[Senate Hearing 118-265]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-265
CONFLICT IN SUDAN: OPTIONS FOR AN
EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 10, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-444 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington, DC..... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Charles, Sarah, Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 33
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 35
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 36
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 52
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Pete Ricketts.......................................... 56
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator John Barrasso.......................................... 61
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Barrasso.................................................. 62
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Scott.............................................. 64
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator
Tim Scott...................................................... 64
Foreign Policy Article, Dated May 10, 2023, titled, ``How the
U.S. Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' by Robbie Gramer... 66
Letter to President Biden, Dated May 19, 2021, Regarding Support
for the Abraham Accords........................................ 80
(iii)
CONFLICT IN SUDAN: OPTIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:51 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Young,
Hagerty, Ricketts, and Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Since fighting erupted in Sudan almost a month ago,
ceasefires have come and gone with no appreciable reduction in
fighting. Violence has left the air in the capital thick with
dust and smoke. Food and water shortages have resulted in
looting and attacks on civilians by armed groups in search of
provisions.
The former strongman head of state who is wanted by the
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity has
escaped from prison. The borders are overwhelmed with people
trying to escape.
Hundreds have been killed, thousands injured, and hundreds
of thousands displaced. One American doctor staying to help
treat the wounded was surrounded by a group of men and stabbed
to death in front of his family.
Sudan is not only descending into violent chaos, it is on
the brink of a full-scale, zero-sum civil war, and the last
civil war went on for more than two decades.
I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today to
discuss how we respond to the conflict in Sudan. I welcome the
long overdue Executive Order issued last week with respect to
Sudan and we are all grateful to those who planned and carried
out the nighttime rescue operation to evacuate more than 70
people working at our embassy including Ambassador Godfrey.
Thankfully, all U.S. Government personnel escaped unharmed.
However, thousands of private American citizens were left
to fend for themselves when the violence broke out, to say
nothing of millions of Sudanese who now understandably feel
abandoned by the international community.
I will not sit here and put the blame on the State
Department or the Administration for a foreign policy failure
that has been many years in the making. The failed negotiations
on the transition to democracy were supported not only by us,
but by the African Union, Gulf states, and the United Nations.
Numerous attempts to broker a ceasefire have failed and the
international community has yet to mount a robust humanitarian
response. Let us be clear. U.S. policy fell short of the
challenge. We refused to call a coup a coup after the Sudanese
military takeover in 2021.
Instead of imposing sanctions, we put the democratic
aspirations of millions of Sudanese in the hands of generals
despite evidence of their complicity in and responsibility for
gross violations of human rights and significant public
corruption.
The Sudanese Armed Forces have a long record of human
rights abuses and the Rapid Support Forces, best known to the
world as the Janjaweed, committed genocide in Darfur and their
leader has been implicated in rapes and massacres and has
allied himself with the Wagner Group.
By convincing ourselves that these figures were going to
help Sudan transition to a democracy, we neglected the need for
accountability. We failed to push hard enough for inclusive
civilian participation and we ended up legitimizing and
entrenching those with guns at the expense of the Sudanese
people's democratic aspirations.
I would like to hear from our witnesses about U.S. policy
options to end the conflict, our efforts to rally the
international community to jumpstart the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and what steps the Administration is
taking to garner international support for collective action to
ensure that military leaders stand down and step aside.
I realize sometimes there are no good options, but hope is
not a foreign policy strategy. We need to understand how our
analysis was so flawed that the State Department failed to draw
down its embassy staff or assist American citizens to depart
before the violence began.
The United States cannot be blindsided like this. I want to
understand what is being done to prevent this in the future.
Now, I realize that if the views of some ends up being the
reality, our ability to predict and prepare for situations like
we are seeing in Sudan will be dramatically affected because of
the potential cuts that are being talked about in discretionary
domestic spending.
Well, everything we do at the State Department is domestic
discretionary spending. I do not know how we are going to get
it better with less.
Under Secretary Nuland, I would like to hear a clear
articulation of our short-, medium-, and long-term goals in
Sudan and the Horn of Africa as well as the Administration's
strategy for achieving them now that we have no diplomatic
presence on the ground in Sudan.
Ms. Charles, given the emerging humanitarian catastrophe we
need a plan to deliver assistance as quickly as possible to the
people of Sudan, to empower civil society voices advocating
against all odds and at great personal cost for democracy.
Millions of lives in Sudan and the Horn of Africa are at
stake as are our strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and
the Red Sea corridor. We need to put the democratic transition
back on track in Sudan.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Risch, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would certainly concur in your remarks. I think you were
a little kinder than I am going to be, but, nonetheless, we
have the situation before us.
This is not a happy occasion. It is disappointing we are
here today having this hearing. The humanitarian and security
catastrophe playing out in Sudan was predictable. This
committee has tried to ensure Sudan had the highest levels of
attention from the State Department. Sadly, that has not
happened.
I concur with the chairman that this is not an easy
situation. It is no question that things are difficult there,
but we do not have the luxury of just dealing with the easy
ones.
More should have been done to protect the Sudanese people
from the military junta. We should have done more to warn
American citizens and position our diplomatic and humanitarian
footprint to respond to the predictable scenario that we all
saw unfolding.
We have seen this movie before. As Sudan faces a
potentially catastrophic civil war and state collapse like
those we have seen in Syria and Libya, urgent leadership by the
United States and its allies is required.
Certainly, the State Department is on the front line of
this. No one should be surprised that those involved in the
Bashir regime's genocide in Darfur 20 years ago refused to
relinquish power.
I am concerned the United States continues to partner with
the same authoritarian actors in the region that have bargained
away Sudan's democratic future in order to secure their own
interests.
Even now, we hope current efforts in Saudi Arabia yield a
real humanitarian ceasefire, but we must also be very honest
with ourselves about the motivations of some of the regional
actors.
In the 4 years since Sudan's generals removed dictator Omar
Al-Bashir from power, a naive hope toward corrupt military
leaders and their foreign backers has driven U.S. policy in
Sudan.
This approach has empowered Sudan's strongman while
victimizing the Sudanese people and undermining the country's
democratic future.
The Biden administration has sanctioned only one Sudanese
entity under Global Magnitsky. While President Biden issued an
Executive order last week, there were no designations with the
announcement. Very disappointing.
The U.S. has also not put its best diplomatic foot forward
to deal with the problem. We did not name an ambassador to
Sudan for more than 2 years after normalizing relations during
a critical time in Sudan's transition. The U.S. embassy in
Khartoum has also faced persistent understaffing and leadership
challenges.
Congress has spoken in a bipartisan manner with an
unmistakable voice on Sudan throughout the post-Bashir
transition. Put the Sudanese people first and end the
stranglehold of Sudan's security forces on the country.
This Administration, however, does not seem to be
listening. During our last Sudan hearing 15 months ago, I
called for the Administration to articulate a clear vision for
what it wants in Sudan. I am still waiting.
The Administration must change not only the architecture,
but also the architects of this policy. We need a policy that
empowers the Sudanese people, weakens these generals, shuts off
the foreign meddling and finance that empowers them, and leads
a coalition of partners committed to putting Sudan's democratic
future first.
We must end this cycle of doing the same thing and
expecting a different outcome. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses today, just as the chairman indicated, about how
the Administration plans to meet immediate needs in Sudan and
make an urgent course correction in its Sudan policy.
Before I close, I would be remiss and I want to express my
deep disappointment for your failure to respond to mine and
many of my colleagues' questions for the record in a timely
manner.
You last testified before this committee on January 26.
Then, after that hearing, as is usual, questions for the record
were submitted because we have limited times at the hearings.
That was over 100 days ago. I received answers to those
questions for the record. Do you know when?
The delay in responding to these questions underscores
serious doubts in my mind that the State Department puts any
value on communication with Congress and holds no respect for
this committee's oversight role.
Some of the questions I submitted to you were about Sudan
and now we get an answer over 100 days later and the day before
the next hearing on this subject.
I really feel that this demonstrates that the Department is
just going through the motions to mollify this committee and
continue on its happy way keeping us in the dark.
I expect to receive meaningful explanation of why these
questions for the record took over 100 days to complete.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Risch.
Our witnesses today are Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Ms. Sarah
Charles, Assistant to the Administrator of USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance.
Under Secretary Nuland has a distinguished 33-year career
as a diplomat, rejoining the Department as Under Secretary for
Political Affairs in April of 2021. I will not go through all
of that history, but suffice it to say that is an incredible
career.
Sarah Charles is assistant to the administrator of USAID in
charge of the Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs, the U.S.
Government's lead for international disaster response.
Before joining the bureau, she was senior director for
policy and advocacy for the International Rescue Committee and
has worked at the National Security Council as director of
humanitarian affairs.
We thank you both for your participation and your service
to our country. I would ask you to summarize your statements in
about 5 minutes. Your full statements will be included in the
record without objection.
Ambassador Nuland, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, distinguished members of this committee. We appreciate
the opportunity to be with you and exchange views at such a
difficult and consequential moment for Sudan.
The third largest nation on the African continent, Sudan
holds enormous promise and opportunity. It should be a thriving
breadbasket for its people, the region, and the world, but
instead it has been plagued, as you both noted, by decades of
authoritarianism, economic turmoil, and civil war.
In 2019, the Sudanese people, longing for a different
future, led a peaceful protest movement that ended the 30-year
reign of a dictator, only to endure a military takeover 2 years
later.
Our engagement since has focused on restoring the promise
of that 2019 revolution and supporting a civilian-led
transition to democracy and civilian rule.
We have worked over the past 18 months with civilian
partners in Sudan to build a coalition to lead this effort
while simultaneously putting pressure on Sudan's generals to
engage seriously in a political process.
Despite the courageous effort by Sudanese civilian leaders
and intensive engagement by international actors, which did
yield considerable progress since last fall on elements of
their own framework for a political agreement, those
negotiations, as you know, broke down over the unwillingness of
the two military leaders to resolve the last issue which stood
in the way of a return to democracy, namely, how the Rapid
Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces would integrate
under a unified command structure.
On April 15, we saw months of progress erased overnight.
You have seen the images: hundreds of killed in pillaging,
looting, armed conflict across the city; food, water, medicine,
electricity, telecoms cut off; hundreds of thousands of
families displaced or hiding in their homes.
Our first priority, as you noted, was the safety of our
people. Over 7 days we consolidated all U.S. personnel at the
embassy compound where our military then bravely extracted them
by helicopter on April 23 to Ethiopia and onward to Djibouti.
Then, with the help of partners--British, French, Germans,
and Saudis--we organized three overland convoys from Khartoum
to Port Sudan, transporting more than 700 more people and
hundreds of our own people also boarded allied and partner
flights.
In total, we facilitated the departure of 2,000 people
including 1,300 U.S. citizens and family members, along with
U.S. LPRs, locally employed staff, and nationals from other
allied and partner countries.
From the outset we have also worked to silence the guns.
Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, our
ambassador to Sudan, Anthony Godfrey, and teams across the
Department have been tirelessly engaged.
First, with Secretary Blinken's intense personal effort we
have secured six sequential short-term ceasefires, which have
lessened the fighting and allowed these evacuations and some
initial movement of humanitarian aid, and then working
intensively with Saudi Arabia and other partners we began on
Sunday these pre-negotiations with the warring parties.
To date, the Secretary has made seven separate calls to
Generals Burhan and Hemedti to try to silence the guns, jump
start this emergency diplomacy, and get talks going. He has
also been in touch with African Union Chairperson Faki and
leaders across the region and in Europe.
As you know, for the last 3 days starting on Sunday
evening, Assistant Secretary Phee and Ambassador Godfrey have
led the U.S. delegation to these emergency pre-negotiations
that began in Jeddah.
Our goal for these talks has been very narrowly focused,
first securing agreement on a declaration of humanitarian
principles and then getting a ceasefire that is long enough to
facilitate the steady delivery of badly needed services.
If this stage is successful--and I talked to our
negotiators this morning, who are cautiously optimistic--it
would then enable expanded talks with additional local,
regional, and international stakeholders towards a permanent
cessation of hostilities and then a return to civilian-led rule
as the Sudanese people have demanded for years.
We and our partners continue to make clear to the warring
parties led by these two generals that there can be no military
solution to this crisis and negotiations are the only way
forward.
We have also made clear, as you said, Chairman, through--
and Ranking Member--through President Biden's May 4 Executive
order to authorize future sanctions that we will hold those
responsible for stealing Sudan's future to account.
These new authorities reinforce a consistent message from
the U.S. that the world is watching, the fighting has to stop,
and will hold those responsible to account.
Meanwhile, we appreciate Saudi Arabia's role hosting these
talks and we will continue to work closely with all regional
partners including the African Union, IGAD, the Sudan Quad that
includes the U.K., to bring this conflict to an end.
Mr. Chairman, if I could, and Mr. Ranking Member, in this
context thank you for passing our ambassador to the African--
Ambassador designate Stephanie Sullivan for the African Union
through this committee and urge your support and help getting
her confirmed on the floor.
Despite the many setbacks, we will continue to stand with
the Sudanese people in their demands for a peaceful and
democratic future. They deserve better.
I thank you, look forward to listening to your questions
and, Ranking Member Risch, you are absolutely right. Those
questions should not have taken 100 days. It is on me. It will
not happen again. I apologize.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to exchange views with
you at such a difficult and consequential moment for Sudan.
The third largest nation on the African continent, Sudan holds
enormous promise and opportunity.
Rich with natural resources and a home to the Nile River Basin,
Sudan should be a thriving breadbasket for its people, the region, and
the world.
Instead, it has been plagued by decades of authoritarianism,
economic turmoil, and civil war.
In 2019, the Sudanese people, longing for a different future, led a
peaceful protest movement that ended the 30-year reign of a dictator .
. . only to endure a military takeover just 2 years later.
Our engagement since has focused on restoring the promise of the
2019 revolution and supporting a transition to democracy and civilian
rule.
We have worked over the past 18 months with civilian partners in
Sudan to build a coalition to lead this effort, while simultaneously
putting pressure on Sudan's generals to engage seriously in the
political process.
Despite courageous efforts by Sudanese civilian leaders and
intensive engagement by international actors that yielded considerable
progress since last fall on the elements of the framework political
agreement----negotiations ultimately broke down over the unwillingness
of the two military leaders to resolve the last issue which stood in
the way of a return to democracy: how the Rapid Support Forces and
Sudanese Armed Forces would be integrated under a unified command
structure.
And on April 15, we saw months of progress erased overnight.
The images out of Sudan's capital, Khartoum, are stark:
hundreds killed in pillaging, looting, and armed conflict
across the city;
food, water, medicine, electricity, and telecoms cut off;
and
hundreds of thousands of families either displaced from
their homes, or hiding inside them.
A first priority was the safety of our people.
Over 7 days, we consolidated all U.S. personnel at our Embassy,
where our military then bravely extracted them by helicopter on April
23 to Ethiopia and onward to Djibouti--they are now back home with
their loved ones.
With the help of partners including the British, French, Germans,
Saudis, and others, we facilitated three overland convoys from Khartoum
to Port Sudan to evacuate 700 more people; and we evacuated hundreds
more on allied and partner flights.
So whether U.S. citizens left aboard a Saudi, Canadian, French,
British or any other flagged carrier, we helped coordinate every
transport that included known U.S. citizens.
In total we evacuated 2,000 people--the majority of whom are our
citizens and their family members, along with U.S. lawful permanent
residents, locally employed staff, and nationals from allied and
partner countries.
From the outset, we have also worked urgently to silence the guns.
Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, Ambassador
Godfrey, and teams across the Department have all been tirelessly
engaged:
First to secure six sequential short-term ceasefires to
lessen the fighting and allow the movement of civilians and
humanitarian aid;
Then--working intensively with Saudi Arabia other partners--
to initiate pre-negotiations with the warring parties.
To date, the Secretary has made seven separate calls to Generals
Burhan and Hemedti to jumpstart this emergency diplomacy and get talks
started.
He also called African Union Chairperson Faki and other regional
leaders to discuss next steps.
As we sit here today, A/S Phee and Amb. Godfrey are leading the
U.S. delegation to these talks that began last Sunday in Jeddah.
We have narrowly scoped the talks to focus on: 1) securing an
agreement on a Declaration of Humanitarian Principles; and 2)
implementing a long-enough ceasefire to facilitate steady delivery of
badly needed services.
If this stage is successful, it would then enable expanded talks
with additional local, regional, and international stakeholders toward
a permanent cessation of hostilities and civilian-led rule, as the
Sudanese people have demanded for years.
We and our partners have made clear to the warring parties that
there can be no military solution to this crisis.
Negotiations are the only viable way forward. Compromise will be
required.
We have also made clear that the U.S. is prepared to use more
coercive measures to hold accountable those responsible for stealing
Sudan's future.
On May 4, President Biden issued an Executive Order to authorize
future sanctions when and if needed.
These new authorities reinforce a consistent message from the U.S.:
the world is watching, the fighting must stop, and we will hold those
responsible to account.
Meanwhile, we appreciate Saudi Arabia's role in hosting the current
talks, and will continue to work closely with our regional partners--in
coordination with the Trilateral Mechanism made up of the UN, African
Union, and IGAD (Horn of Africa's multilateral forum) and the Quad
(U.S.-UK-Saudi Arabia-UAE)--to bring the conflict to an end.
Despite the many setbacks, we will continue to stand with the
Sudanese people in their demands for a peaceful, democratic future.
They deserve better.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Ms. Charles.
STATEMENT OF SARAH CHARLES, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Charles. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today about the unfolding
humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the U.S. Government's
response.
It has been less than 1 month since the hostilities between
the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces erupted,
but the impact on the people of Sudan has already been
devastating.
Ongoing violence has led to the death of hundreds, injuries
to thousands, and destruction of critical infrastructure and
disruption of basic services.
Attacks against humanitarian staff and the looting of
humanitarian assets forced many of our partners to temporarily
suspend hundreds of lifesaving programs and relocate their
staff, impacting millions of people who relied on these
programs to meet basic needs.
Before the conflict, almost 16 million people in Sudan,
more than one-third of the population, required humanitarian
assistance. We do not yet know the full extent to which
humanitarian conditions have worsened since April 15, but their
early reports are grim. An estimated 70 percent of hospitals
across conflict-affected areas are not operational. More than 3
million women and girls are at risk of gender-based violence.
More than 19 million people could be food insecure in the
next 3-6 months if fighting continues.
More than 700,000 people have been internally displaced and
more than 170,000 people have crossed into neighboring
countries, meaning that the ramifications of this conflict do
not end at Sudan's borders.
They stretch into the region, compounding existing
humanitarian needs across several countries. The United States
is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Sudan, and
while the operating context has changed, our commitment to
providing assistance to the people of Sudan has not.
On April 23, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced
the deployment of a Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART,
to the region to lead and coordinate the U.S. Government's
humanitarian response.
While some of our humanitarian programs are temporarily
suspended, as of yesterday 19 of our longstanding partners with
strong national networks continue to operate, albeit with
limited capacity and dwindling prepositioned supplies.
Since the beginning of the conflict, national staff,
neighborhood committees, and other civil society organizations
have shown tremendous bravery, responding to the needs in their
communities amid incredible risk and uncertainty.
One of our partners has been dispatching a network of
midwives across Khartoum to manage obstetric emergencies and
support home births amid airstrikes, gunfire, and rubble when
it has been too dangerous for pregnant women to travel to any
of the few operational hospitals.
Their bravery and commitment to the Sudanese people has
helped save lives and bring new life into the world in
otherwise grim circumstances.
Despite incremental progress, the insecure operating
environment, lack of access, limited supply levels,
inaccessibility of cash, unreliable electricity and telecoms
will impair their ability to sustain this limited delivery of
assistance in the coming weeks.
Looking forward, we are working closely with our partners
to respond now even as we assess additional humanitarian needs.
While rapid assessments are ongoing, we are working with
partners now to use existing programs and prepositioned stocks
to scale up and pivot emergency programming where conditions
allow.
We are also working closely with our colleagues at the
Department of State and the United Nations to advocate in
Jeddah and elsewhere for the conditions that will allow for the
scaling up of humanitarian operations, including overland
routes and air bridges from neighboring countries.
We are also asking government entities in Sudan and in the
neighboring countries to decrease bureaucratic barriers that
limit relief organizations' ability to respond to the crisis at
scale, for example, by expediting customs procedures, issuing
visa waivers for aid workers, and waiving requirements issued
by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission, or HAC, to fast
track humanitarian activities.
For many years the HAC has chronically hampered
humanitarian action and delayed lifesaving assistance in Sudan.
These restrictions were egregious before, all the more so now.
Amid ongoing attacks on aid workers and assets, including
the one that Chairman Menendez just mentioned, we remain
focused on the safety and security of our humanitarian
partners. To date, fighting has resulted in the tragic death of
at least six USAID partner staff and injuries to others.
In conclusion, this conflict is the culmination of decades
of impunity for crimes committed across Sudan, impunity that
has affected our own staff when the murderer of USAID employees
John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, who were killed in
Khartoum in 2008, was released from prison in January.
The Sudanese people have been demanding an end to injustice
and impunity for decades and we stand with them. The
humanitarian crisis in Sudan will continue to deteriorate if
humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance to millions
of vulnerable people continue to be limited by the ongoing
conflict and the actions of the parties.
By seeking a resolution to the conflict and commitments
from the parties involved to uphold humanitarian principles, we
can scale up lifesaving programs across Sudan.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Charles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Sarah Charles
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the
unfolding humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the U.S. Agency for
International Development's (USAID) response.
It has been less than 1 month since hostilities between the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted,
but the impact on the people of Sudan has already been devastating--
exacerbating an already severe national food security crisis. Ongoing
violence has led to the death of hundreds of people, injury to
thousands, destruction of critical infrastructure, and disruption of
service delivery of any kind. As people took shelter from bombardment
and bullets, they depleted their food stocks, medicine supplies, money
reserves, and other resources, leading to rising hunger levels and
deteriorating health for many. Attacks against humanitarian staff and
the looting of humanitarian assets forced many of our partners to
temporarily suspend hundreds of life-saving humanitarian programs and
evacuate their staff--impacting the millions of people who relied on
these programs to meet their basic needs.
Until the violence comes to an end and the humanitarian community
is able to safely resume operations, the crisis in Sudan will continue
to rapidly deteriorate. This is why we urge the SAF and RSF to commit
to a permanent ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, and the
principled delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
populations across the country.
humanitarian needs
Before the conflict, almost 16 million people in Sudan--more than
one-third of the population--required humanitarian assistance to meet
their basic needs; of those, 10 million required food assistance.
Because humanitarian staff have not been able to safely move around
Sudan to conduct needs assessments, we do not know the full extent to
which humanitarian conditions have worsened since April 15. However, we
predict that ongoing shortages of food, safe drinking water, medicine,
and fuel, coupled with limited access to basic services and care have
significantly increased vulnerability for many people, particularly in
Khartoum and the surrounding areas.
The data we have been able to obtain from inside Sudan are grim: an
estimated 70 percent of hospitals across conflict-affected areas of
Sudan are not operational, cutting off critical care for people caught
in the conflict. In addition to dwindling medical supplies,
infrastructure damage, and unreliable access to power, medical
facilities and personnel have also been devastated by at least 25
unconscionable attacks since the conflict began.
Further, the World Food Program (WFP) estimates that the number of
acutely food insecure people across Sudan is expected to increase to a
total of more than 19 million in the next 3-6 months if the current
conflict continues; the highest increases are expected in West Darfur,
West Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and North Darfur. WFP also estimates
that nearly 1.3 million people did not receive food assistance in April
because of the conflict. While WFP resumed operations in Sudan on May
1, millions of people are in danger of not receiving assistance if
fighting continues.
The conflict has also led to widespread displacement: since April
15, more than 700,000 people have been internally displaced across
Sudan, and more than 170,000 people have crossed into neighboring
countries according to the International Organization for Migration.
The UN estimates that as many as 860,000 refugees and returnees could
flee into neighboring countries as the conflict progresses, meaning
that the ramifications of this conflict do not end at Sudan's borders--
they stretch out into the region, compounding existing humanitarian
needs across several countries.
USAID is also concerned by reports of protection violations,
including gender-based violence (GBV) against women and girls,
particularly among those displaced by violence who are seeking shelter
and safety. The UN reports more than 3 million women and girls are at
risk of GBV in Sudan, including due to the conflict-related disruption
of health and protection services.
usaid's response
The UN's Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan requested $1.7
billion to support 12.5 million of the most vulnerable people in 2023,
but as of May 9, it was less than 16 percent funded. The United States
is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Sudan, providing
more than $162.5 million in humanitarian assistance from USAID to date
in fiscal year 2023. And while the operating context has changed,
USAID's commitment to providing humanitarian assistance to the people
of Sudan has not, and we stand by them through this difficult time and
will work to address rising humanitarian needs caused by the conflict,
in partnership with humanitarian actors and other donors.
On April 23, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced the
deployment of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the region
to lead and coordinate the U.S. Government's humanitarian response in
Sudan. Composed of disaster experts from USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance, the DART is currently based in Nairobi, Kenya,
and is working with the international community and our partners to
identify priority needs and scale up urgently needed assistance to
communities affected by conflict in Sudan, as the security situation
allows. USAID also activated a Washington, DC-based Response Management
Team to support the DART in leading and coordinating USAID programs and
the broader U.S. Government humanitarian response.
While many of USAID's humanitarian programs in Sudan are
temporarily suspended, USAID's long-standing humanitarian partners with
strong national networks in health, nutrition, protection, agriculture,
and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) are operating with extremely
limited capacity and using dwindling prepositioned supplies in pockets
of Gedaref, Blue Nile, White Nile, South and West Kordofans, Khartoum,
and the Greater Darfur region. Since April 15, they have relied on
national staff to continue life-saving activities, many of whom have
also been forced to shelter in place or evacuate their homes due to
violence. Since the beginning of the conflict, national staff,
neighborhood committees, and other civil society organizations have
shown tremendous bravery responding to needs in their communities amid
incredible risk and uncertainty.
In just one example, one USAID partner has been dispatching a
network of midwives across Khartoum to manage obstetric emergencies and
support home births in the midst of airstrikes, gunfire, and rubble.
Their staff have also provided critical health care services and
distributed supplies to support safe births for women and girls
affected by the conflict. Their bravery and commitment to the
humanitarian mandate has helped save lives and bring new life into the
world in otherwise grim circumstances.
Despite incremental progress, the insecure operating environment,
lack of access to safely deliver assistance, dwindling supply levels,
inaccessibility of cash, and unreliable electricity and
telecommunications services will impair their ability to sustain this
limited delivery of assistance in the coming weeks. These factors will
also continue to hinder the broader humanitarian community's ability to
resume normal operations in the short term.
looking forward
The United States continues to urge both the SAF and RSF to take in
consideration the interests of the Sudanese nation and its people and
actively engage in the talks towards a ceasefire and end to the
conflict in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Ending the conflict will help reduce
suffering among the people of Sudan and allow for life-saving
humanitarian assistance to reach those in affected areas.
Amid ongoing attacks on aid workers and assets, USAID is also
keenly focused on ensuring the safety and security of our humanitarian
staff and partners in country and continues to prioritize this issue in
conversations with all key stakeholders. To date, fighting has resulted
in the tragic deaths of at least six USAID partner staff and injuries
to others. Armed actors have raided humanitarian housing compounds,
offices, and warehouses around the country, and looted food and
humanitarian supplies, including relief items, equipment, and vehicles,
raising international humanitarian law concerns.
USAID is working closely with our colleagues at the Department of
State and the UN to advocate for increased humanitarian access and the
scaling up of humanitarian operations in Sudan, including by exploring
overland routes and air bridges from neighboring countries and within
Sudan to facilitate the safe passage of goods and personnel. However,
these plans will only succeed if the SAF and RSF commit to upholding
international humanitarian law and respect humanitarian personnel and
assets. To fully take advantage of any opening of humanitarian access,
we are also asking the UN to support a robust scale up for the
response, and in particular to support local responders.
In order to further facilitate humanitarian operations, USAID is
asking the government entities in Sudan and its neighboring countries
to decrease administrative and bureaucratic barriers that limit relief
organizations' ability to respond to this crisis at scale--for example,
by expediting border and customs procedures for quick clearances for
all humanitarian goods, issuing visa waivers for humanitarian workers
deploying to support the response, and waiving the bureaucratic
requirements issued by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
in order to fast-track humanitarian activities. For many years, the HAC
imposed strict terms of engagement with populations in need, which has
chronically hampered humanitarian action and delayed life-saving
assistance in Sudan. These restrictions were egregious before, and are
all the more so now.
USAID is working closely with its partners to respond now, even as
we assess additional humanitarian needs arising from the conflict and
resulting widespread displacement. While assessments are ongoing to
determine these needs, we are working with partners to use existing
programs and resources to scale up and pivot emergency programming
where conditions allow. For example, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
has--in collaboration with WFP--been providing fuel to maintain the
central medical cold chain in Sudan, which preserves millions of
vaccines and insulin doses. Similarly, BHA staff in Sudan's neighboring
countries are working with existing partners to pivot humanitarian
programs in response to the influx of returnees and refugees. For
example, humanitarian organizations are moving in-kind food, health
commodities, shelter support, and WASH supplies in areas of South Sudan
with heightened displacement.
conclusion
This conflict is a culmination of decades of impunity for crimes
committed across Sudan--impunity that has affected our own staff, when
the murderer of USAID employees John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas
Rahama, who were killed in Khartoum in 2008, was released from prison
in January. The Sudanese people have been demanding an end to injustice
and impunity for decades, and we stand with them.
The humanitarian crisis in Sudan will continue to worsen if
humanitarian access and the provision of assistance to millions of
vulnerable people continue to be limited by the ongoing conflict. USAID
is committed to the resumption of humanitarian operations when it is
safe for our partners to do so and will continue to work with all
stakeholders in support of this goal. We owe it to children such as
Saleema, who receives treatment for acute malnutrition from one of our
partners so that she can grow to be healthy and strong, and we owe it
to the more than 50,000 children in Sudan who have lost access to this
life-saving treatment due to violence. By seeking a peaceful resolution
to the conflict and commitments from those involved to uphold
humanitarian principles, the humanitarian community can restart life-
saving nutrition, food assistance, health, protection, and other
programs across Sudan. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify;
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will
start a series of 5-minute rounds.
Madam Secretary, let me preface what I am about to say. I
understand you got a big portfolio umbrella. Some of the issues
that we are going to be discussing here are more specific to
your colleague, who is the Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, and I get it, but since you are the representative of
the State Department here, take my questions in that spirit.
There have been published reports that are highly critical
of the Administration's Sudan policy. Among the things that it
says is that there was memos written and circulated within the
State Department's Bureau of African Affairs warning of U.S.--
risk of current U.S. policy in Sudan and listing potential
scenarios that could emerge in the rivalry between Burhan and
Hemedti including full-scale conflict. They were heavily
redacted and never got to the Secretary's desk.
It has been noted that Burhan and Hemedti were amassing
forces around Khartoum and that at lower levels statements were
being made about that as a reality of a real challenge to the
possibility of conflict breaking out.
There is talks about from several dozen, both officials and
advocates--Sudanese activists--who describe a deeply flawed
U.S. policy process on brokering talks in Sudan in the run-up
to the conflict monopolized by a select few officials who shut
the rest of the interagency team out of deliberations and
quieted a chorus dissent over the direction of U.S.-Sudan
policy.
It goes on to say from the outset there was a consistent
and willful dismissal of views that questioned whether U.N.
talks would be a recipe for success or for failure. Those
warnings were ignored and instead the U.S. built ``a dream
palace of a political process that has now crashed down on the
people of Sudan.''
I have noted on several occasions that Assistant Secretary
of State Phee seems to be--have aversions to sanctions as any
tool at any time for any purpose.
That is a problem because I do not know how else you
induce, especially to entities--to individuals like this to act
when you have--I do not know what you have to offer, at the end
of the day, what consequence they face.
Lastly, civil society seems to be cut out and disillusioned
activists have lost faith in the United States. That is all bad
news, none of which is responded to in any of the testimony
that we have heard here today.
Can you take a minute or so to talk to me about all of
that?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by saying that when the leader Hamdok was
thrown out in October of 2021, we did institute harsh penalties
against Sudan, which were controversial internally, given how
strong they were.
If you recall, after that move we designated the Central
Reserve Police. We also suspended all bilateral aid and debt
relief and support. There were questions internally whether
that was the right thing to do because, of course, some of that
has implications for the Sudanese people.
The goal of those moves, which were made on the Secretary's
watch and this Administration's watch, were to shock the
parties into getting serious about a broad framework for
transition. Thereafter, we supported the Sudanese's own
framework that emerged, which was led, largely, by the
civilians.
Now, you could ask the question whether there was a broad
enough community of civilians involved, but this was a process
designed by the Sudanese themselves and steadily used pressure
on the generals and the parties to try to work through all of
the issues getting back to a transition.
As I said to you, yes, we saw the generals keeping their
own options open. They did not put all of their forces into
garrison.
[Disturbance in the hearing room.]
Ms. Nuland. However, that structure did work through many
of the issues preparatory to a return to civilian rule. We were
left with one issue, which was whether these two generals would
integrate their forces because you cannot have one more--more
than one army in a country at a time.
There was incredible effort made, including by the
Secretary himself, to offer options for the two of them for how
these forces could be integrated various different ways not
just by us, but by the African Union, by our partners and
then--but, as I said, unfortunately, they chose the path of
war, not the path of integration. At various points during
these talks since October and onward, we have seen tensions
spike between these two generals.
At every previous point with our partners, with the
Sudanese civilians, we were able to tamp things down and get
them back to the table. That was not successful on April 15.
That said, throughout this period we had been warning
American citizens not to travel to Sudan. We had been
strengthening our own internal procedures should things get
violent again.
Look, it is a tragedy yet again. Can we get them--this
process restarted? We will see. Will it be the same process?
No, it will have to be broader, but that is where we are.
The Chairman. Yes. Well, look, I am going to close by
simply saying it seems to me that we need to have a process
that, number one, uses our intelligence--and the bureau at the
State Department is pretty good.
They have been on the mark sometimes better than some of
our other intelligence agencies and we need to red tag or red
team, however you might refer it, some of our presumptions
because you cannot work on everything that is going to be the
rosiest thing and then hope that it will turn out that way
buttressed by some hard work, but, nonetheless, you have to
have other availabilities to think through what is the process
of consequences that it does not work out as you aspire for it
to.
I am deeply concerned that we do that on more than one
occasion and we find ourselves with the consequences of not
doing so.
I think that is incredibly important for the Department to
internalize and to think about because I am deeply concerned
about the information that exists.
I know that I used to deal with Senator Coons as he was
trying to find a pathway forward and I was insisting on taking
care of the victims of terrorism.
Sanctions ended up proving the ability to get us there in
the right way, but for it I do not think that we would have
taken care of those victims.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I know you think the Chairman's
statement--some of them were kind of harsh--but I can assure
you that there is worse stuff out there than that. You have
probably read it yourself.
Let me say I do understand. I think everybody understands.
This is a very, very difficult situation, but I think it needs
more attention than what it is getting.
This morning Foreign Policy published an article called
``How the U.S. Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' written
by Robbie Gramer. Have you had a chance to review that?
Ms. Nuland. I have, Ranking Member.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that
for the record, please.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Risch. I think it is a good discussion of the
issues and the problems and how we got here. To be honest with
you, I do not see how we move forward with the current
situation the way it is in Sudan with two warring generals.
Now, most people agree that it is not a full blown civil
war at this point, but history tells us what is going to happen
and that is it is going to move towards a full blown civil war
and, of course, that country's in difficult enough straits.
Let me ask and, first of all--the Africa portfolio is a
tough portfolio. There is no question about that and there is
all kinds of stuff that has got to be done.
As you know, I have got staff that is focused on that and
they try to work with you as much as you will permit, but this
is an area that we have been focused on for some time and it is
just not working.
I guess the question I would have for you is have you got--
give me some hope here. I think sitting down with the two
generals, again, as we have done a number of times--we all look
back to the time when our envoys sat down with them and they
promised nothing was going to happen. On the airplane on the
way back they found out that they were conducting a coup.
This just--it seems to me that we have got to do things
different than what we are doing. Give me some hope here. What
are your thoughts about a bigger movement outside the box than
what we are talking about, sitting down again and saying, will
you guys be good guys? Oh, yeah, we will be good guys and
then--and then away we go. Give me some hope.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Ranking Member.
First of all, we cannot get anything done in Sudan. We
cannot even restore a process in which civilians are
participating until the violence stops and we get some aid and
so that is why these Jeddah talks are narrowly scoped and you
have to work with the guys with the guns.
The fact that both of them sent delegations, that was not
easy to get done either and we are, as I said, cautiously
optimistic that this first installment on getting humanitarian
support in will allow us to get going in coming days. Then the
ceasefire has to be more durable.
We have the sanctions tool now that can allow us to
continue to pressure them. Frankly, we agree that we are going
to have to have a broader process. It is going to have to
include more Sudanese voices.
When you have a population that is either largely displaced
or hiding in their houses, we are going to have to get to
enough peace to do that.
The Sudanese people are the bravest and strongest voices in
this. They do not want to live this way any further, and I
would say that under Ambassador Godfrey and with the support of
Assistant Secretary Phee we have far broader connectivity and
connection with voices throughout society who need to be part
of this.
Even from the talks in Jeddah, Ambassador Godfrey is
staying in contact with Sudanese civilians about how we would
move forward, make this tent bigger, support them with
international assistance as well as carrots and sticks if we
can get there.
I want to just go back, if I may, Chairman, to something
you said about the Africa Bureau. I oversee the African Bureau.
I take responsibility for this as well for Secretary Blinken.
This Sudan policy has been very difficult. I would say that
the debate within the bureau, the debate within the building,
the debate within the interagency, which I have participated in
many times, has been robust and difficult.
We have never taken any options off the table, but we were,
as I said, believing that this framework that the Sudanese
themselves put forward was making progress and we had the
sanctions at the ready if it was not, and then we had this
choice by the generals.
I just want you to know that this is a secretary who
supports rigorous debate inside the building and I support that
as well and, frankly, we have had it all the way through this
crisis.
Let me just underscore that and we will continue to. As you
know, he cares deeply about this one and is regularly bringing
people up to hear different views, including through the
dissent channel.
Senator Risch. Secretary, you, yourself, and the chairman
underscored and I did, too, about all the problems in Africa
and the difficulty there.
Has any consideration been given to getting an envoy or
somebody who is specifically focused on Sudan? We had that
before. We all know that the ambassador was out of the country
when the last blow up happened.
It just seems to me it needs more attention, more
individual attention, because as you have noted, you got a
whole lot on your plate and so do the other people that are
working in the--at the Africa desk. What are your thoughts on
that?
Ms. Nuland. We are obviously looking at all the options as
things move forward, but Ambassador Godfrey is central to all
of this.
Until we can get him back into Sudan, he will continue to
work both on the Sudan internal conversations and, as I said,
he is in contact with a broad cross section of folks on the
ground.
He is also likely to play a stronger role in some of the
regional diplomacy and global diplomacy that we need on Sudan.
That is how we are thinking about it at the moment.
As you know, our envoy for the Horn, Ambassador Hammer, has
been focused primarily on Ethiopia and the GERD, but he will
also play a reinforcing role as necessary on this, which is
within his mandate.
Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up. I am going to have
some more questions for the record. I hope that I do not have
to wait till the leaves turn to get an answer on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. Just a comment.
You mentioned civil society. Civil society does not feel
like they are in this. As a matter of fact they feel that the
two generals have dictated that they have to be out in order
for them to talk. That is fundamentally wrong.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. First, let me thank you for your service. I
want to follow up first on Senator Risch's point about our
capacity here.
The Khartoum mission has always been characterized as
historically difficult to staff so one of the challenges that
we have had is do we have adequate--did we have adequate
personnel in our missions in order to deal with these
challenges.
That is an issue I want to talk about generally, not
necessarily today, but we really do need to figure out how we
can staff these challenging missions with adequate resources to
have the attention we need to avoid conflicts.
I want to talk about the Americans that still are in Sudan.
We are--we understand that we were able to get those who serve
in our mission safely out of Sudan. There are many other
Americans that are in Sudan today.
Do we have an estimate of the numbers, particularly those
that are interested in leaving Sudan? The circumstances there
are certainly anything but certain as to what is going to
happen as far as safety. What is our game plan on helping
Americans?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, when the conflict began on
April 15, we had connectivity with about 5,000 Americans who
had registered with us in one form or another.
That enabled us to push out messages, I think, 12 times so
far about various options for leaving the country, traveling on
flights with allies, or this overland convoy. That is what
resulted in our being able to get about 1,300 of them out.
We are in contact with a number of them who are continuing
to weigh their options, but as we have Americans who are more
ready now than they were at the time that we were doing these
overland convoys to get out, we are giving them advice on
various ways that they can do that, routes that are considered
more safe.
Were we to have a critical mass, a larger number that
wanted to come out, we would look again at other options, but
at the moment our sense is that the majority of the Americans
who have stayed in Sudan have stayed for either reasons of
family or work or history. We are in contact with a large
number of them still.
Senator Cardin. Do we have an estimate as to how many
Americans are interested in leaving Sudan that are there today?
Ms. Nuland. When I asked this question of our consular folk
yesterday, they felt quite comfortable that as we are getting,
frankly, in small handfuls, people making a decision now to
come out who did not want to come out when a week or two ago we
are able to accommodate them on transit.
That situation changes every day as people evaluate their
personal situation and we will stay in touch.
Senator Cardin. The notifications that you are talking
about, could you just explain what notifications were given to
Americans, I guess, after April 15?
Ms. Nuland. As I said, first of all, just to lay the
predicate that the travel guidance to Americans has been since
October 21, that they should not travel to Sudan--if they do
travel to Sudan that they should register with the embassy.
We had about 5,000 Americans registered with the embassy,
as I said. That enabled us in a much more modern and efficient
way to send over 12 messages to them in the last 2 weeks
offering them various options. We use text. We use WhatsApp. We
use email. We use the contact information that they give us.
The registration form that we are now using asks for
multiple ways to contact including family at home, which has
allowed us to be more complete this time than we might have
been in the past.
Senator Cardin. It sounds like you are--have some
confidence that we can get information to those who want to
leave Sudan as to the opportunities that are available on
different options that you are in contact. Is that fair to say?
Ms. Nuland. That is absolutely right and, frankly, we
invite any of you who are hearing from constituents, et cetera,
about people who we have not captured by our system please send
them our way.
Senator Cardin. How confident--let me ask this, if I might,
to Ms. Charles. How confident are you about us being able to
get humanitarian assistance into Sudan? You mentioned about the
midwives, but do we have a network that is reliable to try to
get help in?
Ms. Charles. Currently, 19 of our 33 preexisting
humanitarian partners are operational in some capacity,
although at a much more limited capacity than they were.
We have a lot of supplies that are flowing into Port Sudan
right now, including more than 30,000 metric tons of U.S.-
sourced in-kind commodities that are in the--anchored in the
Suez right now and one of the key elements of those talks in
Jeddah right now is the kind of security arrangements that
would allow those supplies to come in and come in at scale and
be distributed in a way that is more reliable.
Even right now we have worked with our partners, authorized
our partners to use preexisting stocks in-country to respond
where they can.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Ambassador, for being here.
I want to talk about the Americans that were in Sudan, as
well. Help me understand, because it seems to me that once
again the Biden administration was caught flat-footed by the
events that were developing, similar to Afghanistan, that this
changed in a way that you did not anticipate, and what were the
steps you were taking--what plans you had in place to be able
to help Americans.
If I understand correctly, the fighting started on April
15. You evacuated our embassy on the 22nd, but the overland
route did not start until April 28 or 29th in that area.
Tell me--help me, because Britain evacuated 1,573 people by
air, France and Germany over 1,700 people by air, yet initially
we were told that the security situation made it so that it was
too dangerous to be able to evacuate Americans while other
nations were evacuating their people and then days later you
are organizing a ground convoy instead of an air convoy.
Did you not do contingency planning with regard to this?
Why did it take so long to be able to start evacuating
Americans out?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Ricketts, and good to see
you on this committee.
Let me break it down in time and space. As I said, first of
all, we had in place a broad warden system that captured about
5,000 Americans so we were able to push messages to them.
We initially, for those Americans who could get to the
airport, because one of the reasons that we did our first
embassy--our embassy evacuation at the embassy grounds was in
those days between the U.S. evacuation by helicopter and our
allies beginning to fly into the airport, the airport was too
dangerous.
By the time the airport was more safe--and I can talk to
you in another setting about how that was enabled with U.S.
support and help--we were able to put Americans who could get
to the airport on allied flights.
U.K., Germans, others began taking Americans who could get
to the airport, but a number of them still could not do that,
which is why we determined that arranging an alternate route
over land would provide another option not only for our
citizens, but for other countries.
As our allies began flying, enabled by us, I will say, we
also provided the second route for those who could not get to
the airport. Seven hundred over land by the land convoy, but in
total 1,300 Americans, some of them who took the allied
flights, some of them who took our land route.
Senator Ricketts. What I hear you saying, and correct me if
I am wrong, is that the news reports saying that while other
nations like France, Britain, Germany were able to evacuate
their citizens by air, the United States had coordinated with
them to evacuate people by air and we were going to take the
overland route and would take their citizens.
The media was really misstating what was going on, that we
had a plan here where they were going to do the air, we were
going to do the overland. Because the reports I read made it
seem like the United States had no plan to evacuate people by
air and that we did this overland route that happened on April
28 or 29th, much--almost 2 weeks after the fighting started.
Is that accurate that you were actually--the media got it
all wrong and what is going on here is America did--took the
overland route and the other allies took Americans out through
the air route? Is that what you are saying is what happened?
Ms. Nuland. Yes. It was a division of labor, if I may say,
after--when the airport first opened where allies were doing
the flying, Americans were going on those flights if they could
get to the airport----
Senator Ricketts. About how many were----
Ms. Nuland. --and we were doing the land route and both we
and allies were getting----
Senator Ricketts. How about--about how many Americans went
out on the flights?
Ms. Nuland. If you do the math, we got 1,300 Americans out
and 700 whereby--I do not know how many. More Americans got out
on allied flights, I think, than got out on the land route
because the math would lead to that. Probably 700 Americans got
out on allied flights and we are grateful to them for that.
Senator Ricketts. Now, was this a plan in place that you
had prior to April 15 working with the allied nations? Had you
done contingency planning that if the generals started fighting
here is what we were going to do to evacuate Americans?
Ms. Nuland. We do continual planning with our allies and
partners, largely, based at our military commands--and we can
do a classified briefing for you if that would be helpful--for
all high-threat posts and various contingencies.
With regard to this decision on the division of labor, it
had to do with various concerns about who was best positioned
to do what at the time and it was negotiated and arranged in
real time at AFRICOM in Djibouti as well as in AFRICOM and
Stuttgart with our allies.
Senator Ricketts. Okay. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Chairman, thanks.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chair Menendez and Ranking Member
Risch, and thank you for the full committee's attention to this
difficult, urgent challenge.
Under Secretary Nuland, Assistant to the Administrator
Charles, thank you for your testimony and your focus on this, a
vast country the size of Alaska with 45 million people that is
teetering on the brink of an all-out civil war.
We could be on the verge of a dramatic large-scale
humanitarian crisis or we could, depending on the outcome of
these tense preliminary negotiations in Jeddah, see a turning
back towards some hope for stability.
As you know, I worked hard with other members of this
committee. Senator Van Hollen and I went to Khartoum to meet
with the then civilian-led government and Prime Minister Hamdok
and to urge General Burhan and others to continue supporting a
transition of a civilian government.
A subsequent coup and then a very difficult period of
negotiations has left us in a place of real, I think,
difficulty and desperation.
We cannot allow the civilian leadership of the groups that
led the brave uprising that overthrew Omar Al-Bashir to be
shoved aside and I appreciate, Under Secretary, your early
comment that we need a broader process and we need to implement
the President's Executive order.
Help me understand how we will do both of these. How do we
engage the civilian leadership and empower them in the next
step of this process and would you welcome legislative action
here to give you more tools to target individual sanctions?
I respect that the Administration took tough actions in
terms of suspending bilateral aid, suspending debt relief, and
I think that had real impact on leaders.
There are critics who say that in the absence of targeted
individual sanctions there is the continuation of a sense of
impunity that in some ways came from Omar Al-Bashir never being
successfully prosecuted by the ICC and decades of widespread
corruption and oppression.
I introduced the Sudan Democracy Act last year to reflect
the urgent need to hold these military leaders accountable.
Would you support legislation at this point or welcome
additional support for sanctions and how do we broaden this
process?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Coons, let me first start by thanking
you for your indefatigable personal diplomacy on our hardest
challenges in Africa, including your willingness with Senator
Van Hollen to roll up your sleeves and get to Sudan and talk to
the generals. It makes a difference and we appreciate the
partnership that we have on that.
Let me say that we have got to get to a situation where we
can engage the civilians again. Can we do that? Do we have to
wait till we can do that from Khartoum?
Can we begin assuming we can do the most urgent, which is
get the humanitarian aid in and silence or lessen the guns? Can
we start to do that in a more 21st century way with video
meetings, et cetera? I think that remains to be seen.
I do know, as I said at the beginning, that Ambassador
Godfrey is trying to cast even as he works the talks in Jeddah
as wide a net to see what people are wanting.
This has to be a process that is broadly representative of
the desires of the people of Sudan and the 2019 revolution, but
we welcome thoughts you have there.
We are beginning--we are doing the work. We had done it
already, but now that we have the Executive order we are doing
the work to look at appropriate targets in various categories,
particularly if we cannot get these generals to allow the
humanitarian aid in and put their guns down.
With regard to legislation, let me get a little bit more
information from our negotiators after this round is over and
come back to you, if we may.
Senator Coons. We will look forward to prompt input.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
Senator Coons. I do think--I understand in this moment
focusing on the commanders of these two armed forces that are
battling it out literally in the streets of Khartoum, but we
have to be able to find a way to include in this conversation
not just regional actors, but the Sudanese people themselves
and their legitimate leaders.
If I might, because I have just a few moments, Assistant to
the Administrator Charles, do you have the resources you need?
I am concerned about the looting of humanitarian
storehouses, about the deaths of humanitarian workers. Many of
your partners, our partners, are still willing to take on this
very difficult and dangerous duty.
What additional resources and support do you need and are
we doing enough to ask our regional and global partners to also
be engaged, given the scale of the humanitarian need in other
crises around the region and the world?
Ms. Charles. Many competing needs right now around the
globe and our ability to sustain a robust response in Sudan is
going to be very challenged.
Even before this crisis, last year we knew that Sudan was
one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to Russia's
war in Ukraine because of how dependent it was on wheat imports
and so we had already tried to scale up our assistance in Sudan
and it was already going to be hard to sustain that this year,
given competing demands.
We are definitely pressing other donors. We were pleased to
see the Saudis announce $100 million last week, but we want to
see that delivered to partners that can actually deliver on the
ground.
Senator Coons. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to touch
on something that has been quite disturbing to me.
On January 20, 2021, this Administration was presented with
a great opportunity. Sudan had just become party to the Abraham
Accords.
The Abraham Accords presented an opportunity to develop the
economy of Sudan in a new way. There was an opportunity there
to expand the economic opportunities for the people of Sudan
and to stabilize the region.
For months, the Biden administration would not even refer
to the term or use the term Abraham Accords. On May of 2021--
May 18, 2021, then White House press secretary Jen Psaki
demonstrated the contempt that the White House had for the
Abraham Accords when she told reporters the following, and I
want to quote this: ``Aside from putting together a peace
proposal that was dead on arrival, we do not think they,''
meaning the prior administration, ``did anything constructive
to really bring an end to the longstanding conflict in the
Middle East.''
That is why I sent President Biden a letter on May 19,
2021, and I asked him to confirm whether he even supported the
Abraham Accords.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to present this letter for the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What is worse, though, is that we recently saw China
advance what I would call an anti-Abraham Accords deal when you
had the chief diplomat of China negotiate a deal in the Middle
East between Saudi Arabia and its adversary, Iran.
What I would have much preferred to have seen happen would
have been to see our own Secretary of State negotiating a deal
between Saudi Arabia and Israel furthering the Abraham Accords.
I think we have missed a huge opportunity.
Let us turn to the American citizens in Sudan right now. So
far, Ambassador Nuland, at least two American citizens have
already been killed. The intelligence community assesses that
the conflict is likely to be protracted, and they are saying
little prospect for negotiation.
Senator Cardin and I just sent a private letter to
Secretary Blinken urging the Department to take all necessary
steps to protect the lives of U.S. persons that remain in
Sudan, particularly as the security situation deteriorates.
I would like to go back to the conversation you had with
Senator Ricketts just a minute ago. When I served as U.S.
Ambassador to Japan, I understood very clearly the State
Department's foremost responsibility is the safety and security
of the American citizens in the nation.
Where I was serving and as ambassador there, I worked very
closely with both civilian and military leaders to revise and
update the plan that I needed to be in a position to evacuate
over 60,000 American citizens should that need arise.
Secretary Nuland, under what conditions would the Biden
administration implement the civilian evacuation plan--the
noncombatant evacuation operational plan in Sudan to bring the
remaining American citizens that are home in Sudan?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Hagerty, just to--we did talk about
this a little bit before you were able to join us. We had in
total 5,000 Americans registered with the embassy. We were able
throughout this conflict to push repeated messages to them
requesting information about who wanted to leave.
About half of them left on allied aircraft. The other half
left on--who wanted to go--some 1,300 total left on ground
transport that we organized.
We are in touch on a weekly basis, daily basis, with those
who remained for a variety of reasons that you know well, mixed
families----
Senator Hagerty. Yes.
Ms. Nuland. --lives built in Sudan.
Senator Hagerty. I heard that conversation with Senator
Ricketts, but what I am asking specifically is that
communication--is this process part of the NEO plan that has
been designed?
Ms. Nuland. Yes. Yes.
Senator Hagerty. Do you have a NEO plan in place?
Ms. Nuland. Of course.
Senator Hagerty. Are you prepared to exercise that plan
further and are you--do have the resources and the necessary
capabilities to do that if it is necessary to go in and get the
remaining American citizens out who want--again, who, as you
say, desire to leave?
Ms. Nuland. As we evaluate the options for Americans and we
are continuing to get out Americans who want to go, if there is
a critical mass, we will evaluate whether we need to do more.
Senator Hagerty. I think it is just absolutely critical
that we be prepared to execute this. After seeing what happened
in Afghanistan I think the American public was shocked.
We do not want to see another failure like this and I think
we are hearing--my office is hearing a great deal of concern
about the American citizens that are left behind.
Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. I would also, Senator, invite you if you have
particular Americans you are concerned about, please send them
our way and we will work with them.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Madam
Under Secretary, great to see you and it is great to have you
and our key representatives from USAID here today, and thank
you for your efforts both to provide much-needed humanitarian
assistance as well as try to make the ceasefire hold so we can
build on that.
I do want to start by thanking you and your colleagues at
the State Department, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee as well as
the folks at the Consular Affairs divisions for helping get
Americans out who wanted to get out, including every Marylander
who has contacted our office who wanted to exit Sudan or have
their relatives get out of Sudan, including an 89-year-old who
escaped through the Egyptian border crossing.
I want to thank you because everyone we have heard from has
been listened to and had their needs met.
Let me just turn to the current state of the peace--well,
the ceasefire negotiations. If you could talk a little bit more
about the role of the UAE and Saudi Arabia here.
I understand that Senator Coons referenced a trip that we
took to Sudan in 2021 where we met with many of these players.
I know there will be more time to evaluate this as we go
forward, but my takeaway from that trip, which we shared from--
shared with folks at the State Department is that we probably
should have made a choice then to isolate Hemedti.
That is my view. He is a war criminal. We know about his
history in Darfur, and the fact that he was able to continue to
assemble his power base in Sudan, which was already
considerable I think has contributed to the situation we are
here now.
Not that that would have been easy. It would have been
hard, but I think we have seen what happened when he continued
to play the role he has.
Can you talk about the way forward? Then, if you could also
address the potential challenges in neighboring Ethiopia. We
have a very fragile peace in Ethiopia.
Obviously, there are some territorial disputes between
Sudan and Ethiopia and we need to be doing everything we can to
make sure that the conflict in Sudan does not make the
situation even worse in Ethiopia. If you could address those
questions.
Ms. Nuland. First, Senator Van Hollen, it is great to hear
that the consular system worked for your constituents and
Marylanders. Very good to hear. We welcome any improvements,
comments, that you have about that system, going forward, or
any of the other members of this committee.
Second, you missed our shout-out to your diplomacy along
with Senator Coons, which really made a big difference, your
willingness to roll up your sleeves and talk to these
difficult, difficult actors.
In this particular round in Jeddah, first of all, the
Saudis are acting as hosts and have been instrumental to
getting conversation at least going between these warring
parties.
Without that it might not have happened at all. I will say
that although as you know better than many the regional
players, including the UAE, have their own economic interests
and long-term ties to various parts of this, the UAE has been
very constructive in this effort to get parties to Jeddah, to
get the guns stopped, and to get these humanitarian routes
going and they have actually been pressuring both sides and
sending strong messages.
We look forward to that continuing, going forward, and to
staying and--because it is going to take everybody to press on
everybody.
With regard to Ethiopia, I think you talked to Secretary
Blinken after he came back from his trip and we have had
progress, as you know, implementing key elements of the
November cessation of hostilities agreement, the COHA,
including formation of the Tigray interim regional
administration, withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and concurrent
DPLF disarmament, the positive role that the African Union's
monitoring mission is playing.
I will say, back on Sudan, we are working with the African
Union on what we hope will be a large support and convening
function that they will play if we can get to these larger
talks that we talked about.
These initial elements are beginning to show--to bear
fruit. Obviously, we have got continuing difficulties with some
parts of Sudan--with Ethiopia.
We have got to ensure that the Government of Ethiopia
continues to fulfill its commitment for unhindered access to
humanitarian actors for accountability, that it continues to
meet its commitment for real justice, that journalists have
safe access, that we continue to see good conversations with
other constituent parts of Ethiopia and that is what we are
working on and we appreciate your support for all of that.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I hope we can--look, I think
we are all incredibly disappointed that the hopes for democracy
in Sudan have been hijacked here and I know we all share the
goal of trying to get it back on track, but we should look at
some of the lessons learned for why it did not happen the way
we wanted the first time.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of the witnesses for being here today
and, Ms. Charles, good see you from South Carolina. I wish it
was under different circumstances, but certainly always happy
to see a South Carolinian representing our nation.
It has been nearly a month since the outbreak of the
hostilities in Sudan. Since then, we have seen ceasefire after
ceasefire fail. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes.
Nearly 600 have been killed, 5,000 injured, figures that are
likely underrepresented.
Hospitals have been attacked. Medical care is scarce.
Access to food and water is quickly running out. In a country
plagued with sectarian strife and humanitarian crises, the
situation seems to be only getting worse.
All of this is the direct result of two selfish men and
their desire to keep power, really, at all costs it seems to
me, at the expense of their own people, propped up by in part
the inadequacy of the U.S. policy.
Apart from the loss of civilian lives, I am greatly
concerned about the risk that further instability in Sudan can
cause to regions beyond it. I will start with the easy
question.
Ms. Nuland, how did we get where we are and how do we bring
the conflict to an end, particularly not with one strongman,
two strongmen who overthrew the powers that were?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Without going back through decades of tragic history in
Sudan, I will start with where we were after Hamdok was ousted
and our efforts with our international partners to support the
Sudanese people in creating a larger process that included more
Sudanese civil society, more of their civilian voices in this
framework arrangement for a transition which was painfully
negotiated among them, and then months and months of effort
which was, we felt, bearing real fruit to get to that
democratic transition, particularly in the fall and throughout
the winter.
We were, as I said earlier in this hearing, down to
literally one issue, the one that you identified, whether these
two generals would agree to unify their forces and we were in
the process of offering various options for how that could
happen, along with our international partners.
We were concerned because tensions between them would flare
on and off, and then we had the very disappointing choice on
April 15 for them to pick up their guns rather than continue
with the talks and that is how we got where we are.
What are we doing now? We are, first and foremost, focused
on trying to get them to put those guns down long enough and
well enough so that Assistant Secretary Charles and colleagues
can get serious humanitarian aid in.
We are now on our sixth, seventh short-term ceasefire,
which is a direct result of the international pressure that
everybody is putting on them, including more than 12 phone
calls to the parties by Secretary Blinken himself.
What we are trying to get done in Jeddah now is to
negotiate a declaration of commitment to protect the civilians
of Sudan that would be agreed by both of the warring parties to
open corridors and follow humanitarian principles on the ground
in Sudan. That is stage one.
Stage two would then be to try to make the ceasefire
enduring and stage three would be to get back to a civilian-led
process probably with a broader contingent of civilians
involved than we had the last time.
It is extremely difficult, as you noted.
Senator Scott. Yes, ma'am.
Quick thought on evacuation plans for Americans and the
challenges that we seem to face. I would say if you look at the
fact that France was able to evacuate 500 people in the first
48 hours, Germany about 700 people, China about 2,000, all
before the U.S. even started to support the evacuation efforts
of American citizens, my thought is why and the second is, as I
think about the South Carolinians in Khartoum who have been
calling my office asking for assistance, there seems to be no
actual plan that they have received from the State Department.
I would love to hear what happens next and how do we do a
better job of helping our American citizens who want to leave.
Ms. Nuland. After the initial evacuation of the embassy----
Senator Scott. Yes.
Ms. Nuland. --we were able to support our allies in
establishing a beachhead at the airport. More than half of the
Americans who got out--as we have determined through the math
at this hearing, we got 1,300 Americans out altogether. More
than half of them went on those allied flights in the first few
days.
While we were working in a division of labor, if you will,
on the land routes, which were--we were able to get another 700
people out through the land routes, including some of our
allies in exchange, we are continuing to give advice to the--
any remaining Americans.
Sometimes at the beginning of an evacuation people are not
ready or they are not sure about their family circumstances. We
have continuing advice to other--to Americans who want to come
out now.
If you have constituents, please send them to us and we
will work on it.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thanks to both the witnesses and thanks to
the chairman for holding a full committee on this.
I have obviously gathered a lot from listening to my
colleagues. I just want to--obviously, there is multiple fronts
to this effort in terms of America. One is we have heard a lot
about getting American citizens out. I have talked to Jake
Sullivan and others and been working with offices.
Another front is obviously trying to cease hostilities and
these prenegotiations in Jeddah are so critical and then,
finally, helping civil society, which was talked about
extensively, and finding a way not only to deal with the
current crises that are going on threatening civilians,
displacing internal persons, people fleeing to other unstable
countries like Chad and Ethiopia are a crisis, and this is a
day-to-day changing, the reports I am trying to stay up with
from the Congressional Research Service and more.
I want to drill down on a couple themes within those three
areas I talked about. The first is the still challenging
bureaucracy of getting aid into the country, which is really
frustrating when you think about things being held up at the
Port of Sudan, critical supplies, who are the controlling
government entities on the ground right now, the Humanitarian
Aid Commission and more.
Then is there an opportunity to more center civilians in
this larger negotiations that are going on? Because clearly in
Jeddah, the two parties are the warring generals, but the
desire here is for civilian society to begin to be elevated and
the democratic governance to be empowered for the future, as
well.
Ms. Charles. On a personal note, early in my career I
helped start up the Darfur response for one of our humanitarian
partners nearly 20 years ago.
I have been dealing with the HAC--the Humanitarian Affairs
Commission--in Sudan off and on for almost two decades now and
their behavior is egregious even under the best of
circumstances and particularly now.
We have been pressing both in the discussions in Jeddah,
but also in bilateral conversations, including with the embassy
here and others, on the need to lift those bureaucratic
restrictions.
It is egregious to have goods held up in customs and
clearance processes in Port Sudan or have our partners feel
like they have to go to the HAC for permission to draw on
prepositioned supplies.
We are actively working those issues and they continue to
be a top priority. We have seen some of the food that we were
bringing into port Sudan just cleared in the last couple of
days. We have some small progress there, but it is something
that we are certainly staying very much on top of.
Ms. Nuland. Just to say that the humanitarian declaration
of commitment to protect civilians in Sudan that we are working
on in Jeddah embeds in it some of these basic humanitarian
principles that have undergirded the work Assistant Secretary
Charles has done her whole life, but that the Sudanese actors
need to enforce. We will see how that concludes.
With regard to where we go on broadening that initial
framework, I think we agree completely that it is going to have
to be broader. I will say, and I think you have been involved
in this some as well, that we have not limited our own
engagement in terms of how to move the transition forward just
to those who are participants in the framework.
Ambassador Godfrey has really broadened our outreach to the
NGO community, to different aspects of civil society. The
Secretary has had some of those folks into his office. I had a
group of civil society folks in my office.
I think the question is going to be when we--if we have
that good news that we get beyond put down the guns, get a
ceasefire, get the food in, to get back to framework I think
the question is going to be how to structure it so it is
sufficiently broad to capture the various views and ideas, but
not so broad that it becomes unwieldy.
Senator Booker. Obviously, this is a colossal breakdown
here, a failure, in a sense, of democracy to take root and it
means that we have to reevaluate all of our actions and roles
that we have played and try things differently.
I know those conversations are going on. I know that we see
vulnerable citizens--armed militias once again targeted
refugees in Darfur. There are so many crises and fronts to
this.
I want to just get in the last seconds I have a little bit
more input from you because I know that you are--my
understanding, at least, is that you are the chair of a working
group on Wagner and overall and so, clearly, there are
operations going on there.
A large percentage, around 70 percent, of the gold that is
being exported is going to Russia. We know what is going on the
ground. I wonder if in the final seconds can you give me some
insights into the Wagner Group and how are we countering what
is going on. They are really destabilizing efforts in the
region.
Ms. Nuland. As you know, Senator Booker, and as you said,
Wagner plays a malign role no matter where it shows up and in
Africa, whether it is in Sudan, whether it is in Central
African Republic, whether it is across the Sahel, it has
brought nothing, but more violence, a looting of the
sovereignty and the wealth of these countries, and we are
working with multiple countries across Africa to help them,
many of whom have buyer's remorse now that they invited Wagner
in at all.
We can talk to in a more secure setting on some of our
efforts there, everything from countering disinformation to
offering better options in terms of security, et cetera, to
disrupting the supply chain of Wagner weapons in and gold and
other things out.
We are working intensively also with other partners in the
gold supply chain including UAE on these problems, but you are
absolutely right. Prigozhin has brought nothing good to Sudan
and he is strip mining the country of its gold and its future.
Senator Booker. My time is expired. I just want to say--
first of all, I want to take either you and knowing how many
demands on their time someone on--sitting in a classified
setting having this conversation because the scope of the
Wagner's operations, I just saw Facebook shutting down 100+
accounts.
They are working on so many different fronts in the African
venue context that is so disturbing, and I would like to better
understand our efforts to counter their malign activities.
Ms. Nuland. Good. We will look forward to that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me ask you some final questions. I know that the May 4
Executive order on Sudan issued by the President, but there was
also an Executive order issued related to the conflict in
Ethiopia that was never fully utilized.
Not a single Ethiopian was designated under the Executive
order even though 800,000 people are estimated to have died as
a result of the conflict in northern Ethiopia.
Sanctions are only effective if used as part of a well
thought out strategy to obtain specific policy goals and aims.
Does the Administration have a strategy to use targeted
sanctions to obtain the outcomes we are seeking? Will we use
targeted sanctions to pressure the parties in Jeddah to come to
an agreement?
Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I think you have seen around the
world the Administration's commitment to using sanctions
including on a subject that we work on a lot together, the--
Russia's war in Ukraine.
I would argue that the fact of the Executive order on May 4
that we gave ourselves this tool was--had an effect on the
parties being willing to come to Jeddah. As I said, we are
working on how that Executive order could be populated with
names, depending upon how the talks go.
We have done the same in Ethiopia and I would argue that
just having the Executive order played a good role in getting
us to the better place we are in Ethiopia.
The Chairman. Are there packages that deploy--or packages
that are ready to be deployed if you make that decision?
Ms. Nuland. There are. There are.
The Chairman. Well, do we have any diplomatic outreach to
allies and partners to join us in imposing sanctions if we, in
fact, decide to do so?
Ms. Nuland. Yes. The Secretary and Assistant Secretary Phee
and I have all been involved in ensuring that if we go in that
direction we do not go there alone.
The Chairman. Now, I want to refer back to Senator Risch's
remarks about a special envoy for Sudan and that call has a
growing chorus of voices.
Our current special envoy for the Horn of Africa, unlike
his predecessors, does not cover Sudan nor does he directly
report to the President or the Secretary of State. What is the
Administration's position on the special envoy that reports
directly to the President or Secretary of State?
Ms. Nuland. Chairman, at the current moment, particularly
since he is now outside Sudan and not running a massive
embassy, we are deploying Ambassador Godfrey not just to
maintain broad contacts with Sudanese and participate in these
talks in Jeddah and any onward talks, we also anticipate using
him to maintain tight links to regional partners to the global
coalition we will need on this, including working intensively
now with the African Union, although having Steph Sullivan
confirmed would be even augmenting of that.
There are pieces of this Sudan work that Mike Hammer, our
Ethiopia envoy, has been helpful in and he will continue to be
helpful and we will call on him if we need----
The Chairman. In other words, you do not support--the
Department does not support a special envoy, as I hear all your
answers there around the edges, but not onto my question.
Ms. Nuland. At the moment we see Ambassador Godfrey as that
envoy.
The Chairman. Is he really going to do all this shuttle
diplomacy that you are talking about?
Ms. Nuland. He will if we need to. Yes.
The Chairman. Of course, he reports to Molly Phee?
Ms. Nuland. He does.
The Chairman. Yes. It just seems to many of us that given
the stakes in the region that we urgently need a high-level
representative to deal with interlocutors in Africa, the Gulf,
in Europe, and one who reports directly to the President or the
Secretary of State, and while you are here please take that
back to the Department.
I intend to press it at various different levels, but I
think it is incredibly important.
Senator Risch. I want to concur in that.
The Chairman. Senator Risch is joining me in that regard.
He raised it originally.
Finally, Ms. Charles, I have heard some of your answers.
Secretary General Guterres of the U.N. said in mid-April that
the humanitarian situation in Sudan was already precarious, now
a catastrophe.
I hear that you have set up a DART team in Nairobi, but if
a 5-day humanitarian ceasefire is agreed, are organizations
ready to move into assistance to Sudan and deliver it to the
conflict-affected areas?
Ms. Charles. Our partners are already gearing up and, in
fact, many are trying to send more staff into Sudan right now,
which is part of the reason why we are pressing on things like
waivers of visas.
They are also bringing supplies into Port Sudan. The key is
really to have sufficient security to move those supplies from
Port Sudan and then to distribute them where they are most
needed, both inside of Khartoum and Darfur and Northern
Kordofan where we are seeing the fighting.
The Chairman. What does that security entail? Who would
provide it?
Ms. Charles. It is really having the assurances from the
parties that they will respect that access.
The Chairman. Now, given the urgency of the situation, what
happens if we do not get this humanitarian ceasefire? Is there
any way to deliver humanitarian assistance in Sudan if talks in
Jeddah fail?
Ms. Charles. Even right now we are working with our
partners to very quickly use what is already in Sudan and also
pursue all available routes including from neighboring
countries to bring supplies in to try and diversify where
supplies would be coming in from, not be so reliant on just a
Port Sudan to Khartoum route.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, but the Sudan humanitarian
response is already severely underfunded. It just received
about 14 percent of the required funding before the current
crisis.
What actions are we undertaking to galvanize financial
contributions from international partners in order to be able
to meet the challenge, assuming that we have the wherewithal to
do so?
Ms. Charles. Yes. It was already underfunded. We were
funding the majority of that humanitarian response plan. We
have been pleased to see the Saudis make an announcement of
$100 million pledge.
We want to see that actually delivered to actors on the
ground who can responsibly deliver that assistance. We are
certainly pressing others. We have seen indications from the
Canadians, from the European Union as well, that they will put
support behind this, but we have really seen particularly from
the Gulf, I will say, a stepping away from humanitarian
assistance and particularly in their neighborhood we would love
to see them step up in a more----
The Chairman. Now, many of the international staff of aid
organizations evacuated Khartoum so we may not be able to, even
if the opportunity or the window gets open, to rely upon our
traditional partners to reach beneficiaries.
Are we supporting Sudanese organizations that may be able
to--have, in fact, given the opportunity, be able to do that?
Ms. Charles. Yes. Among our partners are 30 Sudanese local
NGOs that are either direct or more often indirect partners of
ours.
We have been in close contact with them, not just our
international partners. Even our international partners, most
of their Sudanese staff are still in-country albeit many of
them have relocated to other areas and they are reconstituting,
and we are working with them again to kind of reconstitute as
quickly as possible and get them the resources they need.
The Chairman. One of the consequences--this is always true.
This is true in the Western Hemisphere as it is in Sudan. That
if we cannot come to a successful conclusion here, up to a
million Sudanese may very well be on the move and seek refuge.
That already has a growing reality on the borders of Egypt.
What is your assessment of Egypt's willingness and capacity
to process a large number of refugees over its border with
Sudan?
Ms. Charles. I can let Under Secretary Nuland speak more
generally about Egypt.
The Chairman. I really thought it was her bailiwick, so to
speak, but if you have insights I am happy to hear that, too.
Ms. Nuland. Do you want to start and I will do the
broader--yes.
Ms. Charles. We certainly have been pressing with
colleagues at the State Department for the Egyptians to allow
international organizations, particularly UNHCR and IOM, to the
border.
Those missions moved for the first time just 4 or 5 days
ago so we have seen some progress on that front. We would also
like to see the opening of kind of a land route from Egypt into
Sudan so that we can address conditions on the Sudanese side of
that border as well.
Ms. Nuland. Just to complement that, we have about 70,000
Sudanese who have already--and third country nationals who have
already arrived in Egypt. Egypt, as you know, is not the
richest country on the planet, so looking at how to encourage
support there and international support for Egypt.
We are also talking to Chad, who is beginning to see its
own stream of refugees and to ensure that the Egyptian Red
Crescent on the border is doing as much as it can, that the
crossing points are open and easy to maneuver.
As Assistant Secretary Charles just said, the first problem
was getting U.N. and IO humanitarian access to the border. That
has now happened. It is something that we are watching and
working on.
The Chairman. Well, this is a challenge of conflict. We see
it in the Western Hemisphere. We have 20 million people who are
displaced in the Southern Hemisphere or they are seeking
refugee status or they are seeking asylum or they are just
simply displaced, and if they cannot be assimilated in the
countries that they have moved to then they will march north.
In this case, they will march elsewhere.
Thinking about that in advance as a reality, a real
possibility--hopefully, not a reality--is going to be critical.
Otherwise, we will then again deal with the aftermath and not
be prepared for the aftermath instead of thinking about it
proactively. I urge you both to look at that.
Let me thank both of our witnesses for appearing before the
committee to discuss the crisis in Sudan. It is obviously an
extremely volatile situation.
We urgently need to use all available tools to put an end
to the fighting, chart a new path forward towards a civilian-
led democracy. Given how rapidly events are changing on the
ground, I urge both of your departments and agencies to
continue to keep the committee apprised of your actions.
The record of the hearing will remain open until the close
of business on Friday, May 12. Please ensure that questions for
the record are submitted no later than that date and let us
hope that we can get an expeditious response to them.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. In the days leading up to the outbreak of hostilities,
media was reporting on troop movements in and around Khartoum and of
rising tensions between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed
Forces. The security situation was clearly becoming more and more
precarious, yet the embassy took no action in response. Why was it that
the embassy did not authorize or order departure of staff, or bring in
additional marines, security personnel, and emergency consular teams to
assist American citizens to depart before the violence began, and what
is being done to ensure this type of analytic failure doesn't put lives
at risk in the future?
Answer. Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
thoroughly considered adjustments to its security posture in regular
EAC meetings, including on April 13, 2023, 2 days before fighting
began. The EAC advised against travel to Karima, Northern State, and
prohibited travel outside of Khartoum for U.S. Government staff and
family members. The Embassy shared this guidance with private U.S.
citizens in an April 13 security alert. The embassy was also in touch
with the U.S. military in Djibouti and Diplomatic Security on
assistance that could be required.
Question. Can you explain why it took so long for the United States
to organize evacuations for American citizens trapped in Khartoum after
hostilities commenced, when other countries--including Germany, France,
the Netherlands, the UK, China, and Saudi Arabia, to name a few--were
able to organize evacuations for their nationals earlier?
Answer. In the initial days of the conflict, the airport in
Khartoum and Wadi Seidna airfield were not viable options for safe
evacuation. Any attempt to have U.S. citizens depart Khartoum then from
the airport could have resulted in casualties. Following those initial
days, a ceasefire extension enabled the United States, our allies, and
partners to undertake departure operations. Our allies did make space
available on their flights for U.S. passport holders out of Sudan as
early as April 23. We encouraged U.S. citizens to avail themselves of
those flights if they felt it was safe to do so, and a number did.
Question. Sudanese stakeholders have sharply criticized the
structure of the negotiations that were meant to lead to a civilian
transition. In their view, placing a military junta with an established
record of human rights abuses at the center of efforts to restore
civilian rule, failing to call the October 2021 coup a coup, and not
pressing for accountability through sanctions--for either the coup or
the use of deadly force on those protesting the coup--contributed to
the marginalization of civilian groups that were on the front lines of
the Sudanese struggle for democracy. Are we using the same failed
methodology--privileging engagement with those with guns over those
without them--and expecting a different result?
Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process
to establish a civilian-led transitional government that would lead
Sudan through a transition culminating in democratic elections. Our
approach emphasized the need for the military to relinquish political
control and operate under the direction of a civilian-led government
with a focus on protecting the people of Sudan and the country's
borders. Sudan's civilian leaders sought to achieve this via
negotiations, which require us to engage both civilians and Sudanese
military leaders.
Question. What is our plan to engage Sudanese civil society more
broadly, moving forward and what about our allies and partners in the
international community--when and how do we expect them to participate
in efforts to reach a political agreement?
Answer. We are engaging Sudanese civilian leaders, Resistance
Committees (RCs), and civil society to work toward the shared goal of
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as
possible, and to harmonize civilian and international assistance
efforts. We will support efforts to advance a political process that is
led by an inclusive coalition of Sudanese civilians--involving women,
the representatives from outlying regions of Sudan, civil society, RCs,
and political parties. We are also engaging our allies and partners to
coordinate civilian engagement efforts, including through the African
Union Expanded Mechanism.
Question. How do we ensure that Saudi Arabia, and other partners,
continue to play a constructive role in what will inevitably be a long
and complicated road toward resumption of a political process?
Answer. We are closely consulting with regional and other partners
on the situation in Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
have been crucial partners in our diplomatic efforts and with
evacuation logistical support. We are also supporting international
diplomatic efforts by the African Union, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development, League of Arab States, United Nations, and
other partners from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to
immediately end the violence.
Question. You noted that sanctions packages are ready, and that the
Administration had reached out to allied and partners to join us in
imposing sanctions. You also said that the threat of sanctions had been
instrumental with regards to Ethiopia; however that agreement took an
additional year to achieve during which thousands suffered and died.
What will be the trigger or triggers for imposing sanctions under the
E.O.?
Answer. Secretary Blinken stated that ``If the cease-fire is
violated, we'll know,'' and that we will promote accountability for the
violators through sanctions and other means. On June 1, the Department
of Treasury added four companies, two affiliated with the SAF and two
with the RSF, to the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) List. We also amended the Sudan Business
Advisory that determine that Sudanese gold is conflict affected, and
imposed visa restrictions on officials from the SAF, RSF, and leaders
from the former Omar al-Bashir regime, responsible for, or complicit
in, undermining Sudan's democratic transition.
Question. What is the specific strategy? Please discuss the
outcomes that have been identified and how the imposition of specific
sanctions will be tied to achieving those outcomes.
Answer. Our immediate objective in issuing sanctions designations
is to change behavior and undermine the ability of the warring parties
to sustain this conflict. Our first tranche of designations on June 1
of four major companies owned by the SAF and RSF advanced that
objective. We stand ready to pursue additional measures to further
undermine their financial networks to compel the two sides to cease
hostilities, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and accept a
civilian government and a resumption of Sudan's democratic transition.
We adjourned the Jeddah Talks on June 21 because of frequent ceasefire
violations; we stand ready to resume talks only but only once the
parties demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations.
Question. Which partners have agreed to join us in imposing
sanctions?
Answer. We will continue to engage our G7, regional, and Gulf
partners to sanction the four companies designated by the U.S. on June
1 and assist in sanctions enforcement, and to take other complementary
steps to put pressure on the parties to stop fighting. They have not
yet made any designations.
Question. What types of sanctions will they impose, and do we have
agreement on the triggers for sanctions?
Answer. We cannot speculate on specific measures other countries
may deploy. We continue to coordinate with our G7 partners on
sanctions.
______
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. When do we expect to convene international partners to
begin to obtain resources to respond to the growing humanitarian need
in Sudan and surrounding countries?
Answer. We have met with core donor counterparts to discuss their
plans to respond to the growing humanitarian needs in Sudan and the
surrounding countries. We understand that a larger donor pledging
conference might convene in June, though details are yet undetermined.
As of May 8, the 2023 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan is 15.4 percent
funded; it has received $268.3 million of the $1.48 billion requested.
Question. What are we doing to support those engaged in the
democratic transition process and peace building activities throughout
the country in the wake of the conflict?
Answer. The outbreak of violence in April forced many partners to
make the difficult decision to temporarily halt programming and
evacuate staff from Sudan. In response to the severely deteriorated
operating environment, USAID is assessing how best to adjust and
continue programs in Sudan that promote peace and democracy, mitigate
conflict, protect human rights, increase access to information, and
empower civil society. The goal of these resulting adjustments is to
protect civilians and mitigate the impact of the conflict on people
while also bolstering efforts to build bridges between divided
communities and revitalize civic engagement to pave the way for greater
citizen engagement, leadership, and inclusion in coordination about
Sudan's political future. As these plans are finalized, USAID will
continue to share updates with the Committee about its continued
efforts to support Sudanese aspirations for freedom, peace, and
justice.
Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
What are some of the most serious logistical and security
challenges that humanitarian actors are facing right now in Sudan?
Answer. First and foremost, the ongoing conflict between the
Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is the primary issue
driving humanitarian needs and limiting access to people in need in
Sudan. The only solution to the growing crisis is a durable end to the
fighting.
Humanitarian organizations in Sudan are facing excessive
bureaucratic impediments to the delivery of assistance, including the
delay or denial of travel permits and entry visas from the Sudanese
authorities. Port Sudan remains the primary entry point for
humanitarian supplies into Sudan; this is neither sustainable nor
sufficient to address the scale of humanitarian response needed. Only
locations in the eastern part of Sudan are accessible by road convoy
from Port Sudan.
The establishment of new entry points into Sudan via cross-border
humanitarian movements and additional humanitarian hubs within Sudan
will be critical to creating a sustainable humanitarian response. The
humanitarian community continues to explore overland, cross-border
routes from neighboring countries. To do this, the U.S. Government is
advocating for neighboring countries to keep their borders open to
Sudanese displaced by conflict so that they may access urgently needed
assistance. Additionally, we are advocating for neighboring countries
to also allow humanitarian goods to freely flow into Sudan to support
the scale-up of the humanitarian response.
Additionally, the looting of humanitarian commodities and
facilities has become widespread in Sudan, especially in conflict areas
where governance has decreased. Looting has affected both public
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations and has
resulted in significant losses and damages to humanitarian operations.
Finally, USAID is concerned that the rainy season upcoming from
June through October could further hinder the delivery of humanitarian
assistance by posing additional logistical challenges to operations.
Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
How could the United States aid the safe movement of refugees and
displaced persons?
Answer. As access and security permit, USAID-funded humanitarian
partners are present at the borders and are working with local
authorities to provide services to those in need as they await to cross
over into neighboring countries. USAID is asking government entities in
Sudan and its neighboring countries to eliminate the bureaucratic
barriers that prevent relief organizations' ability to respond to this
crisis, including the approval of visas and the facilitation of cross-
border movement. We are collaborating with donor government
counterparts to advocate for cross-border movements to get humanitarian
commodities to people in need.
We refer you to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
at the Department of State for additional information about the safe
movement of refugees.
Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
Do our activities place emphasis on protection from sexual and
gender-based violence? How are those activities being resourced?
Answer. Reports received by the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) sub-
sector in Sudan and service providers indicate that GBV in Sudan is
widespread and growing in prevalence since April 15. Women and girls
and those who are on the move, displaced in temporary shelters, and
deprived of basic needs are particularly at risk.
U.S. Government partners, including non-governmental organizations
and public international organizations, are providing GBV assistance in
Sudan. The GBV response in Sudan prioritizes the most vulnerable
populations, including persons living with disabilities, survivors of
sexual exploitation and abuse, and displaced women and girls. For
example, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is working to train service
providers to reach affected women and girls with remote psychosocial
support services in hard-to-reach areas. USAID's partner the UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF) has mobilized community volunteers to provide
mental health and psychosocial support services to children in
Khartoum. In Gedaref, one NGO partner continues to provide psychosocial
support and case service management to people in need and is evaluating
ways to expand programming to other areas as security permits. With
support from USAID, the UN International Organization for Migration
(IOM) airlifted one metric ton of medical supplies and medicines to
South Sudan's Renk county. IOM teams in Renk are providing health
screening at the points of entry and reception centers and
psychological first aid and counseling services to assess immediate
concerns and needs of people fleeing Sudan.
To ensure that protection remains at the center of humanitarian
programming, all partners receiving funding from USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance must address how they will protect vulnerable
beneficiaries from risks of sexual and GBV as part of the application
process and award management. Additionally, all applicants must submit
a Code of Conduct providing for protection from sexual exploitation and
abuse in humanitarian relief operations.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Embassy Khartoum Evacuation & Security: While those
directing Sudan policy within the Administration were preparing for an
imminent declaration of a civilian government, they seem to have missed
obvious signs of the impending collapse of the negotiation process and
ensuing civil war that forced American diplomats to dodge roving gun
battles and airstrikes. How did the State Department fail to see the
apparent signs of an impending crisis in Sudan?
Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process
to establish a civilian-led transitional government and democratic
elections, fulfilling the Sudanese people's aspirations for freedom,
justice, and peace. The Sudanese-led process was successful in
addressing many complex and divisive issues, including transitional
justice and security sector reform. Working with the Tripartite
Mechanism and other international partners, we helped provide Sudanese
military and civilian parties a path to an agreement. In the end, the
Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces chose to elevate their
interests above those of the Sudanese people, refused to negotiate on
the remaining issues, and chose war over peace. They are to blame for
the current crisis.
Question. While I appreciate fully that Sudan's Generals Burhan and
Hemetti ``are to blame for the current crisis,'' my question was asking
about the Administration's preparedness for the outbreak of violence.
How did the State Department fail to see the apparent signs of an
impending crisis in Sudan?
Answer. The State Department assessed heightened tensions in the
days leading up to April 15 and took steps to protect our employees,
warn U.S. citizens and urge military leaders to deescalate. We tracked
closely the heightened rhetoric and troop movements throughout the days
and weeks before the outbreak of fighting. We constantly engaged with
the parties in coordination with our diplomatic partners to prevent
conflict. We transmitted 15 security messages to the Embassy community
between April 13 to May 22 and sent 19 messages to individuals
registered with the Embassy to keep American citizens as informed and
safe as possible. In addition to engaging in diplomacy to encourage the
parties to deescalate tensions, we issued a joint statement with
likeminded partners on April 13 to express concern, urge steps to
reduce tensions, and to urge the partners to fulfill their previous
commitments on establishing a civilian-led transitional government.
Question. Why were we caught flat-footed in our crisis response,
which needlessly endangered U.S. Embassy personnel and did not
sufficiently forewarn American citizens?
Answer. Our Mission in Sudan was aware of complex security threats
throughout Sudan before the conflict began. This was reflected in our
consular and public messaging prior to the outbreak of hostilities, in
which we consistently advised U.S. citizens to not travel to Sudan or
to depart the country immediately. When it became safe to do so, we
assisted approximately 1,300 U.S. citizens and their immediate family
members via U.S. Government-organized convoys, flights with our
international partners, and messaging about options to depart Sudan.
Question. Does Embassy Khartoum have an emergency evacuation plan?
Answer. Like all U.S. embassies worldwide, Embassy Khartoum has an
Emergency Action Plan that includes evacuation plans and regularly
performs drills and exercises on crisis scenarios. Embassy Khartoum and
the Department of Defense coordinated regularly on a range of
contingencies and crisis scenarios in advance of the crisis. As the
situation unfolded, the Department of State and Department of Defense
coordinated in real time and update and refine those plans, based on
the dynamic situation on the ground.
Question. How often does the Department revisit or update the plan?
Answer. Worldwide, all diplomatic missions have Emergency Action
Plans (EAPs), which include a section for evacuation plans. EAPs are
updated and revalidated annually.
Question. Was the Embassy Khartoum evacuation plan executed during
the recent evacuation? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. Embassy Khartoum staff utilized their evacuation
plans, including survey data from the Integrated Survey Program, to
successfully consolidate and evacuate 72 personnel and family members
under Chief of Mission security responsibility.
Question. Did Embassy Khartoum have contingency plans in place in
case post could not execute the emergency evacuation plan?
Answer. Embassy Khartoum maintained an Emergency Action Plan that
included multiple plans for getting personnel out and contingencies in
case personnel were cut off from the embassy. These plans were
implemented, and helped successfully consolidate U.S. personnel, before
moving all U.S. personnel and their family members to the embassy
compound for the evacuation.
Question. Were these contingency plans implemented? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. For staff unable to reach the embassy, Embassy
Khartoum activated its cutoff plan to rally staff to the Alternate
Command Center. This consolidation helped verify accountability and the
subsequent relocation of all staff to the embassy compound.
Question. With evidence of a deteriorating security situation in
Sudan, did the Department consider moving to authorized or ordered
departure before fighting broke out? Please describe the Department's
deliberations on this matter.
Answer. Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
thoroughly considered adjustments to its security posture in regular
EAC meetings, including on April 13, 2023, 2 days before fighting
began. The Embassy did not recommend Authorized or Ordered Departure.
However, the EAC advised against travel to Karima, Northern State, and
prohibited travel outside of Khartoum for U.S. Government staff and
family members. The Embassy shared this guidance with U.S. Government
staff and with private U.S. citizens in an April 13 security alert. The
embassy was also in touch with the U.S. military in Djibouti and
Diplomatic Security on assistance that could be required.
Question. Do all posts in Africa maintain emergency evacuation
plans?
Answer. Yes, all U.S. missions maintain emergency evacuation plans
that are updated and revalidated regularly.
Question. How often are emergency evacuation plans updated for
posts in Africa?
Answer. Emergency Action Plans at all posts in the Bureau of
African Affairs, which include evacuation plans, must be updated and
revalidated annually. Many are updated more frequently when
circumstances warrant.
Question. Do emergency evacuation at posts in Africa plans include
contingencies in case the primary plan is not executable?
Answer. Yes, all emergency evacuation plans include contingencies.
Question. How are you drawing upon the lessons of this crisis to
adapt to other high-risk posts where we could potentially see a similar
scenario play out--say in Chad, Central African Republic, or South
Sudan?
Answer. Following an evacuation, the Office of Crisis Management
and Strategy (CMS) will coordinate a lessons learned exercise to
capture what worked and identify opportunities for improvement. These
lessons learned are shared within the Department and with posts abroad
to inform future planning. Additionally, the Bureau of African Affairs
hosts periodic virtual workshops on crisis preparation with posts
abroad, with the help of CMS, to discuss recent evacuations and lessons
learned from other crises.
Question. Do you commit to brief the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the Embassy evacuations for all high-risk posts in Africa?
Answer. I support briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
following the evacuation of any high-risk post in Africa.
Question. What is the current posture of the Department in Sudan?
Answer. The Department temporarily suspended operations at Embassy
Khartoum effective April 22, 2023, and evacuated all U.S. personnel and
their family members from Sudan.
Question. Under what conditions would the Department decide to move
Embassy personnel back to Khartoum?
Answer. As conditions in Sudan improve, Embassy Sudan's Emergency
Action Committee will meet to discuss changes to the security
environment. The committee will then make a recommendation to the
ambassador, who may then request permission from Department leadership
resume embassy operations. Any decision to resume operations will be
based on verified changes to the security environment in Sudan and
subject to Congressional notification procedures.
Question. What is the timeline for returning to Embassy Khartoum
once the Department decides to do so?
Answer. Prior to temporarily suspending operations, the embassy
disabled and destroyed sensitive computer networks and communications
equipment and sealed the building. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
in conjunction with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and
the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, would need to determine
the timeline for resuming operations based on any damages sustained to
the physical plant, security systems, and in controlled access areas
and assess the availability of locally employed staff to assist.
Resuming operations at Embassy Khartoum would also be subject to
completion of Congressional notification procedures.
Question. How long will it take to restore OpenNet once personnel
access Embassy Khartoum?
Answer. The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in
conjunction with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, must recertify the
building for information processing prior to restarting full
operations. This may require importing new hardware and replacing
damaged equipment. Limited operations using satellite connectivity may
be possible within weeks. Returning to full operations could take
significantly longer.
Question. How long for ClassNet?
Answer. The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in
conjunction with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, must recertify the
building for processing sensitive information prior to restarting
classified operations. This will require importing new hardware and
replacing equipment. Once functional, Diplomatic Security will need to
validate that the building meets required information security
standards to protect classified material. This process will take months
in order to ensure the integrity of sensitive systems.
Question. Did Embassy personnel have to abandon their personal
belongings to be evacuated? If yes, is the Department compensating them
for their losses?
Answer. Yes. Employees will be able to file claims through private
insurance, once it is determined that there has been a loss. Claims
denied by private insurance may then be resubmitted to the Department
for adjudication.
Question. Has there been any damage to Embassy Khartoum or
personnel housing, including the chief of mission residence?
Answer. Yes. The embassy and some personnel housing units have
sustained damage, including the residential housing compound containing
the Deputy Chief of Mission's residence.
Question. Is it the Department's policy to allow mission chiefs to
take annual leave regardless of conditions in the host country? If no,
under what conditions would a chief of mission have annual leave denied
or canceled if previously approved?
Answer. Like all employees, chiefs of mission are entitled to
annual leave, which is vital to an employee's wellbeing and resiliency.
An assistant secretary, as the supervisor for a chief of mission, may
cancel previously approved annual leave or deny annual leave at their
discretion.
Question. When responding to Senator Cardin during the hearing, you
noted that the Embassy ``had connectivity with about 5,000 Americans.''
You estimated that 12 messages were pushed out to them ``about various
options for leaving the country.'' Please share the text of each
message with the timestamp when the Embassy sent them.
Answer. The U.S. Department of State publicly transmitted 15
security messages (Security Alerts) to U.S. citizens from April 13 to
May 12, 2023. The Department also sent 19 direct messages to
individuals registered in our case management system, in addition to
several hundred unique emails and text messages. Please see the
attached for a complete timeline.
consular affairs messaging on the sudan crisis
All times ET.
Friday, May 12, 2023
4:45 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them that consular services are available in
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart on their own and
information on possible commercial options to depart Sudan.
Thursday, May 4, 2023
1:00 AM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them of commercial options to depart Sudan via
ferry.
Wednesday, May 3, 2023
12:40 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not go to
the Hotel Coral in Port Sudan and not to go to Fenti Golf in Khartoum.
10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not to go
to the Hotel Coral, as no further assistance will be provided.
Tuesday, May 2, 2023
2:30 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them that consular services are available in
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart and that the U.S.
Government has completed all currently planned convoys to Port Sudan.
Monday, May 1, 2023
8:00 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising them we are unaware of additional flights from Wadi Seidna
airport and, sharing information on border crossings (approximately
4500 active cases).
Sunday, April 30, 2023
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising that they should seek to leave by commercially available
means.
10:00 PM (approx.): Update on Information for U.S. Citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan-2/) posted on Embassy Khartoum website (posted on TravelGov May
1).
Saturday, April 29, 2023
8:00 PM: Message (CACMS) and SMS sent to the full universe of
registrants advising them of convoy C times and rally point
(approximately 4500 active cases). WhatsApp messages sent to all cases
reported ``ready to depart.'' Calls made to all high-profile, USG-
adjacent, and Congressional cases with this message.
2:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to verified U.S. citizens who were ready to
depart asking them to notify CA if they have departed Sudan, and if
not, verify they are still requesting assistance.
1:30 AM: Security Alert on avoiding Wadi Seidna airfield (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-2/).
Friday, April 28, 2023
3:36 PM: Message (CACMS and [email protected]) sent to individuals
opting into the convoy B with times and rally point.
3:30 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising them to make contact if they wanted assistance departing on
convoy B.
3:15 PM: Topper at Department Press Briefing on advice and assistance
to U.S. citizens.
02:00 AM: Repeat Message ([email protected]) sent to U.S. citizens
who indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally
point information.
Thursday, April 27, 2023
9:30 PM: Message ([email protected]) sent to 147 U.S. citizens who
indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally
point information.
1:30 PM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to the full universe of
registrants who expressed interest in departure regarding convoy A.
TravelGov post (https://twitter.com/TravelGov/status/
1651641198191190025) urging U.S. citizens to fill out CACMS form posted
across all of CA's social media platforms. U.S. Embassy Khartoum's
website updated to have CACMS form link appear in banner on all pages;
large image with form link added to home page.
11:30 AM: Secretary Blinken holds press briefing (https://
www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-of-homeland-
security-alejandro-mayorkas-at-a-joint-press-availability/) with DHS
and mentions convoy.
10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to active cases notifying of
flights opportunities at Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Wednesday, April 26, 2023
10:30 PM: Message (WhatsApp and SMS) sent to all verified U.S.
citizens, ready to depart notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Tuesday, April 25, 2023
7:30 PM: Message (SMS) sent to all verified U.S. citizens, ready to
depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
5:00 PM: Security Alert on Port Sudan and land border options (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert/). Red banner linking to Embassy Alerts
page added to state.gov.
10:00 AM: Message (WhatsApp, SMS, and calls) sent to all verified U.S.
citizens, ready to depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi
Seidna Airfield.
Monday, April 24, 2023
11:06 PM: Security alert on border crossing info for neighboring
countries also sent to all active cases in CACMS (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan/).
Sunday, April 23, 2023
Red banner (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/ea/situation-in-sudan-2023.html) added to
travel.state.gov containing CACMS link and STEP info (additional info
continues to be added and removed as situations unfolds)
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Suspension of
Operations Security Alert.
6:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Saudi vessel
(Amama) in Port Sudan.
Saturday, April 22, 2023
11:00 PM: Security alert on suspension of Embassy operations and
sharing link to CACMS form (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-
suspension-of-embassy-operations/)
11:00 PM: Travel Advisory updated to reflect ordered departure of U.S.
direct hire employees and family members. Pushed out via media note
(https://www.state.gov/sudan-travel-advisory-remains-level-4-do-not-
travel/) and amplified on TravelGov social media/websites, per normal
SOP.
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding a UAE convoy.
3:16 AM: Security Alert on security challenges in country (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/sudan-security-alert/)
Wednesday, April 19, 2023
6:50 PM: Security Alert on ongoing violence and reports of assaults,
home invasions, and looting (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-
s-embassy-khartoum-5/).
3:29 PM: Travelgov social media post with contact info (https://
twitter.com/TravelGov/status/1648770894003683328) advising U.S.
citizens to contact the Embassy via email or phone and sign up for
STEP.
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
9:45 AM: Security Alert noting ongoing fighting, gunfire, and security
force activity, advising shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-18-april-2023/)
Sunday April 16, 2023
10:00 AM: Security Alert on situation and advising to remain indoors
and shelter in place until further notice (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-4/)
Saturday April 15, 2023
Security Alert on continuing to shelter in place (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/)
Security Alert urging shelter in place and stating no plans for U.S.
Government-coordinated evacuation of U.S. citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/).
Security Alert recommending shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-2/)
Travel.Gov published a consolidated post (https://twitter.com/
TravelGov/status/1647338067823304704?s=20) at 4:36 p.m. for Saturday
alerts.
Thursday, April 13, 2023
9:40 AM: Security Alert advising U.S. citizens to avoid travel to
Karima, Northern Sudan, and surrounding areas (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-april-13-2023/)
Background
Except where noted, every Sudan alert is:
pushed out to STEP enrollees
posted on Embassy Khartoum's website
posted on the TSG country page for Sudan (using a script
that pulls from the embassy's page)
amplified by CA on social media
Question. U.S. Policy Approach: During a State Department briefing
on May 11, a senior official [``Senior State Department Official Two'']
noted how the Department ``used U.S. power and influence to press the
generals to respond to the aspirations of the Sudanese people.'' [Link:
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-
on-the-situation-in-sudan/ ] After the initial steps to suspend
international lending and debt relief and some bilateral assistance,
how has the Department ``used U.S. power and influence to press the
generals to respond to the aspirations of the Sudanese people'' under
this Administration?
Answer. We put intense diplomatic pressure on the military
government and led, with our partners, international efforts to support
a Sudanese-led process to form a civilian-led government. We took
additional measures, including sanctioning the Central Reserve Police,
coordinating with our partners to suspend all lending from
international institutions to the government, and organizing the
suspension of bilateral development assistance from the United States
and all of our partners.
Question. What is your understanding of the bipartisan, bicameral
Congressional concerns regarding U.S. policy on Sudan?
Answer. I understand that Congress, like the Department of State,
wants to see a democratic government led by civilians in Sudan. We
agree that only a truly civilian government can be successful in
delivering to the people of Sudan. The United States supports the
Sudanese people in restoring Sudan's democratic transition and forming
a civilian government. The military forces should withdraw from
governance and focus on defending the nation from external threats.
Question. How do you plan to respond to the specific Congressional
concern expressed through hearings, letters, staff and member
consultations, and concurrent resolutions in the House and Senate that
the same engagement approach with the Sudanese generals has not yielded
substantive progress beyond empty promises, unimplemented frameworks,
broken transition agreements, and ultimately war?
Answer. The U.S. strategic approach focuses on pressing for a
ceasefire, humanitarian access and, in parallel, supporting civilian
stakeholders in developing a broad-based political process to end the
conflict and resume a democratic transition. We are working closely
with the AU, IGAD and regional and international partners toward these
ends. Our efforts have not, and will not, be limited to only engaging
the Sudanese generals.
Question. What changes will you make to the Department's approach
to policy architecture and architects to gain Congressional buy-in to
fund and support your continued approach?
Answer. The Department team, led by AF, with support from NEA and
others, and overseen by Secretary Blinken and me, is working with the
AU, IGAD and other partners to help the Sudanese establish a broader
political process as soon as possible to end the conflict and get Sudan
on course for a democratic transition. We anticipate this process will
be more broad-based both in terms of Sudanese stakeholders and
international supporters.
Question. Given the role of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
acting as a paramilitary force for hire by governments and forces to
fight in Yemen, Libya and elsewhere, and its historical role in
carrying out genocide in Darfur, do you agree the RSF should be
sanctioned as an entity?
Answer. The United States is considering the full range of tools at
our disposal to address the conflict in Sudan, and to promote
accountability for the RSF. Our view has long been that the RSF should
integrate into the Sudanese Armed Forces as part of a security sector
reform process. On June 1, the Department of Treasury added two major
companies affiliated with the RSF to the Office of Foreign Asset
Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.
Question. Diplomatic Footprint & Tools: Also, during that
Department briefing on May 11 [see previous question], this same senior
official [``Senior State Department Official Two''] said, ``I find it
confusing when we're told that we haven't been pressing the generals.''
It seems this senior official did not watch our recent hearing or, if
he/she did, did not take the message that Congress wants to see changes
in approach to include how the Department pressures the Generals ``to
respond to the aspirations of the people.'' Many Sudanese people,
including civil society, political party officials, and vital eminent
persons, have strongly criticized the U.S. approach and support for
their aspirations. Do you acknowledge this criticism and agree the
Department's approach to ``pressing the generals'' is not only not
working, but the Sudanese people feel it is not reinforcing their
aspirations?
Answer. We acknowledge that some Sudanese wanted the civilian-led
process we supported to be more broad-based, backed by additional
pressure on the military. Our strategy focused on supporting a
Sudanese-led process to establish, via negotiations, a civilian-led
transitional government that would lead Sudan through a transition
culminating in democratic elections. Working with the Tripartite
Mechanism and other international partners, we helped provide Sudanese
military and civilian parties a path to an agreement that could have
addressed complex and divisive issues related to transitional justice
and security sector reform, among others. We pressed the generals to
resolve their disputes within that process--an effort that ultimately
failed when they took up arms again. They are to blame for the current
crisis.
Question. Will you commit to this Committee to make changes in the
personnel group driving Sudan policy in the Department, what I referred
to as the ``architects'' of the current policy approach in my hearing
opening statement, and expand this to have a more diverse and
consultative group of policy professionals handling these issues?
Answer. Since the crisis, our Africa and Sudan teams, and
Department leaders have taken broad soundings across Washington and
with our international partners on next steps to try to end the
fighting, get in more humanitarian aid and build a new civilian-led
process.
Question. Is it appropriate for senior Bureau of African Affairs
officials, in a woefully understaffed and under-resourced bureau which
I have raised concerns about and communicated to the Department many
times, to continue to dedicate most of their time to Sudan and Ethiopia
issues, essentially owning these issues, when other U.S. national
security interests in Africa are not receiving equal intensity and
focus?
Answer. We appreciate your concern about the Department's staffing
and resource challenges. I can assure you the Bureau of African Affairs
remains focused on advancing U.S. national security interests across
the African continent. I work with AF Bureau leaders and Ambassadors on
a daily basis to ensure broad coverage and policy attention to all the
major challenges across the continent.
Question. If it is appropriate to have senior Bureau of African
Affairs officials dedicate this much time to these matters, then please
explain how the Department is backfilling this gap in senior leadership
and management on other complex issues, such as countering the malign
influence of China and Russia and managing intense humanitarian and
security crises in the Sahel region and Eastern Congo?
Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs has a wealth of talent at the
senior level, and I work intensively with the Assistant Secretary and
her top lieutenants to ensure clear, effective policymaking and
execution across the continent. To that end, I work with the Assistant
Secretary to ensure that our senior Bureau of African Affairs officials
coordinate with colleagues in other agencies and other State Department
offices and bureaus, including the Office of China Coordination, Bureau
of European Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism, and Bureau of Conflict
and Stabilization Operations, and the Global Engagement Center, among
others, to provide continued attention to all issues concerning U.S.
national security interests in Africa, including strategic competition.
Our regional offices help senior officials address the Sahel region and
Eastern Congo along with all pressing issues in Africa in combination
with State Department offices and colleagues in the interagency.
Question. While senior Bureau of African Affairs officials are
dedicating a large amount of their time and resources to managing Sudan
and Ethiopia policy, which senior officials in the Bureau or the
Department are working the solutions to the woeful understaffing and
resourcing of the Bureau?
Answer. Senior officials throughout the Department and in the
Bureau of African Affairs are cognizant of staffing and resource
deficiencies and continue to identify additional resources to advance
U.S. policies in Africa and during crisis situations. The Deputy
Secretary for Management and Resources, and I, and the Undersecretary
for Management and the bureaus that report to him, as well as the
Assistant Secretary, each Deputy Assistant Secretary, and all office
directors and their deputies, actively and regularly engage in staffing
and resource planning.
Question. During the hearing, I asked you about a special envoy for
Sudan to address the need for ``more individual attention.'' You
replied, ``Ambassador Godfrey is central to all of this,'' noting ``he
is also likely to play a stronger role in some of the regional
diplomacy and global diplomacy on Sudan.'' While Ambassador Godfrey is
working hard to manage an embassy staff dislocated by an evacuation,
American citizen evacuation and welfare concerns, and other matters
strictly related to Sudan and our diplomatic and security priorities in
the country, how do you expect this first-time ambassador to carry out
the complex role of international and regional diplomacy effectively?
Answer. Ambassador Godfrey played a leading role in the talks in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and has conducted frequent diplomacy with Sudanese
and regional stakeholders. He is more than up to the challenge of
carrying out this complex task.
Question. If Ambassador Godfrey led discussions to achieve a short-
term ceasefire for the United States in Jeddah, as you stated in your
response above, what role did Assistant Secretary Phee--his superior--
play in Jeddah?
Answer. Resolving the conflict in Sudan and resuming Sudan's
democratic transition remain top Administration priorities. Assistant
Secretary Phee has and maintains relationships of influence with
leaders in Sudan, throughout Africa and the Middle East. She took
immediate action in the first week of the conflict, while Ambassador
Godfrey was still in Khartoum leading the embassy team on evacuation
related efforts, to initiate dialogue between the SAF and RSF that led
to the announcement of temporary ceasefires and the beginning of talks
in Jeddah. These efforts helped reduce violence, allowing U.S.
citizens, foreign nationals, and Sudanese civilians to move out of
harm's way. When those talks transitioned from phone calls to in person
negotiations in Jeddah on May 6, Assistant Secretary Phee led our
delegation's efforts to facilitate negotiations, working closely with
Saudi partners and Ambassador Godfrey, before ultimately handing over
the leadership of that delegation to Ambassador Godfrey.
Question. Regarding my question on a Sudan envoy, you also replied
that Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) Ambassador Hammer
will ``play a reinforcing role as necessary on this, which is within
his mandate.'' Please describe Ambassador Hammer's official mandate and
priorities assigned to him by Department leadership.
Answer. At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Hammer's most
immediate focus has been to bring peace to Northern Ethiopia as well as
to forge a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region.
Furthermore, he works to advance diplomatic efforts to reduce conflict
and in support of an inclusive political process towards lasting peace,
security, and prosperity for all people in Ethiopia. Ambassador Hammer
supports other policy goals in the East Africa region, as needed.
Question. While Ambassador Hammer's title says the ``Horn of
Africa,'' he and the Department have communicated to Congress on
several occasions that Secretary Blinken wants his focus to be on
diplomacy related to Northern Ethiopia and the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD). Given the regional crisis the fighting in Sudan
created, have official Department priorities changed for Ambassador
Hammer? If yes, has this been formally communicated to him, and when?
Answer. At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Hammer's most
immediate focus has been to bring peace to Northern Ethiopia as well as
to forge a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region.
Furthermore, he works to advance diplomatic efforts to reduce conflict
and in support of an inclusive political process towards lasting peace,
security, and prosperity for all people in Ethiopia. Ambassador Hammer
supports other policy goals in the East Africa region, as needed.
Question. If Ambassador Hammer expands his official focus areas
``as necessary,'' will he receive additional staffing and other support
to supplement his expanded workload?
Answer. Ambassador Hammer is fully integrated into the Bureau of
African Affairs, receiving seamless support from the desk officers and
the offices working on issues in the Horn of Africa. He has a small
staff to take advantage of these available resources and avoid
duplication of effort. He also coordinates closely with the Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs. If he needs more support, he'll get it.
Question. Given the current crisis in Sudan, the peace process in
Ethiopia, ongoing regional drought, and famine-like conditions
throughout the Horn of Africa, do you view GERD negotiations as among
the top two priorities of diplomatic focus for our regional envoy in
the region?
Answer. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains a potential
source of conflict and tension, and we continue to support an enduring
arrangement that contributes to a more peaceful and prosperous region.
We are committed to helping the parties find a durable solution that
meets Egypt's water security needs, addresses Sudan's dam safety
concerns, and supports Ethiopia's economic development. Ambassador
Hammer remains actively engaged in support of efforts to reach a GERD
agreement under the auspices of the African Union that will advance the
interests of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
Question. On May 10, the day of the hearing, the State Department
spokesperson issued a media note announcing a May 10-19 trip by Special
Envoy Hammer to Los Angeles, California, and Santa Fe, New Mexico, to
engage with the Ethiopian diaspora and to speak with Global Santa Fe
and the Santa Fe World Affairs Forum. Is Ethiopian diaspora engagement
in the U.S. a greater priority for the Department, given the need for
an expanded set of diplomacy tools and an all-hands-on-deck approach to
securing and maintaining a ceasefire in Sudan and coordinating the
regional and international response?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration emphasizes diaspora
engagement as an integral part of advancing U.S. policy in Ethiopia.
Ambassador Hammer's engagement with diaspora on this trip is the latest
in a series of concerted outreach events with the Ethiopian-American
diaspora to foster greater connectivity between diaspora groups, inform
them of U.S. policy, and advance U.S. foreign policy goals. Assistant
Secretary Phee and Ambassador Godfrey continue to conduct and lead our
engagement on Sudan.
Question. What has Special Envoy Hammer done to date to support
efforts in Sudan?
Answer. Ambassador Hammer remains focused on implementation of the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of Ethiopia
and the Tigray People's Liberation Front reached in Pretoria on
November 2, 2022, and forging a diplomatic resolution to issues related
to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests
of all parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region.
When in discussions about the wider region with likeminded and African
interlocutors, he has provided updates and explained U.S. policy
related to Sudan as part of our effort to support a coordinated
international and regional response to the conflict.
Question. Ceasefire & Mediation Efforts: In your testimony, you
referred to the Department's diplomatic attempts to ``silence the
guns'' as efforts to achieve a ceasefire. ``Silencing the guns'' is a
term often used by the African Union regarding its goal to end conflict
on the continent. Another phrase regularly used by Department officials
is ``African solutions to African problems.'' Why didn't the African
Union (AU) or Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
directly participate in the Jeddah ceasefire talks? Did the U.S. insist
in their participation?
Answer. The Department has been in consultation with both the
African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development since
the conflict began. The Jeddah talks enjoyed broad support. The African
Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
Tripartite Mechanism (United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance
Mission in Sudan, AU, IGAD), countries in the region, and many Sudanese
civilian groups all issued statements in support of the process. The
Jeddah Talks were emergency diplomacy and the parties insisted on
limiting participation to the United States, Saudi Arabia, RSF and SAF.
In parallel with our efforts to secure a durable ceasefire, we have
been supporting the AU and IGAD in standing up a broader political
process.
Question. UN humanitarian aid chief Martin Griffiths was in Jeddah
during the ceasefire talks to engage on humanitarian issues. Still, he
did not engage directly with either of the warring parties, reportedly
due to their insistence he be kept out of the talks. What is the impact
of sidelining the UN's humanitarian aid chief in ceasefire talks that
directly focused on delivering humanitarian assistance in Sudan and
affected surrounding countries where UN agencies will have a
significant role?
Answer. Securing humanitarian access was a central focus of efforts
in Jeddah. The U.S. delegation included staff from USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Affairs. We were in close coordination with the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which sent
a technical expert to Jeddah to support aspects of the talks related to
humanitarian access.
Question. Regarding your testimony's reference to ``silence the
guns,'' you referred to Secretary Blinken's ``intense personal effort''
to secure six ``sequential short-term ceasefires,'' allowing for ``some
initial movement of humanitarian aid.'' Given the widespread open
source reporting that demonstrated fighting continued throughout
successive ceasefires, what is your assessment of the success of those
ceasefires and the degree to which they successfully helped ``silence
the guns''?
Answer. While the mutually announced ceasefires in late April and
early May were not completely adhered to, fighting decreased in those
periods, providing some relief for civilians, and allowing more
humanitarian relief to get to those in need.
Question. Can you provide the scope and scale of the ``initial
movement'' of some humanitarian aid you refer to in your testimony,
including what assistance moved and where?
Answer. Humanitarian partners have continued to provide assistance
throughout the conflict as the situation allows. In late April,
partners began tapping into regional stockpiles of medical supplies,
food, and core relief items (e.g. tents, kitchen sets, plastic sheets)
and bringing these supplies in through Port Sudan. When possible,
partners also worked to move existing supplies in country to more
secure points where assistance could be distributed to conflict
affected populations. Our response has also included assistance for
refugees in neighboring Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan,
and Ethiopia. We will continue to prioritize the creation of safe and
durable humanitarian access to those in need, working closely with
regional and international partners, including the United Nations,
African Union stakeholders, and others.
Question. On May 11, 2023, the parties to the conflict--the SAF and
RSF--signed the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the
Civilians of Sudan with the facilitation of Saudi Arabia and the United
States. While the Jeddah Declaration does secure commitments from the
parties to protect civilians and the movement of humanitarian aid, it
only achieved a commitment ``to prioritizing discussions to achieve a
short-term ceasefire', and to ``scheduling subsequent expanded
discussions to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities.'' What
parties does the State Department envision will be essential to
successful and legitimate ``expanded discussions to achieve a permanent
cessation of hostilities''?
Answer. Moving to a successful permanent cessation of hostilities
would require commitment from both parties to stop fighting and
establish necessary security arrangements. While the parties agreed in
Jeddah to temporary ceasefires that enabled delivery of humanitarian
assistance impacting approximately 2.5 million Sudanese people, their
frequent ceasefire violations and the continuation of fighting
demonstrated a lack of will to adhere to their commitments and move
toward a more durable cessation of hostilities. As a result, the United
States and Saudi Arabia adjourned the talks effective June 21. We stand
ready to reconvene technical ceasefire talks in Jeddah, but only once
the parties demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations
under the Jeddah Declaration. In the meantime, we are working with our
African Union and IGAD partners, to support Sudan's civilian leaders to
develop a broad-based political process to end the conflict and resume
a democratic transition.
Question. Who will facilitate discussions to achieve a short-term
ceasefire for the United States?
Answer. Ambassador John Godfrey led this effort in Jeddah.
Question. If subsequent negotiations to achieve a short-term
ceasefire are not successful, how will the State Department adjust its
approach?
Answer. We continue to press both sides to cease hostilities and
permit the delivery of humanitarian aid and restoration of essential
services to the Sudanese people. We are also engaging with Sudanese
civilian leaders, Resistance Committees, and civil society, as well as
our international partners, to work toward the shared goal of
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as
possible. We adjourned the Jeddah talks on June 21 because of frequent
cease-fire violations; we stand ready to resume talks once both parties
demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations.
Question. Will accountability tools be used in the event a short-
term ceasefire is not agreed to or respected?
Answer. President Biden stated on May 5 that the United States
stands with the people of Sudan--and we are acting to support their
commitment to a future of peace and opportunity. As a result, the
Administration issued a new Executive Order that expands U.S.
authorities to respond to the violence that began on April 15 with
sanctions that hold individuals responsible for threatening the peace,
security, and stability of Sudan; undermining Sudan's democratic
transition; using violence against civilians; or committing serious
human rights abuses.On June 1 our designations of four major companies
owned by the SAF and RSF advanced that objective of accountability.
Question. During the aforementioned May 11 State Department
briefing, a senior official [``Senior State Department Official One'']
stated that a key difference from prior ceasefires the United States
tried to negotiate is ``that we have developed a ceasefire monitoring
mechanism, which is being supported by the UN, the Saudis, and other
members of the international community . . . [that] will help hold the
parties accountable to what they've agreed to do.'' Why did the State
Department announce the development of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism
when a ceasefire has not yet been agreed to by the parties?
Answer. The ceasefire monitoring mechanism was supported by both
sides of the conflict in Sudan. Given the significant distrust, this
was selected as a way for neutral actors to help monitor whether the
parties were complying with the terms of a prospective ceasefire.
Question. How was a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, that will be
supported by the UN, developed when the UN was not directly present in
the Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the United States?
Answer. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission
in Sudan, our partners in the Troika, and the African Union were
consulted on the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and how they can
receive and utilize reporting.
Question. Will the ceasefire monitoring mechanism report on
violations of ``International Humanitarian Law and for international
human rights law,'' which the parties agreed to respect in the Jeddah
Declaration? If yes, will this reporting be public?
Answer. Yes, we intend to make public reporting, as appropriate, on
violations of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law.
Question. How will public reporting be conducted?
Answer. We remain committed to supporting the release of publicly
accessible reporting on conflict developments in Sudan to support
efforts to improve civilian safety and facilitate humanitarian
assistance.
Question. Who does the State Department envision will implement the
ceasefire monitoring mechanism?
Answer. The Department of State will implement the ceasefire
monitoring mechanism through a consortium of expert organizations in
close coordination with United Nations, Troika, and African Union
partners.
Question. Will the United States contribute resources (financial,
human or otherwise) to the implementation of the ceasefire monitoring
mechanism?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Accountability: The two warring generals, Burhan and
Hemetti, have direct links to the genocide in Darfur, oversaw the death
of many Sudanese civilians and the abuse of countless more during their
reign, and continue to steal Sudan's resources. They also removed a
sitting civilian-led transitional government in October 2021. The
United States has not held these generals accountable but instead fed
their lust for legitimacy by repeatedly making them central to the
Administration's policy for a ``democratic transition'' in Sudan. As a
result, the U.S. has less leverage today in Sudan since the removal of
Omar al-Bashir in 2019. It seems to me we helped elevate these two
monsters. Why has the United States not taken any action against the
warring generals, Burhan and Hemetti, their vast financial interests,
or their foreign backers to contain and weaken their stranglehold on
the Sudanese people?
Answer. Supporting Sudanese-led processes and civilian stakeholders
have been central to our efforts. At the same time, we put intense
diplomatic pressure on the military government along with our partners,
and took additional measures, including sanctioning the Central Reserve
Police, coordinating with our partners to suspend all lending from
international institutions to the government, and organizing the
suspension of bilateral development assistance from the United States
and our partners. On June 1 we sanctioned four major companies owned by
the SAF and RSF.
Question. Despite repeated threats of sanctions and other
accountability measures against Generals Burhan and Hemetti and Bashir-
era Islamists, why hasn't the Administration acted against any Sudanese
individual or entity except one--the Central Reserve Police?
Answer. As directed by the President in his May 4 Executive Order,
we are prepared to take actions against members of, and entities
related to, the parties threatening the peace, security, and stability
of Sudan. On June 1 we sanctioned four major companies owned by the SAF
and RSF under this executive order.
Question. On May 4, President Biden issued an executive order (EO)
imposing sanctions on certain persons destabilizing Sudan and
undermining the goal of a democratic transition. However, as we have
seen in Ethiopia, the Administration has not designated any individuals
or entities for sanctions since the announcement of the EO. What is the
Department of State's perspective on designating Sudanese individuals
and entities under the executive order issued by President Biden on May
4 related to Sudan?
Answer. As directed by the President in his May 4 Executive Order,
we are prepared to take actions against members of, and entities
related to, the parties threatening the peace, security, and stability
of Sudan. This will remain the case as long as the forces do not uphold
a ceasefire and allow unhindered humanitarian assistance. On June 1 we
sanctioned four major companies owned by the SAF and RSF; this is our
first tranche of designations.
Question. What accountability measures can this Committee expect
will be used in the case of Sudan?
Answer. We will continue to consider a range of tools, including
sanctions, to promote accountability.
Question. Ahmed Haroun, the former Minister of State for the
Interior wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, is now at-large since his escape from prison
following the outbreak of fighting in Sudan. Impunity for past
atrocities has driven this and previous conflicts in Sudan. Biden
administration officials have not announced any new rewards since
stating it would be ``reinvigorating'' the War Crimes Rewards Program
last year. Will the Department of State offer a reward for information
leading to Ahmed Haroun's arrest consistent with its commitments under
the War Crimes Rewards Program?
Answer. We are aware that Ahmed Haroun was reported to be at-large.
We are considering all available tools, including the War Crimes
Rewards Program, to promote accountability for the people of Sudan.
Question. Accountability has long been a central component to calls
by Sudanese citizens, including for atrocities committed during the
genocide in Darfur, the Khartoum massacre committed by RSF forces in
June 2019, and for state capture and corruption by the RSF and SAF. How
will the Administration work with regional allies to promote
accountability?
Answer. We remain committed to working with partners to call for
and advance accountability efforts, and to encourage partners to
establish authorities for measures that mirror U.S. authorities
established under the May 4 Executive Order. In order to address
concerns about state capture and corruption, we continue to urge
partners, including regional actors, to avoid Sudanese gold and other
industries that contribute to the conflict.
Question. What programming can the State Department and USAID
support to strengthen civil society to promote accountability?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor (DRL) supports civil society-led human rights
documentation in Sudan to pursue justice and accountability and prevent
recurring cycles of violence. Despite the current inability to get
funding into the country, documenters are continuing their work. DRL
also supports documentation of illicit money flows, in order to hold
corrupt officials accountable. DRL is exploring other options to
support accountability in the context of the current conflict,
including conflict related sexual violence.
Question. Civilian Engagement: The de facto exclusion of some
significant facets of Sudanese civil society from formal processes,
including internationally brokered peace agreements, has contributed to
many of Sudan's current problems. With civil society, politicians and
members of the international community can aid Sudan's transition to
genuine civilian-led and pro-democratic governance. They can assist the
many individuals in the SAF, RSF, and other militias to start
participating in a demilitarized future. What steps will the
Administration take to ensure civil society is invited and enabled to
play a meaningful role in shaping what happens in Sudan next?
Answer. We are engaging with Sudanese civilian leaders, Resistance
Committees, and civil society to work toward the shared goal of
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as
possible.
Question. In response to questions during the hearing, you
repeatedly emphasized that Ambassador Godfrey is conducting outreach to
Sudanese civilians in anticipation of them playing a role in future
negotiations to restore the civilian-led transition in Sudan. We have
heard from civilian partners of USAID implementers that they have yet
to receive outreach from Ambassador Godfrey. Please provide more
information on the civilian groups that Ambassador Godfrey has been in
contact with since the outbreak of fighting.
Answer. Ambassador Godfrey and other interagency officials are
engaging a broad range of Sudanese civilian leaders. This includes
members of political parties, civil society organizations, labor and
professional groups, Resistance Committees, university professors,
women and youth groups, and human rights advocates. As an example,
Ambassador Godfrey recently joined A/S Phee and colleagues from USAID
in convening a group of over 20 civilian leaders to discuss Sudanese
initiatives to respond to the crisis.
Question. What is Ambassador Godfrey's message to civilians when he
engages them?
Answer. The United States stands with the people of Sudan. We want
to see a democratic government led by civilians in Sudan--only a truly
civilian government can be successful in delivering to the people of
Sudan. We support the Sudanese people in restoring Sudan's democratic
transition and forming a civilian government.
Question. How will the Department ensure the inclusion and
supremacy of civilian voices in future negotiation processes?
Answer. We are engaging now with civilian stakeholders on their
initiatives to resolve the crisis and are committed to supporting their
leadership when a political negotiation process begins.
Question. The United Nations Integrated Assistance Mission in Sudan
(UNITAMS): The mandate of UNITAMS expires on June 3. Given the events
of the last few weeks and the general inability of the Mission to
fulfill its mandate since its establishment, what are the U.S.
priorities for the mandate renewal in terms of substantive issues and
the timeline for an extension?
Answer. We are preparing for negotiations to renew the United
Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)
mandate. Our goal is to secure a mandate renewal to enable UNITAMS to
continue to use its good offices to work towards a peaceful resolution
of the conflict, as well as demand the parties adhere to a ceasefire
agreement, provide unhindered humanitarian access, and resume working
towards a civilian-led political transition.
Question. What is the U.S. doing to communicate concerns and push
for changes to improve the leadership and management of UNITAMS in
Sudan?
Answer. We are deeply engaged with United Nations leadership and
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General Volker
Perthes to coordinate our response to the crisis and support the
implementation of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance
Mission in Sudan mandate.
Question. What are the accomplishments of UNITAMS in Darfur and
what continues to be the Mission's deficiencies in this region?
Answer. To implement its mandate, the United Nations Integrated
Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) has provided support
for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and reinforced
peacebuilding in Darfur. UNITAMS also provided technical assistance to
strengthen the National Mechanism for the Protection of Civilians and
state-level protection of civilian committees. The outbreak of fighting
in April in Darfur highlights the need for further United Nations
efforts in mitigating conflict.
Question. SOUTH AFRICA: Last week, a delegation of senior South
African officials travelled to the United States to meet with State
Department officials, ostensibly about the U.S.-South Africa
relationship. Then, on May 11, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Brigety,
in a press conference in Johannesburg, ``bet [his] life'' on the claim
that South African weapons and ammunition were loaded onto Russian
vessel the ``Lady R'' from December 6-8, 2022. South Africa's foreign
ministry has denied the claim. Was Ambassador Brigety authorized to
accuse the South African Government of supplying arms to Russia
publicly? If no, why not?
Answer. Ambassador Brigety was authorized to speak with local South
African press about the visit in early May of a delegation of South
African officials to Washington, DC. Those meetings in early May
included discussion of the ``Lady R'' and South Africa's assurance that
an investigation was underway, as President Ramaphosa subsequently
confirmed in a statement. As Ambassador Brigety subsequently clarified,
as did the Department of State spokesperson, we intend to keep
conversations with the South Africans regarding our serious concerns in
diplomatic channels moving forward.
Question. What shifts will be made in the Biden administration's
policy toward South Africa given this clear violation of South Africa's
own policy of non-alignment and neutrality?
Answer. As is the case with many countries, we work with South
Africa on our many important shared priorities--including trade,
health, and climate change--while being frank and clear when we
disagree, such as South Africa's policy toward Russia. Where we see
evidence of South Africa taking actions that bely its stated policy of
nonalignment, we will continue to convey those concerns to South
African officials.
Question. Will South Africa's eligibility for preferential trade
benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act be revoked given
the statutory requirement that beneficiary countries ``not engage in
activities that undermine United States national security or foreign
policy interests''?
Answer. The annual African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) review
process, in which the Department of the State and the interagency
review each country's eligibility, has just begun. We are unable to
predetermine the Department of State's position on AGOA eligibility.
Question. How is the State Department engaged with the United
States Trade Representative on South Africa's AGOA eligibility?
Answer. The Department of State and the United States Trade
Representative are in regular contact regarding African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) matters. AGOA eligibility is determined by the
Trade Policy Staff Committee, which consists of multiple agencies
across the U.S. Government.
Question. If there is evidence that elements within South Africa's
Government or ruling ANC party took part in facilitating a reported
arms transfer to Russia, will the Administration use its existing
authorities to hold those individuals and entities accountable?
Answer. We do not publicly preview sanctions decisions. The Biden-
Harris administration has shown that it does not hesitate to use
existing authorities as appropriate to promote accountability and
curtail Putin's ability to fund and supply his war machine.
Question. MOZAMBIQUE: Please provide an update on the State
Department's efforts on the case of U.S. citizen Ryan Koher? While
Koher is no longer detained, he has yet to be formally charged with a
crime, he remains under investigation and unable to depart Mozambique
due to the confiscation of his passport.
Answer. Mr. Koher was granted provisional release from prison on
March 14. As the investigation is ongoing, Mr. Koher is unable to work
or leave the country and is not in possession of his passport. The
embassy requested a meeting with the Office of the Attorney General to
discuss the ongoing investigation and remains in contact with Mr.
Koher, his legal team, and relevant Government of Mozambique officials
regarding this case.
Question. COUP RESTRICTIONS: In Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso and
Guinea are subject to coup-related restrictions on foreign aid under
Section 7008 (P.L. 117-328, Division K) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2023. What is the current State Department
guidance on the application of Section 7008 in cases where coups have
occurred?
Answer. The Department of State restricts obligations and
expenditures of funds appropriated by the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, or Related Programs Appropriations Act for the government
of any country whose duly elected head of government has been deposed
by military coup d'etat or decree or a coup d'etat or decree in which
the military plays a decisive role. Assistance subject to this
restriction may be resumed to such government if the Secretary of State
certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that
after the termination of assistance a democratically elected government
has taken office. For fiscal year 2023 funds, the Secretary of State,
following consultation with the heads of relevant federal agencies, may
also waive the restriction on a program-by-program basis if the
Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations
that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United
States, subject to consultation with and notification to the
Committees. In addition, certain assistance subject to the restriction
may be provided under other available authorities.
Question. In your view, is the Department of State making full use
of its waiver and notwithstanding authorities provided under the
Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 on coup-
related restrictions to U.S. foreign aid appropriations? If no, why
not?
Answer. The Secretary has not yet exercised the waiver authority
under section 7008(b) of the fiscal year 2023 Appropriations Act. The
waiver is available only with respect to fiscal year 2023 funds, which
are still in the process of being allocated consistent with section
653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and therefore are not available
for obligation or the application of Section 7008.
Question. ELECTIONS: Elections are expected to be called for late
July in Zimbabwe. In addition to the persistent restrictions on
political and civic space in Zimbabwe and the regular use of the
institutions and resources of the state to the benefit of the ruling
ZANU-PF party, the pre-election period in Zimbabwe has been marred by:
the jailing (without bail) and convictions of opposition leaders and
critical voices on politically-motivated charges; the threat of
draconian legislation regulating NGOs; and significant flaws in the
voter registration process. What is the State Department's view on the
prospects for democratic elections in Zimbabwe later this year?
Answer. The Government of Zimbabwe has tilted the playing field in
the ruling ZANU-PF's favor using intimidation, coercion, patronage,
lawfare tactics, and at times, violence. Absent significant change in
the immediate term, it is difficult to see how this can lead to free
and fair elections in 2023.
Question. At what point do the pre-election conditions make it
impossible for Zimbabwe to hold legitimate democratic elections?
Answer. The United States will use all tools at its disposal to
determine whether the 2023 elections in Zimbabwe are free and fair. We
remain concerned about the worrying trends in the lead-up to the
elections, including the Government of Zimbabwe's use of intimidation,
coercion, patronage, lawfare tactics, and at times, violence.
Question. Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
are expected for December of this year. In addition to the logistical
challenges posed by holding nation-wide elections in DRC, the ongoing
State of Seige and conflict in Eastern Congo, exacerbated by the
presence of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels and the delays in conducting a
legitimate voter registration exercise (among other issues) make it
near certain that elections will be delayed and/or impossible to hold
across the country. What lessons did the State Department learn from
its handling of the 2019 electoral process in DRC, including the
controversial ``victory'' of President Tshisekedi?
Answer. Successful elections in 2023 should be free and fair, with
inclusive, transparent, and impartial electoral processes and held in
accordance with constitutional deadlines. President Tshisekedi has
firmly expressed his commitment to free, fair, and on time elections,
but we will remain engaged at the highest levels throughout the
elections planning process to press the Democratic Republic of the
Congo Government to take the necessary legal, financial, and technical
actions to ensure a better election in 2023.
Question. Has the United States been satisfied with the Presidency
of Felix Tshisekedi, which it was quick to support as the winner of the
2019 elections despite serious questions about the legitimacy of the
outcome?
Answer. Since he assumed power in 2019, President Tshisekedi and
his administration have shown a commitment to working closely with the
United States on areas of bilateral interest, including peace in
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), environmental
conservation, public health, and strategic minerals. Although
governance in the DRC has been far from perfect, with ongoing
corruption and human rights concerns, concrete gains have been made.
Our bilateral relationship has allowed us to engage critically with the
DRC Government on combatting trafficking-in-persons, anticorruption
efforts, and professionalization of the Congolese security sector.
Question. How is the State Department engaging with Congolese
officials, including President Tshisekedi, on the challenges to the
electoral process?
Answer. The Department of State continues to call on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo Government to ensure that political and civic
space remains open in the lead up to the elections so that the
Congolese people can express their views peacefully. This message was
delivered by both the President and the Secretary at the U.S.-Africa
Leaders' Summit and has been consistently reiterated in our subsequent
bilateral engagements. The United States is the largest donor of
funding for activities in support of free and fair 2023 elections,
providing $24.75 million to strengthen electoral process transparency
and electoral administration, improve civic education, and empower
communities to participate in elections.
Question. What accountability measures are being discussed for
spoilers to elections in DRC?
Answer. The U.S. Government is willing to consider the full range
of diplomatic and legal tools, including sanctions, in order to promote
accountability and help ensure the DRC can hold free and fair elections
in accordance with constitutional deadlines.
Question. Will the United States support the legitimate winner of
elections in DRC, even if that is not President Tshisekedi?
Answer. Yes.
Question. SOMALIA: Is the violent extremist organization al-Shabaab
present and/or operating in and/or around the city of Laascaanood or
more broadly in the regions of Sool and Sanaag in eastern Somaliland?
Answer. There are reports that al-Shabaab members are present and
operating in Laascaanood and Eastern Somaliland.
______
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Sudan: When Administrator Power appeared before this
Committee 2 weeks ago, I expressed serious concern about humanitarian
aid diversion in Ethiopia. We have since learned of another region
where vital U.S. food aid has shown up for sale. I remain deeply
concerned by the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan but am unclear
what steps USAID will take to mitigate a repeat performance of massive
food aid diversion.
Ms. Charles, how will USAID ensure food and other humanitarian aid
reach the intended recipients in Sudan?
Answer. Assistance saves lives and reflects the goodwill of the
American people. It is egregious that parties in Sudan are deliberately
targeting aid and aid workers. Even under very difficult environments
like Sudan we are redoubling our efforts on risk mitigation. In Sudan,
USAID assigned an expert on risk management to the Sudan response. In
light of the evolving context in Sudan, including the closure of the
banking system posing significant challenges to implementing partners'
ability to operate, USAID developed and shared with partners additional
guidance on the use of hawalas and mobile money should partners need to
utilize these alternatives. USAID also requires non-governmental
organization (NGO) partners to submit a Risk Assessment and Management
Plan (RAMP) as part of their applications for funding in Sudan. As part
of these RAMPs, all NGO applicants must demonstrate that they have
assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S.
Government resources.
Question. What lessons are you learning from and adapting to in
real-time from the discovery of the deeply disturbing theft of food aid
in Ethiopia so this does not happen in Sudan?
Answer. USAID is currently assessing developments and lessons from
both the Ethiopia and Sudan contexts to apply to global humanitarian
risk mitigation measures. While the developments in Ethiopia and Sudan
have both been disheartening, the circumstances and context in those
two crises are significantly different. Nonetheless, USAID looks to
mitigate risks in any context we operate in, and we are taking steps to
ensure our assistance going forward accounts for the different risks
present in both countries.
USAID closely monitors attempts to influence or divert our
assistance across all contexts, and we continue to call for the respect
of humanitarian personnel, facilities, and equipment, so life-saving
assistance may continue to reach those who are in need. In Ethiopia,
the organized diversion that we uncovered was occurring in a systematic
and organized fashion, facilitated by the Government of Ethiopia's
unique role in beneficiary targeting and storage of food assistance.
Ultimately, it is our assessment that that type of diversion is highly
unlikely to occur in Sudan because neither the Government of Sudan nor
the parties to the unfolding conflict have such roles with respect to
our assistance and the chaotic and kinetic environment prohibits them
from doing so.
The diversion that has occurred in Sudan, to date, has been much
more opportunistic and rooted in the theft or destruction of
commodities by armed actors prior to distribution, rather than the
coordinated and organized diversion of commodities seen in the Ethiopia
context. The mechanisms to mitigate this risk in Sudan include ensuring
partners are minimizing the storage of commodities near contact areas
whenever possible, expediting the speed with which commodities move
from warehouse to communities, and actively messaging that the theft of
commodities will not be tolerated and that the USG is watching and will
hold looters accountable. USAID's trusted humanitarian partners working
in Sudan are familiar with operating in active conflict contexts like
the current situation, and they work to mitigate these risks
accordingly.
Our colleagues in the region continue to coordinate with partners
to gather information regarding humanitarian needs, engage with key
stakeholders, and determine best ways to quickly, effectively, and
safely deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need within and
outside Sudan where conditions allow.
Question. Sudan: Assistance to Support Implementation of Framework
Agreement: The U.S. was preparing to commit significant resources to
support the transitional process and government under a much-
anticipated framework deal that ultimately collapsed into civil war. I
understand USAID previewed this assistance package to my staff.
Ms. Charles, what assistance had USAID planned for the transition
process and the government had the framework agreement been successful
and the fighting did not occur?
Answer. Following the revolution and the imperative to support the
civilian-led government, USAID ramped up programming after years of
maintaining a modest program focused on support to civil society and
peacebuilding. The opening democratic space, coupled with significant
resources provided by Congress, enabled both USAID and the Department
of State to expand programs, including support to the nascent
governance structures under the new government. USAID was supporting
Sudan's democratic transition by strengthening civilian political
leadership; promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of
expression and the right of peaceful assembly; and supporting the
Sudanese people's demand for an end to their military's long-standing
domination of politics and the economy. This included efforts to
explore anti-corruption and transparency mechanisms, support for
transitional justice and human rights, and opportunities to support
security sector reform.
Following the military takeover in October 2021 USAID pivoted
programming away from supporting Government of Sudan institutions.
Had the framework agreement held and a government genuinely led by
civilians been formed, USAID programs would have pivoted back to a
posture of support for a transitional government including for
elections preparations, helping marginalized communities throughout
Sudan to participate in the transition, engaging with private sector
actors to bolster Sudan's economy, and supporting the Sudanese people's
demand for democracy, justice, and accountability.
Question. How does USAID intend to use these funds to support the
framework agreement now that it is dead, and what long-term plans is
the Agency developing to adapt our massive assistance portfolio in
Sudan to the current context?
Answer. USAID's assistance will work on many levels, including
support for local initiatives that help meet basic emergency needs and
reinforcement of civilian initiatives aimed at shaping a path to
civilian rule. USAID will work closely with Sudanese civilian leaders
and our implementing partners, in consultation with Congress, to
determine the most effective ways to use our funding to support the
Sudanese people's democratic aspirations. USAID is working closely with
our partners to determine what adjustments we need to make with current
funding, and we will continue to assess the needs to adjust future
programming. USAID has made these types of adjustments before in Sudan
and are confident not only that programming can continue in this
context, but that it can have positive effects. The current context
demonstrates the importance of broad, flexible, and adaptable
programming that provides consistent, long-term support in critical
sectors such as democracy and governance, agriculture (to address
increasing food insecurity) and health.
Question. Risk Management: USAID has many personnel within its
ranks who are well-versed in Sudan, related conflict dynamics, and the
country's politics. I understand one of your colleagues is even a part
of the negotiating team currently in Jeddah and regularly advises the
Assistant Secretary on Sudan issues. Despite this expertise, USAID
seemed ill-prepared for the very predictable scenario that played out
in Khartoum.
Many implementing partners tell my staff USAID did little to warn
them of the mounting risk. USAID-funded partners continued to have
consultants and staff stream into the country in the tense days leading
up to the outbreak of fighting. Why didn't your team's experts
recognize the threat and take better steps to warn implementing
partners, especially as RSF and SAF forces flowed into Khartoum?
Answer. USAID prioritizes safety for our staff and our partners
above all. When USAID receives credible, actionable information that
could jeopardize the safety of staff or staff partners, we share it
with them. There was no recent history of rapid-onset, large-scale
violence in Khartoum as most violence had been in other parts of the
country. As people evacuated, USAID hosted partner calls to communicate
the information it had.
Question. Localization: Low capacity to effectively manage U.S.
foreign assistance resources and protect against waste, fraud, and
abuse can act as an impediment to efforts to ``localize'' aid. Still,
with the appropriate safeguards in place, the evacuation of
international aid organizations from conflict areas of Sudan may give
USAID an opportunity to further operationalize Administrator Power's
localization agenda, to support locally-led responses, and to push back
against a state-centric model of aid.
Is USAID appropriately positioned to expand its work with local
implementers to respond to the expanding conflict and increasing levels
of need in Sudan?
Answer. Yes, USAID is appropriately positioned to expand our
support for local implementing partners to meet current needs. Through
our longstanding support to civil society in Sudan, we have established
networks with local organizations that focus on peacebuilding,
democracy building, human rights, and social cohesion. Some of our
activities are flexible grants-under-contract models that support local
initiatives and organizations, and are particularly well suited to
respond to changing scenarios and needs through targeted, small-scale
activities that pilot new models or approaches and can build confidence
for subsequent efforts to scale-up. Our assistance will work on many
levels, including support for local initiatives that help meet basic
emergency needs and reinforcing civilian initiatives aimed at shaping a
path to civilian rule. To this end, USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI) supports 65 local civil society and community
organizations in support of increasing civilian participation in the
democratic transition process, and increasing access to reliable
information.
For the crisis response, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
(BHA) plans to fund multiple local organizations as sub-awardees under
awards to public international organization and international non-
governmental organization (NGO) partners. With fiscal year 2022
funding, BHA is supporting 37 local organizations to provide
humanitarian assistance as sub-awardees through the Rapid Response Fund
implemented by the International Organization for Migration, through
existing USAID awards with international NGOs, and through the United
Nations Development Program-administered Sudan Humanitarian Fund, which
can disburse emergency allocations to support multi-sectoral
interventions across Sudan through national non-governmental
organizations. These programs are focused on health; nutrition;
agriculture; protection; economic recovery and market systems; shelter
and settlements; and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH).
As USAID is continuing the review of applications for humanitarian
assistance funding and fine-tuning the response strategy, we expect an
increase in local partner involvement. USAID anticipates that
humanitarian funding will continue to be channeled to more local NGO or
community-based organization partners through sub-grants. Our local
partners have a key role in the delivery of health, nutrition, water,
sanitation and hygiene, protection, agriculture, and multipurpose cash
services.
Question. What safeguards have already been put in place, or will
soon be put in place, to accelerate this shift?
Answer. Each mechanism that USAID utilizes to work with local
partners to implement humanitarian assistance has risk mitigation
processes built in to safeguard American taxpayer resources. For
example, USAID's prime partners that provide sub-awards to local NGOs
have several measures to reduce risk of fraud, waste, and abuse,
including BHA-approved oversight strategies, required compliance
monitoring, and provisions requiring prevention of support to
sanctioned groups or individuals which flow down to each sub-awardee.
Additionally, mechanisms that USAID supports, like the Sudan
Humanitarian Fund and International Organization for Migration's Rapid
Response Fund, which are designed to provide streamlined and flexible
grant application and disbursement processes, also include several due
diligence measures, such as screening prospective partners against the
Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
specially designated nationals list and UN Sanctions lists. USAID
regularly cross checks all proposed sub-awardees against the OFAC and
UN sanctions lists for updated information and keeps filing records.
Question. Localization: Citizen groups are coming together to lead
community responses that already have helped reduce mortality and
suffering. By building upon these grassroots responses, USAID can help
bolster community mobilization at a time when spoilers are exploiting
the political vacuum.
How will USAID work to support and fund these local actors?
Answer. Many of the grassroots civil society organizations
instrumental to the 2019 uprising and preserving the civil and
democratic gain after it have pivoted to emergency response to support
their communities. Many of these organizations were USAID partners
prior to the conflict and USAID continues to assist grassroots civil
society actors, supporting them to shift their efforts and address
their communities' emergency needs. This includes partners spearheading
community coordination response efforts in Port Sudan. This pivot will
help the communities receiving this urgently needed assistance to
withstand the immediate shocks of the conflict. Many of these
grassroots members wear many hats in their communities--they are first
responders, caretakers, and community mobilizers, and they rightly
desire a say in the political future of Sudan. While these grassroots
members provide urgent relief to their communities, their efforts will
also help nurture the space necessary for greater citizen engagement,
leadership, and inclusion in coordination about peace and governance in
Sudan. USAID stands poised to ramp up support as opportunities arise.
Question. Humanitarian Assistance: As conflict expands and
humanitarian needs rise, it is critical that providers move swiftly and
efficiently to respond. At the same time, it is necessary for aid to be
conflict sensitive and avoid deepening social, economic, and/or
political fault lines or tensions.
What steps is USAID taking to ensure its responses are locally
appropriate and conflict sensitive?
Answer. USAID takes many measures to ensure that its programs fit
the local context in any country it operates. For example, USAID
ensures humanitarian assistance is conflict sensitive by using
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and
independence as guidelines for implementation. This means that
implementing partners provide humanitarian assistance to the most
vulnerable--regardless of demographic characteristics or affiliation--
based on needs assessments that are carried out by humanitarian
experts. USAID's humanitarian assistance is also implemented by
independent public international organizations and non-governmental
organizations, not through government agencies or other affiliated
groups.
The majority of humanitarian delivery in Sudan is done in
partnership with local organizations, and they will continue to be the
bedrock of the humanitarian response based on their unique capacities,
local knowledge, important networks, and trust and acceptance among
communities. USAID has flexible mechanisms in place, like the
International Organization for Migration's Rapid Response Fund, and
supports the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, to provide immediate funding to
local partners. Providing support through these organizations and
mechanisms allows for flexibility to respond to the most appropriate
needs within the context while incorporating the expertise of local
partners.
Question. Humanitarian Assistance: Historically, warring factions
(including governments) have sought to exercise significant control
over humanitarian operations, including by determining which
organizations will be granted permission to work in an area of
conflict, whether and which international staff will be granted entry
to join the response, who those organizations can hire locally, where
they can travel, and to whom, where, and how assistance will be
targeted. Many also seek to materially benefit from aid operations,
including by directing or manipulating procurements for security,
commodities, and transport and storage. Moreover, warring factions
often seek to relieve international pressure for accountability by
leveraging humanitarian access.
How will international donors avoid re-empowering and legitimizing
NISS/HAC, along with SAF and NCP, through their manipulation and
control over international aid efforts?
Answer. USAID has engaged the Department of State as well as
international donors to coordinate joint advocacy on humanitarian
access in both bilateral and multilateral fora and will continue to do
so. USAID also remains in close contact with our implementing partners
and have asked them to raise humanitarian access issues they encounter
to ensure that our advocacy is specific and targeted at the appropriate
authorities. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA)
continually assesses risks affecting its assistance, including in
Sudan. We--and our implementing partners--are closely monitoring
attempts by the SAF and RSF to control, divert, or otherwise influence
the delivery of our assistance. This includes actions the Sudan
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) may take.
Question. What specifically is the U.S. Government doing to ensure
the international humanitarian response does not empower or materially
benefit these parties and, instead, hold them personally accountable
for this violence?
Answer. USAID places the highest priority on ensuring the agency
and its partners use taxpayer funds wisely, effectively, and for their
intended purpose. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine
the risk of our assistance being used for malign purposes in Sudan. We
are continuously working with partners to safely and effectively
deliver humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people based on
humanitarian principles, and we take seriously any allegation of USAID
assistance being diverted from the intended beneficiaries. For example,
USAID/BHA requires non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to
submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of these RAMPs, all NGO
applicants must demonstrate that they have assessed the risks of fraud,
waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. Government resources.
BHA also has a Risk Management Advisor assigned to support BHA's
Sudan Complex Emergency Response Management Team and Disaster
Assistance Response Team, which leads the USG response to the crisis,
on risk mitigation matters. USAID continues to work closely with its
existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have proper risk
mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S. taxpayer-funded
humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized by those for
whom it is intended.
Finally, all USAID applicants and recipients are required, pursuant
to their award, to disclose in writing to the USAID Office of Inspector
General (OIG), with a copy to the cognizant Agreement Officer, all
violations of federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or
gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award.
We also refer you to the Departments of Treasury and State for
additional information about their efforts to pursue accountability,
including under Executive Order 13067 and 13400 (https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/05/04/
executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-destabilizing-
sudan-and-undermining-the-goal-of-a-democratic-transition/).
Question. Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian needs created by
this conflict are significant not only for Sudan but also neighboring
countries, who are struggling to cope with an influx of refugees
seeking safety.
How is the U.S. Government responding to the crisis in neighboring
countries, including the refugee response?
Answer. As access and security permit, U.S.-funded humanitarian
partners are present at the borders and are working with local
authorities to provide services to those in need. USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) programs are helping to support the needs
of displaced people who have crossed into neighboring countries from
Sudan. USAID partner, the UN World Food Program, continues to support
Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries, including the Central
African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. We continue
to call on all parties to allow safe access for humanitarian agencies
and their workers to those in need, including those in border areas.
For additional information on refugee programing in neighboring
countries, we refer you to the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Pete Ricketts
Question. Evacuation of American Citizens: When responding to my
question on why our allies conducted evacuations sooner than the United
States, you replied that there was a coordinated division of labor
between the United States and our partners in which our allies would be
responsible for air evacuations from the Wadi Seidna airfield near
Khartoum. At the same time, the U.S. would be responsible for the land
evacuation. On April 23, French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed
that a plane had arrived in Djibouti carrying French citizens. Another
French evacuation took place on Monday, taking the total number of
people evacuated to 388. On April 24, reports indicated that four
German Air Force places had evacuated more than 400 people from Sudan
as of Monday. And on Tuesday, April 25, the U.K. announced it was
starting air evacuations for British nationals. In an April 23 Security
Alert from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan, the alert said, ``Due to the
uncertain security situation in Khartoum and closure of the airport, it
is not currently safe to undertake a U.S. Government-coordinated
evacuation of private U.S. citizens. It does not mention coordination
with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S. citizens of the option.
In an April 24 update from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan titled ``Situation
in Sudan: Information for U.S. Citizens in Sudan,'' the embassy
repeated that it could not undertake a U.S. Government-coordinated
evacuation of private U.S. citizens while also saying that ``for those
who are able to depart Port Sudan via ferry, U.S. Government officials
are also receiving citizens in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.'' Again, it does
not mention coordination with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S.
citizens of the option. On this same date (April 24), National Security
Council coordinator for strategic communications, John Kirby, said ``it
is not safe right now for another evacuation attempt'' and that all
Americans who haven't already heeded warnings to leave Sudan should
shelter-in-place due to violence in Khartoum. An April 25 Security
Alert from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan said, ``There are options to
depart Sudan, but you must decide the safest and best method of
departure for yourself and your family.'' Yet again, it does not
mention coordination with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S.
citizens of the option. Regarding the ``division of labor'' mentioned
during your testimony, when was that division of labor decided upon
within the U.S. Government and on what date did we begin that
coordination with those partner nations?
Answer. We respectfully defer to Department of Defense on their
communications regarding flight landing permissions at Wadi Seidna
Military Air Base. In addition to our widely-disseminated Security
Alerts, the Department of State communicated directly with U.S.
citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan via messages sent
through email, WhatsApp, SMS, direct phone calls, and other means. We
communicated with our international partners from the onset of the
crisis to exchange information on departure options as they developed;
we shared these options with U.S. citizens who held the appropriate
U.S. travel documents. As a result of this communication, a number of
U.S. citizens who could safely get to the airport did depart on Allied
flights.
Question. If the U.S. had a coordinated division of labor whereby
our allies would evacuate U.S. citizens by air, why did the U.S.
Embassy in Sudan not put that specific information out in an alert or
an update when allies began air evacuations on April 23, 24, and 25?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs
communicated directly via email, text, and social media to convey these
options to U.S. citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan
and who held the appropriate U.S. travel documents. We communicated
directly with U.S. citizens who expressed an interest in departing
Sudan that international partners offered various options, and that
communication was updated daily as departure options changed quickly
and often.
Question. How did the State Department expect American citizens in
Sudan to know they could evacuate via air via our allies when they
began their air evacuations?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs
communicated directly via email, text, and WhatsApp to convey to U.S.
citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan and who held the
appropriate U.S. travel documents that international partners offered
various options, and that communication was updated daily as departure
options changed quickly and often. A number of U.S. citizens did depart
on Allied flights as a result of our messages.
Question. Why did the National Security Council coordinator for
strategic communications, John Kirby, advise that all Americans who
haven't already heeded warnings to leave Sudan to shelter-in-place due
to violence in Khartoum on April 24 when allied countries had already
begun air evacuations and there was an understanding that they would
take U.S. citizens?
Answer. We respectfully defer to the National Security Council on
questions regarding information they conveyed to U.S. citizens in
Sudan.
Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on
what dates as part of the U.S. military-facilitated embassy evacuation?
Answer. Between April 22 and May 3, 2023, the Department of State,
in coordination with Department of Defense, assisted more than 700
individuals to depart Khartoum to Port Sudan via three separate land
convoys; approximately 280 of those were U.S. citizens. In total, the
Department of State directly or indirectly assisted the departure of
more than 2,000 individuals from Sudan, 1,300 of whom were U.S.
citizens many of whom were provided guidance on how to depart via
commercial ferry from Port Sudan, via overland borders or on Allied
flights.
Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on
what dates as part of the partner nation flights?
Answer. Our records indicate that at least 340 U.S. citizens
departed Sudan on flights charted by foreign governments from April 23
to May 12, 2023. This number likely underestimates the total number of
U.S. citizens that departed on flights chartered by our partners. There
were additional flights where foreign government (allies and partners)
manifests were not provided to the State Department. In addition, there
were likely dual nationals on some of the flights who were not counted
as U.S. citizens. Finally, a small number of U.S. citizens who arrived
in Saudi Arabia by airplane, instead of by ship, may not have been
included in this estimate.
Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on
what dates as part of the three U.S.-facilitated convoys (28 April to 2
May)?
Answer. Approximately 280 U.S. citizens were evacuated as part of
the U.S. facilitated convoys. The first convoy arrived in Port Sudan on
April 29; the second convoy arrived in Port Sudan on April 30; and the
third convoy arrived in Port Sudan on May 1.
Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on
what dates as part of the UN convoy on April 23?
Answer. The Department of State assisted the successful United
Nations-led relocation of 1,300 United Nations, NGO, and diplomatic
personnel, including 78 U.S. citizens, to Port Sudan on April 25.
Question. In response to my question, you noted that the U.S. ``had
in place a broad warden system that captured about 5,000 Americans.''
Also, in your response to Senator Cardin's related evacuation
questions, you noted the U.S. pushed out warden messages ``I think 12
times so far about various options for leaving the country traveling on
flights with allies or this overland convoy.'' Please share with the
Committee the warden messages sent to U.S. citizens registered with the
Department in Sudan, by date.
Answer. The Department of State transmitted 15 security messages
(Security Alerts) to U.S. citizens from April 13 to May 12, 2023. In
addition, the Department also sent 19 messages directly to those
individuals registered in our case management system. Please see the
complete timeline below.
consular affairs messaging on the sudan crisis
All times ET.
Friday, May 12, 2023
4:45 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them that Consular services are available in
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart on their own and
information on possible commercial options to depart Sudan (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-update-on-sudan-may-12-2023/).
Thursday, May 4, 2023
1:00 AM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them of commercial options to depart Sudan via
ferry (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-update-on-sudan-
departure-information-may-4-2023/).
Wednesday, May 3, 2023
12:40 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not go to
the Hotel Coral in Port Sudan and not to go to Fenti Golf in Khartoum.
10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not to go
to the Hotel Coral, as no further assistance will be provided.
Tuesday, May 2, 2023
2:30 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of
registrants informing them that consular services are available in
neighboring countries (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-updated-
information-for-u-s-citizens-in-sudan-may-2-2023-at-830-p-m/) for those
who choose to depart and that the U.S. Government has completed all
currently planned convoys to Port Sudan.
Monday, May 1, 2023
8:00 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising them we are unaware of additional flights from Wadi Seidna
airport and sharing information on border crossings.
Sunday, April 30, 2023
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising that they should seek to leave by commercially available
means.
10:00 PM (approx.): Update on Information for U.S. Citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan-2/) posted on Embassy Khartoum website (posted on TravelGov May
1).
Saturday, April 29, 2023
8:00 PM: Message (CACMS) and SMS sent to the full universe of
registrants advising them of convoy C times and rally point. WhatsApp
messages sent to all cases reported ``ready to depart.'' Calls made to
all high-profile, USG-adjacent, and Congressional cases with this
message.
2:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to verified U.S. citizens who were ready to
depart asking them to notify CA if they have departed Sudan, and if
not, verify they are still requesting assistance.
1:30 AM: Security Alert on avoiding Wadi Seidna airfield.
Friday, April 28, 2023
3:36 PM: Message (CACMS and [email protected]) sent to individuals
opting into the convoy B with times and rally point.
3:30 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants
advising them to make contact if they wanted assistance departing on
convoy B.
3:15 PM: Topper at Department Press Briefing on advice and assistance
to U.S. citizens.
02:00 AM: Repeat Message ([email protected]) sent to U.S. citizens
who indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally
point information.
Thursday, April 27, 2023
9:30 PM: Message ([email protected]) sent to 147 U.S. citizens who
indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally
point information.
1:30 PM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to the full universe of
registrants who expressed interest in departure regarding convoy A.
TravelGov post (https://twitter.com/TravelGov/status/
1651641198191190025) urging U.S. citizens to fill out CACMS form posted
across all of CA's social media platforms.
U.S. Embassy Khartoum's website updated to have CACMS form link appear
in banner on all pages; large image with form link added to home page.
11:30 AM: Secretary Blinken holds press briefing (https://
www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-of-homeland-
security-alejandro-mayorkas-at-a-joint-press-availability/) with DHS
and mentions convoy.
10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to active cases notifying of
flights opportunities at Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Wednesday, April 26, 2023
10:30 PM: Message (WhatsApp and SMS) sent to all verified U.S.
citizens, ready to depart notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Tuesday, April 25, 2023
7:30 PM: Message (SMS) sent to all verified U.S. citizens, ready to
depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
5:00 PM: Security Alert on Port Sudan and land border options (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert/). Red banner linking to Embassy Alerts
page added to state.gov.
10:00 AM: Message (WhatsApp, SMS, and calls) sent to all verified U.S.
citizens, ready to depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi
Seidna Airfield.
Monday, April 24, 2023
11:06 PM: Security alert on border crossing info for neighboring
countries also sent to all active cases in CACMS (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan/).
Sunday, April 23, 2023
Red banner (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/ea/situation-in-sudan-2023.html) added to
travel.state.gov containing CACMS link and STEP info (additional info
continues to be added and removed as situations unfolds)
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Suspension of
Operations Security Alert.
6:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Saudi vessel
(Amama) in Port Sudan.
Saturday, April 22, 2023
11:00 PM: Security alert on suspension of Embassy operations and
sharing link to CACMS form (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-
suspension-of-embassy-operations/)
11:00 PM: Travel Advisory updated to reflect ordered departure of U.S.
direct hire employees and family members. Pushed out via media note
(https://www.state.gov/sudan-travel-advisory-remains-level-4-do-not-
travel/) and amplified on TravelGov social media/websites, per normal
SOP.
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding a UAE convoy.
3:16 AM: Security Alert on security challenges in country (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/sudan-security-alert/)
Wednesday, April 19, 2023
6:50 PM: Security Alert on ongoing violence and reports of assaults,
home invasions, and looting (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-
s-embassy-khartoum-5/).
3:29 PM: Travelgov social media post with contact info (https://
twitter.com/TravelGov/status/1648770894003683328) advising U.S.
citizens to contact the Embassy via email or phone and sign up for
STEP.
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
9:45 AM: Security Alert noting ongoing fighting, gunfire, and security
force activity, advising shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-18-april-2023/)
Sunday April 16, 2023
10:00 AM: Security Alert on situation and advising to remain indoors
and shelter in place until further notice (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-4/)
Saturday April 15, 2023
Security Alert on continuing to shelter in place (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/)
Security Alert urging shelter in place and stating no plans for U.S.
Government-coordinated evacuation of U.S. citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/).
Security Alert recommending shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-2/)
Travel.Gov published a consolidated post (https://twitter.com/
TravelGov/status/1647338067823304704?s=20) at 4:36 p.m. for Saturday
alerts.
Thursday, April 13, 2023
9:40 AM: Security Alert advising U.S. citizens to avoid travel to
Karima, Northern Sudan, and surrounding areas (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-april-13-2023/)
Background
Except where noted, every Sudan alert is:
pushed out to STEP enrollees
posted on Embassy Khartoum's website
posted on the TSG country page for Sudan (using a script
that pulls from the embassy's page)
amplified by CA on social media
Question. In response to my question on whether there were
contingency plans in place to work with allied nations prior to April
15 in the event of significant conflict breaking out, you said ``We do
continual planning with our allies and partners largely based at our
military commands . . . for all high-threat posts and various
contingencies.'' However, you continue, ``With regard to this decision
on the division of labor, it had to do with various concerns about who
was best positioned to do what at the time and it was negotiated and
arranged in real-time at AFRICOM in Djibouti as well as in AFRICOM in
Stuttgart with our allies.'' If the Department conducts continual
planning with all high-threat posts and various contingencies, why was
it necessary to negotiate and arrange in real-time this division of
labor to rely on allies for air evacuations of American citizens?
Answer. Embassy Khartoum, like all posts worldwide, regularly
updates its Emergency Action Plans, which include contingency plans for
evacuations. All plans need refinement based on real-time information,
such as the availability of military assets, conditions on the ground,
and risks associated with evacuation routes. The Department's advanced
contingency planning took into consideration U.S. military base
locations and general assets available at these locations, but still
needed to be updated in real-time to reflect availability of assets and
adjust route options based on the threat picture at specific locations,
including the airports, and on major roads, which changed hourly.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Many view the chaotic and disorganized evacuation of
Sudan as the latest example of the Biden administration's long list of
foreign policy failures. Why did this Administration fail to see the
warning signs early enough to prevent another emergency evacuation?
Answer. The Department was aware of and took action over many weeks
to address tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid
Support Forces (RSF). We engaged in near constant diplomacy, often
working closely with civilians, to defuse tensions between the SAF and
RSF. The Secretaries of State and Defense as well as Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Phee, repeatedly engaged Sudanese actors
to try to bring about a negotiated settlement.
Question. Why did the U.S. strategy to guide Sudan to democracy end
in war?
Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process
to establish a civilian-led transitional government that would bring
Sudan through a political transition culminating in democratic
elections and fulfill the aspirations of the Sudanese people for
freedom, justice, and peace. The Sudanese-led process was successful in
addressing many complex and divisive issues related to transitional
justice and security sector reform, among others. Working with the
Tripartite Mechanism and other international partners, we supported all
the Sudanese parties involved as they worked toward an agreement toward
the end of the process. The Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed
Forces elevated their interests above those of the Sudanese people and
chose to fight instead of negotiating through the issues dividing them.
Question. The situation in Sudan did not develop over the course of
the past month. It is estimated that there were roughly 16,000
Americans in Sudan but the Administration was telling them to find
their own way out of Sudan. Knowing the situation in Sudan could
implode at any time, why did we not have non-combatant evacuation
operation (NEO) plans in place to get American citizens out of Sudan?
Answer. Every post, including Embassy Khartoum has evacuation plans
and regularly performs drills and exercises on crisis scenarios.
Embassy Khartoum and the Department of Defense coordinated regularly on
a range of contingencies and crisis scenarios in advance of this
crisis. As the situation unfolded, the Department of State and
Department of Defense coordinated in real time based on the dynamic
situation on the ground.
Question. With the absence of any commercial air, charter aircraft
capabilities, and overland road routes out of Sudan, what is the Biden
administration advising Americans in Sudan to do?
Answer. We are advising U.S. citizens who remained in Sudan and now
wish to depart to use commercial means, such as ferry service from Port
Sudan. U.S. citizens remain able to cross overland into other
countries, such as Egypt. Information on possible options to depart
Sudan may be found in our most recent Security Alert issued May 12,
2023, which is on the website for the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. The
U.S. Government will continue to provide information for U.S. citizens
in Sudan, including exit options.
Question. With no U.S. presence on the ground, what efforts is the
Biden administration currently taking to ensure the safe evacuation of
Americans stranded in Sudan?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to provide information for
U.S. citizens in Sudan, including exit options. U.S. citizens remaining
in Sudan who need assistance are advised to contact the closest U.S.
embassy or consulate and refer to the most recent Security Alert issued
May 12, 2023, which can be found on the website for the U.S. Embassy in
Khartoum.
Question. Media reports indicate that the Wagner Group expanded its
involvement in Sudan since 2019. They have mined for gold, explored for
uranium and supplied mercenaries to the region of Darfur. In 2021,
Wagner began to strengthen its partnership with General Hamdan, (who
visited Moscow in the early days of the Ukraine war and has reportedly
received military equipment from the group) following the coup that led
to the two generals seizing power. What role did Russia play leading up
to and immediately after the outbreak of conflict?
Answer. Currently, we are only aware of minimal involvement by
Russia in the conflict. The Secretary spoke about our concerns
regarding the Kremlin-backed--Transnational Criminal Organization
Wagner group--at the African Leaders Summit. He told African leaders
that Wagner undermines good governance, exploits insecurity and robs
countries of their mineral wealth. Engagement with Wagner simply brings
more death, destruction, and instability. That said, it is the Sudanese
Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces that bear responsibility for this
conflict.
Question. To what extent has Russia been involved?
Answer. Currently, we are only aware of minimal involvement by
Russia in the conflict. The Secretary has spoken to our concerns about
the Kremlin-backed--Transnational Criminal Organization Wagner group--
that its engagement simply brings more death, destruction, and
instability. That said, it is the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid
Support Forces that bear responsibility for this conflict.
______
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Humanitarian assistance is being targeted in Sudan.
Reports indicate humanitarian aid workers are being violently attacked
and sexually assaulted. In addition, warehouses with critical aid are
also reportedly being looted and destroyed.
Since the beginning of the current conflict, how many humanitarian
aid workers have been killed in Sudan?
Answer. At least six of USAID's humanitarian partner staff have
been killed since the conflict began, four of which were UN staff. The
total number of humanitarian workers who have died from the conflict is
likely higher.
Question. What impact has the violence and destruction had on the
ability of the United States and the international community to deliver
humanitarian assistance?
Answer. Ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces, the
Rapid Support Forces, and other parties to the conflict is the primary
factor driving humanitarian needs in Sudan. Nearly one-third of the
population already required humanitarian assistance before the latest
outbreak of fighting--approximately 16 million people; the conflict has
impeded access to life-saving assistance and basic services for
millions of people, further exacerbating humanitarian needs. People,
particularly in Khartoum and the surrounding areas, are suffering from
shortages of food, fuel, medications, and safe drinking water, while
access to fuel, electricity, and telecommunications infrastructure
remain limited in many parts of the country.
Attacks against humanitarian staff and the looting of humanitarian
assets forced many of our partners to temporarily suspend hundreds of
life-saving humanitarian programs and evacuate their staff--impacting
the millions of people who relied on these programs to meet their basic
needs. Nearly 1.3 million people did not receive food assistance in
April because of the conflict according to the World Food Program. Most
importantly, the insecure operating environment is limiting partners'
ability to access populations in need with life-saving assistance.
Furthermore, the banking system in Sudan shuttered due to the violence,
which has made cash inaccessible for partners. The widespread looting
of warehouses, humanitarian offices, and medical centers have decreased
the amount of commodities, supplies, and equipment available for life-
saving humanitarian assistance. At the same time, insecurity coupled
with shortages of fuel have made the replenishment of these critical
items very difficult.
USAID maintains that a durable end to the conflict is the only
solution to the humanitarian crisis and continues to call on all
parties to allow safe, sustained, and unhindered access for
humanitarian agencies and their workers to reach people in need.
Question. Two-thirds of hospitals in Khartoum have closed.
Hospitals have been shelled or used as defensive positions. Health care
workers have been killed. Hundreds of doctors have fled.
Is the health care system in Sudan on the verge of collapse?
Answer. The ongoing fighting is deteriorating humanitarian
conditions countrywide but has particularly crippled the healthcare
system. Healthcare infrastructure and personnel have come under attack,
people with chronic diseases lack access to care, and the rainy
season--which will begin in June and continue through October--
threatens to compound the situation. Additionally, military occupation
of facilities, as well as a lack of consistent access to electricity,
fuel, medicines, water, and other essential supplies are driving the
collapse of the healthcare system. Approximately two-thirds of
hospitals across Sudan are no longer functioning, and at least 25 have
been attacked since the start of the crisis.
Question. What steps has USAID taken to get emergency medical aid
into Sudan?
Answer. USAID's partner the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is
distributing critical health supplies in Khartoum, including emergency
health kits and essential medicines for hospitals. On May 5, USAID
partner the World Health Organization (WHO), in coordination with the
United Arab Emirates, delivered 30 metric tons of urgent medical
supplies to Port Sudan. The supplies, which will be delivered to
hospitals and health facilities facing dire shortages, include enough
trauma, emergency surgical supplies, and essential medicines to treat
165,000 people. WHO has also distributed trauma kits from Port Sudan to
functioning health facilities in Al Jazirah State and Khartoum. WHO has
distributed fuel to one of the main hospitals in Khartoum to power
generators needed for continued operations.
Question. Last week, the World Food Program said that roughly $13-
14 million worth of food products allocated for the people in Sudan was
looted within the last month. Before the conflict, about one-third of
Sudan already relied on humanitarian assistance.
How is food assistance currently being distributed?
Answer. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance's (BHA) primary
food assistance partner is the UN World Food Program (WFP). BHA-
supported food assistance in Sudan--whether through WFP or a non-
governmental organization partner--is provided via in-kind food
distributions or cash-based transfers for food. Given the ongoing
security situation, partners are primarily relying upon national staff
and available prepositioned stocks to implement programs in pockets of
safety.
Question. What, if anything, can be done to help offset the food
that has been looted?
Answer. WFP's insurance covers commodities from the point where WFP
takes possession of the commodity to the point where they transfer it
to either a government, a partner, or a beneficiary. WFP has processes
in motion for reimbursements on insurances for food, as appropriate. In
some cases, WFP can also work with local authorities to try to recover
stolen commodities.
Question. What steps are being taken to ensure aid workers are safe
and the supplies are secure?
Answer. USAID continually reviews the risks associated with its
humanitarian programming to ensure that partners are able to
effectively carry out USAID-funded activities in line with humanitarian
principles and in compliance with the terms and conditions of their
awards. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine multiple
risks, including the risk of our assistance being diverted in Sudan.
USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance requires partners to submit
a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of the RAMPs, all non-
governmental organization applicants must demonstrate that they have
assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S.
Government resources. USAID is also examining potential augmentation of
additional risk mitigation requirements applicable to new applications
for humanitarian funding or activities in Sudan and is working closely
with its existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have proper risk
mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S. taxpayer-funded
humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized by those for
whom it is intended. Our colleagues in the region are working with
partners to determine the best ways to quickly and safely deliver
humanitarian assistance to people in need within and outside Sudan
where conditions allow.
USAID supports innovative safety and security programs specifically
for the humanitarian community; collecting and sharing aid worker
security incident data to identify threats impacting relief efforts;
funding training that enhances aid workers' ability to keep themselves
safe; and supporting activities that raise professional standards and
capacity across the humanitarian security sector. USAID's humanitarian
implementing partners determine their own risk tolerance and develop
their own mitigation strategies to address their workers'
vulnerabilities in high-threat high-risk environments such as Sudan.
All implementing partners are required to maintain an operational
security management system based on a comprehensive risk assessment and
planning process that meets their organization's duty of care for their
staff. This includes requiring the submission of location-specific
Safety and Security Plans specific to each proposed operational area as
part of their applications for funding in Sudan. All applicant Safety
and Security Plans must include and clearly address the following:
contextual analysis, threat analysis, vulnerability analysis,
contingency planning for relevant emergency situations (abduction,
evacuation, emergency medical care, psychosocial support, sexual
assault, armed attack), and risk mitigation measures in relation to the
above topics.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
Question. Sanctions: While I was pleased to see the executive order
that was issued last week, without actual designations, it means
nothing. Ms. Nuland--When does the Administration plan to designate
individuals under the executive order?
Answer. The United States is considering the full range of tools at
our disposal to address the conflict in Sudan, and this includes
designating individuals under the executive order. On June 1, the
Department of Treasury added four companies, two affiliated with the
SAF and two with the RSF, to the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. We also amended the Sudan
Business Advisory that determine that Sudanese gold is conflict
affected, and imposed visa restrictions on officials from the SAF, RSF,
and leaders from the former Omar al-Bashir regime, responsible for, or
complicit in, undermining Sudan's democratic transition.
Question. Do you believe that Hemedti and Burhan meet the
qualifications for sanctions under the executive order?
Answer. We cannot comment on potential sanctions targets. We have
frequently condemned the actions of their forces in perpetuating this
conflict.
______
Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
Question. As the crisis intensifies, humanitarian relief will be
paramount. Unfortunately, we've seen raids against humanitarian
caravans and attacks on personnel. The World Food Programme (WFP)--
which until recently was headed by my friend and fellow South
Carolinian, David Beasley--has lost at least three of its employees and
an estimated $400 million worth of critical supplies since the violence
started. I've also heard that implementing partners on the ground are
facing significant bureaucratic delays from Sudanese officials,
including the Humanitarian Aid Commission.
As the greatest contributor to the WFP and several other
implementers in the region, what steps can we take to provide taxpayer
accountability and ensure humanitarian relief reaches those who are
most in need?
Answer. USAID is working very closely with its partners to identify
which bureaucratic impediments are constraining humanitarian
operations, in which areas, and by which authorities. Having a
comprehensive understanding of these impediments allows USAID to be a
better advocate for changes that will improve our partners' ability to
operate. USAID is coordinating with the Department of State to elevate
these bureaucratic impediments to the appropriate authorities at all
levels, whether inside Sudan, in neighboring countries, or through
diplomatic channels in Washington. USAID will regularly update these
diplomatic points based on partner feedback and the evolving context on
the ground.
From an award management perspective, USAID places the highest
priority on ensuring we and our partners use taxpayer funds wisely,
effectively, and for their intended purpose. We continually review the
risks associated with our programming to ensure that partners are able
to effectively carry out USAID-funded activities in line with
humanitarian principles and in compliance with the terms and conditions
of their awards. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine
multiple risks, including the risk of our assistance being diverted in
Sudan. BHA requires non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to
submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of these RAMPs, NGO
applicants must demonstrate that they have assessed the risks of fraud,
waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. Government resources.
USAID/BHA has a Risk Management Advisor assigned on the
humanitarian Response Management Team to provide compliance and risk
mitigation expertise. USAID/BHA is also examining potential
augmentation of additional risk mitigation requirements applicable to
new applications for funding or activities in Sudan and is working
closely with its existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have
proper risk mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S.
taxpayer-funded humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized
by those for whom it is intended.
Finally, USAID takes seriously any allegation of USAID assistance
being diverted from the intended beneficiaries. All USAID funding
recipients are required, pursuant to their award, to disclose in
writing to the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG), with a copy to
the cognizant Agreement Officer, loss, damage, or theft as well as all
violations of Federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or
gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award.
Foreign Policy Article, Dated May 10, 2023, titled, ``How the U.S.
Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' by Robbie Gramer
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Letter to President Biden, Dated May 19, 2021, Regarding Support for
the Abraham Accords
Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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