[Senate Hearing 118-355]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-355
ORIGINS OF COVID 19: AN EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2024
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-048 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
LAPHONZA BUTLER, California ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
Sapana R. Vora, Senior Professional Staff Member
Emily C. McHara, Research Assistant
William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
Christina N. Salazar, Minority Chief Counsel
Megan Krynen, Minority Professional Staff Member
Kendal B. Tigner, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Paul................................................. 2
Senator Hassan............................................... 19
Senator Johnson.............................................. 21
Senator Marshall............................................. 24
Senator Scott................................................ 27
Senator Romney............................................... 29
Senator Hawley............................................... 31
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 45
WITNESSES
TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2024
Gregory D. Koblentz, Ph.D., Associate Professor and Director,
Biodefense Graduate Program, George Mason University........... 4
Robert F. Garry, Ph.D., Professor and Associate Dean, School of
Medicine, Tulane University.................................... 7
Steven C. Quay, M.D., Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, Atossa
Therapeutics, Inc., Former Faculty Member, Stanford University
School of Medicine............................................. 10
Richard H. Ebright, Ph.D., Board of Governors Professor of
Chemistry and Chemical Biology and Laboratory Director, Waksman
Institute of Microbiology, Rutgers University.................. 13
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Ebright, Richard H. Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 164
Garry, Robert F. Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Koblentz, Gregory D. Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Quay, Steven C. M.D., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement with addendum............................. 87
APPENDIX
Senator Marshall's chart......................................... 230
Statements submitted for the Record by Senator Peters:
ODNI Assessment on COVID Origins............................. 231
ODNI Links Between WIV and COVID............................. 249
Nature Medicine Article...................................... 259
Science Article--Worobey et al............................... 262
Science Article--Pekar et al................................. 271
GAO Report--Pandemic Origins................................. 278
GAO Report--Public Health Preparedness....................... 324
GAO Report--Virus Field Research............................. 366
CRS Report--COVID-19 and China............................... 404
CSET Report.................................................. 458
CRS Report--Global Pandemics................................. 503
CRS Report--Improved Oversight of Pathogen Research.......... 506
Survival Article............................................. 510
Science Article--Bloom et al................................. 541
CRS Report--Origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic................. 544
GAO Report--Federal Research................................. 547
NSABB Report................................................. 593
National Science and Technology Council Policy Document...... 626
National Science and Technology Council Implementation
Guidance................................................... 657
Statements submitted for the Record by Senator Paul:
America First Legal.......................................... 742
Chan......................................................... 876
Frontiers of Freedom......................................... 880
Open the Books............................................... 890
Ruskin....................................................... 892
Statements submitted for the Record by Senator Johnson:
HHS Redacted Documents....................................... 898
Slack Messages............................................... 978
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Dr. Koblentz................................................. 1128
Dr. Garry.................................................... 1134
Dr. Quay..................................................... 1139
Dr. Ebright.................................................. 1147
ORIGINS OF COVID-19:
AN EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
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TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters, Chair
of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters [presiding], Hassan, Blumenthal,
Ossoff, Paul, Johnson, Lankford, Romney, Scott, Hawley, and
Marshall.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
Appendix on page 45.
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The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic was one of
the worst public health crises that our country has ever faced.
We lost more than one million Americans to the virus, family
members and neighbors, friends, and colleagues, and millions
more died around the world.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a once in a generation event
that not only threatened our public health, but also created
unprecedented challenges to our economic and homeland security,
as well as our very way of life. As Americans navigated the
COVID-19 pandemic, they endured changing healthcare guidance,
uncertainty, and misinformation about how to best protect
themselves and their families from this deadly virus.
Today's hearing is intended to examine the available
scientific evidence related to the virus that causes COVID-19,
and provides some transparency to Americans who are continuing
to have to navigate their exposure to the virus.
As Chair of this Committee, I led an investigation into the
Federal Government's initial pandemic response. The report was
called ``Historically Unprepared,'' and included
recommendations on how we can ensure that we are better
prepared to prevent and respond to future pandemics. This
March, I also launched a bipartisan biosecurity and life
science research investigation with Ranking Member Paul to look
into a wide range of constantly evolving biological risk and
threats to better enhance our preparedness for future
incidents.
This morning, we are going to hear from academic experts
who can discuss how COVID-19 pandemic may have started, and how
we can learn from this outbreak to better address future
potential infectious disease outbreaks and protect human life
better.
Better understanding the possible origins of COVID-19
pandemic is not only important to our public health, it is also
a matter of homeland security. We must learn from the
challenges faced during this pandemic to ensure we can better
protect Americans from future potential biological incident.
Our government needs the flexibility to determine the origins
of naturally occurring outbreaks as well as potential outbreaks
that could arise from mistakes or malicious intent.
All that said, the history has shown us it is seldom simple
or straightforward to identify the singular cause of an
infectious disease outbreak. It can take months or years to
pinpoint an origin, and in some cases, we may never find the
answer.
This is also the case with COVID-19. There are theories
that indicate that COVID-19 began either by entering the human
population through an entirely natural means or possibly
through a lab incident or accident. Given the likelihood that
the Chinese government may never fully disclose all the
information they have about the initial COVID-19 outbreak, we
must use the scientific information available to better prepare
for future potential pandemics.
We must not only examine the scientific information we have
about COVID-19, but also the tools and procedures the
government has in place to understand such viral outbreaks and
how we can prevent them from becoming widespread in the future.
Today's hearing and our panel of expert witnesses will help
us understand how the most recent pandemic began, so that we
can take necessary steps to protect the American people from
future biological threats.
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Paul for his
opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Today, we are here to examine one of the most
critical and debated questions of our time; did COVID-19
originate in a lab? To answer this question, let's revisit the
early days of the pandemic and examine what some of Dr. Anthony
Fauci's inner circle said privately about the origins of the
virus, discussions that were only revealed through Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) litigation.
Kristian Andersen wrote, ``The lab-escaped version of this
is so frigging likely to have happened because they were
already doing this type of work, and the molecular data is
fully consistent with that scenario.'' Ian Lipkin stressed the,
``nightmare of circumstantial evidence to assess,'' regarding
the possibility of inadvertent release given the scale of bat
coronavirus research pursued in Wuhan.
Bob Garry said, ``I really can't think of a plausible
natural scenario where you get from the bat virus or one very
similar to it to COVID-19, where you insert exactly four amino
acids, 12 nucleotides, and all have to be added at the exact
same time to gain this function. I just can't figure out how
this gets accomplished in nature.''
According to Garry, ``it's not crackpot to suggest this
could have happened given the Gain-of-Function (GoF) research
we know what was happening at Wuhan.'' These are all private
statements, which you will discover today, differ greatly from
their public statements. Even Ralph Baric, world-famous Gain-
of-Function researcher, and collaborator with Wuhan's Dr. Shi,
admitted ``so they, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), have
a very large collection of viruses in their laboratory. As you
know, proximity is a problem. It's a problem.''
Federal court orders reveal that even Dr. Fauci himself
privately acknowledged concerns about Gain-of-Function research
in Wuhan and, ``mutations in the virus that suggest it might
have been engineered,'' just days before he commissioned the
Proximal Origin paper.
Despite these private doubts, publicly, these so-called
experts and their allies were dismissing the lab leak theory as
a conspiracy. Within days, Andersen, Lipkin, and Garry were
putting final touches on what would be remembered as one of the
most remarkable reversals in modern history. In their Proximal
Origin paper, these scientists concluded, ``We do not believe
that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible.''
Privately, they were saying one thing. Publicly, they were
saying another. Media pundits parroted the narrative while
social media platforms censored discussion about the lab leak,
labeling it as misinformation and stifling open discourse about
the virus's origins.
The coverup went beyond public statements. Federal agencies
and key officials withheld and continue to conceal crucial
information from both Congress and the public. For instance,
Dr. David Morens of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
deleted emails that could have contained valuable insights into
early discussions. When he deleted them, he made the comment,
``I think were safe now.'' He deleted emails. He said, ``The
early emails I have deleted, ``to Peter Daszak at EcoHealth
Alliance (EHA),'' I think we are safe now.''
The Office of the Director National Intelligence (ODNI)
failed to comply with a law that was passed unanimously. One of
the Senators on this Committee got it passed. We were going to
declassify this and reveal it, and the administration has
refused. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
NIH have not produced documents related to the Gain-of-Function
research that the Chair and I requested nearly a year ago.
I have been asking for two or three years as an individual
member with some other Republican members and have not gotten
these records. I have now asked with the Democrat chairman over
a year, and they are still resisting. They say it's not Gain-
of-Function. Well, let's hear the debate. Did they debate at
NIH, whether it was Gain-of-Function in Wuhan? If there's a
debate, let's hear the scientific arguments on both sides.
They will not give us that information. This has been a
deliberate, prolonged effort to deceive the Committee about
certain Gain-of-Function research experiments that the agencies
have been withholding. What we have found as we have gone
through this is that at every step, there's been resistance.
The hearing today is to try to find out whether or not we
can get to the truth. Do we know for certain it came from the
lab? No. But there's a preponderance of evidence indicating
that it may have come from the lab.
Do we know viruses have come from animals in the past? Yes.
They have come from animals in the past, but this time, there's
no animal reservoir. There are no animal handlers with
antibiotics. There's a lot of reasons why there are indications
that this could well have come from the lab.
This is the discussion we will have today. This is a
discussion that's long and coming. It's been over three years
that we have been asking for this. But this is great. This is
good. We will have scientists on both sides of this issue, and
I hope we have a spirited debate.
Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Paul. It is the
practice of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses. If each of you would
please stand and raise your right hands. Do you swear the
testimony that you will give before this Committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
Dr. Koblentz. I do.
Dr. Garry. I do.
Dr. Quay. I do.
Dr. Ebright. I do.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. You may be seated.
Our first witness is Dr. Gregory Koblentz. He is an
Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate
Program at George Mason University's (GMU) Schar School of
Policy and Government.
He serves as Editor in Chief of The Pandora Report, an
online newsletter that covers global health security, and as
co-Director of the Global Biolabs initiative that tracks high
security labs and bio risk management policies around the
world.
Dr. Koblentz, you are now recognized for your opening
statement.
TESTIMONY OF GREGORY D. KOBLENTZ, PH.D.,\1\ ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
AND DIRECTOR, BIODEFENSE GRADUATE PROGRAM, GEORGE MASON
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Koblentz. Thank you, Chair Peters, Ranking Member Paul,
and other Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to talk to you today about the origins of COVID-19,
and its implications for us biodefense and global health
security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Koblentz appears in the Appendix
on page 47.
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I have been conducting research and teaching on biodefense,
global health security, and biorisk management for the last 25
years at the Schar School at George Mason, as you indicated. I
come before you today in my personal capacity, and my views do
not represent those of George Mason, the organizations with
which I am affiliated.
I have submitted a lengthy written statement to you which I
will not go over today in detail, but I am happy to answer any
questions you have about it during the rest of the hearing.
What I would like to do now is just highlight some key points.
First, let me directly address the main topic of the
hearing today; the available evidence on the origins of COVID-
19. More than four years after the start of the pandemic, the
origin of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) virus remains a subject of debate. There are two
pandemic pathways that have been widely discussed to explain
how SARS-CoV-2 emerged in Wuhan in 2019; a natural spillover
event from animals to humans and an accidental release of a
pathogen from a laboratory. The possibility that SARS-CoV-2 was
deliberately developed as a biological weapon has been
unanimously rejected by all U.S. intelligence agencies. While
the intelligence community (IC) is divided on the origin of the
pandemic most agencies have determined that the virus was not
genetically engineered.
I believe the available evidence points most strongly to a
natural spillover event as the origin of the pandemic. However,
a research-related accident cannot be ruled out at this time. A
key obstacle to a more definitive conclusion is the lack of
transparency exercise by the Chinese government, which affects
assessments of both potential pathways to the pandemic. Until
there's an independent, international, transparent
investigation, it's unlikely we will be able to come up with a
more definitive conclusion that will satisfy both sides of the
debate.
It is not my intention to review this debate today. Instead
of looking backwards, I prefer to look forwards and plan for
the future. The reality is that we are not as well prepared to
prevent, detect, respond to, or recover from a biological
incident or pandemic as we should be regardless of its origin.
The growing H5N1 (bird flu) outbreak in the United States is a
testament to the challenges we currently face and the urgency
of addressing them.
The difficulty in determining the origin of COVID-19 is not
unusual among the outbreaks and pandemics we have already
experienced this century. It is taken years to identify the
origin of a novel pathogen, sometimes, only in lay general
terms. Rarely is it possible to identify the exact sequence of
events that led to the first human infection that sparked a
pandemic.
Determining the origin of an outbreak or pandemic can be
divided into four stages: detection, identification,
characterization, and attribution. Understanding how a specific
pathogen entered and spread in a population to cause an
outbreak is a multidisciplinary undertaking that requires
expertise in epidemiology, human medicine, veterinary medicine,
biology, genetics, bioinformatics, ecology, anthropology, and
related fields.
Seeking the origin of an outbreak requires collecting, and
analyzing a large amount of data collected from diverse sources
by a range of agencies with a variety of scientific
capabilities and disciplinary specializations. The quality of
the data, and the rigor of the epidemiological, and scientific
investigation will affect the level of confidence we have in
these determinations.
The origin of a pandemic or an outbreak are rarely
definitive, and need to be carefully qualified to reflect the
strength of available evidence, as well as gaps and
uncertainties. Determining the origin of an outbreak can
improve the effectiveness of response to an ongoing incident,
reduce the likelihood of or magnitude of future incidents, or
even prevent future outbreaks altogether.
Making this do termination, however, is not always
straightforward or successful. The process of investigating the
source of an outbreak is like putting together a puzzle where
you do not know what the final picture will look like, the
pieces change shape and move around, and pieces are added and
moved as you are trying to solve the puzzle.
There are also several factors that influence the success
of an origin investigation, including the passage of time, the
biology and epidemiology of the specific pathogen, limited
scientific knowledge about novel pathogens, local and national
politics, and economic considerations.
We saw each of these factors at play in Wuhan in 2019 and
2020. Indeed, we see similar factors at play in the response to
the current H5N1 outbreak in the United States as well. The key
point is that determining the origin of an outbreak or
biological incident is scientific and could be complex. It can
also be politically fraught and subject to countervailing
pressures by other actors with an interest in obscuring, or
delaying, or halting the outcome of investigation.
What should be done to improve our ability to determine the
origins of a biological incident? This Congress should work
with the Biden Administration to invest in strengthening
biosurveillance and biorisk management in the United States and
internationally. This would not only enhance our ability to
determine the origins of future incidents, but also improve our
capabilities to prevent them, and respond more successfully to
prevent an outbreak from becoming a pandemic.
Biosurveillance in the United States suffers from
fragmentation, chronic underinvestment in State and local
public health capacity, and lack of capacity to rapidly develop
and deploy diagnostics. In my written statement, I provide
further recommendations about biosurveillance.
In the interest of time, I will just focus on the
recommendations on biorisk management. This is a field that
encompasses field and laboratory biosafety, laboratory
biosecurity, and oversight of dual-use research of concern
(DURC).
Even if the origins of COVID-19 is proven to be the result
of a natural zoonotic spillover event, the pandemic raise
important questions about the efficacy of our oversight of
dual-use research of concern, including with pathogens with
enhanced transmissibility or virulence.
The pandemic has also dramatically illustrated the
consequences, if such a pathogen escapes from a lab and sparks
a pandemic. Regardless of one's views on the origin of the
pandemic, we should all be able to agree that we want to
minimize the risk that a future pandemic could be caused by a
laboratory accident. Last month, the Biden Administration
released a new U.S. Government (USG) policy for oversight of
dual-use research of concern, which represents a significant
step forward in oversight of high-consequence research.
There are two immediate steps that Congress could take to
enhance implementation of this policy. First, Congress could
support the Biden Administration's efforts to provide education
and training to the wide array of stakeholders who are now
going to be affected by this policy.
This policy now covers 95 biological agents and toxins up
from 14, so there's a much wider swath of the biological
community that's now going to be subject to oversight, and they
need to understand this policy in order to implement it
effectively.
Congress also needs to pass legislation to close a loophole
in the current policy that allows privately funded research,
including that with engineering of potential pandemic
pathogens, to continue without any oversight. I think it is in
the power of Congress to solve that further, easily over the
longer-term.
Congress needs to modernize the U.S. biorisk management
system. I think the most effective way to do that would be
creation of an independent Federal agency that would be
responsible for biorisk management across both publicly and
privately funded enterprises.
In conclusion, we know enough about the two different
pathways to a pandemic; both the demonstrated route of natural
transmission, and the potential for a laboratory accident, that
we have enough information now that we can take action that
will significantly reduce the risk posed by both types of
risks.
Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Koblentz.
Our second witness is Dr. Robert Garry. He is a Professor
of Microbiology and Immunology, and an Associate Dean for
Biomedical Sciences at Tulane School of Medicine. Dr. Garry has
been a professor of virology for over 40 years, and has
performed groundbreaking work in diagnostics for emerging
pathogens, including the Ebola virus.
Dr. Garry, welcome to the Committee. You are now recognized
for your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT F. GARRY, PH.D.,\1\ PROFESSOR AND ASSOCIATE
DEAN, SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, TULANE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Garry. Thank you very much.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Garry appears in the Appendix on
page 69.
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Chair Peters, Ranking Member Paul, distinguished Members of
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify today. As Chair Peter says, I am
a Professor and Associate Dean at Tulane School of Medicine in
New Orleans. The reason you may know me is because I am an
author on a peer-reviewed paper that appeared in Nature
Medicine entitled, The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2.
In the Proximal Origin paper, my co-authors and I discussed
several different possible origins of SARS-CoV-2. The three
possible origins for the virus that are most relevant to
today's discussion are; one, direct spillover from a bat to a
human, two, spillover from a bat to an intermediate animal and
then to a human, and three, lab origin.
At the time of writing the Proximal Origin paper in early
February to mid-March 2020, we did not rule out any of these
three pathways. Based on the current available evidence, I
believe the most plausible origin of SARS-CoV-2 is spillover
from a bat to an intermediate animal, and then to a human. I
further believe the available evidence indicates that this
spillover happened naturally, likely at the Huanan Seafood
Market in Wuhan, China.
I do not believe that the available scientific evidence
when considered holistically supports that the virus was
created in the lab at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. However,
I am first and foremost a scientist, and I will adhere to the
scientific method. I will continue to evaluate new evidence and
reassess the validity of my scientific hypotheses regarding the
origins of SARS-CoV-2.
I look forward to continuing the scientific debate and
peer-reviewed materials with other scientists, including those
here today, regarding our different perspectives and
interpretations of the evidence.
That said, I am heartened by the attention this Committee
is giving to a very timely and important topic, Gain-of-
Function research. I welcome this opportunity to engage in an
open and constructive conversation about the risk, and
benefits, and appropriate safeguards and restrictions on this
research.
As Chair Peter's mentioned again before, I have been a
virology professor for over 40 years. I have seen firsthand the
damage that emerging viruses can cause. I researched human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) before we knew the profound
impacts this emerging virus would have on all society, and
while the American public was still fearful of blood
transfusions. I was present in Sierra Leone at the outbreak of
Ebola in 2014 and witnessed the death toll and heartbreak,
including many close friends and colleagues who succumbed. I am
currently developing countermeasures to Lassa virus, a deadly
hemorrhagic fever virus with up to a 70 percent case fatality.
I understand perhaps better than most the importance of
assuring appropriate safeguards for research, including
adequate oversight of funding, rules, and guidelines regarding
study design, including the types of viruses that require
oversight and universal standards for the use of appropriate
protective gear when handling highly transmissible or
pathogenic viruses, in the laboratory or in field studies.
But, I also know the vital role of responsibly performed
research, including on highly transmissible and pathogenic
viruses. It advances public health and national security.
Without Gain-of-Function research, we would have no Tamiflu.
Without Gain-of-Function research, we would not have a vaccine
to prevent cancer caused by infection by the human
papillomavirus.
Without Gain-of-Function research, we will not be able to
identify how novel viruses infect us. If we do not know how
they infect us, we cannot develop appropriate treatments and
cures for the next potential pandemic creating virus.
I also encourage the Committee to empower the scientific
enterprise to address the certainty of viral threats that
emerge from nature in the future. For example, potential
pandemic viruses can infiltrate commercial animal farming
industries. The wildlife trade in China was the only enterprise
in the world comparable in size to the United States cattle
industry.
Multiple spillovers of SARS-CoV, the first severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), occurred in 2002 through 2004, and
they came from the Chinese Wildlife Trade. Evidence similarly
indicates that this likely happened again with SARS-CoV-2 in
2019. I hope we treat these instances as a stark and timely
reminder that this can happen anywhere in the world. In fact,
it's happening right in our backyard with the serious threat
from bird flu that it poses to our United States cattle
industry.
As a member of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID's) Center for Research and Emerging Infectious
Disease (CREID) network, I know that Gain-of-Function research
can be done responsibly and safely. The new guidance from the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shows that
research with high-risk pathogens and the types of experiments
that require review can be clearly defined in a way that does
not obstruct low-risk research.
I am honored to be a part of this important conversation
that will help define the future of a vitally important area of
virology, and I urge the Members of this Committee to find a
path forward that permits appropriate Gain-of-Function research
to continue to help ensure our public help and national
security.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Garry.
Our next two witnesses will be introduced by Ranking Member
Paul.
Senator Paul. Steven Quay is an M.D., Ph.D. He's the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Atossa Therapeutics, a clinical
stage biopharmaceutical company developing novel therapeutics
for oncology.
Dr. Quay has authored 400 publications in the field of
medicine, including 32 on the origin of SARS-CoV-2. His work
has been cited over 12,000 times, placing him in the top one
percent of scientists worldwide. His paper, a Bayesian
Analysis, concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that SARS-CoV-2
is not a natural zoonosis, but instead, is laboratory-derived.
This article has been viewed over 206,000 times.
Dr. Quay holds 238 U.S. patents, and patent applications in
22 areas of medicine, including ribonucleic acid (RNA)
Chemistry and Coronavirus Therapeutics. Before his current
role, he was a member of the Department of Pathology at the
Stanford University School of Medicine.
Dr. Quay, welcome to the Committee. You are now recognized
for your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. QUAY, M.D., PH.D.,\1\ CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ATOSSA THERAPEUTICS, INC., FORMER FACULTY MEMBER,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Dr. Quay. Committee Chair, Senator Peters, Ranking Member,
Senator Paul, Committee Members, invited participants, ladies,
and gentlemen, I am a physician, scientist, and have a 50-year
career spanning academic medical research, biotechnology, and
scientific fraud investigation. My biography summarizes my
career.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Quay appears in the Appendix on
page 87.
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I speak today, however, as an independent scientist. I do
not receive any NIH or NIAID funding. Scientists who are
dependent on NIH or NIAID funding may have pressure to publicly
agree with orthodoxies that privately they admit are wrong. My
approach to the COVID pandemic origin that killed 20 million-
plus people, caused $20 trillion in economic damage, is based
on six approaches to the data and the events.
I will start with something Dr. Garry said privately.
``Someone should tell Nature, meaning the British journal, that
the fish market probably did not start the outbreak.'' I agree
with Dr. Garry. Unfortunately, one reason we are having these
hearings is that the public statements of many virologists have
not been congruent with their private conversations.
In any case, I will describe the six approaches to the
question that all support a lab leak as a source and can go
deeper into each of those with questions. First, the virus was
spreading in Wuhan and around the world in the fall of 2019,
months before the first case in the Huanan Seafood Market.
This was supported by 14 observations or evidence. The
evidence includes the calculation of the time to the most
recent common ancestor, hospital overloads in Wuhan, antibodies
in patients from Italy, Spain, and the United States,
wastewater samples from Brazil, sick athletes at the October
Wuhan military games, school closings in Wuhan, and dozens of
documented patients. This dismisses out of hand the market as
the origin.
But second, let's look at the market data. The human
infections, the animal samples, and the environmental
specimens. These generate eight observations. No infected
animals in the market or the supply chain were infected. No
infected wildlife vendors had SARS. All human infections are
the non-ancestral lineage B.
The environmental specimens with animal deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) have no SARS2. One vendor had animals from Southern
China where SARS2 came from, but this vendor and his animals
are negative for SARS2. Now, only one of 14 environmental
samples with raccoon dog DNA contains SARS reads, and that
contains one read out of 210 million. 13 of the 14 raccoon dog
DNA specimens had no SARS2. With SARS1, literally 100 percent
of the market animals were infected.
I frankly think it is shameful for scientists to mislead
journalists in the public saying, these data I just described,
are evidence raccoon dogs were infected with SARS2. This is why
trust in science is broken. None of these data are consistent
with an infected animal passing SARS2 to a human at the market.
The 1,500-kilometer distance to the nearest SARS2--related
virus is like the distance from Washington, D.C. to the Florida
Everglades. Imagine you are at dinner at a restaurant in North
Bethesda near the NIAID labs. You get sick, and you are told
that the virus you caught is only found in bats from the
Everglades. But it also happens to be under study at the
laboratories you see outside the restaurant window. That's what
the market origin people are asking you to believe.
Third, documented events at or related to Wuhan Institute
of Virology beginning in March, 2019, are consistent with the
expected activities when a lab-acquired infection as occurred.
These timelines include; unusual attention from the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), leading to the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) physician soldier being put in charge. Large tender
requests to repair biosafety equipment. A virus database
disappearing in the middle of the night.
Large tender requests for a lab security force to, ``handle
foreign personnel.'' Patents for a device to prevent a lab-
acquired infection. Rumors in the virology community of a new
SARS virus in the lab. 30 vials of the three most dangerous
viruses on the planet being shipped illegally from a lab in
Canada to WIV in March, and then one of those pathogens being
found as a major contaminant in a biosafety level (BSL) lab in
December. These events taken together are a classic example of
closing the barn door after the horse left.
Fourth, the evidence that is found in a natural zoonosis
with respect to the animal host, the virus, and the human, are
missing with. 96,000 animals were tested and are negative for
SARS2. 43,000 blood samples from blood donors in Wuhan were
tested. A natural spillover like SARS1 would have produced
about 260 positives. A lab accident would be 0. Of course, 0 is
what is found.
With respect to the virus, a spillover produces posterior
diversity in the virus genome. A lab leak does not. SARS2 has
no posterior diversity. Natural spillovers, as Dr. Garry
indicated this morning, involve multiple markets. SARS1 began
in Southern China, at 11 spillovers, in 11 different markets,
in nine different cities. Kristian Andersen, the Proximal
Origin in SARS2, said SARS2 was one person being infected with
one animal. I agree.
Fifth, the genome of SARS2 has eight features found in a
synthetic virus that are not found in natural viruses. The
probability that SARS2 came from nature based on these features
is one in a billion. These features are the backbone, the
receptor-binding domain, the furin cleavage site (FCS), the
genetics of the furin cleavage site, the number, location, and
pattern of cloning sites in SARS2 that used the Baric cloning
method and the open reading frames (ORF8) gene.
Based on SARS2 cloning sites, I predicted how SARS2 could
be made in the laboratory. A year later, Baric used the
predicted steps to make an infectious clone of SARS2. These
same features were described in a 2018 Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) grant by WIV and U.S.
scientists.
With respect to the grant, SARS2 had the proposed backbone
from the proposed region in China, the proposed adaption to
human killing, the proposed diversity from SARS1, the proposed
no CM cleavage site, number, location, and pattern, the
proposed human cleavage site at the proposed S1/S2 junction.
Let's close with a thought experiment. It's 2018. Do you
think a market spillover of a coronavirus could have happened
in Wuhan? Dr. Baric and Shi have studied coronaviruses for a
decade, and they said, no.
How do I know that? Because they used Wuhan residents as
control for a study looking for antibodies in coronaviruses, in
people living near bat caves in Southern China. The rural
residents had a three percent rate. Wuhan residents had 0.
Let's flip that and ask the reverse question. Do you think
a lab-acquired infection could begin in Wuhan, a city with the
world's leading laboratory, collecting coronavirus from nature,
doing synthetic biology on coronaviruses, doing Petri dish and
animal research on coronavirus with a bat colony for testing,
and that had written a blueprint to make a coronavirus that had
seven unique features found in SARS-CoV-2? I will let you
answer that question yourself.
I have a number of specific reforms I believe should be
implemented, and I would be happy to discuss them during the
questioning. What happens if we have these hearings and nothing
happens? The warning is virology right now is testing a Nipah
virus in a synthetic clone. This is a U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) bio-terrorism agent. It kills
three out of four people.
A lab leak with an airborne Nipah virus would quickly,
within weeks, disrupt food and energy distribution, fire and
police services, medical care. My analysis of this tipping
point event is that it would set back civilization about 250
years. The work of this Committee is critical if we now fail to
act with the knowledge we have. History, if it can still be
recorded, will judge us poorly.
Thank you for your time.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
Dr. Richard Ebright is Board of Governors, Professor of
Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Rutgers University. He also
serves as the Laboratory Director for the Waksman Institute of
Microbiology, a position he has held for 37 years.
Dr. Ebright has authored over 185 peer-reviewed
publications, and holds more than 45 issued and pending U.S.
patents. He's the co-founder of Biosafety Now, and a member of
the advisory board of the Global Biolabs Project and the
Institutional Biosafety Committee at Rutgers University.
Previously, he served as on the Antimicrobial Resistance
Committee for Infectious Disease Society of America, the
Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project, and the Pathogen
Security Working Group for the State of New Jersey.
Dr. Ebright, welcome to the Committee. You are now
recognized for your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD H. EBRIGHT, PH.D.,\1\ BOARD OF GOVERNORS
PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGY AND LABORATORY
DIRECTOR, WAKSMAN INSTITUTE OF MICROBIOLOGY, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Dr. Ebright. Chair Peters, Ranking Member Paul, and Members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the
origins of COVID-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Ebright appears in the Appendix
on page 164.
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I am Board of Governors Professor of Chemistry and Chemical
Biology at Rutgers University and Laboratory Director at the
Waksman Institute of Microbiology. In my statement, I will
present my assessment of the origin of COVID, and will
summarize key lines of evidence that support my assessment.
I assess that a large preponderance of evidence indicates
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID, entered humans through
a research incident. I base this assessment on information in
publicly available documents, press reports, and scientific
papers, on my research experience in microbial genomics,
microbial genetics, DNA synthesis technology, and recombinant
DNA technology, and on my knowledge of and experience with
biosafety, biosecurity, and biorisk management for work with
pathogens.
Four key facts support my assessment.
First, COVID emerged in Wuhan, a city that is 800 miles
from the closest bats, harboring SARS-CoV-2-like viruses that
could have served as progenitors of SARS-CoV-2, but that
contains labs that, prior to the outbreak, were conducting the
world's largest research program on bats SARS viruses,
possessed the world's largest collection of bat SARS viruses,
and possessed the virus most closely similar to SARS-CoV-2.
The large distance between Wuhan and bats harboring SARS-
CoV-2-like viruses points away from a natural origin of COVID,
and Wuhan's status as the global epicenter of research on bat
SARS viruses points toward a research origin of COVID.
Second, in the four years preceding the outbreak, Wuhan
labs performed research that placed them on a trajectory to
obtain SARS viruses having high pandemic potential. In 2018,
one year before the outbreak, Wuhan labs proposed research to
obtain SARS viruses having even higher pandemic potential and
features that match, in detail, the features of SARS-CoV-2
Wuhan.
Wuhan labs performed high-risk virus discovery and Gain-of-
Function research on bat SARS viruses.
In their virus discovery research, Wuhan researchers
searched for new bat viruses in caves in Southern China,
brought samples to Wuhan, and sequenced, cultured, and
characterized new viruses in Wuhan.
In their Gain-of-Function research, Wuhan researchers
genetically modified bat SARS viruses, constructing viruses
having enhanced ability to infect human cells, and having
enhanced viral growth and enhanced lethality in mice engineered
to possess human receptors for SARS viruses so-called
``humanized mice''.
Already in 2015, scientists expressed concern that the
Wuhan Institute of Virology was conducting research that posed
unacceptably high risk. At a 2015 Royal Society and National
Academies meeting on Gain-of-Function research and its
oversight, the research on bats SARS viruses by the Wuhan
Institute of Virology and its collaborators was singled out as
the research most likely of all research in the world to
trigger a pandemic.
In 2017 to 2018, with NIH funding, the Wuhan Institute of
Virology constructed genetically modified SARS viruses that
combined the spike gene from one bat SARS virus with the rest
of the genetic information from another bat SARS virus,
obtaining new viruses that efficiently infected human cells,
and obtaining at least one new virus that exhibited 10,000
times enhanced viral growth in lungs, one million times
enhanced viral growth in brains, and three times enhanced
lethality, in humanized mice.
In 2018, just one year before the outbreak, in an NIH grant
proposal, Wuhan Institute of Virology and collaborators
proposed to construct additional genetically modified SARS
viruses, proposing to construct viruses having spikes with even
higher binding affinities for human SARS receptors-seeking
viruses, and having even higher pandemic potential.
Also, in 2018, just one year before the outbreak in a DARPA
grant proposal, Wuhan Institute of Virology and its
collaborators proposed to construct genetically modified SARS
viruses having a furin cleavage site, a feature associated with
increased viral growth and increased transmissibility. They
proposed to insert the furin cleavage site at the spike gene
S1/S2 border, and to construct the viruses by synthesizing six
nucleic acid-building blocks, and assembling them using the
reagent BsmB1.
Third, Wuhan labs performed this research on SARS viruses
using an inadequate biosafety standard (just biosafety level
2), an inadequate personal protective equipment (just gloves
and a lab coat).
Lab accidents that result in infection or release are
common even at biosafety levels higher than biosafety level 2.
For context, the original SARS virus, SARS-CoV-1, caused lab-
acquired infections in Singapore at biosafety level 3, in
Beijing twice at biosafety level 3, and in Taipei at biosafety
level 4. For further context, SARS-CoV-2 itself caused lab-
acquired infections in Beijing in 2020 at biosafety level 3,
and in Taipei in 2021 at biosafety level 3.
The Wuhan lab's use of biosafety level 2 for research on
bat SARS viruses would have posed a very high risk of infection
of lab staff upon encountering a virus having the Ursula
transmission properties of SARS-CoV-2.
Fourth, in 2019, a novel SARS virus having a spike with
extremely high binding affinity for human SARS receptors, a
furin cleavage site inserted at the spike S1/S2 border, and a
genome sequence with features enabling assembly from six
synthetic nucleic acid building blocks using the reagent
BsmB1--a virus having the exact features proposed into 2018 NIH
and DARPA proposals--emerged on the doorstep of Wuhan Institute
of Virology.
SARS-CoV-2 is the only one of more than 800 known SARS
viruses that possesses a furin cleavage site. Mathematically,
this observation alone implies that the probability of finding
a natural SARS virus possessing a furin cleavage site is less
than one in 800.
Taken together, the presence of a spike having an extremely
high affinity for human SARS receptors, the presence of a furin
cleavage site inserted at the spike S1/S2 border, the genome
sequence enabling assembly from six synthetic nucleic acid-
building blocks using the reagent BsmB1, and the one-for-one
match between these features and the features proposed in the
2018 NIH and DARPA proposals, make an extremely strong case--a
smoking gun--for a research origin.
In summary, multiple lines of secure evidence point to a
research origin.
By contrast, as I hope, I will have the opportunity to
review in response to questions, no--zero--secure evidence
points toward a natural origin.
Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Thank you to each of our
witnesses.
Dr. Garry, my first question I am going to direct it toward
you. Of the evidence that's been presented so thus far, it's
still not clear to me how much is concrete, documented
information, and how much is speculation, or perhaps just
filling in the gaps with assumptions based on what's out there.
My question for you, Dr. Garry, could you elaborate more on
the specific hard evidence that supports your claim that the
Chinese market in Wuhan was the most likely source of the
virus?
Dr. Garry. Certainly, and thank you for the question. There
is a lot of evidence that this virus emerged from the Huanan
Seafood Market in Wuhan, but let me just focus on three points:
Epidemiology, molecular forensics, and genetics.
First, the epidemiology. The early cases from December,
2019 before the disease was even described, all centered
around--in fact, they painted a bullseye on the Huanan Seafood
Market. The molecular forensics environmental samples were
collected from the market after it was closed, the hotspot of
SARS-CoV-2 positivity. The RNA was in the southwest corner of
the market.
In those very same samples, RNA and DNA from raccoon dogs,
and masked palm civets was found in these samples, co-mingling
with the SARS-CoV-2 RNA genomes. The SARS-CoV-2 spilled over at
least twice in the market. The phylogenetics, the genetics of
the virus, are very clear about that. That is not compatible
with a lab leak.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Garry do we know that the virus that
caused COVID-19 existed in the Wuhan lab before the pandemic?
If not, how could we find that out?
Dr. Garry. In fact, we do not know. The intelligence
community has looked at that point very intently and has not
been able to determine that Wuhan had the virus. We don't have
the evidence from the Chinese. It's just one of the many things
that we are missing that we would like to get from the Chinese
government.
Chairman Peters. Based on the bat coronavirus that we know
that researchers in the Wuhan lab were working on, would it
have been possible for them to create this virus? Is it
possible?
Dr. Garry. Not from a bat coronavirus. If you take the time
to read my written testimony, in that document, I went through
a lot of evidence that this virus did not spill over directly
from a bat to a human being. It had to go through an
intermediate animal.
It is not just the evidence from the Huanan Market. There's
other genetic evidence. The bat coronaviruses are viruses that
are spread by the gastrointestinal route. For a virus like this
to become a respiratory virus, it's just going to require too
many mutations, too many changes for a bat virus to spill
directly over to a human being. That could only really happen
in nature with replication through an intermediate animal.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Dr. Koblentz, the next question
is for you. I am aware that through FOIA request, a lot of
information from U.S. agencies and U.S.-based organizations
have been obtained by people investigating the COVID-19
origins. However, it seems as though we have gotten relatively
little or nothing from Chinese agencies or the Wuhan Institute
of Virology, specifically.
My question for you, sir, is what specific information from
China would be most helpful in settling this origin debate?
Dr. Koblentz. Thank you, Senator. There's a range of
information that would be useful for furthering our
investigation on the origins of the pandemic. The Chinese
government has collected lots of information about the samples
that were both at Huanan Market, and elsewhere in Wuhan, and in
other provinces where they sampled animals.
But they have not released the raw data. They provided
information, but not the data that epidemiologists and
virologists have wanted to see in order to do their own
analyses. Just last year, they did release more information
through publications, but this information they have been
sitting on for quite a while. There is more information that
should be released and the raw data should be made available to
independent, outside experts to make their own assessments.
In terms of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, there should
be records about the research they are conducting. There should
be records about the medical surveillance they are performing
on their researchers and records on the maintenance and
operation of their biocontainment equipment.
Those documents could be reviewed by outside experts to
determine if there's any signs that there was any accident or
any indications that the virus escaped from the lab. There's
quite a bit of information that is potentially available.
But obviously, the Chinese government has chosen to be
opaque about what they have and what they know in a way that
has frustrated people involved with looking at this in terms of
assessing both the natural zoonosis spillover pathway and also
looking at the lab accident pathway.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Garry you talked about the virus
jumping from an animal into a human. We have heard the term
spillover. For the benefit of this Committee, could you explain
spillover?
Dr. Garry. Sure. In fact, most human diseases have come to
us from animals. When we are talking about a spillover, we are
talking about a cross-species transmission. From one animal
species to another. It could be another animal, but, usually
when we talk about spillover, we are talking about from an
animal to a human.
So, animals have their own viruses just like we do. The
ones that are dangerous in the animals are the ones that have
capacity to infect more than one species. You can think about a
virus like rabies that can infect a wide range of mammulian
hosts.
Chairman Peters. Do we know what animal or animals could
have carried this virus, and were they at the market? Explain
that more fully, please.
Dr. Garry. Sure. We do not know that for sure. What we do
know is that when you look for the virus in the market, on
environmental surfaces and various places, you found it mostly
in the southwest corner of the market. This is where the
wildlife was sold, the animals like the raccoon dogs or the
masked palm civets.
In fact, there were many of the samples there had SARS-CoV-
2, DNA and RNA from those animals right there in the same
sample. You could imagine somebody maybe came and sneezed on
that sample, but the most likely explanation is that animals
were in fact infected themselves with SARS-CoV-2. When you look
at the drains outside of that one stall that had the most SARS-
CoV-2, that drain also had the virus.
We do not have the smoking gun evidence that there was
actually an infected animal in the market. But I think we have
the next best thing with this forensic molecular biology.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Thank you.
Ranking Member Paul, you are recognized for your questions.
Senator Paul. Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent (UC) to
submit statements for the record\1\ from U.S. Right To Know,
Open the Books America, First Legal, Frontiers of Freedom, and
Dr. Alina Chan.
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\1\ The statements submitted for the Record by Senator Paul appears
in the Appendix on page 742.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Peters. Without objection.
Senator Paul. Just in the last few minutes, Dr. Garry has
told us that this could not have come from bats. It had to go
through an intermediate host. That may well be true. But
arguing against that is they tested 90,000-some-odd animals,
and there is no animal host that's been found.
But what he also doesn't tell you is the animal host could
be a laboratory animal. It could be passed serially through
that, and that's one way of quickly adapting and pushing
natural selection to adapt a virus toward humans.
Dr. Alina Chan has written extensively about this, how this
virus did not show up clunky and poorly transmissible. This
virus showed up immediately, very transmissible in humans as if
it had been preadapted in a lab.
Dr. Ebright, Dr. Garry tells us that he's wedded to the
scientific method and that he considered all the different
possibilities in Proximal Origins. I know you are a professor,
and I am assuming you have been the senior author on many
papers. I assume that you teach your younger researchers what
is good scientific method and not good scientific method.
In the abstract of Proximal Origins, Dr. Garry and his
fellow authors state categorically that the virus is not a
laboratory construct. That does not sound to me like open-
mindedness, and I wonder what you would tell a younger
researcher or someone you are instructing in the scientific
method about putting categorical statements into a scientific
paper.
Dr. Ebright. It's important to emphasize that the paper in
question, Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2, published in March,
2020, was not a research article. It was an opinion piece. It
was published as a correspondence item, which is the section in
the journal that holds opinion pieces and editorials.
It was an opinion piece. The authors were stating their
opinion, but that opinion was not well founded.
In March 2020, there was no basis to state that as a
conclusion, as opposed to simply a hypothesis. Moreover, we
know that compelling evidence has been presented as a result of
congressional inquiry in the House, that four of the authors of
that paper--Dr. Andersen, Dr. Garry, Dr. Holmes, and Dr.
Rambaut--in their private communications, clearly knew the
conclusion that they stated in that article was invalid.
In terms of what I would tell a younger scientist I would
be mentoring, I would tell a younger scientist that you do not
state a conclusion without evidence, even in an opinion piece
in a scientific journal, and you never, under any circumstances
in a scientific journal, state conclusions that you know to be
unsound.
That represents scientific misconduct. It represents
scientific misconduct up to and including fraud. The paper in
question, the Proximal Origin paper, has been recommended for
review of retraction. Two requests--one in 2023, and one in
2024--were submitted by teams of scientists to the journal in
question, to the journal editors, asking them to add an
editorial expression of concern and to initiate a review for
retraction of the article.
Senator Paul. I know of no other example in modern
scientific history or publications where a publication has come
forward pronouncing with such authority that the lab leak is
implausible, it is not a laboratory construct, while privately
saying this is no frigging conspiracy theory. Looks like it
did, I am 90/10, I am 50/50, but no doubt in the paper.
In fact, we know that it went back and forth with Dr. Fauci
and with editors who say we want the statements to be stronger,
we want the conclusions to be stronger. That was actually
coming from Nature at the time. We want you to doctor it up and
even be more strong, because we are making a political point
here.
That's where we should have known we were off track. That
these people were politicians and that they were pushing an
idea, because as Dr. Collins finally admitted in one of the
emails, this is about the business of science with China, this
will disturb our relations with China if anybody questions
this.
Dr. Quay, the idea that this came from the fish market, I
thought had been discredited by virtually all of the
scientists. Now, I am really surprised it's still being
presented here. I know that the Chinese, the CDC, George Gao,
over there, basically said that they no longer consider it.
Actually, if you think about it from their perspective, we
are not sure if we can trust them. But at the same time, the
Chinese, if they would rather have it come from a lab or the
market, I think would choose the market over the lab. If we
were going to think they were dishonest would be dishonest
toward saying, hey, we found some animals.
But if you could review stepwise, just a little bit slower,
some of the evidence for why it's not there, the amount of
animals tested, the animal handlers compared to SARS1, but also
the idea of this genetic diversity that you know, when SARS1
came about the first time.
I think it tried hundreds of times because these animal
viruses do not infect humans well in the beginning. It tried a
hundred times over and over again. Even in the end, SARS1 did
not transmit between humans very well. That's why containment
worked, and that's why quarantine worked because it was not
very infectious.
But go through a little bit, step-by-step, the evidence of
why anybody still maintaining that it came from the market is
misguided.
Dr. Quay. Sure. Let me agree with Dr. Garry about SARS1
being a spillover. Let me elaborate a little bit. There were 11
cities, 11 markets, 3 different lineages, and a 30-nucleotide
difference among the initial cases in patients, which
approximates about a year of posterior diversity. It's either
in one market or it's in no market. There's no other proposal
for a market origin from it.
457 animals were tested in the market, 0 were found to be
infected. SARS1, 92 animals, 100 hundred percent infected. The
wildlife vendors in SARS1 were all infected. We have 10 vendors
here. None of them are infected. One vendor had bamboo rats
from Southern China where the backbone comes from. He was not
infected, his animals were not infected.
SARS2 has no posterior diversity. As Dr. Andersen said,
it's one jump from one animal to one human. The most likely
place that happens is in a laboratory. Again, to be clear, when
you say an animal, it could be a Petri dish. It could be animal
cells and a Petri dish.
The question of where the origins came from is the question
of where the animal is. They have tested 96 animals in nature,
and they have tested 0 animals at Wuhan Institute Virology.
That's where we need to look.
Senator Paul. Thank you. I will reserve the rest for a
second round.
Chairman Peters. Senator Hassan, you are recognized for
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thanks, Chair Peters, and Ranking Member
Paul for holding this hearing. Thank you to all of our
witnesses for being here today.
Dr. Koblentz, one of the areas of inquiry in this hearing
is obviously whether research funded by the United States
government has appropriate oversight. However, private
companies, universities, and independent research institutions
are also engaging in cutting edge research.
While their research has the potential to cure diseases and
boost our economy, unless they accept Federal funding, there is
very little Federal oversight to ensure that private labs are
engaged in safe and ethical research.
What safety procedures are in place for research facilities
that do not receive government funding, and are there oversight
measures that either government or independent authorities
should put in place to monitor work at these labs, including
labs working on gene synthesis?
Dr. Koblentz. Thank you, Senator. The oversight of
privately funded research is much less than that of federally
funded research in terms of both biosafety biosecurity and
dual-use research oversight.
What we have seen in the area of dual-use research
oversight, for example, in the most recent policy that the
Biden Administration released, only applies to federally
funded-research. However, there is the ability for Federal
agencies to require their grant recipients to apply this new
policy to all research, including that's privately funded. But
that requires special authority that some agencies may have,
but others would need legislation to give them that ability.
That would not cover research that's only conducted by
privately funded entities, but it would expand the scope of
research. In order to expand the scope of oversight to all
privately funded research would require a legislative action.
Along the lines of the proposal I included in my written
statement for the establishment of a national biorisk
management agency that would have authority over biosafety,
biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight regardless of
source of funding because at the end of the day, it should not
matter where the funding comes from in terms of making sure
this research is being done safely, securely, and responsibly.
Senator Hassan. Thank you for that. Another question to
you, Dr. Koblentz, we have heard a great deal about the risks
of certain types of research involving dangerous pathogens, and
the need for robust oversight on the type of experiments that
are performed. We have heard less about the potential risks
from researchers performing off the books or unsupervised
experiments that may be risky or unethical.
How serious are the risks posed by malicious or unethical
insiders, and are the United States and international
authorities equipped to sufficiently mitigate these risks?
Dr. Koblentz. Following the revelations that Bruce Ivins
was responsible for the anthrax letter attacks which happened
in 2009, the United States took a much stronger stance on
trying to prevent insider threats at facilities. The Federal
Select Agent Program, which focuses on biosecurity, included a
number of measures to try and better monitor scientists access
to pathogens in terms of ensuring that they do not become
security risks.
That kind of effort to mitigate insider threats does not
exist in the side of dual-use research oversight. There is a
lot of emphasis on self-governance by research institutions and
by Principal Investigator (PIs) to basically govern their own
labs and make sure that work is not being done, that is as you
said, off the books or is any way unethical.
It is really at this point on research institutions to make
sure that the work activity being done on their facilities is
in compliance with all relevant laws and regulations. That is
an area that is currently a gap in our oversight of this kind
of research.
Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you. One more question for you.
When it comes to biosecurity, the U.S. domestic security is
obviously tied to international efforts. What happens halfway
across the globe can clearly impact us in the United States?
Doctor, you are involved in the Global BioLabs initiative,
which is an organization that tracks all the highest
biosecurity level labs in the world. Are there labs that are of
particular concern? If so, what action should Congress and the
Executive Branch take to improve their safety, and thus, our
national security?
Dr. Koblentz. As we documented in our report last year on
Global Biolabs, there's been a building boom in BSL-4 labs
since the start of the pandemic. There are number of countries
that are now building their first BSL-4 labs that do not
actually have their national biosafety and biosecurity
legislation regulations in place.
Countries like the Philippines, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia
are trying to construct facilities, but they do not yet have
the regulatory infrastructure that they need to make sure those
labs can operate safely, securely, and responsibly. In
addition, countries like China and India, who already operate
BSL-4 labs, are planning on building additional labs as well.
In all of these cases there's a need for making sure that
at the national level, that the right virus management policies
are in place, and at the laboratory level, that these policies
are being followed properly. There are a number of measures
that the both the United States and internationally through
World Health Organization (WHO) and other entities could take
to try and ensure that these regulations are in place and are
being followed properly.
Senator Hassan. Can you elaborate on what those steps would
be?
Dr. Koblentz. Sure. There is an international standard for
biorisk management that creates a framework for how you ensure
that safety and security is prioritized across your laboratory
and your research enterprise. It's called International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 35001. It was negotiated
at the end of 2019, but has not been widely adopted yet by labs
around the world.
Having that kind of an international standard is very
useful because it provides the best practices for biosafety and
biosecurity, and it includes a process by which you need to
document how you are complying with that standard.
That documentation then becomes available for audit in the
event that you need to have any kind of investigation by local,
national, or international authorities to ensure that the
facility is operating properly, and is operating safely, and
securely.
That kind of standard provides an international metric for
measuring whether or not a lab is operating to the
international standards that we would hope they would be.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Johnson, you are
recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank you and the Ranking Member for holding this
very important hearing. We need a lot more of these. I want to
thank all the witnesses for your very detailed testimony, and I
would encourage anybody viewing this hearing to go online and
read the detailed testimony.
You can find it very difficult to not come away after
reading that, that you know, we may not have a smoking gun, but
the circumstantial evidence is strong that this was a man-made
virus, and that it was probably leaked from the lab, probably
at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
One thing that's convinced me very early on, I have been
convinced of this quite some time, is just the coverup. The
fact that Chinese took down data sets, so all of a sudden. You
could not find a smoking gun because it no longer exists, and
we will probably never know that.
But also, the coverup here within the U.S. Government. I
have been doing oversight on our response to COVID, which by
the way, was a miserable failure we're four percent of the
world's population--we apparently experienced 16 percent of the
deaths, supposedly the most modern medical system in the world.
That's a miserable failure. We need to do a lot of oversight,
not just on the origin, which is an important aspect of this,
but on everything.
If we are serious about this, by the way, we have to start
letting subpoenas start flying out. I will do this one more
time. I have done this multiple times. This is the 50 final
pages of Fauci's emails. By the way, the only reason we
realized that Fauci was engaged in a coverup with Dr. Garry is
the fact that we had to FOIA these that they did not turn these
over, which they should have. We had to FOIA them, had to go to
court.
Our staff has taken the 4,000 pages that we got that were
redacted, narrowed those down to 400 pages. They allowed us to
look at these things unredacted in a reading room, 350 pages,
but not the final 50. In terms of the coverup, my guess is the
smoking gun exists somewhere under these heavy redactions.
Actually, my plea to the Chair, is to issue a subpoena to get
these final 50 pages, then maybe we will get a full extent of
the extensive coverup.
Dr. Garry, I do not know, have you ever used the word
conspiracy theory as it relates to the lab leak? Have you ever
accused people who put that thing forward, that they are bunch
of conspiracy theorists?
Dr. Garry. Not in my public----
Senator Johnson. OK. I will tell you who has. It's the
editor in chief of Nature magazine that published the Proximal
Origin. He said, talking about your study, your coverup,
``Great work. We will put conspiracy theories about the origin
of SARS-CoV-2 to rest.''
Will you at least admit that people who are raising the
possibility of a lab leak, were not conspiracy theorists that
there were legitimate concern about Gain-of-Function research,
creating this chimeric virus?
Dr. Garry. Of course, sir. I mean, that would include us at
the very beginning.
Senator Johnson. That's progress. Because, again, an awful
lot of people's reputations were ruined by this coverup and by
the accusations of people being conspiracy theorists.
Now, Dr. Ebright, you know, the purpose of this hearing
really is to talk about the danger of Gain-of-Functional
research. Right now, we are about ready to be scaremongered--I
think we are already being scaremongered on H5N1.
Back in late 2011, the world learned of two scientific
teams. One in University of Wisconsin Madison, and one in the
Netherlands, that had apparently said each of these labs create
H5N1 viruses that gained the ability to spread through the air
between ferrets. The animal model used to study how flu viruses
might behave in humans. That's pretty darn dangerous stuff.
Right? That is primarily what led to the moratorium on Gain-of-
Function. Correct?
Dr. Ebright. That is correct.
Senator Johnson. What possible reason is there to be
producing what nature probably could not produce? Why are we
doing this?
Dr. Ebright. It's important to emphasize that the research
in question has no--zero--civilian practical applications.
Gain-of-function research on potential pandemic pathogens is
not used for and does not contribute to the development of
vaccines, and does not contribute to, the development of drugs.
Senator Johnson. Again, that rationale for all this
research is exactly that.
Dr. Ebright. But it's not.
Senator Johnson. But that's the rationale in case we have
to respond to a bioweapon attack, OK, we need a defense
mechanism. That's the reason, for example, the Defense
Department (DOD) has spent $42 million or funded EcoHealth
Alliance for $42 million and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) for $53 million. Correct?
Dr. Ebright. The current definition is research that is
reasonably anticipated to increase either the transmissibility
or the virulence of a potential pandemic pathogen. That
research does not contribute to developing countermeasures
against potential pandemic.
Senator Johnson. Again, that's the rationale they used. The
thing they really scared the public on was the 1918 Flu
Pandemic. Correct? Even Anthony Fauci admitted, most people who
died of the flu pandemic died of pneumonia because we did not
have antibiotics. Correct?
Dr. Ebright. Bacterial pneumonia.
Senator Johnson. I think one of the things we have to
provide oversight is the sabotage of early treatment using
widely available cheap and safe generic drugs. We did not do
that. From my standpoint, the first thing we ought to be doing
in any kind of pandemic is, is there some way to treat this,
and let doctors be doctors, let them practice medicine?
I am sure you are familiar with the concept of Muller's
Ratchet, correct?
Dr. Ebright. Of what?
Senator Johnson. Muller's Ratchet. It is basically what
viruses generally do, is they will become more transmissible,
but less pathogenic. Because, again, a virus snuffs itself out.
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) snuffed itself out,
SARS snuffed itself out, except there were a couple lab leaks
that produced SARS outbreaks. Correct?
Again, my point is, are we making things worse with human
intervention producing vaccines that are not sterilizing, that
allow variants to be produced in things like antibody dependent
enhancement?
Again, there's an awful lot of concern that we do not even
consider here, because we are on this quest to have a vaccine
for everything and produce vaccines for viruses that have not
even been created yet in the lab.
Again, that's the question we ought to be asking this
Committee is, what in the world are we doing? What's the
rationale for doing this? Are we actually causing more harm
than good?
Dr. Ebright. With vaccine development, I would disagree.
Vaccines, in general, do not pose significant harms and offer
significant benefits.
With respect to the Gain-of-Function research--which
creates new threats, biological threats that do not exist
currently, and might not naturally come into existence in a
decade, a century, or a millennium--that research creates
threats, and those threats are existentially risky threats.
That research is being conducted without a justifiable
rationale. There is no rationale in terms of development of
countermeasures. Industry develops vaccines and therapeutics
against diseases that currently are in humans, not against
diseases that do not yet exist and need to be made in the lab.
Senator Johnson. We could use a public debate regarding all
things vaccine, the profit, motive of it, and everything else.
But that's for another day.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator
Marshall, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARSHALL
Senator Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I think, first of all, it's important to remember why we
are here today. We are here today because we do not want to
have another pandemic like this. I think it's important that we
recognize that a million Americans have lost a loved one, and
they are still looking for closure. We have 15 million
Americans with Long COVID, and perhaps if we knew the origin of
COVID and the development, maybe that would give us a clue how
to treat us.
I want to start with Dr. Quay and go back to the DEFUSE
grant for just a second. This is a grant by EcoHealth and Peter
Daszak--recall that Peter Daszak is David Morens's BFF--and
that grant was denied, but yet it lays out a framework for the
development of COVID-19. You went through six or seven, several
reasons that are absolutely consistent that they said they
would do X and they did X. What are the chances of all those
things ending up in a COVID virus?
Dr. Quay. Yes. Again, just as a reminder, so they said they
were going to go to a particular spot in Southern China to get
a virus. They were going to make sure that it had diversity
from SARS1 of about 25 percent. They were going to put it into
humanized mice to enhance its ability to recognize the receptor
binding domain.
They are going to put furin cleavage site in a very
particular spot. Out of 13,000 letters in the spike protein,
they said in the grant, they were going to put it at a spot
called the S1/S2 junction.
All of those were found in SARS-CoV-2. Its nearest neighbor
is from the same area. It has a 99 percent binding affinity for
the human receptor. SARS1 jumped into humans. It only had 15
percent of the epidemic changes it needed to become epidemic.
Senator Marshall. What do you think the chances of all six
or seven----
Dr. Quay. I have quantified it because I like statistics,
and it's 1 in 1.2 billion.
Senator Marshall. A one in a billion chance. All that comes
to fruition. There were some comments on that grant in the
margin. Dr. Baric, North Carolina, developed the technology for
the protein spike. He taught Dr. Shi, he gave them humanized
mice, again, this was all funded with USAID grant money as
well. What were some of the comments in the margin you think
that are significant?
Dr. Quay. This is important because the folks told DARPA,
we are going to do this research in North Carolina under very
high safety conditions. In the grant, that's what they wrote.
The marginal comments, in drafts, that were only obtained
through FOIA said a different thing. Daszak said, ``Hey, we are
going to shift this over to Wuhan because it will be cheaper,
faster. We will get a lot more done that way.'' Baric says,
``Boy, if U.S. scientists knew this was going on, they would
think this is crazy. This is in the marginal comments. In a
way, they were not truthful with DARPA in the grant.
Senator Marshall. Dr. Baric, you along with Dr. Fauci are
the father of Gain-of-Function knew that other scientists in
America would have a fit if this was being done here.
Dr. Quay. Yes. Again, so fast forward to January, 2020,
these two scientists, Daszak and Baric, sitting down with the
sequence of SARS-CoV-2, and a computer would know within one
hour, this thing has all the features of what we proposed in
that grant. The fact they neither did not tell anybody, or the
people they told did not do anything about it, meant that
human-to-human transmission was not--we were not aware of that.
Asymptomatic transmission, we were not aware of. This is the
first new respiratory virus that's asymptomatic.
Senator Marshall. Great. I am going to use that and come
back to that point in just a second. We went through what I
call the smoking guns that really show beyond a reasonable
doubt that this virus was made in a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
It was synthetic, everywhere from the geography of where it
shows up for the first time to the fact that there was virus
already spreading to multiple continents by the time the wet
market outbreak occurs.
They never have found the intermediate species, with SARS
and MERS, that took months to find an intermediate species.
Anyone that says the raccoon dog is the intermediate species is
just laughable science. No progenitor viruses.
The timeline. They were developing a vaccine already in
November, 2019. Dr. Shi has taken down the DNA lab banks in
September, 2019. Shi takes down another lab bank here in this
country, maybe March of the next year as well.
But of all the smoking guns, and this is the hardest to
explain to people, is just the genetic makeup of this virus.
You pointed out the protein spike. A protein spike that fits
into a lung cell would be like the chances of a person walking
in the room with a key that fits the lock on those doors.
It was a perfect protein spike. You mentioned the furin
cleavage site. There are other spots. But I wanted to talk
about the ORF8 site for just a second. Dr. Quay, what's the
significance of this ORF8 site?
Dr. Quay. ORF8 is a protein that's down near the right-hand
side of the virus. It is not in the final virus. It is secreted
into the bloodstream, and it does two things. Early in the
infection, it blocks interferon expression. You do not sweat,
you do not have a fever, you do not show the symptoms of an
infection. Later in the infection, it blocks what's called
antigen major histocompatibility complex (MHC) presentation.
We learned from HIV that a virus that can block the ability
of pieces of the virus to be presented to the immune system is
a virus that is very hard to make antibodies against. It's very
hard to fight against it.
Two master these during 2015 that have only been published
in Chinese, no papers came from it, at the Wuhan Institute of
Virology, created a synthetic cloning system for ORF8. Gain-of-
Function research around things that make viruses asymptomatic
and things that make them not be able to make antibodies too
are beyond the pale of what Dr. Ebright has said in terms of
the civilian use.
Senator Marshall. This ORF8 is a synthetic link sequence,
never found in nature, and they place it in here, right? They
place this link in here for the purposes of the two cardinal
sins; the cardinal sin of asymptomatic virus, and then
transmission without that symptom as well, and the inability to
make an immune response.
That's the cardinal sins of Gain-of-Function research. What
purpose would there be if you're wanting to develop vaccines?
Is there any civilian purpose or is this, in fact, a bioweapon?
Dr. Quay. I cannot say it's a bioweapon because that's in
the mind of the person that made it, but it is highly unusual,
highly synthetic. They were doing synthetic biology around it,
and its two functions are quite remarkable with respect to what
kind of research you would do in the civilian world.
Senator Marshall. Dr. Ebright, is there a possibility that
it could have been a dual purpose, that they could have been
used as a bioweapon?
Dr. Ebright. The original SARS virus, SARS-CoV-1 is a tier-
one select agent in the United States. It is in the group of
pathogens and biological toxins that our Federal Government has
identified as having high potential for use as a bioweapon in
biowarfare, bioterrorism, or bio-crime. It, by definition,
therefore, according to our Federal Government, is a bioweapon
agent. It is not a bioweapon, but it is an agent that
potentially could be used.
Senator Marshall. Is there any good use, any good reason to
put this in the virus if you are developing a vaccine?
Dr. Ebright. I would return to my general comment on Gain-
of-Function research on potential pandemic pathogens. That
research has no civilian practical application. Researchers
undertake it because it is fast, it is easy, it requires no
specialized equipment or skills, it was prioritized for
funding, and has been prioritized for publication by scientific
journals.
These are major incentives to researchers worldwide, in
China, and in the United States. The researchers undertake this
research because it's easy, they can get the money, and they
can get the papers.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Marshall. Senator
Scott, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. First, I want to thank the Chair and the
Ranking Member for hosting this hearing. We should do this a
lot, and I think there's a lot we still need to learn.
The COVID pandemic was devastating for our country as we
all know. The response by the Biden Administration, the media,
has done nothing but amplify the consequences of this crisis
and erode trust in our Federal Government.
Not long ago, anyone asking questions about the origins of
COVID and the possibility of this virus resulting from a lab
leak were branded as conspiracy theorists. Just like the Hunter
Biden laptop story, the experts said this was disinformation,
and waged a campaign against Members of Congress, medical
professionals, and everyone else asking questions to discredit
them as a liar and extremist. Anthony Fauci led the charge of
this public smear campaign, and I think it's great that he's
not there anymore.
We know that this is not only a critical theory, but the
most likely cause of the pandemic. China cannot be trusted.
Because the Biden Administration has chosen weak appeasement of
the CCP, we still have enforced accountability or got the
answers the American public deserve.
HHS Office of the Inspector General (HHS OIG) did a review
of the EcoHealth Alliance and its management of the grant
contract. EcoHealth received funds and had the Wuhan as a
subcontractor. It's my understanding that NIH requires annual
data reporting for what we spend money on and the research
data.
The Wuhan Institute never provided or only provided partial
data. EcoHealth either failed to submit or submitted incomplete
data. NIH failed to police their own grant program and allowed
this to slide for years. About 85 percent of EcoHealth's budget
comes from Federal research grants. I have no idea why NIH
would think it's a good idea to give us tax dollars to
Communist China. It seems like a pretty poor idea to me.
Dr. Ebright, would it make sense to hold grant recipients
accountable for the failure to comply with the terms of their
grants? Why not require the prime grantee to fully reimburse
the government if they are one of their subcontractors fail to
fully comply with the terms of the grant. Seems like we do that
with our personal life. If somebody does the wrong thing, they
owe us the money back. What do you think?
Dr. Ebright. We do currently hold the grantee responsible,
not only for the primary award, but for sub-awards for
subcontracts. When a researcher submits a grant proposal to
NIH, when a researcher submits each annual grant progress
report to NIH, the researcher signs a certification box. That
certification box says that the researcher will comply with the
terms and condition of the grant, and will provide full and
factual information upon request, subject to administrative,
civil, and criminal penalties. The basis for accountability
exists.
Senator Scott. Has EcoHealth been held accountable? Have
they given any money back?
Dr. Ebright. To my knowledge, there has been no claw-back
of funding from EcoHealth. There has, however, been an
immediate suspension that went into effect a month ago of
EcoHealth Alliance and then this month of its president. A
suspension of eligibility for Federal funding of all forms, and
a referral for debarment from eligibility for Federal funding
from all sources.
Senator Scott. Do you know any instances where NIH has ever
held anybody accountable and gotten the money back?
Dr. Ebright. Yes. This has happened in a number of cases.
Examples include data fraud. Other examples include sexual
harassment or other forms of abuse that are outside the terms
and conditions of the grant.
Senator Scott. Why do you think they have not gotten the
money back from EcoHealth? Why they have not been held
accountable?
Dr. Ebright. I would place that burden on Congress and on
the White House, in that the NIH is unlikely to move toward
clawback without motivation from either Congress or the White
House. It is their job, but it is also the job of our
Legislative Branch through its oversight responsibility and our
Executive Branch through its primary responsibility to ensure
that jobs are carried out.
Senator Scott. Do you know anybody at NIH that's ever been
fired for failure to do their job?
Dr. Ebright. You mean an NIH staffer?
Senator Scott. Yes. As part of the administrative staff at
NIH? Have you heard of anybody?
Dr. Ebright. I do not.
Senator Scott. Has anybody you know of ever been fired from
NIH over what they did by not enforcing the EcoHealth grant
program?
Dr. Ebright. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Scott. OK. So, as you said, EcoHealth has been
suspended from further funding with possible disbarment, but
they are currently appealing it. Do you think it's right to
debar them?
Dr. Ebright. Absolutely.
Senator Scott. How long should they be debarred for?
Dr. Ebright. The debarment term specified by law typically
is three years. The debarment proceedings determine, first,
whether a debarment will occur and then determine the duration,
the term of the debarment. I would recommend a permanent
debarment given the number of terms and conditions of the
EcoHealth Alliance grants that were violated and the severity
of those violations.
Senator Scott. Wuhan Institute of Virology has been
debarred for 10 years. You think it be should be permanent, and
why hasn't it been?
Dr. Ebright. Yes, I do. I do not know why.
Senator Scott. Why do you think it was not permanent?
Dr. Ebright. I do not know.
Senator Scott. Does anybody else have any background of why
NIH does not enforce their own rules. Have you guys have you
heard of people, anybody from NIH, being reprimanded, fired or
anything over the EcoHealth?
Dr. Quay. No.
Senator Scott. Why do you-all think?
Dr. Quay. I think the retired head of the NIAID should be
asked that question.
Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Romney,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member, for
the hearing.
There's a lot of energy and passion around; was it at from
an animal or was it a lab leak? I must admit, I do not
understand why there's so much energy around that. Strikes me
that we will never be 100 percent sure. I presume about one or
the other. We might be 98 percent or something, but we will
always be a little uncertain. Given the fact that it could have
been either we know what action we ought to take to protect
from either.
Why there's so much passion around it makes me think it's
more political than scientific, but maybe I am wrong. The
action that strikes me, based on what I have heard, we should
not be financing Gain-of-Function research. What I heard was
there's no particular reason for it other than military
warfare. We should not do that anyway.
One, we know that whether it came from an animal or not, we
should not be financing Gain-of-Function research. No. 2, we
should insist that any place we send money follows the
international ISO standards. I did not get the number, Dr.
Koblentz, but you had a number there that suggested that people
have to follow. We should not be getting money or going to labs
that do not follow those international standards.
No. 3, whether it was from a wet market or the Wuhan lab,
China's to blame. Both those things were in China. If we are
looking for someone to blame, we know who it is. It's Chinese,
and they should take responsibility for it, and should have
opened themselves up to complete disclosure.
So, am I wrong here? Is there a reason there's so much
energy around whether it came from a wet market or a lab. In
both cases, the action is simple. We should cleanup the wet
markets, and No. 2, we should tighten the labs. Please go
ahead, Dr. Quay.
Dr. Quay. I will just say, briefly. I think, the energy is
around the fact that paychecks, salaries, careers are based on
continuing Gain-of-Function research by some of the most vocal
people in this debate. I think if you follow the money, you
will see the answer.
Senator Romney. Thank you. Dr. Garry, what's your thought?
Dr. Garry. A lot of the talk around Gain-of-Function
research depends on how you define it, and the definition is
very important. There are some informal definitions, there are
very technical definitions, and we have to get that part right.
Because if you define it in a way that basically interferes
with a lot of biomedical research on viruses and on other
things, too, cancer research, everything, you are going to
really cripple the biomedical research enterprise. Let's get
that right.
I don't think, just a blanket we should stop funding all
Gain-of-Function research, because some of that is important.
For developing animal models of new diseases as they come
forth. You have to select for a virus that can act, actually
replicate in a distinct animal that you can use in the lab. If
you do not permit Gain-of-Function research, we won't be able
to respond to a new threat because we won't be able to make
animal models. Getting that right. Getting the definition right
is very important.
I think that the Office of Science and Technology Policy's
new guidelines for this type of research is very clear. It's a
good step forward. You should look at that and see what you can
do best to codify that into some kind of legislation.
Senator Romney. Yes. Dr. Ebright, did you concur with that
point of view; that we needed to find exactly what kind of
research is OK and which is not, which has a beneficial purpose
and which has only malevolent purpose?
Dr. Ebright. The definition of Gain-of-Function research
has been clear. There is a legally controlling official
definition in the U.S. policy that was in effect from 2014 to
2017, and there has been an legally controlling definition in
the U.S. policy that has been in effect from 2018 to the
present. The definitions have never been in question.
But as for the intensity that you asked about at the start
of your series of questions, the intensity comes from those who
are practitioners of Gain-of-Function research and related
high-risk research on potential pandemic pathogens. Who have
for two decades successfully resisted Federal oversight of
their activities, who have insisted on self-regulation without
external oversight, and who would like this to continue despite
the very real possibility--even though, as you say, not a
certainty--of the very real possibility that SARS-CoV-2, a
pandemic that killed 20 million and cost $25 trillion, may have
come from precisely that category of research.
That is the basis of the intensity. Only after there is an
acknowledgement--and I see this acknowledgement today in a
bipartisan fashion among Members of this Committee, from both
parties. Only after there is an acknowledgement that there is a
very real possibility--not a remote possibility, but a very
real possibility, of a lab origin--will there be the political
will to impose regulation on this scientific community that has
successfully resisted and obstructed regulation for two
decades.
Every other component of biomedical research that poses
risks or has significant consequences has regulation, Federal
regulation, with force of law. There's regulation of human
subjects research. There's regulation of vertebrate animal
research. There's regulation of embryonic stem cell research.
But in this category of research--which is the most significant
in terms of consequences and potentially existential risk--
there is almost no regulation with force of law.
There is no regulation with force of law for biosafety, for
any pathogen other than the smallpox virus. There is no
regulation with force of law for biorisk management for any
pathogen. That needs to change.
That's what produces this intensity.
Senator Romney. It strikes me that whether COVID came from
a lab or it came from a wet market, that issue still has to be
addressed.
Dr. Ebright. Absolutely.
Senator Romney. I am not going to get so excited about
where COVID happened to come from. What I know is that
something very dangerous could come from Gain-of-Function
research if it's not properly regulated; how to define what,
where those boundaries are, and what one can do and one cannot
do. That's something that we ought to be focused on.
Even if we became 98 percent sure it came from a wet
market, that would not mean that Gain-of-Function research
could by itself become a huge danger to humanity, and therefore
we ought to regulate it. Is that something you gentlemen agree
with, or am I making a mistake?
Dr. Garry. I completely agree with you, Senator Romney.
That's well stated.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Romney. Senator Hawley,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thanks for
holding this hearing. Thanks for the witnesses for being here.
I have to say, I think one of the worst things that
happened in the COVID era is that our own government
deliberately withheld information from us, from the American
people, tried to propagandize the American people, used the
arms and agencies of government to actively censor Americans
who dared to question the propaganda. And they are still lying
to us.
I will give you the proof of it. I wrote the bill that
requires the administration to declassify the intelligence
assessments and reports related to the origins of COVID-19.
Now, listen, I just want to say. Everybody sitting on this dais
has read these. I have read them. I guarantee you my colleagues
have read them.
I know what the Department of Energy (DOE) concluded. I
know what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concluded.
I knew what they concluded years ago because we could read them
when people like Dr. Fauci were out there saying the lab leak
``hypothesis'' was totally discredited and nonsense. You could
go read the intelligence and know our own government thought
otherwise.
At this late hour, this government still refuses to release
the intelligence. They are blatantly disregarding the law that
this body passed, the Senate passed unanimously. The propaganda
involved in the origins of COVID-19 is astounding to me. It
recalls the worst of the wartime propaganda in years past when
the government would deliberately lie to people. Here that's
what they have been doing with COVID-19 and are still doing it.
You had this whole cabal of led by Dr. Fauci and others who
as soon as the lab leak hypothesis that we now know is a lot
more than a hypothesis, as soon as it's mentioned, what did
Fauci do? We know because this has all been litigated in the
Federal district court. In fact, in multiple Federal courts. I
have the finding of fact from the court right here that they
lay it all out.
Fauci goes to the WHO, asks the WHO to intervene, to
discredit the lab leak. He then speaks against it multiple
times from the podium at the White House. He then does
countless media interviews. I mean, my gosh, what show has he
not been on? He is still on TV spewing this misinformation, as
he would call it. But he did these multiple interviews where he
says, no way, no how lab leak. Not possible at all.
Then he coordinates--and the whole Federal Government
coordinates with the biggest tech companies in the world to
suppress, and media companies, to suppress any American who
would ask questions about it. It's absolutely disgraceful.
Dr. Garry, you were part of this propaganda effort. I mean,
you were right at the center of it. It's astounding. You wrote
this piece, this Nature magazine piece or whatever it was, that
we have heard testimony here today, Nature Medicine, March 17,
2020. We have heard testimony here today from other scientists
on the panel that it's basically an opinion piece. You said at
the time that definitively SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory
construct, is not a laboratory construct.
Of course, our own government's key agencies have concluded
otherwise. On the basis of this, Dr. Fauci and others cited
this piece, and went out to use it to mobilize our own
government, to censor people who asked questions about it.
People lost their jobs because of this. They lost their jobs,
they lost their standing. They were kicked off Facebook. They
were kicked off Twitter.
Do you regret being part of this effort, this propaganda
effort?
Dr. Garry. Senator, I was simply just writing a paper about
our scientific opinions about where this virus came from.
Senator Hawley. Oh, no, you weren't. You said in an email,
that you tried to withhold, but that we have. February 2, 2020,
you wrote, ``I really can't think of a plausible natural
scenario where you can get from the bat virus or one very
similar to this.'' I am quoting you. ``I just can't figure out
how this gets accomplished in nature--it's stunning. Of course,
in the lab it would be easy.''
Dr. Garry. Of course, and I actually figured it out. That's
the whole point of that.
Senator Hawley. You figured it out. You wrote this while
you were writing your propaganda piece, while you were writing
your paper.
Dr. Garry. I wrote that somewhere around February 2nd.
Senator Hawley. Yes. February. It was exactly February 2nd.
You testified that you were writing your Proximal Origin paper
in early February. You are saying that what, did it come to you
overnight?
Dr. Garry. There was new data that came----
Senator Hawley. Like a revelation from God.
Dr. Garry. No----
Senator Hawley. It's overnight.
Dr. Garry [continuing]. It's the scientific method.
Senator Hawley. I got it. I have figured it out, and now I
can definitively rule out--it's amazing. Is that what happened?
Dr. Garry. It's just the scientific method.
Senator Hawley. Oh, it's just science. It's the scientific
method that happened in lightning speed, and then was used to
propagandize, and lie to, and shut down. As a scientist who is
supposed to follow facts, do you regret the fact that your
``work'' was used to censor your fellow scientists? It was used
to censor ordinary Americans who asked questions about the
virus. Do you regret that?
Dr. Garry. When you write a paper, you get it in the
journal, we cannot control what happens after that.
Senator Hawley. Oh, I see. You are not responsible at all.
It's amazing. Nobody who is involved in any of this is
responsible. Never. They are not responsible. People lost their
jobs. People have lost probably their healthcare associated
with their jobs. People have been run out of public--like they
are done available in polite society. You cannot show your face
because my gosh, you questioned. But you, you don't have
anything to do with it.
Why is so many of your papers, your other papers been
retracted or subjected to formal expressions of concern? Why is
that?
Dr. Garry. There's a long story behind that.
Senator Hawley. Four of them. Right? On July 26, 2021,
Virology retracted a paper of yours. Also, in 2021, the Journal
of General Virology retracted another of your papers. In March
2022, an expression of concern was added by an editor of yet
another journal to another of your papers. On April 4, 2024, a
third scientific paper of yours was retracted from the Journal
of Medical Virology. Is this normal?
Dr. Garry. Those papers did not come from my lab, but you
know, I'm certainly helping----
Senator Hawley. So, they are not yours?
Dr. Garry. They are not mine. No.
Senator Hawley. Oh, so your work is----
Dr. Garry. I am on the paper, but they did not come from my
lab work.
Senator Hawley. Work that God gave you a flash of
inspiration remains absolutely unimpeachable.
Dr. Garry. We stand by that.
Senator Hawley. Do you stand by your assertion and your
Nature piece that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct?
Dr. Garry. No, we do, and that's exactly the same
conclusion that the intelligence community came to.
Senator Hawley. Couldn't possibly be.
That is a lie. Let's stop right there. That is a lie. I
have read the intelligence. The ``intelligence community'' did
not come to that conclusion. Multiple intelligence community
agents and components have concluded it was likely a lab leak.
They concluded that at the same time that you and your people
were propagandizing the American public, and using the channels
and influence of the American government to censor ordinary
Americans.
That is the truth. I am not going to sit here and allow you
to lie any further. Dr. Garry, you have disgracefully
participated in shameful propaganda. That has been one of the
worst chapters in this country's history with the government
propagandizing its own people.
And you know what? I'm not a scientist, I don't know. But
what I do know is it is wrong. It is wrong to censor and lie to
the American public. It is wrong to withhold critical
information from them. It is wrong to countenance that and to
say, ``Oh, I just had nothing to do with it. I wish we could
have done better.'' You should have done better, sir. You
should have done better. Because you didn't, people have
suffered.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Garry. Could I----
Chairman Peters. Doctor, if you'd like to respond? I think
he can respond to your question.
Dr. Garry. Yes. Actually, Senator Hawley, I am going to
agree with you with about something. I do think that we should
learn more information from the intelligence community, what
they found. I agree with you that they should be more open and
tell where those conclusions came from. At the FBI, and at the
Energy Department. All the agencies should come forth with more
information. There's a point we can agree with.
That was an interesting exchange. But, all we did was write
a paper, Nature Medicine, 3,000 words, it's been one of the
most scrutinized papers in history. It's held up very well. It
was not an attempt to distort things and to mislead the
American public. It was just simply a paper. Like the many
other scientific papers that I have written in my career.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Let's move on to a second
round. I will tell the Members we have a vote that I believe
has already been called. We also have a hard stop at 10 after
12 o'clock. The second round will be five minutes, and I will
start.
Actually, Doctor, I will just pick up from your answer
there. A lot of has been directed toward the paper that you
wrote and the research that went in into that. Does the science
sense the paper came out to strengthen your argument or weaken
it? What does the science show?
Dr. Garry. It absolutely strengthens it. I mean, we
published a series of papers after the Proximal Origins paper,
all of them conclusively moving toward the natural origin
hypothesis. So, we stand by that paper. It was a good paper.
Chairman Peters. We are currently seeing enormous changes
in technology in the biological sciences, from artificial
intelligence (AI) to biological design tools, even robot
laboratories where experiments can be conducted from really
anywhere on the globe.
Dr. Koblentz, my question for you is, in your opinion, will
these types of technological changes make it easier or harder
for us to determine the origins of future pandemics?
Dr. Koblentz. The advances you just discussed will
definitely make it more complicated to do that. On the one
hand, we are going to have much more sophisticated capabilities
to analyze viral genomes and do the kind of analyses that are
some of the features of Dr. Garry's work, to understand the
evolution of these pathogens and where they come from. That
will be incredibly useful investigating any future outbreak.
On the other hand, the fact that these technologies are
going to be globally diffused, the fact that there are a
growing number of high and maximum containment laboratories
that conduct high-consequence research will make it a more
complicated process because there will be more potential
sources for outbreaks, whether they are naturally occurring or
from laboratories.
The technologies are not a net negative, but they are not a
panacea. It's definitely going to be a much more complicated
endeavor to go through this exercise in the future.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Dr. Quay, a question for you.
We know the U.S. intelligence community has reported that a few
scientists at the Wuhan lab got sick in December, the fall of
2019, but it's not clear that any of them had COVID-19. My
question for you, sir, is what evidence do we have that someone
at the Wuhan lab got COVID-19 before anyone else did? Do you
know if these scientists actually got tested for COVID-19?
Dr. Quay. No, I don't. All of my data around that relies on
the State Department (DOS) statement. There were three
individuals--we believe we know one of them, at least Ben Hu,
was responsible for some of the synthetic work in the
laboratory.
Reasonably young person who is said to have been
hospitalized with an X-ray-confirmed disease consistent with
COVID-19, but not blood testing. We do know also that in March
2020, Dr. Shi reported that no one at the Wuhan Institute of
Virology had SARS-CoV-2.
With another individual, we did a statistical analysis of
probability of that with the incidents in Wuhan, and that is
not a truthful statement because of that. Those are the two
facts I have.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Garry, you want to respond?
Dr. Garry. Yes. Senator Peters, could I read from the
Intelligence Committee, the Office of the Director National
Intelligence about these three supposed sick workers at the
Wuhan Institute of Virology. They write, ``While several WIV
researchers fell mildly in fall 2019, they experienced a range
of symptoms consistent with colds or allergies with
accompanying symptoms typically not associated with COVID-19.
Some of them were confirmed to have been sick with other
illnesses unrelated to COVID-19.'' The three sick workers at
the WIV is simply a myth.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Quay, what specific hard evidence
proves that the Wuhan lab did experiments that that created the
virus? Do we have specific evidence?
Dr. Quay. No. One of our biggest challenges is we do not
know what they have done inside there. We know what they were
doing in the past. We know what they did in the fall of 2019.
All consistent with the things you would do if there had been a
laboratory accident there.
You are filing a patent, the first patent out of 600
patents for a device to prevent a coronavirus infection in an
infected worker. One of the inventors on that patent is a PLA
military doctor scientist. The head of the laboratory was
dismissed and a PLA soldier was put in charge of the laboratory
December, 2019.
We do not have access inside the laboratory. We probably
will never have it. But the genome inside the virus comports to
the DEFUSE Grant in such a way that it's inconsistent. In a
court of law, you find someone criminally for 95 percent or
greater probabilities, and this is one in a billion, which is
greater than that, that this is a synthetic virus.
Chairman Peters. I do not want to put words in your mouth.
A lot of these are assumptions that you are making not hard
evidence.
Dr. Quay. The hard evidence is the incidents of the
features of SARS-CoV-2 can individually be looked at in nature.
They can be identified with the frequency in nature. Then you
can say, what is the chance that each of these were combined in
one virus at the same time? This is what virologists do all the
time in looking for origins. When you do that, you conclude
that it has a one in a billion chance of coming from nature,
and it meets all seven criteria of the DEFUSE Grant.
Chairman Peters. OK. Thank you. Ranking Member Paul, you
are recognized for questions.
Senator Paul. Dr. Garry indicated that the intelligence
community was somewhat unified, or a lot of them believe this
came from animals, and that's just not true. The ones that have
been vocal about this and talked a lot about have been the DOE,
which has more scientists than any other agency in Washington,
probably other than NIH. They have concluded that it did come
from the lab.
FBI concluded it came from the lab. We had a whistleblower
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that says the
scientists that were convened to study this voted 6 to 1 to say
it came from the lab, and then they were overruled by superiors
for political reasons. There's a lot of evidence that people
within the intel agencies actually do believe that there is
evidence that it came from the lab.
In addition to people getting sick, there's also about a
week in October where they do imagery of who's using a cell
phone, and nobody's using a cell phone in the lab for about a
week. The lab's completely empty for about a week. Some people
think that was during a cleanup period.
But if you are sitting at home and you are sort of an
independent, you are scientist over here saying Gain-of-
Function is the best thing since sliced bread. Over here, you
are saying, well, we really have not developed any meaningful
vaccines or technology from this. You are like, who do I
believe? Who you believe does go to character. We have to look
at some of the statements. Like I said, I have never seen
anything like this between public and private statements.
Kristian Andersen early on in this sends an email to Fauci,
and Fauci says, Bob, Garry, and a couple of the other
virologists, we think it's inconsistent. This virus, this
genetic sequence of COVID is inconsistent with the expectations
of evolutionary theory. They believed it did not come from
nature.
They had looked at this, these are smart people that when
they were not looking at it, when they were trying to look at
it through an objective lens, concluded one thing until they
came to another conclusion that it might hurt the business of
science and the arrangements they had going on with China and
concluded opposite.
But with Kristian Andersen, its stark. It's stark because
he says, oh, Bob, and all these, oh, we all believe it's
inconsistent with the expectations of evolutionary theory. A
week later, Kristian Andersen is saying, what I like to use
when I talk to the public is I like to tell them it's
consistent with the expectations of evolutionary theory. He
goes from inconsistent to consistent. Complete opposite
approach, within days, maybe even simultaneously as these
papers are being written.
Really the hypocrisy of those involved, and those who are
saying, not a laboratory construct. If you want to know who to
believe, look at their private statements versus their public
statements.
We have gain-of-function is the best thing since sliced
bread or gain-of-function is a real problem. Now, Senator
Romney's why does it matter? If there's a chance, we should do
something. I think he's right. If you believe there's a one
percent chance, we should do something.
But if you think there's a one percent chance, or you want
to sort of glad hand people at the end and say, well, we should
do something, their argument for the people who think it's not
likely to happen is going to be, oh, the administration has
already fixed this. It's already done. All we need is a few
little regulatory things. We do not need legislation. We do not
need independent oversight. We do not need people looking at
this who are not on the receiving end of the money.
This is the whole problem of NIH. The people regulating
themselves are getting the money. The administration has put in
place some regulations to try to help with the buying of select
agents.
Dr. Quay, if you could explain to us what a few
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) scientists did
recently and how well the administrative regulations are
working without actual congressional legislation.
Dr. Quay. Sure. Three scientists at MIT said that they were
going to be a red team, and they contacted the FBI because what
they were going to do was about to be potentially illegal. They
put together ricin and the 1918 Influenza. Those two are select
agents, and they are highly lethal.
They broke the genes up in a particular way. They added
some benign genes. Then, they put out test orders roughly
following the White House guidelines. Test orders to see if
laboratories would send them the pieces they needed to build
these viruses or ricin, or they would stop them.
In fact, in 94 percent of the time, they sent the pieces
right to them. They purposely did not make the active strain of
the RNA, they made the inactive strain to show that they could
do it, but they proved they could make ricin. They proved they
could make the 1918 Influenza under the guidance that have just
come out of the White House in a way that----
Senator Paul. This gets at where do we go forward. Our next
hearing, or one of our next hearings, is going to be what do we
do for gain-of-function reform? What kind of committee do we
set up to look at this? If the answer is from the other side,
oh, it's already done, the White House did it, this is showing
you what the White House did, even if it was well intentioned,
did not work.
These scientists got the material off the Internet to
create the Spanish Flu that killed 50-100 million people. This
is not something we should scoff at and say, oh, it's not a
laboratory construct. We do not do anything here. Let the
administration do this.
I would say this if it were a Republican administration, I
do not care which party it's in, I agree with scientists like
Kevin Esvelt who equate this with nuclear weapons. This is
incredibly important and needs congressional oversight on the
select agents, but also on the Gain-of-Function.
Now, some people think this just started, it's incredibly
partisan. And now just for a quick answer, then a more
extensive answer. Dr. Ebright, are you part of the right-wing
conspiracy? Are you somehow some kind of crazy Republican
partisan?
Dr. Ebright. I am a registered Democrat. I voted for Biden.
I had a Biden sign on my lawn, and I had a Biden sticker on my
car.
Senator Paul. All right, that's enough of that. But the
main point I wanted to make is, this is not a partisan thing.
In fact, when I have talked to Dr. Ebright, he says he got
involved with this after September 11, 2001 (9/11) when the
anthrax attacks came. But then more involved in 2010 as it
heated up and everybody was talking about it in the scientific
community when scientists took the avian flu, which is very
deadly in humans, but like most animal virus, not very
transmissible in humans. They mutated it in Netherlands to make
it spread through the air and just spread to mammals.
That's a crazy thing. If people think that's a benign use
of Gain-of-Function, we should never ever listen to people like
that. Who else thinks it was benign and we did not need to do
anything? Anthony Fauci. There have been these two camps. There
has been this debate going on for a decade. I think it is a
very good debate. It should be an intellectual debate.
But realize, these other people, Collins and Fauci, who
were saying, take these people down, take down the people we
disagree with. This is not scientific debate that they're
taking us off the Internet. These are people who are not
playing under the American rules, not playing under the
scientific method, and they should be discounted. But we have
to have a real debate over this.
As we move forward, and I would like to ask you, Dr.
Ebright, on this. How important is it that we actually have a
law passed, and that we actually have regulators that are
scientists, but that are outside of the supply of money,
outside of the exchange of grant money?
Dr. Ebright. I think it's a matter of survival. It's that
important.
There needs to be an entity that is independent of agencies
that fund research and perform research, to eliminate the
structural conflict of interest that has existed with current
self-regulation by agencies that perform and fund research.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Senator Johnson, you are
recognized for your questions.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In Eisenhower's very prescient farewell speech, he not only
warned us about the military industrial complex, he warned us
about government funding of research. He said you do that, then
scientists are going to be more interested in their grant, in
obtaining a grant than pursuing truthful science. He said you
end up with a scientific technological elite that would drive
public policy.
I think we witnessed that during COVID. They drove it in a
very bad direction. I want to talk about the coverup again. Dr.
Garry, how much have you received in government grants over
your career? Do you have any figure in that, a ballpark?
Dr. Garry. Senator, I am not sure.
Senator Johnson. Hundreds of millions?
Dr. Garry. Not hundreds.
Senator Johnson. I have information that between you and
Dr. Kristian Andersen, between 2020 and 2022, you received
$25.2 million in grants from the NIH.
Dr. Garry. That's possible.
Senator Johnson. That's accurate. So, after you write the
Proximal Origin theory, you have been working with Dr. Fauci
how many years?
Dr. Garry. I do not actually work with Dr. Fauci.
Senator Johnson. I mean, you have certainly come to his aid
and testified kind of in his support during AIDS. But the fact
is, you cashiered $25.2 million in government grants after
writing the Proximal Origin paper, didn't you? $25.2 million in
grants.
Dr. Garry. It was not because we wrote the paper.
Senator Johnson. Anthony Fauci has led out billions of
dollars' worth of grants, right? He controls an awful lot of
information. Again, the point being, why would they cover it
up. January 27, 2020, Dr. Fauci is informed via email that
NIAID has been funding Coronavirus project in China for the
last five years.
These are the emails that were FOIAed. They were not given
to us, and they are heavily redacted. January 31st, he starts
conversations with Dr. Andersen, et al., Dr. Garry. February
1st, Dr. Fauci emails his Principal Deputy Director Hugh
Auchincloss. He said, ``Hugh, it's essential that we speak this
morning. Keep your cell phone on. I have a conference call at
7:45. This will likely be over at 8:45. Read this paper as well
as the email that I will forward to you. You will have tasks
today that must be done.''
Now that, that is somebody who's scrambling to cover up his
backside for funding dangerous research at the Wuhan lab for
five years. Is that correct? Dr. Ebright, I will ask you that
question, but in addition, you basically accused Dr. Garry of
scientific misconduct, possibly serious as fraud. Why don't you
address that? Because I would agree with you.
Dr. Ebright. On the Proximal Origin paper, I have signed
two letters by teams of scientists requesting an editorial
review of that paper for retraction for misconduct. Then on two
of the Market papers, there are only two published.
Senator Johnson. But, again, what was the misconduct? You
have accused him, but what was the misconduct?
Dr. Ebright. The misconduct of highest importance was
stating conclusions the authors knew, at the time,
contemporaneously--while writing the paper, submitting the
paper, and publishing the paper--were untrue. This is the most
egregious form of scientific misconduct publishing a paper
where you know the conclusions are untrue.
Senator Johnson. Of course, the reason we did not get those
emails other than through a court order is that the emails
themselves were so unbelievably incriminating.
Dr. Ebright. That is correct.
Senator Johnson. That they thought one thing and wrote the
exact other for an article that was quoted like 5,800 times. I
mean that again, as Senator Hawley and others have pointed out,
destroyed people's careers, they were ridiculed, they were
vilified.
Dr. Ebright. Yes.
Senator Johnson. That is scientific misconduct and fraud.
Dr. Garry, I have to say, people are bemoaning the fact that
they no longer trust science or that we don't trust our Federal
health agencies. The reason the American public legitimately do
not trust scientists and Federal health agencies are because of
people like you. You bear that responsibility for violating the
public's trust from your scientific misconduct and fraud.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Garry, you can respond.
Dr. Garry. Thank you so much. I would just encourage people
to go and read the Nature Medicine article, The Proximal Origin
of SARS-CoV-2. We did not put anything in that paper that we
did not believe was true. The conclusions of that paper have
held up very well. In fact, there's been an abundance of
scientific evidence that has come forward since then to support
all the conclusions. Everything we wrote in that paper. There's
no fraud. Yes, indeed, some of the authors changed their mind
during the course of writing that paper over a period of weeks.
That's not fraud, sir. That is just the way that the scientific
method works.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Chair, I would ask consent to enter
all these Slack messages from this, Dr. Andersen et al., that
group that have all these quotes into our appearing record,\1\
and we will provide them to you. Thank you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The statements submitted by Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 898.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Peters. Without objection.
Senator Marshall, you are recognized for your questions.
Senator Marshall. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Garry, I think it's also important to point out a
couple things, and one is that you have received $60 million of
grants from the NIH over the years, and you have your own
vaccine company. That obviously is a bit of a conflict of
interest. I do not think the scientific world really agrees
with your conclusion that it stood up to the test of times. I
think the Proximal Origin article is literally an editorial. An
opinion page.
But unfortunately, our intelligence community took it as
the gospel. I think it's also interesting to me that in within
the scientific community, that two agencies, the Department of
Energy and FBI said they leaned toward a lab leak origin of
this, that's public knowledge, and that they have the
scientists to actually understand what the heck we are talking
about.
They are realizing that nature could have made this virus.
There are so many things wrong with your theory, and all you
come back to is, oh, it started in the wet market. But you have
yet to show us an intermediate host. You have yet to show us
progenitor species, all the farms that these animals outside of
the market. How many of those animals were positive? I think,
the answer is none.
I want to go down this ODNI route for just a second, and
it's a fact that the ODNI has not complied with the law.
Congress has passed legislation, that did declassify
information related to COVID origins, ODNI has not complied.
Leaving ODNI in charge ensures a total monitoring control of
the information, the misinformation. That's why we have to move
this investigation outside of the ODNI.
Additionally, it's a fact that our current grant research
process hides the ultimate beneficiaries of U.S. grants
research and bypasses all export controls. All of that has to
be changed. This is why we need a 9/11-style investigation
outside of cameras, outside of the politics here on Capitol
Hill to find out where this virus came from. What did the
United States do to contribute and how do we keep this from
happening again?
Dr. Quay, I want to go back to some line of question we
were going down earlier, just the research being done in Wuhan
China. I think that there's a naivety upon Americans to think
that the Chinese military is in one's place doing research and
the WIV is doing research and the CCP is not involved. What's
it like to work in labs in Wuhan and the interaction between
the CCP and those entities? What does their day usually start
with?
Dr. Quay. I think one of the telling ways to see that is
without visiting them. Is to go through the minutes of
laboratory meetings, which you can. You can get a hold of there
in Chinese, you can translate them. Unlike laboratory meetings
in the United States which are pretty much, you start out, you
start presenting your data, you challenge your data in that.
They start with a recitation of what the Communist party's
missions are with respect to their position in the world and
the role of their research, and it goes down a litany. These
are by Communist Party members who are part of every lab
meeting present. Then, they finally start talking about the
research into the lab, but not at the beginning.
Senator Marshall. Then the military takes over the WIV in
December as well to promote the coverup. What is the
interaction between the Chinese military and the WIV
scientists?
Dr. Quay. So the woman that took over was the one that was
most responsible for the response to the SARS1. Interestingly,
if you look at the closest viruses to SARS-CoV-2. You have
RaTG13, which is inside the WIV. You have the Banal viruses
from Laos. We know WIV is sampling there
The next one down are two viruses that were collected by
the PLA army, and we began studying in 2017. The S2 region of
the spike protein is almost identical to those viruses that
were originally collected by the PLA army, the first genetic
cluster of patients that have both lineage A, lineage B, we're
in the PLA hospital three kilometers from the WIV.
Senator Marshall. I think we have debated back and forth
about the benefits and risk of viral Gain-of-Function research.
I am just going to say viral manipulation. Viral manipulation
so we do not have to worry about your silly definitions that
are used to obscure what's really happening here.
I am going to ask each one of you, do you feel comfortable
funding any type of biomanipulation research with foreign
entities that are hostile toward America like the CCP? Dr.
Ebright.
Dr. Ebright. I think there are strong reasons for
international collaboration in science, with both allied
nations and adversary nations. However, there's a line that
never should be crossed, and that is research that has weapons
implications, and research on discovery and enhancement of
bioweapons agents. The research on SARS viruses in Wuhan, most
surely is an example of such research.
Senator Marshall. I would like to go through the questions,
but I think I should be respectful of everyone's time. Thank
you so much, Mr. Chair, for giving us the second round. Thank
you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Marshall.
One quick question came up for me. Dr. Quay, you talked about
the genetic features could only happen in a lab. I would like
to ask Dr. Garry, do the genetic features, do those only come
from lab experiments or is there a natural evolution?
Dr. Garry. Of course not. Dr. Quay mentioned the virus
called BANAL-20-52. That virus is extremely close to SAR-CoV-2.
In fact, if we isolated both of those viruses out in nature and
did not know anything about a pandemic, you would say those are
in the same very close family together. So, BANAL-20-52, is
essentially a very close member of SARS-CoV-2. It's got all the
genetic features of SARS-CoV-2. Certainly, the fact that that
virus is in nature shows that SARS-CoV-2 could have arisen
through a natural process.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Ebright.
Dr. Ebright. The virus has no furin cleavage site. As Dr.
Garry is aware.
Dr. Garry. The furin cleavage site is not the only feature
of the virus that makes it a virus that's able to cause a
pandemic. There are dozens, maybe hundreds of other changes
that the virus has to go through before it can have that
potential. Nobody in a laboratory would know how to put those
features into any virus, let alone one that's 97 or 96 percent
similar to SARS-CoV-2.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Quay.
Dr. Quay. When you do serial passage of a virus, Darwin and
evolution selects for the right position. When you look at
3,800 possible changes in the amino acids and the receptor
binding domain, all but 17 changes are not improvements. So,
SARS-CoV-2 is at 99 percent perfected for the receptor binding
domains of humans. SARS1, when it first jumped to humans had 15
percent and evolved over a couple years to get to the pandemic
stage. It started out with a 99 percent perfect virus, which is
serial passage.
Dr. Garry. Dr. Quay, the BANAL-20-52 virus, the receptor
binding domain is 50 amino acids long. 49 of those 50 are the
same as in SARS-CoV-2. You do not have to create any kind of
scenario where you are passing viruses in the lab. You know
that receptor-binding domain (RBD), is already in nature
essentially fully formed.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Ranking Member Paul and I are
holding these hearings and we want to be thinking about the
future. How do we make sure that we handle pandemics or
potential pandemics much better in the future. I am going to
ask each of you a brief question. In the event that we never
get to the bottom of how this pandemic started, both Ranking
Member Paul, and I believe that we have to do everything we can
to put forward policies that will hopefully prevent a future
pandemic.
I would like each of you to identify, I am going to go
down, I will start with Dr. Koblentz, and then go down. Just to
identify, briefly, in the remaining time here, one or two
priority actions that we should take to help us prevent the
next pandemic. If there's one or two thoughts this Committee
should take to heart, what would that be? Dr. Koblentz.
Dr. Koblentz. In order to address the threat of the natural
zoonosis spillover pandemic, there really needs to be a One
Health approach to biosurveillance and preventing spillover in
key countries that have--you know ecologically are prime for
disease emergence.
For the lab origin possibilities, we need a much stronger
global architecture for biorisk management. Underlying all
that, we need a much stronger biosurveillance system, both
domestically and internationally, to detect these outbreaks as
soon as possible, and guide the medical and public health
responses. We need to prevent outbreaks from becoming
pandemics.
Chairman Peters. Dr. Garry.
Dr. Garry. I guess my recommendation would be a very
practical one. We have bird flu in our dairy cattle in the
United States, that as we are speaking here. That's a very
dangerous virus. I would take a look at that and see what we
can do to keep the unthinkable from happening and that virus
acquiring extra features. Maybe recombination of the virus from
a pig, maybe recombination of the virus from human to turn that
into a virus that would be very difficult to control it spread
right now with our current technologies.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Dr. Quay.
Dr. Quay. Four recommendations. One, is to move the
oversight of select agent research and Gain-of-Function outside
of NIH, NIAID and into some independent institutional review
board. You could model it after human research boards,
institutional review board. No. 1 and No. 2 is taking Western
biotechnology equipment, which rights now is the superior
equipment, United States, United Kingdom (UK) primarily, and
putting it under export control, so at least we know where the
machines are going, and perhaps we could put some controls over
it.
No. 3 is simple. Do not put these next to lines, subways
where, where accidents can happen. No. 4, gain-of-opportunity
where you do not necessarily do viral research, but you go out
and try to collect a virus that is in a cave, it has no chance
of running into a human. You bring it back to a city with 11
million people. You purify it out of a sample for feces where
there's 200 other viruses. You make it pure; you make it 10 to
the fourth, 10 to the fifth, a million more copies of it.
Setting up a laboratory accident gain-of-opportunity has the
same risk as gain-of-function. We should look at those. Thank
you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Dr. Ebright.
Dr. Ebright. Legislation should address three subjects.
The first is establishing a review entity that is
independent of agencies that fund biomedical research and
perform biomedical research, to eliminate the conflict of
interest that exists today.
Two, the oversight must cover all forms of research,
irrespective of funding source--not only federally funded
research, but also other funded research--and must cover
research both unclassified and classified in character.
And three, these improvements in oversight need to be
codified in law so that they are enforceable with rule of law.
Voluntary self-regulation, voluntary guidance and best
practices have not worked, and they will not work in the
future.
Legislation for an independent review, legislation for a
comprehensive review--irrespective of funding source and
classification status--and legislation for enforceable
oversight with force of law.
Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. I would like to thank each of
our witnesses here for joining us today, for your testimony,
for your expertise. Appreciate your concrete solutions as to
next steps going forward, and we will likely reach out to you
again and again to continue to flesh out these ideas.
Pandemics and other infectious disease outbreaks will
unfortunately be an enduring threat to our country and to our
world. While the question of the origin of the COVID-19
pandemic remains unresolved, I think it's clear that there are
things that we can and must pursue to reduce biological risk
here at home and abroad.
I hope this Committee's work will also result in restoring
and maintaining the trust in public health agencies and the
scientific process, as we will need to make sure we are doing
that to prevent future pandemics in this country. I look
forward to our continuing work together to improve the Federal
Government's ability to prevent, to detect, and to respond to
biological threats.
The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days
until 5 p.m. on July 3, 2024, for the submission of statements
and questions for the record. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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