooks on the roof of the AGR building. In the video, a person can be heard trying to get an officer’s attention and another person says, “He’s on the roof. Right there.”⁸

⁴ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (written testimony of United States Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe at 6).

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ Maurice DuBois, et al, *Timeline of Trump Shooting Shows Secret Service was Aware of Suspicious Person 20 Minutes Before Assassination Attempt*, CBS News, July 18, 2024, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-trump-rally-shooting/>.

⁷ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (opening statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate).

⁸ *Trump Rally shooting: Timeline before gunman shot Donald Trump*, WRAL, YouTube, July 21, 2024, at 1:47-2:01, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIDSS9Kbh-8>, (accessed July 29, 2024).

- **6:11pm**—According to media reports, Crooks points his rifle at a local police officer who is boosted onto the roof of the AGR building. The officer subsequently drops from the roof to the ground.⁹
 - FBI Deputy Director Abbate’s Congressional testimony confirms this point as well.¹⁰
- **6:11pm**—According to Acting Director Rowe, “a member of former President Trump’s protective detail contact[s] their Pittsburgh Field Office to inquire about the radio update that there was an issue local law enforcement was looking into near the perimeter.”¹¹
- **6:11:03pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio that the individual on the roof of the AGR building is armed and laying down.
 - According to FBI Deputy Director Abbate, the officer who reports this is the same local police officer who was boosted on the roof.¹²
- **6:11:11pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio that the individual on the roof of the AGR building is armed with a “long gun.”
- **6:11:33pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio that shots have been fired from the AGR building roof.
 - Media reports place the first shot fired at 6:11:33pm.¹³
- **6:11:34pm**—According to media reports, two more shots are fired.¹⁴
- **6:11:37pm**—According to media reports, additional gunshots are fired.¹⁵
- **6:11:40pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio to lock down all roads.
- **6:11:52pm**—According to a media report, a final gunshot is heard.¹⁶

⁹ Robert Legare, Andres Triay, and Melissa Quinn, FBI Says Trump Agreed to Victim Interview About Assassination Attempt, CBS News, July 29, 2024, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-fbi-interview-shooting-assassination-attempt/>.

¹⁰ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (opening statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate).

¹¹ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (written testimony of United States Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe at 7).

¹² *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 118th Cong. (2024) (opening statement and testimony of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate).

¹³ Maurice DuBois, et al., Timeline of Trump Shooting Shows Secret Service was Aware of Suspicious Person 20 Minutes Before Assassination Attempt, CBS News, July 18, 2024, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-trump-rally-shooting/>.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

- **6:11:52 pm**—An “alert tone” is sent over multiple radio channels.
- **6:11:57 pm**—An “Emergency Traffic only” announcement is sent over multiple radio channels.
- **6:12:11 pm**—A local law enforcement officer reports over the radio that the **shooter is down**.
- **6:12:18 pm**—Command confirms receipt of the radio report that the shooter is down.
- **6:12:20 pm**—A sheriff’s officer reports on the radio that the shooter is down.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
 HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

July 14, 2024

The Honorable Merrick Garland
 Attorney General
 Department of Justice

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
 Secretary
 Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Christopher Wray
 Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dear Attorney General Garland, Secretary Mayorkas, and Director Wray:

On July 13, 2024 our nation experienced a tragedy—the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump during an outdoor campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.¹ According to reports, the would-be assassin, Thomas Matthew Crooks, was armed with a rifle and was able to position himself on a roof “less than 150 meters (164 yards)” from the stage where former President Trump was speaking.² From there, the suspected gunman apparently fired at the former president, wounding him. Two spectators at the rally were critically injured and, sadly, one person was killed.³ According to a Secret Service statement, after the gunman fired “multiple shots . . . from an elevated position outside of the rally venue[,] U.S. Secret Service personnel neutralized the shooter, who is now deceased.”⁴

While there is still much more information that has yet to be uncovered and shared with the public, the American people deserve a full explanation and complete transparency about this failure of security. Accordingly, I request that your agencies preserve all records⁵ referring or

¹ Michael Biesecker and Lanna Durkin Richer, What we know about the 20-year-old suspect in the apparent assassination attempt of Donald Trump, AP, July 13, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/20-year-suspect-apparent-assassination-attempt-donald-trump-111926657>; Authorities Search for Motive After Trump Assassination Attempt, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-rally-incident>.

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ Statement, United States Secret Service, Secret Service Statements Regarding Violence at the July 13, 2024, Trump Campaign Rally, (July 13, 2024), <https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2024/07/secret-service-statements-regarding-violence-july-13-2024-trump-campaign> (from statement made July 13, 2024 at 9:00 p.m.).

⁵ “Records” include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (emails, email attachments, and any other electronically-created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether or not they resulted in final documents).

July 14, 2024

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relating to the protective detail of former President Trump, including the protective detail at the Butler campaign rally on July 13, 2024, any threats made against the former president, and how federal law enforcement addressed or will address those threats. In addition, please provide the following information:

1. A copy of the security plan in place for the July 13, 2024 rally.
2. Provide all records between and among the Secret Service, FBI, state, and local law enforcement referring or relating to the July 13, 2024 rally.
3. A detailed description of the security measures in place for the July 13, 2024 rally, including, but not limited to:
 - a. The size of the security perimeter established, and how that perimeter size was selected;
 - b. The total number of Secret Service personnel involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - c. The total number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - d. The total number of state and local law enforcement involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - e. A detailed list of the special operations division units, including the total number of personnel from each unit, deployed for the rally, such as the Counter Assault Team or the Counter Sniper Team;
 - f. A complete list of all federal, state, or local entities that had access to, or participated in the creation of the security plan for the July 13, 2024 rally;
 - g. A complete list of all federal agencies, state, and local law enforcement that provided agents, or other personnel, to provide security, or other logistical resources, for the July 13, 2024 rally;
 - h. A detailed list of any countermeasure equipment deployed at the rally, including but not limited to unmanned aerial drones; and
 - i. A description of the screening procedures used for individuals entering the security perimeter established for the rally.
4. Did the Secret Service receive requests for additional security protection for former President Trump? If so, when were those requests made, by whom, and were those requests granted or denied? Please provide all records referring or relating to requests for additional security protection for former President Trump from November 15, 2022 (when he announced his candidacy for the 2024 election) to the present.⁶
5. Was the Secret Service or FBI aware of any threats or other information concerning a potential security threat to former President Trump and the July 13, 2024 rally?

⁶ Gabby Orr et al., Former President Donald Trump announces a White House bid for 2024, CNN, Nov. 16, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/trump-2024-presidential-bid/index.html>.

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6. A detailed timeline of former President Trump's movements during the July 13, 2024 rally, including but not limited to when former President Trump arrived at the event, when he walked on stage, when shots were fired, when Secret Service agents initially rushed the stage, when Secret Service agents escorted former President Trump off the stage, and when former President Trump was evacuated from the venue following the assassination attempt.
7. According to reports, at least one rally attendee attempted to alert police to the presence of an individual on a building roof with a rifle "five to seven minutes" into former President Trump's speech.⁷ Was Secret Service or the FBI made aware of this warning? If so, when did the Secret Service or FBI first become aware of this warning?
 - a. Has the Secret Service or FBI interviewed rally attendees who reportedly attempted to alert police to the presence of the shooter?
 - b. Has the Secret Service or FBI identified and interviewed the police who reportedly received the alert about the presence of the shooter? If so, please provide the names and associated law enforcement agency for each of these individuals.
8. When and how did the Secret Service become aware of the suspected gunman?
 - a. Did the suspected gunman evade Secret Service detection until the moment he opened fire? If so, why was the area in which the suspected gunman was located not closely monitored or secured?
 - b. Was the building, including its roof, in which the suspected gunman was located swept by Secret Service or other law enforcement prior to the rally?
 - c. When did the suspected gunman arrive to the rally site in Butler, PA? When and how did he go to the roof of the building where he apparently took position?
9. Provide all official electronic communications, including but not limited to text messages, between and among Secret Service, FBI, and other law enforcement agents from July 11, 2024 to July 14, 2024 referring or relating to the Butler, PA event.
10. All details associated with the would-be assassin, Thomas Matthew Crooks, including but not limited to:
 - a. Whether Crooks was on any watch list or if the FBI, Secret Service, or local law enforcement was otherwise aware of him prior to July 13, 2024;
 - b. Any FBI file or other document associated with Crooks;
 - c. The ATF Form 4473 associated with the suspected gunman's weapon(s).
 - d. A list of social media accounts associated with Crooks;
 - e. Whether Crooks had ever communicated to anyone about assassinating former President Trump; and if so, when and to whom;
 - f. How, when, and where Crooks obtained any firearms used in the attempted assassination of former President Trump; and
 - g. Whether Crooks had any criminal history or history of mental health issues.

⁷ Kipp Jones, 'He Had a Rifle!' Trump Rally Attendee Frantically Warned police Gunman Was Crawling on Roof, Mediaite, July 13, 2024, <https://www.mediaite.com/news/he-had-a-rifle-trump-rally-attendee-says-he-warned-police-gunman-was-crawling-on-roof/>.

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11. The number and type of weapons and bullets recovered, including the number of bullets fired by the suspected gunman during the rally. Have all the bullets fired by the suspected gunman been recovered?
12. Provide all firearm tracing requests connected to the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt.
13. In addition to weapons and bullets, what other items were discovered by law enforcement after the shooter was neutralized, including but not limited to electronic devices?
14. Reports indicate that the “suspected shooter had explosive devices in his car” which was parked near the rally.⁸
 - a. When did law enforcement locate the suspected shooter’s car? Where was it parked? How long had it been parked in that location?
 - b. Was the car parked in an area that was swept by Secret Service or other law enforcement prior to the rally?
 - c. Describe the type and amount of “explosive devices” that were apparently found in the suspected shooter’s car.
 - d. In addition to the “explosive devices,” what other items were discovered in the car, including but not limited to electronic devices?
15. All records referring or relating to any briefing provided to President Biden, Secretary Mayorkas, or Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle regarding the attempted assassination of former President Trump at the July 13, 2024 rally.
16. Does the FBI and Secret Service believe that Crooks acted alone?

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. Please confirm the preservation of records and provide the requested information as soon as possible.

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

⁸ Saide Gurman, Suspected Shooter Had Explosive Devices in His Car, Sources Say, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-rally-incident/card/suspected-shooter-had-explosive-devices-in-his-car-sources-say-nqpD12AqQQNtSvYtEpS9>.

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cc: The Honorable Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Ms. Kimberly Cheatle
Director
United State Secret Service

The Honorable Joseph Cuffari
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Michael Horowitz
Inspector General
Department of Justice

Preliminary Findings:**July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt on Former President Donald Trump****Executive Summary:**

On July 13, 2024, former President Donald Trump survived an assassination attempt at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.¹ The following day, Senator Ron Johnson wrote to Attorney General Merrick Garland, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray demanding a preservation of records, information relating to the security of the Butler rally, background information on the alleged gunman, and all texts and communications between law enforcement agents, including Secret Service personnel, relating to the rally from July 11, 2024 to July 14, 2024.² To date, the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and FBI have failed to provide any of the requested information and have not even confirmed that they will preserve the relevant records.

The lack of transparency from federal entities regarding the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt—which left former President Trump wounded, one rally goer dead, and two other spectators critically injured—is unacceptable.³ Congress and the public deserve a full explanation and complete answers to all questions regarding the failure of security at the Butler rally. Without transparency, the truth behind the assassination attempt will never be fully revealed and understood.

Given these high stakes and the public's right to know the truth, in the immediate aftermath of the assassination attempt, Senator Johnson's office began contacting federal, state, and local government entities as well as private companies seeking information about the security failures at the July 13, 2024 Butler rally. Here are some key-takeaways the senator's office has learned to date that the public deserves to know:

1. Secret Service did not attend a security briefing provided to local special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and sniper teams the morning of July 13, 2024.

At 9:00am on July 13, 2024, Butler County Emergency Services (Butler ESU) provided a security briefing for the local SWAT teams and snipers assigned to the rally. In addition to Butler County, local SWAT teams and snipers from Washington County and Beaver County were also tasked with security responsibilities. According to local law enforcement, Butler ESU

¹ Michael Biesecker and Lanna Durkin Richer, What we know about the 20-year-old suspect in the apparent assassination attempt of Donald Trump, AP, July 13, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/20-year-suspect-apparent-assassination-attempt-donald-trump-111926657>; Authorities Search for Motive After Trump Assassination Attempt, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-rally-incident>.

² Letter from Ron Johnson, Ranking Member, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Merrick Garland, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Security, and Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 14, 2024.

³ Michael Biesecker and Lanna Durkin Richer, What we know about the 20-year-old suspect in the apparent assassination attempt of Donald Trump, AP, July 13, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/20-year-suspect-apparent-assassination-attempt-donald-trump-111926657>; Authorities Search for Motive After Trump Assassination Attempt, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-rally-incident>.

was responsible for assigning locations for the sniper teams under its command. According to information obtained by Senator Johnson's office, there were less than 40 local SWAT operators and snipers assigned to the Butler rally. During the briefing, Butler ESU provided local law enforcement with images of the security perimeter at the rally—which did not include the American Glass Research (AGR) building where the shooter, Thomas Matthew Crooks, was located—the location of law enforcement agents, and a breakdown of security sectors on the farm show grounds. Secret Service did not attend this security briefing according to individuals with knowledge of the briefing.

It is unclear why Secret Service did not participate in this security briefing and the extent to which Butler ESU coordinated with Secret Service in creating and implementing the security plan for the rally.

Given the recent reporting that Crooks “was able to fly a drone and get aerial footage of the Pennsylvania fairgrounds shortly before the former president was set to speak there,” it is important to note that Butler ESU's security briefing did address drones, according to information obtained by Senator Johnson's staff.⁴ It is unknown whether any action was taken regarding Crooks' drone and the exact time when Crooks' drone was discovered.

2. Local law enforcement said communications were siloed and they were not in frequent radio contact directly with Secret Service.

Individuals with local law enforcement told Senator Johnson's office that communications between different entities providing security at the rally were siloed. For example, local SWAT and sniper teams operated on separate radio channels from patrol. According to these individuals, communications had to be routed to Butler ESU command, who would then relay information to either Secret Service or other local law enforcement patrols. It is unclear why communications were set up this way and whether the lack of direct communications between local law enforcement and Secret Service hindered any response time or decision-making.

3. Local law enforcement notified command about Crooks prior to the shooting and received confirmation that Secret Service was aware of the notification.

At 5:10pm on July 13, 2024, nearly one hour before former President Trump was shot, one of two local law enforcement snipers (hereafter AGR sniper 1) positioned in the AGR building observed the shooter, Crooks, for the first time. Local law enforcement told Senator Johnson's office that at the time, even though Crooks did not have a weapon, he seemed suspicious. At 5:14pm AGR sniper 1 took at least two pictures of Crooks (one of the pictures appears to show Crooks on his phone).⁵ At 5:28pm, AGR sniper 1 took a picture of a bicycle

⁴ Sadie Gurman and Aruna Viswanatha, Trump Gunman Flew Drone Over Rally Site Hours Before Attempted Assassination, Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-gunman-flew-drone-over-rally-site-hours-before-attempted-assassination-2d0e2e1a>.

⁵ At least one of the pictures has been released via news reports. See e.g., Joe Marino et al., Trump gunman Thomas Crooks used bike to scout rally unimpeded, N.Y. Post, <https://nypost.com/2024/07/18/us-news/trump-gunman-thomas-crooks-used-bike-to-scout-rally/>.

and backpack near the AGR building (it is unclear whether these items are associated with Crooks).⁶ At 5:32pm, AGR sniper 1 saw Crooks again near the AGR building apparently looking at news feeds on his phone and holding a range finder, according to information reported to Senator Johnson's office. Shortly after, AGR sniper 1 reported the suspect to a group text of other law enforcement snipers on site and was instructed to report the suspect to command.

At 5:41pm AGR sniper 1 called into command to report the suspect and described the suspect's appearance and notes that he has a range finder. At 5:45pm AGR sniper 1 texted the Beaver ESU Group Command about the suspect and instructed them to relay the message to command. At 5:59pm, a Beaver County law enforcement operator received confirmation from a Butler County SWAT commander that command, which included Secret Service, was made aware of the messages and requested more information about the suspect's location.

To date, there are public reports that a "counter sniper flagged a suspicious man using a rangefinder to the Secret Service some 20 minutes before a gunman opened fire" at the rally.⁷ The information obtained by Senator Johnson's office appears to confirm these reports but raises further questions about what the Secret Service did with this information, why Secret Service did not immediately send agents to the AGR building, and, perhaps most importantly, why former President Trump was allowed to go on stage.

4. Following the shooting Secret Service was seen on the roof of the AGR building with local law enforcement; photos of the shooter were sent to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for facial recognition.

At approximately 6:23pm on July 13, 2024—twelve minutes after former President Trump was shot—two Beaver County, PA law enforcement agents accessed the roof of the American Glass Research (AGR) building and saw Crooks, deceased. During a subsequent search of Crooks, local law enforcement discovered a suspected remote triggering device. At 6:32pm, 7:45pm, and 7:46pm, the Beaver County law enforcement agents took pictures of Crooks, a cellphone and the remote control device near the suspected shooter's body.⁸ Between 6:40pm and 6:50pm, local law enforcement on the roof were joined by the Allegheny County Bomb Squad and one individual wearing a suit who local law enforcement assumed to be a Secret Service agent, according to information reported to Senator Johnson's office. According to individuals on the roof, a member of the Allegheny County Bomb Squad requested the photos be sent to a phone number, with a 215 (Philadelphia) area code, which was stated to be for the ATF. The ATF was apparently requesting the photos of Crooks for facial recognition purposes.

⁶ This photo has been released via news reports. See e.g., Willis Robinson, Thomas Crooks' parents 'called the cops on the day of the Trump rally shooting', Daily Mail, July 17, 2024, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13643655/Secret-Service-spotted-Thomas-Crooks-hunting-rangefinder-inside-Trump-rally-THREE-HOURS-shooting.html>.

⁷ Max Matza and Nadine Yousif, Trump gunman flagged by Secret Service 20 minutes before shooting, BBC, July 18, 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c51ydg792ggo>.

⁸ Some of these pictures were released via news reports. See e.g., Nicholas McEntyre, Thomas Crooks' cellphone and transmitter seen next to his body after Trump shooting — as details emerge he told his boss he needed the day off work, N.Y. Post, July 17, 2024, <https://nypost.com/2024/07/17/us-news/thomas-matthew-crooks-cell-phone-and-transmitter-found-next-to-trump-would-be-assassin-body/>.

Senator Johnson's staff called the phone number and confirmed that it was, in fact, associated with the ATF. However, in subsequent attempts to establish further talks with the individual with that number, Senator Johnson's staff received the following email from ATF's Acting Deputy Chief of Legislative Affairs:

I'm reaching out because I understand that you that you reached out to our personnel in the Philadelphia Field Division with questions regarding the assassination attempt on former President Trump. We would like to ask that you coordinate any of these kinds of requests through our office, so that we may in turn coordinate through Main Justice and our colleagues at FBI, which is the lead investigatory agency.⁹

It is unclear when Secret Service arrived on the roof following the shooting, how Secret Service (and others) accessed the roof of the building, why ATF would be the agency responsible for conducting facial recognition in an attempt to identify Crooks, and whether ATF ultimately did conduct any facial recognition on the photos provided to their agent.

5. Secret Service was initially not going to send snipers to the rally, according to local law enforcement.

Local law enforcement informed Senator Johnson's office that days before the rally, they learned from Butler County law enforcement that Secret Service was not going to send their own snipers to the rally and that local law enforcement would need to go "sniper heavy" in order to ensure proper coverage. Local law enforcement learned at least a day before the rally that Secret Service changed course and decided to send two sniper teams. If Secret Service had originally not intended to send snipers to the rally, it is unclear why and when Secret Service changed their plan.

* * * * *

The findings and timeline released in this document are very preliminary, and barely scratch the surface of what a full investigation must reveal. We are releasing this document to provide the public with complete transparency and to ensure that all entities examining the assassination attempt are equipped with this information. We are also hoping it prompts others—both in law enforcement and the general public—to come forward. The information presented in this document raises many questions that Congress and law enforcement entities must answer. Senator Johnson's office will continue to pursue the truth and in doing so, encourages anyone with relevant information on the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt or the alleged shooter to contact his office and email his whistleblower account: Whistleblower_PSIJohnson@hsgac.senate.gov.

In addition to connecting with his office, Senator Johnson also encourages individuals with relevant information to cooperate with federal, state, and local law enforcement. Anyone who attended the rally—including law enforcement—should carefully memorialize, document,

⁹ July 18, 2024 email from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Acting Deputy Chief of Legislative Affairs. (on file with Sen. Johnson's office).

back-up and save any and all potentially relevant information including, but not limited to, security records, video and audio from the rally, proof of attendance at the rally, and eye-witness testimony. It is crucial in the early days of this investigation that all potential evidence is preserved and secured.

Congress and law enforcement must investigate the attempted assassination of former President Trump thoroughly, truthfully, and transparently. The public deserves no less.

Preliminary Timeline Based on Information Uncovered by Senator Johnson's Office

The following timeline includes information Senator Johnson's office has obtained during the week following the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump on July 13, 2024. This preliminary information is being shared with the public to ensure transparency.

July 5, 2024—Eight Days before Trump Rally

- According to local law enforcement, United States Secret Service first informs Butler County Emergency Services (Butler ESU) of the Trump Rally scheduled for July 13, 2024.
 - Local law enforcement reportedly sees media reports of the rally around July 3, 2024.

July 8, 2024—Five Days before Trump Rally

- Butler ESU reportedly meets with Secret Service regarding the rally and receives information regarding the timeline of the event and is informed that the rally will be held at the Butler Farm Show grounds.

July 10, 2024—Three Days before Trump Rally

- Secret Service reportedly conducts a site visit at the Butler Farm Show grounds in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally.

July 13, 2024—Day of Trump Rally

- **9:00am**—Butler ESU holds a briefing for the local SWAT and Sniper units from Butler County, Beaver County, and Washington County providing security for the event.
 - At the briefing Butler ESU provides a 46-page slide deck which outlines:
 - Areas of responsibility for each local unit; and
 - Staging locations, including sniper locations, for each local unit and the Secret Service.
 - According to attendees of the briefing, no Secret Service or other federal law enforcement is present for this briefing.
 - According to attendees of the briefing, Secret Service had not initially intended to provide sniper units, changed course for unclear reasons.
 - Butler ESU's briefing includes an outline of the security perimeter for the event and areas of responsibility.
- **9:27am**—Thomas Matthew Crooks, the alleged shooter, enters a Home Depot located in Bethel Park, PA.
 - CCTV footage of the Home Depot reportedly shows the shooter entering alone.
- **9:41am**—Crooks purchases a 5.5 FT Aluminum Dual Platform ladder.

- **9:42am**—Crooks exits the Home Depot.
 - CCTV footage of the Home Depot parking lot reportedly captures Crooks exiting the lot by vehicle. The footage could not identify the make/model of the vehicle.
- **10:30am**—Two local law enforcement snipers are in position on the second floor inside the American Glass Research (AGR) building.
- **5:10pm**—Crooks is first observed by one of the snipers (AGR sniper 1) at the AGR building.
- **5:14pm**—AGR sniper 1 takes the below pictures of Crooks.



- **5:28pm**—AGR sniper 1 takes the below picture of a bicycle and what appears to be two bags located near the AGR building. It is unclear what happened to the bicycle and bags after July 13, 2024.



- **5:32pm**—AGR sniper 1 spots Crooks looking at his phone and using a rangefinder.

- **5:38pm**—AGR sniper 1 sends a message to the “Sniper Group” about Crooks.
- **5:40pm**—AGR sniper 1 is told to “call into command” regarding Crooks.
- **5:41pm**—AGR sniper 1 calls into command and provides a description of Crooks and the rangefinder, as well as that Crooks was “lurking around [the] AGR building.”
- **5:49pm**—Photos of Crooks are sent to Butler ESU Command.
- **5:55pm**—Butler ESU Command confirms receipt of the photos and states they have been relayed on.
- **5:59pm**—Butler ESU Command asks for the direction that Crooks is traveling. AGR sniper 1 is initially unsure of the direction Crooks is traveling.
- **6:05pm**—AGR sniper 1 later communicates that Crooks is seen moving northeast “in the direction of Sheetz” and that Crooks has a backpack.
- **6:06-6:12pm**—AGR sniper 1 goes to ground floor of the building to meet local law enforcement patrol to alert them to Crooks presence.
- **Approx. 6:11pm**—Crooks begins shooting.
 - Secret Service reportedly return fire and Crooks is killed.¹⁰
- **6:23pm**—Beaver County SWAT operators access the roof where Crooks is located and confirm Crooks is deceased.
 - According to those SWAT operators, there was local law enforcement from another county and at least one Secret Service agent, wearing a suit, also on the roof.
- **6:46pm**—Crooks is patted down. Law enforcement reportedly finds a transmitter device, Crooks phone, and the rangefinder in Crooks pockets.
- **7:45pm-7:46pm**—At the request of Allegheny Bomb Squad, local law enforcement text pictures of Crooks and the items near his body to a phone number with a 215 area code (from the Philadelphia area) associated with an ATF agent. ATF reportedly is using the pictures of Crooks to run facial recognition.

¹⁰ Greg Wehner, Bryan Llenas, Sniper killed would-be Trump assassin with ‘one-in-a-million shot’: source, FoxNews (July 19, 2024), <https://www.foxnews.com/us/sniper-killed-would-be-trump-assassin-one-million-shot-source>.

Outstanding Questions Regarding the July 13, 2024 Rally and Assassination Attempt

Questions from July 14, 2024 letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, and FBI Director Christopher Wray:

1. A copy of the security plan in place for the July 13, 2024 rally.
2. Provide all records between and among the Secret Service, FBI, state, and local law enforcement referring or relating to the July 13, 2024 rally.
3. A detailed description of the security measures in place for the July 13, 2024 rally, including, but not limited to:
 - a. The size of the security perimeter established, and how that perimeter size was selected;
 - b. The total number of Secret Service personnel involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - c. The total number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - d. The total number of state and local law enforcement involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally;
 - e. A detailed list of the special operations division units, including the total number of personnel from each unit, deployed for the rally, such as the Counter Assault Team or the Counter Sniper Team;
 - f. A complete list of all federal, state, or local entities that had access to, or participated in the creation of the security plan for the July 13, 2024 rally;
 - g. A complete list of all federal agencies, state, and local law enforcement that provided agents, or other personnel, to provide security, or other logistical resources, for the July 13, 2024 rally;
 - h. A detailed list of any countermeasure equipment deployed at the rally, including but not limited to unmanned aerial drones; and
 - i. A description of the screening procedures used for individuals entering the security perimeter established for the rally.
4. Did the Secret Service receive requests for additional security protection for former President Trump? If so, when were those requests made, by whom, and were those requests granted or denied? Please provide all records referring or relating to requests for additional security protection for former President Trump from November 15, 2022 (when he announced his candidacy for the 2024 election) to the present.¹¹
5. Was the Secret Service or FBI aware of any threats or other information concerning a potential security threat to former President Trump and the July 13, 2024 rally?

¹¹ Gabby Orr et al., Former President Donald Trump announces a White House bid for 2024, CNN, Nov. 16, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/trump-2024-presidential-bid/index.html>.

6. A detailed timeline of former President Trump's movements during the July 13, 2024 rally, including but not limited to when former President Trump arrived at the event, when he walked on stage, when shots were fired, when Secret Service agents initially rushed the stage, when Secret Service agents escorted former President Trump off the stage, and when former President Trump was evacuated from the venue following the assassination attempt.
7. According to reports, at least one rally attendee attempted to alert police to the presence of an individual on a building roof with a rifle "five to seven minutes" into former President Trump's speech.¹² Was Secret Service or the FBI made aware of this warning? If so, when did the Secret Service or FBI first become aware of this warning?
 - a. Has the Secret Service or FBI interviewed rally attendees who reportedly attempted to alert police to the presence of the shooter?
 - b. Has the Secret Service or FBI identified and interviewed the police who reportedly received the alert about the presence of the shooter? If so, please provide the names and associated law enforcement agency for each of these individuals.
8. When and how did the Secret Service become aware of the suspected gunman?
 - a. Did the suspected gunman evade Secret Service detection until the moment he opened fire? If so, why was the area in which the suspected gunman was located not closely monitored or secured?
 - b. Was the building, including its roof, in which the suspected gunman was located swept by Secret Service or other law enforcement prior to the rally?
 - c. When did the suspected gunman arrive to the rally site in Butler, PA? When and how did he go to the roof of the building where he apparently took position?
9. Provide all official electronic communications, including but not limited to text messages, between and among Secret Service, FBI, and other law enforcement agents from July 11, 2024 to July 14, 2024 referring or relating to the Butler, PA event.
10. All details associated with the would-be assassin, Thomas Matthew Crooks, including but not limited to:
 - a. Whether Crooks was on any watch list or if the FBI, Secret Service, or local law enforcement was otherwise aware of him prior to July 13, 2024;
 - b. Any FBI file or other document associated with Crooks;
 - c. The ATF Form 4473 associated with the suspected gunman's weapon(s).
 - d. A list of social media accounts associated with Crooks;
 - e. Whether Crooks had ever communicated to anyone about assassinating former President Trump; and if so, when and to whom;
 - f. How, when, and where Crooks obtained any firearms used in the attempted assassination of former President Trump; and
 - g. Whether Crooks had any criminal history or history of mental health issues.

¹² Kipp Jones, 'He Had a Rifle!' Trump Rally Attendee Frantically Warned police Gunman Was Crawling on Roof, Mediaite, July 13, 2024, <https://www.mediaite.com/news/he-had-a-rifle-trump-rally-attendee-says-he-warned-police-gunman-was-crawling-on-roof/>.

11. The number and type of weapons and bullets recovered, including the number of bullets fired by the suspected gunman during the rally. Have all the bullets fired by the suspected gunman been recovered?
12. Provide all firearm tracing requests connected to the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt.
13. In addition to weapons and bullets, what other items were discovered by law enforcement after the shooter was neutralized, including but not limited to electronic devices?
14. Reports indicate that the “suspected shooter had explosive devices in his car” which was parked near the rally.¹³
 - a. When did law enforcement locate the suspected shooter’s car? Where was it parked? How long had it been parked in that location?
 - b. Was the car parked in an area that was swept by Secret Service or other law enforcement prior to the rally?
 - c. Describe the type and amount of “explosive devices” that were apparently found in the suspected shooter’s car.
 - d. In addition to the “explosive devices,” what other items were discovered in the car, including but not limited to electronic devices?
15. All records referring or relating to any briefing provided to President Biden, Secretary Mayorkas, or Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle regarding the attempted assassination of former President Trump at the July 13, 2024 rally.
16. Does the FBI and Secret Service believe that Crooks acted alone?

Questions based on preliminary findings:

1. When did the Secret Service first arrive at the AGR building on July 13, 2024?
2. When did the Secret Service first access the roof of the AGR building on July 13, 2024?
3. How many Secret Service agents were at the AGR building on July 13, 2024?
4. How did Secret Service access the roof of the AGR building?
5. Did ATF conduct facial recognition on Crooks?
6. If so, why was ATF responsible for conducting facial recognition on Crooks?

¹³ Saide Gurman, Suspected Shooter Had Explosive Devices in His Car, Sources Say, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-rally-incident/card/suspected-shooter-had-explosive-devices-in-his-car-sources-say-nqppDI2AqQQNtSvYEpS9>.

7. Why did Secret Service not immediately send agents to the AGR building when it became aware of reports of Crooks?
8. What exact time did Secret Service snipers first have Crooks in their sight?
9. Why was former President Trump permitted to go on stage if the Secret Service was aware of Crooks?
10. Why did Secret Service not participate in the July 13, 2024 9:00am briefing for local SWAT and sniper units?
11. What coordination existed between Butler ESU and Secret Service regarding the creation and implementation of the security plan presented at the July 13, 2024 briefing?
12. Why was Crooks permitted to fly a drone over the rally site in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally's start and was any action taken regarding the drone?
13. When was it discovered that Crooks had flown a drone over the rally site in advance of July 13, 2024 rally's start?
14. Why did Secret Service not initially intend to send sniper units for the July 13, 2024 rally?
15. When did Secret Service alter its initial decision not to send sniper units for the July 13, 2024 rally?
16. Why did Secret Service alter its initial decision not to send sniper units to the July 13, 2024 rally?
17. When did Secret Service first inform local law enforcement that it would not send sniper units to the July 13, 2024 rally?
18. When did Secret Service first inform local law enforcement that it would in fact send sniper units to the July 13, 2024 rally?
19. How many local law enforcement officials were on patrol during the July 13, 2024 rally?
20. Who determined how many local law enforcement officials would be needed for patrol during the July 13, 2024 rally?
21. Who determined how many sniper units would be needed for the July 13, 2024 rally?
22. Who determined how many SWAT units would be needed for the July 13, 2024 rally?
23. What was the make and model of Crooks' vehicle discovered after the rally?

24. Was the bicycle and bags identified by AGR sniper 1 on July 13, 2024 determined to be connected to Crooks?
25. What happened to the bicycle and bags identified by AGR sniper 1 on July 13, 2024?
26. Local law enforcement have stated that a number of individuals were detained near the AGR building after the attempted assassination of former President Trump. How many individuals were detained near the AGR building?
27. Why were individuals detained near the AGR building on July 13, 2024?
28. What happened to the individuals detained near the AGR building on July 13, 2024?
29. Why were Secret Service and local SWAT and sniper units not in direct communication?
30. Was Secret Service able to monitor local SWAT and sniper unit radio channels?
31. Who was the point of contact between Butler ESU command and the Secret Service?
32. Who made the decision to silo communications between the Secret Service and local law enforcement?
33. How many briefings or meetings did Secret Service hold with local law enforcement in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally, and when did these briefings or meetings occur?
34. What local law enforcement agencies attended briefings with the Secret Service in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally?
35. How many times did Secret Service visit the site of the July 13, 2024 rally in advance of the rally?
36. Who participated in the site visits with the Secret Service in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally?
37. Has the 5.5 foot ladder Crooks purchased at Home Depot on the morning of July 13, 2024 been located?
38. If the ladder has been located, where was the ladder found?
39. Has the backpack that Crooks was seen with on July 13, 2024 been located?
40. If it the backpack has been located, what were the contents of Crooks backpack?
41. How many shell casings were found at the AGR building on July 13, 2024?

**Preliminary Findings Continued:
Eight Shell Casings Found Near Crooks' Body According to First-Hand Information
Obtained by Senator Ron Johnson's Office**

On Sunday, July 21, 2024, Senator Johnson released preliminary findings based on conversations and information obtained by his office following the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on Donald Trump.¹ The senator's office has continued to speak with witnesses and is appreciative of the individuals who have come forward to share what they saw and experienced.

On July 22, 2024, during testimony before the House Oversight and Accountability Committee, then-Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle, refused to answer questions about the number of shell casings found near the body of would-be assassin Thomas Matthew Crooks.² Although Cheatle confirmed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told her how many shell casings were recovered on the roof, she withheld the specific number from lawmakers due to the ongoing FBI investigation.³

Today, July 23, 2024, in testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Christopher Paris, the commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, was asked how many rounds Crooks fired before he was killed.⁴ Commissioner Paris responded, "I believe the number is 8, 8 casings have been recovered."⁵

This testimony is consistent with eye-witness information Senator Johnson's office has received to date.

1. Multiple local law enforcement officials report eight shell casings found near Crooks' body.

At least three local law enforcement officials reported to Senator Johnson's office that there were eight shell casings located near Crooks' body. Two of these individuals saw the shell casings first-hand. The third individual told Senator Johnson's office that the FBI informed him that there were eight shell casings found on the roof.

* * * *

Senator Johnson is releasing this material—even though it is preliminary—to ensure transparency and to keep the public well-informed.

¹ Press Release, *Senator Ron Johnson, Sen. Johnson Releases Preliminary Findings on Review of July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump* (July 21, 2024), <https://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/2024/7/sen-johnson-releases-preliminary-findings-on-review-of-july-13-2024-assassination-attempt-on-former-president-trump>.

² Trump Assassination Attempt: Hearing before the House Oversight and Accountability Committee, 118 Cong. (2024) (response by U.S. Secret Service Director to question regarding the number of shell casings found), transcript available at <https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-8055606?5>.

³ *Id.*

⁴ Examining the Assassination Attempt of July 13: Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 118 Cong. (2024).

⁵ *Id.*

RICK SCOTT
FLORIDA

United States Senate

ARMED SERVICES
HOMELAND SECURITY
BUDGET
SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AGING

July 18, 2024

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
President
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Biden:

I have been hearing from Floridians and folks across America asking questions about what is happening with the federal government's investigation of the assassination attempt on President Donald J. Trump, the murder of an innocent American and serious injury of others during the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, on Saturday, July 13th. There is a lot of information out there, some real and some not, and when there is a lack of transparency, people naturally assume the worst. I write today to urge you and your administration to take every action necessary to share updates with President Trump, Congress and the American people, and answer questions about what happened, who is being held accountable and how we make sure it never happens again. Now is the time for absolute transparency and accountability.

While we are grateful beyond words for the heroic actions of the Secret Service agents and law enforcement officers on the ground who put themselves in danger that day to protect President Trump, it is now clear to every American that there were gross failures in leadership of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal law enforcement agencies that led to the assassination attempt, murder and severe injuries that occurred at this event. It is a miracle that President Trump is alive and well, but absolutely inexcusable that the deranged would-be assassin had a direct line of sight to the former president and the leading candidate for President of the United States.

Just hours after the shooting, I called on Chairman Gary Peters to immediately hold a U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) hearing, before August 1st, with testimony from these agencies, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and deliver the answers that we as U.S. senators and the American people demand and deserve from our government. I am glad that Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul have announced that HSGAC will be conducting a bipartisan investigation into this matter, but you must also take daily action to show accountability to the American people. That is why I have asked, and I implore you to ask, that FBI Director Christopher Wray, USSS Director Kimberly

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
July 18, 2024
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Cheatle, and DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas hold a daily public press conference to share updates and answer questions from the American people.

It is imperative that the American people know that the U.S. government is answering questions and holding people accountable for the failures that led to this totally preventable tragedy. Therefore, I ask that you immediately answer the following questions:

1. Are you and/or members of your administration providing regular updates to President Trump regarding the investigation?
2. Have you directed USSS Director Kimberly Cheatle, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and FBI Director Christopher Wray to hold a daily press conference to update the press and American people on this investigation and answer questions?
3. Has anyone employed by the U.S. government had disciplinary action taken against them, including being placed on leave, for action or inaction connected to the assassination attempt, murder and severe injuries that occurred on July 13th?

I also ask that you instruct USSS Director Cheatle to immediately answer the following questions, and ask that public responses are provided where possible and classified responses are provided where necessary:

1. If the buck stops with you, and this has clearly been established as a colossal USSS breakdown and national embarrassment of historic proportion, why haven't you resigned?
2. Please detail the protocol for stationing USSS personnel, including counter sniper teams, on graded roofs.
3. It is well documented that the would-be assailant was identified at least 20 minutes before any shots were fired. What transpired from the time that a shooter was identified to shots being fired at the rally?
4. Was the Trump campaign made aware of the increase in credible security threats received by the USSS prior to the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?
5. Why was President Trump allowed to take the stage after USSS and law enforcement on-site identified, but had not yet neutralized, a credible security threat?
6. Was there a standing shoot-to-kill or shoot-to-wound/ maim order given to USSS teams and participating law enforcement for the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?
7. What was the use-of-force policy and was there a stand-down order given to any law enforcement officer at the July 13th rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
July 18, 2024
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8. Why didn't the USSS employ the use of drones or other airborne assets to survey the area during the July 13th rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?
9. Was the building that the shooter fired from identified during the USSS advance as a location presenting a security risk?
10. Were any USSS or other U.S. government law enforcement resources diverted from the outdoor Trump rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, to the indoor event held by First Lady Jill Biden in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 13th?
11. Have any requests for additional protective resources by the Trump campaign been denied or gone unanswered since November 15, 2022?
12. What is the USSS standard operating procedure (SOP) for an outdoor rally involving a former president? What is the SOP for a presumptive nominee and leading candidate for President of the United States? How does that SOP differ from that used for a sitting president?
13. Was the SOP for protection of a former president followed and correctly executed during the July 13th rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?
14. If there were deviations from the standard SOP for an outdoor rally held by a former president, please detail those deviations and the reasons for each.
15. Please list the law enforcement agencies that were involved in protective services for the July 13th rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and how many officers from each of these agencies were on site, both inside and outside of the USSS perimeter.
16. Was the number of law enforcement personnel present at the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, more or less than the average number of law enforcement personnel present at previous outdoor rallies held by President Trump?
17. Was the number of USSS agents present at the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, more or less than the average number of USSS agents present at previous outdoor rallies held by President Trump?
18. Which law enforcement organizations (USSS, State, Local) were responsible for each security ring?

I expect to receive an immediate response with answers to these questions and hope that you share my belief that maximum transparency and accountability are absolutely critical to establishing and maintaining trust between the U.S. government and the American people following this historic security failure and tragedy. As I have stated multiple times since Saturday, the security of our Republic is being questioned and we, as a nation, deserve answers.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Rick Scott". The signature is stylized with a large initial "R" and a long, sweeping underline.

Rick Scott
United States Senator

Cc: The Honorable Kimberly Cheatle, Director, U.S. Secret Service
The Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Senator Dick Durbin
Committee on the Judiciary on
“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump”
Questions for the Record
August 13, 2024

Questions for Ronald Rowe, Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

1. In addition to motive, it remains unknown how the shooter brought his assault rifle to the site. FBI Director Wray suggested it may have a collapsible stock, but as far as we know, there have been no witnesses who spotted the shooter with a weapon before he was on the roof. We also know the shooter visited the grounds multiple times prior to the arrival of the Secret Service and law enforcement—so it seems possible that he hid the assault rifle the morning of the rally. Prior to the hearing, we learned the shooter was spotted by local law enforcement sitting outside the secured fenced perimeter earlier than was initially understood. He may have observed where local countersniper units were positioning themselves in the AGR building.

Why was the public close enough to observe law enforcement officials taking up their positions? How does the Secret Service plan to limit this vulnerability in the future?

2. On August 1, 2024, the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security released a report on “The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021.” This report found a number of security failures, some of which resemble security failures at the Butler rally. For example, USSS did not sweep the bushes along the perimeter of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters, where a pipe bomb had been placed, despite sweeping and securing the interior of the building. Then Vice President-elect Kamala Harris walked within 20 feet of the device on January 6. The assassination attempt at the Butler rally was possible, despite the gunman’s lack of sophistication, in part by perimeter security failures as well, including the gunman’s use of a drone for surveillance and his ability to scale a building outside of the security perimeter to stage his attack.

The Republican National Convention took place just two days after Butler and the Democratic National Convention will begin on August 19. Due to the size of the crowds and the variety of sites, both conventions present more complex security considerations than any single rally or events in regularly visited sites such as the Capitol and the parties’ national headquarters in Washington, DC.

How has USSS changed its standard operating procedures to account for these recurring failures at the perimeters of protected sites to protect both conventions and secure future sites?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to the Ronald W. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, United States Secret Service
From Ranking Member Rand Paul

**“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump”**

July 30, 2024

1. Were the Secret Service and the Trump campaign made aware of a plot by Iran to try to assassinate President Trump before the rally in Butler, PA? Were the Secret Service agents on site briefed on the threat?
2. Who decided that the AGR buildings would be outside the Secret Service perimeter for the event? Why was that decision made?
3. Who was assigned responsibility for securing the AGR buildings and grounds? Who decided that? Who communicated that to whom?
4. Have your investigators spoken to the local law enforcement?
5. Are there recordings of the Secret Service radio communications from that day? Are there recordings from the command post?
6. Why was President Trump allowed to take the stage if Secret Service was aware that local law enforcement was trying to locate a suspicious individual with a rangefinder that had been seen with a backpack? Why wasn't his security detail informed?
7. Did the Secret Service formally approve of the local law enforcement sniper positions?
8. Local law enforcement told my staff that they identified vulnerabilities with the AGR building to multiple Secret Service agents during a walk through on July 11, and they assured their concerns would be taken care of. Is that accurate? What, if anything, did Secret Service do to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified by local law enforcement?
9. In your assessment, do you believe the event was staffed appropriately?
10. What was the response to the crowd yelling that someone was on the roof? How much time passed between the initial alerts and the Secret Service's reaction?
11. Did the Secret Service counter-snipers brief the local law enforcement snipers in the AGR building the day of the event?
12. What pre-event coordination and planning were conducted with local law enforcement agencies? How were responsibilities and tasks delineated?
13. Were members of local law enforcement working at the time of the assassination attempt interviewed the night of the rally?
14. Has Secret Service conducted a debrief with local law enforcement agencies post-incident?
15. Can you clarify the chain of responsibility regarding the roof? Who within the USSS was directly responsible for overseeing the roof, and how was this responsibility assigned?

16. How many incidents of suspicious individuals were reported at the July 13 event? How many individuals were spotted with a rangefinder and backpack? Generally, how prevalent are reports of suspicious persons at Trump campaign rallies?
17. Knowing what you know, should the Secret Service have delayed President Trump from taking the stage? At what point should that decision have been made?
18. On July 24, 2024, along with Senators Gary Peters, Richard Blumenthal, and Ron Johnson, I requested documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. To date, we have not received all of the requested documents, and the ones we have received are heavily redacted. I request that you produce the following outstanding documents and unredacted versions of those already provided:
- All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.
 - Planning: All documents and information related to planning for the July 13, 2024, event, including without limitation:
 - Roles and responsibilities of all federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.
 - Any mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other memoranda or documents between USSS and SLTT law enforcement partner agencies, or any other federal government agency establishing responsibilities, plans, or procedures, that were activated or in effect for the July 13, 2024, event.
 - Resources: All documents and information related to resources dedicated to former President Trump's protective detail as of July 13, 2024, including:
 - The number of USSS agents, their roles and duties.
 - The number of other federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies that supported USSS's security and protection efforts at the July 13, 2024, event, including their roles and duties.
 - The USSS footprint for the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of agents, their roles and duties, and any other USSS assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and C-UAS capabilities and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs) or any other assets dedicated to the event.

- Policies: All documents and information related to USSS policies, procedures, and protocols for:
 - USSS's Advance Planning Methodology and conducting pre-event security assessments.
 - Responding to potential threats to a protectee.
 - USSS counter-sniper teams.
- Timeline: Including when USSS became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination.
- Communications: All documents and information related to:
 - Any communications internally within USSS or externally to or from any outside office, agency, or entity, related to the July 13, 2024, event, from any time up to and including July 13, 2024.
 - Any communications internally within USSS or externally to or from any outside office, agency, or entity, related to former President Trump's protective detail or other security measures, between November 15, 2022, and July 13, 2024.
- The Site Post Log from Butler, SSF 3048.
- Planning: All documents and information related to planning for the July 13, 2024, event, including without limitation:
 - Risk or threat assessments and identified vulnerabilities, including those that specifically address the building from which the shooter operated.
 - Plans for responding to an attack during the event, including coordinating and communicating with SLTT and any other law enforcement partner agencies.
- Resources: All documents and information related to resources dedicated to former President Trump's protective detail as of July 13, 2024, including:
 - The number of non-USSS personnel, including without limitation Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) or any other personnel within DHS, their roles, and duties.
 - What actions, if any, USSS took to further enhance the security of former President Trump's USSS protective detail in response to intelligence indicating a potential Iranian plot to assassinate former President Trump, and when USSS took those actions.

- Any internal reviews or audits conducted regarding resource allocation for this event.
- Any requests from former President Trump's campaign, his protective detail, or anyone else within USSS for additional protective resources to his USSS security detail from January 20, 2021, to the present, including any approvals or denials, justifications for any denials, or modifications.
- Any changes, including without limitation "additional security enhancements" USSS made to former President Trump's USSS protective detail after the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, as referenced in the USSS Director's July 15, 2024, statement.
- If the number of USSS agents or any other officers, assets, or resources from any federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies provided for the event was less than initially planned, requested, or offered, please indicate for what USSS, or federal or SLTT law enforcement partner fewer resources were provided, the reasoning/justification, the number or type of resource not provided, and all supporting documents and information related to such decisions.
- Policies: All documents and information related to USSS policies, procedures, and protocols for:
 - Training for agents assigned to protect high-risk individuals.
 - Please also provide documents and information identifying:
 - Whether any deviations were made from any of the above policies, procedures, or protocols related to former President Trump's protective detail before or on July 13, 2024, who approved such deviations and when.
 - Whether any updates or changes to these protocols were made following the July 13, 2024, event.
- Intelligence: All documents and information related to intelligence generated or received by USSS in advance of or during the July 13, 2024, event, including finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence, regarding:
 - Potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event.
 - The perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump.
 - A potential assassination plot by Iran or any of its proxies against former President Trump.

- The elections threat environment.
- Investigations: All documents and information related to:
 - The independent investigation into the July 13, 2024, event for DHS.
 - The USSS internal investigation into the July 13, 2024, event. For both investigations, please provide:
 - All documents relating to the scope of the investigation, who is leading the investigation, and the deadline of the investigation.
 - All directives, guidance, or parameters given to the entity conducting the investigation.
 - All assessments of what failures occurred (by either USSS or other federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies) that allowed the attempted assassination of former President Trump, including resource constraints.

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Questions for the Record from Senator Lindsey O. Graham for Acting Director Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., United States Secret Service
“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump”
July 30, 2024**

1. As requested in the hearing, please provide the threat-based protective model as it relates to evaluation of Iranian threats prior to the assassination attempt on President Trump.
2. Please confirm whether you have produce all standard protocols in place to secure events such as President Trump’s rally on July 13, 2024 and the specific protocols for President Trump’s rally on July 13, 2024.
 - a. If you cannot confirm this, please produce all relevant documents.
3. Please confirm whether you have produced all of the Secret Service’s policies as it relates to securing events such as President Trump’s rally on July 13, 2024 and the specific policy or policies created for President Trump’s rally on July 13, 2024.
 - a. If you cannot confirm this, please produce all relevant documents.

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Questions for the Record from Senator Alex Padilla
Submitted to Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.
Senate Judiciary Committee
“Examination of the Security Failures
Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump”
Tuesday, July 30, 2024**

1. Coordination and communication between the Secret Service, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies is critical. As the events of June 15th have clearly demonstrated, the ability to effectively collaborate and timely communicate can significantly impact the outcome of such events. Given the complexities involved, it is important to review how these processes functioned during the recent attack and identify any areas where communication and coordination can be strengthened.
 - a. Mr. Rowe, what joint initiatives or programs have you or will you put in place to enhance threat assessment and response capabilities going forward?

2. Director Rowe, the role of the U.S. Secret Service is critical in ensuring the safety and security of our nation's leaders. However, it is essential that we continuously assess and enhance the support and resources available to the Secret Service to address the ever-evolving landscape of threats.
 - a. Mr. Rowe, can you discuss any new training programs or protocols being developed to address emerging threats?
 - b. Mr. Rowe, what additional resources does the Secret Service need to effectively protect public figures and respond to threats?
 - c. Mr. Rowe, how is the Secret Service supporting the mental health and well-being of agents involved in such high-stress incidents?

3. The attack on Donald Trump highlights the ongoing threats to our nation's leaders and exposes significant shortcomings in the current policies and protocols of the Secret Service. Ensuring the safety of public figures requires continuous evaluation and improvement of our security measures, interagency collaboration, and Congressional support.
 - a. Mr. Rowe, what would you saw are the biggest lessons learned so far?
 - b. Mr. Rowe, are there any specific recommendations you have for Congress to better support your respective agency in preventing and responding to such attacks?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Questions for the Record
Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa
Senate Judiciary Committee and
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Joint Hearing on the Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump
August 14, 2024

Questions for Acting Director Ronald Rowe

1. In order to better understand how communications were organized on July 13, which local law enforcement entities had direct radio contact with Secret Service?
2. For local law enforcement entities who provided support on that day and did not have direct radio contact with Secret Service, how did Secret Service ensure that they all had adequate communication channels with entities who had direct radio contact with Secret Service? What process did local law enforcement have to follow to communicate information to the Secret Service?
3. Describe the process that a local law enforcement officer had to follow to send a picture of a suspect to the Secret Service.

4. Provide a full list of all federal and state law enforcement entities who were physically located in the Command Center on July 13. Was the Command Center able to fulfill its role of sharing real-time reports and intelligence that could affect the visit?
5. Did the Secret Service assign Beaver and Butler County snipers to the AGR building complex? If so, when was the assignment made? If not, was local law enforcement responsible for placing their snipers wherever they wished?
6. Through my oversight, I've been told by multiple local law enforcement personnel that Butler County ESU held a pre-event briefing around 9:00am on the day of the event but no Secret Service or federal law enforcement personnel were present. Is this accurate?
7. In your written testimony, you said that "[o]n the morning of July 13th, a site briefing was conducted with Secret Service personnel and law enforcement partners supporting the event."
 - a. What Secret Service personnel were present at this briefing? For example, were snipers and post-standers present?
 - b. Why wasn't Secret Service present at all day-of briefings?
 - c. Do you plan to direct Secret Service to update their processes for attending day-of briefings based on the events of July 13? If so, how? If not, why not?
8. Did federal law enforcement personnel meet with local law enforcement in advance of and on the day of the rally to coordinate security? If so, when and did those meetings include federal and state snipers?
9. Did the number of Secret Service personnel and other federal staff who were physically present on July 13 take into account the reported threat by Iran against Trump?
 - a. How many Secret Service personnel served as "post-standers" on July 13?
 - b. Was this number sufficient for the threat posed that day?
 - c. How many other law enforcement personnel served as "post-standers," please provide breakdown by agency.
10. The Secret Service has a dual mission of 1) protection and 2) criminal investigations. While both are important, it is clear that your protection mission is no-fail.
 - a. How does the Secret Service ensure that it's balancing these missions, while ensuring it's prioritizing the protective mission?
 - b. Do you believe that the Secret Service is successfully balancing both?
11. Your written testimony states that you "directed resources to facilitate our protective site communications—particularly our communications with our State and local partners."
 - a. What changes have been made to radio and other communications?
 - b. Are these changes being made so that all local and state law enforcement can send communications directly to Secret Service?

12. Your written testimony states that you “directed the expanded use of drones at protective sites to help detect threats on roofs and other elevated areas.”
- Please describe this expanded use of drones, including if Secret Service uses them before and during an event. Also describe how you’ll ensure they’re operational even if cell phone towers are down.
 - Does Secret Service have enough drones to provide support at all sites and events during this election season? When will you need to rely on DHS, or other federal, state, or local partners? What’s your plan for deploying the use of drones at events immediately?
13. Your written testimony says that “[a]t 5:45 p.m., a local Butler County Emergency Services Unit counter sniper team member texted the Secret Service counter sniper team leader about a suspicious person and sent two photos of the individual, later identified to be the assailant.” Was the gunman’s use of a rangefinder included in this text?
14. In your written testimony you stated that “[a]t 5:53 p.m., the Secret Service counter sniper team leader emailed the Secret Service counter sniper teams that local law enforcement was looking for a suspicious individual outside of the perimeter.” Was the gunman’s use of a rangefinder included in this email?
15. In your written testimony, you state that in communication with State and local partners “a delay, of even a few seconds in communication, can make the difference in life and death.” A Butler Township Police Department patrol officer encountered the gunman after climbing onto the roof to confront him and this information was communicated over the radio. My investigative team has reviewed local law enforcement footage from that day which shows a group of law enforcement officers provided support and were on the ground beneath the patrol officer.
- Did Butler Township’s encounter with the shooter on the roof get to the Secret Service prior to the shooting? Provide exact timestamps.
 - Did local or state law enforcement officers receive this information prior to the shooting?
16. Please provide plans outlining how Secret Service plans to track the implementation progress of all recommendations that may be issued as a result of the Independent Review of July 13, 2024, Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump announced by Secretary Mayorkas on July 21, 2024.¹
17. Please provide a timeline and details on the coverage area assigned to the sniper that ultimately shot Crooks on July 13. Please discuss whether the roof of the AGR building was part of their assigned coverage area.
18. Provide the make and model of the UAS that the shooter flew on July 13, 2024.

¹ Department of Homeland Security Press Release. July 21, 2024. Secretary Mayorkas Names Bipartisan Independent Law Enforcement Experts For 45-Day Independent Review of July 13, 2024, Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald Trump. <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/07/21/secretary-mayorkas-names-bipartisan-independent-law-enforcement-experts-45-day>. (last accessed: Aug. 13, 2024).

19. During the July 30, 2024, hearing FBI Deputy Director Abbate testified that “[o]n July 6, the shooter registered to attend the rally.” How many tickets did the shooter’s registration request? Did the shooter use his ticket to enter the rally at any point on July 13? If so, when? Please provide information for all entries.
20. Secret Service and other law enforcement have reported issues with cell phone and radio reception during the event. Did the Secret Service or any other law enforcement entity jam reception at any point during the July 13, 2024 event? If so, who, why, and for how long?
21. On Jul 23, 2024, I wrote a letter to you and Secretary Mayorkas about the events of July 13. I requested a response no later than July 30, 2024. However, as of August 14, 2024, you have not provided a response. Please provide responses to the following questions from my July 23, 2024 letter. Please note that in response to your July 30, 2024, testimony and information that has come to light since the hearing some questions have been modified:²
- a. Provide a list of all USSS, local, and state law enforcement who deployed, or were set to deploy, UASs and counter UASs for the July 13, 2024, rally. Provide a detailed description of their intended use.
 - b. List all the requests that the USSS received from local and state law enforcement agencies to operate UASs and counter UASs before or during the July 13, 2024, event. Did the USSS approve these requests? If not, why not?
 - c. Was the USSS Counter UAS operator aware of the shooter’s use of a drone? Did the Counter UAS operator deploy countermeasures in response to the drone? If not, why not? Provide all records.
 - d. Who at USSS was responsible for making the final decision to deploy UAS or counter UAS for the July 13, 2024, event?
 - e. Provide all records between and among USSS, local law enforcement, state law enforcement, sheriffs, and federal law enforcement related to the use of UAS and counter UAS for the July 13, 2024 event with former President Trump.
 - f. Since January 2021, has the USSS deployed UASs or counter UASs during campaign events and rallies? If yes, provide a detailed description of their use, including but not limited to the date, location, event, protectee, and number of UASs or counter UASs deployed.
 - g. Provide all DHS and USSS guidance, policies, and similar documents concerning training requirements for UAS and counter UAS and a detailed description of the training.
 - h. Was the water tower cleared in advance of the rally? If not, why not?
 - i. Did the water tower have any role in the events at the Trump rally? Please describe.
22. On July 16, 2024 I wrote a letter to your predecessor Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle, in her capacity as Director of the Secret Service, and Secretary Mayorkas on the events of July 13, 2024. I have yet to receive a written response to my letter. Accordingly, provide the following documents and written responses to the questions listed below. Please note that in response to your July 30,

² July 23, 2024 letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Mr. Ronald Rowe, Acting Director, US Secret Service on DHS – USSS Operational Security Plan. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_dhs_uss_s_-_operational_security_plan.pdf

2024, testimony and information that has come to light since the hearing some questions have been modified:³

- a. Provide all records between and among USSS, local law enforcement, state law enforcement, sheriffs, and federal law enforcement relating to the July 13, 2024, rally with former President Trump.
- b. From January 2021 to the date of these QFRs, have all requests for additional Secret Service resources to protect President Trump or his family been fulfilled? If not, why not? Provide all records.
- c. Provide all records relating to all threats USSS was aware of prior to the rally.
- d. Provide a copy of the Secret Service advance plan assessing risks and establishing the security perimeter for the rally and a list of all meetings that took place as part of the advance planning, including dates, times, and attendees. In your response, also provide the established security procedures to screen individuals prior to entering the security perimeter.
- e. Provide the names of all USSS supervisors who were responsible for reviewing and approving the security plan.
- f. Provide a list of all law enforcement agencies that were present, including local police, state police, sheriffs, and all federal agencies, and a clear delineation of the physical area that each agency was responsible for securing.
- g. Provide the names of all Secret Service personnel present that day, their titles, the unit they are were attached to (for example, the counter-assault team) and a description of their responsibilities.
- h. For federal agencies present that day other than USSS, list each federal agency, the number of personnel who were assigned, their title, their home agency and location (HQ or field office location), and a description of their responsibilities.
- i. Provide a complete list of all countermeasures, including drones, that were deployed at the rally and the agency responsible.
- j. Was the AGR building where the sniper was situated, including its roof, considered a potential threat? Which agency was responsible for securing that area? Was the building secured? If so, which agency secured it and when? Provide all records.
- k. Provide all records regarding what was found on the gunman's body and in his vehicle.
- l. Provide a full and complete timeline of events that transpired, beginning with the actions taken by the Secret Service advance team and ending with former President Trump's evacuation.
- m. Provide a detailed description on whether USSS followed all guidance, policies, and related procedures when securing the premises. Where guidance, policies, or procedures were not followed, explain what was not followed and why.
- n. Provide USSS policies, guidance, and similar documents relating to the use of state and local law enforcement to supplement Secret Service protection of former presidents at public events, including documents relating to securing the site.
- o. Provide a status update on each of the recommendations, both classified and unclassified, issued by the Protective Mission Panel (PMP) in its 2014 report.

³ July 16, 2024 letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle, Director, US Secret Service on Trump Assassination Attempt. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_dhs_uss - trump_assassination_attempt.pdf.

- p. For each Secret Service agent on duty that day, provide the number of hours, including percentage of work time, used for training. How often did these agents take part in readiness test training as prescribed in the PMP recommendations?
 - q. Since January 2021, what actions has USSS taken to improve hiring and retention of Secret Service personnel?
 - r. Since January 2021, provide a detailed description of how USSS prioritizes its core mission of protection in relation to investigative responsibilities and diversity initiatives.
 - s. Was USSS alerted by state or local law enforcement, or members of the public that the suspected gunman was on top of the roof with a rifle prior to firing?
 - t. Has USSS interviewed any individuals who attended the rally? If so, how many interviews of rally attendees has USSS conducted? Provide a timeline of events with respect to notification of the gunman and interviews conducted.
 - u. Was the suspected gunman known to the USSS prior to the shooting?
 - v. Do you commit to conducting a full and complete Mission Assurance Inquiry or other review of the actions taken before, during, and after the attempted assassination? If so, please provide a timeline for the review, as well as its scope. If not, why not?
 - w. Has USSS leadership informed all USSS personnel to preserve all records, such as text messages and emails, related to the assassination attempt? If yes, please provide a copy of the preservation request.
 - x. Provide a copy of the advance risk assessment and security plan and other documents related to President Trump's protection during his October 31, 2020, rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.
 - y. Please include a description of any coordination with federal and local law enforcement for the rally.
23. Does Secret Service have any planned IT updates, including software updates, that may affect their ability to retain records that may be of interest in July 13, 2024, investigations into the attempted assassination of Donald Trump? If so, do you commit to pausing or canceling any updates to ensure that no records are lost?
24. Please list all preservation efforts that Secret Service has taken to date to ensure the integrity and retention of all records that may be of interest in July 13, 2024, investigations.
25. Does Secret Service commit to collaborating with the DHS Office of Inspection General (OIG) to ensure that they have timely and complete access to all records and individuals they wish to interview?
26. During your August 2, 2024, press conference, you stated that the July 13 event "was the first time Secret Service counter snipers were deployed to support the former president's detail."
- a. What threat existed that required Secret Service counter snipers to be deployed? When was that threat first known?
 - b. What federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies did the Secret Service communicate with to evaluate and analyze the threat for purposes of deploying counter snipers?

27. On July 20, 2024, I wrote a letter to your predecessor Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle, in her capacity as Director of the Secret Service on USSS Post Standings. The letter re-iterated my requests from my July 16, 2024 letter.⁴ In addition, it requested all communication records with the subject line, “203.080 Candidate Donald Trump to Pittsburgh, PA” and “203.080 First Lady, Dr. Jill Biden to Pittsburgh, PA” no later than July 26, 2024. I have yet to receive a written response to my letter or records. Accordingly, please provide a response and the records.
28. On August 9, 2024, I wrote a letter to you with follow up questions based on your testimony. Although a response is not due until August 16, 2024, I have not received a written response to your letter. Please provide the following documents and written responses to the questions listed below:
- a. Were you aware of the body camera footage from the Butler Township Police Department before your July 30 congressional testimony? If not, why not? If so, did you review it in advance of your testimony?
 - b. Regarding the reported statement from the Butler Township officer, describe in detail the “Tuesday meeting” that occurred with Secret Service. In addition, list all local, state, and federal personnel present at that meeting, provide all records and precisely answer whether the statement from the Butler Township officer is an accurate representation of events.
 - c. Please provide a site diagram making clear where all local and federal law enforcement counter snipers were positioned and their assigned coverage areas, along with the shooter’s positions throughout the day.
 - d. Do the photographs and diagrams referenced above conflict with Secret Service records regarding how local snipers were supposed to be positioned and how the AGR building was supposed to be covered? Please explain and provide all records.
 - e. Describe, in detail, how the Beaver County and Butler County counter sniper teams were assigned to their positions on the second floor of the AGR complex and their respective coverage areas. Did the Secret Service assign or approve the location of the counter snipers in the AGR complex? If so, when, who and how was the instruction given?
 - f. Do any Secret Service records indicate that the local counter snipers were supposed to be located inside, and not outside, the AGR building? Provide all records.
 - g. Regarding your testimony, who told Secret Service that the building “was going to be covered”? Who took part in the “face to face” meeting that you referenced?
 - h. Did Secret Service walk through and survey the AGR building as part of its advance security plan prior to the July 13 event? If so, describe when and list all local, state, and federal law enforcement present. If not, why not?
 - i. Why has the Secret Service not met with Beaver County ESU about the assassination attempt on July 13? Do you have plans to do so? If not, why not?
 - j. Did any federal law enforcement personnel assigned to the July 13 event see a person

⁴ July 20, 2024 letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle, Director, USSS Post Standings. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_uss_s_-_post_standings.pdf; July 16, 2024 letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Kimberly A. Cheatle, Director, US Secret Service on Trump Assassination Attempt. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_dhs_uss_s_-_trump_assassination_attempt.pdf.

on the roof of the AGR building at any point prior to the gunman opening fire? If so, which agency? Please explain in detail and with timestamps

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to the Ronald W. Rowe, Jr.
From Senator James Lankford**

**“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt
on Former President Trump”
July 30, 2024**

1. Have you seen a situation before where the Secret Service, based on active security concerns, tells a protectee that they should delay their plans while security concerns are addressed? What is the protocol? Who makes that call and who is responsible for communicating that to the protectee?
2. At the event on July 13, did the Secret Service have warning that there was an unresolved security concern? At what time was the Secret Service first made aware, specifically, of a security concern related to the individual we now have identified as Thomas Matthew Crooks? Was former-President Trump or any member of the campaign notified of any security concerns prior to former-President Trump going onstage? Why not?
3. Have you definitively ruled out that Thomas Matthew Crooks conspired with any other individual or entity in planning and perpetrating this assassination attempt?
4. Did all Federal law enforcement personnel and material positioned at the rally site belong to Secret Service or were other agency personnel and material present? What agencies?
5. Was there advanced planning by Secret Service leading up to the campaign rally? What Federal, state, and local agencies contributed to the security plan for the rally? How were Federal resources deployed at the rally site?
6. What counter-UAS resources does Secret typically deploy to secure outdoor events for protectees? How long before such events are counter-UAS resources deployed?
 - a. Were counter-UAS resources deployed at the Butler campaign event similar to what are typically deployed? If not, why not?
 - b. Did deployed counter-UAS resources identify, ascertain the source, and/or attempt to mitigate the surveillance drone used by Crooks? If not, why not?

7. Describe in detail the Secret Service's policies and guidance as it relates to and coordinating communicating with local law enforcement agencies for events similar to the Butler campaign event.
 - a. Were these policies followed prior to the Butler campaign event as agencies planned security for the event? If not, why not?
 - b. Were these policies followed on the day of the Butler campaign event? If not, why not?
8. What policies do the Secret Service have in place to determine whether additional security is needed?
9. The assassination attempt took place around the same time as several other events requiring Secret Service personnel were occurring. Public reporting has recently discussed the agency's struggles with resources.
 - a. Can you describe Secret Service's staffing challenges, as well as how far behind, if it all, the agency is in meeting its staffing goals?
 - b. Can you provide a list of initiatives and requested authorities by the agency aimed at addressing staffing challenges for the agency?
10. In interviews with the Secret Service personnel after the event, has the Secret Service found that anyone recommended that former-President Trump should delay going onto the stage? If so, who and at what time?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
From Senator Josh Hawley
“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump”
July 30, 2024**

Questions for Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Jr.

1. To date, has anyone in the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) been fired, suspended, or subject to any discipline for actions related to the rally at Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024? Please provide a complete list of employee names, disciplinary actions taken, dates these actions were taken, and the stated reason for these disciplinary actions.
2. Who, within the USSS, made the decision to deny counter-sniper coverage to the rooftop from which Thomas Crooks shot former President Trump on July 13?
3. Who, within the USSS, was responsible for approving the communications plan between federal, state, and local law enforcement officers on July 13? Please provide the communications plan as approved prior to the event, to include USSS, other federal, as well as state and local law enforcement.
4. Who, within the USSS, was responsible for supervising the local law enforcement partners at the rally on July 13?
5. Who, within the USSS, was the lead site agent at the rally on July 13?
 - a. Who specifically made the decision to assign the lead site agent to the July 13 rally?
 - b. On what basis was this decision made?
6. According to new public reports, there was another lead agent who also made security decisions on July 13.
 - a. Who was this agent?
 - b. Who made the decision to assign this agent to the event?
 - c. Has this agent been disciplined?

7. Who, within the USSS, was in charge of determining the security perimeter for the Butler, Pennsylvania rally?
8. Which individuals reviewed, approved, or otherwise signed off on the final determination for the security perimeter?
9. What reasons were given for excluding the American Glass Research (AGR) buildings from the security perimeter?
10. Was there supposed to be law enforcement stationed on the roof of AGR Building 6? If not, why was that not part of the security operations plan?
11. Were any law enforcement agents or counter-sniper teams supposed to be stationed on the roof of any AGR building?
12. Did any law enforcement agents or counter-sniper teams abandon their assigned posts at any AGR building because of heat or weather?
13. Why did the local officers in the second floor window of the adjacent AGR Building not see the shooter?
14. Where did the local officers in the second floor window of the adjacent AGR Building go?
15. How did local law enforcement lose sight of the shooter?
16. Why were local law enforcement not patrolling the perimeter of AGR Building 6?
17. How did Crooks access the roof of AGR Building 6?
18. Who was responsible for denying the public access to the roofs of the AGR buildings?
19. Who was responsible for denying the public access to the water tower?
20. How much time elapsed between when law enforcement first encountered Crooks on the roof of AGR Building 6 and when he discharged his weapon?
21. How much time elapsed between when USSS counter-snipers initially identified Crooks as a threat and when they successfully neutralized him?
22. When did the USSS site survey take place?
23. Did the USSS counter sniper team (CST) that eventually worked the event participate in the site survey?
24. Who chose the positions for the CSTs, given that their positions on the red barns have partially obstructed lines of sights to the AGR building (the clearest threat building for a potential sniper)?
25. Were rehearsals held before the event between USSS, other federal law enforcement, and state and local law enforcement?
26. Was state and local law enforcement input incorporated into the USSS security plan?
27. Who was in overall command of the security of the event, including of USSS, other federal officials, as well as state and local law enforcement?

28. Were Counter Surveillance Division (CSD) resources requested for the Butler rally on July 13? If so, were they provided? If not, why not?
29. Were you personally involved in making policy or personnel decisions affecting CSD's manpower? Please provide all responsive records during your time as Deputy Director in which policy and personnel changes were made to CSD.
30. Did the Acting Secret Service Director ever deny resources to the Trump campaign, or USSS sniper teams, as has been reported in the press?
31. What specific changes have you made to USSS policies following the rally on July 13, 2024?
32. How many law enforcement agents or officers were assigned to the Butler rally on July 13, 2024?
 - a. How many of these were from former President Trump's permanent detail?
 - b. How many of these were from local or regional USSS offices?
 - c. How many of these were from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)?
 - d. How many of these were from other components of DHS?
 - e. How many of these were from other federal law enforcement components?
 - f. How many of these were from state or local law enforcement?
33. What role, if any, did former Director Kimberly Cheatle have in reviewing, approving, or directing any plans for the Butler rally?
34. What role, if any, did you as Deputy Director have in reviewing, approving, or directing any plans for the Butler rally?
35. Has former President Trump, his organization, his campaign, or any related entity ever requested additional protection from USSS?
 - a. What role, if any, did former Director Cheatle have in reviewing, approving, or denying any such requests?
 - b. What role, if any, did you as Deputy Director or Acting Director have in reviewing, approving, or denying any such requests?
36. Did USSS at any point suggest or encourage former President Trump, his organization, his campaign, or any related entity to stop holding outdoor rallies?
37. What type of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capabilities did the USSS prepare for the Butler rally?
38. What specific technical difficulties prevented USSS from deploying UAS or counter-UAS assets?
39. What UAS or counter-UAS capabilities did state or local law enforcement offer to USSS to prepare for the Butler rally?

40. What UAS or counter-UAS assets, if any, were ultimately deployed in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024?
41. Do you support declassifying all information related to the agency's failure to protect former President Trump at the Butler rally on July 13, 2024?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Senator Mike Lee

Questions for the Record for Ronald Rowe, Acting Director of the United States Secret Service

Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing: "Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump"

1. How many times was a request made for additional resources for President Trump's Presidential Protection Detail or any events attended by President Trump? Please provide who made the request. If you cannot provide the name of the individual, please provide their title; whether and on what date the request was granted, denied or remains unanswered; and if the request was denied, by whom and for what reason.
2. Did you deny as either Deputy Director of the Secret Service or Acting Director or did anyone on your staff deny internal or external requests for additional resources for President Trump's Presidential Protection Detail? Please provide who made the request, if you cannot provide the name of the individual, please provide the title; whether and on what date the request was granted, denied or remains unanswered; and if the request was denied, by whom and for what reason.
3. A few weeks ago, a Secret Service whistleblower claimed that requests for counter snipers at President Trump's events have been denied if the events are not within driving distance of Washington, DC. Is this true? If yes, please provide the dates and explanations for each denial. If no, please provide documentation regarding the presence of U.S. Secret Service counter snipers at President Trump's events.
4. There have been various reports about why there was no law enforcement presence on the roof of the AGR building. In some reports, Secret Service agents claim the AGR building roof was the responsibility of local law enforcement. Yet, on August 8, 2024, the Wall Street Journal released body camera footage from a Butler Township officer immediately after the assassination attempt. The officer can be heard saying "I f—ing told them that they needed to post guys f—ing over here...I told them that f—ing Tuesday. I talked to the Secret Service guys. They're like, 'Yeah, no problem. We're going to post guys over here.'" Who was responsible for the roof of the AGR building? Why did the Secret Service leave the roof unprotected? Has the Secret Service reviewed this body camera footage? Is the Butler


Township Officer's statement accurate? If yes, who in the Secret Service did he speak with on Tuesday, July 9, 2024?

5. With law enforcement stationed inside the AGR building, were the building interior and roof swept by U.S. Secret Service before the rally? If yes, when?
6. Why was the AGR building outside the security perimeter for the July 13, 2024 rally?
7. Which U.S. Secret Service individuals, identified by position, approved the security perimeter for this event?
8. Per reports from local police, the United States Secret Service was not present at the pre-rally security briefing held by the Beaver County Police Department. Were FBI agents present, and if not, why and who is responsible for making that decision? Why did the United States Secret Service fail to attend the meeting with Beaver County Police?
9. According to reports, it is unclear whether Crooks carried the rifle on the roof of the AGR building just before the shooting or whether he might have placed it on the roof earlier as no law enforcement or rallygoers reported seeing him with a rifle until after he was on the roof. When was the rifle first on the roof? Do you have any evidence indicating when Crooks placed the rifle on the roof?
10. According to reports, at 5:45 pm on July 13th, a Beaver County ESU sniper sent a photo of Crooks to a Secret Service sniper. Crooks began shooting at 6:11 pm. What steps were taken to protect the former President during those 26 minutes? What steps should have been taken during those 26 minutes?
11. Why was President Trump allowed to take the stage at 6:02 pm—17 minutes after the suspicious person report—if the Secret Service had multiple law enforcement reports and photos of a suspicious person in its possession?
12. Were members of President Trump's Presidential Protection Detail notified of the suspicious person at the July 13, 2024 rally? If yes, who and at what time? Please provide the number of people on his detail who were notified, and if you cannot provide their names, please provide their titles.
13. Why was President Trump not notified of the suspicious person?
14. Individual rally attendees notified local law enforcement of an individual on the roof of the AGR building with a gun at 6:09 pm. Why was President Trump not removed in the two minutes between when law enforcement officers were notified there was a man with a gun and the shooting began?

15. According to testimony at the July 30th, hearing, roughly 30 seconds elapsed from the time the local law enforcement officer saw Crooks on the roof of the AGR building with a gun and when he began shooting. What happened during those 30 seconds? What should have happened? What went wrong?
16. Did the Secret Service have a Counter UAS drone at the rally site? Was it operational? If yes, at what time did the counter drone become operational? If no, what time did the U.S. Secret Service receive notification that the drone was not operational? What steps were taken to increase coverage?
17. Was the shooter's drone detected in real time? Why or why not?
18. At what time in advance of an event involving a presidential protectee are private drones banned? Why or why not?
19. There are reports that the drone surveillance program went offline hours before the rally began. Is this accurate? Understanding there were legitimate threats to President Trump's life from the Iranians, was anyone sent to secure and visually assess those areas the drone would have observed before the rally began? Why or why not?

The day after our hearing new video footage emerged. The video footage was taken by James Copenhaver, a victim seriously wounded by Thomas Crooks on July 13th. It showed an armed man, presumably Crooks, running across the rooftop of the AGR building directly in front of President Trump. When did the FBI become aware of this video? Has the FBI added this video footage to their investigation? Did President Trump's Protective Detail and the Secret Service Counter Snipers see this man running across the roof? If yes, why did they not remove him or remove President Trump from the stage? If no, how did they not see him?

20. In the same article as the body camera footage, the Wall Street Journal claims that there were no U.S. Secret Service agents in the command center complicating communications. Based on your testimony on July 30, 2024, the command center was the only way for local law enforcement to communicate with the Secret Service. Is it true that no Secret Service agents were stationed in the command center? If yes, why?
21. If Secret Services agents were not stationed in the command center, could this be why local law enforcement officer's warnings about the man on the roof with the gun did not reach President Trump's Presidential Protection Detail?



22. On July 30th, Susan Crabtree of Real Clear Politics published the email above, which was sent the day before by a U.S. Secret Service counter sniper to the entire Secret Service Uniformed Division and exposes what he believes is the Secret Service's "inability to protect our leaders due to our leadership." The counter sniper claims that "our SUPERVISORS (aka leadership) knew better and thought our concerns were less important." As Deputy Director and now as Acting Director, when were you made aware of this Secret Service counter sniper's concerns? Was the counter sniper's email from Monday, July 29, 2024 at 10:34 pm to Uniformed Division staff deleted? If so, why and who within the Secret Service made the decision to delete the email?
23. Please address the claims made in the email. Specifically, what "concerns were less important" and how might have leadership believed they "knew better" than the agents on the ground? How has the leadership within the Secret Service evolved, and how might these changes have sparked such an email? To your knowledge, are these sentiments shared by other counter snipers? What steps are being taken to ensure that the agency remains focused on its primary mission of protecting its protectees rather than becoming bogged down by bureaucratic inefficiencies?

24. On August 5, 2024, Susan Crabtree published a piece on Real Clear Politics titled “Former Secret Service Chief Wanted to Destroy Cocaine Evidence” alleging that former Director Cheatle and you wanted to destroy the cocaine found in the White House on July 2, 2023. Ms. Crabtree received information from sources within the Secret Service that a Uniformed Division officer assigned to investigate the incident was removed from the investigation after he told supervisors, including former Director Cheatle and you, that he wanted to follow certain investigative protocols, which included preserving the evidence. Are these allegations true? Why or why not? Were any Uniformed Division officers removed from the investigation? If yes, please provide a written justification for each removal.
25. Last month, activists belonging to a group called the “Palestinian Youth Movement” were able to breach the secure perimeter surrounding the Watergate Hotel, where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife were staying and released maggots and other insects into the hotel. The Secret Service, which was partially responsible for the security of the Israeli Prime Minister during his visit, admitted via a spokesperson that the conference room in the hotel where the maggots were released was not part of the service’s “security plan with Israeli security services and our local partners.” How did the Secret Service fail, once again, to effectively secure the perimeter of a building containing a high-value target? Who at the Secret Service, identified by title, was responsible for the operational success of this particular mission?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

SENATOR TED CRUZ
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Questions for the Record for Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director of the United States Secret Service.

I. Directions

Please provide a wholly contained answer to each question. A question's answer should not cross-reference answers provided in other questions. Because a previous nominee declined to provide any response to discrete subparts of previous questions, they are listed here separately, even when one continues or expands upon the topic in the immediately previous question or relies on facts or context previously provided. **Any answers that include sensitive information may be designated as "law enforcement confidential" and be submitted on a separate document.**

If a question asks for a yes or no answer, please provide a yes or no answer first and then provide subsequent explanation. If the answer to a yes or no question is sometimes yes and sometimes no, please state such first and then describe the circumstances giving rise to each answer.

If a question asks for a choice between two options, please begin by stating which option applies, or both, or neither, followed by any subsequent explanation.

If you disagree with the premise of a question, please answer the question as-written and then articulate both the premise about which you disagree and the basis for that disagreement.

If you lack a basis for knowing the answer to a question, please first describe what efforts you have taken to ascertain an answer to the question and then provide your tentative answer as a consequence of its reasonable investigation. If even a tentative answer is impossible at this time, please state why such an answer is impossible and what efforts you, if confirmed, or the administration or the Department, intend to take to provide an answer in the future. Please further give an estimate as to when the Committee will receive that answer.

To the extent that an answer depends on an ambiguity in the question asked, please state the ambiguity you perceive in the question, and provide multiple answers which articulate each possible reasonable interpretation of the question in light of the ambiguity.

II. Questions

1. On July 20, 2024, the Washington Post claimed that “[t]op officials at the U.S. Secret Service repeatedly denied requests for additional resources and personnel sought by Donald Trump’s security detail in the two years leading up to his attempted assassination at a rally in Pennsylvania last Saturday.”
 - a. From the date that President Trump left office to the present, please list every denied request for additional security by President Trump’s team.
 - b. Please list the date of each denied request for additional security and describe the request made.
 - c. Please provide the name of the key decision maker(s) who denied the request.
 - d. Please provide all emails, letters, or documents relating to and documenting the decision-making process.
 - e. Were you, Director Cheatle, or Secretary Mayorkas ever briefed on these requests when they were made?
 - f. Were you, Director Cheatle, or Secretary Mayorkas involved in the decision-making?
2. On April 11, 2024 USA Today, reported that Robert F. Kennedy threatened the Department of Homeland Security with legal action, after Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas denied his fifth request for Secret Service Protection.
 - a. From the date that Mr. Kennedy declared his candidacy for President to the present, please list every denied request for additional security by Mr. Kennedy’s team.
 - b. Please list the date of each denied request for additional security and describe the request made.
 - c. Please confirm that Secretary Mayorkas was responsible for denying these request.
 - d. Please provide all emails, letters, or documents relating to and documenting the decision-making process.
 - e. Were you or Director Cheatle ever briefed on these requests when they were made?
 - f. Were you or Director Cheatle involved in the decision-making process?
3. During questioning, you were presented with Secret Service Chief of Communications

Anthony Guglielmi's X post, where he claimed, "There's an untrue assertion that a member of the former President's team requested additional security resources & that those were rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added protective resources & technology & capabilities as part of the **increased campaign travel tempo**."

- a. You mentioned in your response that this X Post was correct regarding Trump's security requests related to his event in Butler, Pennsylvania. Given that the post refers to "increased campaign travel tempo," is it not the case that this X Post is making a statement broader than Trump's requests solely regarding Butler and is making a general statement about Trump's security requests during the campaign?
 - b. Can you disavow this post and say that the post is incorrect?
 - c. Who was in charge of reviewing and approving these posts?
4. How many Secret Service Agents were at Butler, Pennsylvania, as a part of President Trump's security detail for the rally?
 5. How many Secret Service Agents were assigned to First Lady Jill Biden at her campaign event in Pittsburgh that same day?
 6. How many Secret Service Agents were assigned to President Joe Biden at his June 28, 2024 rally at the North Carolina State Fairgrounds in Raleigh, North Carolina?
 7. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have there been against President Trump?
 8. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against Robert F. Kennedy Jr.?
 9. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against President Biden?
 10. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against First Lady Jill Biden?
 11. Susan Crabtree, a political correspondent for RealClearPolitics, reported that Secret Service resources were diverted away from President Trump's rally in Butler to First Lady Jill Biden's event in Pittsburgh. Is this true?
 - a. If so, how many agents were diverted? Please include their seniority, their title, and the role.
 12. On July 17, 2024, the New York Post reported that the gunman "was spotted by law enforcement, using a rangefinder and looking at his phone, nearly an hour before

Trump took the stage, though he first raised suspicions around 3 p.m. that day when he passed through the security screening area with the rangefinder.”

- a. Around 3 p.m., was the gunman stopped and questioned when he passed through the security screening area with a rangefinder?
 - b. If not, why not?
 - c. Why was the gunman not detained when he passed through the security screening area with a rangefinder?
 - d. Is there a benign use of a rangefinder at a political rally?
 - e. At 5:32, when local law enforcement saw the gunman using a rangefinder, why was he not stopped, questioned, and detained?
 - f. Who first spotted the gunman using a rangefinder, and why did that person not respond to stop, question, and detain the gunman?
13. Did the Secret Service or state or local police deploy aerial assets such as drones or helicopters?
 14. Fox News reported on July 25, 2024, that “[l]ocal law enforcement repeatedly offered to provide drone coverage in the sky above former President Trump’s July 13 campaign rally [. . .] but was rebuffed by the U.S. Secret Service.”
 - a. Is this accurate?
 - b. Who was in charge of denying the use of the local law enforcement drone?
 - c. Why was the use of a local law enforcement drone denied?
 - d. Is there precedent of local law enforcement providing aerial assets in cooperation with the U.S. Secret Service?
 15. Please describe the mechanism, communication protocols, and the communication medium (text, radio, etc.) for coordinating efforts and relaying threats and other safety developments between local law enforcement and the Secret Service on President Trump’s rally in Butler.
 - a. Were all protocols followed?
 - b. Was there radio interoperability between different radio communication systems used by the various agents and units involved in the security operation on that day?

- c. If so, did radio interoperability function as expected? Was information about the shooter relayed through the radio before and after the shooting?
16. Please provide all the details of the communication (timestamp, description, radio/call transcripts, text messages) that occurred between local law enforcement and the Secret Service relating to the gunman in the hours leading up to the shooting (if any). If communication was minimal, why did local law enforcement fail to communicate to the Secret Service about the gunman?
 17. Prior to the event, was there any briefing or meeting between local law enforcement and the Secret Service to coordinate communication and security protocols?
 18. If local law enforcement was tracking the gunman as a suspicious individual, why did they not request President Trump to be removed from the stage?
 19. Was the Secret Service or local law enforcement supposed to be on the rooftop of the AGR building?
 - a. If so, why was no one on that rooftop?
 20. Why was President Trump not pulled from the stage when individuals in the crowd saw a man with a rifle on top of the AGR building a full two minutes before he fired on the former President?
 21. A local police officer, hoisted up by a fellow officer, encountered the gunman on the rooftop of the AGR building twenty-four seconds before the first shots were fired.
 - a. Did that local police officer have a radio?
 - b. If so, did he call in the threat to the Secret Service or otherwise attempt to alert the Secret Service?
 - c. Why was Trump not pulled from the stage during the 24 seconds after local law enforcement saw Crooks on the roof with the rifle?
 22. Despite having over eight full days between the assassination attempt that caught the world's attention and the House Oversight hearing addressing the topic, Director Cheatle did not even bother to visit the site.
 - a. Given the gravity of the assassination attempt, why did Director Cheatle not immediately visit the attempted assassination scene?
 23. At the House hearing, former Director Cheatle claimed to be "the best person to lead the Secret Service at this time," yet she resigned less than a day afterward.

- a. What events or pressures led to this sudden change in her stance on her leadership capability?
- b. Given her refusal to resign despite widespread calls from lawmakers and public officials, what ultimately convinced her that stepping down was necessary?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump
Questions for the Record
Submitted August 13, 2024**

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR COTTON

Questions for Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, United States Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

1. On July 20, the *Washington Post* reported that “top officials at the U.S. Secret Service repeatedly denied requests for additional resources and personnel sought by Donald Trump’s security detail in the two years leading up to his attempted assassination.”

On July 22, former Secret Service Director Kim Cheatle testified before the House that she had not personally turned down enhanced security requests from former President Trump’s team. In your testimony at the July 30 hearing, when Sen. Hawley asked whether you had “denied any resources to former President Trump’s team,” you responded, “No, not me. No, sir, not personally.”

If it was not you or former Director Cheatle, who were the “top officials” who repeatedly denied the Trump team’s requests for additional resources?

2. Your predecessor, former Director Cheatle, made “diversity” one of the Secret Service’s top priorities. Cheatle “aim[ed] to have 30% female recruits by 2030” as part of “an effort to diversify the agency,” and also sought to “maximize” hiring of “Individuals with Disabilities (IWD)” as special agents “to promote inclusive diversity efforts.” During her tenure, the agency hosted seminars on “respectful use of pronouns” and set up recruiting booths at Pride events. The head of the Secret Service’s “Office of Equity” even called diversity a “mission imperative.”

In the aftermath of the Trump assassination attempt, will you continue to divert the Secret Service’s time, attention, and resources towards diversity initiatives, or will you reevaluate the agency’s priorities?

3. At the Butler, PA shooting site, there is a water tower roughly 100 yards away from the American Glass Research (AGR) complex. An agent stationed on the water tower catwalk would have had a clear vantage point to monitor the AGR rooftops, and would have easily been able to spot the shooter on the southern-most building’s rooftop. Why did the Secret Service fail to establish an overwatch position on the water tower?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Questions from Senator Thom Tillis for Acting U.S. Secret Service Director Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.

1. Your agency must hire for jobs where having the best and most capable people can literally be the difference between life and death. How does your agency balance the pursuit of diversity benchmarks against simply hiring the best people when there is a conflict between those two goals?
2. Acting Director Rowe—as you know, 3,600 special agents and 1,600 Uniformed Division officers work for the Secret Service. After completing the Secret Service program, how often do special agents and officers attend additional scenario-based training throughout their careers?
3. Do you believe the failures at the Butler, PA rally are due to staffing issues, lack of training, or just failed communication between agencies?
4. Acting Director Rowe – as I mentioned during the hearing, it would be very helpful to have a concise and complete record of all requests for additional protection made by former President Trump and his team. Dating back to November 5th of 2022, what requests for additional security were made and what was the resolution of those requests? Specifically, were the requests granted, partially granted, or denied?
5. I'm extremely concerned about the 25-30 seconds between when a local law enforcement officer came face to face with the assailant and when the first shots were fired.

Did local law enforcement try to relay information during that time to former President Trump's detail? If so, why did that information not make it to the agents nearest him?

Acting Director Rowe failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation
From Senator Lindsey O. Graham**

**“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump”
July 30, 2024**

1. At this point, what do you know about Thomas Matthew Crooks’ motive in attempting to assassinate President Trump?
2. Are you able to rule out the possibility that Crooks was working with or instigated by another person or organization, including a foreign power such as Iran?
3. Are you following up on any additional threats against President Trump? How are you communicating these threats to the Secret Service and the Trump Campaign?
4. Has the FBI been able to access the encrypted messaging applications found on Crooks’ phone? If not, has the FBI ascertained whether it will be possible to access these encrypted messaging applications in the future?
 - a. Does the FBI cooperate with third party companies to assist in accessing encrypted technology? Please identify those third parties.
 - b. What additional tools does the FBI require in order to perform its investigative duties regarding encrypted technology?
5. Of the applications found on Crooks’ phone, how many utilized foreign servers or foreign data storage capabilities?
6. Did Crooks interact with any known foreign persons in the three years prior to July 13, 2024? If so, please note the number of foreign persons (by country), the number of contacts per foreign person and country, the nature of their contact, how the contact was facilitated, and whether the FBI believes that the contact was made in direct connection to Crooks’ actions on July 13, 2024. If this information must be provided in a classified setting, please provide a classified annex to your responses.
7. During your opening remarks, you revealed to the joint hearing that the FBI, “recently uncovered is a social media account, which is believed to be associated with [Thomas Matthew Crooks] in the 2019 to 2020 timeframe.” You revealed that the account contained “over 700 comments” which reflect “anti-Semitic and anti-immigration themes, espouse political violence, and are extreme in nature.” Further, you testified that, if confirmed to be authored by Crooks, these posts were “important to note, particularly given the general absence of information to date reflecting on the shooter’s potential motive.”
 - a. Which platform was the above referenced social media account posted on? Which company owns it?
 - b. What username was believed to be used by Crooks for the above social media account?
 - c. Please provide a complete disclosure of the posts made using the above referenced social media account.
 - d. If you are unwilling to provide answers to the questions above because the FBI has not fully verified that this account and posts came from Crooks, then for what reason did you make any reference to that account at all? Chairman Peters of the Homeland

Security and Government Affairs Committee asked you before your testimony—
“Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this committee will be the
truth, **the whole truth**, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” You agreed. It
is not a fulfillment of this oath to provide an oblique reference to a matter with
refusal to clarify upon further inquiry.

8. There have been reports that Crooks made pro-immigration comments using an account on
the social media platform Gab in 2021 under the username “epicMicrowave”.
 - a. Has the FBI been able to attribute this account and its contents to Crooks?
 - b. If the FBI has reason to believe that this Gab account belonged to Crooks, why was
this account not discussed in your opening statement?
 - c. Why were anti-immigration views posted when Crooks was 15 years old “important
to note,” but not pro-immigration views posted when Crooks was 17 years old?

**Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration
on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection
in the committee offices.**

**Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on
“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump”
July 30, 2024**

**Questions for the Record
Senator Amy Klobuchar**

For Deputy Director Paul Abbate:

Last year the Capitol Police investigated more than 8,000 threats against Members of Congress, an increase of more than four times over the past seven years.

- What steps is the Justice Department taking to prioritize the investigation and prosecution of these threat cases?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Questions for the Record from Senator Alex Padilla

**Submitted to Paul Abbate
Senate Judiciary Committee**

**“Examination of the Security Failures
Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump”**

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

1. Coordination and communication between the Secret Service, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies is critical. As the events of June 15th have clearly demonstrated, the ability to effectively collaborate and timely communicate can significantly impact the outcome of such events. Given the complexities involved, it is important to review how these processes functioned during the recent attack and identify any areas where communication and coordination can be strengthened.
 - a. Mr. Abbate, can you elaborate on the current state of interagency collaboration and how it can be improved to prevent and respond to politically motivated violence?

2. The attack on Donald Trump highlights the ongoing threats to our nation’s leaders and exposes significant shortcomings in the current policies and protocols of the Secret Service. Ensuring the safety of public figures requires continuous evaluation and improvement of our security measures, interagency collaboration, and Congressional support.
 - a. Mr. Abbate, are there any specific recommendations you have for Congress to better support your respective agency in preventing and responding to such attacks?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Questions for the Record
Senator Charles E. Grassley of Iowa
Senate Judiciary Committee and
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Joint Hearing on the Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump

August 14, 2024

Questions for Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation

1. On July 16, 2024, I wrote the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the assassination attempt against former President Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania and the subsequent investigations into the incident.¹ My letter was based on the FBI's public assertion that it "assumed the role of the lead federal law enforcement agency in the investigation" into the attempted assassination.² Further, on July 14, 2024, Attorney General Garland said that he "directed the FBI, the ATF, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the Department's National Security Division to bring every available resource to bear on this investigation."³ I have yet to receive a written response to my letter. Accordingly, provide the following documents and written responses to the questions listed below:
 - a. All records⁴ between and among FBI personnel, U.S. Secret Service personnel, and other law enforcement agencies related to the rally in Butler, PA.
 - b. Was the FBI aware of any threats relating to the rally in Butler, PA in advance of it? If so, please explain and provide all records.
 - c. A list of all weapons recovered, and explosives found at the crime scene, as well as in the gunman's home and vehicle, or that he may have been able to access, such as weapons belonging to other members of his household. Also, please include a description of how the gunman obtained the weapon used that day.
 - d. Precisely when did local and federal law enforcement become aware of the explosives belonging to the gunman?
 - e. Provide all trace requests for the firearms used by or associated with the gunman in the assassination attempt against former President Trump and the other victims.
 - f. Provide all FBI case files and records related to the gunman generated as part of this investigation.
 - g. Prior to the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, was the FBI made aware of the identity of the gunman?
2. In your testimony, you stated that "[w]ithin minutes of the attack, the FBI field office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania received notification of the assassination attempt and responded to the scene immediately with a surge of resources, quickly moving forward on the investigation."
 - a. How many FBI personnel arrived at the scene to investigate the assassination attempt?

¹ Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Attorney General Garland and FBI Director Wray, (Jul. 16, 2024) https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_doj_fbi_-_trump_assassination_attempt.pdf.

² FBI National Press Office, *FBI Statement on Incident in Butler Pennsylvania*, (Update: July 14, 2024, published July 13, 2024). <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-incident-in-butler-pennsylvania>.

³ DOJ Office of Public Affairs, *Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Addresses Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump*, Speech (July 14, 2024). <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-addresses-attempted-assassination-former-president>.

⁴ "Records" include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (e-mails, email attachments, and any other electronically-created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether or not they resulted in final documents).

- b. What time did the FBI investigative team arrive at the scene and commence its investigation?
 - c. Please describe, in detail, the “surge of resources” the FBI provided to quickly move forward with the investigation.
 - d. How many FBI personnel were assigned to the July 13 event prior to the shooting?
3. Did the Secret Service request additional personnel from the FBI for assignment at the July 13 event? If yes:
- a. How many FBI personnel were requested;
 - b. How many FBI personnel were assigned; and
 - c. The duties of each FBI personnel assigned.
4. In your testimony, you stated that “[o]n July 7, the shooter traveled from his home to the Butler Farm Show grounds and remained there for approximately 20 minutes. We assess this shows advanced planning and reconnaissance on his part.” You further testified that on “the morning of July 13, at approximately 10:00 AM, the shooter returned to the Farm Show grounds and remained there for about 70 minutes before returning home again.” You also stated that the shooter returned to the “scene and was moving around the Farm Show grounds close to the American Glass Research, AGR, building, from which he ultimately committed the attack. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 3:51 PM, the shooter flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the Farm Show grounds for about 11 minutes.”
- a. What was the exact location where the shooter parked his car on July 7 and the morning and afternoon of July 13?
5. In your testimony, you stated that “our explosive experts have analyzed the three IEDs recovered, two from the shooter’s vehicle, one from the family residence.”
- a. What was the exact location where the shooter parked his car when it was searched for explosives and what time did this occur?
 - b. Did federal or state law enforcement conduct the search of the shooter’s vehicle for explosives?
 - c. Provide all details and records relating to the types of IEDs recovered and their viability.
6. Provide all records obtained by the FBI relating to the shooter, Thomas Crooks, including but not limited to his online and social media accounts.
- a. Which social media platforms did he use and were they encrypted?
7. Did the FBI use the assistance of Israeli firms to obtain access to Crooks’ phone?
8. Has the FBI determined if Crooks had any foreign links, including financial? Please explain.
9. Has the FBI determined Crooks’ motive? If so, what is it and how did the FBI come to that conclusion?
10. How many interviews has the FBI conducted? Which federal, state, county and local law enforcement entities have been interviewed?
11. During the July 13 assassination attempt on former President Trump, Mr. Corey Comperatore was killed and Mr. James Copenhaver and Mr. David Dutch were injured after being struck by gunfire. Our prayers go out to these three victims, their families, and the countless other victims traumatized by experiencing such a horrific event while exercising their First Amendment Rights.
- a. What services and support has the FBI, such as its Victims Services Division, provided to:

- i. The civilian victims and survivors of the July 13 assassination attempt; and
 - ii. State and local law enforcement officials.
 - b. Have state and local law enforcement officials requested additional resources to support and assist the victims of the July 13 event? If yes, were these requests granted? If these requests were not granted, please explain in detail why not.
12. Media outlets have reported that the shooter's father, Matthew Crooks, called Butler County police prior to the shooting or after the shooting to report his son as missing. Has the FBI obtained access to Matthew Crooks' phone? If so, did he make a call to law enforcement at any time on July 13? When was the call made?⁵
 13. Is news reporting accurate that the shooter's father believed the shooter to be at the shooting range on July 13?
 14. Did anyone, including any individual in the Crooks' household, report Thomas Crooks for a mental evaluation or similar mental wellbeing evaluation? If yes, who, when, and for what specific reason? Provide records.
 15. Did Matthew Crooks communicate with Thomas Crooks on July 13? If yes, when and was it done via call or text? Provide records.
 16. Provide all law enforcement records relating to Thomas Crooks.

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record

From Senator Josh Hawley

“Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump”

July 30, 2024

Questions for Deputy Director Abbate

⁵ Rebecca Rosenberg, Jake Gibson, David Spunt, *Trump shooter's parents called police hours before assassination attempt*, Fox News (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.foxnews.com/us/trump-shooters-parents-called-police-hours-before-assassination-attempt>; John Miller, *Trump shooter requested Saturday off from work and told colleagues he'd be back at work Sunday, officials say*, CNN (Jul. 17, 2024) <https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/16/politics/trump-shooter-requested-saturday-off-from-work/index.html>.

1. To the best of your knowledge, what was Crooks's motive?
2. Do you support declassifying all information related to the attempted assassination on former President Trump on July 13, 2024?
3. What is your timetable for declassifying information related to the assassination attempt? Please provide a detailed roadmap.
4. Have any disciplinary actions been taken against FBI personnel in response to the assassination attempt? Please provide a comprehensive accounting.
5. Has anyone refused to testify, produce evidence, or cooperate with your investigation?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Senator Mike Lee

Questions for the Record for Paul Abbate, Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing: "Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump"

1. According to reports, it is unclear whether Crooks carried the rifle on the roof of the AGR building just before the shooting or whether he might have placed it on the roof earlier as no law enforcement or rallygoers reported seeing him with a rifle until after he was on the roof.

When was the rifle first on the roof? Do you have any evidence indicating when Crooks placed the rifle on the roof?

2. The day after our hearing new video footage emerged. The video footage was taken by James Copenhagen, a victim seriously wounded by Thomas Crooks on July 13th. It showed an armed man, presumably Crooks, running across the rooftop of the AGR building directly in front of President Trump. When did the FBI become aware of this video? Has the FBI added this video footage to their investigation? Did President Trump's Protective Detail and the Secret Service Counter Snipers see this man running across the roof? If yes, why did they not remove him or remove President Trump from the stage? If no, how did they not see him?
3. What protocols were the Secret Service Counter Snipers at the July 13th rally required to follow before firing? Could they have neutralized Crooks before he fired? Did they need authorization to neutralize Crooks before he began firing if they saw him with the gun?
4. Does the FBI have any evidence or are you seeking any evidence indicating Crooks did not act alone?
5. Was the shooter's drone detected in real time? Why or why not? If not, when did the FBI become aware of the drone?
6. According to testimony at the July 30th hearing, roughly 30 seconds elapsed from the time the local law enforcement officer saw Crooks on the roof of the AGR building with a gun and when he began shooting. What happened during those 30 seconds? What should have happened? What went wrong?
7. When does the FBI expect to complete its investigation of the July 13th assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump?
8. According to news reports, you made the decision to execute a surprise search on former President Trump's residence at Mar a Lago in 2023 over the protests of the FBI's Washington Field Office Director Steven M. D'Antuono who recommended working with former President Trump's attorneys to conduct a consensual search. Why did you overrule Mr. D'Antuono and execute a surprise search on a former President's home?
9. On July 25, 2024, Gab CEO revealed that his company received an emergency disclosure request from law enforcement for the social media account @epicmicrowave based on suspicions that it might belong to Thomas Crooks. At our July 31st hearing, you stated that the ownership of the account had not been verified. Does the Gab account @epicmicrowave belong to Thomas Crooks? Why was the Gab account @epicmicrowave investigated?
10. Gab CEO Andrew Torba said the following regarding the @epicmicrowave posts "a majority of them were in support of President Biden. He went on to say, "A number of posts in particular

expressed support for President Biden's COVID lockdowns, border policies and executive orders." Based on your investigation, are Mr. Torba's comments accurate? If no, why not?

11. Can you confirm whether or not the FBI was ever made aware of the @epicmicrowave Gab account prior to the attempted assassination of President Trump?
12. We now know, per reports from local police, that the United States Secret Service was not present at the pre-rally security briefing held by the Beaver County Police Department. Were FBI agents present, and if not, why and who is responsible for making that decision?
13. A whistleblower report made available to the House Judiciary Committee alleges that the United States Secret Service was understaffed at President Trump's Butler, Pennsylvania rally as a result of security demands associated with the NATO summit that concluded earlier that same week. Given that the FBI is leading the investigation into the events that led to the attempted assassination of President Trump, can you confirm whether or not your investigation has so far verified the claims that the Secret Service was in fact understaffed on July 13, 2024?
14. If your investigation has been able to conclude that understaffing was indeed a problem, who at the Secret Service identified the issue and when was the issue raised?
15. If, through the course of your investigation, you have not yet been able to determine whether or not the Secret Service suffered from an understaffing issue, can you confirm whether or not your investigation will include determining whether or not the Secret Service was understaffed on the day of President Trump's rally?
16. On Thursday, July 25th, a spokesperson for the FBI confirmed that the bureau's shooting reconstruction team, "continues to examine evidence from the scene, including bullet fragments, and the investigation remains ongoing." Can you provide an update on the status of the reconstruction team's work, and any insights their work has garnered?
17. How many times, and on what dates, have FBI agents returned to the scene of the attempted assassination?
18. On August 8, 2024, the Wall Street Journal released body camera footage from a Butler Township officer immediately after the assassination attempt. The officer can be heard saying "I f—ing told them that they needed to post guys f—ing over here... I told them that f—ing Tuesday. I talked to the Secret Service guys. They're like, 'Yeah, no problem. We're going to post guys over here'." Has the FBI reviewed this body camera footage?
19. In the same article as the body camera footage, the Wall Street Journal claims that there were no U.S. Secret Service agents in the command center complicating communications. Based on your testimony on July 30, 2024, the command center was the only way for local law

enforcement to communicate with the Secret Service. Is it true that no Secret Service agents were stationed in the command center? If yes, why?

20. If Secret Services agents were not stationed in the command center, could this be why local law enforcement officer's warnings about the man on the roof with the gun did not reach President Trump's Presidential Protection Detail?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

SENATOR TED CRUZ

U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Questions for the Record for Paul Abbate, Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I. Directions

Please provide a wholly contained answer to each question. A question's answer should not cross-reference answers provided in other questions. Because a previous nominee declined to provide any response to discrete subparts of previous questions, they are listed here separately, even when one continues or expands upon the topic in the immediately previous question or relies on facts or context previously provided. **Any answers that include sensitive information may be designated as "law enforcement confidential" and be submitted on a separate document.**

If a question asks for a yes or no answer, please provide a yes or no answer first and then provide subsequent explanation. If the answer to a yes or no question is sometimes yes and sometimes no, please state such first and then describe the circumstances giving rise to each answer.

If a question asks for a choice between two options, please begin by stating which option applies, or both, or neither, followed by any subsequent explanation.

If you disagree with the premise of a question, please answer the question as-written and then articulate both the premise about which you disagree and the basis for that disagreement.

If you lack a basis for knowing the answer to a question, please first describe what efforts you have taken to ascertain an answer to the question and then provide your tentative answer as a consequence of its reasonable investigation. If even a tentative answer is impossible at this time, please state why such an answer is impossible and what efforts you, if confirmed, or the administration or the Department, intend to take to provide an answer in the future. Please further give an estimate as to when the Committee will receive that answer.

To the extent that an answer depends on an ambiguity in the question asked, please state the ambiguity you perceive in the question, and provide multiple answers which articulate each possible reasonable interpretation of the question in light of the ambiguity.

II. Questions

1. Gab CEO Andrew Torba has come out publically saying that the shooter had a Gab account.
 - a. Has the FBI confirmed that the shooter possessed a Gab account?
 - b. Please provide all the shooter's posts on the Gab account.
 - c. Did these posts include messages of support for President Biden and the Democratic Party?
 - d. Did these posts include messages of opposition against President Trump or the Republican Party?

2. In your testimony, you have discussed the presence of other social media accounts of the shooter.
 - a. Describe the FBI's process of investigating the shooter's social media presence.
 - b. Please provide all the suspected accounts and public posts of the shooter.
 - c. Please describe the general political ideology or views expressed in these accounts and public posts.
 - d. Did any of the posts include messages of support for President Biden, the Democratic Party?
 - e. Did any of the posts include messages of opposition against President Trump or the Republican Party?
 - f. Did any of the posts include pro-immigration or anti-immigration messages?
 - g. Did any of the posts include anti-Semitic messages?

3. Did the FBI search the shooter's online search history?
 - a. Did the shooter search for information to assist him in his planning of the shooting?
 - b. Did the shooter look-up similar shootings or crimes?
 - c. Did the shooter look up information to assist him in other crimes?
 - d. Did the shooter look up political figures such as Donald Trump? If so, what kind of

searches did he do?

- e. Did his search results indicate any political ideology or point-of-view antagonistic toward President Trump and/or in favor of President Biden?
4. Did the shooter meet anyone in person on the day of the shooting, and if so, who?
5. Did the shooter communicate with anyone by text or phone on the day of the shooting, and if so, who?
6. Was the shooter intending to use explosives at the event, and if so, what was his plan?
7. In your testimony, you said that the FBI team had conducted more than 460 interviews in its investigation. Can you provide the general categories of people interviewed, and the list of individuals interviewed?
8. In your testimony, you said that the FBI have received more than 2,000 tips from the public. Have any tips indicated if the shooter was working with others?
9. Have any tips pointed to the shooter's motives?
10. In your testimony, you stated that legal process has been issued to dozens of companies. Which companies has the FBI been investigating?
11. Have all companies been cooperating?
12. Did the FBI receive any tips from the public regarding the shooter before the incident, such as tips warning of the shooter's plans or indicating that the shooter was at risk of committing a crime?
13. Was the shooter bullied in high school?
14. Did the shooter ever threaten violence in school or in public?
15. Have any tips indicated that there was foreign influence or support behind this incident?
16. Did the FBI have any agents on the ground at the Trump rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?
17. How does the FBI and Secret Service coordinate efforts around investigating the shooting?
18. What kind of FBI resources were being devoted to investigating threats to President Trump's

security at the time of the shooting?

19. Has the FBI increased its resources devoted to investigating threats to President Trump's security, and if so, in what capacity?
20. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have there been against President Trump?
21. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against Robert F. Kennedy Jr.?
22. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against President Biden?
23. Since August 2023, how many credible threats have been made against First Lady Jill Biden?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

**Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump
Questions for the Record
Submitted August 13, 2024**

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR COTTON

Questions for Paul Abbate, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice

1. The *Washington Post* reported that you ordered the head of the FBI's DC field office to execute the surprise armed raid at Mar-A-Lago, overruling his recommendation not to conduct such a raid. An FBI agent also signed a sworn affidavit asserting that you threatened FBI employees with termination if they disagreed with your manhunt for January 6 protestors. Another FBI agent told the House Judiciary Committee that you tried to hide the fact that the FBI had dozens of undercover informants at the January 6 protest because disclosure would be "embarrassing" for the FBI. Considering your actions against Trump and his supporters, why do you have a leading role in the Trump shooting investigation?
2. In your opening testimony at the July 30 hearing on the Trump assassination attempt, you stated that the FBI's "investigation has not determined motive." However, you proceeded to reveal that the shooter may have made comments with "anti-immigration themes" on social media. You highlighted these alleged posts despite the fact that "the investigative team is still working to verify this account to determine if it did belong to the shooter."

Your opening statement did not disclose that the FBI is investigating more recent social media posts possibly authored by the shooter that expressed support for President Biden's COVID lockdowns, border policies, and executive orders. You only acknowledged the existence of those posts in response to questioning by Sen. Blackburn, to whom you conceded that the FBI was investigating posts with "pro-immigration, pro-lockdown leftist views."

Why did you discuss the shooter's potential "anti-immigration" posts but not the "pro-immigration" posts in your opening statement?

3. If the shooter did in fact express support on social media for President Biden's COVID lockdowns, border policies, and executive orders, would the FBI consider this an indication that he was politically-motivated to assassinate former President Trump?

4. Last year, in Nashville, Tennessee, a transgender extremist shot up a Christian elementary school. The FBI uncovered the shooter's manifesto, but still claimed to be baffled as to the shooter's motive. The FBI refused to release information about the manifesto's contents, and it was only due to unauthorized leaks that we learned that the shooter was motivated by hatred against white people, Christianity, and conservatives, and that shooter specifically fantasized about killing blonde children for their "white privilege." The FBI also told the Nashville police not to release the manifesto because "pontificators" and "self-professed 'experts' will proffer their perspectives on the motivations behind the attack" if the manifesto were released.

Is the FBI also concerned that Americans will "pontificate" about the Trump shooter's motives?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.

Questions from Senator Thom Tillis for FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate

1. Your agency must hire for jobs where having the best and most capable people can literally be the difference between life and death. How does your agency balance the pursuit of diversity benchmarks against simply hiring the best people when there is a conflict between those two goals?
2. Do you believe the failures at the Butler, PA rally are due to staffing issues, lack of training, or just failed communication between agencies?
3. I'm extremely concerned about the 25-30 seconds between when a local law enforcement officer came face to face with the assailant and when the first shots were fired. Did local law enforcement try to relay information during that time to former President Trump's detail? If so, why did that information not make it to the agents nearest him?

Deputy Director Abbate failed to respond to these questions by the end of the Administration on January 20, 2025. If further information is received, it will be on file for public inspection in the committee offices.