[Senate Hearing 118-304]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                                



                                                        S. Hrg. 118-304
 
                    SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING


                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
                     THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
                          CYBERSECURITY POLICY


                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS



                             FIRST SESSION



                               __________

                            OCTOBER 4, 2023

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
       




                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov             
                  
                  
                  
                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 55-727  PDF           WASHINGTON : 2024
               
                  
                  
                  


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          



            SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,        
             AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY        

              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland, Chairman        
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 MITT ROMNEY, Utah
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska

                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Van Hollen, Hon. Chris, U.S. Senator From Maryland...............     1

Romney, Hon. Mitt, U.S. Senator From Utah........................     3

Cha, Dr. Victor, Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair, 
  Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Snyder, Scott, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on 
  Foreign Relations, Washington, DC..............................    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    11

Town, Jenny, Senior Fellow, Director of 38 North Program, Stimson 
  Center, Washington, DC.........................................    15
    Prepared Statement...........................................    17

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Dr. Victor Cha to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    34

The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Scott Snyder for the 
  Following Questions by Senator Chris Van Hollen................    38

Responses of Ms. Jenny Town to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    39

                                 (iii)

  


                    SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2023

                           U.S. Senate,    
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
                International Cybersecurity Policy,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chris Van 
Hollen presiding.
    Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Schatz, Romney, 
and Ricketts.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Van Hollen. Welcome, everybody. This meeting of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the 
Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy will come to 
order.
    I would like to begin by thanking Senator Romney--Ranking 
Member Romney--and members of the committee for being here--
Senator Ricketts--as we discuss the security and other 
challenges facing the Korean Peninsula and U.S. interests and 
the role in the region.
    We are grateful to be joined by three experts in this area: 
Dr. Victor Cha, Mr. Scott Snyder, and Ms. Jenny Town, and I am 
going to introduce each of them more fully in a minute.
    Despite the passage of 70 years since the end of the Korean 
War, lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula remains elusive and 
the security concerns stemming from this conflict continued to 
echo far beyond the region.
    The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United 
States, forged in mutual sacrifice seven decades ago, remains a 
key linchpin for peace and prosperity in East Asia and, as we 
have reaffirmed in recent months, the U.S. commitment to this 
alliance is ironclad.
    In April, President Biden welcomed South Korean President 
Yoon for a state visit in which the two leaders unveiled the 
Washington Declaration to reinforce extended deterrence and 
respond to North Korea's growing nuclear threats.
    That same month, Senator Romney and I. and our colleagues 
passed a bipartisan Senate resolution to honor the 70th 
anniversary of our historic alliance and President Yoon also 
addressed a joint session of Congress.
    In August, President Biden hosted an historic summit at 
Camp David with President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister 
Kishida to deepen our trilateral cooperation and bring greater 
peace, prosperity, and security to the Indo-Pacific region.
    I salute the efforts of these leaders to heal old wounds, 
look to the future, and address shared challenges. This 
trilateral partnership will help to counter the military threat 
from North Korea as our nations have committed to share real-
time data on North Korean missile launches by the end of this 
year.
    I also commend the strong language the leaders issued in 
response to the PRC's mounting aggression in the South China 
Sea. This is an historic moment in the U.S.-ROK alliance, one 
we can build on to confront a range of pressing global security 
and economic challenges.
    One of those challenges is, of course, Putin's war against 
Ukraine, which has shaken the international order not just in 
Europe, but around the world.
    Autocrats across the globe, including Xi Jinping in China 
and Kim Jong-un in North Korea, are paying close attention to 
the collective response of the United States and our allies and 
will draw lessons based on that response.
    Kim Jong-un has been seeking to leverage Russia's need for 
a supply of basic munitions to gain access to Russia's advanced 
missile technology. At the U.N. 2 weeks ago, President Yoon 
vowed that South Korea and its allies will not ``stand idly 
by,'' and we must not.
    I look forward to recommendations from our witnesses as to 
what we can do together, but among the steps we should take is 
to better enforce the existing U.S. and international sanctions 
against the DPRK including the provision of the bipartisan Otto 
Warmbier BRINK Act, which I authored a couple years ago, took 
effect in 2019.
    That law put additional teeth into the sanctions regime, 
applying secondary sanctions against foreign banks and entities 
that violate them, but the sanctions regime has been subject to 
a lot of leakage. In fact, the United Nations has identified a 
variety of schemes the DPRK is using to evade those sanctions 
and some of the firms that are aiding and abetting them in that 
effort, and North Korea's theft of cryptocurrency to fund its 
illegal weapons programs is another area we must do more to 
monitor and crack down on.
    We must also do more to shine a light on the horrendous 
human rights abuses taking place in North Korea. The DPRK's 
increasing alignment with Russia and China raises other 
concerns that we will discuss as we go forward.
    There are many other areas where we have to coordinate our 
efforts with South Korea including countering the PRC's 
economic coercion, preventing the export to the PRC of cutting-
edge technologies that can enhance China's military 
technologies, and the need for the United States and South 
Korea to work together with other countries in the region to 
support our goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    We have a lot of ground to cover today. Before I introduce 
our witnesses, let me turn it over to Senator Romney for his 
opening statement.
    Senator Romney.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
the members of this panel for being here.
    I have met at least one of you before, but others of you I 
have followed by virtue of your expertise and appreciate your 
willingness to testify here today and provide your perspective 
and experience.
    I apologize in advance for having to leave at 3:20. I have 
another engagement that I, unfortunately, will have to run to 
attend, but I am deeply interested in this topic.
    I would underscore the significance of the years--70 
years--as an anniversary of the Korean War. Dear friends of 
mine served in that war--in that conflict and my heart is moved 
by the sacrifice made by many of the people of your nation--of 
the South Korean nation as well as our nation who have served 
together to provide for the security that now exists in South 
Korea.
    I recognize--we all do--that the South Korean War--the 
Korean War was, rather, at the outset of the Cold War and in 
some respects we are facing another Cold War today, not with 
the former Soviet Union so much as with an assertive China.
    At the outset of those things our circumstances are 
different. One is that the ROK has been an extraordinary 
technological leader and economic powerhouse. It is hard to 
imagine a place which is more technologically advanced than 
South Korea, that provides more products to the world than 
South Korea.
    It has fought well above its weight class in the world of 
economic affairs and in geopolitics, which is greatly 
appreciated here and by other nations around the world.
    At the same time, North Korea has become, at least in my 
view, more belligerent and more malevolent in the last year or 
two.
    We are seeing that not only with aggressive actions with 
their missiles, but also with various flights and so forth that 
are threatening and, of course, with North Korea indicating a 
potential to provide weapons to Russia in their invasion of 
Ukraine.
    I am concerned about the fact that South Korea has a 
nuclear neighbor to its north with a massive investment in 
conventional as well as nuclear arms, and at the same time does 
not have a nuclear capacity of its own, and I would presume if 
I lived there I would be disturbed by that lack of balance and 
would be wondering how that could be remediated.
    I look forward to hearing your perspectives on these 
matters. I share the chairman's deep conviction that it is 
critical that our nations remain closely allied, that that we 
combine our support with the support of other nations in the 
region, Japan, obviously, in particular, and that association I 
would like to get your perspective on as well.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, we will turn to your questions and 
then we will be able to hear ultimately from our panelists.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Romney, 
for those remarks. I am now going to introduce more fully our 
three witnesses. Thank you all again for joining us.
    We have Victor Cha, who is the senior vice president for 
Asia and Korean Chair at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies and is also the distinguished professor 
of government at Georgetown University.
    He was appointed in 2021 by the Biden administration to 
serve on the Defense Policy Board as an advisory role to the 
Secretary of Defense. From 2004-2007, he served on the National 
Security Council and was responsible for Japan, Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island nations.
    Earlier he was deputy head of delegation at the Six-Party 
Talks and received two outstanding service commendations during 
his tenure at the NSC. He is the author of seven books, two-
time Fulbright Scholar and currently serves on 10 editorial 
boards of academic journals among many other accomplishments 
and expertise. Thank you, Dr. Cha, for being here.
    Scott Snyder is a senior fellow for Korea studies and 
director of the program of U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on 
Foreign Relations.
    Prior to joining the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. 
Snyder was a senior associate in the international relations 
program of the Asia Foundation, where he founded and directed 
the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the Asia 
Foundation's representative in Korea from 2000-2004.
    He was also a senior associate at the Pacific Forum Center 
for Strategic and International Studies. He has worked as an 
Asia specialist in the research and studies program of the U.S. 
Institute of Peace and as acting director of the Asia Society's 
contemporary affairs program.
    He was the Pantech visiting fellow at Stanford University's 
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2005-2006 and 
received an Abe Fellowship in 1998 from 1999 by the Social 
Security's Research Council. Again, thank you, Mr. Snyder, for 
being here to share your expertise.
    Jenny Town is a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and the 
director of Stimson's 38 North program. Her expertise in North 
Korea, U.S.-DPRK relations, U.S.-ROK alliance, and the 
northeast Asia regional security is well known and established.
    She was named one of Worth magazine's ``Groundbreakers 
2020: Fifty Women Changing the World,'' and one of Fast 
Company's most creative people in business in 2019 for her role 
in co-founding and managing the 38 North website, which 
provides policy and technical analysis on North Korea.
    Ms. Town is also an expert reviewer for Freedom House's 
Freedom in the World Index where she previously worked on the 
Human Rights in North Korea Project. From 2008-2018, Ms. Town 
served as the assistant director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies known as 
SAIS.
    Ms. Town, welcome and thank you very much for being with 
us.
    Let me now turn it over to you, Victor Cha, for your 
statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR CHA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA AND 
 KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member 
Romney, and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
    I am going to use my time to reflect on two recent and 
important developments with regard to security on the Korean 
Peninsula. From a U.S. perspective, one of these is positive 
and one of these is negative.
    The positive developments relate to the vast improvement, 
as Senator Romney suggested in his comments, in trilateral 
relations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.
    The scope of agreements reached at Camp David really are 
impressive and unprecedented and it leads me to ask sort of why 
did this happen--why did these three allies come together, and 
I think there are five reasons.
    The first is that the external security environment has 
compelled a much higher level of cooperation among the allies. 
To put it bluntly, the war in Europe really has changed 
everything, not just in Europe, but also in Asia.
    The unthinkable such as war in the Taiwan Strait or on the 
Korean Peninsula has now become possible and leaders are 
looking for ways to try to create more certainty and more 
stability.
    A second factor is China's increasingly assertive behavior 
in the East China Sea, in the South China Sea, and in the 
Taiwan Straits that has created much more uncertainty in the 
minds of leaders in Asia when you couple that with the war in 
Europe.
    A third factor bringing the three allies together, of 
course, is North Korea's unceasing ICBM and weapons of mass 
destruction campaign. In the past months, North Korea has 
tested its first successful solid propellant nuclear ICBM and 
this campaign shows no signs of abating anytime soon.
    The fourth factor contributing to the success of 
trilateralism is South Korean President Yoon's efforts at 
improving relations with Japan. The South Korean President 
basically took what would be the hardest foreign policy issue 
domestically and pushed forward even when initially it was not 
being reciprocated by Tokyo.
    The significance of this trilateral cooperation cannot be 
underestimated. When the United States, Japan, and South Korea 
are together, each is safer and each has a stronger ground upon 
which to deal with China.
    While Camp David has been a positive development for 
security on the Korean Peninsula, the negative development 
relates to the budding relationship between North Korea and 
Russia. It is not new in the sense that there has always been 
cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, but there are a few 
elements that are new.
    First, the North Korean leader arguably has leverage in the 
relationship for the first time in recent memory. Putin needs 
fresh supplies of ammunition and shells from North Korea to 
prosecute this unjust war in Ukraine and that gives Kim Jong-un 
a lot of leverage.
    Second, the Kim-Putin summit reduces Kim's need to talk to 
the United States. It is noteworthy that the Biden 
administration has stated its interest in reengaging in 
dialogue with North Korea with no preconditions as to the 
results of those talks.
    This, to me, is a subtle but significant change that 
suggests greater flexibility in the U.S. position. However, the 
prospects of such talks I think are even less likely because of 
the Putin-Kim summit.
    Indeed, I believe that part of the reason for Kim's 
engagement with Putin is because of the spectacular failure and 
the inability to recover from the era of summit diplomacy with 
the previous administration in the United States.
    The only way the North Korean leader could save face with 
regard to that was to come out of the COVID lockdown and seek a 
major summit with either Xi Jinping or Putin and he got his 
summit with Putin.
    Third, I am concerned that this summit meeting could result 
in substantial and significant Russian support of North Korea's 
weapons programs. To put it bluntly, the North Korean leader 
would not have traveled all the way to Russia simply for a food 
for munitions deal.
    Kim is looking for Russian assistance with his nuclear 
weapons program, with his military satellite program, a 
nuclear-powered submarine, and his ICBM program.
    Fourth, the summit will likely lead to more DPRK forced 
labor being sent to Russia. We have just done a report looking 
at Russia and China, who have been major perpetrators of North 
Korean human rights abuses.
    There are several options for how the United States should 
respond to this and I will just highlight a few. The full list 
is in my written testimony.
    The first is to seek coordinated responses in the form of 
sanctions through the G-7+ and the NATO AP4 venues. It is no 
longer possible to seek action on North Korea through the U.N. 
Security Council given Russia and China's opposition.
    Second, consider a new declaratory policy to neutralize 
DPRK ICBM launches including the possibility of preemptive 
action. This is a risky policy, but it would be aimed at 
deterring further testing by DPRK.
    Third, consider South Korean lethal assistance to Ukraine. 
South Korean President Yoon has stated that North Korea's 
provision of lethal assistance to Russia is a direct threat to 
South Korea's security. South Korea thus far has provided 
humanitarian assistance and indirect lethal support through 
third parties like Poland and the United States.
    Fourth, consider enhanced South Korea cooperation with 
AUKUS. Should Russia provide nuclear submarine technology to 
North Korea this might be considered a response. South Korea 
has world-class port facilities that could be nuclear 
certified.
    Then, finally, frame choices for China. Beijing remains 
ambivalent about this new cooperation between Pyongyang and 
Moscow. The United States should make clear to China that it 
cannot use North Korea as a vehicle for indirectly supporting 
Russia's war.
    In conclusion, there are some who might argue that this new 
development in DPRK-Russia cooperation is a response to the 
Camp David summit. I do not believe that to be the case. 
Russia's need for ammunition alone would have made this 
cooperation inevitable.
    This concatenation of developments in the region, however, 
is precipitating an arms race in Asia, but this is not at the 
initiative of the United States or its allies.
    China's massive nuclear buildup, North Korea's drive to 
become a nuclear weapons state the size of France, and most of 
all Russia's war in Europe have fundamentally changed the 
security environment in the region and on the Peninsula in ways 
that have compelled countries who support the peaceful status 
quo to respond.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor Cha

    Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, and distinguished 
members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to share my views with you on 
this important topic. The views represented in this testimony are my 
own and not those of any employer or institution with which I am 
affiliated. In my testimony, I would like to reflect on two recent and 
important developments with regard to security on the Korean peninsula. 
From a U.S. perspective, one of these is positive and one is negative.
                       the meaning of camp david
    The positive development relates to the vast improvement in 
trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 
I have been studying relations between these three key allies in 
Northeast Asia for decades. My first book, in fact, was on the 
trilateral relations among Japan, Korea, and the United States and how 
invaluable this was to U.S. strategic interests.
    During the Cold War, the United States saw the individual bilateral 
alliances with Korea and Japan as a strategic, trilateral whole when it 
came to defense and deterrence. The United States had troops deployed 
in both countries and the ``Korea Clause'' of the 1969 Nixon-Sato Joint 
Communique and Okinawa Reversion plan affirmed the role that Japan 
would play in Korean defense.
    In the post-Cold War era, Washington saw the trilateral 
relationship as an institution that could promote democracy, economic 
prosperity, and support of the liberal international order in a region 
of the world that did not yet readily accept such values.
    Today, the three allies are instrumental to shaping a strategic 
environment in which to manage China's rise, and they are critical to 
consolidating supply chains in emerging technologies.
    In this long history of these three-way relations, there have been 
several memorable moments, but I will focus on two: one good and one 
bad.
    The first, a positive moment, was in June 1965 when the United 
States brokered the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan 
and South Korea. This settlement included massive technological and 
economic assistance that eventually helped to launch the South Korean 
economy. It was no doubt a controversial agreement at the time for 
South Korea, but it was the right decision made by the government in 
pursuit of Korean national interests.
    The second, a negative moment, was in 2022 when Japan-Korea 
bilateral relations plummeted to one of its lowest points in history. 
Japanese company assets in Korea were on the verge of being confiscated 
following a South Korean supreme court ruling about compensation for 
forced labor during the occupation period from 1910 to 1945. South 
Korea threatened to decouple from an intelligence-sharing agreement 
with the United States and Japan (GSOMIA). Japan put South Korea on an 
export control list. South Korea nullified an agreement with Japan on 
compensation for comfort women victims. And Japanese and South Korean 
leaders had fallen into a state of non-dialogue even as threats mounted 
around them from China and North Korea.
    Of course, there have been other difficult periods in bilateral 
relations, like in the 1970s--when Mun Se Kwang attempted to 
assassinate President Park and murdered his wife. But what arguably 
made 2022 more damaging is that Korea and Japan were on the road to 
actively decoupling from each other's security--which was a gift to 
North Korea, China, and Russia, and a major liability for the United 
States.
    It is in this context that the Camp David summit of August 2023 
represents the third historic event in the history of trilateral 
relations. The scope of agreements reached is impressive: the 
institutionalization of trilateral meetings at the leader level and at 
the cabinet/minister level; the creation of a new, named set of 
trilateral exercises; and many other areas of cooperation scoped out in 
the Spirit of Camp David statement including: (1) securing supply 
chains, (2) combatting disinformation, and (3) promoting coordinated 
development assistance. This institutionalization of trilateral 
relations and the broadened scope of cooperation is unprecedented.
    How were the three allies able to accomplish this? I think there 
are five reasons. First, the external security environment compelled a 
higher level of cooperation among the allies. Put bluntly, the war in 
Europe has changed everything. Its ripple effects are felt in Asia and 
has altered the way leaders think about security. The unthinkable--such 
as war in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean peninsula--has become 
possible. The Ukraine war has made the security environment in Asia 
unstable, and leaders look for ways to create more stability.
    A second factor is China's increasingly assertive behavior in the 
East China Sea, South China Sea, and in the Taiwan strait. This alone 
may not worry Koreans and Japanese enough, but in combination with the 
war in Ukraine and Taiwan's election in a few months, there is more 
uncertainty than ever before.
    A third factor bringing the three allies together is North Korea's 
unceasing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) campaign. It has done scores of missile tests during 
the Biden presidency. In the past months, North Korea has tried to 
launch military satellites, rolled out a new submarine capable of 
launching multiple submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 
successfully tested its first solid propellant nuclear ICBM. This 
campaign shows no sign of abating any time soon.
    A fourth factor contributing to the cooperation between our Korean 
and Japanese allies is U.S. domestic politics. Our upcoming elections 
worry Seoul and Tokyo. The possibility of a return to foreign policy by 
the United States that denigrates allies in Europe and Asia and views 
them as liabilities rather than assets creates an impulse to try to 
institutionalize trilateral cooperation now to avoid uncertainty in the 
future.
    The fifth factor contributing to the success of trilateralism is 
South Korean President Yoon's foreign policy. While President Biden 
certainly has supported coalition-building among U.S. allies in Asia 
and hosted the Camp David summit, Yoon's efforts at improving relations 
with Japan were instrumental. From early on in his presidency, Yoon 
made Japan rapprochement a top priority. He gets a lot of credit for 
this from the White House, which refers to Yoon's efforts as brimming 
with ``political courage.'' Yoon basically took on the hardest foreign 
policy issue domestically and pushed forward even when the Kishida 
government in Tokyo did not initially reciprocate.
    The significance of this trilateral cooperation cannot be 
underestimated. When the United States, Japan, and Korea are together, 
each is safer, and each has a stronger ground upon which to deal with 
China. This is not a trilateral alliance per se because of domestic 
sensitivities in Korea and Japan, but it is about as close as you can 
get to one, complete with the new, named trilateral exercises and the 
commitment to consult.
                        the new unholy alliance
    While Camp David was a positive development for security on the 
Korean peninsula, the negative development relates to the budding 
relationship between North Korea and Russia. Kim Jong-un's second visit 
to Russia took place this past month, featuring new military 
cooperation between these longtime neighbors. Kim's 6-day long sojourn 
was longer than his previous trip in 2019, where he visited the 
Vostochny space center, Komsomolsk-on-Amur defense industry, and 
Vladivostok. He toured Russian jet fighters, rockets, strategic 
bombers, and guided missile frigates. Just when you thought the 
situation with North Korea could not get any worse, it has with the 
consummation of this unholy alliance.
    It is not new in the sense that there has always been cooperation 
between Pyongyang and Moscow historically, but there are a few elements 
that are new. First, the North Korean leader arguably has leverage in 
this relationship for the first time in recent memory. In the past, 
North Korea was always the supplicant, asking for patron prices for 
Russian energy and debt relief. Now, Putin needs fresh supplies of 
ammunition and shells from North Korea to prosecute his unjust war in 
Ukraine.
    Second, the Kim-Putin summit reduces Kim's need to talk to the 
United States. The Biden administration, despite numerous attempts, has 
had no success in engaging the North Koreans in disarmament dialogue. 
It is noteworthy that the Administration has stated its interest in 
reengaging in dialogue with DPRK with no preconditions as to the 
results of such talks. This is a subtle but significant change that 
suggests greater flexibility. But the prospects of such talks are even 
less likely now in the aftermath of the Kim-Putin summit. Indeed, part 
of the reason for Kim's engagement with Putin is because of the 
spectacular failure of the previous U.S. Administration's summit 
diplomacy with North Korea. The abrupt end to the U.S.-DPRK summit 
meeting in Hanoi in 2019 was a tremendous embarrassment for Kim. The 
country shortly after that went into a 3-year Covid-19 lockdown. The 
only way the North Korean leader could save face was to emerge from the 
lockdown with a major summit with either Xi Jinping or Putin.
    Third, I am concerned that this summit meeting could result in 
substantial and significant Russian support of North Korea's weapons 
programs. To put it bluntly, the North Korean leader would not travel 
all the way to Russia simply for a food-for-munitions deal. The visit 
to the space station, Russian Pacific Fleet, and other military 
facilities all suggest that Kim is looking for Russian assistance with 
his nuclear weapons program, military satellite program, a nuclear-
powered submarine, and his ICBM program.
    Fourth, the summit will likely lead to more DPRK forced labor being 
sent to Russia. A recent report (https://www.bushcenter.org/
publications/how-china-and-russia-facilitate-north-koreas-human-rights-
abuses) by the Bush Institute details how Russia and China have been 
major perpetrators of North Korean human rights abuses. The remittances 
from these workers do not go to the families, but end up in government 
coffers to support the weapons programs.
    There are several options for the United States in response to 
these developments.

   Seek coordinated responses in the form of censure and 
        sanctions through the G7-plus and NATO + Asia-Pacific 4. It is 
        no longer possible to seek United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions (UNSCRs) on North Korean misbehavior through the UN 
        Security Council given Russian and Chinese opposition.

   Coordinate legislative actions on Russia and North Korea 
        among like-minded partners like the United States, Japan, 
        Korea, and Australia. This becomes even more important because 
        the groupings above do not have any enforcement authority like 
        the UN. Therefore, providing each ally with enforcement tools 
        based on new directives is key.

   Accelerate and enhance trilateral military cooperation among 
        the United States, Japan, and Korea. This would include all of 
        the new initiatives enumerated in the Camp David summit.

   Consider a new declaratory policy to neutralize future DPRK 
        ICBM launches, including pre-emptive action. This is a risky 
        policy, but it would be aimed at deterring further testing by 
        DPRK.

   Consider South Korean lethal assistance to Ukraine. South 
        Korean President Yoon has stated that North Korea's provision 
        of lethal assistance to Russia would constitute a direct threat 
        to South Korea's national security. Seoul has thus far provided 
        only humanitarian assistance directly to Ukraine but has 
        provided indirect lethal support through third parties like the 
        United States and Poland.

   Consider enhanced South Korean cooperation with AUKUS. 
        Should Russia provide nuclear submarine technology to North 
        Korea, this might be considered as a response. South Korea has 
        world-class port facilities that could be nuclear certified.

   Frame choices for China. Beijing remains ambivalent about 
        this new cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow and has 
        maintained an arms-length distance from military support of 
        Russia's unjust war in Ukraine. The Chinese foreign ministry 
        thus far has refused to comment on DPRK-Russia relations, but 
        foreign minister Wang Yi met Sergei Lavrov in mid-September for 
        4 days of consultations. The United States should look for 
        opportunities to widen the divide between Xi and these other 
        protagonists, and should make clear to China that it cannot use 
        North Korea as a vehicle for indirectly supporting Russia's 
        war.

    There are some who argue that this new development in DPRK-Russia 
cooperation is a response to the Camp David summit. I do not believe 
this to be the case. Russia's need for ammunition alone would have made 
this cooperation inevitable regardless of U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral 
cooperation. While it is true that this concatenation of developments 
in the region is precipitating an arms race in Asia, this is not at the 
initiative of the United States or its allies. China's massive nuclear 
buildup, North Korea's drive to become a nuclear weapons state the size 
of France, and most of all, Russia's war in Europe have fundamentally 
changed the security environment in the region and on the Korean 
peninsula in ways that have compelled countries who support the 
peaceful status quo to respond.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Dr. Cha.
    Mr. Snyder.

  STATEMENT OF SCOTT SNYDER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR KOREA STUDIES, 
          COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege of 
participating in this hearing on security on the Peninsula and 
for spotlighting the impact of a new era of major power rivalry 
on the Peninsula and Indo-Pacific security situation.
    Thank you also for your strong voice of support for the 
U.S.-South Korea alliance reflected in your opening comments, 
which is our most valuable instrument for responding to 
international security challenges not only on the Peninsula, 
but increasingly globally.
    The U.S.-South Korea alliance has become even more 
important in the context of a possible contagion of revisionist 
actions modeled on Russia's invasion of Ukraine that China and 
North Korea as challengers to internationally accepted 
borderlines might be tempted to repeat in Asia.
    Bipartisan congressional support for the alliance is also 
important against the backdrop of domestic political 
polarization and emerging forms of narrow nationalism in the 
U.S. and South Korea that could hamper alliance cooperation 
that has served us so well for 70 years.
    I see three main impacts of the evolving global security 
situation on the Korean Peninsula. The first one you touched on 
in your opening statement and that is the paralysis of the U.N. 
Security Council as a result of major power rivalry as the main 
instrument by which we impose penalties on North Korea for its 
illegal ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests.
    China and Russia have opened a back door of supply to North 
Korea despite UNSC resolutions intended to keep the front door 
closed, and they are protecting North Korea from punishment 
from further UNSC violations.
    Given the paralysis at the U.N., the United States has no 
choice but to build a coalition of the willing among like-
minded countries in similar fashion to the development of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative in the mid 2000s, which 
supported efforts to discourage North Korean illicit maritime 
transfers.
    U.N. paralysis requires a revamp of the array of sanctions 
designed to deny North Korea's supply of technologies that have 
military uses. This effort should bypass Chinese and Russian 
noncooperation through the pursuit of secondary sanctions as a 
means by which to hold banking entities accountable.
    The Otto Warmbier BRINK Act that you sponsored is a step in 
the right direction toward addressing these issues, and the 
U.S. and South Korea and Japan need to grapple more actively 
with North Korea's exploitation of cyber theft as an instrument 
for circumventing legal restraints and its ability to conduct 
international transactions.
    There is also a need to supplement the public reporting on 
North Korean illicit transfers that had been supplied by the 
U.N. panel of experts as a means by which to hold North Korea's 
actions in the light.
    Second, evolving byproducts of U.S.-China rivalry include 
an expanded focus on competition with China and the 
strengthening of like-minded cooperation among the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea.
    The deepening institutionalization of U.S.-Japan-South 
Korea coordination as a result of the Camp David summit has 
enhanced the effectiveness of that coalition to deal with the 
danger of Chinese coercive behavior.
    There is also the development of a tit-for-tat dynamic 
between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on the one hand and 
Russia, China, and North Korea on the other.
    While strengthening our own coalition, the United States 
and South Korea, in my view, should resist the urge to allow 
policy toward North Korea to be subordinated to the U.S.-China 
rivalry, which may serve to push China, North Korea, and Russia 
closer toward each other.
    Rather, the United States and South Korea should pursue 
efforts to compartmentalize North Korea as an area where China 
maintains a limited shared interest in denuclearization despite 
U.S.-China strategic competition.
    Third, North Korea's continued missile testing and the 
adjustment of its nuclear doctrine will continue to place 
pressure on the United States and South Korea to reconcile the 
gap between the global view of extended deterrence through 
which the United States pledges to uphold global 
nonproliferation norms while responding to North Korean nuclear 
threats and the peninsular view, which focuses on the imbalance 
between a North Korea that has nuclear weapons and a South 
Korea that does not, as Senator Romney referenced.
    In addition to enhancing the U.S.-South Korean nuclear 
planning consultations through the Nuclear Consultative Group 
announced last April, the United States should also provide 
training to dedicated South Korean units in nuclear weapons 
response and containment in the event of nuclear use on the 
Peninsula.
    This would equip South Korean personnel to respond in real 
time to nuclear use scenarios rather than having to wait on 
U.S. specialized units from off the Peninsula in the event of 
use.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to join you today and I 
look forward to the discussion.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Mr. Scott Snyder

    Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify 
before this committee on the security situation on the Korean 
Peninsula. We have just passed the 70th anniversary of the signing of 
the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Defense Treaty, which marked 
the beginning of a security alliance ``forged in blood'' during the 
Korean War. Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance has evolved to 
encompass economic cooperation powered by chips, electric batteries, 
and clean technology, as the threat perceptions of our two countries 
have expanded in the face of common threats not only on the peninsula, 
but also regionally and globally.
    As like-minded democracies, the scope of common values, interests, 
and actions that initially bounded the United States and South Korea 
together to address the North Korean threat now extends to potential 
revisionist security threats across the Taiwan Strait, in the South 
China Sea, and from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Likewise, the scope 
of U.S.-South Korea alliance cooperation extends both to non-
traditional security as we cooperate to combat threats against public 
health, energy security, and climate change and to the growing 
integration of our economies to ensure supply chain resiliency and 
maintain leadership in technological innovation and development.
    I emphasize the U.S.-South Korea alliance because it is the most 
promising instrument through which the United States maintains its 
interest and stake in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula while 
also The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions 
on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. Government. All 
statements of fact and addressing major threats to security in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Because the viability of the alliance provides the 
foundation for U.S. strategy and policy toward security on the 
peninsula and in the region, please allow me to make a brief comment on 
the importance of defending the alliance from the emerging internal 
threat posed by domestic political polarization in our two countries.
    My forthcoming book, The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Why It Might 
Fail and Why It Must Not, argues that the risks of a ``go it alone'' 
approach to Indo-Pacific security represented by ``America First'' or 
``Korea first'' policies threaten the longstanding bipartisan consensus 
and strong public support that the alliance enjoys. There remains a 
risk that narrow partisan arguments that denigrate or demean our allies 
and partners might undermine this support. In the United States, 
arguments against the alliance might revolve around whether allies are 
paying enough to justify our commitment to defend against a threat 
``over there.''
    In South Korea, there could be arguments that cooperation with 
North Korea is more important than the alliance with the United States 
on the one hand or that South Korea cannot rely on the credibility of 
U.S. defense pledges against North Korea's nuclear weapons on the 
other. In this regard, the determination of Congress to preserve the 
bipartisan consensus supporting the U.S.-South Korea security alliance 
is a bulwark against any possible degradation of the effectiveness of 
the alliance in preserving our mutual security and prosperity.
    The primary security developments facing the United States on the 
Korean Peninsula today revolve around the implications of the changing 
geopolitical context on North Korea's foreign policy and strategic 
aims, the impact of South Korea's closer alignment with the United 
States on the relative priority of North Korea in the context of 
broader Indo-Pacific issues, and the implications of North Korea's 
nuclear declarations for the future of the regime.
           the era of major power rivalry and its impact on 
                      north korea's foreign policy
    North Korea under Kim Jong Un has consistently pursued its 
objective of attaining domestic prestige and international legitimacy 
as a nuclear weapon state. Upon becoming leader, one of Kim's first 
acts in 2012 was to enshrine the nuclear legacy of his forefathers into 
the preamble of the North Korean constitution. Kim dangled the prospect 
of ``complete denuclearization'' to win a series of summits with China, 
South Korea, and the United States under President Donald Trump. But 
the regime's internal statements and actions underscore Kim's quest to 
illegally gain international recognition as a ``responsible nuclear 
state,'' but outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
    The failure of Kim's 2019 Hanoi summit with President Trump meant 
Kim returned home empty-handed. As a result, Kim redirected his 
diplomatic focus away from the United States, redoubled his missile and 
nuclear development in response to a hostile external environment, and 
recentralized his domestic economy. An extended self-quarantine during 
the COVID-19 pandemic weakened North Korea economically, but Kim used 
the pandemic to demonize foreign influences in the country and reassert 
political loyalty to himself as the primary condition for survival in 
an isolated North Korea. The intensification of major power rivalry 
between the United States and China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine 
further catalyzed North Korea's inward focus, created space for Kim's 
diplomatic maneuvers, and undermined the effectiveness of UN sanctions.
    Kim Jong Un's recent summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
reflects North Korea's geopolitical realities and marks the emergence 
of Kim's post-COVID foreign policy 2.0. No longer pursuing a sanctions-
relieving deal with the United States in exchange for partial 
denuclearization, Kim's foreign policy 2.0 is marked by a sanctions-
defying arms deal with Putin in exchange for tangible Russian military 
and economic rewards. Kim now faces a more favorable geopolitical 
environment for growing his nuclear arsenal and burnishing his 
legitimacy without facing the risks or demands that would come from the 
United States. And Kim may still hold out hope that his meeting with 
Putin is only a warm-up for renewed summitry with a reelected President 
Trump in 2025.
    Additionally, paralysis at the UN Security Council resulting from 
geopolitical rivalry has created new opportunities for North Korea to 
benefit from global divisions that did not exist prior to the pandemic. 
Moreover, global sanctions applied to Russia following its invasion of 
Ukraine expanded the domain of sanctioned countries to include both 
North Korea and Russia, with the perverse impact of partially relieving 
North Korea's isolation and expanding Kim's freedom of action.
    The main implication of stalemale at the UN Security Council for 
U.S. policy toward North Korea is the evisceration of an effective UN-
centered international sanctions regime, enabling North Korea to engage 
in nuclear and missile tests with virtual impunity from political 
censure and with assurance that the country will face no further 
tangible costs for its actions. The nine major UN Security Council 
resolutions punishing North Korea for missile tests since 2006 have 
been undermined. China and Russia brazenly supply North Korea through 
the back door of bilateral transfers while the UN front door remains 
firmly shut. Moreover, North Korea has adapted its myriad sanctions 
evasion practices since the high point of UN sanctions pressure in 2017 
to render the sanctions ineffective.
    Thus, the sanctions regime against North Korea is in desperate need 
of a revamp, even if such a regime will not stand on the foundation of 
UN Security Council resolutions. Instead, the United States should 
pursue the establishment of a broad multilateral sanctions regime among 
like-minded actors in a fashion similar to that of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), a multilateral effort established in 2006 to 
interdict illicit North Korean commercial transfers. By building a 
coalition of the willing, the United States can sustain some pressure 
on North Korea while attempting to bypass Chinese and Russian non-
cooperation through the pursuit of secondary sanctions that hold 
entities with exposure to the U.S. banking system accountable for their 
assistance to North Korea.
    The reestablishment or revitalization of a multilateral sanctions 
regime targeting North Korea is necessary but will not be sufficient 
unless it is accompanied by an updated analysis of North Korea's 
pattern of external resource procurements and the ability to hold 
accountable entities physically located in states not participating in 
the multilateral regime. For instance, the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea have already announced cooperative measures to monitor and 
interdict North Korean earnings from cybertheft operations undertaken 
by the North Korean Government. Such efforts need to be pursued with 
both greater urgency and expanded scope.
    Meanwhile, the Biden administration should be ready to engage in 
diplomacy with North Korea where possible. The securing of the release 
of Private Travis King underscores the necessity and value of 
maintaining diplomatic channels and openness to dialogue, even while 
prospects for denuclearization negotiations remain low. Prospects for 
broader diplomacy will remain poor until the North sends a clear signal 
indicating its willingness to talk.
u.s.-south korean alignment on indo-pacific strategy and its impact on 
                       policy toward north korea
    The second geostrategic development with implications for policy 
toward North Korea is the decision by South Korean President Yoon Suk 
Yeol to align South Korea's policies toward China more closely with the 
United States. President Yoon's closer alignment with the United States 
is reflected in his government's decision to adopt the U.S. strategic 
framework for the region by issuing South Korea's first Indo-Pacific 
strategy. The adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategy reflects the 
broadening of the scope of U.S.-South Korean strategic coordination 
beyond a sole focus on North Korea to include more active coordination 
on China. Effective policy coordination toward China will require a 
significant investment of time, effort, and resources by both 
governments. But in the course of expanding the scope of coordination 
to include China policy, the importance of effectively addressing North 
Korea's nuclear development must not be lost in the shuffle.
    In addition, the Yoon administration's courageous effort to 
stabilize relations with Japan and the deepening of trilateral 
cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea have 
implications for policy toward North Korea. The institutionalization of 
trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea 
will strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, enhance 
real-time monitoring and responses to North Korean missile launches, 
and align trilateral public diplomacy toward North Korea on issues such 
as human rights and its destabilizing military development, all while 
enabling the expansion of a values-based investment, development, and 
deterrence strategy against Chinese aggression across the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    Alongside the deepening of trilateral cooperation, there is also 
the development of a tit-for-tat dynamic between rival coalitions among 
the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the one hand and China, 
North Korea, and Russia on the other hand. The development of such a 
dynamic makes it more likely that North Korea will receive a measure of 
protection and support from China and Russia while diminishing the 
likelihood of positive interactions between North Korea and the United 
States, Japan, or South Korea. One ironic impact is that the 
development of rival coalitions eases North Korea's isolation and 
deepens its dependency on China and Russia in return for greater 
protection from UN sanctions.
    Deepening U.S.-China geostrategic differences will continue to 
offer Kim Jong Un solace rather than restraint despite the limited 
shared interest that the United States and China have in North Korea's 
denuclearization. The United States and South Korea should resist the 
urge to subordinate North Korea as an issue on the U.S.-South Korea 
policy agenda with China or to think about North Korea simply as a 
subcomponent of the China challenge. Instead, the United States and 
South Korea should pursue an approach to China built on a U.S.-South 
Korea alignment borne of common values but that attempts to 
compartmentalize North Korea as an area where both sides hold shared 
interests despite U.S.-China strategic competition. Such an approach 
should exploit differences within the emerging China-North Korea-Russia 
coalition and encourage Chinese efforts to maintain restraint on the 
worst of North Korea's destabilizing behavior.
    For instance, China may be dissatisfied with Kim's warming 
relations with Putin, but Chinese leader Xi Jinping has both a close 
relationship with Putin and sufficient leverage over North Korea that 
he is unlikely to be drawn into a fruitless competition for influence 
over Kim. The biggest risk inherent in the warming of relations between 
Kim and Putin is the possibility that Kim might misread warming 
relations as a justification for ignoring perceived Chinese restraints 
on North Korea's ability and willingness to pursue a seventh nuclear 
test. The United States and South Korea should make efforts to separate 
China from North Korea and Russia rather than allowing rising U.S.-
China competition to force Xi into closer alignment with Kim and Putin.
              u.s.-south korean alliance coordination and 
               north korea's nuclear weapons development
    A third dimension of the international security challenge posed by 
North Korea's enshrinement of its nuclear status in the regime's 
constitution is that it further deepens the intractability of the North 
Korean nuclear issue and makes it possible for the North to use its 
nuclear program as a poison pill meant to guarantee Kim's primary 
objective of regime survival. Rather than enhancing the regime's 
legitimacy and survivability, however, it highlights the dangers to 
global security of Kim Jong Un's ``I survive or we all die'' quest for 
absolute security.
    North Korea's threats to preemptively use tactical nuclear weapons 
against South Korea have generated debates within South Korea over its 
own acquisition of nuclear weapons independent of the United States, 
giving hope to North Korea that its nuclear threats might generate 
unprecedented tensions in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. At the April 
2023 summit between Presidents Biden and Yoon, the United States and 
South Korea responded to South Korean public support for an autonomous 
nuclear capability with the Washington Declaration, which pledged 
closer nuclear planning and coordination through the newly established 
U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group. At that time, President 
Biden personally underscored U.S. policy that North Korea's use of 
nuclear weapons would result in the end of their regime and committed 
to closely consult with the South Korean President on such matters. The 
United States has increased the rotation of U.S. nuclear-capable 
strategic assets to South Korea, which included the first visit of a 
U.S. nuclear submarine to a South Korean port in over four decades.
    The promulgation of the Washington Declaration and subsequent 
measures have been moderately successful in assuaging South Korean 
concerns about the credibility of the U.S. pledge to defend South Korea 
from North Korea's nuclear threats. Through ongoing nuclear planning 
consultations at various levels, the United States and South Korea must 
continue to bridge the gap between the global view of extended 
deterrence through which the United States pledges to uphold global 
nonproliferation norms while responding to North Korean nuclear threats 
and the peninsular view which focuses on the imbalance between a North 
Korea that has nuclear weapons and South Korea that does not. Another 
step that the United States should take as part of this process 
involves the training of South Korean military units on how to 
implement effective responses in the event of the detonation of a North 
Korean nuclear device on South Korean soil. Such training would provide 
South Korea with its own dedicated nuclear response capability and 
would save the precious hours it might take for U.S. units to arrive in 
South Korea to carry out a response to a nuclear disaster.
                               conclusion
    North Korea's decades-long pursuit of nuclear weapons has gradually 
turned the regime from a peninsular to global security threat. The rise 
of major power rivalry has complicated the already slim prospects for 
resolving the threat and has provided additional protection for North 
Korea, which is the source of the threat. Kim Jong Un's quest for 
regime survival and legitimacy has exacerbated an intractable and 
potentially catastrophic situation that has both peninsular and global 
implications. The international community must seek levers that 
catalyze the pace of change inside North Korea and take measures to 
limit the truly daunting consequences that may come if Kim Jong Un 
indeed takes steps to export his own insecurity to the rest of the 
world.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Snyder.
    Ms. Town.

 STATEMENT OF JENNY TOWN, SENIOR FELLOW, DIRECTOR OF 38 NORTH 
            PROGRAM, STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Town. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 
Romney and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    It is really a deep honor to be here today and to be able 
to appear before you and I am truly grateful for both the 
committee's interest in this issue, but also this incredible 
opportunity to be part of this discussion with Dr. Cha and Mr. 
Snyder.
    The recent summit between Putin and Kim in what seems to be 
a new level of military cooperation forming between the two 
comes as no surprise. Deepening alignment between China, 
Russia, and North Korea has been taking form for the past few 
years and especially between Russia and North Korea since 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    However, since the failure to reach an agreement in 2019 to 
keep U.S.-North Korea rapprochement alive we have essentially 
been sidelined by Pyongyang.
    Overtures have been made to the North Koreans to try and 
revive those negotiations and essentially repeat the 
conversations of the past despite, as we have all talked about, 
the drastic shifts in the geopolitical situation that work in 
North Korea's favor now.
    Certainly, that has not worked and instead North Korea has 
spent the last few years even while in pandemic isolation 
building up its WMD programs in ways that challenge U.S. and 
allied forces and are on trend with the arms race in the 
region.
    We are now watching this move into a new phase and 
Pyongyang is cultivating actual security partners as well, and 
Russia seems more than willing given its precarious situation. 
To what extent is still unclear, but it seems enough to have 
Kim excited.
    The question this raises is how do we get back in the game? 
This is, obviously, a challenge we have not figured out and one 
that we are seeing the consequences of play out in real time.
    While the U.S. has focused heavily on strengthening our 
alliances with South Korea and Japan to great success, as many 
have mentioned, and bolstering our extended deterrence 
arrangements, these efforts are still just one piece of the 
security puzzle.
    They are not going to reduce tensions or mitigate the 
threat environment on their own and, in fact, they often 
strengthen the North's conviction that its choices are just.
    North Korea as the smaller country meets power with power 
to prove that it will not be intimidated, and the U.S. and 
South Korea are also good at meeting power with power. For 
every negative action North Korea takes, we are ready to 
increase pressure and demonstrate how much overmatch of 
capabilities we have, remind them that we could annihilate them 
if they cross the line.
    However, as the bigger country and the stronger forces in 
this equation, we really should assess when we use these kinds 
of responses to be more strategic and to avoid the kind of 
escalation spiral we are caught in today.
    At the same time, what we are not good at is matching good 
will for good will. The trust deficit between our countries 
means that we assume North Korea's negative choices to have the 
most sinister intent and we tend to believe that about their 
positive actions as well.
    This also has been an obstacle to diplomacy in the past. 
There have been times when North Korea wanted to negotiate, was 
willing to take or took unilateral actions to create windows of 
opportunity, but our own skepticism and reluctance to 
reciprocate led to missed opportunities.
    In fact, we are actually posed with one of those moments 
today. The release of Travis King was the best possible outcome 
for all parties involved, and acknowledging that and finding a 
way to reciprocate that good will could potentially help create 
some small diplomatic opening.
    In my submitted remarks, I have listed a few 
recommendations for how to think about rebuilding diplomacy 
with North Korea and I will highlight just two here.
    The first is we need a full-time envoy. North Korea's 
impact on regional and global security dynamics is serious and 
consequential and needs to be treated as such.
    Despite what else is happening around the world, we should 
upgrade the Special Representative position back to a full-time 
position to strategize, to coordinate interagency efforts, and 
to be proactive and persistent in trying to reestablish 
channels of communication with the North Koreans.
    Second, we need to recognize that North Korea's loyalties 
and alignments are not forever, and even the competition of 
influence between Russia and China shows that Pyongyang cares 
most about the results.
    Finding ways to instill some confidence that resuming talks 
with the United States on a range of issues, not just nuclear, 
comes with some easy wins while we work towards more difficult 
outcomes may help lower the perception of political or even 
personal risk for our North Korean counterparts and may 
eventually be compelling.
    Certainly, there are no magic answers here that are going 
to guarantee success and changing course is undoubtedly going 
to come with criticism, but waiting for North Korea to come 
around as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula 
becomes more dangerous does not serve the collective interests 
of the U.S. or our allies.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Town follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ms. Jenny Town

    Subcommittee Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is a distinct honor to be 
able to testify this afternoon, about the growing challenges to 
security on the Korean Peninsula.
    The recent summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, was a 
stark reminder of how the geopolitical trends in the region are 
shifting as well as the cost of passive diplomacy toward North Korea.
    This was by no means a surprising development; signaling between 
Russia and North Korea has been deepening for some time now, especially 
since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Kim is one of the few leaders who 
has consistently and openly supported Putin's war, pledging both 
political and tactical support--a commitment that came at little cost 
to North Korea, but was sure to be rewarded.
    On the heels of the trilateral summit between the United States, 
South Korea and Japan at Camp David, Moscow's willingness to host Kim 
at the space launch facility and openly engage North Korea on rocket 
and satellite technologies, fighter jets and other military 
technologies, appears to signal more than just a potential arms deal in 
the works to help prolong Russia's warfighting ability in Ukraine. 
These developments suggest a sense of reciprocal high level political 
signaling, but that Putin sees a role for North Korea in Russia's 
larger ``war against the West''--a proposition that could help North 
Korea accelerate its WMD development.
    That said, the way Russia-North Korea relations have evolved in 
recent years illustrates the importance of finding ways to rebuild 
diplomacy with North Korea. While Pyongyang is not sending signals it 
is open to diplomacy with the United States, especially on nuclear 
issues, waiting for it to do so would be a serious mistake.
                   a look back: missed opportunities
    The Hanoi Summit in 2019 was a major window of opportunity for 
U.S.-DPRK relations, one that is unlikely to be replicated in the 
foreseeable future. Not only was Kim Jong Un still willing to negotiate 
about the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, but there was high level 
political will in South Korea and the United States to try to 
facilitate that process in mutually beneficial ways. China and Russia 
were also supportive of these diplomatic efforts, although carving out 
their own interests along the way.
    An agreement at that time, even if not ideal, would have created a 
starting point for cultivating cooperation, building trust and 
providing a basis for testing each party's resolve: what were the 
various parties willing to do to reap the benefits of better relations? 
How far were they willing to go? From enhanced regional security and 
stability to economic development and integration, to confidence and 
security building measures that could pave the way for more substantive 
progress on denuclearization or even arms control talks on the Korean 
Peninsula, the possibilities at the time under that particular cast of 
leaders, seemed promising.
    While cautious optimism was warranted, there were signs that Kim 
Jong Un saw a real opportunity to explore cooperation. To create a 
political environment conducive to and build momentum for diplomacy, 
Kim took a number of positive unilateral steps ahead of the first U.S.-
DPRK summit in Singapore, including a self-declared moratorium on 
nuclear and long-range missile testing, the return of U.S. detainees, 
partial demolition of the country's nuclear test site, and partial 
dismantlement of the country's main rocket launch pad, the latter of 
which closed loopholes in disputes between rocket launches and missile 
launches that had derailed agreements in the past. Domestic measures 
were also taken, including the elimination of anti-U.S. propaganda as 
well as a buildup of domestic expectations that a diplomatic 
breakthrough was on the horizon that would bring about greater economic 
development. Even after Singapore, North Korea was quick to act on the 
return of U.S. POW/MIA remains as the one concrete action item 
stipulated in the Singapore Joint Statement.
    While U.S.-DPRK relations were in good standing, inter-Korean 
relations also evolved quickly. For instance, with one inter-Korean 
summit already under his belt, Kim hosted South Korean President Moon 
in Pyongyang in September 2018, allowing him to speak to a live North 
Korean audience, hosting K-pop exhibitions in Pyongyang (cultural 
exposure that had historically been banned), and even standing on the 
top of Mt. Paektu, hands raised to show that the two Koreas were moving 
forward together. North Korea's willingness to both negotiate and start 
to implement the inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement also 
showed a level of good will, cooperativeness, and eagerness to move 
forward that hadn't existed in decades.
    These measures all came with hefty political risk, especially for 
Kim. Not only was it his diplomatic debut, but the live domestic 
coverage of the summits and the raising of domestic expectations was a 
big gamble--one that eventually, did not pan out. The inability to come 
to agreement in Hanoi was consequential and meant the collapse of 
inter-Korean talks as well, as Seoul was unable to move forward with an 
ambitious cooperation agenda. Not only was there a price to pay by both 
those advising and negotiating on the North Korean side, but efforts 
were needed to spin the diplomatic efforts as a success while tamping 
expectations back down about the country's future. By the end of the 
year, when no further progress was made on defining an acceptable first 
step agreement, Kim's disillusionment with negotiating with the United 
States was palpable and rhetoric started to shift toward a ``new way,'' 
one that set forth a plan to make the economy more resilient to a 
persistent sanctions regime and that appeared to focus diplomatic 
energy on more like-minded states, where the potential benefits of 
cooperation were lower but easier to attain.
             implications for resuming nuclear negotiations
    The prospects of recreating the conditions that lead to the 
summitry of 2018-2019 are extremely low for the near-term.
North Korea's View of Nuclear Weapons
    The biggest obstacle to resuming negotiations about 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is that Pyongyang's attitudes 
toward its nuclear weapons program have fundamentally changed. 
Alongside the announcement of its new ``Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear 
Forces'' in September 2022,\1\ wherein North Korea described itself as 
a responsible nuclear state and outlined conditions under which it 
would consider nuclear use, North Korean rhetoric about its nuclear 
weapons program also shifted. While past descriptions of the country's 
nuclear weapons were posed as contingent on the United States 
maintaining its hostile policy against the DPRK, leaving the door open 
to negotiations, Kim Jong Un's speech to the Supreme National Assembly 
denounced future negotiations to this end, adding ``We have drawn the 
line of no retreat regarding our nuclear weapons so that there will be 
no longer any bargaining over them.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``DPRK's Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces Promulgated,'' 
Naenara, September 9, 2022.
    \2\ ``Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh 
Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,'' Rodong Sinmun, September 9, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Just last week, Kim announced that a constitutional amendment had 
been passed that ``ensures the country's right to existence and 
development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly 
developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.'' He explained (http://
www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyMy0w
OS0yOC1IMDA1QA==) how the country's nuclear weapons were for self-
defense against a ``protracted confrontation with the U.S. . . . and 
its vassal forces'' and stressed the need for ``exponentially boosting 
the production of nuclear weapons and diversifying the nuclear strike 
means and deploying them.''
Alignment with China and Russia and Embracing a ``New Cold War''
    From about 2021 on, North Korea has embraced the suggestion of a 
``new Cold War'' and its alignment within it, deepening its ties to 
China and Russia. This, as some scholars have noted (https://
www.38north.org/2022/11/the-real-significance-of-north-koreas-recent-
military-activities/), marks a ``fundamental shift away from the 
North's 30+ year policy of nonalignment with China or Russia and 
efforts to normalize relations with the United States.''
    Moves were swift to strengthen relations with China and Russia, 
with the North Korean defense minister pledging in 2022, ``strategic 
and tactic[al] coordinated operations with the Chinese army, and Kim 
Jong Un touting a new level of ``strategic and tactical cooperation'' 
with Russia. The inclusion of tactical cooperation was new in both 
instances.
    North Korea has certainly benefited from these alignments, 
especially as the United States strengthens both bilateral and 
trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. China and 
Russia, embroiled in competition with what they perceive as a U.S.-led 
or West-led security bloc in the region, have viewed North Korea as an 
important security partner. They have provided political cover for 
North Korea at the UN Security Council, blocking any attempts at 
imposing new sanctions for Pyongyang's continued WMD testing, and have 
resumed exports and aid to North Korea, with little clarity on what 
Pyongyang provides in return. In Russia's case, there have been 
multiple U.S. intelligence leaks (https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2022/11/02/north-korea-russia-weapons-ukraine/) of 
transfers of arms and munitions from North Korea. While China is a 
major partner to North Korea these days, especially economically, North 
Korea has made clear that Russia is currently its primary focus. The 
differentiating factor here appears to be who can provide Pyongyang the 
greatest benefit in the short-term. China is still conscious of its 
international reputation, which constrains the type and depth of 
cooperation it is willing to openly engage in with North Korea. Russia, 
on the other hand is less sensitive to international pressure and 
condemnation due to the country's growing pariah status and has proven 
willing to openly cooperate in both economic and military terms.
    North Korea is the only United Nations member that recognizes 
Crimea, Donestsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson as Russian 
territories, and its willingness to provide tactical support for war 
efforts speaks volumes. Moreover, some scholars suggest (https://
www.38north.org/2023/09/does-kims-visit-to-russia-signal-an-end-to-
north-koreas-strategic-solitude/) that South Korea's efforts to support 
Ukraine, even if indirectly, and arms provisions to Poland, likely play 
some role in Moscow's calculus as well.
    The potential benefits (https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/15/
russia-north-korea-putin-kim-summit-diplomacy-weapons-missiles-space-
cooperation-sanctions/) of cooperation with Russia to North Korea are 
more obvious spanning from food and oil imports in exchange for 
services such as skilled labor (construction workers), to a range of 
conventional and/or strategic technologies, parts or components, raw 
and composite materials for its missile programs or even military 
industry, and more. Moreover, given Pyongyang's call for exponential 
expansion of its nuclear arsenals and its limited capacity to produce 
plutonium in particular, given its one 5 Megawatt plutonium production 
reactor, Russian technical assistance (https://www.38north.org/2023/09/
siegfried-hecker-on-the-new-russia-dprk-relationship-and-nuclear-
cooperation/) in getting the long-stalled Experimental Light Water 
Reactor (under construction since 2011) running and weaponized, or even 
direct, clandestine supply of plutonium cannot be ruled out.
    Whether Russia is truly willing to go that far to help North Korea 
ramp up its WMD capabilities is yet to be seen. At the same time, the 
possibility that it could demonstrates an urgency for Washington to 
find new ways to engage North Korea.
                 rebuilding diplomacy with north korea
    Rebuilding diplomacy with North Korea has to start with the 
fundamental recognition that North Korea has its own national interests 
and will act accordingly. It is an insecure country among political, 
economic and military giants. While it possesses nuclear weapons, 
constant reminders of how the United States and its allies can bring 
about ``the end'' (https://www.npr.org/2023/04/26/1172116000/u-s-and-
south-korea-announce-moves-to-strengthen-alliance) of either the state 
or the regime only fuels that insecurity and feeds North Korea's 
conviction in its choices.
    Deterrence alone will not reduce nuclear dangers posed by North 
Korea, as Pyongyang responds to power with power. Relying on deterrence 
messaging, using overly aggressive or increasingly muscular language, 
emphasizing pressure on the North, or pursuing any concession that is 
achieved through what Yun and Aum describe (https://thebulletin.org/
2020/10/a-practical-approach-to-north-korea-for-the-next-us-president/) 
as ``reluctant submission rather than its motivated self-interest,'' 
will not be meaningful or sustainable. They note, the biggest flaw in 
U.S. policy ``is the belief that the United States can somehow bully 
North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons.''
    This notion that we can force North Korea to a point where they 
must choose between denuclearization and survival belies the extent to 
which North Korea has been able to adapt to the various restrictions 
imposed upon it, find partners willing to violate or ignore unilateral 
and/or international sanctions, and endure suffering along the way for 
what it perceives as a just cause.
    Furthermore, continuing to pursue a denuclearization-centered 
approach means Washington will be left standing by the wayside for some 
time, passively watching North Korea's continued development of its 
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and, especially now, 
deepened security partnerships along perceived Cold War alignments--all 
developments that increase uncertainty and instability in the region 
and pose further challenges to U.S. and allied relations.
    This is especially true as an arms race is accelerating in 
Northeast Asia. Expecting North Korea to see denuclearization as a 
pathway to either greater prosperity or increased security while the 
rest of the region arms up is setting ourselves up for failure, 
especially when there is such a trust deficit between our countries.
    The United States has clearly given thought and attention to U.S. 
and allied defenses and cooperation and has demonstrated great resolve 
and commitment to our mutual defense and extended deterrence 
commitments. However, that is only one part of the equation and in the 
absence of diplomacy, risks exacerbating competition and adversarial 
relations in the region.
    Equally important, however, is the need to rebuild diplomacy with 
North Korea. As a former witness testified previously, previous 
failures should not preclude additional diplomatic attempts to reduce 
the North Korean nuclear threat.\3\ At the same time, new approaches 
need to better reflect the realities of where our relations are today 
and the broader geopolitical context in which it takes place. This will 
require a reframing of our goals and some truly creative thinking about 
a strategy to achieve them. Some principles to consider include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Prepared remarks of Bruce Klingner, ``North Korea Policy One 
Year After Hanoi,'' Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and 
International Cybersecurity Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, February, 25, 2020, p. 19.

   Recognize acts of goodwill and reciprocate: Reciprocating 
        North Korean acts of goodwill can potentially create small 
        windows of opportunity to reopen channels of communication and 
        help identify ways to deescalate tensions. For example, North 
        Korea's return of Travis King took diplomatic coordination 
        across multiple stakeholders, but the result was the best 
        possible outcome for all those involved. While there is nothing 
        formally expected in return for King's release, some small 
        reciprocal gesture could help reinforce this positive 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        development.

   Gear up for diplomacy: North Korea may be small and poor, 
        but its weapons development impacts the regional and global 
        security environment in disproportionate ways. While the U.S. 
        is focused on bolstering extended deterrence to assure our 
        allies in the region against growing North Korean WMD 
        capabilities, that assurance will always be a bottomless pit 
        until the threat has abated. For such a challenge, the Biden 
        administration needs more than just a part-time special 
        representative to spearhead efforts. This posting has been, and 
        should be, reconstituted as a full-time position, working to 
        create new opportunities to reengage Pyongyang and coordinate 
        interagency efforts. This is especially important now as a new 
        Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights begins her tenure.

   Determine short-term goals beyond denuclearization: While 
        the Biden administration has conveyed several invitations to 
        the North Koreans for unconditional talks, the perception is 
        that the subject of talks--either explicit or implicit--is 
        denuclearization. While denuclearization of the Korean 
        Peninsula should remain a long-term goal, including the 
        prevention of South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons, there 
        is greater urgency at the moment to reduce tensions and avoid 
        endless arms racing and nuclear war. While it is unclear what 
        topics Pyongyang might respond to, probing interest across a 
        range of issues in either bilateral or multilateral formats 
        could prove useful, especially as U.S.-China relations begin to 
        thaw.

   Build concrete proposals to manage expectations: It seems 
        unlikely that Pyongyang will see the prospect of re-engaging 
        with the United States in long, drawn out negotiations that may 
        or may not result in an agreement as compelling. One reason it 
        favors Russia in the current environment is that engagement 
        poses little political risk and high reward for Kim Jong Un. 
        Convincing Kim that there are benefits to better relations with 
        the United States will take more explicit proposals, even in 
        the invitation phase, to set bounded expectations of what the 
        purpose of talks will be, what is on the table to be gained--
        preferably with little negotiation--and what longer-term goals 
        this interaction could feed into. Building North Korea's 
        confidence that reasonable results are possible within a short 
        time frame, may lower the perceived political risk of 
        engagement and create new opportunities.

   Clear pathways for informal engagement: As North Korea 
        emerges from its prolonged COVID-related isolation, 
        opportunities to engage at informal levels become possible 
        again, such as humanitarian work and Track 2 engagement. While 
        there is currently no guarantee when the North Koreans may be 
        willing to resume these types of engagements, the U.S. 
        Government could work to clear out some of the bureaucratic 
        hurdles, such as those outlined in H.R. 1504/S. 690 on 
        Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act, involved in 
        pursuing this work to help organizations and individuals be 
        ready to act when the opportunity arises.

   Recalibrate the scope, scale, and frequency of Joint 
        Military Exercises: Military readiness is important, especially 
        when tensions are high, and managing combined forces in action 
        is complex. That said, the strategy of back-to-back exercises 
        for months on end, some standard and some reactive to North 
        Korean actions, should be reassessed. At what point do actions 
        become excessive or even counterproductive? While North Korea 
        often objects to joint military exercises in general, recent 
        statements have more specific complaints about the ``aggressive 
        provocation of the U.S. far beyond its constant military 
        readiness,'' and drills that ``continue all the year round, day 
        after day and month after month, with the involvement of huge 
        war hardware specially targeted on a country.'' \4\ \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ ``Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of 
C.C., WPK,'' KCNA, July 14, 2023.
    \5\ ``U.S.-led Hostile Forces' Ceaseless War Provocations Under 
Fire,'' KCNA, May 19, 2023.

   Better manage messaging about extended deterrence and 
        military exercises: Coordinating public messaging across allies 
        is a challenging task, but one that is important to alliance 
        management as well as messaging to adversaries. Constantly 
        portraying drills as the ``largest ever'' or using terms like 
        ``annihilation drill'' can be unnecessarily aggressive. 
        Moreover, finding ways to make information (https://
        www.38north.org/reports/2022/09/us-rok-strategic-dialogue-
        recalibrating-deterrence-against-an-evolving-dprk-nuclear-
        threat/) about alliance consultation institutions and processes 
        more transparent and accessible, such as a dedicated alliance-
        focused website, could help convey to the general public a 
        sense of deep, ongoing cooperation without the confrontational 
        messaging.
                               conclusion
    North Korea's nuclear ambitions have proven resilient to pressure 
and enduring, especially as the security situation in the region 
becomes more dangerous. Strengthening U.S. and allied defenses, and 
extended deterrence coordination and consultation are important to the 
protection of our common and collective interests. But this is just one 
part of the equation. Rebuilding diplomacy with North Korea is equally 
important to reducing the risks of nuclear conflict--whether 
intentional or accidental--and to curbing endless arms racing in this 
vital and dynamic region. For the United States, this will take 
creative, concerted and persistent efforts to bring about, and some 
early wins up front to keep our foot in the door. Failing to do so 
could have serious implications for security on the Korean Peninsula.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Town.
    Now we will begin the questioning period here, and I think 
all of you know well that one of the big issues we are facing 
right now here in the United States Senate and House is the 
question of maintaining our security assistance and commitment 
to the people of Ukraine as they continue to battle Putin's 
aggression.
    The Senate version of the Continuing Resolution included at 
least a down payment on that assistance. The House version that 
ultimately passed did not. President Biden has committed to 
making sure that we meet our commitments and there is 
bipartisan support in the United States Senate and House to 
continue to provide that assistance.
    As we watch what is happening across the Capitol, 
obviously, there are concerns that have been raised. My 
question to each of you, beginning with you, Dr. Cha, is as 
South Korea watches this week, we know that President Xi is 
watching closely. We know that our adversaries are watching 
very closely what happens in Ukraine.
    Of course, so are our allies, I believe. To each of you, 
beginning with Dr. Cha, what would be the impact on the 
psychology of our security alliance between the United States 
and South Korea?
    What would be the psychological impact in South Korea were 
the United States to discontinue its support to the people of 
Ukraine?
    Dr. Cha. It is a great question. I will offer some thoughts 
on it.
    I think--so the region, South Korea--our allies South 
Korea, Japan, and Australia--are watching very closely what the 
United States is doing in Ukraine and how we are supporting 
Ukraine.
    If we were to discontinue funding, I think politically they 
could rationalize it and say, well, South Korea and Japan, we 
are treaty allies. Ukraine is not a treaty ally. It is not a 
member of NATO.
    I think publicly politically they can rationalize it, but 
inside behind closed doors, I think they would be very 
concerned that an attack of this nature against a country 
unprovoked and then the United States does not continue its 
support of Ukraine would certainly have a major impact on the 
credibility of the U.S. commitment not just in Europe, but also 
in Asia.
    I would say also Asian allies including allies like 
Australia, Japan, and South Korea have also stepped up. They 
want to work with the United States and help to support the 
United States and NATO in terms of what they are doing in 
Ukraine.
    As you know well, the Japanese, the South Koreans have been 
providing a lot of assistance and the South Korean President 
has even hinted that he would provide more assistance, not just 
humanitarian, but lethal assistance.
    Nevertheless, if the United States were to stop funding the 
defense of Ukraine, it would have a major impact on the way 
allies think about our credibility.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Mr. Snyder.
    Mr. Snyder. I would agree, as I suggested in my opening 
remarks, that there is the risk of a revisionist contagion that 
I think our allies in Asia are focused on.
    I think that is the reason why the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine had such a big impact on their own threat perceptions 
in the region and so I do think that that would be a setback.
    As related to the idea of allies stepping up, I agree that 
the idea that most have is that they would go together with the 
United States. If they are asked to fill a gap, I think in 
particular in the context of South Korea there are a couple of 
obstacles.
    One is domestic resistance. The more important one is that 
with the Putin-Kim summit Russia has established a kind of 
mutual deterrence dynamic with South Korea as related to the 
possibility of lethal assistance to Ukraine, and that is 
essentially the threat that if South Korea provides lethal 
assistance to Ukraine, then Russia would up its assistance to 
North Korea, and vice versa.
    There is also a mutual deterrence dynamic with regard to 
the question of how much Russia does with North Korea as 
related to how South Korea would respond in terms of providing 
greater assistance to Ukraine.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Ms. Town.
    Ms. Town. I tend to agree with my colleagues in terms of 
that this is very much seen as we are going together, that this 
is an allied response. I think there would be a certain sense 
of betrayal if there was--if the U.S. did stop with assisting 
Ukraine.
    I think there is a lot of South Koreans, especially the 
South Korean public, who does see a lot of themselves in the 
Ukraine example, of a country that has been attacked.
    At the same time, I think there is the same kind of debate 
inside South Korea as there is here in the United States where 
there is, certainly, also another faction of the public who 
does not see any affinity towards Ukraine and does not see it 
as their business either, especially when there are domestic 
issues that plague the administration.
    The U.S. leadership on Ukraine is such--is especially 
important when we are talking about allied relations and I do 
think it would cause our allies to also start to pull back and 
start to rethink their choices.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Professor Cha, I wanted to begin this by 
asking you to elaborate on one of your recommendations and I 
did not quite understand. I think it was number two, which was 
preemptive action with regards to a missile launch. What did 
you mean by that? Perhaps give me some logic or some pros and 
cons.
    Dr. Cha. Sure. One of the problems we have, Senator, is 
since last year, North Korea has done over a hundred ballistic 
missile tests. We have never seen anything like this before.
    All of us have been studying this issue for decades and we 
have never seen that level--that tempo of activity before. 
Those tests are for demonstration purposes, but they are also 
for advancing their capabilities--you need to test to know 
whether it works--and we really do not have a good way of 
deterring those tests.
    When we are negotiating with them, I think as Jenny would 
agree, they do not test as much, but they are not interested in 
talking right now.
    At the same time, the three allies have gotten much more 
integrated in terms of missile defense tracking, real-time 
early warning--these sorts of things--and my point is that 
given that this is a moving target and it is getting worse and 
worse, what else can we do to try to deter them from testing.
    One of the ideas there, and it is a risky one, is 
declaratory policy to say that we reserve the right to actually 
take down a missile if it is headed over Japan or if it is 
headed towards Hawaii or the West Coast of the United States 
and that could be a mid-course intercept or it could be on the 
launch pad.
    Now, they are firing now mobile missiles so it is harder to 
take it out preemptively, but the idea is that we need to 
consider something to deter further missile testing and we do 
not have anything that is doing that right now.
    It is risky. I acknowledge it is risky, but perhaps we are 
at that point now.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    As I think about the last couple of decades with our 
relationship with the DPRK, it seems to be that we have gone 
from pillar to post, guardrail to guardrail, from being 
aggressive and oppositional at one hand to writing love letters 
on the other to having a meet--we have been all over the map.
    It strikes me that we have no consistent strategy or policy 
with regards to the DPRK and I wonder if you draw any lessons 
from that or any suggestions about what we might do to develop 
a consistent policy approach with regards to the DPRK because 
what we have done so far, from what I can tell, has not worked.
    I look to you. Are there lessons learned from the last 
decades that we ought to consider as we think about the next 
decades? Begin with you, Dr. Cha.
    Dr. Cha. Having participated in the failure of that 
diplomacy, I would agree with you. I think we have been trying 
to deal with North Korea since Ronald Reagan and have been 
unsuccessful.
    The deal that we put on the table effectively has been the 
same, which is they freeze and dismantle their major programs 
in return for economic assistance, food, political recognition, 
and a security guarantee--not a security guarantee, a peace 
assurance on the Peninsula and the region.
    It has come in different formats--bilaterally or 
multilaterally, Six-Party Talks, but I think we have to come to 
the realization that it is not the deal that they want anymore 
and, frankly, we are at a loss as to what to pursue next.
    As you have said, we have tried everything from expert 
working level talks to summitry, leader to leader, on at least 
three different occasions--in Singapore, in Hanoi and at 
Panmunjom, and none of those have reached a conclusion.
    I do not want to sound skeptical, but I think that it is 
very difficult to imagine a deal that would satisfy us that 
could be had with the current regime in North Korea or the 
things that they would want to have a serious negotiation or 
things that is very difficult for us to give up like our 
alliance relationship with South Korea, our troops on the 
Korean Peninsula, our forces in Japan as well.
    It is--I guess the--one of the main lessons that I have 
learned from this is that it is not really the modalities of 
the negotiation or what is on offer.
    The problem right now is that the deal that makes the most 
sense from a U.S. and allied perspective is not the one the 
North Koreans want.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Snyder.
    Mr. Snyder. As I think about the history, and it is a long 
history, I think less about a cycle than about a progression in 
which things are getting worse.
    We are learning things about each other and I think that 
what we are learning with each iteration is actually making it 
even more difficult to bridge the gap. I think that we did 
learn something, for instance, from engaging directly in 
summitry with Kim Jong-un.
    The main thing I think we learned is that Kim Jong-un does 
not want to give up his nuclear weapons, and I think the main 
thing that he learned is that even though he thought he was 
entering into negotiations from a position of strength, he was 
not nearly powerful enough to coerce us into accepting him as a 
nuclear state.
    That dynamic is problematic. I think that where the real 
challenge comes is that we have spent so much time focusing on 
denial that we have not necessarily looked as closely as we 
needed to about how we can stimulate the pace of change inside 
an authoritarian near totalitarian regime in such a way is that 
it can evolve in order to make different choices.
    It is an exceedingly difficult challenge that I am putting 
on the table. I think that is the reason why we have not been 
able to do it is that our perspective on trying to counter 
their action has kind of inhibited us and even in policy terms 
inhibits us from trying to reach in to North Korea and generate 
the level of debate and even dissent that would actually be 
necessary for North Korea to change direction.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Ms. Town.
    Ms. Town. Thank you, Senator.
    It is an important question and one that, yes, there is no 
easy answers to. I think part of this process is we have to 
understand that North Korea is also growing stronger every 
year. Where we started in negotiations with North Korea is not 
the North Korea it is today, and North Korea has nuclear 
weapons. This is not a nonproliferation challenge.
    When we started negotiating in the 1990s, we were trying to 
prevent North Korea from building nuclear weapons and we tend 
to still have that same proposition when we go into 
negotiations now despite the fact that North Korea tested their 
first nuclear weapon in 2006 and has since then conducted five 
other tests.
    I think we need to understand that what we are dealing with 
now--the nature of the denuclearization challenge right now is 
not nonproliferation.
    It is disarmament, and I think that really takes a very 
different approach in order to solve, of how do you convince an 
insecure country to disarm and to trust that we have their best 
interests at heart, especially when there are examples out 
there that would prove otherwise.
    I think that is the fundamental problem with our approach 
today is that we still continue to hold on to this notion that 
we can--that we have time, that we can keep North Korea at the 
train station, and instead they are already racing down the 
track and what we are trying to do is stop a moving train.
    In doing so, I think we need to be more agile. I think one 
of the lessons we are learning is we need to be more agile.
    Right now, we tend to always approach this issue in a 
denuclearization-centric approach where if North Korea is not 
willing to talk about denuclearization, which they are not 
right now, then we are left empty-handed.
    They have all of the agency to control the process because 
we are not really interested in talking about anything else at 
the moment, even though we do have other security concerns and 
especially about preventing nuclear conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula.
    I think we need to be more--we need to take these lessons 
to heart and actually start to pull that process apart instead 
of looking for the big deal, at the end of the road kind of 
agreements.
    We need to start building this in steps. We need to start 
providing the kind of incentives and kind of early wins that 
would help create some momentum in any negotiation process and 
we need to be open to talking about issues other than just 
denuclearization, especially just to rebuild the relationship 
itself.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. [inaudible]
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    For the last several years the United States has expanded 
our approach to security on the Korean Peninsula, for example, 
deploying strategic assets to South Korea like nuclear-armed 
submarines, the restarted trilateral exercises in cooperation, 
and then earlier this year as was already referenced the U.S. 
and South Korea national security authorities announced the 
Nuclear Consultative Group so our two countries could talk 
about deterrence strategies. I think this is a step forward in 
what we are doing.
    Dr. Cha, I would like to get your assessment of the NCG and 
what do you see as the long-term benefits to the United States 
and to South Korea?
    Dr. Cha. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    As you know well, the Nuclear Consultative Group was 
created out of the Washington Declaration to try to address 
concerns about the credibility of U.S. nuclear extended 
deterrence on the Peninsula.
    Why do the Koreans have these concerns? As Jenny said, the 
train has left the station. North Korea really has ramped up 
their capabilities--again, a hundred ballistic missile tests.
    The NCG was meant to try to address that in a way that goes 
beyond the existing dialogues like the KIDD, the Korea--there 
are several other dialogues, as you know, that take place, but 
this was meant to be a high level that provided more insight 
into U.S. nuclear planning.
    It is not nuclear sharing, but it is an important next step 
in terms of the U.S.-Korea military relationship and I think a 
good one. Does it check the box in terms of credibility of 
nuclear deterrence? I think for the time being it does.
    In the longer term, and as North Korea continues to develop 
these capabilities, and as China also continues to ramp up 
their nuclear weapons capabilities through the end of this 
decade, there will be more questions that come up both in Korea 
and Japan about the credibility of our nuclear umbrella.
    Those are bridges we are going to have to cross in the 
future eventually, but for the time being, I think this was an 
important step that the Administration took and all for the 
better of the alliance.
    Senator Ricketts. Are there specific recommendations you 
have for the partnership that would make it more effective?
    Dr. Cha. One of the things--we at CSIS did a report on this 
and one of the things that we suggest where, was taken up by 
the Administration was more direct real-time warning sharing.
    There are other things that we can consider. For example, 
one of the things I mentioned in my testimony is more 
cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and AUKUS in terms of 
not necessarily to supply South Korea with nuclear submarines, 
but just as a very specific example, Australian nuclear 
submarines if they get service now will need to go all the way 
to Groton, Connecticut.
    Meanwhile, in South Korea there are world-class ports that 
could be nuclear certified where they could do the work there.
    Same is the case for Japan, although there is a different 
attitude and norm with regard to nuclear weapons in Japan, very 
clearly.
    Another which we have suggested in the past is not to 
redeploy nuclear weapons to the--U.S. nuclear weapons to the 
Korean Peninsula, but to at least just begin a preliminary 
dialogue about what would be the infrastructure prerequisites 
if we were to consider something like that.
    Even beginning that dialogue at a working level, not at a 
high policy level--at a working level would also send an 
important deterrence signal not just to North Korea, but in 
particular to our ally.
    As you know well, deterrence is about capabilities and 
intentions and I do not think there is anybody, any of our 
allies in the region, that doubt U.S. capabilities, but there 
are concerns about intentions, and these sorts of things as I 
have just described them help to send the right signal about 
the credibility of the U.S. umbrella.
    Senator Ricketts. The CCP has expressed concerns about this 
partnership. Do you have any concerns about them retaliating 
because of what we are doing with the NCG?
    Dr. Cha. The type of retaliation I am most concerned about 
is not military retaliation, but economic coercion.
    When the United States put a missile defense battery in 
Korea in 2016-2017, China carried out a campaign of economic 
coercion against South Korea that cost South Korea tens of 
billions of dollars, and as you know well they have done this 
to many countries in the region.
    I think that is the most proximate threat in terms of 
retaliation and, of course, they would draw closer to North 
Korea as a result of that.
    I really hesitate at the idea of thinking that if we do not 
do something to strengthen our alliances that somehow China and 
Russia will then moderate what they do with North Korea.
    I do not think that is the case. They will continue to 
pursue a tightening of their relationship regardless of what we 
do.
    Senator Ricketts. Would you agree that when the CCP 
actually expresses displeasure about something that probably 
means we are on the right track with regard to deterrence?
    Dr. Cha. Yes. That would be a reflection that the signal is 
being heard and that we are on the right track, yes.
    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all 
of the testifiers for being here.
    I want to follow up on Senator Romney's line of 
questioning. I have been now--I have been here for 11 years, 
not on the Foreign Relations Committee the whole time, and 
looking obviously very carefully about--at this issue both from 
the United States' equities, but obviously specifically 
representing the state of Hawaii and it just seems to me that 
complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula is not feasible.
    I remember being--prepping for a hearing and one of my 
staffers recommended that I not be on the bleeding edge of 
admitting that, and then Senator Corker just went ahead and 
said it all.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Schatz. I just kind of want to get on the record, 
Mr. Cha, and Ms. Town, in particular, your view of that because 
it seems to me that we just keep kind of whistling past this 
graveyard and every time I get a briefing either at the 
national security level or in the foreign policy context, it is 
sort of like magical thinking.
    Maybe they will not be able to do this. Here is the 
technological piece. Oh, look, they solved that. Oh, we thought 
they could not range. Oh, they can range.
    Now they have got--and now they can range CONUS and, well, 
reentry--well, they got that and they keep getting better and 
better and seem to be totally undeterred and we just need a new 
pathway.
    I will start with you, Mr. Cha. What is that new pathway?
    Dr. Cha. That is a really hard question.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Schatz. Well, why do we not do it this way? Because 
I do only have 3 minutes. I want to hear from both of you.
    Dr. Cha. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. I agree with you, and maybe it is the wrong 
question to ask because the problem with our current policy is 
we start with the end, right?
    Dr. Cha. Right. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. What are some short-term incremental steps 
that we can take to increase the potential for leverage and the 
potential for good outcomes in the short term? Forget 
denuclearizing the Peninsula. Let us talk about risk reduction 
in the short term.
    Dr. Cha. Yes. I did not mean to be flippant about the 
question. I think it is a very important one. As you know, I am 
a part time resident of Hawaii so I think about this as well 
all the time.
    Senator Schatz. I've seen you on a couple of airplanes. 
Yes.
    Dr. Cha. Yes.
    [Laughter.]
    Dr. Cha. I do think, practically speaking, it is threat 
reduction. It is risk reduction. CVID is the bumper sticker and 
there are political and alliance management reasons why we need 
to say CVID having to do with Japan and having to do with our 
Iran policy as well as the NPT regime.
    If we were ever to get back into a negotiation, as a former 
negotiator, the first steps would be threat reduction, risk 
reduction, freezing Yongbyon, getting inspectors back in, 
trying to get into the Experimental Light Water Reactor----
    Senator Schatz. In exchange for what?
    Dr. Cha. In exchange for things like reducing sanctions--
the 2016-2017 sanctions, the general sector sanctions--which 
were the ones that the North Koreans were most concerned about 
when President Trump met them in Vietnam. Political 
recognition, security assurances--these sorts of things.
    The danger, of course, is that people will accuse whichever 
Administration were to reengage with this as buying the same 
horse for the 15th time.
    Senator Schatz. It is two--there are a number of dangers, 
but the two obvious ones are what it does for nonproliferation 
policy globally and then the other is politics.
    Dr. Cha. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. Who wants to be the Administration that 
softens its stance on North Korea as they are engaged in all 
this belligerent behavior?
    I am going to have to stop it there and go to Ms. Town.
    Ms. Town. Yes. This is the million-dollar question of is 
denuclearization possible and if we believe it is not then what 
are we doing.
    I think if we think about denuclearization, North Korea's 
thinking on denuclearization, on its nuclear program, has 
fundamentally changed. Whatever hope we had before is even less 
now.
    That does not mean we give up. We should continue to try. 
We should continue to try to work for a denuclearized Korean 
Peninsula, which also includes preventing South Korea from 
going nuclear.
    In the meantime, I think we really do need to define what 
our other goals with North Korea are, and there were trends, 
for instance, that were promising in North Korea prior to 2017-
2018 when negotiations started and those were the rise of 
markets, the growing kind of socioeconomic space and social 
change that was happening inside the country.
    If we look at the policies that we have now, our punitive 
approach to North Korea because of their nuclear program is 
really cutting off a lot of the--is really counterproductive to 
a lot of the productive things we thought were going on.
    I think there is a reason to rethink our sanctions policies 
and really distinguish between that which is actually going to 
affect any kind of procurement of dual-use goods versus what is 
going to have spillover effects into the economy.
    How do we get--how do we reempower the people? We always 
talk about wanting to get information in to the people, but we 
continue to cut off our own access to the people and their 
access to us and their access to goods and markets.
    Senator Schatz. Just one final comment. When all you have 
is a hammer everything looks like a nail and I just think it--
we really need your help on developing more tools because 
otherwise we just keep hammering the same nail and saying how 
come this is not working.
    We need to open up the aperture on a bipartisan basis to 
get smarter on this because, as Senator Romney said, this 
policy is a failure and has to change.
    Dr. Cha. If I could just say one of the tools on the 
enforcement side really is some of the--so as Senator Van 
Hollen mentioned, some of the work that has been done on things 
like the Otto Warmbier Act, the use of banking restrictions, 
and especially on the secondary sanctioning side.
    I know sanctions do not solve all the problem, but these 
are important sanctions. We are starting a project now where we 
are trying to identify supply chains for other things that are 
being imported by countries in the West and China with regard 
to North Korea for secondary sanctioning.
    There is the engagement side, but there is the sanction 
side and that is an important piece of this as well.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    I know Senator Romney has to leave now. Thank you, Senator.
    When we were thinking about having this hearing on the 
Korean Peninsula, we thought we might get to the point where 
there was a consensus that what we have been doing, clearly, is 
not successful, at least in achieving the goal as we have 
stated it, which is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
    That is a very worthy goal, but in practice, clearly, we 
have not been able to achieve it, as you all have indicated in 
response to Senator Schatz's question and others.
    I do agree that we need to be thinking of other sort of 
long-term approaches, but in the meantime I want to ask all of 
you about both North Korea's relationship with Russia and near-
term decisions that we may need to make and then North Korea's 
relationship with China and what kind of decisions that we 
might be interested in making jointly with them.
    On the case of Russia, we had, of course, President Yoon in 
response to North Korea's visit to--the visit with Putin say, 
we will not stand idly by.
    My question is what would you all recommend that we do to 
put some kind of teeth behind that statement, not sit idly by.
    Now, Dr. Cha, one idea that you suggested we look at was 
South Korea provide lethal assistance to support Ukraine. So 
far they have been providing important assistance--nonlethal 
assistance.
    Then, as I listen to all of you, you have got the issue of 
North Korea providing munitions to Russia on the assumed 
promise that Russia would now help North Korea in providing 
higher technology--more technology to its missile system, 
submarines, and others in return.
    Could you just speak a little bit to that dynamic? On the 
one hand, you could see how South Korea threatening to provide 
more lethal assistance to Russia could be used maybe to get 
Russia to commit not to provide anything more to North Korea?
    On the other hand, obviously, we would like to see as much 
support as possible go to the people of Ukraine at this point 
in time. Those are--if you could talk through a little bit that 
decision tree starting with you, Dr. Cha.
    Dr. Cha. Sure. A very important question.
    On the South Korean lethal assistance, I was in Korea about 
2 weeks ago at a conference where the former national security 
adviser to the current South Korean President, in a public 
venue, had said that if Russia is going to provide--if North 
Korea is going to assist Russia and Russians are going to pay 
the North Koreans in technology, that is a direct threat to 
South Korea so South Korea should actually do something about 
that.
    I thought it was a--I was surprised by the statement, but I 
think it sort of says where the thinking is on this. As you 
said, Ukraine needs help. If there is any place in the world 
where there are munition stockpiles, it is on the Korean 
Peninsula, and I can--pretty sure that South Korean munitions 
are going to be better than North Korean munitions.
    In terms of what else can be done about it, there is this 
kind of open question about China because I cannot imagine that 
China is 100 percent behind all this and they certainly do not 
like Russia and North Korea getting closer together.
    I do not know if there is some way to pull China away from 
this. They have not been very committal publicly. They were not 
at the U.N. a couple weeks ago. Wang Yi has gone--has been to 
Russia, but we do not know what came of that.
    Then the third thing is, again, some of the work that you 
have already done on this and that is in terms of sanctions 
packages and secondary sanctioning of Russian entities, 
companies, and others that might--Russian entities and 
companies, but also secondary sanctioning to those that might 
be affiliated with those companies as a way to create some sort 
of compellence so that there are costs to Russia engaging with 
North Korea.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Mr. Snyder.
    Mr. Snyder. I was actually at the same meeting that Victor 
was with the former national security adviser and I do believe 
that that was an important form of response that was reflected 
in the broader South Korean media and, I imagine, was also 
transmitted to Moscow.
    One of the key issues is making sure that Putin got the 
message on that. I think he probably did, but the other aspect 
of that Putin-Kim meeting that I think we need to keep in mind 
as we think about all the possibilities for the Russia-North 
Korea relationship is that these are two isolated leaders that 
distrust each other and probably do not have much trust in each 
other's products either.
    This is a very transactional relationship. It may be more 
limited, but they have control of their public communications 
and I think that Putin and Kim were sort of trolling the U.S. 
and South Korea a little bit.
    I do not want to dismiss the risk of greater Russia-North 
Korea interaction as a way of expanding the North Korea 
problem, but I also think that we should not allow it to be 
overblown.
    Senator Van Hollen. Got it. Thank you.
    Ms. Town.
    Ms. Town. Thank you, Senator.
    I think on the Russia angle--I was not at that conference, 
but I was on a panel recently with a Russian diplomat or former 
diplomat, and the way he described it of Russia's approach was 
a bit more strategic than just Ukraine.
    It was not just about Ukraine. It was about building a 
security partner for the war against the West, and I think 
there is--and I think that also feeds into why Russia would be 
more willing to build actual military cooperation and not just 
do an arms deal because we know Kim Jong-un did not need to go 
to Russia to broker an arms deal.
    I think they are--this plays into all of the great power 
competition that is going on and I do think the--it will change 
South Korea's calculus on Ukraine and because it does suddenly 
now make Ukraine more of a Korean Peninsula security issue if 
Russia is going to directly grow its military cooperation with 
North Korea.
    I think the China angle is also really important here 
because China does still care about its international 
reputation and is worried about worst case scenarios in East 
Asia, and I think this is one area of cooperation and one area 
of discussion that they would be willing to have of how do we 
prevent this from actually changing the balance of power in 
such a negative way that we cannot come back from.
    Senator Van Hollen. Let me pick up there because, as I 
indicated, I wanted to talk a little bit about both the North 
Korea-Russia relationship and how that is developing, but also 
the North Korea-China relationship.
    I think all of you have made the point that if you go back 
a number of years, China was willing to work much more closely 
with the United States with respect to restraining North 
Korea's nuclear program, nuclear testing, missiles.
    They were with us at the U.N. a couple of times many years 
ago in terms of sanctions. All that has changed and now China 
has sort of not cooperated with us in that way.
    At the same time, I have to believe that they continue to 
have an interest in constraining North Korea's nuclear 
programs, both missile and another--potential other weapons 
test.
    Maybe talk a little bit more about how we communicate that 
with China, because at the same time we have these other big 
challenges I agree with Dr. Cha. We cannot sort of forfeit the 
strengthening of our alliances, whether it is through having a 
South Korean role in AUKUS or other issues.
    At the same time, if we agree that China does have a mutual 
interest with us in constraining the North Korean nuclear 
weapons program overall, what can and should we be doing on 
that front?
    Maybe we will start with Ms. Town and then go this way.
    Ms. Town. Thank you, Senator.
    It is a tough question because there are a lot of competing 
interests here and it is--North Korea tends to be fairly low on 
China's priorities as well and so I think the military 
cooperation between Russia and North Korea, I do not think came 
as a surprise to the Chinese.
    Certainly, they sent a delegation to Pyongyang ahead of 
that summit and there was presumably meetings with the Russians 
before that as well, and there was no condemnation of it that 
came out from the Chinese after it happened.
    Again, I do think there is concern there and recent 
discussions I have had with Chinese scholars is that they are 
also wondering what to do, and they are very concerned that the 
situation is getting out of control.
    I think there is room for, perhaps, a regional security 
discussion to happen at a high level, not about any specific 
country, but where the region is headed as a whole to see if 
you can start that dialogue and under the premise of preventing 
nuclear war.
    I also think there is interesting opportunities for other 
kinds of incentives to be given to the Chinese as well, 
especially with the prospects of a China-South Korea-Japan 
trilateral summit coming before the end of the year if there is 
some concessions that can be made in that that could 
incentivize the Chinese to also think twice about where it 
stands in terms of North Korea and Russia cooperation.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Mr. Snyder.
    Mr. Snyder. The biggest concern I have about the 
development of the North Korea-Russia relationship is actually 
that it will damage the possible apparent restraint measures 
that China has urged on North Korea as related to a seventh 
nuclear test.
    We do not know necessarily with any assurance what 
precisely China has done, but the U.S. intelligence community 
has been expecting this test and it has not happened.
    My main concern is really that Kim Jong-un might misread 
his engagement with Russia as giving him license to do what he 
did--what his grandfather did in the Cold War--play the Chinese 
and the Soviets off against each other.
     I think that China's overall--North Korea's overall level 
of dependence on China is great enough that China does not have 
to go down that road.
    I do think that this is an area where both the U.S. and 
South Korea have an interest in continuing to engage with China 
even if they are not fully forthcoming about the actions that 
they take as related to North Korea.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Dr. Cha.
    Dr. Cha. I think unless you are super hard line in China, 
the majority of sort of, I think, China foreign policy thinkers 
cannot see this DPRK-Russia thing is in China's interest. It 
just cannot be.
    First of all, they want to neutralize Russia and North 
Korea getting closer together. Historically, they have always 
not liked it when Russia and North Korea get too close.
    They do not want to be seen as tacitly supporting this in a 
way that involves them in expanding the war in Ukraine or 
prolonging it. Then, I think the other thing that they should 
be concerned about--and there is actually a very good long form 
interview in Jenny's program in 38 North about this--is the 
concern about Russia supplying fuel for North Korea's nuclear 
reactors.
    The absence of fuel is one of the biggest constraints right 
now on North Korea really expanding their nuclear weapons 
program, but if Russia provides fuel under the guise of 
civilian nuclear energy, so within NPT regime--within the NPT 
regime, as I said in my testimony, North Korea's goal is to 
develop a nuclear weapons force the size of the U.K. or France, 
and the Chinese cannot possibly think that is good.
    The real question is can they get out of their own way to 
do something that is in their interests and not tie it to how 
upset they are at U.S.-China competition. Can they get out of 
their own way and do that? Thus far they have not been able to.
    The U.N., basically--when they were asked about this they 
said, oh, that is just a Russia-North Korea bilateral issue; it 
is not something we have any comment on. Which I think is a 
placeholder as they try to figure out exactly what they can do 
here.
    I agree. I think, with the gist of my colleagues' comments, 
that this is something that we should really investigate with 
China and try to engage in a dialogue with them because it is 
clearly in both of our interest to see this stopped.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. There is much more I would 
like to ask all three of you about, but there is a vote on and 
I am being summoned to cast my vote since my colleagues are 
waiting.
    Thank you for much food for thought as we move forward on 
all the issues that we covered. We may submit some questions 
for the record if you are all willing to entertain those.
    You covered--mentioned, Dr. Cha, the issue of responding to 
economic coercion, and thank you for having me over at CSIS 
last week to make some remarks on our important alliance 
between the United States and the ROK.
    There are issues of making sure that we coordinate when it 
comes to the export of very sophisticated technologies that 
could be used to enhance China's military without trying to 
hurt their economy, just focused on the military piece, but 
that requires a lot of collaboration.
    There are issues regarding the issue of cryptocurrency and 
the ROK's use of cryptocurrency and theft of cryptocurrency in 
itself and to evade sanctions. There are a lot of other issues 
to talk about.
    I do think that you successfully sort of hit some of the 
big questions that we have to deal with, some of the longer-
term questions we have to address as well as identifying some 
really short-term important interests regarding, for example, 
working with China to try to discourage another nuclear test--
those kind of things.
    I know I speak on behalf of all my colleagues who are here 
and others that wish they would be here thanking you for your 
expertise--sharing your expertise here today, but also your 
ongoing efforts in this area.
    Finally, let me just close where I began and I think each 
of you began, which is the importance of the alliance between 
the United States and South Korea forged in mutual sacrifice, 
and I think recent events have testified to the strength of 
that relationship. We want to make sure it remains that way and 
this hearing is an important part of that process.
    Let me thank all three of you and with that, this meeting 
is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


               Responses of Dr. Victor Cha to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. CRYPTOCURRENCY THEFT BY DPRK: According to recent 
comments by White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and 
Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger, ``[a]bout half of North Korea's 
missile program has been funded by cyberattacks and cryptocurrency 
theft.'' Reports also suggest that the DPRK is using funds it raises 
through cryptocurrency theft to evade sanctions, launder money, and 
strengthen its conventional arms and military readiness. South Korea 
has also habitually raised efforts to combat this theft as a point of 
potential cooperation that can be strengthened with the U.S.
    Given the pressing nature of this threat, how can the U.S. limit 
the DPRK's theft of cryptocurrency to fund its illegal weapons program?

    Answer. The United States can pursue a range of strategies to 
increase American cyber resiliency to effectively deter or counter 
future North Korean cyberattacks and cryptocurrency theft. These 
strategies include:

   Improving domestic and international cyber frameworks and 
        awareness: Because cybersecurity is a relatively new domain, 
        frameworks to enact and regulate laws, particularly on the 
        global level, are in short supply. The United States can lead 
        efforts to build accountability measures through existing 
        institutions. Domestically, the U.S. has already established a 
        voluntary method for sharing cyber threat and vulnerability 
        information in near-real time between the Federal Government 
        and entities across different critical infrastructure sectors 
        (``Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program 
        [CISCP]''). The U.S. Government should continue to address 
        liability and privacy concerns to encourage more organizations 
        to join the program. The U.S. may also consider expanding the 
        CISCP model internationally to work with allied nations' cyber-
        defense institutions to monitor and respond to attacks.

        Second, the United States can lead members of the United 
        Nations to support the creation of an international body 
        empowered to draft standards of conduct regarding cybertheft 
        and sabotage. Although the attribution of cybercrimes will 
        remain a challenge, the existence of a framework will improve 
        coordination between states and offer avenues for open 
        discussion on these issues.

        There are no illusions about the challenges of implementing 
        these recommendations. First and foremost, coordination between 
        cybersecurity firms and the intelligence community, and among 
        states, will require stakeholders to address privacy and 
        security concerns. Likewise, achieving an international 
        consensus on the rules and norms surrounding cybersecurity will 
        be difficult and time consuming, particularly as China and 
        Russia--countries that have provided North Korea with tacit 
        consent to carry out cyberattacks--both hold significant sway 
        within the UN.

   Strengthen cryptocurrency security: Given that most of the 
        cyberattacks take place in blockchain and cryptocurrency, the 
        Federal Trade Commission should collaborate with financial 
        institutions to carry out awareness campaigns. Additionally, 
        the anonymous nature of cryptocurrency exchanges and the 
        resulting lack of regulation means that the responsibility to 
        prevent hacking often falls on the users. While two-factor 
        authentication, seed words, and hardware wallets exist, many 
        applications still allow users to opt out of them. The U.S. 
        Government should encourage financial institutions and 
        cryptocurrency exchange applications to invest in further 
        securing crypto wallets and making additional security steps a 
        requirement for all users.

   Address known vulnerabilities: The most exploited vulnerable 
        technical applications are Microsoft Office and Adobe Flash 
        products. In addition to raising public awareness for 
        institutions using these products, the U.S. can establish a 
        communication channel with Microsoft and Adobe to fast-track 
        cyberattack meditations. In recent years, North Korea's 
        ransomware attacks have frequently targeted the U.S. healthcare 
        sector. The U.S. may consider sending a government advisor to 
        vulnerable institutions to train internal IT specialists on how 
        to encrypt data, conduct regular scans on internet-facing 
        devices, update patches, software, and operating systems, and 
        train employees on phishing attacks. This process would 
        supplement the existing joint warning system from the FBI, 
        Treasury Department, and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
        Agency.

   Increase the quantity and quality of domestic tech talent to 
        ensure U.S. Government entities and infrastructure are not 
        vulnerable to North Korean cyberattacks: In comparison to 
        leading American technology companies that attract 
        international talent, the U.S. Government faces a shortage of 
        technology workers and struggles to recruit and retain talent 
        to work in the government and defense sectors. The government 
        can increase the quantity and quality of applications by 
        streamlining the security clearance process and forging 
        partnerships with private firms to access a larger applicant 
        pool. The Biden administration's proposed federal budget for 
        fiscal year 2024, which includes a $12.7 billion increase for 
        cyber-related activities within federal agencies, is an 
        important development in the right direction. Implementing 
        initial and retraining programs to adapt worker skills to the 
        challenges related to cyber network defense will help ensure 
        that human capital keeps up with efforts to adopt technologies 
        and practices that enhance cybersecurity.

    Question. How can the U.S., South Korea, and other allies work 
together to combat this threat? What work is already being done to 
strengthen this coordination?

    Answer. The Biden administration has already undertaken important 
groundwork to allow the United States to work more effectively with 
South Korea and other allies to increase cyber defense collaboration. 
Establishing a new Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy and 
appointing Nathaniel Fick as the cyber ambassador-at-large sends an 
important signal of U.S. commitment to protecting an open and secure 
global communications network and building standards of responsible 
conduct in cyberspace. The establishment of the Bureau has also helped 
create a more streamlined process to collaborate across the U.S. 
Government and with allies to take advantage of existing channels for 
coordination, such as the U.S.-ROK Cyber Dialogue, the U.S.-ROK Working 
Group on DPRK Cyber Threats, and the U.S.-ROK Cyber Cooperation Working 
Group.
    When President Biden and South Korean President Yoon met in 
Washington in April 2023, the two leaders issued a joint statement 
announcing plans to establish a ``Strategic Cybersecurity Cooperation 
Framework'' that would guide the two countries' increased cooperation 
in cybersecurity efforts and capacity building. Since then, South Korea 
and the U.S. held the eighth ROK-U.S. Cyber Cooperation Working Group 
in May, where South Korea expressed a willingness to regularly 
participate in the U.S.-led multinational cyber exercise. The following 
month, the two countries held the inaugural meeting of a new high- 
level consultation channel between the White House and South Korea's 
presidential office.
    All of these efforts are important, tangible steps toward expanding 
cooperation on deterring cybercrimes and securing critical 
infrastructure. In addition to strengthening bilateral government-to-
government coordination, the U.S. and South Korea should emphasize the 
critical role of the private sector in evaluating and implementing 
cybersecurity strategies. As a starting point, Washington and Seoul 
should consider inviting non-governmental and industry experts to 
regularly take part in the U.S.-ROK Cyber Dialogues.
    There are also ample opportunities for the U.S. and South Korea to 
work with regional allies and partners. The U.S. should take advantage 
of the recent vast improvement in trilateral relations between the 
U.S., Japan, and South Korea to consider military-to- military cyber 
cooperation and push for better integration and information sharing on 
cybercrime-related information. The three countries can also discuss 
coordinated strategies to enhance cyber capacity building in the Indo-
Pacific region, targeting those countries that are frequently involved 
in facilitating North Korean illicit networks.
    Lastly, the United States should continue to leverage regional 
partnerships to build a coalition of like-minded allies and partners in 
support of cyberspace that is grounded in democratic values. Given that 
the U.S. is a sponsoring nation and Japan and South Korea are 
contributing participants of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), the three countries can use this channel 
to explore trilateral and transatlantic means of cooperation on cyber 
defense. Additionally, the U.S. and South Korea should consider 
supporting the institutionalization of the Asia-Pacific (AP4) grouping 
based on South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand's participation 
in the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid. The grouping would be particularly 
well positioned to focus on defending the rules-based international 
order by enhancing dialogue and cooperation on shared security 
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including cybersecurity.

    Question. PRC ECONOMIC COERCION: The PRC uses a range of economic 
tools to punish countries' political and strategic decisions it views 
as countering its interests. When I last visited South Korea in August 
2017, Beijing was using similar tactics against Seoul following the 
deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile 
system. The PRC reacted to the THAAD deployment by banning Chinese 
tourists from traveling to South Korea and canceled K-pop music 
concerts in China. The deployment also prompted boycotts in China 
against Korea goods and services such as Korean shopping malls. The 
boycotts by South Korea's largest trading partner resulted in an 
estimated loss of $7.5 billion to the Korean economy in 2017.
    What punitive economic measures does the PRC currently have in 
place against South Korea?

    Answer. The most prominent example of Chinese economic coercion 
against South Korea was the PRC's targeted campaign against South 
Korean businesses and goods and services in response to the country's 
decision to deploy the U.S. THAAD system in 2017. Chinese sanctions 
against the South Korean conglomerate Lotte (owner of the land where a 
U.S. missile defense system has been deployed) forced the corporation 
to close all its stores in China, resulting in more than $7.5 billion 
in economic damage. The Chinese Government also withheld group tours to 
Korea, costing South Korea's tourism industry an estimated $15.6 
billion in losses.
    But the effects of China's targeted economic coercion practices are 
not isolated and go far beyond the economic tolls. In 2017, South Korea 
under the Moon administration responded to Chinese economic coercion by 
distancing itself from regional alliances, stating that it would not 
consider additional deployment of THAAD, participate in the U.S. 
missile defense system, or support building the South Korea-U.S.-Japan 
security cooperation into a military alliance. When the U.S. unveiled 
its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in 2017, South Korea was 
reticent to integrate FOIP into its foreign policy agenda or make 
public statements of support to avoid antagonizing China. The country 
also effectively preempted an invitation by the Biden administration to 
join the Quad and initially hesitated to join the Chip 4 alliance in 
part due to concerns that Xi Jinping would retaliate against South 
Korea like it did in 2017. In 2020, South Korea remained silent and did 
not advocate for sanctions when China passed the 2020 National Security 
Law of Hong Kong suppressing democracy. In 2021, the Moon 
administration stated that South Korea would not participate in the 
U.S.-led diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics over 
human rights issues in Xinjiang. As these examples show, Chinese 
economic coercion not only threatens the liberal trading order, but 
also the liberal international order, forcing countries to make choices 
on issues that have nothing to do with trade, like democracy, human 
rights, and regional partnerships.

    Question. How can the U.S. work with ROK to respond to this 
economic coercion? What preemptive measures as well reactive policies 
would you recommend that the U.S. and our partners pursue to negate the 
impact of PRC's economic coercion?

    Answer. The U.S. and our partners have already begun to establish 
several reactive policies centered largely on ``de-risking'' measures 
aimed at identifying economic security vulnerabilities, practicing 
trade diversification, and devising impact-mitigation measures. 
Strengthening newly created institutions such as the Quad, the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework, the Mineral Security Partnership, the Chip 
4 alliance, and the Clean Network will help the U.S. and its partners 
secure supply chains through ``reshoring'' and ``friendshoring.'' While 
these measures raise production costs and lower efficiency gains, they 
are necessary to reduce dependence on China and minimize vulnerability 
to its economic coercion. The United States and its allies and partners 
can also consider establishing a more systematic approach to 
implementing mitigation measures that include trade support, monetary 
assistance, and investment funds.
    While these policies provide protection in certain key sectors, the 
U.S. and our partners need to implement measures that are not just 
defensive but aim to change Chinese behavior and deter its economic 
predatory behavior overall. My research (https://direct.mit.edu/isec/
article/48/1/91/117127/Collective-Resilience-Deterring-China-s) shows 
that past targets of Beijing's economic coercion have significantly 
more leverage than they think, collectively exporting over $46.6 
billion worth of goods on which China is more than 70 percent dependent 
as a proportion of its total import of those goods. These countries 
also export over $12.7 billion worth of goods on which China is more 
than 90 percent dependent. These states, and other U.S. partners and 
allies, should band together and practice a NATO Article 5-type of 
collective economic deterrence strategy by promising to retaliate 
should China act against any alliance member. This strategy of 
``collective resilience'' promises a multilateral response in the trade 
space to the prospect of economic bullying by the Chinese Government 
and seeks to shape Chinese conformity with the liberal trading order. 
While forcing China to find a new supplier or pay a higher price for 
one high-dependence item may not be enough to change its behavior, 
sanctions on an aggregation of these items would sufficiently 
inconvenience China and deter future predatory behavior. The collective 
resilience strategy does not advocate for a trade war, but rather seeks 
to credibly signal that a collective of states will carry out 
retaliation if and when China acts against any of the member states.
    To signal credible deterrence, coalition members would need to 
reassure smaller powers that they would not be abandoned when Beijing 
threatens sanctions to pressure them to leave the coalition. Key 
members like the United States should commit to trigger actions if 
Beijing coerces any other member. Though costly, this strategy will 
have little credibility otherwise. Partner states might also invest in 
a collective fund to compensate smaller members for losses or offer 
alternative export or import markets to divert trade in response to 
Chinese sanctions. The U.S. can consider building coalitions of like-
minded groupings. I propose the Group of Seven plus Australia given 
that these countries: (1) want to preserve the U.S.-led liberal 
international order; (2) are medium-to-large countries that cannot be 
easily bullied by Beijing; (3) already participate in the European 
Union's anti-coercion efforts or have already confronted Beijing's 
coercion; and (4) have the collective resilience capabilities to 
leverage China's vulnerability. This grouping is already highly 
cohesive, making it more feasible to enact collective action.

    Question. U.S. DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK: The Biden 
administration in 2021 stated that it will pursue a ``calibrated, 
practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with 
North Korea'' to eventually achieve the ``complete denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula,'' even as U.S. and international sanctions remain 
in place. The approach appears to envision offering partial sanctions 
relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization. Biden 
administration officials say they have reached out to North Korea, 
offering to meet ``without preconditions,'' and that ``the ball is in 
[Pyongyang's] court.''
    What incentives or other creative approaches would you recommend 
that the United States employ to increase diplomatic engagement with 
the North Korean regime?

    Answer. The Administration, in a slight change of words, has said 
that it is willing to meet with North Korea without preconditions as to 
the ultimate outcome of such talks. This is an important but subtle 
shift in policy designed to offer a way for the counterpart to re-
engage. The unilateral lifting of sanctions is not advisable in my 
opinion. And talk about a peace regime or peace declaration to try to 
change the environment for talks with North Korea is unlikely to create 
incentives for Pyongyang to talk. On the contrary, such an action by 
the United States would be seen as affirming the North's nuclear 
weapons state status. The Chinese have been unwilling to use either 
pressure or incentives to bring the North to the table. Historically, 
it has been the latter that has elicited some North Korean interest, 
albeit only temporarily. But Beijing has explicitly linked North Korea 
diplomacy to U.S.-China relations demonstrating that it does not 
perceive the North's expanding WMD programs as a threat. I believe this 
is an incorrect calculation as the North's WMD drive is causing the 
consolidation of U.S. alliances in the region in an unprecedented 
fashion that makes China's external environment more unfavorable (from 
Beijing's perspective).

    Question. If diplomacy with DPRK were to restart, what short- and 
long-term objectives should the U.S. seek in such talks?

    Answer. There are important reasons why the long-term objective of 
the United States' North Korea policy should continue to be the 
peaceful denuclearization of North Korea. These reasons include 
preserving the regional security architecture and alliances, 
particularly with Japan and South Korea, and upholding the global non-
proliferation regime.
    But if the U.S. were to restart negotiations with North Korea, 
there are several short- and medium-term objectives that the United 
States can seek to prevent and deter the threat of North Korean nuclear 
and military aggression against the United States, its military forces 
abroad, and its allies in the region. They would primarily be focused 
on threat and risk reduction measures, including requiring a test ban, 
a stop to fissile material production, declaration of nuclear and 
missile-related sites, halting quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in North Korea's missile program and nuclear arsenal, and 
preventing the proliferation of DPRK nuclear technology. As a starting 
point, the U.S. might demand freezing Yongbyon and allowing IAEA 
inspectors back into the nuclear complex in exchange for reducing the 
harsher UNSC sanctions imposed in 2016 and 2017 and providing political 
recognition and security assurances. The United States should remain 
open to high-level talks with North Korea, but frankly, I think the 
North Koreans lost so much face from the 2019 Hanoi Summit with the 
Trump administration that it will be a while before they are interested 
in talking to the U.S. The recent improvement in relations with Russia 
reduces even further the incentive for the North to talk to the U.S., 
not just because of Russian support, but also because the Putin summit 
will trigger Xi Jinping to reach out to Pyongyang in order not to allow 
it to get too close to Moscow. There is little that the U.S. can do to 
intervene in this dynamic. Focusing on reinforcing defense and 
deterrence with our allies, as well as involving United Nations Command 
sending states into peacetime deterrence and defense consultations is 
the best course forward.
                                 ______
                                 

   The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Scott Snyder for the 
            Following Questions by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. CRYPTOCURRENCY THEFT BY DPRK: According to recent 
comments by White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and 
Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger, ``[a]bout half of North Korea's 
missile program has been funded by cyberattacks and cryptocurrency 
theft.'' Reports also suggest that the DPRK is using funds it raises 
through cryptocurrency theft to evade sanctions, launder money, and 
strengthen its conventional arms and military readiness. South Korea 
has also habitually raised efforts to combat this theft as a point of 
potential cooperation that can be strengthened with the U.S.
    Given the pressing nature of this threat, how can the U.S. limit 
the DPRK's theft of cryptocurrency to fund its illegal weapons program?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. How can the U.S., South Korea, and other allies work 
together to combat this threat? What work is already being done to 
strengthen this coordination?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. PRC ECONOMIC COERCION: The PRC uses a range of economic 
tools to punish countries' political and strategic decisions it views 
as countering its interests. When I last visited South Korea in August 
2017, Beijing was using similar tactics against Seoul following the 
deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile 
system. The PRC reacted to the THAAD deployment by banning Chinese 
tourists from traveling to South Korea and canceled K-pop music 
concerts in China. The deployment also prompted boycotts in China 
against Korea goods and services such as Korean shopping malls. The 
boycotts by South Korea's largest trading partner resulted in an 
estimated loss of $7.5 billion to the Korean economy in 2017.
    What punitive economic measures does the PRC currently have in 
place against South Korea?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. How can the U.S. work with ROK to respond to this 
economic coercion?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. What preemptive measures as well reactive policies would 
you recommend that the U.S. and our partners pursue to negate the 
impact of PRC's economic coercion?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. U.S. DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK: The Biden 
administration in 2021 stated that it will pursue a ``calibrated, 
practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with 
North Korea'' to eventually achieve the ``complete denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula,'' even as U.S. and international sanctions remain 
in place. The approach appears to envision offering partial sanctions 
relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization. Biden 
administration officials say they have reached out to North Korea, 
offering to meet ``without preconditions,'' and that ``the ball is in 
[Pyongyang's] court.''
    What incentives or other creative approaches would you recommend 
that the United States employ to increase diplomatic engagement with 
the North Korean regime?

    [No Response Received.]

    Question. If diplomacy with DPRK were to restart, what short- and 
long-term objectives should the U.S. seek in such talks?

    [No Response Received.]
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Jenny Town to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. CRYPTOCURRENCY THEFT BY DPRK: According to recent 
comments by White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and 
Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger, ``[a]bout half of North Korea's 
missile program has been funded by cyberattacks and cryptocurrency 
theft.'' Reports also suggest that the DPRK is using funds it raises 
through cryptocurrency theft to evade sanctions, launder money, and 
strengthen its conventional arms and military readiness. South Korea 
has also habitually raised efforts to combat this theft as a point of 
potential cooperation that can be strengthened with the U.S.
    Given the pressing nature of this threat, how can the U.S. limit 
the DPRK's theft of cryptocurrency to fund its illegal weapons program?

    Answer. This is a difficult task given how quickly technology and 
tactics can change, how difficult it is to anticipate these trends and 
how relatively slow policy and policy coordination can be on these 
issues. That said, there is room for improvement, especially in working 
with the private sector to help address these issues. Some 
recommendations include:

   Establish an advisory council of leading nongovernmental and 
        private sector analysts who track and monitor North Koren cyber 
        activities to offer outside assistance and advice to relevant 
        government agencies working to curb North Korea's access to 
        cryptocurrency and to prosecute accordingly;

   Fund opportunities for nongovernmental organizations to 
        provide training on cyber and cryptocurrency schemes to high 
        risk private sector companies (similar to programs that offer 
        training on safeguards to custom and border control) to 
        increase awareness of the sanctions regime and obligations, 
        North Korean methods and likely targets, and best practices for 
        due diligence;

   Make information on known groups and campaigns easy to find 
        and publicly available in a timely fashion to enhance 
        collective understanding of the scale and speed of disruption 
        campaigns; and

   Establish and promote clear, easy, centralized reporting 
        protocols for incidents.

    Question. How can the U.S., South Korea, and other allies work 
together to combat this threat? What work is already being done to 
strengthen this coordination?

    Answer. The mandate for U.S.-ROK bilateral cooperation on 
cybersecurity has already been established through U.S.-ROK bilateral 
summit process.\1\ Establishing a similar ``U.S.-ROK Strategic 
Cybersecurity Cooperation Framework'' with other allies, or as a region 
mechanism would help to institutionalize and improve threat 
identification, information sharing, technical cooperation, and 
response coordination across the U.S. and its allies. The bilateral 
working group on the DPRK Cyber Threat has met four times since its 
inauguration in August 2022 to discuss the evolving nature of the North 
Korea's cyber actions, how to raise awareness among relevant parties 
and increase information sharing between governments and the private 
sector.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Leaders Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th 
Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and 
the Republic of Korea,'' White House Briefing Room, April 26, 2023, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/
26/leaders-joint-statement-in-commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-
the-alliance-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-
korea/.
    \2\ ``Fourth U.S.-ROK Working Group Meeting on the DPRK Cyber 
Threat: Media Note,'' Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of 
State, July 26, 2023, https://www.state.gov/fourth-u-s-rok-working-
group-meeting-on-the-dprk-cyber-threat/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Expanding this kind of cooperation across various actors 
bilaterally, including law enforcement financial agencies will be 
important. Cyber exercises can be a useful mechanism for this kind of 
public-private interagency coordination. Finding ways to expand this 
kind of cooperation across the network of U.S. allies, especially in 
creating standards for information sharing and reporting, could be 
useful.

    Question. PRC ECONOMIC COERCION: The PRC uses a range of economic 
tools to punish countries' political and strategic decisions it views 
as countering its interests. When I last visited South Korea in August 
2017, Beijing was using similar tactics against Seoul following the 
deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile 
system. The PRC reacted to the THAAD deployment by banning Chinese 
tourists from traveling to South Korea and canceled K-pop music 
concerts in China. The deployment also prompted boycotts in China 
against Korea goods and services such as Korean shopping malls. The 
boycotts by South Korea's largest trading partner resulted in an 
estimated loss of $7.5 billion to the Korean economy in 2017.
    What punitive economic measures does the PRC currently have in 
place against South Korea?

    Answer. China has been more judicious in its use of economic 
sanctions against South Korea since imposing the THAAD sanctions in 
2016. China partially lifted those sanctions in 2017, although some 
lingering restrictions still prohibit South Korean artists from 
performing in China. This kind of heavy handed tactics did not result 
in a change in South Korea's deployment of THAAD and negatively 
impacted South Korean public perception of China--an effect that 
persists to date.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Richard Q. Turcsanyi and Esther E. Song, ``South Koreans Have 
the World's Most Negative Views of China. Why?'' The Diplomat, December 
24, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/south-koreans-have-the-
worlds-most-negative-views-of-china-why/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As countries like South Korea look to redirect supply chains and 
trade away from China toward the U.S. and other countries with shared 
values, Beijing appears to be shifting its strategy as well. Instead of 
rushing toward punitive measures, China seems to be doubling down on 
diplomacy for now, for instance, trying to revive the China-ROK-Japan 
trilateral summit process, likely to avoid making ``de-risking'' moves 
more attractive by excessive coercion.

    Question. How can the U.S. work with ROK to respond to this 
economic coercion?

    Answer. Finding ways to help redirect trade and or create new 
economic opportunities with South Korea and other affected allies, in 
the specific areas being restricted can both bolster allied relations 
and help mitigate the impact of such measures. For South Korea, some of 
this is already taking place, even if inadvertently. Hosting BTS at the 
White House, for instance, while Korean artists are banned from 
performing in China, sends a strong message of solidarity--not just at 
the military level--but also helps boost the visibility of K-pop in the 
U.S. as more and more groups gain popularity across the country.
    Moreover, longer term strategies that encourage ``de-risking and 
diversifying'' trade away from China, toward U.S. and other countries 
that share values, lessens the leverage that China has over time. 
Encouraging this not only at the bilateral level but also at trilateral 
and multilateral levels, especially cooperation on supply chains, can 
help bolster resilience against economic coercion and create the 
foundations for facilitating more collective responses.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See examples in report such as: Stokes, Jacob, and Joshua Fitt. 
``Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.-South Korea Alliance Cooperation on 
China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies,'' 
Center for a New American Security, March 15, 2023, https://
www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peninsula-plus-enhancing-u-s-south-
korea-alliance-cooperation-on-china-multilateralism-and-military-and-
security-technologies; Reynolds, Matthew, and Matthew P. Goodman. 
``Deny, Deflect, Deter: Countering China's Economic Coercion.'' CSIS, 
March 21, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/deny-deflect-deter-
countering-chinas-economic-coercion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, in the case that China does threaten economic 
sanctions against U.S. allies for military or even de-risking efforts, 
the U.S. should consider threatening reciprocal sanctions on China, to 
demonstrate to both our allies and China, a sense of solidarity.

    Question. What preemptive measures as well reactive policies would 
you recommend that the U.S. and our partners pursue to negate the 
impact of PRC's economic coercion?

    Answer. There are a number of reports that provide recommendations 
for both trying to preempt Chinese economic coercion as well as how to 
respond to it. In many of these reports, de-risking and diversifying 
trade and supply chains away from China is highlighted as a way to 
increase overall resilience to coercion.
    One report suggests establishing and international task force on 
countering coercion ``to promote information sharing and develop a 
playbook of response options and communications strategies.\5\ Another 
report suggests the establishment of an interagency commission, 
``CoerCom,'' to pool knowledge and resources, and coordinate response 
strategies and well as encouraging our allies and partners to set up 
similar commissions to facilitate greater cooperation.\6\ Along those 
lines, the U.S. could establish an anti-coercion instrument akin to 
recent EU efforts. The EU's instrument enables the EU to respond, in 
line with international law, to economic coercion aimed at the EU as a 
whole or any member state. The goal is to dissuade this kind of action, 
but also respond with collective actions and provide resources and 
compensation for mitigating the impact to its member states as well.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Fergus Hunter, Daria Impiombato, Yvonne Lau, Adam Triggs, 
Albert Zhang, Urmika Deb, ``Countering China's coercive diplomacy,'' 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/
report/countering-chinas-coercive-diplomacy.
    \6\ Matthew Reynolds and Matthew P. Goodman, ``Deny, Deflect, 
Deter: Countering China's Economic Coercion,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, March 21, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
deny-deflect-deter-countering-chinas-economic-coercion.
    \7\ ``Anti-coercion: deal on new trade tool to protect EU from 
economic blackmail,'' Press Release, European Parliament, June 6, 2023, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230605IPR94605/
anti-coercion-deal-on-new-trade-tool-to-protect-eu-from-economic-
blackmail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One report suggested establishing an ``Indo-Pacific hybrid threat 
centre'' that would facilitate research and analysis of hybrid threats 
across the region, and promote information sharing and engagement on 
these issues to raise the overall situational awareness of the hybrid 
threat environment and identify potential areas of concern.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Lesley Seebeck, Emily Williams and Jacob Wallis, ``Countering 
the Hydra: A proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat center,'' 
Policy Brief Report No. 60/2022, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
June 7. 2022, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/countering-hydra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several of these recommendations underscore the importance of 
collective action, not only as a way to try and dissuade the use of 
economic coercion, but also to create costs to the country trying to 
impose it, in its broader trade relations, while also mitigating the 
effects on the targets of coercion. While the U.S. does not have member 
states like the EU, building cooperation and collection resources 
within our network of alliances can help safeguard U.S. interests in 
the long run and create greater resiliency among our allies against 
hybrid threats.

    Question. U.S. DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK: The Biden 
administration in 2021 stated that it will pursue a ``calibrated, 
practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with 
North Korea'' to eventually achieve the ``complete denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula,'' even as U.S. and international sanctions remain 
in place. The approach appears to envision offering partial sanctions 
relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization. Biden 
administration officials say they have reached out to North Korea, 
offering to meet ``without preconditions,'' and that ``the ball is in 
[Pyongyang's] court.''
    What incentives or other creative approaches would you recommend 
that the United States employ to increase diplomatic engagement with 
the North Korean regime?

    Answer. Rebuilding diplomacy with North Korea at this stage in both 
bilateral and larger geopolitical relations requires us to rethink our 
approach to diplomacy in general. First, we need to recognize that 
diplomatic efforts focused on denuclearization at the moment will not 
be effective. North Korea has made clear that it is not willing to 
negotiate on their WMD programs for the foreseeable future. More 
importantly, the kinds of incentives that would politically palatable 
in the U.S. will pale in comparison to what Russia seems to be willing 
to offer Pyongyang currently.
    However, we also do not have a good understanding of what issues 
North Korea might be willing to engage on. Probing North Korean 
responses and reactions on a range of security oriented concerns 
through either partner governments, like Sweden, or Track 2 channels, 
could help identify areas of mutual interest. These insights would help 
us then shape a new agenda and proposals for engaging Pyongyang 
directly.
    As U.S.-China relations start to thaw, this could also create a 
window of opportunity to propose a similar agenda to Pyongyang. 
Proposing talks focused on preventing nuclear war in the region could 
be a useful framing, especially if coinciding with progress in U.S.-
China strategic stability talks. This broad framing can create space to 
address a number of security concerns in the region, such as codes of 
conduct for signaling/communication of military exercises and other 
measures to reduce risks of misperceptions that could lead to conflict. 
Moreover, given the nature of atrocities seen in the current conflicts, 
especially that in the Middle East, there could be value in a 
multilateral dialogue on the code of conduct of war aimed at 
recommitting all states the region to adhere to international norms in 
this regard.
    Essentially, as we lead with issues other than denuclearization, 
the approach should shift away from a transactional exchange to 
identifying issues of mutual interest in addressing both traditional 
and nontraditional security challenges, seeking to negotiate practical 
and implementable measures to improve relations and the overall 
security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula.
    At the same time, efforts should be taken to clear obstacles for 
U.S. humanitarian work to move forward if and when the opportunity 
arises. Several concrete actions to clear out some of the bureaucratic 
hurdles to pursuing this work are outlined in H.R. 1540/S. 690 on 
Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act. Implementing these 
measures could help American humanitarian organizations to be ready to 
act quickly if and when the opportunity arises.

    Question. If diplomacy with DPRK were to restart, what short- and 
long-term objectives should the U.S. seek in such talks?
    Much of this will depend on the subject and format (bilateral or 
multilateral) of said talks. For instance, proposing talks on the 
prevention of nuclear war could have a number of short term objectives, 
such as moratorium on nuclear and missile testing on the Korean 
Peninsula or in the region (not just North Korea); reestablishing 
consistent and reliable communication channels as well as protocols for 
crisis communications; codes of conduct for notifying military 
exercises in advance of conduct to help lower the risks of 
misperceptions; and codes of conduct in case of conflict to recommit to 
international humanitarian law and minimize civilian harm. These kinds 
of issues may start as bilateral talks to probe interest, but may be 
better served in a multilateral or minilateral format in the longer 
term, to create commitments among all the relevant regional 
stakeholders.
    Longer term security objectives could include eliminating 
preemptive doctrines in the region; assessing the political appetite 
for an arms control agreement in the region; building cooperation on 
nuclear safety and security concerns; discussing realistic conditions 
for a permanent peace agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement; and 
understanding realistic conditions for resuming efforts to denuclearize 
the Korean Peninsula.