    [Senate Hearing 118-]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hr. 118-379

                      EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
                    LEADING TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON
                             FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                             HOMELAND SECURITY AND
                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                                    and the

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                   __________

                                 JULY 30, 2024
                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    56-406 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2026

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chair
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MITT ROMNEY, Utah
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    LAPHONZA BUTLER, California          ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas

                       David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                          Alan S. Kahn, Chief Counsel
             Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
                   Claudine J. Brenner, Deputy Chief Counsel
               Megan Petry Edgette, Senior Investigative Counsel
                     Kevin G. McAloon, Senior Investigator
               William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
                  Christina N. Salazar, Minority Chief Counsel
              Kendal B. Tigner, Minority Professional Staff Member
              Megan M. Krynen, Minority Professional Staff Member
                James P. Stephens, Minority Special Investigator
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                       RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chair
    SHELDON WHITEHOUSE Rhode Island      LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina,
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota               Ranking Member
    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           TED CRUZ, Texas
    ALEX PADILLA, California             JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
    LAPHONZA R. BUTLER, California       THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
                                         MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
                 Joseph Zogby, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
          Katherine Nikas, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Peters...............................................     1
        Senator Paul.................................................     3
        Senator Durbin...............................................     4
        Senator Graham...............................................     5
        Senator Klobuchar............................................    18
        Senator Carper...............................................    20
        Senator Grassley.............................................    22
        Senator Johnson..............................................    23
        Senator Butler...............................................    25
        Senator Hassan...............................................    27
        Senator Cornyn...............................................    29
        Senator Scott................................................    31
        Senator Blumenthal...........................................    33
        Senator Ossoff...............................................    34
        Senator Lee..................................................    36
        Senator Hawley...............................................    39
        Senator Cruz.................................................    42
        Senator Marshall.............................................    46
        Senator Hirono...............................................    48
        Senator Lankford.............................................    49
        Senator Kennedy..............................................    51
        Senator Rosen................................................    53
        Senator Cotton...............................................    55
        Senator Welch................................................    57
        Senator Tillis...............................................    59
        Senator Blackburn............................................    61
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Peters...............................................    65

                                    WITNESS

                            THURSDAY, JULY 11, 2024

    Ronald L. Rowe Jr., Acting Director, United States Secret
      Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..................     6
    Paul Abbate, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
      U.S. Department of Justice.....................................     8

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Abbate, Paul:
        Testimony....................................................     8
    Rowe, Ronald L. Jr.:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement with attachments..........................    67

                                    APPENDIX

    Senator Cruz chart...............................................    79
    Senator Grassley's letters.......................................    80
    Senator Johnson's timeline of events.............................   104
    Senator Johnson's letter.........................................   108
    Senator Johnson's preliminary findings...........................   113
    Senator Johnson's continued preliminary findings.................   126
    Senator Scott's letter...........................................   127
    Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
        Mr. Rowe.....................................................   131
        Mr. Abbate...................................................   165

                      EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY FAILURES
                      LEADING TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
                           ON FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024

                                 U.S. Senate,
                       Committee on Homeland Security
                              and Governmental Affairs,
                                and the Committee on Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Garry Peters, and
    Hon. Richard Durbin, Chairmen of the Committees, presiding.
        Present: Senators Peters [presiding], Carper, Hassan,
    Rosen, Blumenthal, Ossoff, Butler, Paul, Johnson, Lankford,
    Scott, Hawley, and Marshall.
        And present: Senators Durbin [presiding], Klobuchar,
    Hirono, Padilla, Welch, Graham, Grassley, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz,
    Cotton, Kennedy, Tillis, and Blackburn.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS\1\

        Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
    Appendix on page 65.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Just over two weeks ago, a gunman fired shots at former
    president Donald Trump. This assassination attempt wounded the
    former president and caused the death of Corey Comperatore; a
    husband, father of two, and former fire chief who was attending
    the rally with his family. David Dutch and James Copenhaver
    were also attending the rally and were also injured in the
    attack.
        Let me be clear. This was an attack on our democracy.
    Americans should be able to attend a political rally and
    express their political beliefs without fear of violence, and
    political candidates for our nation's highest office should be
    confident that their safety will never be compromised for their
    service. Although we are still learning about the shooter's
    motive, this attack was a shocking reminder that the threat of
    political violence is alive and well in our country.
        By all accounts, this was an inexcusable security and
    planning failure, and we need to get all of the facts about
    what happened that day, and how we can ensure an attack like
    this is never allowed to happen again. Today's panel of
    witnesses leads the men and women who protect our top leaders
    and are investigating this crime, and I want to thank them both
    for being here today, as well as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
    and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a very
    productive and informative briefing with our Committees last
    week.
        Today, our witnesses will help us begin to answer critical
    questions, and get the information that we need to implement
    reforms that are clearly needed to strengthen security
    protocols for the U.S. Secret Service and the people who
    receive their protection.
        The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
    (HSGAC) has already begun that work. This discussion comes in
    the midst of a bipartisan investigation that Senator Paul and I
    launched shortly after the assassination attempt took place.
    Our teams are still collecting critical information, speaking
    to law enforcement, and piercing together the details of this
    event.
        This past weekend, a bipartisan team of our investigators,
    along with key staff from Senators Blumenthal and Senator
    Johnson's offices, traveled to Pennsylvania to speak with local
    law enforcement officials, review critical information from
    security officials who were working alongside the Secret
    Service, and to see the site firsthand.
        I want to thank the incredibly brave local law enforcement
    officers in and around Butler County who responded that
    afternoon and who met with my staff this past weekend. They
    have helped to answer tough questions, as well as discuss in
    detail how the event actually unfolded. I also want to thank
    the owners of Butler Farm Show and the American Glass Research
    for allowing my staff and law enforcement to walk the grounds
    and examine the roof of the building the gunman was able to
    assess. We greatly appreciate your assistance.
        I have also requested documents along with Senators Paul,
    Blumenthal, and Johnson, related to security preparations,
    intelligence gathering on potential violence prior to the
    attack, and detailed explanations of the security response from
    Federal, State, and local authorities. As part of our ongoing
    investigation, we also seek to speak with additional Federal
    law enforcement personnel, including Secret Service agents who
    were responsible for securing the event.
        Today's hearing is an important opportunity to ask critical
    questions, and to begin to give the American people the
    transparency and the answers that they certainly deserve. There
    are still many unanswered questions. We need additional
    information about the Secret Service's advanced planning
    efforts, the decisions surrounding sniper and counter-sniper
    team use, placement, and coordination. We also need answers
    about what appears to be a problematic communication system
    that limited efforts to relay information and respond to events
    as they unfolded real time.
        While today is focused on asking difficult questions about
    what went wrong, I also want to thank the men and women of the
    Secret Service, who in an instant will, lay their lives on the
    line to protect our nation's leaders. They have incredibly
    challenging jobs, and they must continue their mission no
    matter what our hearing and investigation reveals.
        I am also grateful to our Senate Judiciary Committee
    colleagues for joining us in this important discussion, given
    their key role in oversight of both of the agencies represented
    before us today. It is very clear that the U.S. Senate is
    focused on a productive conversation that will generate real
    answers and real reforms. I appreciate all the work from
    Members of both of our Committees to help us achieve this
    absolutely essential goal.
        I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Paul for his
    opening remarks.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL

        Senator Paul. Eighteen days ago, a would-be assassin
    managed to climb onto a roof 400 feet from the stage where the
    former president and leading Presidential candidate Donald
    Trump was speaking. The assassin's bullet struck President
    Trump nearly missing a fatal blow thanks to a last-minute head
    turn. Tragically, not everyone was so fortunate. A beloved
    husband and father in the audience was killed, his life stolen
    in an instant. Two others remain seriously injured. Their
    futures uncertain.
        The lives of law enforcement officers working the event and
    those in the audience have been forever changed. Yet, the media
    has shamefully moved on to other stories, and Google has been
    caught trying to suppress iconic images of a bloody Donald
    Trump, images showcasing the resolve of our nation in the face
    of the attack.
        But the American people have not forgotten, and we will not
    forget. There is no question that this was a monumental failure
    by the Secret Service. They had one job, and they failed. We
    know that. What remains unclear is who specifically failed, how
    they failed, and what must be done to ensure that something
    like this never happens again. America deserves to know that
    those responsible for this failure are frankly not going to be
    in charge of securing the upcoming Democratic National
    Convention (DNC). We need to know that someone's been placed on
    suspension, that someone won't be in charge of the next Donald
    Trump rally.
        Now, I was encouraged to hear that the acting Director
    Rowe, has initiated a disciplinary investigation in addition to
    the ongoing Secret Service policy review. This is an important
    step. However, real accountability will require a comprehensive
    examination of all the facts, which still remain unclear.
        This past Friday, my investigative team went to
    Pennsylvania to meet with local law enforcement and document
    the scene. One of the concerning things my team was told is
    that no one from Secret Service has talked to them since the
    shooting. I do not know how an investigation into what failed
    can be conducted without talking to the officers and agencies
    who were relied upon to do much of the work.
        Many questions remain unanswered about the planning and
    performance of the security for July 13th. While a host of
    errors led to this security disaster, we now know local
    enforcement officers were suspicious of the shooter 90 minutes
    in advance of the shooting.
        There are two glaring issues we need to focus on. First,
    why were the American Glass Research (AGR) grounds and the roof
    left unattended? Why was the AGR building, the shooter's perch,
    left outside the perimeter? Local law enforcement told my staff
    that they specifically flagged the vulnerability of the
    building to the Secret Service and were told that it would be
    taken care of. Clearly, these vulnerabilities were not
    addressed. Second, why was Donald Trump allowed to take the
    stage and why was he not removed from the stage when a
    suspicious individual was taking increasingly suspicious
    activities?
        Over 20 minutes before President Trump began his speech,
    the Secret Service Command Center had been made aware of an
    individual with a rangefinder. At least 10 minutes before it
    was confirmed, the Secret Service's Counter Sniper Team had
    been made aware of the suspicious subject, and provided a
    photograph and a detailed description. Why was the event not
    delayed until the individual was found and checked out?
        Interviews with local law enforcement paint a different
    picture in critical places from what we have been told by the
    Secret Service in other briefings. Now we need to hear from the
    Secret Service agents responsible for security that day. Our
    Committee has formally requested interviews with those agents,
    but we have not yet been allowed to speak to them. I expect
    Director Rowe today to tell us when we will be allowed to talk
    to these people.
        Finally, let me close with this. Grave mistakes were made
    on July 13th, but that does not take away from the bravery of
    dozens of Federal, State, and local officers that day. We are
    grateful for their sacrifices and professionalism. They deserve
    the truth. Now, also, it is our duty and our utmost
    responsibility to ensure that we learn from this failure and
    hold those responsible accountable.
        Chairman Peters. I would now like to recognize Chairman
    Durbin of the Senate Judiciary Committee for his opening
    remarks.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

        Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        This is a rare joint meeting of the two committees, but we
    have matching jurisdiction, and I think it's the most efficient
    way to get to the truth. So, thank you for letting us join you
    today.
        We have all seen the movies. We have read the books; the
    international assassin with sophisticated technology, elaborate
    plans, well-honed skills, sets out to kill a leading political
    figure in the United States. But how does that match the
    reality of what happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, when a 20-
    year-old, introverted college student outsmarted one of the
    most sophisticated American law enforcement agencies in
    history, came within an inch of killing a former president of
    the United States?
        That's why we are gathered today to ask these hard
    questions. There's more to this story than other aspects that
    we ought to consider as well. We cannot lose sight of the
    factor that contributes to the violence on July 13th.
    Widespread, easy access to AR-15 military-style rifles. While
    we rely on the Secret Service to protect elected officials, we
    must acknowledge the unique challenges they face in light of
    the proliferation of weapons of war on our street.
        Pennsylvania, like many States, allows individuals to
    openly carry a loaded rifle without a permit. To make matters
    worse, assault rifles can easily be purchased from unlicensed
    dealers without a background check because of dangerous
    loopholes on our gun laws. The same kind of firearm has been
    used to carry out mass shootings in Newtown, Uvalde, Las Vegas,
    and Highland Park, Illinois, killing dozens of children and
    adults, and injuring many more.
        Looking across this dais, I recognize we have our
    differences on many issues, but when it comes to the protection
    of the President and the Presidential candidates, we should
    stand united. We know that protecting our elected officials is
    essential to a functioning democracy. I hope this hearing can
    be an example of how we will work together on a bipartisan
    basis, to not only understand this shocking event, but to
    ensure it never happens again. We must do this with or without
    the incendiary language and conspiracy mongering, that too
    often dominates our political discourse today.
        Ongoing investigations by the Secret Service and the FBI
    are critical. But Congress, the victim's families, and the
    American people, deserve transparency and accountability now.
        I will now turn to my partner on the Judiciary Committee,
    Ranking Member Lindsey Graham.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM

        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Several of us are from the military and have a military
    background. If this happened in the military, a lot of people
    would be fired. If a lot of people are not fired, the system
    failed yet again. Having said that, the people who are brave
    and jumped on the stage to protect the President need to be
    applauded. We need to learn what happened, make corrective
    action, but somebody's got to be fired. Nothing's going to
    change until somebody loses their job. Thank you.
        Chairman Peters. It's the practice of the Homeland Security
    and Governmental Affairs Committee to swear in witnesses. If
    our two witnesses could please stand and raise your right hand.
    Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this
    Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you, God?
        Mr. Rowe. I do.
        Mr. Abbate. I do.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you. You may be seated.
        Our first witness is Ronald Rowe, Jr. Mr. Rowe is currently
    the Acting Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior
    to this role, Acting Director Rowe was the 23rd Deputy Director
    of the Secret Service. He has had a distinguished 25-year
    career in the Secret Service, from coordinating major security
    operations, to collaborating with other government and law
    enforcement agencies.
        Additionally, he has served as the Chief of Staff to the
    Director as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of
    Protective Operations, and as Deputy Assistant Director for the
    Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs.
        Mr. Director, thank you for appearing before this Committee
    today. You are now recognized for your opening statement.

      TESTIMONY OF RONALD L. ROWE JR.,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED
      STATES SECRET SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Rowe. Good morning, Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking
    Member Paul, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished Members
    of the Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement with attachments from Mr. Rowe appears
    in the Appendix on page 67.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A critical part of the Secret Service Mission is protecting
    our nation's current and former government leaders. The
    attempted assassination of former president Donald J. Trump on
    Saturday, July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a failure
    on multiple levels.
        I join you and all Americans in condemning the horrific
    assault on former president Trump, Corey Comperatore, James
    Copenhaver, and David Dutch. I extend my deepest sympathies to
    the Comperatore family, and my sincere wishes for Mr.
    Copenhaver and Mr. Dutch's continued recovery.
        Before I begin, though, I want to commend the heroic
    actions of the men and women of the United States Secret
    Service on July 13th. Our special agents shielded the former
    president with their bodies while shots were still being fired,
    selflessly, willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without
    hesitation.
        I am extremely proud of these actions and those taken by
    the counter sniper team to neutralize the threat that prevented
    further loss of life, and I applaud the actions of our tactical
    teams that responded so quickly. I would also like to express
    my gratitude to our Federal, State, and local partners. We rely
    on these critical relationships which have developed over
    decades of daily collaboration to secure protective events and
    conduct criminal investigations.
        As you are aware, there are multiple ongoing investigations
    of the attack and the security failures that occurred that day.
    I pledge my full support to those inquiries so the Secret
    Service, your committees, and the American people have a
    thorough and complete understanding of what happened leading up
    to and during July 13th. I will not wait for the results of
    those findings to assess where we failed that day. I have taken
    and will continue to take immediate steps to ensure we do not
    repeat those failures.
        Since my appointment as the Acting Director one week ago, I
    identified gaps in our security on July 13th and have
    implemented corrective actions. One of my first actions as
    acting director was traveling to the Butler Farm Show site to
    better understand how our protection failed. I went to the roof
    of the AGR building where the assailant fired shots, and I laid
    in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. What I saw
    made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer, and a 25-
    year veteran with this Secret Service, I cannot defend why that
    roof was not better secured.
        To prevent similar lapses from occurring in the future, I
    directed our personnel to ensure every event site security plan
    is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before
    it is implemented. It is clear to me that other protective
    enhancements could have strengthened our security at the Butler
    event.
        As such, I have directed the expanded use of unmanned
    aerial systems (UAS) at protective sites to help detect threats
    on roofs and other elevated threats. I have also directed
    resources to facilitate our protective site communications,
    particularly our communications with our State and local
    partners. In addition, I have instructed the asset requests for
    Secret Service Protective details to be approved expeditiously
    and afforded the maximum use of requested personnel at
    protective sites to address this heightened security
    environment.
        I have heard your calls for accountability, and I take them
    very seriously. Given the magnitude of this failure, the Secret
    Services Office of Professional Responsibility is reviewing the
    actions and decisionmaking of Secret Service personnel in the
    lead-up to and on the day of the attack. If this investigation
    reveals that Secret Service employees violated agency
    protocols, those employees will be held accountable to our
    disciplinary process.
        With respect to congressional investigations and request
    for information, I instructed my staff to provide full
    cooperation and respond expeditiously on a continuing basis to
    ensure you have the information you need to conduct your
    critical oversight.
        In my testimony before you today, I will provide details on
    the Secret Services advance security planning for the Butler
    Farm Show site, facts as we know them regarding the incident
    itself, known breakdowns in executing the security plan, and
    corrective actions that the agency is taking to ensure that
    nothing like this happens again.
        But I do not believe that inadequate time to plan for this
    event was a factor in the failure. As you saw in my written
    statement, I am prepared to provide an overview of the security
    planning leading up to and during the July 13th attack.
    However, I would like to point out that based on what I know
    right now, neither the Secret Service counter sniper teams nor
    members of the former president's security detail had any
    knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building
    with a firearm.
        It is my understanding those personnel were not aware the
    assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. Prior to
    that, they were operating with the knowledge that local law
    enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual
    prior to the shots being fired. I regret that information was
    not passed to Congress and the public sooner with greater
    frequency. I fear this lack of information has given rise to
    multiple false and dangerous conspiracy theories about what
    took place that day. I want to debunk these theories.
        Let me address one conspiracy directly. The Secret Service
    counter sniper neutralized the assailant within seconds after
    the assailant fired his weapon. That counter sniper had full
    discretion to use deadly force to stop an attacker and did not
    need to seek authorization to fire. I am immensely proud of the
    selfless dedication of our employees to the mission. Every day,
    across the globe, the men and women answer the call to protect
    our nation's leaders, and the standard is no fail for a reason.
        During our current high operational tempo, I want and I
    need to ensure that the Secret Service workforce are uplifted
    so they can focus on carrying out the mission. They have my
    full support, and I am confident in their abilities to ensure
    the safety and security of the people we protect. They are
    worthy of trusting confidence and they deserve your support as
    well as the support of the American people.
        Chair Peters, Chair Durbin, Ranking Member Paul, Ranking
    Member Graham, and Members of the Committees, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify at this joint hearing. I will submit the
    remainder of my statement for the record, and I will answer
    your questions.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Rowe.
        Our second witness is Paul Abbate. Mr. Abbate is the Deputy
    Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the
    Department of Justice (DOJ). In this role, Deputy Director
    Abbate oversees all FBI domestic and international
    investigative and intelligence activities.
        Prior to his appointment as deputy director, he has had a
    distinguished three decades within the FBI leading counter-
    terrorism efforts, and most recently, as the Associate Deputy
    Director of the FBI, where he is responsible for the management
    of all FBI personnel, budget, administration, as well as
    infrastructure.
        Mr. Abbate, thank you for appearing before the Committee
    here today. You are recognized for your opening remarks.

     TESTIMONY OF PAUL ABBATE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
               INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Abbate. Thank you, sir.
        Good morning, Chair Peters and Chair Durbin, Ranking
    Members, Paul and Graham, and distinguished Members of the
    Committee. It is a privilege to appear before you today to
    discuss the FBI's investigation of the attempted assassination
    of former president Trump on July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania.
        Before going further, I want to again offer my and our
    condolences to the victims of this heinous attack to the family
    and loved ones of heroic firefighter and father, Corey
    Comperatore, to Mr. Dutch, to Mr. Copenhaver, who continued to
    recover, and to former president Trump, who was also struck by
    a bullet fired from the shooter's rifle. Our thoughts and
    prayers are with each of them, and their families, and loved
    ones.
        Within minutes of the attack, the FBI field office in
    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania received notification of the
    assassination attempt and responded to the scene immediately
    with a surge of resources, quickly moving forward on the
    investigation. From the outset, the FBI has been investigating
    this attack as an assassination attempt and an act of domestic
    terrorism. Our team continues to conduct a full, thorough, and
    objective investigation, and will continue to follow all leads
    and avenues of investigation to logical conclusion, leaving no
    stone unturned.
        While it's not typical to provide details of an ongoing
    investigation, this, as we all know, is an extraordinarily
    tragic set of circumstances of the utmost national importance,
    making it essential to inform the American public and Congress
    what is known right now with full transparency. The
    investigation remains focused, of course, on determining
    motive, identifying any potential co-conspirators, or others
    with knowledge of the attack, and building out a timeline of
    shooter Thomas Crook's actions in advance of and during the
    attack.
        Thus far, though, absolutely nothing has been ruled out,
    the investigation has not identified a motive, nor any co-
    conspirators, or others with advanced knowledge. To date, the
    FBI team has conducted more than 460 interviews, executed
    search warrants, including at the shooter's residence, and
    seized electronic media to include phones, laptops, hard
    drives, and thumb drives.
        Legal process has been issued to dozens of companies, and
    we have received more than 2,000 tips from the public. The full
    resources of the FBI have been brought to bear in furtherance
    of the investigation. Agents, analysts, professional staff,
    experts, I have personally visited the site of this horrific
    attack and seen firsthand the work of FBI Pittsburgh and our
    partners on the frontline, and want to thank all involved for
    their ongoing tireless efforts to get the answers that we need
    and to deliver justice.
        Specialized resources deployed included evidence response
    teams, victim services specialists, laboratory, and operational
    technology division resources, to process physical and digital
    evidence, a shooting reconstruction team. Additionally, our
    explosive experts have analyzed the three improvised explosive
    device (IEDs) covered, two from the shooter's vehicle, one from
    the family residence, and our behavioral analysis unit,
    importantly is helping to build a profile of the shooter to
    include his mental state.
        Next, I want to provide a brief highlighted overview of the
    timeline that has been established to date through witness
    interviews and other information. Again, this is our
    understanding at present and is subject to change and further
    refinement as more facts are collected.
        On July 3rd, the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania was
    announced. On July 6th, the shooter registered to attend the
    rally and performed a search for ``how far was Oswald from
    Kennedy.'' On July 7th, the shooter traveled from his home to
    the Butler Farm Show grounds and remained there for
    approximately 20 minutes. We assessed this show's advanced
    planning and reconnaissance on his part.
        On July 12th, the shooter traveled from his home to the
    Clairton Sportsman Club where he practiced shooting. On the
    morning of July 13th. At approximately 10 a.m., the shooter
    returned to the farm show grounds and remained there for about
    70 minutes before returning home again. At approximately 1:30
    p.m., while at the residence, the shooter's father gave him a
    rifle for the purpose, he believed, of going back to the
    sportsman club.
        About 25 minutes later, the shooter, purchased ammunition
    while in route to the Butler Farm Show grounds. The subject
    then arrived at the scene, was moving around the farm show
    grounds close to the American Glass Research building from
    which he ultimately committed the attack.
        Shortly thereafter, at approximately 3:51 p.m., the shooter
    flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the farm show grounds
    for about 11 minutes. The drone and controller were later found
    in the subject's car. Analysis has not revealed any photos or
    video taken by the drone, but we can confirm that he was live
    streaming at the time, and would have been able to view it on
    his controller.
        The first reported citing the shooter by local law
    enforcement was at approximately 4:26 p.m. At approximately
    5:10 p.m., the shooter was again identified by local law
    enforcement as a suspicious person around the AGR building. At
    approximately 5:14 p.m., a local special weapons and tactics
    (SWAT) operator took a photo of the shooter.
        At about 5:32 p.m., local SWAT observed the shooter next to
    the AGR building using his phone browsing news sites, and with
    a range finder. At approximately 5:38 p.m., the photo of the
    shooter taken earlier was sent to local SWAT operators in a
    text message group. Subsequently, approximately 25 minutes
    prior to the shooting, the U.S. Secret Service command post was
    notified of a suspicious person.
        Officers lost sight of the subject from approximately 6:02
    p.m. to 6:08 p.m., but continued to communicate with each other
    in an attempt to locate him. Recently discovered video from a
    local business shows the shooter pulling himself up onto the
    AGR building rooftop at approximately 6:06 p.m. And
    approximately 6:08 p.m., the subject was observed on the roof
    by local law enforcement.
        At approximately 6:11 p.m., a local police officer was
    lifted to the roof by another officer, saw the shooter, and
    radioed that he was armed with a long gun. Within approximately
    the next 30 seconds, the shots were fired. The evidence
    recovery team found eight shell casings at the scene next to
    the shooter's body. We believe that the shooter fired eight
    rounds.
        While the investigation has not determined motive, the
    investigative team continues to review information from legal
    returns, including online and social media accounts. Something
    just very recently uncovered that I want to share is a social
    media account, which is believed to be associated with this
    with the shooter in about the 2019-2020 timeframe. There were
    over 700 comments posted from this account. Some of these
    comments, if ultimately attributable to the shooter, appear to
    reflect anti-Semitic, and anti-immigration themes to espouse
    political violence, and are described as extreme in nature.
        While the investigative team is still working to verify
    this account to determine if it did in fact belong to the
    shooter, we believe it important to share and note it today,
    particularly, given the general absence of other information to
    date from social media and other sources of information that
    reflect on the shooter's potential motive and mindset.
        These are the facts, in part, that the investigation has
    revealed to date. While the shooter is dead, our work is very
    much ongoing and urgent.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering any and all
    questions.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Abbate.
        We will, now proceed. Chair Durbin and Ranking Member
    Graham will ask the first two questions. I will then ask
    question with Ranking Member Paul. Then after that, we will
    alternate between Members of the Judiciary recognized by Chair
    Durbin and Members of the Homeland Security Committee
    recognized by me.
        With that, Senator Durbin, you are recognized for your
    questions.
        Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        I would like to begin by making a statement that it's not
    in the form of a question, and you will understand why when I
    say it. In 20 days, we are going to start the Democratic
    National Convention in Chicago. I have been briefed by the law
    enforcement agencies plans for security for that event. Tens of
    thousands of people will be there, including some of the
    highest-ranking politicians in the United States. I trust that
    both of your agencies can answer in the affirmative if I ask
    you whether you are actively engaged in working with the
    development of security plan, taking into consideration the
    lessons of July 13th.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that is 100 percent yes from the Secret
    Service,
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, from the FBI as well, Senator. We have
    been working on this for well over a year in preparation.
        Chairman Durbin. I am not going to ask for details for
    obvious reasons, but I do want to ask a question about the
    Secret Service staffing. Congress has nearly doubled the budget
    for the Secret Service over the last 10 years, from $1.8
    billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 to $3 billion in Fiscal Year
    2024. Despite this large increase in funding, the number of
    agents in product protective operations has fallen from 4,027
    to 3,671 during that same time period, an approximate nine
    percent reduction.
        Acting Director Rowe, what accounts for protective
    operations losing 356 agents over the past 10 years?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator with respect to where we are today on
    staffing, and then I will address the 10 year point of where we
    were. In this year alone, we are going to end the year on the
    positive of 200-plus agents. That's the first time in a number
    of years that we have been able to do that. Part of that was
    gaining some efficiencies in our hiring process.
        But what I want to re-emphasize is we have not dropped
    standards. Only two percent of every applicant actually makes
    it through the hiring process. We are filling our classes at
    the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). We are
    doing this ramp up as part of what lies ahead of us with the
    Los Angeles (LA) Olympics in 2028.
        With respect to what has happened in years prior. This is a
    difficult and challenging job being a Secret Service agent,
    living your life by somebody else's schedule, constantly away
    from your family, constantly having to meet increased
    operational and investigative demands, which we gladly do. But
    it's not for everyone.
        I think there are times where people have to make tough
    choices and they decide to leave the agency, but that does not
    mean that they were any less of an agent or that they were not
    committed to the mission because we are all committed to being
    Patriots and serving our country and protecting our nation's
    highest leaders.
        I think there was a variety of factors. Some of it was the
    pandemic, some of it was the economy, or other opportunities.
    We have people that are very skilled in cyber that often leave
    the job. Some of the protective skills that they acquire are
    also in demand in the private sector. But some of the
    mechanisms that we have put in place just in the last year is
    also retaining our workforce, and that's what we are focused on
    right now.
        Chairman Durbin. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    has determined that restaffing from these losses have been
    slowed due to a number of factors, including the years-long
    background checks for prospective agents and the assignments
    agents must work through before being assigned to protection.
    Given these constraints, what steps have you taken to improve
    recruitment?
        Mr. Rowe. We are actually putting out targeted recruitment
    opportunities. We have just recently put it out for within our
    uniformed division for our counter sniper unit, our hazardous
    agent medical emergency response unit, our counter assault team
    on the special agent side. We are actually trying to gather the
    best and the brightest.
        I will tell you that we are having great success with a lot
    of these vacancies. But what I want to reiterate is that, for
    example, on the counter assault vacancy, we had 700 applicants
    that applied for this. Really, what we will glean after they
    make it through the process and they have to be able to hold a
    top secret sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI)
    clearance, if we realize 15 out of that tranche, that's a two
    percent pass rate. It is very competitive, and we are trying to
    make sure that we are getting the best and the brightest
    without dropping standards.
        Chairman Durbin. One last question for either one of you.
    What is the purpose of a range finder? Once this assassin was
    identified as using a range finder, wasn't that proof positive
    that he was a dangerous individual?
        Mr. Rowe. I will say, Senator, that obviously somebody is
    trying to determine where they are in proximity to a location,
    a fixed location. I will defer to my colleague here, but I
    believe it was a recreation-or sports-related. I thought I had
    read that it was a golf range finder. Nonetheless, it still
    would have provided him the ability to provide the distance
    that he was away from his intended target.
        Chairman Durbin. Wasn't that enough?
        Mr. Rowe. As far as raising suspicion? Yes. I think he was
    identified as being suspicious by local law enforcement.
        Chairman Durbin. And nothing happened.
        Mr. Rowe. I know that local law enforcement was attempting
    to locate him.
        Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you. Member Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you. Let's go back to the resources.
    Do you need more money?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, listen, there isn't a single branch, a
    single agency in the Executive Branch that does not need more
    money. Everyone would take more resources. We have had a great
    relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
    the Office Management and Budget (OMB)----
        Senator Graham. Do you feel constrained? Do you feel
    constrained to ask for more resources by anybody?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. We don't. Actually, we have a great
    relationship with our appropriators, and obviously, the
    authorizing committees. They have always looked out for the
    Secret Service.
        Senator Graham. I would encourage you to think big when it
    comes to resourcing the department in light of what happened
    here. At the time of the shooting, the Iranians were
    threatening high level American officials, including President
    Trump. Right?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, it's widely known----
        Senator Graham. I am right, FBI?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. That's 100 percent correct.
        Senator Graham. Did that factor into the security
    footprint?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will say is that it is widely
    known that the Iranians do not like us. I refer you to the
    National Security----
        Senator Graham. It's not that they do not like us. They
    threaten to kill certain people, and they named them.
        Mr. Rowe. Correct, sir, but I cannot publicly comment.
        Senator Graham. It's not like, I hate America. I am going
    to kill these three guys. Right.
        Mr. Rowe. I cannot publicly comment, sir.
        Senator Graham. They publicly comment on it.
        Mr. Rowe. But Senator, what I am trying to say is I cannot
    publicly comment on what intelligence, but I can assure you
    that we do a threat-based protective model.
        Senator Graham. I would like to have that model provided to
    the Committee. Could you do that?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Could you also give us the protocols that
    are in place to secure a site like this?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. OK. Thank you. One, the protective detail
    around President Trump, I know them all very well, they are
    brave men and women. These questions are not to belittle
    anybody, they are trying to find out how the system failed so
    badly. You say you are not reluctant to ask for more money.
    What do we need to do to make it easier to hire people without
    lowering our standards? I know it's a hard job. Can we do
    anything to help you?
        Mr. Rowe. I think we are willing to take that back, sir. I
    think we are working on our time to hire.
        Senator Graham. Well, if you had more people, you would
    have more time off.
        Mr. Rowe. That's true, sir.
        Senator Graham. OK. Let's get more people more time off.
    These are tough jobs. I mean, people on this Committee know
    that.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, they are.
        Senator Graham. I don't know how they hold a family
    together doing what they are doing. It's the military really on
    steroids. The encrypted app. Paul, can you tell us about these
    apps? Have they been broken into? The guy had some apps that
    were encrypted.
        Mr. Abbate. I think we have experienced a range of returns
    on this. Some of the applications that he was using online were
    encrypted in nature.
        Senator Graham. Have we broken into them?
        Mr. Abbate. We have received returns that we have not been
    able to get information back because of their encrypted nature.
        Senator Graham. Is there any way to solve that problem,
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, we have talked about this before. We
    need a solution that provides lawful access to law enforcement.
        Senator Graham. You are telling me the guy that took eight
    shots at the former president, has apps that we cannot get into
    that may, if you could get into, reveal some relevant
    information?
        Mr. Abbate. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Graham. If he were talking to some foreign power,
    and I do not think any foreign power would hire this guy, by
    the way, so I am not overly worried this was some great plot by
    the Iranians because they could not even think of this.
    However, there could come a day where something like this is
    very important. How do we solve this problem?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, as we have been saying, we need a
    solution that provides lawful access when we go to a company.
        Senator Graham. I agree with you. I am not blaming you. We
    have encrypted apps of an assassin, a murderer, and we cannot
    get into them all these days after. That needs to be fixed.
    Folks, I am all for privacy, but to a point. What if in the
    future somebody's using these apps to communicate with a
    foreign power? I think we need to know these things. We need to
    know them in real time.
        Lessons learned is that everything failed. Corrective
    action, seems to me you need more money, and more people,
    accountability. At the end of the day, how many people do you
    think will be relieved of their duties, Mr. Rowe, because of
    this?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I publicly cannot, and I cannot weigh in
    on that right now.
        Senator Graham. Sure.
        Mr. Rowe. Right. It has to be a fair and neutral process.
    Right?
        Senator Graham. Absolutely.
        From a fair point of view, would you say this is a major
    system failure at every turn, and those in charge of the system
    in question, not only was it embarrassing, they failed?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, if there were policy violations,
    those individuals will be held accountable and they will be
    subject to our table----
        Senator Graham. Just send us the policies, if you could.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Mr. Rowe. We will. But they will be held to our table of
    penalties, which will include up to termination.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Chairman Peters. Director Rowe, in your testimony here
    today, as well as in your written testimony, you said very
    clearly that you cannot defend why that building with the
    shooter on top of it was not better covered. You were very
    clear; you cannot defend that.
        My question to you is, my understanding is that there's a
    detailed site survey that is done prior to an event to identify
    potential threat points. Talk to me about that site survey. I
    am sure you have had a chance to look at it now after action.
    How did that site survey get approved when it was so clear that
    that was a major threat from that building?
        Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. Our Pittsburgh field office
    did the advance. During that advance, not only were they
    discussing amongst themselves about mitigating the line of
    sight, but also, they were discussing with other agencies that
    were supporting it.
        Our counter snipers met with their counterparts. The team
    lead and team lead met. They walked the site. They identified
    the AGR building. If I may, Senator, if I could point out
    something right now, if I may, and we will place this for the
    record.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The information referred by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
    page 74.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        But this is the point of view. This is from the second
    floor of the AGR building. This point of view where the counter
    sniper team, locally, was posted. The gold arrow indicates
    where the shooter fired from. Looking left, why was the
    assailant not seen when we were told that building was going to
    be covered, that there had been a face-to-face that afternoon
    that our team leads met. This was the view.
        Let me show you another view, Senator Give me B.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
    page 76.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This view is a reenactment by one of my agents laying flat.
    There was a five-inch rise on the middle of that roof. The
    assailant would have had to present his boar over that to get
    his shot off. The view underneath reflects the perspective that
    he would have had. Again, I call your attention back to the
    first exhibit if they would have looked left. Give me C.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The picture referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
    page 77.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is what our counter sniper team saw. Shooter, no
    elbows. You barely make out the crown of his head. Below it,
    the assailant up prone. Let me just tell you, our counter
    sniper, this individual, I know him. I consider him a friend.
    He has covered me operationally in conflict zones. When I did
    my time on the President's detail, he exemplifies the courage,
    the skill, and the ability to respond under great stress in
    such short time to neutralize the threat and prevent further
    loss of life.
        Getting back to your question, Senator. These were
    discussions that were had between the Pittsburgh field office,
    the local counterparts, and everyone supporting that visit that
    day. That's why when I laid in that position, I could not, and
    I will not, and I cannot understand why there was not better
    coverage, or at least somebody looking at that roof line when
    that's where they were posted.
        Chairman Peters. Director Rowe, the Secret Service State,
    and local law enforcement were on multiple communication
    channels, is my understanding, during that time. As a result,
    local law enforcement was only able to call in to a State
    command center that was then relayed from the Secret Service.
        It seemed to be a recurring issue in emergency situations
    that we are finding with the Federal Government that there's
    not a seamless way to communicate, particularly if you are
    relying on local law enforcement to deal with what was clearly
    a major vulnerability. Local law enforcement in Butler told my
    staff that that they had no way of communicating directly with
    the Secret Service. If I listen to Mr. Abbate saying there was
    about 30 seconds between when the local law enforcement
    reported that there was a man on the roof with a gun 30
    seconds. If it's communicated directly to a counter sniper
    team, would that be enough time to react prior to the firing of
    those shots?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, if we would had that information, they
    would have been able to address it more quickly. It appears
    that that information was stuck or siloed in that State and
    local channel. I will tell you, though, that our tactical
    elements not only did they have embeds from Butler County
    Emergency Services Unit (ESU) with them, but they also had
    radios on the tactical net.
        It is troubling to me that we did not get that information
    as quickly as we should have. We did not know that there was
    this incident going on, and the only thing we had was that
    locals were working an issue at the 3 p.m., which would have
    been the former president's right-hand side, which is where the
    shot came. Nothing about man on the roof, nothing about man
    with a gun. None of that information ever made it over our net.
        Chairman Peters. So that will change?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. We are working right now to figure out
    the interoperability, and also make sure that we do have access
    to those channels, whether through the counterpart system or
    some other means.
        Chairman Peters. Very good. Ranking Member Paul, you are
    recognized for your questions.
        Senator Paul. Director Rowe, I am encouraged by your
    attitude and what you brought here today; what you have talked
    about as far as immediate changes that you have made, and I
    hope you will follow through with that. I am encouraged by the
    fact that you acknowledge that it's indefensible, that the roof
    was unattended. Would you say the roof being unattended
    breaches standard protocol for setting up a security perimeter?
        Mr. Rowe. What I would say, Senator, is that that roof
    should have had better coverage, and we will get to the bottom
    of if there were any policy violations.
        Senator Paul. I would think indefensible would go along
    with breaching protocol, and I cannot imagine how indefensible
    would not be breaching protocol. What I would caution, though,
    is that I sense, and you are the Secret Service, and these
    people are your friends, and they are heroic people who do good
    things, that we cannot let our friendships blind us from
    responsibility. Someone's in charge of the security at the
    zone.
        Would the Secret Service be in charge of the entire
    operation and they work with law enforcement, but they are in
    charge. The person in charge of the entire operation is the
    Secret Service, not the local police?
        Mr. Rowe. You are correct, sir. This is a failure of the
    Secret Service.
        Senator Paul. So that's what I mean. I don't wish anybody
    harm. I appreciate the bravery of the United States Capitol
    Police (USCP). I was at the shooting at the ball field. I have
    heard a hundred shots coming my way. Fortunately, none came to
    me. But I appreciate the bravery of all the people who protect
    us. But there's also the idea that there are certain mistakes
    that don't make you a bad person, but they are just inexcusable
    if you made that mistake.
        For example, let's say you determine, well, local police
    should have been on there, and local police says, no, they did
    not tell us to do it. It's a he said, she said. Still,
    ultimately, the agent in charge should be walking the grounds
    and say there's a roof 100 yards away from the stadium with a
    clear sight. Someone's got to be on the roof. Local police, I
    told you to get on the roof, get on the roof. Or you put the
    Secret Service. Ultimately the buck does not pass along to
    somebody. Whoever's in charge is in charge.
        But really, I think it would be helpful to all of us. I
    know the process has to be meted out, but there needs to also
    be a process for protecting the next Trump rally. The fact that
    whoever was in charge in Butler, next week is not in charge of
    a rally in Las Vegas.
        I think you really should simply say that the leadership
    from that event is going through a process. But until that
    process, they won't be in charge of the Democrat National
    Convention. That would reassure a lot of people that they won't
    be in charge of security until it's determined. Can you tell us
    something to that accord?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. I can tell you that the team planning
    the Democratic National Convention, that is a national special
    security event. That team has been on the ground, that's from
    DC with support from our Chicago field office.
        But I just want to reiterate that our Pittsburgh field
    office staff, they are wearing this harder than anybody right
    now in the Secret Service. They feel completely demoralized.
    What I am trying to do is also let them know that, listen, they
    need to be focused on the mission at hand. I also have to walk
    a tightrope here and make sure that I am not tainting any
    future, you know, disciplinary action.
        Senator Paul. I understand, and I have great respect for
    all the officers, but ultimately, someone had to be in charge,
    and someone made a terrible error. It's an error of judgment.
    The big error is the roof. But another big error is we have 90
    minutes of a suspicious person.
        Now, Senator Durbin mentioned the rangefinder. None of
    these things are enough to shoot a suspicious person, but they
    certainly would be enough to stop the proceedings. That's where
    I think you get to the second major management or judgment
    error of this.
        Now, Trump's done probably 100 rallies like this. How often
    at one of his rallies are there 90 minutes of looking at one
    person and at least a half a dozen pictures of that person? How
    often does that happen? Is it against protocol to a let a
    proceeding go on when you have a suspicious person, 90 minutes
    worth of people talking about this person and we don't stop the
    proceeding? Does that defy protocol?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, while there's 90 minutes in total from
    when he is first identified by local law enforcement, we have
    about a 30-minute window. But in no time is there anything ever
    communicated about weapon or harm? I think that's where the
    threat--
        Senator Paul. We are talking about a weapon. You shoot
    people with a weapon.
        Mr. Rowe. Sure.
        Senator Paul. Without a weapon, we are talking about people
    you stop and say--he had a backpack, which was probably big
    enough to have the AR-15 in it. In all likelihood, the backpack
    has the weapon in it. A guy with a big backpack would never get
    through the perimeter. Once again, a big mistake was not having
    the perimeter wide enough to prevent people from shooting
    outside the perimeter.
        But the thing is, he would have never gotten through the
    perimeter, right? His backpack would have been checked. But
    people with big backpacks are very suspicious, and I would
    think he's been seen six times, but you got 20 or 30 minutes of
    knowing about it. But the thing is, there's all kinds of
    chatter going on about this. You would think the chatter going
    on with the local police is on a police radio, and a policeman
    with that radio is standing in the control tent so you get that
    communication. So there's a huge and massive breakdown.
        But really, my question is, how often has this happened at
    other rallies where there's a half a dozen pictures and 90
    minutes of people talking about a suspicious person? I just
    cannot imagine it's real common.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, at rallies, there are people that come
    to the attention of law enforcement for a variety of reasons.
    If they come to our attention for some other activity that
    might, put it a little bit hey, we probably need to go check
    that individual out, this happens. That's why we attempt to
    locate them. That's why it's important for us to try to find
    them, and it's important to have the information. And so local
    law enforcement did their very level best to try to locate him.
    They did provide us the photos 30 minutes prior. It just, he
    evaded any detection by law enforcement.
        Senator Paul. But once again, it's the overall person in
    charge. It's a terrible breakdown. It's a terrible management
    decision not to have stopped it. There was a chance to stop the
    proceeding. The question is not whether there's enough
    information to take down an individual.
        It's a much lower standard to say, hey, we are going to
    wait until we get this individual. The roof and the 90 minutes
    of it, both, I think, are failure of your protocol. I think
    when that's determined, the person who made these decisions
    cannot be in a position of authority again.
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Klobuchar.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KLOBUCHAR

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of
    you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it, Director Rowe,
    we had the classified briefing and also today the taking
    responsibility for the agency, and your own personal emotion,
    and reaction to your visit in what had gone wrong.
        For the people in my State that keep asking me, ``I just
    don't get how he got on the roof.'' I know we have gone through
    great details and a lot of examination. Could you just give a
    minute on what went wrong and how you think it can be fixed?
    Because I think it's just going to help to dispel the
    conspiracy theories.
        There are some people that think it did not really happen,
    which of course is completely ridiculous. It did. There are
    some people that think all kinds of conspiracies went on within
    the government, which is also false. But could you just tell
    them what went wrong so they understand?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes. Thank you, Senator. I thought long and hard
    about this. I think this was a failure of imagination. A
    failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous
    world where people do actually want to do harm to our
    protectees.
        I think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions,
    the assumptions that we know our partners are going to do
    everything they can, and they do this every day. But we did not
    challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone's going
    to cover that. We assume that there's going to be uniform
    presence. We did not challenge that internally during that
    advance.
        Moving forward, I have directed that when we are talking to
    people and we are making requests, we are very specific about
    what we want. We are providing explicit instructions on exactly
    what our expectation is, what we need them to do, and what we
    want them to do. That's the only way that we are going to be
    able to move forward beyond this.
        Let me just tell you that our State and local law
    enforcement partners are the best. This belief that somehow,
    they are less than Federal law enforcement, or they are less
    than the Secret Service. They are out there patrolling
    communities every day. They are the ones out there going into
    hazardous conditions every day. They know their communities.
    They have the ability to enforce State and local laws. Our
    advanced agents do not. We need them and we need them to be
    partners with us. I think we need to be very clear to them, and
    that may have contributed to this situation.
        Senator Klobuchar. Yes. Appreciate that, and I have same
    respect. Next, one of the things you mentioned to me was, and
    to all of us, was in this other briefing, was just the texting
    protocol. I think a lot of us think about this in non-security
    settings about how people are just texting all the time instead
    of talking and how it takes our eyes off, in your case, the
    target. Could you talk about what might have gone wrong there,
    and how you think things could change when there's the hope is
    that their eyes are constantly on the scene, and on the
    potential targets, and risks?
        Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. Again, we need people focused
    on the problem or on their area of responsibility. It was great
    that there was a text chain, but that communication needs to go
    over the net. It needs to go over a radio channel so that
    everyone has situational awareness of it. The point I was
    making in the closed-door briefing is that we have to get to a
    point now where we are using our radio systems to have that
    collective awareness of this.
        I think, one of the things that I have directed is that in
    addition to the interoperability, we are going to roll out
    common operating picture or common operating platform that we
    utilize for national special security events. We have the
    ability to roll that out to the field that has a Blue Force
    Tracker in it, where you can put where all your State and local
    assets are, where our Federal assets are.
        But in addition to that, I want people using the radio so
    it's great that the tactical elements are talking to each
    other. It's great that the shift is talking to each other, but
    we have to be able to make sure that whenever we come across a
    situation that everyone has situational awareness of this.
        In my time when I was operational in the President's
    detail, we were given the explicit instruction, hey, if you are
    going to pass it, if it's relevant enough that you feel like
    you need to pass that information, do it over the radio. That
    was the protocol that we had.
        I think over the years, perhaps with the advent of
    technology and smartphones, perhaps we have gotten away from
    that. But we need to get people back on the scope, back on
    mission, back focused on what they need to be responsible for.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. The next question I will put in
    writing, thank you very much, of you, Mr. Abbate. But it's just
    pointing out that we have seen this rise in threats against
    Members of Congress, which of course is relevant to this.
        8,000 just last year, more than four times over the past
    seven years. I will want to ask you in writing about the steps
    that the Justice Department is taking to prioritize these
    cases.\1\ I know there's been some changes made.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The question from Senator Klobuchar appears in the Appendix on
    page 167.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. It's of our highest priority, and
    we are urgently working on it 24/7 a day, every day to protect
    each and every one of you here.
        Senator Klobuchar. Appreciate it. Thank you, both of you.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Carper, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

        Senator Carper. Thanks very much.
        Mr. Rowe, Mr. Abbate, thank you for joining us. Today I
    have the privilege of representing Delaware, the first State to
    ratify the Constitution. We did that over 200 years ago. The
    Constitution sort of outlines how we elect our leaders, and it
    changes with respect to technology over the years. But there
    for as long as we have been a country-threats to our leaders
    when they pursue elective office. We are going to be gathering
    in Chicago in just a few weeks.
        There's been gatherings in other parts of the country to
    help make sure that what was adopted in that original
    Constitution is actually carried out faithfully. It's just
    incredibly important that those who aspire to elected office,
    and those who take on those challenges are protected, and their
    families are protected, as well as those who surround them. I
    share with my colleagues, my prayers for those who have been
    killed or injured on the July 13th. We are grateful that one of
    our Presidential candidates is OK.
        But I have a question about what I still cannot get over
    how a 20-year-old loner could somehow outfox, outsmart two of
    the smartest Federal agencies, and State agencies, and law
    enforcement with odds of like 1,000 to 1 and be able to almost
    pull this off. It just blows my mind. Hopefully, we will get to
    the truth and all of that.
        I am a Navy guy, spent 20-many years of my life in the
    Navy. I learned as a midshipman that when the ship runs on
    ground at sea, the commanding officer is held responsible.
    Whether the commanding officer's awake or asleep, at the helm,
    the commanding officer is held responsible. At the end of the
    day, I am not interested in a blame game, but I am sure
    interested in finding out who was responsible and making sure
    that they account for their responsibility.
        My question is, what policies are currently in place to
    facilitate real time information-sharing between the Secret
    Service and local law enforcement during an event? What changes
    to information-sharing practices will the Secret Service make
    in light of the apparent breakdown in communications on July
    13th?
        Mr. Rowe. Thank you for that question, Senator. We are
    looking at our procedures. We rely on a counterpart system and
    the radio interoperability, it's a complex challenge. It's not
    just about being able to find whatever frequency our local
    counterparts are on and then just piping it in. There are some
    technical challenges that have to be there.
        To alleviate that, we have always relied on a security room
    where we have representatives from the local agencies those
    individuals are there to, one, bring their own radio, and then
    relay relevant information that would impact our security plan.
    I think what I am looking at, and again, what I am in looking
    at this situation, is there was a unified command post, and we
    had our security room.
        We had communications that day at the Butler Farm site we
    are challenging. Not just challenging for the Secret Service,
    but for challenging for locals. There were some cellular
    issues. There were radio issues. You saw that with the
    testimony from the colonel from Pennsylvania State Police last
    week in the House.
        I think as I am thinking about this, I think we need to
    consider what is our model moving forward? I think we need to
    be where the greatest amount of partners are when that
    information is being discussed.
        The other thing that I am looking at is we need to also
    make sure that we have redundancies as far as cellular on the
    ground or additional repeaters. I have directed our Chief
    Information Officer (CIO) to do that, and we are rolling assets
    out now supporting campaign sites.
        Senator Carper. Thank you for that. Mr. Abbate, quick
    question. Based on the initial information you have gathered
    from the investigation, do you believe there were any actions
    taken by the shooter in the weeks, days, or hours leading up to
    the shooting that should have caused alarm and grabbed the
    attention of law enforcement?
        Mr. Abbate. He did not have any interactions with law
    enforcement leading up to this, Senator? We have not found
    anything yet that would have alerted law enforcement, the FBI,
    or Secret Service to his intention, activities in advance of
    this event.
        I will note, however, to your prior question, that we do
    have a very strong relationship, an integrated relationship
    between FBI, and Secret Service, and every other Federal,
    State, local agency. You can imagine we have constructs like
    the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Violent Crime Task
    Forces (VCTF) where we are cross-embedded with each other. When
    it comes to this event and others like it, we are always
    talking in advance.
        In fact, with respect to this event, we did have a meeting
    between U.S. Secret Service and FBI in the days leading up to
    the event to determine, assess whether there was any
    information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the
    rally, or to former president Trump, or anyone else there.
    There was an absence of that in the lead-up, specifically.
    Again, none of us had any information in our holdings with
    regard to the ultimate shooter.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thank you for that. Thanks very
    much, both of you.
        Chairman Durbin. Next on the Senate Judiciary Committee is
    Senator Grassley.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

        Senator Grassley. Mr. Chair, I would like to introduce my
    oversight letters and investigative documents into the
    record.\1\ This is information I have already made public.
        Chairman Peters. Without objection.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Oversight letters and Investigative documents submitted by
    Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on page 80.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Grassley. OK, thank you. I would also like to call
    my colleagues' attention to a legislation that Senator Cortez
    Masto and I have introduced that would require Senate
    confirmation of the Director of the Secret Service. I think
    this is very important because no other agency has a no-fail
    mission.
        Mr. Rowe, in your written testimony, you stated that to
    prevent similar lapses like the one on July 13th from happening
    again, you will ensure every event site security plan is surly
    vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it's
    implemented. Based on your testimony, the security plan for the
    Butler event deviated from the security standards. How would
    vetting by multiple experienced supervisors fix that?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think having many eyes on a particular
    problem set helps. That way you do not have tunnel vision. You
    are just focusing on one thing. That's why I think it's
    important not only at the field office level, but also at the
    detail level.
        Part of what we had started doing with the former
    president's detail is having them send out site agents, having
    them send out supervisors. I think having that collaboration
    and having additional eyes to examine the problem, will make
    sure that we are not missing anything.
        Senator Grassley. I think you have answered my question.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Grassley. Let me go on. Also, to you, in your
    written testimony, you stated that you, ``regret that
    information was not passed to Congress and the public sooner,
    and with greater frequency. What's your communication plan
    going forward to ensure that the American people in Congress
    are fully informed?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, we just started a rolling production
    that is bicameral. We made our first rolling production last
    week. We made one yesterday. We will continue to do that. My
    view is that sunshine is the best disinfectant, and we intend
    to provide information to Congress as it carries out its
    oversight function.
        Senator Grassley. OK. Also, I made public documents that
    show Secret Service deployed a counter unmanned aerial system
    operator on July the 13th. According to the Secret Service, the
    drone system was supposed to be operational at 3 p.m. that day.
    However, we have been told by Secret Service that because of
    cellular bandwidth problems, it was not operational until about
    5:20 of that day.
        If the system was operational, Secret Service would have
    had the ability to detect the shooter and his own drone use.
    Why is the Secret Service dependent upon local cell cellular
    network? Does the Secret Service have a backup plan in place?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes. Thank you, Senator. That is something that I
    briefed in the closed door, and again, something that has cost
    me a lot of sleep because of the eventual outcome of the
    assailant. That what if we had geolocated him because that
    counter UAS platform had been up?
        It is something that I have struggled with to understand,
    and I have no explanation for it. It is something that I feel
    as though we could have perhaps found him, we could have maybe
    stopped him. Maybe, on that particular day, he would have
    decided this isn't the day to do it, because law enforcement
    just found me flying my drone. People fly drones all the time
    on the peripheries of our sites. We go out, and we talk to
    them, and we ascertain what their intentions are.
        On this day, in particular, because of the connectivity
    challenge, as you noted, there was a delay and he flew his
    drone at 3:51, approximately. Moving forward, we are leveraging
    resources from the Department of Homeland Security and others
    to make sure that we have dedicated connectivity, so that we
    are not reliant on public domain, so that we can ensure that
    whatever assets we have in place, those assets are operational.
    That is my commitment to you, that we are going to make sure we
    are going to do that. That is something we are moving out on.
        Senator Grassley. Thank you. I hope that you will answer
    some of my other questions in writing.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The questions from Senator Grassley appears in the Appendix on
    page 140.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Peters. Senator Johnson, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Acting Director Rowe, in our secure briefing last week, I
    made the point that if you do not want conspiracy theories to
    spread, you need to provide information. I appreciate these
    photos today. These things could have been released literally
    within days and a whole lot more information as well. Congress
    needs to provide oversight. We do not have certain
    investigatory tools like you have, but what we can do is do
    interviews. Acting Director Rowe, did you receive our letter
    from July 25th requesting interviews with 13 individuals of the
    Secret Service?
        Mr. Rowe. We are in receipt of that letter, Senator.
        Senator Johnson. Deputy Director Abbate, have you seen that
    letter as well? Do you know who we are requesting interviews
    with?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, I have not seen the letter.
        Senator Johnson. OK. Do you know whether those individuals
    submitted to interviews with the FBI, acting Director Rowe?
        Mr. Rowe. We are in the process. Those employees are being
    interviewed, if they have not already been interviewed, sir.
        Senator Johnson. Are those interviews being transcribed?
        Mr. Abbate. The FBI interviews, sir?
        Senator Johnson. Yes. We have 302s on those.
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Johnson. OK. When will Congress get those 302s?
    When will we get those transcriptions of those interviews?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, I will take that back and we will get
    those to you as soon as possible.
        Senator Johnson. Acting Director Rowe, when will those
    individuals be made available for Congress for this Committee
    to interview them?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, we will make them available
        Senator Johnson. How soon? Because memories are short. They
    can be influenced by events. We need these transcribed
    interviews as soon as possible.
        Mr. Rowe. We will get that done, sir.
        Senator Johnson. Does Secret Service use encrypted
    communications at events?
        Mr. Rowe. On our radio nets? We do, sir.
        Senator Johnson. Those memorialized? Are those saved?
        Mr. Rowe. The radio traffic from Butler, we did not have
    recordings.
        Senator Johnson. Do you normally?
        Mr. Rowe. Not on the road outside of DC or outside of a
    Presidential or vice-Presidential stop.
        Senator Johnson. Communications between Secret Service
    agents will not be available like we have gotten the
    communications from local law enforcement.
        Mr. Rowe. I am sorry, Senator----
        Senator Johnson. We are not going to be able to get those
    communications. You did not save them?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir----
        Senator Johnson. Which is very unfortunate.
        Mr. Rowe. It is, sir. Moving forward, I have directed that
    we will now start recording those so that we will have them
    moving forward.
        Senator Johnson. By the way, I am going to ask for a number
    of things at the very end to be entered in the record, but one
    of my preliminary findings is that the Secret Service did not
    attend the 9 a.m. briefing the day of the event. In your
    testimony, you said that a site briefing was conducted with
    Secret Service personnel and law enforcement partners
    supporting the event. Those both cannot be true. So local law
    enforcement do not believe Secret Service was present at the 9
    a.m. briefing. Were they or were they not?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, with respect to the snipers that went on
    national television, and gave an interview and said that they
    did not get a briefing from the Secret Service, they were not.
    They were supporting through mutual aid, and our personnel
    briefed the tactical team leader that was leading that element,
    that was providing this counter sniper.
        Senator Johnson. Acting Director Rowe, you said that the
    Secret Service provides explicit instructions to the locals.
    Were explicit instructions provided to cover the roof of the
    AGR building and locals just not follow it, or were those
    explicit instructions not provided?
        Mr. Rowe. It's my understanding what was communicated is
    that the locals had a plan and that they had been there before.
        Senator Johnson. An awful lot of the chatter in social
    media has to do with is there a partisanship in the Secret
    Service providing coverage for some individuals and none for
    others, about Secret Service coverage or additional coverage
    enhancements being denied? Was there ever requested additional
    coverage for Mar-a-Lago
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, we have provided additional resources to
    the Mar-a-Lago.
        Senator Johnson. Was coverage asked for and denied ever?
        Mr. Rowe. I will have to research that, Senator. But I am
    happy to tell you we have made significant investments since
    the former president has left office, over $4 million of
    technology resources and arms.
        Senator Johnson Again, documents will come out eventually
    to make the point one way or the other. This is an important
    piece of information that Congress needs to have.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes. Senator, we will make those available to
    you.
        Senator Johnson. There's a report today by Susan Crabtree
    of RealClearPolitics, saying that you denied sniper coverage
    outside of driving distance to DC. Is that true?
        Mr. Rowe. That is a false statement, sir.
        Senator Johnson. That is incorrect?
        Mr. Rowe. That is incorrect.
        Senator Johnson. OK. That's the kind of information you
    need to refute with documentation. Deputy Director Abbate, you
    said this was an assassination attempt and domestic terrorism.
    It's obviously an assassination attempt. Why make the
    distinction? What is different about that?
        Mr. Abbate. We think it's important to cover all the
    possibilities here in the reality of what we are dealing with
    and what we have all seen, Senator. We have learned lessons
    from the past. The tragic shooting at the baseball field was
    referenced here. We have learned the lesson from that. That was
    not opened properly. We have made changes in the Bureau, and
    it's reflected here in terms of how this investigation is being
    approached with a completely open mind and inclusive of all the
    possibilities, including domestic terrorism.
        Senator Johnson. I fear that makes the investigation
    potentially partisan. Mr. Chair, I would like to request that
    my July 14th letter to Attorney General (AG) Garland, Mayorkas,
    and Wray be under the record.\1\ It asks for all kinds of
    information, documentation. Asks a lot of questions. My
    preliminary findings of July 21st and July 23rd, including
    timelines, bunch of questions as well be under the record,\2\
    and then our updated timeline dated today. This goes not only
    by minute, by second, and we will continue to update this
    timeline as more information becomes public. This is the way
    you do investigation. We need to find out literally second by
    second what happens so the American public understands the
    truth.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The letter submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix
    on page 108.
        \2\ The documents submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the
    Appendix on page 113.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Peters. Without objection, so ordered.
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Butler.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUTLER

        Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you to both of our Chairmen and Ranking Members for
    holding this incredibly important hearing, critically, for the
    American people to understand the safety and security that is
    being provided to our national leaders. Thank you both for
    being here and for, again, answering the hard questions.
        This is a time of, I think, heightened attention,
    deservedly so, not only for our national leaders, but for the
    teacher who decides that they are going to go and participate
    in their democracy, or the firefighter who wants to hear the
    voice and vision of the potential next leader of this country.
    My thoughts and prayers really are with those Pennsylvania
    families who have lost loved ones or have been critically
    injured. As I offer my questions today, it would be in service
    to those to preventing future incidents.
        But in the one question of looking backward to the event on
    the 13th, Director Abbate, can you just talk a little bit about
    how did Mr. Crooks, how was he able to get an AR-15 onto the
    roof of that building? Does your investigation illuminate
    anything that we have learned to help to make that point more
    clear?
        Mr. Abbate. We do not have definitive evidence yet as to
    how he got the rifle up there. Based on everything that's been
    collected thus far, photos, video eyewitness accounts, we do
    believe he likely had it in the backpack.
        Senator Butler. Broken down in the backpack?
        Mr. Abbate. We are still assessing that. Our laboratory has
    taken it, looked at the rifle itself and measured that against
    the backpack itself. And if placed in this backpack, it would
    extend outside. It would have been visible. But we do not have
    anyone who observed him with the backpack with a rifle barrel
    or other part of it sticking out of the backpack. But the rifle
    would not have fit fully into this backpack to be concealed in
    whole.
        We have video that was recently found of the shooter
    walking in a distance from his car just before 6 p.m., at about
    5:56, I believe. Based on everything we have, we assess that he
    returned to his vehicle at that time, got the backpack, and
    then proceeded back to the area into the AGR building. Then
    he's observed, of course, on the roof just minutes later
    holding the backpack in front of him.
        In fact, there's dash cam footage from a police vehicle
    that shows him briefly traversing the roof with the backpack in
    front of him. Then it's just minutes after that that he's
    actually seen by the officer, who I described, with the rifle
    on the roof.
        It's possible that he broke the rifle down, we do not have
    conclusive evidence of that, and took it out of the bag on the
    roof in those moments before, and reassembled it there. That's
    one of the theories we are looking at and working on right now.
        Senator Butler. Thank you for that. Acting Director Rowe,
    thank you for your years of dedicated service and jumping in at
    a hot time. But you take me right to this point of
    communication. There's been a lot of conversation and even in
    your written and verbal testimony, you have talked a lot about
    the communication and the disparate nature in which it's
    happening across the different channels.
        One sort of foundational question that I have is, are all
    elements of an event communicated on the same channel? If I
    lost my kid, and I am at a big rally, are local law enforcement
    talking on the same channel about me losing my kid? That they
    are talking about a suspicious individual?
        Mr. Rowe. When it comes to the locals, they likely have
    some type of common channel that they work off of in a county
    or an adjoining municipality. When it comes to the Secret
    Service, we do have various channels for various agents and our
    uniform division officers working specific aspects of that
    advance.
        Senator Butler. It's not possible that the delay in
    communication or the losing of the thread of tracking this
    individual was sort of lost in the commotion of all of the
    other communications that could have been, or maybe was sort of
    separate from the communication channels that were happening?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can only speak to the Secret Service
    lines of communication and we did not have anything beyond
    suspicious person that was communicated to us.
        Senator Butler. Sure.
        Last question really quickly because I am out of time, but
    Acting Director, was there any communication with the Secret
    Service that was talking directly with the President's, the
    former president's detail. That feels like there's been some
    question by colleagues about why the call was not made to delay
    the event. Help us understand the communication that either was
    or was not happening directly with the former president's
    detail to make the call to delay 10 minutes, 20. We have all
    been to these events. They never happen on time, but to delay
    while this was being investigated,
        Mr. Rowe. The detail, they were operating on their net,
    which our security room was monitoring. But again, having
    information of a suspicious individual. There were other calls
    that day of individuals that came to the attention of law
    enforcement, of people that needed medical attention. So that
    particular regarding the assailant, that never really rose to a
    level of we should not put him out there. Had we known that
    there was a dangerous individual out there, we would never let
    a protectee go out on stage.
        Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Hassan, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I want to
    thank you, and Chair Durbin, and the Ranking Members for
    holding this joint hearing today. Thank you to our witnesses,
    not only for being here, but for your careers of service to our
    country, and to the men and women you lead.
        I am really grateful that former president Trump is safe,
    and extend my sympathies to the family of Cory Comperatore, who
    was fatally shot at the rally. My sympathies to everyone who
    was injured.
        On July 13th, major failures nearly led to the
    assassination of a Presidential candidate who is also a former
    president of the United States. The Secret Service has to be
    fully transparent about how this happened and how it's going to
    change moving forward, understanding there's also a need to
    balance Congress's engagement in oversight with allowing law
    enforcement to conduct an ongoing criminal investigation.
        I want to thank the agents of the Secret Service for
    selflessly acting to protect elected officials, and their
    families, and our former presidents. We are grateful for their
    sacrifices and their service, and I want to thank all law
    enforcement, and particularly law enforcement officers and
    first responders, who worked to minimize harm to the crowd on
    July 13th.
        Mr. Rowe, I want to start with you. New Hampshire hosts
    many political rallies. Protecting the speakers and attendees
    at these events requires extensive coordination between State
    and local law enforcement, the Secret Service staff, and
    obviously campaigns event staff. As a former Governor, I have
    experienced some of the challenges that this type of
    coordination can create, but we know that this coordination is
    really essential to public safety.
        It's clear that there were significant coordination
    failures on July 13th. You told us earlier that the local SWAT
    team told the Secret Service that local law enforcement had
    eyes on the AGR roof. But there are reports that members of a
    local SWAT team never met with the Secret Service in the days
    before the Butler rally.
        What steps does the Secret Service take prior to political
    rallies to ensure that the agency is effectively coordinating
    with the candidate's security details with State and local law
    enforcement, and with campaign event staff?
        Mr. Rowe. As part of the advance process, Senator, as
    happened in Butler as well, there's a police meeting.
    Basically, that initiates the advance, that's bringing not only
    emergency management officials, but all the State and local law
    enforcement agencies that may have aspects of supporting or
    assisting in that advance and on that visit. The focus of that
    police meeting, one, is to exchange numbers and business cards,
    and then coordinate times for walkthroughs.
        There were walkthroughs of the Butler Farm site with local
    law enforcement agencies that were supporting that visit. That
    was directly as a result of having that police meeting to begin
    the process of figuring out, dividing up the labor, areas of
    responsibility.
        Senator Hassan. What you are telling me is that at that
    meeting, the first meeting, led to the walkthrough that the
    Secret Service does with local law enforcement, and that at
    least some members or directors of the local SWAT team would
    have been part of that process?
        Mr. Rowe. As I understand it, the Beaver County, they were
    seconded to assist Butler, but the Butler ESU team were part of
    the advanced process.
        Senator Hassan. OK. How many agents did the Secret Service
    provide to plan and secure this event, and how many people from
    State and local law enforcement agencies supported the security
    of this event?
        Mr. Rowe. In totality, between law enforcement, State, and
    local, and Federal, there are 155 personnel at the Butler Farm
    site that day. All combined, Secret Service, it's in the 70s.
    Then, we had support from Homeland Security Investigations
    (HSI) that were providing post standards, and then we had
    approximately 70 or so various Pennsylvania State law
    enforcement.
        Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you. I want to go to one other
    issue before my time expires. You have talked today and in our
    secure briefing about the interoperability of the Secret
    Services counter drone capability, that it failed early on, and
    so it did not catch the drone floating over the site by the
    shooter.
        First, you have addressed this a little bit, what changes
    is the Secret Service making to ensure that it has backup
    technology, but also, what efforts did the Secret Service
    undertake to coordinate with other law enforcement regarding
    anti-drone capability at the rally site?
        Mr. Rowe. We are working to determine that right now,
    Senator. We are getting the redundancies in place. Counter UAS
    authority, it is a little complex. State and locals do not
    necessarily have this ability to do that. It does require
    coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ,
    because it could impact commercial travel.
        Senator Hassan. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am just going
    to follow up. I think one of the things that you are hearing
    from a lot of folks, but I am not sure we are really clear on
    yet, is how is it that somebody who clearly is arousing concern
    from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious? How is it
    that that information doesn't get to the former president's
    detail? I will follow up in writing. Thank you.
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked?
        Mr. Rowe. Because There was no counter UAS present, sir.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CORNYN

        Senator Cornyn. You had a drone system, but you had
    bandwidth problems. The bandwidth apparently was adequate for
    the shooter's drone, but not for the Secret Service. Can you
    explain that?
        Mr. Rowe. I have no explanation for it, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. We also know that in the military context,
    electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on
    the battlefield. Does the Secret Service have jamming
    capabilities or drones?
        Mr. Rowe. We have drones, sir. I have to be very careful
    about how I answer this one in an open forum. What I can tell
    you is that we have technical security measures, sir, to
    address, I think, what you are asking me.
        Senator Cornyn. The question is, can you take down a
    suspicious drone? Because this can be used not only for
    surveillance by the shooter, which obviously it was here, but
    also drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the
    President, or in this case, to President Trump. Do you have the
    capacity to stop a weaponized drone?
        Mr. Rowe. What I will tell you, sir, is that we have
    technical security measures that we utilize at permanently
    protective sites. We also have the ability in a limited
    fashion, at temporary sites. What I can tell you is that on
    this day, the counter UAS system had technical difficulties and
    did not go operational until after 5 p.m.
        Senator Cornyn. In this case, the shooter had a rifle, but
    somebody who wanted to kill a President, or a former president,
    or a candidate for President, would not need a rifle. They
    could use a drone. Correct?
        Mr. Rowe. It is a potential threat factor.
        Senator Cornyn. This individual was identified as a
    suspicious person. Can you explain to us when a suspicious
    person becomes identified as a threat?
        Mr. Rowe. I think it's also when a weapon or some other
    dangerous item is then presented.
        Senator Cornyn. A range finder would not render someone a
    threat as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion?
        Mr. Rowe. I think the rangefinder is what initially brought
    him to the attention of local law enforcement.
        Senator Cornyn. Why would the President be allowed to take
    to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified, and
    before the Secret Service or local law enforcement were able to
    investigate the circumstances?
        Mr. Rowe. At that time, Senator, suspicion had not risen to
    the level of threat or imminent harm.
        Senator Cornyn. Ultimately, that suspicious person did
    become a threat. Do you think if the President had been asked
    not to take the stage, and during the time it took to
    investigate to eliminate that suspicion, wouldn't that have
    been the appropriate way to deal with it?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, it certainly is one way to do it. This
    is a challenge for law enforcement in general, is that being
    able to identify somebody that comes to your attention and you
    are trying to determine what are their intentions. This is a
    challenge for law enforcement.
        The individual actually came to the attention for
    suspicion. He's on the outer perimeter adjacent the secured
    site. Law enforcement is circulating for him. But again,
    additional information at that point, we are not rising to the
    level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him.
        Senator Cornyn. I am just suggesting that maybe President
    Trump's appearance should have been delayed while that
    suspicion could be adequately investigated. But I have always
    thought of the Secret Service as the best of the best when it
    comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to
    protect the life of their person. They are detailed to. I think
    you described the very rigorous process by which people are
    screened. I think you mentioned the two percent standard,
    people who are interested in serving. Only a very small
    fraction of those individuals are actually accepted in the
    Secret Service because of the high standards that your agency
    has.
        But explain to me why the Secret Service being an elite law
    enforcement agency would delegate to local law enforcement or
    others who did not meet that same two percent standard. In
    other words, isn't that something that Secret Service should
    have covered as opposed to delegating it to local law
    enforcement?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator again, this is where I went back to
    earlier when I said it was in a failure to challenge our
    assumptions. We assume that the State and locals had it. By no
    means do I want to diminish the commitment. I am sure you
    agree, State and local law enforcement do their jobs every day
    and protect the communities that you represent.
        Senator Cornyn. No doubt about it.
        Mr. Rowe. I think what we made an assumption that there was
    going to be uniform presence out there, that there would be
    sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be
    counters, sniper teams in the AGR building. I can assure you
    that we are not going to make that mistake again.
        Moving forward, I have directed our Office of Protective
    Operations that when our counter snipers are up, their counter
    snipers are up, and they are on the roof as well. We do this
    all the time with our colleagues in the New York City Police
    Department when we cover the United Nations General Assembly
    (UNGA). So that is our Trusted Traveler Programs (TTP) moving
    forward
        Senator Cornyn. Director Rowe, I would just submit to you
    that those assumptions can be lethal.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Scott, you are recognized for your
    questions.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

        Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Let me just follow up with what Senator Cornyn has asked.
    Do you know who makes the drone that the Secret Service uses?
        Mr. Rowe. That Secret Service uses?
        Senator Scott. Yes. The one that you did not work. Who's
    the manufacturer? Is it American made, manufacturer?
        Mr. Rowe. I believe it is, Senator.
        Senator Scott. We talked about this the other day. Very few
    times in history do our Presidents get shot at. You would know
    that this is something that the American public is very
    interested in. As Senator Johnson said, there's a lot of
    questions being asked. I was at Church Sunday, and three people
    came up to me and asked me if there was a second shooter.
    There's all this information that you guys are not responding
    to.
        When I was Governor of Florida, I had two mass shootings. I
    had the Pulse nightclub shooting. I had the Marjory Stoneman
    Douglas shooting. We did daily, we did two or three times a
    day, local, State, and Federal law enforcement, FBI, everybody
    involved, we answered questions.
        What I asked you the other day is, why aren't you doing
    that? What both of you have allowed. You have allowed the
    public to assume the negative which I don't get and think you
    should be doing. I think you should be doing all along at least
    once a day press conference. I think that you have to tell the
    public what's going on.
        Having a hearing is really nice. I mean, how often are we
    going to do this? You are clearly not going to do it here for
    another month and a half. I asked you the other day, why aren't
    you doing press conferences? And are you going to commit to
    doing press conferences? I think what you-all have said the
    other day, you are going to ask Secretary Mayorkas and Director
    Wray, if you guys could do those daily press conferences, and
    start giving the public information. You know, what's the
    answer?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that's why, one, I am here today. I am
    here today to provide information and answer those questions.
    We are moving toward doing more frequent releases of
    information. We are willing to do that press conference. Once
    we get through this hearing today, we are going to, in all
    likelihood, do one this week.
        Senator Scott. OK? What's the commitment to the public that
    you are going to do press conferences? I mean, it's what, 17
    days? We are sitting 17 days into this, and I am getting asked
    questions that I can't believe are true, but the public
    believes it's true.
        What you-all are doing is you ruin your reputation, impact
    the integrity of the Federal Government. It makes no sense to
    me. Are you going to commit to it--are you going to do it once
    a month? The FBI, it's the same thing, not just you. What did
    Director Wray say? Did he say he could not do it?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, if I may jump in here. First, thank
    you all for your guidance in this regard. In fact, we have not
    done something every day, no doubt about that. But, we are
    focused from the FBI side on the investigation. In part, as we
    have laid out here today, we actually, based on your guidance,
    we did a media engagement, not a standup-type press conference,
    just yesterday, and laid out in full everything that I have
    shared here, and even beyond that, just in the interest of
    time.
        But we are because of the intense interest in this, and the
    implications and the national importance, we have literally
    provided everything through media, and through journalists in
    here all of the information that we have derived from the
    investigation. Thus, sir, we remain committed to do that in
    full, answering all questions and sharing all information we
    obtain.
        Senator Scott. Do you guys realize the value of going in
    front of the press and answering all their questions? You
    realize that if you don't do it that way, everything gets
    filtered. You get to put out all the information, and you
    should be providing--I mean, you should be saying every day
    this is what we know now. Like Senator Johnson said, put
    together a timeline. You should have put together a timeline.
    You should immediately put out, this is what we know right now,
    and this is what we don't know.
        Like you have said, you don't know how the gun got up
    there, right? You have said it, but why that should have been
    out all along? Say we are looking at it, it does not make any
    sense. We have done this, we have done this, we have done this.
    I just don't get it. Why? Why what you are doing? I have said
    this about the FBI. I mean, the people who work at Secret
    Service, they are great people. You are a black hole, you lose
    the support of the American public because people do not
    believe you are being direct with them.
        I completely disagree with your approach. I just want to
    finish. Like everybody else, I did a letter July 18th. I have
    not gotten any answers yet. I want to put it into the
    record,\1\ and I would love to get the answers to this because
    this is what the public is asking for. They want more
    information. They want to know what happened, who's going to be
    held accountable, and how we are going to make sure this never
    happens again. Thank you.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The letter submitted by Senator Scott appears in the Appendix
    on page 127.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Peters. Without objection, it will be entered into
    the record.
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Blumenthal.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLUMENTHAL

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you for being here to both of you and more important
    thank you for your professional dedication, your personal
    bravery, and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. I
    know for both of you, this moment is a painful one. Acting
    Director Rowe, I have heard you speak in a private setting very
    emotionally and passionately about the need to take
    responsibility and take action that will assure accountability.
    I know that you share a commitment along with Director Abbate
    to full public disclosure to the maximum extent possible.
        We can make speeches at you, and I have made one myself in
    that private setting about the need for broader, fuller
    disclosure to the public, not just in press conferences, but in
    the course of your investigation about what you know and feel
    you can disclose without compromising your investigation.
        Let me ask you, last week Senator Peters and Paul, along
    with Senator Johnson and myself, sent requests to both of your
    agencies to produce documents. We have only received a handful
    so far. Can you commit to when we can expect those documents?
        Mr. Rowe. We will get them to you as quickly as we can,
    Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can we expect them this week?
        Mr. Rowe. We will work to get to meet that deadline, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. When can we expect all the
    communications, the text messages that agents have sent to each
    other? Eventually, all of it is going to come out as you know.
    When can we expect all of those documents?
        Mr. Rowe. We will gather them up and get them to you,
    Senator
        Senator Blumenthal. You, I think, took the position as to
    the local law enforcement responsible for the shooter on the
    roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to
    take him out. But ultimately, doesn't the buck stop with the
    Secret Service?
        Mr. Rowe. It stops with us, sir. But let me just clarify
    the perspective that they had on that roof, when I show you the
    perspective from when our sniper saw, he's on the downside of
    that ridge roof. Their perspective from the AGR building,
    looking out their area of responsibility looking left, they
    should have been able to see.
        You can see in that photo\1\ in Exhibit A, which we will
    make part of the record and turn over to the Committee. He's
    already crossed over that bridge or the walkway and stepped up
    onto that roof. I am not saying that they should have
    neutralized him, but if they would have just held their post
    and looked left, maybe, and there's a lot of maybes there,
    Senator.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The photo referenced by Mr. Rowe appears in the Appendix on
    page 74.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Blumenthal. A lot of maybes, but somebody needs to
    be held accountable. I think Senator Graham hit the nail on the
    head. We need to know who specifically was responsible for
    doing what. Who was responsible for saying to former president
    Trump, ``Sir, it's not safe to go out there yet.'' Who was
    responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement
    were doing their job? Who was responsible for tracking down
    that suspicious person who fit the profile; 10 to 25 years old,
    young male.
        The FBI has warned us about it year after year after year.
    Director Wray has come before us and said the threat is from
    domestic extremism, the lone gunman. We are all aware of it in
    law enforcement. I think we need individual accountability
    here, and people need to be held responsible, in fact, lose
    their jobs, if necessary, to send a message that this massive
    intelligence and surveillance failure as well as the
    enforcement failure cries out for accountability. Let me just
    ask, in the short time I have left, what is the nature of the
    Iran threat?
        Mr. Abbate. I am sorry, Senator, could you repeat the
    question?
        Senator Blumenthal. What is the nature of the Iran threat,
    the threat to former president Trump that has been mentioned?
        Mr. Abbate. Let me be clear here. The terrorist regime of
    Iran has been targeting people our country for many years now.
    We have talked about that here before. I want to be clear about
    that. From the FBI standpoint, we know publicly they have
    targeted former president Trump. They have called for his
    assassination along with other current and former officials.
    That's public information. It's well known to everyone.
        Senator Blumenthal. Was there a specific or imminent threat
    on July 13th?
        Mr. Abbate. We have no information that there are any co-
    conspirators or that foreign or domestic, including Iran,
    related to this. I want to be clear; we have no evidence of
    that. We are not ruling anything out. We are looking into all
    possibilities and leaving our minds open to that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Was that on the minds of the Secret
    Service on July 13th, that there might be some threat from
    Iran?
        Mr. Rowe. Sir, as Deputy Director Abbate just said, we are
    aware of the public sentiment and statements of the government
    of Iran to do harm to Donald J. Trump, and we use a threat-
    based model.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF

        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for
    your testimony today and for your service.
        Mr. Rowe, I want to begin discussing Secret Service
    staffing, and the extent to which HSI or other personnel are
    augmenting, or backfilling inadequate Secret Service capacity,
    generally, and on the day of the assassination attempt. To what
    extent are HSI personnel, for example, filling close protection
    roles that would normally or optimally be filled by Secret
    Service personnel?
        Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As we have
    done, even back when we were with Treasury, we enlist during
    campaign years the assistance of other law enforcement agencies
    in that department. When we were in Treasury, we used Bureau of
    Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), we used Internal Revenue
    Service Criminal Investigation (IRSCI). When we transferred
    over to the Department of Homeland Security, we have brought
    that practice with us.
        So going into a campaign year or during a national special
    security event like the United Nations General Assembly, we
    will enter into a memorandum of assistance for the campaign
    with HSI. HSI will provide post standards. Essentially, Federal
    agents, law enforcement, to be able to help secure a site when
    it comes to close protection. The only time that we will
    utilize them is during a United Nations General Assembly where
    they may be utilized to protect low-level head of State or
    provide security at a hotel in New York City where those
    protectees are staying.
        Senator Ossoff. On the day in question, all of the former
    president's close protection detail were full-time Secret
    Service personnel?
        Mr. Rowe. They were, and they were assigned to the Donald
    Trump detail.
        Senator Ossoff. OK. Interoperability with other Federal,
    and State, and local law enforcement agencies, specifically on
    communications, what have you determined to date played a role
    in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies, the
    suspicion or identification of a threat?
        Mr. Rowe. I think there was a delay in reporting. Not
    having that real time. As they were closing in on him, as
    information is known as----
        Senator Ossoff. Be more specific. Who were closing in on
    him?
        Mr. Rowe. Local law enforcement were closing in on him as
    he's seen scurrying across the roof, right? That information
    and we are getting to the bottom of that. We are working on
    trying to figure out what was the delay? Why didn't we hear
    that coming out of the unified command? So based on the
    information I have right now, what I can tell you, Senator, is
    that apparently not having that real time information is what
    really hindered us in being able to understand more than it was
    just the locals working an issue at the 3 p.m. There was
    actually a little bit something more urgent than that.
        Senator Ossoff. Does it appear that that is due to a lack
    of communications links between relevant officials and
    agencies, or poor communications practices and a failure to
    report?
        Mr. Rowe. I don't want to rule out. I want to have a
    neutral opinion on that. I don't know if it was poor practices.
    I can tell you that the interoperability, having the not being
    able to have that technical fix, and which is a lofty goal to
    be able to do that, is something that has been a hindrance. But
    that's why we use a counterpart system.
        Senator Ossoff. In fact, is not the capability when an
    intergovernmental interagency team is deployed to secure a site
    like this and to mount, if necessary, a quick reaction. There
    is not currently the capability, for example, State law
    enforcement, SWAT personnel, or local law enforcement officers,
    to communicate directly with Secret Service officers onsite?
        Mr. Rowe. Technically you could do it, but it would take a
    long time to get it done. For a one-day or an eight-hour
    operation it requires a lot. It would be months of planning of
    knowing that we are going to go to this particular
    jurisdiction, and that we are going to need your frequencies,
    the keys, and we are going to need to load you into our radios,
    and you are going to be needed to load it into ours and vice
    versa.
        Senator Ossoff. Right. This presents potentially, I think,
    an opportunity for the Homeland Security Committee. I mean, not
    just in an executive protection context, but any complex
    incident response, any counter terrorism, any natural disaster
    context. The inability, swiftly, to link personnel from
    disparate jurisdictions at the local, State, and Federal level
    is a vulnerability for the Nation. Is it not?
        Mr. Rowe. I would think and based on my experience, being
    able to talk to other agencies in real time, certainly would
    assist in that response.
        Senator Ossoff. Mr. Chair, do I have time for one more
    question?
        Chairman Durbin. Yes.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you. I know others have touched on
    this. One of the things that's been most baffling to the public
    has been the failure to fully secure this structure, which even
    to a lay person's uninformed eye, clearly presents as a site
    from which an attack on the former president of this event
    could be mounted. It had particular characteristics that made
    it even more of potential value to an attacker.
        Just walk us through one more time. Is there not an
    established doctrine, or practice, or checklist by which such
    sites are assessed for threat and determine whether or not to
    be within or without of the security perimeter?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, controlling high ground is something
    that is a must for us whenever we go into a location.
        Senator Ossoff. Yes. I know we are all eager for more
    information on why that task was not completed in this case.
    Thank you for your testimony.
        Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Lee.

                    OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEE

        Senator Lee. Why was President Trump allowed to take the
    stage at 6:02 p.m., exactly 17 minutes after multiple
    suspicious person reports were provided, complete with photos,
    and information suggesting that the assailant had a
    rangefinder, something that ordinary people don't use in this
    kind of circumstance?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, it was suspicion not weapon, or
    there was never communication of that there was an individual
    with a gun, or threat, or other bad intentions.
        Senator Lee. How many suspicious person reports did you
    receive that day?
        Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you on the exact number, but
    there were other individuals that came to the attention of law
    enforcement that day.
        Senator Lee. Would President Biden ever be allowed on stage
    under similar circumstances with an unresolved set of multiple
    suspicious person reports provided, including indicating that
    there was a range finder involved?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can tell you that a suspicious person
    on the outer perimeter with local law enforcement attempting to
    locate is, would happen. But I would need more information as
    far as whether or not we would allow the President to go on or
    off.
        Again, for us, it comes down to weapon, a potential threat,
    is the individual carrying an IED, is there a weapon? Is there
    some other factor that now ramps up our attention to----
        Senator Lee. Understood.
        Mr. Rowe [continuing]. Let's hold off on this.
        Senator Lee. If there were eight shell casings found next
    to the assailant's body, but he was neutralized after the first
    shot, where did those other shots come from? Where did the
    other shots go?
        Mr. Rowe. As far as the assailant shooting?
        Senator Lee. Yes. Did the assailant get out eight shots, or
    were those shell casings left from the day before? Where did
    they come from?
        Mr. Abbate. The shooter, Senator, we believe fired eight
    rounds. We had the shooting reconstruction team go out there
    for a period of days and collect all that. We have bullet
    holes, bullet fragmentation, all taken back, and there we are
    still putting together the trajectory and ballistic analysis.
    Although we do have fragments of the bullets and bullets had
    been collected in the distance from the shooter's weapon.
        Senator Lee. Got you. It's my understanding there was a
    sniper team assigned to a window with complete overlook,
    complete view of the roof, the same rooftop, sloped rooftop
    where the shots were fired. It's also my understanding,
    according to some whistleblower accounts, that that post was
    abandoned. What can you tell me about that? Why was it
    abandoned?
        Mr. Rowe. I saw that from the colonel's testimony, sir, and
    it's something that I have asked in our mission assurance is
    getting to the bottom of. There were two-man counter sniper
    teams from the local that were in that AGR building.
        Senator Lee. At some point they just left?
        Mr. Rowe. I do not have an answer for you on that, Senator.
    But it seems to me that if even one of them left, there should
    have been remaining some additional eyes left in that building.
        Senator Lee. Yes. That seems like something that maybe
    should be one of the very first questions you address. I am
    actually surprised that you do not know that already. I would
    ask that you submit to us in writing\1\ what you learn as soon
    as you learn it. Will you commit to that?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the
    Appendix on page 152.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lee. Let me just state it this way. Multiple
    requests were made by Trump's protective detail and by Trump's
    campaign team to the Secret Service for additional resources. I
    am told that those were denied, and as I recall, the Secret
    Service spokesperson initially denied that such requests were
    made and denied. Why not tell the truth from the outset? What
    were they trying to do there?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I do not think there was any intention
    to mislead----
        Senator Lee. Looks like a pretty material fact, isn't it?
        Mr. Rowe. I saw that report. Go ahead, Senator.
        Senator Lee. Will you commit to me that you will submit to
    us in writing\2\ what requests were made by whom, and to whom,
    and when they were denied?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The information requested by Senator Lee appears in the
    Appendix on page 152.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rowe. I will, sir.
        Senator Lee. OK. Look, at the end of the day, we we are
    looking at a situation in which at a minimum, people knew that
    this guy had a gun at least two minutes before the shooting
    happened. I want to know what you can tell me about what
    happened during that final two-minute period where a whole
    bunch of people in the crowd saw and were shouting, ``He's got
    a gun.''
        During that two-minute period, perhaps at the beginning of
    it, the local police started to climb the rooftop, and there
    was at least 30 seconds after which local police were able to
    personally observe the shooter with a gun, had the gun pointed
    at him. What happened during that time period? Why on earth was
    President Trump not removed from the stage at that moment?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, the reason why President Trump was not
    removed was, again, we did not have anything more than locals
    working an issue at the 3 o'clock. It was not determined as to
    whether or not it was the same individual or not, and there was
    no report of----
        Senator Lee. The same individual as what?
        Mr. Rowe. The same suspicious individual.
        Senator Lee. Right. But we have left the category of
    suspicious individual at that point. You have a guy with a gun
    on a rooftop, 136 yards away from the stage, that he's got a
    gun at that point. What happened during that time period that
    did not result in President Trump is protective detail being
    notified of that, and him immediately being removed from the
    situation?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will say, and then I will turn it
    over to Deputy Director Abbate, no information regarding a
    weapon on the roof was ever passed to our personnel.
        Senator Lee. How is that even possible? Do you want to
    comment to that?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, again, I believe that information, and
    this is probably something my colleague can expound, on
    information that was in law enforcement, local law enforcement
    channels, but did not cross over and make it to Secret Service
    awareness.
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, just to clarify the timeline. The
    individual was first seen by law enforcement on the roof at
    about 6:08. We are still working to perfect the timeline based
    on the radio communications and all that. It was not until at
    6:11, 03 seconds, the officer saw him and called out his arm.
    That was the first sighting where he had the rifle on the roof,
    and then he----
        Senator Lee. That was relayed to the Secret Service Command
    Center at that point?
        Mr. Abbate. My understanding is no. Secret Service, it was
    not relayed to them. It's a narrower timeframe, though. It's
    probably about, maybe, up to half a minute between the time
    he's seen with the rifle and when the shots are fired.
        Senator Lee. But there's still time at that point. If there
    were an open channel of communication in which they were able
    to tell him, ``He's got a gun, take him out.'' You could still
    take President Trump off the stage. You could have him duck.
    You could have the shooter neutralized. Do you not have a
    channel of communication by which they can say, ``Gun. Take him
    out.''
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that information stayed in local
    channels and did not make it over to Secret Service.
        Senator Lee. They did not consider that relevant? You are
    saying that the local police did not consider that relevant
    enough to pass along to the Secret Service?
        Mr. Rowe. Sir, I think that they were in the midst of
    dealing with a very critical situation, and they articulated
    that over the radio, as I understand it. However, it was never
    relayed over to us.
        Thank you, Senator Lee. Senator Hawley.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY

        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director Rowe, can you put your first poster or your first
    demonstrative back up.
        Mr. Rowe. Please put it up.
        Senator Hawley. Just to make sure everybody can see it.
    This is the photograph I believe that you took, your team took
    of the roof. The AGR roof. Yes, that's the one. So, from this
    vantage point, as the law enforcement who are in those windows,
    as they look left, they should be able to see the shooter
    clearly there on the AGR second floor roof. My question is, why
    is there not a Secret Service counter Sniper on that roof?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, when we post up, it is our methodology
    is to look at things that can see in on our protectees so that
    they can provide that coverage.
        Senator Hawley. But why is there not a Secret Service
    counters sniper there with clear line of sight? That roof has a
    clear line of sight to the former president. Why didn't you put
    a Secret Service counter sniper there?
        Mr. Rowe. The Secret Service's counter sniper role is to
    neutralize those threats that are looking in on us from where
    the Protectee is, not necessarily his position.
        Senator Hawley. You think maybe you might want to revise
    that protocol in light of what happened here?
        Mr. Rowe. They were protecting the principle, and I think
    in the----
        Senator Hawley. The principle got shot.
        Mr. Rowe. I understand that, sir.
        Senator Hawley. Do you think you might want to revise the
    protocol? Let me ask you this. Who is the lead site agent who
    made the decision to leave the AGR building completely outside
    of the security perimeter? Who was that?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I cannot give you that name. This person
    is operational. They are still doing investigations. They are
    still doing protective visits.
        Senator Hawley. Have they been relieved of duty,
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, they have not been relieved of duty.
        Senator Hawley. I know their name, by the way.
        Why have they not been relieved of duty?
        Mr. Rowe. They are still cooperating, not only being
    interviewed by the FBI, but also by our Office of Professional
    Responsibility. We will let the facts of the mission assurance
    and any further investigations play out.
        Senator Hawley. Isn't the fact that a former president was
    shot, that a good American is dead, that other Americans were
    critically wounded, isn't that enough mission failure for you
    to say that the person who decided that that building should
    not be in the security perimeter probably ought to be stepped
    down?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think you are using the word decided,
    and I think we need to allow the investigation play out to
    include----
        Senator Hawley. OK. Who did make the decision then if it
    was not the lead site agent who made the decision not to put
    that in the security perimeter?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, you are zeroing in on one particular
    agent. I want to find out exactly what was the entire decision
    process?
        Senator Hawley. Yes.
        Mr. Rowe. I want to be neutral and make sure that we get to
    the bottom of it, and interview everybody in order to determine
    if there was more than one person who perhaps exercised bad
    judgment.
        Senator Hawley. Sure. My question is, why don't you relieve
    everybody of duty who made bad judgment? Yes, you are right. I
    am zeroing in on somebody. I am trying to find somebody who's
    accountable here,
        Mr. Rowe. And we will.
        Senator Hawley. You are telling me that the person who made
    the decision not to include this in the perimeter has not been
    relieved of duty. What about the person who's in charge of the
    interoperability of radio frequencies between local law
    enforcement and Secret Service? Has that person been relieved
    of duty?
        Mr. Rowe. No, Senator, because interoperability is a
    greater challenge than just one person on that day. We had a
    counterpart system. It failed spectacularly.
        Senator Hawley. Has the person who decided, who made the
    decision to send Donald Trump onto the stage knowing that you
    had a security situation, has that person been relieved of
    duty?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. They have not.
        Senator Hawley. Has the person who decided not to pull the
    former president off of stage when you knew that, in your
    words, the locals were working a serious security situation,
    has that person been relieved of duty?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. Again, I refer you back to my original
    answer that we are investigating this through a mission
    assurance and as opposed to zeroing in on one or two
    individuals to find out exactly what the decisionmaking process
    was.
        Senator Hawley. What would you need to investigate, to know
    that there were critical enough failures that some individuals
    ought to be held accountable? What more do you need to know?
        Mr. Rowe. What I need to know is exactly what happened. I
    need my investigators to do their job, and I cannot put my
    thumb on the scale.
        Senator Hawley. A lot of people did not do their job.
        What do you mean put your thumb on the scale?
        Mr. Rowe. You are asking me, Senator, to completely make a
    rush to judgment about somebody failing. I acknowledge this was
    a failure of the Secret Service----
        Senator Hawley. Is it not prima facie that somebody has
    failed? A former president was shot.
        Mr. Rowe. Sir, this could have been our Texas School Book
    Depository. I have lost sleep over that for the last 17 days.
        Senator Hawley. Then fire somebody.
        Mr. Rowe. I will tell you, Senator, that I will not rush to
    judgment. That people will be held accountable, and I will do
    so with integrity, and not rush to judgment and put people----
        Senator Hawley. I can't believe----
        Mr. Rowe. Unfairly persecuted.
        Senator Hawley. Unfairly persecuted?
        Mr. Rowe. Unfairly, sir.
        Senator Hawley. We have people who are dead.
        Mr. Rowe. We have to be able to have a proper investigation
    into this, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. You said earlier that you have to make sure
    that your protocols are followed. Unless there's a protocol
    violation, people would not be disciplined. I would just say to
    you, I don't really care that much about your protocols. I
    think if your protocols don't provide for the fact that when a
    former president is shot, when an American is killed, when
    other rally goers, innocent people who just showed up on the
    day when they are shot at and critically wounded, if that isn't
    a protocol violation, prima facie, you should revise your
    protocols.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think this is where you and I agree
    this was a failure, and we will get to the bottom of it.
        Senator Hawley. I hope you are going to do something about
    it. Let me ask you something else. The RealClearPolitics
    reports this morning that you were directly involved in denying
    additional security resources and personnel, including counter
    snipers. Not just to this event, but over the last two years.
    That President Trump's team repeatedly asked for these
    additional resources, and you personally were involved in
    denying them. Is that true?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, as I stated earlier, that is not true.
        Senator Hawley. You never denied any resources to former
    president Trump's team?
        Mr. Rowe. No, not me. No, sir. Not personally.
        Senator Hawley. You weren't involved in any of that?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir.
        Senator Hawley. You were never involved in the
    decisionmaking?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. I was not.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you just one or two other things
    here quickly. Whistleblowers tell me that in fact, law
    enforcement were stationed to be on that roof, and that law
    enforcement abandoned their post because it was too hot. Is
    that accurate?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I have heard that as well. Again, they
    posted up inside. I think moving forward, as I said earlier, we
    are going to ensure that State and local counter snipers are on
    roofs.
        Senator Hawley. But do you know if someone was supposed to
    be on the roof? Do you know if someone was, in fact--that's
    what the whistleblowers tells me. That may or may not be
    accurate. Do you know that to be the fact? Was somebody posted
    to the roof, local law enforcement or whomever?
        Mr. Rowe. I do not know that to be a fact.
        Senator Hawley. Can I ask you why you don't know that?
        Mr. Rowe. Again, Senator, we are looking at this, and they
    should have been on that roof. The fact that they were in the
    building is something that I am still trying to understand.
        Senator Hawley. I just want to express my frustration,
    Director. Those 17 days, or whatever it's been, that
    whistleblowers are telling us more than you are, and you don't
    know, you haven't ascertained if there was supposed to be law
    enforcement on the roof. That seems like a pretty basic fact.
        I am also told that local law enforcement suppliers offered
    the Secret Service drones and you declined them. Is that true?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, one, I have been very transparent and
    forthcoming.
        Senator Hawley. Your agency has not been transparent and
    forthcoming. So please, let's not go there.
        Mr. Rowe. I have been forthcoming, sir.
        Senator Hawley. That remains to be seen. You have been on
    the job a few days so far. You have fired nobody.
        Chairman Durbin. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Were you offered drones?
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Hawley.
        Mr. Rowe. No. There wasn't offered to fly a drone on that
    day.
        Senator Hawley. Why did you deny it?
        Mr. Rowe. Again, I think the ability of local law
    enforcement to provide an asset, we probably should have taken
    them up on it if it was offered.
        Chairman Durbin. Senator Cruz.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CRUZ

        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Rowe, thank you for being here. I agree with what you
    said at the outset, that the individual Secret Service agents
    demonstrated remarkable personal courage, putting their bodies
    in between the line of sight of the shooter and the President.
        That being said, the bravery of the line agents is quite
    different from the decisions of Secret Service leadership.
    Secret Service leadership committed catastrophic security
    failures, indeed, the worst security failures for the Secret
    Service since 1981. Since the attempted assassination of
    President Ronald Reagan. It is incumbent upon this Committee to
    determine why those security failures happened.
        Just after the shooting, Secret Service put out an official
    statement from your spokesperson that says, ``There's an untrue
    assertion that me, a member of the former president's team,
    requested additional security resources, and that those were
    rebuffed. This is absolutely false. In fact, we added
    protective resources, and technology, and capabilities as part
    of the increased campaign travel tempo.'' Was this tweet
    accurate?
        Mr. Rowe. With respect to Butler, Pennsylvania, it is
    accurate, sir.
        Senator Cruz. It is accurate that the Trump team had not
    asked for additional security and had not been rebuffed.
        Mr. Rowe. If you are talking about Butler, Pennsylvania,
    all assets requested were approved. If you are talking about
    the media reporting of assets requested, there were times when
    assets were unavailable and not able to be filled. Those gaps
    were staffed with State and local law enforcement tactical
    assets.
        Senator Cruz. I am reading from The Washington Post, July
    20, 2024. Secret Service is said to have denied requests for
    more security at Trump events. The opening paragraph, ``Top
    officials of the U.S. Secret Service repeatedly denied requests
    for additional resources and personnel sought by Donald Trump's
    security detail in the two years leading up to his attempted
    assassination according to four people familiar with the
    requests.''
        Is that right? That repeatedly, the Trump detail asked for
    more resources, and repeatedly, Secret Service leadership
    turned that down?
        Mr. Rowe. That is not accurate, Senator. Assets are
    requested.
        Senator Cruz. How many requests did the Trump team or the
    Trump detail ask for?
        Mr. Rowe. I can get you that number in----
        Senator Cruz. You do not know now.
        Mr. Rowe. No. I can speak to the ones that reported in The
    Washington Post, and we can go through them if you like.
        Senator Cruz. But you do not know how many requests there
    were?
        Mr. Rowe. In general, how many requests since 2021 that the
    former Trump detail has made a request for assets?
        Senator Cruz. You have had two weeks. You had a
    spokesperson, put something out that is false on its face. By
    the way, did you approve this statement when it went out?
        Mr. Rowe. I do not know if I did or did not, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. Is this spokesperson still employed? Does he
    still have a job?
        Mr. Rowe. He's still employed, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. He lied on behalf of the Secret Service. He
    still has a job. Did your predecessor, the former director, did
    she approve this statement?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, our communications team, they send out
    statements. They do deconflict them and they put them out.
        Senator Cruz. Did she approve this statement?
        Mr. Rowe. I do not know if she did or did not, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. And you do not know if you did either?
        Mr. Rowe. I do not recall approving it, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. Will you commit to provide this Committee in
    writing, every written request for additional resources from
    the Trump campaign or the Trump detail, and every response from
    Secret Service?\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The information requested by Senator Cruz appears in the
    Appendix on page 157.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I will commit to providing responses and
    getting you the information that you are seeking.
        Senator Cruz. May I ask you something? Who makes the
    decision to deny those requests? Did you make that decision?
        Mr. Rowe. Which requests are you talking about?
        Senator Cruz. Any of them.
        Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That were in The Washington Post?
        Senator Cruz. Yes.
        Mr. Rowe. The process, sir, is that a detail will make a
    request for either staffing, technical assets. That is handled
    between the field office and the detail.
        Senator Cruz. OK. So, there's a bureaucracy. Is there a
    decisionmaker?
        Mr. Rowe. It's not a bureaucracy, Senator, it's a process.
        Senator Cruz. Give me the person that's a decisionmaker. Is
    there one?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, it's a conversation. It's not just an
    absolute yes or no.
        Senator Cruz. Let me tell you what I believe. I believe
    that the Secret Service leadership made a political decision to
    deny these requests. I think the Biden Administration has been
    suffused with partisan politics. Did the same person who denied
    the request for additional security to President Trump also
    repeatedly deny the request for security to Robert F. Kennedy
    (RFK) Jr., whose father was murdered by an assassin and whose
    uncle was murdered by an assassin? Did the same person make
    that decision?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, what I will tell you is that Secret
    Service agents are not political--nor do they allow----
        Senator Cruz. OK. You are not answering my question.
        But you know what? Leadership appointed----
        Mr. Rowe. I will get to your answer, Senator, if you're
    allow me.
        Senator Cruz. Leadership appointed by the President is
    political. I have a simple question, yes or no. Did the same
    person deny the Trump request that also denied the RFK request?
    That's a yes or no question.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that is not a yes or no question. One,
    there is a process for a candidate nominee to receive
    protection.
        Senator Cruz. Does the buck stop anywhere?
        Mr. Rowe. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process that there's
    no participant----
        Senator Cruz. It's a bicameral, bipartisan process. What
    cameral?
        Mr. Rowe. For a candidate protectee----
        Senator Cruz. You are not a Congress. You do not have a
    cameral.
        Mr. Rowe. Mr. Kennedy submitted a request that was referred
    over to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC).
        Senator Cruz. OK. You are refusing to answer the question.
    Let me ask because the failures on that day were catastrophic.
    By the way, is it true that on the day of the Butler event,
    that Secret Service transferred an agent from President Trump
    to the First Lady?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. That's not true.
        Senator Cruz. That's been widely reported.
        Mr. Rowe. It's not true. There was one airport agent that
    actually went on the manpower request for the Trump detail.
    They handled the arrival at the airport for the First Lady
    and----
        Senator Cruz. What is the relative size of the Trump detail
    compared to the detail that is assigned to the President or the
    First lady?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, the former president travels with a full
    shift just like the President.
        Senator Cruz. The exact same size. Is that your testimony?
    That President Trump had the same size detail that President
    Biden has?
        Mr. Rowe. On the day-of in Butler? The number of agents
    surrounding him? It is the same number of agents surrounding
    the President today. There is a difference between a sitting
    president who also not only has----
        Senator Cruz. Hold on. You are using President in a way
    that is not clear. Is it your testimony that in Butler,
    Pennsylvania, Donald Trump had the same number of agents
    protecting him that Joe Biden has at a comparable event?
        Mr. Rowe. I am telling you the shift, the close protection
    shift surrounding.
        Senator Cruz. That's a yes or no.
        Mr. Rowe. That's what you asked me, Senator, and I am
    trying to answer it.
        Senator Cruz. You are not answering it. Is it the same
    number of agents or not?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, there is a difference between the
    sitting President of the United States.
        Senator Cruz. What's the difference?
        Mr. Rowe. The difference?
        Senator Cruz. 2X, 3X, 5X, 10X?
        Mr. Rowe. National command authority to launch a nuclear
    strike, Sir. There are other assets----
        Senator Cruz. I am not asking other assets.
        Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That travel with the President----
        Senator Cruz. How many more agents travel----
        Mr. Rowe [continuing]. That the former president will not
    get.
        Senator Cruz. Sir, you are refusing to answer.
        Mr. Rowe. But the number of Secret Service agents
    protecting him----
        Senator Cruz. Sir, stop interrupting me.
        Mr. Rowe. Go ahead, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. You are refusing to answer clear and direct
    questions. I am asking the relative difference in the number of
    agents between those assigned to Donald Trump and those
    assigned to Joe Biden. I am not asking why you assign more to
    Joe Biden. I am asking is the difference. Is it 2X, 3X, 5X,
    10X?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I will get you that number so you can
    see it with your own eyes.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Marshall, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARSHALL

        Senator Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director Rowe, there was probably 10 buildings within
    sniper range of President Trump on that afternoon. Why was the
    building being used by the sniper not in the security zone?
        Mr. Rowe. That's a question that I have asked, Senator.
    There was a decision that we were going to construct the site
    and it was going to maintain within the Butler Farm Show site.
    That building, that AGR was right on the curtilage of our outer
    perimeter. It is something that I--again, having been there and
    walked it, I had a hard time understanding why.
        Senator Marshall. There's no protocol that says anything
    within 300, 500 yards, or in direct line of the President
    should be in or out of the security zone. There's not a
    protocol that describes that?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, what we try to do is we try to either
    control the high ground or mitigate line of sight concerns.
        Senator Marshall. OK. You have stated that on multiple
    occasions, President Trump's team was denied more of a detail,
    more assets. Who denies that? Who is the person that denies
    that, generally speaking?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, there's a process. Again, there's a
    conversation had with the detail.
        Senator Marshall. There's got to be a buck stopping.
    There's got to be someone. Who is the person? Is it an
    individual within the DC agency? Is it someone in the
    Pittsburgh office who denies this?
        Mr. Rowe. It has nothing to do with the Pittsburgh office,
    sir. It is a conversation between not only the detail, the
    field office, but also----
        Senator Marshall. I do not want to know the conversation. I
    want to know who makes the decision.
        Mr. Rowe. The decision, sir, it's our process between the
    Office of Protective Operations and the Office of
    Investigations.
        Senator Marshall. Is there a title for this position?
        Mr. Rowe. We affectionately call it the War Room, and it's
    where all of our logistics files into.
        Senator Marshall. It's a room that makes the decision?
        Mr. Rowe. It is a staffing and assignments officer.
        Senator Marshall. OK. Is the Secret Service required to do
    a briefing with all entities of law enforcement involved in the
    event in the days leading up to the event and the day of the
    event?
        Mr. Rowe. We do a police meeting, sir.
        Senator Marshall. Is it required? Is it part of your
    standard operating procedure (SOP)?
        Mr. Rowe. The police meeting is what initiates the advance,
    and that is what is required.
        Senator Marshall. Was this meeting held on that day?
        Mr. Rowe. The police meeting took place on the days prior
    to that.
        Senator Marshall. Do you have documentation of that meeting
    actually happening?
        Mr. Rowe. If we do, sir, I will get them to you.
        Senator Marshall. But you are saying that it did not happen
    on the day of the event.
        Mr. Rowe. Sir, I think what you are referring to is a
    briefing that the State and locals would have done with
    themselves. We did a briefing with our own folks.
        Senator Marshall. Did your people meet with local law
    enforcement the day of the assassination attempt?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes.
        Senator Marshall. OK. You realize that local law
    enforcement says no. That that meeting never happened. That's
    why we need to get these people in to talk to us. This is why
    the FBI needs to be speaking up sooner than later and say
    whether that meeting did or did not happen. Surely, there's
    some type of documentation of that meeting one way or the
    other. Is there documentation of that meeting?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I can tell you that what you are
    referring to is the counter sniper team seconded to Butler ESU.
    Our personnel met with the team lead from Butler ESU, and they
    discussed areas of concern, areas of responsibility. That did
    in fact happen at the site on that day
        Senator Marshall. Director, I think you would agree with me
    that there were multiple individual and institutional failures
    the day of this assassination attempt. You have a $3 billion
    budget, you are still 2,000 employees short, and in 2022, the
    Secret Service had a 48 percent departure rate. That tells me
    you either have a culture problem or just gross incompetence.
    Which one is it?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I would challenge that 48 percent
    departure rate. Let me get you some statistics that we have. It
    is not 48 percent.
        Senator Marshall. But go back to the multiple failures that
    we saw on an individual basis, also systemic. I think it proves
    that there's either incompetence or some type of a culture
    problem within the ss.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I know you are not calling our workforce
    incompetent, and I know we do not have a culture problem. If
    anything, we are dedicated to making sure that we do not have
    mission failure. Let me get you the hiring numbers that we have
    because I think you will actually see that, no, we have
    actually done very well fairly recently. We are trying to make
    sure that we have the numbers that we need. Of course, we need
    more people. Everybody does. But let me get you those numbers,
    and I think let your own eyes see.
        Senator Marshall. Would you also disagree with me when it's
    reported that almost 50 percent of the rank and file officers
    do not trust leadership within the Secret Service?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, I think it's the right of every worker
    to talk bad about their boss.
        Senator Marshall. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Hirono, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HIRONO

        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Clearly there is a lot that the Secret Service has to, as
    answer for in this stunning security failure. But I do want to
    follow up on Mr. Abbate's testimony that an online profile of
    the shooter may have been found. You said it contains anti-
    Semitic and anti-immigrant postings. Can you elaborate, have
    you found anything further in that the shooter's profile?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, this was just discovered, as I
    mentioned, and it's being closely analyzed right now. We need
    to verify that it is in fact that it belonged to the now
    deceased shooter, and that he made these comments. That's why I
    felt it important in the interest of transparency to share that
    here, but add the caveat that we still have a lot of work to do
    which we are working on quickly to determine that.
        It's of importance, I think, because if it is, in fact, the
    shooter that posted these comments, it's the first real
    indication where he's expressing what are described as
    extremist views and talking about political violence.
        Senator Hirono. I take it that once you determine that it
    was in fact that the shooter who posted these kinds of
    comments, that you will let the public know as well as this
    Committee.
        Mr. Abbate. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. I think, in fact, it is very important that
    many of the perpetrators of mass shootings, et cetera, have
    these kinds of postings online that are very anti-immigrant,
    anti-Semitic, of anti-everything. It is really important as we
    determine the kind of profile for many of these shooters, that
    we understand how critical it is that we are careful how
    critically important it is that people are careful about what
    they are posting online, the misinformation, disinformation,
    everything else along those lines.
        This is for Abbate, once again. What kind of firearm, what
    kind of weapon did Crooks use in the assassination attempt?
        Mr. Abbate. This was an AR-15-style rifle manufactured by a
    company named Panther Arms.
        Senator Hirono. Once again, many of the persons involved in
    these kinds of mass shootings use this particular kind of
    weapon. We know from similar hearings that the Judiciary
    Committee has had, that we are a nation awash in guns. In your
    view, shouldn't we be doing more to prevent the easy
    accessibility of these kinds of firearms in our country?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, we are focused on collecting the facts
    here, and I am not going to comment on something like that.
        Senator Hirono. I know that a hesitancy to ask about
    firearms and all of that. I should think that as a law
    enforcement person, that you probably have some opinions along
    those lines. But you do not want to articulate what to many
    people in our country, there's a causal factor here; the easy
    accessibility of guns.
        I want to ask that question because I think it's important
    that the American people understand that, we are a nation that
    is awash in guns, and we have more mass shootings than any
    other country. Yet, we have been unable to pass the kind of
    laws that prevent these kinds of firearms to be easily
    available. That we have not done enough to promote gun safety
    in our country.
        Mr. Chair, I wanted to articulate that as like the elephant
    in the room that nobody wants to address, including apparently,
    our law enforcement officers. I am disappointed in that, but
    obviously, we have work to do to create a much safer
    environment, and to prevent persons who have these kinds of
    ideological perspectives and who are--I would say, who have
    these kinds of profiles to have such easy accessibility to the
    kind of firearms that can cause mass death and destruction.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Lankford, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                 OPEN9ING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

        Senator Lankford. Mr. Chair, thank you.
        Thank you, to both of you, for the testimony today.
    Director Rowe, future Vice President JD Vance was in my State
    this past week in Oklahoma City. I talked with some of the
    Secret Service folks that are there. They are doing a terrific
    job. I got a chance to be able to thank them, personally, for
    the tasks they are doing. I know the Oklahoma folks in Secret
    Service, and they are very dedicated, incredibly sharp people
    on that team.
        I know this is a challenge to all Secret Service. This is
    something every Secret Service agent wakes up every single day
    and wants to avoid. Please continue to be able to pass on our
    gratitude for the work they do every single day and for what's
    happening out there. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Abbate, I want to ask you about some of the interviews
    that have happened. You-all have done more than 400 interviews
    at this point for the counter sniper team that was local law
    enforcement, that was on the second floor overlooking that
    rooftop. Have they been interviewed at this point?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. I believe that each of them have
    been interviewed.
        Senator Lankford. Do you know offhand if they were at their
    post at that time able to look across? That they were at that
    post at some times--do we know they were at that post at 6:08
    to 6:11?
        Mr. Abbate. My understanding, and I want to be fair, I have
    not read the reports directly, but I have been briefed on some
    of it. They were at times during the timeframe we are talking
    about here on-post within the AGR building. I do believe, but I
    would want to confirm this, at some point one or more did
    venture out in an effort to locate and isolate the shooter.
        Senator Lankford. We understand from the timeline that they
    were also looking for this individual that was suspicious that
    they had left that post, to be able to try to look for him on
    the ground at different points to try to be able to see if they
    could get a different perspective. What we are trying to figure
    out is during that time period that he actually climbed on the
    roof, assembled a firearm, or took a firearm with him or picked
    one up, whatever, it might have been there, that they were able
    to actually see him if they were able to look left, has been
    acknowledged in the photos that are up there?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, I do not know the exact timing and the
    movements of each officer that was out there, but what I would
    derive from it is they were all focused on locating the
    shooter, the suspicious person at the time. Then as we have all
    seen, the one officer attempted to get on the roof directly--
    there were efforts going on in those final minutes, right on
    the video to try to get to this person.
        Senator Lankford. We have one officer being boosted up by
    another officer----
        Mr. Abbate. Yes.
        Senator Lankford [continuing]. To look up on the roof
    because people on the ground had said there's someone up there
    and they have a gun that's crawling on that roof. They climbed
    up to be able to see it. He turned around with a rifle, he came
    down, and then at that point he gets on the local radio that he
    has and says there's someone on the roof with a gun. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. I believe that that's accurate.
        Senator Lankford. What's the rest of the radio
    communication? We have heard that first call in, we know it's
    about 30 seconds from the time he called in until the actual
    first shot rang out. What else was discussed on the radio
    during that 30-second time period?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, we have the radio communications. The
    local radio communications were recorded and captured, and we
    do have that as part of the investigation. The key points to
    me, that local officer communicating that he sees the
    individuals he's armed, that's at about 6:11 and some seconds,
    I think it's three seconds. Then he identifies it as a long
    gun. About 6:11 and 11 seconds. Then, the shots, which all
    happened quickly together, I believe happened within probably
    30 seconds of that.
        Senator Lankford. We are talking about over the radio
    because there's a command center there.
        Mr. Abbate. Yes.
        Senator Lankford. Were all radios, including the local, as
    they are all being listened to, to try to be able to review.
    There's a statement that has the word ``gun'' in it that's
    coming out across that radio. We only know that first
    communication. We do not know what came back and forth on that.
    We would like to get transcripts of that conversation that was
    done, local law enforcement.
        But coming into that command center, there's also the word
    ``gun'' coming through one of the radio frequencies, I would
    think that would be communicated pretty quickly to everybody
    across the spectrum. 30 seconds is not long, but that's a
    National Football League (NFL) play, plus a huddle, plus the
    next play----
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lankford [continuing]. That's quite a bit of time
    still to be able to respond when Secret Service moved to be
    able to protect the President once the first shots were fired
    within two seconds, they are gathered around him. So, trying to
    be able to figure out where the word gun got lost in radio
    communication here and what else was said.
        Mr. Abbate. We will share the communications with you and
    the Committees. Senator, I will note just from my notes, there
    was effort within those minutes and seconds once the gun was
    announced. There's other communications where the local police
    are talking about deploying a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and
    responding and that they have the building surrounded. It's not
    in avoid. I do not want to give you the impression.
        Senator Lankford. Right, I understand. But typically, I
    would assume for Secret Service, if they hear over the radio
    over something gun, they are moving to be able to protect the
    detail, either the person they are protecting at that point,
    the protectee, that they are moving pretty quickly at that
    point, if that's what's actually coming out. That's what I am
    trying to be able to figure out how that did not get
    communicated out to the people that were directly in front of
    the former president at that point.
        The last question I would have, I only have a second left,
    is just was there any overhead drone? We have talked about
    counter drone, but any visibility that Secret Service had to be
    able to see the field and all the operation and their own
    ability?
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. As was asked by another Senator earlier,
    it appears that there was an offer by a State or local agency
    to fly a drone on our behalf. I am getting to the bottom as to
    why we turned that down.
        Senator Lankford. OK. Thank you.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Kennedy, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY

        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, am I
    saying your name right?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Kennedy. You are the Deputy Director of the FBI. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. Is there any doubt in your mind or in the
    collective mind of the FBI that President Trump was shot in the
    ear by a bullet fired by the assassin, Crooks?
        Mr. Abbate. There is absolutely no doubt in the FBI's mind.
    It wasn't whether former president Trump was hit with a bullet
    and wounded in the ear. No doubt. There never has been. I have
    been part of this investigation since the very beginning and
    that has never been raised.
        Senator Kennedy. You are sure?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. It was not a space laser.
        Mr. Abbate. No.
        Senator Kennedy. It was not a Murder Hornet?
        Mr. Abbate. Absolutely not.
        Senator Kennedy. It was not Sasquatch.
        Mr. Abbate. No, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. It was a bullet?
        Mr. Abbate. It was a bullet, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. Fired by Crooks.
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. That hit President Trump in the ear and
    almost killed him?
        Mr. Abbate. 100 percent Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. OK. Glad we cleared that up. I do not want
    to get off the subject here. Did the FBI just settle two
    lawsuits? One wholly, one in part in which the FBI agreed to
    give Peter Strzok $1.2 million and Ms. Lisa Paige $800,000.
        Mr. Abbate. It's my understanding, Senator, that the
    Department of Justice was involved in that. Not the FBI.
        Senator Kennedy. The FBI had nothing to do with it.
        Mr. Abbate. There may have been consultation with our
    General Counsel's office, but.
        Senator Kennedy. Does the FBI have to sign off on it?
        Mr. Abbate. I don't know the answer to that. I don't
    believe so, but I would want to confirm that.
        Senator Kennedy. I would like you to--this would be the
    same Lisa Paige who said to Mr. Strzok, ``Trump's not ever
    going to become President. Right? To which Mr. Strzok said,
    ``No, no, he won't. We will stop.'' That's the Peter Strzok and
    Lisa Paige I am talking about. I need to know if the FBI signed
    off on this lawsuit.
        Mr. Abbate. We will get that answer for you, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. Then I need to know who signed off on it.
    Did you sign off on it?
        Mr. Abbate. I absolutely did not, and would never sign off
    on something like that.
        Senator Kennedy. Did Chris Ray sign off on it, the
    settlement?
        Mr. Abbate. I don't believe he did. Nor do I think you
    would have.
        Senator Kennedy. You need to let me know who signed off on
    this. If anyone at the FBI. Was Merrick Garland who agreed to
    do this? Is that right?
        Mr. Abbate. Senator, I do not know who signed off on that.
        Senator Kennedy. Hell, somebody had to agree to it. I have
    settled a lawsuit before. The client's got to agree to it. You
    are the client.
        Mr. Abbate. Understood. I am going to direct it to the
    Department of Justice to answer those questions.
        Senator Kennedy. Get me that information, if you would.
        Mr. Rowe, help me understand this. The assassin, Crooks,
    fired his first shot, as I understand it, at 6:12 p.m. He was
    about 140, 150 yards away. It's been reported that the
    government snipers, saw him on the roof 20 minutes before. Not
    two minutes, 20 minutes before. Is that correct?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that's first time I am hearing this.
    That is not correct, based on the information I have right now,
    sir.
        Senator Kennedy. When did the FBI snipers see him on the
    roof?
        Mr. Rowe. Just secret service snipers, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. I am sorry. You are right.
        Mr. Rowe. That's an insult, sir. No, I am just kidding.
        Senator Kennedy. I understand. I apologize. When did the
    Secret Service snipers, one of whom ultimately shot the
    assassin, Crooks, first see him on that roof?
        Mr. Rowe. Sir immediately upon the shots being fired are
    snipers.
        Senator Kennedy. I know that, but when did they first see
    him? You got a guy lying on a roof. You got snipers in an
    elevated position. They can look down on the roof. You have the
    guy lying there with a gun pointed at the former president of
    the United States. They shot him. Good for them. He's now dead
    as Woodrow Wilson. That's a good thing. I am sorry. God forgive
    me, but it's a good thing. But when did the snipers first see
    him?
        Mr. Rowe. As soon as he presented himself as a target and a
    threat to the President, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. When was that?
        Mr. Rowe. He fires, initially, a volley. I believe it was
    three shots.
        Senator Kennedy. No, he fired at 6:12 p.m.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. OK. This first shot.
        Mr. Rowe. Within 15.5 seconds of the first shot, he's
    neutralized.
        Senator Kennedy. Here's what people are asking.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Crooks was up there. The snipers at some
    point saw him.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Our snipers because they killed him.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. When did they first see him? It has been
    reported repeatedly that the snipers first saw him 20 minutes
    before. That's more than a quarter in an NFL football game.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. You do not know the answer to that?
        Mr. Rowe. I do know the answer, sir. I am telling you
    that----
        Senator Kennedy. What is the answer?
        Mr. Rowe. No, they did not see him. They only saw him----
        Senator Kennedy. They never saw him.
        Mr. Rowe. No, sir. They did not.
        Senator Kennedy. How could they not see the guy? How could
    they not see him? They are in an elevated position. They are
    checking rooftops. They are looking around.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. There are two government snipers. How
    could they not see him there? He was big as Dallas, lying there
    with a gun pointed at the President. How could they not see
    him?
        Mr. Rowe. Because I believe he was obscured by that roof,
    sir. He did not pop up----
        Senator Kennedy. The roof is flat with ridges.
        Mr. Rowe. He's below the line where they would have seen
    him, sir. He did have concealment. I am not going to say it's
    cover. He did have concealment, and then ultimately gets into
    firing position and fires. Within 15.5 seconds of his first
    shot, he's neutralized.
        Senator Kennedy. I am gone way over you. You gentlemen need
    to answer these questions. Mr. Deputy Director, get me that
    information about those lawsuits.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your
    questions.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Peters, and Ranking Member
    Paul, for holding this important hearing on the attempted
    assassination of former president Trump.
        I am grateful for everyone's service and dedication.
    However, it's critical that this Committee get to the bottom of
    what happened that day so that we can prevent any future
    catastrophic security failures, and ensure that nothing like
    this happens again.
        Director Rowe, given that the event took place in a rural
    area, we have talked a lot about connectivity issues, was law
    enforcement at a disadvantage due to a lack of or limited
    connectivity? Why is the Secret Service not adopted a dedicated
    satellite-enabled Wi-Fi connection, which would facilitate
    integrated communication, enabled device connectivity to
    include drones and allowing for the sharing of real time
    intelligence?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, thank you for that question. Based on
    what I have seen, that radio connectivity, cellular was an
    issue that day. With respect to the satellite broadband, that
    is something that I have tasked our CIO and then we are getting
    some support from the Department of Homeland Security on. We
    will start to leverage whatever asset we have to ensure that
    connectivity.
        Senator Rosen. I can tell you that we have those Special
    Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) in Homeland Security, those
    special event ratings that we have for things like the Super
    Bowl. We have it a lot in Las Vegas. They do bring these mobile
    units to be sure that we have all the dedicated Wi-Fi cell
    service and integration that is absolutely necessary for
    securing a huge event. I look forward to hearing about that.
    Thank you.
        I want to talk a little bit about intelligence for lone
    wolf actors. Because although we have not been made aware of
    any specific intelligence, the Secret Service or others had in
    the shooter before the event, we do know that we have intel on
    Iranian threats against the former president.
        Again, Acting Director Rowe, could talk to us about how you
    utilize intelligence collection as a way of mitigating threats
    from State actors like Iran, compared to lone wolf actors, what
    it seems to be like the attempted assassin that we have here in
    Crooks.
        What are the specific challenges with the intelligence
    collection as a mitigation tool against lone wolf actors versus
    state actors?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, first, let me preface by saying the
    Secret Service is not a member of the intelligence community
    (IC). However, we are their biggest consumers of information.
    We receive that information regularly, especially as it
    pertains to our protective mission and the people that we
    protect. We have embeds with the FBI through their national
    Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
        Our agents are basically embeds and are able to not only
    receive information, but also follow up on investigations that
    may have a nexus or a direction of interest toward one of our
    protectees. We have an excellent working relationship with the
    FBI. We have an excellent working relationship with the
    intelligence community.
        We are not collectors, we are consumers of finished
    analytic products that the intelligence community or the FBI
    produces. We ingest them, and then we use that to adjust our
    protective posture. We do this daily, weekly, all of the time.
    It's not only for protective for protectees, but also the
    events and sites that we protect on, on a permanent or
    temporary basis.
        Largely, a lot of the people that come to our attention,
    and in the case of the assailant, to me, as I overlay him on
    over top of, say, John Hinkley who tried to shoot President
    Reagan, I see an individual based on information that I have
    now. Some of the great work that the FBI has done, we have an
    individual who's a loner. We have an individual who was focused
    on Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Hinkley traveled the 1980
    campaign. We know that he followed President Carter. On March
    1981, he happened to show up in Washington, D.C. and he saw an
    opportunity to try to attack President Reagan.
        When it comes to the Secret Service, 1981 was a watershed
    moment for us. We have people that are, for whatever reason,
    fixated on carrying out an attack against the President of the
    United States, or one of our protectees. In this instance, you
    have the assailant who was a loner, obviously. He was
    researching, he had researched the Democratic National
    Convention. He had researched, and Googled, or used a search
    engine about the former president. I think he had moved toward
    an idea that he was going to try to do something.
        When I look at this, we do not have a challenge with the
    FBI or the intelligence community. I think what we always try
    to wrestle with is trying to line up and see people as they are
    starting to head down a pathway toward violence.
        It's something that we have spent a lot of time and
    resources in with our National Threat Assessment Center to try
    to gain a better understanding so that we can help our agents
    in the field as they are doing these protective intelligence
    cases and these investigations to be able to make a
    determination. Is somebody generally a threat or do they need
    mental health, or do they need some other type of service?
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time's
    over. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Cotton, you are
    recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COTTON

        Senator Cotton. At the onset, I want to express, as many
    Members have, as President Trump did, the admiration and
    respect for the bravery and skill of the officers who were
    onsite that day; Secret Service officers, as well as all the
    local law enforcement.
        As it happened, my nine-year-old son was watching with me
    that afternoon, and it was hard to get him to turn away from
    it. He asked who all those men and women were who jumped on Mr.
    Trump. I said, in layman's terms, ``Those are his bodyguards.''
    He said, ``What are they doing?'' I said, ``They are protecting
    him from a bullet.'' He said, ``Actually?'' I said, ``Yes.'' He
    said, ``For real?'' I said, yes. It was hard for him to process
    that. But as a reminder, I told him that there are men and
    women in the Secret Service, in law enforcement, in the
    military who are willing to die for our country.
        It's an important lesson that I think that everyone should
    take away from this. That you had very brave men and women on
    the ground there who were doing their job to protect this
    country, to protect a former president and a nominee for
    president as they do every day for so many other protectees.
    Obviously, there were failures in the planning and preparation
    for this event.
        Mr. Rowe, we have heard that the shooter had a golf range
    finder. Was that not on the list of prohibited items at an
    event like this?
        Mr. Rowe. Currently, it is not on the list of prohibitive
    items, but we are going to make that change. Senator.
        Senator Cotton. John Kennedy cannot get into an Louisiana
    State University (LSU) football game with a flask.
        Senator Kennedy. Yes, I can.
        Senator Cotton. He probably can, but he is not supposed to.
    It just seems like common sense that you do not need a laser
    range finder at an event like this. It feels like that a lot of
    that was just the lack of common sense being exercised. Are
    officers not empowered on the front line to use common sense to
    say, like, if a guy has a laser range finder, he should be
    detained or at least stopped. That's why he's carrying around.
        If you have a building like this that's not secure from 150
    meters away, someone, even the frontline lowest level, most
    junior officer should be able to kind of like send up the red
    flag immediately and say, like, we need to halt everything
    right now and figure out what the hell is going on. Do officers
    not feel empowered to use that kind of conversation?
        Mr. Rowe. I would hope they would, Senator. I can tell you
    from our uniform division officers that run our magnetometer
    screening, they do a tremendous job. Even though something may
    or may not be on the prohibitive items list, they are well
    trained and they do exercise that that good common sense.
        Senator Cotton. I want every one of your officers all
    around the country to hear that acting director wants them to
    exercise common sense. It does not have to be policy or
    protocol or procedure. They should exercise common sense. Thank
    you for that.
        It was reported right before Ms. Cheatle's hearing last
    week that, in fact, President Trump's detail had requested more
    resources and those had been denied. She said that she did not
    deny those resources. You have testified this morning that you
    did not either. So, who did? The Secret Service is not the post
    office. It's not this vast bureaucracy. Right? Like I am not
    surprised to hear that you knew the counter sniper. It's a
    small agency and you have a lot of career officers. Like,
    surely, you have gotten to the bottom by now on whose desk this
    request landed and who denied it.
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, sometimes when they make a request, they
    may not have the asset available. For example, the detail may
    say, hey, we want 15 magnetometers. What we will look at it
    based on what the event size, we will say, hey, listen, we are
    going to send 10 based on our protocols of screening. We have a
    flow rate of how many people we can put through.
        When it comes to a counter sniper or something like that,
    because I know that's been the subject of some media reporting
    where they have requested counter snipers, we do have a finite
    number of counter snipers. What we try to do is, if we cannot
    fill that asset and that's where we will say, hey, we cannot
    fill this assignment.
        However, through the field office, they will use local law
    enforcement resources. In those situations, for example in the
    one that has been the subject of a lot of reporting in South
    Carolina, they in fact did use local assets to be able to do
    that. There were three counter sniper teams. One of them was
    formerly with the Secret Service Uniform Division. They
    actually use the same practices that we use.
        It's not that there was a drop in the capability. They
    actually use the best practices that we would use. The asset
    may be denied by Secret Service between the War Room and that
    conversation with the detail in the field. But that does not
    equate to a vulnerability or a gap.
        Senator Cotton. OK. One final question about the Iran
    threat. As you know, Iran made credible threats against several
    former Trump Administration officials, many of whom still have
    government-provided security details to this day. Ms. Cheatle
    removed Secret Service protection from Robert O'Brien last
    year. Were you involved in that decision?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, he was a memorandum protectee meaning
    that the President authorized protection for him. We do not
    weigh in on who gets protection.
        Senator Cotton. You are still protecting some others. I
    won't reveal their names. You are still protecting others, and
    other personal security officers in the Federal Government are
    protecting other officials. Like, who made the decision that
    Robert O'Brien no longer needed a security detail despite
    Iran's ongoing credible threats?
        Mr. Rowe. I can tell you, sir, it was not the Secret
    Service. We do not factor into that decision at all.
        Senator Cotton. Can you take a look at why that happened
    now that you are in charge and consider the possibility that he
    might still need that protection given all of his counterparts
    in the Trump Administration still have protection?
        Mr. Rowe. I will do so, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Again, I am not going to reveal the
    protective details, but I am pretty confident that the agency
    can get this done. I think it needs to get done if you look at
    the kind of ongoing threats that he and all these others face.
        Mr. Rowe. I will, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Despite all the resource constraints we
    have talked about today, he's not the President of the United
    States. He does not have an 18-car motorcade, nor do any of the
    others. I think he needs that protective detail. Now that you
    are in charge, I am asking you to take a new look at that and
    also talk to your supervisors inside the Department about
    whether you can spare just that small limited amount of
    resources. OK?
        Senator Cotton. I will, sir.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Welch, you are recognized for your
    questions?

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WELCH

        Senator Welch. Thank you very much.
        First of all, thank you both for the tremendous work you
    do, and for all the folks behind you and under you. So thank
    you for that. I kind of want to follow up a little bit on
    Senator Cotton. There's three issues that have been raised. One
    is the selection of who gets protection. You have addressed
    that just now. The other is whether it's a budget issue which I
    do not think necessarily think it is.
        But then there's the operational question. Was this an
    operational failure? It appears to me that's where the focus
    should be. One of the issues on the operations is the capacity
    of people who are part of the team, both Secret Service and
    also the local law enforcement. Their capacity to act on what
    they see.
        This is what Senator Cotton, I think, was talking about
    with common sense. You mentioned that the sniper was authorized
    immediately to act, he was not checking in with anyone, right,
    and he took out the shooter as quickly as he could. But
    according to the time line, local law enforcement captured two
    photographs of the shooter at 5:10. At 5:32, local law
    enforcement officers a spot of suspicious of person who turned
    out to be the shooter with a phone and a range finder. And
    5:46, the alert was so significant that sniper's text photo of
    the shooter from where he was initially spotted to the USSS
    lead sniper.
        How is it that where you had these experienced law
    enforcement people who understood the gravity of the
    responsibility of protecting the former president, none of
    these actionable observations resulted in action. I will direct
    that first to you, Deputy Director Abbate.
        Mr. Abbate. Thank you, Senator. From the FBI standpoint, we
    are simply collecting the facts. We have interviewed most of
    the officers now.
        Senator Welch. OK. Acting Director Rowe?
        Mr. Rowe. So, in that Senator, I think there was a sense of
    this guy is standing out and that's why he came to the
    attention of local law enforcement.
        Senator Welch. No, I get that. That's my point.
        Mr. Rowe. Right.
        Senator Welch. He did stand out.
        Mr. Rowe. Correct.
        Senator Welch. But nothing happened. There were alerts, but
    there was, like, you have somebody suspicious, why didn't
    somebody go interact with this suspicious person like right
    away?
        Mr. Rowe. They were attempting to locate him. I cannot
    answer that question as to why. If they took a picture of him,
    and they thought he was unusual, suspicious, not acting normal,
    why there was not--and I think, again, there was probably an
    assumption on the part of that officer that took that picture
    that, oh, some uniform or somebody will go eventually and, and
    walk up to this----
        Senator Welch. See, that's what seems like an operational
    failure. Somebody else will do it. Is the responsibility of an
    officer to alert some other officer that they think somebody
    might be suspicious, or the first officer who sees a suspicious
    person can take the next step to actually engage that person or
    talk to someone very, very close to it and say, engage that
    person. This guy was wandering around for quite a while.
        Mr. Rowe. He was. I cannot put myself in the mind of that
    officer.
        Senator Welch. I am not asking you to do that. I am asking,
    how does the process work? So that is the job of the leaders as
    opposed to the officers? Are they empowered to act immediately
    upon the observation of someone who looks very suspicious,
    particularly when they have the rangefinder? They were in a
    place where it really was not about seeing the rally. It was,
    as we see, it was a place where you get a good view of former
    president Trump. I mean, that is a leadership issue, right?
        Mr. Rowe. Senator, that officer did not work for me. That
    was a State and local officer that made that observation, took
    that picture. I can tell you from the Secret Service
    perspective, and we do this routinely, is that when people come
    to our attention, we locate them. We go up, we do a field
    interview, or we try to do a consensual encounter.
        Senator Welch. OK. That's the operational thing I am
    talking about. If you do it within Secret Service, you-all are
    in charge. You are relying on local law enforcement assets.
    Those folks, and they did their job here, up to a point where
    they identified this person passed information along, but
    nobody acted. The empowerment to that local officer, I would
    think has to come be transmitted through the Secret Service.
    Maybe in the earlier briefings, but you know, where you say,
    folks, you see somebody suspicious, you engage that suspicious
    person.
        Mr. Rowe. I don't disagree, Senator. It goes back to my
    comments at the beginning of the hearing, that we need to be
    very direct to our local law enforcement counterparts so that
    they understand exactly what are their expectations.
        Senator Welch. I yield back. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Tillis, you recognized
    for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TILLIS

        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Abbate, Mr. Rowe,
    thank you for being here.
        Mr. Rowe, do you have a picture? I was watching your
    testimony earlier. Do you have a photograph of the vantage
    point from the Secret Service snipers?
        Mr. Rowe. I do. Let's see.
        Senator Tillis. There were two. Is that correct?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. Stage left and stage right.
        Senator Tillis. OK. I do not know if you have a vantage
    point of both of them or not.
        Mr. Rowe. That's the vantage point of the sniper who
    neutralized the assailant.
        Senator Tillis. OK. Would they have also been impaired in
    terms of actually seeing him until he popped his head up?
        Mr. Rowe. The sniper on the stage's right sides, Senator,
    they had an obstructive view because of that tree.
        Senator Tillis. They had an obstructive view.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes.
        Senator Tillis. The one thing, and this discussion that I
    do not believe that a sniper saw someone on the roof 20 minutes
    before just does not make sense to me. It sounds like the one
    who took the shot probably saw him for the first time about a
    split second before he pulled the trigger.
        Mr. Rowe. That's my assessment, sir.
        Senator Tillis. First off, I would like to clarify the
    requests that have been made of a lot of people so that we get
    the information in a good form. I think it would be helpful at
    least all the way back to, I think, November 5, 2022, I
    believe, when President Trump announced that he was running for
    reelection. I think it would be helpful if we could just get a
    matrix of any request for additional security.
        The resolution of that request. Was it honored? Was it
    denied? Was it downsized? If you could give us that, I think
    that that's going to be the best way versus giving us mounds
    and mounds of paper. If you can do that, I know you are looking
    at the same thing. I have heard from you that any subsequent
    request for field requests are being honored. I believe that
    that's true. Is that your testimony?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tillis. OK, thank you. I am more worried about the
    24 to 30 seconds between the time, I believe, a local law
    enforcement officer was hoisted on the shoulders of another
    police officer, saw a person armed, less than 200 yards away
    from the President, who I believe jumped down. What happened in
    those 24 or 30 seconds.
        Obviously, there's no such thing as a panic button. The
    first thing you would think is you had panic, you cover the
    President, get him off stage. None of that happened. What
    happened? Is it just that I hear a text message is what
    actually happened in the 30 seconds where a law enforcement
    officer knew that a gun was pointed in the direction of the
    President from a fairly short range.
        What actually did those folks who did have knowledge of
    exactly what was happening and could probably infer what was
    about to happen, what did they do? Mr. Abbate or Mr. Rowe,
    either one, based on your interviews.
        Mr. Abbate. Thank you, Senator. From the interviews you
    know, the officers in the immediate vicinity were operating
    with urgency at that point to get to this person. But he was on
    the roof. The officer who had looked over the edge, based on
    what I have been told, the shooter turned toward him with the
    rifle. That's what the officer observed. He was under threat
    himself in that second. He had to retreat and step down and get
    back to the ground in order to protect himself and keep him
    safe from potential rifle fire. But once he got to the ground,
    along with other officers, there were Butler County local
    officers, Pennsylvania State Police, they were moving around
    trying to find to get to this guy.
        Senator Tillis. Clearly, we have an operational problem
    here, because we had more than 20 seconds to have somehow cut
    through all the crap and the communications, whatever
    impediments there were have to be removed. First off, I love
    law enforcement. I wear the blue pin every day. They do great
    work. Secret Service did phenomenal work on the stage, but they
    failed because their job is to protect the public, and they
    needed to put themselves in harm's way to stop him.
        Now, I will let the interviews go through, but there was a
    massive failure. There were at least two law enforcement
    officers that knew a guy was about to pull the trigger at the
    President. I am just not really happy with the fact that we
    could not have communicated, covered President Trump, and try
    to secure the situation.
        I am going to let the investigation go forward. I think
    it's very important to point out that we cannot let a scenario
    go in the future where 20 seconds can lapse when a law
    enforcement officer within two football fields of a former
    president of the United States has material knowledge that
    somebody's about to get shot at on stage and we do not have
    instantaneous response. In the old days, maybe you would just
    shoot a gun in the air. I know for a lot of reasons why they
    did not do that, but there had to be some way to actually
    diffuse that situation. It did not happen on July the 13th.
        I just want to end by saying, Mr. Rowe, I think you have
    been forthcoming in your answers. I know you are frustrated. I
    have seen you twice now. You are clearly embarrassed by what
    happened. You do not think there's any reasonable explanation.
    To my colleagues who are worried about communications, they
    should spend times in their local government and State
    legislatures to understand just how bad communication is
    between law enforcement and first responders. We need to invest
    in this infrastructure that was also a part of the failure.
        But if you can please get to me and get to this Committee,
    a chronology of requests, accepted, denied, and the reasons
    for, I think that's going to be very helpful.
        Mr. Rowe. I will, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Chairman Peters. Senator Blackburn, you are recognized for
    your questions.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLACKBURN

        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to each
    of you for your patience and for being here today.
        Director Rowe, I want to come to you first because a
    counter sniper has decided to speak out about the culture at
    your agency. I think it is very telling. He sent an email, and
    I am going to quote from that. ``This agency needs to change,
    and if not now, when the next assassination in 30 days.''
        But here's what I want to talk with you about, because in
    this email, he says, and I am quoting again, ``The motto of the
    USSS is CYA, and every supervisor is doing it.'' Now, that's
    the end of his quote. You are the guy in charge, and you are
    one of those supervisors. You have been a career guy there at
    the Secret Service. The public has lost trust in the ability to
    execute the mission to protect. I want to know how you feel
    about the fact that employees in your agency are worried about
    covering their behind and not worried about protecting a former
    president.
        Mr. Rowe. Thank you, Senator. I am hurt by that email, but
    not in the way you think I am saying it. I am hurt because my
    people are hurting right now. We need them.
        Senator Blackburn. Then why did somebody delete the email?
        Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you on that, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. The agency deleted the email.
        Mr. Rowe. But may I address your question?
        Senator Blackburn. Yes, please.
        Mr. Rowe. I will get back to you as to whether the email
    was deleted or not. My agency is hurting. Emotions are raw. I
    actually want to hear more from that duty officer. That
    technician in his email, he referenced that he had spent time
    serving our nation as a United States Marine. That he is a 20-
    year professional of the Secret Service. I am committed to
    being a change agent. Meaning, I am committed to reviewing some
    of these things. I looked at the points in his email very
    quickly. I saw it as I was on my way over here this morning. I
    want to have further conversations, not only with him, but also
    the counter sniper supervisor----
        Senator Blackburn. If I may step back in, sir?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. All right. You want to talk with him?
    What about other whistleblowers? What about this culture? Are
    you going to allow these whistleblowers to speak out? Because
    it is troublesome if somebody went into the server and deleted
    that email, and I would hope you will get to the bottom of that
    and be able to provide some answers. Because this is, as you
    have heard from both sides, this is a situation that cannot be
    allowed to happen again.
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. Ever Mr. Abbate, and am I saying your
    name properly? We have heard it pronounced three different ways
    today in the hearing.
        Mr. Abbate. Abbate, Senator
        Senator Blackburn. Abbate?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes. Thank you.
        Senator Blackburn. You had mentioned a social media account
    that espoused anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic views, but you did
    not say what platform that was on and what the username was.
    This is Crooks that we are discussing.
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. That's Crooks. I did not want to
    comment on it because we have not fully confirmed yet, and I
    thought that--as soon as we confirm and certify that----
        Senator Blackburn. Would you provide that?
        Mr. Abbate. I will provide it to you.
        Senator Blackburn. That, and also the age at which he had
    those feelings. Then we understand that the Gab account is pro-
    immigration, pro-lockdown, leftist views. Is that accurate?
        Mr. Abbate. I have not seen it directly, but I believe from
    what I have been told, that is accurate. With the Gab account,
    though that's been publicly revealed through the CIO and other
    things, we are still working to certify and verify that that's
    his account also. But it does have differing points of view it
    would appear.
        Senator Blackburn. OK. What age and how fresh is that Gab
    account?
        Mr. Abbate. The Gab account, based on my recollection, the
    comments in there or the messaging is from about 2021, I
    believe.
        Senator Blackburn. OK. The other preceded that, maybe he
    was age 14?
        Mr. Abbate. Yes, Senator. The other account that we talked
    about was in the 2019, 2020 timeframe. It would have been in
    the couple years right before the Gab----
        Senator Blackburn. Right before that.
        Mr. Abbate. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. Are there other accounts that you-all
    are currently verifying and receiving information from?
        Mr. Abbate. As I mentioned, we have issued a bunch of legal
    processes and we are still awaiting returns from a number of
    the companies to include other social media companies as well.
        Senator Blackburn. OK. My time has expired. Thank you for
    your patience today. Thank you for the information. We look
    forward to getting more information. Director Rowe, we are
    going to hold you to being a change agent because things at the
    Secret Service absolutely have to change. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses
    for your testimony here today. Certainly, what happened on July
    13th, could and should have been prevented from what I have
    heard today. I am certainly grateful to our witnesses for their
    candid answers and for helping to provide additional clarity
    and new information about the circumstances surrounding this
    attack.
        Acting Director Rowe, some of what you have said today
    conflicts with information and accounts that we have received
    from local law enforcement that we have had the opportunity to
    talk with. They have been voluntarily and I will say
    expeditiously cooperating with our bipartisan investigation,
    which we certainly appreciate.
        But we now need to speak with Secret Service agents
    directly who are directly involved. I would say that you need
    to make them available as soon as possible. Those, those
    interviews cannot start weeks from now or months from now. Time
    is of the essence when memories are fresh, and you can get the
    information that is most important to us.
        My question for you as we wrap up this hearing, acting
    Director Rowe, will you commit to having those agents available
    for this Committee to interview as soon as possible in a matter
    of days, not weeks, matter of days?
        Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Certainly, the American people deserve to know what went
    wrong, and they deserve accountability for those security
    failures. As we continue our bipartisan investigation into
    security failures that day and any underlying systemic issues,
    we will continue working to follow the facts, get clear
    answers, and make important recommendations to ensure that a
    security failure like this never happens again.
        The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 5
    p.m. on August 14, 2024, for the submission of statements and
    for the questions for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        Chairman Peters. This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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