[Senate Hearing 118-368]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-368

                      YEMEN AND RED SEA SECURITY ISSUES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
                       SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
                          AND COUNTERTERRORISM

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 27, 2024

                               __________

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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

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                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOkayER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          


             SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,        
               CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM        

           CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  TED CRUZ, Texas
CORY A. BOOkayER, New Jersey         MARCO RUBIO, Florida

                              (ii)        

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut..........     1

Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana......................     3

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     4

Lenderking, Timothy A., U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Shapiro, Hon. Daniel B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for the Middle East, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. 
  Department of Defense, Washington, DC..........................     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    12

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Tim Kaine..............................................    34

Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Marco Rubio............................................    37

Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator John Barrasso..........................................    38

Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Tim Kaine..............................................    39

Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Marco Rubio............................................    42

Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Additional Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................    43

Tweets by U.S. Agency for International Development Director 
  Samantha Power, Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen..........    45

                                 (iii)

  

 
                   YEMEN AND RED SEA SECURITY ISSUES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2024

                           U.S. Senate,    
             Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
                Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher 
Murphy presiding.
    Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Kaine, Booker, Young, Van Hollen, Romney, Barrasso, Cruz, and 
Hagerty.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Murphy. We call this meeting of the subcommittee to 
order.
    Senator Young is on his way back from votes. I doubt he is 
pining to hear all of my opening remarks so I will put them 
into the record, turn the dais over to him and then we will 
hear from our witnesses.
    We are convening the subcommittee today to discuss an 
incredibly important topic, developments in Yemen and on the 
Red Sea.
    For the better part of the last decade, Gulf nations, often 
assisted by the United States, have been at war in Yemen 
against Houthi forces that control sizable parts of the 
country.
    I have argued that it was a catastrophic mistake for the 
United States and our Arab partners to be part of this 
conflict. My belief was that the war would simply strengthen 
the Houthis and strengthen Iran's influence in Yemen.
    During the last several months we have seen tragic evidence 
of this reality. Armed with sophisticated technology from Iran 
and coordinated with the Iranian military the Houthis have 
launched a dizzying barrage of attacks--missiles, underwater 
drones, aerial drones--against ships transiting through the Red 
Sea.
    The Red Sea is one of the most important geostrategic 
locations in the world. Fifteen percent of international 
maritime commerce passes through its waters, and now 90 percent 
of Red Sea traffic has been forced to choose longer and 
costlier alternatives.
    The cost increases to global shipping of this diversion 
will be significant. Consumers will bear the brunt of that.
    But the impact is not just economic. Due to the Houthis' 
actions in the Red Sea, bulk container ships with food supplies 
for starving people in Yemen have not been able to make their 
deliveries.
    In Sudan, where 95 percent of the population cannot afford 
more than one meal per day, aid deliveries of food and medicine 
are crucially delayed and come at significantly higher costs.
    I opposed the U.S. involvement in the Yemen war. I regret 
that Houthis are now strong enough to attack our interests in 
the region. But this is where we are. And now that we are in 
the crosshairs we must respond.
    That is why I have supported the President's leadership to 
launch Operation Prosperity Guardian to restore maritime 
security in the Red Sea.
    I have also supported the President's decision, together 
with our partners in the U.K., to target Houthi infrastructure 
in Yemen to prevent imminent attacks.
    That kinetic response has been paired with a targeted 
sanctions strategy to squeeze the Houthis' ability to finance 
their operations and increased interdiction efforts to 
intercept weapons coming from Iran to the Houthis.
    But this response has occurred without congressional 
authorization. And to my knowledge there is no existing law 
that would permit military action against the Houthis.
    The Constitution requires Congress to authorize acts of 
war. Period. Stop. We swore an oath to follow the Constitution. 
If we believe this is a just military action, and I do, then we 
should authorize it.
    But we also need to acknowledge that there is a real risk 
of escalation in the Red Sea, especially since Iran is 
unquestionably aiding the actions of the Houthis.
    Thus, an authorization is important to legalize the 
existing operations but also guard against an unauthorized 
mission creep.
    Now, I want the focus of today's hearing to be on the on 
the ground reality in the Red Sea, the scope of the threat to 
the United States, the merits of our existing response plan and 
the options going forward.
    I do not intend for this hearing to turn into a forum on 
congressional authorization. But for the military campaign 
against the Houthis to continue, I believe that a tailored, 
time bound congressional authorization is not just nice to 
have, it is required. To both authorize and limit the current 
military operation. And I will be in discussions with my 
colleagues in the coming days to introduce such an 
authorization.
    This debate, if we could have it, would importantly help us 
understand both the power and the limits of American military 
might in and around the Red Sea.
    The broader crisis in Yemen and the lingering war is not 
over. It is a crisis that Senator Young and I have been focused 
on together for years.
    The war that has ravaged Yemen for nearly a decade and 
created the world's worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen has 
quieted but the country is still in dire straits.
    The United States, through Special Envoy Lenderking who 
will testify before us today, regional allies, and the U.N. 
have all been working together with Yemeni leaders and citizens 
to find a political solution to permanently end the war and 
resolve Yemen's internal conflicts.
    Peace will only come through political reconciliation. Our 
airstrikes can protect U.S. assets in the region and in the Red 
Sea, but they cannot bring peace to Yemen.
    This is an incredibly important hearing today. I look 
forward to our discussion with our witnesses to help us chart 
that path forward.
    I will now turn it over to Senator Young.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman, for convening this 
important hearing and the critical foreign policy challenge.
    I thank our witnesses for appearing today.
    The actions of Iran's proxies in Yemen and the surrounding 
waters threaten the lives of innocent mariners and sailors as 
well as significant global commerce, and they risk 
destabilizing a fragile pathway toward peace in Yemen.
    Nine nations border the Red Sea and connecting gulfs--none 
of them are Iran--and yet the bloodstained fingerprints of the 
world's leading State sponsor of terror are all over the Red 
Sea.
    Whether it be material support to the Houthis in Yemen or 
whether it be other means of direct support using its 
intelligence and command and control apparatus to enable the 
actions of the Houthis, these actions are having a cascading 
destabilizing effect on food security in Africa, global energy 
prices, and the dreams of millions of Yemeni people to rebuild 
their society and lives.
    It is imperative that the Administration respond to these 
actions while demonstrating it is both a strategy for deterring 
aggression and appropriate legal doctrine for maintaining these 
Global Commons.
    To date I have not seen such a strategy put forward. I am 
encouraged that the Foreign Relations Committee will be holding 
two hearings this week on Iran's destabilizing activities 
across the region.
    But I must also point out the lack of public committee 
action on these and other questions since Hamas attacks on 
Israel on October 7.
    I have no doubt about the sincerity of today's witnesses 
when they will tell us that they are committed to addressing 
the security challenges across the Red Sea and particularly in 
Yemen.
    I do have doubts, however, that the Administration has an 
actionable plan--an actionable plan to bring an end to Houthi 
aggression, Iranian terrorism, and a curtailment of Russian and 
Chinese meddling in this vital region.
    Our military actions to date carried out by incredibly 
brave U.S. service members have yet to stop the Houthis. The 
questions we are thus presented with are what do we do now?
    What actions by the United States are we willing to 
countenance? How do we push back on the Iranian parroted 
rhetoric tying the Houthis' actions to Israel's fight against 
Hamas? How do we continue to push for a stable peace process in 
Yemen?
    I hope that we will be able to get at these topics today, 
and I hope that we will hear from our witnesses today--what we 
hear will help us all better understand how the Administration 
plans to ramp up its response to finally take seriously the 
need to respond adequately to the threats facing the Red Sea.
    Finally, I would like to mention the names of Navy Special 
Warfare Operator First Class Chris Chambers and Navy Special 
Warfare Operator Second Class Nathan Gage Ingram, and I would 
like to acknowledge and offer my sincerest sympathies to their 
families.
    These men came from families of veterans, all of whom 
understand sacrifice, but they are nonetheless in our hearts.
    These two brave men gave their lives to preserving 
America's security in the Red Sea, and we would be remiss if we 
did not remember the continued danger our men and women in 
uniform face even this very hour on the land and sea and in the 
air around Yemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Young. Let me 
add my words and sentiments of sympathy. Thank you for that 
recognition.
    The chairman is joining us today, and I turn it over to him 
for some opening remarks.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Cardin. Senator Murphy, first, I want to welcome 
Ambassador Lenderking and Secretary Shapiro to our committee 
and thank them for their service.
    I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Young 
for conducting this hearing. I think it is extremely important.
    I just want to add my support for your opening comments on 
the responsibility of Congress in regards to the AUMF--the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force.
    I agree with you that the Administration should be seeking 
that authority, and it is our responsibility to respond to it, 
and I also want to acknowledge your leadership and Senator 
Kaine's leadership in regards to that issue.
    One or two points I would just like to make. I am very 
interested in learning where Iran's command and control was 
involved in regards to the Houthis' campaign. I think as much 
information as we can get as to the responsibilities for the 
proxy activities by Iran would be helpful to us.
    And then the point that you raised earlier, and that is how 
is the campaign in regards to the Red Sea with the Houthis 
affecting the prospects for peace within Yemen from the warring 
parties. I think these are all issues that are going to be very 
important for us to learn today, and I thank you very much for 
conducting this hearing.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me introduce our two witnesses, and then I will turn it 
over to both of you for 5-minute remarks.
    It is my pleasure to introduce Tim Lenderking, U.S. Special 
Envoy for Yemen. Mr. Lenderking is familiar to many of us on 
this committee.
    Previously he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Arabian and Peninsula Affairs in the Near East Bureau at 
the Department of State and held other key positions at the 
State Department in the region.
    Dan Shapiro is here with us today--again, well known to 
this committee. He is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for the Middle East.
    Ambassador Shapiro is best known to us as a former U.S. 
Ambassador to Israel and previously served in a number of 
important roles here in the U.S. Senate.
    I will turn it over to you first, Mr. Lenderking, and then 
to Ambassador Shapiro.

  STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY A. LENDERKING, U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 
        YEMEN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Lenderking. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this 
invitation to speak with you about the situation in Yemen and 
the Administration's response to ongoing Houthi attacks in the 
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
    Yemen is at a crucial moment. Reckless Houthi attacks are 
jeopardizing the very real accomplishments of multilateral 
diplomacy over the past 3 years.
    When President Biden appointed me special envoy for Yemen 
in 2021 he made clear that achieving a diplomatic durable peace 
in Yemen was a top Administration priority. That has not 
changed and there is tangible progress to point to.
    In 2020-21 Yemen was a hot war with more than 400 cross-
border attacks per year and tremendous destruction of 
infrastructure, countless deaths inside the country.
    Now both the cross-border attacks and that destruction have 
ceased, and after more than 50 trips to the region over the 
past 
3 years I remain convinced that peace in Yemen is not only 
possible but serves U.S. interests, those of our regional 
partners, and of course, the Yemeni people themselves. People 
of Yemen deserve to live in peace.
    Despite the Houthis' illegal maritime attacks the April 
2022 truce between Yemen's warring parties continues to hold. 
Violence inside Yemen remains at the lowest level since 2015, 
and Yemen's humanitarian crisis, while still acute, is less 
severe than at its peak.
    Until the Houthis' escalation average Yemenis were 
beginning to see a way back to stability. We should not lose 
sight of these milestones even as we necessarily degrade and 
destroy Houthi military capabilities and condemn their attacks 
on civilian shipping.
    In December U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg 
announced that the parties to the conflict had reached an 
understanding on a roadmap for peace including a durable cease 
fire and an inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni political process.
    We have strived for and supported these goals, and the U.N. 
roadmap remains Yemen's best hope to end the conflict. Yet, as 
we have all seen since October, the Houthis are throwing this 
progress away.
    Iran is equipping and facilitating Houthi attacks in the 
Red Sea. Credible public reports suggest a significant number 
of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah operatives are supporting 
Houthi attacks from inside Yemen.
    I cannot imagine the Yemeni people want these Iranians in 
their country. This must stop.
    The Houthis risk killing mariners from many nations every 
time they launch an attack, which now they have done on more 
than 45 occasions. By attacking oil tankers and other ships 
carrying hazardous materials they are accountable for 
environmental catastrophe in the Red Sea.
    By making maritime traffic through the Red Sea costly and 
dangerous the Houthis are exacerbating economic and 
humanitarian conditions in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and 
elsewhere.
    These attacks on commercial vessels are acts of terrorism. 
The Houthis are not even adhering to their stated goals. They 
are mostly striking ships with no connection whatsoever to 
Israel and driving up the difficulty and cost of delivering 
humanitarian aid to people around the world including, of 
course, to Yemenis themselves.
    Since they hijacked the Galaxy Leader on November 19 they 
have held hostage 25 innocent sailors from five countries. The 
Houthis should release them immediately and unconditionally and 
not behave in this reckless manner. What they are doing is 
piracy.
    Houthi hypocrisy becomes even clearer as we look at their 
continued abuse of the human rights of the Yemeni people. Their 
detention facilities are filling up with political detainees.
    They are recruiting child soldiers and indoctrinating them 
in hate. They are blockading the city of Ta'izz, Yemen's third 
largest city, and they routinely restrict humanitarian access. 
Do not take it from me. Ask the Yemeni people.
    In response to the Red Sea threat the United States and our 
partners are employing a multi-prong military, economic, and 
diplomatic strategy to raise the cost of continued attacks and 
shift the Houthi calculus.
    The U.S. military has acted quickly and decisively to 
thwart the Houthi military threat. In addition, on February 
16th our designation of the Houthis as a specially designated 
global terrorist went into effect.
    The designation is a powerful means to hold the Houthis 
accountable. In parallel to targeted military strikes and the 
terrorism designation we are also working every diplomatic 
channel to speak with one global voice to condemn Houthi 
attacks.
    Building on strong and unanimous Statements from the U.N. 
Security Council and the G-7, the United States mobilized a 
group of 44 States to call out Houthi provocations in the 
strongest possible terms.
    On January 10 we secured passage of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 2722 which demands a halt to these reckless attacks.
    These efforts are one component of a broader diplomatic 
strategy. Even as we degrade and disrupt Houthi capabilities, 
squeeze their terrorist financing and shame them on the world 
stage we must also seek diplomatic off ramps.
    We are working multiple channels to make clear to the 
Houthis that they must cease their attacks immediately. Let me 
be clear. We do not seek this confrontation, but we will 
respond to the attacks.
    I remain hopeful as the envoy for Yemen that we can 
preserve a diplomatic path forward. But the Houthis are harming 
their own people by putting off the peace process.
    Ultimately, peace in Yemen serves the interests of all 
Yemenis just as it does those of the United States and our 
regional partners the United States stands ready to support.
    Thank you again for your invitation today. I look forward 
to the discussion and your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lenderking follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking

    Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, distinguished Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for this invitation to speak with you about the 
situation in Yemen and the Administration's response to ongoing Houthi 
attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
    Yemen is at a crucial moment. Reckless Houthi attacks are 
jeopardizing the very real accomplishments of multilateral diplomacy 
over the past 3 years. When President Biden appointed me Special Envoy 
for Yemen in 2021, he made clear that achieving a durable peace in 
Yemen was a top Administration priority. That has not changed, and 
there is tangible progress to point to. After more than 50 trips to the 
region over the past 3 years, I remain convinced that peace in Yemen is 
not only possible but also serves U.S. interests, those of our regional 
partners, and, of course, those of Yemenis themselves. The people of 
Yemen deserve to live without the war, hunger, and disease that have 
killed hundreds of thousands over the past decade.
    Despite the Houthis' illegal and reckless maritime attacks, the 
April 2022 truce between Yemen's warring parties continues to hold. 
Violence inside Yemen remains at the lowest levels since 2015, and 
Yemen's humanitarian crisis, while still acute, is less severe than at 
its peak. Until the Houthis' escalation, average Yemenis were beginning 
to see a way back to stability.
    We should not lose sight of these milestones, even as we 
necessarily degrade and destroy Houthi militant capabilities and 
condemn their attacks on civilian shipping. Our regional and 
international partners--the Saudis, Omanis, and Emiratis in 
particular--remain committed to the peace process in Yemen and continue 
to engage constructively. In December, U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen 
Hans Grundberg announced that the parties to the conflict had reached 
an understanding that would form the basis of a roadmap for peace in 
Yemen, including a durable cease fire and an inclusive, Yemeni-Yemeni 
political process. We have strived for these goals, and the U.N. 
roadmap remains Yemen's best hope to for an end to the conflict and to 
avoid falling back into bloody civil war.
    Yet, as we have all seen since October, the Houthis are throwing 
this progress away to serve their own self-interested political agenda, 
aligning with Iran, at the expense of the Yemeni people. Iran is 
equipping and facilitating Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Credible 
public reports suggest a significant number of Iranian and Lebanese 
Hizballah operatives are supporting Houthi attacks from inside Yemen. A 
recent unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report confirms the 
Houthis' use of Iranian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to 
conduct attacks across the Middle East. This must stop.
    The Houthis risk killing mariners from many nations every time they 
launch an attack, which they have now done on more than 45 occasions. 
By attacking oil tankers and other ships carrying hazardous materials, 
they are accountable for environmental catastrophe in the Red Sea, 
which would destroy Yemen's fishing industry. The Houthis are 
exacerbating the suffering of their own people; on February 19, for 
example, they targeted a ship transporting essential grain and food 
destined for Aden and Hudaydah. By making maritime traffic through the 
Red Sea costly and dangerous, the Houthis are exacerbating economic and 
humanitarian conditions in Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia--countries with a 
combined population of more than 250 million people that rely on the 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for critical imports, economic activity, and 
humanitarian aid.
    These attacks on commercial vessels are acts of terrorism. The 
Houthis are not even adhering to their stated goals; they are mostly 
hitting ships with no connection whatsoever to Israel, with over 55 
countries affected to date, and driving up the difficulty and cost of 
delivering humanitarian aid to people around the world--including, of 
course, to Yemenis themselves. Since November 19, when the Houthis 
seized the MV Galaxy Leader by force, they have held hostage 25 
innocent sailors from five countries. The Houthis should release them 
immediately and unconditionally, and not behave like an armed militia.
    Houthi hypocrisy becomes even clearer as we focus on their 
continued abuse of the human rights of the Yemeni people. Their 
detention facilities are filling up with political detainees. They are 
recruiting child soldiers and indoctrinating them in hate. They are 
blockading the city of Taiz, and they routinely restrict humanitarian 
access to civilians as a form of collective punishment. Don't take it 
from me. Ask the Yemeni people themselves.
    In response to the Red Sea threat, the United States and our 
partners are employing a multi-pronged military, economic, and 
diplomatic strategy to raise the costs of continued attacks and shift 
the Houthi calculus.
    As DASD Shapiro will describe in detail, the U.S. military has 
acted quickly and decisively to counter the Houthi maritime threat. We 
are mobilizing U.S. and partner assets to degrade and destroy their 
ability to continue their attacks. Our defensive strikes on Houthi 
missile and drone infrastructure are having a significant effect. Our 
interdictions have disrupted Iran's resupply of the Houthis and 
provided tangible evidence of Iran's continued support to the Houthis' 
maritime attacks. Operation Prosperity Guardian, a U.S. led naval 
operation in the Red Sea with more than 20 likeminded partners, is 
defending navigational rights and freedoms. Operation Aspides, a 
complementary and significant EU naval effort recently announced, 
further bolsters our collective ability to defend international vessels 
and makes clear that Red Sea security is a global concern.
    In addition, on February 16 our designation of the Houthis as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist--or SDGT--came into effect. The 
designation is a powerful means to hold the Houthis accountable for 
their actions through asset freezes and blocking of financial 
transactions while enabling the continued flow of humanitarian 
assistance and trade to the Yemeni people. The designation complements 
a series of targeted sanctions on individuals and entities facilitating 
Iranian financial assistance to Houthis. We understand the Houthis, 
despite their grandstanding, are keen to see the terrorist designation 
removed. What is more, SDGT ensures the Houthis cannot reap the 
benefits of a peace agreement while continuing their attacks.
    The Administration chose to pursue the SDGT rather than a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of the Houthis because we 
assessed that SDGT maximizes our ability to avoid unintended 
humanitarian impacts on Yemeni civilians through licenses and other 
mitigation measures. We will continue to assess these factors on an 
ongoing basis and adjust as needed.
    We do not want the people of Yemen to suffer because of the 
Houthis' reckless behavior. For that reason, the U.S. Government has 
taken significant steps to shield the Yemeni people from any adverse 
impacts this designation may have. During the 30 day implementation 
period between January 17 and February 16, the Departments of State and 
the Treasury, together with USAID, conducted robust outreach to 
stakeholders, including aid providers, financial institutions, 
insurers, importers, the diaspora community, and partners who are 
crucial to facilitating humanitarian assistance and the commercial 
import of critical commodities into Yemen. The Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) at the Department of the Treasury also published five 
general licenses authorizing certain transactions related to the 
provision of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as personal remittances, 
telecommunications and mail, and port and airport operations on which 
the Yemeni people rely, in addition to a general license authorizing 
transactions for the official business diplomatic and consular 
missions. These newly issued general licenses are in addition to the 
pre-existing global general licenses issued in December 2022, which, 
inter alia, authorize certain transactions for the official business of 
the U.S. Government, the United Nations and other international 
organizations, and certain activities of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).
    In parallel to targeted military strikes and the terrorism 
designation, we are also working every diplomatic channel to speak with 
one global voice in condemnation of Houthi attacks. The Houthis desire 
to be viewed as a government, but they are violating international law 
and behaving like an armed militia with no respect for international 
norms. Building on strong and unanimous statements from the U.N. 
Security Council and G7, the United States mobilized a group of 44 
states, including the entire EU, all NATO members, and key Indo-Pacific 
nations in December to call out Houthi provocations in the strongest 
possible terms. On January 10, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
resolution 2722, which demands a halt to these reckless attacks and 
affirmed the navigational rights and freedoms of vessels in the Red 
Sea. The Houthis seek legitimacy on the world stage, and the broad 
coalition of likeminded nations we have assembled makes clear the depth 
of their isolation. Every globally connected country stands to lose 
from Houthi attacks, including our strategic competitors.
    These efforts are one component of a broader diplomatic strategy. 
Even as we degrade and disrupt Houthis capabilities, squeeze their 
terrorist financing, and shame them on the world stage, we must also 
seek diplomatic off ramps to bring an end to these Houthi attacks. Let 
me be clear--we do not seek this confrontation, but we will respond to 
Houthi attacks. We are working multiple channels to make clear to the 
Houthis that the possibility of peace remains if they cease their 
attacks immediately. But with every missile launched, they run the risk 
of an even greater catastrophe that could doom the prospects of any 
agreement. We do not seek escalation or wider conflict in the region.
    I remain hopeful we can preserve a diplomatic path forward, but the 
Houthis are harming their own people by putting off the peace process. 
The Houthis appear determined to continue their reckless course for 
now. Ultimately, peace in Yemen serves the interest of all Yemenis, 
just as it does those of our regional partners. The United States 
stands ready to support.
    Thank you again for your invitation today, and I look forward to 
your questions.

    Senator Murphy. Thank you.
    Ambassador Shapiro.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL B. SHAPIRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
  OF DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
      DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Young, 
and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the invitation to 
speak with you today about the Houthis' terrorist and piratical 
threats in the Red Sea and the Department of Defense's work to 
protect civilians and restore safe and free navigation for all 
legitimate maritime traffic in one of the world's most critical 
waterways.
    I will summarize the Houthi threat and our guiding 
principles for addressing this critical issue. Since November 
19th the Houthis have conducted at least 48 attacks against 
commercial shipping and naval vessels in and around the Red Sea 
through which 15 percent of all global trade flows.
    They have used anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship 
cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems uncrewed surface 
vessels, and in one instance a helicopter borne seizure. 
Despite the Houthis' claims these attacks are almost entirely 
unrelated to Israel and Israeli affiliated shipping, and to be 
clear any such attacks would be entirely illegitimate anyway.
    These are indiscriminate attacks that are as much an 
affront to maritime commerce as is piracy, and they have 
affected the interests of more than 55 nations and threatened 
the free flow of commerce through the Red Sea, a bedrock of the 
global economy.
    These attacks have prompted more than a dozen major 
shipping operators to suspend transits of the Red Sea causing a 
spike in insurance rates for vessels in the region, and, most 
importantly, putting the lives of innocent mariners and our 
service members at risk.
    The Houthis' attacks are also driving up prices and causing 
delivery delays in critical humanitarian items such as food and 
medicine in places where they are needed most.
    This is adversely affecting those in need of assistance 
around the world including in Sudan, Ethiopia, and indeed, in 
Yemen itself, and to cite one regional country suffering 
significantly from Houthi terrorism Egypt has seen Suez Canal 
transit fees decline by some $100 million per month, depriving 
it of a critical source of foreign currency.
    Most recently the Houthis launched a series of anti-ship 
ballistic missile attacks and UAS attacks against commercial 
ships in the Red Sea including one that impacted the MV 
Islander on February 22, wounding a member of its crew, and one 
on February 18 against the MV Rubymar.
    They severely damaged that vessel, putting it at risk of 
sinking, forcing the crew to abandon ship, and causing an 18-
mile oil slick in the Red Sea.
    The Houthis have also launched weapons toward our warships 
including an anti-ship cruise missile that the USS Laboon 
intercepted.
    The Houthis have also fired medium range ballistic missiles 
against Israel that have threatened or caused damage to Egypt, 
to Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as well.
    It is clear that these Houthi attacks represent an 
international problem that affects all nations committed to the 
exercise of navigational freedoms and the free flow of 
commerce.
    These attacks, which affect the entire region and nations 
across the globe, cannot go unchallenged, and this problem 
demands a broad based and collective response.
    So our guiding principles are to internationalize the 
response to the Houthis' attacks in coordination with our 
allies and partners and to nest military, diplomatic, and 
economic----
    [Disturbance in the hearing room.]
    Senator Murphy. The meeting will come to order. The meeting 
will come to order.
    [Disturbance in the hearing room.]
    Senator Murphy. The witness can continue.
    Mr. Shapiro. We seek to internationalize the response to 
Houthis' attacks in coordination with our allies and partners 
and to nest military, diplomatic, and economic actions within a 
whole of government approach to impose costs on the Houthi 
leadership and degrade their ability to conduct attacks on 
commercial shipping.
    Special Envoy Lenderking has discussed the State 
Department's intensive partner based diplomacy and the 
specially designated global terrorist designation. I will 
expand upon the Department of Defense's efforts in the Red Sea.
    Our main defensive effort in the Red Sea is called 
Operation Prosperity Guardian. Since Secretary Austin announced 
this coalition in December more than 20 countries have joined 
to increase maritime patrols in the Red Sea and safeguard 
commercial shipping.
    The coalition is led by Task Force 153, which is charged 
with providing leadership in command and control of 
international maritime security activities in the Red Sea, Bab-
el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.
    Operation Prosperity Guardian is designed to reassure the 
maritime shipping industry, deter illegal activity, and promote 
safe navigation while protecting the free flow of international 
commerce.
    Meanwhile, the department has been engaged in efforts to 
destroy and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to 
conduct maritime attacks such as the anti-ship ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and 
facilities known to house such weapons.
    On January 11, January 22, February 3, and February 24 at 
the President's direction we executed deliberate, carefully 
planned multinational strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen 
alongside the United Kingdom and with the support of a growing 
number of partners that now includes Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.
    In our most recent deliberate strike this past Saturday we 
struck 18 targets across eight locations in Houthi controlled 
Yemen including Houthi underground weapon storage facilities, 
missile storage facilities, one way attack unmanned aerial 
systems, air defense systems, radars, and a helicopter.
    Beyond coalition strikes U.S. forces have also conducted 
self-defense strikes against Houthi targets including missiles 
and UAS on launchers posing an imminent threat nearly three 
dozen times over the past few weeks.
    In total we have struck over 230 targets in Houthi 
controlled Yemen through both deliberate and self-defense 
strikes, likely destroying hundreds of Houthi weapons.
    That is not including the dozens of Houthi missiles and UAS 
that U.S. and partner naval vessels have intercepted and shot 
down over the Red Sea.
    In December U.S. forces also disrupted the Houthis' 
attempts to board and seize the MV Maersk Hangzhou, sinking 
three Houthi fast boats in the process after they fired on U.S. 
helicopters.
    The Houthis have not attempted another seizure since that 
incident. However, they do appear committed to sustaining 
standoff maritime attacks with the remaining inventory of 
weapons.
    Complementary to our efforts to degrade and destroy Houthi 
capabilities I would like to mention the department's efforts 
to stem the flow of Iranian origin lethal aid to Yemen that 
enables these attacks and to publicly expose Iran's support to 
the Houthis.
    On January 11 and January 28 U.S. naval forces interdicted 
dhows carrying Iranian origin lethal aid to the Houthis in 
clear violation of international law, and Senator Young, I want 
to thank you for recognizing our two Navy SEALs who perished in 
the January 11 interdiction.
    In these interdictions U.S. forces discovered over 200 
packages that contained components of unmanned underwater and 
surface vehicles, propulsion guidance and warheads for Houthi 
medium range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, 
air defense associated components, military grade communication 
network equipment, anti-tank guided missile launcher 
assemblies, explosive, and other military components.
    These are the very same weapons that have been employed by 
the Houthis to threaten and attack U.S. Navy vessels but also 
innocent mariners on international merchant ships.
    In support of our efforts to publicly expose Iran's support 
to the Houthis the Defense Intelligence Agency published this 
unclassified report providing clear and compelling evidence 
that the Houthis have employed Iranian origin missiles and 
unmanned aerial attack vehicles in these attacks.
    Iran does not control the Houthis in the way it does Iran 
aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria, but it certainly has 
the choice to provide or withhold support to the Houthis 
without which the Houthis would struggle to effectively track 
and strike vehicles in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
    We have made it very clear to Iran that we hold it 
accountable for attacks by its partners and proxies and believe 
Iranian leaders are aware of the consequences should these 
attacks result in U.S. casualties.
    Our actions in Iraq and Syria have demonstrated the 
Administration's willingness to directly hold Iran responsible 
for militia attacks and to underscore in response to a 
continuing pattern of Iranian and Iran backed attacks against 
U.S. personnel and facilities and the continuing threat of 
future such attacks the United States has taken and as 
necessary will continue to take military action against the 
IRGC and its affiliates.
    In conclusion, while the Department of Defense supports the 
overall aim of de-escalating tensions and restoring stability 
in the Red Sea we will not hesitate to defend civilians and 
protect the free flow of commerce in one of the world's most 
critical waterways.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro

    Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to speak with you today 
about the Houthis' piratical threats in the Red Sea and the 
Department's work to protect civilians and restore safe and free 
navigation for all legitimate maritime traffic in one of the world's 
most critical waterways.
    Before I begin, I wanted to briefly introduce myself. I am Dan 
Shapiro, and I am the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the 
Middle East. I look forward to working with you in this capacity.
    Now, I'd like to summarize the Houthi threat and our guiding 
principles for addressing this critical issue.
             regional and global effects of houthi attacks
    As you are all aware, since November 19, the Houthis have conducted 
at least 48 attacks against commercial shipping and naval vessels in 
and around the Red Sea through which 15 percent of ALL global trade 
flows using anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCMs), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), uncrewed surface 
vessels, and--in one instance--a helicopter borne seizure.
    Despite the Houthis' claims, these attacks are almost entirely 
unrelated to Israel and Israeli affiliated shipping. And to be clear, 
any such attacks would be entirely illegitimate anyway. These are 
indiscriminate acts that are as much an affront to maritime commerce as 
piracy, having affected the interests of more than 55 nations and 
threatened the free flow of commerce through the Red Sea--a bedrock of 
the global economy.
    These attacks have prompted more than a dozen major shipping 
operators to suspend transits of the Red Sea, caused a spike in 
insurance rates for vessels in the region, and, most importantly, put 
the lives of innocent mariners and our servicemembers at risk.
    The Houthis' attacks are also driving up prices and causing 
delivery delays in critical humanitarian items, such as food and 
medicine in places where they're needed most. This is adversely 
affecting those in need of assistance around the world, including in 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and in Yemen itself. To cite one regional country 
suffering significantly from Houthi terrorism, Egypt has seen Suez 
Canal transit fees decline by some $100 million per month, depriving it 
of a critical source of foreign currency.
    Most recently, the Houthis launched a series of ASBMs and UAS 
attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea, including ones that 
impacted the M/V Islander on February 22 and the M/V Rubymar on 
February 18. The Houthi attack on the Islander injured a crewmember 
while the attack on the Rubymar severely damaged the vessel, put it at 
risk of sinking, forced the crew to abandon ship, and caused an 18 mile 
oil slick. The Houthis also launched weapons toward our warships, 
including an ASCM that the USS Laboon intercepted.
    The Houthis have also fired missiles against Israel that have 
threatened or caused damage to Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
              whole of government approach to the houthis
    It is clear that these Houthi attacks represent an international 
problem that affects all nations committed to the exercise of 
navigational freedoms and the free flow of commerce. These attacks, 
which affect the entire region and nations across the globe, cannot go 
unchallenged. And this problem demands a broad based and collective 
response.
    So, our guiding principles are to internationalize the response to 
the Houthis' attacks in coordination with our allies and partners and 
to nest military, diplomatic, and economic actions within a whole of 
government approach to impose costs on Houthi leadership and deter 
Houthi attacks on commercial shipping.
    The United States has coordinated multiple multilateral statements 
condemning Houthi attacks, imposed new sanctions on the group and 
designated it a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, 
drafted a successful U.N. Security Council resolution affirming the 
right of states to defend their vessels from Houthi attacks, 
established a defensive coalition of more than 20 countries to patrol 
the Red Sea and safeguard commercial shipping, and now conducted three 
rounds of combined strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.
    While I will defer to Special Envoy Lenderking to discuss the State 
Department's intensive partner based diplomacy and the SDGT 
designation, I would like to expand upon the Department of Defense's 
efforts in the Red Sea.
                     operation prosperity guardian
    Our main defensive effort in the Red Sea is called Operation 
Prosperity Guardian. Since Secretary Austin announced this coalition in 
December, more than 20 countries have joined on to increase maritime 
patrols in the Red Sea and safeguard commercial shipping.
    This coalition is led by Task Force 153, which is charged with 
providing leadership and command and control of international maritime 
security activities in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf 
of Aden. Operation Prosperity Guardian is designed to reassure the 
maritime shipping industry, deter illegal activity, and promote safe 
navigation while protecting the free flow of international commerce.
                 deliberate and self-defensive strikes
    Meanwhile, the Department has been engaged in efforts to destroy 
and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to conduct maritime 
attacks, such as ASBMs, ASCMs, UAS, and facilities known to house such 
weapons. On January 11, January 22, February 3, and February 24, at the 
President's direction, we executed deliberate, carefully planned 
multinational strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen alongside the 
United Kingdom and with support from a growing number of partners that 
now includes Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
New Zealand.
    In our most recent deliberate strike on Saturday, we struck 18 
targets across eight locations in Houthi controlled Yemen, including 
Houthi underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage 
facilities, one way attack unmanned aerial systems, air defense 
systems, radars, and a helicopter.
    Beyond coalition strikes, U.S. forces have also struck Houthi 
targets, including missiles and UAS on launchers, nearly three dozen 
times in self-defense over the last few weeks.
    In total, we have struck over 230 targets in Houthi controlled 
Yemen through both deliberate and self-defense strikes, likely 
destroying hundreds of Houthi weapons. This is not including the dozens 
of Houthi missiles and UAS that U.S. and partner naval vessels have 
intercepted and shot down over the Red Sea. In December, U.S. forces 
also disrupted the Houthis' attempts to board and seize the M/V Maersk 
Hangzhou, sinking three Houthi fast boats in the process after they 
fired on U.S. helicopters. The Houthis have not attempted another 
seizure attempt since this incident. However, the Houthis appear 
committed to sustaining standoff maritime attacks with their remaining 
inventory of weapons.
                 disrupting and exposing iran's support
    Complementary to our efforts to degrade and destroy Houthi 
capabilities, I'd like to mention the Department's efforts to stem the 
flow of Iranian origin lethal aid to Yemen that enables these attacks 
and publicly expose Iran's support to the Houthis. On January 11 and 
January 28, U.S. forces interdicted dhows carrying Iranian origin 
lethal aid to the Houthis in Yemen in clear violation of international 
law.
    In the latest interdictions, U.S. forces discovered over 200 
packages that contained unmanned underwater/surface vehicle (UUV/USV) 
components; propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range 
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs); air 
defense associated components; military grade communication and network 
equipment; anti-tank guided missile launcher assemblies; explosives; 
and other military components. These same weapons have been employed by 
the Houthis to threaten and attack not just U.S. Navy vessels, but also 
innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting the Red 
Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.
    In support of our efforts to publicly expose Iran's support to the 
Houthis, the Defense Intelligence Agency published an unclassified 
report providing clear and compelling evidence that the Houthis have 
employed Iranian origin missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles in 
attacks.
    Iran does not control the Houthis in the way that it does Iran 
aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria, but it certainly has the 
choice to provide or withhold support to the Houthis, without which the 
Houthis would struggle to effectively track and strike vessels 
navigating shipping lanes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
    We have made it clear to Iran that we hold it accountable for 
attacks by its partners and proxies, and believe Iranian leaders are 
aware of the consequences should these attacks result in U.S. 
casualties. Our actions in Iraq and Syria have demonstrated the 
Administration's willingness to directly hold Iran responsible for 
militia attacks. To underscore, in response to a continuing pattern of 
Iranian and Iran backed attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities 
and the continuing threat of future such attacks, the United States has 
taken, and as necessary, will continue to take military action against 
the IRGC and its affiliates.
                               conclusion
    In conclusion, while the Department of Defense supports the overall 
aim of de-escalating tensions and restoring stability in the Red Sea, 
we will not hesitate to defend civilians and protect the free flow of 
commerce in one of the world's most critical waterways.

    Senator Murphy. Thank you both for your testimony.
    We will start a round of 5-minute questions.
    Envoy Lenderking, you have spent the better part of the 
last 3 years both speaking to and trying to understand the 
Houthis and their rationale for their engagement in a variety 
of conflicts.
    Their rationale for these strikes is ridiculous on its 
face. They say this is connected to Israel's response in Gaza, 
and yet they are attacking ships indiscriminant of the ship's 
flag. This seems to have nothing to do with what is happening 
in Gaza.
    But it is really important that we understand what the 
reasons are for this engagement, what the Houthis' goals are, 
because it will help us shape a response and help us try to 
rebuild deterrence.
    So I would appreciate you talking to the committee for a 
moment about why you think the Houthis have chosen to engage 
the United States and our allies in this way by attacking the 
shipping lanes in the Red Sea and what you think the goals are 
of that engagement.
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, thank you very much, Senator, and 
thanks for all of your support over the years for this effort 
that we have engaged on to bring a peace deal in Yemen. Very, 
very grateful for that.
    I think there are two factors that are driving the Houthis 
at least. One is Gaza, in a sense, presented an opportunity for 
them that they felt they wanted to take advantage of and I 
think they were, as we both clearly said, goaded, encouraged, 
instructed, aided, abetted, assisted by the Iranians to take 
the fight to the Red Sea, and I think they have had an 
opportunity to put some of the weapons that they have been able 
to accumulate over the years on display both through the 
attacks on civilian infrastructure in Israel at the beginning 
of this conflict and now on the Red Sea, testing all of these 
items that they have been able to either receive from the 
Iranians in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions or 
to construct in their own country with the parts that are 
smuggled in on these dhows.
    And I think they have sought, as you note, Senator, to link 
this to the Gaza situation. It is entirely an illegitimate 
linkage and you rightly point out they are attacking ships in a 
reckless manner including those that have----
    [Disturbance in the hearing room.]
    Senator Murphy. The witness will suspend. Committee will be 
in order.
    Mr. Lenderking. Including those destined--they even 
attacked one ship that was loaded with corn for Iran. They have 
attacked Russian ships, Chinese ships. They have engendered a 
huge amount of international enmity as a result of that and I 
see--I think you see that reflected in the number of countries 
who are speaking out in various ways about the problem.
    But I think the fact that they continue this and have said 
publicly that they will not stop until there is a cease fire in 
Gaza is an indication that we are not yet at the point, 
unfortunately, where they do intend to dial back.
    Senator Murphy. Ambassador Shapiro, the Administration has 
largely pointed to general Article II authorities as their 
justification for this military campaign.
    I know that you do not serve in the DOD's General Counsel 
office but this looks to me like war in every bit of the 
constitutional sense.
    We have engaged in multiple rounds of strikes. We have a 
limited number of boots on the ground. We have taken 
casualties. We have prisoners.
    I am having a hard time understanding why this does not 
require a traditional congressional war authorization. So maybe 
you can speak for a moment about the Administration's legal 
basis for these ongoing strikes.
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Senator.
    U.S. forces maintain the ability to defend themselves when 
they are operating lawfully on the world's oceans and they have 
the right, and indeed, they have the obligation to defend and 
protect U.S. shipping that comes under attack from various 
sources including piracy when they are transiting international 
waters.
    The President did direct the deliberate strikes consistent 
with his Article II authority as commander in chief to protect 
and defend U.S. personnel and certain partners.
    The strikes are also necessary and proportionate actions in 
the exercise of the United States' inherent right of self-
defense reflected in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
    Beyond that I would certainly defer to colleagues in the 
Office of the General Counsel. On appropriate occasions the 
President has forwarded to the Congress a report consistent 
with the War Powers Resolution. But I will defer to my 
colleagues to go further.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    The chairman has referenced the importance of an AUMF in 
this context. I know the chairman of the committee, Senator 
Cardin, also articulated that, and I would just emphasize 
historically it has been important to me that Congress takes 
its prerogatives as it relates to authorizing force seriously 
in part because I feel like this strengthens the hand of our 
commander in chief and our warfighters in reestablishing 
deterrence.
    And so as this conversation moves forward the details will 
matter, but I want to emphasize that and relatedly dive into a 
number of follow up questions on this war powers concern we 
have.
    So, Mr. Shapiro, I will begin with you. In this setting can 
you walk through your understanding; I know you referred us to 
the Office of Legal Counsel of the department's legal views on 
unilateral U.S. action--feel free to challenge any premises I 
have here--but unilateral U.S. action to defend commercial 
ships of foreign nations.
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Senator.
    The President, again, has directed these strikes consistent 
with the Article II authority as commander in chief to protect 
and defend U.S. personnel and certain partners. That is an 
important element.
    We have partners in this coalition, and it is fully within 
the President's authority as commander in chief to make those.
    Senator Young. Is there a precedent you are looking to? 
Give me just one that gives a legal basis for Operation 
Prosperity Guardian's multilateral defense of shipping.
    Mr. Shapiro. Yes. Senator, I would have to defer to 
colleagues to find the historical precedence for that, but that 
is an inherent part of the President's Article II authorities.
    Senator Young. I have got to--did you not anticipate 
questions about the legal rationale before you came before the 
subcommittee?
    Mr. Shapiro. Senator, we did, indeed, and those are the 
answers that we believe provide the President the authority to 
conduct these operations, both the defensive operations, and 
indeed, the proportional responses.
    Senator Young. Okay. That is--this is about as rigorous as 
I will say, for the record--not for you, of course, because you 
have been tasked with being here.
    But those are about as specific as the Administration's 
rationale that they gave with the war powers notification. So 
we are going to need more information on a going forward basis.
    Reporting in Bloomberg stated a legal theory as being 
developed by the Administration that operations in 
international waters are not even considered hostilities, or 
that brief and intermittent strikes do not constitute 
hostilities and thus would not trigger the war powers 
resolution.
    Can you speak to that?
    Mr. Shapiro. I am not familiar with that legal theory. The 
strikes----
    Senator Young. I think I read about this in the New York 
Times.
    Mr. Shapiro. Yes. I am not familiar with that legal theory 
from internal conversations within the Administration.
    The strikes against U.S. vessels, against international 
mariners, are strikes, certainly, when it involves U.S. ships 
that the U.S. Navy is obligated and has the right to defend 
against in international waters and there are necessary and 
proportionate responses under Article 51 of the United Nations 
charter.
    Senator Young. Has the United States military entered into 
hostilities with the Houthis? Yes or no. You are a 
representative of the Administration.
    Mr. Shapiro. These are strikes on Houthi targets. That 
might be the correct term. I do not know if that is the correct 
legal term for what we are engaged in. But we obviously have 
struck, as I said, many, many targets in Yemen where the 
Houthis have weapons that they have used and are using and 
sometimes are in the process of using against us and against 
our partners.
    Senator Young. I will change gears a little bit. What is 
the long term assessment of what authorities the Administration 
is going to need if it continues this prolonged exchange of 
fire with the Houthis?
    Mr. Shapiro. It is very hard to speculate on hypotheticals 
about how the conflict could evolve. Until now I think we feel 
very strongly the President has the authorities, the ones I 
have articulated.
    I do not think there is any question, and this hearing is 
part of that, that the Administration is committed to consult 
with Congress on additional actions going forward and the 
authorities under which that would be conducted.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    What is the Administration's anticipated end point at which 
it assesses it has restored deterrence?
    Mr. Shapiro. We need to see the Houthis stop these attacks. 
We, clearly, have not seen that yet. They, clearly, feel that 
it serves some interests whether it is an internal one, whether 
it is an Iranian agenda, whether it is a regional raising of 
their profile, whatever it is, and we have removed and degraded 
considerable capability. They still have capability.
    Senator Young. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Shapiro. So until they stop, we are not done.
    Senator Young. So just extending that, not done, can you 
characterize for me what level of military activity is going to 
be necessary, the Administration is prepared to take, to reach 
that endpoint so that they are not done?
    Mr. Shapiro. Senator, again, it is very hard to speculate. 
Much of it depends on when they decide they have endured enough 
of the strikes that we--and degraded enough of the capability 
that we are capable of and exercising now on an ongoing basis.
    We hope to restore stability and de-escalate tensions in 
the region very soon. So we do not want to assume this will 
take a particular amount of time.
    We want to use all the tools and the partners and the 
capabilities we have to make very clear to them and of course, 
to Iran, their supporters and sponsors, that this must end, and 
we will continue to take action until it comes to an end.
    Senator Young. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the 
witnesses.
    Houthi behavior is abhorrent but I have got to admit I have 
grave skepticism about what we are doing right now. I have 
grave skepticism about the legal authorities. I have grave 
skepticism about the absence of true shared responsibility with 
nations whose ships are being attacked by the Houthis.
    Why should the U.S. and the U.K. be shouldering the burden 
of protecting other nations' ships? And I have serious 
skepticism about the effectiveness of this operation in terms 
of de-escalating the attacks in the Red Sea.
    To begin with, on legal authority I think we have all 
conceded that there is no congressional authorization for these 
hostilities. The hostilities definition under the War Powers 
Resolution has clearly been met when we are talking about 200 
attacks on Houthis.
    We are losing troops. They are losing civilian casualties 
and others. This is hostilities. There is no congressional 
authorization for them.
    To claim that this is covered by Article II self-defense; 
Article II self-defense means you can defend U.S. personnel. 
You can defend U.S. military assets. You probably can defend 
U.S. commercial ships.
    But the defense of other nations' commercial ships in no 
way, and it is not even close, that is not self-defense under 
Article II of the Constitution, and a President cannot make it 
self-defense by calling another nation a partner.
    If you are defending the commercial ships of other nations 
it is in my view laughable to call that self-defense, and so a 
narrow mission to defend U.S. shipping both military and 
commercial that is Article II self-defense.
    But broader efforts to defend commercial ships of other 
nations, while it might be strategically a good idea there is 
no constitutional authorization that would allow the President 
to do that unilateral.
    And second, taking offensive actions and striking targets 
within Yemen to degrade Yemeni capacity--Houthi capacity--
while, again, it might be strategically a smart thing to do, 
that is not self-defense under Article II.
    And so I basically view this at the first level as a set of 
actions that might have a strategic value although we have yet 
to see a strategy.
    Senator Young and Senator Murphy and I wrote a letter to 
the Administration asking many of these questions on January 
23, and we do not have a response. But there may be a strategic 
wisdom in doing it but I think the activities are far beyond 
what a President's unilateral power would be. That is number 
one.
    Number two, shared responsibility. Commercial shipping in 
the Red Sea involves ships from many, many nations, and 
although there are partners in this operation the military 
actions are being undertaken by the United States and the U.K.
    Why should the United States and U.K. be shouldering the 
burden of this? There needs to be--if we can get to a point 
where we can actually authorize U.S. participation we should 
not do it without other nations participating.
    But finally, I guess my most serious skepticism right now 
is at the effectiveness of this. President Biden himself has 
said that the actions that we are undertaking are not likely to 
deter Houthi escalation, and I am a little disappointed that 
you so quickly tried to pour cold water on the idea that this 
is connected to the war in Gaza.
    These attacks started, Secretary Shapiro, as you said on 
November 19. The Houthis have said this is because of the war 
in Gaza.
    Now, you have pointed out instances of ships that were not 
going to Israel or instances of ships that had food that were 
going to nations that needed food.
    But I think the most natural interpretation of this is the 
Houthis seeing some suffer in the region or saying others are 
going to suffer in the region until we figure out a response, 
and I would venture to suggest that about the only time we have 
seen something that was a de-escalation moment was in the week-
plus long pause in Gaza when the first hostage deal was done.
    And so trying to reestablish deterrence I do not think you 
are going to do it if the 200 strikes become 400 strikes, 800 
strikes, 1,200 strikes.
    I think you will reestablish deterrence when we get a 
hostage deal that leads us to a truce, that leads us to 
humanitarian aid into Gaza, that leads us to the ability to 
discuss whether whatever that truce period is can be extended.
    And so I hope you do not just pour cold water on the idea 
that, oh, this is not really related to Gaza because the timing 
of it was related to Gaza, they are saying it is related to 
Gaza, and the only period of de-escalation that we have seen 
was during the first hostage release.
    I am going to continue to press on the legal authority 
questions, and I think many of us have these questions and 
there is some difference of opinion, I think, on the committee 
about whether this U.S. strategy is going to involve de-
escalation at all or whether it is actually going to foment 
more regional conflict.
    I consider myself in the camp of Senators who believe the 
U.S. involvement in another war in the Middle East would 
reflect that we learned virtually nothing over the last 25 
years, and we definitely should not slip or slide into a war.
    This is the kind of thing that can lead us to slip or slide 
into a war, and that is why Congress needs to be engaged and 
have a debate about whether this is a mission that is in the 
national interest or not.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    For the witnesses' benefit I am not going to be talking 
about the AUMF, but I think we have discussed that fully and it 
is an important topic, and I concur with the direction of the 
questions that have been asked so far.
    I am very concerned about the fact that this is an attack 
on trade in the Red Sea, which I presume affects the nations 
along the Red Sea in a very significant way and that only 
Bahrain is participating in preventing or defending against 
these attacks.
    What is the Administration's effort with Saudi Arabia in 
terms of becoming more involved in this effort, and is there 
progress on that front?
    Mr. Lenderking.
    Mr. Lenderking. Thank you, Senator. I think that is a very 
apt question to ask as well.
    I know that from the State side and Secretary Blinken this 
was a very significant issue that was raised early, on and we 
felt, I think, as Ambassador Shapiro said the President had 
said that this is an international problem and needs an 
international response, and certainly, we need to see our Gulf 
partners in the game much more, and I think we all feel that 
that is the case.
    There is not a country in the Gulf that does--that approves 
of what the Houthis are doing.
    Senator Romney. But what is happening with the Saudis? Are 
they getting on board? Is the Administration working with them 
or--and the other nations, UAE and so forth? Is there effort in 
that regard or they are just saying, no thank you, you guys do 
it?
    Mr. Lenderking. There certainly is. I mean--sorry.
    There is certainly engagement at my level--I will not speak 
for the Defense Department--but the Secretary of State as well 
to if anything expand this coalition, either OPG or the strike 
coalition.
    Senator Romney. Okay.
    Mr. Lenderking. And there is very strong recognition that 
the Gulf partners--I think to get at Senator Kaine's question 
this is a multifaceted responsibility. It should not be all on 
the U.S. and the U.K.
    Senator Romney. Where is the economic impact? Who suffers 
as a result of this?
    I know that shipping rates for Europe and Asia have gone up 
significantly but even in the Atlantic and Pacific shipping 
rates have gone up in part because there is less container 
capacity as a result of people having to go around the Cape of 
Good Hope.
    But who really suffers from this? Are the Chinese traders 
suffering? Are the nations along the Red Sea suffering? Who is 
suffering as a result of what the Houthis are doing? Where is 
the economic impact the biggest?
    I guess what I am getting at is this. Why is not China 
putting pressure on the Houthis? Why are they not putting 
pressure on Iran?
    I mean, we are out there with our flag flying and our men 
and women in harm's way. China is the nation that I would 
presume is most impacted by closing off trade to the Red Sea, 
and yet they are sitting on the sidelines pretending like they 
are everybody's friend.
    Why is China not being embarrassed? You mentioned in your 
testimony that the Houthis are suffering international enmity. 
I do not think they could care less, the Houthis, about 
international enmity.
    China cares, however, and putting a spotlight on China's 
lack of involvement and lack of effort to stop these attacks I 
think would be highly effective.
    Help me with this idea of who suffers the most in terms of 
trade, and why is China not participating?
    Mr. Lenderking. I could not agree more with you, Senator. I 
think the burden has to be shared because the pain is being 
felt in multiple realms and multiple regions.
    If you look at where the impact is, you look at a country 
like Egypt where Suez Canal fees are down 50 percent, it is 
impacting the currency. It is impacting the ability of their 
economy to function. You look at the movement of humanitarian 
supplies into Sudan, a desperately poor situation, violence 
prevailing there. That is very disturbing.
    The Ethiopian economy also suffering and Yemen itself--the 
Yemenis themselves are being hurt by what the Houthis are 
doing--the decrease in commercial activity going into Yemen's 
own ports. So----
    Senator Romney. It strikes me that we are there at huge 
risk and huge economic impact for ourselves in order to support 
the Chinese economy and to support the economies of people 
along the Red Sea who are all sitting back quietly supporting--
in many cases supporting Iran, who has given the support that 
the Houthis are relying upon.
    I find it--I mean, what are the strategic options here? One 
is to say, hey, we are out. You guys want to close down the Red 
Sea that is up to you guys unless you want to step in and 
protect it.
    The idea that we are there suffering and these people are 
not defending themselves and putting pressure on Iran is 
something I just do not understand.
    Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up so I will stop there.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Romney.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Special Envoy Lenderking, I would like to spend some time 
with you. You have been dealt a tough hand.
    I would like to talk with you about the designation that 
the Trump administration made of the Houthis as a foreign 
terrorist organization and the fact that shortly after the 
Biden administration took office they delisted the Houthis as a 
foreign terrorist organization.
    We saw what has happened in the time in between. There have 
been attacks on our allies at UAE, attacks on our allies the 
Saudis. We have seen attacks on U.S. personnel in our 
facilities in the Middle East.
    We have seen a tremendous amount of unrest since that time, 
and I think you know, but I am going to read it for my 
colleagues here what the designation of a foreign terrorist 
organization requires.
    First, it requires that it is a foreign organization. 
Indeed, the Houthis are. The organization engages in terrorist 
activity, or it retains the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism. Yes, they do.
    And finally, the terrorist activity or terrorism of the 
organization threatens the security of United States nationals 
or the national security of the United States. The Houthis meet 
these requirements.
    My question for you was the Trump administration wrong in 
designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization?
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, thank you, Senator. At that time, as 
you probably know, there was a strong movement within the Trump 
administration to designate the Houthis. It led to the FTO.
    A new administration came in, sought to prioritize Yemen as 
a foreign policy priority, and I believe that effort has borne 
fruit in terms of the peace process, which I described.
    But yes, over time----
    Senator Hagerty. I heard you describe the peace process. 
But with all due respect, I also saw the article in Foreign 
Affairs where our national security adviser claimed that the 
Middle East was in the greatest period of peace we have ever 
seen, and now we have seen what happens.
    My question is what do the Houthis have to do to be 
declared a foreign terrorist organization? Do they have to kill 
Americans?
    Mr. Lenderking. Certainly not. I think we have come down 
hard with this designation that we have. The FTO is a 
possibility. I think we constantly assess the impact of the 
campaign that we are doing, both the military--the impact of 
the designation.
    The SDGT, Senator, that I described will cut off financial 
networks, their ability to fundraise. It will put some hurt, 
and if we need to adjust to the FTO, if these attacks continue 
then we have that option.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, they certainly have continued at a 
rapid pace. I would like to see more than a little hurt. I 
would like to see this addressed, sir.
    Let me go to another thing that concerns me, and that has 
to do with the diversion of the aid that we send to Yemen. I 
think about what Hamas has done with the aid that we have sent 
to Gaza.
    I am deeply concerned that the Houthis may as well divert 
the aid that we are sending--the U.S. taxpayer funded 
humanitarian aid that we are sending into Yemen, and I have got 
a very disturbing example here. I am sure there are others.
    But the Biden administration right now is sending over $1.1 
million for the Yemen based operations of Norwegian Peoples 
Aid. Norwegian Peoples Aid.
    This is an organization--the NPA--that settled a civil 
lawsuit with the Department of Justice in 2018 for previously 
providing training and expert advice to the Iranian military 
and to Palestinian terrorist groups including Hamas, and we are 
sending our tax dollars there. They started receiving them in 
August of last year and they are supposed to be receiving them 
all the way through September of this year.
    We should not send a penny toward an organization like 
this. So my question to you, and I know this is a tough 
question to answer, but can you guarantee that our taxpayer 
dollars that are going to Yemen are not in some way being 
diverted to the Houthis to support this activity that we are 
talking about right now?
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, Senator, I think that is an 
incredibly important point.
    I am not aware of any taxpayer dollar going to support this 
type of activity. That should not be happening. That is 
definitely not within the priorities of our----
    Senator Hagerty. Can you guarantee that our taxpayer money 
will not wind up supporting the Houthis doing exactly what they 
are doing, which is putting U.S. and many other lives at risk, 
driving up inflation not only in the region as was described by 
Mr. Shapiro, but it is disrupting supply chains.
    It is causing cargo shipments to go up. It is causing 
inflation right here hurting Americans at home. I am concerned 
that we are right back funding both sides of the proposition 
here by sending this aid there.
    Mr. Lenderking. Senator, I share the concern. I will 
certainly take a look at that.
    Senator Hagerty. I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Lenderking. Yes. Absolutely.
    Senator Hagerty. Secretary Blinken could not answer me 
either when I asked him about the foreign aid that is going 
into Gaza and that is being diverted by Hamas.
    Please, please address this. Thank you.
    Mr. Lenderking. Thank you for your concern. Yes.
    Senator Murphy. Are you ready to go, Senator Van Hollen? 
Because you are up.
    Senator Van Hollen. I am. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Welcome to both of you. It is great to see you.
    And just to my friend Senator Hagerty I would suggest 
everybody look at the statements including a recent renewal of 
the statement by David Satterfield, our Ambassador, that makes 
it absolutely clear that when it comes to aid being provided by 
U.N. organizations and international NGOs that there have 
been--he has gotten no reports of diversion even from our 
Israeli friends, and I would be happy to share that with the 
Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. If I might.
    I have had direct reports from the Israelis. That is 
exactly what is happening.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, they have not reported it to the 
person on the ground, David Satterfield, who is our 
coordinator, and that is the statement I have got from him 
recently just a couple days ago. Happy to share it with you.
    Senator Hagerty. It would only require Mr. Satterfield to 
go and ask the national security advisor----
    Senator Murphy. Senator Van Hollen is recognized.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. If I could, Mr. Chairman, 
just have a few more minutes as a result of that.
    Look, I want to pick up on a couple of questions raised by 
Senator Kaine--and Ambassador Shapiro, good to see you--there 
has been lots of discussion here about our actions against the 
Houthis, and I am fully in support of protecting waterways.
    But let us also recognize that the Houthi action has been 
in response to the war on Gaza. Would you not agree with that, 
Mr. Shapiro?
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Senator.
    I would certainly agree that the Houthis have made the 
claim that that is the original motivation for their attacks. I 
think they have made some other claims along the way.
    I would just simply say that whatever the rationale or 
reason or claim that the Houthis or any other organization 
would make for conducting these kinds of attacks, there is no 
legitimacy to them.
    There is no legitimacy to target international----
    Senator Van Hollen. Ambassador, I agree with you. I agree 
there is no legitimacy. There is no disagreement there.
    But is it not a fact that the Houthi attacks on shipping 
went down significantly during the period of the humanitarian 
pause in November?
    Mr. Shapiro. I believe there was a decline during that 
period. It was not a complete cessation, and there have been 
various points when there have been spikes and valleys so I do 
not know to what we can attribute that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Right.
    Mr. Shapiro. Sometimes I think the decline is in response 
to our strikes while they reload and prepare for their next 
strikes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, our strikes, as you know, 
actually came after this humanitarian pause period.
    Mr. Shapiro. Correct. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. And so their reduction in strikes there 
during that pause period cannot be attributed to the actions we 
took in terms of strikes. I think the record is pretty clear.
    But if I could ask you--as you know, the Algerians had a 
cease fire resolution at the U.N. which we vetoed, but we at 
the same time said we were going to provide--we, the United 
States, were going to propose a U.N. Security Council 
resolution.
    I do not know if you have had a chance to look at some of 
the provisions that have been put out there by the United 
States.
    But one of them indicates that under current circumstances 
a major ground offensive into Rafah would result in further 
harm to civilians and further displacement including 
potentially into neighboring countries.
    Do you agree with that conclusion?
    Mr. Shapiro. A bit outside my brief to speak about the 
Security Council resolution. Obviously, the State Department 
should address that.
    I will say that in all of our recent engagements with 
Israel--that includes Secretary Austin's conversations with 
Minister of Defense Gallant, that includes conversations 
between our military--we have made very clear that no operation 
should be considered or undertaken in Rafah without a clear and 
executable plan and the follow through to implement it to 
ensure the safety--safe evacuation of civilians who are taking 
safe harbor in Rafah and provision for their humanitarian needs 
as they move.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, given that would you agree that 
it would it be a mistake for the United States to provide more 
offensive weapons at this time to the Netanyahu government 
without receiving assurances with respect to actions in Rafah 
that we have requested?
    Mr. Shapiro. Well, as you know, Senator, the President has 
made clear from the beginning of this conflict on October 7th 
that he will help ensure Israel has what it needs to defend 
itself following those terrible terrorist attacks and ensuring 
they cannot be repeated, that they must observe the laws of war 
and laws of armed conflict and ensure that they do the maximum 
to protect civilians and provide for their humanitarian needs.
    As you know, the President very much in dialogue with you, 
Senator, issued the National Security Memorandum 20 which will 
help ensure that we receive credible and reliable assurances 
from all our partners who receive defense services--defense 
articles and certain defense services.
    Senator Van Hollen. And I very much appreciate the 
President taking that action. I think it was an important step, 
and I thank you and the Administration and the President, of 
course, on that.
    But let me just say I think it would be sending very mixed 
signals if prior to receiving clear assurances from the 
Netanyahu government that they will not take the actions in 
Rafah that we are worried about we were to at the same time 
extend further significant military assistance.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to include in the 
record a statement made by Samantha Power today from Jordan 
where she is standing in front of lots of World Food Programme 
shipments that need to get into Gaza saying these should be 
into Gaza.
    And I would just ask you, Ambassador Shapiro, and both of 
you to take back to the present Administration 20 Senators--25, 
actually, I think--wrote the President a letter talking about 
five specific actions the Netanyahu government needs to take to 
allow more assistance into Rafah including opening more 
crossings, things that are common sense measures that in the 
view of many of us should be taken right now.
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
    Thank you both.
    Senator Murphy. I will enter that into the record. Thank 
you, Senator Van Hollen.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this hearing.]
    Senator Murphy. Senator Young and I are going to pose a 
series of second round questions for you, and I want to start 
with, I think, this really important series of questions that 
you got from Senator Kaine and to a certain extent Senator Van 
Hollen.
    So, listen, I support the actions that the Administration 
has taken because I believe that the United States is the 
guarantor of the freedom of navigation of international waters.
    We have an obligation to respond when United States 
interests are being attacked in commercial waters. But I do 
worry about the efficacy of a campaign of military strikes when 
we have seen very little evidence that airstrikes against the 
Houthis have restored deterrence over the course of a 7-year 
war with the Saudis who conducted 23,000 airstrikes.
    I would note that nine of the locations targeted by the 
United States and the U.K. strikes in January of this year were 
previously hit by 419 airstrikes in the Saudi led air war 
between 2015 and 2022.
    So if 23,000 airstrikes by the Saudis were not effective in 
moving the needle militarily and restoring deterrence how can 
we be confident that our campaign of airstrikes is going to 
have a different outcome?
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Look, we, first of all, have to understand who we are 
dealing with. We are dealing with an organization, now a 
specially designated global terrorist organization, that simply 
thinks the rules do not apply to it.
    They are backed by the common denominator of a range of 
threats around the region by Iran which provides weapons which 
we have discussed, which provides intelligence, which provides 
targeting information, which provides financial support and 
training, and they too have an agenda, and that agenda includes 
to try to get the United States to depart the Middle East.
    And so these are the actors we are dealing with, and what 
our strikes are intended to demonstrate, first of all, is that 
we will continue to degrade and remove their capability if they 
continue to conduct these attacks.
    We will also try to interdict as much as we can and work 
with our partners on that. We will, of course, defend those who 
are transiting the waters and that we will be prepared to take 
additional actions if there are, obviously, additional threats 
against us or against our people.
    We have demonstrated that very clearly in our responses to 
the tragic attack on Tower 22 in Jordan and there was a very 
strong U.S. response in Iraq and Syria against IRGC affiliated 
targets, individuals and facilities, and it has until now led 
to a quiet period since February 4th.
    We do not want to take that for granted. But it has 
demonstrated to Iran, again, one of the key enablers of the 
Houthis, that we are prepared to respond.
    Senator Murphy. Right. But the extent of the military 
infrastructure inside Yemen, especially after 7 years of 
developing partnership with Iran, is extensive, and they have 
shown over the course of 7 years of significant airstrikes from 
the Saudis, sometimes with U.S. participation and help, the 
ability to very quickly rebuild their capacity.
    There is not a lot of evidence that during the period of 
these airstrikes we have had any effective deterrent. Do we 
actually believe there is a finite amount of infrastructure 
that can be hit and destroyed so as to change the reality 
inside the Red Sea through military operations alone?
    Mr. Shapiro. We know that they still have capability. We 
sort of have a good sense of the numerator, what we have been 
able to eliminate and what they have used, and we do not fully 
know the denominator.
    That is, obviously, information we are working to develop, 
and obviously we are working to prevent that from expanding 
through interdictions and working with partners to prevent 
other smuggling activities.
    I cannot tell you that we know that there is a moment when 
they will decide that they have had enough. That is our 
intention to make sure that they understand that if they 
continue to target us and our innocent mariners that we will 
work with our partners to prevent--to protect them and that we 
will respond as appropriate to conduct these acts of self-
defense.
    Senator Murphy. Let me ask you one last question on this 
question of authorization.
    I do agree that it is a very troubling and creative 
interpretation of Article II authority to extend protection to 
partners. I agree with Senator Kaine that that is probably not 
a theory in good standing.
    But let me ask you if you believe that Article II authority 
gives you the ability to attack partners of those that are 
directing attacks at U.S. partners. I am asking, of course, 
about Iran.
    Do you have existing Article II authority, having 
identified Iran as a participant in these Houthi attacks, to 
launch strikes against Iranian assets or Iran itself?
    Mr. Shapiro. I would really be overstepping to speculate on 
authorities that would be cited for strikes that have not taken 
place. I will say that the President's Article II authority was 
very much relevant in the response strikes in Iraq and Syria 
following the attack on Tower 22 in Jordan in which three U.S. 
service members were killed.
    And I do think that has an impact. That has an impact in 
Iran's thinking since the targets included IRGC affiliated 
facilities, and it included individuals that IRGC was well 
known to support in their attacks on the United States.
    So I think they take that seriously, and they should take 
that seriously.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Special Envoy Lenderking, the Houthis had 
indicated that if they were relisted as a specially designated 
global terrorist group that they would expel humanitarian 
workers and take other actions.
    We are just days, frankly, into this going into effect, 
this relisting. Can you provide any update on where those 
threats stand as well as the practical implications of this 
designation on the ground?
    Mr. Lenderking. Thank you, Senator.
    I mean, the Houthis took a few actions which, honestly, 
have not had a great deal of impact. They did, as you note, 
threaten to expel U.S. and U.K. aid workers in Yemen.
    There are a number of U.S. and U.K. nationals who do a lot 
of great work on the humanitarian side in Yemen. From what I 
understand so far the Houthis have not made good on those 
threats. They issued ``legislation,'' quote/unquote. I say that 
in quotes because they are not a legitimate government. They 
are not internationally recognized. They are a militant group 
and recently designated as a terrorist group also.
    They took action to designate us, and they have said that 
they will continue their attacks on shipping. So they have 
taken a few steps which I think are mainly for their own public 
consumption.
    Senator Young. Over the years you have spent countless days 
in the region. You may head there again soon, we were 
discussing before the hearing. Can you describe how the 
narrative has shifted since the brutal attacks on October 7 in 
terms of bringing peace to Yemen from before the war to now?
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, I think a significant number of 
Yemenis want to see the Yemen conflict ended, and I think it is 
heartening that, as I mentioned earlier, that the truce, which 
was set in April 2022, has essentially held inside Yemen.
    So despite the fact that there are attacks on the Red Sea 
by the Houthis--by Red Sea shipping the internal war in Yemen 
has not heated up, and we are very concerned that that could 
happen and be another effect, if you will, of a prolonged 
situation on the Red Sea.
    So we want to--and by the way, Senator, I think it is 
important also that the roadmap that I described is something 
that the parties--that is, the Yemen government and the Houthis 
and the Saudis--all say they still want to see achieved.
    I think that is important. But as a priority of course----
    Senator Young. That is where I was headed next.
    Mr. Lenderking. Yes. A key priority, of course, is to get 
the Red Sea attacks under control. Stopped.
    Senator Young. And what if there is ongoing escalation? 
What will be implications for your broader efforts to try and 
reconcile----
    Mr. Lenderking. No question that a broader escalation or 
continuation of the status quo undermines the peace effort, 
which we have worked very hard to achieve over the last 3 years 
and would ultimately, I think, degrade our own interests in the 
region which are solidly behind seeing a peace effort in Yemen.
    We do not want a return of al-Qaeda in Yemen. We do not 
want ISIS building up its capabilities in Yemen. Yemen is a 
country that, unfortunately, in the past has threatened and led 
to the deaths of Americans.
    So stability in Yemen is important to our interest and to 
those of our partners so we want to see this effort drive 
forward. The roadmap that I referred to, Senator, is the best 
opportunity that Yemen has had for peace since this conflict 
began.
    Senator Young [presiding]. Before I recognize Senator Cruz 
I would be remiss if I did not ask a question about China.
    In the last year or so it has liked to sort of style itself 
as a power broker in the Middle East, and yet here we are in 
the midst of real security crisis, which is for so many an 
economic and diplomatic crisis in the region, and China is 
nowhere to be found.
    So, Mr. Lenderking, how has this example of Chinese 
inaction been helpful for our diplomats, if at all, in pushing 
back on Chinese diplomatic and financial inroads in the region? 
Seems like an opportunity to remind people who is really 
working to effect positive change in the region.
    Mr. Lenderking. No, Senator, thank you, and it picks up on 
the questions that Senator Romney also posed about the Chinese 
role, and we do see a certain degree of freeloading that is 
absolutely unacceptable.
    When we talk about an international problem that needs an 
international solution we need the Chinese much more 
aggressively engaged. They are feeling the impact economically 
of the Red Sea attacks on their own shipping effort.
    So that is--and I would just assure you that we have a 
dialogue at my level and at the most senior levels of this 
Government with the Chinese about taking a more responsible 
role in the Red Sea, and we will continue that.
    Senator Young. That is positive.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Shapiro, you have worked on Iran related issues 
throughout this Administration. You were on the team headed by 
Rob Malley, and you are now at the Defense Department.
    Meanwhile, the Biden administration has allowed the Iranian 
regime to build up a ghost fleet of tankers which are third 
country flagged tankers. That fleet grew from about 70 vessels 
at the beginning of the Administration to almost 400 tankers 
today.
    The Iranian regime used that ghost fleet to ship over a 
billion barrels of oil and to make unaccountable tens if not 
hundreds of billions of dollars.
    When Joe Biden came into power Iran was selling, roughly, 
300,000 barrels of oil a day. Today, due to the Biden 
administration's appeasement of Iran, Iran is selling, roughly, 
2 million barrels of oil a day.
    Those billions of dollars went directly to fund terrorism. 
They went to the Houthis. They went to Hamas. They went to 
Hezbollah. They pay for the Houthis' terrorists, terrorism, and 
for their weapons. They paid for the October 7 atrocities in 
Israel.
    The Biden administration refused to meaningfully enforce 
our sanctions, and we are seeing the consequences with war in 
the Middle East.
    In your judgment how is the Biden administration's 
appeasement of Iran and refusal to enforce sanctions against 
Iran--how has that worked out for the safety and security of 
Israel and the safety and security of America?
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Senator.
    A number of the questions you raise about sanctions 
enforcement are the province of the Treasury Department, and I 
simply on behalf of the Defense Department will have to defer 
to my colleagues there.
    I will tell you that the subject of the hearing focuses on 
how we are responding to this particular threat of an Iranian 
sponsored and backed organization, the Houthi. Before you 
arrived we also spoke a bit about the U.S. response to other 
Iranian proxies.
    Senator Cruz. I had a question. How is this working out for 
the safety and security of Israel and the safety and security 
of America? You are not answering that question.
    Mr. Shapiro. The answer I can provide is that we are making 
very clear to Iran through our posture in the region, through 
the assistance we provide to our partners including Israel and 
its need to defend itself, to our own responses when Iran and 
Iranian backed organizations have targeted our personnel and 
tragically have killed three of our personnel, and in their 
sponsorship of the Houthi military strikes against free 
shipping in the Red Sea that we will respond and Iran----
    Senator Cruz. With all respect that is baloney, and the 
Ayatollah has heard the message. Let me ask you how many ghost 
fleet vessels did the Biden administration sanction before 
October 7?
    Mr. Shapiro. Again, sanctions matters belong to the 
Treasury Department so I do not know----
    Senator Cruz. Do you know the answer?
    Mr. Shapiro. I do not know the answer and would have to 
defer to the Department for that answer.
    Senator Cruz. And is the Biden administration concerned 
about the billions of dollars they continue to flow to the 
Ayatollah today?
    Right now, today, that money is flowing to the Ayatollah 
because there are 400 ships in the ghost fleet that this 
Administration will not sanction. The Ayatollah is selling much 
of that oil to Communist China.
    The revenue is being used to fund Hamas, to fund Hezbollah, 
to fund the Houthis, and the Biden administration's response 
is, well, we made very clear there will be consequences.
    Baloney. Cut off the money. Why will the Biden 
administration not cut off the money from Iran?
    Mr. Shapiro. Senator, I really have to stay in the lane of 
the Department of Defense. What we have made very clear----
    Senator Cruz. Did you work with Rob Malley on his task 
force?
    Mr. Shapiro. I worked for a few months as an advisor to 
then Special Envoy Malley, yes.
    Senator Cruz. And you were Ambassador to Israel. You have 
long experience in the region. I find it impossible that you 
have no views on the $100 billion plus that Joe Biden has 
gifted to the Ayatollah that has been used to murder Americans 
and murder Israelis.
    I am asking you is it not time to cut off the money?
    Mr. Shapiro. On behalf of the Defense Department what I can 
say is that when we see Iran, which we do see on a daily and 
regular basis, supporting terrorism, providing weapons, 
providing intelligence, providing sponsorship and training to 
terrorist organizations, we make very clear to Iran that not 
only will we----
    Senator Cruz. But you do not make clear. If they continue 
to have the money you are not making it clear. If you say here 
is $100 billion, but you know what, we are going to send you a 
stern letter, well, that $100 billion is being used to fund 
weapons.
    Let me ask--all right. And it is not just Iran, by the way. 
The Houthis--listen, the Trump administration rightly 
designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. 
Within a month of taking office what did the Biden 
administration do? Delisted the Houthis.
    Now, finally, last month the Biden administration was 
forced to relist the Houthis and to designate them as a 
specially designated global terrorist group.
    How did it work out delisting the Houthis for 3 years? Did 
they behave just quietly, or did they continue to be the 
terrorists they have been the whole time even while the 
Administration was trying to appease them?
    Mr. Shapiro. Some of this is Special Envoy Lenderking's 
province. What we have done as the Houthis have demonstrated 
through their actions that they are behaving as a terrorist 
organization is not only that designation but also the 
defensive operation of Operation Prosperity Guardian.
    Senator Cruz. So prior to January of this year they were 
not behaving as terrorists? Is that your----
    Mr. Shapiro. They were not shooting at ships in the Red Sea 
in November of last year.
    Senator Cruz. Were they terrorists last year? Were the 
Houthis terrorists last year?
    Mr. Shapiro. They were designated as of--as a designation 
that took----
    Senator Cruz. I am asking you is it DoD's view were the 
Houthis terrorists in 2023, yes or no?
    Mr. Shapiro. They were a designated terrorist organization 
as of a few days ago when I took office on February----
    Senator Cruz. And your delisting them was indefensible and 
has proven catastrophic.
    Senator Young. Just as a quick follow up, Mr. Shapiro, to 
Mr. Cruz's line of questioning, forces in the region have 
interdicted shipping--Special Envoy Lenderking referenced it 
earlier--interdicted the shipments from Iran over to Yemen for 
a number of years running.
    Can you describe briefly--and then I will turn it over to 
my colleague, Senator Barrasso, Mr. Shapiro--how has the 
smuggling situation evolved since October 7 and since we have 
surged our forces into the Red and Arabian Sea?
    Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Senator.
    The smuggling continues. We know that it continues. I think 
to get into details to describe exactly what we are seeing--the 
volume, the routes, the shipments--would probably require 
speaking in a closed session.
    But because we continue to see those efforts we have 
undertaken, and NAVCENT in particular has been in the lead on 
this, enhanced efforts to identify and then interdict those 
shipments when we see them.
    We do communicate with various partners who could also 
bring that capability to interdict. Ambassador Lenderking and I 
have worked together on looking at opportunities to strengthen 
the inspection mechanism of UNVIM which tanker shipments that 
are on their way into the Hodeidah port of Yemen are also 
searched for weapons. This is a work in progress.
    So I believe the smuggling does continue, but because we 
know it continues we are upping our efforts to interdict those 
shipments.
    Senator Murphy [presiding]. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. 
Thanks for holding this meeting.
    Mr. Lenderking, last week I was in Djibouti. We have 140 
members of the Wyoming Air National Guard there, kind of right 
there at the tip of activities. It is a hotspot, what we see is 
happening with the attack on the ships that are trading to the 
point where they cannot get through the Suez Canal.
    They cannot get insurance. They are going around Africa. It 
is adding about 12 days to the transit time. Concern adding to 
the costs significantly, the impact of foreign trade, all of 
these things as a result of the Houthis and what they are doing 
in that area aiming at ships with drones, sometimes with 
missiles.
    It is only about 11 miles that I was there at the point 
looking how close things were. So they are in a hotspot.
    The day I get back the New York Times has this big expose 
about the fact that the Administration has really fallen down 
on the job of trying to prevent the sale of Iranian oil to 
China.
    They reported 59 million barrels of oil on--they describe 
them as shadowy tankers that left Iran and all of these have 
ended up in China, and then the cash from all of this ended up 
in Iran, and at the lowest prices of oil it would be $2.8 
billion but likely much more as prices fluctuate.
    The Secretary of Treasury came to Congress. She testified--
this is before that report came out--that, oh, things are fine, 
that we are doing everything we can.
    The American people do not believe it. The soldiers that 
are there risking their lives do not believe it, because that 
is the money that is being used. There was 140 attacks by the 
Houthis funded--and by Iran on American soldiers in the last 4 
months.
    We know where the money is coming from. A lot of it is 
coming from the sale of oil that we should be blocking or other 
funds that go from the United States.
    I think the Administration has failed completely. I think 
the President is just being outworked and outplayed and 
outmaneuvered by the Iranians. I think the world is seeing a 
diminished President who is just not up to the job.
    What are you doing from the standpoint of the State 
Department to prevent this ongoing effort to sell--for Iran to 
be able to continue to sell to China?
    I mean, they are working together, and Iran is also giving 
drones to Russia. You have North Korea being belligerent as 
well. It just seems that we are not where we want to be. As a 
State Department official what is your response to all this?
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, thank you, Senator, first of all, for 
visiting Djibouti. It is not necessarily everybody's first 
thought of where to go, but we have important interests there.
    I have been there three times in this particular job so I 
am aware of the details about with which you speak. We do have 
a very important interdiction and inspection operation for 
Yemen ships that is based in Djibouti called the U.N. 
Verification Inspection Mission.
    But certainly, agree with you that the Iranians are not 
supposed to be able to sell that kind of oil to China. I think 
there are very vigorous efforts to counter that with our 
partners and allies and that kind of funding, I think, that you 
are speaking about is in violation of not only U.S. interests 
but also numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions.
    Senator Barrasso. And it does seem that it was the New York 
Times expose that actually brought it to the fore because the 
Administration seems to be unaware of all of this that was 
happening out there.
    Mr. Lenderking. I think the Administration--I am not the 
Iran expert, Senator, but I think the Administration is aware 
of it and would certainly look into these reports in more depth 
now that they have been----
    Senator Barrasso. If they are aware of it then they tried 
to mislead Congress intentionally because the Secretary of 
Treasury said we are doing absolutely everything possible, and 
then all of a sudden this gets shown to the world from a press 
coverage. So anything you want to add on this?
    Okay. Well, we can go on and on. The other thing that I saw 
in Djibouti, and I would ask you to comment on this, and you 
saw as well, China is building a large base there. You can see 
it from the air coming in. You can see it from the ground. 
China is making significant investments in that area.
    Our base in Djibouti was an old French Foreign Legion base, 
which is why it is named after the commander of the base at the 
time. Communist China is making significant investments right 
in that area where the Gulf of Aden comes down and then it goes 
up into the Red Sea.
    And from a State Department standpoint anything that you 
are noticing with that and we need to be concerned with?
    Mr. Lenderking. Well, certainly, Senator, I think we are 
very conscious and aware of Chinese expansion in the Gulf 
region, which is by and large not in our interests. I think 
that is very much a part of the engagement that we have with 
the Chinese and also our partners in the region and in East 
Asia as well.
    Senator Barrasso. Okay.
    And then to Mr. Shapiro, last month Qatar Energy decided to 
suspend all transits through the Red Sea. This led to the 
shipments being forced, as I talked about, around the Cape of 
Good Hope in South Africa, adding significant delays, about a 
day--probably 12 days added in Israel, much more fuel being 
expended to move the product around.
    At the same time Russia, Iran, are both building up their 
LNG export capacity. Europe's energy supply be helped or hurt 
by President Biden's decision to reduce American LNG exports, 
actually putting a pause on that, given that the supplies from 
Qatar are now forced to go around Africa?
    Mr. Shapiro. Senator, I am certainly not an expert on 
energy markets or energy export policies so I think I will 
decline to answer the question.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, it is hurting.
    Mr. Shapiro. Sorry?
    Senator Barrasso. I will just tell you the answer. It is 
hurting.
    Mr. Shapiro. Yes. May I address your question about China, 
if it is all right?
    Senator Barrasso. Please.
    Mr. Shapiro. Because China has been mentioned on a couple 
of occasions, and I think it is actually quite noteworthy--one 
of your colleagues mentioned that what is quite clear is that 
China is playing no role to help with this multilateral 
international effort to defend legitimate shipping in 
international waterways, and it is one of those moments when I 
think it has become clear to many of our partners in the region 
sometimes who--when people ask questions are they going to 
remain committed to the U.S. or they ask will the U.S. remain 
committed to the region or will they have alternative security 
partners.
    They do not have a alternative security partner in China. 
There is nobody other than the United States who will do what 
we are doing to defend freedom of navigation in this region.
    And so I actually think it has been a moment of clarity 
about U.S. influence in this region in this regard.
    Senator Barrasso. I do not know if either of you want this 
question. You can comment.
    What is the Administration's strategy to ensure Europe is 
not forced to turn to Iran and Russia for LNG now that the U.S. 
is not wanting to export based on the President's new policy?
    Mr. Shapiro. I think it is a bit beyond the Defense 
Department's area of----
    Senator Barrasso. Well, it is indefensible. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Barrasso.
    Let me thank both of you for being here today.
    In particular, Envoy Lenderking, let me thank you for all 
the hard work that you had done previous to the eruption of 
this conflict to try to bring a political settlement to the 
people of Yemen.
    I know we were close, and I think one of the reasons why we 
need to place an imperative and a priority on bringing to close 
this round of hostilities so that you and others can get back 
to the work of trying to midwife that political compromise.
    I noticed an individual with a resemblance in the audience, 
and so I want to welcome your father and stepmother to the 
hearing today. You should be very proud of the work that your 
son has done to try to bring peace to a region that has been 
without it for far too long.
    With that, we thank you both for your testimony. Senator 
Young and I were just commenting this has been one of the most 
substantive and wide ranging hearings that we have had on this 
committee.
    We are going to keep the record open for members to submit 
questions until the close of business Thursday, and with thanks 
to the subcommittee this hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. How does the Administration define the term 
``hostilities'' for the purposes of the War Powers Act of 1973?

    Answer. Whether a particular situation involves hostilities for 
purposes of the War Powers Resolution is a highly fact specific inquiry 
and analysis.
    With respect to recent U.S. military actions in the Red Sea region, 
actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi 
threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their 
longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen. The 
Administration's view is that the War Powers Resolution's 60 day 
termination provision does not require an end to U.S. actions like 
those taken to date.
    This conclusion is based on the facts of this particular situation, 
which the Administration does not believe constitute an introduction of 
forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities that triggers the 
termination provision.
    This is a question that lawyers from across the interagency have 
analyzed closely. The Biden administration remains committed to acting 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including on 
the use of military force, and respects the important role of Congress 
in these matters.

    Question. Does the Administration distinguish between offensive and 
defensive U.S. military actions as to what constitutes ``hostilities,'' 
for the purposes of the War Powers Act of 1973? If so, on what basis?

    Answer. The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary 
to defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces 
carry out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea.
    Whether a particular situation involves hostilities for purposes of 
the War Powers Resolution is a highly fact specific inquiry and 
analysis.

    Question. Does the Administration distinguish between military 
actions ordered by the President and those directed by combatant 
commands, such as U.S. Central Command, as to what constitutes 
``hostilities''? If so, on what basis?

    Answer. The level of approval does not itself determine whether the 
War Powers Resolution's 60-day termination provision is triggered. 
Whether a particular situation triggers the War Powers Resolution is a 
highly fact specific inquiry and analysis.
    Both the strikes approved by the President and those approved by 
the Commander of U.S. Central Command or below have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces who are operating to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea, where we and others are operating in 
accordance with international law.

    Question. Why did the Administration refrain from submitting War 
Powers 
reports for U.S. naval actions in the Red Sea beginning in October 
2023, including the repeated downing of Houthi drones and missiles 
aimed at Israel, U.S., and international commercial vessels, and U.S. 
Navy vessels?

    Answer. The Biden administration remains fully committed to keeping 
the appropriate committees of Congress informed. To that end, the 
President notified Congress about certain counter-Houthi actions on 
January 12, 2024, January 24, 2024, February 5, 2024, and February 26, 
2024.
    That said, the War Powers Resolution does not require reporting on 
the actions U.S. forces have taken to defend themselves, and the 
actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi 
threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their 
longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. Why did the Administration refrain from submitting a War 
Powers report for the skirmish between U.S. Navy helicopters and Houthi 
boats on December 31, resulting in the sinking of multiple vessels and 
ten Houthi fatalities?

    Answer. The Biden administration remains fully committed to keeping 
the appropriate committees of Congress informed.
    Actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi 
threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their 
longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen.
    On December 31, 2023, U.S. forces responded to a distress call from 
a commercial vessel, consistent with international law, and were 
required to use force to defend themselves as they responded to the 
distressed civilian mariners.
    The War Powers Resolution does not require reporting on this action 
U.S. forces took to defend themselves while continuing to conduct 
longstanding naval operations to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea; it was not an introduction of forces into hostilities 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. Why has the Administration only submitted War Powers 
reports for some U.S. airstrikes in Yemen (such as those conducted with 
the United Kingdom) but not others?

    Answer. The President authorized U.S. forces to take certain 
limited strikes against facilities in Yemen that facilitate Houthi 
militants' attacks in the Red Sea region on four occasions: January 11, 
2024, January 22, 2024, February 3, 2024, and February 24, 2024. These 
discrete strikes were carried out as part of a multinational operation 
alongside the United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, and the Netherlands. In each of these instances, in an effort 
to keep Congress informed, the President notified Congress on January 
12, 2024, January 24, 2024, February 5, 2024, and February 26, 2024, as 
a matter of comity.
    The War Powers Resolution does not require reporting on the actions 
U.S. forces have taken to defend themselves while continuing to conduct 
longstanding naval operations to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. The Administration has characterized many recent strikes 
against Houthi targets as in ``self-defense.'' How does the 
Administration define ``self-defense'' and ``imminent threat'' in this 
context?

    Answer. The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary 
to defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces 
carry out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea. The strikes have targeted the specific 
types of weapons and infrastructure that have been used for Houthi 
attacks and that continue to threaten U.S. forces.
    What constitutes a threat of imminent attack depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances at the time.

    Question. Does the President have authority under the 
Constitution's Article II to use military force to defend non-U.S. 
commercial shipping?

    Answer. The U.S. military actions taken to date have been 
consistent with the President's authority under Article II of the 
Constitution.
    The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces carry 
out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    The U.S. military actions have also been consistent with the U.S. 
Navy's longstanding authorities and mission. Defending U.S. commerce 
and interests at sea has been a core mission of the U.S. Navy since the 
Constitution authorized Congress to provide and maintain a permanent 
Navy.
    To that end, the U.S. Navy has long operated in the waterways 
around Yemen, consistent with the U.S. Navy's statutory authorities and 
mission of the peacetime promotion of national security interests and 
prosperity of the United States. This area is critical to global 
commerce: Nearly 15 percent of all seaborne trade passes through the 
Red Sea, including 8 percent of global grain trade; 12 percent of all 
seaborne traded oil; and 8 percent of the world's liquefied natural 
gas.

    Question. When did the War Powers Act of 1973's 60-day clock start 
with respect to hostilities involving U.S. forces in the Red Sea, 
Yemen, and Gulf of Aden following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack 
on Israel by Hamas? Is this clock still running? If so, when will it 
run out?

    Answer. Actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from 
Houthi threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out 
their longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen. 
The War Powers Resolution's 60 day termination provision does not 
require an end to U.S. actions like those taken to date.
    This is a question that lawyers from across the executive branch 
have analyzed closely. The Biden administration remains committed to 
acting consistent with applicable domestic and international law, 
including on the use of military force, and respects the important role 
of Congress in these matters.
    The U.S. Navy has long operated in the waterways around Yemen, 
consistent with the U.S. Navy's statutory authorities and mission of 
the peacetime promotion of national security interests and prosperity 
of the United States. This area is critical to global commerce: Nearly 
15 percent of all seaborne trade passes through the Red Sea, including 
8 percent of global grain trade; 12 percent of all seaborne-traded oil; 
and 8 percent of the world's liquefied natural gas.
    The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces carry 
out that longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea. The strikes have targeted the specific types of 
weapons and infrastructure that have been used for Houthi attacks and 
that continue to threaten U.S. forces.
    Thus, we do not believe the War Powers Resolution requires 
termination of U.S. actions like those taken to date.
    Indeed, if we were required to cease defending ourselves in this 
way, we would in effect need to abandon our ongoing naval posture in 
waters where we have been conducting a mission to protect and defend 
U.S. commerce and interests at sea that is longstanding and consistent 
with statutory authorities, and where we and others are operating in 
accordance with international law.
    We would emphasize that this conclusion is based on the facts of 
this particular situation, which we do not believe constitute an 
introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities 
that triggers the termination provision.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve.

    Question. Does the Administration intend to remove U.S. forces from 
hostilities when the 60-day clock runs out or seek congressional 
authorization?

    Answer. In the particular facts and circumstances here, we do not 
believe that the War Powers Resolution's termination provision requires 
U.S. forces to cease taking actions like those undertaken thus far. 
These actions have been necessary to defend U.S. forces conducting 
longstanding naval operations to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve.
    The Administration respects the important role of Congress in these 
matters and remains committed to keeping Congress informed on the 
situation.

    Question. Does the Administration believe U.S. strikes in Yemen 
will lead to an end to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden? If so, when and how?

    Answer. The Administration's strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen are 
designed to degrade the Houthis' capabilities to continue their 
reckless attacks on international and commercial shipping in the Red 
Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Administration is also taking measures to 
interdict the supply of weapons to the Houthis. The Houthis have 
publicly stated they will stop attacks on commercial shipping in the 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden when there is a cease fire in Gaza.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. During your April 21, 2021, SFRC testimony, you stated 
that ``what has been most striking to me is the recognition and 
understanding of the necessary role of Houthi representation in any 
post-war Yemeni government. No longer is anyone suggesting Houthi 
representatives be locked out of any future settlement--a popular 
refrain when the conflict began.'' Do you still believe there is room 
for the Houthis in a future Yemeni government after their string of Red 
Sea attacks, which have targeted our service members and innocent 
mariners?

    Answer. We strongly condemn the Houthis' behavior; their attacks 
must cease, and the United States will continue to hold the group 
accountable for their actions. A fully inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni 
political dialogue that includes all legitimate actors is the only 
sustainable solution to the country's internal conflict. Only Yemenis 
can decide the future of their country.

    Question. Do you feel the same about Hamas's future role in Gaza?

    Answer. Although my area of responsibility is Yemen, not Gaza, I 
strongly condemn Hamas's behavior, just as I do the Houthis'.

    Question. Why should we continue to provide aid to what in effect 
has become a failed state, taken over by Houthi terrorists and Iran?

    Answer. U.S. humanitarian assistance is designed to benefit 
individuals in need, not governments or authorities. We remain 
committed to supporting the most vulnerable Yemenis, and we continue to 
support critical and lifesaving humanitarian activities and services, 
such as the provision of essential nutrition, healthcare, and water, 
sanitation, and hygiene assistance across all of Yemen. The people of 
Yemen should not be made to suffer for the actions of a terrorist group 
that is both deeply unpopular and unrepresentative of the Yemeni 
people. USAID development assistance programs are implemented only in 
areas controlled by the Republic of Yemen Government.

    Question. What steps should we take to ensure that a functional 
government in Yemen exists, one that is not dominated by the Houthis or 
other terrorist groups?

    Answer. The United States strongly supports the Republic of Yemen 
Government. We will continue to support this government to allow it to 
fulfill its obligations to the Yemeni people.

    Question. In February 2021, the Biden administration removed the 
Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization lists. In January 2024, 
the Biden administration only re-designated the Houthis as a SDGT. Was 
this the right decision given the results?

    Answer. In 2021, the Department of State revoked Ansarallah's FTO 
and SDGT designations in recognition of the dire humanitarian situation 
in Yemen. The revocations were intended to ensure that relevant U.S. 
policies did not impede assistance to those already suffering a 
humanitarian crisis. However, since November 2023, the Houthis have 
launched dozens of unprecedented attacks against international maritime 
vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as military forces 
positioned in the area to defend the safety and security of commercial 
shipping.
    The Administration has made clear that the Houthis must be held 
accountable for their actions in the Red Sea and beyond. The 
Administration also seeks to mitigate any adverse humanitarian impacts 
of U.S. sanctions on the people of Yemen. The designation of Ansarallah 
as an SDGT advances both these Administration priorities.

    Question. Do you believe revocation of terrorist designations 
allowed Iran to move more arms and funding into Yemen?

    Answer. The Administration will continue to counter and blunt 
Iranian malign influence wherever we can. The choice to move away from 
Iran is in the hands of the Houthis. Iran also has the choice to 
provide or withhold support, without which the Houthis would struggle 
to effectively track and strike commercial vessels navigating shipping 
lanes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran has been providing 
support for the planning of operations against commercial vessels in 
the Red Sea. This is consistent with Iran's long term support and 
encouragement of the Houthis' destabilizing actions in the region.

    Question. Why were the Houthis only re-designated as SDGT and not 
as an FTO?

    Answer. The SDGT designation is carefully calibrated to maximize 
its deterrent impact on the Houthis while mitigating any adverse 
impacts on vulnerable Yemeni civilians to the greatest extent possible.

    Question. What was that decision based on, and why?

    Answer. The Administration remains concerned about the grave 
humanitarian situation in Yemen and seeks to mitigate any adverse 
humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions on the people of Yemen. At the 
time the SDGT designation was announced, the Department of the Treasury 
published general licenses designed to facilitate the provision of 
food, medicine, and fuel, as well as personal remittances, 
telecommunications, and port and airport operations on which the Yemeni 
people rely. An FTO designation would trigger a criminal prohibition on 
knowingly providing material support or resources, whose potential 
impacts on the humanitarian situation would not be mitigated by the 
general licenses.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Timothy A. Lenderking to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. Why was the position of Special Envoy for Yemen created, 
and what need was it attempting to fill?

    Answer. President Biden created a Special Envoy for Yemen to bring 
the conflict parties together to reach a negotiated settlement that 
will end the conflict in Yemen through a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue and end 
the suffering of the Yemeni people.

    Question. Please identify and delineate the lines of authority and 
responsibilities between these two positions (Special Envoy for Yemen 
and U.S. Ambassador to Yemen) as they relate to Yemen.

    Answer. The U.S. Ambassador to Yemen leads the U.S. Mission to 
Yemen and is responsible for the bilateral relationship with the 
internationally recognized Government of Yemen. The U.S. Special Envoy 
for Yemen is mandated by the President to bring the conflict parties 
together to reach a negotiated settlement that will end the conflict in 
Yemen through a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue and work to mitigate the 
humanitarian crisis and the suffering of the Yemeni people.

    Question. What system is in place to avoid overlapping 
responsibilities, conflicting policy positions, organizational stove 
piping, and miscommunications between these two positions and their 
staff?

    Answer. The U.S. Mission to Yemen and the Office of the Special 
Envoy work as one team to advance U.S. policy with respect to Yemen. In 
addition to daily staff level contacts, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen 
and the U.S. Special Envoy maintain routine, structured contact to 
advance U.S. priorities.

    Question. Are the Houthis terrorist?

    Answer. The Administration designated Ansarallah (commonly known as 
the Houthis) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, effective 
February 16, 2024.

    Question. Is the Administration currently reviewing the FTO 
designation for the Houthis?

    Answer. The Department will continue to monitor the Houthis' 
destabilizing activity against peaceful maritime trade as well as their 
contacts with Iran and continue to consider additional designations as 
appropriate in the future.

    Question. Do the Houthis meet the requirements and definition to be 
designated as an FTO?

    Answer. As a matter of law, in order to designate any group as an 
FTO, the Secretary of State must determine that it is a foreign 
organization that engages in terrorist activity or terrorism or retains 
the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, 
that threatens the security of United States nationals or the national 
security of the United States. In 2021, the Department of State revoked 
Ansarallah's FTO and SDGT designations in recognition of the dire 
humanitarian situation in Yemen. The U.S. Government carefully 
calibrated Ansarallah's 2024 SDGT designation to maximize its deterrent 
impact on the group while mitigating impact on vulnerable Yemeni 
civilians to the greatest extent possible.

    Question. How many Houthis and individuals supporting the Houthis 
have been sanctioned by the U.S. Government?

    Answer. Ten Houthi operatives have been designated pursuant to E.O. 
13611 (Yemen authority) and five Houthi operatives as well as the group 
itself have been designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism 
authority). Additionally, 45 persons have been designated and nine 
vessels identified as blocked property pursuant to E.O. 13224 for 
involvement with the network of Iran based IRGC-QF and Houthi financial 
facilitator Sa'id al-Jamal.

    Question. How many Houthi attacks have there been on U.S. 
commercial and naval vessels since November 2023?

    Answer. We would refer you to the Department of Defense for an 
accurate, unclassified answer to this question.

    Question. How many total attacks have the Houthis conducted since 
November 2023?

    Answer. There have been over 55 total maritime attacks thus far.

    Question. How many injuries and deaths to U.S. citizens, personnel, 
and servicemembers have resulted from Houthi attacks?

    Answer. Houthi attacks have not resulted in any injuries or deaths 
to U.S. citizens thus far.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. How does the Administration define the term 
``hostilities'' for the purposes of the War Powers Act of 1973?

    Answer. Whether a particular situation involves hostilities for 
purposes of the War Powers Resolution is a highly fact specific inquiry 
and analysis.
    With respect to recent U.S. military actions in the Red Sea region, 
actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi 
threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their 
longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen. The 
Administration's view is that the War Powers Resolution's 60 day 
termination provision does not require an end to U.S. actions like 
those taken to date.
    This conclusion is based on the facts of this particular situation, 
which the Administration does not believe constitute an introduction of 
forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities that triggers the 
termination provision.
    This is a question that lawyers from across the interagency have 
analyzed closely. The Biden administration remains committed to acting 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including on 
the use of military force, and respects the important role of Congress 
in these matters.

    Question. Does the Administration distinguish between offensive and 
defensive U.S. military actions as to what constitutes ``hostilities,'' 
for the purposes of the War Powers Act of 1973? If so, on what basis?

    Answer. The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary 
to defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces 
carry out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea.
    Whether a particular situation involves hostilities for purposes of 
the War Powers Resolution is a highly fact specific inquiry and 
analysis.

    Question. Does the Administration distinguish between military 
actions ordered by the President and those directed by combatant 
commands, such as U.S. Central Command, as to what constitutes 
``hostilities''? If so, on what basis?

    Answer. The level of approval does not itself determine whether the 
War Powers Resolution's 60 day termination provision is triggered. 
Whether a particular situation triggers the War Powers Resolution is a 
highly fact specific inquiry and analysis.
    Both the strikes approved by the President and those approved by 
the Commander of U.S. Central Command or below have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces who are operating to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea, where we and others are operating in 
accordance with international law.

    Question. Why did the Administration refrain from submitting War 
Powers reports for U.S. naval actions in the Red Sea beginning in 
October 2023, including the repeated downing of Houthi drones and 
missiles aimed at Israel, U.S. and international commercial vessels, 
and U.S. Navy vessels?

     Answer. The Biden administration remains fully committed to 
keeping the appropriate committees of Congress informed. To that end, 
the President notified Congress about certain counter-Houthi actions on 
January 12, 2024, January 24, 2024, February 5, 2024, and February 26, 
2024.
    That said, the War Powers Resolution does not require reporting on 
the actions U.S. forces have taken to defend themselves and the actions 
taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and 
attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their longstanding 
maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. Why did the Administration refrain from submitting a War 
Powers report for the skirmish between U.S. Navy helicopters and Houthi 
boats on December 31, resulting in the sinking of multiple vessels and 
10 Houthi fatalities?

    Answer. The Biden administration remains fully committed to keeping 
the appropriate committees of Congress informed.
    Actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from Houthi 
threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out their 
longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen.
    On December 31, 2023, U.S. forces responded to a distress call from 
a commercial vessel, consistent with international law, and were 
required to use force to defend themselves as they responded to the 
distressed civilian mariners. The War Powers Resolution does not 
require reporting on this action U.S. forces took to defend themselves 
while continuing to conduct longstanding naval operations to protect 
and defend U.S. commerce and interests at sea; it was not an 
introduction of forces into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. Why has the Administration only submitted War Powers 
reports for some U.S. airstrikes in Yemen (such as those conducted with 
the United Kingdom) but not others?

    Answer. The President authorized U.S. forces to take certain 
limited strikes against facilities in Yemen that facilitate Houthi 
militants' attacks in the Red Sea region on four occasions: January 11, 
2024, January 22, 2024, February 3, 2024, and February 24, 2024. These 
discrete strikes were carried out as part of a multinational operation 
alongside the United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, and the Netherlands. In each of these instances, the President, 
as part of his efforts to keep the Congress informed, notified Congress 
on January 12, 2024, January 24, 2024, February 5, 2024, and February 
26, 2024, as a matter of comity.
    The War Powers Resolution does not require reporting on the actions 
U.S. forces have taken to defend themselves while continuing to conduct 
longstanding naval operations to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve, and the Administration will continue to ensure that we act 
consistent with applicable domestic and international law, including 
with congressional reporting requirements.

    Question. The Administration has characterized many recent strikes 
against Houthi targets as in ``self-defense.'' How does the 
Administration define ``self-defense'' and ``imminent threat'' in this 
context?

    Answer. The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary 
to defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces 
carry out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. 
commerce and interests at sea. The strikes have targeted the specific 
types of weapons and infrastructure that have been used for Houthi 
attacks and that continue to threaten U.S. forces.
    What constitutes a threat of imminent attack depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances at the time.

    Question. Does the President have authority under the 
Constitution's Article II to use military force to defend non-U.S. 
commercial shipping?

    Answer. The U.S. military actions taken to date have been 
consistent with the President's authority under Article II of the 
Constitution.
    The strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces carry 
out their longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    The U.S. military actions have also been consistent with the U.S. 
Navy's longstanding authorities and mission. Defending U.S. commerce 
and interests at sea has been a core mission of the U.S. Navy since the 
Constitution authorized Congress to provide and maintain a permanent 
Navy. To that end, the U.S. Navy has long operated in the waterways 
around Yemen, consistent with the U.S. Navy's statutory authorities and 
mission of the peacetime promotion of national security interests and 
prosperity of the United States. This area is critical to global 
commerce: Nearly 15 percent of all seaborne trade passes through the 
Red Sea, including 8 percent of global grain trade; 12 percent of all 
seaborne traded oil; and 8 percent of the world's liquefied natural 
gas.

    Question. When did the War Powers Act of 1973's 60 day clock start 
with respect to hostilities involving U.S. forces in the Red Sea, 
Yemen, and Gulf of Aden following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack 
on Israel by Hamas? Is this clock still running? If so, when will it 
run out?

    Answer. Actions taken to date have been to defend U.S. forces from 
Houthi threats and attacks as those U.S. forces continue to carry out 
their longstanding maritime mission in waters off the coast of Yemen. 
The War Powers Resolution's 60 day termination provision does not 
require an end to U.S. actions like those taken to date.
    This is a question that lawyers from across the executive branch 
have analyzed closely. The Biden administration remains committed to 
acting consistent with applicable domestic and international law, 
including on the use of military force, and respects the important role 
of Congress in these matters.
    The U.S. Navy has long operated in the waterways around Yemen, 
consistent with the U.S. Navy's statutory authorities and mission of 
the peacetime promotion of national security interests and prosperity 
of the United States. This area is critical to global commerce: Nearly 
15 percent of all seaborne trade passes through the Red Sea, including 
8 percent of global grain trade; 12 percent of all seaborne traded oil; 
and 8 percent of the world's liquefied natural gas.
    he strikes that U.S. forces have taken have been necessary to 
defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks as U.S. forces carry 
out that longstanding mission to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea. The strikes have targeted the specific types of 
weapons and infrastructure that have been used for Houthi attacks and 
that continue to threaten U.S. forces.
    Thus, we do not believe the War Powers Resolution requires 
termination of U.S. actions like those taken to date.
    Indeed, if we were required to cease defending ourselves in this 
way, we would in effect need to abandon our ongoing naval posture in 
waters where we have been conducting a mission to protect and defend 
U.S. commerce and interests at sea that is longstanding and consistent 
with statutory authorities, and where we and others are operating in 
accordance with international law.
    We would emphasize that this conclusion is based on the facts of 
this particular situation, which we do not believe constitute an 
introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities 
that triggers the termination provision.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve.

    Question. Does the Administration intend to remove U.S. forces from 
hostilities when the 60-day clock runs out or seek congressional 
authorization?

    Answer. In the particular facts and circumstances here, we do not 
believe that the War Powers Resolution's termination provision requires 
U.S. forces to cease taking actions like those undertaken thus far. 
These actions have been necessary to defend U.S. forces conducting 
longstanding naval operations to protect and defend U.S. commerce and 
interests at sea.
    We will continue to evaluate the facts and circumstances as they 
evolve.
    The Department of Defense respects the important role of Congress 
in these matters and remains committed to keeping Congress informed on 
the situation.

    Question. Does the Administration believe U.S. strikes in Yemen 
will lead to an end to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden? If so, when and how?

    Answer. The strikes conducted to date have all been designed to 
defend U.S. forces from Houthi threats and attacks. Strikes have sought 
to degrade and destroy the capabilities that the Houthis use in attacks 
on naval vessels and commercial shipping and erode the Houthis' ability 
to sustain such attacks. Such actions are necessary to end Houthi 
attacks.
    In addition, the U.S. Government is engaged in a whole of 
government campaign to impose costs on Houthi leadership to bring about 
an end to these attacks. The Department of Defense is supporting this 
whole of government campaign, including by establishing Operation 
Prosperity Guardian, a multinational coalition to defend commercial 
shipping in the Red Sea, and conducting measures to disrupt the flow of 
Iranian materiel to Yemen.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Considering the significant support the Houthis receive 
from Iran, how do you propose addressing the deepening relationship 
between the Houthis and Iran while seeking a comprehensive peace 
agreement in Yemen?

    Answer. While the Department of Defense supports the de-escalation 
of regional tensions through diplomacy, it is clear that the United 
States cannot endorse a peace agreement while the Houthis hold 
international commerce hostage. It is also clear that Iran continues to 
enable the Houthis' ability to conduct these aggressive acts. The 
Department of Defense is addressing the relationship between the 
Houthis and Iran by publicly exposing Iran's complicity in the Houthis' 
attack campaign and working to cut off Iranian resupply to the Houthis.
    In January, the Department interdicted two dhows carrying Iranian 
shipments of advanced conventional weapons components to the Houthis, 
including ballistic and cruise missile components, explosives, unmanned 
underwater/surface vehicle components, air defense components, military 
grade communication and network equipment, and anti-tank guided missile 
launcher assemblies. In recent years the Department has conducted or 
enabled partners to conduct over a dozen such seizures.
    While the Administration remains committed to ending the war in 
Yemen and pursuing all off ramps to de-escalate tensions in the Red 
Sea, the Houthis' actions have undermined peace in Yemen through their 
continued attacks. The Houthis cannot seek international legitimacy and 
recognition and concurrently conduct illegal and piratical acts against 
international shipping in the Red Sea. The Administration has made 
clear to the Houthis that their actions are alienating and are to the 
detriment of the Yemeni people and the Houthis' own interests.

    Question. What measures can be taken to reduce Iran's influence and 
promote stability in the region amidst ongoing conflict?

    Answer. The Department of Defense has bolstered the defensive 
capabilities of our partners in the region and conducted both combined 
and unilateral action against Iran backed threats to make clear to Iran 
that its destabilizing behavior risks escalation in the region and 
direct conflict with the United States. Since October 7, the Department 
of Defense has rapidly flowed forces into theater, including two 
carrier strike groups, additional fighter aircraft, missile defense 
platforms, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to 
deter Iran from expanding the conflict and promote stability in the 
region. The Secretary of Defense has also directed seven strikes 
against IRGC and Iranian aligned militia group (IAMG) infrastructure in 
Iraq and Syria and two strikes against IAMG militia personnel involved 
in planning and directing attacks against U.S. forces. These strikes 
have made clear to Iran that we remain willing and able to impose heavy 
costs on Iran for its destabilizing actions in the region. IAMGs have 
not attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria since February 4, 
underscoring the importance of the Department's response strikes and 
flexible force posture in deterring Iran backed attacks.

    Question. What is limiting the Department of Defense from 
effectively neutralizing the Houthis threat in Yemen and their backers 
in Iran?

    Answer. The Houthis have deep and robust weapons stockpiles 
resulting from extensive Iranian supply provided over a decade of 
conflict with the Saudi led Coalition. While the Houthis have not yet 
ceased their attacks, our coalition and unilateral strikes have likely 
destroyed hundreds of Houthi weapons that the Houthis would otherwise 
use to conduct maritime attacks. The Department stands ready and able, 
in concert with our international partners, to strike additional Houthi 
targets as necessary with the goal of further degrading the Houthis' 
ability to sustain their attacks. The Department's strikes continue to 
gradually erode the Houthis' ability to sustain the tempo and scale of 
their attacks and to communicate to the Houthis that there will be a 
cost for their attacks.

    Question. What will it take for the U.S. re-establish deterrence in 
the Red Sea?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is clear eyed that military means 
are necessary but insufficient to stop Houthi attacks and uphold 
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Forcing the Houthis to reconsider 
the viability of their attack campaign demands a robust whole of 
government, multinational approach across the diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic domains. Accordingly, the Department of Defense 
is working with interagency partners to impose costs on Iran and the 
Houthis and isolate them internationally, protect international 
shipping, deny Houthi weapons resupply, and degrade Houthi ability to 
sustain their attacks, ultimately to uphold freedom of navigation in 
the Red Sea.
    While the Department has already organized two robust multinational 
coalitions to protect international shipping and degrade Houthi 
capabilities, the Department is bolstering efforts in tandem with our 
partners and allies to neutralize the Houthis' ability to restock their 
weapons inventory. The Department is also working with interagency 
partners to publicly expose Iran's role in facilitating Houthi attacks 
and highlight that Houthi attacks have compromised the welfare of the 
Yemeni people they claim to defend. In conjunction with our interagency 
partners and in consultation with our partners and allies, the 
Department is identifying opportunities to sever Houthi financial 
networks and increasing diplomatic pressure against the Houthis.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Mr. Daniel B. Shapiro to Additional Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. On February 1, 2024, President Biden issued Executive 
Order 14115, ``Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, 
Security, and Stability in the West Bank.'' Thus far, only Israeli 
citizens have been sanctioned, though as written, it can and should be 
applied to Palestinians who engage in violence.
    Was it the Administration's intent to sanction Palestinians under 
the E.O.?

    Answer. The Administration issued Executive Order 14115 to promote 
accountability for certain harmful actions that threaten the peace, 
security, and stability of the West Bank. The E.O. established U.S. 
authority to issue financial sanctions against those directing or 
participating in certain actions, including acts or threats of violence 
against civilians, intimidating civilians to cause them to leave their 
homes, destroying or seizing property, or engaging in terrorist 
activity in the West Bank. I defer to the State Department to provide 
additional information about how the U.S. Government has exercised the 
authorities pursuant to the E.O.

    Question. Why has the Administration not imposed the property 
blocking and visa sanctions on the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose 
continued ``pay for slay'' martyr payment programs provide financial 
support for individuals that have directly participated in acts of 
violence targeting civilians in the West Bank, and activities that are 
explicitly prohibited by the order?

    Answer. The Administration issued Executive Order 14115 to promote 
accountability for certain harmful actions that threaten the peace, 
security, and stability of the West Bank. The E.O. established U.S. 
authority to issue financial sanctions against those directing or 
participating in certain actions, including acts or threats of violence 
against civilians, intimidating civilians to cause them to leave their 
homes, destroying or seizing property, or engaging in terrorist 
activity in the West Bank. I defer to the State Department to provide 
additional information about how the U.S. Government has exercised the 
authorities pursuant to the E.O.

    Question. Why has the Biden administration failed to fully exercise 
the authorities of the President's executive order in order to hold 
those Palestinian individuals accountable for undermining peace, 
security, and stability in Judea and Samaria and Israel more broadly?

    Answer. The Administration issued Executive Order 14115 to promote 
accountability for certain harmful actions that threaten the peace, 
security, and stability of the West Bank. The E.O. established U.S. 
authority to issue financial sanctions against those directing or 
participating in certain actions, including acts or threats of violence 
against civilians, intimidating civilians to cause them to leave their 
homes, destroying or seizing property, or engaging in terrorist 
activity in the West Bank. I defer to the State Department to provide 
additional information about how the U.S. Government has exercised the 
authorities pursuant to the E.O.

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