[Senate Hearing 118-265]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-265

                   CONFLICT IN SUDAN: OPTIONS FOR AN 
                       EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                             
                               __________

                              MAY 10, 2023

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
             
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

  
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political 
  Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington, DC.....     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Charles, Sarah, Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau of 
  Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International 
  Development, Washington, DC....................................     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    33

Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    35

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    36

Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    52

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Pete Ricketts..........................................    56

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator John Barrasso..........................................    61

Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  John Barrasso..................................................    62

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Tim Scott..............................................    64

Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Tim Scott......................................................    64

Foreign Policy Article, Dated May 10, 2023, titled, ``How the 
  U.S. Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' by Robbie Gramer...    66

Letter to President Biden, Dated May 19, 2021, Regarding Support 
  for the Abraham Accords........................................    80

                                 (iii)
 
      CONFLICT IN SUDAN: OPTIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:51 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Young, 
Hagerty, Ricketts, and Scott.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Since fighting erupted in Sudan almost a month ago, 
ceasefires have come and gone with no appreciable reduction in 
fighting. Violence has left the air in the capital thick with 
dust and smoke. Food and water shortages have resulted in 
looting and attacks on civilians by armed groups in search of 
provisions.
    The former strongman head of state who is wanted by the 
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity has 
escaped from prison. The borders are overwhelmed with people 
trying to escape.
    Hundreds have been killed, thousands injured, and hundreds 
of thousands displaced. One American doctor staying to help 
treat the wounded was surrounded by a group of men and stabbed 
to death in front of his family.
    Sudan is not only descending into violent chaos, it is on 
the brink of a full-scale, zero-sum civil war, and the last 
civil war went on for more than two decades.
    I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today to 
discuss how we respond to the conflict in Sudan. I welcome the 
long overdue Executive Order issued last week with respect to 
Sudan and we are all grateful to those who planned and carried 
out the nighttime rescue operation to evacuate more than 70 
people working at our embassy including Ambassador Godfrey. 
Thankfully, all U.S. Government personnel escaped unharmed.
    However, thousands of private American citizens were left 
to fend for themselves when the violence broke out, to say 
nothing of millions of Sudanese who now understandably feel 
abandoned by the international community.
    I will not sit here and put the blame on the State 
Department or the Administration for a foreign policy failure 
that has been many years in the making. The failed negotiations 
on the transition to democracy were supported not only by us, 
but by the African Union, Gulf states, and the United Nations.
    Numerous attempts to broker a ceasefire have failed and the 
international community has yet to mount a robust humanitarian 
response. Let us be clear. U.S. policy fell short of the 
challenge. We refused to call a coup a coup after the Sudanese 
military takeover in 2021.
    Instead of imposing sanctions, we put the democratic 
aspirations of millions of Sudanese in the hands of generals 
despite evidence of their complicity in and responsibility for 
gross violations of human rights and significant public 
corruption.
    The Sudanese Armed Forces have a long record of human 
rights abuses and the Rapid Support Forces, best known to the 
world as the Janjaweed, committed genocide in Darfur and their 
leader has been implicated in rapes and massacres and has 
allied himself with the Wagner Group.
    By convincing ourselves that these figures were going to 
help Sudan transition to a democracy, we neglected the need for 
accountability. We failed to push hard enough for inclusive 
civilian participation and we ended up legitimizing and 
entrenching those with guns at the expense of the Sudanese 
people's democratic aspirations.
    I would like to hear from our witnesses about U.S. policy 
options to end the conflict, our efforts to rally the 
international community to jumpstart the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, and what steps the Administration is 
taking to garner international support for collective action to 
ensure that military leaders stand down and step aside.
    I realize sometimes there are no good options, but hope is 
not a foreign policy strategy. We need to understand how our 
analysis was so flawed that the State Department failed to draw 
down its embassy staff or assist American citizens to depart 
before the violence began.
    The United States cannot be blindsided like this. I want to 
understand what is being done to prevent this in the future.
    Now, I realize that if the views of some ends up being the 
reality, our ability to predict and prepare for situations like 
we are seeing in Sudan will be dramatically affected because of 
the potential cuts that are being talked about in discretionary 
domestic spending.
    Well, everything we do at the State Department is domestic 
discretionary spending. I do not know how we are going to get 
it better with less.
    Under Secretary Nuland, I would like to hear a clear 
articulation of our short-, medium-, and long-term goals in 
Sudan and the Horn of Africa as well as the Administration's 
strategy for achieving them now that we have no diplomatic 
presence on the ground in Sudan.
    Ms. Charles, given the emerging humanitarian catastrophe we 
need a plan to deliver assistance as quickly as possible to the 
people of Sudan, to empower civil society voices advocating 
against all odds and at great personal cost for democracy.
    Millions of lives in Sudan and the Horn of Africa are at 
stake as are our strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and 
the Red Sea corridor. We need to put the democratic transition 
back on track in Sudan.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator 
Risch, for his opening statement.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would certainly concur in your remarks. I think you were 
a little kinder than I am going to be, but, nonetheless, we 
have the situation before us.
    This is not a happy occasion. It is disappointing we are 
here today having this hearing. The humanitarian and security 
catastrophe playing out in Sudan was predictable. This 
committee has tried to ensure Sudan had the highest levels of 
attention from the State Department. Sadly, that has not 
happened.
    I concur with the chairman that this is not an easy 
situation. It is no question that things are difficult there, 
but we do not have the luxury of just dealing with the easy 
ones.
    More should have been done to protect the Sudanese people 
from the military junta. We should have done more to warn 
American citizens and position our diplomatic and humanitarian 
footprint to respond to the predictable scenario that we all 
saw unfolding.
    We have seen this movie before. As Sudan faces a 
potentially catastrophic civil war and state collapse like 
those we have seen in Syria and Libya, urgent leadership by the 
United States and its allies is required.
    Certainly, the State Department is on the front line of 
this. No one should be surprised that those involved in the 
Bashir regime's genocide in Darfur 20 years ago refused to 
relinquish power.
    I am concerned the United States continues to partner with 
the same authoritarian actors in the region that have bargained 
away Sudan's democratic future in order to secure their own 
interests.
    Even now, we hope current efforts in Saudi Arabia yield a 
real humanitarian ceasefire, but we must also be very honest 
with ourselves about the motivations of some of the regional 
actors.
    In the 4 years since Sudan's generals removed dictator Omar 
Al-Bashir from power, a naive hope toward corrupt military 
leaders and their foreign backers has driven U.S. policy in 
Sudan.
    This approach has empowered Sudan's strongman while 
victimizing the Sudanese people and undermining the country's 
democratic future.
    The Biden administration has sanctioned only one Sudanese 
entity under Global Magnitsky. While President Biden issued an 
Executive order last week, there were no designations with the 
announcement. Very disappointing.
    The U.S. has also not put its best diplomatic foot forward 
to deal with the problem. We did not name an ambassador to 
Sudan for more than 2 years after normalizing relations during 
a critical time in Sudan's transition. The U.S. embassy in 
Khartoum has also faced persistent understaffing and leadership 
challenges.
    Congress has spoken in a bipartisan manner with an 
unmistakable voice on Sudan throughout the post-Bashir 
transition. Put the Sudanese people first and end the 
stranglehold of Sudan's security forces on the country.
    This Administration, however, does not seem to be 
listening. During our last Sudan hearing 15 months ago, I 
called for the Administration to articulate a clear vision for 
what it wants in Sudan. I am still waiting.
    The Administration must change not only the architecture, 
but also the architects of this policy. We need a policy that 
empowers the Sudanese people, weakens these generals, shuts off 
the foreign meddling and finance that empowers them, and leads 
a coalition of partners committed to putting Sudan's democratic 
future first.
    We must end this cycle of doing the same thing and 
expecting a different outcome. I look forward to hearing from 
our witnesses today, just as the chairman indicated, about how 
the Administration plans to meet immediate needs in Sudan and 
make an urgent course correction in its Sudan policy.
    Before I close, I would be remiss and I want to express my 
deep disappointment for your failure to respond to mine and 
many of my colleagues' questions for the record in a timely 
manner.
    You last testified before this committee on January 26. 
Then, after that hearing, as is usual, questions for the record 
were submitted because we have limited times at the hearings.
    That was over 100 days ago. I received answers to those 
questions for the record. Do you know when?
    The delay in responding to these questions underscores 
serious doubts in my mind that the State Department puts any 
value on communication with Congress and holds no respect for 
this committee's oversight role.
    Some of the questions I submitted to you were about Sudan 
and now we get an answer over 100 days later and the day before 
the next hearing on this subject.
    I really feel that this demonstrates that the Department is 
just going through the motions to mollify this committee and 
continue on its happy way keeping us in the dark.
    I expect to receive meaningful explanation of why these 
questions for the record took over 100 days to complete.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Risch.
    Our witnesses today are Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Ms. Sarah 
Charles, Assistant to the Administrator of USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Assistance.
    Under Secretary Nuland has a distinguished 33-year career 
as a diplomat, rejoining the Department as Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs in April of 2021. I will not go through all 
of that history, but suffice it to say that is an incredible 
career.
    Sarah Charles is assistant to the administrator of USAID in 
charge of the Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs, the U.S. 
Government's lead for international disaster response.
    Before joining the bureau, she was senior director for 
policy and advocacy for the International Rescue Committee and 
has worked at the National Security Council as director of 
humanitarian affairs.
    We thank you both for your participation and your service 
to our country. I would ask you to summarize your statements in 
about 5 minutes. Your full statements will be included in the 
record without objection.
    Ambassador Nuland, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, distinguished members of this committee. We appreciate 
the opportunity to be with you and exchange views at such a 
difficult and consequential moment for Sudan.
    The third largest nation on the African continent, Sudan 
holds enormous promise and opportunity. It should be a thriving 
breadbasket for its people, the region, and the world, but 
instead it has been plagued, as you both noted, by decades of 
authoritarianism, economic turmoil, and civil war.
    In 2019, the Sudanese people, longing for a different 
future, led a peaceful protest movement that ended the 30-year 
reign of a dictator, only to endure a military takeover 2 years 
later.
    Our engagement since has focused on restoring the promise 
of that 2019 revolution and supporting a civilian-led 
transition to democracy and civilian rule.
    We have worked over the past 18 months with civilian 
partners in Sudan to build a coalition to lead this effort 
while simultaneously putting pressure on Sudan's generals to 
engage seriously in a political process.
    Despite the courageous effort by Sudanese civilian leaders 
and intensive engagement by international actors, which did 
yield considerable progress since last fall on elements of 
their own framework for a political agreement, those 
negotiations, as you know, broke down over the unwillingness of 
the two military leaders to resolve the last issue which stood 
in the way of a return to democracy, namely, how the Rapid 
Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces would integrate 
under a unified command structure.
    On April 15, we saw months of progress erased overnight. 
You have seen the images: hundreds of killed in pillaging, 
looting, armed conflict across the city; food, water, medicine, 
electricity, telecoms cut off; hundreds of thousands of 
families displaced or hiding in their homes.
    Our first priority, as you noted, was the safety of our 
people. Over 7 days we consolidated all U.S. personnel at the 
embassy compound where our military then bravely extracted them 
by helicopter on April 23 to Ethiopia and onward to Djibouti.
    Then, with the help of partners--British, French, Germans, 
and Saudis--we organized three overland convoys from Khartoum 
to Port Sudan, transporting more than 700 more people and 
hundreds of our own people also boarded allied and partner 
flights.
    In total, we facilitated the departure of 2,000 people 
including 1,300 U.S. citizens and family members, along with 
U.S. LPRs, locally employed staff, and nationals from other 
allied and partner countries.
    From the outset we have also worked to silence the guns. 
Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, our 
ambassador to Sudan, Anthony Godfrey, and teams across the 
Department have been tirelessly engaged.
    First, with Secretary Blinken's intense personal effort we 
have secured six sequential short-term ceasefires, which have 
lessened the fighting and allowed these evacuations and some 
initial movement of humanitarian aid, and then working 
intensively with Saudi Arabia and other partners we began on 
Sunday these pre-negotiations with the warring parties.
    To date, the Secretary has made seven separate calls to 
Generals Burhan and Hemedti to try to silence the guns, jump 
start this emergency diplomacy, and get talks going. He has 
also been in touch with African Union Chairperson Faki and 
leaders across the region and in Europe.
    As you know, for the last 3 days starting on Sunday 
evening, Assistant Secretary Phee and Ambassador Godfrey have 
led the U.S. delegation to these emergency pre-negotiations 
that began in Jeddah.
    Our goal for these talks has been very narrowly focused, 
first securing agreement on a declaration of humanitarian 
principles and then getting a ceasefire that is long enough to 
facilitate the steady delivery of badly needed services.
    If this stage is successful--and I talked to our 
negotiators this morning, who are cautiously optimistic--it 
would then enable expanded talks with additional local, 
regional, and international stakeholders towards a permanent 
cessation of hostilities and then a return to civilian-led rule 
as the Sudanese people have demanded for years.
    We and our partners continue to make clear to the warring 
parties led by these two generals that there can be no military 
solution to this crisis and negotiations are the only way 
forward.
    We have also made clear, as you said, Chairman, through--
and Ranking Member--through President Biden's May 4 Executive 
order to authorize future sanctions that we will hold those 
responsible for stealing Sudan's future to account.
    These new authorities reinforce a consistent message from 
the U.S. that the world is watching, the fighting has to stop, 
and will hold those responsible to account.
    Meanwhile, we appreciate Saudi Arabia's role hosting these 
talks and we will continue to work closely with all regional 
partners including the African Union, IGAD, the Sudan Quad that 
includes the U.K., to bring this conflict to an end.
    Mr. Chairman, if I could, and Mr. Ranking Member, in this 
context thank you for passing our ambassador to the African--
Ambassador designate Stephanie Sullivan for the African Union 
through this committee and urge your support and help getting 
her confirmed on the floor.
    Despite the many setbacks, we will continue to stand with 
the Sudanese people in their demands for a peaceful and 
democratic future. They deserve better.
    I thank you, look forward to listening to your questions 
and, Ranking Member Risch, you are absolutely right. Those 
questions should not have taken 100 days. It is on me. It will 
not happen again. I apologize.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members 
of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to exchange views with 
you at such a difficult and consequential moment for Sudan.
    The third largest nation on the African continent, Sudan holds 
enormous promise and opportunity.
    Rich with natural resources and a home to the Nile River Basin, 
Sudan should be a thriving breadbasket for its people, the region, and 
the world.
    Instead, it has been plagued by decades of authoritarianism, 
economic turmoil, and civil war.
    In 2019, the Sudanese people, longing for a different future, led a 
peaceful protest movement that ended the 30-year reign of a dictator . 
. . only to endure a military takeover just 2 years later.
    Our engagement since has focused on restoring the promise of the 
2019 revolution and supporting a transition to democracy and civilian 
rule.
    We have worked over the past 18 months with civilian partners in 
Sudan to build a coalition to lead this effort, while simultaneously 
putting pressure on Sudan's generals to engage seriously in the 
political process.
    Despite courageous efforts by Sudanese civilian leaders and 
intensive engagement by international actors that yielded considerable 
progress since last fall on the elements of the framework political 
agreement----negotiations ultimately broke down over the unwillingness 
of the two military leaders to resolve the last issue which stood in 
the way of a return to democracy: how the Rapid Support Forces and 
Sudanese Armed Forces would be integrated under a unified command 
structure.
    And on April 15, we saw months of progress erased overnight.
    The images out of Sudan's capital, Khartoum, are stark:

   hundreds killed in pillaging, looting, and armed conflict 
        across the city;

   food, water, medicine, electricity, and telecoms cut off; 
        and

   hundreds of thousands of families either displaced from 
        their homes, or hiding inside them.

    A first priority was the safety of our people.
    Over 7 days, we consolidated all U.S. personnel at our Embassy, 
where our military then bravely extracted them by helicopter on April 
23 to Ethiopia and onward to Djibouti--they are now back home with 
their loved ones.
    With the help of partners including the British, French, Germans, 
Saudis, and others, we facilitated three overland convoys from Khartoum 
to Port Sudan to evacuate 700 more people; and we evacuated hundreds 
more on allied and partner flights.
    So whether U.S. citizens left aboard a Saudi, Canadian, French, 
British or any other flagged carrier, we helped coordinate every 
transport that included known U.S. citizens.
    In total we evacuated 2,000 people--the majority of whom are our 
citizens and their family members, along with U.S. lawful permanent 
residents, locally employed staff, and nationals from allied and 
partner countries.
    From the outset, we have also worked urgently to silence the guns.
    Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, Ambassador 
Godfrey, and teams across the Department have all been tirelessly 
engaged:

   First to secure six sequential short-term ceasefires to 
        lessen the fighting and allow the movement of civilians and 
        humanitarian aid;

   Then--working intensively with Saudi Arabia other partners--
        to initiate pre-negotiations with the warring parties.

    To date, the Secretary has made seven separate calls to Generals 
Burhan and Hemedti to jumpstart this emergency diplomacy and get talks 
started.
    He also called African Union Chairperson Faki and other regional 
leaders to discuss next steps.
    As we sit here today, A/S Phee and Amb. Godfrey are leading the 
U.S. delegation to these talks that began last Sunday in Jeddah.
    We have narrowly scoped the talks to focus on: 1) securing an 
agreement on a Declaration of Humanitarian Principles; and 2) 
implementing a long-enough ceasefire to facilitate steady delivery of 
badly needed services.
    If this stage is successful, it would then enable expanded talks 
with additional local, regional, and international stakeholders toward 
a permanent cessation of hostilities and civilian-led rule, as the 
Sudanese people have demanded for years.
    We and our partners have made clear to the warring parties that 
there can be no military solution to this crisis.
    Negotiations are the only viable way forward. Compromise will be 
required.
    We have also made clear that the U.S. is prepared to use more 
coercive measures to hold accountable those responsible for stealing 
Sudan's future.
    On May 4, President Biden issued an Executive Order to authorize 
future sanctions when and if needed.
    These new authorities reinforce a consistent message from the U.S.: 
the world is watching, the fighting must stop, and we will hold those 
responsible to account.
    Meanwhile, we appreciate Saudi Arabia's role in hosting the current 
talks, and will continue to work closely with our regional partners--in 
coordination with the Trilateral Mechanism made up of the UN, African 
Union, and IGAD (Horn of Africa's multilateral forum) and the Quad 
(U.S.-UK-Saudi Arabia-UAE)--to bring the conflict to an end.
    Despite the many setbacks, we will continue to stand with the 
Sudanese people in their demands for a peaceful, democratic future. 
They deserve better.
    Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

    The Chairman. Ms. Charles.

  STATEMENT OF SARAH CHARLES, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, 
  BUREAU OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 
           INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Charles. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today about the unfolding 
humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the U.S. Government's 
response.
    It has been less than 1 month since the hostilities between 
the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces erupted, 
but the impact on the people of Sudan has already been 
devastating.
    Ongoing violence has led to the death of hundreds, injuries 
to thousands, and destruction of critical infrastructure and 
disruption of basic services.
    Attacks against humanitarian staff and the looting of 
humanitarian assets forced many of our partners to temporarily 
suspend hundreds of lifesaving programs and relocate their 
staff, impacting millions of people who relied on these 
programs to meet basic needs.
    Before the conflict, almost 16 million people in Sudan, 
more than one-third of the population, required humanitarian 
assistance. We do not yet know the full extent to which 
humanitarian conditions have worsened since April 15, but their 
early reports are grim. An estimated 70 percent of hospitals 
across conflict-affected areas are not operational. More than 3 
million women and girls are at risk of gender-based violence.
    More than 19 million people could be food insecure in the 
next 3-6 months if fighting continues.
    More than 700,000 people have been internally displaced and 
more than 170,000 people have crossed into neighboring 
countries, meaning that the ramifications of this conflict do 
not end at Sudan's borders.
    They stretch into the region, compounding existing 
humanitarian needs across several countries. The United States 
is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Sudan, and 
while the operating context has changed, our commitment to 
providing assistance to the people of Sudan has not.
    On April 23, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced 
the deployment of a Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART, 
to the region to lead and coordinate the U.S. Government's 
humanitarian response.
    While some of our humanitarian programs are temporarily 
suspended, as of yesterday 19 of our longstanding partners with 
strong national networks continue to operate, albeit with 
limited capacity and dwindling prepositioned supplies.
    Since the beginning of the conflict, national staff, 
neighborhood committees, and other civil society organizations 
have shown tremendous bravery, responding to the needs in their 
communities amid incredible risk and uncertainty.
    One of our partners has been dispatching a network of 
midwives across Khartoum to manage obstetric emergencies and 
support home births amid airstrikes, gunfire, and rubble when 
it has been too dangerous for pregnant women to travel to any 
of the few operational hospitals.
    Their bravery and commitment to the Sudanese people has 
helped save lives and bring new life into the world in 
otherwise grim circumstances.
    Despite incremental progress, the insecure operating 
environment, lack of access, limited supply levels, 
inaccessibility of cash, unreliable electricity and telecoms 
will impair their ability to sustain this limited delivery of 
assistance in the coming weeks.
    Looking forward, we are working closely with our partners 
to respond now even as we assess additional humanitarian needs. 
While rapid assessments are ongoing, we are working with 
partners now to use existing programs and prepositioned stocks 
to scale up and pivot emergency programming where conditions 
allow.
    We are also working closely with our colleagues at the 
Department of State and the United Nations to advocate in 
Jeddah and elsewhere for the conditions that will allow for the 
scaling up of humanitarian operations, including overland 
routes and air bridges from neighboring countries.
    We are also asking government entities in Sudan and in the 
neighboring countries to decrease bureaucratic barriers that 
limit relief organizations' ability to respond to the crisis at 
scale, for example, by expediting customs procedures, issuing 
visa waivers for aid workers, and waiving requirements issued 
by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission, or HAC, to fast 
track humanitarian activities.
    For many years the HAC has chronically hampered 
humanitarian action and delayed lifesaving assistance in Sudan. 
These restrictions were egregious before, all the more so now.
    Amid ongoing attacks on aid workers and assets, including 
the one that Chairman Menendez just mentioned, we remain 
focused on the safety and security of our humanitarian 
partners. To date, fighting has resulted in the tragic death of 
at least six USAID partner staff and injuries to others.
    In conclusion, this conflict is the culmination of decades 
of impunity for crimes committed across Sudan, impunity that 
has affected our own staff when the murderer of USAID employees 
John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, who were killed in 
Khartoum in 2008, was released from prison in January.
    The Sudanese people have been demanding an end to injustice 
and impunity for decades and we stand with them. The 
humanitarian crisis in Sudan will continue to deteriorate if 
humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance to millions 
of vulnerable people continue to be limited by the ongoing 
conflict and the actions of the parties.
    By seeking a resolution to the conflict and commitments 
from the parties involved to uphold humanitarian principles, we 
can scale up lifesaving programs across Sudan.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Charles follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Sarah Charles

                              introduction
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the 
unfolding humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development's (USAID) response.
    It has been less than 1 month since hostilities between the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted, 
but the impact on the people of Sudan has already been devastating--
exacerbating an already severe national food security crisis. Ongoing 
violence has led to the death of hundreds of people, injury to 
thousands, destruction of critical infrastructure, and disruption of 
service delivery of any kind. As people took shelter from bombardment 
and bullets, they depleted their food stocks, medicine supplies, money 
reserves, and other resources, leading to rising hunger levels and 
deteriorating health for many. Attacks against humanitarian staff and 
the looting of humanitarian assets forced many of our partners to 
temporarily suspend hundreds of life-saving humanitarian programs and 
evacuate their staff--impacting the millions of people who relied on 
these programs to meet their basic needs.
    Until the violence comes to an end and the humanitarian community 
is able to safely resume operations, the crisis in Sudan will continue 
to rapidly deteriorate. This is why we urge the SAF and RSF to commit 
to a permanent ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, and the 
principled delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable 
populations across the country.
                           humanitarian needs
    Before the conflict, almost 16 million people in Sudan--more than 
one-third of the population--required humanitarian assistance to meet 
their basic needs; of those, 10 million required food assistance. 
Because humanitarian staff have not been able to safely move around 
Sudan to conduct needs assessments, we do not know the full extent to 
which humanitarian conditions have worsened since April 15. However, we 
predict that ongoing shortages of food, safe drinking water, medicine, 
and fuel, coupled with limited access to basic services and care have 
significantly increased vulnerability for many people, particularly in 
Khartoum and the surrounding areas.
    The data we have been able to obtain from inside Sudan are grim: an 
estimated 70 percent of hospitals across conflict-affected areas of 
Sudan are not operational, cutting off critical care for people caught 
in the conflict. In addition to dwindling medical supplies, 
infrastructure damage, and unreliable access to power, medical 
facilities and personnel have also been devastated by at least 25 
unconscionable attacks since the conflict began.
    Further, the World Food Program (WFP) estimates that the number of 
acutely food insecure people across Sudan is expected to increase to a 
total of more than 19 million in the next 3-6 months if the current 
conflict continues; the highest increases are expected in West Darfur, 
West Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and North Darfur. WFP also estimates 
that nearly 1.3 million people did not receive food assistance in April 
because of the conflict. While WFP resumed operations in Sudan on May 
1, millions of people are in danger of not receiving assistance if 
fighting continues.
    The conflict has also led to widespread displacement: since April 
15, more than 700,000 people have been internally displaced across 
Sudan, and more than 170,000 people have crossed into neighboring 
countries according to the International Organization for Migration. 
The UN estimates that as many as 860,000 refugees and returnees could 
flee into neighboring countries as the conflict progresses, meaning 
that the ramifications of this conflict do not end at Sudan's borders--
they stretch out into the region, compounding existing humanitarian 
needs across several countries.
    USAID is also concerned by reports of protection violations, 
including gender-based violence (GBV) against women and girls, 
particularly among those displaced by violence who are seeking shelter 
and safety. The UN reports more than 3 million women and girls are at 
risk of GBV in Sudan, including due to the conflict-related disruption 
of health and protection services.
                            usaid's response
    The UN's Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan requested $1.7 
billion to support 12.5 million of the most vulnerable people in 2023, 
but as of May 9, it was less than 16 percent funded. The United States 
is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Sudan, providing 
more than $162.5 million in humanitarian assistance from USAID to date 
in fiscal year 2023. And while the operating context has changed, 
USAID's commitment to providing humanitarian assistance to the people 
of Sudan has not, and we stand by them through this difficult time and 
will work to address rising humanitarian needs caused by the conflict, 
in partnership with humanitarian actors and other donors.
    On April 23, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced the 
deployment of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the region 
to lead and coordinate the U.S. Government's humanitarian response in 
Sudan. Composed of disaster experts from USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Assistance, the DART is currently based in Nairobi, Kenya, 
and is working with the international community and our partners to 
identify priority needs and scale up urgently needed assistance to 
communities affected by conflict in Sudan, as the security situation 
allows. USAID also activated a Washington, DC-based Response Management 
Team to support the DART in leading and coordinating USAID programs and 
the broader U.S. Government humanitarian response.
    While many of USAID's humanitarian programs in Sudan are 
temporarily suspended, USAID's long-standing humanitarian partners with 
strong national networks in health, nutrition, protection, agriculture, 
and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) are operating with extremely 
limited capacity and using dwindling prepositioned supplies in pockets 
of Gedaref, Blue Nile, White Nile, South and West Kordofans, Khartoum, 
and the Greater Darfur region. Since April 15, they have relied on 
national staff to continue life-saving activities, many of whom have 
also been forced to shelter in place or evacuate their homes due to 
violence. Since the beginning of the conflict, national staff, 
neighborhood committees, and other civil society organizations have 
shown tremendous bravery responding to needs in their communities amid 
incredible risk and uncertainty.
    In just one example, one USAID partner has been dispatching a 
network of midwives across Khartoum to manage obstetric emergencies and 
support home births in the midst of airstrikes, gunfire, and rubble. 
Their staff have also provided critical health care services and 
distributed supplies to support safe births for women and girls 
affected by the conflict. Their bravery and commitment to the 
humanitarian mandate has helped save lives and bring new life into the 
world in otherwise grim circumstances.
    Despite incremental progress, the insecure operating environment, 
lack of access to safely deliver assistance, dwindling supply levels, 
inaccessibility of cash, and unreliable electricity and 
telecommunications services will impair their ability to sustain this 
limited delivery of assistance in the coming weeks. These factors will 
also continue to hinder the broader humanitarian community's ability to 
resume normal operations in the short term.
                            looking forward
    The United States continues to urge both the SAF and RSF to take in 
consideration the interests of the Sudanese nation and its people and 
actively engage in the talks towards a ceasefire and end to the 
conflict in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Ending the conflict will help reduce 
suffering among the people of Sudan and allow for life-saving 
humanitarian assistance to reach those in affected areas.
    Amid ongoing attacks on aid workers and assets, USAID is also 
keenly focused on ensuring the safety and security of our humanitarian 
staff and partners in country and continues to prioritize this issue in 
conversations with all key stakeholders. To date, fighting has resulted 
in the tragic deaths of at least six USAID partner staff and injuries 
to others. Armed actors have raided humanitarian housing compounds, 
offices, and warehouses around the country, and looted food and 
humanitarian supplies, including relief items, equipment, and vehicles, 
raising international humanitarian law concerns.
    USAID is working closely with our colleagues at the Department of 
State and the UN to advocate for increased humanitarian access and the 
scaling up of humanitarian operations in Sudan, including by exploring 
overland routes and air bridges from neighboring countries and within 
Sudan to facilitate the safe passage of goods and personnel. However, 
these plans will only succeed if the SAF and RSF commit to upholding 
international humanitarian law and respect humanitarian personnel and 
assets. To fully take advantage of any opening of humanitarian access, 
we are also asking the UN to support a robust scale up for the 
response, and in particular to support local responders.
    In order to further facilitate humanitarian operations, USAID is 
asking the government entities in Sudan and its neighboring countries 
to decrease administrative and bureaucratic barriers that limit relief 
organizations' ability to respond to this crisis at scale--for example, 
by expediting border and customs procedures for quick clearances for 
all humanitarian goods, issuing visa waivers for humanitarian workers 
deploying to support the response, and waiving the bureaucratic 
requirements issued by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
in order to fast-track humanitarian activities. For many years, the HAC 
imposed strict terms of engagement with populations in need, which has 
chronically hampered humanitarian action and delayed life-saving 
assistance in Sudan. These restrictions were egregious before, and are 
all the more so now.
    USAID is working closely with its partners to respond now, even as 
we assess additional humanitarian needs arising from the conflict and 
resulting widespread displacement. While assessments are ongoing to 
determine these needs, we are working with partners to use existing 
programs and resources to scale up and pivot emergency programming 
where conditions allow. For example, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
has--in collaboration with WFP--been providing fuel to maintain the 
central medical cold chain in Sudan, which preserves millions of 
vaccines and insulin doses. Similarly, BHA staff in Sudan's neighboring 
countries are working with existing partners to pivot humanitarian 
programs in response to the influx of returnees and refugees. For 
example, humanitarian organizations are moving in-kind food, health 
commodities, shelter support, and WASH supplies in areas of South Sudan 
with heightened displacement.
                               conclusion
    This conflict is a culmination of decades of impunity for crimes 
committed across Sudan--impunity that has affected our own staff, when 
the murderer of USAID employees John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas 
Rahama, who were killed in Khartoum in 2008, was released from prison 
in January. The Sudanese people have been demanding an end to injustice 
and impunity for decades, and we stand with them.
    The humanitarian crisis in Sudan will continue to worsen if 
humanitarian access and the provision of assistance to millions of 
vulnerable people continue to be limited by the ongoing conflict. USAID 
is committed to the resumption of humanitarian operations when it is 
safe for our partners to do so and will continue to work with all 
stakeholders in support of this goal. We owe it to children such as 
Saleema, who receives treatment for acute malnutrition from one of our 
partners so that she can grow to be healthy and strong, and we owe it 
to the more than 50,000 children in Sudan who have lost access to this 
life-saving treatment due to violence. By seeking a peaceful resolution 
to the conflict and commitments from those involved to uphold 
humanitarian principles, the humanitarian community can restart life-
saving nutrition, food assistance, health, protection, and other 
programs across Sudan. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify; 
I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will 
start a series of 5-minute rounds.
    Madam Secretary, let me preface what I am about to say. I 
understand you got a big portfolio umbrella. Some of the issues 
that we are going to be discussing here are more specific to 
your colleague, who is the Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, and I get it, but since you are the representative of 
the State Department here, take my questions in that spirit.
    There have been published reports that are highly critical 
of the Administration's Sudan policy. Among the things that it 
says is that there was memos written and circulated within the 
State Department's Bureau of African Affairs warning of U.S.--
risk of current U.S. policy in Sudan and listing potential 
scenarios that could emerge in the rivalry between Burhan and 
Hemedti including full-scale conflict. They were heavily 
redacted and never got to the Secretary's desk.
    It has been noted that Burhan and Hemedti were amassing 
forces around Khartoum and that at lower levels statements were 
being made about that as a reality of a real challenge to the 
possibility of conflict breaking out.
    There is talks about from several dozen, both officials and 
advocates--Sudanese activists--who describe a deeply flawed 
U.S. policy process on brokering talks in Sudan in the run-up 
to the conflict monopolized by a select few officials who shut 
the rest of the interagency team out of deliberations and 
quieted a chorus dissent over the direction of U.S.-Sudan 
policy.
    It goes on to say from the outset there was a consistent 
and willful dismissal of views that questioned whether U.N. 
talks would be a recipe for success or for failure. Those 
warnings were ignored and instead the U.S. built ``a dream 
palace of a political process that has now crashed down on the 
people of Sudan.''
    I have noted on several occasions that Assistant Secretary 
of State Phee seems to be--have aversions to sanctions as any 
tool at any time for any purpose.
    That is a problem because I do not know how else you 
induce, especially to entities--to individuals like this to act 
when you have--I do not know what you have to offer, at the end 
of the day, what consequence they face.
    Lastly, civil society seems to be cut out and disillusioned 
activists have lost faith in the United States. That is all bad 
news, none of which is responded to in any of the testimony 
that we have heard here today.
    Can you take a minute or so to talk to me about all of 
that?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me start by saying that when the leader Hamdok was 
thrown out in October of 2021, we did institute harsh penalties 
against Sudan, which were controversial internally, given how 
strong they were.
    If you recall, after that move we designated the Central 
Reserve Police. We also suspended all bilateral aid and debt 
relief and support. There were questions internally whether 
that was the right thing to do because, of course, some of that 
has implications for the Sudanese people.
    The goal of those moves, which were made on the Secretary's 
watch and this Administration's watch, were to shock the 
parties into getting serious about a broad framework for 
transition. Thereafter, we supported the Sudanese's own 
framework that emerged, which was led, largely, by the 
civilians.
    Now, you could ask the question whether there was a broad 
enough community of civilians involved, but this was a process 
designed by the Sudanese themselves and steadily used pressure 
on the generals and the parties to try to work through all of 
the issues getting back to a transition.
    As I said to you, yes, we saw the generals keeping their 
own options open. They did not put all of their forces into 
garrison.
    [Disturbance in the hearing room.]
    Ms. Nuland. However, that structure did work through many 
of the issues preparatory to a return to civilian rule. We were 
left with one issue, which was whether these two generals would 
integrate their forces because you cannot have one more--more 
than one army in a country at a time.
    There was incredible effort made, including by the 
Secretary himself, to offer options for the two of them for how 
these forces could be integrated various different ways not 
just by us, but by the African Union, by our partners and 
then--but, as I said, unfortunately, they chose the path of 
war, not the path of integration. At various points during 
these talks since October and onward, we have seen tensions 
spike between these two generals.
    At every previous point with our partners, with the 
Sudanese civilians, we were able to tamp things down and get 
them back to the table. That was not successful on April 15.
    That said, throughout this period we had been warning 
American citizens not to travel to Sudan. We had been 
strengthening our own internal procedures should things get 
violent again.
    Look, it is a tragedy yet again. Can we get them--this 
process restarted? We will see. Will it be the same process? 
No, it will have to be broader, but that is where we are.
    The Chairman. Yes. Well, look, I am going to close by 
simply saying it seems to me that we need to have a process 
that, number one, uses our intelligence--and the bureau at the 
State Department is pretty good.
    They have been on the mark sometimes better than some of 
our other intelligence agencies and we need to red tag or red 
team, however you might refer it, some of our presumptions 
because you cannot work on everything that is going to be the 
rosiest thing and then hope that it will turn out that way 
buttressed by some hard work, but, nonetheless, you have to 
have other availabilities to think through what is the process 
of consequences that it does not work out as you aspire for it 
to.
    I am deeply concerned that we do that on more than one 
occasion and we find ourselves with the consequences of not 
doing so.
    I think that is incredibly important for the Department to 
internalize and to think about because I am deeply concerned 
about the information that exists.
    I know that I used to deal with Senator Coons as he was 
trying to find a pathway forward and I was insisting on taking 
care of the victims of terrorism.
    Sanctions ended up proving the ability to get us there in 
the right way, but for it I do not think that we would have 
taken care of those victims.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, I know you think the Chairman's 
statement--some of them were kind of harsh--but I can assure 
you that there is worse stuff out there than that. You have 
probably read it yourself.
    Let me say I do understand. I think everybody understands. 
This is a very, very difficult situation, but I think it needs 
more attention than what it is getting.
    This morning Foreign Policy published an article called 
``How the U.S. Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' written 
by Robbie Gramer. Have you had a chance to review that?
    Ms. Nuland. I have, Ranking Member.
    Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that 
for the record, please.
    The Chairman. Without objection.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Risch. I think it is a good discussion of the 
issues and the problems and how we got here. To be honest with 
you, I do not see how we move forward with the current 
situation the way it is in Sudan with two warring generals.
    Now, most people agree that it is not a full blown civil 
war at this point, but history tells us what is going to happen 
and that is it is going to move towards a full blown civil war 
and, of course, that country's in difficult enough straits.
    Let me ask and, first of all--the Africa portfolio is a 
tough portfolio. There is no question about that and there is 
all kinds of stuff that has got to be done.
    As you know, I have got staff that is focused on that and 
they try to work with you as much as you will permit, but this 
is an area that we have been focused on for some time and it is 
just not working.
    I guess the question I would have for you is have you got--
give me some hope here. I think sitting down with the two 
generals, again, as we have done a number of times--we all look 
back to the time when our envoys sat down with them and they 
promised nothing was going to happen. On the airplane on the 
way back they found out that they were conducting a coup.
    This just--it seems to me that we have got to do things 
different than what we are doing. Give me some hope here. What 
are your thoughts about a bigger movement outside the box than 
what we are talking about, sitting down again and saying, will 
you guys be good guys? Oh, yeah, we will be good guys and 
then--and then away we go. Give me some hope.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    First of all, we cannot get anything done in Sudan. We 
cannot even restore a process in which civilians are 
participating until the violence stops and we get some aid and 
so that is why these Jeddah talks are narrowly scoped and you 
have to work with the guys with the guns.
    The fact that both of them sent delegations, that was not 
easy to get done either and we are, as I said, cautiously 
optimistic that this first installment on getting humanitarian 
support in will allow us to get going in coming days. Then the 
ceasefire has to be more durable.
    We have the sanctions tool now that can allow us to 
continue to pressure them. Frankly, we agree that we are going 
to have to have a broader process. It is going to have to 
include more Sudanese voices.
    When you have a population that is either largely displaced 
or hiding in their houses, we are going to have to get to 
enough peace to do that.
    The Sudanese people are the bravest and strongest voices in 
this. They do not want to live this way any further, and I 
would say that under Ambassador Godfrey and with the support of 
Assistant Secretary Phee we have far broader connectivity and 
connection with voices throughout society who need to be part 
of this.
    Even from the talks in Jeddah, Ambassador Godfrey is 
staying in contact with Sudanese civilians about how we would 
move forward, make this tent bigger, support them with 
international assistance as well as carrots and sticks if we 
can get there.
    I want to just go back, if I may, Chairman, to something 
you said about the Africa Bureau. I oversee the African Bureau. 
I take responsibility for this as well for Secretary Blinken.
    This Sudan policy has been very difficult. I would say that 
the debate within the bureau, the debate within the building, 
the debate within the interagency, which I have participated in 
many times, has been robust and difficult.
    We have never taken any options off the table, but we were, 
as I said, believing that this framework that the Sudanese 
themselves put forward was making progress and we had the 
sanctions at the ready if it was not, and then we had this 
choice by the generals.
    I just want you to know that this is a secretary who 
supports rigorous debate inside the building and I support that 
as well and, frankly, we have had it all the way through this 
crisis.
    Let me just underscore that and we will continue to. As you 
know, he cares deeply about this one and is regularly bringing 
people up to hear different views, including through the 
dissent channel.
    Senator Risch. Secretary, you, yourself, and the chairman 
underscored and I did, too, about all the problems in Africa 
and the difficulty there.
    Has any consideration been given to getting an envoy or 
somebody who is specifically focused on Sudan? We had that 
before. We all know that the ambassador was out of the country 
when the last blow up happened.
    It just seems to me it needs more attention, more 
individual attention, because as you have noted, you got a 
whole lot on your plate and so do the other people that are 
working in the--at the Africa desk. What are your thoughts on 
that?
    Ms. Nuland. We are obviously looking at all the options as 
things move forward, but Ambassador Godfrey is central to all 
of this.
    Until we can get him back into Sudan, he will continue to 
work both on the Sudan internal conversations and, as I said, 
he is in contact with a broad cross section of folks on the 
ground.
    He is also likely to play a stronger role in some of the 
regional diplomacy and global diplomacy that we need on Sudan. 
That is how we are thinking about it at the moment.
    As you know, our envoy for the Horn, Ambassador Hammer, has 
been focused primarily on Ethiopia and the GERD, but he will 
also play a reinforcing role as necessary on this, which is 
within his mandate.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up. I am going to have 
some more questions for the record. I hope that I do not have 
to wait till the leaves turn to get an answer on that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Just a comment.
    You mentioned civil society. Civil society does not feel 
like they are in this. As a matter of fact they feel that the 
two generals have dictated that they have to be out in order 
for them to talk. That is fundamentally wrong.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. First, let me thank you for your service. I 
want to follow up first on Senator Risch's point about our 
capacity here.
    The Khartoum mission has always been characterized as 
historically difficult to staff so one of the challenges that 
we have had is do we have adequate--did we have adequate 
personnel in our missions in order to deal with these 
challenges.
    That is an issue I want to talk about generally, not 
necessarily today, but we really do need to figure out how we 
can staff these challenging missions with adequate resources to 
have the attention we need to avoid conflicts.
    I want to talk about the Americans that still are in Sudan. 
We are--we understand that we were able to get those who serve 
in our mission safely out of Sudan. There are many other 
Americans that are in Sudan today.
    Do we have an estimate of the numbers, particularly those 
that are interested in leaving Sudan? The circumstances there 
are certainly anything but certain as to what is going to 
happen as far as safety. What is our game plan on helping 
Americans?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, when the conflict began on 
April 15, we had connectivity with about 5,000 Americans who 
had registered with us in one form or another.
    That enabled us to push out messages, I think, 12 times so 
far about various options for leaving the country, traveling on 
flights with allies, or this overland convoy. That is what 
resulted in our being able to get about 1,300 of them out.
    We are in contact with a number of them who are continuing 
to weigh their options, but as we have Americans who are more 
ready now than they were at the time that we were doing these 
overland convoys to get out, we are giving them advice on 
various ways that they can do that, routes that are considered 
more safe.
    Were we to have a critical mass, a larger number that 
wanted to come out, we would look again at other options, but 
at the moment our sense is that the majority of the Americans 
who have stayed in Sudan have stayed for either reasons of 
family or work or history. We are in contact with a large 
number of them still.
    Senator Cardin. Do we have an estimate as to how many 
Americans are interested in leaving Sudan that are there today?
    Ms. Nuland. When I asked this question of our consular folk 
yesterday, they felt quite comfortable that as we are getting, 
frankly, in small handfuls, people making a decision now to 
come out who did not want to come out when a week or two ago we 
are able to accommodate them on transit.
    That situation changes every day as people evaluate their 
personal situation and we will stay in touch.
    Senator Cardin. The notifications that you are talking 
about, could you just explain what notifications were given to 
Americans, I guess, after April 15?
    Ms. Nuland. As I said, first of all, just to lay the 
predicate that the travel guidance to Americans has been since 
October 21, that they should not travel to Sudan--if they do 
travel to Sudan that they should register with the embassy.
    We had about 5,000 Americans registered with the embassy, 
as I said. That enabled us in a much more modern and efficient 
way to send over 12 messages to them in the last 2 weeks 
offering them various options. We use text. We use WhatsApp. We 
use email. We use the contact information that they give us.
    The registration form that we are now using asks for 
multiple ways to contact including family at home, which has 
allowed us to be more complete this time than we might have 
been in the past.
    Senator Cardin. It sounds like you are--have some 
confidence that we can get information to those who want to 
leave Sudan as to the opportunities that are available on 
different options that you are in contact. Is that fair to say?
    Ms. Nuland. That is absolutely right and, frankly, we 
invite any of you who are hearing from constituents, et cetera, 
about people who we have not captured by our system please send 
them our way.
    Senator Cardin. How confident--let me ask this, if I might, 
to Ms. Charles. How confident are you about us being able to 
get humanitarian assistance into Sudan? You mentioned about the 
midwives, but do we have a network that is reliable to try to 
get help in?
    Ms. Charles. Currently, 19 of our 33 preexisting 
humanitarian partners are operational in some capacity, 
although at a much more limited capacity than they were.
    We have a lot of supplies that are flowing into Port Sudan 
right now, including more than 30,000 metric tons of U.S.-
sourced in-kind commodities that are in the--anchored in the 
Suez right now and one of the key elements of those talks in 
Jeddah right now is the kind of security arrangements that 
would allow those supplies to come in and come in at scale and 
be distributed in a way that is more reliable.
    Even right now we have worked with our partners, authorized 
our partners to use preexisting stocks in-country to respond 
where they can.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you, Ambassador, for being here.
    I want to talk about the Americans that were in Sudan, as 
well. Help me understand, because it seems to me that once 
again the Biden administration was caught flat-footed by the 
events that were developing, similar to Afghanistan, that this 
changed in a way that you did not anticipate, and what were the 
steps you were taking--what plans you had in place to be able 
to help Americans.
    If I understand correctly, the fighting started on April 
15. You evacuated our embassy on the 22nd, but the overland 
route did not start until April 28 or 29th in that area.
    Tell me--help me, because Britain evacuated 1,573 people by 
air, France and Germany over 1,700 people by air, yet initially 
we were told that the security situation made it so that it was 
too dangerous to be able to evacuate Americans while other 
nations were evacuating their people and then days later you 
are organizing a ground convoy instead of an air convoy.
    Did you not do contingency planning with regard to this? 
Why did it take so long to be able to start evacuating 
Americans out?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Ricketts, and good to see 
you on this committee.
    Let me break it down in time and space. As I said, first of 
all, we had in place a broad warden system that captured about 
5,000 Americans so we were able to push messages to them.
    We initially, for those Americans who could get to the 
airport, because one of the reasons that we did our first 
embassy--our embassy evacuation at the embassy grounds was in 
those days between the U.S. evacuation by helicopter and our 
allies beginning to fly into the airport, the airport was too 
dangerous.
    By the time the airport was more safe--and I can talk to 
you in another setting about how that was enabled with U.S. 
support and help--we were able to put Americans who could get 
to the airport on allied flights.
    U.K., Germans, others began taking Americans who could get 
to the airport, but a number of them still could not do that, 
which is why we determined that arranging an alternate route 
over land would provide another option not only for our 
citizens, but for other countries.
    As our allies began flying, enabled by us, I will say, we 
also provided the second route for those who could not get to 
the airport. Seven hundred over land by the land convoy, but in 
total 1,300 Americans, some of them who took the allied 
flights, some of them who took our land route.
    Senator Ricketts. What I hear you saying, and correct me if 
I am wrong, is that the news reports saying that while other 
nations like France, Britain, Germany were able to evacuate 
their citizens by air, the United States had coordinated with 
them to evacuate people by air and we were going to take the 
overland route and would take their citizens.
    The media was really misstating what was going on, that we 
had a plan here where they were going to do the air, we were 
going to do the overland. Because the reports I read made it 
seem like the United States had no plan to evacuate people by 
air and that we did this overland route that happened on April 
28 or 29th, much--almost 2 weeks after the fighting started.
    Is that accurate that you were actually--the media got it 
all wrong and what is going on here is America did--took the 
overland route and the other allies took Americans out through 
the air route? Is that what you are saying is what happened?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes. It was a division of labor, if I may say, 
after--when the airport first opened where allies were doing 
the flying, Americans were going on those flights if they could 
get to the airport----
    Senator Ricketts. About how many were----
    Ms. Nuland. --and we were doing the land route and both we 
and allies were getting----
    Senator Ricketts. How about--about how many Americans went 
out on the flights?
    Ms. Nuland. If you do the math, we got 1,300 Americans out 
and 700 whereby--I do not know how many. More Americans got out 
on allied flights, I think, than got out on the land route 
because the math would lead to that. Probably 700 Americans got 
out on allied flights and we are grateful to them for that.
    Senator Ricketts. Now, was this a plan in place that you 
had prior to April 15 working with the allied nations? Had you 
done contingency planning that if the generals started fighting 
here is what we were going to do to evacuate Americans?
    Ms. Nuland. We do continual planning with our allies and 
partners, largely, based at our military commands--and we can 
do a classified briefing for you if that would be helpful--for 
all high-threat posts and various contingencies.
    With regard to this decision on the division of labor, it 
had to do with various concerns about who was best positioned 
to do what at the time and it was negotiated and arranged in 
real time at AFRICOM in Djibouti as well as in AFRICOM and 
Stuttgart with our allies.
    Senator Ricketts. Okay. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Mr. Chairman, thanks.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chair Menendez and Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you for the full committee's attention to this 
difficult, urgent challenge.
    Under Secretary Nuland, Assistant to the Administrator 
Charles, thank you for your testimony and your focus on this, a 
vast country the size of Alaska with 45 million people that is 
teetering on the brink of an all-out civil war.
    We could be on the verge of a dramatic large-scale 
humanitarian crisis or we could, depending on the outcome of 
these tense preliminary negotiations in Jeddah, see a turning 
back towards some hope for stability.
    As you know, I worked hard with other members of this 
committee. Senator Van Hollen and I went to Khartoum to meet 
with the then civilian-led government and Prime Minister Hamdok 
and to urge General Burhan and others to continue supporting a 
transition of a civilian government.
    A subsequent coup and then a very difficult period of 
negotiations has left us in a place of real, I think, 
difficulty and desperation.
    We cannot allow the civilian leadership of the groups that 
led the brave uprising that overthrew Omar Al-Bashir to be 
shoved aside and I appreciate, Under Secretary, your early 
comment that we need a broader process and we need to implement 
the President's Executive order.
    Help me understand how we will do both of these. How do we 
engage the civilian leadership and empower them in the next 
step of this process and would you welcome legislative action 
here to give you more tools to target individual sanctions?
    I respect that the Administration took tough actions in 
terms of suspending bilateral aid, suspending debt relief, and 
I think that had real impact on leaders.
    There are critics who say that in the absence of targeted 
individual sanctions there is the continuation of a sense of 
impunity that in some ways came from Omar Al-Bashir never being 
successfully prosecuted by the ICC and decades of widespread 
corruption and oppression.
    I introduced the Sudan Democracy Act last year to reflect 
the urgent need to hold these military leaders accountable. 
Would you support legislation at this point or welcome 
additional support for sanctions and how do we broaden this 
process?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Coons, let me first start by thanking 
you for your indefatigable personal diplomacy on our hardest 
challenges in Africa, including your willingness with Senator 
Van Hollen to roll up your sleeves and get to Sudan and talk to 
the generals. It makes a difference and we appreciate the 
partnership that we have on that.
    Let me say that we have got to get to a situation where we 
can engage the civilians again. Can we do that? Do we have to 
wait till we can do that from Khartoum?
    Can we begin assuming we can do the most urgent, which is 
get the humanitarian aid in and silence or lessen the guns? Can 
we start to do that in a more 21st century way with video 
meetings, et cetera? I think that remains to be seen.
    I do know, as I said at the beginning, that Ambassador 
Godfrey is trying to cast even as he works the talks in Jeddah 
as wide a net to see what people are wanting.
    This has to be a process that is broadly representative of 
the desires of the people of Sudan and the 2019 revolution, but 
we welcome thoughts you have there.
    We are beginning--we are doing the work. We had done it 
already, but now that we have the Executive order we are doing 
the work to look at appropriate targets in various categories, 
particularly if we cannot get these generals to allow the 
humanitarian aid in and put their guns down.
    With regard to legislation, let me get a little bit more 
information from our negotiators after this round is over and 
come back to you, if we may.
    Senator Coons. We will look forward to prompt input.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    Senator Coons. I do think--I understand in this moment 
focusing on the commanders of these two armed forces that are 
battling it out literally in the streets of Khartoum, but we 
have to be able to find a way to include in this conversation 
not just regional actors, but the Sudanese people themselves 
and their legitimate leaders.
    If I might, because I have just a few moments, Assistant to 
the Administrator Charles, do you have the resources you need?
    I am concerned about the looting of humanitarian 
storehouses, about the deaths of humanitarian workers. Many of 
your partners, our partners, are still willing to take on this 
very difficult and dangerous duty.
    What additional resources and support do you need and are 
we doing enough to ask our regional and global partners to also 
be engaged, given the scale of the humanitarian need in other 
crises around the region and the world?
    Ms. Charles. Many competing needs right now around the 
globe and our ability to sustain a robust response in Sudan is 
going to be very challenged.
    Even before this crisis, last year we knew that Sudan was 
one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to Russia's 
war in Ukraine because of how dependent it was on wheat imports 
and so we had already tried to scale up our assistance in Sudan 
and it was already going to be hard to sustain that this year, 
given competing demands.
    We are definitely pressing other donors. We were pleased to 
see the Saudis announce $100 million last week, but we want to 
see that delivered to partners that can actually deliver on the 
ground.
    Senator Coons. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to touch 
on something that has been quite disturbing to me.
    On January 20, 2021, this Administration was presented with 
a great opportunity. Sudan had just become party to the Abraham 
Accords.
    The Abraham Accords presented an opportunity to develop the 
economy of Sudan in a new way. There was an opportunity there 
to expand the economic opportunities for the people of Sudan 
and to stabilize the region.
    For months, the Biden administration would not even refer 
to the term or use the term Abraham Accords. On May of 2021--
May 18, 2021, then White House press secretary Jen Psaki 
demonstrated the contempt that the White House had for the 
Abraham Accords when she told reporters the following, and I 
want to quote this: ``Aside from putting together a peace 
proposal that was dead on arrival, we do not think they,'' 
meaning the prior administration, ``did anything constructive 
to really bring an end to the longstanding conflict in the 
Middle East.''
    That is why I sent President Biden a letter on May 19, 
2021, and I asked him to confirm whether he even supported the 
Abraham Accords.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to present this letter for the 
record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    What is worse, though, is that we recently saw China 
advance what I would call an anti-Abraham Accords deal when you 
had the chief diplomat of China negotiate a deal in the Middle 
East between Saudi Arabia and its adversary, Iran.
    What I would have much preferred to have seen happen would 
have been to see our own Secretary of State negotiating a deal 
between Saudi Arabia and Israel furthering the Abraham Accords. 
I think we have missed a huge opportunity.
    Let us turn to the American citizens in Sudan right now. So 
far, Ambassador Nuland, at least two American citizens have 
already been killed. The intelligence community assesses that 
the conflict is likely to be protracted, and they are saying 
little prospect for negotiation.
    Senator Cardin and I just sent a private letter to 
Secretary Blinken urging the Department to take all necessary 
steps to protect the lives of U.S. persons that remain in 
Sudan, particularly as the security situation deteriorates.
    I would like to go back to the conversation you had with 
Senator Ricketts just a minute ago. When I served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Japan, I understood very clearly the State 
Department's foremost responsibility is the safety and security 
of the American citizens in the nation.
    Where I was serving and as ambassador there, I worked very 
closely with both civilian and military leaders to revise and 
update the plan that I needed to be in a position to evacuate 
over 60,000 American citizens should that need arise.
    Secretary Nuland, under what conditions would the Biden 
administration implement the civilian evacuation plan--the 
noncombatant evacuation operational plan in Sudan to bring the 
remaining American citizens that are home in Sudan?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Hagerty, just to--we did talk about 
this a little bit before you were able to join us. We had in 
total 5,000 Americans registered with the embassy. We were able 
throughout this conflict to push repeated messages to them 
requesting information about who wanted to leave.
    About half of them left on allied aircraft. The other half 
left on--who wanted to go--some 1,300 total left on ground 
transport that we organized.
    We are in touch on a weekly basis, daily basis, with those 
who remained for a variety of reasons that you know well, mixed 
families----
    Senator Hagerty. Yes.
    Ms. Nuland. --lives built in Sudan.
    Senator Hagerty. I heard that conversation with Senator 
Ricketts, but what I am asking specifically is that 
communication--is this process part of the NEO plan that has 
been designed?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes. Yes.
    Senator Hagerty. Do you have a NEO plan in place?
    Ms. Nuland. Of course.
    Senator Hagerty. Are you prepared to exercise that plan 
further and are you--do have the resources and the necessary 
capabilities to do that if it is necessary to go in and get the 
remaining American citizens out who want--again, who, as you 
say, desire to leave?
    Ms. Nuland. As we evaluate the options for Americans and we 
are continuing to get out Americans who want to go, if there is 
a critical mass, we will evaluate whether we need to do more.
    Senator Hagerty. I think it is just absolutely critical 
that we be prepared to execute this. After seeing what happened 
in Afghanistan I think the American public was shocked.
    We do not want to see another failure like this and I think 
we are hearing--my office is hearing a great deal of concern 
about the American citizens that are left behind.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Nuland. I would also, Senator, invite you if you have 
particular Americans you are concerned about, please send them 
our way and we will work with them.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Madam 
Under Secretary, great to see you and it is great to have you 
and our key representatives from USAID here today, and thank 
you for your efforts both to provide much-needed humanitarian 
assistance as well as try to make the ceasefire hold so we can 
build on that.
    I do want to start by thanking you and your colleagues at 
the State Department, Assistant Secretary Molly Phee as well as 
the folks at the Consular Affairs divisions for helping get 
Americans out who wanted to get out, including every Marylander 
who has contacted our office who wanted to exit Sudan or have 
their relatives get out of Sudan, including an 89-year-old who 
escaped through the Egyptian border crossing.
    I want to thank you because everyone we have heard from has 
been listened to and had their needs met.
    Let me just turn to the current state of the peace--well, 
the ceasefire negotiations. If you could talk a little bit more 
about the role of the UAE and Saudi Arabia here.
    I understand that Senator Coons referenced a trip that we 
took to Sudan in 2021 where we met with many of these players. 
I know there will be more time to evaluate this as we go 
forward, but my takeaway from that trip, which we shared from--
shared with folks at the State Department is that we probably 
should have made a choice then to isolate Hemedti.
    That is my view. He is a war criminal. We know about his 
history in Darfur, and the fact that he was able to continue to 
assemble his power base in Sudan, which was already 
considerable I think has contributed to the situation we are 
here now.
    Not that that would have been easy. It would have been 
hard, but I think we have seen what happened when he continued 
to play the role he has.
    Can you talk about the way forward? Then, if you could also 
address the potential challenges in neighboring Ethiopia. We 
have a very fragile peace in Ethiopia.
    Obviously, there are some territorial disputes between 
Sudan and Ethiopia and we need to be doing everything we can to 
make sure that the conflict in Sudan does not make the 
situation even worse in Ethiopia. If you could address those 
questions.
    Ms. Nuland. First, Senator Van Hollen, it is great to hear 
that the consular system worked for your constituents and 
Marylanders. Very good to hear. We welcome any improvements, 
comments, that you have about that system, going forward, or 
any of the other members of this committee.
    Second, you missed our shout-out to your diplomacy along 
with Senator Coons, which really made a big difference, your 
willingness to roll up your sleeves and talk to these 
difficult, difficult actors.
    In this particular round in Jeddah, first of all, the 
Saudis are acting as hosts and have been instrumental to 
getting conversation at least going between these warring 
parties.
    Without that it might not have happened at all. I will say 
that although as you know better than many the regional 
players, including the UAE, have their own economic interests 
and long-term ties to various parts of this, the UAE has been 
very constructive in this effort to get parties to Jeddah, to 
get the guns stopped, and to get these humanitarian routes 
going and they have actually been pressuring both sides and 
sending strong messages.
    We look forward to that continuing, going forward, and to 
staying and--because it is going to take everybody to press on 
everybody.
    With regard to Ethiopia, I think you talked to Secretary 
Blinken after he came back from his trip and we have had 
progress, as you know, implementing key elements of the 
November cessation of hostilities agreement, the COHA, 
including formation of the Tigray interim regional 
administration, withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and concurrent 
DPLF disarmament, the positive role that the African Union's 
monitoring mission is playing.
    I will say, back on Sudan, we are working with the African 
Union on what we hope will be a large support and convening 
function that they will play if we can get to these larger 
talks that we talked about.
    These initial elements are beginning to show--to bear 
fruit. Obviously, we have got continuing difficulties with some 
parts of Sudan--with Ethiopia.
    We have got to ensure that the Government of Ethiopia 
continues to fulfill its commitment for unhindered access to 
humanitarian actors for accountability, that it continues to 
meet its commitment for real justice, that journalists have 
safe access, that we continue to see good conversations with 
other constituent parts of Ethiopia and that is what we are 
working on and we appreciate your support for all of that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I hope we can--look, I think 
we are all incredibly disappointed that the hopes for democracy 
in Sudan have been hijacked here and I know we all share the 
goal of trying to get it back on track, but we should look at 
some of the lessons learned for why it did not happen the way 
we wanted the first time.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Scott.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to both of the witnesses for being here today 
and, Ms. Charles, good see you from South Carolina. I wish it 
was under different circumstances, but certainly always happy 
to see a South Carolinian representing our nation.
    It has been nearly a month since the outbreak of the 
hostilities in Sudan. Since then, we have seen ceasefire after 
ceasefire fail. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes. 
Nearly 600 have been killed, 5,000 injured, figures that are 
likely underrepresented.
    Hospitals have been attacked. Medical care is scarce. 
Access to food and water is quickly running out. In a country 
plagued with sectarian strife and humanitarian crises, the 
situation seems to be only getting worse.
    All of this is the direct result of two selfish men and 
their desire to keep power, really, at all costs it seems to 
me, at the expense of their own people, propped up by in part 
the inadequacy of the U.S. policy.
    Apart from the loss of civilian lives, I am greatly 
concerned about the risk that further instability in Sudan can 
cause to regions beyond it. I will start with the easy 
question.
    Ms. Nuland, how did we get where we are and how do we bring 
the conflict to an end, particularly not with one strongman, 
two strongmen who overthrew the powers that were?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Without going back through decades of tragic history in 
Sudan, I will start with where we were after Hamdok was ousted 
and our efforts with our international partners to support the 
Sudanese people in creating a larger process that included more 
Sudanese civil society, more of their civilian voices in this 
framework arrangement for a transition which was painfully 
negotiated among them, and then months and months of effort 
which was, we felt, bearing real fruit to get to that 
democratic transition, particularly in the fall and throughout 
the winter.
    We were, as I said earlier in this hearing, down to 
literally one issue, the one that you identified, whether these 
two generals would agree to unify their forces and we were in 
the process of offering various options for how that could 
happen, along with our international partners.
    We were concerned because tensions between them would flare 
on and off, and then we had the very disappointing choice on 
April 15 for them to pick up their guns rather than continue 
with the talks and that is how we got where we are.
    What are we doing now? We are, first and foremost, focused 
on trying to get them to put those guns down long enough and 
well enough so that Assistant Secretary Charles and colleagues 
can get serious humanitarian aid in.
    We are now on our sixth, seventh short-term ceasefire, 
which is a direct result of the international pressure that 
everybody is putting on them, including more than 12 phone 
calls to the parties by Secretary Blinken himself.
    What we are trying to get done in Jeddah now is to 
negotiate a declaration of commitment to protect the civilians 
of Sudan that would be agreed by both of the warring parties to 
open corridors and follow humanitarian principles on the ground 
in Sudan. That is stage one.
    Stage two would then be to try to make the ceasefire 
enduring and stage three would be to get back to a civilian-led 
process probably with a broader contingent of civilians 
involved than we had the last time.
    It is extremely difficult, as you noted.
    Senator Scott. Yes, ma'am.
    Quick thought on evacuation plans for Americans and the 
challenges that we seem to face. I would say if you look at the 
fact that France was able to evacuate 500 people in the first 
48 hours, Germany about 700 people, China about 2,000, all 
before the U.S. even started to support the evacuation efforts 
of American citizens, my thought is why and the second is, as I 
think about the South Carolinians in Khartoum who have been 
calling my office asking for assistance, there seems to be no 
actual plan that they have received from the State Department.
    I would love to hear what happens next and how do we do a 
better job of helping our American citizens who want to leave.
    Ms. Nuland. After the initial evacuation of the embassy----
    Senator Scott. Yes.
    Ms. Nuland. --we were able to support our allies in 
establishing a beachhead at the airport. More than half of the 
Americans who got out--as we have determined through the math 
at this hearing, we got 1,300 Americans out altogether. More 
than half of them went on those allied flights in the first few 
days.
    While we were working in a division of labor, if you will, 
on the land routes, which were--we were able to get another 700 
people out through the land routes, including some of our 
allies in exchange, we are continuing to give advice to the--
any remaining Americans.
    Sometimes at the beginning of an evacuation people are not 
ready or they are not sure about their family circumstances. We 
have continuing advice to other--to Americans who want to come 
out now.
    If you have constituents, please send them to us and we 
will work on it.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Thanks to both the witnesses and thanks to 
the chairman for holding a full committee on this.
    I have obviously gathered a lot from listening to my 
colleagues. I just want to--obviously, there is multiple fronts 
to this effort in terms of America. One is we have heard a lot 
about getting American citizens out. I have talked to Jake 
Sullivan and others and been working with offices.
    Another front is obviously trying to cease hostilities and 
these prenegotiations in Jeddah are so critical and then, 
finally, helping civil society, which was talked about 
extensively, and finding a way not only to deal with the 
current crises that are going on threatening civilians, 
displacing internal persons, people fleeing to other unstable 
countries like Chad and Ethiopia are a crisis, and this is a 
day-to-day changing, the reports I am trying to stay up with 
from the Congressional Research Service and more.
    I want to drill down on a couple themes within those three 
areas I talked about. The first is the still challenging 
bureaucracy of getting aid into the country, which is really 
frustrating when you think about things being held up at the 
Port of Sudan, critical supplies, who are the controlling 
government entities on the ground right now, the Humanitarian 
Aid Commission and more.
    Then is there an opportunity to more center civilians in 
this larger negotiations that are going on? Because clearly in 
Jeddah, the two parties are the warring generals, but the 
desire here is for civilian society to begin to be elevated and 
the democratic governance to be empowered for the future, as 
well.
    Ms. Charles. On a personal note, early in my career I 
helped start up the Darfur response for one of our humanitarian 
partners nearly 20 years ago.
    I have been dealing with the HAC--the Humanitarian Affairs 
Commission--in Sudan off and on for almost two decades now and 
their behavior is egregious even under the best of 
circumstances and particularly now.
    We have been pressing both in the discussions in Jeddah, 
but also in bilateral conversations, including with the embassy 
here and others, on the need to lift those bureaucratic 
restrictions.
    It is egregious to have goods held up in customs and 
clearance processes in Port Sudan or have our partners feel 
like they have to go to the HAC for permission to draw on 
prepositioned supplies.
    We are actively working those issues and they continue to 
be a top priority. We have seen some of the food that we were 
bringing into port Sudan just cleared in the last couple of 
days. We have some small progress there, but it is something 
that we are certainly staying very much on top of.
    Ms. Nuland. Just to say that the humanitarian declaration 
of commitment to protect civilians in Sudan that we are working 
on in Jeddah embeds in it some of these basic humanitarian 
principles that have undergirded the work Assistant Secretary 
Charles has done her whole life, but that the Sudanese actors 
need to enforce. We will see how that concludes.
    With regard to where we go on broadening that initial 
framework, I think we agree completely that it is going to have 
to be broader. I will say, and I think you have been involved 
in this some as well, that we have not limited our own 
engagement in terms of how to move the transition forward just 
to those who are participants in the framework.
    Ambassador Godfrey has really broadened our outreach to the 
NGO community, to different aspects of civil society. The 
Secretary has had some of those folks into his office. I had a 
group of civil society folks in my office.
    I think the question is going to be when we--if we have 
that good news that we get beyond put down the guns, get a 
ceasefire, get the food in, to get back to framework I think 
the question is going to be how to structure it so it is 
sufficiently broad to capture the various views and ideas, but 
not so broad that it becomes unwieldy.
    Senator Booker. Obviously, this is a colossal breakdown 
here, a failure, in a sense, of democracy to take root and it 
means that we have to reevaluate all of our actions and roles 
that we have played and try things differently.
    I know those conversations are going on. I know that we see 
vulnerable citizens--armed militias once again targeted 
refugees in Darfur. There are so many crises and fronts to 
this.
    I want to just get in the last seconds I have a little bit 
more input from you because I know that you are--my 
understanding, at least, is that you are the chair of a working 
group on Wagner and overall and so, clearly, there are 
operations going on there.
    A large percentage, around 70 percent, of the gold that is 
being exported is going to Russia. We know what is going on the 
ground. I wonder if in the final seconds can you give me some 
insights into the Wagner Group and how are we countering what 
is going on. They are really destabilizing efforts in the 
region.
    Ms. Nuland. As you know, Senator Booker, and as you said, 
Wagner plays a malign role no matter where it shows up and in 
Africa, whether it is in Sudan, whether it is in Central 
African Republic, whether it is across the Sahel, it has 
brought nothing, but more violence, a looting of the 
sovereignty and the wealth of these countries, and we are 
working with multiple countries across Africa to help them, 
many of whom have buyer's remorse now that they invited Wagner 
in at all.
    We can talk to in a more secure setting on some of our 
efforts there, everything from countering disinformation to 
offering better options in terms of security, et cetera, to 
disrupting the supply chain of Wagner weapons in and gold and 
other things out.
    We are working intensively also with other partners in the 
gold supply chain including UAE on these problems, but you are 
absolutely right. Prigozhin has brought nothing good to Sudan 
and he is strip mining the country of its gold and its future.
    Senator Booker. My time is expired. I just want to say--
first of all, I want to take either you and knowing how many 
demands on their time someone on--sitting in a classified 
setting having this conversation because the scope of the 
Wagner's operations, I just saw Facebook shutting down 100+ 
accounts.
    They are working on so many different fronts in the African 
venue context that is so disturbing, and I would like to better 
understand our efforts to counter their malign activities.
    Ms. Nuland. Good. We will look forward to that.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Let me ask you some final questions. I know that the May 4 
Executive order on Sudan issued by the President, but there was 
also an Executive order issued related to the conflict in 
Ethiopia that was never fully utilized.
    Not a single Ethiopian was designated under the Executive 
order even though 800,000 people are estimated to have died as 
a result of the conflict in northern Ethiopia.
    Sanctions are only effective if used as part of a well 
thought out strategy to obtain specific policy goals and aims. 
Does the Administration have a strategy to use targeted 
sanctions to obtain the outcomes we are seeking? Will we use 
targeted sanctions to pressure the parties in Jeddah to come to 
an agreement?
    Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I think you have seen around the 
world the Administration's commitment to using sanctions 
including on a subject that we work on a lot together, the--
Russia's war in Ukraine.
    I would argue that the fact of the Executive order on May 4 
that we gave ourselves this tool was--had an effect on the 
parties being willing to come to Jeddah. As I said, we are 
working on how that Executive order could be populated with 
names, depending upon how the talks go.
    We have done the same in Ethiopia and I would argue that 
just having the Executive order played a good role in getting 
us to the better place we are in Ethiopia.
    The Chairman. Are there packages that deploy--or packages 
that are ready to be deployed if you make that decision?
    Ms. Nuland. There are. There are.
    The Chairman. Well, do we have any diplomatic outreach to 
allies and partners to join us in imposing sanctions if we, in 
fact, decide to do so?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes. The Secretary and Assistant Secretary Phee 
and I have all been involved in ensuring that if we go in that 
direction we do not go there alone.
    The Chairman. Now, I want to refer back to Senator Risch's 
remarks about a special envoy for Sudan and that call has a 
growing chorus of voices.
    Our current special envoy for the Horn of Africa, unlike 
his predecessors, does not cover Sudan nor does he directly 
report to the President or the Secretary of State. What is the 
Administration's position on the special envoy that reports 
directly to the President or Secretary of State?
    Ms. Nuland. Chairman, at the current moment, particularly 
since he is now outside Sudan and not running a massive 
embassy, we are deploying Ambassador Godfrey not just to 
maintain broad contacts with Sudanese and participate in these 
talks in Jeddah and any onward talks, we also anticipate using 
him to maintain tight links to regional partners to the global 
coalition we will need on this, including working intensively 
now with the African Union, although having Steph Sullivan 
confirmed would be even augmenting of that.
    There are pieces of this Sudan work that Mike Hammer, our 
Ethiopia envoy, has been helpful in and he will continue to be 
helpful and we will call on him if we need----
    The Chairman. In other words, you do not support--the 
Department does not support a special envoy, as I hear all your 
answers there around the edges, but not onto my question.
    Ms. Nuland. At the moment we see Ambassador Godfrey as that 
envoy.
    The Chairman. Is he really going to do all this shuttle 
diplomacy that you are talking about?
    Ms. Nuland. He will if we need to. Yes.
    The Chairman. Of course, he reports to Molly Phee?
    Ms. Nuland. He does.
    The Chairman. Yes. It just seems to many of us that given 
the stakes in the region that we urgently need a high-level 
representative to deal with interlocutors in Africa, the Gulf, 
in Europe, and one who reports directly to the President or the 
Secretary of State, and while you are here please take that 
back to the Department.
    I intend to press it at various different levels, but I 
think it is incredibly important.
    Senator Risch. I want to concur in that.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch is joining me in that regard. 
He raised it originally.
    Finally, Ms. Charles, I have heard some of your answers. 
Secretary General Guterres of the U.N. said in mid-April that 
the humanitarian situation in Sudan was already precarious, now 
a catastrophe.
    I hear that you have set up a DART team in Nairobi, but if 
a 5-day humanitarian ceasefire is agreed, are organizations 
ready to move into assistance to Sudan and deliver it to the 
conflict-affected areas?
    Ms. Charles. Our partners are already gearing up and, in 
fact, many are trying to send more staff into Sudan right now, 
which is part of the reason why we are pressing on things like 
waivers of visas.
    They are also bringing supplies into Port Sudan. The key is 
really to have sufficient security to move those supplies from 
Port Sudan and then to distribute them where they are most 
needed, both inside of Khartoum and Darfur and Northern 
Kordofan where we are seeing the fighting.
    The Chairman. What does that security entail? Who would 
provide it?
    Ms. Charles. It is really having the assurances from the 
parties that they will respect that access.
    The Chairman. Now, given the urgency of the situation, what 
happens if we do not get this humanitarian ceasefire? Is there 
any way to deliver humanitarian assistance in Sudan if talks in 
Jeddah fail?
    Ms. Charles. Even right now we are working with our 
partners to very quickly use what is already in Sudan and also 
pursue all available routes including from neighboring 
countries to bring supplies in to try and diversify where 
supplies would be coming in from, not be so reliant on just a 
Port Sudan to Khartoum route.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you, but the Sudan humanitarian 
response is already severely underfunded. It just received 
about 14 percent of the required funding before the current 
crisis.
    What actions are we undertaking to galvanize financial 
contributions from international partners in order to be able 
to meet the challenge, assuming that we have the wherewithal to 
do so?
    Ms. Charles. Yes. It was already underfunded. We were 
funding the majority of that humanitarian response plan. We 
have been pleased to see the Saudis make an announcement of 
$100 million pledge.
    We want to see that actually delivered to actors on the 
ground who can responsibly deliver that assistance. We are 
certainly pressing others. We have seen indications from the 
Canadians, from the European Union as well, that they will put 
support behind this, but we have really seen particularly from 
the Gulf, I will say, a stepping away from humanitarian 
assistance and particularly in their neighborhood we would love 
to see them step up in a more----
    The Chairman. Now, many of the international staff of aid 
organizations evacuated Khartoum so we may not be able to, even 
if the opportunity or the window gets open, to rely upon our 
traditional partners to reach beneficiaries.
    Are we supporting Sudanese organizations that may be able 
to--have, in fact, given the opportunity, be able to do that?
    Ms. Charles. Yes. Among our partners are 30 Sudanese local 
NGOs that are either direct or more often indirect partners of 
ours.
    We have been in close contact with them, not just our 
international partners. Even our international partners, most 
of their Sudanese staff are still in-country albeit many of 
them have relocated to other areas and they are reconstituting, 
and we are working with them again to kind of reconstitute as 
quickly as possible and get them the resources they need.
    The Chairman. One of the consequences--this is always true. 
This is true in the Western Hemisphere as it is in Sudan. That 
if we cannot come to a successful conclusion here, up to a 
million Sudanese may very well be on the move and seek refuge. 
That already has a growing reality on the borders of Egypt.
    What is your assessment of Egypt's willingness and capacity 
to process a large number of refugees over its border with 
Sudan?
    Ms. Charles. I can let Under Secretary Nuland speak more 
generally about Egypt.
    The Chairman. I really thought it was her bailiwick, so to 
speak, but if you have insights I am happy to hear that, too.
    Ms. Nuland. Do you want to start and I will do the 
broader--yes.
    Ms. Charles. We certainly have been pressing with 
colleagues at the State Department for the Egyptians to allow 
international organizations, particularly UNHCR and IOM, to the 
border.
    Those missions moved for the first time just 4 or 5 days 
ago so we have seen some progress on that front. We would also 
like to see the opening of kind of a land route from Egypt into 
Sudan so that we can address conditions on the Sudanese side of 
that border as well.
    Ms. Nuland. Just to complement that, we have about 70,000 
Sudanese who have already--and third country nationals who have 
already arrived in Egypt. Egypt, as you know, is not the 
richest country on the planet, so looking at how to encourage 
support there and international support for Egypt.
    We are also talking to Chad, who is beginning to see its 
own stream of refugees and to ensure that the Egyptian Red 
Crescent on the border is doing as much as it can, that the 
crossing points are open and easy to maneuver.
    As Assistant Secretary Charles just said, the first problem 
was getting U.N. and IO humanitarian access to the border. That 
has now happened. It is something that we are watching and 
working on.
    The Chairman. Well, this is a challenge of conflict. We see 
it in the Western Hemisphere. We have 20 million people who are 
displaced in the Southern Hemisphere or they are seeking 
refugee status or they are seeking asylum or they are just 
simply displaced, and if they cannot be assimilated in the 
countries that they have moved to then they will march north. 
In this case, they will march elsewhere.
    Thinking about that in advance as a reality, a real 
possibility--hopefully, not a reality--is going to be critical. 
Otherwise, we will then again deal with the aftermath and not 
be prepared for the aftermath instead of thinking about it 
proactively. I urge you both to look at that.
    Let me thank both of our witnesses for appearing before the 
committee to discuss the crisis in Sudan. It is obviously an 
extremely volatile situation.
    We urgently need to use all available tools to put an end 
to the fighting, chart a new path forward towards a civilian-
led democracy. Given how rapidly events are changing on the 
ground, I urge both of your departments and agencies to 
continue to keep the committee apprised of your actions.
    The record of the hearing will remain open until the close 
of business on Friday, May 12. Please ensure that questions for 
the record are submitted no later than that date and let us 
hope that we can get an expeditious response to them.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. In the days leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, 
media was reporting on troop movements in and around Khartoum and of 
rising tensions between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed 
Forces. The security situation was clearly becoming more and more 
precarious, yet the embassy took no action in response. Why was it that 
the embassy did not authorize or order departure of staff, or bring in 
additional marines, security personnel, and emergency consular teams to 
assist American citizens to depart before the violence began, and what 
is being done to ensure this type of analytic failure doesn't put lives 
at risk in the future?

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) 
thoroughly considered adjustments to its security posture in regular 
EAC meetings, including on April 13, 2023, 2 days before fighting 
began. The EAC advised against travel to Karima, Northern State, and 
prohibited travel outside of Khartoum for U.S. Government staff and 
family members. The Embassy shared this guidance with private U.S. 
citizens in an April 13 security alert. The embassy was also in touch 
with the U.S. military in Djibouti and Diplomatic Security on 
assistance that could be required.

    Question. Can you explain why it took so long for the United States 
to organize evacuations for American citizens trapped in Khartoum after 
hostilities commenced, when other countries--including Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, the UK, China, and Saudi Arabia, to name a few--were 
able to organize evacuations for their nationals earlier?

    Answer. In the initial days of the conflict, the airport in 
Khartoum and Wadi Seidna airfield were not viable options for safe 
evacuation. Any attempt to have U.S. citizens depart Khartoum then from 
the airport could have resulted in casualties. Following those initial 
days, a ceasefire extension enabled the United States, our allies, and 
partners to undertake departure operations. Our allies did make space 
available on their flights for U.S. passport holders out of Sudan as 
early as April 23. We encouraged U.S. citizens to avail themselves of 
those flights if they felt it was safe to do so, and a number did.

    Question. Sudanese stakeholders have sharply criticized the 
structure of the negotiations that were meant to lead to a civilian 
transition. In their view, placing a military junta with an established 
record of human rights abuses at the center of efforts to restore 
civilian rule, failing to call the October 2021 coup a coup, and not 
pressing for accountability through sanctions--for either the coup or 
the use of deadly force on those protesting the coup--contributed to 
the marginalization of civilian groups that were on the front lines of 
the Sudanese struggle for democracy. Are we using the same failed 
methodology--privileging engagement with those with guns over those 
without them--and expecting a different result?

    Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process 
to establish a civilian-led transitional government that would lead 
Sudan through a transition culminating in democratic elections. Our 
approach emphasized the need for the military to relinquish political 
control and operate under the direction of a civilian-led government 
with a focus on protecting the people of Sudan and the country's 
borders. Sudan's civilian leaders sought to achieve this via 
negotiations, which require us to engage both civilians and Sudanese 
military leaders.

    Question. What is our plan to engage Sudanese civil society more 
broadly, moving forward and what about our allies and partners in the 
international community--when and how do we expect them to participate 
in efforts to reach a political agreement?

    Answer. We are engaging Sudanese civilian leaders, Resistance 
Committees (RCs), and civil society to work toward the shared goal of 
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as 
possible, and to harmonize civilian and international assistance 
efforts. We will support efforts to advance a political process that is 
led by an inclusive coalition of Sudanese civilians--involving women, 
the representatives from outlying regions of Sudan, civil society, RCs, 
and political parties. We are also engaging our allies and partners to 
coordinate civilian engagement efforts, including through the African 
Union Expanded Mechanism.

    Question. How do we ensure that Saudi Arabia, and other partners, 
continue to play a constructive role in what will inevitably be a long 
and complicated road toward resumption of a political process?

    Answer. We are closely consulting with regional and other partners 
on the situation in Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
have been crucial partners in our diplomatic efforts and with 
evacuation logistical support. We are also supporting international 
diplomatic efforts by the African Union, the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development, League of Arab States, United Nations, and 
other partners from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to 
immediately end the violence.

    Question. You noted that sanctions packages are ready, and that the 
Administration had reached out to allied and partners to join us in 
imposing sanctions. You also said that the threat of sanctions had been 
instrumental with regards to Ethiopia; however that agreement took an 
additional year to achieve during which thousands suffered and died. 
What will be the trigger or triggers for imposing sanctions under the 
E.O.?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken stated that ``If the cease-fire is 
violated, we'll know,'' and that we will promote accountability for the 
violators through sanctions and other means. On June 1, the Department 
of Treasury added four companies, two affiliated with the SAF and two 
with the RSF, to the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) Specially 
Designated Nationals (SDN) List. We also amended the Sudan Business 
Advisory that determine that Sudanese gold is conflict affected, and 
imposed visa restrictions on officials from the SAF, RSF, and leaders 
from the former Omar al-Bashir regime, responsible for, or complicit 
in, undermining Sudan's democratic transition.

    Question. What is the specific strategy? Please discuss the 
outcomes that have been identified and how the imposition of specific 
sanctions will be tied to achieving those outcomes.

    Answer. Our immediate objective in issuing sanctions designations 
is to change behavior and undermine the ability of the warring parties 
to sustain this conflict. Our first tranche of designations on June 1 
of four major companies owned by the SAF and RSF advanced that 
objective. We stand ready to pursue additional measures to further 
undermine their financial networks to compel the two sides to cease 
hostilities, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and accept a 
civilian government and a resumption of Sudan's democratic transition. 
We adjourned the Jeddah Talks on June 21 because of frequent ceasefire 
violations; we stand ready to resume talks only but only once the 
parties demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations.

    Question. Which partners have agreed to join us in imposing 
sanctions?

    Answer. We will continue to engage our G7, regional, and Gulf 
partners to sanction the four companies designated by the U.S. on June 
1 and assist in sanctions enforcement, and to take other complementary 
steps to put pressure on the parties to stop fighting. They have not 
yet made any designations.

    Question. What types of sanctions will they impose, and do we have 
agreement on the triggers for sanctions?

    Answer. We cannot speculate on specific measures other countries 
may deploy. We continue to coordinate with our G7 partners on 
sanctions.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. When do we expect to convene international partners to 
begin to obtain resources to respond to the growing humanitarian need 
in Sudan and surrounding countries?

    Answer. We have met with core donor counterparts to discuss their 
plans to respond to the growing humanitarian needs in Sudan and the 
surrounding countries. We understand that a larger donor pledging 
conference might convene in June, though details are yet undetermined. 
As of May 8, the 2023 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan is 15.4 percent 
funded; it has received $268.3 million of the $1.48 billion requested.

    Question. What are we doing to support those engaged in the 
democratic transition process and peace building activities throughout 
the country in the wake of the conflict?

    Answer. The outbreak of violence in April forced many partners to 
make the difficult decision to temporarily halt programming and 
evacuate staff from Sudan. In response to the severely deteriorated 
operating environment, USAID is assessing how best to adjust and 
continue programs in Sudan that promote peace and democracy, mitigate 
conflict, protect human rights, increase access to information, and 
empower civil society. The goal of these resulting adjustments is to 
protect civilians and mitigate the impact of the conflict on people 
while also bolstering efforts to build bridges between divided 
communities and revitalize civic engagement to pave the way for greater 
citizen engagement, leadership, and inclusion in coordination about 
Sudan's political future. As these plans are finalized, USAID will 
continue to share updates with the Committee about its continued 
efforts to support Sudanese aspirations for freedom, peace, and 
justice.

    Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that 
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
    What are some of the most serious logistical and security 
challenges that humanitarian actors are facing right now in Sudan?

    Answer. First and foremost, the ongoing conflict between the 
Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is the primary issue 
driving humanitarian needs and limiting access to people in need in 
Sudan. The only solution to the growing crisis is a durable end to the 
fighting.
    Humanitarian organizations in Sudan are facing excessive 
bureaucratic impediments to the delivery of assistance, including the 
delay or denial of travel permits and entry visas from the Sudanese 
authorities. Port Sudan remains the primary entry point for 
humanitarian supplies into Sudan; this is neither sustainable nor 
sufficient to address the scale of humanitarian response needed. Only 
locations in the eastern part of Sudan are accessible by road convoy 
from Port Sudan.
    The establishment of new entry points into Sudan via cross-border 
humanitarian movements and additional humanitarian hubs within Sudan 
will be critical to creating a sustainable humanitarian response. The 
humanitarian community continues to explore overland, cross-border 
routes from neighboring countries. To do this, the U.S. Government is 
advocating for neighboring countries to keep their borders open to 
Sudanese displaced by conflict so that they may access urgently needed 
assistance. Additionally, we are advocating for neighboring countries 
to also allow humanitarian goods to freely flow into Sudan to support 
the scale-up of the humanitarian response.
    Additionally, the looting of humanitarian commodities and 
facilities has become widespread in Sudan, especially in conflict areas 
where governance has decreased. Looting has affected both public 
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations and has 
resulted in significant losses and damages to humanitarian operations.
    Finally, USAID is concerned that the rainy season upcoming from 
June through October could further hinder the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance by posing additional logistical challenges to operations.

    Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that 
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
    How could the United States aid the safe movement of refugees and 
displaced persons?

    Answer. As access and security permit, USAID-funded humanitarian 
partners are present at the borders and are working with local 
authorities to provide services to those in need as they await to cross 
over into neighboring countries. USAID is asking government entities in 
Sudan and its neighboring countries to eliminate the bureaucratic 
barriers that prevent relief organizations' ability to respond to this 
crisis, including the approval of visas and the facilitation of cross-
border movement. We are collaborating with donor government 
counterparts to advocate for cross-border movements to get humanitarian 
commodities to people in need.
    We refer you to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
at the Department of State for additional information about the safe 
movement of refugees.

    Question. As you know, the United Nations is anticipating that 
close to 1 million people will flee Sudan if the conflict persists.
    Do our activities place emphasis on protection from sexual and 
gender-based violence? How are those activities being resourced?

    Answer. Reports received by the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) sub-
sector in Sudan and service providers indicate that GBV in Sudan is 
widespread and growing in prevalence since April 15. Women and girls 
and those who are on the move, displaced in temporary shelters, and 
deprived of basic needs are particularly at risk.
    U.S. Government partners, including non-governmental organizations 
and public international organizations, are providing GBV assistance in 
Sudan. The GBV response in Sudan prioritizes the most vulnerable 
populations, including persons living with disabilities, survivors of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, and displaced women and girls. For 
example, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is working to train service 
providers to reach affected women and girls with remote psychosocial 
support services in hard-to-reach areas. USAID's partner the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) has mobilized community volunteers to provide 
mental health and psychosocial support services to children in 
Khartoum. In Gedaref, one NGO partner continues to provide psychosocial 
support and case service management to people in need and is evaluating 
ways to expand programming to other areas as security permits. With 
support from USAID, the UN International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) airlifted one metric ton of medical supplies and medicines to 
South Sudan's Renk county. IOM teams in Renk are providing health 
screening at the points of entry and reception centers and 
psychological first aid and counseling services to assess immediate 
concerns and needs of people fleeing Sudan.
    To ensure that protection remains at the center of humanitarian 
programming, all partners receiving funding from USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Assistance must address how they will protect vulnerable 
beneficiaries from risks of sexual and GBV as part of the application 
process and award management. Additionally, all applicants must submit 
a Code of Conduct providing for protection from sexual exploitation and 
abuse in humanitarian relief operations.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Embassy Khartoum Evacuation & Security: While those 
directing Sudan policy within the Administration were preparing for an 
imminent declaration of a civilian government, they seem to have missed 
obvious signs of the impending collapse of the negotiation process and 
ensuing civil war that forced American diplomats to dodge roving gun 
battles and airstrikes. How did the State Department fail to see the 
apparent signs of an impending crisis in Sudan?

    Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process 
to establish a civilian-led transitional government and democratic 
elections, fulfilling the Sudanese people's aspirations for freedom, 
justice, and peace. The Sudanese-led process was successful in 
addressing many complex and divisive issues, including transitional 
justice and security sector reform. Working with the Tripartite 
Mechanism and other international partners, we helped provide Sudanese 
military and civilian parties a path to an agreement. In the end, the 
Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces chose to elevate their 
interests above those of the Sudanese people, refused to negotiate on 
the remaining issues, and chose war over peace. They are to blame for 
the current crisis.

    Question. While I appreciate fully that Sudan's Generals Burhan and 
Hemetti ``are to blame for the current crisis,'' my question was asking 
about the Administration's preparedness for the outbreak of violence. 
How did the State Department fail to see the apparent signs of an 
impending crisis in Sudan?

    Answer. The State Department assessed heightened tensions in the 
days leading up to April 15 and took steps to protect our employees, 
warn U.S. citizens and urge military leaders to deescalate. We tracked 
closely the heightened rhetoric and troop movements throughout the days 
and weeks before the outbreak of fighting. We constantly engaged with 
the parties in coordination with our diplomatic partners to prevent 
conflict. We transmitted 15 security messages to the Embassy community 
between April 13 to May 22 and sent 19 messages to individuals 
registered with the Embassy to keep American citizens as informed and 
safe as possible. In addition to engaging in diplomacy to encourage the 
parties to deescalate tensions, we issued a joint statement with 
likeminded partners on April 13 to express concern, urge steps to 
reduce tensions, and to urge the partners to fulfill their previous 
commitments on establishing a civilian-led transitional government.

    Question. Why were we caught flat-footed in our crisis response, 
which needlessly endangered U.S. Embassy personnel and did not 
sufficiently forewarn American citizens?

    Answer. Our Mission in Sudan was aware of complex security threats 
throughout Sudan before the conflict began. This was reflected in our 
consular and public messaging prior to the outbreak of hostilities, in 
which we consistently advised U.S. citizens to not travel to Sudan or 
to depart the country immediately. When it became safe to do so, we 
assisted approximately 1,300 U.S. citizens and their immediate family 
members via U.S. Government-organized convoys, flights with our 
international partners, and messaging about options to depart Sudan.

    Question. Does Embassy Khartoum have an emergency evacuation plan?

    Answer. Like all U.S. embassies worldwide, Embassy Khartoum has an 
Emergency Action Plan that includes evacuation plans and regularly 
performs drills and exercises on crisis scenarios. Embassy Khartoum and 
the Department of Defense coordinated regularly on a range of 
contingencies and crisis scenarios in advance of the crisis. As the 
situation unfolded, the Department of State and Department of Defense 
coordinated in real time and update and refine those plans, based on 
the dynamic situation on the ground.

    Question. How often does the Department revisit or update the plan?

    Answer. Worldwide, all diplomatic missions have Emergency Action 
Plans (EAPs), which include a section for evacuation plans. EAPs are 
updated and revalidated annually.

    Question. Was the Embassy Khartoum evacuation plan executed during 
the recent evacuation? Why or why not?

    Answer. Yes. Embassy Khartoum staff utilized their evacuation 
plans, including survey data from the Integrated Survey Program, to 
successfully consolidate and evacuate 72 personnel and family members 
under Chief of Mission security responsibility.

    Question. Did Embassy Khartoum have contingency plans in place in 
case post could not execute the emergency evacuation plan?

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum maintained an Emergency Action Plan that 
included multiple plans for getting personnel out and contingencies in 
case personnel were cut off from the embassy. These plans were 
implemented, and helped successfully consolidate U.S. personnel, before 
moving all U.S. personnel and their family members to the embassy 
compound for the evacuation.

    Question. Were these contingency plans implemented? Why or why not?

    Answer. Yes. For staff unable to reach the embassy, Embassy 
Khartoum activated its cutoff plan to rally staff to the Alternate 
Command Center. This consolidation helped verify accountability and the 
subsequent relocation of all staff to the embassy compound.

    Question. With evidence of a deteriorating security situation in 
Sudan, did the Department consider moving to authorized or ordered 
departure before fighting broke out? Please describe the Department's 
deliberations on this matter.

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) 
thoroughly considered adjustments to its security posture in regular 
EAC meetings, including on April 13, 2023, 2 days before fighting 
began. The Embassy did not recommend Authorized or Ordered Departure. 
However, the EAC advised against travel to Karima, Northern State, and 
prohibited travel outside of Khartoum for U.S. Government staff and 
family members. The Embassy shared this guidance with U.S. Government 
staff and with private U.S. citizens in an April 13 security alert. The 
embassy was also in touch with the U.S. military in Djibouti and 
Diplomatic Security on assistance that could be required.

    Question. Do all posts in Africa maintain emergency evacuation 
plans?

    Answer. Yes, all U.S. missions maintain emergency evacuation plans 
that are updated and revalidated regularly.

    Question. How often are emergency evacuation plans updated for 
posts in Africa?

    Answer. Emergency Action Plans at all posts in the Bureau of 
African Affairs, which include evacuation plans, must be updated and 
revalidated annually. Many are updated more frequently when 
circumstances warrant.

    Question. Do emergency evacuation at posts in Africa plans include 
contingencies in case the primary plan is not executable?

    Answer. Yes, all emergency evacuation plans include contingencies.

    Question. How are you drawing upon the lessons of this crisis to 
adapt to other high-risk posts where we could potentially see a similar 
scenario play out--say in Chad, Central African Republic, or South 
Sudan?

    Answer. Following an evacuation, the Office of Crisis Management 
and Strategy (CMS) will coordinate a lessons learned exercise to 
capture what worked and identify opportunities for improvement. These 
lessons learned are shared within the Department and with posts abroad 
to inform future planning. Additionally, the Bureau of African Affairs 
hosts periodic virtual workshops on crisis preparation with posts 
abroad, with the help of CMS, to discuss recent evacuations and lessons 
learned from other crises.

    Question. Do you commit to brief the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the Embassy evacuations for all high-risk posts in Africa?

    Answer. I support briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
following the evacuation of any high-risk post in Africa.

    Question. What is the current posture of the Department in Sudan?

    Answer. The Department temporarily suspended operations at Embassy 
Khartoum effective April 22, 2023, and evacuated all U.S. personnel and 
their family members from Sudan.

    Question. Under what conditions would the Department decide to move 
Embassy personnel back to Khartoum?

    Answer. As conditions in Sudan improve, Embassy Sudan's Emergency 
Action Committee will meet to discuss changes to the security 
environment. The committee will then make a recommendation to the 
ambassador, who may then request permission from Department leadership 
resume embassy operations. Any decision to resume operations will be 
based on verified changes to the security environment in Sudan and 
subject to Congressional notification procedures.

    Question. What is the timeline for returning to Embassy Khartoum 
once the Department decides to do so?

    Answer. Prior to temporarily suspending operations, the embassy 
disabled and destroyed sensitive computer networks and communications 
equipment and sealed the building. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 
in conjunction with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and 
the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, would need to determine 
the timeline for resuming operations based on any damages sustained to 
the physical plant, security systems, and in controlled access areas 
and assess the availability of locally employed staff to assist. 
Resuming operations at Embassy Khartoum would also be subject to 
completion of Congressional notification procedures.

    Question. How long will it take to restore OpenNet once personnel 
access Embassy Khartoum?

    Answer. The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in 
conjunction with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, must recertify the 
building for information processing prior to restarting full 
operations. This may require importing new hardware and replacing 
damaged equipment. Limited operations using satellite connectivity may 
be possible within weeks. Returning to full operations could take 
significantly longer.

    Question. How long for ClassNet?

    Answer. The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in 
conjunction with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, must recertify the 
building for processing sensitive information prior to restarting 
classified operations. This will require importing new hardware and 
replacing equipment. Once functional, Diplomatic Security will need to 
validate that the building meets required information security 
standards to protect classified material. This process will take months 
in order to ensure the integrity of sensitive systems.

    Question. Did Embassy personnel have to abandon their personal 
belongings to be evacuated? If yes, is the Department compensating them 
for their losses?

    Answer. Yes. Employees will be able to file claims through private 
insurance, once it is determined that there has been a loss. Claims 
denied by private insurance may then be resubmitted to the Department 
for adjudication.

    Question. Has there been any damage to Embassy Khartoum or 
personnel housing, including the chief of mission residence?

    Answer. Yes. The embassy and some personnel housing units have 
sustained damage, including the residential housing compound containing 
the Deputy Chief of Mission's residence.

    Question. Is it the Department's policy to allow mission chiefs to 
take annual leave regardless of conditions in the host country? If no, 
under what conditions would a chief of mission have annual leave denied 
or canceled if previously approved?

    Answer. Like all employees, chiefs of mission are entitled to 
annual leave, which is vital to an employee's wellbeing and resiliency. 
An assistant secretary, as the supervisor for a chief of mission, may 
cancel previously approved annual leave or deny annual leave at their 
discretion.

    Question. When responding to Senator Cardin during the hearing, you 
noted that the Embassy ``had connectivity with about 5,000 Americans.'' 
You estimated that 12 messages were pushed out to them ``about various 
options for leaving the country.'' Please share the text of each 
message with the timestamp when the Embassy sent them.

    Answer. The U.S. Department of State publicly transmitted 15 
security messages (Security Alerts) to U.S. citizens from April 13 to 
May 12, 2023. The Department also sent 19 direct messages to 
individuals registered in our case management system, in addition to 
several hundred unique emails and text messages. Please see the 
attached for a complete timeline.
             consular affairs messaging on the sudan crisis
All times ET.
Friday, May 12, 2023
4:45 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them that consular services are available in 
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart on their own and 
information on possible commercial options to depart Sudan.
Thursday, May 4, 2023
1:00 AM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them of commercial options to depart Sudan via 
ferry.
Wednesday, May 3, 2023
12:40 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not go to 
the Hotel Coral in Port Sudan and not to go to Fenti Golf in Khartoum.

10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not to go 
to the Hotel Coral, as no further assistance will be provided.
Tuesday, May 2, 2023
2:30 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them that consular services are available in 
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart and that the U.S. 
Government has completed all currently planned convoys to Port Sudan.
Monday, May 1, 2023
8:00 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising them we are unaware of additional flights from Wadi Seidna 
airport and, sharing information on border crossings (approximately 
4500 active cases).
Sunday, April 30, 2023
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising that they should seek to leave by commercially available 
means.

10:00 PM (approx.): Update on Information for U.S. Citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan-2/) posted on Embassy Khartoum website (posted on TravelGov May 
1).
Saturday, April 29, 2023
8:00 PM: Message (CACMS) and SMS sent to the full universe of 
registrants advising them of convoy C times and rally point 
(approximately 4500 active cases). WhatsApp messages sent to all cases 
reported ``ready to depart.'' Calls made to all high-profile, USG-
adjacent, and Congressional cases with this message.

2:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to verified U.S. citizens who were ready to 
depart asking them to notify CA if they have departed Sudan, and if 
not, verify they are still requesting assistance.

1:30 AM: Security Alert on avoiding Wadi Seidna airfield (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-2/).
Friday, April 28, 2023
3:36 PM: Message (CACMS and [email protected]) sent to individuals 
opting into the convoy B with times and rally point.

3:30 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising them to make contact if they wanted assistance departing on 
convoy B.

3:15 PM: Topper at Department Press Briefing on advice and assistance 
to U.S. citizens.

02:00 AM: Repeat Message ([email protected]) sent to U.S. citizens 
who indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally 
point information.
Thursday, April 27, 2023
9:30 PM: Message ([email protected]) sent to 147 U.S. citizens who 
indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally 
point information.

1:30 PM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to the full universe of 
registrants who expressed interest in departure regarding convoy A. 
TravelGov post (https://twitter.com/TravelGov/status/
1651641198191190025) urging U.S. citizens to fill out CACMS form posted 
across all of CA's social media platforms. U.S. Embassy Khartoum's 
website updated to have CACMS form link appear in banner on all pages; 
large image with form link added to home page.

11:30 AM: Secretary Blinken holds press briefing (https://
www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-of-homeland-
security-alejandro-mayorkas-at-a-joint-press-availability/) with DHS 
and mentions convoy.

10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to active cases notifying of 
flights opportunities at Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Wednesday, April 26, 2023
10:30 PM: Message (WhatsApp and SMS) sent to all verified U.S. 
citizens, ready to depart notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Tuesday, April 25, 2023
7:30 PM: Message (SMS) sent to all verified U.S. citizens, ready to 
depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.

5:00 PM: Security Alert on Port Sudan and land border options (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert/). Red banner linking to Embassy Alerts 
page added to state.gov.

10:00 AM: Message (WhatsApp, SMS, and calls) sent to all verified U.S. 
citizens, ready to depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi 
Seidna Airfield.
Monday, April 24, 2023
11:06 PM: Security alert on border crossing info for neighboring 
countries also sent to all active cases in CACMS (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan/).
Sunday, April 23, 2023
Red banner (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/ea/situation-in-sudan-2023.html) added to 
travel.state.gov containing CACMS link and STEP info (additional info 
continues to be added and removed as situations unfolds)

10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Suspension of 
Operations Security Alert.

6:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Saudi vessel 
(Amama) in Port Sudan.
Saturday, April 22, 2023
11:00 PM: Security alert on suspension of Embassy operations and 
sharing link to CACMS form (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-
suspension-of-embassy-operations/)

11:00 PM: Travel Advisory updated to reflect ordered departure of U.S. 
direct hire employees and family members. Pushed out via media note 
(https://www.state.gov/sudan-travel-advisory-remains-level-4-do-not-
travel/) and amplified on TravelGov social media/websites, per normal 
SOP.

10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding a UAE convoy.

3:16 AM: Security Alert on security challenges in country (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/sudan-security-alert/)
Wednesday, April 19, 2023
6:50 PM: Security Alert on ongoing violence and reports of assaults, 
home invasions, and looting (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-
s-embassy-khartoum-5/).

3:29 PM: Travelgov social media post with contact info (https://
twitter.com/TravelGov/status/1648770894003683328) advising U.S. 
citizens to contact the Embassy via email or phone and sign up for 
STEP.
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
9:45 AM: Security Alert noting ongoing fighting, gunfire, and security 
force activity, advising shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-18-april-2023/)
Sunday April 16, 2023
10:00 AM: Security Alert on situation and advising to remain indoors 
and shelter in place until further notice (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-4/)
Saturday April 15, 2023
Security Alert on continuing to shelter in place (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/)

Security Alert urging shelter in place and stating no plans for U.S. 
Government-coordinated evacuation of U.S. citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/).

Security Alert recommending shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-2/)

Travel.Gov published a consolidated post (https://twitter.com/
TravelGov/status/1647338067823304704?s=20) at 4:36 p.m. for Saturday 
alerts.
Thursday, April 13, 2023
9:40 AM: Security Alert advising U.S. citizens to avoid travel to 
Karima, Northern Sudan, and surrounding areas (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-april-13-2023/)
Background
    Except where noted, every Sudan alert is:

   pushed out to STEP enrollees

   posted on Embassy Khartoum's website

   posted on the TSG country page for Sudan (using a script 
        that pulls from the embassy's page)

   amplified by CA on social media

    Question. U.S. Policy Approach: During a State Department briefing 
on May 11, a senior official [``Senior State Department Official Two''] 
noted how the Department ``used U.S. power and influence to press the 
generals to respond to the aspirations of the Sudanese people.'' [Link: 
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-
on-the-situation-in-sudan/ ] After the initial steps to suspend 
international lending and debt relief and some bilateral assistance, 
how has the Department ``used U.S. power and influence to press the 
generals to respond to the aspirations of the Sudanese people'' under 
this Administration?

    Answer. We put intense diplomatic pressure on the military 
government and led, with our partners, international efforts to support 
a Sudanese-led process to form a civilian-led government. We took 
additional measures, including sanctioning the Central Reserve Police, 
coordinating with our partners to suspend all lending from 
international institutions to the government, and organizing the 
suspension of bilateral development assistance from the United States 
and all of our partners.

    Question. What is your understanding of the bipartisan, bicameral 
Congressional concerns regarding U.S. policy on Sudan?

    Answer. I understand that Congress, like the Department of State, 
wants to see a democratic government led by civilians in Sudan. We 
agree that only a truly civilian government can be successful in 
delivering to the people of Sudan. The United States supports the 
Sudanese people in restoring Sudan's democratic transition and forming 
a civilian government. The military forces should withdraw from 
governance and focus on defending the nation from external threats.

    Question. How do you plan to respond to the specific Congressional 
concern expressed through hearings, letters, staff and member 
consultations, and concurrent resolutions in the House and Senate that 
the same engagement approach with the Sudanese generals has not yielded 
substantive progress beyond empty promises, unimplemented frameworks, 
broken transition agreements, and ultimately war?

    Answer. The U.S. strategic approach focuses on pressing for a 
ceasefire, humanitarian access and, in parallel, supporting civilian 
stakeholders in developing a broad-based political process to end the 
conflict and resume a democratic transition. We are working closely 
with the AU, IGAD and regional and international partners toward these 
ends. Our efforts have not, and will not, be limited to only engaging 
the Sudanese generals.

    Question. What changes will you make to the Department's approach 
to policy architecture and architects to gain Congressional buy-in to 
fund and support your continued approach?

    Answer. The Department team, led by AF, with support from NEA and 
others, and overseen by Secretary Blinken and me, is working with the 
AU, IGAD and other partners to help the Sudanese establish a broader 
political process as soon as possible to end the conflict and get Sudan 
on course for a democratic transition. We anticipate this process will 
be more broad-based both in terms of Sudanese stakeholders and 
international supporters.

    Question. Given the role of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 
acting as a paramilitary force for hire by governments and forces to 
fight in Yemen, Libya and elsewhere, and its historical role in 
carrying out genocide in Darfur, do you agree the RSF should be 
sanctioned as an entity?

    Answer. The United States is considering the full range of tools at 
our disposal to address the conflict in Sudan, and to promote 
accountability for the RSF. Our view has long been that the RSF should 
integrate into the Sudanese Armed Forces as part of a security sector 
reform process. On June 1, the Department of Treasury added two major 
companies affiliated with the RSF to the Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.

    Question. Diplomatic Footprint & Tools: Also, during that 
Department briefing on May 11 [see previous question], this same senior 
official [``Senior State Department Official Two''] said, ``I find it 
confusing when we're told that we haven't been pressing the generals.'' 
It seems this senior official did not watch our recent hearing or, if 
he/she did, did not take the message that Congress wants to see changes 
in approach to include how the Department pressures the Generals ``to 
respond to the aspirations of the people.'' Many Sudanese people, 
including civil society, political party officials, and vital eminent 
persons, have strongly criticized the U.S. approach and support for 
their aspirations. Do you acknowledge this criticism and agree the 
Department's approach to ``pressing the generals'' is not only not 
working, but the Sudanese people feel it is not reinforcing their 
aspirations?

    Answer. We acknowledge that some Sudanese wanted the civilian-led 
process we supported to be more broad-based, backed by additional 
pressure on the military. Our strategy focused on supporting a 
Sudanese-led process to establish, via negotiations, a civilian-led 
transitional government that would lead Sudan through a transition 
culminating in democratic elections. Working with the Tripartite 
Mechanism and other international partners, we helped provide Sudanese 
military and civilian parties a path to an agreement that could have 
addressed complex and divisive issues related to transitional justice 
and security sector reform, among others. We pressed the generals to 
resolve their disputes within that process--an effort that ultimately 
failed when they took up arms again. They are to blame for the current 
crisis.

    Question. Will you commit to this Committee to make changes in the 
personnel group driving Sudan policy in the Department, what I referred 
to as the ``architects'' of the current policy approach in my hearing 
opening statement, and expand this to have a more diverse and 
consultative group of policy professionals handling these issues?

    Answer. Since the crisis, our Africa and Sudan teams, and 
Department leaders have taken broad soundings across Washington and 
with our international partners on next steps to try to end the 
fighting, get in more humanitarian aid and build a new civilian-led 
process.

    Question. Is it appropriate for senior Bureau of African Affairs 
officials, in a woefully understaffed and under-resourced bureau which 
I have raised concerns about and communicated to the Department many 
times, to continue to dedicate most of their time to Sudan and Ethiopia 
issues, essentially owning these issues, when other U.S. national 
security interests in Africa are not receiving equal intensity and 
focus?

    Answer. We appreciate your concern about the Department's staffing 
and resource challenges. I can assure you the Bureau of African Affairs 
remains focused on advancing U.S. national security interests across 
the African continent. I work with AF Bureau leaders and Ambassadors on 
a daily basis to ensure broad coverage and policy attention to all the 
major challenges across the continent.

    Question. If it is appropriate to have senior Bureau of African 
Affairs officials dedicate this much time to these matters, then please 
explain how the Department is backfilling this gap in senior leadership 
and management on other complex issues, such as countering the malign 
influence of China and Russia and managing intense humanitarian and 
security crises in the Sahel region and Eastern Congo?

    Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs has a wealth of talent at the 
senior level, and I work intensively with the Assistant Secretary and 
her top lieutenants to ensure clear, effective policymaking and 
execution across the continent. To that end, I work with the Assistant 
Secretary to ensure that our senior Bureau of African Affairs officials 
coordinate with colleagues in other agencies and other State Department 
offices and bureaus, including the Office of China Coordination, Bureau 
of European Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism, and Bureau of Conflict 
and Stabilization Operations, and the Global Engagement Center, among 
others, to provide continued attention to all issues concerning U.S. 
national security interests in Africa, including strategic competition. 
Our regional offices help senior officials address the Sahel region and 
Eastern Congo along with all pressing issues in Africa in combination 
with State Department offices and colleagues in the interagency.

    Question. While senior Bureau of African Affairs officials are 
dedicating a large amount of their time and resources to managing Sudan 
and Ethiopia policy, which senior officials in the Bureau or the 
Department are working the solutions to the woeful understaffing and 
resourcing of the Bureau?

    Answer. Senior officials throughout the Department and in the 
Bureau of African Affairs are cognizant of staffing and resource 
deficiencies and continue to identify additional resources to advance 
U.S. policies in Africa and during crisis situations. The Deputy 
Secretary for Management and Resources, and I, and the Undersecretary 
for Management and the bureaus that report to him, as well as the 
Assistant Secretary, each Deputy Assistant Secretary, and all office 
directors and their deputies, actively and regularly engage in staffing 
and resource planning.

    Question. During the hearing, I asked you about a special envoy for 
Sudan to address the need for ``more individual attention.'' You 
replied, ``Ambassador Godfrey is central to all of this,'' noting ``he 
is also likely to play a stronger role in some of the regional 
diplomacy and global diplomacy on Sudan.'' While Ambassador Godfrey is 
working hard to manage an embassy staff dislocated by an evacuation, 
American citizen evacuation and welfare concerns, and other matters 
strictly related to Sudan and our diplomatic and security priorities in 
the country, how do you expect this first-time ambassador to carry out 
the complex role of international and regional diplomacy effectively?

    Answer. Ambassador Godfrey played a leading role in the talks in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and has conducted frequent diplomacy with Sudanese 
and regional stakeholders. He is more than up to the challenge of 
carrying out this complex task.

    Question. If Ambassador Godfrey led discussions to achieve a short-
term ceasefire for the United States in Jeddah, as you stated in your 
response above, what role did Assistant Secretary Phee--his superior--
play in Jeddah?

    Answer. Resolving the conflict in Sudan and resuming Sudan's 
democratic transition remain top Administration priorities. Assistant 
Secretary Phee has and maintains relationships of influence with 
leaders in Sudan, throughout Africa and the Middle East. She took 
immediate action in the first week of the conflict, while Ambassador 
Godfrey was still in Khartoum leading the embassy team on evacuation 
related efforts, to initiate dialogue between the SAF and RSF that led 
to the announcement of temporary ceasefires and the beginning of talks 
in Jeddah. These efforts helped reduce violence, allowing U.S. 
citizens, foreign nationals, and Sudanese civilians to move out of 
harm's way. When those talks transitioned from phone calls to in person 
negotiations in Jeddah on May 6, Assistant Secretary Phee led our 
delegation's efforts to facilitate negotiations, working closely with 
Saudi partners and Ambassador Godfrey, before ultimately handing over 
the leadership of that delegation to Ambassador Godfrey.

    Question. Regarding my question on a Sudan envoy, you also replied 
that Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) Ambassador Hammer 
will ``play a reinforcing role as necessary on this, which is within 
his mandate.'' Please describe Ambassador Hammer's official mandate and 
priorities assigned to him by Department leadership.

    Answer. At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Hammer's most 
immediate focus has been to bring peace to Northern Ethiopia as well as 
to forge a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all 
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region. 
Furthermore, he works to advance diplomatic efforts to reduce conflict 
and in support of an inclusive political process towards lasting peace, 
security, and prosperity for all people in Ethiopia. Ambassador Hammer 
supports other policy goals in the East Africa region, as needed.

    Question. While Ambassador Hammer's title says the ``Horn of 
Africa,'' he and the Department have communicated to Congress on 
several occasions that Secretary Blinken wants his focus to be on 
diplomacy related to Northern Ethiopia and the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD). Given the regional crisis the fighting in Sudan 
created, have official Department priorities changed for Ambassador 
Hammer? If yes, has this been formally communicated to him, and when?

    Answer. At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Hammer's most 
immediate focus has been to bring peace to Northern Ethiopia as well as 
to forge a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all 
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region. 
Furthermore, he works to advance diplomatic efforts to reduce conflict 
and in support of an inclusive political process towards lasting peace, 
security, and prosperity for all people in Ethiopia. Ambassador Hammer 
supports other policy goals in the East Africa region, as needed.

    Question. If Ambassador Hammer expands his official focus areas 
``as necessary,'' will he receive additional staffing and other support 
to supplement his expanded workload?

    Answer. Ambassador Hammer is fully integrated into the Bureau of 
African Affairs, receiving seamless support from the desk officers and 
the offices working on issues in the Horn of Africa. He has a small 
staff to take advantage of these available resources and avoid 
duplication of effort. He also coordinates closely with the Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs. If he needs more support, he'll get it.

    Question. Given the current crisis in Sudan, the peace process in 
Ethiopia, ongoing regional drought, and famine-like conditions 
throughout the Horn of Africa, do you view GERD negotiations as among 
the top two priorities of diplomatic focus for our regional envoy in 
the region?

    Answer. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains a potential 
source of conflict and tension, and we continue to support an enduring 
arrangement that contributes to a more peaceful and prosperous region. 
We are committed to helping the parties find a durable solution that 
meets Egypt's water security needs, addresses Sudan's dam safety 
concerns, and supports Ethiopia's economic development. Ambassador 
Hammer remains actively engaged in support of efforts to reach a GERD 
agreement under the auspices of the African Union that will advance the 
interests of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

    Question. On May 10, the day of the hearing, the State Department 
spokesperson issued a media note announcing a May 10-19 trip by Special 
Envoy Hammer to Los Angeles, California, and Santa Fe, New Mexico, to 
engage with the Ethiopian diaspora and to speak with Global Santa Fe 
and the Santa Fe World Affairs Forum. Is Ethiopian diaspora engagement 
in the U.S. a greater priority for the Department, given the need for 
an expanded set of diplomacy tools and an all-hands-on-deck approach to 
securing and maintaining a ceasefire in Sudan and coordinating the 
regional and international response?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration emphasizes diaspora 
engagement as an integral part of advancing U.S. policy in Ethiopia. 
Ambassador Hammer's engagement with diaspora on this trip is the latest 
in a series of concerted outreach events with the Ethiopian-American 
diaspora to foster greater connectivity between diaspora groups, inform 
them of U.S. policy, and advance U.S. foreign policy goals. Assistant 
Secretary Phee and Ambassador Godfrey continue to conduct and lead our 
engagement on Sudan.

    Question. What has Special Envoy Hammer done to date to support 
efforts in Sudan?

    Answer. Ambassador Hammer remains focused on implementation of the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of Ethiopia 
and the Tigray People's Liberation Front reached in Pretoria on 
November 2, 2022, and forging a diplomatic resolution to issues related 
to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests 
of all parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region. 
When in discussions about the wider region with likeminded and African 
interlocutors, he has provided updates and explained U.S. policy 
related to Sudan as part of our effort to support a coordinated 
international and regional response to the conflict.

    Question. Ceasefire & Mediation Efforts: In your testimony, you 
referred to the Department's diplomatic attempts to ``silence the 
guns'' as efforts to achieve a ceasefire. ``Silencing the guns'' is a 
term often used by the African Union regarding its goal to end conflict 
on the continent. Another phrase regularly used by Department officials 
is ``African solutions to African problems.'' Why didn't the African 
Union (AU) or Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
directly participate in the Jeddah ceasefire talks? Did the U.S. insist 
in their participation?

    Answer. The Department has been in consultation with both the 
African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development since 
the conflict began. The Jeddah talks enjoyed broad support. The African 
Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
Tripartite Mechanism (United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance 
Mission in Sudan, AU, IGAD), countries in the region, and many Sudanese 
civilian groups all issued statements in support of the process. The 
Jeddah Talks were emergency diplomacy and the parties insisted on 
limiting participation to the United States, Saudi Arabia, RSF and SAF. 
In parallel with our efforts to secure a durable ceasefire, we have 
been supporting the AU and IGAD in standing up a broader political 
process.

    Question. UN humanitarian aid chief Martin Griffiths was in Jeddah 
during the ceasefire talks to engage on humanitarian issues. Still, he 
did not engage directly with either of the warring parties, reportedly 
due to their insistence he be kept out of the talks. What is the impact 
of sidelining the UN's humanitarian aid chief in ceasefire talks that 
directly focused on delivering humanitarian assistance in Sudan and 
affected surrounding countries where UN agencies will have a 
significant role?

    Answer. Securing humanitarian access was a central focus of efforts 
in Jeddah. The U.S. delegation included staff from USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Affairs. We were in close coordination with the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which sent 
a technical expert to Jeddah to support aspects of the talks related to 
humanitarian access.

    Question. Regarding your testimony's reference to ``silence the 
guns,'' you referred to Secretary Blinken's ``intense personal effort'' 
to secure six ``sequential short-term ceasefires,'' allowing for ``some 
initial movement of humanitarian aid.'' Given the widespread open 
source reporting that demonstrated fighting continued throughout 
successive ceasefires, what is your assessment of the success of those 
ceasefires and the degree to which they successfully helped ``silence 
the guns''?

    Answer. While the mutually announced ceasefires in late April and 
early May were not completely adhered to, fighting decreased in those 
periods, providing some relief for civilians, and allowing more 
humanitarian relief to get to those in need.

    Question. Can you provide the scope and scale of the ``initial 
movement'' of some humanitarian aid you refer to in your testimony, 
including what assistance moved and where?

    Answer. Humanitarian partners have continued to provide assistance 
throughout the conflict as the situation allows. In late April, 
partners began tapping into regional stockpiles of medical supplies, 
food, and core relief items (e.g. tents, kitchen sets, plastic sheets) 
and bringing these supplies in through Port Sudan. When possible, 
partners also worked to move existing supplies in country to more 
secure points where assistance could be distributed to conflict 
affected populations. Our response has also included assistance for 
refugees in neighboring Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, 
and Ethiopia. We will continue to prioritize the creation of safe and 
durable humanitarian access to those in need, working closely with 
regional and international partners, including the United Nations, 
African Union stakeholders, and others.

    Question. On May 11, 2023, the parties to the conflict--the SAF and 
RSF--signed the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the 
Civilians of Sudan with the facilitation of Saudi Arabia and the United 
States. While the Jeddah Declaration does secure commitments from the 
parties to protect civilians and the movement of humanitarian aid, it 
only achieved a commitment ``to prioritizing discussions to achieve a 
short-term ceasefire', and to ``scheduling subsequent expanded 
discussions to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities.'' What 
parties does the State Department envision will be essential to 
successful and legitimate ``expanded discussions to achieve a permanent 
cessation of hostilities''?

    Answer. Moving to a successful permanent cessation of hostilities 
would require commitment from both parties to stop fighting and 
establish necessary security arrangements. While the parties agreed in 
Jeddah to temporary ceasefires that enabled delivery of humanitarian 
assistance impacting approximately 2.5 million Sudanese people, their 
frequent ceasefire violations and the continuation of fighting 
demonstrated a lack of will to adhere to their commitments and move 
toward a more durable cessation of hostilities. As a result, the United 
States and Saudi Arabia adjourned the talks effective June 21. We stand 
ready to reconvene technical ceasefire talks in Jeddah, but only once 
the parties demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations 
under the Jeddah Declaration. In the meantime, we are working with our 
African Union and IGAD partners, to support Sudan's civilian leaders to 
develop a broad-based political process to end the conflict and resume 
a democratic transition.

    Question. Who will facilitate discussions to achieve a short-term 
ceasefire for the United States?

    Answer. Ambassador John Godfrey led this effort in Jeddah.

    Question. If subsequent negotiations to achieve a short-term 
ceasefire are not successful, how will the State Department adjust its 
approach?

    Answer. We continue to press both sides to cease hostilities and 
permit the delivery of humanitarian aid and restoration of essential 
services to the Sudanese people. We are also engaging with Sudanese 
civilian leaders, Resistance Committees, and civil society, as well as 
our international partners, to work toward the shared goal of 
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as 
possible. We adjourned the Jeddah talks on June 21 because of frequent 
cease-fire violations; we stand ready to resume talks once both parties 
demonstrate their commitment to uphold their obligations.

    Question. Will accountability tools be used in the event a short-
term ceasefire is not agreed to or respected?

    Answer. President Biden stated on May 5 that the United States 
stands with the people of Sudan--and we are acting to support their 
commitment to a future of peace and opportunity. As a result, the 
Administration issued a new Executive Order that expands U.S. 
authorities to respond to the violence that began on April 15 with 
sanctions that hold individuals responsible for threatening the peace, 
security, and stability of Sudan; undermining Sudan's democratic 
transition; using violence against civilians; or committing serious 
human rights abuses.On June 1 our designations of four major companies 
owned by the SAF and RSF advanced that objective of accountability.

    Question. During the aforementioned May 11 State Department 
briefing, a senior official [``Senior State Department Official One''] 
stated that a key difference from prior ceasefires the United States 
tried to negotiate is ``that we have developed a ceasefire monitoring 
mechanism, which is being supported by the UN, the Saudis, and other 
members of the international community . . . [that] will help hold the 
parties accountable to what they've agreed to do.'' Why did the State 
Department announce the development of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism 
when a ceasefire has not yet been agreed to by the parties?

    Answer. The ceasefire monitoring mechanism was supported by both 
sides of the conflict in Sudan. Given the significant distrust, this 
was selected as a way for neutral actors to help monitor whether the 
parties were complying with the terms of a prospective ceasefire.

    Question. How was a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, that will be 
supported by the UN, developed when the UN was not directly present in 
the Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the United States?

    Answer. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission 
in Sudan, our partners in the Troika, and the African Union were 
consulted on the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and how they can 
receive and utilize reporting.

    Question. Will the ceasefire monitoring mechanism report on 
violations of ``International Humanitarian Law and for international 
human rights law,'' which the parties agreed to respect in the Jeddah 
Declaration? If yes, will this reporting be public?

    Answer. Yes, we intend to make public reporting, as appropriate, on 
violations of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.

    Question. How will public reporting be conducted?

    Answer. We remain committed to supporting the release of publicly 
accessible reporting on conflict developments in Sudan to support 
efforts to improve civilian safety and facilitate humanitarian 
assistance.

    Question. Who does the State Department envision will implement the 
ceasefire monitoring mechanism?

    Answer. The Department of State will implement the ceasefire 
monitoring mechanism through a consortium of expert organizations in 
close coordination with United Nations, Troika, and African Union 
partners.

    Question. Will the United States contribute resources (financial, 
human or otherwise) to the implementation of the ceasefire monitoring 
mechanism?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Accountability: The two warring generals, Burhan and 
Hemetti, have direct links to the genocide in Darfur, oversaw the death 
of many Sudanese civilians and the abuse of countless more during their 
reign, and continue to steal Sudan's resources. They also removed a 
sitting civilian-led transitional government in October 2021. The 
United States has not held these generals accountable but instead fed 
their lust for legitimacy by repeatedly making them central to the 
Administration's policy for a ``democratic transition'' in Sudan. As a 
result, the U.S. has less leverage today in Sudan since the removal of 
Omar al-Bashir in 2019. It seems to me we helped elevate these two 
monsters. Why has the United States not taken any action against the 
warring generals, Burhan and Hemetti, their vast financial interests, 
or their foreign backers to contain and weaken their stranglehold on 
the Sudanese people?

    Answer. Supporting Sudanese-led processes and civilian stakeholders 
have been central to our efforts. At the same time, we put intense 
diplomatic pressure on the military government along with our partners, 
and took additional measures, including sanctioning the Central Reserve 
Police, coordinating with our partners to suspend all lending from 
international institutions to the government, and organizing the 
suspension of bilateral development assistance from the United States 
and our partners. On June 1 we sanctioned four major companies owned by 
the SAF and RSF.

    Question. Despite repeated threats of sanctions and other 
accountability measures against Generals Burhan and Hemetti and Bashir-
era Islamists, why hasn't the Administration acted against any Sudanese 
individual or entity except one--the Central Reserve Police?

    Answer. As directed by the President in his May 4 Executive Order, 
we are prepared to take actions against members of, and entities 
related to, the parties threatening the peace, security, and stability 
of Sudan. On June 1 we sanctioned four major companies owned by the SAF 
and RSF under this executive order.

    Question. On May 4, President Biden issued an executive order (EO) 
imposing sanctions on certain persons destabilizing Sudan and 
undermining the goal of a democratic transition. However, as we have 
seen in Ethiopia, the Administration has not designated any individuals 
or entities for sanctions since the announcement of the EO. What is the 
Department of State's perspective on designating Sudanese individuals 
and entities under the executive order issued by President Biden on May 
4 related to Sudan?

    Answer. As directed by the President in his May 4 Executive Order, 
we are prepared to take actions against members of, and entities 
related to, the parties threatening the peace, security, and stability 
of Sudan. This will remain the case as long as the forces do not uphold 
a ceasefire and allow unhindered humanitarian assistance. On June 1 we 
sanctioned four major companies owned by the SAF and RSF; this is our 
first tranche of designations.

    Question. What accountability measures can this Committee expect 
will be used in the case of Sudan?

    Answer. We will continue to consider a range of tools, including 
sanctions, to promote accountability.

    Question. Ahmed Haroun, the former Minister of State for the 
Interior wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, is now at-large since his escape from prison 
following the outbreak of fighting in Sudan. Impunity for past 
atrocities has driven this and previous conflicts in Sudan. Biden 
administration officials have not announced any new rewards since 
stating it would be ``reinvigorating'' the War Crimes Rewards Program 
last year. Will the Department of State offer a reward for information 
leading to Ahmed Haroun's arrest consistent with its commitments under 
the War Crimes Rewards Program?

    Answer. We are aware that Ahmed Haroun was reported to be at-large. 
We are considering all available tools, including the War Crimes 
Rewards Program, to promote accountability for the people of Sudan.

    Question. Accountability has long been a central component to calls 
by Sudanese citizens, including for atrocities committed during the 
genocide in Darfur, the Khartoum massacre committed by RSF forces in 
June 2019, and for state capture and corruption by the RSF and SAF. How 
will the Administration work with regional allies to promote 
accountability?

    Answer. We remain committed to working with partners to call for 
and advance accountability efforts, and to encourage partners to 
establish authorities for measures that mirror U.S. authorities 
established under the May 4 Executive Order. In order to address 
concerns about state capture and corruption, we continue to urge 
partners, including regional actors, to avoid Sudanese gold and other 
industries that contribute to the conflict.

    Question. What programming can the State Department and USAID 
support to strengthen civil society to promote accountability?

    Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor (DRL) supports civil society-led human rights 
documentation in Sudan to pursue justice and accountability and prevent 
recurring cycles of violence. Despite the current inability to get 
funding into the country, documenters are continuing their work. DRL 
also supports documentation of illicit money flows, in order to hold 
corrupt officials accountable. DRL is exploring other options to 
support accountability in the context of the current conflict, 
including conflict related sexual violence.

    Question. Civilian Engagement: The de facto exclusion of some 
significant facets of Sudanese civil society from formal processes, 
including internationally brokered peace agreements, has contributed to 
many of Sudan's current problems. With civil society, politicians and 
members of the international community can aid Sudan's transition to 
genuine civilian-led and pro-democratic governance. They can assist the 
many individuals in the SAF, RSF, and other militias to start 
participating in a demilitarized future. What steps will the 
Administration take to ensure civil society is invited and enabled to 
play a meaningful role in shaping what happens in Sudan next?

    Answer. We are engaging with Sudanese civilian leaders, Resistance 
Committees, and civil society to work toward the shared goal of 
establishing civilian democratic governance in Sudan as soon as 
possible.

    Question. In response to questions during the hearing, you 
repeatedly emphasized that Ambassador Godfrey is conducting outreach to 
Sudanese civilians in anticipation of them playing a role in future 
negotiations to restore the civilian-led transition in Sudan. We have 
heard from civilian partners of USAID implementers that they have yet 
to receive outreach from Ambassador Godfrey. Please provide more 
information on the civilian groups that Ambassador Godfrey has been in 
contact with since the outbreak of fighting.

    Answer. Ambassador Godfrey and other interagency officials are 
engaging a broad range of Sudanese civilian leaders. This includes 
members of political parties, civil society organizations, labor and 
professional groups, Resistance Committees, university professors, 
women and youth groups, and human rights advocates. As an example, 
Ambassador Godfrey recently joined A/S Phee and colleagues from USAID 
in convening a group of over 20 civilian leaders to discuss Sudanese 
initiatives to respond to the crisis.

    Question. What is Ambassador Godfrey's message to civilians when he 
engages them?

    Answer. The United States stands with the people of Sudan. We want 
to see a democratic government led by civilians in Sudan--only a truly 
civilian government can be successful in delivering to the people of 
Sudan. We support the Sudanese people in restoring Sudan's democratic 
transition and forming a civilian government.

    Question. How will the Department ensure the inclusion and 
supremacy of civilian voices in future negotiation processes?

    Answer. We are engaging now with civilian stakeholders on their 
initiatives to resolve the crisis and are committed to supporting their 
leadership when a political negotiation process begins.

    Question. The United Nations Integrated Assistance Mission in Sudan 
(UNITAMS): The mandate of UNITAMS expires on June 3. Given the events 
of the last few weeks and the general inability of the Mission to 
fulfill its mandate since its establishment, what are the U.S. 
priorities for the mandate renewal in terms of substantive issues and 
the timeline for an extension?

    Answer. We are preparing for negotiations to renew the United 
Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) 
mandate. Our goal is to secure a mandate renewal to enable UNITAMS to 
continue to use its good offices to work towards a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict, as well as demand the parties adhere to a ceasefire 
agreement, provide unhindered humanitarian access, and resume working 
towards a civilian-led political transition.

    Question. What is the U.S. doing to communicate concerns and push 
for changes to improve the leadership and management of UNITAMS in 
Sudan?

    Answer. We are deeply engaged with United Nations leadership and 
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General Volker 
Perthes to coordinate our response to the crisis and support the 
implementation of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance 
Mission in Sudan mandate.

    Question. What are the accomplishments of UNITAMS in Darfur and 
what continues to be the Mission's deficiencies in this region?

    Answer. To implement its mandate, the United Nations Integrated 
Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) has provided support 
for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and reinforced 
peacebuilding in Darfur. UNITAMS also provided technical assistance to 
strengthen the National Mechanism for the Protection of Civilians and 
state-level protection of civilian committees. The outbreak of fighting 
in April in Darfur highlights the need for further United Nations 
efforts in mitigating conflict.

    Question. SOUTH AFRICA: Last week, a delegation of senior South 
African officials travelled to the United States to meet with State 
Department officials, ostensibly about the U.S.-South Africa 
relationship. Then, on May 11, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Brigety, 
in a press conference in Johannesburg, ``bet [his] life'' on the claim 
that South African weapons and ammunition were loaded onto Russian 
vessel the ``Lady R'' from December 6-8, 2022. South Africa's foreign 
ministry has denied the claim. Was Ambassador Brigety authorized to 
accuse the South African Government of supplying arms to Russia 
publicly? If no, why not?

    Answer. Ambassador Brigety was authorized to speak with local South 
African press about the visit in early May of a delegation of South 
African officials to Washington, DC. Those meetings in early May 
included discussion of the ``Lady R'' and South Africa's assurance that 
an investigation was underway, as President Ramaphosa subsequently 
confirmed in a statement. As Ambassador Brigety subsequently clarified, 
as did the Department of State spokesperson, we intend to keep 
conversations with the South Africans regarding our serious concerns in 
diplomatic channels moving forward.

    Question. What shifts will be made in the Biden administration's 
policy toward South Africa given this clear violation of South Africa's 
own policy of non-alignment and neutrality?

    Answer. As is the case with many countries, we work with South 
Africa on our many important shared priorities--including trade, 
health, and climate change--while being frank and clear when we 
disagree, such as South Africa's policy toward Russia. Where we see 
evidence of South Africa taking actions that bely its stated policy of 
nonalignment, we will continue to convey those concerns to South 
African officials.

    Question. Will South Africa's eligibility for preferential trade 
benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act be revoked given 
the statutory requirement that beneficiary countries ``not engage in 
activities that undermine United States national security or foreign 
policy interests''?

    Answer. The annual African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) review 
process, in which the Department of the State and the interagency 
review each country's eligibility, has just begun. We are unable to 
predetermine the Department of State's position on AGOA eligibility.

    Question. How is the State Department engaged with the United 
States Trade Representative on South Africa's AGOA eligibility?

    Answer. The Department of State and the United States Trade 
Representative are in regular contact regarding African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) matters. AGOA eligibility is determined by the 
Trade Policy Staff Committee, which consists of multiple agencies 
across the U.S. Government.

    Question. If there is evidence that elements within South Africa's 
Government or ruling ANC party took part in facilitating a reported 
arms transfer to Russia, will the Administration use its existing 
authorities to hold those individuals and entities accountable?

    Answer. We do not publicly preview sanctions decisions. The Biden-
Harris administration has shown that it does not hesitate to use 
existing authorities as appropriate to promote accountability and 
curtail Putin's ability to fund and supply his war machine.

    Question. MOZAMBIQUE: Please provide an update on the State 
Department's efforts on the case of U.S. citizen Ryan Koher? While 
Koher is no longer detained, he has yet to be formally charged with a 
crime, he remains under investigation and unable to depart Mozambique 
due to the confiscation of his passport.

    Answer. Mr. Koher was granted provisional release from prison on 
March 14. As the investigation is ongoing, Mr. Koher is unable to work 
or leave the country and is not in possession of his passport. The 
embassy requested a meeting with the Office of the Attorney General to 
discuss the ongoing investigation and remains in contact with Mr. 
Koher, his legal team, and relevant Government of Mozambique officials 
regarding this case.

    Question. COUP RESTRICTIONS: In Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso and 
Guinea are subject to coup-related restrictions on foreign aid under 
Section 7008 (P.L. 117-328, Division K) of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2023. What is the current State Department 
guidance on the application of Section 7008 in cases where coups have 
occurred?

    Answer. The Department of State restricts obligations and 
expenditures of funds appropriated by the Department of State, Foreign 
Operations, or Related Programs Appropriations Act for the government 
of any country whose duly elected head of government has been deposed 
by military coup d'etat or decree or a coup d'etat or decree in which 
the military plays a decisive role. Assistance subject to this 
restriction may be resumed to such government if the Secretary of State 
certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that 
after the termination of assistance a democratically elected government 
has taken office. For fiscal year 2023 funds, the Secretary of State, 
following consultation with the heads of relevant federal agencies, may 
also waive the restriction on a program-by-program basis if the 
Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations 
that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United 
States, subject to consultation with and notification to the 
Committees. In addition, certain assistance subject to the restriction 
may be provided under other available authorities.

    Question. In your view, is the Department of State making full use 
of its waiver and notwithstanding authorities provided under the 
Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 on coup-
related restrictions to U.S. foreign aid appropriations? If no, why 
not?

    Answer. The Secretary has not yet exercised the waiver authority 
under section 7008(b) of the fiscal year 2023 Appropriations Act. The 
waiver is available only with respect to fiscal year 2023 funds, which 
are still in the process of being allocated consistent with section 
653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and therefore are not available 
for obligation or the application of Section 7008.

    Question. ELECTIONS: Elections are expected to be called for late 
July in Zimbabwe. In addition to the persistent restrictions on 
political and civic space in Zimbabwe and the regular use of the 
institutions and resources of the state to the benefit of the ruling 
ZANU-PF party, the pre-election period in Zimbabwe has been marred by: 
the jailing (without bail) and convictions of opposition leaders and 
critical voices on politically-motivated charges; the threat of 
draconian legislation regulating NGOs; and significant flaws in the 
voter registration process. What is the State Department's view on the 
prospects for democratic elections in Zimbabwe later this year?

    Answer. The Government of Zimbabwe has tilted the playing field in 
the ruling ZANU-PF's favor using intimidation, coercion, patronage, 
lawfare tactics, and at times, violence. Absent significant change in 
the immediate term, it is difficult to see how this can lead to free 
and fair elections in 2023.

    Question. At what point do the pre-election conditions make it 
impossible for Zimbabwe to hold legitimate democratic elections?

    Answer. The United States will use all tools at its disposal to 
determine whether the 2023 elections in Zimbabwe are free and fair. We 
remain concerned about the worrying trends in the lead-up to the 
elections, including the Government of Zimbabwe's use of intimidation, 
coercion, patronage, lawfare tactics, and at times, violence.

    Question. Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
are expected for December of this year. In addition to the logistical 
challenges posed by holding nation-wide elections in DRC, the ongoing 
State of Seige and conflict in Eastern Congo, exacerbated by the 
presence of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels and the delays in conducting a 
legitimate voter registration exercise (among other issues) make it 
near certain that elections will be delayed and/or impossible to hold 
across the country. What lessons did the State Department learn from 
its handling of the 2019 electoral process in DRC, including the 
controversial ``victory'' of President Tshisekedi?

    Answer. Successful elections in 2023 should be free and fair, with 
inclusive, transparent, and impartial electoral processes and held in 
accordance with constitutional deadlines. President Tshisekedi has 
firmly expressed his commitment to free, fair, and on time elections, 
but we will remain engaged at the highest levels throughout the 
elections planning process to press the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Government to take the necessary legal, financial, and technical 
actions to ensure a better election in 2023.

    Question. Has the United States been satisfied with the Presidency 
of Felix Tshisekedi, which it was quick to support as the winner of the 
2019 elections despite serious questions about the legitimacy of the 
outcome?

    Answer. Since he assumed power in 2019, President Tshisekedi and 
his administration have shown a commitment to working closely with the 
United States on areas of bilateral interest, including peace in 
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), environmental 
conservation, public health, and strategic minerals. Although 
governance in the DRC has been far from perfect, with ongoing 
corruption and human rights concerns, concrete gains have been made. 
Our bilateral relationship has allowed us to engage critically with the 
DRC Government on combatting trafficking-in-persons, anticorruption 
efforts, and professionalization of the Congolese security sector.

    Question. How is the State Department engaging with Congolese 
officials, including President Tshisekedi, on the challenges to the 
electoral process?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to call on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Government to ensure that political and civic 
space remains open in the lead up to the elections so that the 
Congolese people can express their views peacefully. This message was 
delivered by both the President and the Secretary at the U.S.-Africa 
Leaders' Summit and has been consistently reiterated in our subsequent 
bilateral engagements. The United States is the largest donor of 
funding for activities in support of free and fair 2023 elections, 
providing $24.75 million to strengthen electoral process transparency 
and electoral administration, improve civic education, and empower 
communities to participate in elections.

    Question. What accountability measures are being discussed for 
spoilers to elections in DRC?

    Answer. The U.S. Government is willing to consider the full range 
of diplomatic and legal tools, including sanctions, in order to promote 
accountability and help ensure the DRC can hold free and fair elections 
in accordance with constitutional deadlines.

    Question. Will the United States support the legitimate winner of 
elections in DRC, even if that is not President Tshisekedi?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. SOMALIA: Is the violent extremist organization al-Shabaab 
present and/or operating in and/or around the city of Laascaanood or 
more broadly in the regions of Sool and Sanaag in eastern Somaliland?

    Answer. There are reports that al-Shabaab members are present and 
operating in Laascaanood and Eastern Somaliland.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Sudan: When Administrator Power appeared before this 
Committee 2 weeks ago, I expressed serious concern about humanitarian 
aid diversion in Ethiopia. We have since learned of another region 
where vital U.S. food aid has shown up for sale. I remain deeply 
concerned by the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan but am unclear 
what steps USAID will take to mitigate a repeat performance of massive 
food aid diversion.
    Ms. Charles, how will USAID ensure food and other humanitarian aid 
reach the intended recipients in Sudan?

    Answer. Assistance saves lives and reflects the goodwill of the 
American people. It is egregious that parties in Sudan are deliberately 
targeting aid and aid workers. Even under very difficult environments 
like Sudan we are redoubling our efforts on risk mitigation. In Sudan, 
USAID assigned an expert on risk management to the Sudan response. In 
light of the evolving context in Sudan, including the closure of the 
banking system posing significant challenges to implementing partners' 
ability to operate, USAID developed and shared with partners additional 
guidance on the use of hawalas and mobile money should partners need to 
utilize these alternatives. USAID also requires non-governmental 
organization (NGO) partners to submit a Risk Assessment and Management 
Plan (RAMP) as part of their applications for funding in Sudan. As part 
of these RAMPs, all NGO applicants must demonstrate that they have 
assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. 
Government resources.

    Question. What lessons are you learning from and adapting to in 
real-time from the discovery of the deeply disturbing theft of food aid 
in Ethiopia so this does not happen in Sudan?

    Answer. USAID is currently assessing developments and lessons from 
both the Ethiopia and Sudan contexts to apply to global humanitarian 
risk mitigation measures. While the developments in Ethiopia and Sudan 
have both been disheartening, the circumstances and context in those 
two crises are significantly different. Nonetheless, USAID looks to 
mitigate risks in any context we operate in, and we are taking steps to 
ensure our assistance going forward accounts for the different risks 
present in both countries.
    USAID closely monitors attempts to influence or divert our 
assistance across all contexts, and we continue to call for the respect 
of humanitarian personnel, facilities, and equipment, so life-saving 
assistance may continue to reach those who are in need. In Ethiopia, 
the organized diversion that we uncovered was occurring in a systematic 
and organized fashion, facilitated by the Government of Ethiopia's 
unique role in beneficiary targeting and storage of food assistance. 
Ultimately, it is our assessment that that type of diversion is highly 
unlikely to occur in Sudan because neither the Government of Sudan nor 
the parties to the unfolding conflict have such roles with respect to 
our assistance and the chaotic and kinetic environment prohibits them 
from doing so.
    The diversion that has occurred in Sudan, to date, has been much 
more opportunistic and rooted in the theft or destruction of 
commodities by armed actors prior to distribution, rather than the 
coordinated and organized diversion of commodities seen in the Ethiopia 
context. The mechanisms to mitigate this risk in Sudan include ensuring 
partners are minimizing the storage of commodities near contact areas 
whenever possible, expediting the speed with which commodities move 
from warehouse to communities, and actively messaging that the theft of 
commodities will not be tolerated and that the USG is watching and will 
hold looters accountable. USAID's trusted humanitarian partners working 
in Sudan are familiar with operating in active conflict contexts like 
the current situation, and they work to mitigate these risks 
accordingly.
    Our colleagues in the region continue to coordinate with partners 
to gather information regarding humanitarian needs, engage with key 
stakeholders, and determine best ways to quickly, effectively, and 
safely deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need within and 
outside Sudan where conditions allow.

    Question. Sudan: Assistance to Support Implementation of Framework 
Agreement: The U.S. was preparing to commit significant resources to 
support the transitional process and government under a much-
anticipated framework deal that ultimately collapsed into civil war. I 
understand USAID previewed this assistance package to my staff.
    Ms. Charles, what assistance had USAID planned for the transition 
process and the government had the framework agreement been successful 
and the fighting did not occur?

    Answer. Following the revolution and the imperative to support the 
civilian-led government, USAID ramped up programming after years of 
maintaining a modest program focused on support to civil society and 
peacebuilding. The opening democratic space, coupled with significant 
resources provided by Congress, enabled both USAID and the Department 
of State to expand programs, including support to the nascent 
governance structures under the new government. USAID was supporting 
Sudan's democratic transition by strengthening civilian political 
leadership; promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of 
expression and the right of peaceful assembly; and supporting the 
Sudanese people's demand for an end to their military's long-standing 
domination of politics and the economy. This included efforts to 
explore anti-corruption and transparency mechanisms, support for 
transitional justice and human rights, and opportunities to support 
security sector reform.
    Following the military takeover in October 2021 USAID pivoted 
programming away from supporting Government of Sudan institutions.
    Had the framework agreement held and a government genuinely led by 
civilians been formed, USAID programs would have pivoted back to a 
posture of support for a transitional government including for 
elections preparations, helping marginalized communities throughout 
Sudan to participate in the transition, engaging with private sector 
actors to bolster Sudan's economy, and supporting the Sudanese people's 
demand for democracy, justice, and accountability.

    Question. How does USAID intend to use these funds to support the 
framework agreement now that it is dead, and what long-term plans is 
the Agency developing to adapt our massive assistance portfolio in 
Sudan to the current context?

    Answer. USAID's assistance will work on many levels, including 
support for local initiatives that help meet basic emergency needs and 
reinforcement of civilian initiatives aimed at shaping a path to 
civilian rule. USAID will work closely with Sudanese civilian leaders 
and our implementing partners, in consultation with Congress, to 
determine the most effective ways to use our funding to support the 
Sudanese people's democratic aspirations. USAID is working closely with 
our partners to determine what adjustments we need to make with current 
funding, and we will continue to assess the needs to adjust future 
programming. USAID has made these types of adjustments before in Sudan 
and are confident not only that programming can continue in this 
context, but that it can have positive effects. The current context 
demonstrates the importance of broad, flexible, and adaptable 
programming that provides consistent, long-term support in critical 
sectors such as democracy and governance, agriculture (to address 
increasing food insecurity) and health.

    Question. Risk Management: USAID has many personnel within its 
ranks who are well-versed in Sudan, related conflict dynamics, and the 
country's politics. I understand one of your colleagues is even a part 
of the negotiating team currently in Jeddah and regularly advises the 
Assistant Secretary on Sudan issues. Despite this expertise, USAID 
seemed ill-prepared for the very predictable scenario that played out 
in Khartoum.
    Many implementing partners tell my staff USAID did little to warn 
them of the mounting risk. USAID-funded partners continued to have 
consultants and staff stream into the country in the tense days leading 
up to the outbreak of fighting. Why didn't your team's experts 
recognize the threat and take better steps to warn implementing 
partners, especially as RSF and SAF forces flowed into Khartoum?

    Answer. USAID prioritizes safety for our staff and our partners 
above all. When USAID receives credible, actionable information that 
could jeopardize the safety of staff or staff partners, we share it 
with them. There was no recent history of rapid-onset, large-scale 
violence in Khartoum as most violence had been in other parts of the 
country. As people evacuated, USAID hosted partner calls to communicate 
the information it had.

    Question. Localization: Low capacity to effectively manage U.S. 
foreign assistance resources and protect against waste, fraud, and 
abuse can act as an impediment to efforts to ``localize'' aid. Still, 
with the appropriate safeguards in place, the evacuation of 
international aid organizations from conflict areas of Sudan may give 
USAID an opportunity to further operationalize Administrator Power's 
localization agenda, to support locally-led responses, and to push back 
against a state-centric model of aid.
    Is USAID appropriately positioned to expand its work with local 
implementers to respond to the expanding conflict and increasing levels 
of need in Sudan?

    Answer. Yes, USAID is appropriately positioned to expand our 
support for local implementing partners to meet current needs. Through 
our longstanding support to civil society in Sudan, we have established 
networks with local organizations that focus on peacebuilding, 
democracy building, human rights, and social cohesion. Some of our 
activities are flexible grants-under-contract models that support local 
initiatives and organizations, and are particularly well suited to 
respond to changing scenarios and needs through targeted, small-scale 
activities that pilot new models or approaches and can build confidence 
for subsequent efforts to scale-up. Our assistance will work on many 
levels, including support for local initiatives that help meet basic 
emergency needs and reinforcing civilian initiatives aimed at shaping a 
path to civilian rule. To this end, USAID's Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) supports 65 local civil society and community 
organizations in support of increasing civilian participation in the 
democratic transition process, and increasing access to reliable 
information.
    For the crisis response, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance 
(BHA) plans to fund multiple local organizations as sub-awardees under 
awards to public international organization and international non-
governmental organization (NGO) partners. With fiscal year 2022 
funding, BHA is supporting 37 local organizations to provide 
humanitarian assistance as sub-awardees through the Rapid Response Fund 
implemented by the International Organization for Migration, through 
existing USAID awards with international NGOs, and through the United 
Nations Development Program-administered Sudan Humanitarian Fund, which 
can disburse emergency allocations to support multi-sectoral 
interventions across Sudan through national non-governmental 
organizations. These programs are focused on health; nutrition; 
agriculture; protection; economic recovery and market systems; shelter 
and settlements; and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH).
    As USAID is continuing the review of applications for humanitarian 
assistance funding and fine-tuning the response strategy, we expect an 
increase in local partner involvement. USAID anticipates that 
humanitarian funding will continue to be channeled to more local NGO or 
community-based organization partners through sub-grants. Our local 
partners have a key role in the delivery of health, nutrition, water, 
sanitation and hygiene, protection, agriculture, and multipurpose cash 
services.

    Question. What safeguards have already been put in place, or will 
soon be put in place, to accelerate this shift?

    Answer. Each mechanism that USAID utilizes to work with local 
partners to implement humanitarian assistance has risk mitigation 
processes built in to safeguard American taxpayer resources. For 
example, USAID's prime partners that provide sub-awards to local NGOs 
have several measures to reduce risk of fraud, waste, and abuse, 
including BHA-approved oversight strategies, required compliance 
monitoring, and provisions requiring prevention of support to 
sanctioned groups or individuals which flow down to each sub-awardee. 
Additionally, mechanisms that USAID supports, like the Sudan 
Humanitarian Fund and International Organization for Migration's Rapid 
Response Fund, which are designed to provide streamlined and flexible 
grant application and disbursement processes, also include several due 
diligence measures, such as screening prospective partners against the 
Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
specially designated nationals list and UN Sanctions lists. USAID 
regularly cross checks all proposed sub-awardees against the OFAC and 
UN sanctions lists for updated information and keeps filing records.

    Question. Localization: Citizen groups are coming together to lead 
community responses that already have helped reduce mortality and 
suffering. By building upon these grassroots responses, USAID can help 
bolster community mobilization at a time when spoilers are exploiting 
the political vacuum.
    How will USAID work to support and fund these local actors?

    Answer. Many of the grassroots civil society organizations 
instrumental to the 2019 uprising and preserving the civil and 
democratic gain after it have pivoted to emergency response to support 
their communities. Many of these organizations were USAID partners 
prior to the conflict and USAID continues to assist grassroots civil 
society actors, supporting them to shift their efforts and address 
their communities' emergency needs. This includes partners spearheading 
community coordination response efforts in Port Sudan. This pivot will 
help the communities receiving this urgently needed assistance to 
withstand the immediate shocks of the conflict. Many of these 
grassroots members wear many hats in their communities--they are first 
responders, caretakers, and community mobilizers, and they rightly 
desire a say in the political future of Sudan. While these grassroots 
members provide urgent relief to their communities, their efforts will 
also help nurture the space necessary for greater citizen engagement, 
leadership, and inclusion in coordination about peace and governance in 
Sudan. USAID stands poised to ramp up support as opportunities arise.

    Question. Humanitarian Assistance: As conflict expands and 
humanitarian needs rise, it is critical that providers move swiftly and 
efficiently to respond. At the same time, it is necessary for aid to be 
conflict sensitive and avoid deepening social, economic, and/or 
political fault lines or tensions.
    What steps is USAID taking to ensure its responses are locally 
appropriate and conflict sensitive?

    Answer. USAID takes many measures to ensure that its programs fit 
the local context in any country it operates. For example, USAID 
ensures humanitarian assistance is conflict sensitive by using 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and 
independence as guidelines for implementation. This means that 
implementing partners provide humanitarian assistance to the most 
vulnerable--regardless of demographic characteristics or affiliation--
based on needs assessments that are carried out by humanitarian 
experts. USAID's humanitarian assistance is also implemented by 
independent public international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations, not through government agencies or other affiliated 
groups.
    The majority of humanitarian delivery in Sudan is done in 
partnership with local organizations, and they will continue to be the 
bedrock of the humanitarian response based on their unique capacities, 
local knowledge, important networks, and trust and acceptance among 
communities. USAID has flexible mechanisms in place, like the 
International Organization for Migration's Rapid Response Fund, and 
supports the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, to provide immediate funding to 
local partners. Providing support through these organizations and 
mechanisms allows for flexibility to respond to the most appropriate 
needs within the context while incorporating the expertise of local 
partners.

    Question. Humanitarian Assistance: Historically, warring factions 
(including governments) have sought to exercise significant control 
over humanitarian operations, including by determining which 
organizations will be granted permission to work in an area of 
conflict, whether and which international staff will be granted entry 
to join the response, who those organizations can hire locally, where 
they can travel, and to whom, where, and how assistance will be 
targeted. Many also seek to materially benefit from aid operations, 
including by directing or manipulating procurements for security, 
commodities, and transport and storage. Moreover, warring factions 
often seek to relieve international pressure for accountability by 
leveraging humanitarian access.
    How will international donors avoid re-empowering and legitimizing 
NISS/HAC, along with SAF and NCP, through their manipulation and 
control over international aid efforts?

    Answer. USAID has engaged the Department of State as well as 
international donors to coordinate joint advocacy on humanitarian 
access in both bilateral and multilateral fora and will continue to do 
so. USAID also remains in close contact with our implementing partners 
and have asked them to raise humanitarian access issues they encounter 
to ensure that our advocacy is specific and targeted at the appropriate 
authorities. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA) 
continually assesses risks affecting its assistance, including in 
Sudan. We--and our implementing partners--are closely monitoring 
attempts by the SAF and RSF to control, divert, or otherwise influence 
the delivery of our assistance. This includes actions the Sudan 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) may take.

    Question. What specifically is the U.S. Government doing to ensure 
the international humanitarian response does not empower or materially 
benefit these parties and, instead, hold them personally accountable 
for this violence?

    Answer. USAID places the highest priority on ensuring the agency 
and its partners use taxpayer funds wisely, effectively, and for their 
intended purpose. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine 
the risk of our assistance being used for malign purposes in Sudan. We 
are continuously working with partners to safely and effectively 
deliver humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people based on 
humanitarian principles, and we take seriously any allegation of USAID 
assistance being diverted from the intended beneficiaries. For example, 
USAID/BHA requires non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to 
submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their 
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of these RAMPs, all NGO 
applicants must demonstrate that they have assessed the risks of fraud, 
waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. Government resources.
    BHA also has a Risk Management Advisor assigned to support BHA's 
Sudan Complex Emergency Response Management Team and Disaster 
Assistance Response Team, which leads the USG response to the crisis, 
on risk mitigation matters. USAID continues to work closely with its 
existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have proper risk 
mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S. taxpayer-funded 
humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized by those for 
whom it is intended.
    Finally, all USAID applicants and recipients are required, pursuant 
to their award, to disclose in writing to the USAID Office of Inspector 
General (OIG), with a copy to the cognizant Agreement Officer, all 
violations of federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or 
gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award.
    We also refer you to the Departments of Treasury and State for 
additional information about their efforts to pursue accountability, 
including under Executive Order 13067 and 13400 (https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/05/04/
executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-destabilizing-
sudan-and-undermining-the-goal-of-a-democratic-transition/).

    Question. Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian needs created by 
this conflict are significant not only for Sudan but also neighboring 
countries, who are struggling to cope with an influx of refugees 
seeking safety.
    How is the U.S. Government responding to the crisis in neighboring 
countries, including the refugee response?

    Answer. As access and security permit, U.S.-funded humanitarian 
partners are present at the borders and are working with local 
authorities to provide services to those in need. USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) programs are helping to support the needs 
of displaced people who have crossed into neighboring countries from 
Sudan. USAID partner, the UN World Food Program, continues to support 
Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries, including the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. We continue 
to call on all parties to allow safe access for humanitarian agencies 
and their workers to those in need, including those in border areas. 
For additional information on refugee programing in neighboring 
countries, we refer you to the Department of State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Pete Ricketts

    Question. Evacuation of American Citizens: When responding to my 
question on why our allies conducted evacuations sooner than the United 
States, you replied that there was a coordinated division of labor 
between the United States and our partners in which our allies would be 
responsible for air evacuations from the Wadi Seidna airfield near 
Khartoum. At the same time, the U.S. would be responsible for the land 
evacuation. On April 23, French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed 
that a plane had arrived in Djibouti carrying French citizens. Another 
French evacuation took place on Monday, taking the total number of 
people evacuated to 388. On April 24, reports indicated that four 
German Air Force places had evacuated more than 400 people from Sudan 
as of Monday. And on Tuesday, April 25, the U.K. announced it was 
starting air evacuations for British nationals. In an April 23 Security 
Alert from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan, the alert said, ``Due to the 
uncertain security situation in Khartoum and closure of the airport, it 
is not currently safe to undertake a U.S. Government-coordinated 
evacuation of private U.S. citizens. It does not mention coordination 
with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S. citizens of the option. 
In an April 24 update from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan titled ``Situation 
in Sudan: Information for U.S. Citizens in Sudan,'' the embassy 
repeated that it could not undertake a U.S. Government-coordinated 
evacuation of private U.S. citizens while also saying that ``for those 
who are able to depart Port Sudan via ferry, U.S. Government officials 
are also receiving citizens in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.'' Again, it does 
not mention coordination with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S. 
citizens of the option. On this same date (April 24), National Security 
Council coordinator for strategic communications, John Kirby, said ``it 
is not safe right now for another evacuation attempt'' and that all 
Americans who haven't already heeded warnings to leave Sudan should 
shelter-in-place due to violence in Khartoum. An April 25 Security 
Alert from the U.S. Embassy in Sudan said, ``There are options to 
depart Sudan, but you must decide the safest and best method of 
departure for yourself and your family.'' Yet again, it does not 
mention coordination with allies on air evacuations nor advise U.S. 
citizens of the option. Regarding the ``division of labor'' mentioned 
during your testimony, when was that division of labor decided upon 
within the U.S. Government and on what date did we begin that 
coordination with those partner nations?

    Answer. We respectfully defer to Department of Defense on their 
communications regarding flight landing permissions at Wadi Seidna 
Military Air Base. In addition to our widely-disseminated Security 
Alerts, the Department of State communicated directly with U.S. 
citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan via messages sent 
through email, WhatsApp, SMS, direct phone calls, and other means. We 
communicated with our international partners from the onset of the 
crisis to exchange information on departure options as they developed; 
we shared these options with U.S. citizens who held the appropriate 
U.S. travel documents. As a result of this communication, a number of 
U.S. citizens who could safely get to the airport did depart on Allied 
flights.

    Question. If the U.S. had a coordinated division of labor whereby 
our allies would evacuate U.S. citizens by air, why did the U.S. 
Embassy in Sudan not put that specific information out in an alert or 
an update when allies began air evacuations on April 23, 24, and 25?

    Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs 
communicated directly via email, text, and social media to convey these 
options to U.S. citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan 
and who held the appropriate U.S. travel documents. We communicated 
directly with U.S. citizens who expressed an interest in departing 
Sudan that international partners offered various options, and that 
communication was updated daily as departure options changed quickly 
and often.

    Question. How did the State Department expect American citizens in 
Sudan to know they could evacuate via air via our allies when they 
began their air evacuations?

    Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs 
communicated directly via email, text, and WhatsApp to convey to U.S. 
citizens who expressed an interest in departing Sudan and who held the 
appropriate U.S. travel documents that international partners offered 
various options, and that communication was updated daily as departure 
options changed quickly and often. A number of U.S. citizens did depart 
on Allied flights as a result of our messages.

    Question. Why did the National Security Council coordinator for 
strategic communications, John Kirby, advise that all Americans who 
haven't already heeded warnings to leave Sudan to shelter-in-place due 
to violence in Khartoum on April 24 when allied countries had already 
begun air evacuations and there was an understanding that they would 
take U.S. citizens?

    Answer. We respectfully defer to the National Security Council on 
questions regarding information they conveyed to U.S. citizens in 
Sudan.

    Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on 
what dates as part of the U.S. military-facilitated embassy evacuation?

    Answer. Between April 22 and May 3, 2023, the Department of State, 
in coordination with Department of Defense, assisted more than 700 
individuals to depart Khartoum to Port Sudan via three separate land 
convoys; approximately 280 of those were U.S. citizens. In total, the 
Department of State directly or indirectly assisted the departure of 
more than 2,000 individuals from Sudan, 1,300 of whom were U.S. 
citizens many of whom were provided guidance on how to depart via 
commercial ferry from Port Sudan, via overland borders or on Allied 
flights.

    Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on 
what dates as part of the partner nation flights?

    Answer. Our records indicate that at least 340 U.S. citizens 
departed Sudan on flights charted by foreign governments from April 23 
to May 12, 2023. This number likely underestimates the total number of 
U.S. citizens that departed on flights chartered by our partners. There 
were additional flights where foreign government (allies and partners) 
manifests were not provided to the State Department. In addition, there 
were likely dual nationals on some of the flights who were not counted 
as U.S. citizens. Finally, a small number of U.S. citizens who arrived 
in Saudi Arabia by airplane, instead of by ship, may not have been 
included in this estimate.

    Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on 
what dates as part of the three U.S.-facilitated convoys (28 April to 2 
May)?

    Answer. Approximately 280 U.S. citizens were evacuated as part of 
the U.S. facilitated convoys. The first convoy arrived in Port Sudan on 
April 29; the second convoy arrived in Port Sudan on April 30; and the 
third convoy arrived in Port Sudan on May 1.

    Question. Precisely how many U.S. citizens were evacuated and on 
what dates as part of the UN convoy on April 23?

    Answer. The Department of State assisted the successful United 
Nations-led relocation of 1,300 United Nations, NGO, and diplomatic 
personnel, including 78 U.S. citizens, to Port Sudan on April 25.

    Question. In response to my question, you noted that the U.S. ``had 
in place a broad warden system that captured about 5,000 Americans.'' 
Also, in your response to Senator Cardin's related evacuation 
questions, you noted the U.S. pushed out warden messages ``I think 12 
times so far about various options for leaving the country traveling on 
flights with allies or this overland convoy.'' Please share with the 
Committee the warden messages sent to U.S. citizens registered with the 
Department in Sudan, by date.

    Answer. The Department of State transmitted 15 security messages 
(Security Alerts) to U.S. citizens from April 13 to May 12, 2023. In 
addition, the Department also sent 19 messages directly to those 
individuals registered in our case management system. Please see the 
complete timeline below.
             consular affairs messaging on the sudan crisis
All times ET.
Friday, May 12, 2023
4:45 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them that Consular services are available in 
neighboring countries for those who choose to depart on their own and 
information on possible commercial options to depart Sudan (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-update-on-sudan-may-12-2023/).
Thursday, May 4, 2023
1:00 AM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them of commercial options to depart Sudan via 
ferry (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-update-on-sudan-
departure-information-may-4-2023/).
Wednesday, May 3, 2023
12:40 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not go to 
the Hotel Coral in Port Sudan and not to go to Fenti Golf in Khartoum.

10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to all active cases advising not to go 
to the Hotel Coral, as no further assistance will be provided.
Tuesday, May 2, 2023
2:30 PM: Message (CACMS/Security Alert) sent to the full universe of 
registrants informing them that consular services are available in 
neighboring countries (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-updated-
information-for-u-s-citizens-in-sudan-may-2-2023-at-830-p-m/) for those 
who choose to depart and that the U.S. Government has completed all 
currently planned convoys to Port Sudan.
Monday, May 1, 2023
8:00 AM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising them we are unaware of additional flights from Wadi Seidna 
airport and sharing information on border crossings.
Sunday, April 30, 2023
10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising that they should seek to leave by commercially available 
means.

10:00 PM (approx.): Update on Information for U.S. Citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan-2/) posted on Embassy Khartoum website (posted on TravelGov May 
1).
Saturday, April 29, 2023
8:00 PM: Message (CACMS) and SMS sent to the full universe of 
registrants advising them of convoy C times and rally point. WhatsApp 
messages sent to all cases reported ``ready to depart.'' Calls made to 
all high-profile, USG-adjacent, and Congressional cases with this 
message.

2:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to verified U.S. citizens who were ready to 
depart asking them to notify CA if they have departed Sudan, and if 
not, verify they are still requesting assistance.

1:30 AM: Security Alert on avoiding Wadi Seidna airfield.
Friday, April 28, 2023
3:36 PM: Message (CACMS and [email protected]) sent to individuals 
opting into the convoy B with times and rally point.

3:30 PM: Message (CACMS) sent to the full universe of registrants 
advising them to make contact if they wanted assistance departing on 
convoy B.

3:15 PM: Topper at Department Press Briefing on advice and assistance 
to U.S. citizens.

02:00 AM: Repeat Message ([email protected]) sent to U.S. citizens 
who indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally 
point information.
Thursday, April 27, 2023
9:30 PM: Message ([email protected]) sent to 147 U.S. citizens who 
indicated they would take convoy A. Email includes timing and rally 
point information.

1:30 PM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to the full universe of 
registrants who expressed interest in departure regarding convoy A.

TravelGov post (https://twitter.com/TravelGov/status/
1651641198191190025) urging U.S. citizens to fill out CACMS form posted 
across all of CA's social media platforms.

U.S. Embassy Khartoum's website updated to have CACMS form link appear 
in banner on all pages; large image with form link added to home page.

11:30 AM: Secretary Blinken holds press briefing (https://
www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-of-homeland-
security-alejandro-mayorkas-at-a-joint-press-availability/) with DHS 
and mentions convoy.

10:30 AM: Message (CACMS) transmitted to active cases notifying of 
flights opportunities at Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Wednesday, April 26, 2023
10:30 PM: Message (WhatsApp and SMS) sent to all verified U.S. 
citizens, ready to depart notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.
Tuesday, April 25, 2023
7:30 PM: Message (SMS) sent to all verified U.S. citizens, ready to 
depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi Seidna Airfield.

5:00 PM: Security Alert on Port Sudan and land border options (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert/). Red banner linking to Embassy Alerts 
page added to state.gov.

10:00 AM: Message (WhatsApp, SMS, and calls) sent to all verified U.S. 
citizens, ready to depart in Khartoum notifying them to go to Wadi 
Seidna Airfield.
Monday, April 24, 2023
11:06 PM: Security alert on border crossing info for neighboring 
countries also sent to all active cases in CACMS (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/situation-in-sudan-information-for-u-s-citizens-in-
sudan/).
Sunday, April 23, 2023
Red banner (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/ea/situation-in-sudan-2023.html) added to 
travel.state.gov containing CACMS link and STEP info (additional info 
continues to be added and removed as situations unfolds)

10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Suspension of 
Operations Security Alert.

6:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding Saudi vessel 
(Amama) in Port Sudan.
Saturday, April 22, 2023
11:00 PM: Security alert on suspension of Embassy operations and 
sharing link to CACMS form (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-
suspension-of-embassy-operations/)

11:00 PM: Travel Advisory updated to reflect ordered departure of U.S. 
direct hire employees and family members. Pushed out via media note 
(https://www.state.gov/sudan-travel-advisory-remains-level-4-do-not-
travel/) and amplified on TravelGov social media/websites, per normal 
SOP.

10:00 PM: Message (CACMS) to all active cases regarding a UAE convoy.

3:16 AM: Security Alert on security challenges in country (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/sudan-security-alert/)
Wednesday, April 19, 2023
6:50 PM: Security Alert on ongoing violence and reports of assaults, 
home invasions, and looting (https://sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-
s-embassy-khartoum-5/).

3:29 PM: Travelgov social media post with contact info (https://
twitter.com/TravelGov/status/1648770894003683328) advising U.S. 
citizens to contact the Embassy via email or phone and sign up for 
STEP.
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
9:45 AM: Security Alert noting ongoing fighting, gunfire, and security 
force activity, advising shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-18-april-2023/)
Sunday April 16, 2023
10:00 AM: Security Alert on situation and advising to remain indoors 
and shelter in place until further notice (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-4/)
Saturday April 15, 2023
Security Alert on continuing to shelter in place (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/)

Security Alert urging shelter in place and stating no plans for U.S. 
Government-coordinated evacuation of U.S. citizens (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-3/).

Security Alert recommending shelter in place (https://sd.usembassy.gov/
security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-2/)

Travel.Gov published a consolidated post (https://twitter.com/
TravelGov/status/1647338067823304704?s=20) at 4:36 p.m. for Saturday 
alerts.
Thursday, April 13, 2023
9:40 AM: Security Alert advising U.S. citizens to avoid travel to 
Karima, Northern Sudan, and surrounding areas (https://
sd.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-khartoum-april-13-2023/)
Background
    Except where noted, every Sudan alert is:

   pushed out to STEP enrollees

   posted on Embassy Khartoum's website

   posted on the TSG country page for Sudan (using a script 
        that pulls from the embassy's page)

   amplified by CA on social media

    Question. In response to my question on whether there were 
contingency plans in place to work with allied nations prior to April 
15 in the event of significant conflict breaking out, you said ``We do 
continual planning with our allies and partners largely based at our 
military commands . . . for all high-threat posts and various 
contingencies.'' However, you continue, ``With regard to this decision 
on the division of labor, it had to do with various concerns about who 
was best positioned to do what at the time and it was negotiated and 
arranged in real-time at AFRICOM in Djibouti as well as in AFRICOM in 
Stuttgart with our allies.'' If the Department conducts continual 
planning with all high-threat posts and various contingencies, why was 
it necessary to negotiate and arrange in real-time this division of 
labor to rely on allies for air evacuations of American citizens?

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum, like all posts worldwide, regularly 
updates its Emergency Action Plans, which include contingency plans for 
evacuations. All plans need refinement based on real-time information, 
such as the availability of military assets, conditions on the ground, 
and risks associated with evacuation routes. The Department's advanced 
contingency planning took into consideration U.S. military base 
locations and general assets available at these locations, but still 
needed to be updated in real-time to reflect availability of assets and 
adjust route options based on the threat picture at specific locations, 
including the airports, and on major roads, which changed hourly.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. Many view the chaotic and disorganized evacuation of 
Sudan as the latest example of the Biden administration's long list of 
foreign policy failures. Why did this Administration fail to see the 
warning signs early enough to prevent another emergency evacuation?

    Answer. The Department was aware of and took action over many weeks 
to address tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid 
Support Forces (RSF). We engaged in near constant diplomacy, often 
working closely with civilians, to defuse tensions between the SAF and 
RSF. The Secretaries of State and Defense as well as Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs Phee, repeatedly engaged Sudanese actors 
to try to bring about a negotiated settlement.

    Question. Why did the U.S. strategy to guide Sudan to democracy end 
in war?

    Answer. Our strategy focused on supporting a Sudanese-led process 
to establish a civilian-led transitional government that would bring 
Sudan through a political transition culminating in democratic 
elections and fulfill the aspirations of the Sudanese people for 
freedom, justice, and peace. The Sudanese-led process was successful in 
addressing many complex and divisive issues related to transitional 
justice and security sector reform, among others. Working with the 
Tripartite Mechanism and other international partners, we supported all 
the Sudanese parties involved as they worked toward an agreement toward 
the end of the process. The Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed 
Forces elevated their interests above those of the Sudanese people and 
chose to fight instead of negotiating through the issues dividing them.

    Question. The situation in Sudan did not develop over the course of 
the past month. It is estimated that there were roughly 16,000 
Americans in Sudan but the Administration was telling them to find 
their own way out of Sudan. Knowing the situation in Sudan could 
implode at any time, why did we not have non-combatant evacuation 
operation (NEO) plans in place to get American citizens out of Sudan?

    Answer. Every post, including Embassy Khartoum has evacuation plans 
and regularly performs drills and exercises on crisis scenarios. 
Embassy Khartoum and the Department of Defense coordinated regularly on 
a range of contingencies and crisis scenarios in advance of this 
crisis. As the situation unfolded, the Department of State and 
Department of Defense coordinated in real time based on the dynamic 
situation on the ground.

    Question. With the absence of any commercial air, charter aircraft 
capabilities, and overland road routes out of Sudan, what is the Biden 
administration advising Americans in Sudan to do?

    Answer. We are advising U.S. citizens who remained in Sudan and now 
wish to depart to use commercial means, such as ferry service from Port 
Sudan. U.S. citizens remain able to cross overland into other 
countries, such as Egypt. Information on possible options to depart 
Sudan may be found in our most recent Security Alert issued May 12, 
2023, which is on the website for the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. The 
U.S. Government will continue to provide information for U.S. citizens 
in Sudan, including exit options.

    Question. With no U.S. presence on the ground, what efforts is the 
Biden administration currently taking to ensure the safe evacuation of 
Americans stranded in Sudan?

    Answer. The U.S. Government continues to provide information for 
U.S. citizens in Sudan, including exit options. U.S. citizens remaining 
in Sudan who need assistance are advised to contact the closest U.S. 
embassy or consulate and refer to the most recent Security Alert issued 
May 12, 2023, which can be found on the website for the U.S. Embassy in 
Khartoum.

    Question. Media reports indicate that the Wagner Group expanded its 
involvement in Sudan since 2019. They have mined for gold, explored for 
uranium and supplied mercenaries to the region of Darfur. In 2021, 
Wagner began to strengthen its partnership with General Hamdan, (who 
visited Moscow in the early days of the Ukraine war and has reportedly 
received military equipment from the group) following the coup that led 
to the two generals seizing power. What role did Russia play leading up 
to and immediately after the outbreak of conflict?

    Answer. Currently, we are only aware of minimal involvement by 
Russia in the conflict. The Secretary spoke about our concerns 
regarding the Kremlin-backed--Transnational Criminal Organization 
Wagner group--at the African Leaders Summit. He told African leaders 
that Wagner undermines good governance, exploits insecurity and robs 
countries of their mineral wealth. Engagement with Wagner simply brings 
more death, destruction, and instability. That said, it is the Sudanese 
Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces that bear responsibility for this 
conflict.

    Question. To what extent has Russia been involved?

    Answer. Currently, we are only aware of minimal involvement by 
Russia in the conflict. The Secretary has spoken to our concerns about 
the Kremlin-backed--Transnational Criminal Organization Wagner group--
that its engagement simply brings more death, destruction, and 
instability. That said, it is the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid 
Support Forces that bear responsibility for this conflict.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. Humanitarian assistance is being targeted in Sudan. 
Reports indicate humanitarian aid workers are being violently attacked 
and sexually assaulted. In addition, warehouses with critical aid are 
also reportedly being looted and destroyed.
    Since the beginning of the current conflict, how many humanitarian 
aid workers have been killed in Sudan?

    Answer. At least six of USAID's humanitarian partner staff have 
been killed since the conflict began, four of which were UN staff. The 
total number of humanitarian workers who have died from the conflict is 
likely higher.

    Question. What impact has the violence and destruction had on the 
ability of the United States and the international community to deliver 
humanitarian assistance?

    Answer. Ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces, the 
Rapid Support Forces, and other parties to the conflict is the primary 
factor driving humanitarian needs in Sudan. Nearly one-third of the 
population already required humanitarian assistance before the latest 
outbreak of fighting--approximately 16 million people; the conflict has 
impeded access to life-saving assistance and basic services for 
millions of people, further exacerbating humanitarian needs. People, 
particularly in Khartoum and the surrounding areas, are suffering from 
shortages of food, fuel, medications, and safe drinking water, while 
access to fuel, electricity, and telecommunications infrastructure 
remain limited in many parts of the country.
    Attacks against humanitarian staff and the looting of humanitarian 
assets forced many of our partners to temporarily suspend hundreds of 
life-saving humanitarian programs and evacuate their staff--impacting 
the millions of people who relied on these programs to meet their basic 
needs. Nearly 1.3 million people did not receive food assistance in 
April because of the conflict according to the World Food Program. Most 
importantly, the insecure operating environment is limiting partners' 
ability to access populations in need with life-saving assistance. 
Furthermore, the banking system in Sudan shuttered due to the violence, 
which has made cash inaccessible for partners. The widespread looting 
of warehouses, humanitarian offices, and medical centers have decreased 
the amount of commodities, supplies, and equipment available for life-
saving humanitarian assistance. At the same time, insecurity coupled 
with shortages of fuel have made the replenishment of these critical 
items very difficult.
    USAID maintains that a durable end to the conflict is the only 
solution to the humanitarian crisis and continues to call on all 
parties to allow safe, sustained, and unhindered access for 
humanitarian agencies and their workers to reach people in need.

    Question. Two-thirds of hospitals in Khartoum have closed. 
Hospitals have been shelled or used as defensive positions. Health care 
workers have been killed. Hundreds of doctors have fled.
    Is the health care system in Sudan on the verge of collapse?

    Answer. The ongoing fighting is deteriorating humanitarian 
conditions countrywide but has particularly crippled the healthcare 
system. Healthcare infrastructure and personnel have come under attack, 
people with chronic diseases lack access to care, and the rainy 
season--which will begin in June and continue through October--
threatens to compound the situation. Additionally, military occupation 
of facilities, as well as a lack of consistent access to electricity, 
fuel, medicines, water, and other essential supplies are driving the 
collapse of the healthcare system. Approximately two-thirds of 
hospitals across Sudan are no longer functioning, and at least 25 have 
been attacked since the start of the crisis.

    Question. What steps has USAID taken to get emergency medical aid 
into Sudan?

    Answer. USAID's partner the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is 
distributing critical health supplies in Khartoum, including emergency 
health kits and essential medicines for hospitals. On May 5, USAID 
partner the World Health Organization (WHO), in coordination with the 
United Arab Emirates, delivered 30 metric tons of urgent medical 
supplies to Port Sudan. The supplies, which will be delivered to 
hospitals and health facilities facing dire shortages, include enough 
trauma, emergency surgical supplies, and essential medicines to treat 
165,000 people. WHO has also distributed trauma kits from Port Sudan to 
functioning health facilities in Al Jazirah State and Khartoum. WHO has 
distributed fuel to one of the main hospitals in Khartoum to power 
generators needed for continued operations.

    Question. Last week, the World Food Program said that roughly $13-
14 million worth of food products allocated for the people in Sudan was 
looted within the last month. Before the conflict, about one-third of 
Sudan already relied on humanitarian assistance.
    How is food assistance currently being distributed?

    Answer. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance's (BHA) primary 
food assistance partner is the UN World Food Program (WFP). BHA-
supported food assistance in Sudan--whether through WFP or a non-
governmental organization partner--is provided via in-kind food 
distributions or cash-based transfers for food. Given the ongoing 
security situation, partners are primarily relying upon national staff 
and available prepositioned stocks to implement programs in pockets of 
safety.

    Question. What, if anything, can be done to help offset the food 
that has been looted?

    Answer. WFP's insurance covers commodities from the point where WFP 
takes possession of the commodity to the point where they transfer it 
to either a government, a partner, or a beneficiary. WFP has processes 
in motion for reimbursements on insurances for food, as appropriate. In 
some cases, WFP can also work with local authorities to try to recover 
stolen commodities.

    Question. What steps are being taken to ensure aid workers are safe 
and the supplies are secure?

    Answer. USAID continually reviews the risks associated with its 
humanitarian programming to ensure that partners are able to 
effectively carry out USAID-funded activities in line with humanitarian 
principles and in compliance with the terms and conditions of their 
awards. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine multiple 
risks, including the risk of our assistance being diverted in Sudan. 
USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance requires partners to submit 
a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their 
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of the RAMPs, all non-
governmental organization applicants must demonstrate that they have 
assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. 
Government resources. USAID is also examining potential augmentation of 
additional risk mitigation requirements applicable to new applications 
for humanitarian funding or activities in Sudan and is working closely 
with its existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have proper risk 
mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S. taxpayer-funded 
humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized by those for 
whom it is intended. Our colleagues in the region are working with 
partners to determine the best ways to quickly and safely deliver 
humanitarian assistance to people in need within and outside Sudan 
where conditions allow.
    USAID supports innovative safety and security programs specifically 
for the humanitarian community; collecting and sharing aid worker 
security incident data to identify threats impacting relief efforts; 
funding training that enhances aid workers' ability to keep themselves 
safe; and supporting activities that raise professional standards and 
capacity across the humanitarian security sector. USAID's humanitarian 
implementing partners determine their own risk tolerance and develop 
their own mitigation strategies to address their workers' 
vulnerabilities in high-threat high-risk environments such as Sudan. 
All implementing partners are required to maintain an operational 
security management system based on a comprehensive risk assessment and 
planning process that meets their organization's duty of care for their 
staff. This includes requiring the submission of location-specific 
Safety and Security Plans specific to each proposed operational area as 
part of their applications for funding in Sudan. All applicant Safety 
and Security Plans must include and clearly address the following: 
contextual analysis, threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, 
contingency planning for relevant emergency situations (abduction, 
evacuation, emergency medical care, psychosocial support, sexual 
assault, armed attack), and risk mitigation measures in relation to the 
above topics.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. Sanctions: While I was pleased to see the executive order 
that was issued last week, without actual designations, it means 
nothing. Ms. Nuland--When does the Administration plan to designate 
individuals under the executive order?

    Answer. The United States is considering the full range of tools at 
our disposal to address the conflict in Sudan, and this includes 
designating individuals under the executive order. On June 1, the 
Department of Treasury added four companies, two affiliated with the 
SAF and two with the RSF, to the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) 
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. We also amended the Sudan 
Business Advisory that determine that Sudanese gold is conflict 
affected, and imposed visa restrictions on officials from the SAF, RSF, 
and leaders from the former Omar al-Bashir regime, responsible for, or 
complicit in, undermining Sudan's democratic transition.

    Question. Do you believe that Hemedti and Burhan meet the 
qualifications for sanctions under the executive order?

    Answer. We cannot comment on potential sanctions targets. We have 
frequently condemned the actions of their forces in perpetuating this 
conflict.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Sarah Charles to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. As the crisis intensifies, humanitarian relief will be 
paramount. Unfortunately, we've seen raids against humanitarian 
caravans and attacks on personnel. The World Food Programme (WFP)--
which until recently was headed by my friend and fellow South 
Carolinian, David Beasley--has lost at least three of its employees and 
an estimated $400 million worth of critical supplies since the violence 
started. I've also heard that implementing partners on the ground are 
facing significant bureaucratic delays from Sudanese officials, 
including the Humanitarian Aid Commission.
    As the greatest contributor to the WFP and several other 
implementers in the region, what steps can we take to provide taxpayer 
accountability and ensure humanitarian relief reaches those who are 
most in need?

    Answer. USAID is working very closely with its partners to identify 
which bureaucratic impediments are constraining humanitarian 
operations, in which areas, and by which authorities. Having a 
comprehensive understanding of these impediments allows USAID to be a 
better advocate for changes that will improve our partners' ability to 
operate. USAID is coordinating with the Department of State to elevate 
these bureaucratic impediments to the appropriate authorities at all 
levels, whether inside Sudan, in neighboring countries, or through 
diplomatic channels in Washington. USAID will regularly update these 
diplomatic points based on partner feedback and the evolving context on 
the ground.
    From an award management perspective, USAID places the highest 
priority on ensuring we and our partners use taxpayer funds wisely, 
effectively, and for their intended purpose. We continually review the 
risks associated with our programming to ensure that partners are able 
to effectively carry out USAID-funded activities in line with 
humanitarian principles and in compliance with the terms and conditions 
of their awards. USAID has robust risk analysis processes that examine 
multiple risks, including the risk of our assistance being diverted in 
Sudan. BHA requires non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to 
submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan (RAMP) as part of their 
applications for funding in Sudan. As part of these RAMPs, NGO 
applicants must demonstrate that they have assessed the risks of fraud, 
waste, abuse, and other misuses of U.S. Government resources.
    USAID/BHA has a Risk Management Advisor assigned on the 
humanitarian Response Management Team to provide compliance and risk 
mitigation expertise. USAID/BHA is also examining potential 
augmentation of additional risk mitigation requirements applicable to 
new applications for funding or activities in Sudan and is working 
closely with its existing humanitarian partners to ensure they have 
proper risk mitigation systems in place to ensure that ongoing U.S. 
taxpayer-funded humanitarian assistance is reaching and being utilized 
by those for whom it is intended.
    Finally, USAID takes seriously any allegation of USAID assistance 
being diverted from the intended beneficiaries. All USAID funding 
recipients are required, pursuant to their award, to disclose in 
writing to the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG), with a copy to 
the cognizant Agreement Officer, loss, damage, or theft as well as all 
violations of Federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or 
gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award.

  Foreign Policy Article, Dated May 10, 2023, titled, ``How the U.S. 
        Fumbled Sudan's Hopes for Democracy,'' by Robbie Gramer

                                Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
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 Letter to President Biden, Dated May 19, 2021, Regarding Support for 
                          the Abraham Accords

                                  Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
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