[Senate Hearing 118-349]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-349

              TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION: AUTHORITARIANS 
                      TARGETING DISSENTERS ABROAD

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 6, 2023

                               __________


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                 Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
             
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina

                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          


                              (ii)
                              

                      C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L. U.S. Senator From Maryland..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     2

Grozev, Christo, Investigative Journalist, Co-Founder, Bellingcat 
  Productions, New York, New York................................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Abramowitz, Michael, President, Freedom House, Washington, DC....     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

Gallagher, Caoilfhionn, KC, International Legal Counsel to Jimmy 
  Lai, Doughty Street Barristers, London, England................    13
    Prepared Statement...........................................    17

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Statement for the Record From the Sikh Coalition Concerning 
  Threats That Sikhs in the United States Face From the 
  Government of India............................................    65

Article From the Wall Street Journal, Dated December 2, 2023, 
  ``Foiled Plot To Kill U.S. Sikh is Linked to Murder of Canadian 
  Activist''.....................................................    76

                                 (iii)

 
  TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION: AUTHORITARIANS TARGETING DISSENTERS ABROAD

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin J. 
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Shaheen, 
Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, 
and Young.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    For many exiles, human rights defenders, journalists, and 
civil society activists around the world, it takes incredible 
courage to speak out against autocrats. Both friends and foes 
send their agents across borders to hunt down and harass 
critics, even here on U.S. soil.
    We have seen disturbing allegations against an Indian 
Government official for involvement in planning to assassinate 
a U.S. citizen in New York who was critical of the Indian 
Government.
    This follows allegations of India's involvement in the 
killing of the Canadian Sikh leader earlier this year. The Modi 
government had labeled both critics as terrorists.
    Transnational repression is not new, but modern 
technologies have expanded the governments' reach like never 
before.
    One of the most sophisticated global campaigns of 
transnational repression comes from the People's Republic of 
China. Of course, they deny this. They have said, ``the 
accusation of transnational repression is totally made out of 
thin air.''
    Tell that to the Olympic figure skater whose father 
participated in Tiananmen Square protests or the Asian-American 
Army veteran who ran for Congress in New York or the Radio Free 
Asia journalist who lives in Virginia.
    Beijing targeted all of them and their family members, 
trying to get tax records, installing cameras in their home, 
stalking them, imprisoning their family back in China.
    It is not just China. A Chechnyan leader told those who 
opposed him, ``This modern age and technology allows us to know 
everything, and we can find any of you.''
    His patron--President Putin--is just as brutal in his 
persecution of opponents. He sends his hit squads after those 
he calls scum and traitors.
    I want to begin this hearing by thanking our witnesses not 
just for coming to speak to us about this absolutely critical 
issue, but for your bravery and courage in the face of these 
attacks, and I am going to have more to say about each one of 
our witnesses. This is a distinguished panel that have been on 
the forefront in the fight for human rights and we thank you 
very much for your courage, and we particularly thank you for 
being with us today to share what we can do in regards to this 
important issue.
    Your continued dedication to defending human rights and 
democracy is an inspiration. As you all know, this is a deadly 
serious threat to the safety of diaspora and exile communities. 
They use slander and libel laws to attack human rights 
defenders in court.
    They threaten the family members of dissidents who still 
live back home, and as you all--and as you know, they have no 
problem physically assaulting or even killing to make their 
point.
    This oppression is not only felt by the direct victims of 
the agents of these regimes. By going after one or two critics 
they send a message to the entire exile community; you are 
never safe anywhere, not even if you are in a democratic 
nation, not even if you have political asylum.
    That is what makes transnational repression so chilling. It 
forces many to stop speaking out or end their activism 
altogether. Whether it is China, Russia, Iran, or Tajikistan, 
these countries threaten human rights defenders all over the 
world.
    That is why I wrote to the President of Tajikistan 
expressing my concerns regarding his treatment of political 
opponents and that is why I led the Transnational Repression 
Accountability and Prevention Act to increase transparency 
about these regimes' abuse of Interpol red notices to get local 
law enforcement to arrest critics.
    More is needed. In the coming days I will be introducing 
the International Freedom Protection Act. This will address the 
growing use of transnational oppression by autocratic and 
illiberal states.
    I look forward to working with all the colleagues of this 
committee, Democrats and Republicans, on this legislation. It 
is now my pleasure to turn it over to my distinguished 
colleague, Ranking Member Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that and thank 
you for your leadership in this particular area.
    Most Americans are not familiar with the term transnational 
repression. It is not a household term or household phrase, but 
Americans understand the concept.
    Transnational repression occurs when authoritarian 
governments go beyond their borders to harass and intimidate 
their citizens, those who defend human rights abroad, or anyone 
they consider to be a threat to their regimes.
    Governments who have gotten away with silencing dissidents 
inside their own country are now trying to stifle free speech 
around the world including the United States.
    Just last week the Department of Justice, as the chairman 
referred to, unsealed an indictment alleging an Indian 
Government official engaged in a plot to assassinate a U.S. 
citizen in New York City.
    It should surprise no one that China is leading the world 
in using transnational repression to quash any sign of dissent. 
Last month, pro CCP--Chinese Communist Party--protesters funded 
by the Chinese consulate harassed and assaulted human rights 
advocates on U.S. soil at APEC in San Francisco.
    The failure of the Administration and the city government 
to prevent or even respond to these attacks is deeply 
unfortunate. The Administration prioritized a smooth meeting 
with Xi Jinping over addressing this issue publicly.
    Hong Kong authorities are increasingly engaged in acts of 
transnational repression. This fall, Hong Kong authorities 
issued bounties for political dissidents who left the city, 
some of whom are seeking asylum in the United States.
    Prominent Hong Kong businessman Jimmy Lai remains unjustly 
imprisoned while the CCP harasses his international legal team.
    I look forward to hearing directly from Ms. Gallagher on 
that matter today.
    Beyond Asia it is clear the legacy of Soviet tyranny looms 
large in Eurasia. Russia sends its operatives to poison, 
intimidate, and sometimes assassinate members of the opposition 
and dissidents in exile.
    A few years ago the Russians actually shot a man in the 
head in a public park in Germany in broad daylight. They also 
poisoned a man in a park in England in 2018, which a lot of us, 
of course, are very familiar with.
    There is no boundaries that they will respect and that is 
clear. Our NATO ally Turkey is also a top offender. While it 
has decried acts of transnational repression that takes place 
on its soil, it has also used these same tactics to suppress 
Turkish dissidents outside of the country.
    This is evidenced by its pursuit of members of the Gulenist 
movement including former NBA player Enes Kanter Freedom, who 
has had his Turkish passport canceled while abroad, Interpol 
red alerts issued for his arrest, and threats so aggressive the 
FBI has issued him a call button.
    The Iranian regime is another egregious yet unsurprising 
offender. It targets dissidents and critics abroad to include 
murder and kidnapping plots against Americans on U.S. soil.
    As countries fail to push back on these increasingly brazen 
actions that undermine sovereignty and national security, 
perpetrators grow more emboldened and additional countries 
adopt similar tactics.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on what 
more can be done to stop this egregious practice and in 
particular I want to hear what we as the United States 
Government can do about it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    As I indicated, we have a really distinguished group of 
panelists today that have really seen firsthand the 
consequences of these actions.
    Today, we are honored to welcome Mr. Christo Grozev, an 
award-winning investigative journalist and co-founder of the 
investigative outlet Bellingcat Productions.
    Through his investigative work, he has exposed numerous 
Russian plots and assassinations including identifying the 
suspect responsible for the poisoning of Russian opposition 
leader Alexei Navalny.
    His bravery earned him the European Press Prize for 
Investigative Reporting in 2019 and the Nannen Prize in 2021.
    In retaliation for his investigations into the activities 
of President Putin's Russia, he has experienced intimidation, 
surveillance, break-ins, and thefts with Russia ordering his 
arrest in absentia earlier this year. Despite these threats, he 
has admirably persisted in his work. Welcome.
    We are also welcoming Michael Abramowitz, the president of 
Freedom House, an organization that has been critical in 
shedding a light on transnational repression and broader 
threats to democracy globally.
    Mr. Abramowitz has demonstrated his deep commitment to 
supporting freedom and democracy around the world through his 
illustrious career which includes leading the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum's Levine Institute for Holocaust Education and 
24 years at the Washington Post in which he covered many of my 
activities in the state legislature and in the Congress, and I 
do not hold any grudges. It is nice to have you here, Mr. 
Abramowitz.
    I am also honored to welcome Ms. Caoilfhionn Gallagher, the 
human rights and civil liberties lawyer currently serving as 
the international legal counsel to the pro-democracy 
businessman and publisher Jimmy Lai.
    Through her career Ms. Gallagher has represented many 
journalists, activists, and human rights defenders. For years, 
the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong authorities have 
targeted her for her work on Mr. Lai's case including through 
death and rape threats, cyber attacks, and threats of 
prosecution and extradition to Hong Kong.
    Despite these attacks, Ms. Gallagher bravely continues to 
seek justice for Mr. Lai.
    Welcome to all.
    Mr. Grozev, we will start off with you. Your full 
testimonies will be made part of our record. You may proceed as 
you wish. We would appreciate if you would summarize in 
approximately 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF CHRISTO GROZEV, INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST, CO-
      FOUNDER, BELLINGCAT PRODUCTIONS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

    Mr. Grozev. I assume I should go first.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Grozev. Thank you very much.
    Dear Chairman, honorable committee members, let me start by 
asserting that the notion of exclusively domestic repression is 
a misconception, in my view.
    Any bad regime if left unchecked in the pursuit of 
suppressing domestic competitors, critics, or simply 
inconvenience will ultimately extend its repressive machinery 
across its borders and we have seen that happen with Russia.
    Initially directed towards its own citizens globally, this 
apparatus ultimately will target anyone, whatever nationality, 
perceived to obstruct their pursuit of eternal authority.
    Over the course of almost a decade, I and my investigative 
partners have scrutinized Russia's repressive operations, 
encompassing both judicial and extrajudicial methods against 
its own citizens.
    Our investigative team comprised of my former colleagues 
from Bellingcat, the Insider in Russia and Der Spiegel in 
Germany, laid bare a systemic and industrial scale operation of 
repressions.
    This apparatus targets hundreds of Russian political 
activists, journalists, and former intelligence officers who 
have turned or perceived to have turned against the regime.
    The overarching objective of these repressive operations 
appear to be either assassination or intimidation through the 
threat of assassination of these activists.
    While our initial belief was that these repressive measures 
exclusively target Russian citizens or former Russian citizens, 
we saw a much broader scope. Notable instances of the former 
include the poisoning of Russian activists on Russian soil such 
as Vladimir Kara-Murza, an American resident who was poisoned 
twice; the near fatal poisoning of Alexei Navalny in August 
2020.
    Beyond Russia's borders, individuals like Sergei Skripal 
and his daughter Yulia barely survived the Novichok poisoning 
by a group of GRU spies in Salisbury.
    An innocent and random British woman became an unintended 
victim of this bungled operation. Additionally, at least seven 
men of Chechen origin we have investigated and have been found 
to have been killed by undercover agents of FSB's Vympel unit 
in Turkey and Germany as the co-chairman referred to earlier.
    As our investigations unfolded, it became apparent that 
Russia's assassination and intimidation attempts were not 
confined to Russian nationals alone. In 2015, we discovered 
that a group of GRU spies poisoned and almost killed a 
Bulgarian arms manufacturer simply for supplying defensive 
munitions to Ukraine.
    In the past 12 months alone, my Russian investigative 
partner Roman Dobrokhotov and I have become targets of both 
judicial and extrajudicial prosecution.
    Roman's residence in Moscow was subject to a police raid in 
front of his minor children and he narrowly escaped arrest and 
essentially defected or ran out from Russia under the nose of 
approaching FSB operatives.
    Last Christmas, I found myself on Russia's most wanted list 
with a succinct explanation of my crime--wanted for a crime 
without specifics, depriving me of any opportunity for a 
defense.
    Just a month later, law enforcement agencies advised me 
against my return from the United States to Austria where I 
live, citing a clear and present danger posed by a clandestine 
Russian intelligence operation targeting both me and my 
colleague Roman.
    I discovered that Russian intelligence officers had 
surveilled and tailed Roman and me for nearly 2 years, 
monitoring all of our movements and awaiting the opportune 
moment to strike.
    Regrettably, I am not at liberty to disclose specifics of 
this operation as the case is currently under official 
investigation in several countries. My, as well as Roman's, 
work as journalists have been severely restricted by this. We 
have to stick to our new accidental domiciles, myself in the 
United States and Roman in the United Kingdom.
    The constraints on travel for work or leisure with our 
families persist as uncertainty looms regarding which country 
may choose to enforce Kremlin's request for extradition.
    In the past year alone, Kremlin's transnational repressive 
operations have seen a surge both in frequency and audacity. 
Judicially, or within whatever Russia calls justice, arrest 
warrants have been issued for or are pending to be issued for 
U.S. journalist Masha Gessen and Facebook spokesperson Andy 
Stone.
    Similar to my case, Andy stands accused of a crime, leaving 
the world befuddled about what the crime is. These measures, 
however, pale in comparison to Kremlin's extrajudicial 
operations against Russian journalists opposing the war.
    In the past year, at least three women, two journalists and 
one political activist, have exhibited signs of poisoning with 
prohibited chemical weapons. These cases involving Elena 
Kostyuchenko, Irina Babloyan, and Natalia Arno which we have 
investigated with our colleagues at the Insider remain 
unresolved.
    Aligned with Russia's methods, our investigation has 
exposed the infiltration by GRU, Russia's military 
intelligence, of Russian human rights groups abroad, diaspora 
organizations, and a recent case we discovered involved an 
undercover GRU officer infiltrating human rights organizations 
and seeking proximity to Gary Kasparov, another outspoken 
critic of Putin's regime.
    The fallacy of domestic only repression is evident. 
Russia's regime has been permitted to persecute its opponents 
domestically without legal consequences for decades.
    Adhering to the outdated principle of legal sovereignty, 
civilized countries abstain from conducting independent 
judicial inquiries into incidents such as the poisoning of 
Kara-Murza or Navalny, the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, and 
many others.
    Russian colleagues and activists have long shouted at us 
and at Western leaders against handshaking and dancing at 
weddings with Putin, cautioning against energy deals that 
embolden him while he suppresses dissent domestically.
    Unfortunately, Western leaders only heeded these warnings 
when Putin invaded a neighboring country and there is a risk of 
these leaders growing wary amongst the protracted war and 
shaking hands soon again. Only today Putin arrived in Dubai to 
artillery salute and this is a victory for him.
    It is imperative for us to acknowledge that as long as 
rogue states like Russia benefit from judicial sovereignty over 
its own people, they remain incentivized to treat the rest of 
the world as the playing ground for pursuing their so-called 
national interests against an ever expanding list of targets.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Grozev follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Christo Grozev

    Allow me to commence by asserting that the notion of exclusively 
domestic repression is a misconception. Any malevolent regime, if left 
unchecked in its pursuit of suppressing domestic competitors, critics, 
or inconveniences, will inevitably extend its repressive machinery 
beyond its borders. Initially directed toward its own citizens 
globally, this apparatus ultimately targets anyone perceived to 
obstruct its perpetual authority.
    Over the course of nearly a decade, I and my investigative partners 
have scrutinized Russia's repressive operations, encompassing both 
judicial and extrajudicial methods, against its own citizens. Our 
investigative team, comprised of colleagues from Bellingcat, The 
Insider, and Der Spiegel, has laid bare a systemic, industrial-scale 
repressive machine. This apparatus targets hundreds of Russian 
political activists, journalists, and former intelligence officers who 
have been perceived as having turned against the regime. The 
overarching objectives of these repressive operations appear to be 
either assassination or intimidation through attempted assassinations.
    While the initial belief was that these repressive measures 
exclusively targeted Russian citizens or former citizens, a broader 
scope became evident. Notable instances include the poisoning of 
Russian activists on Russian soil, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza twice, 
and the near-fatal poisoning of Alexei Navalny in August 2020. Beyond 
Russia's borders, individuals like Sergey Skripal and his daughter 
Yulia barely survived Novichok poisonings by a group of GRU spies in 
Salisbury. An innocent and random British woman became an unintended 
victim of this bungled operation. Additionally, at least seven men of 
Chechen origin were killed by undercover agents of the FSB's Vympel 
unit in Turkey and Germany. The most recent victim, Zelimkhan 
Khangoshvili, was shot and killed by an FSB assassin in a crowded park 
in Berlin.
    As our investigations unfolded, it became apparent that Russia's 
assassination and intimidation attempts were not confined to Russians 
alone. In 2015, a group of GRU spies poisoned a Bulgarian arms 
manufacturer supplying defensive munitions to Ukraine. In the past 12 
months, my Russian investigative partner Roman Dobrokhotov and I have 
become targets of both judicial and extrajudicial persecution. Roman's 
residence in Moscow was subjected to a police raid in front of his 
minor children, and he narrowly evaded arrest under the scrutiny of 
approaching FSB operatives.
    Last Christmas, I found myself on Russia's official wanted list, 
with a succinct explanation: ``wanted for a crime,'' without specifics, 
depriving me of any opportunity for a defense. Barely a month later, 
law enforcement agencies advised against my return to Austria, citing a 
clear and present danger posed by a clandestine Russian intelligence 
operation targeting both me and my colleague. I discovered that Russian 
intelligence officers had surveilled and trailed Roman and me for 
nearly 2 years, monitoring our movements and awaiting the opportune 
moment to strike.
    Regrettably, I am not at liberty to disclose the specifics of this 
operation as the case is currently under official investigation in 
several countries. My, as well as Roman's, work as journalists has been 
restricted to our new, accidental, domiciles--myself in the United 
States and Roman in the United Kingdom. The constraints on travel for 
work or leisure with our families persist, as uncertainty looms 
regarding which country may choose to enforce Kremlin's extradition 
requests or where undercover agents may await us.
    In the past year, the Kremlin's transnational repressive operations 
have seen a surge in both frequency and audacity. Judicially, or within 
the questionable semblance of justice practiced in Russia, arrest 
warrants have been issued for U.S. journalist Masha Gessen and 
Facebook's spokesperson Andy Stone. Similar to my case, Andy stands 
accused of ``a crime,'' leaving the world puzzled about what crime that 
is, and him unable to disprove his alleged criminality.
    These measures, however, pale in comparison to the Kremlin's 
extrajudicial, kinetic operations against Russian journalists opposing 
the war or the regime. In the past year alone, at least three women--
two journalists and one political activist--have exhibited signs of 
poisoning with prohibited chemical agents. These cases, involving Elena 
Kostyuchenko, Irina Babloyan, and Natalia Arno, remain unresolved, but 
align with Russia's GRU methods. Our investigation has exposed the 
infiltration of GRU undercover spies within Russian human rights groups 
and diaspora organizations, with a recent case involving an undercover 
GRU officer infiltrating human rights organizations, participating in 
sanction-list drafting bodies, and seeking proximity to Gary Kasparov, 
an outspoken critic of Putin's regime.
    The fallacy of domestic-only repression becomes evident. Russia's 
regime has been permitted to persecute its opponents domestically 
without legal consequences for decades. Adhering to the outdated 
principle of legal sovereignty, civilized countries abstain from 
conducting independent judicial inquiries into incidents such as the 
poisoning of Kara-Murza or Navalny, or the assassination of Boris 
Nemtsov. Russian colleagues, journalists, and activists have long 
shouted warnings to Western leaders against hand-shaking and dancing at 
weddings with Putin, cautioning against energy deals that embolden him 
while he suppresses dissent domestically. Unfortunately, Western 
leaders only heeded these warnings when Putin invaded a neighboring 
country, and there is a risk of them growing weary amid the protracted 
war.
    It is imperative to acknowledge that as long as rogue states like 
Russia benefit from judicial sovereignty over their own people, they 
remain incentivized to treat the rest of the world as a realm for 
pursuing their so-called national interest against an expanding list of 
targets.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. We 
appreciate it.
    Mr. Abramowitz.

  STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ, PRESIDENT, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Abramowitz. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, it 
is an honor to testify today.
    Transnational repression occurs when states reach across 
borders to silence dissent from activists, journalists, and 
others living in exile, often using intimidation and violence.
    This phenomenon is not new, but has been made easier by the 
scale of global migration and modern technologies that allow 
governments to monitor critics beyond their borders.
    From 2014 through 2022 Freedom House has collected 
information on 854 direct physical cases of transnational 
repression and this includes assassination, kidnapping, 
assault, detention, or deportations.
    These have been committed by 38 governments in 91 
countries. These numbers are likely only the tip of the iceberg 
as states are also using indirect tactics to intimidate 
activists in exile through use of spyware, surveillance, 
threats sent over social media, or threats against their family 
members back home.
    The top 10 perpetrators in our assessment are China, 
Turkey, Tajikistan, Egypt, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Iran, Belarus, and Rwanda.
    These 10 countries are responsible for 80 percent of the 
cases in our database and China is responsible for fully 30 
percent of the cases. In the last several years, as my 
colleague just outlined, we have seen brazen measures to 
intimidate and silence exiles.
    A prominent case involves a failed Iranian plot to kidnap 
journalist and women's rights activists Masih Alinejad from her 
home in Brooklyn. Iran also attempted an assassination that was 
also unsuccessful. Alinejad now lives under federal protection.
    Just weeks ago, a group of activists were physically 
assaulted in San Francisco during the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit while protesting human rights violations by 
Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.
    It is not only authoritarian governments accused of 
transnational repression, as Senators Risch and Cardin pointed 
out.
    The Canadian Prime Minister has implicated the Government 
of India in the June murder of a Sikh activist and a Canadian 
citizen in Canada, and just last week the Department of Justice 
alleged in an indictment that an Indian national in India was 
hired by an Indian government official to orchestrate the 
assassination of a U.S. citizen who is a Sikh activist.
    The impact of transnational repression on targeted 
individuals is severe. People's physical safety is endangered. 
Their travel is complicated. Their houses are surveilled in the 
U.S. and elsewhere. They are harassed online and offline and 
communication with family and friends living in the country of 
origin is fraught.
    The impact on journalists is especially noteworthy. As the 
space for free media and dissent has closed in authoritarian 
countries, governments are increasingly reaching outward to 
target exiled journalists who continue to do their vital work 
from abroad.
    We have a new report just out today that we have shared 
with the committee that describes the repressive toolkit used 
against targeted exiled journalists in the media. At least 26 
governments have targeted journalists and 112 of our 854 cases 
in our database involve journalists.
    We urge Congress to strengthen the U.S. response to 
transnational repression and ensure that the U.S. has the tools 
needed to protect those within our borders for years to come.
    Transnational repression is a direct attack on our security 
and rights. First, Congress should pass legislation to address 
gaps in the U.S. Government's response to transnational 
repression.
    This includes codifying a definition of transnational 
repression, ensuring government officials who may encounter 
perpetrators or victims of transnational repression receive the 
training necessary to recognize and respond to the problem, and 
strengthening sanctions authorities to make it easier to hold 
perpetrators accountable.
    The Transnational Repression Policy Act, which was 
introduced by Senators Merkley, Rubio, Cardin, and Hagerty, 
includes provisions in all these areas and we urge its passage.
    Second, Congress should establish clear pathways for exiled 
human rights defenders to receive permanent legal status when 
needed.
    Democratic governments should consider appropriate 
mechanisms including providing special visas such as 
humanitarian visas or visas for human rights defenders, 
activists, and journalists to help them receive legal status 
and should ensure those individuals are not being denied legal 
status as a result of illegitimate criminal charges leveled 
against them by origin country governments.
    Finally, Congress should urge the Executive Branch to 
continue to raise transnational repression as a priority issue 
with our partners and allies.
    The United States must not hesitate to raise this issue 
directly at the highest levels with those countries 
perpetrating transnational repression even when those 
perpetrators are close partners such as Saudi Arabia and India.
    Transnational repression is a violation of rights and 
sovereignty and breaks the bond of trust that must exist for 
deep cooperation between nations.
    Whether a government engages in transnational repression 
should be a factor--a significant factor determining the nature 
of bilateral relations and the closeness of any partnership.
    Thank you for your time and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Abramowitz follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Abramowitz

    I'd like to thank Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and the 
members of this committee for the opportunity to testify today. I ask 
that my full remarks be entered into the record.
                    transnational repression defined
    Transnational repression occurs when states reach across borders to 
silence dissent from activists, journalists, and others living in 
exile. Perpetrator states do so using intimidation and violence. This 
issue presents a direct threat to rights and security around the world, 
including here in the United States, and will require a coordinated 
response from across the U.S. Government and between the United States 
and other democratic governments.
    From 2014 through 2022, Freedom House has collected information on 
854 direct, physical incidents (assassination, kidnapping, assault, 
detention, or deportation) of transnational repression around the 
world, committed by 38 governments in 91 countries. During this time, 
13 states have engaged in assassinations abroad, and 30 have conducted 
renditions.
    These numbers are likely only the tip of the iceberg, as states 
also use indirect tactics to intimidate activists in exile, such as the 
use of spyware, surveillance, threats sent over social media or phone, 
or threats against family members back home (known as coercion by 
proxy).
    The top five perpetrators in our assessment are China, Turkey, 
Tajikistan, Egypt, and Russia--while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, 
Belarus, and Rwanda round out the top 10. These 10 countries are 
responsible for 80 percent of the cases in our database. And China, 
which conducts the most comprehensive and sophisticated campaign of 
transnational repression, is responsible for 30 percent of the cases.
    In the last several years, these countries have undertaken brazen 
measures to intimidate and silence their exiles and diasporas. One of 
the most famous cases in the United States involves the Iranian 
regime's plot to kidnap journalist and women's rights activist Masih 
Alinejad from her home in Brooklyn. When that didn't work, Iran 
attempted an assassination plot that was thankfully also unsuccessful. 
To this day, Alinejad lives under federal protection.
    Just weeks ago, a group of activists were physically assaulted in 
San Francisco during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Summit while protesting human rights violations by Xi Jinping and the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party. In 2021, Belarusian officials called a 
fake bomb threat into a Ryanair flight from Greece to Lithuania, 
forcing an emergency landing in Minsk in order to apprehend a blogger 
critical of the ruling regime. Only 13 months ago, Emirati law 
enforcement arrested Egyptian-American activist and former Egyptian 
army officer Sherif Osman based on a request from Egypt. Russian 
journalists Elena Kostyuchenko and Irina Babloyan were poisoned in late 
2022, possibly in connection with their critical reporting on Russia's 
full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Throughout 2022, Tajikistan's 
Government expanded its campaign of transnational repression against 
members of the Pamiri ethnic group, securing the extradition from 
Russia of outspoken Pamiri activists such as Oraz and Ramzi Vazirbekov.
    This does not mean that only authoritarian governments are 
responsible for incidents of transnational repression. In September, 
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada's security 
services had intelligence linking ``agents of the Government of India'' 
to the June murder of Sikh activist and Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh 
Nijjar in British Columbia. And on November 29, the Department of 
Justice alleged in an indictment that an Indian national in India was 
hired by an Indian Government official to orchestrate the assassination 
of a U.S. citizen who is a Sikh activist.
                       an old but growing problem
    In some ways, transnational repression is a new term for an old 
problem. As long as states and leaders have seen themselves as 
threatened by dissent outside their borders, they have tried to control 
that dissent, and sometimes have resorted to coercion to do so. There 
are legions of historical examples, from the murder of Iranian exiles 
in Europe after the revolution to the car bomb murder of Orlando 
Letelier in Washington, DC by Chilean Government agents.
    What has changed is the dynamic between those who leave and the 
states they leave behind, and with it the scale and scope of 
transnational repression. The increased scale of global migration has 
knit our world closer together as more people move across borders and 
build lives in different countries. It should also be recognized that 
more and more activists and journalists are being driven from their 
home communities by authoritarian powers closing down space for them to 
operate freely. In Russia alone, hundreds of journalists and activists 
have fled Vladimir Putin's crackdown, setting up operations to continue 
their work in Georgia, Armenia, Germany, Lithuania, and other countries 
in Europe and Eurasia, all while remaining politically engaged in their 
origin states.
    Digital technology has enabled exiled individuals and groups to 
remain connected to their origin countries, posting on social media and 
messenger apps that reach people within milliseconds instead of 
arduously smuggling physical samizdat across borders. States, in turn, 
have gained instantaneous capabilities to surveil their overseas 
critics through social media monitoring and spyware. That surveillance 
all too often leads to concrete threats against those living in the 
diaspora.
    One of the most recent and worrying developments is the 
extraterritorial repression of reporters. As the space for free media 
and dissent has closed in authoritarian countries, governments are 
increasingly reaching outward to target exiled journalists who continue 
to do their courageous work from abroad. Our new report released today, 
titled A Light That Cannot Be Extinguished: Exiled Journalism and 
Transnational Repression, examines this issue more closely and 
describes the repressive toolkit used against target exiled journalists 
and media. At least 26 governments have targeted journalists, and 112 
of the 854 cases in our database--13 percent of all cases--involved 
journalists.
    Perpetrator states of transnational repression are innovating even 
as awareness of the problem in host countries grows. Moving forward, 
host governments and law enforcement must pay increasing attention to 
the role of diplomatic staff and proxy actors working on behalf of 
origin states to intimidate exiles. The aforementioned recently 
unsealed DOJ indictment alleging a murder-for-hire scheme organized by 
an Indian Government employee against a Sikh activist in New York City 
points to the involvement of criminal associates in such plots. 
Additionally, foreign governments, such as that of China, may continue 
to seek out private investigators to co-opt host state institutions and 
more easily reach targeted individuals.
    For too long, democracies have missed or allowed the actions of 
authoritarian countries inside their borders. Such a pattern of 
impunity has emboldened states to act abroad without fear of 
consequences.
                 a global threat to rights and security
    When we see the Russian Government for years get away with killing 
its opponents abroad in baroque schemes across Europe; when we see the 
murder of Jamal Khashoggi literally inside Saudi Arabia's Istanbul 
consulate go unpunished; when we see the Turkish Government boast 
officially that it has kidnapped over 100 people from abroad without 
any consequence; when we see Rwanda kidnap regime critic Paul 
Rusesabagina off of a Dubai tarmac; when we see armed Iranian agents 
visiting the house of journalist Masih Alinejad in Brooklyn; when we 
see an Indian Government agent plotting to murder a Sikh activist in 
New York City; we have a global problem. Transnational repression poses 
a threat to both rights and security and a challenge for both domestic 
and foreign policy.
    The impact of transnational repression on targeted individuals is 
severe. People's physical safety is endangered, their travel is 
complicated, their houses are surveilled in the U.S. and elsewhere, 
they are harassed online and offline, and communication with family and 
friends living in the country of origin is fraught. Some people are cut 
off from their families entirely. Each individual incident of 
transnational repression produces ripple effects throughout the 
community, fostering an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among 
neighbors and compatriots.
    Even when taking care to avoid being impacted by transnational 
repression, individuals may still face imprisonment and the possibility 
of deportation. To take one example, Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist, 
has been in a Morocco prison for 2 \1/2\ years after he was detained 
upon arrival on the basis of a since invalidated INTERPOL notice 
requested by China. Hasan's detention in Casablanca was particularly 
unfortunate, as he had opted to flee Turkey due to the uptick in 
pressure from the Turkish Government on outspoken Uyghurs.
    The fundamental question is whether democratic societies can and 
will protect the rights of people inside our borders against such 
intimidation. The bet that autocrats are making is that we are not 
willing to bear the cost of doing so. We must prove them wrong.
                            progress so far
    Transnational repression is part of a pattern of authoritarian 
powers seeking to globalize the repression they use to maintain control 
in their own societies. Thankfully, there has been strong, bipartisan 
interest in addressing this issue here in the United States and a 
growing interest from democracies in Europe and elsewhere.
    The Biden administration has made addressing transnational 
repression a priority issue across agencies. We are pleased to see 
strong interagency coordination, and, as we understand it, increasing 
engagement between the Executive Branch and the Hill--something 
crucially important for an effective U.S. response.
    Among the steps taken by the U.S. Government: The Commerce 
Department has moved to rein in the use of American technology in the 
production of powerful commercial spyware, which is a crucial vector of 
transnational repression. The State and Treasury departments have 
sanctioned perpetrators of transnational repression. State has been 
holding trainings for diplomats, engaging with allies around the world, 
and coordinating emergency responses for diaspora communities and 
exiles abroad. The Department of Homeland Security has pursued outreach 
to vulnerable communities inside the U.S. The FBI has a dedicated 
stream of work on transnational repression, including a public web 
page, the issuance of several informational bulletins for targeted 
communities, and the ability for individuals to report transnational 
repression to the FBI hotline. And, we have seen the Department of 
Justice investigate and prosecute a growing number of cases of 
transnational repression plotted against U.S. persons, sending a 
powerful signal to perpetrators and their agents that these actions 
will be caught and punished.
    There are also a number of bills pending in Congress, including 
some authored by members of this committee.
    These are all important steps that we and others have encouraged, 
and we applaud these efforts. But, more action is needed.
                      recommendations for congress
    We urge Congress to strengthen the U.S. response to transnational 
repression and ensure the U.S. has the tools needed to protect those 
within our borders for years to come. There are three specific steps 
Congress can take.
    1) Pass legislation to address gaps in the U.S. Government's 
response to transnational repression. This includes codifying a 
definition of transnational repression, ensuring government officials 
who may encounter perpetrators or victims of transnational repression 
receive the training necessary to recognize and respond to the problem, 
and strengthening sanctions authorities to make it easier to hold 
perpetrators accountable. The Transnational Repression Policy Act, 
which was introduced by Senators Merkley, Rubio, Cardin, and Hagerty, 
includes provisions in all these areas. We urge its passage.
    At present, U.S. law does not include a definition of transnational 
repression, which makes it impossible for officials to sufficiently 
respond. A definition is important to allow officials to understand 
what transnational repression is and to direct their agencies on 
reporting, training, and sufficient outreach to and support for victims 
and potential targets. Codification of a definition for foreign policy 
purposes in Title 22 should include a detailed description that 
explains the full scope of transnational repression tactics. Any 
updates to Title 18, which deals with crimes and criminal activity, 
should be narrowly tailored to ensure U.S. criminal law can 
sufficiently address transnational repression without inadvertently 
criminalizing benign activities or enabling the targeting of 
individuals simply due to their country of origin. Congressman Schiff 
has introduced legislation that would update Title 18 with additional 
authorities related to transnational repression.
    Some agencies and bureaus have provided training for officials. 
But, trainings are not yet routinized or mandated for all officials or 
employees who may come in contact with perpetrators or victims. 
Establishing agency-wide trainings for all officials who may encounter 
the issue will help the U.S. Government respond more effectively.
    On the sanctions front, the United States possesses a number of 
targeted sanctions options, including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act; the authorities provided in section 7031(c) of the 
annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act; the Khashoggi Ban visa restrictions, and several 
country-specific sanctions programs. With the exception of the 
Khashoggi Ban, however, none of these sanctions programs explicitly 
address transnational repression, and they cover only the most severe 
cases of transnational repression, such as murder or kidnapping. And 
while the Khashoggi Ban addresses transnational repression directly, it 
only imposes visa bans--a weaker measure than the asset freezes 
included in other sanctions mechanisms. It is also a policy implemented 
voluntarily by the Biden administration, meaning future administrations 
would not be legally required to screen visa applicants for activity 
related to transnational repression.
    2) Establish clear pathways for exiled human rights defenders to 
receive permanent legal status when needed. Democratic governments 
should consider appropriate mechanisms, including providing special 
visas, such as humanitarian visas or visas for human rights defenders, 
activists, and journalists, to help them receive legal status. 
Countries should also review their asylum processes to ensure that 
exiled human rights defenders, activists, and journalists are not being 
denied legal status as a result of illegitimate criminal charges 
leveled against them by origin country governments. Permanent legal 
status offers a better safeguard against transnational repression by 
making the protection of a democracy permanent, reducing a human rights 
defender's reliance on identification documents from their home country 
(which can often be cancelled or put them at risk when needing to enter 
consulates or embassies of their original country for renewal), and 
potentially allows family reunification, which reduces the risk of 
coercion by proxy.
    3) Urge the Executive Branch to continue to raise transnational 
repression as a priority issue with partners and allies. We commend 
U.S. leadership in the newly launched G7 Rapid Response Mechanism 
Working Group on Transnational Repression and for signing the 
Declaration of Principles to Combat Transnational Repression. In 
addition to these efforts with like-minded governments, the United 
States must not hesitate to raise this issue directly at the highest 
levels with perpetrators of transnational repression, even when those 
perpetrators are close partners such as Saudi Arabia and India. 
Transnational repression is a violation of rights and sovereignty and 
breaks the bond of trust that must exist for deep cooperation between 
nations. Whether a government engages in transnational repression 
should be a significant factor determining the nature of bilateral 
relations and the closeness of any partnership.
    Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you for your testimony.
    Ms. Gallagher.

  STATEMENT OF CAOILFHIONN GALLAGHER KC, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
   COUNSEL TO JIMMY LAI, DOUGHTY STREET BARRISTERS, LONDON, 
                            ENGLAND

    Ms. Gallagher. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you very much, Chairman Cardin and Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you for casting a light on this vitally 
important issue of transnational repression.
    In my time today I wish to focus upon two countries: Iran 
and China. First, I want to look at something I am increasingly 
seeing in my work as an international lawyer, the 
extraterritorial targeting of Iranian journalists worldwide, 
and second, I want to give the very stark example in Hong Kong 
of transnational repression and reprisals against those 
supporting Jimmy Lai, my client, the renowned pro-democracy 
campaigner, media owner and writer imprisoned in Hong Kong.
    Indeed, this hearing is timely. Mr. Lai turns 76 this 
Friday. It is approaching the third anniversary of him being in 
custody consistently since December 2020, and on the 18th of 
December he is facing a trial under the much maligned--rightly 
much maligned National Security Law.
    That is an example of not only diaspora and exiled 
communities being targeted by the Chinese and Hong Kong 
authorities, but anyone who dares to stand up and speak for Mr. 
Lai's rights.
    Now, those examples illustrate that the nature of the 
threats faced by those who speak truth to power is changing and 
the actions we take to combat those threats must change too and 
change urgently.
    First example, Iran's targeting of journalists globally, I 
have given you more detail in my written testimony, but in 
brief I would say this. It is often said that journalists do 
not want to become the story, but I am afraid given Iran's 
actions today, we must discuss journalists' stories.
    Iran has a long, shameful history of targeting journalists 
on its own soil--arresting them, accusing them of espionage 
simply for doing their jobs, and those tactics have been used 
for many decades.
    I now see four new developments which are particularly 
troubling.
    First, Iran using tactics which are routinely cross border, 
targeting those using the long arm of the state who work as 
journalists anywhere across the world including Voice of 
America here, BBC News Persian in the U.K., Iran International, 
Deutsche Welle, Radio Farda, and it attempts to silence them 
both through lawfare weaponizing Iranian laws and a range of 
extralegal tactics.
    Second, and importantly as the only woman on the panel, I 
wanted to highlight the fact that many of Iran's transnational 
attacks on journalists are gendered and misogynistic. Women 
journalists face particularly egregious transnational attacks. 
I want to give two examples of that.
    First, with my clients BBC News Persian that, one, involved 
a presenter being photoshopped into a pornographic image which 
was then sent to her 14-year-old son in London at his school--
particularly chilling, demonstrates that they know where he 
goes to school--sent to his headmaster.
    A second is fake stories stating that a BBC News Persian 
presenter had been raped by a colleague known to Iranian 
audiences and a fake photo blog was produced as showing her 
with her illegitimate child. Later, her father was hauled in 
and interrogated by authorities in Iran where he lived. 
Officers told him that she had hidden this from her family, she 
was so embarrassed about having been raped by a colleague.
    A third tactic is that Iran is also now using collective 
punishment of those connected to those journalists in Iran that 
combine external tactics outside Iran with internal tactics in 
Iran to target family members and sources.
    Fourth, Iran's conduct against journalists has escalated to 
include routine and regular credible threats to life including 
the kidnapping of a French journalist in exile, Ruhollah Zam, 
him being returned to Iran and executed and, indeed, we have 
seen now in the last year in particular, individual chilling 
examples morphing to become a systematic tool in the Iranian 
authorities' global toolbox and the committee may be 
particularly interested in the analysis done by another one of 
my clients, Paul Caruana Galizia, the journalist, in a series 
for Tortoise specifically about Iran's transnational tactics.
    In February of this year, the U.K. security services MI-5 
revealed that U.K. authorities have discovered at least 15 
threats to kidnap or kill British or U.K.-based individuals 
perceived as enemies of the Iranian regime since January 2022.
    That is 15 in 13 months, more than one a month, and it is 
why Iran International had to suspend their operations in the 
U.K. and be based solely from Washington because they could not 
be protected adequately by U.K. authorities.
    Next example I want to turn to, and I am happy to answer 
more questions about this also, concerns China and Hong Kong, 
and it is little wonder that since the passing of the National 
Security Law, a number of states suspended their extradition 
arrangements and recognized that Hong Kong was now trying to 
use the long arm of the state to silence critics around the 
world.
    Because the NSL, of course, is dangerously vague and broad, 
virtually anything could be deemed a threat to national 
security under its provisions. It can apply to anyone on the 
planet.
    We saw a very grave escalation earlier this year with the 
bounties on the heads of exiled activists and language being 
used by John Lee calling them street rats and saying that they 
would be hunted down and pursued for life.
    I want to give a specific example about Jimmy Lai. Earlier 
this year, this committee heard from his son Sebastien and 
Sebastien himself, simply for campaigning for his father, for 
leading the ``Free Jimmy Lai'' campaign has been targeted 
himself.
    He has been threatened in state media. He has been 
interrupted when he addressed the Human Rights Council in 
Geneva in June 2023. He has been--it has been very clear to him 
that if he ever returns to Hong Kong, he himself may be 
criminalized.
    My colleagues and I, as members of the international legal 
team for Jimmy Lai and Sebastien Lai, have been subjected to a 
range of actions and, importantly, none of us are Hong Kongers. 
None of us are in exile. None of us are dissidents.
    We are international lawyers working for our clients 
seeking to hold China and Hong Kong to account for flagrant 
violations of Jimmy Lai's fundamental rights protected by 
international law and what we are experiencing does not come 
anywhere close to the most extreme examples you have heard 
about today.
    Just before I conclude, I want to just highlight four 
tactics used against us.
    First, attacks in Chinese affiliated state media directed 
at me particularly as leader of the team, but also importantly 
directed at Jimmy Lai, and the suggestion is that Jimmy Lai, by 
instructing international lawyers, by his case being brought to 
the United Nations, is in collusion with me, engaging with a 
foreign agent, and committing further criminal offenses, that I 
am also committing criminal offenses.
    It is outrageous to think that by using mechanisms 
established internationally to hold states to account for 
violating international law, both Jimmy Lai and we as his 
lawyers can be accused of being criminals.
    Second, we have seen formal statements from the Hong Kong 
authorities accusing us of committing criminal offenses for 
doing our jobs, our crime being lawyers doing our jobs.
    Third, we have had an extensive and prolonged campaign of 
hacking attempts and cyber harassment, much of which has also 
been misogynistic and sexist, distressing, and frightening 
including multiple death, rape, dismemberment threats to me, 
threats to my family members, and the timing and content of 
those attacks are plainly designed to stop me doing my job as 
Jimmy Lai's lawyer.
    They come thick and fast on key days for the case. I woke 
up this morning to 17 different rape and death threats on the 
day when I am giving evidence before this committee. It also 
includes spying attempts which are sophisticated and concerning 
and often involve privilege fishing, if I can put it that way, 
seeking to obtain legally privileged sensitive information 
about clients or others.
    I am happy to answer further questions on that. It has also 
involved intimidatory physical surveillance.
    Now, that campaign by China-Hong Kong to silence dissent 
and critical voices and to shut down scrutiny of 
international--international scrutiny of their actions is 
comprehensive and sophisticated.
    It does not just extend within its own borders to 
individuals such as Jimmy Lai. It does not just extend to those 
who the Hong Kong authorities erroneously describe as self-
exiled such as the individuals with the bounties.
    It extends to anyone anywhere in the world who dares to 
question their narrative regardless of their nationality, and 
these are deeply concerning issues and I thank the committee 
for casting a light on them today and I am happy to answer 
further questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Gallagher follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The Chairman. Let me, again, thank all three of you. This 
is chilling information you are presenting to us.
    I think we know what is happening, but it is, when we hear 
it spelled out the way you all have laid it out, it really does 
present a damning situation where transnational repression is 
really eating at the core of our own democracy because many of 
the victims are being prosecuted because of participating here 
in the United States in our open society.
    That is a direct attack at our system of government and it 
compromises our ability to get objective information. I think 
of Kara-Murza who is currently in prison in Russia.
    He was indicted and sent to prison because of his 
activities here in the United States informing our committees 
about what was happening in Russia.
    That is why he was imprisoned, poisoned a couple times. He 
survived that, but now he is lingering in prison.
    I think of Sergei Magnitsky and bringing that cause here to 
the United States by Bill Browder. Both of--of course, Sergei 
Magnitsky was arrested, tortured, and killed and Bill Browder 
is under indictment in Russia.
    I think about so many of these cases that are really aimed 
at what is happening here in the United States. I have a 
constituent, Muyai Gazi, from Rwanda who because of a speech he 
gave in 2006, critical what was happening in Rwanda, he was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison in Rwanda for what he said here 
in the United States, just open speech.
    It really does affect our system. We know that--and, Mr. 
Grozev, you are at risk. We recognize that, and travel--we saw 
that with Bill Browder with red notice through Interpol, that 
you could be picked up by a democratic state because of their 
obligations under the Interpol system on red notice.
    We are trying to correct some of those issues, but it seems 
to me we have got to be much more aggressive because you are at 
risk. You are at risk here, but you are certainly at risk if 
you travel.
    I appreciate Mr. Abramowitz giving us a roadmap of some 
things that we can do, but tell us more effectively how we can 
help you. We put a spotlight on these issues. We do not hide 
from this. We want to give you a platform. We want the world to 
know what is happening.
    What more can we do to protect particularly our two people 
that are here that are on--basically frontline soldiers in this 
campaign? What else would you like to see the United States 
Senate do?
    Mr. Grozev. I would just take a minute to suggest that the 
United States can take a more leading coordinating role in 
helping law enforcement across Europe, for example. Many of the 
crimes against--many of the examples of transnational 
aggression do not happen on American territory.
    The Russians, for example, would not dare usually by the 
old rules. Nobody knows what the new rules are, but the old 
rules of the game, they would not dare attack somebody on 
American territory, at least not physically.
    They do it in Europe and you have to understand that this 
is an organized crime group called a country and--as the late 
John McCain used to call them, and they operate like an 
organized crime group with operations in different countries.
    No one country has this division of how they operate as a 
whole and somebody needs to take the initiative to help the 
Government of the Czech Republic or the Government of Germany 
or of Austria to complete the puzzle of understanding how these 
operations are conducted.
    Therefore, investigations against such prospective or 
committed crimes against journalists and activists must be 
coordinated on a transnational scale.
    Transnational crime must be fought with transnational 
measures and we do not see that happening. I think the United 
States can allocate resources and maybe the Senate can help 
with that to--for such a coordinating body that actually 
advises and coordinates different law enforcement agents across 
the world.
    The Chairman. Thanks for that suggestion.
    Ms. Gallagher, any suggestions of what you would like to 
see us do?
    Ms. Gallagher. Yes, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, may I start by saying I do not at all put 
myself in the same category of a frontline worker in the way 
that Christo Grozev is.
    Indeed, the person who is really in the front line is my 
client, Jimmy Lai, and ultimately the reason that these 
secondary transnational tactics are being used against 
Sebastien Lai for speaking out for his father or against us as 
the lawyers is because it is another weapon with which to 
target ultimately Jimmy Lai himself. I just want to emphasize 
that.
    I do think there are a number of actions which could be 
taken. The first thing is that the enemies of freedom are 
sophisticated and coordinated. I think we need to be much more 
sophisticated and coordinated in how we deal with these 
tactics.
    We have seen the U.S. Government with the role that it has 
taken on hostage taking and arbitrary detention of U.S. 
nationals abroad, creating the role of special envoy so that 
you have some muscle memory and a centralized place where you 
can look at the tactics that are used about arbitrary detention 
and hostage taking in Iran, in Rwanda, in Egypt, and so on.
    It seems to me that an equivalent centralized type role in 
relation to transnational repression could be very important 
and powerful because what I find in these cases is when I am 
dealing with transnational repression in cases concerning Saudi 
Arabia, for example, I deal with officials in multiple 
countries who are starting with a blank sheet of paper and who 
simply do not know the tactics that you then see when you are 
dealing with, for example, China, Russia, Iran.
    It seems to me internalized centralized coordination could 
lead to more sophisticated policymaking in this field and the 
U.S. would be well-placed to take a leadership role in relation 
to that.
    Similarly, in many countries in which I act in which there 
is transnational repression and, indeed, as a victim of it 
myself in the U.K., I often find that police forces are not 
centralized.
    You get some tactics, for example, which are picked up 
because someone complains to their local police force in 
Nottingham that something that has happened with China for 
people working in relation to Hong Kong issues or some 
academics in the north of England have complained to their 
local police force. There is no centralized knowledge base 
where people can go.
    I think democratic states who are experiencing this just 
need to get more sophisticated in looking at having a 
centralized way of dealing with it.
    I also think it is important that we tackle the bad 
carriers who are facilitating this happening. Now, some of that 
may involve--and a case like Rwanda was mentioned by Michael 
earlier--in the case of Paul Rusesabagina, the way in which he 
was kidnapped and brought to Rwanda did involve a European 
Union registered airline company with a private jet picking him 
up in Dubai and bringing him to Rwanda in a kidnap attempt.
    Now, it seems to me we need to look at what action is taken 
in relation to a private company--a European Union company--
which facilitates that. In relation to Hong Kong, what do we do 
about companies and other entities who are unwitting or 
otherwise involved in these actions?
    Now, some of them are witting bad carriers, but some of 
them are unwitting and in that I would highlight the role of 
tech companies who often are used for cyber harassment and do 
not have very sophisticated ways of dealing with it.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    My first line of questioning for Mr. Grozev. I am always 
struck that every time we see a Russian poisoning case, they 
use the same poison all the time it seems like and it is also 
one that is easily identifiable and traced back to the FSB or 
one of their agencies.
    I am assuming this is done to send a message as much as 
anything else that they are doing this and they are not trying 
to do it secretly. They want people to understand what they 
have done.
    Am I right in that assessment?
    Mr. Grozev. That is as good of an analysis an anyone. We do 
not know what exactly is in their head, but my conclusion is 
that they have an optional approach. They are trying to use a 
weapon that they continually improve over the years and invest 
millions and millions in making more efficient on the hope that 
it may remain undiscovered.
    In the case it gets discovered, it has such a scary 
reputation that it achieves a different outcome which is fear 
and intimidation. They win, from their point of view, either 
way.
    If it remains undiscovered, they win. If it gets 
discovered, then it points to them; they also win. They have 
zero reputation cost and thus you are right that they do not 
mind being discovered.
    Senator Risch. On top of that the Russians are notorious 
that when they do get caught red-handed, whatever they are 
doing, they just lie about it. A good example of that is the 
invasion of Ukraine. They get on TV all the time and say, well, 
we--this was not our fault. America did this. America caused 
this.
    It is just--it is phenomenal that they can do that and, 
yet, people shrug their shoulders and walk away from it.
    Listen, for all three of you I have a question that I would 
like perhaps a general answer. Time is limited so if you would 
give me as brief a answer as you could I would appreciate it.
    I think we are at a point on the planet where countries are 
deciding which club they are going to belong to. Is it a 
freedom and democracy and a government that is created by the 
people and operated by the people and disciplined by the people 
or is it a dictatorship, an autocracy, and, of course, the two 
governments operate very, very differently.
    I note that none of the cases that have been referred to 
here today come from democratic countries. They come from the 
autocracies.
    I think that our challenge as human beings over in this 
century, in the 21st century, is going to be trying to figure 
out how the two groups of countries exist on this planet 
without killing each other because I think one thing we can all 
agree on--North Korea, Iran, China, they are not going to 
change. They are going to be the same for a long, long time to 
come for the foreseeable future.
    You hope that there is some change, but hope, as we all 
know, is not much of a strategy. The democracies are not going 
to change. We are not going to change. Great Britain is not 
going to change.
    The countries that make up those--the group of free 
countries are not going to change. The conduct we are talking 
about specifically in this hearing is--are small instances, and 
I say that not to demean them because when I say small I mean 
compared to a war like what is going on in Ukraine or in 
Israel.
    They are a unique, specific incident. They wind up in a 
newspaper reporting. Everybody reads it and what have you, but 
they turn the page and move on to sports or something else.
    How do we deal with these from country to country? How do 
we as a country deal with these, with the countries who 
perpetrate that and other free countries without going to war 
over them, obviously?
    There needs to be some kind of discipline. There needs to 
be some kind of accountability. How do you do that? What is 
your recommendation in how we deal with these?
    Let us go down the dais just like we started.
    Mr. Grozev, would you please start?
    Mr. Grozev. Very briefly, and I have said this before, I 
would advocate for invoking the principle of universal 
jurisdiction whenever feasible to investigate crimes that 
otherwise remain uninvestigated because bad actors are not 
going to investigate themselves.
    Many countries have the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. Partly, the United States can invoke it, but a 
crime that happens across several countries outside of the 
United States and as its core--its basis of an action decided 
in Moscow can still be prosecuted.
    It is not at the moment. Everybody delivers the benefit of 
the principle of judicial sovereignty to bad actors and this is 
one way that it, I think can be somewhat curtailed.
    You also pointed out that not every country is in the camp 
of either the bad actor or the good actor. Some countries are 
borderline.
    They are nominally democracies and they are in many 
respects democracies, but they sometimes are afraid of taking 
action against China or Russia because of economic pressures.
    Those are very insidious nonaction sometimes. For example, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Georgia--the country of Georgia--within 
certain governments are afraid to prosecute Russian crime or 
Chinese crime that happens on their territory.
    Such nonactions actually can be sanctioned, can--sanctions 
can be imposed against the people not prosecuting by the United 
States. These are two examples I could see as very practical.
    Senator Risch. I am out of time.
    Briefly, Mr. Abramowitz.
    Mr. Abramowitz. Thank you for the question.
    A couple points I would like to make. First of all, I think 
since Freedom House began reporting on this phenomenon 3 or 4 
years ago, I think that democratic governments have actually 
begun to kind of be much more aware of the problem and actually 
do things about it.
    Is it perfect? No, but you see law enforcement agencies 
like the Justice Department, Homeland Security, the FBI, their 
agents are being educated about their problems.
    They are noticing these cases that might not have--they 
might not have noticed before. We talked with Western 
democracies as well. They are really beginning to be much more 
focused on this issue.
    There is not a silver bullet, Senator, with this. I think 
that--in my testimony I outlined a range of different things--
sanctions, visa bans, the creation of tip lines for people to 
tip off law enforcement.
    This is going to be a generational struggle, I think. 
Russia--as you pointed out, Russia and China are not going 
anywhere. Other countries are choosing sides now and I think 
what is really important is for particularly the United States 
Government and other democracies to make clear that this is 
unacceptable behavior and to not sweep this under the rug.
    When especially people that are friendly to the United 
States--I mentioned India and Saudi Arabia--and these are--and 
Saudi Arabia is a significant perpetrator of transnational 
repression. We have had two big cases that have been outlined 
from India recently. This should be a matter that is in the 
bilateral relationship and if it is seen as being swept under 
the rug then I think other governments will not take it as 
seriously.
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The People's Republic of China has committed a despicable 
campaign of genocide against the Uyghur people and has exported 
its suppression to target ethnic and religious minority groups 
and their family members globally.
    Since 1997, members of the Uighur diaspora have experienced 
the long reach of the PRC's authoritarianism in the form of 
unprovoked harassment, intimidation, and coercion. Communities 
in our own nation are victims of China's repression.
    Mr. Abramowitz, how do China's tactics differ and remain 
unpublicized compared to other countries when it is the key 
enabler of transnational repression?
    Mr. Abramowitz. Senator, China is the world leader on 
transnational repression. It has been very clear from our 
reports, from the work that my colleagues have done. They 
conduct the most sophisticated global and comprehensive 
campaign of transnational repression in the world.
    I would say that China is, number one, the campaign targets 
many groups--ethnic and religious minorities, political 
dissidents, human rights activists, journalists and former 
insiders.
    It is the full range of tactics that they use from direct 
attacks like kidnapping dissidents, co-opting other countries 
to detain their dissidents, and also in the case of the Uyghurs 
that you outlined, really threatening their families to get 
their family members who are living in the free world to 
basically shut up.
    Finally, the sheer breadth and global scale of the campaign 
is incredible and outspoken members of the Hong Kong diaspora 
have found themselves in the dragnet as have many others.
    It is really the number-one country--the number-one 
perpetrator.
    Senator Menendez. How can the United States help support 
governments to combat China's repression of minority groups 
abroad and, for example, can Magnitsky sanctions be utilized to 
hold the perpetrators enabling China's transnational repression 
accountable?
    Mr. Abramowitz. We have certainly been in favor of the 
greater use of the Magnitsky sanctions to target individuals. 
We think that there can be changes to the law to make 
perpetrators of transnational repression more squarely within 
the focus of the sanction regime.
    I would also say I think it is very difficult to influence 
China directly, but one of the themes that we have looked at at 
Freedom House over the last 5 years is China's efforts to co-
opt international fora like the Human Rights Council in Geneva. 
It is really important for the United States to really combat 
China's efforts in fora like that.
    Senator Menendez. Russia imprisons dissenters like Vladimir 
Kara-Murza and Alexei Navalny that threaten Putin's power and 
it shuts down independent media to control the behavior and 
flow of information to its citizens, but, sadly, Russia's 
repression does not stop within its borders. In 2022, Russia 
journalists Yevgenia Baltatarova fled to Kazakhstan after 
Russian police searched her house due to her online presence in 
opposition to Russia's illegal war against Ukraine.
    Kazakh authorities then detained her when they learned of 
the criminal charges against her and told her she was not 
allowed to leave Kazakhstan.
    Mr. Grozev, how--have there been widespread transnational 
repression activities targeting Russian journalists and media 
services who moved abroad after Russia invaded Ukraine?
    Mr. Grozev. Yes. I give example with three--at least three 
cases where Russian journalists have been targeted or activists 
have been targeted abroad with assassination attempts, which 
may have intended to just be inconclusive assassination 
attempts just to send a shiver down the spine of other 
journalists.
    Women were selected, in my view, specifically because of 
the terror from a Russian perspective of the fact that they are 
not stopping at gender or boundary, and we have seen more 
attempts than the three, but the three are conclusively linked 
to chemical weapons that we believe are only in the hands of 
Russia.
    We have seen attempts by Russian authorities to force 
countries that are nominally democratic to extradite Russians 
that are in those countries. Kazakhstan is one example, but 
Bulgaria is another example. Austria is another example.
    There are many attempts for judicial repression in addition 
to the extrajudicial that were mentioned earlier. I think we 
are talking about cases that are definitely close to 100, not 
just one or two.
    Senator Menendez. One-hundred?
    Mr. Grozev. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Chair, if I may, one last question. 
In November, the Nicaraguan regime applauded the unprecedented 
win of the first Miss Universe winner and called her win a 
moment of ``legitimate joy and pride.''
    Shortly after, the director of the Miss Nicaragua pageant, 
Karen Celebertti, was prohibited from returning to Nicaragua 
and her husband and son in Nicaragua were detained on 
accusations of conspiracy dating back to 2018.
    Clearly, Ortega regime intends to use such tactics to 
silence all dissenters both within Nicaragua and abroad. Mr. 
Grozev, how should the United States respond to the Ortega 
regime's intimidation of Karen Celebertti and her family?
    Mr. Grozev. As we discussed earlier, we believe that 
sanction tools such as the Magnitsky Act should not be 
exclusively used to countries like Russia. They can definitely 
be applied to the context of Nicaragua as well.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Many Americans believe that the Chinese Communist Party is 
an external threat only. However, this hearing illustrates the 
long tentacles of authoritarian regimes like the CCP and that 
it knows no borders.
    This became obvious with the revelation that the CCP is 
operating secret police stations in overseas centers around the 
world including here in the United States to intimidate, 
threaten, and harass Chinese dissidents.
    While the case in New York is well known, there are reports 
that there could be others including in my home state of 
Nebraska. This is a flagrant violation of our sovereignty and 
must be addressed swiftly and forcefully.
    As countries have woken up to the threat of these police 
stations and overseas centers, the CCP has adapted. According 
to a recent report by Safeguard Defenders, the CCP is running a 
global network of consular volunteers through its embassies and 
consulates who form part of the United Front influence to 
enforce operations on foreign soil.
    These consular volunteers are mostly used to help with 
administrative tasks linked to consular protection, risk 
assessments, and even warnings and advisories to overseas 
citizens and organizations.
    This gives them the full access to individuals' personal 
information and may also enhance their control over overseas 
communities and dissenters. According to the report, none of 
these liaisons have been declared to host country authorities 
by the PRC or other relevant actors, let alone receive consent.
    While the PRC embassies and consulates have been using 
these informal networks for at least a decade, they were 
recently formalized through a state council decree in 
September.
    Mr. Abramowitz, in your testimony you said that host 
governments and law enforcement officials must pay increasing 
attention to the role of diplomatic staff and proxy actors 
working on behalf of the origin states to intimidate exiles.
    What role do these consular volunteers play in enhancing 
the CCP's ability to conduct transnational repression 
activities?
    Mr. Abramowitz. Senator, the honest truth is my knowledge 
on this issue is really from the human rights group that you 
cited that did very good work and that is deeply disturbing.
    We were encouraged to see in April an indictment for two 
PRC nationals arrested on suspicion of operating one such 
police station in New York. This issue is beginning to kind of 
get greater attention.
    I think the point that I would just simply make is that the 
850 or so cases we have had of physical transnational 
repression--the murders, the renditions--that is just the tip 
of the iceberg and countries like China are employing 
surveillance, these police stations, spyware, just all manner 
of tactics, and I think it is a wakeup call for the nation.
    Senator Ricketts. Are there things specifically we can do 
with regard to these consular volunteers or how do we work 
better with our allies on these?
    Mr. Abramowitz. I think the one thing that I would--that 
comes to mind that I would suggest is that I would say for--if 
it comes to the attention of the State Department or a foreign 
ministry in a certain country that a diplomat is behaving 
outside of the normal diplomat channels, that seems to me 
grounds for expulsion.
    Senator Ricketts. In addition to formalizing consular 
volunteers, other parts of the CCP's new regulations on 
consular protection could allow it to grow into its capacity to 
carry out transnational repression.
    In Article 7 of this state council new regulation that I 
mentioned, it states that the PRC embassies can act 
unilaterally under ``special circumstances'' granted that there 
is permission from the host country.
    Under Article 7 it states the PRC embassies can--sorry, 
under Article 3, rather, states the consulates are responsible 
when ``the rights of Chinese nationals are violated or simply 
if help is needed.''
    The PRC might target a Chinese national abroad under almost 
any pretext, but these new regulations could provide formal 
grounds for the PRC consulates to intervene in overseas private 
affairs of Chinese nationals whether they welcome government 
support or not.
    What is your takeaway on this, Mr. Abramowitz, with regard 
to these new security rules from embassies and consulates and 
are there specific things we should do in light of this new 
regulation that the state council and the Chinese government 
has passed?
    Mr. Abramowitz. Let me just add, if I may. I think my 
colleague wanted to say one thing on that because she had 
just----
    Senator Ricketts. Oh, sure. Absolutely. Ms. Gallagher.
    Ms. Gallagher. Of course. It is just following your 
question earlier about the overseas police stations and the 
consular volunteers.
    Just a quick point. When the NGO Safeguard Defenders 
published their report on Chinese police stations abroad, they 
received on that day an email purportedly coming from me as an 
international human rights lawyer in that space saying your 
report is superb--I would like to offer you my services pro 
bono--I would like to help.
    They engaged with that email, and after a period of time 
they started getting asked questions about their sources for 
the report, and luckily the person who received the email at 
Safeguard Defenders thought something was not quite right and 
reached out to me through another source and we discovered that 
it was quite a sophisticated fake.
    Now, that is an example of this kind of privilege-phishing 
that I have been speaking about where people purport to be 
lawyers, people who are well-respected and reach out in that 
way.
    Indeed, I have had those privilege-phishing type emails 
from people purporting to be staffers to members of the Senate 
and from people who purport to be partners in U.S. law firms. 
They are very sophisticated and it does seem to me there is a 
very simple step which could be taken in relation to that.
    The U.S. Government, of course, issued a business advisory 
warning U.S. businesses of emerging risks to their operations 
and activities in Hong Kong in July 2021.
    It does seem to me these tactics of transnational 
repression that are being used including that example of 
privilege-phishing and purporting to be professionals in order 
to obtain sensitive information which may put people at very 
serious risk that that should obviously be the subject of quite 
clear guidance from the U.S. government, it seems to us, so 
that people are warned about this tactic, and I for my part 
share the concerns which you raised, Senator, regarding broadly 
at this issue.
    It does also seem to me in the U.S. unusually there has 
obviously been criminal justice activity in relation to the 
overseas police stations. Many, many countries there was none. 
There have been very few prosecutions arising from those 
overseas police stations, which is concerning.
    Senator Ricketts. Mr. Chairman, may I just--I have a 
follow-up question for Ms. Gallagher.
    The Chairman. Please do.
    Senator Ricketts. On these new regulations the Chinese 
Government state council has put out with regard to the 
behavior of their consulates and these consular volunteers and 
so forth, what steps do you think we as the United States or I 
should take with regard to these new regulations that came out?
    The Chairman. I would ask that you respond briefly, if you 
could.
    Ms. Gallagher. Of course. I can give you a more detailed 
answer on that in writing subsequently if that would be 
helpful.
    Senator Ricketts. That would be great. Great. Thank you 
very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We have a statement from the Sikh 
Coalition that is well-documented and without objection it will 
be made part of the record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and that is a good 
segue into my line of questioning. It is one thing to deal with 
this behavior when it comes from a nation that we would sort of 
put into the adversary camp--China, Iran, others, but you, Mr. 
Abramowitz, mentioned in particular nations like India with 
which we have a strong relationship or Saudi Arabia--one a 
democracy, one a monarchy--and I want to just focus on how do 
we deal with this when it is a nation that we are in 
partnership with and I want to use India as an example.
    I would like to introduce into the record an article from 
The Wall Street Journal, December 2, ``Foiled plot to kill U.S. 
Sikh is linked to murder of a Canadian activist.''
    The Chairman. Without objection it will be included in the 
record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Kaine. I want to read the first two paragraphs of 
the letter. I think members of the panel understand this, but I 
just want to make sure the public does.

        ``Hours after a Sikh community leader was assassinated 
        by two masked men in the parking lot of his temple in 
        Canada, a senior Indian security officer sent a drug 
        trafficker he knew a video of the blood-covered victim 
        slumped over in his truck. An hour later he followed 
        that up with the New York address of another Sikh 
        activist he wanted killed.

        ``The trafficker got right on it, according to U.S. 
        prosecutors. He passed on the video and other messages 
        to a purported hit man who had already accepted a 
        $15,000 advance payment for the contract killing on 
        U.S. soil and suggested there could be more such work. 
        `We have so many targets,' he told the hired gun, who 
        he did not know was really an undercover U.S. law 
        enforcement officer.''

    That is the case that has been recently brought in federal 
court in New York connecting to the murder of the Sikh activist 
in the suburb of Toronto and it is highly, highly disturbing, 
to say the least.
    That quote, ``We have so many targets,'' is something we 
need to pay very serious attention to. It is interesting to 
note that the Indian Government's reaction to the prosecution 
in the United States has been somewhat different than to the 
claim that their intelligence officials--at least one 
official--was implicated in the murder in Toronto.
    When the Canadian Government Prime Minister Trudeau raised 
the issue and laid out the evidentiary case, the Indian 
Government responded in a very negative way and asked Ottawa to 
recall about 40 Canadian diplomats that were in India.
    When the news of this prosecution in the United States came 
out, the Indian Government at least suggested they were 
somewhat concerned and potentially chastened by the story and 
their comments have been a little bit more reasonable.
    We often say we are the oldest democracy in the world and 
India is the largest democracy in the world. This is not the 
behavior of a respectable democracy and I would like you to 
just use this--use the Indian example when we are dealing with 
a nation that we have such strong connections to--we have 
military connections, economic connections, connections of 
family. Our Indian-American diaspora community in the United 
States is such an important part of who we are as a country.
    What are the strategies you suggest that we use in dealing 
with nations that we traditionally count as friends?
    Mr. Abramowitz. What I can say on this, I honestly do not 
know more about these cases than is in the public record so 
far. This is all coming to light. It strikes me that one thing 
that is very important is to get more information about India's 
activities in democracies out there in the open. That strikes 
me as something that this body could obtain from sources within 
the U.S. Government, I think, and to publicize as much as you 
can so be transparent about what is going on.
    I would say the only other thing that I would add is that 
if you look at freedom in the world, which is our canonical 
annual survey of political rights and civil liberties in the 
world, you see two broad trends.
    One is authoritarian countries kind of getting stronger, 
but you will also see backsliding among established democracies 
and, clearly, India is one of the cases that have been--where 
there has been this kind of backsliding.
    The kind of overseas activities that you are alluding to is 
also part of a backsliding--a democratic backsliding.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. Just one last comment. I want to 
thank Ms. Gallagher for being here representing my profession, 
the legal profession. The targeting of lawyers who represent 
political dissidents, human rights activists, is a longtime 
strategy.
    There is a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1963, 
NAACP v. Button, that came out of Virginia when Virginia tried 
to pass both criminal statutes and ethical rules to stop 
lawyers from taking on school desegregation cases.
    When dictators want to go after political dissidents, they 
usually start with the lawyers, but it never ends there.
    Thank you for your work. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all 
of you for your testimony here today.
    To Ms. Gallagher, let me just thank you for your ongoing 
work with Jimmy Lai. A couple years ago, Senator Toomey--former 
Senator Toomey and I teamed up and we passed the Hong Kong 
Accountability Act to provide the Executive Branch with more 
tools to go after both Chinese Government officials, as well as 
folks in Hong Kong, who were cracking down on dissent and I am 
pleased it has been used. Obviously, we need to do a lot more 
on that front.
    Mr. Abramowitz, great to see you. Let me thank you for all 
you are doing at Freedom House, and in your testimony you say 
for too long democracies have missed or allowed the actions of 
authoritarian countries inside their borders. Such a pattern of 
impunity has emboldened states to act abroad without fear of 
consequences, and that, of course, is what we are focused on in 
this hearing.
    There is a little known provision in the Arms Export 
Control Act that prohibits arms transfers to any countries that 
are ``engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation 
or harassment directed against individuals in the United 
States.'' Not just citizens, not just green card holders, 
individuals in the United States.
    Now, some of the countries we are talking about today are 
countries we, obviously, do not sell arms to in any form--
China, Russia, Iran--but there are many governments out there 
that are engaged in this kind of intimidation and harassment of 
individuals on U.S. soil who are.
    Would you agree that we should use all of the tools at our 
disposal? Because a October GAO report just came out, indicated 
that this provision of law has actually never been used.
    One of the things we are looking at is requiring the 
Administration to come forward with a report identifying which 
countries would trigger this provision. Is that something you 
would support?
    Mr. Abramowitz. I would be--what I can commit to, Senator, 
is I can have my staff look at the proposal and we can come 
back to you with a considered answer on that.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Freedom House response: We do think the United States should look 
closely at every existing tool available to address the threat of 
transnational repression and would be in favor of the United States 
exploring whether it could utilize this Arms Control Act provision 
against perpetrators of transnational repression. The GAO report that 
highlighted this as an option is an excellent report that contains a 
number of good recommendations.

    Mr. Abramowitz. The one thing that comes to mind in your 
question is that one of the key tools of transnational 
repression is the use of spyware. That is something that has 
been done by a number of different countries and I think there 
was an executive order earlier this year.
    Senator Van Hollen. I am going to get to that. That is my 
next question. You anticipated----
    Mr. Abramowitz. Oh, okay. My point being is that I think 
really being careful about exporting spyware to those countries 
that could use it as part of transnational repression strikes 
me as a----
    Senator Van Hollen. Right, but this provision I gathered--I 
am not sure--I do not think anybody was really focused on this 
provision and it is embedded in our law, and I am going to be 
working to make sure that we reactivate it or activate it since 
it has never been activated.
    Mr. Abramowitz. What I----
    Senator Van Hollen. It is not an automatic tool. It does 
not require cutting off arms transfers, but it is a tool that 
the executive branch has never used. I look forward to working 
with folks on that.
    Let me talk about the spyware issue because it is a very 
important issue. You mentioned in your testimony. You just 
mentioned it now. Of course, NSO technology was used to go 
after Khashoggi, specifically targeting his fiance.
    We also know that in addition to NSO technology there has 
been this Predator software that has been used. The 
administration has taken some actions, but this is the tool--
these are the tools of choice of authoritarian governments and 
other governments.
    Some have been mentioned today that are our close friends 
that used to go--to either go after dissidents themselves or 
these are companies that sell their wares in many cases to 
authoritarian governments and other governments.
    What more can we be doing to make sure that these tools of 
choice sold by private companies cannot be abused in this way? 
In fact, it turns out the Predator software was used to target 
a couple members of Congress recently.
    Can you just speak to this?
    Mr. Abramowitz. I think it is a very serious problem that 
you are raising. I think that--two things that come to mind. 
Number one is the U.S. Government can give extra scrutiny to 
applications from companies that are seeking to export products 
to those countries where--that may be engaging in transnational 
repression, the so-called unfree countries or--that would be 
one thing that I think--extra scrutiny to these applications.
    I think that governments can look at the research done by 
Freedom House and other human rights groups to look at those 
countries that could be qualified for that. I do not think it 
is a big secret.
    I think to the extent that export controls exist, they need 
to be carefully and thoroughly enforced. It is not a silver 
bullet.
    Senator Van Hollen. No, I understand. It is not just the 
countries though. Right now, we just have lots of private 
entities that are engaged in these kind of activities. It seems 
to me we need to do a much better job of figuring out how we 
target them and that ecosystem, to the extent their software is 
being used by foreign governments to crack down on dissidents.
    Obviously, there are important good uses like for the U.S. 
Government to have surveillance technology, but this is a very 
different use of those technologies. I see that I am out of 
time, but I want to----
    Mr. Abramowitz. I would like to commit that my team will 
get back to you with a thoughtful response on that question. I 
think it is an important issue.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Freedom House response: As you know, in March 2023, the 
Administration of President Joseph Biden announced an executive order 
that, among other mandates, bars federal agencies from the 
``operational'' use of commercial spyware products that pose a threat 
to national security or counterintelligence, or that could be employed 
by foreign governments to violate human rights or target people from 
the United States. While this is a welcome step forward, Congress 
should make the Executive Order provisions permanent law through 
bipartisan legislation, ensuring that the prohibition remains in place 
under future administrations. To guarantee effective international 
cooperation on spyware, the United States and like-minded democracies 
will need to encourage other governments to implement common standards. 
Governments that signed the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the 
Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware should follow through on 
their commitments and encourage like-minded states to join.
    In addition, the U.S. Government should work closely with civil 
society to ensure that democracies' lists of prohibited companies are 
swiftly and appropriately updated as the industry evolves. The U.S. 
Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security has imposed 
special licensing requirements on several surveillance firms whose 
foreign government clients had used their technologies to target 
journalists, activists, and others. The addition of these firms to the 
bureau's Entity List was a positive development, and others engaged in 
such practices should be subjected to the same restrictions. When 
reviewing export licensing applications, the U.S. Government should 
give extra scrutiny to applications from companies seeking to export 
products to countries whose governments may engage in human rights 
abuses, especially those previously identified as perpetrators of 
transnational repression. Governments should consult research by 
Freedom House and other human rights organizations to determine whether 
there is a risk that the exported items could enable human rights 
abuses. Where export controls already exist, governments should enforce 
them thoroughly and update and strengthen them as necessary to account 
for the development of new technologies. Government signatories to the 
U.S. Government-led Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative should 
follow through on their commitment to prevent the export of 
technologies used in the violation of human rights.
    Furthermore, government surveillance programs should adhere to the 
International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance (https://necessaryandproportionate.org/
principles/), a framework agreed upon by a broad consortium of civil 
society groups, industry leaders, and scholars with the aim of 
protecting people's rights. The principles, which state that all 
communications surveillance must be legal, necessary, and 
proportionate, should also be applied to open-source intelligence 
methods such as social media monitoring and the use of intrusive tools 
such as spyware.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Also, Congress should reform or repeal existing surveillance laws 
in the United States, including Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and Executive Order 12333. Broad powers under Section 
702 and Executive Order 12333 have allowed U.S. Government agencies to 
collect and access Americans' personal data without meaningful 
transparency or oversight. Congress should also close a legal loophole 
that allows U.S. Government agencies to purchase personal data from 
data brokers rather than obtaining a warrant.
    Finally, the U.S. Government should refrain from introducing 
legislation that weakens encryption, for example by mandating 
``backdoor'' access for authorities or the ability to trace messages. 
In the United States, any reforms to Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act should not undermine the ability of intermediaries and 
service providers to offer robust encryption. Weakening encryption 
would endanger the lives of activists, journalists, members of 
marginalized communities, and ordinary people around the world.

    Ms. Gallagher. I would also like to add something on 
spyware. I can add more detail in writing, but I have also 
through my previous work prior to acting for Mr. Lai, those 
technologies have been used against me in relation to cases 
that I have done in respect to Saudi Arabia and a number of 
other countries, and it does seem to me one of the key issues 
as well as the issue of export licensing applications is the 
protection of end-to-end encryption because increasingly what I 
see which is concerning is a naive notion that somehow you can 
have a backdoor in relation to end-to-end encryption which good 
actors can use and bad actors cannot. It is very concerning and 
I think that is an issue that we need to flag as well.
    I know it is referred to briefly in the Freedom House 
report that has been published today.
    Senator Van Hollen. Protecting end-to-end encryption? Yes.
    Ms. Gallagher. Protecting end-to-end encryption, but that 
is a key point.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes, for dissidents. Yes. No, I think 
that is a very important point. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. 
Abramowitz, thank you for the work of Freedom House.
    If we were just kind of ballpark estimating between the 
year 2000 and 2023, the increase in transnational repression 
actions within the United States, how would you characterize 
that?
    Mr. Abramowitz. It is hard for me to give you--what I can 
tell you is the facts. We have documented this since 2014. We 
have documented 850 different cases. We will be out in January 
with an update to our report. I expect there to be many, many 
more cases.
    This is a very old tactic--dates, the murder of Trotsky in 
Mexico, but I think what I would say is that the conditions 
are--and the belligerence of the authoritarian countries is 
just definitely increasing.
    Senator Merkley. Certainly, anecdotally has--the impression 
is a massive increase and one of the top actors--the top actor, 
according to Freedom House, is China and our Congressional 
Executive Commission on China, which I co-chair, we have had a 
lot of examination of this and we realize that very few 
incidents get reported.
    Those that do get reported can range from someone walking 
up to a Chinese-American or Chinese national in America and 
saying just simply, ``We know who your family are back in 
China,'' and walking away. Or it might be an email that says 
that or a text message that says that.
    I have been pressing for the FBI to develop a much better 
system that--and publicity in trying to collect information 
about these incidents and, of course, there is a trust factor 
that has to be established.
    People are afraid to report. Do you have any 
recommendations on how we can see more of the iceberg that is 
hidden from us about the extent of transnational repression 
going on, suppressing freedom of assembly, freedom of speech 
here in the United States?
    Mr. Abramowitz. I would say two things.
    Number one, I think a codified definition of this so that 
everyone knows what you are talking about, and then directing 
the law enforcement agencies to collect that information.
    I think they already are doing that to some extent, but I 
think, as my testimony indicated, we are at the tip of the 
iceberg.
    Senator Merkley. Yes, they are collecting very, very little 
and in fact the FBI when I have repeatedly approached them 
says, well, we are just going to tell people to call our 
national tip line, which is a tip line for everything in the 
world.
    There has to be some type of higher trust portal, Chinese 
language-speaking assurances to communities that their 
information is highly protected and so forth. At least that is 
certainly what I have been hearing from others. I guess would 
you share that perspective?
    Mr. Abramowitz. In general, yes. I think that--I just will 
say that we have--my team has spent a lot of time over the last 
couple of years briefing out the findings of our research to 
different law enforcement agencies.
    There is a huge appetite of information because I think 
many individual agents, they will see a case and it seems like 
a isolated case, but, in fact, it is part of a larger national 
and global story.
    I think anything we can do to paint that larger picture 
would be very valuable.
    Senator Merkley. I do appreciate that you highlighted the 
act that a number of us have put together, including the 
chairman and Senator Hagerty, and the chairman now pursuing a 
broader bill or, I guess, maybe more targeted bill, but to take 
on transnational repression.
    I think this is such an important growing challenge, and in 
that context I think many would be surprised to find that 
Turkey is among the top five offenders--Turkey, a NATO ally.
    Given that we have so many dynamics that interact with 
Turkey including the military base, their common NATO 
membership, and so forth, what more can we do to bring an end 
to or dramatically diminish transnational repression by Turkey?
    Mr. Abramowitz. As you suggest, Turkey has been on a 
campaign since 2016 to hunt down and track its critics who are 
living abroad.
    I think it is very important for the United States to 
assist victims. I think it is important to not deport people 
back to the country of origin.
    I think it is a very hard challenge. We have other security 
interests with Turkey. One thing I would just like to say which 
I have not had a chance to say today is I think there is one 
silver lining to this whole situation.
    It is a terrible situation, but I do think that Americans 
and others, because of the publicity and the greater publicity 
of this problem, are beginning to see the nature of 
authoritarian regimes.
    They understand that what happens in China is not just 
happening in China anymore. What is happening in Russia is not 
just happening in Russia anymore.
    The rights of people inside democracies are directly at 
threat because of this--their free speech rights, as one of my 
colleagues just said.
    I think it is a very important point. I think anything we 
can do to get more information out about the size of this 
phenomenon is really important.
    Senator Merkley. I will just close by noting that among the 
recommendations you had was for us to provide permanent legal 
protection to human rights defenders, to journalists who are 
under attack, and I certainly would second that.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
each of you for being here and for your ongoing work.
    Mr. Abramowitz, in your opening statement you mentioned 
Belarus, I believe, as one of the top 10 countries that is 
behaving in a way that promotes transnational crime.
    Yesterday, I had an opportunity to meet with Sviatlana 
Tsikhanouskaya, who was here. She is--I think, most of us 
believe she is the real leader of Belarus having won that 
election against Lukashenko in 2020.
    Her husband has been imprisoned since that time for his 
effort to try and challenge Lukashenko and she was recently 
sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison.
    One of--can you talk about--and I would ask each of you on 
the panel if you have thoughts about this, about whether you 
see regimes like Lukashenko working with the Kremlin mimicking 
what Putin has done or are these efforts by authoritarian 
leaders to work together to deploy intimidation tactics and do 
all of the detentions--acts of violence, all of the things that 
you all have outlined?
    Mr. Abramowitz. First of all, thank you for that question. 
We actually at Freedom House yesterday welcomed Natalia 
Pinchuk, the wife of the Nobel Prize winner Mr. Bialiatski, to 
Freedom House.
    Senator Shaheen. Yes, I had a chance to meet with her as 
well.
    Mr. Abramowitz. It is a heartrending story. Not just her 
husband is in a penal colony, but 1,500 other Belarusian 
political prisoners.
    The point that I would simply make is that the autocrats 
are learning from each other. Putin was the original kind of 
modern-day autocrat and his tactics are being copied by other 
autocrats including Lukashenko and including the most--one of 
the most brazen cases of transnational repression--the forcing 
down of the airplane so he could arrest the blogger.
    Senator Shaheen. The Ryanair.
    Do either of the other panelists have thoughts on this?
    Mr. Grozev. I would completely agree with Mr. Abramowitz. 
It is a copycat situation especially with Lukashenko. Although 
he was chronologically before Putin--created his model before 
Putin--but what has to be clear is that there is no assumed 
collaboration between them.
    There is actually a lot of distrust and this is something 
that can be used in thinking how to maybe topple this autocracy 
on a smaller scale now.
    Russia does not trust Lukashenko's own loyalty forever and 
Lukashenko himself does not trust that Russia will not overtake 
Belarus and make him just a figurehead.
    This is an important discord that is not--it is latent. It 
is under the surface. We have seen evidence of this on the 
surface, for example, when Lukashenko arrested 33 Russian 
mercenaries thinking that they was sent by the Kremlin to 
topple him just before the election is 2020.
    This is a good example of the paranoia that is in his head. 
There is occasional collaboration between the intelligence 
services, but there is generally distrust, and we have seen 
cases where Russia has sent their own agents to actually watch 
over what Lukashenko says, what members his government says, at 
certain press conferences, because they do not trust him and, 
again, this is an opportunity as much as the threat.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Ms. Gallagher, I actually have a different question for you 
because I think you suggested the idea of a special envoy for 
transnational repression, and I am not sure which of you talked 
about improper detentions--illegal detentions of American 
citizens, and having worked on some of those early cases and 
helping to develop legislation around creating a fusion cell 
here to support victims of that kind of repression. Can you 
talk about what more we ought to be thinking about in terms of 
supporting victims? Not just going after the perpetrators, but 
what can we do to support victims and their families?
    I really like the idea of the special envoy. I think that 
makes a lot of sense.
    Ms. Gallagher. First of all, thank you very much for the 
very important work that you have done in this space.
    Unfortunately, in my work I often deal with journalists, 
human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, bloggers, 
cartoonists, who are arbitrarily detained by authoritarian 
regimes for doing their work.
    One of the difficulties you have is that you cannot as a 
lawyer use the usual legal tools you have because you are 
dealing with a regime which does not play by the rules.
    These are not rule-of-law-compliant countries, and one of 
the things where I think the U.S. has shown real leadership is 
in centralizing its learning in those cases.
    I do think the special envoy works very well. I met with 
him recently and, indeed, I understand he is in the U.K. today 
giving evidence.
    There is no equivalent role in the U.K., so what I see time 
and again in the U.K. is the complete blank sheet when you have 
a case like this, which is very problematic.
    The other issue that we have, and Jimmy Lai is a good 
example of this, is that sometimes there is a lack of awareness 
that when you are dealing with Hong Kong, for example, or you 
are dealing with a regime which is now in the same category as 
Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, these kinds of cases, I do think in 
respect to victims, one of the real problems that I see, and 
this is--I see it in the U.K., but also Australia and a number 
of other jurisdictions--here is a real lack of aftercare for 
victims.
    Quite often what you have is someone who has been subjected 
to arbitrary detention, the most horrendous violation of their 
rights, are often in circumstances where they are in solitary 
confinement. They may have been subjected to torture and so on.
    When they return, the support drops off a cliff. Sometimes 
they are provided with very initial support from a psychiatrist 
or psychologist, but the gap is then filled ordinarily by civil 
society organizations or by fundraising, and that is a very 
serious problem and I think that is one obvious area.
    I should also just say on the playbook question that you 
asked my colleagues, I think that what I am increasingly seeing 
in my work and the patterns that I am seeing is, and Belarus is 
a good example, whether it is working directly with the Kremlin 
or just simply copying the tactics, we are now seeing that 
there is a dictator's playbook and mechanisms which are used 
which are effective in transnational repression are inevitably 
going to be spreading and used by others and it is one of the 
reasons why it is such a high political priority to deal with 
China who we all agree is the most serious actor in this space, 
the most sophisticated actor in this space.
    Unless we treat that as the political priority, which it 
deserves to be, we will see those tactics spreading, picked up 
by others, in the way that we saw Russia's tactics picked up by 
Belarus most graphically with that example of Roman Protasevich 
being hijacked in a Ryanair plane and forcibly brought within 
jurisdiction.
    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one more question 
for the panel?
    One of the--since you have all mentioned China, one of the 
things that we are seeing happening in China is a extensive 
collection of DNA by the Chinese.
    Are there ways in which you are concerned that they are 
going to use this database to promote the kind of transnational 
repression that you all are talking about? How do you see that 
working or is that totally different than what you think we are 
dealing with now?
    I think as we look at AI and the prospects for AI in the 
future that this is an area that we ought to be thinking about.
    Mr. Abramowitz. Senator, all I can say is that we are 
deeply concerned just in general about the ``bad uses'' of 
technology.
    We just put out a report at Freedom House. We did an annual 
survey of online rights and what was very interesting about the 
report was it showed that, number one, traditional repression, 
censorship, is increasing online, but also AI is now being used 
to kind of turbo-charge human rights violations to spread 
disinformation, to make it easier for the authorities to 
censor.
    I think, in general, that is very concerning and the 
collection of that kind of database sounds disturbing to me as 
well.
    Senator Shaheen. Any other thoughts about that?
    Mr. Grozev. I would, again, hypothetically and analytically 
I would imagine that it would contribute to the two sets of 
transnational oppression and repression, for example, by the 
inability of good governments to offer protection to--with the 
usual traditional methods of witness protection, for example, 
because the one biometric that you cannot change is DNA.
    You can change your face. You can change the fingerprints, 
but you cannot change DNA.
    Theoretically, the Chinese Government could use that to 
verify the identity of their enemies even after they have 
received protection.
    Ms. Gallagher. Of course, I agree with the comments about 
theoretically what--how it could be used. I do not have any 
comments specifically on that issue or that database simply 
because it is not within my area of expertise.
    I would be happy to look at it if helpful. I would save 
just generally that I think it is right that you are raising 
the question because I think in relation to China, what we have 
seen is increasingly creative use of lawfare, weaponization of 
the law, increasingly creative use of technology in order to 
extend the long arm of the state to target people 
internationally, wherever around the world they may be.
    It does seem to me that quite often we respond to that in a 
firefighting way, in a defensive responsive way, and I 
mentioned earlier the enemies of freedom being creative. It is 
time for us to get creative, too.
    It does seem to me that we should be preemptively thinking 
about what their next moves may be. I welcome the question, 
although I cannot give you a specific answer on it.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine, I was going to ask if you had 
anything further.
    Once again, let me thank our witnesses. It is clear to us 
that transnational repression, there is the victim and we are 
obviously concerned about the individual that has been 
victimized by these actions.
    It is also compromising the ability of the nation in which 
that person comes from, from having the type of participation 
that is necessary for that country's growth, and then there is 
also the concerns it has on our own democracies because it 
denies us the opportunity to hear different views and it 
compromises our own country.
    We see over and over again that democratic institutions are 
used by our adversaries for their own advantage. This is 
another example where they are using our open system to gain 
information, to supply disinformation, in order to advance 
their causes.
    The discussions that took place just recently on the AI, 
you may not be aware, but every senator is going through AI 
101, 102, 103, and 104--I think the last classes are this 
week--and we are looking at how we can get a handle on AI from 
a regulatory--from a government regulatory point of view.
    Not to stop technology, but to deal, as Mr. Abramowitz 
said, the bad actors and what you are seeing out there--how can 
we try to bring this in.
    This is just an open invitation to all three of you. As we 
go through this process, if you see a role that we can play in 
Congress in the regulation of AI as it relates to this issue, 
do not hesitate to supply that information to us.
    This committee has some jurisdiction over a potential bill 
that will be coming up next year. There is going to be some 
individual bills coming out on urgent issues, but the general 
bill we expect to come out next year.
    Please give us that because I would welcome provisions that 
could help us deal with this current challenge.
    The record of the committee will remain open until close of 
business tomorrow for those that might have questions. You 
already have a few questions that you volunteered to answer, 
Ms. Gallagher. We appreciate that very much.
    The record will remain open for the questions and then we 
would ask that you--to the extent that questions are asked that 
you try to get replies to us in a timely way.
    Then concluding this, again, thank the three of you for 
your contribution to these issues, to your willingness to take 
on an incredible challenge and in some cases personal risk 
including as has been pointed out not only the individual here, 
Mr. Grozev, your challenge, but Ms. Gallagher as a lawyer, it 
is--you are at risk as well.
    Mr. Abramowitz, people sometimes go after the adversary 
groups--the groups that are trying to get the information out 
there, so we recognize these are challenging times. Thank you 
again. With that, the hearing will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


  Statement for the Record From the Sikh Coalition Concerning Threats 
   That Sikhs in the United States Face From the Government of India

                            Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
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Article From the Wall Street Journal, Dated December 2, 2023, ``Foiled 
   Plot To Kill U.S. Sikh is Linked to Murder of Canadian Activist''

                                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


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