[Senate Hearing 118-297]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-297
OPEN HEARING:
THE 2024 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-721 WASHINGTON : 2025
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.]
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JOHN CORNYN, Texas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JERRY MORAN, Kansas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JON OSSOFF, Georgia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
MARK KELLY, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
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William Wu, Staff Director
Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 11, 2024
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia....................... 1
Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida........................... 4
WITNESSES
Avril D. Haines, Director of National Intelligence............... 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 41
William J. Burns, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.......... 18
Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation... 11
Brett M. Holmgren, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Research, U.S. Department of State............................. 32
General Timothy D. Haugh, Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service................................ 33
Lieutenant General Jeffrey A. Kruse, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency............................................ 16
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Answers Submitted by Mr. Holmgren in Response to Senator Lankford 81
OPEN HEARING:
WORLDWIDE THREATS ASSESSMENT 2024
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Monday, March 11, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, in open
session, the Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman of the
Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Warner (presiding), Rubio, Wyden,
Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Kelly,
Risch, Collins, Cotton, Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, Rounds.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Chairman Warner. Good afternoon. I'd like to call this
hearing to order. And welcome to our witnesses: Director of
National Intelligence, Avril Haines; CIA Director, Bill Burns;
FBI Director, Chris Wray; Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Research at the State Department, Brett Holmgren; Director
of the National Security Agency, General Timothy Haugh; and
Defense Intelligence Agency Director, Lieutenant General
Jeffrey Kruse.
Thank you for appearing today before the Senate
Intelligence Committee's annual worldwide threats hearing. It
is important for Congress and for the American people to hear
directly from the leaders of our Intelligence Community about
the threats and challenges facing the United States.
I'd like to first acknowledge the women and men of the U.S.
intel community. Most Americans will never see the work you do
behind the scenes. But be assured that the Members of this
Committee know its importance, and we thank you for what you do
to keep America safe.
The threat environment today is perhaps one of the most
challenging we've seen in recent years. We see nations
backsliding from democratic institutions. We see authoritarian
systems seeking to impose their will upon neighbors while
looking to undermine the international system that has been
guarantor of security and stability since World War II. And we
see the rise in competition around new technologies. We must
ensure that our institutions, including the IC, evolve to meet
these new challenges, which means, in my mind, redefining what
we think of as national security.
The IC was built to collect measures of hard power, how
many ships, planes, and military personnel an adversary might
have. But the nature of strategic competition today revolves as
much around not only traditional military power, but around
nontraditional tools and the ability to harness emerging dual-
use technologies. For example, advanced communication networks
can provide ubiquitous connectivity but also ubiquitous
surveillance. Artificial intelligence can accelerate software
development but can also accelerate malicious cyber attacks or
the spread of misinformation. Biotechnology advancements may
lead one day to curing cancer or eliminating famine, but also
may create new pathogens or even, as some have warned,
genetically-engineered super soldiers. And access to rare earth
minerals may help determine who shapes the energy future for
the whole world.
Compounding all of this, the nature of conflict
increasingly allows adversaries to project power through
asymmetrical means. For example, cyber attacks can disable
critical infrastructure from thousands of miles away and are
increasingly available to a widening array of actors.
Inexpensive, unmanned systems, drones, can threaten
multibillion dollar ships. We are now even seeing the
possibility of foreign adversaries weaponizing space in ways
that could be massively destructive not only to our national
security, but to our way of life and useful tools such as GPS
and satellite communications.
Similarly, misinformation and disinformation are
increasingly deployed cheaply by an array of adversarial
actors. We all know that more than 60 countries, over half the
world's population, will vote this year. And I am deeply
concerned that democracy, including in the United States, is
under greater threat than ever from these foreign adversaries.
Bad actors like Russia are particularly incentivized to
interfere, given what's at stake in Ukraine. Poll after poll
increasingly demonstrates that Americans are distrustful of
traditional sources of information, while AI provides the tools
to spread sophisticated misinformation at an unprecedented
speed and scale.
Amidst these threats, our ability to respond has been
hamstrung as recent litigation pending before the Supreme Court
has had a chilling effect on the voluntary sharing of
information related to foreign malign influence threats between
U.S. government agencies and social media companies. So, today
I would like each of our witnesses to report on how their
agencies and the IC as a whole are prepared and poised to meet
these technology-based challenges and what more needs to be
done.
Yet even with this new landscape, more traditional national
security challenges remain. Terrorist groups still threaten our
homeland. Over the last couple of years, we've seen
authoritarian powers challenging democratic norms, undermining
the international order, and intimidating their neighbors. The
People's Republic of China under Xi Jinping has presented an
unprecedented challenge, a techno-authoritarian behemoth whose
economy is intertwined with our own, challenging democratic
values, U.S. leadership, and global institutions, often using
enormous government subsidies. China has used its substantial
investment power to lead or attempt to dominate a range of key
industries, whether it be telecommunications and Huawei, social
media and TikTok, or genomics and BGI.
Another authoritarian adversary, Russia under Putin, has
continued its brutal invasion of Ukraine, illegally using
military forces to seize territory. Ukrainians have bravely
been fending off the Russian military for over two years,
supported by partners around the world. The Russian military
has suffered severe losses of men and equipment. The fact is
that close to 87 percent of Russia's pre-war ground forces have
been taken out of the conflict by either being killed or
wounded. And now, as a result of his aggression, Putin faces
what he has always feared, a NATO more united than ever.
That said, this war is in a critical phase, with a serious
imbalance of equipment. And my fear is the decision thus far by
the House of Representatives not to even take up legislation
that would support Ukraine in their fight against Putin's
aggression has been one of the most shortsighted decisions on a
national security issue that I can possibly imagine. Without
this assistance, Ukrainian defenses will be disastrously
undermined, as well as global confidence in America's resolve
will be undermined. And that will be the case whether it comes
from Putin in Europe or the PRC in Taiwan.
And as we convene this hearing, we also face continued
instability in the Middle East. The horrific terrorist attacks
against Israel's civilians by Hamas on October 7th have been
followed by an incursion by Israel that has cost an estimated
30,000 Palestinians their lives. And while Iran and its key
partners such as Hezbollah appear to be deterred from widening
the conflict for now, other Iranian proxies such as the Houthis
in Yemen and Iraqi Shia militias have attempted to expand their
conflict and drag in our country.
At the same time, Israel's war against Hamas has shown the
difficulty of using military force alone to eradicate a non-
state actor embedded in a civilian population, especially one
that has been so adept at using underground tunnels.
And I worry that Prime Minister Netanyahu's conduct in the
war threatens to undermine support for Israel in the long term,
including in the United States. This international support has
been key to Israel's security. And as a longtime friend of
Israel, this is of great concern to me for even Israel's
support in the United States.
In addition, we convene this timely hearing as Congress
faces a pressing deadline on a key national security program.
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
provides unique and critical foreign intelligence necessary to
protect our national security, enabling the IC to prevent and
thwart terrorist attacks, track foreign spies, uncover economic
espionage, protect U.S. troops, expose human and drug
trafficking, and disrupt foreign cyber attacks. Allowing this
program to lapse would critically damage our national security.
In closing, we face an increasing array of diversity of
challenges, but we also have an opportunity to reinvigorate
America's democratic values in the face of autocracies like
China and Russia. We cannot take for granted either democracy
or the international system that has kept Americans safe for
decades. Maintaining both requires leadership, conviction, and
sacrifice.
With that, let me now turn to the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for coming here today.
And I also extend my thanks to the men and women who work
underneath you that do the important work of keeping our
country safe at what I think you could describe as one of those
pivot moments in history, where what life will be like for a
generation is being determined by what's happening now and in
the near future, while events are changing perhaps faster than
any other time in human history.
I think we have to remind ourselves, if we're going to talk
about the specific threats, the whats of the why, the bigger
outline picture of why things are happening the way they are
happening, because I do think that they are all interrelated.
So, from the end of the Cold War, I don't know when the end
date is, but let's say the late 2000s, we lived in a unipolar
world. The United States was basically the only country in the
world that could project power everywhere at every time. And we
were called upon to do many things in regards to that. But
other nation-states progressed during that stage. And I still
think America by far, by every measure you can imagine,
economically, culturally, militarily remains the world's
strongest nation and should remain that way for the foreseeable
future, if we make the right choices.
That order that I just described is being challenged. It's
being challenged by nation-states that, frankly, don't like the
way the world looks now. At least, they think it benefits
America and it hurts them, and they want to remake a new world,
perhaps even replace the world that they think is beneficial to
America and our democratic allies with an alternative, if not
at least a replacement--this new order that they seek.
The Chinese, they believe we're in inevitable decline and
that their rise is inevitable as well. Like I said, they don't
like the rules of the world as they believe were written by
America and our allies, and so they increasingly are taking it
upon themselves at every opportunity to challenge them. In
every domain, they steal our ideas on innovation and so forth
so that their companies can do the things that we do, but of
course do it cheaper and flood markets with those products.
I don't need to tell this panel or the Members of this
Committee and the general public that they're expanding their
military capabilities in an extraordinary way, to include not
simply projecting power in the Indo-Pacific but around the
world. By the way, they manipulate loopholes in our laws and in
our systems in this country to buy up land, buy up companies,
gain strategic advantage in industries, and undermine our
industries in return. They are a major part of flooding this
country with deadly drugs that are destroying communities and
ravaging entire families. And they've also gotten very good at
hiring lobbyists and even deputizing the corporate industry,
corporate America to come up here and lobby us for things that
are beneficial to the Chinese goals at the expense of this
country long term.
And I think it's important to mention here today they also
happen to control--and anybody who says they don't, doesn't
know what they're talking about, because every company in China
is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party--they happen to
control a company that owns the one of the world's best
artificial intelligence algorithms. It's the one that's used in
this country by TikTok, and it uses the data of Americans to
basically read your mind and predict what videos you want to
see. The reason why TikTok is so successful, the reason why
it's so attractive, is because it knows you better than you
know yourself. And the more you use it, the more it learns. The
problem is not TikTok or the videos. The problem is that the
algorithm that powers it is controlled by a company in China
that must do whatever the Chinese Communist Party tells them to
do. And the only way that that algorithm works is if that
company in China, under the control of the Chinese government,
is given access to the data that TikTok collects. TikTok does
not work without that algorithm, and that algorithm is
controlled by a company that's controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party under the law of China.
In the case of Putin, he actually sees America as decadent
and in decline, and he views Russia as resilient. They view
themselves as a great power, and he believes that great powers
have a right to buffer-states. He believes that great powers
have a right not just to have their own borders, but to control
the countries around their borders as buffer-states. I think
they already have that in Belarus in his mind, and it is one of
the reasons why he invaded Ukraine.
In the case of Iran, they want to export their Shia Islamic
revolution to the entire Middle East. And the problem with this
is two things standing in their way: the state of Israel and
the United States of America. And so that is why they have
proxy groups in places like Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in
Yemen, in Gaza, who they use for their purposes. One of their
purposes is to use these groups now to attack Americans so that
we will say it's not worth the trouble, we need to get out of
there.
And once we leave, then they'll move on Jordan and on
Bahrain, then they'll make Israel an unlivable place. And
ultimately, their ambitions are the entire region and most of
the Gulf kingdoms. That's why I think it's a mistake to view
the horrific events of October 7th as simply the latest
iteration of a longstanding Israeli-Palestinian problem. It is
deeply tied to the head of this snake, and the head of this
snake is in Iran and in Tehran.
Add to all of these three countries North Korea. We haven't
heard a lot about it yet. They have become increasingly
aggressive. In fact, I would argue that we perhaps are closer
to some armed hostilities than we've been in a decade or
longer. Why? Why have they become so aggressive? They feel
empowered. They feel empowered because Putin is buying things
from them and helping them to break their international
isolation, and also because--I don't know what percentage of
their economy is powered by ransomware attacks and cyber
hacking, but it's substantial. They generate a lot of money
from that.
And then add to all these parades of horribles the fact
that terror is still a threat. Iran, as has been publicly
reported, is still trying to kill former government officials
that live in the United States of America. There are former
government officials in this country no longer in office who
require 24 hours a day security because Iran is trying to kill
them inside the United States. Hezbollah, an agent of Iran, is
also looking for ways to conduct terrorist attacks against
American interests and Israeli and Jewish interests all over
the world and here in the homeland as well. By the way, ISIS
and al-Qaeda are not out of business. They are still involved.
I'll add al-Shabab to that. They also want to kill Americans.
If they could do it in the homeland, they would love that. And
all of that happening at a time in which perhaps the single
largest, most eventful migration corridor in history is
operating right off of our border.
So, I think it's a mistake sometimes to divide all of these
problems geographically because in some ways they're all
interrelated in key ways. Yes, these individual states all have
different ambitions, but they share a common goal, and the
common goal is a world friendlier and better for them and their
interests, and a world in which America is weakened and less
able to act. And all of these crises begin to interlock in a
way that help them. For example, the Chinese and the Russians
probably see great benefit--no, not probably--they do see great
benefit from what's happening in the Middle East, because they
figure every dollar and every second of our attention that's
paid there, we're not paying to what's happening with Ukraine
and we're not paying to the Indo-Pacific. The Chinese see great
benefit in Ukraine as well, because they view it as the more
time and money we spend there, the less time and money and
focus we have on them.
In fact, one of the things I know the Chinese hope for is
one of two things: (A) we deplete ourselves in Ukraine and/or
the Middle East, particularly Ukraine; or (B), we cut and run,
and then they can go around the world and say: See, I told you
America's weak; I told you America's unreliable. They have a
plan for either outcome, which makes it challenging for us as
we decide what to do here.
So, these things all come together, and I think that's
really the overarching threat that we face, is an understanding
that none of these should be viewed in isolation. The goals
that Russia has, the goals that Iran has, the goals that North
Korea has, the goals that the Chinese have may be different
goals. But one of the real developments that threatens the
security of our country is that they are increasingly
partnering with one another--not a NATO alliance, not the sort
of formal alliance that's written out. But they are
increasingly partnering with each other, that's on selected
topics and in selected opportunities, because they all share
one goal. And that is they want to weaken America, weaken our
alliances, weaken our standing and our capability and our will,
because it helps them to achieve the world as they envision it,
the world they want. But it comes at our expense and at the
expense of all it's been built over the last 20 or 30 years.
I think that one of the greatest dangers we face is the
inability to see how all these things are interconnected. And I
think one of the greatest challenges we face is to deal with
them as if they are interconnected. I think that what life will
be like on this planet for the next generation will be
determined very much by what we do or fail to do here over the
next two to three years, and certainly with the issues that are
before us today.
So, I look forward to hearing from all of you, and I
appreciate you coming.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. Director Haines,
I believe you're up first.
STATEMENT OF AVRIL D. HAINES,
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Haines. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, Members of the
Committee, thank you so much for the opportunity to be here
today alongside my wonderful colleagues to present the IC's
annual threat assessment.
And before I start, I also want to thank publicly the
people of the Intelligence Community. From the collector to the
analyst and everybody in between, we're really presenting the
result of their labor at this hearing. And they work tirelessly
every day to keep our country safe and prosperous, and we are
all very proud to represent them here today.
I also want to take the opportunity to thank all of you for
the extraordinary support that you've shown to the Intelligence
Community. The ICs relationship with its oversight committees
is quite obviously critically important. And you all work with
us on a bipartisan basis, and that is especially inspiring in
today's environment. We're grateful for your encouragement and
for your wisdom.
Today the United States faces an increasingly complex and
interconnected threat, as has been noted by the Chairman and
Vice Chairman, environment characterized by really three
categories of challenges. The first is an accelerating
strategic competition with major authoritarian powers that are
actively working to undermine the rules-based order and the
open international system the United States and our partners
rely on for trade, commerce, the free flow of information, and
accountability to the truth.
[Interruption from a member of the public.]
Chairman Warner. I recognize people feel passionately, but
the American people deserve to hear from the leaders of the
Intelligence Community.
Director Haines, continue.
Director Haines. The second category is a set of more
intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, such as
climate change, corruption, narcotics trafficking, health
security, terrorism, and cybercrime that often interact with
traditional state-based political, economic, and security
challenges.
And the third category is regional and localized conflicts
that have far-reaching and at times cascading implications, not
only for neighboring countries but also for the world.
And all three challenges are affected by trends in new and
emerging technologies, environmental changes, and economic
strain that are stoking instability and making it that much
more challenging for us to forecast developments and their
implications. These dynamics are putting unprecedented burdens
on the institutions and the relationships that the United
States relies on to manage such challenges, and perhaps more
than ever, frankly, highlight the need for sustained U.S.
leadership to uphold the rules-based order.
And I'll just touch on these three categories of
challenges, starting with strategic competition in China, in an
effort to provide some context and highlight some of the
intersections.
President Xi continues to envision China as a leading power
on the world stage, and Chinese leaders believe it is essential
to project power globally in order to be able to resist U.S.
pressure, for they are convinced that the United States will
not tolerate a powerful China. Nevertheless, the PRC seeks to
ensure China can maintain positive ties to the United States
and will likely continue to do so this year, as they see
stability in our relationship as important to their capacity to
attract foreign direct investment. Boosting the domestic
economy is a fundamental priority for President Xi, yet he
appears to be doubling down on a long-term growth strategy that
will deepen public and investor pessimism over the near-term.
With youth unemployment around 14.9 percent, no major stimulus
aimed at consumption, forthcoming massive local debts, and a
property market contraction, 2024 is likely to be another
difficult year for China's economy, all against the backdrop of
an aging and shrinking population and slowing economic growth.
President Xi is counting on China's investments in
technology, such as advanced manufacturing and robotics,
artificial intelligence, high performance computing to drive
productivity gains and spur future growth. Yet, he is
increasingly concerned about the United States ability to
interfere with China's technological goals. Consequently, in an
effort to protect and promote China's capacity to compete
technologically, which President Xi views as fundamental to his
long-term growth strategy, PRC leaders modified their approach
to economic retaliation against the United States over the last
year, imposing at least some tangible costs on U.S. firms, even
as they continue to moderate such actions to avoid domestic
costs.
Chinese leadership is furthermore pursuing a strategy to
boost China's indigenous innovation and technological self-
reliance; expand their efforts to acquire, steal, or compel the
production of intellectual property and capabilities from
others, including the United States; and continue to engage in
coercive behavior to control critical global supply chains of
relevance. In the meantime, President Xi's emphasis on control
and central oversight is unlikely to solve the challenges posed
by China's economic and endemic corruption, demographic
decline, and structural economic constraints. And over the
coming year, tension between these challenges and China's
aspirations for greater geopolitical power will probably become
all the more apparent.
Given its ambitions, Beijing will continue to use its
military forces to intimidate its neighbors and to shape the
region's actions in accordance with the PRC's priorities. We
expect the PLA will field more advanced platforms, deploy new
technologies, and grow more competent in joint operations, with
a particular focus on Taiwan and the western Pacific.
And the role intended for China's growing nuclear forces
and cyber capabilities in this effort and the ultimate intent
behind unprecedented growth in these areas remain a priority
for us in the IC, and they are not unrelated to actions of
Russia.
President Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine
continues unabated. Ukraine's retreat from Malvika and their
struggle to stave off further territorial losses in the past
few weeks have exposed the erosion of Ukraine's military
capabilities with the declining availability of external
military aid. The assistance that is contemplated in the
Supplemental is absolutely critical to Ukraine's defense right
now. And without that assistance, it is hard to imagine how
Ukraine will be able to maintain the extremely hard-fought
advances it has made against the Russians, especially given the
sustained surge in Russian ammunition production and purchases
from North Korea and Iran.
And meanwhile, President Putin is increasing defense
spending in Russia, reversing his long-standing reluctance to
devote a high percentage of GDP to the military as he looks to
rebuild. In many ways, this is prompted by the fact that Russia
has paid an enormous price for the war in Ukraine. Not only has
Russia suffered more military losses than in any time since
World War II--roughly 300,000 casualties and thousands of tanks
and armored combat vehicles, setting them back years--it has
also precipitated Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO,
which Putin believes requires an expansion of Russia's ground
forces.
Putin continues to judge the time is on his side and almost
certainly assumes that a larger, better equipped military will
also serve the purpose of driving that point home to Western
audiences. Such messaging is important because Putin's
strategic goals remain unchanged. He continues to see NATO
enlargement and Western support to Ukraine as reinforcing his
long held belief that the United States and Europe seek to
restrict Russian power and undermine him.
And of course, in the meantime, Russia continues to
modernize and fortify its nuclear weapons capabilities, even
though it maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear
weapons stockpile. We remain concerned that Moscow will put at
risk longstanding global norms against the use of asymmetric or
strategically destabilizing weapons, including in space and in
the cyber domain.
Another critical intersection we are monitoring is the
relationship, as the Vice Chairman noted, between the
governments of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, which is
evolving as these four countries expand collaboration through a
web of bilateral and in some cases trilateral arrangements.
This growing cooperation and willingness to exchange aid in
military, economic, political, and intelligence matters
enhances their individual capabilities, enables them to
cooperate on competitive actions, assist them to further
undermine the rules-based order, and gives them each some
insulation from external international pressure.
And nevertheless, we assess these relationships will remain
far short of formal alliances or a multilateral access.
Parochial interest, desire to avoid entanglements, and wariness
of harm and instability from each other's actions will likely
limit their cooperation and ensure it advances incrementally,
absent direct conflict between one of these countries and the
United States. And nevertheless, the power dynamics are
shifting among them, and this is creating new challenges. In
particular, Russia's need for support in the context of Ukraine
has forced it to grant some long-sought concessions to China,
North Korea and Iran, with the potential to undermine, among
other things, long-held nonproliferation norms.
As I noted in the beginning, intensifying transnational
challenges are intersecting with these more traditional
threats. For example, with the advent of generative AI, states
and non-state actors who are interested in conducting foreign
malign influence operations no longer need to master a language
to create potentially believable false content. The threat of
malign actors exploiting these tools and technologies to
undercut U.S. interests in democracy is particularly potent as
voters go to the poll in more than 60 elections around the
globe this year, as the Chairman noted.
We have also seen a massive increase in the number of
ransomware attacks globally, which went up roughly 74 percent
in 2023 from what it was in 2022, and U.S. entities were the
most heavily targeted. Many of these are conducted by non-state
actors with the Russia-based cybercriminal group LockBit
remaining the most popular ransomware as a service provider.
LockBit was responsible for nearly a quarter of all claimed
attacks worldwide, leading to a joint effort by 11 countries to
seize its resources and take down its online domains.
Transnational criminal organizations and human smuggling
operations increasingly exploit migrants through extortion,
kidnaping, and human trafficking. And in particular, the threat
from illicit drugs remains at historic levels, with Mexican
transnational criminal organizations supplying and moving large
amounts of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl into the United
States. More than 100,000 Americans have died from drug related
overdoses during the past year and most of those deaths have
been attributed to illicit fentanyl. And as such, the threat
from fentanyl and other synthetic drugs to the health and
welfare of everyday Americans remains a top priority for the
Intelligence Community.
In the third category, we have multiple regional conflicts
with far-reaching implications, perhaps nowhere more obviously
than in the Middle East. This crisis in Gaza is a stark example
of how regional developments have the potential for broader and
even global implications. Now having lasted for more than five
months, the Gaza conflict has roiled the Middle East with
renewed instability, presenting new security paradigms and
humanitarian challenges while pulling in a range of actors.
The conflict has prompted new dynamics even as it has
entrenched old ones. We continue to assess that Hezbollah and
Iran do not want to cause an escalation of the conflict that
pulls us or them into a full-out war, yet the Houthis entered
the war and were willing to do so without Iran acting first,
becoming one of the most aggressive actors in the conflict: the
Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria that have been
attacking our forces and have been more focused on the United
States and Israel, using the conflict as an opportunity to
pursue their own agenda.
Moreover, the crisis has galvanized violence by a range of
actors around the world. And while it is too early to tell, it
is likely that the Gaza conflict will have a generational
impact on terrorism. Both al-Qaeda and ISIS inspired by Hamas
have directed supporters to conduct attacks against Israeli and
U.S. interests. And we have seen how it is inspiring
individuals to conduct acts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobic
terror worldwide. In this third category of regional and
localized conflicts, we have many more we might discuss,
including Haiti and Sudan and what is happening in the Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo--and the list goes on.
And this finally brings me to 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which will expire on April 19th
without Congressional action. The intelligence gathered
pursuant to Section 702 was essential in preparing this annual
threat assessment and is absolutely fundamental to every aspect
of our work, as I know you know. 702 provides unique insights
into foreign intelligence targets such as foreign adversaries,
terrorist organizations including Hamas, weapons proliferators,
spies, malicious cyber actors, and fentanyl traffickers. And it
does so at a speed and reliability that we simply cannot
replace with any other authority. And as Congress pursues
reauthorization, we understand there will be reforms and we
support those that bolster the compliance and oversight regimes
in place, while preserving the operational agility that is
vital to keeping the Nation safe.
Thank you for your patience and we look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Director Haines. I appreciate
it.
I know we don't normally do these on Monday. I appreciate
everybody coming in. We will be conducting a closed session
after this open session, so Members should hold any questions
of a classified nature until after that. And after the chair
and vice chair go through our first round of questions, we'll
then recognize Members in rounds of five minutes, all based on
seniority.
Director Haines, I want to start with where you ended up on
702. This critical component of both law enforcement and the
Intelligence Community expires on April 19th. Congress needs to
act. Sixty percent of all the information that goes into the
President's Daily Brief is derived from 702 information.
Foreigner talking to foreigner in terms of bad guys.
One of the things that the Vice Chairman and I are very
proud of is we worked very hard on a reform of Section 702 that
we introduced last year, including 16 co-sponsors. A great
number of Members of this Committee are part of that reform
effort that, again, looked at trying to make sure where there
had been perhaps overzealous use at the FBI in terms of who was
querying, how things were queried, have been dramatically
constrained.
Director Wray, I want to start my question, though, with
you. Some have actually said, though, that where we didn't go
far enough, and they would propose a reform that would require
agencies to seek a warrant before conducting U.S. person
queries. Could you explain what would happen on a practical
level, both from the IC side and the law enforcement side, if
that requirement was put in place?
Director Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the short answer is a warrant requirement for us to
run U.S. person queries would be untenable and would largely
gut the effectiveness of the authority. And I say that for
several reasons.
First, it would blind us to information already lawfully in
our possession that we need to be able to review and act on in
a very time-sensitive way to be able to stop terrorist attacks,
protect a victim from cyber-attack, warn somebody who is
potentially targeted with assassination or kidnaping.
Second, in many instances, at the time that the query would
be run, we wouldn't have the probable cause that the query term
is associated with an agent of a foreign power. That's what the
query tells; and so, you got that problem. And then the third
problem is that an awful lot of the places that we're using 702
queries are to assist victims and to prevent potential victims
from further attacks, whether terrorist attacks, cyberattacks,
etc. And so, in those instances, you'd never be able to get a
warrant requirement, even if there were some kind of delay
built into it. That alone, for all these threats which are
extremely time sensitive, I think the DNI correctly used the
term agility. That is the key.
And so, I would implore Congress not to take that
additional step. You mentioned the compliance failures. I've
been very clear that the compliance failures that occurred at
the FBI are wholly unacceptable, and that's why I've put in
place a whole host of reforms, covering everything from
training to our systems, approvals, oversight, an Office of
Internal Audit. I could go on and on. And those reforms are
working. The FISA court itself most recently found 98 percent
compliance and commented on the reforms working. The most
recent Justice Department report found the reforms working, 99
percent compliance. And so, I think legislation that ensures
those reforms stay in place but also preserves the agility and
the utility of the tools, what we need to be able to protect
the American people.
Chairman Warner. Well, I appreciate that. And I do think,
our reform bill had the notion of trust-but-verify so that we
would literally legislate the reforms that had been put in
place, add a few others, add some of the additional amicus
provisions. One of the things I think that has been discovered,
that the majority of the queries that involve Americans are
actually on victim notification. The very notion of having a
warrant to have a victim notification is contradictory in
itself. I want to raise another issue that I think has been
appropriately raised, and this is the question around bulk
purchase of personal data. I think we need to go much further
on data protection, and I think that has been a failure of this
Congress to address in its past.
Director Haines, I know you've done a study on this. And my
fear is that some of the proposed reforms would actually not
limit foreign entities from obtaining this data but would limit
law enforcement. Can you talk to the question of bulk data
purchases and data brokers?
Director Haines. Absolutely. From our perspective,
commercially-available information, as we think about the
entire set of what's out there and what's been discussed in
Congress in relation to this, is just increasingly critical to
the Intelligence Community's work. And I think an obvious
example of this is commercial imagery and the role that it
played, for example, in the context of the invasion of Ukraine.
But there's a whole series of other areas where we're
purchasing information, such as commercial threat information
that's related to cyber security and things like that.
And at the same time, we recognize that commercially-
available information raises new and important issues related
to privacy and civil liberties. And this is in large part true
because more of our daily lives are connected digitally to the
world today than ever before. And an increasing amount of data
about individuals and their activities, often perceived as not
especially sensitive on its own, is actually available for sale
alongside increasingly sophisticated analytic tools that
essentially, relying on artificial intelligence, can actually
in aggregate raise significant privacy and civil liberties
issues that are relevant, which is why we basically said, look,
we recognize this is something that is of concern, and we want
to make sure that we're actually addressing this issue
appropriately and responsibly within the Intelligence
Community.
So, we had a panel, an external panel, look at this
question and really asked them how and under what circumstances
should we use commercially-available information, and in
particular to reflect on the existing framework for privacy and
civil liberties. We've published that report. And in fact,
Senator Wyden asked us to, and as a consequence, put that out.
And as an Intelligence Community in our EXCOM, as we call it,
all the heads together, agreed that we thought those
recommendations made sense. And we have issued IC guidance
basically for cataloging commercially-available information
acquired by IC elements to ensure that our handling of such
information is consistent with relevant legal policy-security
considerations to facilitate oversight. And we've developed a
framework that augments each ICs elements attorney general
guidelines and related policies with general principles and
additional guidance on how IC elements should access, collect,
process commercially available information, including more
precise guidance for identifying and dealing with categories of
information that pose a greater risk of implicating privacy and
civil liberties concerns.
And finally, as the panel recommended also, the framework
sets out standards and procedures that govern and require
periodic reevaluation and acquisition and use decisions. And I
think the challenge that is posed by some of the legislative
proposals that I've seen require, for example, a probable cause
requirement before you can obtain that information. Similarly,
we are not going to have in the scenario of, for example,
getting cyber-threat information commercially, a probable cause
reason for getting that. What we're trying to do is understand
what the vulnerabilities are. And then what we recognize is
that whatever the commercial information is that we're
obtaining, we need to treat it in a way that actually mitigates
against the risks that have been described.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Director Wray, we know that over the
last three years millions of people crossed the U.S. border
illegally, and many have been released into the country. Have
members or people with ties to dangerous gangs like, for
example, the prison gang Tren de Aragua from Venezuela, were
they among the people that came into this country?
Director Wray. Well, I don't know that I can speak to this
specific gang. But certainly, we have had dangerous individuals
enter the United States of a variety of sorts.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Are we now seeing crimes from people
that entered the country over the last three years, some of
them with ties to gangs or other criminal organizations?
Director Wray. Well, I guess what I would say is this. From
an FBI perspective, we are seeing a wide array of very
dangerous threats that emanate from the border, and that
includes everything from drug trafficking. The FBI alone seized
enough fentanyl in the last two years to kill 270 million
people. That's just on the fentanyl side. An awful lot of the
violent crime in the United States is at the hands of gangs who
are themselves involved in the distribution of that fentanyl.
Vice Chairman Rubio. But you're also seeing and tracking
local law enforcement arresting and, for example, the assault
on the police officers in New York. All the reporting said they
had ties to this gang in particular. But there's no doubt that
people that were criminals in their country of origin have
crossed that border and are now in the U.S. committing crimes.
Director Wray. Correct.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Is there now a black market emerging
to sell? We've seen reports of a black market emerging selling
fake Social Security cards, fake green cards. Have you seen
reporting on that?
Director Wray. Well, certainly on the Darknet, for example,
there is a significant marketplace for different kinds of
stolen identity information.
Vice Chairman Rubio. What about in the street?
Director Wray. I think as well, yeah.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay. There are smuggling networks all
over the world that specialize in moving people from all over
the world, including from the Middle East, Central Asia, and so
forth. Are we aware of any of these smuggling organizations are
run by are conducted by people that have ties, for example, to
ISIS or other terrorist organizations?
Director Wray. So, I want to be a little bit careful how
far I can go in open session. But there is a particular network
where some of the overseas facilitators of the smuggling
network have ISIS ties that we're very concerned about, and
that we've been spending enormous amount of effort with our
partners investigating exactly what that network is up to. It's
something that's, again, the subject of our current
investigation.
Vice Chairman Rubio. So, there's a network we're concerned
about that has facilitators involved in it that have ties to
ISIS or other terrorist organizations?
Director Wray. Correct.
Vice Chairman Rubio. I talked about TikTok in the opening.
Just to lay the groundwork here, TikTok is this American--
TikTok US, American company, or headquartered putatively in
America--and they have this platform which is fascinating,
right? It's very effective, very good, has a lot of members.
One of the things that powers it is that it is powered by an
algorithm based on artificial intelligence where the more you
use it, the more it learns about you. It in essence reads your
mind. It knows the kinds of videos you like, and it feeds you
more and more of them, causing you to go back. That algorithm
is not owned by TikTok. It's owned by ByteDance, a Chinese
company, correct?
Director Wray. That's my understanding.
Vice Chairman Rubio. And so, the only way that algorithm
works is if that Chinese company has access to the data being
generated by TikTok. The owner of the algorithm, ByteDance, has
to have access. So, it doesn't matter where the data is stored.
Ultimately, they have to have access to it in order to make the
algorithm work, correct?
Director Wray. Right. I think what you're getting to is the
key point: that the parent company is, for all intents and
purposes, beholden to the CCP.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, the reason why I raised that is
if ByteDance in China is the one that owns the driver that
makes TikTok effective, isn't it true that under Chinese law,
the Chinese Communist Party says that data that you're gaining
access to in order to make your algorithm work, we want a copy
of that data. If they said that to ByteDance in the future,
ByteDance would have to give it to them.
Director Wray. That's my understanding.
Vice Chairman Rubio. And if they went to them and said we
want you to change your algorithms so that Americans start
seeing videos that hurt this candidate or help that candidate
in the upcoming election, ByteDance would have to do that under
Chinese law.
Director Wray. That's my understanding.
Vice Chairman Rubio. And if they said we want you to put
out videos that make Americans fight with each other or spread
conspiracy theories and get them at each other's throat,
ByteDance can't go to Chinese court and fight the Communist
Party. They would have to do it.
Director Wray. That's my understanding. And I would just
add that that kind of influence operation, or the different
kinds of influence operations you're describing, are
extraordinarily difficult to detect, which is part of what
makes the national security concerns represented by TikTok so
significant.
Vice Chairman Rubio. All right. Thank you.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my
thanks to all of you and of course the people you work with
every day.
I'm going to start with this issue of government purchases
of Americans' data. And former acting CIA Director Mike Morrell
presents something of a different view on this. He has said
that the amount of the information available for the government
to buy would, quote, knock your socks off. And if it were
collected through normal intelligence methods, it would be top
secret information kept under lock and key.
I believe Mr. Morrell is right. It is the Wild West out
there in terms of sensitive information on Americans, and the
government can buy it up. Unlike normal intelligence
collection, there are apparently virtually no rules here. To
take one public example, I want to go to you, General Kruse,
not to be going after you especially. But you said that the
Defense Intelligence Agency has acknowledged it obtains and
purchases actual U.S. location data. So, my question for you
and any other Members who would like to add to it, are there
any Constitutional or statutory limits on your agency's
purchasing of the location information of Americans?
Constitutional or statutory limits, any?
General Kruse. Thank you for the question, Senator Wyden. I
would say, yes, there are absolute and very clear guidelines
for all of us. And when we purchase the bulk data, the first
thing we do is we exclude all of the data that is within U.S.
territory and is on U.S. citizens as the very first step. Our
teams have been here with the Congress talking through our
attorney general guidelines, have been speaking with the
concerns that you and others have voiced to us. I think we have
built the processes around our purchasing of commercial data
and use of commercial in partnership with----
Senator Wyden. Respectfully, I didn't hear you mention what
I asked about. Either Constitutional or statutory limits. So,
why don't you just send that to us for the record?
And I will just say, colleagues, this is the reason why
Congress needs to pass legislation limiting government
purchases of Americans' information. And I also believe that
Congress needs to pass the bill that I introduced with the Vice
Chairman, Senator Rubio, making sure this information isn't
bought up by foreign countries, either.
So, let's go now to Section 702. And obviously, the
government needs to have Section 702 to focus on foreign
threats. It is just essential that it be done without throwing
aside the privacy rights of law-abiding Americans. There is a
workable solution. Under a bipartisan proposal that I've been
part of, the government wouldn't need a warrant to run searches
on Americans to see who they're talking to. It's only when the
government wants to read the content of those private
conversations that a warrant would be required, even though
there are also many exceptions that we have put into the bill--
exceptions for emergencies, consent, cyberattacks--the list
goes on. Now, according to FBI's data, the FBI looks at content
in less than two percent of its searches on Americans.
So, my question would be for you, Director Wray. As I've
described it using your data, the data from the FBI, doesn't
our warrant requirement only apply to a tiny fraction of the
searches the FBI conducts when you factor in all of these
exceptions? I mean, I can go through them, but I think you know
them. You know, if there's any imminent danger, no warrant; if
there are other dangers you have to go get the warrant later.
But the exception list is very long.
So, the question is, isn't it correct that what we're
talking about in the bipartisan bill here in the Senate and in
the House, it would apply to only a small fraction of the
searches you're conducting?
Director Wray. As a percentage, it's not a significant
percentage. Certainly, the number is significant, and I think
the fundamental problem with the warrant requirement before you
can look at the content, is that it's the content that tells us
whether or not it's an agent of a foreign power involved, so I
think that's part of the problem that we have.
[Interruption from a Member of the Public.]
Chairman Warner. If the witness will pause for a moment.
Continue.
Director Wray. I think where I got cut off, was I was just
explaining that the fundamental problem is that in the
instances where we need to look at the content, the probable
cause that's lacking at that point is what's established by
seeing the content. That's what tells us more often than not,
that there's an agent of a foreign power involved.
And so that's what enables us to then act and go forward
with the appropriate investigative steps.
Senator Wyden. So, there's an exception for imminent
danger. There's an exception in other emergencies. There is an
exception to simply conversations with foreign threats. I'd
like you to send to me, so we'll have this for the record, how
having those exceptions will in some way obstruct you when
you're trying to deal with a tiny number of warrants. This is
all about Americans believing. You bet we have foreign threats.
There's no question about it, but we can address those foreign
threats in a way that's compatible with the liberty and the
values that law-abiding Americans hold. I'm happy to work with
you on it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Director Haines, you
understandably spent considerable time talking about the
significant threats that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea
pose to our country. Since the way that our disastrous
withdrawal from Afghanistan unfolded, we've also seen a large
increase in terrorist attacks conducted by ISIS. In fact, those
number nearly 200 and have resulted in some 1,300 casualties.
So obviously Afghanistan has shown that once again, the Taliban
is either unwilling or unable to control terrorist groups.
Are there threats of terrorist attacks from ISIS toward
Americans a problem still? And how are you balancing the great
power competition with the threats from ISIS? In addition, I
would like you to comment on whether or not terrorist groups
backed by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, pose a threat to
our homeland.
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
In terms of the threat from ISIS, which you're absolutely
right, remains a significant counterterrorism concern for us,
most of the attacks that you're talking about, globally taken
on by ISIS, have actually occurred by parts of ISIS that are
outside of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there still remains an
ISIS concern. It is one where, ironically, the Taliban is
actually also concerned about it, because the ISIS group that
is in Afghanistan is in fact going after the Taliban. And so,
this is a place where, actually, the Taliban has taken action
against that group in ways that are consistent also with our
concerns and interests.
So that is one piece. In terms of the terrorist groups that
are backed by Iran, absolutely. That is a major issue for us
and there are a number of them. Obviously, we often talk about
Iranian-aligned militia groups that have been attacking U.S.
forces and assets in Iraq and Syria in particular, but also in
other parts of the region attempting to. And there have been
just dozens and dozens of attacks that we've been looking to
manage, and that continues to be fueled by Iran. They provide
weapons, they provide training, they provide money to those
groups, and we still obviously see them as a destabilizing
force in the region. We also see Iran's support of Hezbollah,
as you noted, and of Hamas over the years--and so considerably.
Not to mention the Houthis, who are another example of this.
But certainly, that's been a large issue and my colleagues
may wish to add to this.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Director Wray, we know that
China is the primary provider of the predecessor chemicals and
the pill presses for fentanyl. And you've pointed out in your
testimony the extraordinary scope of the amount of fentanyl
that has been produced. And indeed, 80 percent of the overdoses
in Maine last year involved fentanyl.
But what we're also seeing in Maine is a new phenomenon
that was reported by some enterprising journalists. And that is
that Chinese nationals are establishing illegal marijuana
growing operations all over the state. One public report
estimates there are more than 200 of them, primarily in rural
Maine. They're unregulated. They're illicit. They're destroying
homes because they're growing the marijuana inside. And the
marijuana is very potent.
What is the FBI doing to support local county and state
officials? And why do you think the Chinese have sent their
citizens to rural America to establish these illegal growing
operations?
Director Wray. Well, certainly we're observing the same
phenomenon that you're describing. I know we've had a number of
cases that have resulted in indictments of Chinese nationals
involved with illegal marijuana grow operations here, and
otherwise involved in different kinds of organized criminal
activity. We are tackling that through working with our state
and local law enforcement partners, through a variety of task
forces. We're trying to share intelligence with them to help
get ahead of the threat. I'm not sure that I could give you a
reason as to why it's happening, but that is something that
we're very focused on. And you mentioned the precursors to
fentanyl, the pill presses, this issue. I would just add to
that yet another one which is that an awful lot of the meth
precursors to the labs in Mexico also come from China.
So, it's fentanyl, it's also meth and so there is certainly
a big degree to which problems that we are experiencing here in
an acute way, source back to them.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
According to the annual threat assessment, Russian
President Putin probably believes, quote, that his approach to
winning the war in Ukraine is paying off and the Western and
U.S. support to Ukraine is finite, end quote. For any of you,
what lessons is Putin taking from the U.S. failure to further
support Ukraine in its fight for national survival? And what
lessons might China's Xi Jinping learn from this failure?
Director Burns. Senator, I'd be glad to address your
question. I just returned from my tenth visit to Ukraine during
the course of the war, and I left convinced that we're at a
profoundly important crossroads for Ukraine, for European
security and for long-term American interests around the world.
I think down one road, with supplemental assistance approved by
the Congress, lies the very real possibility of cementing a
strategic success for Ukraine and a strategic loss for Vladimir
Putin's Russia.
It's our assessment that with Supplemental assistance,
Ukraine can hold its own on the front lines through 2024 and
into early 2025; that Ukraine can continue to exact costs
against Russia, not only with deep penetration strikes in
Crimea, but also against Russia's Black Sea fleet, continuing
the success which has resulted in 15 Russian ships over the
course of the last six months.
In other words, with Supplemental assistance, Ukraine can
put itself in a position by the end of 2024, the beginning of
2025, where it could regain the offensive initiative and also
put itself in a position to negotiate from a position of
greater strength and achieve an outcome in which Putin's goal,
which was to subjugate Ukraine and to control its choices,
would be denied. Where Ukraine could sustain itself as a
strong, sovereign independent country, anchor itself in Western
institutions and have the space and the security to recover
from this terrible aggression. And leave Russia to deal with
the long-term consequences of Putin's brutal and foolish
invasion.
Down another road, however, without Supplemental
assistance, it seems to me lies a much grimmer future. Ukraine
is likely to lose ground and probably significant ground in
2024. I saw in the Battle of Avdiivka, which forced a rushed
withdrawal of Ukrainian forces just a couple of days before I
was in Kyiv on this last visit, the consequences of that. One
senior Ukrainian partner described what happened to me. He said
that, you know, our men fought as long and as hard as they
could, we ran out of ammunition and the Russians just kept
coming. And I think without Supplemental assistance in 2024,
you're going to see more Avdiivkas; and that, it seems to me,
would be a massive and historic mistake for the United States.
Senator Heinrich. And what lesson do you think the CCP will
take from that?
Director Burns. I think the consequence of that will not
just be for Ukraine or European security----
[Interruption from a member of the public.]
Chairman Warner. Witness will continue.
Director Burns. I think the consequences of that are going
to be felt not only by Ukrainians and in European security, but
across the Indo-Pacific, where if we're seen to be walking away
from support for Ukraine, not only is that going to feed doubts
amongst our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, it's going
to stoke the ambitions of the Chinese leadership in
contingencies ranging from Taiwan to the South China Sea.
So that's what I saw on this last visit. That's what I
think is at stake for all of us. I think the truth is that the
Ukrainians are not running out of courage and tenacity, they're
running out of ammunition. And we're running out of time to
help them.
Senator Heinrich. Director, let's jump to the elephant in
the room then. I want to thank you for your efforts to secure
hostage releases and a ceasefire in the Middle East. Ramadan
has now begun. Give us, to the best of your ability, a little
bit on where things stand with those negotiations and what
flashpoints you might be concerned could push us into a more
regional conflict over the course of the next month.
Director Burns. Sure. For the last few months, since the
last hostage return and ceasefire in the latter part of
November, the President has been working very hard to try to
renew that process. And I've traveled eight times to meet with
my Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari partners, and returned most
recently on Saturday night from the last such trip. What's on
the table right now is a potential agreement that has three
main elements. The first would be the return of about 40
hostages. These are the remaining women hostages, older men,
and hostages who are wounded or seriously ill--as the first
step, as the first phase toward the return of all of the
hostages, which I know the President has deeply committed. And
that would be in return for a defined number of Palestinian
prisoners held by the Israelis.
The second element is a ceasefire of at least six weeks,
again, as the first step toward what might be more enduring
arrangements over time.
And then the third element would be a major surge in
humanitarian assistance, which under the circumstances of a
ceasefire could actually be distributed effectively to people
who so deeply need them.
Director Burns. So, we're going to continue to work hard at
this. I don't think anybody can guarantee success. What I think
you can guarantee is that the alternatives are worse. For
innocent civilians in Gaza who are suffering under desperate
conditions, for the hostages and their families who are
suffering also under very desperate conditions, and for all of
us. So, we're going to keep at this.
Chairman Warner. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions.
But we've got a lot of ground to cover here, and mine really
need to be in a classified setting because I refer to some
classified matters. So, I'm going to reserve until we get into
the closed session.
Chairman Warner. All right. Fine.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Senator Heinrich was going to address the
real elephant in the room, which are some of our audience
members accusing you of pretty serious conduct. So, Director
Burns, I want to give you a chance to respond to what's been
said. Is Israel exterminating the Palestinian people?
Director Burns. Senator, all I can say is, you know, what I
said before. I think there are a lot of innocent civilians in
Gaza who are in desperate conditions right now. I think there
are hostages and their families who are also in desperate
circumstances, as well. I've learned a long time ago in crises
like this, that you have to find a practical goal and pursue it
relentlessly. And the goal the President has laid out, working
with our Israeli, Qatari, and Egyptian partners, I think, is
the most practical one I can see right now. It is to produce a
ceasefire of at least six weeks, produce the return of the
hostages--ultimately all of the hostages--and get desperately-
needed humanitarian relief to people who need it in Gaza.
Senator Cotton. So, is that a no? You do not believe Israel
is exterminating the Palestinian people?
Director Burns. I understand Israel's need, and the
President has emphasized this, to respond to the brutish attack
that Israelis suffered on the 7th of October, against Hamas,
against a terrorist group. But I think we all also have to be
mindful of the, you know, enormous toll that this has taken on
innocent civilians in Gaza. And as the President has said, it's
very important for Israel to be extremely mindful of that and
to avoid further loss of civilian life.
Senator Cotton. Director Haines, do you believe Israel is
exterminating the Palestinian people?
Director Haines. I really don't have anything to add to
what Director Burns has said. I fully endorse what he's
commented on.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Israel--and you also stand accused of
starving the Palestinian children. Is Israel starving children
in Palestine or in Gaza?
Director Burns. You know, I think, Senator, the reality is
that there are children who are starving in Gaza.
Senator Cotton. But is Israel doing that?
Director Burns. They're starving, they're malnourished as a
result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can't get to
them. It's very difficult to distribute humanitarian assistance
effectively unless you have a ceasefire, which is exactly why I
think there's great value in what's on the table now--a return
of hostages and a significant ceasefire enabling people to get
that humanitarian assistance.
Senator Cotton. Okay. For the record, I do not believe that
Israel, nor any of you, or the United States Government is
exterminating the Palestinian people or starving Palestinian
children.
Director Haines, there have been several news reports, you
might say leaks, to the effect that Iran does not have full
control of its proxy groups. That's the headline from Politico
last month. The quote: While Iran is supporting the proxy
groups financially and with military equipment, intelligence
officials do not believe it is commanding the attacks. Its lack
of control over the Houthis and the militias in Iraq and Syria
has muddied the deliberations in Washington about how to
respond to repeated attacks on U.S. interests in the region,
including the attack in Jordan on January 28th that killed
three American troops.
But on page 18 of the assessment, the Intelligence
Community writes: Tehran was able to flex the network's
military capabilities in the aftermath of Hamas's attack on
October 7th, orchestrating anti-Israel and anti-U.S. attacks
from Lebanon to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait while shielding
Iranian leaders from significant consequences.
``Orchestrating'' is stronger than anything I've heard. It's
not providing support or training or funding. So, it's your
assessment, the Intelligence Community assessment, that Tehran
has orchestrated attacks on Israel and against U.S. personnel
and positions in the Middle East since October 7th?
Director Haines. Yes. And I don't think that means that the
proxy groups or that others are always listening to everything
that they have to say or under their direct control. But I
think orchestrating is an appropriate characterization of what
they've looked to do.
Senator Cotton. So, it has, to use the dictionary
definition, arranged or directed the elements of a situation to
produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously. That's
correct?
Director Haines. [Non-verbal affirmative response.]
Senator Cotton. Okay. Director Burns, on page 34 of the
assessment, the IC notes that the FBI and the Department of
Energy have concluded that the most likely origins for the
coronavirus pandemic was a laboratory in Wuhan, but the CIA
cannot agree with that conclusively.
Why can't the CIA reach the same conclusion that the FBI
and the Department of Energy have reached?
Director Burns. Our analysts continue to look at this very
carefully. They have not yet concluded that there's definitive
evidence on either side of this, whether natural transmission
or a lab accident as well. And we continue to pursue, you know,
more intelligence, more information that might help them to
reach a definitive conclusion. But right now, they haven't been
able to reach that.
Senator Cotton. Director Wray, why are your analysts so
much more confident?
Director Wray. Our analysts did very rigorous work
involving a whole slew of experts of different sorts. We
reached the assessment with moderate confidence, and we stand
by that assessment.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
you. And as others have said, thank you to the people who
operate under very difficult circumstances around the world to
supply us with this important information.
Director Burns, I just want to say your statement to
Senator Heinrich about the impact and long-term consequences of
our abandoning Ukraine is important and I think should be
required reading around here.
The implications are it's a 50-year mistake that would
haunt this country, both in Europe but also, as you suggest, in
the Indo-Pacific, including Kim Jong Un would assess that we
didn't have the staying power. He's already making noises about
the peninsula.
Director Wray, you talked with Senator Rubio about TikTok.
Just to reiterate, it's dangerous because it allows the Chinese
Communist Party to have access to an enormous trove of data
about Americans. That's number one. Is that correct?
Director Wray. That's one of the pieces of it. There are
several.
Senator King. The second piece is the power that the
misinformation and sort of policy direction, that it enables
the Communist Party to exercise, correct?
Director Wray. Well, I think the second piece is the
algorithm, right? In other words, the first is the data. The
second is the algorithm. The third is the software.
Senator King. But the problem is not TikTok. It's the
control by China. If TikTok were divested and owned by an
American company or a Belgian company or a British company, we
wouldn't have this level of problem. Is that correct?
Director Wray. Correct.
Senator King. Thank you.
Who controls Mexico? Is the government of Mexico in control
or are the cartels in control? And how do we get at the problem
of the drugs, the fentanyl? By the way, I did a little
calculation a minute ago. About 15 people have died in this
country of overdoses, mostly fentanyl, since this hearing
started an hour and twenty minutes ago. That's how serious this
problem is. One a day in my state of Maine.
How do we get control of this problem?
Director Haines. I'll start in, because there are a lot of
us, obviously, that are working to help support those who are
on the front lines of this, which include the FBI, obviously,
and DEA and DHS and others who are really focused on this
question.
But on the first point, Senator King, with respect to
Mexico, I think there's no question that it is a challenge for
the government of Mexico to deal with the cartels. And there
are parts of the country that are effectively under the control
of the cartels in certain respects. And yet at the same time,
we'd say that our cooperation with them has improved over time.
And I think Director Burns and Director Wray may have more to
say on this, but this is an area where we've really been able
to work with them to try to help to----
Senator King. Obviously, we have been able to work, and
it's improving, but this is a drastic problem that should be
treated as such in terms of the impact on Americans.
Maybe this is a DHS question. But Director Wray, do we know
how fentanyl is actually getting in? Where is it coming from?
Director Wray. You mean coming----
Senator King. Yes. How does it get into the U.S.?
Director Wray. It's coming through a variety of means,
including at ports of entry, but there's a variety of ways it
gets in. Part of the challenge of fentanyl is, of course, how
small it is and how easy it is to conceal and how easy it is to
be innovative in ways to get it across the border. The vast
majority of the fentanyl that's killing Americans is, of
course, coming from Mexico, and the vast majority of the
precursors for that fentanyl is coming from China.
Senator King. Well, I should mention that in the
Supplemental that's pending in the House, which we've always
focused on Ukraine, there's also a major fentanyl-blocking
provision that would be very important to this country to have
enacted as soon as possible.
Director Haines, you're nodding, but the record doesn't
show nodding.
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely. It's not coming to the
Intelligence Community in that case, but there are--funding
obviously for the capacity to do greater detection and things
like that that DHS would be deploying, I believe, among others,
and I absolutely agree that this is a fundamental issue. And we
are--yeah, we can also talk more in closed session about some
of the organizational things that we're looking to do to
improve our capacity.
Senator King. But we have a major bill to address fentanyl
in that Supplemental, if we can get that out of its limbo in
the House.
General, one question. I'm concerned about a gap. NSA can
talk about foreign intelligence gathering not in the U.S.
Here's my worry. A Saint Petersburg, Russia, troll farm sends
or hacks information in the United States through a server in
New Jersey or Pennsylvania or California. Does that create a
gap? Talk to me about the relationship between yourself and NSA
and the FBI. I just worry that there's a place there where we
may lose contact.
General Haugh. Senator, thank you for the question. So, if
we think about this right now today in the context of threats
to our elections, we spend an enormous amount of time
collaborating across all the elements of the U.S. government to
make sure that we're aligned and that we're appropriately using
our authorities to be able to garner whatever information is
required to be able to identify a foreign threat.
First and foremost, we are going to collect that threat of
a foreign intelligence target outside the United States. And
so, one of those tools that really assists in this type of
scenario is Section 702 and our ability, because--and by its
very nature--if there's an origin of that threat that there's a
foreign entity communicating within the United States with a
communications provider, it offers us an opportunity under
Section 702 to target that foreign intelligence threat outside
the United States. And so, with the reauthorization of Section
702, that would ensure one means by which we are able to see
the foreign part of that communication.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Director Wray, I wanted to ask you a little
bit about some of your testimony about the border. Last year
169 individuals on the terrorist watchlist were detained at the
southern border. So far this year, it's been 58. We know there
were, since 2021, approximately 1.8 million got-aways; in other
words, not people that turned themselves in claiming asylum,
not people paroled into the interior, but 1.8 million migrants
who were evading law enforcement at the border.
Can you tell us, can you tell the American people with any
certainty, that there are zero people on the terrorist
watchlist that were among that 1.8 million got-aways?
Director Wray. Well, what I would say is you rightly
highlighted the kind of what--You remember Secretary Rumsfeld
used to refer to the known known, the known unknown, and the
unknown unknown? And I think here in many ways the national
security ramifications of the issues at the border are better
reflected in some ways more by what we don't know about the
people who snuck in, provided fake documents, or in some other
way got in when there wasn't sufficient information available
at the time they came in to connect the dots.
It's almost more significant, in our view, than the actual
number of so-called KSTs, because those people for the most
part are stopped, detained, and processed appropriately.
Senator Cornyn. And I guess you would answer the same way
that people with criminal records, members of criminal street
gangs, and other, being among that 1.8 million figure for
migrants who got away. We don't know what that 1.8 million is
composed of, do we?
Director Wray. That's correct.
Senator Cornyn. What we do know is that more than 37,000
Chinese nationals were detained at the U.S. southern border in
2023. That number is up ten times over the earlier tally. And
these individuals who were of course detained, sometimes they
claim asylum, sometimes they're paroled into the interior. But
again, we don't know how many Chinese nationals that may be
among that 1.8 million got-aways that have made their way into
the interior of the United States. You would answer the same
way, I assume?
Director Wray. Right. We don't know what we're dealing
with. In that particular context, it gets especially
challenging because presumably within that group, you've got
not only people who may mean us harm, but also people who are
fleeing the CCP and share our concerns about their
authoritarian thuggishness.
Senator Cornyn. Of course, that's an important point. I'm
not suggesting all of them are, but I'm just suggesting this is
a huge, gaping vulnerability in our national security that we
don't have answers for. I'm reminded that there were 26 co-
conspirators in the 9/11 attacks against the United States,
killing 3,000 people: 26 people killed 3,000 Americans on 9/11.
I worry that among the people that are coming across the
border, that are evading law enforcement, that there are some
people among those that mean to do us harm. Do you share that
concern?
Director Wray. I do.
Senator Cornyn. And, in fact, according to public sources,
this is CNN, August 30, 2023, you alluded to this earlier about
dozens of migrants from Uzbekistan that were being facilitated
by a suspected ISIS agent in Turkey that was assisting those
migrants to make their way to the southern border and into the
United States, correct?
Director Wray. So that's a threat stream that we're very
concerned about. We're very actively investigating, working
with DHS, on both people whose travel was facilitated, but also
members of the facilitation network in some other way overseas.
There's probably more I could share on that in closed session
if you would like.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Well, one of the things that I think this reveals is that
our border situation, the illegal immigration, has changed over
the years. It seems to me coming from a border state, years ago
you would look at people coming across who wanted to work,
wanted to provide for their family. Now of course, we
understand people fleeing violence and poverty, things like
that.
But also, we see the pull factors, the fact that if you
make it to the border, you can likely stay for the rest of your
natural life, is an enormous magnet for people to come. But
also, and not just people who have benign intentions toward the
United States who want a better life, but also people that want
to do us harm.
I know sometimes people say, well, this is just a fantastic
theory. It's no basis in reality. Do you consider that to be a
frivolous consideration?
Director Wray. I do not. And I've been, I think, very vocal
about this. We, of course, are not responsive, FBI, for the
physical security of the border. We work hard to be good
partners with DHS on that. But there are a whole host of
threats that emanate from the border, and some of them are
criminal threats. We talked about fentanyl and violence.
And then, of course, we have concerns that it could be a
vulnerability that terrorist organizations could seek to
exploit. I would add that we are not at the moment tracking any
specific terrorist plot coming across the border in that
regard. But it wasn't that long ago, as you will recall, that
we had indictments of an individual who was trying to smuggle
foreign nationals across the border to assassinate former
President Bush.
So it goes to your point that numbers are important, but
numbers don't tell the whole story. It only takes a few people
who can be responsible for a whole lot of harm.
Chairman Warner. Senator Bennet.
Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here. Thank you for your service.
Director Burns, the FBI Director just mentioned President
Bush. I think you were our ambassador to Russia when he was
President, is that right?
Director Burns. Yes, sir.
Senator Bennet. And you have one of the longest
distinguished careers in American diplomacy and now you're in
the middle of a negotiation in the Middle East that I think
everybody up here hopes that you're going to be successful
about.
In that context, I want to ask you about the Supplemental
bill that has the Ukraine funding in it. That's a bill that
passed out of the Senate with 70 votes. We almost don't pass
anything around here with 70 votes--a broad bipartisan
recognition of the importance of that bill.
I agree with your assessment and the Intelligence
Community's assessment that Ukraine has the possibility to
prevail in this conflict with Russia. Nobody two years ago
would have believed that. But the way they fought, the way
they've been able to be supported by our munitions and our
intelligence, obviously has made a difference. But they have
succeeded in ways nobody could have imagined. There are people
here and there are people in the House that don't believe that.
Their assessment is different than the Intelligence
Community's, and their judgement is different and that's fine.
We have different judgments.
I would ask you, since you're here, a little bit about the
negotiating posture that Ukraine, the West, NATO, wants to put
ourselves in with Vladimir Putin. And considering that
question, I wonder whether you could talk a little bit about
whether or not our negotiating position, if you're somebody who
believes in the end, that somehow Ukraine can't prevail--
although I believe they can--and believes only that they can be
in a position to negotiate an end to this, why it would be
better for us to pass the Supplemental from that vantage point
than to fail to pass the Supplemental?
Director Burns. Thanks very much, Senator.
I think today, first I'll start with Vladimir Putin and
Russia. It's our assessment that Russia is not serious about
negotiations today, in the sense that they may be interested in
the theater of negotiations, but they're not really interested
in negotiating in the sense of compromise right now, because as
Director Haines said in her opening remarks, I think President
Putin believes that time is on his side, that he can grind down
the Ukrainians, and wear down the rest of us. So, if you look
at the prospect of a more serious negotiation in the future,
it's essential for Ukraine, first with our support, to disabuse
the Russian leadership of that notion. In other words, to
puncture his confidence that time is on his side, to
demonstrate that for Russia also there are long-term
consequences to this war. They've already suffered enormously
in terms of their military: 315,000 plus dead and wounded, four
times the casualties that the Soviet Union suffered in a decade
of war in Afghanistan. The destruction of something on the
order of two thirds of their pre-war tank inventory. And long-
term economic consequences which is fast-making Russia the
economic vassal of China. Not to mention a much stronger and
bigger NATO that they have to face today.
So, the challenge in 2024 is helping the Ukrainians not
just to hold their own, but to continue to impose costs so that
they'd be in a position of greater strength, greater leverage
in a negotiation. And I think that would be my answer to that
question. If you want to get to a serious negotiation, you have
to help the Ukrainians demonstrate that Putin is wrong in his
notion that time is on his side.
Senator Bennet. That logic seems fairly compelling to me.
Let me ask you another question, since you served
Republican and Democratic Presidents over many decades. You
hear people in this building say that the United States of
America has to give up on our support for Ukraine in an actual
conflict with Vladimir Putin, an actual conflict with Russia,
because of the fear that we will not be able to afford some
plausible, but nevertheless theoretical, conflict with China in
the future.
Do you believe the United States of America cannot handle
our commitments with respect to Ukraine and NATO and be able to
deter Beijing as well?
Director Burns. No, I don't believe that. I think we're
entirely capable. Senator Rubio said this earlier, I think the
United States, while we may not have uncontested primacy in the
world today, we still have a stronger hand to play than any of
our adversaries or rivals. So, I believe we're entirely capable
of continuing to support Ukraine in a conflict that has
consequences well beyond Ukraine and European security. And I
think sustaining that support for Ukraine not only doesn't come
at the expense of deterring China, it actually helps to deter
China, whether it's in Taiwan or the South China Sea or other
places. It is our assessment that Xi Jinping was sobered by
what happened, especially in the first year of the war. He
didn't expect that Ukraine would resist with the courage and
tenacity that the Ukrainians demonstrated. He didn't expect
that the United States, whom he believes is a declining power,
would step up in the way the President has led, with all of
your support, to show solidarity with Ukraine as well. That's
had an impact, I believe, far beyond Ukraine or European
security, and that's really what's at stake today.
Senator Bennet. And I would say we'd look back, Mr.
Chairman, at that $60 billion and say that it was a bargain
compared to what we would otherwise spend. Mr. Chairman, my
colleagues, I think almost all of them went over a minute and a
half. So let me just say in the last 15 seconds that I have,
that our threat assessment----
Chairman Warner. I think the record will stand corrected.
You get a couple of seconds, but we've been holding here.
Senator Bennet. Director Haines, I'll take it for the
record but there is in the document, reference to the serious
issues that we're confronting in space right now; and had I
more time to ask you about that, we'd have a conversation.
Chairman Warner. You'll get a chance in classified session.
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chairman Warner, thank you.
Director Burns, I was in Mexico about a year ago and met
with President Lopez Obrador and my request, among others, was
that he personally intervene with Chinese leadership and ask
for the precursors to not be imported into Mexico, and thereby
utilized, and ultimately end up as fentanyl in the United
States. He committed to doing that. My understanding from his
government, as well as public sources is that he did. And then
there seemed to be some level of interest on the part of China
in negotiating with us or having conversations with United
States about that topic. I don't know that much has come from
that, but you may tell me that I'm wrong.
What explains the Chinese unwillingness to be more
proactive in combating precursor chemicals coming to the U.S.?
Do they have the capability? Are they intentionally inflicting
harm on Americans and America? Is there some quid pro quo that
they're looking for?
Director Burns. I think, Senator, since the President met
with President Xi in November in California, there have been
some signs of greater Chinese seriousness about dealing with
this problem, effectively enforcing their own law because
that's all that we're asking. When I was in Beijing in late May
of last year, I raised this issue very directly with my
counterparts, as well. So, I think there are some signs that
the Chinese are beginning to address the problem, not just of
precursor chemicals, but also of pill pressing equipment.
Certainly, they can do more, and I think that's why it's so
important for all of us to continue to push as hard as we can,
and to make clear, as you indicated earlier, that this is a
problem not only for the United States but for Mexico and for
others around the world.
Senator Moran. So, what would be China's reluctance to
actually crack down on those exports?
Director Burns. I hope that what you're seeing now is a
readiness to do more, I think, since November. But I think you
know that's something that obviously from the President on
down, we need to continue to reinforce as hard as we can,
because they do bear some responsibility for what's happening
in our own society.
Senator Moran. General Kruse, how do you assess the current
balance of military power in the Pacific today between the
United States and China and others?
General Kruse. I think I would describe the balance of
power today as China is on a rise that it has been planning for
multiple five-year periods, and it has executed that
development, that training, that exercising in a way that has
put them in a position that at some point in the not too
distant future, in accordance with Xi's own goals, they will be
a world-leading military power.
The United States, though, is the world-leading military
power today. And so, the imperative piece for us is to be on
that same trajectory, to match them stride for stride and
ensure we stay ahead of the growth that we see in China. There
is no doubt of the growth that you see, and has been discussed
today, in military power associated with China and their rise
in all domains--cyber, space, as well as conventional.
Senator Moran. Director Haines, has Iran sought to use our
borders, our porous borders, to conduct terrorist activities in
the United States?
Director Haines. We have a very good example of Iran
supporting, in effect, efforts to come across the border to go
after a former ambassador from Saudi Arabia, for example. There
was a case against Arbabsiar in that scenario. So, they have
historically attempted this, but it's actually been very
challenging for them and something that we consistently monitor
on a regular basis. They prefer to go through--to the extent
that they're able--criminal entities and other groups as a way
of trying to achieve their goals.
Senator Moran. Director Wray, there were reports of our
military technologies being utilized in North Korean military
equipment found in Ukraine, coming from Russia. How do we
explain that?
Director Wray. I'm definitely tracking similar incidents in
terms of Iranian drones, for example, where U.S. technology has
appeared as components. I think part of it has to do with dual-
use technologies and companies here not being perhaps as
vigilant as they need to be about the potential uses of their
technologies.
And so, we're trying to be very heavily engaged with the
private sector to make sure that they're more thoughtful about
who they're selling to and where their pieces and components
may end up.
Chairman Warner. Senator Casey.
Senator Moran. Senator Warner, even though you gave Senator
Bennet additional time, I'll not ask for any.
Chairman Warner. You're a very generous Member.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. I want to
thank the panel for your testimony today and also for your
public service.
I'm going to follow up on the fentanyl, and I want to ask a
related question about xylazine. And I know our colleagues have
mentioned and asked questions about fentanyl.
But I'll start with Director Wray, to direct your attention
to this question about fentanyl. The threat assessment this
year on page 36 says that, quote, China remains a primary
source for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill press
equipment, end quote. And then it goes on to talk about what
the cartels do. It's noteworthy, I think, that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission told us that in fiscal year 2022, 88
percent of fentanyl trafficking offenders were U.S. citizens.
88 percent. In fiscal year '21, 86 percent of fentanyl
trafficking offenders were U.S. citizens.
But we know how it gets here. We have a pretty good sense
of how it gets here. We also know the Administration announced
that it had made progress--they believe some progress--in
reestablishing coordination with the Chinese government on
countering fentanyl. I'm increasingly concerned, as well, about
xylazine and other non-fentanyl synthetic opioids. Xylazine, as
many people know, is a powerful veterinary sedative that is
mixed with illicit fentanyl. And unfortunately, the City of
Philadelphia has become almost ground zero for the
proliferation of illicit xylazine. According to DEA, xylazine
was detected in nearly half--half!--of all fentanyl related to
overdoses in Philly.
So, Director Wray, I wanted to ask you, is the Chinese
government holding up its end of the bargain and cracking down
on illicit fentanyl traffickers?
Director Wray. Well, I would say the scale of the problem
that we're continuing to see suggests to me that there's a
whole lot of room for improvement from the Chinese government.
Let me just put it that way.
You mentioned xylazine. Certainly, xylazine is of concern
to us. You're right that the Philadelphia area is a place where
we're seeing a certain amount of that. We've got a lot of
investigations in the Philadelphia and Newark areas. Of course,
one of the problems with xylazine, as you I'm sure know, is
it's not responsive to Narcan, so that just adds to the
challenge. And certainly, xylazine has been found in drug
combinations in, and I think, maybe 48 of the 50 states or
something. And it's, you know, very easy to buy, unfortunately,
online from China-based suppliers. So, I think that just adds
to the problem. We are, in addition to our investigative work,
trying to engage in your area and nearby areas with hospitals
and state diversion groups and things like that to try to raise
awareness about it. But xylazine is not a controlled substance
currently under the U.S. Controlled Substances Act, so that's
just an additional kind of aggravating circumstance.
Senator Casey. And also, a related question. To what extent
is regulation by China of xylazine and other non-fentanyl
synthetic opioids part of U.S. law enforcement's discussions
with their Chinese counterparts?
Director Wray. Certainly, trying to work with the Chinese
on their controlled substances listings is a key part of it.
Now, part of the problem with precursors, of course, is that
there's an almost infinite number of variations that people can
come up with. So, even when they schedule things, you see new
ones crop up in their stead.
And so, I think that just adds to the challenge. You know,
you asked how serious are they. I would just point to the sheer
volume that we're contending with, and I think that tells you
all you need to know about how serious the Chinese are so far,
so far, in helping us address the problem.
Senator Casey. And Director Haines, I want to ask you about
Iranian evasion of sanctions. We know that since the imposition
of increased sanctions against Iranian oil in 2018 and '19,
Iran has been increasingly successful in finding ways to evade
sanctions, and its oil revenues are increasingly rising. I know
the Administration is focused on blocking Iran's oil exports.
How is the Intelligence Community supporting the
Administration's efforts to impose further costs on Iran,
including by focusing on identifying and sanctioning so-called
ghost-fleet vessels carrying Iranian oil and Chinese refineries
purchasing Iranian oil?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. We're very involved is
the short answer. But the longer answer--And we actually do
periodic reports to Congress that tell you about some of the
work that we do in this area, where we're identifying where we
see sanctions evasion, where we see opportunities for
essentially additional targets for sanctions that might be
acted on, things that are sort of third parties or others who
are involved in these transactions so that the Treasury
Department and others can, in fact, go after them in that
respect. And it's a constant and critical issue.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Lankford?
Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thanks to all of you. The team
that you work around, please pass on our thanks and our
gratitude to them. They work very hard. Most folks will never
know who they are and not get a chance to be able to say thank
you so please pass it on as well.
I do want to continue some of the conversation about the
border, because while we're dealing with worldwide threats,
we're seeing the worldwide threats coming towards us and some
obvious vulnerabilities in this.
As has been mentioned, we've talked about in the past--
well, in this fiscal year--58 people on the terror watchlist
that have been identified and picked up. There's also a
category called special interest aliens. Director Wray, I know
you're familiar with that as well. The special interest aliens,
many people may not know this definition. I'm just going to
read it of what this designation is. It says: A special
interest alien is a non-US person who, based on analysis of
travel patterns, potentially poses a national security risk to
the United States or its interests. Often such individuals or
groups are employing travel patterns known or evaluated
possibly to have a nexus to terrorism.
Do we have a listing of how many people have crossed our
southern border that we have identified in this fiscal year
that are special interest aliens?
Director Wray, do you know that number?
Director Wray. I don't know the number, but we could follow
up with you to see if that's something we could provide.
Senator Lankford. It has been one of our challenges to try
to identify that, while on the terror watchlist we can get that
number and know that it's 58 exactly. When we ask the issue of
special interest aliens, we're told often that is law
enforcement sensitive. We know the number is in the thousands
but have not been able to get a specific number nor a specific
tracking on that. So, that'd be helpful to be able to know,
because the next question is the obvious one. If those
individuals that are coming in--and I'm just going to give you
a number if it's in the thousands--is FBI contacted when these
individuals that are coming across our border? Released into
the country? Because the vast majority of the SIAs, we don't
have criminal background information on them. We have a theory.
So, they're released into the country currently.
Is the FBI kept in contact, from DHS and others, who those
individuals are? Or what kind of tracking and monitoring is on
those individuals?
Director Wray. I know that we work closely with DHS,
especially CBP, on the issue of special interest aliens,
including a whole lot of work on the other side of the border
to try to prevent them from coming in in the first place. And I
know there are instances where we're contacted, but I'm not
sure that as I sit here right now, I can tell you that we're
contacted in every instance.
Senator Lankford. Ok, that's helpful.
Mr. Holmgren, you haven't gotten a lot of questions today,
and we need to give you some attention here.
Obviously, the State Department is very engaged in this in
trying to be able to figure out for the intelligence side, on
the information sharing. Those individuals that are crossing
the border right now from many of those countries, we don't
have any criminal information on these individuals. Do you know
just off hand how many countries that are coming into the
United States, when they're crossing our southern border, we
have criminal background information? Let me give you for
instance Venezuela. We were talking about Venezuelan gangs
earlier and those individuals that are crossing into the
country, many of them being paroled into the country. Is
Venezuela freely sharing their criminal records with us? Do we
know if these individuals have a criminal record?
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator.
I don't know exactly if Venezuela is sharing specific
information with us. What I can say, though, about Venezuela,
obviously, is that we've seen over seven million Venezuelans
emigrate from the country since 2017, a significant portion of
whom obviously have emigrated to the United States illegally.
But when we do get relevant information from our counterparts
at DHS and FBI, our analysts use that to help inform their
judgment.
Senator Lankford. One of the challenges that we have as
well for individuals, for instance--currently Nicaragua is not
taking people back on that. And we are all dependent on State
Department to impose some sort of consequences on Nicaragua to
say you're a recalcitrant country. You're not taking people
back on that.
Do you happen to know any of the conversation right now
between Nicaragua and the United States on trying to deal with
recalcitrance? Because we do have a tracking of some that have
criminal records that are coming towards us and consider that a
threat.
Mr. Holmgren. Senator, I don't have specifics on the
details of engagement with Nicaragua. Happy to follow up with
you offline.
Senator Lankford. That'd be great. Thank you very much for
that.
Director Wray, let me come back to you and talk a little
bit about CFATS. This is an acronym most people don't know: the
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. We've had that
since 2007. It expired in July of last year and has not been
reauthorized yet. One of the aspects of that is for a chemical
facility, refinery, whatever it may be, they have the ability
to be able to check against the terror watchlist using this
authority on that. With its expiration, there's about 9,000
people a month that used to be checked on that, just in the
hiring and the process of all over the country. We have about
63,000 people we're estimating that have not been checked.
My question for you is, do we have any idea how many people
show up as a hit on the terror watchlist from the hiring in the
past? That when we do that check on it, which now is not
occurring because we've not reauthorized this, how many folks
do ping on that terror watchlist?
Director Wray. I'm not sure I can give you a number sitting
here right now. But I will tell you, I share your concern about
the lapse in the authorities. And one of the challenges of this
particular space is, of course it doesn't take many for it to
be a real problem. And we rely on that authority--or we
historically have--to protect.
Senator Lankford. Could you say that number is not zero as
far as how many people have pinged on the terror watchlist when
that has been run in the past?
Director Wray. Correct.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I think you've given a number of the
witnesses homework assignments there.
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In New York's Capital Region, the Albany Nanotech Complex
is set to house some of our Nation's most advanced electronics
research, development, and manufacturing in particular fields
like wafer processing, manufacturing, and lithography tools.
Today's annual threat assessment points out that China
currently lags behind the U.S. in developing the most advanced
chips, giving them cause to steal our technology, which we've
seen them do over and over. I included legislation in last
year's NDAA requiring DOD to establish a pilot program to
enable collaboration between the NSA's Cybersecurity
Collaboration Center and the U.S. semiconductor manufacturers
to improve the cybersecurity and semiconductor design and
manufacturing process.
General Haugh, how is the NSA working with the FBI to
create safeguards against espionage and cyber attacks at
leading public research facilities and at semiconductor
manufacturers?
General Haugh. Senator, thank you for the question. In
terms of how we think about the China cyber threat, it is clear
that they are going to be relentless to intend to steal
intellectual property. And so, from our perspective, part of
what NSA is really focused on doing is illuminating that
threat. So, we have done a series of unclassified advisories
with a number of partners, elements across U.S. government, six
other nations, multiple companies, to illuminate that threat in
a way that allows us to get now unity of action against that
threat. Unclassified reports to allow increased unity of
action.
So, from the FBI's perspective, they're a teammate in
everything that we do that talks about the cyber threat within
the United States. And from a specific look at semiconductors,
critical technology that clearly China wants to catch up on,
and from our perspective an area that we will continue to
identify those threats and communicate those both through the
FBI and then through unclassified advisories wherever we can.
Senator Gillibrand. Director Wray.
Director Wray. I would just agree with everything General
Haugh just said. I would just add to that. We have set up
counterintelligence task forces in all 56 Field Offices,
including in the Albany area. NSA is a key participant with us
in our national effort in that regard. And in addition to the
unclassified information that can be shared through the good
work that we do together, one of the advantages to the FBI
engaging with private companies is because we get information
from so many different sources. There are times when we can
share information with a private sector entity in a way that
helps protect NSA's sources and methods, just because it
doesn't clearly get identified as this is something NSA told
us.
Senator Gillibrand. Research from the Center for Countering
Digital Hate found that the leading AI image-generators create
election disinformation in 41 percent of cases in which they
are prompted, including images that could support false claims
about candidates or election fraud, in spite of controls we've
been told have been put in place.
This is for the entire panel. Have any of you seen foreign
adversaries with intent to use generative AI--either images,
videos, audio--to deceive American voters? What are we relying
on to advise the public when this inauthentic content appears?
Director Wray, you can start.
Director Wray. I want to think about what I can say here.
Certainly, AI is something that all of our most significant
adversaries are taking a hard look at to enhance their efforts.
We have seen AI used in a variety of settings. Whether it's
been used specifically to target voters, I'm not sure that I
could say that. But we are actively concerned about that as the
latest wrinkle in a longstanding effort to engage in
information warfare.
Senator Gillibrand. Director Burns.
Director Burns. Another example is we've seen evidence that
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has used AI to generate
videos aimed at inspiring lone-wolf attacks as a result to the
Gaza conflict as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Director Haines.
Director Haines. I think another example is Russia
deploying AI tools in the context of their influence efforts in
Ukraine. And there we've seen, for example--I think it was in
March 2022 there was a deepfake of the Ukrainian President
Zelensky asking Ukrainians to lay down their arms and
ultimately had to be actually countered by President Zelensky
in order to address it.
Senator Gillibrand. Did we give them the information or
capability to do that quickly?
Director Haines. The Ukrainians? Yes, we worked with them
on that.
Senator Gillibrand. General Haugh.
General Haugh. So, in terms of how we're thinking about AI
security, NSA established an AI Security Center. Part of that
is to be able to generate and communicate to anyone that is
building a model in the United States. From an AI perspective,
what are those threats and what are the security mechanisms to
avoid misuse of those models? We're also using the AI Security
Center for how we apply all of the ethical and safety standards
of how the department will leverage AI. But really, the last
component would be how do we communicate to those companies the
threats that they will have of their technology and how it will
be employed?
Senator Gillibrand. Go ahead.
Mr. Holmgren. Sure, Senator. Quickly, you're right to raise
this as a threat and I think our view of it is that tools like
generative AI will essentially lower the barrier for actors,
state and non-state, with fewer resources to engage in
potential election interference.
Senator Gillibrand. And General Kruse.
General Kruse. From a DIA perspective, I don't think I
would add anything to what has been covered here, other than
the counterintelligence portion of that, that has a touch point
across everything that's already been mentioned.
Chairman Warner. I would add, ladies and gentlemen, that at
the Munich Security Conference, something I participated in,
there were 20 tech companies that came together, most of the
social media companies, on a voluntary basis to indicate both
watermarking and willingness to take down AI-generated video
and voice that were affecting elections, but it was voluntary,
and the proof will be in the pudding.
Senator Gillibrand. And just for the record, no one said
they have a plan to tell the American people or to advise the
American people.
Chairman Warner. This Committee will be having public
hearings on this subject very shortly that Senator Rubio and I
have agreed upon.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
thank you to all of you for your service and to your teams as
well.
Director Wray, with regard to the PRC and some recent
public reports of significant agricultural land purchases. If
these land purchases are accurate, they may very well pose a
threat to not only some military installations, but most
certainly involved in food production that takes away from our
ability to produce for our own country, as well. But just
curious about whether or not you are aware could confirm land
purchases by Chinese nationalists within the United States? And
are you following them at this time?
Director Wray. So, this is an issue that we're focused on a
lot lately. I think what I would say is we're investigating a
number of instances proactively, where we're seeing either
commercial real estate or land being purchased by those with
ties to the PRC near critical infrastructure. And I want to be
clear, of course, foreign purchase of land including Chinese
purchase of land is not itself inherently illegal. But the
problem is the risk, and as has been discussed much here
already in a different context, the hold that the Chinese
government and the CCP have over its businesses in particular.
And so, we're particularly concerned about situations where a
purchase of land near a military installation, critical
infrastructure, or something like that could be leveraged to
enable anything from espionage, data collection, or worse.
Senator Rounds. Do you know if the tools that we have in
place today are strong enough or capable of stopping these
purchases from moving forward?
Director Wray. Certainly, a lot of types of transactions go
through the CFIUS process, but I'm not clear on whether or not
that fully extends to all the kind of land purchase situations
that we're concerned about. We are working through the CFIUS
process when that applies. We're working with the USDA to try
to work towards maybe some kind of mandatory reporting regime
that might apply. So, I think there is room for plugging gaps
that may exist.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I'd like to also ask, with regard to AI in particular.
Look, the bottom line is, is it's not going away. It's
something that we're going to have to deal with right now. It
appears as though we lead the world in regard to AI
capabilities. But most certainly, our near-peer adversaries
recognize that and they're going to do whatever they can as a
shortcut to our capabilities--air, land, sea, space, and
cyberspace.
With regard to the advances with AI right now, I'm
concerned as much about China and Russia and their capability
to use AI to develop weapons systems that we have never really
thought about as being in the forefront of a major and direct
threat to the United States. And I'm going to talk about
biologics, in particular. We know that China and Russia have
significant capabilities with regard to AI, and that using AI
you can make rapid advances, as you've noted on pages 30
through 33 in your report, that with AI you can very rapidly
develop your biologics. I'm concerned about the fact that it
may very well be used as a weapon system.
I'm not sure who to direct this to, but I'll start with
Director Wray, and if you'd like to pass this on, that's fine.
But it seems to me that this is an area that if we're not ahead
in time to be able to identify and stop them, that this is
probably as much of a threat to the United States as any other
that we've got today.
Director Wray. Well, I'll start, and others may want to
chime in more from a military perspective. What I would say is
that from an FBI perspective, one of our priorities is
protecting American AI innovation from theft, especially from
the Chinese. America leads the world in AI innovation and AI is
often--to Senator Gillibrand's question, for example, about
detecting deepfakes--one of the best weapons against AI is
better AI. And so, we need to protect that innovation. And
we're keenly concerned that the Chinese, which have, as I've
testified repeatedly, a bigger hacking program than every other
major nation combined--if they steal our AI to power it, it
makes words like ``force multiplier'' sound like an
understatement.
Senator Rounds. And may I just, in one last thought, just
on page 32 of your report, you make it clear that Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea probably maintain the capability
to produce and use pathogens and toxins. And China and Russia
have proven adept at manipulating the information space to
reduce trust and confidence in countermeasures and U.S.
biotechnology and research.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panel.
Director Wray, I believe you noted this earlier, but do you
share my view that the threat of terrorism associated with
unlawful entry through the southern border poses a serious
threat to U.S. national security?
Director Wray. Yes. I've testified repeatedly that we are
concerned about the terrorism implications from potential
targeting of vulnerabilities at the border.
Senator Ossoff. How would you assess the present level of
threat and risk of a terrorist attack in the United States
compared to past periods during your tenure?
Director Wray. Well, even before October 7th, I would have
told this Committee that we were at a heightened threat level
from a terrorism perspective, in the sense that it's the first
time I've seen in a long, long time the threats from homegrown
violent extremists, that is jihadist inspired extremists,
domestic violent extremists, foreign terrorist organizations,
and state sponsored terrorist organizations, all being elevated
at one time. Since October 7th, though, that threat has gone to
a whole other level. And so, this is a time, I think, for much
greater vigilance than has maybe been called upon of us before
October 7th.
Senator Ossoff. Is the FBI postured to understand the
extent of the terrorist threat associated with the southern
border? We've been briefed on some specific threats. Do you
feel that you know enough to assure us that the FBI is as well
across it as you can be, or do you need more resources, or do
you feel you're flying blind and not able to define the
potential scope and extent of the threat?
Director Wray. I think we are working very hard with our
partners, but there's no question that we need more resources
to combat the threat. I'll just give a concrete example.
Through working with DHS, they collect DNA samples, and we
provide kits to DHS to collect DNA samples from the people
coming across the border, that then get sent to the FBI lab.
That's part of why we asked for a significant enhancement
because of the sheer increase in people coming across means a
sheer increase in the number of samples that need to be
collected. That's what helps us identify those people if
they're then committing crimes somewhere in the United States.
Or as happens all too often, unfortunately, they go back across
the border and tried to illegally reenter again. So, we need to
be able to process those samples quickly. There's a backlog. We
asked in the '24 budget for enhancement. Not only did we not
get an enhancement, there was a 10 percent cut to the Terrorist
Screening Center. So, whatever happened in '24 happened in '24,
but I would urge Congress, as we look at fiscal year '25, that
we can't double down on those cuts if we're going to be serious
about protecting the border.
Senator Ossoff. Well, speaking of Congress, I think it's
worth noting that a serious, tough bipartisan border security
measure was put forward in the Congress. In fact, coauthored by
a conservative Republican Member of this Committee, which would
have surged enforcement resources to the border; which would
have provided substantial resources to fight cartels, and to
crack down on fentanyl trafficking; which would have tightened
asylum standards and expedited adjudication and therefore
removal timelines for those who were trying to enter the
country without a valid reason to. The former President put out
the word that he wanted the bill stopped for political reasons
and the bill was stopped. In fact, not only was the bill
stopped in the Senate, it was denied even a debate on the
Senate floor. And this speaks to the corrosive impact of
extreme partisanship and polarization in this country on our
national security.
So, I'd like to ask you, Director Haines, how do our
adversaries view the impact of political extremism and
polarization and partisanship on America's strength and
stability? We're talking about worldwide threats. Those threats
can exploit our own frailties here at home.
Director Haines. I think the best way I can answer that
question is to point to the fact that we've seen that both
Russia and China, for example, have taken the opportunity to
highlight where there's political dysfunction or other issues
that they see in the context of our governance and use it as
part of their information operations globally. And both to
highlight, for example to their own populations, that democracy
is quite challenging and would you really want this at home
kind of thing. And also, to demonstrate to our allies and
partners that maybe we can't be relied on as effectively.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Haines. Thank you all
for your testimony.
Chairman Warner. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
everyone, for being here today. I've been sitting here since
2:30. There's often maybe an advantage for going last in one of
these hearings.
I was going to say it was the elephant in the room until my
colleague from Georgia brought it up. But as I've sat here,
I've heard most Members of this Committee ask something about
the southern border--not everybody but the majority. I've spent
a lot of time on the border, perhaps more time than maybe
anybody on this Committee, maybe with the exception of Senator
Cornyn, who I've traveled to the border with. And I strongly
agree with what most of my Democrat and Republican colleagues
have said about the problems and the challenges. Fentanyl
coming north, precursors often from China heading south,
violent extremist organizations, Chinese migrants who might be
in Maine selling rather strong marijuana, ISIS, Iran proxies,
problems in Mexico. Over and over again, they've pointed out
all these problems. And I've worked on this issue, providing
more pay for Border Patrol, closing gaps in border wall along
the southern border, where they make sense, and they certainly
do in a lot of places. More money for NGOs to help Border
Patrol.
Director Wray pointed out, talking about how we need more
resources to combat the threat, and it helps when DHS gets
those resources. And we had the opportunity to do something
about it. We really did. More money for technology, including
fentanyl detection, more Border Patrol agents, more asylum
officers, more authorities to rapidly expel individuals, a
change in the credible fear standard, more money for detention
facilities, more visas to reunite families. And this
legislation was endorsed by the Border Patrol Union. And it had
strong bipartisan support--until it didn't. And my colleague
from Georgia points out why it didn't.
Director Wray, is it in your assessment that more resources
and stronger policy that could help your partners, not
necessarily the FBI, but DHS. Is that your assessment, that
that would help deal with all these things that were mentioned
in this Committee hearing today?
Director Wray. Well, I'll leave it to others to speak to
policies. But certainly, in terms of resources, not just for
DHS but for the FBI, we need more resources to deal with all
the threats that emanate from the border that we're responsible
for.
Senator Kelly. Director Haines.
Director Haines. I don't have anything to add to that.
Senator Kelly. Director Burns.
Director Burns. Nope, I don't have anything to add. I
agree.
Senator Kelly. All right. Well, I'm going to yield back the
remainder of my time, because I think it's the failure of that
legislation, that alone presents a national security threat to
this country, in my view.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Well, thank you. Let me thank my Members.
And let me also just say for a moment we have strong views on
this Committee. But one of the things I think that we have
always taken some pride in is that we can disagree without
questioning each other's patriotism, without questioning each
other's motives, and I hope that tenor will be maintained.
Members on this side feel very strongly, I felt very
strongly on the border bill. Members on the other side raised
legitimate questions about the border, as well. I do hope,
particularly as we deal with our intelligence professionals,
the one thing we've tried to have this Committee always do, and
frankly I learned from people like Richard Burr and Dianne
Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss, is that that disagreement, at
least in terms of the Intelligence Committee, should not go in
terms of ad hominem attacks. I don't think I heard that. I
heard huge policy differences. We ought to have those. But the
one thing I hope and pray is that we maintain these notions.
Because the intelligence professionals, who never get the
recognition they need, look to this Committee to be I hope an
island of sanity in an otherwise sometimes challenging
political environment.
That doesn't take away anybody's views; it doesn't take
away anybody's right to have those views. But I have enormous
respect for every Member of this Committee regardless of which
side of the aisle they sit on. And we're going to go at it time
and again, but I hope we owe our intelligence professionals
that kind of notion, that just because we're on different
political sides of the aisle, that neither political party has
a monopoly on truth or patriotism. And we can have differences
of opinion without questioning each other's truth or
patriotism. And with that----
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reclaim my time,
please.
Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I can't let this go, the
last two speakers on the Democratic side, without responding.
Look, I've been on this Committee for 15 years, and we do a
really good job until politics do creep in. And that's what's
happened here this afternoon with the last two speakers.
These are the facts. The last President of the United
States closed the border. He closed the border down to almost
zero crossings by the time he left office. He did it even
though he was sued over and over and over again by people from
the other side of the aisle. But he shut it down and he shut it
down under the law that's in effect today.
Congress has done its job. It passed a law saying you
cannot enter the United States without authorization. That's
the law today. When the current President came in, we all know
he took the policies of the former President, tore them up, and
rescinded them, and now we have what we have.
As far as the bill that's concerned, everybody's talking
about the former President making phone calls. He never called
me. But I can tell you this. I will not vote for any bill that
allows any illegals to cross into this country. And everybody
here knows that bill would have allowed 5,000 a day to come
into this country. That's not for me. And I don't care if the
President calls me or doesn't call me. My red line is not one.
What we need to do is enforce the laws that we have. You
want to talk about the front door and how we let them in the
front door? I'm all in. But the back door has got to get
closed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. And I would simply add that the former
President and a number of my Republican colleagues had
repeatedly said: to make the kind of changes you need
permanently on the border, you need legislation. And that is an
ongoing debate. It's a debate that we'll have here and
elsewhere. And what we need, and the most important last
comment I'll make because we will be breaking and going into
closed Senate, is we need an Intelligence Community that's
going to never be afraid to tell truth to power. And truth to
power sometimes means telling us on both sides of the aisle
what we don't necessarily want to hear.
I think you, the witnesses, and frankly the men and women,
literally thousands of them, who you represent, do that on a
regular basis. And at the end of the day, while we may hassle
and haggle over some of these policy things, the most important
thing you've got to do is keep speaking that truth to power,
even when we don't want to hear.
We are adjourned until we move into the classified setting.
(Whereupon at 4:52 p.m. the hearing was recessed, subject to
the call of the Chairman.)
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