    [Senate Hearing 118-273]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-273

                     IMPROVING EXPORT CONTROLS ENFORCEMENT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                          EMERGING THREATS AND SPENDING

                                   OVERSIGHT

                                    OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                              HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 10, 2024

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    55-522 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                       GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MITT ROMNEY, Utah
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    LAPHONZA BUTLER, California          ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas

                   David M. Weinberg, Majority Staff Director
               William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk

            SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND SPENDING OVERSIGHT

                     MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire, Chairman
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              MITT ROMNEY, Utah
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida

                   Jason M. Yanussi, Majority Staff Director
                       Nicholas F. Caron, Policy Advisor
               Scott Maclean Richardson, Minority Staff Director
               Maggie Frankel, Minority Professional Staff Member
                    Paul H.J. Hurton III, Subcommittee Clerk

                               C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Hassan...............................................     1
        Senator Scott................................................    10
        Senator Romney...............................................    13
        Senator Lankford.............................................    15
        Senator Blumenthal...........................................    17
        Senator Rosen................................................    20
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Hassan...............................................    31

                                    WITNESS
                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2024

    Eun Young Choi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
      Department of Justice..........................................     2
    Kevin J. Kurland, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
      Enforcement, Department of Commerce............................     4
    James R. Mancuso, Assistant Director, Global Trade and
      Investigations Division, Homeland Security Investigations,
      Department of Homeland Security................................     6

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Choi, Eun Young:
        Testimony....................................................     2
        Prepared statement...........................................    33
    Kurland, Kevin J.:
        Testimony....................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................    42
    Mancuso, James R.:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    50

                                    APPENDIX

    Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
        Mr. Kurland..................................................    55

                     IMPROVING EXPORT CONTROLS ENFORCEMENT

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2024

                                         U.S. Senate,
                           Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
                                            Spending Oversight,
                        of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Margaret
    Hassan, presiding.
        Present: Senators Hassan [presiding], Rosen, Blumenthal,
    Ossoff, Romney, Lankford, and Scott.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN\1\

        Senator Hassan. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to
    order. I want to welcome our very distinguished panel of
    witnesses, and thank you for appearing today to discuss what
    your agencies are doing to enforce export controls, and how
    Congress can enhance enforcement efforts to prevent our
    adversaries from illegally acquiring advanced technology.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Hassan appears in the
    Appendix on page 31.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I also want to thank Ranking Member Romney and his staff,
    and the ranking member will be here shortly. We are in the
    middle of votes, but I want to thank them for working with us
    on this hearing and the months of staff oversight that have led
    up to today. I appreciate our continued partnership to address
    emerging threats to our Nation.
        To our witnesses, I look forward to hearing from each of
    you about trends in export control violations, your agency's
    unique role in enforcement, and how better agency coordination
    can help prevent our adversaries from accessing sensitive
    technologies. We look forward to hearing more about actions
    that Congress can take to prevent advanced technologies from
    flowing to bad actors while still working to maintain the
    United States' innovation edge and our place at the center of
    the world's economy.
        By breaking our expert control laws and acquiring sensitive
    U.S. technologies, our adversaries can grow their military and
    cyber capabilities. This represents a considerable threat to
    the United States' national security. This is why over the past
    few years, there have been significant efforts to improve U.S.
    export controls as authorities work to constrain efforts by
    countries like China to acquire sensitive dual-use
    technologies.
        This focus is important, and I have been glad to see the
    administration consistently roll out updated guidance in export
    controls for emerging technologies. However, there is always
    more work to do. It is incumbent on Congress to ensure the
    effectiveness of actions taken by the Executive Branch,
    especially as it relates to inter-agency coordination.
        I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses about
    their efforts to enforce expert controls and how Congress and
    the Federal Government can work together to keep the American
    people safe, secure, and free.
        I will recognize Senator Romney in when he returns from
    voting for his opening statement. But what I thought I would do
    is get us started on testimony, and then when he comes, we can
    break for his opening statement. It is the practice of the
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to
    swear in witnesses. If you will all please stand and raise your
    right hand.
        Do you swear that the testimony you give before this
    Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth, so help you, God?
        Ms. Choi. I do.
        Mr. Kurland. I do.
        Mr. Mancuso. I do.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, and please be seated.
    Our first witness today is Eun Young Choi. Ms. Choi is the
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) in the National
    Security Division (NSD) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).
    Before overseeing export controls at the National Security
    Division, Ms. Choi was the inaugural director of the National
    Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team. In this role, she set
    strategic priorities to address crimes involving
    cryptocurrencies and digital assets.
        Welcome, Ms. Choi, you are recognized for your opening
    statement.

       TESTIMONY OF EUN YOUNG CHOI,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
                  GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Ms. Choi. Good afternoon, Chair Hassan, and distinguished
    staff of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to
    testify here today. I joined the National Security Division
    this past July after spending over a decade at the Department
    of Justice, eight years of which I spent as an Assistant United
    States Attorney (AUSA) for the Southern District of New York,
    focusing primarily on cyber investigations, including those
    implicating national security. Just before joining NSD, as you
    mentioned, I was the inaugural director of the National
    Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team, which focuses on the criminal
    use of digital assets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Choi appears in the Appendix on
    page 33.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The work of NSD is increasingly focused on responding to
    the evolving and dynamic threats posed by sophisticated nation-
    state actors such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
    These countries have sought to acquire sensitive technologies,
    including not only military hardware, but also emerging
    technologies such as advanced computing and autonomous vehicle
    capabilities, as well as the components upon which these
    technologies are built, for instance, semiconductors and
    microelectronics.
        Such technology in the hands of our adversaries, risk
    undermining us and allied military capabilities. It can also be
    exploited by repressive regimes to conduct surveillance of
    civilian populations suppressed descent, and enable human
    rights abuses.
        Enforcing our export controls and sanctions laws is
    critically important to countering these threats to our natural
    security and requires interagency, international, and private
    sector cooperation. The Justice Department plays a central role
    in those efforts, investigating and prosecuting criminal
    violations of those laws alongside our law enforcement and
    interagency partners.
        This interagency partnership is at the heart of the
    Disruptive Technology Strike Force (DTSF), which was
    established in February 2023, under the leadership of NSD in
    the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security
    (BIS), and is designed to pursue enforcement actions against
    those who engage in the illicit transfer of emerging
    technologies. The Strike force consists of 15 cells located
    across the country, made up of local Federal prosecutors and
    agents from four agencies, including the two represented here
    today, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
    Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).
        In close partnership with NSD's Counterintelligence and
    Export Control Section (CES), these local cells investigate and
    prosecute companies and individuals who violate U.S. laws
    governing the transfer of technology. Their work is supported
    by an inter-agency team of analysts who coordinate case leads
    and identify opportunities to generate new leads.
        Since May 2023, the Strike Force has investigated and
    charged 16 cases across seven cells, and has secured guilty
    pleas from four defendants on exports, smuggling, and money
    laundering charges.
        These cases include the arrest of a defendant who allegedly
    was engaged in a year's long scheme to illegally send sensitive
    technology, including semiconductors to a Russian entity with
    ties to the Russian military and the Federal Security Service
    (FSB), using a network of transshipment points in Hong Kong and
    other countries to try to evade tighter export controls put
    into place Following Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine.
        The Strike Force also announced charges against four
    Chinese nationals who allegedly smuggled U.S.-origin items that
    could be used in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs), ballistic missile systems, and other military-end uses
    through the use of front companies in China and Hong Kong for
    the benefit of the Iranian armed forces.
        We recently marked the one-year anniversary of the Strike
    Force by bringing together the local cells to Phoenix, and
    holding a summit focused on case studies, best investigative
    practices, briefings on cutting edge technologies, and one-year
    reports of their efforts.
        The work of the Strike Force builds upon the success of the
    Task Force KleptoCapture to capture, an inter-agency task force
    dedicated to enforcing sanctions, export and trade
    restrictions, that the United States has levied in response to
    the Russian invasion.
        The task force's successes to date include seizing,
    restraining, or obtaining forfeiture judgments against almost
    $700 million worth of assets belonging to Russian oligarchs and
    others who unlawfully supported the Russian regime and invaded
    U.S. economic countermeasures, and charging more than 70
    individuals and five corporate entities accused of sanctions
    evasion, export control violations, money laundering, and other
    crimes, many of whom have been arrested in more than a half
    dozen countries.
        To that end, we have been leveraging our international
    partnerships to follow leads, track down perpetrators, and make
    arrests around the globe. Curtailing the flow of sensitive
    technology to our adversaries is a global problem and it
    demands a global response.
        Finally, private sector partnership is critical to our
    work. Companies are on the front lines when it comes to export
    controls and sanctions. Their decisions as to how, where, and
    with whom to do business can be just as important as our
    criminal enforcement actions.
        I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these issues with
    you and would be happy to answer any questions.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much for your testimony.
    Senator Romney, we just started testimony. We can go through
    with it or you can make your opening statement.
        Senator Romney. Oh, please continue.
        Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you. Our next witness is Kevin
    Kurland. Mr. Kurland is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
    Export Enforcement at the Bureau of Industry and Security at
    the Department of Commerce.
        He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the
    Undersecretary for the Bureau of Industry and Security. Before
    joining the Bureau of Industry and Security, he worked as an
    international trade analyst at a U.S.-based law firm.
        Welcome, Mr. Kurland. You are recognized for your opening
    statement.

     TESTIMONY KEVIN J. KURLAND,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
               EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

        Mr. Kurland. Chair Hassan, Ranking Member Romney and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
    inviting me to testify in the Commerce Department's ongoing
    efforts to enforce U.S. export controls.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kurland appears in the Appendix
    on page 42.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I currently serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
    Export Enforcement at the Commerce Department's Bureau of
    Industry and Security. When Congress passed the Export Control
    Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), it provided BIS with robust
    regulatory as well as administrative and criminal enforcement
    authorities that export enforcement leverages every day to
    protect U.S. national security.
        At Export Enforcement, our talented law enforcement agents
    and analysts are focused on a singular mission to keep our
    country's most sensitive technologies out of the world's most
    dangerous hands. Thanks to the authorities granted under ECRA,
    we have powerful tools to identify, disrupt, and investigate
    any violations of our controls. No Federal agency, and quite
    frankly, no other country has so expansive a toolkit to enforce
    export control rules.
        At no point in history has export controls been more
    central to our national security than right now. The most
    recent annual threat assessment published by the intelligence
    community (IC) reaffirms that nation-state actors, especially
    China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are the most pressing
    threats. It also identifies transnational threats that can
    result from the misuse of disruptive technologies like
    artificial intelligence (AI).
        Accordingly, Export Enforcement's mission is laser focused
    on preventing sensitive U.S. technologies from being used for
    malign purposes by these nation-state actors. We do this in
    three primary ways: prioritization of our enforcement efforts
    on the most pressing threats, expansion of our partnerships at
    home and abroad, and aggressive enforcement of our controls.
        My full testimony provides additional details on each of
    these lines of effort, but I would like to highlight a few key
    initiatives and actions that illustrate our effectiveness.
    First, we have prioritized our analytical and investigative
    work to match the evolving threat environment. We have updated
    our procedures for initiating enforcement leads and opening
    investigations to focus on the technologies, end users, and end
    uses of most concern.
        We have been responsible for the addition of significant
    numbers of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian procurement-related
    parties to the Entity List, including ones announced just this
    morning. We conducted over 1,500 end use checks last year in
    over 60 countries, the highest number ever with the
    overwhelming majority targeting Chinese, Russian, and Iranian
    procurements, and transshipments of concern.
        Second, to expand the effectiveness of our robust
    enforcement authorities, we have partnered with industry and
    academia, other agencies, including the intelligence community,
    and like-minded countries to prevent diversion. We work closely
    with companies and universities to ensure they understand our
    rules and to warn them of illicit procurement efforts.
        We launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, which
    BIS and DOJ co-lead in partnership with Homeland Security
    Investigations (HSI), FBI, and DCIS to prevent nation-state
    actors from illicitly acquiring our most sensitive technologies
    to advance their authoritarian regimes and facilitate human
    rights abuses.
        We established export enforcement coordination mechanisms
    with Canada, the European Union (EU), Five Eyes, and G7
    counterparts, and we organized a Disruptive Technology
    Protection Network with Japan and South Korea to replicate the
    Disruptive Technology Strike Force model abroad.
        Third, we have aggressively enforced our controls in a way
    that imposes real costs on those who seek to violate export
    controls and undermine U.S. national security. Our criminal
    enforcement efforts with DOJ last fiscal year (FY) resulted in
    the highest number of criminal convictions and number of months
    in prison on record.
        On the administrative side, we resolved or imposed the
    highest number of administrative cases, denial orders, and
    temporary denial orders, including the largest stand-alone
    administrative penalty in BIS history; a $300 million penalty
    against Seagate for continuing to ship millions of hard disc
    drives to Huawei, a party on our Entity List, without BIS
    authorization.
        My testimony provides additional examples of high-profile
    cases dismantling illicit procurement networks involving China,
    Russia, and Iran, as well as of firearms traffickers.
        Let me close by reaffirming that the work of our talented
    staff of 200 agents and analysts in partnership with industry,
    other agencies, and international counterparts has never been
    more important, and is achieving significant results that
    directly protect U.S. national security through aggressive
    enforcement of U.S. export controls.
        I thank the Subcommittee for its support and look forward
    to your questions.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Kurland. Our third
    witness is James Mancuso. Mr. Mancuso is the Assistant Director
    of the Homeland Security Investigations, Global Trade and
    Investigations Division, and Director of the National
    Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center. Before his
    current role, Mr. Mancuso served as special agent in charge for
    HSI Baltimore. He also has served as the HSI attache to the
    United Kingdom and Ireland.
        Welcome, Mr. Mancuso. You are recognized for your opening
    statement.

     TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. MANCUSO,\1\ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
         TRADE AND INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, HOMELAND SECURITY
            INVESTIGATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Mancuso. Chair Hassan, Ranking Member Romney, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to discuss export
    enforcement, and the vital role Homeland Security Investigation
    plays as it stands at the forefront of U.S.
    counterproliferation investigations (CPI), and the enforcement
    of our nation's export statutes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mancuso appears in the Appendix
    on page 50.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The enforcement of export control laws has been a critical
    element of U.S. national security dating back to 1789 when the
    first U.S. Congress and President George Washington created the
    United States Custom Service to interdict contraband under the
    United States, collect duties, and enforce our fledgling
    nation's trade laws. HSI formed under the Homeland Security Act
    of 2002 remains steadfast in its 234-year-old mission of
    enforcing our nation's export control laws.
        HSI is a principal investigative component of the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), enforcing more than 400
    Federal criminal statutes. The mission of HSI is to
    investigate, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs) and national security threats seeking to
    exploit the customs and immigration laws of the United States.
        HSI consists of more than 6,800 special agents assigned to
    235 domestic field offices, 93 international offices in 56
    countries. HSI is designated as the primary law enforcement
    agency charged with investigating violations of U.S. export
    laws related to military items, controlled dual-use goods, and
    sanctioned or embargoed countries.
        I currently serve as the Assistant Director of the HSI
    Global Trade Division and the Director of the National
    Intellectual Property Rights Coordination (IPR) Center. The
    Global Trade Division provides oversight support for
    investigations of U.S. import and export laws to ensure
    national security, protect the public's health and safety, stop
    predatory and illegal trade practices, and prevent sensitive
    U.S. technologies and weapons from reaching transnational
    criminal organizations and foreign adversaries.
        Global trade components include the Counterproliferation
    Investigations Unit, the Counterproliferation Mission Center,
    located in Huntsville, Alabama, and two whole-of-government
    centers; the IPR Center, and the Export Enforcement
    Coordination Center (E2C2).
        HSI through its CPI program, brings to bear significant
    resources against sophisticated illicit procurement networks,
    which operate globally on behalf of transnational criminal
    organizations and other malign nation-states attempting to
    acquire U.S. military items and control dual-use goods. HSI's
    broad authorities combined with the extensive global footprint,
    has allowed its special agents to forge partnerships with
    domestic and international law enforcement communities. This is
    proving critical when illicit procurement networks exploit
    vulnerabilities in the global supply chain to circumvent laws
    for the purpose of illegally obtaining controlled goods and
    technologies.
        Combating the illegal export and proliferation of sensitive
    technology equipment and weapons is an operational priority.
    Last year, the CPI program initiated over 1,500 investigations,
    made nearly 700 criminal arrests, worked with the Department of
    Justice to secure 371 indictments and 292 convictions, clearly
    demonstrating HSI unwavering commitment to national security.
        The Export Enforcement Coordination Center was created in
    2010 by Executive Order (EO) and serves as the primary forum
    within the Federal Government for executive departments and
    agencies to coordinate and enhance their export enforcement
    activities. HSI serves as the executive agency designated for
    the administration of E2C2, and is responsible to house, lead,
    manage, and fund the initiative.
        The E2C2 two provides a whole-of-government approach to
    enforcement by ensuring inter-agency coordination, promoting
    multi-agency collaboration, and minimizing duplicative efforts
    and strengthening the critical link between law enforcement,
    the U.S. intelligence community, and export licensing entities.
    As a result of these partnerships, approximately 15,000
    deconfliction requests have been processed by the E2C2 since
    becoming operational in 2012.
        Export enforcement is critical to achieving our national
    security and foreign policy goals. HSI through its CPI program
    is uniquely positioned to effectively work with its partners in
    a unified effort to enforce our nation's export control laws.
        I appreciate your interest in this important topic and look
    forward to your questions. Thank you.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you all three for your excellent
    testimony.
        We are going to proceed to questions now, and I will start
    with a set of questions, and then turn it over to Senator
    Romney while I go vote.
        To all three of our witnesses in your testimony, you each
    highlight the important and unique role that your agencies play
    in enforcing us export controls. Your agencies are working hard
    to protect our national security, but unfortunately, our
    adversaries are nimble, and they are constantly finding new
    ways to circumvent U.S. export controls.
        Just this week, we saw concerning new reports that show how
    Iran is utilizing U.S. technology in weapons that it uses and
    exports to extremist groups and other hostile actors around the
    globe. I would like to hear about the new tactics that
    adversarial States like China, Russia, or Iran are using to
    avoid U.S. enforcement efforts and illegally obtain sensitive
    advanced technologies. Ms. Choi, we can start with you.
        Ms. Choi. I think it is important to recognize, and I
    appreciate that question, the interconnected nature of many of
    these adversaries. One way to think about it is for countries
    such as Russia and Iran, where U.S. economic countermeasures
    are quite comprehensive, they have incredibly robust
    procurement networks that involve shipment points in the use of
    front companies across the world, including in jurisdictions
    where it's sometimes difficult to hold people criminally
    accountable, such as, for instance, in our view China and Hong
    Kong, along with some of in the recent months since or in the
    recent years now, since the start of the unlawful invasion of
    Ukraine the countries that surround Russia, right?
        I think one of the trends we are seeing is just how robust
    these procurement networks are, and we are doing the best that
    we can to try to find from the DOJ's perspective instances
    where we can identify willful participants in these procurement
    networks and holding them accountable to ensure that we can
    disrupt their ongoing flow of goods.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Kurland.
        Mr. Kurland. Madam Chair, what I would say is, we are
    focused on the activities of nation-state actors like China,
    Russia, Iran, and particularly their acquisition of advanced
    technologies, disruptive technologies, like AI, biotech,
    advanced computing, and quantum.
        I think what is important to understand is these countries
    have both the intent and the resources to seek to acquire these
    items through any means necessary. That is what we are seeing
    on a day-to-day basis, whether it is licit acquisition, or
    illicit acquisition through cyber exfiltration, through theft,
    through the use of shell companies, through transshipments that
    is through shell companies.
        This is a whole-of government-effort where they have
    resources, and maybe in the case of China, almost unlimited
    resources, to seek to acquire these goods. What we are doing as
    an interagency is, we are fighting back by basically leveraging
    the authorities and resources that we have across the
    interagency through this Disruptive Technology Strike Force
    model.
        The idea is how do we get together Commerce, and HSI and
    FBI analysts, to identify how our adversaries are seeking to
    illicitly acquire those items, and then get prosecutors and
    investigators in cells all across the country to prioritize
    enforcement actions against those activities.
        We have had a significant amount of success just in the
    first 15 months that the Strike Force has been in effect.
    Sixteen criminal cases have been brought. Just last month we
    had one involving a Google employee who was stealing AI
    software and technology to take it back to China. Their whole-
    of-government response requires us to be as similarly nimble
    and active to share our limited resources and our comprehensive
    authorities to go after those threats.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you for that. Mr. Mancuso.
        Mr. Mancuso. Much like my colleagues here at the table
    expressed, it is a whole-of-government approach, and that is
    one of the things at the E2C2 where we really rely on each
    other's unique authorities and, and different investigative
    methodologies and strategies to attack this problem set. I will
    go to a different direction and talk a little bit about
    partnership engagement with private industry. At the E2C2, we
    are regularly----
        Senator Hassan. I want to just stop you for a minute
    because what I was trying to get at was how China, Russia, and
    Iran are trying to avoid our enforcement effort. Then I want to
    move into the topic about kind of how we are responding to
    that.
        Mr. Mancuso. Sure. When we are talking about the relentless
    efforts of our adversaries, they are constantly attempting to
    acquire these components, this innovation, this creation, this
    technology, and it's important for the government to have that
    conversation with industry. No one knows their customer base
    like private industry.
        When they are receiving a one-off request, when they are
    receiving something outside their normal supply chain and their
    red flags kind of go up, that is when we need to have an honest
    conversation with them. We have the ability, a two-way
    conversation, not just a one-way conversation with the
    government.
        We start there, and then when we receive intelligence or
    referrals from our private industry partners that this may be a
    request from a bad actor, that is when law enforcement is
    involved. That is when we work with our industry partners and
    all the agencies, and then we do what we do best. We
    investigate that allegation.
        Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you. Mr. Mancuso. Another
    question for you, and then I will turn it over to Senator
    Romney. As you know, many of our foreign partners rely on their
    customs agencies to enforce export controls. Frequently, those
    customs agencies are not law enforcement agencies, and they may
    not have the authority to take direct action against criminals.
    As a result, there may be delays in turning intelligence into
    enforcement actions.
        How does this situation impact Homeland Security
    Investigations' operations? How could Congress better enable
    HSI to act against international criminal organizations that
    break our export control laws?
        Mr. Mancuso. Thank you for that question. The subject of
    international overseas customs officers is very dear to me. I
    had the opportunity, the privilege, to serve as the attache to
    the United Kingdom (UK) at the embassy in London for five
    years.
        HSI has invested a tremendous amount of resources and
    efforts into a very healthy overseas footprint. And what it's
    allowed us to do is strategically align ourselves in different
    regions with our international partners to combat this.
        Now, as legacy customs officers, I understand the
    challenges of working with our customs partners. One of the
    things I would say is we as HSI have looked at threats and we
    have been able to realign our resources to address today's
    threats. For example, we now have four HSI personnel in HSI
    Taipei. That was a strategic decision we made as an agency to
    counter the threat from China.
        Conversely, in HSI Bucharest, we now have a presence there
    before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They were working,
    spending an incredible amount of time, hand in hand with their
    Ukrainian customs counterparts recovering weapon systems from
    the battlefield, exploiting those weapon systems to see are
    there U.S. components in those, and if so, how do they get
    there? It is an incredible challenge.
        Thank you for your interest in this. How could you help? I
    think one of the ways you could help would be ensuring that HSI
    in our FY 2025 budget, HSI is fully funded, therefore giving us
    the strategic ability to adjust resources internationally. The
    ability to turn on a dime and pivot, not just today's threats,
    but the threats tomorrow and five years down the road.
        Thank you for just that topic.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. I will return to this in another
    round of questioning with our other witnesses. Senator Romney.
        Senator Romney. I am going to yield to my colleague,
    Senator Scott, who has a hard stop on the other end.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

        Senator Scott. I want to thank the Chair and Ranking
    Member, for hosting this hearing. Thanks each of you for being
    here. Thank you for what you do.
        Mr. Kurland, I personally do not believe that the United
    States should be doing any business with Communist China Party
    (CCP). The CCP is not an honest trade partner. Just recently,
    we learned more details about American business executives
    being trapped in China with an exit ban just for civil
    litigation business disputes for as little as $7,000.
        They steal our intellectual property, use non-market
    economic practices to destroy our businesses, harness our
    technology and innovation for their military to defeat us, or
    to make the world dependent on Chinese-run technology. They cut
    corners at every turn, from the labor they use, to poisons they
    put in their foods that they normally export to America. Every
    U.S. dollar spent there supports the CCP's military and its
    horrific human rights violations based on the BIS count country
    report for China.
        In 2022, only seven percent of export licenses for tangible
    items, technology, and software were denied. A whopping 3,249
    were approved, and another 980 were returned without action.
    Approvals for licenses to export to China to remain at
    historically high levels. Do you think this is an approval
    rating that we should be comfortable with?
        Mr. Kurland. Senator Scott, first of all, let me say that I
    share your concerns about China's illicit procurement of U.S.
    technology, particularly to support its destabilizing military
    modernization programs and mass surveillance programs.
        I am on the export enforcement side of the house not the
    export administration side of the house that does the
    licensing. What I can tell you is, on our side, our team is
    focused on preventing and detering China from illicitly
    acquiring technology to support these destabilizing programs.
    It is why we have stood up the Disruptive Technology Strike
    Force.
        We have been using the administrative enforcement authority
    that we have under the Export Control Reform Act in an
    aggressive manner. We have imposed the highest stand-alone
    civil penalty in our history just this past year against a
    party that was selling hard disk drives to a party on our
    Entity List called Huawei a $300 million penalty. We have
    imposed the most temporary denial orders in our history in just
    the past year.
        In addition, we continue to aggressively use our Entity
    List to prevent China from getting access to key technologies.
    There are now over 800 companies, Chinese companies, that are
    already on the Entity List in addition to six that we are
    adding tomorrow. They were announced this morning, four of
    which are involved with providing AI chips to China's military
    modernization programs. They are going on the list tomorrow in
    addition to two additional Chinese parties along with United
    Arab Emirates (UAE) counterparts that were providing components
    to the Russian and Iranian UAV programs.
        Last, I will say we have been working with our interagency
    colleagues and in particular Financial Crimes Enforcement
    Network (FinCEN) to receive from financial institutions
    suspicious activity reports that we can also action into
    enforcement leads with regard to China's evasion of our
    controls. We are systematically focused on preventing China
    from getting access to those technologies using all of the
    authorities that we have been authorized.
        Senator Scott. If you look at the numbers, it seems like
    there is a basic presumption of approval rather than a denial.
    The denials is, it seems, like it is an anomaly. Do you believe
    that there should be reforms to the BIS review process so there
    is going to be better parameters in place to effective
    presumption of denial as opposed to the assembly baked in
    presumption of approval?
        Look, and we also know the hardware's only as good as what
    it is running on it, but it seems BIS list is porous and clunky
    to deal with the panoply of threats that should be addressed
    for export limitations.
        So No. 1 is, do you think we ought to have presumption of
    denial with anything with regard to China? No. 2 is, how do you
    consider software for inclusions on the list?
        Mr. Kurland. Senator every license application that goes
    through the Commerce system gets reviewed by the Department of
    Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of Energy
    (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DOD), and also gets
    intelligence information added to it. There is a fully informed
    decision that is being made by an interagency body on each one
    of those activities.
        Each one of those licenses are reviewed de novo, if you
    will, on their own merits based on review or a refresh of
    information that the Department of Commerce and our interagency
    colleagues have in terms of determining whether or not this is
    a reliable recipient of U.S. items. That is the basis on which
    those licenses are reviewed. In terms of software and----
        Senator Scott. Still a pretty big number, right?
        Mr. Kurland. Certainly, Senator. There is a lot of trade
    between the United States and China, and so there is a lot of
    licenses that are received in the system, but it also shows
    that there is a lot of licenses that are subject to our control
    that are undergoing that four-agency scrutiny to determine
    whether or not there is a reliable recipient on the other end.
        Senator Scott. What about software?
        Mr. Kurland. Certainly software in terms of its control is
    something that we control in addition to commodities and
    technology itself. It is intangible, but it also goes through
    that same licensing process. It does not matter whether it is
    internet protocol (IP), or software, or a widget that you can
    hold, all of those transactions go through our system through
    all four agencies in order to make a determination on whether
    to approve.
        Senator Scott. Let us talk about TikTok. I saw a report
    this morning that that when you look at TikTok and compare it
    to Instagram, and you look at the messaging on Instagram versus
    TikTok, it is no if and buts about it, the Chinese government
    is targeting us. They are targeting our kids. They are
    targeting every citizen gets on there for the news. It is not a
    little bit biased. It is complete.
        There is nothing on TikTok about Tiananmen Square. There is
    nothing on about Tibet, and it all supports pro Hamas, attacks
    Israel. I mean, it is complete. It is not a little bit, it is
    complete.
        Knowing all that, do you believe that TikTok ought to be
    banned?
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, I am going to defer to my colleague
    from the Department of Justice on the topic of TikTok.
        Senator Scott. OK.
        Ms. Choi. Senator, I think that the Department of Justice
    and its leadership would agree with your characterization of
    the national security threats that are posed by TikTok. It is
    our view that TikTok and its parent company ByteDance are
    presenting a clear and present danger to our national security.
    We are in support of the Foreign Adversary Controlled
    Application Bill because it covers both TikTok and any
    attendant or subsequent applications that may have similar
    concerns with regard to foreign adversary control over our
    data.
        There are three different ways in which we think it's a
    concern for national security. First, in particular, TikTok, as
    you mentioned, collects fast amounts of personal data from more
    than 170 million Americans who actively use the platform. It
    also relies on a proprietary algorithm that was developed and
    maintained in China to determine what content to show, and what
    content not to show or to suppress to its users. Third, TikTok
    continues to rely on PRC-based source code and employees to
    support its U.S. operations.
        We think that the national security front in this regard is
    even more urgent because of the Chinese government's growing
    use and focus on its AI capabilities.
        Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY

        Senator Romney [presiding.] Thank you, Senator Scott. I am
    going to ask some questions now, and then when the Chair
    returns, she will, I think, provide Senator Lankford the
    opportunity to speak, and then we will finally get to Senator
    Blumenthal.
        A couple of questions. There is a great deal being written
    about the degree of leakage, if you will, of things that are
    not supposed to be exported from our country or from our
    friends that are somehow getting in the hands of adversaries of
    one kind or another. How great a part do you think that is? Is
    this a tiny share of those things that are most sensitive, or
    is this a pretty significant problem that that we need to
    address?
        Any one of you can respond to that? Maybe I will go over to
    Mr. Mancuso, and I realize we have a lot of things in the list,
    and so some things they are not terribly interested in, but I
    am thinking particularly about large scale chips that go into
    or other key defense technologies. How much of that is getting
    through? Are we a sieve? Are we not really a sieve, but drip,
    drip, drip. What's the characterization of what's getting
    around our export controls?
        Mr. Mancuso. Thank you for that question. I can say this is
    the Assistant Director for Global Trade, I think the sheer
    volume of legitimate trade far outweighs the illicit trade that
    is going on. However, that small slice is of concern.
        What you have is you have folks at this table, all the 20
    partners at the E2C2, the intelligence community. All of us are
    completely laser-focused on retaining America's innovation, our
    creativity, our intellectual property, right? We developed the
    most advanced weapon systems of the world because of our
    ability to create this. We are the envy of the entire world.
    That also means our adversaries will stop at nothing to obtain
    this technology in these weapon systems.
        With that being said, we are focused on this issue. We are
    an investigative agency looking at these agencies attempting to
    disrupt and dismantle the flow of this technology. It concerns
    all of us. Like I said, we are focused. I am also concerned the
    day that they do not want our technology, the day that we are
    not the world leader because that means that they have
    surpassed us and they have become superior. All of us at this
    table are laser-focused, making sure that date never happens.
        Senator Romney. Yes. I think there's a recognition that
    with regards to AI, in particular. It is very difficult to
    control the software. Some software on AI has already been put
    on open source and represents, in my view, a huge breach of
    poor judgment or breach of good judgment. It is poor judgment.
        There are some who believe that the only way we are going
    to try and keep AI from being used in a most negative way is if
    we limit the supply of the chips necessary to operate AI. Are
    we able to do that successfully, or is it like, no, we really
    cannot.
        Mr. Kurland, do you have a sense of that?
        Mr. Kurland. At BIS, Senator, we have been imposing
    controls not only on entities that are involved in these types
    of diversionary attempts, but we have over the past year and a
    half rolled out a series of significant countrywide controls on
    China in addition to parties in not only that are resident
    there, but their actors that are sitting in third countries as
    well.
        It is a complex problem set, and certainly with regards to
    the semiconductor ecosystem where the vast majority of chips
    are produced offshore, trying to identify potential violators
    is something that we all here are working hard to do using all
    source intelligence, putting together analytical cells that are
    trying to identify those activities, working hand in hand with
    industry to both prevent on the front side and then, if there
    are violations, imposing penalties that are high enough to
    deter others is critical. We have been doing that as an
    interagency. We have issued over a dozen multi-sealed documents
    just in the past year and a half that are trying to get at this
    problem set: how do we get industry to harden their supply
    chains and their distribution Networks.
        Then, we are working globally, internationally. Chair
    Hassan mentioned some of the complications of our international
    partners in most of these jurisdictions. The licensing folks
    are actually disconnected from the enforcement folks, right,
    and that creates a bit of a gap because the enforcement folks
    do not know what's coming into the system that's being
    licensed, and the licensing folks do not actually know what's
    going out, which is the biggest vulnerability, the things that
    should be coming into the system that are not.
        We have been working very closely. We have attaches similar
    to HSI that are stationed now in 10 countries around the globe,
    trying to get our international partners to increase their
    capacity to identify and then take enforcement action in
    coordination with us.
        It's a challenge, but we are using all the tools at our
    disposal--industry, interagency, international--to try to get
    at making sure that these key technologies are not getting into
    those hands. Where we're identified it, we are either using
    criminal enforcement, administrative enforcement, or as I
    mentioned, just this morning, we added four companies to our
    Entity List in China that were explicitly diverting AI chips to
    the Chinese military weapons program so that we can alert
    industry and have them harden their supply chains when they are
    doing their due diligence of transactions.
        Senator Romney. What will the penalties be for those
    corporations that have been, if you will, shipping those chips
    into China?
        Mr. Kurland. Sure. They would be subject to criminal and/or
    administrative enforcement authority. Up to 20 years in jail,
    or $1 million per fine. Then on the administrative side, we
    have a statutory maximum of $365,000 or twice the value of each
    violation. And as in the case of Seagate that resulted in a
    $300 million penalty to set a deterrence level to say we expect
    companies to put in place internal compliance programs when
    they are screening their transactions.
        Then when they find a problem, they come to us voluntarily
    through what we call a voluntary self-disclosure to tell us
    because if they do not do it, and there's a willful action
    where there's knowledge, then we are going to take aggressive
    action to try to deter others from violating and also putting
    those that are investing in in compliance programs at a
    competitive disadvantage. We want to level that playing field
    at the same time.
        Senator Romney. Ms. Choi, who's been the most successful in
    being able to get the key technologies that are vital and we
    have endeavored to restrict? Is it China or is it Russia? We
    read stories about Russia being able to get technologies that
    they are using in Ukraine. At the same time, we read about
    China.
        Just today, we have read more stories about China getting
    advantage of our technologies. Are they equally effective or is
    one more effective than the other?
        Ms. Choi. Senator Romney, I would say that--I would refer
    you to the annual threat assessment which focuses on China's
    efforts in particular. I would say both of those countries pose
    concerns, but with regard to China, that threat assessment
    notes that China seeks to become a world science and technology
    (S&T) superpower, and to use this technological superiority for
    economic, political, and military gain.
        Among its various methods to do that, it includes means to
    acquire or steal IP, its cyber operations, and its illicit
    procurement. I would say China is laser-focused on trying to
    advance its science and technology program, and it's a focus
    for us at the Department of Justice.
        Senator Romney. Thank you. Senator Lankford.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

        Senator Lankford. Senator Romney, thank you. Thanks all
    your work. This is a lot of behind the scenes, very technical,
    very legal work that makes an enormous difference for the
    country. I really do appreciate the ongoing work on this.
        I have a question about Huawei. We have talked about for
    years in trying to be able to limit the proliferation of Huawei
    around the world and communication systems. Now in their
    partnerships for chips development and such, Huawei's become a
    hundred-billion-dollar company.
        The question is, are we being effective in limiting them?
    Can we show real progress in future limitations for Huawei
    getting into our ally systems and into American systems? How do
    we actually show that as a metric for how we are protecting us,
    our technology, and our allies? Anyone can step in on that.
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, as you know, Huawei is a significant
    national security concern for us. They have been on our Entity
    List since 2019.
        Senator Lankford. But they are still getting bigger.
        Mr. Kurland. Our Entity List is not necessarily aimed at
    preventing their growth, it's aimed at preventing them from
    misusing U.S. technology for their malign activities. I think
    we have a level of confidence that our entity listing, in
    addition to the use of the foreign direct product rule, has had
    a significant impact on their ability to leverage U.S.
    technology to conduct their activities.
        Where we have had an opportunity to enforce our controls
    against Huawei, we have done it. I have mentioned the Seagate
    case twice, but it's, I think, an example of how aggressively
    we are identifying violations. As it relates to Huawei, we have
    another case as well that we resolved back in 2021, I believe,
    involving Huawei. We are focused on preventing them from
    getting our tech.
        Senator Lankford. OK, I get it. Again, and I do not want to
    be flippant to say your focus is to be able to stop them from
    growing. I understand they are a Chinese company. They are
    going to continue to grow. Our focus is trying to keep them out
    of the systems of our allies, and to keep them from stealing
    our tech and our technology as well in the process.
        The concern all along has been the next Huawei, the other
    company that's coming up. Obviously, we have a lot of focus on
    Huawei at this point. Do we know at this point the next company
    that the Chinese are using to be able to basically do the exact
    same thing and to be able to go after technology? When you are
    doing the entities list, it is whack-a-mole all the time on it.
    How is that going as far as identifying those next companies?s
        Mr. Kurland. What I can say, Senator, on that question is
    we are lashed up with the IC on a daily basis. We are reviewing
    information. We are evaluating trends that are happening in
    China, and we are amending our controls, when necessary, both
    in terms of countrywide and entity wide, or entity-specific, I
    should say, to address those concerns.
        We have done that with regard to advanced computing,
    semiconductor manufacturing, a number of their key parties in
    terms of both equipment manufacturing and semiconductors
    themselves have been put on our Entity List. These actions do
    retard and delay their capabilities, but should we identify the
    next champion, certainly it is somebody we will actively review
    to determine whether or not they are involved in violation of
    our controls but also whether or not we need to take some other
    regulatory action against them to prevent their access to U.S.
    tech.
        Senator Lankford. This is just a process question that is
    getting the information out to different companies to let them
    know, hey, this entity is now on our Entity List, because
    that's changing all the time. Have you been able to evaluate
    how quickly companies are able to get the information
    processed? Is there an expectation to say within the next 15
    days, 30 days, or 90 days, that the changes are made in this?
    Because some of them may be in the middle of contracting in the
    process when they actually discover that. Walk me through the
    process of how that's actually distributed out to companies and
    how quickly that can turn around.
        Mr. Kurland. Sure. Senator, I will answer it two ways. One
    is from the government perspective, and then one is from the
    industry perspective. When we put parties on the Entity List,
    we are working hand in glove with U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) and HSI to identify transactions the next day
    that would violate our regulations. Then we both have authority
    to detain those shipments, or if they are moving to have them
    redelivered. We have the ability to immediately take
    enforcement action against shipments that are moving in
    violations of our regulations.
        In terms of industry, obviously, they are published in the
    Federal Register. But one of the things that we have made
    available is something called the Consolidated Screening List,
    which is a list of all the proscribed parties that is updated
    in real time from Treasury, State, and Commerce that companies
    can simply just download into their IT systems.
        There are commercial systems as well, but it's a free
    service that we offer where companies can just download that
    immediately upon--and they get notification. They can sign up
    through our website for notifications of updates. They can
    download it so that their screening system immediately picks up
    those changes.
        Those are some of the ways that we are working--it's also a
    way for us to make sure that, in particular, small and medium
    sized enterprises, which may not have the resources to expend
    and buy commercial software for these entities, can simply just
    import that information for free into their IT system and have
    an automated way to screen their transactions
        Senator Lankford. For enforcement itself, and you talked
    about that there are criminal penalties, obviously, for selling
    to those on the entities list. How quickly do you start
    enforcing those penalties? Because you may put on the entities
    list today, there's a contract that they actually do 3 weeks
    from now. Is that a criminal penalty that comes?
        Again, not being flippant about it, trying to be able to
    find out how quickly we are able to actually move from, it's
    there to, we need to do enforcement to be able to stop and how
    quickly it moves to major fines versus this is a contact to you
    to say, stop, you may or may not have known.
        Ms. Choi. Senator Lankford, that's actually a very
    important part point. I would note that criminal enforcement is
    a very important part of the enforcement rubric. But with
    regard to penalties in particular, that does not happen until
    after we have adjudicated the criminal prosecution, right? We
    have to bring charges, there needs either to be a guilty plea
    or a trial, and then there has to be sentencing.
        The penalties are oftentimes, somewhat distant from the
    original sort of understanding of the problem. But there are
    many non-criminal sort of circumstance or examples in which
    that information could be helpful. For instance, as Mr. Kurland
    was explaining, if there was new information that was available
    to a company that may prohibit them from entering into that
    transaction, that's still disrupting a potential opportunity
    for there to be an export violation because we are looking for
    opportunities short of criminal prosecution to stop and disrupt
    that threat.
        Senator Lankford. Sure. Grateful to do that. Thank you.
    Thanks for the questioning time. I may follow up with you on
    some questions on university students that are foreign students
    here in the United States. That's a growing population. We are
    not going to try to cutoff all foreign students here, but there
    are challenges that are there when they are involved in
    research, and there may be the possible transfer of technology
    or information as well. I will try to follow up with some
    questions for that. Thank you.
        Senator Hassan [presiding.] Senator Blumenthal.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BLUMENTHAL

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Hassan, and Senator
    Romney, for your leadership on this Subcommittee. As you may
    know, I am Chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on
    Investigations (PSI). We are conducting an investigation into
    the flow of parts and components, semiconductors, chips, to
    Russia.
        I recently visited Russia, as a matter of fact, with
    Senator Blumenthal. In the course of a meeting with President
    Zelinski, he handed me a folder with documents, photographs,
    charts, showing me how prevalent American chips and other
    components are in Russian weapons that they have recovered on
    the battlefield. Our own military and intelligence community
    confirms that the flow is prevalent and pervasive.
        This issue is at one level, very complex and challenging.
    At the other level, it's very simple. This system is not
    working. This system is not working, and I want to know why.
    That's the purpose of the investigation we are conducting.
        Our Subcommittee's inquiry shows added--reflecting
    significant jumps in the export of products from four of the
    largest United States manufacturing companies, Intel, Texas
    Instruments, AMD, and Analog Devices to five countries
    neighboring Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Finland,
    Turkey. In recent years, exports to these countries increased
    by huge orders of magnitude between 2021 and 2022. For example,
    we found exports to Kazakhstan rose by more than 1,000 percent,
    and they are continuing to rise.
        Mr. Kurland, I am assuming that you are aware of these
    trends, the increased flow of United States technology to these
    countries, eventually becoming parts of Russian weapons used to
    kill Ukrainians. Correct?
        Mr. Kurland. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you asked the State Department or
    one of our agencies of government whether it's Treasury or some
    other country to bring increased pressure on these countries?
        Mr. Kurland. There is a whole-of-government effort,
    Senator, to bring pressure on these countries, particularly
    that are outside the coalition. We have a coalition of 39
    countries that have agreed to impose substantially similar
    controls on Russia. The vast majority of these shipments that
    you are referencing are coming from countries that are outside
    of the coalition; countries like China, UAE.
        Senator Blumenthal. I mentioned five countries that do not
    include China or UAE. I mentioned countries like Finland and
    Turkey. Finland is part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO). Turkey is part of NATO. Other countries depend on us. I
    am assuming that more can be done. You mentioned in your
    testimony, Mr. Kurland that we have been providing ``guidance''
    on spotting red flags and implementing best practices to
    prevent diversion to private industry.
        What are those red flags and why aren't they working?
        Mr. Kurland. Sure. We have been working diligently with
    industry to provide them with as much information as we have
    about the evasion tactics of Russia. Some of those tactics are
    companies that did not exist prior to the invasion now exist
    and are receiving items that require some enhanced due
    diligence where they were receiving items unrelated from that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me just come right to the point.
        Mr. Kurland. Sure.
        Senator Blumenthal. Don't you agree that these American
    manufacturers have to know, looking at these trends, that
    something is awry here?
        Mr. Kurland. I think, Senator, that this is a complex
    supply chain, but industry needs to do more, and we are trying
    to do more. We are using our Entity List as aggressively as
    possible. I, personally, over the past few months, have signed
    out over 40 letters to the major distributors, manufacturers,
    and express carriers identifying----
        Senator Blumenthal. I have no question that you are doing
    your job, and you are doing it as well as you can, and you are
    doing it expertly and with consummate dedication. My question
    is, are the private companies reacting positively and promptly
    enough?
        Mr. Kurland. I think there is a general recognition that
    they need to do more. I share your concern that they need to do
    more----
        Senator Blumenthal. By general recognition, do you mean on
    their part or our part?
        Mr. Kurland. On their part. I have been personally talking
    with the major trade associations, with major companies. I know
    even our undersecretary has been reaching out. There's a
    recognition that these components are ending up in places that
    they shouldn't be.
        We need industry to do a better job of hardening their
    supply chains, and we are making specific asks of them to try
    to do that. Taking a look at these lists of companies and
    stopping voluntarily to sell to them. Putting together more
    effective distributor relationships so that they can track who
    the actual end user of these components are. There's a lot that
    they can do that we are encouraging them to do.
        Senator Blumenthal. I apologize for interrupting, but as
    you know, my time is limited. When you say you are encouraging
    them, as the saying goes, talk is cheap. There's the blunt
    instrument of criminal prosecution, which is very difficult to
    do. People can say, oh, well, we ought to prosecute them. But
    obviously, there's mens rea and intent, and all the
    difficulties of doing an effective prosecution.
        I was a prosecutor for quite a few years, not minimizing
    the difficulties, but there are not more effective instruments
    other than jawboning that can be brought to bear here on
    private industry or on the countries that are complicit because
    they are not completely immune to economic pressure and other
    kinds of pressure that has real world consequences in dollars,
    and cents, or otherwise?
        Mr. Kurland. We have increasingly been ratcheting up our
    controls. That is on the other side of the bureau, Senator. I
    am on the enforcement side of the house. I can speak
    specifically to how we are addressing the evasion of our
    controls as they relate to those that are in place, and that's
    why we are out talking with industry.
        We are giving them as much guidance as possible. We are
    providing them with lists. But as our controls change we will
    effectively enforce those controls as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired, but I would
    appreciate an opportunity to follow up with you on these
    issues. Again, I appreciate the work that you are doing on this
    very difficult topic. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chair.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rosen.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Hassan, and of course,
    Ranking Member Romney for your hard work on this really
    important Committee. Thank you to the witnesses for being here
    and testifying today.
        I want to focus my questions on artificial intelligence,
    and of course, its potential role in aiding in our enforcement
    in this area, and so many others. Because one of the issues
    this Committee in particular has been focusing on is how
    government use of AI has the potential to dramatically improve
    how effective and efficient government is. Whether it's cutting
    waiting times for Americans seeking support from Federal
    agencies, Federal workers using data to root out fraud and
    focus their efforts on going after bad actors.
        To all of the witnesses. How can data analytics and AI
    tools improve export control enforcement, and where are your
    agencies in the development and the adoption of these type of
    tools for this purpose?
        We can start with you, Ms. Choi.
        Ms. Choi. Thank you for that question. The Department of
    Justice recognizes, as you do, Senator Rosen, that there's
    tremendous potential in the use of AI to improve the way in
    which we are defending our national security or protecting the
    American people. With regard to export controls in particular,
    I am sure that my colleagues at the table will be able to
    discuss more specifically the ways in which AI could be
    harnessed in the export control investigations portion of our
    type of our criminal prosecutions.
        From the Department of Justice perspective, we are making
    sure that we are looking at AI as a tool, especially when it
    comes to litigation, to see if there are ways in which we can
    use it to generate leads, but also to do the data analytics
    that we need to when it comes to evidence, when it comes to
    documents, including in the export control realm, because of
    the tremendous amount of documents, for instance, that are in
    other languages. Unfortunately, I can only speak a few.
        We want to make sure that prosecutors can understand and
    digest that evidence. I would note that you know, we are
    looking at also from the Emerging Technology Board and within
    the Department of Justice to ensure that we have safeguards so
    that we are using AI in this manner at the Department of
    Justice. That we can protect the rule of law and make sure that
    people's rights are not violated as a result.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, having access to AI is a critical
    function for us to do our job more efficiently and more
    effectively given the amount of data that we have available to
    us, whether it's classified, open-source.
        Government data is vast. The ability for AI to be able to
    synthesize that information for an analyst at a terminal and to
    be able to use that to predicate a law enforcement lead that
    would result in an identification of a violation would be
    incredibly powerful.
        I can say at the Department of Commerce, we do not have the
    resources at this point to be running AI in that manner.
    Currently we are running a pilot. But the money even that we
    are using for that pilot for AI is not in our base.
        We have asked in our Fiscal Year 2025 budget for a $3
    million down payment to keep this pilot running. But, I think
    we are in agreement with the study from Centers for Strategic
    and International Studies (CSIS) that talked about the
    infrastructure backbone for BIS to have an infusion of
    resources that could upgrade our IT capabilities, particularly
        Senator Rosen. IT modernization?
        Mr. Kurland. Yes.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I have a few other questions I
    want to ask. Please, Mr. Mancuso.
        Mr. Mancuso. That's a great question. In terms of what we
    are doing with HSI and looking at our threats overseas, folks
    that are trying to go ahead and steal our technology and our
    creativity, we go through as HSI, some of our customs
    counterparts are international partners, a tremendous amount of
    trade data. Looking for those anomalies in the trade data.
        Criminal networks are constantly shifting and adjusting
    their tactics to stay one step ahead. AI would potentially give
    us the ability to go through mass volumes of data and identify
    these one-off anomalies which could be an indication that
    there's a transshipment or an end user is going to repackage
    that and set it onto an adversary.
        It's interesting. It's a topic that's top of mind. In the
    President's latest Executive Order, we were named, the IPR
    Center, our part for helping out industry on the electoral
    property side. What we did is we commissioned a study with
    Michigan State universities in anti-counterfeiting and product
    protection.
        We are going to reach out to U.S. businesses and say two
    things. How can you harness the power of AI to protect your
    intellectual property, and what are the top threats to your
    organization from AI? These are things we are working on, I am
    excited to release.
        Senator Rosen. We will look forward to seeing that. But I
    want to talk in the time I have left about the dual-use
    technology investigations, because American firms, honestly, we
    are really at the forefront of the AI technology revolution.
    For the last few years, I led a Senate delegation to the
    Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. Multiple companies
    unveiled to us their new semiconductor chips.
        Last year, the Biden administration announced restrictions
    on the export of AI chips and manufacturing equipment to China
    in order to limit China's access to advanced semiconductors
    related to AI.
        Mr. Mancuso, I will go to you. Given the rapid advancement
    in AI technology, the importance of the semiconductor chips in
    supporting the more powerful AI, these large language models,
    all this amount of data, what resources do you need to keep up
    with the expansion?
        Mr. Mancuso. Thank you for that question. There is no doubt
    that AI is evolving at a pace that's hard to keep up with. What
    we are doing at the E2C2 in this space is working with our
    partners here at the table and the 20 other partners, and in
    terms of resources and commitment. Thank you very much for
    that.
        Again, I would go back to the Fiscal Year 2025 budget and
    ensuring that HSI is funded to go ahead and give us the
    resources, and the flexibility to think strategically and to
    prepare for this, and to put resources in place to meet that
    challenge. Again, thank you for that, your leadership and
    interest in this topic.
        Senator Rosen. I am going to ask Mr. Kurland more broadly.
    What other dual-use technologies do you see as high risk? How
    should we help you as a Federal Government prioritize these
    technologies, because there are a lot out there? What do you
    need? How can we help?
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, thank you. We are really focused on
    the key disruptive technologies that have been identified by
    the intelligence community: AI, biotech, quantum, advanced
    compute.
        From our perspective, we believe that if we have more
    resources--as we have been able to demonstrate under the
    Ukraine Supplemental--when we have more analysts, we are able
    to identify more violations of our controls. When we have more
    attaches overseas, we are able to conduct more end use checks
    that identify diversionary activities, and those predicate our
    law enforcement leads.
        Senator Rosen. We have to partner AI with the common sense
    of humans.
        Mr. Kurland. Yes, exactly.
        Senator Rosen. Yes, thank you.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you, Senator Rosen. I do have some
    more questions, so I appreciate the witness's patience this
    afternoon. I appreciate the questions that my colleagues have
    asked as well.
        I want to go back to the question I left off on which was
    really about international cooperation. To Mr. Kurland and Mr.
    Mancuso, recent reporting noted that Russian manufacturers have
    been importing machine tools that are made in Taiwan, and then
    using those tools to produce weapons.
        Taiwan is a strategic U.S. partner and should be working
    with U.S. authorities to counter Russia. How can we get Taiwan
    and other international partners to be more proactive in
    countering Russia. Mr. Kurland, we will start with you.
        Mr. Kurland. Madam Chair, I think it's important to start
    with that Taiwan is a member of the Global Export Control
    Coalition, which means it has committed to imposing
    complementary controls as 38 other countries have done. It is a
    critical player in the global semiconductor supply chain and
    other key technologies like machine tools.
        Anybody that is a member of this coalition allows us to A,
    influence them because there is a need to harmonize controls,
    but also bring together our enforcement elements for
    cooperation and build their capacity. That's what we have been
    doing.
        I actually came back last month from Taiwan speaking with
    officials: how can we help them build their capacity for
    enforcement and implementation. We have an export control
    officer that is stationed there funded on a 1-year Ukraine
    Supplemental. We have asked the Congress in FY 2025 to actually
    make that position permanent. But we have a person that's
    working every day with the Taiwanese authorities to get them to
    increase their capacity, and they actually have done that. In
    February, they amended their controls. They now have controls
    on 77 pieces of machine tools.
        But that's the model that we are using with other close
    partners and allies. Which is, when you are part of the
    coalition, there's an expectation that you are going to keep
    pace with our changes in controls and that you are going to
    effectively enforce. We are working through our attaches
    overseas to help build that capacity.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Mancuso, anything to add to
    that question?
        Mr. Mancuso. I believe, it's a great question. Thank you. I
    believe earlier I discussed how HSI made a commitment to have
    HSI for HSI personnel stationed in Taipei. The mission there is
    to work alongside with their law enforcement, but it's also
    capacity building. It's also the greater partnership effort.
    It's sharing of best practices, and it's really being a good
    partner. That's what we are doing, HSI officers, agents
    overseas are doing. We are working hand in hand with our
    international partners. If it's important to them, it's
    important to us and vice versa.
        It is establishing these critical relationships on a global
    basis so we can all rely on the global community to combat this
    threat. We cannot do this alone. The United States clearly, and
    our partnership at the table, we cannot accomplish this alone.
    You have to rely on your committed global partners and then
    demonstrating by investing with our agents there, we are
    demonstrating our commitment to them and this in time will
    breed success.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Now I want to turn to kind of a
    follow-up on what Senator Blumenthal was asking you about. Ms.
    Choi, so we know how important it is that the private sector
    research institutions in academia share information with law
    enforcement about our adversary's various attempts to break
    export control laws and illegally gain access to critical U.S.
    technology.
        We understand how important it is that they share
    information with law enforcement and that private entities that
    engage in cutting edge research and development uphold the law,
    protect intellectual property. What is DOJ doing to coordinate
    with private entities to prevent violations of export control
    laws and stop adversaries from illegally accessing advanced
    technologies?
        Ms. Choi. Senator, I appreciate the question. The
    Department of Justice also believes that, companies are in the
    forefront of our efforts to protect national security in the
    ways that you have described. In a variety of different lines
    of effort, we have been engaging with companies in order to
    ensure that they are incentivized to come forward, be it
    through our voluntary self-disclosure policies, to notify the
    government when they see things that are happening within the
    confines of their business that would be of concern or
    potential criminal activity.
        We also think it's very important to provide them with the
    actionable intelligence that they can use to strengthen their
    own compliance systems because I think prevention is always
    going to be a better solution, be it in the export control
    realm or in cyber, when it comes to trying to protect your
    intellectual property.
        I know with regard to the export control, the Disruptive
    Technology Strike Force has been having a series of private
    sector engagements, including having fora in various large
    cities to try to bring industry that are in that area of
    jurisdiction to explain trends that are happening within that
    area and that industry.
        But in addition, we are ensuring that we have compliance
    notes, which we had discussed earlier. Again, actionable
    intelligence that companies can use to arm themselves. The flip
    side of that is when companies are willing participants in
    criminal evasion of our sanctions and export control laws and
    other criminal violations. We are focused on increasing and
    making more robust our corporate enforcement regime as well.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. I have a few more questions, but
    I wanted to turn to Senator Romney, if you have more questions.
        Senator Romney. Yes. I am going to ask an open-ended
    question which is what you would recommend that we do, if
    anything, to reduce the flow of technology from the United
    States, particularly that which has been limited by export
    controls, that nonetheless is finding its hands in Russia,
    China, and other places, in part, because it's so critical now
    with AI.
        It has always been important, but now with AI, it's the
    national security implications of us not being able to manage
    the super semiconductors that are necessary for AI. It's really
    extraordinary. I wonder if I could offer suggestions. One is
    more coordination among different agencies in the United States
    whether we need to do a better job and establish some type of
    entity that does more coordination.
        Another alternative, which is putting more burden on the
    shoulders of the of companies. Chip manufacturers, I mean
    Intel, AMD, and so forth, Analog Devices. Given the fact that
    we just heard from Senator Blumenthal that there was 1,000
    percent increase in shipments to a neighbor of Russia of
    technology, which is ultimately clearly going to Russia.
        There could be a requirement that on particularly highly
    sensitive items, not all the items that we put export controls
    on, but in certain highly sensitive items that a corporation
    must track where it's gone and where it is, and be able to
    provide that information to somebody to say, all right, yes,
    this is where it is. If they do not do that, that we fine them
    heavily or provide the sanctions.
        I hate just finding more requirements for you guys and
    trying to say, well, we have to get more money to you, because
    we all know that dollars are hard to come by at the Federal
    Government level. How about, say, to corporations, if you are
    going to see a shipment something of high sensitivity to some
    nation that's not part of the coalition, then you have to track
    where it is and be able to report to us how much you have sent,
    to which company, and where those items have gone.
        That means putting people in that country, tracking it,
    determining through an audit, whether I am looking for what are
    the solutions to this, because it is not working now. There's a
    great effort on our part, but they are finding ways around it.
        So why don't we just go down the order that you each
    testified with any suggestions you have, as you know, very
    briefly, if you know. If you were a king for a day, what should
    we be doing differently than we are doing, legislatively, or
    other ways?
        Ms. Choi. Senator, with regard to your specific thought
    regarding the burden or the changing standards as it applies to
    corporations. I will defer to Mr. Kurland on that. I know you
    said that you understand that resources are scarce. If I could
    just illustrate one example of the resources that are required
    to do these sophisticated cases.
        In one sanctions case alone, I am thinking of there are
    multiple petabytes of data, which we had to analyze for one
    criminal case. We simply are at our wit's end when it comes to
    resourcing and doing the big data analytics, and we know our
    adversaries are doing with our data. We need to be able to do
    that and be armed to do that.
        I would have that in mind when you are thinking about
    resourcing in the Fiscal Year 2025. One other thing that's
    maybe not so obvious, but is very important to us, is the
    reauthorization of Section 702. It's absolutely vital to all
    the national security work that we do, but in particular, I
    think it's important to highlight that in certain instances, we
    have been able to glean insights into the illicit transfer of
    technology and goods to hostile foreign state actors for the
    use of that particular tool.
        We would be happy to give you more details in a classified
    setting, but that is incredibly vital to every single thing
    that we do day in, day out. Thank you.
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, I cannot respond to policy
    prescriptions. I am on the enforcement side. What I can commit
    to you is that if new actions are taken, we will commit to
    aggressively enforce those from our perspective that requires
    more analysts, more attache overseas, more agents that are
    working with DOJ to bring criminal cases.
        It gets back to that IT issue as well; better IT systems so
    that we can create efficiencies to identify these violators and
    then more quickly be able to bring those cases, whether it's a
    criminal case, whether it's an administrative case, whether
    it's an entity listing. We have the authorities. We have never
    worked better together as an interagency in terms of E2C2,
    Disruptive Technology Strike Force. We are working in a
    complementary manner and sharing those resources. But the more
    resources that we have, the more effective we can be.
        Senator Romney. Thank you.
        Mr. Mancuso. The important first step was, today, we are
    having a hearing highlighting the importance of this. No. 2,
    HIS, we are not a policy agency. We are not a regulatory
    agency. We are an investigative agency. As I have mentioned
    earlier, just ensuring that we have the resources to do what we
    do. We are, like I said, we have a very healthy global
    footprint, and we are working every day. The men and women of
    HSI are working with our international partners, and to
    continue that, I believe that again, is a recipe for success.
    Thank you.
        Senator Romney. Thank you. Madam Chair.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Senator Romney. I want
    to keep going at another aspect of this issue of how we work
    with private entities. As we have heard during this whole
    hearing, the Export Enforcement Coordination Center does really
    important work coordinating interagency enforcement efforts and
    ensuring that information is shared among Federal agencies.
        However, private entities don't have access to most US
    export data, making it more challenging for them to conduct due
    diligence and avoid working with bad actors who are trying to
    violate our export controls law. Is DHS considering ways in
    which it could share more data with U.S. companies with
    research institutions in academia to help them protect
    themselves against accidental violations of export controls.
        Mr. Mancuso. Thank you for that question. I think the
    answer is we are always evaluating what we are doing well
    against what we could be doing better. That's a question we ask
    ourselves every day, and we can never become complacent.
        We do have an aggressive industry outreach. We do have
    Project Shield America where we are actively speaking to
    thousands of companies every year. We are going to research
    universities; we are talking to them. That is one thing we are
    doing. Could we do it better? I am sure we always could.
        Senator Hassan. Yes. Again, this is not a question about
    better. I share all of my colleagues' respect and real
    gratitude for the work that all of you and the people you work
    with do. What I am trying to get at is, do we have a way of
    sharing actual data that these entities could use, or is DHS
    exploring it?
        Mr. Mancuso. Sure. In certain circumstances, but we are
    limited. Some of the law enforcement sensitive data that we sit
    on, and there are limitations, what we can legally share with
    our partners too. We share with private to the greatest extent
    possible. That is part of a two-way conversation, but there are
    limitations on what we can share and how we can share it. We do
    to the greatest extent possible, but there are limitations.
        Senator Hassan. OK. Ms. Choi, the Disruptive Technology
    Strike Force, which was created last year, works across Federal
    agencies to coordinate with global partners and enforce export
    controls. As the Strike Force continues into its second year,
    how should it expand its collaboration with more of our partner
    nations?
        Ms. Choi. Chair Hassan, that's an excellent question. We
    are trying to increase our international cooperation in a
    variety of ways. As was previously mentioned, there's an effort
    underway pursuant to the Camp David meeting between the
    President and leaders from Japan and South Korea to ensure that
    we are well equipped to help strengthen those other countries'
    export control regimes as well. Because export control regimes,
    at least from a criminal perspective, it's very important for
    our authorities to be aligned and for the violations to be of
    the same kind in order for us to have a maximum impact for
    disruption.
        We also have, as a matter of course, every criminal
    investigation that we have, we leverage the global footprint of
    both the Department of Justice and the international law
    enforcement agencies that we work with and their presence
    abroad in export control.
        Senator Hassan. OK. We heard earlier that just today,
    Commerce listed two UAE firms for supporting Russia and Iran's
    drone program. Is DOJ considering embedding personnel in
    hotspots for export control evasion, like the UAE, and if so,
    does the Strike Force need additional resources or authorities
    to do that?
        Ms. Choi. Senator Hassan, I do not know about the specifics
    of the UAE information that you just outlined. I would say I am
    not aware of a particular effort from DOJ to enhance its UAE
    presence on export controls. I will say I am aware of many
    different engagements with UAE on a variety of different
    issues, including export controls.
        Again, we can always do more with more. The extent that we
    would have further resources to allow for that travel and to
    build those partnerships, the muscle memory with our
    international partners, we would look forward to receiving
    that.
        Senator Hassan. OK, thank you. Mr. Kurland, earlier you
    mentioned that BIS would be adding six new entities to your
    agency list because they were providing AI tech to China. Can
    you tell the Subcommittee more about their efforts to undermine
    export controls? How egregious were the violations? What
    additional action should we be taking against those entities or
    individuals who are working for them?
        Mr. Kurland. Senator, there are four entities that will be
    listed tomorrow for seeking to acquire AI chips for China's
    military modernization program and military intelligence end
    users. Addressing China's whole-of-government approach to
    acquiring these advanced technologies is something that we are
    all focused on a day-to-day basis.
        It requires significant resources and analyst overseas. You
    were just mentioning attaches that are overseas. We currently
    are located in 10 countries, including UAE and key
    transshipment countries like Hong Kong and Taiwan, to prevent
    those types of diversions, and then to help us identify
    enforcement outcomes when those are identified.
        Senator Hassan. OK. I want to follow up with you. Maybe we
    will learn more tomorrow, but what we are really trying to get
    at is a sense of what these entities are doing, because that
    helps obviously inform us about what the next steps are and how
    we can be helpful. I am, again, out of time. Do you have any
    more questions? All right.
        I have one or two more, and I thank you guys again for your
    patience. Mr. Kurland, an end use check is when the Commerce
    Department physically inspects an export-controlled item in a
    foreign country to ensure that the item will not be used for
    illegal purposes after a request from the Commerce Department.
        Foreign governments have 60 days to allow U.S. inspectors
    to conduct end use checks in their jurisdictions. If a foreign
    government does not allow end-use checks within that timeframe,
    the Commerce Department can take away export licenses. How does
    the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) share data with law
    enforcement regarding countries that delay end-use checks? How
    does interagency data sharing help inform sector-specific
    enforcement and private industry engagement?
        Mr. Kurland. Sure. Thank you. You explained the program
    perfectly, Madam Chair, in terms of our law enforcement
    investigators doing these end-use checks.
        First, let me say that the majority of our partners around
    the globe ask for a list of who we are going to do checks at,
    and many of them also participate on those checks. We currently
    have no issues with regard to conducting checks anywhere around
    the globe.
        We had an issue back in October 2022 that resulted in a
    change of our regulations, which you were referencing, as well
    as a policy that Assistant Secretary Axelrod issued that said
    that if a host government, in that case it was China, did not
    schedule a check within 60 days because we had a backlog, we
    would put them on our unverified list.
        Then our regulation change allowed us to move them to the
    Entity List, which basically imposes a license requirement on
    any item subject to our regulations if those delays continued.
    I am happy to report that based on that regulation change and
    the policy initiative, that it has spurred the government of
    China to eliminate the backlog and to continue to cooperate
    with us.
        At this point you know, we are not having any issue
    globally with conducting checks, and we have tools in place to
    spur foreign governments that might attempt to delay completion
    of those checks.
        Senator Hassan. That's good to hear. We have had a very
    comprehensive discussion, and I am very grateful for the three
    of you for spending so much time and sharing your expertise
    with us. I want to thank you for joining us today, but I also
    always like to give witnesses a chance to highlight any aspect
    of your work, in this case, on export control enforcement that
    we did not cover.
        If you feel like we have been comprehensive, you can say,
    ``we are all set,'' but I just did not want to leave today
    without giving you each a brief chance just to touch on
    anything we have not gotten to today. I will start with you,
    Ms. Choi, and work right down the line.
        Ms. Choi. Thank you for that opportunity. I would just say
    that we remain very focused on export controls. I think we have
    covered a lot of topics today, and so I will probably cede the
    rest of my time. But certainly, I would just like to
    reemphasize that we appreciate your leadership, and yours
    Senator Romney and your focus on this particular issue.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Kurland.
        Mr. Kurland. Madam Chair, I would say that at Commerce, we
    continue to be singularly focused on protecting U.S. technology
    from being misappropriated by our adversaries.
        To the extent that we have an ability to do more if the
    Congress is able to provide us with additional resources from
    our FY 2025 budget request, in addition to requests that have
    been identified by non-governmental organizations (NGO's), in
    terms of the Kiev School of Economics (KSE), AEI, CSIS. They
    all have identified you know, the fact that if we have more
    analysts, we have more export control officers overseas, we
    have more agents, we have better IT systems, we can be more
    even more effective as we are laser-focused on this problem
    set.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Mancuso.
        Mr. Mancuso. I just want to say on behalf of the men and
    women of HSI, especially the folks in the CPI realm, all of our
    men and women at the E2C2, and in Huntsville, Alabama, thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today. You asked
    some great questions and we appreciate your time. Thank you.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much not only for your
    testimony today, but for everything you and the teams you work
    with the men and women in your agencies do to help secure our
    Nation. I look forward to continuing this conversation with my
    colleagues and constituents. I know you have given all of us a
    lot of ideas and identified some new problems for us to solve.
    We appreciate that.
        The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 5
    p.m. on April 25th for submissions of statements and questions
    for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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