[Senate Hearing 118-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hr. 118-379
EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
LEADING TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON
FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
and the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2024
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-406 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chair
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
LAPHONZA BUTLER, California ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Alan S. Kahn, Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
Claudine J. Brenner, Deputy Chief Counsel
Megan Petry Edgette, Senior Investigative Counsel
Kevin G. McAloon, Senior Investigator
William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
Christina N. Salazar, Minority Chief Counsel
Kendal B. Tigner, Minority Professional Staff Member
Megan M. Krynen, Minority Professional Staff Member
James P. Stephens, Minority Special Investigator
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chair
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE Rhode Island LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina,
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota Ranking Member
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey TED CRUZ, Texas
ALEX PADILLA, California JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia TOM COTTON, Arkansas
PETER WELCH, Vermont JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
LAPHONZA R. BUTLER, California THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Joseph Zogby, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Katherine Nikas, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Paul................................................. 3
Senator Durbin............................................... 4
Senator Graham............................................... 5
Senator Klobuchar............................................ 18
Senator Carper............................................... 20
Senator Grassley............................................. 22
Senator Johnson.............................................. 23
Senator Butler............................................... 25
Senator Hassan............................................... 27
Senator Cornyn............................................... 29
Senator Scott................................................ 31
Senator Blumenthal........................................... 33
Senator Ossoff............................................... 34
Senator Lee.................................................. 36
Senator Hawley............................................... 39
Senator Cruz................................................. 42
Senator Marshall............................................. 46
Senator Hirono............................................... 48
Senator Lankford............................................. 49
Senator Kennedy.............................................. 51
Senator Rosen................................................ 53
Senator Cotton............................................... 55
Senator Welch................................................ 57
Senator Tillis............................................... 59
Senator Blackburn............................................ 61
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 65
WITNESS
THURSDAY, JULY 11, 2024
Ronald L. Rowe Jr., Acting Director, United States Secret
Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.................. 6
Paul Abbate, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Department of Justice..................................... 8
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Abbate, Paul:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Rowe, Ronald L. Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 67
APPENDIX
Senator Cruz chart............................................... 79
Senator Grassley's letters....................................... 80
Senator Johnson's timeline of events............................. 104
Senator Johnson's letter......................................... 108
Senator Johnson's preliminary findings........................... 113
Senator Johnson's continued preliminary findings................. 126
Senator Scott's letter........................................... 127
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Rowe..................................................... 131
Mr. Abbate................................................... 165
EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
LEADING TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
ON FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
and the Committee on Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Garry Peters, and
Hon. Richard Durbin, Chairmen of the Committees, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters [presiding], Carper, Hassan,
Rosen, Blumenthal, Ossoff, Butler, Paul, Johnson, Lankford,
Scott, Hawley, and Marshall.
And present: Senators Durbin [presiding], Klobuchar,
Hirono, Padilla, Welch, Graham, Grassley, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz,
Cotton, Kennedy, Tillis, and Blackburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
Appendix on page 65.
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Just over two weeks ago, a gunman fired shots at former
president Donald Trump. This assassination attempt wounded the
former president and caused the death of Corey Comperatore; a
husband, father of two, and former fire chief who was attending
the rally with his family. David Dutch and James Copenhaver
were also attending the rally and were also injured in the
attack.
Let me be clear. This was an attack on our democracy.
Americans should be able to attend a political rally and
express their political beliefs without fear of violence, and
political candidates for our nation's highest office should be
confident that their safety will never be compromised for their
service. Although we are still learning about the shooter's
motive, this attack was a shocking reminder that the threat of
political violence is alive and well in our country.
By all accounts, this was an inexcusable security and
planning failure, and we need to get all of the facts about
what happened that day, and how we can ensure an attack like
this is never allowed to happen again. Today's panel of
witnesses leads the men and women who protect our top leaders
and are investigating this crime, and I want to thank them both
for being here today, as well as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a very
productive and informative briefing with our Committees last
week.
Today, our witnesses will help us begin to answer critical
questions, and get the information that we need to implement
reforms that are clearly needed to strengthen security
protocols for the U.S. Secret Service and the people who
receive their protection.
The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
(HSGAC) has already begun that work. This discussion comes in
the midst of a bipartisan investigation that Senator Paul and I
launched shortly after the assassination attempt took place.
Our teams are still collecting critical information, speaking
to law enforcement, and piercing together the details of this
event.
This past weekend, a bipartisan team of our investigators,
along with key staff from Senators Blumenthal and Senator
Johnson's offices, traveled to Pennsylvania to speak with local
law enforcement officials, review critical information from
security officials who were working alongside the Secret
Service, and to see the site firsthand.
I want to thank the incredibly brave local law enforcement
officers in and around Butler County who responded that
afternoon and who met with my staff this past weekend. They
have helped to answer tough questions, as well as discuss in
detail how the event actually unfolded. I also want to thank
the owners of Butler Farm Show and the American Glass Research
for allowing my staff and law enforcement to walk the grounds
and examine the roof of the building the gunman was able to
assess. We greatly appreciate your assistance.
I have also requested documents along with Senators Paul,
Blumenthal, and Johnson, related to security preparations,
intelligence gathering on potential violence prior to the
attack, and detailed explanations of the security response from
Federal, State, and local authorities. As part of our ongoing
investigation, we also seek to speak with additional Federal
law enforcement personnel, including Secret Service agents who
were responsible for securing the event.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity to ask critical
questions, and to begin to give the American people the
transparency and the answers that they certainly deserve. There
are still many unanswered questions. We need additional
information about the Secret Service's advanced planning
efforts, the decisions surrounding sniper and counter-sniper
team use, placement, and coordination. We also need answers
about what appears to be a problematic communication system
that limited efforts to relay information and respond to events
as they unfolded real time.
While today is focused on asking difficult questions about
what went wrong, I also want to thank the men and women of the
Secret Service, who in an instant will, lay their lives on the
line to protect our nation's leaders. They have incredibly
challenging jobs, and they must continue their mission no
matter what our hearing and investigation reveals.
I am also grateful to our Senate Judiciary Committee
colleagues for joining us in this important discussion, given
their key role in oversight of both of the agencies represented
before us today. It is very clear that the U.S. Senate is
focused on a productive conversation that will generate real
answers and real reforms. I appreciate all the work from
Members of both of our Committees to help us achieve this
absolutely essential goal.
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Paul for his
opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Eighteen days ago, a would-be assassin
managed to climb onto a roof 400 feet from the stage where the
former president and leading Presidential candidate Donald
Trump was speaking. The assassin's bullet struck President
Trump nearly missing a fatal blow thanks to a last-minute head
turn. Tragically, not everyone was so fortunate. A beloved
husband and father in the audience was killed, his life stolen
in an instant. Two others remain seriously injured. Their
futures uncertain.
The lives of law enforcement officers working the event and
those in the audience have been forever changed. Yet, the media
has shamefully moved on to other stories, and Google has been
caught trying to suppress iconic images of a bloody Donald
Trump, images showcasing the resolve of our nation in the face
of the attack.
But the American people have not forgotten, and we will not
forget. There is no question that this was a monumental failure
by the Secret Service. They had one job, and they failed. We
know that. What remains unclear is who specifically failed, how
they failed, and what must be done to ensure that something
like this never happens again. America deserves to know that
those responsible for this failure are frankly not going to be
in charge of securing the upcoming Democratic National
Convention (DNC). We need to know that someone's been placed on
suspension, that someone won't be in charge of the next Donald
Trump rally.
Now, I was encouraged to hear that the acting Director
Rowe, has initiated a disciplinary investigation in addition to
the ongoing Secret Service policy review. This is an important
step. However, real accountability will require a comprehensive
examination of all the facts, which still remain unclear.
This past Friday, my investigative team went to
Pennsylvania to meet with local law enforcement and document
the scene. One of the concerning things my team was told is
that no one from Secret Service has talked to them since the
shooting. I do not know how an investigation into what failed
can be conducted without talking to the officers and agencies
who were relied upon to do much of the work.
Many questions remain unanswered about the planning and
performance of the security for July 13th. While a host of
errors led to this security disaster, we now know local
enforcement officers were suspicious of the shooter 90 minutes
in advance of the shooting.
There are two glaring issues we need to focus on. First,
why were the American Glass Research (AGR) grounds and the roof
left unattended? Why was the AGR building, the shooter's perch,
left outside the perimeter? Local law enforcement told my staff
that they specifically flagged the vulnerability of the
building to the Secret Service and were told that it would be
taken care of. Clearly, these vulnerabilities were not
addressed. Second, why was Donald Trump allowed to take the
stage and why was he not removed from the stage when a
suspicious individual was taking increasingly suspicious
activities?
Over 20 minutes before President Trump began his speech,
the Secret Service Command Center had been made aware of an
individual with a rangefinder. At least 10 minutes before it
was confirmed, the Secret Service's Counter Sniper Team had
been made aware of the suspicious subject, and provided a
photograph and a detailed description. Why was the event not
delayed until the individual was found and checked out?
Interviews with local law enforcement paint a different
picture in critical places from what we have been told by the
Secret Service in other briefings. Now we need to hear from the
Secret Service agents responsible for security that day. Our
Committee has formally requested interviews with those agents,
but we have not yet been allowed to speak to them. I expect
Director Rowe today to tell us when we will be allowed to talk
to these people.
Finally, let me close with this. Grave mistakes were made
on July 13th, but that does not take away from the bravery of
dozens of Federal, State, and local officers that day. We are
grateful for their sacrifices and professionalism. They deserve
the truth. Now, also, it is our duty and our utmost
responsibility to ensure that we learn from this failure and
hold those responsible accountable.
Chairman Peters. I would now like to recognize Chairman
Durbin of the Senate Judiciary Committee for his opening
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Peters.
This is a rare joint meeting of the two committees, but we
have matching jurisdiction, and I think it's the most efficient
way to get to the truth. So, thank you for letting us join you
today.
We have all seen the movies. We have read the books; the
international assassin with sophisticated technology, elaborate
plans, well-honed skills, sets out to kill a leading political
figure in the United States. But how does that match the
reality of what happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, when a 20-
year-old, introverted college student outsmarted one of the
most sophisticated American law enforcement agencies in
history, came within an inch of killing a former president of
the United States?
That's why we are gathered today to ask these hard
questions. There's more to this story than other aspects that
we ought to consider as well. We cannot lose sight of the
factor that contributes to the violence on July 13th.
Widespread, easy access to AR-15 military-style rifles. While
we rely on the Secret Service to protect elected officials, we
must acknowledge the unique challenges they face in light of
the proliferation of weapons of war on our street.
Pennsylvania, like many States, allows individuals to
openly carry a loaded rifle without a permit. To make matters
worse, assault rifles can easily be purchased from unlicensed
dealers without a background check because of dangerous
loopholes on our gun laws. The same kind of firearm has been
used to carry out mass shootings in Newtown, Uvalde, Las Vegas,
and Highland Park, Illinois, killing dozens of children and
adults, and injuring many more.
Looking across this dais, I recognize we have our
differences on many issues, but when it comes to the protection
of the President and the Presidential candidates, we should
stand united. We know that protecting our elected officials is
essential to a functioning democracy. I hope this hearing can
be an example of how we will work together on a bipartisan
basis, to not only understand this shocking event, but to
ensure it never happens again. We must do this with or without
the incendiary language and conspiracy mongering, that too
often dominates our political discourse today.
Ongoing investigations by the Secret Service and the FBI
are critical. But Congress, the victim's families, and the
American people, deserve transparency and accountability now.
I will now turn to my partner on the Judiciary Committee,
Ranking Member Lindsey Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Several of us are from the military and have a military
background. If this happened in the military, a lot of people
would be fired. If a lot of people are not fired, the system
failed yet again. Having said that, the people who are brave
and jumped on the stage to protect the President need to be
applauded. We need to learn what happened, make corrective
action, but somebody's got to be fired. Nothing's going to
change until somebody loses their job. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. It's the practice of the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee to swear in witnesses. If
our two witnesses could please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Rowe. I do.
Mr. Abbate. I do.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. You may be seated.
Our first witness is Ronald Rowe, Jr. Mr. Rowe is currently
the Acting Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior
to this role, Acting Director Rowe was the 23rd Deputy Director
of the Secret Service. He has had a distinguished 25-year
career in the Secret Service, from coordinating major security
operations, to collaborating with other government and law
enforcement agencies.
Additionally, he has served as the Chief of Staff to the
Director as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of
Protective Operations, and as Deputy Assistant Director for the
Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs.
Mr. Director, thank you for appearing before this Committee
today. You are now recognized for your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD L. ROWE JR.,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED
STATES SECRET SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Rowe. Good morning, Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking
Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished Members
of the Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
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\1\ The prepared statement with attachments from Mr. Rowe appears
in the Appendix on page 67.
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A critical part of the Secret Service Mission is protecting
our nation's current and former government leaders. The
attempted assassination of former president Donald J. Trump on
Saturday, July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a failure
on multiple levels.
I join you and all Americans in condemning the horrific
assault on former president Trump, Corey Comperatore, James
Copenhaver, and David Dutch. I extend my deepest sympathies to
the Comperatore family, and my sincere wishes for Mr.
Copenhaver and Mr. Dutch's continued recovery.
Before I begin, though, I want to commend the heroic
actions of the men and women of the United States Secret
Service on July 13th. Our special agents shielded the former
president with their bodies while shots were still being fired,
selflessly, willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without
hesitation.
I am extremely proud of these actions and those taken by
the counter sniper team to neutralize the threat that prevented
further loss of life, and I applaud the actions of our tactical
teams that responded so quickly. I would also like to express
my gratitude to our Federal, State, and local partners. We rely
on these critical relationships which have developed over
decades of daily collaboration to secure protective events and
conduct criminal investigations.
As you are aware, there are multiple ongoing investigations
of the attack and the security failures that occurred that day.
I pledge my full support to those inquiries so the Secret
Service, your committees, and the American people have a
thorough and complete understanding of what happened leading up
to and during July 13th. I will not wait for the results of
those findings to assess where we failed that day. I have taken
and will continue to take immediate steps to ensure we do not
repeat those failures.
Since my appointment as the Acting Director one week ago, I
identified gaps in our security on July 13th and have
implemented corrective actions. One of my first actions as
acting director was traveling to the Butler Farm Show site to
better understand how our protection failed. I went to the roof
of the AGR building where the assailant fired shots, and I laid
in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. What I saw
made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer, and a 25-
year veteran with this Secret Service, I cannot defend why that
roof was not better secured.
To prevent similar lapses from occurring in the future, I
directed our personnel to ensure every event site security plan
is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before
it is implemented. It is clear to me that other protective
enhancements could have strengthened our security at the Butler
event.
As such, I have directed the expanded use of unmanned
aerial systems (UAS) at protective sites to help detect threats
on roofs and other elevated threats. I have also directed
resources to facilitate our protective site communications,
particularly our communications with our State and local
partners. In addition, I have instructed the asset requests for
Secret Service Protective details to be approved expeditiously
and afforded the maximum use of requested personnel at
protective sites to address this heightened security
environment.
I have heard your calls for accountability, and I take them
very seriously. Given the magnitude of this failure, the Secret
Services Office of Professional Responsibility is reviewing the
actions and decisionmaking of Secret Service personnel in the
lead-up to and on the day of the attack. If this investigation
reveals that Secret Service employees violated agency
protocols, those employees will be held accountable to our
disciplinary process.
With respect to congressional investigations and request
for information, I instructed my staff to provide full
cooperation and respond expeditiously on a continuing basis to
ensure you have the information you need to conduct your
critical oversight.
In my testimony before you today, I will provide details on
the Secret Services advance security planning for the Butler
Farm Show site, facts as we know them regarding the incident
itself, known breakdowns in executing the security plan, and
corrective actions that the agency is taking to ensure that
nothing like this happens again.
But I do not believe that inadequate time to plan for this
event was a factor in the failure. As you saw in my written
statement, I am prepared to provide an overview of the security
planning leading up to and during the July 13th attack.
However, I would like to point out that based on what I know
right now, neither the Secret Service counter sniper teams nor
members of the former president's security detail had any
knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building
with a firearm.
It is my understanding those personnel were not aware the
assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. Prior to
that, they were operating with the knowledge that local law
enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual
prior to the shots being fired. I regret that information was
not passed to Congress and the public sooner with greater
frequency. I fear this lack of information has given rise to
multiple false and dangerous conspiracy theories about what
took place that day. I want to debunk these theories.
Let me address one conspiracy directly. The Secret Service
counter sniper neutralized the assailant within seconds after
the assailant fired his weapon. That counter sniper had full
discretion to use deadly force to stop an attacker and did not
need to seek authorization to fire. I am immensely proud of the
selfless dedication of our employees to the mission. Every day,
across the globe, the men and women answer the call to protect
our nation's leaders, and the standard is no fail for a reason.
During our current high operational tempo, I want and I
need to ensure that the Secret Service workforce are uplifted
so they can focus on carrying out the mission. They have my
full support, and I am confident in their abilities to ensure
the safety and security of the people we protect. They are
worthy of trusting confidence and they deserve your support as
well as the support of the American people.
Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking
Member Graham, and Members of the Committees, thank you for the
opportunity to testify at this joint hearing. I will submit the
remainder of my statement for the record, and I will answer
your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Rowe.
Our second witness is Paul Abbate. Mr. Abbate is the Deputy
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In this role, Deputy Director
Abbate oversees all FBI domestic and international
investigative and intelligence activities.
Prior to his appointment as deputy director, he has had a
distinguished three decades within the FBI leading counter-
terrorism efforts, and most recently, as the Associate Deputy
Director of the FBI, where he is responsible for the management
of all FBI personnel, budget, administration, as well as
infrastructure.
Mr. Abbate, thank you for appearing before the Committee
here today. You are recognized for your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL ABBATE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Abbate. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Chair Peters and Chair Durbin, Ranking
Members, Paul and Graham, and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a privilege to appear before you today to
discuss the FBI's investigation of the attempted assassination
of former president Trump on July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania.
Before going further, I want to again offer my and our
condolences to the victims of this heinous attack to the family
and loved ones of heroic firefighter and father, Corey
Comperatore, to Mr. Dutch, to Mr. Copenhaver, who continued to
recover, and to former president Trump, who was also struck by
a bullet fired from the shooter's rifle. Our thoughts and
prayers are with each of them, and their families, and loved
ones.
Within minutes of the attack, the FBI field office in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania received notification of the
assassination attempt and responded to the scene immediately
with a surge of resources, quickly moving forward on the
investigation. From the outset, the FBI has been investigating
this attack as an assassination attempt and an act of domestic
terrorism. Our team continues to conduct a full, thorough, and
objective investigation, and will continue to follow all leads
and avenues of investigation to logical conclusion, leaving no
stone unturned.
While it's not typical to provide details of an ongoing
investigation, this, as we all know, is an extraordinarily
tragic set of circumstances of the utmost national importance,
making it essential to inform the American public and Congress
what is known right now with full transparency. The
investigation remains focused, of course, on determining
motive, identifying any potential co-conspirators, or others
with knowledge of the attack, and building out a timeline of
shooter Thomas Crook's actions in advance of and during the
attack.
Thus far, though, absolutely nothing has been ruled out,
the investigation has not identified a motive, nor any co-
conspirators, or others with advanced knowledge. To date, the
FBI team has conducted more than 460 interviews, executed
search warrants, including at the shooter's residence, and
seized electronic media to include phones, laptops, hard
drives, and thumb drives.
Legal process has been issued to dozens of companies, and
we have received more than 2,000 tips from the public. The full
resources of the FBI have been brought to bear in furtherance
of the investigation. Agents, analysts, professional staff,
experts, I have personally visited the site of this horrific
attack and seen firsthand the work of FBI Pittsburgh and our
partners on the frontline, and want to thank all involved for
their ongoing tireless efforts to get the answers that we need
and to deliver justice.
Specialized resources deployed included evidence response
teams, victim services specialists, laboratory, and operational
technology division resources, to process physical and digital
evidence, a shooting reconstruction team. Additionally, our
explosive experts have analyzed the three improvised explosive
device (IEDs) covered, two from the shooter's vehicle, one from
the family residence, and our behavioral analysis unit,
importantly is helping to build a profile of the shooter to
include his mental state.
Next, I want to provide a brief highlighted overview of the
timeline that has been established to date through witness
interviews and other information. Again, this is our
understanding at present and is subject to change and further
refinement as more facts are collected.
On July 3rd, the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania was
announced. On July 6th, the shooter registered to attend the
rally and performed a search for ``how far was Oswald from
Kennedy.'' On July 7th, the shooter traveled from his home to
the Butler Farm Show grounds and remained there for
approximately 20 minutes. We assessed this show's advanced
planning and reconnaissance on his part.
On July 12th, the shooter traveled from his home to the
Clairton Sportsman Club where he practiced shooting. On the
morning of July 13th. At approximately 10 a.m., the shooter
returned to the farm show grounds and remained there for about
70 minutes before returning home again. At approximately 1:30
p.m., while at the residence, the shooter's father gave him a
rifle for the purpose, he believed, of going back to the
sportsman club.
About 25 minutes later, the shooter, purchased ammunition
while in route to the Butler Farm Show grounds. The subject
then arrived at the scene, was moving around the farm show
grounds close to the American Glass Research building from
which he ultimately committed the attack.
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 3:51 p.m., the shooter
flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the farm show grounds
for about 11 minutes. The drone and controller were later found
in the subject's car. Analysis has not revealed any photos or
video taken by the drone, but we can confirm that he was live
streaming at the time, and would have been able to view it on
his controller.
The first reported citing the shooter by local law
enforcement was at approximately 4:26 p.m. At approximately
5:10 p.m., the shooter was again identified by local law
enforcement as a suspicious person around the AGR building. At
approximately 5:14 p.m., a local special weapons and tactics
(SWAT) operator took a photo of the shooter.
At about 5:32 p.m., local SWAT observed the shooter next to
the AGR building using his phone browsing news sites, and with
a range finder. At approximately 5:38 p.m., the photo of the
shooter taken earlier was sent to local SWAT operators in a
text message group. Subsequently, approximately 25 minutes
prior to the shooting, the U.S. Secret Service command post was
notified of a suspicious person.
Officers lost sight of the subject from approximately 6:02
p.m. to 6:08 p.m., but continued to communicate with each other
in an attempt to locate him. Recently discovered video from a
local business shows the shooter pulling himself up onto the
AGR building rooftop at approximately 6:06 p.m. And
approximately 6:08 p.m., the subject was observed on the roof
by local law enforcement.
At approximately 6:11 p.m., a local police officer was
lifted to the roof by another officer, saw the shooter, and
radioed that he was armed with a long gun. Within approximately
the next 30 seconds, the shots were fired. The evidence
recovery team found eight shell casings at the scene next to
the shooter's body. We believe that the shooter fired eight
rounds.
While the investigation has not determined motive, the
investigative team continues to review information from legal
returns, including online and social media accounts. Something
just very recently uncovered that I want to share is a social
media account, which is believed to be associated with this
with the shooter in about the 2019-2020 timeframe. There were
over 700 comments posted from this account. Some of these
comments, if ultimately attributable to the shooter, appear to
reflect anti-Semitic, and anti-immigration themes to espouse
political violence, and are described as extreme in nature.
While the investigative team is still working to verify
this account to determine if it did in fact belong to the
shooter, we believe it important to share and note it today,
particularly, given the general absence of other information to
date from social media and other sources of information that
reflect on the shooter's potential motive and mindset.
These are the facts, in part, that the investigation has
revealed to date. While the shooter is dead, our work is very
much ongoing and urgent.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering any and all
questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Abbate.
We will, now proceed. Chair Durbin and Ranking Member
Graham will ask the first two questions. I will then ask
question with Ranking Member Paul. Then after that, we will
alternate between Members of the Judiciary recognized by Chair
Durbin and Members of the Homeland Security Committee
recognized by me.
With that, Senator Durbin, you are recognized for your
questions.
Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Peters.
I would like to begin by making a statement that it's not
in the form of a question, and you will understand why when I
say it. In 20 days, we are going to start the Democratic
National Convention in Chicago. I have been briefed by the law
enforcement agencies plans for security for that event. Tens of
thousands of people will be there, including some of the
highest-ranking politicians in the United States. I trust that
both of your agencies can answer in the affirmative if I ask
you whether you are actively engaged in working with the
development of security plan, taking into consideration the
lessons of July 13th.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that is 100 percent yes from the Secret
Service,
Mr. Abbate. Yes, from the FBI as well, Senator. We have
been working on this for well over a year in preparation.
Chairman Durbin. I am not going to ask for details for
obvious reasons, but I do want to ask a question about the
Secret Service staffing. Congress has nearly doubled the budget
for the Secret Service over the last 10 years, from $1.8
billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 to $3 billion in Fiscal Year
2024. Despite this large increase in funding, the number of
agents in product protective operations has fallen from 4,027
to 3,671 during that same time period, an approximate nine
percent reduction.
Acting Director Rowe, what accounts for protective
operations losing 356 agents over the past 10 years?
Mr. Rowe. Senator with respect to where we are today on
staffing, and then I will address the 10 year point of where we
were. In this year alone, we are going to end the year on the
positive of 200-plus agents. That's the first time in a number
of years that we have been able to do that. Part of that was
gaining some efficiencies in our hiring process.
But what I want to re-emphasize is we have not dropped
standards. Only two percent of every applicant actually makes
it through the hiring process. We are filling our classes at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). We are
doing this ramp up as part of what lies ahead of us with the
Los Angeles (LA) Olympics in 2028.
With respect to what has happened in years prior. This is a
difficult and challenging job being a Secret Service agent,
living your life by somebody else's schedule, constantly away
from your family, constantly having to meet increased
operational and investigative demands, which we gladly do. But
it's not for everyone.
I think there are times where people have to make tough
choices and they decide to leave the agency, but that does not
mean that they were any less of an agent or that they were not
committed to the mission because we are all committed to being
Patriots and serving our country and protecting our nation's
highest leaders.
I think there was a variety of factors. Some of it was the
pandemic, some of it was the economy, or other opportunities.
We have people that are very skilled in cyber that often leave
the job. Some of the protective skills that they acquire are
also in demand in the private sector. But some of the
mechanisms that we have put in place just in the last year is
also retaining our workforce, and that's what we are focused on
right now.
Chairman Durbin. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has determined that restaffing from these losses have been
slowed due to a number of factors, including the years-long
background checks for prospective agents and the assignments
agents must work through before being assigned to protection.
Given these constraints, what steps have you taken to improve
recruitment?
Mr. Rowe. We are actually putting out targeted recruitment
opportunities. We have just recently put it out for within our
uniformed division for our counter sniper unit, our hazardous
agent medical emergency response unit, our counter assault team
on the special agent side. We are actually trying to gather the
best and the brightest.
I will tell you that we are having great success with a lot
of these vacancies. But what I want to reiterate is that, for
example, on the counter assault vacancy, we had 700 applicants
that applied for this. Really, what we will glean after they
make it through the process and they have to be able to hold a
top secret sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI)
clearance, if we realize 15 out of that tranche, that's a two
percent pass rate. It is very competitive, and we are trying to
make sure that we are getting the best and the brightest
without dropping standards.
Chairman Durbin. One last question for either one of you.
What is the purpose of a range finder? Once this assassin was
identified as using a range finder, wasn't that proof positive
that he was a dangerous individual?
Mr. Rowe. I will say, Senator, that obviously somebody is
trying to determine where they are in proximity to a location,
a fixed location. I will defer to my colleague here, but I
believe it was a recreation-or sports-related. I thought I had
read that it was a golf range finder. Nonetheless, it still
would have provided him the ability to provide the distance
that he was away from his intended target.
Chairman Durbin. Wasn't that enough?
Mr. Rowe. As far as raising suspicion? Yes. I think he was
identified as being suspicious by local law enforcement.
Chairman Durbin. And nothing happened.
Mr. Rowe. I know that local law enforcement was attempting
to locate him.
Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Member Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Let's go back to the resources.
Do you need more money?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, listen, there isn't a single branch, a
single agency in the Executive Branch that does not need more
money. Everyone would take more resources. We have had a great
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the Office Management and Budget (OMB)----
Senator Graham. Do you feel constrained? Do you feel
constrained to ask for more resources by anybody?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. We don't. Actually, we have a great
relationship with our appropriators, and obviously, the
authorizing committees. They have always looked out for the
Secret Service.
Senator Graham. I would encourage you to think big when it
comes to resourcing the department in light of what happened
here. At the time of the shooting, the Iranians were
threatening high level American officials, including President
Trump. Right?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, it's widely known----
Senator Graham. I am right, FBI?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. That's 100 percent correct.
Senator Graham. Did that factor into the security
footprint?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will say is that it is widely
known that the Iranians do not like us. I refer you to the
National Security----
Senator Graham. It's not that they do not like us. They
threaten to kill certain people, and they named them.
Mr. Rowe. Correct, sir, but I cannot publicly comment.
Senator Graham. It's not like, I hate America. I am going
to kill these three guys. Right.
Mr. Rowe. I cannot publicly comment, sir.
Senator Graham. They publicly comment on it.
Mr. Rowe. But Senator, what I am trying to say is I cannot
publicly comment on what intelligence, but I can assure you
that we do a threat-based protective model.
Senator Graham. I would like to have that model provided to
the Committee. Could you do that?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Could you also give us the protocols that
are in place to secure a site like this?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. OK. Thank you. One, the protective detail
around President Trump, I know them all very well, they are
brave men and women. These questions are not to belittle
anybody, they are trying to find out how the system failed so
badly. You say you are not reluctant to ask for more money.
What do we need to do to make it easier to hire people without
lowering our standards? I know it's a hard job. Can we do
anything to help you?
Mr. Rowe. I think we are willing to take that back, sir. I
think we are working on our time to hire.
Senator Graham. Well, if you had more people, you would
have more time off.
Mr. Rowe. That's true, sir.
Senator Graham. OK. Let's get more people more time off.
These are tough jobs. I mean, people on this Committee know
that.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, they are.
Senator Graham. I don't know how they hold a family
together doing what they are doing. It's the military really on
steroids. The encrypted app. Paul, can you tell us about these
apps? Have they been broken into? The guy had some apps that
were encrypted.
Mr. Abbate. I think we have experienced a range of returns
on this. Some of the applications that he was using online were
encrypted in nature.
Senator Graham. Have we broken into them?
Mr. Abbate. We have received returns that we have not been
able to get information back because of their encrypted nature.
Senator Graham. Is there any way to solve that problem,
Mr. Abbate. Senator, we have talked about this before. We
need a solution that provides lawful access to law enforcement.
Senator Graham. You are telling me the guy that took eight
shots at the former president, has apps that we cannot get into
that may, if you could get into, reveal some relevant
information?
Mr. Abbate. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. If he were talking to some foreign power,
and I do not think any foreign power would hire this guy, by
the way, so I am not overly worried this was some great plot by
the Iranians because they could not even think of this.
However, there could come a day where something like this is
very important. How do we solve this problem?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, as we have been saying, we need a
solution that provides lawful access when we go to a company.
Senator Graham. I agree with you. I am not blaming you. We
have encrypted apps of an assassin, a murderer, and we cannot
get into them all these days after. That needs to be fixed.
Folks, I am all for privacy, but to a point. What if in the
future somebody's using these apps to communicate with a
foreign power? I think we need to know these things. We need to
know them in real time.
Lessons learned is that everything failed. Corrective
action, seems to me you need more money, and more people,
accountability. At the end of the day, how many people do you
think will be relieved of their duties, Mr. Rowe, because of
this?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I publicly cannot, and I cannot weigh in
on that right now.
Senator Graham. Sure.
Mr. Rowe. Right. It has to be a fair and neutral process.
Right?
Senator Graham. Absolutely.
From a fair point of view, would you say this is a major
system failure at every turn, and those in charge of the system
in question, not only was it embarrassing, they failed?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, if there were policy violations,
those individuals will be held accountable and they will be
subject to our table----
Senator Graham. Just send us the policies, if you could.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Rowe. We will. But they will be held to our table of
penalties, which will include up to termination.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Director Rowe, in your testimony here
today, as well as in your written testimony, you said very
clearly that you cannot defend why that building with the
shooter on top of it was not better covered. You were very
clear; you cannot defend that.
My question to you is, my understanding is that there's a
detailed site survey that is done prior to an event to identify
potential threat points. Talk to me about that site survey. I
am sure you have had a chance to look at it now after action.
How did that site survey get approved when it was so clear that
that was a major threat from that building?
Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. Our Pittsburgh field office
did the advance. During that advance, not only were they
discussing amongst themselves about mitigating the line of
sight, but also, they were discussing with other agencies that
were supporting it.
Our counter snipers met with their counterparts. The team
lead and team lead met. They walked the site. They identified
the AGR building. If I may, Senator, if I could point out
something right now, if I may, and we will place this for the
record.\1\
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\1\ The information referred by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
page 74.
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But this is the point of view. This is from the second
floor of the AGR building. This point of view where the counter
sniper team, locally, was posted. The gold arrow indicates
where the shooter fired from. Looking left, why was the
assailant not seen when we were told that building was going to
be covered, that there had been a face-to-face that afternoon
that our team leads met. This was the view.
Let me show you another view, Senator Give me B.\2\
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\2\ The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
page 76.
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This view is a reenactment by one of my agents laying flat.
There was a five-inch rise on the middle of that roof. The
assailant would have had to present his boar over that to get
his shot off. The view underneath reflects the perspective that
he would have had. Again, I call your attention back to the
first exhibit if they would have looked left. Give me C.\3\
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\3\ The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
page 77.
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This is what our counter sniper team saw. Shooter, no
elbows. You barely make out the crown of his head. Below it,
the assailant up prone. Let me just tell you, our counter
sniper, this individual, I know him. I consider him a friend.
He has covered me operationally in conflict zones. When I did
my time on the President's detail, he exemplifies the courage,
the skill, and the ability to respond under great stress in
such short time to neutralize the threat and prevent further
loss of life.
Getting back to your question, Senator. These were
discussions that were had between the Pittsburgh field office,
the local counterparts, and everyone supporting that visit that
day. That's why when I laid in that position, I could not, and
I will not, and I cannot understand why there was not better
coverage, or at least somebody looking at that roof line when
that's where they were posted.
Chairman Peters. Director Rowe, the Secret Service State,
and local law enforcement were on multiple communication
channels, is my understanding, during that time. As a result,
local law enforcement was only able to call in to a State
command center that was then relayed from the Secret Service.
It seemed to be a recurring issue in emergency situations
that we are finding with the Federal Government that there's
not a seamless way to communicate, particularly if you are
relying on local law enforcement to deal with what was clearly
a major vulnerability. Local law enforcement in Butler told my
staff that that they had no way of communicating directly with
the Secret Service. If I listen to Mr. Abbate saying there was
about 30 seconds between when the local law enforcement
reported that there was a man on the roof with a gun 30
seconds. If it's communicated directly to a counter sniper
team, would that be enough time to react prior to the firing of
those shots?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, if we would had that information, they
would have been able to address it more quickly. It appears
that that information was stuck or siloed in that State and
local channel. I will tell you, though, that our tactical
elements not only did they have embeds from Butler County
Emergency Services Unit (ESU) with them, but they also had
radios on the tactical net.
It is troubling to me that we did not get that information
as quickly as we should have. We did not know that there was
this incident going on, and the only thing we had was that
locals were working an issue at the 3 p.m., which would have
been the former president's right-hand side, which is where the
shot came. Nothing about man on the roof, nothing about man
with a gun. None of that information ever made it over our net.
Chairman Peters. So that will change?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. We are working right now to figure out
the interoperability, and also make sure that we do have access
to those channels, whether through the counterpart system or
some other means.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Ranking Member Paul, you are
recognized for your questions.
Senator Paul. Director Rowe, I am encouraged by your
attitude and what you brought here today; what you have talked
about as far as immediate changes that you have made, and I
hope you will follow through with that. I am encouraged by the
fact that you acknowledge that it's indefensible, that the roof
was unattended. Would you say the roof being unattended
breaches standard protocol for setting up a security perimeter?
Mr. Rowe. What I would say, Senator, is that that roof
should have had better coverage, and we will get to the bottom
of if there were any policy violations.
Senator Paul. I would think indefensible would go along
with breaching protocol, and I cannot imagine how indefensible
would not be breaching protocol. What I would caution, though,
is that I sense, and you are the Secret Service, and these
people are your friends, and they are heroic people who do good
things, that we cannot let our friendships blind us from
responsibility. Someone's in charge of the security at the
zone.
Would the Secret Service be in charge of the entire
operation and they work with law enforcement, but they are in
charge. The person in charge of the entire operation is the
Secret Service, not the local police?
Mr. Rowe. You are correct, sir. This is a failure of the
Secret Service.
Senator Paul. So that's what I mean. I don't wish anybody
harm. I appreciate the bravery of the United States Capitol
Police (USCP). I was at the shooting at the ball field. I have
heard a hundred shots coming my way. Fortunately, none came to
me. But I appreciate the bravery of all the people who protect
us. But there's also the idea that there are certain mistakes
that don't make you a bad person, but they are just inexcusable
if you made that mistake.
For example, let's say you determine, well, local police
should have been on there, and local police says, no, they did
not tell us to do it. It's a he said, she said. Still,
ultimately, the agent in charge should be walking the grounds
and say there's a roof 100 yards away from the stadium with a
clear sight. Someone's got to be on the roof. Local police, I
told you to get on the roof, get on the roof. Or you put the
Secret Service. Ultimately the buck does not pass along to
somebody. Whoever's in charge is in charge.
But really, I think it would be helpful to all of us. I
know the process has to be meted out, but there needs to also
be a process for protecting the next Trump rally. The fact that
whoever was in charge in Butler, next week is not in charge of
a rally in Las Vegas.
I think you really should simply say that the leadership
from that event is going through a process. But until that
process, they won't be in charge of the Democrat National
Convention. That would reassure a lot of people that they won't
be in charge of security until it's determined. Can you tell us
something to that accord?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. I can tell you that the team planning
the Democratic National Convention, that is a national special
security event. That team has been on the ground, that's from
DC with support from our Chicago field office.
But I just want to reiterate that our Pittsburgh field
office staff, they are wearing this harder than anybody right
now in the Secret Service. They feel completely demoralized.
What I am trying to do is also let them know that, listen, they
need to be focused on the mission at hand. I also have to walk
a tightrope here and make sure that I am not tainting any
future, you know, disciplinary action.
Senator Paul. I understand, and I have great respect for
all the officers, but ultimately, someone had to be in charge,
and someone made a terrible error. It's an error of judgment.
The big error is the roof. But another big error is we have 90
minutes of a suspicious person.
Now, Senator Durbin mentioned the rangefinder. None of
these things are enough to shoot a suspicious person, but they
certainly would be enough to stop the proceedings. That's where
I think you get to the second major management or judgment
error of this.
Now, Trump's done probably 100 rallies like this. How often
at one of his rallies are there 90 minutes of looking at one
person and at least a half a dozen pictures of that person? How
often does that happen? Is it against protocol to a let a
proceeding go on when you have a suspicious person, 90 minutes
worth of people talking about this person and we don't stop the
proceeding? Does that defy protocol?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, while there's 90 minutes in total from
when he is first identified by local law enforcement, we have
about a 30-minute window. But in no time is there anything ever
communicated about weapon or harm? I think that's where the
threat--
Senator Paul. We are talking about a weapon. You shoot
people with a weapon.
Mr. Rowe. Sure.
Senator Paul. Without a weapon, we are talking about people
you stop and say--he had a backpack, which was probably big
enough to have the AR-15 in it. In all likelihood, the backpack
has the weapon in it. A guy with a big backpack would never get
through the perimeter. Once again, a big mistake was not having
the perimeter wide enough to prevent people from shooting
outside the perimeter.
But the thing is, he would have never gotten through the
perimeter, right? His backpack would have been checked. But
people with big backpacks are very suspicious, and I would
think he's been seen six times, but you got 20 or 30 minutes of
knowing about it. But the thing is, there's all kinds of
chatter going on about this. You would think the chatter going
on with the local police is on a police radio, and a policeman
with that radio is standing in the control tent so you get that
communication. So there's a huge and massive breakdown.
But really, my question is, how often has this happened at
other rallies where there's a half a dozen pictures and 90
minutes of people talking about a suspicious person? I just
cannot imagine it's real common.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, at rallies, there are people that come
to the attention of law enforcement for a variety of reasons.
If they come to our attention for some other activity that
might, put it a little bit hey, we probably need to go check
that individual out, this happens. That's why we attempt to
locate them. That's why it's important for us to try to find
them, and it's important to have the information. And so local
law enforcement did their very level best to try to locate him.
They did provide us the photos 30 minutes prior. It just, he
evaded any detection by law enforcement.
Senator Paul. But once again, it's the overall person in
charge. It's a terrible breakdown. It's a terrible management
decision not to have stopped it. There was a chance to stop the
proceeding. The question is not whether there's enough
information to take down an individual.
It's a much lower standard to say, hey, we are going to
wait until we get this individual. The roof and the 90 minutes
of it, both, I think, are failure of your protocol. I think
when that's determined, the person who made these decisions
cannot be in a position of authority again.
Chairman Durbin. Senator Klobuchar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KLOBUCHAR
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of
you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it, Director Rowe,
we had the classified briefing and also today the taking
responsibility for the agency, and your own personal emotion,
and reaction to your visit in what had gone wrong.
For the people in my State that keep asking me, ``I just
don't get how he got on the roof.'' I know we have gone through
great details and a lot of examination. Could you just give a
minute on what went wrong and how you think it can be fixed?
Because I think it's just going to help to dispel the
conspiracy theories.
There are some people that think it did not really happen,
which of course is completely ridiculous. It did. There are
some people that think all kinds of conspiracies went on within
the government, which is also false. But could you just tell
them what went wrong so they understand?
Mr. Rowe. Yes. Thank you, Senator. I thought long and hard
about this. I think this was a failure of imagination. A
failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous
world where people do actually want to do harm to our
protectees.
I think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions,
the assumptions that we know our partners are going to do
everything they can, and they do this every day. But we did not
challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone's going
to cover that. We assume that there's going to be uniform
presence. We did not challenge that internally during that
advance.
Moving forward, I have directed that when we are talking to
people and we are making requests, we are very specific about
what we want. We are providing explicit instructions on exactly
what our expectation is, what we need them to do, and what we
want them to do. That's the only way that we are going to be
able to move forward beyond this.
Let me just tell you that our State and local law
enforcement partners are the best. This belief that somehow,
they are less than Federal law enforcement, or they are less
than the Secret Service. They are out there patrolling
communities every day. They are the ones out there going into
hazardous conditions every day. They know their communities.
They have the ability to enforce State and local laws. Our
advanced agents do not. We need them and we need them to be
partners with us. I think we need to be very clear to them, and
that may have contributed to this situation.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes. Appreciate that, and I have same
respect. Next, one of the things you mentioned to me was, and
to all of us, was in this other briefing, was just the texting
protocol. I think a lot of us think about this in non-security
settings about how people are just texting all the time instead
of talking and how it takes our eyes off, in your case, the
target. Could you talk about what might have gone wrong there,
and how you think things could change when there's the hope is
that their eyes are constantly on the scene, and on the
potential targets, and risks?
Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. Again, we need people focused
on the problem or on their area of responsibility. It was great
that there was a text chain, but that communication needs to go
over the net. It needs to go over a radio channel so that
everyone has situational awareness of it. The point I was
making in the closed-door briefing is that we have to get to a
point now where we are using our radio systems to have that
collective awareness of this.
I think, one of the things that I have directed is that in
addition to the interoperability, we are going to roll out
common operating picture or common operating platform that we
utilize for national special security events. We have the
ability to roll that out to the field that has a Blue Force
Tracker in it, where you can put where all your State and local
assets are, where our Federal assets are.
But in addition to that, I want people using the radio so
it's great that the tactical elements are talking to each
other. It's great that the shift is talking to each other, but
we have to be able to make sure that whenever we come across a
situation that everyone has situational awareness of this.
In my time when I was operational in the President's
detail, we were given the explicit instruction, hey, if you are
going to pass it, if it's relevant enough that you feel like
you need to pass that information, do it over the radio. That
was the protocol that we had.
I think over the years, perhaps with the advent of
technology and smartphones, perhaps we have gotten away from
that. But we need to get people back on the scope, back on
mission, back focused on what they need to be responsible for.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. The next question I will put in
writing, thank you very much, of you, Mr. Abbate. But it's just
pointing out that we have seen this rise in threats against
Members of Congress, which of course is relevant to this.
8,000 just last year, more than four times over the past
seven years. I will want to ask you in writing about the steps
that the Justice Department is taking to prioritize these
cases.\1\ I know there's been some changes made.
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\1\ The question from Senator Klobuchar appears in the Appendix on
page 167.
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Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. It's of our highest priority, and
we are urgently working on it 24/7 a day, every day to protect
each and every one of you here.
Senator Klobuchar. Appreciate it. Thank you, both of you.
Chairman Peters. Senator Carper, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks very much.
Mr. Rowe, Mr. Abbate, thank you for joining us. Today I
have the privilege of representing Delaware, the first State to
ratify the Constitution. We did that over 200 years ago. The
Constitution sort of outlines how we elect our leaders, and it
changes with respect to technology over the years. But there
for as long as we have been a country-threats to our leaders
when they pursue elective office. We are going to be gathering
in Chicago in just a few weeks.
There's been gatherings in other parts of the country to
help make sure that what was adopted in that original
Constitution is actually carried out faithfully. It's just
incredibly important that those who aspire to elected office,
and those who take on those challenges are protected, and their
families are protected, as well as those who surround them. I
share with my colleagues, my prayers for those who have been
killed or injured on the July 13th. We are grateful that one of
our Presidential candidates is OK.
But I have a question about what I still cannot get over
how a 20-year-old loner could somehow outfox, outsmart two of
the smartest Federal agencies, and State agencies, and law
enforcement with odds of like 1,000 to 1 and be able to almost
pull this off. It just blows my mind. Hopefully, we will get to
the truth and all of that.
I am a Navy guy, spent 20-many years of my life in the
Navy. I learned as a midshipman that when the ship runs on
ground at sea, the commanding officer is held responsible.
Whether the commanding officer's awake or asleep, at the helm,
the commanding officer is held responsible. At the end of the
day, I am not interested in a blame game, but I am sure
interested in finding out who was responsible and making sure
that they account for their responsibility.
My question is, what policies are currently in place to
facilitate real time information-sharing between the Secret
Service and local law enforcement during an event? What changes
to information-sharing practices will the Secret Service make
in light of the apparent breakdown in communications on July
13th?
Mr. Rowe. Thank you for that question, Senator. We are
looking at our procedures. We rely on a counterpart system and
the radio interoperability, it's a complex challenge. It's not
just about being able to find whatever frequency our local
counterparts are on and then just piping it in. There are some
technical challenges that have to be there.
To alleviate that, we have always relied on a security room
where we have representatives from the local agencies those
individuals are there to, one, bring their own radio, and then
relay relevant information that would impact our security plan.
I think what I am looking at, and again, what I am in looking
at this situation, is there was a unified command post, and we
had our security room.
We had communications that day at the Butler Farm site we
are challenging. Not just challenging for the Secret Service,
but for challenging for locals. There were some cellular
issues. There were radio issues. You saw that with the
testimony from the colonel from Pennsylvania State Police last
week in the House.
I think as I am thinking about this, I think we need to
consider what is our model moving forward? I think we need to
be where the greatest amount of partners are when that
information is being discussed.
The other thing that I am looking at is we need to also
make sure that we have redundancies as far as cellular on the
ground or additional repeaters. I have directed our Chief
Information Officer (CIO) to do that, and we are rolling assets
out now supporting campaign sites.
Senator Carper. Thank you for that. Mr. Abbate, quick
question. Based on the initial information you have gathered
from the investigation, do you believe there were any actions
taken by the shooter in the weeks, days, or hours leading up to
the shooting that should have caused alarm and grabbed the
attention of law enforcement?
Mr. Abbate. He did not have any interactions with law
enforcement leading up to this, Senator? We have not found
anything yet that would have alerted law enforcement, the FBI,
or Secret Service to his intention, activities in advance of
this event.
I will note, however, to your prior question, that we do
have a very strong relationship, an integrated relationship
between FBI, and Secret Service, and every other Federal,
State, local agency. You can imagine we have constructs like
the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Violent Crime Task
Forces (VCTF) where we are cross-embedded with each other. When
it comes to this event and others like it, we are always
talking in advance.
In fact, with respect to this event, we did have a meeting
between U.S. Secret Service and FBI in the days leading up to
the event to determine, assess whether there was any
information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the
rally, or to former president Trump, or anyone else there.
There was an absence of that in the lead-up, specifically.
Again, none of us had any information in our holdings with
regard to the ultimate shooter.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you for that. Thanks very
much, both of you.
Chairman Durbin. Next on the Senate Judiciary Committee is
Senator Grassley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRASSLEY
Senator Grassley. Mr. Chair, I would like to introduce my
oversight letters and investigative documents into the
record.\1\ This is information I have already made public.
Chairman Peters. Without objection.
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\1\ The Oversight letters and Investigative documents submitted by
Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on page 80.
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Senator Grassley. OK, thank you. I would also like to call
my colleagues' attention to a legislation that Senator Cortez
Masto and I have introduced that would require Senate
confirmation of the Director of the Secret Service. I think
this is very important because no other agency has a no-fail
mission.
Mr. Rowe, in your written testimony, you stated that to
prevent similar lapses like the one on July 13th from happening
again, you will ensure every event site security plan is surly
vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it's
implemented. Based on your testimony, the security plan for the
Butler event deviated from the security standards. How would
vetting by multiple experienced supervisors fix that?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think having many eyes on a particular
problem set helps. That way you do not have tunnel vision. You
are just focusing on one thing. That's why I think it's
important not only at the field office level, but also at the
detail level.
Part of what we had started doing with the former
president's detail is having them send out site agents, having
them send out supervisors. I think having that collaboration
and having additional eyes to examine the problem, will make
sure that we are not missing anything.
Senator Grassley. I think you have answered my question.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. Let me go on. Also, to you, in your
written testimony, you stated that you, ``regret that
information was not passed to Congress and the public sooner,
and with greater frequency. What's your communication plan
going forward to ensure that the American people in Congress
are fully informed?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, we just started a rolling production
that is bicameral. We made our first rolling production last
week. We made one yesterday. We will continue to do that. My
view is that sunshine is the best disinfectant, and we intend
to provide information to Congress as it carries out its
oversight function.
Senator Grassley. OK. Also, I made public documents that
show Secret Service deployed a counter unmanned aerial system
operator on July the 13th. According to the Secret Service, the
drone system was supposed to be operational at 3 p.m. that day.
However, we have been told by Secret Service that because of
cellular bandwidth problems, it was not operational until about
5:20 of that day.
If the system was operational, Secret Service would have
had the ability to detect the shooter and his own drone use.
Why is the Secret Service dependent upon local cell cellular
network? Does the Secret Service have a backup plan in place?
Mr. Rowe. Yes. Thank you, Senator. That is something that I
briefed in the closed door, and again, something that has cost
me a lot of sleep because of the eventual outcome of the
assailant. That what if we had geolocated him because that
counter UAS platform had been up?
It is something that I have struggled with to understand,
and I have no explanation for it. It is something that I feel
as though we could have perhaps found him, we could have maybe
stopped him. Maybe, on that particular day, he would have
decided this isn't the day to do it, because law enforcement
just found me flying my drone. People fly drones all the time
on the peripheries of our sites. We go out, and we talk to
them, and we ascertain what their intentions are.
On this day, in particular, because of the connectivity
challenge, as you noted, there was a delay and he flew his
drone at 3:51, approximately. Moving forward, we are leveraging
resources from the Department of Homeland Security and others
to make sure that we have dedicated connectivity, so that we
are not reliant on public domain, so that we can ensure that
whatever assets we have in place, those assets are operational.
That is my commitment to you, that we are going to make sure we
are going to do that. That is something we are moving out on.
Senator Grassley. Thank you. I hope that you will answer
some of my other questions in writing.\1\
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\1\ The questions from Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on
page 140.
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Chairman Peters. Senator Johnson, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Acting Director Rowe, in our secure briefing last week, I
made the point that if you do not want conspiracy theories to
spread, you need to provide information. I appreciate these
photos today. These things could have been released literally
within days and a whole lot more information as well. Congress
needs to provide oversight. We do not have certain
investigatory tools like you have, but what we can do is do
interviews. Acting Director Rowe, did you receive our letter
from July 25th requesting interviews with 13 individuals of the
Secret Service?
Mr. Rowe. We are in receipt of that letter, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Deputy Director Abbate, have you seen that
letter as well? Do you know who we are requesting interviews
with?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, I have not seen the letter.
Senator Johnson. OK. Do you know whether those individuals
submitted to interviews with the FBI, acting Director Rowe?
Mr. Rowe. We are in the process. Those employees are being
interviewed, if they have not already been interviewed, sir.
Senator Johnson. Are those interviews being transcribed?
Mr. Abbate. The FBI interviews, sir?
Senator Johnson. Yes. We have 302s on those.
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
Senator Johnson. OK. When will Congress get those 302s?
When will we get those transcriptions of those interviews?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, I will take that back and we will get
those to you as soon as possible.
Senator Johnson. Acting Director Rowe, when will those
individuals be made available for Congress for this Committee
to interview them?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, we will make them available
Senator Johnson. How soon? Because memories are short. They
can be influenced by events. We need these transcribed
interviews as soon as possible.
Mr. Rowe. We will get that done, sir.
Senator Johnson. Does Secret Service use encrypted
communications at events?
Mr. Rowe. On our radio nets? We do, sir.
Senator Johnson. Those memorialized? Are those saved?
Mr. Rowe. The radio traffic from Butler, we did not have
recordings.
Senator Johnson. Do you normally?
Mr. Rowe. Not on the road outside of DC or outside of a
Presidential or vice-Presidential stop.
Senator Johnson. Communications between Secret Service
agents will not be available like we have gotten the
communications from local law enforcement.
Mr. Rowe. I am sorry, Senator----
Senator Johnson. We are not going to be able to get those
communications. You did not save them?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir----
Senator Johnson. Which is very unfortunate.
Mr. Rowe. It is, sir. Moving forward, I have directed that
we will now start recording those so that we will have them
moving forward.
Senator Johnson. By the way, I am going to ask for a number
of things at the very end to be entered in the record, but one
of my preliminary findings is that the Secret Service did not
attend the 9 a.m. briefing the day of the event. In your
testimony, you said that a site briefing was conducted with
Secret Service personnel and law enforcement partners
supporting the event. Those both cannot be true. So local law
enforcement do not believe Secret Service was present at the 9
a.m. briefing. Were they or were they not?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, with respect to the snipers that went on
national television, and gave an interview and said that they
did not get a briefing from the Secret Service, they were not.
They were supporting through mutual aid, and our personnel
briefed the tactical team leader that was leading that element,
that was providing this counter sniper.
Senator Johnson. Acting Director Rowe, you said that the
Secret Service provides explicit instructions to the locals.
Were explicit instructions provided to cover the roof of the
AGR building and locals just not follow it, or were those
explicit instructions not provided?
Mr. Rowe. It's my understanding what was communicated is
that the locals had a plan and that they had been there before.
Senator Johnson. An awful lot of the chatter in social
media has to do with is there a partisanship in the Secret
Service providing coverage for some individuals and none for
others, about Secret Service coverage or additional coverage
enhancements being denied? Was there ever requested additional
coverage for Mar-a-Lago
Mr. Rowe. Senator, we have provided additional resources to
the Mar-a-Lago.
Senator Johnson. Was coverage asked for and denied ever?
Mr. Rowe. I will have to research that, Senator. But I am
happy to tell you we have made significant investments since
the former president has left office, over $4 million of
technology resources and arms.
Senator Johnson Again, documents will come out eventually
to make the point one way or the other. This is an important
piece of information that Congress needs to have.
Mr. Rowe. Yes. Senator, we will make those available to
you.
Senator Johnson. There's a report today by Susan Crabtree
of RealClearPolitics, saying that you denied sniper coverage
outside of driving distance to DC. Is that true?
Mr. Rowe. That is a false statement, sir.
Senator Johnson. That is incorrect?
Mr. Rowe. That is incorrect.
Senator Johnson. OK. That's the kind of information you
need to refute with documentation. Deputy Director Abbate, you
said this was an assassination attempt and domestic terrorism.
It's obviously an assassination attempt. Why make the
distinction? What is different about that?
Mr. Abbate. We think it's important to cover all the
possibilities here in the reality of what we are dealing with
and what we have all seen, Senator. We have learned lessons
from the past. The tragic shooting at the baseball field was
referenced here. We have learned the lesson from that. That was
not opened properly. We have made changes in the Bureau, and
it's reflected here in terms of how this investigation is being
approached with a completely open mind and inclusive of all the
possibilities, including domestic terrorism.
Senator Johnson. I fear that makes the investigation
potentially partisan. Mr. Chair, I would like to request that
my July 14th letter to Attorney General (AG) Garland, Mayorkas,
and Wray be under the record.\1\ It asks for all kinds of
information, documentation. Asks a lot of questions. My
preliminary findings of July 21st and July 23rd, including
timelines, bunch of questions as well be under the record,\2\
and then our updated timeline dated today. This goes not only
by minute, by second, and we will continue to update this
timeline as more information becomes public. This is the way
you do investigation. We need to find out literally second by
second what happens so the American public understands the
truth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The letter submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 108.
\2\ The documents submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Peters. Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Durbin. Senator Butler.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUTLER
Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to both of our Chairmen and Ranking Members for
holding this incredibly important hearing, critically, for the
American people to understand the safety and security that is
being provided to our national leaders. Thank you both for
being here and for, again, answering the hard questions.
This is a time of, I think, heightened attention,
deservedly so, not only for our national leaders, but for the
teacher who decides that they are going to go and participate
in their democracy, or the firefighter who wants to hear the
voice and vision of the potential next leader of this country.
My thoughts and prayers really are with those Pennsylvania
families who have lost loved ones or have been critically
injured. As I offer my questions today, it would be in service
to those to preventing future incidents.
But in the one question of looking backward to the event on
the 13th, Director Abbate, can you just talk a little bit about
how did Mr. Crooks, how was he able to get an AR-15 onto the
roof of that building? Does your investigation illuminate
anything that we have learned to help to make that point more
clear?
Mr. Abbate. We do not have definitive evidence yet as to
how he got the rifle up there. Based on everything that's been
collected thus far, photos, video eyewitness accounts, we do
believe he likely had it in the backpack.
Senator Butler. Broken down in the backpack?
Mr. Abbate. We are still assessing that. Our laboratory has
taken it, looked at the rifle itself and measured that against
the backpack itself. And if placed in this backpack, it would
extend outside. It would have been visible. But we do not have
anyone who observed him with the backpack with a rifle barrel
or other part of it sticking out of the backpack. But the rifle
would not have fit fully into this backpack to be concealed in
whole.
We have video that was recently found of the shooter
walking in a distance from his car just before 6 p.m., at about
5:56, I believe. Based on everything we have, we assess that he
returned to his vehicle at that time, got the backpack, and
then proceeded back to the area into the AGR building. Then
he's observed, of course, on the roof just minutes later
holding the backpack in front of him.
In fact, there's dash cam footage from a police vehicle
that shows him briefly traversing the roof with the backpack in
front of him. Then it's just minutes after that that he's
actually seen by the officer, who I described, with the rifle
on the roof.
It's possible that he broke the rifle down, we do not have
conclusive evidence of that, and took it out of the bag on the
roof in those moments before, and reassembled it there. That's
one of the theories we are looking at and working on right now.
Senator Butler. Thank you for that. Acting Director Rowe,
thank you for your years of dedicated service and jumping in at
a hot time. But you take me right to this point of
communication. There's been a lot of conversation and even in
your written and verbal testimony, you have talked a lot about
the communication and the disparate nature in which it's
happening across the different channels.
One sort of foundational question that I have is, are all
elements of an event communicated on the same channel? If I
lost my kid, and I am at a big rally, are local law enforcement
talking on the same channel about me losing my kid? That they
are talking about a suspicious individual?
Mr. Rowe. When it comes to the locals, they likely have
some type of common channel that they work off of in a county
or an adjoining municipality. When it comes to the Secret
Service, we do have various channels for various agents and our
uniform division officers working specific aspects of that
advance.
Senator Butler. It's not possible that the delay in
communication or the losing of the thread of tracking this
individual was sort of lost in the commotion of all of the
other communications that could have been, or maybe was sort of
separate from the communication channels that were happening?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can only speak to the Secret Service
lines of communication and we did not have anything beyond
suspicious person that was communicated to us.
Senator Butler. Sure.
Last question really quickly because I am out of time, but
Acting Director, was there any communication with the Secret
Service that was talking directly with the President's, the
former president's detail. That feels like there's been some
question by colleagues about why the call was not made to delay
the event. Help us understand the communication that either was
or was not happening directly with the former president's
detail to make the call to delay 10 minutes, 20. We have all
been to these events. They never happen on time, but to delay
while this was being investigated,
Mr. Rowe. The detail, they were operating on their net,
which our security room was monitoring. But again, having
information of a suspicious individual. There were other calls
that day of individuals that came to the attention of law
enforcement, of people that needed medical attention. So that
particular regarding the assailant, that never really rose to a
level of we should not put him out there. Had we known that
there was a dangerous individual out there, we would never let
a protectee go out on stage.
Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Senator Hassan, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I want to
thank you, and Chair Durbin, and the Ranking Members for
holding this joint hearing today. Thank you to our witnesses,
not only for being here, but for your careers of service to our
country, and to the men and women you lead.
I am really grateful that former president Trump is safe,
and extend my sympathies to the family of Cory Comperatore, who
was fatally shot at the rally. My sympathies to everyone who
was injured.
On July 13th, major failures nearly led to the
assassination of a Presidential candidate who is also a former
president of the United States. The Secret Service has to be
fully transparent about how this happened and how it's going to
change moving forward, understanding there's also a need to
balance Congress's engagement in oversight with allowing law
enforcement to conduct an ongoing criminal investigation.
I want to thank the agents of the Secret Service for
selflessly acting to protect elected officials, and their
families, and our former presidents. We are grateful for their
sacrifices and their service, and I want to thank all law
enforcement, and particularly law enforcement officers and
first responders, who worked to minimize harm to the crowd on
July 13th.
Mr. Rowe, I want to start with you. New Hampshire hosts
many political rallies. Protecting the speakers and attendees
at these events requires extensive coordination between State
and local law enforcement, the Secret Service staff, and
obviously campaigns event staff. As a former Governor, I have
experienced some of the challenges that this type of
coordination can create, but we know that this coordination is
really essential to public safety.
It's clear that there were significant coordination
failures on July 13th. You told us earlier that the local SWAT
team told the Secret Service that local law enforcement had
eyes on the AGR roof. But there are reports that members of a
local SWAT team never met with the Secret Service in the days
before the Butler rally.
What steps does the Secret Service take prior to political
rallies to ensure that the agency is effectively coordinating
with the candidate's security details with State and local law
enforcement, and with campaign event staff?
Mr. Rowe. As part of the advance process, Senator, as
happened in Butler as well, there's a police meeting.
Basically, that initiates the advance, that's bringing not only
emergency management officials, but all the State and local law
enforcement agencies that may have aspects of supporting or
assisting in that advance and on that visit. The focus of that
police meeting, one, is to exchange numbers and business cards,
and then coordinate times for walkthroughs.
There were walkthroughs of the Butler Farm site with local
law enforcement agencies that were supporting that visit. That
was directly as a result of having that police meeting to begin
the process of figuring out, dividing up the labor, areas of
responsibility.
Senator Hassan. What you are telling me is that at that
meeting, the first meeting, led to the walkthrough that the
Secret Service does with local law enforcement, and that at
least some members or directors of the local SWAT team would
have been part of that process?
Mr. Rowe. As I understand it, the Beaver County, they were
seconded to assist Butler, but the Butler ESU team were part of
the advanced process.
Senator Hassan. OK. How many agents did the Secret Service
provide to plan and secure this event, and how many people from
State and local law enforcement agencies supported the security
of this event?
Mr. Rowe. In totality, between law enforcement, State, and
local, and Federal, there are 155 personnel at the Butler Farm
site that day. All combined, Secret Service, it's in the 70s.
Then, we had support from Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) that were providing post standards, and then we had
approximately 70 or so various Pennsylvania State law
enforcement.
Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you. I want to go to one other
issue before my time expires. You have talked today and in our
secure briefing about the interoperability of the Secret
Services counter drone capability, that it failed early on, and
so it did not catch the drone floating over the site by the
shooter.
First, you have addressed this a little bit, what changes
is the Secret Service making to ensure that it has backup
technology, but also, what efforts did the Secret Service
undertake to coordinate with other law enforcement regarding
anti-drone capability at the rally site?
Mr. Rowe. We are working to determine that right now,
Senator. We are getting the redundancies in place. Counter UAS
authority, it is a little complex. State and locals do not
necessarily have this ability to do that. It does require
coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ,
because it could impact commercial travel.
Senator Hassan. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am just going
to follow up. I think one of the things that you are hearing
from a lot of folks, but I am not sure we are really clear on
yet, is how is it that somebody who clearly is arousing concern
from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious? How is it
that that information doesn't get to the former president's
detail? I will follow up in writing. Thank you.
Chairman Durbin. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Director Rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked?
Mr. Rowe. Because There was no counter UAS present, sir.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CORNYN
Senator Cornyn. You had a drone system, but you had
bandwidth problems. The bandwidth apparently was adequate for
the shooter's drone, but not for the Secret Service. Can you
explain that?
Mr. Rowe. I have no explanation for it, sir.
Senator Cornyn. We also know that in the military context,
electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on
the battlefield. Does the Secret Service have jamming
capabilities or drones?
Mr. Rowe. We have drones, sir. I have to be very careful
about how I answer this one in an open forum. What I can tell
you is that we have technical security measures, sir, to
address, I think, what you are asking me.
Senator Cornyn. The question is, can you take down a
suspicious drone? Because this can be used not only for
surveillance by the shooter, which obviously it was here, but
also drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the
President, or in this case, to President Trump. Do you have the
capacity to stop a weaponized drone?
Mr. Rowe. What I will tell you, sir, is that we have
technical security measures that we utilize at permanently
protective sites. We also have the ability in a limited
fashion, at temporary sites. What I can tell you is that on
this day, the counter UAS system had technical difficulties and
did not go operational until after 5 p.m.
Senator Cornyn. In this case, the shooter had a rifle, but
somebody who wanted to kill a President, or a former president,
or a candidate for President, would not need a rifle. They
could use a drone. Correct?
Mr. Rowe. It is a potential threat factor.
Senator Cornyn. This individual was identified as a
suspicious person. Can you explain to us when a suspicious
person becomes identified as a threat?
Mr. Rowe. I think it's also when a weapon or some other
dangerous item is then presented.
Senator Cornyn. A range finder would not render someone a
threat as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion?
Mr. Rowe. I think the rangefinder is what initially brought
him to the attention of local law enforcement.
Senator Cornyn. Why would the President be allowed to take
to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified, and
before the Secret Service or local law enforcement were able to
investigate the circumstances?
Mr. Rowe. At that time, Senator, suspicion had not risen to
the level of threat or imminent harm.
Senator Cornyn. Ultimately, that suspicious person did
become a threat. Do you think if the President had been asked
not to take the stage, and during the time it took to
investigate to eliminate that suspicion, wouldn't that have
been the appropriate way to deal with it?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, it certainly is one way to do it. This
is a challenge for law enforcement in general, is that being
able to identify somebody that comes to your attention and you
are trying to determine what are their intentions. This is a
challenge for law enforcement.
The individual actually came to the attention for
suspicion. He's on the outer perimeter adjacent the secured
site. Law enforcement is circulating for him. But again,
additional information at that point, we are not rising to the
level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him.
Senator Cornyn. I am just suggesting that maybe President
Trump's appearance should have been delayed while that
suspicion could be adequately investigated. But I have always
thought of the Secret Service as the best of the best when it
comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to
protect the life of their person. They are detailed to. I think
you described the very rigorous process by which people are
screened. I think you mentioned the two percent standard,
people who are interested in serving. Only a very small
fraction of those individuals are actually accepted in the
Secret Service because of the high standards that your agency
has.
But explain to me why the Secret Service being an elite law
enforcement agency would delegate to local law enforcement or
others who did not meet that same two percent standard. In
other words, isn't that something that Secret Service should
have covered as opposed to delegating it to local law
enforcement?
Mr. Rowe. Senator again, this is where I went back to
earlier when I said it was in a failure to challenge our
assumptions. We assume that the State and locals had it. By no
means do I want to diminish the commitment. I am sure you
agree, State and local law enforcement do their jobs every day
and protect the communities that you represent.
Senator Cornyn. No doubt about it.
Mr. Rowe. I think what we made an assumption that there was
going to be uniform presence out there, that there would be
sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be
counters, sniper teams in the AGR building. I can assure you
that we are not going to make that mistake again.
Moving forward, I have directed our Office of Protective
Operations that when our counter snipers are up, their counter
snipers are up, and they are on the roof as well. We do this
all the time with our colleagues in the New York City Police
Department when we cover the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). So that is our Trusted Traveler Programs (TTP) moving
forward
Senator Cornyn. Director Rowe, I would just submit to you
that those assumptions can be lethal.
Chairman Peters. Senator Scott, you are recognized for your
questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Let me just follow up with what Senator Cornyn has asked.
Do you know who makes the drone that the Secret Service uses?
Mr. Rowe. That Secret Service uses?
Senator Scott. Yes. The one that you did not work. Who's
the manufacturer? Is it American made, manufacturer?
Mr. Rowe. I believe it is, Senator.
Senator Scott. We talked about this the other day. Very few
times in history do our Presidents get shot at. You would know
that this is something that the American public is very
interested in. As Senator Johnson said, there's a lot of
questions being asked. I was at Church Sunday, and three people
came up to me and asked me if there was a second shooter.
There's all this information that you guys are not responding
to.
When I was Governor of Florida, I had two mass shootings. I
had the Pulse nightclub shooting. I had the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas shooting. We did daily, we did two or three times a
day, local, State, and Federal law enforcement, FBI, everybody
involved, we answered questions.
What I asked you the other day is, why aren't you doing
that? What both of you have allowed. You have allowed the
public to assume the negative which I don't get and think you
should be doing. I think you should be doing all along at least
once a day press conference. I think that you have to tell the
public what's going on.
Having a hearing is really nice. I mean, how often are we
going to do this? You are clearly not going to do it here for
another month and a half. I asked you the other day, why aren't
you doing press conferences? And are you going to commit to
doing press conferences? I think what you-all have said the
other day, you are going to ask Secretary Mayorkas and Director
Wray, if you guys could do those daily press conferences, and
start giving the public information. You know, what's the
answer?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that's why, one, I am here today. I am
here today to provide information and answer those questions.
We are moving toward doing more frequent releases of
information. We are willing to do that press conference. Once
we get through this hearing today, we are going to, in all
likelihood, do one this week.
Senator Scott. OK? What's the commitment to the public that
you are going to do press conferences? I mean, it's what, 17
days? We are sitting 17 days into this, and I am getting asked
questions that I can't believe are true, but the public
believes it's true.
What you-all are doing is you ruin your reputation, impact
the integrity of the Federal Government. It makes no sense to
me. Are you going to commit to it--are you going to do it once
a month? The FBI, it's the same thing, not just you. What did
Director Wray say? Did he say he could not do it?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, if I may jump in here. First, thank
you all for your guidance in this regard. In fact, we have not
done something every day, no doubt about that. But, we are
focused from the FBI side on the investigation. In part, as we
have laid out here today, we actually, based on your guidance,
we did a media engagement, not a standup-type press conference,
just yesterday, and laid out in full everything that I have
shared here, and even beyond that, just in the interest of
time.
But we are because of the intense interest in this, and the
implications and the national importance, we have literally
provided everything through media, and through journalists in
here all of the information that we have derived from the
investigation. Thus, sir, we remain committed to do that in
full, answering all questions and sharing all information we
obtain.
Senator Scott. Do you guys realize the value of going in
front of the press and answering all their questions? You
realize that if you don't do it that way, everything gets
filtered. You get to put out all the information, and you
should be providing--I mean, you should be saying every day
this is what we know now. Like Senator Johnson said, put
together a timeline. You should have put together a timeline.
You should immediately put out, this is what we know right now,
and this is what we don't know.
Like you have said, you don't know how the gun got up
there, right? You have said it, but why that should have been
out all along? Say we are looking at it, it does not make any
sense. We have done this, we have done this, we have done this.
I just don't get it. Why? Why what you are doing? I have said
this about the FBI. I mean, the people who work at Secret
Service, they are great people. You are a black hole, you lose
the support of the American public because people do not
believe you are being direct with them.
I completely disagree with your approach. I just want to
finish. Like everybody else, I did a letter July 18th. I have
not gotten any answers yet. I want to put it into the
record,\1\ and I would love to get the answers to this because
this is what the public is asking for. They want more
information. They want to know what happened, who's going to be
held accountable, and how we are going to make sure this never
happens again. Thank you.
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\1\ The letter submitted by Senator Scott appears in the Appendix
on page 127.
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Chairman Peters. Without objection, it will be entered into
the record.
Chairman Durbin. Senator Blumenthal.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLUMENTHAL
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for being here to both of you and more important
thank you for your professional dedication, your personal
bravery, and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. I
know for both of you, this moment is a painful one. Acting
Director Rowe, I have heard you speak in a private setting very
emotionally and passionately about the need to take
responsibility and take action that will assure accountability.
I know that you share a commitment along with Director Abbate
to full public disclosure to the maximum extent possible.
We can make speeches at you, and I have made one myself in
that private setting about the need for broader, fuller
disclosure to the public, not just in press conferences, but in
the course of your investigation about what you know and feel
you can disclose without compromising your investigation.
Let me ask you, last week Senator Peters and Paul, along
with Senator Johnson and myself, sent requests to both of your
agencies to produce documents. We have only received a handful
so far. Can you commit to when we can expect those documents?
Mr. Rowe. We will get them to you as quickly as we can,
Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Can we expect them this week?
Mr. Rowe. We will work to get to meet that deadline, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. When can we expect all the
communications, the text messages that agents have sent to each
other? Eventually, all of it is going to come out as you know.
When can we expect all of those documents?
Mr. Rowe. We will gather them up and get them to you,
Senator
Senator Blumenthal. You, I think, took the position as to
the local law enforcement responsible for the shooter on the
roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to
take him out. But ultimately, doesn't the buck stop with the
Secret Service?
Mr. Rowe. It stops with us, sir. But let me just clarify
the perspective that they had on that roof, when I show you the
perspective from when our sniper saw, he's on the downside of
that ridge roof. Their perspective from the AGR building,
looking out their area of responsibility looking left, they
should have been able to see.
You can see in that photo\1\ in Exhibit A, which we will
make part of the record and turn over to the Committee. He's
already crossed over that bridge or the walkway and stepped up
onto that roof. I am not saying that they should have
neutralized him, but if they would have just held their post
and looked left, maybe, and there's a lot of maybes there,
Senator.
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\1\ The photo referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
page 74.
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Senator Blumenthal. A lot of maybes, but somebody needs to
be held accountable. I think Senator Graham hit the nail on the
head. We need to know who specifically was responsible for
doing what. Who was responsible for saying to former president
Trump, ``Sir, it's not safe to go out there yet.'' Who was
responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement
were doing their job? Who was responsible for tracking down
that suspicious person who fit the profile; 10 to 25 years old,
young male.
The FBI has warned us about it year after year after year.
Director Wray has come before us and said the threat is from
domestic extremism, the lone gunman. We are all aware of it in
law enforcement. I think we need individual accountability
here, and people need to be held responsible, in fact, lose
their jobs, if necessary, to send a message that this massive
intelligence and surveillance failure as well as the
enforcement failure cries out for accountability. Let me just
ask, in the short time I have left, what is the nature of the
Iran threat?
Mr. Abbate. I am sorry, Senator, could you repeat the
question?
Senator Blumenthal. What is the nature of the Iran threat,
the threat to former president Trump that has been mentioned?
Mr. Abbate. Let me be clear here. The terrorist regime of
Iran has been targeting people our country for many years now.
We have talked about that here before. I want to be clear about
that. From the FBI standpoint, we know publicly they have
targeted former president Trump. They have called for his
assassination along with other current and former officials.
That's public information. It's well known to everyone.
Senator Blumenthal. Was there a specific or imminent threat
on July 13th?
Mr. Abbate. We have no information that there are any co-
conspirators or that foreign or domestic, including Iran,
related to this. I want to be clear; we have no evidence of
that. We are not ruling anything out. We are looking into all
possibilities and leaving our minds open to that.
Senator Blumenthal. Was that on the minds of the Secret
Service on July 13th, that there might be some threat from
Iran?
Mr. Rowe. Sir, as Deputy Director Abbate just said, we are
aware of the public sentiment and statements of the government
of Iran to do harm to Donald J. Trump, and we use a threat-
based model.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for
your testimony today and for your service.
Mr. Rowe, I want to begin discussing Secret Service
staffing, and the extent to which HSI or other personnel are
augmenting, or backfilling inadequate Secret Service capacity,
generally, and on the day of the assassination attempt. To what
extent are HSI personnel, for example, filling close protection
roles that would normally or optimally be filled by Secret
Service personnel?
Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As we have
done, even back when we were with Treasury, we enlist during
campaign years the assistance of other law enforcement agencies
in that department. When we were in Treasury, we used Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), we used Internal Revenue
Service Criminal Investigation (IRSCI). When we transferred
over to the Department of Homeland Security, we have brought
that practice with us.
So going into a campaign year or during a national special
security event like the United Nations General Assembly, we
will enter into a memorandum of assistance for the campaign
with HSI. HSI will provide post standards. Essentially, Federal
agents, law enforcement, to be able to help secure a site when
it comes to close protection. The only time that we will
utilize them is during a United Nations General Assembly where
they may be utilized to protect low-level head of State or
provide security at a hotel in New York City where those
protectees are staying.
Senator Ossoff. On the day in question, all of the former
president's close protection detail were full-time Secret
Service personnel?
Mr. Rowe. They were, and they were assigned to the Donald
Trump detail.
Senator Ossoff. OK. Interoperability with other Federal,
and State, and local law enforcement agencies, specifically on
communications, what have you determined to date played a role
in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies, the
suspicion or identification of a threat?
Mr. Rowe. I think there was a delay in reporting. Not
having that real time. As they were closing in on him, as
information is known as----
Senator Ossoff. Be more specific. Who were closing in on
him?
Mr. Rowe. Local law enforcement were closing in on him as
he's seen scurrying across the roof, right? That information
and we are getting to the bottom of that. We are working on
trying to figure out what was the delay? Why didn't we hear
that coming out of the unified command? So based on the
information I have right now, what I can tell you, Senator, is
that apparently not having that real time information is what
really hindered us in being able to understand more than it was
just the locals working an issue at the 3 p.m. There was
actually a little bit something more urgent than that.
Senator Ossoff. Does it appear that that is due to a lack
of communications links between relevant officials and
agencies, or poor communications practices and a failure to
report?
Mr. Rowe. I don't want to rule out. I want to have a
neutral opinion on that. I don't know if it was poor practices.
I can tell you that the interoperability, having the not being
able to have that technical fix, and which is a lofty goal to
be able to do that, is something that has been a hindrance. But
that's why we use a counterpart system.
Senator Ossoff. In fact, is not the capability when an
intergovernmental interagency team is deployed to secure a site
like this and to mount, if necessary, a quick reaction. There
is not currently the capability, for example, State law
enforcement, SWAT personnel, or local law enforcement officers,
to communicate directly with Secret Service officers onsite?
Mr. Rowe. Technically you could do it, but it would take a
long time to get it done. For a one-day or an eight-hour
operation it requires a lot. It would be months of planning of
knowing that we are going to go to this particular
jurisdiction, and that we are going to need your frequencies,
the keys, and we are going to need to load you into our radios,
and you are going to be needed to load it into ours and vice
versa.
Senator Ossoff. Right. This presents potentially, I think,
an opportunity for the Homeland Security Committee. I mean, not
just in an executive protection context, but any complex
incident response, any counter terrorism, any natural disaster
context. The inability, swiftly, to link personnel from
disparate jurisdictions at the local, State, and Federal level
is a vulnerability for the Nation. Is it not?
Mr. Rowe. I would think and based on my experience, being
able to talk to other agencies in real time, certainly would
assist in that response.
Senator Ossoff. Mr. Chair, do I have time for one more
question?
Chairman Durbin. Yes.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. I know others have touched on
this. One of the things that's been most baffling to the public
has been the failure to fully secure this structure, which even
to a lay person's uninformed eye, clearly presents as a site
from which an attack on the former president of this event
could be mounted. It had particular characteristics that made
it even more of potential value to an attacker.
Just walk us through one more time. Is there not an
established doctrine, or practice, or checklist by which such
sites are assessed for threat and determine whether or not to
be within or without of the security perimeter?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, controlling high ground is something
that is a must for us whenever we go into a location.
Senator Ossoff. Yes. I know we are all eager for more
information on why that task was not completed in this case.
Thank you for your testimony.
Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEE
Senator Lee. Why was President Trump allowed to take the
stage at 6:02 p.m., exactly 17 minutes after multiple
suspicious person reports were provided, complete with photos,
and information suggesting that the assailant had a
rangefinder, something that ordinary people don't use in this
kind of circumstance?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, it was suspicion not weapon, or
there was never communication of that there was an individual
with a gun, or threat, or other bad intentions.
Senator Lee. How many suspicious person reports did you
receive that day?
Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you on the exact number, but
there were other individuals that came to the attention of law
enforcement that day.
Senator Lee. Would President Biden ever be allowed on stage
under similar circumstances with an unresolved set of multiple
suspicious person reports provided, including indicating that
there was a range finder involved?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can tell you that a suspicious person
on the outer perimeter with local law enforcement attempting to
locate is, would happen. But I would need more information as
far as whether or not we would allow the President to go on or
off.
Again, for us, it comes down to weapon, a potential threat,
is the individual carrying an IED, is there a weapon? Is there
some other factor that now ramps up our attention to----
Senator Lee. Understood.
Mr. Rowe [continuing]. Let's hold off on this.
Senator Lee. If there were eight shell casings found next
to the assailant's body, but he was neutralized after the first
shot, where did those other shots come from? Where did the
other shots go?
Mr. Rowe. As far as the assailant shooting?
Senator Lee. Yes. Did the assailant get out eight shots, or
were those shell casings left from the day before? Where did
they come from?
Mr. Abbate. The shooter, Senator, we believe fired eight
rounds. We had the shooting reconstruction team go out there
for a period of days and collect all that. We have bullet
holes, bullet fragmentation, all taken back, and there we are
still putting together the trajectory and ballistic analysis.
Although we do have fragments of the bullets and bullets had
been collected in the distance from the shooter's weapon.
Senator Lee. Got you. It's my understanding there was a
sniper team assigned to a window with complete overlook,
complete view of the roof, the same rooftop, sloped rooftop
where the shots were fired. It's also my understanding,
according to some whistleblower accounts, that that post was
abandoned. What can you tell me about that? Why was it
abandoned?
Mr. Rowe. I saw that from the colonel's testimony, sir, and
it's something that I have asked in our mission assurance is
getting to the bottom of. There were two-man counter sniper
teams from the local that were in that AGR building.
Senator Lee. At some point they just left?
Mr. Rowe. I do not have an answer for you on that, Senator.
But it seems to me that if even one of them left, there should
have been remaining some additional eyes left in that building.
Senator Lee. Yes. That seems like something that maybe
should be one of the very first questions you address. I am
actually surprised that you do not know that already. I would
ask that you submit to us in writing\1\ what you learn as soon
as you learn it. Will you commit to that?
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\1\ The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the
Appendix on page 152.
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Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Lee. Let me just state it this way. Multiple
requests were made by Trump's protective detail and by Trump's
campaign team to the Secret Service for additional resources. I
am told that those were denied, and as I recall, the Secret
Service spokesperson initially denied that such requests were
made and denied. Why not tell the truth from the outset? What
were they trying to do there?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I do not think there was any intention
to mislead----
Senator Lee. Looks like a pretty material fact, isn't it?
Mr. Rowe. I saw that report. Go ahead, Senator.
Senator Lee. Will you commit to me that you will submit to
us in writing\2\ what requests were made by whom, and to whom,
and when they were denied?
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\2\ The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the
Appendix on page 152.
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Mr. Rowe. I will, sir.
Senator Lee. OK. Look, at the end of the day, we we are
looking at a situation in which at a minimum, people knew that
this guy had a gun at least two minutes before the shooting
happened. I want to know what you can tell me about what
happened during that final two-minute period where a whole
bunch of people in the crowd saw and were shouting, ``He's got
a gun.''
During that two-minute period, perhaps at the beginning of
it, the local police started to climb the rooftop, and there
was at least 30 seconds after which local police were able to
personally observe the shooter with a gun, had the gun pointed
at him. What happened during that time period? Why on earth was
President Trump not removed from the stage at that moment?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, the reason why President Trump was not
removed was, again, we did not have anything more than locals
working an issue at the 3 o'clock. It was not determined as to
whether or not it was the same individual or not, and there was
no report of----
Senator Lee. The same individual as what?
Mr. Rowe. The same suspicious individual.
Senator Lee. Right. But we have left the category of
suspicious individual at that point. You have a guy with a gun
on a rooftop, 136 yards away from the stage, that he's got a
gun at that point. What happened during that time period that
did not result in President Trump is protective detail being
notified of that, and him immediately being removed from the
situation?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will say, and then I will turn it
over to Deputy Director Abbate, no information regarding a
weapon on the roof was ever passed to our personnel.
Senator Lee. How is that even possible? Do you want to
comment to that?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, I believe that information, and
this is probably something my colleague can expound, on
information that was in law enforcement, local law enforcement
channels, but did not cross over and make it to Secret Service
awareness.
Mr. Abbate. Senator, just to clarify the timeline. The
individual was first seen by law enforcement on the roof at
about 6:08. We are still working to perfect the timeline based
on the radio communications and all that. It was not until at
6:11, 03 seconds, the officer saw him and called out his arm.
That was the first sighting where he had the rifle on the roof,
and then he----
Senator Lee. That was relayed to the Secret Service Command
Center at that point?
Mr. Abbate. My understanding is no. Secret Service, it was
not relayed to them. It's a narrower timeframe, though. It's
probably about, maybe, up to half a minute between the time
he's seen with the rifle and when the shots are fired.
Senator Lee. But there's still time at that point. If there
were an open channel of communication in which they were able
to tell him, ``He's got a gun, take him out.'' You could still
take President Trump off the stage. You could have him duck.
You could have the shooter neutralized. Do you not have a
channel of communication by which they can say, ``Gun. Take him
out.''
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that information stayed in local
channels and did not make it over to Secret Service.
Senator Lee. They did not consider that relevant? You are
saying that the local police did not consider that relevant
enough to pass along to the Secret Service?
Mr. Rowe. Sir, I think that they were in the midst of
dealing with a very critical situation, and they articulated
that over the radio, as I understand it. However, it was never
relayed over to us.
Thank you, Senator Lee. Senator Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Director Rowe, can you put your first poster or your first
demonstrative back up.
Mr. Rowe. Please put it up.
Senator Hawley. Just to make sure everybody can see it.
This is the photograph I believe that you took, your team took
of the roof. The AGR roof. Yes, that's the one. So, from this
vantage point, as the law enforcement who are in those windows,
as they look left, they should be able to see the shooter
clearly there on the AGR second floor roof. My question is, why
is there not a Secret Service counter Sniper on that roof?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, when we post up, it is our methodology
is to look at things that can see in on our protectees so that
they can provide that coverage.
Senator Hawley. But why is there not a Secret Service
counters sniper there with clear line of sight? That roof has a
clear line of sight to the former president. Why didn't you put
a Secret Service counter sniper there?
Mr. Rowe. The Secret Service's counter sniper role is to
neutralize those threats that are looking in on us from where
the Protectee is, not necessarily his position.
Senator Hawley. You think maybe you might want to revise
that protocol in light of what happened here?
Mr. Rowe. They were protecting the principle, and I think
in the----
Senator Hawley. The principle got shot.
Mr. Rowe. I understand that, sir.
Senator Hawley. Do you think you might want to revise the
protocol? Let me ask you this. Who is the lead site agent who
made the decision to leave the AGR building completely outside
of the security perimeter? Who was that?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I cannot give you that name. This person
is operational. They are still doing investigations. They are
still doing protective visits.
Senator Hawley. Have they been relieved of duty,
Mr. Rowe. Senator, they have not been relieved of duty.
Senator Hawley. I know their name, by the way.
Why have they not been relieved of duty?
Mr. Rowe. They are still cooperating, not only being
interviewed by the FBI, but also by our Office of Professional
Responsibility. We will let the facts of the mission assurance
and any further investigations play out.
Senator Hawley. Isn't the fact that a former president was
shot, that a good American is dead, that other Americans were
critically wounded, isn't that enough mission failure for you
to say that the person who decided that that building should
not be in the security perimeter probably ought to be stepped
down?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think you are using the word decided,
and I think we need to allow the investigation play out to
include----
Senator Hawley. OK. Who did make the decision then if it
was not the lead site agent who made the decision not to put
that in the security perimeter?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, you are zeroing in on one particular
agent. I want to find out exactly what was the entire decision
process?
Senator Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Rowe. I want to be neutral and make sure that we get to
the bottom of it, and interview everybody in order to determine
if there was more than one person who perhaps exercised bad
judgment.
Senator Hawley. Sure. My question is, why don't you relieve
everybody of duty who made bad judgment? Yes, you are right. I
am zeroing in on somebody. I am trying to find somebody who's
accountable here,
Mr. Rowe. And we will.
Senator Hawley. You are telling me that the person who made
the decision not to include this in the perimeter has not been
relieved of duty. What about the person who's in charge of the
interoperability of radio frequencies between local law
enforcement and Secret Service? Has that person been relieved
of duty?
Mr. Rowe. No, Senator, because interoperability is a
greater challenge than just one person on that day. We had a
counterpart system. It failed spectacularly.
Senator Hawley. Has the person who decided, who made the
decision to send Donald Trump onto the stage knowing that you
had a security situation, has that person been relieved of
duty?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. They have not.
Senator Hawley. Has the person who decided not to pull the
former president off of stage when you knew that, in your
words, the locals were working a serious security situation,
has that person been relieved of duty?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. Again, I refer you back to my original
answer that we are investigating this through a mission
assurance and as opposed to zeroing in on one or two
individuals to find out exactly what the decisionmaking process
was.
Senator Hawley. What would you need to investigate, to know
that there were critical enough failures that some individuals
ought to be held accountable? What more do you need to know?
Mr. Rowe. What I need to know is exactly what happened. I
need my investigators to do their job, and I cannot put my
thumb on the scale.
Senator Hawley. A lot of people did not do their job.
What do you mean put your thumb on the scale?
Mr. Rowe. You are asking me, Senator, to completely make a
rush to judgment about somebody failing. I acknowledge this was
a failure of the Secret Service----
Senator Hawley. Is it not prima facie that somebody has
failed? A former president was shot.
Mr. Rowe. Sir, this could have been our Texas School Book
Depository. I have lost sleep over that for the last 17 days.
Senator Hawley. Then fire somebody.
Mr. Rowe. I will tell you, Senator, that I will not rush to
judgment. That people will be held accountable, and I will do
so with integrity, and not rush to judgment and put people----
Senator Hawley. I can't believe----
Mr. Rowe. Unfairly persecuted.
Senator Hawley. Unfairly persecuted?
Mr. Rowe. Unfairly, sir.
Senator Hawley. We have people who are dead.
Mr. Rowe. We have to be able to have a proper investigation
into this, Senator.
Senator Hawley. You said earlier that you have to make sure
that your protocols are followed. Unless there's a protocol
violation, people would not be disciplined. I would just say to
you, I don't really care that much about your protocols. I
think if your protocols don't provide for the fact that when a
former president is shot, when an American is killed, when
other rally goers, innocent people who just showed up on the
day when they are shot at and critically wounded, if that isn't
a protocol violation, prima facie, you should revise your
protocols.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think this is where you and I agree
this was a failure, and we will get to the bottom of it.
Senator Hawley. I hope you are going to do something about
it. Let me ask you something else. The RealClearPolitics
reports this morning that you were directly involved in denying
additional security resources and personnel, including counter
snipers. Not just to this event, but over the last two years.
That President Trump's team repeatedly asked for these
additional resources, and you personally were involved in
denying them. Is that true?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, as I stated earlier, that is not true.
Senator Hawley. You never denied any resources to former
president Trump's team?
Mr. Rowe. No, not me. No, sir. Not personally.
Senator Hawley. You weren't involved in any of that?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir.
Senator Hawley. You were never involved in the
decisionmaking?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. I was not.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you just one or two other things
here quickly. Whistleblowers tell me that in fact, law
enforcement were stationed to be on that roof, and that law
enforcement abandoned their post because it was too hot. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I have heard that as well. Again, they
posted up inside. I think moving forward, as I said earlier, we
are going to ensure that State and local counter snipers are on
roofs.
Senator Hawley. But do you know if someone was supposed to
be on the roof? Do you know if someone was, in fact--that's
what the whistleblowers tells me. That may or may not be
accurate. Do you know that to be the fact? Was somebody posted
to the roof, local law enforcement or whomever?
Mr. Rowe. I do not know that to be a fact.
Senator Hawley. Can I ask you why you don't know that?
Mr. Rowe. Again, Senator, we are looking at this, and they
should have been on that roof. The fact that they were in the
building is something that I am still trying to understand.
Senator Hawley. I just want to express my frustration,
Director. Those 17 days, or whatever it's been, that
whistleblowers are telling us more than you are, and you don't
know, you haven't ascertained if there was supposed to be law
enforcement on the roof. That seems like a pretty basic fact.
I am also told that local law enforcement suppliers offered
the Secret Service drones and you declined them. Is that true?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, one, I have been very transparent and
forthcoming.
Senator Hawley. Your agency has not been transparent and
forthcoming. So please, let's not go there.
Mr. Rowe. I have been forthcoming, sir.
Senator Hawley. That remains to be seen. You have been on
the job a few days so far. You have fired nobody.
Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Were you offered drones?
Chairman Durbin. Senator Hawley.
Mr. Rowe. No. There wasn't offered to fly a drone on that
day.
Senator Hawley. Why did you deny it?
Mr. Rowe. Again, I think the ability of local law
enforcement to provide an asset, we probably should have taken
them up on it if it was offered.
Chairman Durbin. Senator Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CRUZ
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Rowe, thank you for being here. I agree with what you
said at the outset, that the individual Secret Service agents
demonstrated remarkable personal courage, putting their bodies
in between the line of sight of the shooter and the President.
That being said, the bravery of the line agents is quite
different from the decisions of Secret Service leadership.
Secret Service leadership committed catastrophic security
failures, indeed, the worst security failures for the Secret
Service since 1981. Since the attempted assassination of
President Ronald Reagan. It is incumbent upon this Committee to
determine why those security failures happened.
Just after the shooting, Secret Service put out an official
statement from your spokesperson that says, ``There's an untrue
assertion that me, a member of the former president's team,
requested additional security resources, and that those were
rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added
protective resources, and technology, and capabilities as part
of the increased campaign travel tempo.'' Was this tweet
accurate?
Mr. Rowe. With respect to Butler, Pennsylvania, it is
accurate, sir.
Senator Cruz. It is accurate that the Trump team had not
asked for additional security and had not been rebuffed.
Mr. Rowe. If you are talking about Butler, Pennsylvania,
all assets requested were approved. If you are talking about
the media reporting of assets requested, there were times when
assets were unavailable and not able to be filled. Those gaps
were staffed with State and local law enforcement tactical
assets.
Senator Cruz. I am reading from The Washington Post, July
20, 2024. Secret Service is said to have denied requests for
more security at Trump events. The opening paragraph, ``Top
officials of the U.S. Secret Service repeatedly denied requests
for additional resources and personnel sought by Donald Trump's
security detail in the two years leading up to his attempted
assassination according to four people familiar with the
requests.''
Is that right? That repeatedly, the Trump detail asked for
more resources, and repeatedly, Secret Service leadership
turned that down?
Mr. Rowe. That is not accurate, Senator. Assets are
requested.
Senator Cruz. How many requests did the Trump team or the
Trump detail ask for?
Mr. Rowe. I can get you that number in----
Senator Cruz. You do not know now.
Mr. Rowe. No. I can speak to the ones that reported in The
Washington Post, and we can go through them if you like.
Senator Cruz. But you do not know how many requests there
were?
Mr. Rowe. In general, how many requests since 2021 that the
former Trump detail has made a request for assets?
Senator Cruz. You have had two weeks. You had a
spokesperson, put something out that is false on its face. By
the way, did you approve this statement when it went out?
Mr. Rowe. I do not know if I did or did not, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Is this spokesperson still employed? Does he
still have a job?
Mr. Rowe. He's still employed, Senator.
Senator Cruz. He lied on behalf of the Secret Service. He
still has a job. Did your predecessor, the former director, did
she approve this statement?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, our communications team, they send out
statements. They do deconflict them and they put them out.
Senator Cruz. Did she approve this statement?
Mr. Rowe. I do not know if she did or did not, Senator.
Senator Cruz. And you do not know if you did either?
Mr. Rowe. I do not recall approving it, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Will you commit to provide this Committee in
writing, every written request for additional resources from
the Trump campaign or the Trump detail, and every response from
Secret Service?\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The information requested by Senator Cruz appears in the
Appendix on page 157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I will commit to providing responses and
getting you the information that you are seeking.
Senator Cruz. May I ask you something? Who makes the
decision to deny those requests? Did you make that decision?
Mr. Rowe. Which requests are you talking about?
Senator Cruz. Any of them.
Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That were in The Washington Post?
Senator Cruz. Yes.
Mr. Rowe. The process, sir, is that a detail will make a
request for either staffing, technical assets. That is handled
between the field office and the detail.
Senator Cruz. OK. So, there's a bureaucracy. Is there a
decisionmaker?
Mr. Rowe. It's not a bureaucracy, Senator, it's a process.
Senator Cruz. Give me the person that's a decisionmaker. Is
there one?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, it's a conversation. It's not just an
absolute yes or no.
Senator Cruz. Let me tell you what I believe. I believe
that the Secret Service leadership made a political decision to
deny these requests. I think the Biden Administration has been
suffused with partisan politics. Did the same person who denied
the request for additional security to President Trump also
repeatedly deny the request for security to Robert F. Kennedy
(RFK) Jr., whose father was murdered by an assassin and whose
uncle was murdered by an assassin? Did the same person make
that decision?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will tell you is that Secret
Service agents are not political--nor do they allow----
Senator Cruz. OK. You are not answering my question.
But you know what? Leadership appointed----
Mr. Rowe. I will get to your answer, Senator, if you're
allow me.
Senator Cruz. Leadership appointed by the President is
political. I have a simple question, yes or no. Did the same
person deny the Trump request that also denied the RFK request?
That's a yes or no question.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that is not a yes or no question. One,
there is a process for a candidate nominee to receive
protection.
Senator Cruz. Does the buck stop anywhere?
Mr. Rowe. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process that there's
no participant----
Senator Cruz. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process. What
cameral?
Mr. Rowe. For a candidate protectee----
Senator Cruz. You are not a Congress. You do not have a
cameral.
Mr. Rowe. Mr. Kennedy submitted a request that was referred
over to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC).
Senator Cruz. OK. You are refusing to answer the question.
Let me ask because the failures on that day were catastrophic.
By the way, is it true that on the day of the Butler event,
that Secret Service transferred an agent from President Trump
to the First Lady?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. That's not true.
Senator Cruz. That's been widely reported.
Mr. Rowe. It's not true. There was one airport agent that
actually went on the manpower request for the Trump detail.
They handled the arrival at the airport for the First Lady
and----
Senator Cruz. What is the relative size of the Trump detail
compared to the detail that is assigned to the President or the
First lady?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, the former president travels with a full
shift just like the President.
Senator Cruz. The exact same size. Is that your testimony?
That President Trump had the same size detail that President
Biden has?
Mr. Rowe. On the day-of in Butler? The number of agents
surrounding him? It is the same number of agents surrounding
the President today. There is a difference between a sitting
president who also not only has----
Senator Cruz. Hold on. You are using President in a way
that is not clear. Is it your testimony that in Butler,
Pennsylvania, Donald Trump had the same number of agents
protecting him that Joe Biden has at a comparable event?
Mr. Rowe. I am telling you the shift, the close protection
shift surrounding.
Senator Cruz. That's a yes or no.
Mr. Rowe. That's what you asked me, Senator, and I am
trying to answer it.
Senator Cruz. You are not answering it. Is it the same
number of agents or not?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, there is a difference between the
sitting President of the United States.
Senator Cruz. What's the difference?
Mr. Rowe. The difference?
Senator Cruz. 2X, 3X, 5X, 10X?
Mr. Rowe. National command authority to launch a nuclear
strike, Sir. There are other assets----
Senator Cruz. I am not asking other assets.
Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That travel with the President----
Senator Cruz. How many more agents travel----
Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That the former president will not
get.
Senator Cruz. Sir, you are refusing to answer.
Mr. Rowe. But the number of Secret Service agents
protecting him----
Senator Cruz. Sir, stop interrupting me.
Mr. Rowe. Go ahead, Senator.
Senator Cruz. You are refusing to answer clear and direct
questions. I am asking the relative difference in the number of
agents between those assigned to Donald Trump and those
assigned to Joe Biden. I am not asking why you assign more to
Joe Biden. I am asking is the difference. Is it 2X, 3X, 5X,
10X?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I will get you that number so you can
see it with your own eyes.
Chairman Peters. Senator Marshall, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARSHALL
Senator Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Director Rowe, there was probably 10 buildings within
sniper range of President Trump on that afternoon. Why was the
building being used by the sniper not in the security zone?
Mr. Rowe. That's a question that I have asked, Senator.
There was a decision that we were going to construct the site
and it was going to maintain within the Butler Farm Show site.
That building, that AGR was right on the curtilage of our outer
perimeter. It is something that I--again, having been there and
walked it, I had a hard time understanding why.
Senator Marshall. There's no protocol that says anything
within 300, 500 yards, or in direct line of the President
should be in or out of the security zone. There's not a
protocol that describes that?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, what we try to do is we try to either
control the high ground or mitigate line of sight concerns.
Senator Marshall. OK. You have stated that on multiple
occasions, President Trump's team was denied more of a detail,
more assets. Who denies that? Who is the person that denies
that, generally speaking?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, there's a process. Again, there's a
conversation had with the detail.
Senator Marshall. There's got to be a buck stopping.
There's got to be someone. Who is the person? Is it an
individual within the DC agency? Is it someone in the
Pittsburgh office who denies this?
Mr. Rowe. It has nothing to do with the Pittsburgh office,
sir. It is a conversation between not only the detail, the
field office, but also----
Senator Marshall. I do not want to know the conversation. I
want to know who makes the decision.
Mr. Rowe. The decision, sir, it's our process between the
Office of Protective Operations and the Office of
Investigations.
Senator Marshall. Is there a title for this position?
Mr. Rowe. We affectionately call it the War Room, and it's
where all of our logistics files into.
Senator Marshall. It's a room that makes the decision?
Mr. Rowe. It is a staffing and assignments officer.
Senator Marshall. OK. Is the Secret Service required to do
a briefing with all entities of law enforcement involved in the
event in the days leading up to the event and the day of the
event?
Mr. Rowe. We do a police meeting, sir.
Senator Marshall. Is it required? Is it part of your
standard operating procedure (SOP)?
Mr. Rowe. The police meeting is what initiates the advance,
and that is what is required.
Senator Marshall. Was this meeting held on that day?
Mr. Rowe. The police meeting took place on the days prior
to that.
Senator Marshall. Do you have documentation of that meeting
actually happening?
Mr. Rowe. If we do, sir, I will get them to you.
Senator Marshall. But you are saying that it did not happen
on the day of the event.
Mr. Rowe. Sir, I think what you are referring to is a
briefing that the State and locals would have done with
themselves. We did a briefing with our own folks.
Senator Marshall. Did your people meet with local law
enforcement the day of the assassination attempt?
Mr. Rowe. Yes.
Senator Marshall. OK. You realize that local law
enforcement says no. That that meeting never happened. That's
why we need to get these people in to talk to us. This is why
the FBI needs to be speaking up sooner than later and say
whether that meeting did or did not happen. Surely, there's
some type of documentation of that meeting one way or the
other. Is there documentation of that meeting?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can tell you that what you are
referring to is the counter sniper team seconded to Butler ESU.
Our personnel met with the team lead from Butler ESU, and they
discussed areas of concern, areas of responsibility. That did
in fact happen at the site on that day
Senator Marshall. Director, I think you would agree with me
that there were multiple individual and institutional failures
the day of this assassination attempt. You have a $3 billion
budget, you are still 2,000 employees short, and in 2022, the
Secret Service had a 48 percent departure rate. That tells me
you either have a culture problem or just gross incompetence.
Which one is it?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I would challenge that 48 percent
departure rate. Let me get you some statistics that we have. It
is not 48 percent.
Senator Marshall. But go back to the multiple failures that
we saw on an individual basis, also systemic. I think it proves
that there's either incompetence or some type of a culture
problem within the ss.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I know you are not calling our workforce
incompetent, and I know we do not have a culture problem. If
anything, we are dedicated to making sure that we do not have
mission failure. Let me get you the hiring numbers that we have
because I think you will actually see that, no, we have
actually done very well fairly recently. We are trying to make
sure that we have the numbers that we need. Of course, we need
more people. Everybody does. But let me get you those numbers,
and I think let your own eyes see.
Senator Marshall. Would you also disagree with me when it's
reported that almost 50 percent of the rank and file officers
do not trust leadership within the Secret Service?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think it's the right of every worker
to talk bad about their boss.
Senator Marshall. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Peters. Senator Hirono, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HIRONO
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Clearly there is a lot that the Secret Service has to, as
answer for in this stunning security failure. But I do want to
follow up on Mr. Abbate's testimony that an online profile of
the shooter may have been found. You said it contains anti-
Semitic and anti-immigrant postings. Can you elaborate, have
you found anything further in that the shooter's profile?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, this was just discovered, as I
mentioned, and it's being closely analyzed right now. We need
to verify that it is in fact that it belonged to the now
deceased shooter, and that he made these comments. That's why I
felt it important in the interest of transparency to share that
here, but add the caveat that we still have a lot of work to do
which we are working on quickly to determine that.
It's of importance, I think, because if it is, in fact, the
shooter that posted these comments, it's the first real
indication where he's expressing what are described as
extremist views and talking about political violence.
Senator Hirono. I take it that once you determine that it
was in fact that the shooter who posted these kinds of
comments, that you will let the public know as well as this
Committee.
Mr. Abbate. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Hirono. I think, in fact, it is very important that
many of the perpetrators of mass shootings, et cetera, have
these kinds of postings online that are very anti-immigrant,
anti-Semitic, of anti-everything. It is really important as we
determine the kind of profile for many of these shooters, that
we understand how critical it is that we are careful how
critically important it is that people are careful about what
they are posting online, the misinformation, disinformation,
everything else along those lines.
This is for Abbate, once again. What kind of firearm, what
kind of weapon did Crooks use in the assassination attempt?
Mr. Abbate. This was an AR-15-style rifle manufactured by a
company named Panther Arms.
Senator Hirono. Once again, many of the persons involved in
these kinds of mass shootings use this particular kind of
weapon. We know from similar hearings that the Judiciary
Committee has had, that we are a nation awash in guns. In your
view, shouldn't we be doing more to prevent the easy
accessibility of these kinds of firearms in our country?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, we are focused on collecting the facts
here, and I am not going to comment on something like that.
Senator Hirono. I know that a hesitancy to ask about
firearms and all of that. I should think that as a law
enforcement person, that you probably have some opinions along
those lines. But you do not want to articulate what to many
people in our country, there's a causal factor here; the easy
accessibility of guns.
I want to ask that question because I think it's important
that the American people understand that, we are a nation that
is awash in guns, and we have more mass shootings than any
other country. Yet, we have been unable to pass the kind of
laws that prevent these kinds of firearms to be easily
available. That we have not done enough to promote gun safety
in our country.
Mr. Chair, I wanted to articulate that as like the elephant
in the room that nobody wants to address, including apparently,
our law enforcement officers. I am disappointed in that, but
obviously, we have work to do to create a much safer
environment, and to prevent persons who have these kinds of
ideological perspectives and who are--I would say, who have
these kinds of profiles to have such easy accessibility to the
kind of firearms that can cause mass death and destruction.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Senator Lankford, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPEN9ING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chair, thank you.
Thank you, to both of you, for the testimony today.
Director Rowe, future Vice President JD Vance was in my State
this past week in Oklahoma City. I talked with some of the
Secret Service folks that are there. They are doing a terrific
job. I got a chance to be able to thank them, personally, for
the tasks they are doing. I know the Oklahoma folks in Secret
Service, and they are very dedicated, incredibly sharp people
on that team.
I know this is a challenge to all Secret Service. This is
something every Secret Service agent wakes up every single day
and wants to avoid. Please continue to be able to pass on our
gratitude for the work they do every single day and for what's
happening out there. I appreciate that.
Mr. Abbate, I want to ask you about some of the interviews
that have happened. You-all have done more than 400 interviews
at this point for the counter sniper team that was local law
enforcement, that was on the second floor overlooking that
rooftop. Have they been interviewed at this point?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. I believe that each of them have
been interviewed.
Senator Lankford. Do you know offhand if they were at their
post at that time able to look across? That they were at that
post at some times--do we know they were at that post at 6:08
to 6:11?
Mr. Abbate. My understanding, and I want to be fair, I have
not read the reports directly, but I have been briefed on some
of it. They were at times during the timeframe we are talking
about here on-post within the AGR building. I do believe, but I
would want to confirm this, at some point one or more did
venture out in an effort to locate and isolate the shooter.
Senator Lankford. We understand from the timeline that they
were also looking for this individual that was suspicious that
they had left that post, to be able to try to look for him on
the ground at different points to try to be able to see if they
could get a different perspective. What we are trying to figure
out is during that time period that he actually climbed on the
roof, assembled a firearm, or took a firearm with him or picked
one up, whatever, it might have been there, that they were able
to actually see him if they were able to look left, has been
acknowledged in the photos that are up there?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, I do not know the exact timing and the
movements of each officer that was out there, but what I would
derive from it is they were all focused on locating the
shooter, the suspicious person at the time. Then as we have all
seen, the one officer attempted to get on the roof directly--
there were efforts going on in those final minutes, right on
the video to try to get to this person.
Senator Lankford. We have one officer being boosted up by
another officer----
Mr. Abbate. Yes.
Senator Lankford [continuing]. To look up on the roof
because people on the ground had said there's someone up there
and they have a gun that's crawling on that roof. They climbed
up to be able to see it. He turned around with a rifle, he came
down, and then at that point he gets on the local radio that he
has and says there's someone on the roof with a gun. Is that
correct?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. I believe that that's accurate.
Senator Lankford. What's the rest of the radio
communication? We have heard that first call in, we know it's
about 30 seconds from the time he called in until the actual
first shot rang out. What else was discussed on the radio
during that 30-second time period?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, we have the radio communications. The
local radio communications were recorded and captured, and we
do have that as part of the investigation. The key points to
me, that local officer communicating that he sees the
individuals he's armed, that's at about 6:11 and some seconds,
I think it's three seconds. Then he identifies it as a long
gun. About 6:11 and 11 seconds. Then, the shots, which all
happened quickly together, I believe happened within probably
30 seconds of that.
Senator Lankford. We are talking about over the radio
because there's a command center there.
Mr. Abbate. Yes.
Senator Lankford. Were all radios, including the local, as
they are all being listened to, to try to be able to review.
There's a statement that has the word ``gun'' in it that's
coming out across that radio. We only know that first
communication. We do not know what came back and forth on that.
We would like to get transcripts of that conversation that was
done, local law enforcement.
But coming into that command center, there's also the word
``gun'' coming through one of the radio frequencies, I would
think that would be communicated pretty quickly to everybody
across the spectrum. 30 seconds is not long, but that's a
National Football League (NFL) play, plus a huddle, plus the
next play----
Mr. Abbate. Yes, sir.
Senator Lankford [continuing]. That's quite a bit of time
still to be able to respond when Secret Service moved to be
able to protect the President once the first shots were fired
within two seconds, they are gathered around him. So, trying to
be able to figure out where the word gun got lost in radio
communication here and what else was said.
Mr. Abbate. We will share the communications with you and
the Committees. Senator, I will note just from my notes, there
was effort within those minutes and seconds once the gun was
announced. There's other communications where the local police
are talking about deploying a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and
responding and that they have the building surrounded. It's not
in avoid. I do not want to give you the impression.
Senator Lankford. Right, I understand. But typically, I
would assume for Secret Service, if they hear over the radio
over something gun, they are moving to be able to protect the
detail, either the person they are protecting at that point,
the protectee, that they are moving pretty quickly at that
point, if that's what's actually coming out. That's what I am
trying to be able to figure out how that did not get
communicated out to the people that were directly in front of
the former president at that point.
The last question I would have, I only have a second left,
is just was there any overhead drone? We have talked about
counter drone, but any visibility that Secret Service had to be
able to see the field and all the operation and their own
ability?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. As was asked by another Senator earlier,
it appears that there was an offer by a State or local agency
to fly a drone on our behalf. I am getting to the bottom as to
why we turned that down.
Senator Lankford. OK. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Senator Kennedy, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, am I
saying your name right?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. You are the Deputy Director of the FBI. Is
that correct?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. Is there any doubt in your mind or in the
collective mind of the FBI that President Trump was shot in the
ear by a bullet fired by the assassin, Crooks?
Mr. Abbate. There is absolutely no doubt in the FBI's mind.
It wasn't whether former president Trump was hit with a bullet
and wounded in the ear. No doubt. There never has been. I have
been part of this investigation since the very beginning and
that has never been raised.
Senator Kennedy. You are sure?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. It was not a space laser.
Mr. Abbate. No.
Senator Kennedy. It was not a Murder Hornet?
Mr. Abbate. Absolutely not.
Senator Kennedy. It was not Sasquatch.
Mr. Abbate. No, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. It was a bullet?
Mr. Abbate. It was a bullet, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. Fired by Crooks.
Mr. Abbate. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. That hit President Trump in the ear and
almost killed him?
Mr. Abbate. 100 percent Senator.
Senator Kennedy. OK. Glad we cleared that up. I do not want
to get off the subject here. Did the FBI just settle two
lawsuits? One wholly, one in part in which the FBI agreed to
give Peter Strzok $1.2 million and Ms. Lisa Paige $800,000.
Mr. Abbate. It's my understanding, Senator, that the
Department of Justice was involved in that. Not the FBI.
Senator Kennedy. The FBI had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Abbate. There may have been consultation with our
General Counsel's office, but.
Senator Kennedy. Does the FBI have to sign off on it?
Mr. Abbate. I don't know the answer to that. I don't
believe so, but I would want to confirm that.
Senator Kennedy. I would like you to--this would be the
same Lisa Paige who said to Mr. Strzok, ``Trump's not ever
going to become President. Right? To which Mr. Strzok said,
``No, no, he won't. We will stop.'' That's the Peter Strzok and
Lisa Paige I am talking about. I need to know if the FBI signed
off on this lawsuit.
Mr. Abbate. We will get that answer for you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. Then I need to know who signed off on it.
Did you sign off on it?
Mr. Abbate. I absolutely did not, and would never sign off
on something like that.
Senator Kennedy. Did Chris Ray sign off on it, the
settlement?
Mr. Abbate. I don't believe he did. Nor do I think you
would have.
Senator Kennedy. You need to let me know who signed off on
this. If anyone at the FBI. Was Merrick Garland who agreed to
do this? Is that right?
Mr. Abbate. Senator, I do not know who signed off on that.
Senator Kennedy. Hell, somebody had to agree to it. I have
settled a lawsuit before. The client's got to agree to it. You
are the client.
Mr. Abbate. Understood. I am going to direct it to the
Department of Justice to answer those questions.
Senator Kennedy. Get me that information, if you would.
Mr. Rowe, help me understand this. The assassin, Crooks,
fired his first shot, as I understand it, at 6:12 p.m. He was
about 140, 150 yards away. It's been reported that the
government snipers, saw him on the roof 20 minutes before. Not
two minutes, 20 minutes before. Is that correct?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that's first time I am hearing this.
That is not correct, based on the information I have right now,
sir.
Senator Kennedy. When did the FBI snipers see him on the
roof?
Mr. Rowe. Just secret service snipers, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I am sorry. You are right.
Mr. Rowe. That's an insult, sir. No, I am just kidding.
Senator Kennedy. I understand. I apologize. When did the
Secret Service snipers, one of whom ultimately shot the
assassin, Crooks, first see him on that roof?
Mr. Rowe. Sir immediately upon the shots being fired are
snipers.
Senator Kennedy. I know that, but when did they first see
him? You got a guy lying on a roof. You got snipers in an
elevated position. They can look down on the roof. You have the
guy lying there with a gun pointed at the former president of
the United States. They shot him. Good for them. He's now dead
as Woodrow Wilson. That's a good thing. I am sorry. God forgive
me, but it's a good thing. But when did the snipers first see
him?
Mr. Rowe. As soon as he presented himself as a target and a
threat to the President, sir.
Senator Kennedy. When was that?
Mr. Rowe. He fires, initially, a volley. I believe it was
three shots.
Senator Kennedy. No, he fired at 6:12 p.m.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. OK. This first shot.
Mr. Rowe. Within 15.5 seconds of the first shot, he's
neutralized.
Senator Kennedy. Here's what people are asking.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Crooks was up there. The snipers at some
point saw him.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Our snipers because they killed him.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. When did they first see him? It has been
reported repeatedly that the snipers first saw him 20 minutes
before. That's more than a quarter in an NFL football game.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. You do not know the answer to that?
Mr. Rowe. I do know the answer, sir. I am telling you
that----
Senator Kennedy. What is the answer?
Mr. Rowe. No, they did not see him. They only saw him----
Senator Kennedy. They never saw him.
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. They did not.
Senator Kennedy. How could they not see the guy? How could
they not see him? They are in an elevated position. They are
checking rooftops. They are looking around.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. There are two government snipers. How
could they not see him there? He was big as Dallas, lying there
with a gun pointed at the President. How could they not see
him?
Mr. Rowe. Because I believe he was obscured by that roof,
sir. He did not pop up----
Senator Kennedy. The roof is flat with ridges.
Mr. Rowe. He's below the line where they would have seen
him, sir. He did have concealment. I am not going to say it's
cover. He did have concealment, and then ultimately gets into
firing position and fires. Within 15.5 seconds of his first
shot, he's neutralized.
Senator Kennedy. I am gone way over you. You gentlemen need
to answer these questions. Mr. Deputy Director, get me that
information about those lawsuits.
Chairman Peters. Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your
questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Peters, and Ranking Member
Paul, for holding this important hearing on the attempted
assassination of former president Trump.
I am grateful for everyone's service and dedication.
However, it's critical that this Committee get to the bottom of
what happened that day so that we can prevent any future
catastrophic security failures, and ensure that nothing like
this happens again.
Director Rowe, given that the event took place in a rural
area, we have talked a lot about connectivity issues, was law
enforcement at a disadvantage due to a lack of or limited
connectivity? Why is the Secret Service not adopted a dedicated
satellite-enabled Wi-Fi connection, which would facilitate
integrated communication, enabled device connectivity to
include drones and allowing for the sharing of real time
intelligence?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, thank you for that question. Based on
what I have seen, that radio connectivity, cellular was an
issue that day. With respect to the satellite broadband, that
is something that I have tasked our CIO and then we are getting
some support from the Department of Homeland Security on. We
will start to leverage whatever asset we have to ensure that
connectivity.
Senator Rosen. I can tell you that we have those Special
Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) in Homeland Security, those
special event ratings that we have for things like the Super
Bowl. We have it a lot in Las Vegas. They do bring these mobile
units to be sure that we have all the dedicated Wi-Fi cell
service and integration that is absolutely necessary for
securing a huge event. I look forward to hearing about that.
Thank you.
I want to talk a little bit about intelligence for lone
wolf actors. Because although we have not been made aware of
any specific intelligence, the Secret Service or others had in
the shooter before the event, we do know that we have intel on
Iranian threats against the former president.
Again, Acting Director Rowe, could talk to us about how you
utilize intelligence collection as a way of mitigating threats
from State actors like Iran, compared to lone wolf actors, what
it seems to be like the attempted assassin that we have here in
Crooks.
What are the specific challenges with the intelligence
collection as a mitigation tool against lone wolf actors versus
state actors?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, first, let me preface by saying the
Secret Service is not a member of the intelligence community
(IC). However, we are their biggest consumers of information.
We receive that information regularly, especially as it
pertains to our protective mission and the people that we
protect. We have embeds with the FBI through their national
Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
Our agents are basically embeds and are able to not only
receive information, but also follow up on investigations that
may have a nexus or a direction of interest toward one of our
protectees. We have an excellent working relationship with the
FBI. We have an excellent working relationship with the
intelligence community.
We are not collectors, we are consumers of finished
analytic products that the intelligence community or the FBI
produces. We ingest them, and then we use that to adjust our
protective posture. We do this daily, weekly, all of the time.
It's not only for protective for protectees, but also the
events and sites that we protect on, on a permanent or
temporary basis.
Largely, a lot of the people that come to our attention,
and in the case of the assailant, to me, as I overlay him on
over top of, say, John Hinkley who tried to shoot President
Reagan, I see an individual based on information that I have
now. Some of the great work that the FBI has done, we have an
individual who's a loner. We have an individual who was focused
on Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Hinkley traveled the 1980
campaign. We know that he followed President Carter. On March
1981, he happened to show up in Washington, D.C. and he saw an
opportunity to try to attack President Reagan.
When it comes to the Secret Service, 1981 was a watershed
moment for us. We have people that are, for whatever reason,
fixated on carrying out an attack against the President of the
United States, or one of our protectees. In this instance, you
have the assailant who was a loner, obviously. He was
researching, he had researched the Democratic National
Convention. He had researched, and Googled, or used a search
engine about the former president. I think he had moved toward
an idea that he was going to try to do something.
When I look at this, we do not have a challenge with the
FBI or the intelligence community. I think what we always try
to wrestle with is trying to line up and see people as they are
starting to head down a pathway toward violence.
It's something that we have spent a lot of time and
resources in with our National Threat Assessment Center to try
to gain a better understanding so that we can help our agents
in the field as they are doing these protective intelligence
cases and these investigations to be able to make a
determination. Is somebody generally a threat or do they need
mental health, or do they need some other type of service?
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time's
over. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Cotton, you are
recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COTTON
Senator Cotton. At the onset, I want to express, as many
Members have, as President Trump did, the admiration and
respect for the bravery and skill of the officers who were
onsite that day; Secret Service officers, as well as all the
local law enforcement.
As it happened, my nine-year-old son was watching with me
that afternoon, and it was hard to get him to turn away from
it. He asked who all those men and women were who jumped on Mr.
Trump. I said, in layman's terms, ``Those are his bodyguards.''
He said, ``What are they doing?'' I said, ``They are protecting
him from a bullet.'' He said, ``Actually?'' I said, ``Yes.'' He
said, ``For real?'' I said, yes. It was hard for him to process
that. But as a reminder, I told him that there are men and
women in the Secret Service, in law enforcement, in the
military who are willing to die for our country.
It's an important lesson that I think that everyone should
take away from this. That you had very brave men and women on
the ground there who were doing their job to protect this
country, to protect a former president and a nominee for
president as they do every day for so many other protectees.
Obviously, there were failures in the planning and preparation
for this event.
Mr. Rowe, we have heard that the shooter had a golf range
finder. Was that not on the list of prohibited items at an
event like this?
Mr. Rowe. Currently, it is not on the list of prohibitive
items, but we are going to make that change. Senator.
Senator Cotton. John Kennedy cannot get into an Louisiana
State University (LSU) football game with a flask.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, I can.
Senator Cotton. He probably can, but he is not supposed to.
It just seems like common sense that you do not need a laser
range finder at an event like this. It feels like that a lot of
that was just the lack of common sense being exercised. Are
officers not empowered on the front line to use common sense to
say, like, if a guy has a laser range finder, he should be
detained or at least stopped. That's why he's carrying around.
If you have a building like this that's not secure from 150
meters away, someone, even the frontline lowest level, most
junior officer should be able to kind of like send up the red
flag immediately and say, like, we need to halt everything
right now and figure out what the hell is going on. Do officers
not feel empowered to use that kind of conversation?
Mr. Rowe. I would hope they would, Senator. I can tell you
from our uniform division officers that run our magnetometer
screening, they do a tremendous job. Even though something may
or may not be on the prohibitive items list, they are well
trained and they do exercise that that good common sense.
Senator Cotton. I want every one of your officers all
around the country to hear that acting director wants them to
exercise common sense. It does not have to be policy or
protocol or procedure. They should exercise common sense. Thank
you for that.
It was reported right before Ms. Cheatle's hearing last
week that, in fact, President Trump's detail had requested more
resources and those had been denied. She said that she did not
deny those resources. You have testified this morning that you
did not either. So, who did? The Secret Service is not the post
office. It's not this vast bureaucracy. Right? Like I am not
surprised to hear that you knew the counter sniper. It's a
small agency and you have a lot of career officers. Like,
surely, you have gotten to the bottom by now on whose desk this
request landed and who denied it.
Mr. Rowe. Senator, sometimes when they make a request, they
may not have the asset available. For example, the detail may
say, hey, we want 15 magnetometers. What we will look at it
based on what the event size, we will say, hey, listen, we are
going to send 10 based on our protocols of screening. We have a
flow rate of how many people we can put through.
When it comes to a counter sniper or something like that,
because I know that's been the subject of some media reporting
where they have requested counter snipers, we do have a finite
number of counter snipers. What we try to do is, if we cannot
fill that asset and that's where we will say, hey, we cannot
fill this assignment.
However, through the field office, they will use local law
enforcement resources. In those situations, for example in the
one that has been the subject of a lot of reporting in South
Carolina, they in fact did use local assets to be able to do
that. There were three counter sniper teams. One of them was
formerly with the Secret Service Uniform Division. They
actually use the same practices that we use.
It's not that there was a drop in the capability. They
actually use the best practices that we would use. The asset
may be denied by Secret Service between the War Room and that
conversation with the detail in the field. But that does not
equate to a vulnerability or a gap.
Senator Cotton. OK. One final question about the Iran
threat. As you know, Iran made credible threats against several
former Trump Administration officials, many of whom still have
government-provided security details to this day. Ms. Cheatle
removed Secret Service protection from Robert O'Brien last
year. Were you involved in that decision?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, he was a memorandum protectee meaning
that the President authorized protection for him. We do not
weigh in on who gets protection.
Senator Cotton. You are still protecting some others. I
won't reveal their names. You are still protecting others, and
other personal security officers in the Federal Government are
protecting other officials. Like, who made the decision that
Robert O'Brien no longer needed a security detail despite
Iran's ongoing credible threats?
Mr. Rowe. I can tell you, sir, it was not the Secret
Service. We do not factor into that decision at all.
Senator Cotton. Can you take a look at why that happened
now that you are in charge and consider the possibility that he
might still need that protection given all of his counterparts
in the Trump Administration still have protection?
Mr. Rowe. I will do so, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Again, I am not going to reveal the
protective details, but I am pretty confident that the agency
can get this done. I think it needs to get done if you look at
the kind of ongoing threats that he and all these others face.
Mr. Rowe. I will, sir.
Senator Cotton. Despite all the resource constraints we
have talked about today, he's not the President of the United
States. He does not have an 18-car motorcade, nor do any of the
others. I think he needs that protective detail. Now that you
are in charge, I am asking you to take a new look at that and
also talk to your supervisors inside the Department about
whether you can spare just that small limited amount of
resources. OK?
Senator Cotton. I will, sir.
Chairman Peters. Senator Welch, you are recognized for your
questions?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WELCH
Senator Welch. Thank you very much.
First of all, thank you both for the tremendous work you
do, and for all the folks behind you and under you. So thank
you for that. I kind of want to follow up a little bit on
Senator Cotton. There's three issues that have been raised. One
is the selection of who gets protection. You have addressed
that just now. The other is whether it's a budget issue which I
do not think necessarily think it is.
But then there's the operational question. Was this an
operational failure? It appears to me that's where the focus
should be. One of the issues on the operations is the capacity
of people who are part of the team, both Secret Service and
also the local law enforcement. Their capacity to act on what
they see.
This is what Senator Cotton, I think, was talking about
with common sense. You mentioned that the sniper was authorized
immediately to act, he was not checking in with anyone, right,
and he took out the shooter as quickly as he could. But
according to the time line, local law enforcement captured two
photographs of the shooter at 5:10. At 5:32, local law
enforcement officers a spot of suspicious of person who turned
out to be the shooter with a phone and a range finder. And
5:46, the alert was so significant that sniper's text photo of
the shooter from where he was initially spotted to the USSS
lead sniper.
How is it that where you had these experienced law
enforcement people who understood the gravity of the
responsibility of protecting the former president, none of
these actionable observations resulted in action. I will direct
that first to you, Deputy Director Abbate.
Mr. Abbate. Thank you, Senator. From the FBI standpoint, we
are simply collecting the facts. We have interviewed most of
the officers now.
Senator Welch. OK. Acting Director Rowe?
Mr. Rowe. So, in that Senator, I think there was a sense of
this guy is standing out and that's why he came to the
attention of local law enforcement.
Senator Welch. No, I get that. That's my point.
Mr. Rowe. Right.
Senator Welch. He did stand out.
Mr. Rowe. Correct.
Senator Welch. But nothing happened. There were alerts, but
there was, like, you have somebody suspicious, why didn't
somebody go interact with this suspicious person like right
away?
Mr. Rowe. They were attempting to locate him. I cannot
answer that question as to why. If they took a picture of him,
and they thought he was unusual, suspicious, not acting normal,
why there was not--and I think, again, there was probably an
assumption on the part of that officer that took that picture
that, oh, some uniform or somebody will go eventually and, and
walk up to this----
Senator Welch. See, that's what seems like an operational
failure. Somebody else will do it. Is the responsibility of an
officer to alert some other officer that they think somebody
might be suspicious, or the first officer who sees a suspicious
person can take the next step to actually engage that person or
talk to someone very, very close to it and say, engage that
person. This guy was wandering around for quite a while.
Mr. Rowe. He was. I cannot put myself in the mind of that
officer.
Senator Welch. I am not asking you to do that. I am asking,
how does the process work? So that is the job of the leaders as
opposed to the officers? Are they empowered to act immediately
upon the observation of someone who looks very suspicious,
particularly when they have the rangefinder? They were in a
place where it really was not about seeing the rally. It was,
as we see, it was a place where you get a good view of former
president Trump. I mean, that is a leadership issue, right?
Mr. Rowe. Senator, that officer did not work for me. That
was a State and local officer that made that observation, took
that picture. I can tell you from the Secret Service
perspective, and we do this routinely, is that when people come
to our attention, we locate them. We go up, we do a field
interview, or we try to do a consensual encounter.
Senator Welch. OK. That's the operational thing I am
talking about. If you do it within Secret Service, you-all are
in charge. You are relying on local law enforcement assets.
Those folks, and they did their job here, up to a point where
they identified this person passed information along, but
nobody acted. The empowerment to that local officer, I would
think has to come be transmitted through the Secret Service.
Maybe in the earlier briefings, but you know, where you say,
folks, you see somebody suspicious, you engage that suspicious
person.
Mr. Rowe. I don't disagree, Senator. It goes back to my
comments at the beginning of the hearing, that we need to be
very direct to our local law enforcement counterparts so that
they understand exactly what are their expectations.
Senator Welch. I yield back. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Tillis, you recognized
for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TILLIS
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, Mr. Rowe,
thank you for being here.
Mr. Rowe, do you have a picture? I was watching your
testimony earlier. Do you have a photograph of the vantage
point from the Secret Service snipers?
Mr. Rowe. I do. Let's see.
Senator Tillis. There were two. Is that correct?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. Stage left and stage right.
Senator Tillis. OK. I do not know if you have a vantage
point of both of them or not.
Mr. Rowe. That's the vantage point of the sniper who
neutralized the assailant.
Senator Tillis. OK. Would they have also been impaired in
terms of actually seeing him until he popped his head up?
Mr. Rowe. The sniper on the stage's right sides, Senator,
they had an obstructive view because of that tree.
Senator Tillis. They had an obstructive view.
Mr. Rowe. Yes.
Senator Tillis. The one thing, and this discussion that I
do not believe that a sniper saw someone on the roof 20 minutes
before just does not make sense to me. It sounds like the one
who took the shot probably saw him for the first time about a
split second before he pulled the trigger.
Mr. Rowe. That's my assessment, sir.
Senator Tillis. First off, I would like to clarify the
requests that have been made of a lot of people so that we get
the information in a good form. I think it would be helpful at
least all the way back to, I think, November 5, 2022, I
believe, when President Trump announced that he was running for
reelection. I think it would be helpful if we could just get a
matrix of any request for additional security.
The resolution of that request. Was it honored? Was it
denied? Was it downsized? If you could give us that, I think
that that's going to be the best way versus giving us mounds
and mounds of paper. If you can do that, I know you are looking
at the same thing. I have heard from you that any subsequent
request for field requests are being honored. I believe that
that's true. Is that your testimony?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. OK, thank you. I am more worried about the
24 to 30 seconds between the time, I believe, a local law
enforcement officer was hoisted on the shoulders of another
police officer, saw a person armed, less than 200 yards away
from the President, who I believe jumped down. What happened in
those 24 or 30 seconds.
Obviously, there's no such thing as a panic button. The
first thing you would think is you had panic, you cover the
President, get him off stage. None of that happened. What
happened? Is it just that I hear a text message is what
actually happened in the 30 seconds where a law enforcement
officer knew that a gun was pointed in the direction of the
President from a fairly short range.
What actually did those folks who did have knowledge of
exactly what was happening and could probably infer what was
about to happen, what did they do? Mr. Abbate or Mr. Rowe,
either one, based on your interviews.
Mr. Abbate. Thank you, Senator. From the interviews you
know, the officers in the immediate vicinity were operating
with urgency at that point to get to this person. But he was on
the roof. The officer who had looked over the edge, based on
what I have been told, the shooter turned toward him with the
rifle. That's what the officer observed. He was under threat
himself in that second. He had to retreat and step down and get
back to the ground in order to protect himself and keep him
safe from potential rifle fire. But once he got to the ground,
along with other officers, there were Butler County local
officers, Pennsylvania State Police, they were moving around
trying to find to get to this guy.
Senator Tillis. Clearly, we have an operational problem
here, because we had more than 20 seconds to have somehow cut
through all the crap and the communications, whatever
impediments there were have to be removed. First off, I love
law enforcement. I wear the blue pin every day. They do great
work. Secret Service did phenomenal work on the stage, but they
failed because their job is to protect the public, and they
needed to put themselves in harm's way to stop him.
Now, I will let the interviews go through, but there was a
massive failure. There were at least two law enforcement
officers that knew a guy was about to pull the trigger at the
President. I am just not really happy with the fact that we
could not have communicated, covered President Trump, and try
to secure the situation.
I am going to let the investigation go forward. I think
it's very important to point out that we cannot let a scenario
go in the future where 20 seconds can lapse when a law
enforcement officer within two football fields of a former
president of the United States has material knowledge that
somebody's about to get shot at on stage and we do not have
instantaneous response. In the old days, maybe you would just
shoot a gun in the air. I know for a lot of reasons why they
did not do that, but there had to be some way to actually
diffuse that situation. It did not happen on July the 13th.
I just want to end by saying, Mr. Rowe, I think you have
been forthcoming in your answers. I know you are frustrated. I
have seen you twice now. You are clearly embarrassed by what
happened. You do not think there's any reasonable explanation.
To my colleagues who are worried about communications, they
should spend times in their local government and State
legislatures to understand just how bad communication is
between law enforcement and first responders. We need to invest
in this infrastructure that was also a part of the failure.
But if you can please get to me and get to this Committee,
a chronology of requests, accepted, denied, and the reasons
for, I think that's going to be very helpful.
Mr. Rowe. I will, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Senator Blackburn, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLACKBURN
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to each
of you for your patience and for being here today.
Director Rowe, I want to come to you first because a
counter sniper has decided to speak out about the culture at
your agency. I think it is very telling. He sent an email, and
I am going to quote from that. ``This agency needs to change,
and if not now, when the next assassination in 30 days.''
But here's what I want to talk with you about, because in
this email, he says, and I am quoting again, ``The motto of the
USSS is CYA, and every supervisor is doing it.'' Now, that's
the end of his quote. You are the guy in charge, and you are
one of those supervisors. You have been a career guy there at
the Secret Service. The public has lost trust in the ability to
execute the mission to protect. I want to know how you feel
about the fact that employees in your agency are worried about
covering their behind and not worried about protecting a former
president.
Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. I am hurt by that email, but
not in the way you think I am saying it. I am hurt because my
people are hurting right now. We need them.
Senator Blackburn. Then why did somebody delete the email?
Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you on that, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. The agency deleted the email.
Mr. Rowe. But may I address your question?
Senator Blackburn. Yes, please.
Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you as to whether the email
was deleted or not. My agency is hurting. Emotions are raw. I
actually want to hear more from that duty officer. That
technician in his email, he referenced that he had spent time
serving our nation as a United States Marine. That he is a 20-
year professional of the Secret Service. I am committed to
being a change agent. Meaning, I am committed to reviewing some
of these things. I looked at the points in his email very
quickly. I saw it as I was on my way over here this morning. I
want to have further conversations, not only with him, but also
the counter sniper supervisor----
Senator Blackburn. If I may step back in, sir?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. All right. You want to talk with him?
What about other whistleblowers? What about this culture? Are
you going to allow these whistleblowers to speak out? Because
it is troublesome if somebody went into the server and deleted
that email, and I would hope you will get to the bottom of that
and be able to provide some answers. Because this is, as you
have heard from both sides, this is a situation that cannot be
allowed to happen again.
Mr. Rowe. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. Ever Mr. Abbate, and am I saying your
name properly? We have heard it pronounced three different ways
today in the hearing.
Mr. Abbate. Abbate, Senator
Senator Blackburn. Abbate?
Mr. Abbate. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Blackburn. You had mentioned a social media account
that espoused anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic views, but you did
not say what platform that was on and what the username was.
This is Crooks that we are discussing.
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. That's Crooks. I did not want to
comment on it because we have not fully confirmed yet, and I
thought that--as soon as we confirm and certify that----
Senator Blackburn. Would you provide that?
Mr. Abbate. I will provide it to you.
Senator Blackburn. That, and also the age at which he had
those feelings. Then we understand that the Gab account is pro-
immigration, pro-lockdown, leftist views. Is that accurate?
Mr. Abbate. I have not seen it directly, but I believe from
what I have been told, that is accurate. With the Gab account,
though that's been publicly revealed through the CIO and other
things, we are still working to certify and verify that that's
his account also. But it does have differing points of view it
would appear.
Senator Blackburn. OK. What age and how fresh is that Gab
account?
Mr. Abbate. The Gab account, based on my recollection, the
comments in there or the messaging is from about 2021, I
believe.
Senator Blackburn. OK. The other preceded that, maybe he
was age 14?
Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. The other account that we talked
about was in the 2019, 2020 timeframe. It would have been in
the couple years right before the Gab----
Senator Blackburn. Right before that.
Mr. Abbate. Yes.
Senator Blackburn. Are there other accounts that you-all
are currently verifying and receiving information from?
Mr. Abbate. As I mentioned, we have issued a bunch of legal
processes and we are still awaiting returns from a number of
the companies to include other social media companies as well.
Senator Blackburn. OK. My time has expired. Thank you for
your patience today. Thank you for the information. We look
forward to getting more information. Director Rowe, we are
going to hold you to being a change agent because things at the
Secret Service absolutely have to change. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses
for your testimony here today. Certainly, what happened on July
13th, could and should have been prevented from what I have
heard today. I am certainly grateful to our witnesses for their
candid answers and for helping to provide additional clarity
and new information about the circumstances surrounding this
attack.
Acting Director Rowe, some of what you have said today
conflicts with information and accounts that we have received
from local law enforcement that we have had the opportunity to
talk with. They have been voluntarily and I will say
expeditiously cooperating with our bipartisan investigation,
which we certainly appreciate.
But we now need to speak with Secret Service agents
directly who are directly involved. I would say that you need
to make them available as soon as possible. Those, those
interviews cannot start weeks from now or months from now. Time
is of the essence when memories are fresh, and you can get the
information that is most important to us.
My question for you as we wrap up this hearing, acting
Director Rowe, will you commit to having those agents available
for this Committee to interview as soon as possible in a matter
of days, not weeks, matter of days?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Peters. Great. Thank you.
Certainly, the American people deserve to know what went
wrong, and they deserve accountability for those security
failures. As we continue our bipartisan investigation into
security failures that day and any underlying systemic issues,
we will continue working to follow the facts, get clear
answers, and make important recommendations to ensure that a
security failure like this never happens again.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 5
p.m. on August 14, 2024, for the submission of statements and
for the questions for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Peters. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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