[Senate Hearing 118-249]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 118-249

               INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA: 
                    IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING


                               BEFORE THE


                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE


                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS


                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 24, 2023

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
       
     
             




[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 







                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov  
                  
                                ______ 
                                
                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

55-043 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024 





















                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          



                              (ii) 




















                              

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Phee, Hon. Molly, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, 
  United States Department of State, Washington, DC..............     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Benjamin L. Cardin.............................................    22

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    25

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Cory A. Booker.................................................    29

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator Tim 
  Scott..........................................................    30

                                 (iii)

  

 
                   INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL AND WEST  
                 AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

                              ----------                              

                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. 
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Shaheen, Coons, 
Murphy, Kaine, Van Hollen, Risch, and Ricketts.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
    First let me share with my colleagues, some of us just got 
back early this morning from a visit to the Middle East. Ten of 
our colleagues were there. I was joined by Senator Coons and 
Senator Booker of this Committee. The trip was headed by 
Senator Graham. It was a bipartisan group, five Democrats, five 
Republicans. Joining Senator Graham on the Republican side were 
Senator Collins, Senators Thune, Sullivan, and Britt. Senators 
Blumenthal and Reed joined on the Democratic side, so there 
were 10 of us there.
    Our visit to Israel was shocking. We saw firsthand the 
brutality of Hamas. We saw that in the scars in the country. We 
saw the videos. We saw the photos. We saw things we would never 
thought we would ever see in our lifetime, as we have 
characterized Hamas as ISIS. It is evil. What it did is 
unspeakable.
    We made it clear that we stand with Israel and the right to 
defend themselves. We met with the families of the hostages. It 
was not an easy meeting. The pain, the uncertainty, the fate of 
their loved ones, all that weighed very heavily on us as we 
were able to meet with the Israeli officials to try to 
understand the game plan. We stressed that Israel has a right 
to defend itself, and we need to do everything we can to 
provide the humanitarian assistance and safe harbor for those 
Palestinians who are trying to escape Hamas.
    It was a difficult trip and it is difficult times. As we 
were there, there were rockets and missiles being fired in 
parts of Israel and in Gaza, and we know the situation is 
deteriorating. We made it clear that the United States stands 
strongly against any escalation of this conflict by the enemies 
of Israel who would try to take advantage of this situation.
    We also visited first the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was a 
very encouraging visit. We were there because we know Hamas was 
trying to end the normalization talks between the Saudis and 
the Israelis. We made it clear, and in our conversations with 
the Crown Prince, that that could not happen. We need to stay 
focused first on the tragedies of Hamas, what it caused in 
Israel, but to keep alive the normalization and integration of 
the countries in the Middle East, and we have received positive 
conversations with the Crown Prince.
    I just really wanted to update our Committee that we 
thought this visit was extremely important, underscoring the 
importance of bipartisan response by the United States Congress 
to the tragedies that are taking place in the Middle East.
    From the Middle East to the subject of this hearing, the 
governing crisis in West Africa and Sahel.
    Five nations in the region are suffering coups since 2020. 
This includes Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, and most 
recently, Niger. Mali and Burkina Faso have actually had two 
coups. At the same time, there has been an alarming increase in 
terrorist attacks by militant Islamist organizations.
    Today we are going to examine this recent wave of coups and 
violence and what it means for U.S. policy. I welcome Assistant 
Secretary Phee. I want to thank you for the work that you and 
your team are doing in this area. Your efforts to support this 
region as it responds to the situations in West Africa and the 
Sahel are vital.
    The challenges are great, but we must acknowledge the 
current trajectory is grim. It requires a critical evaluation 
of our policies. Congress demanded that when we passed the 
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act.
    The junta leaders justified their coups by pointing to 
their elected governments' failure to improve security, but 
they themselves have failed to deliver as well. In both Mali 
and Burkina Faso, security has sharply deteriorated. Even as 
civilian deaths have skyrocketed, incidents in Niger are on the 
rise, as well.
    The spiraling security situation is already impacting 
coastal West African nations. Attacks in Ghana, Togo, and Benin 
are increasing. Sudan and Gabon have both had coups. 
Instability now stretches from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. 
Why? What is driving this dynamic?
    It is hard to say our security assistance has been 
effective in the Sahel or in countries in West Africa. We 
certainly have very little to show in terms of improved 
security, stability, or stronger democratic institutions, and 
quite frankly, there is an uncomfortable truth in all of this. 
Across the Sahel, the United States trained militias and 
militaries responsible for the coups. We have trained the very 
people overthrowing civilian governments. It is critical that 
we take a brutally honest look at our approach to date.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, I would like to hear your 
thoughts. Is it time for the United States to change its 
strategy? Is our security assistance helping or leading or 
contributing to the negative outcomes? How should we adjust 
these policies?
    We also need to be consistent in our response to coups in 
Africa. I understand one size does not fit all, but it is 
important for the United States to take a principled stance 
when coups occur. We need to lead with our values as we try to 
advance an agenda of good governance in the region. I think we 
need to make our position crystal clear: military takeovers of 
civilian-led governments are coups. We should not mince words. 
Anyone engaged in coups should be personally sanctioned. The 
failure to sanction, a policy shift that has clearly taken 
place here in our government, sends the wrong message.
    The presence of the Russian Wagner mercenary group presents 
an additional serious threat. The impact of Wagner's operation 
in Mali have been disastrous for civilians. Wagner and the 
Malian military stand accused of massacring as many as 500 
people in Moura in 2022. Moscow is making overtures in the 
military regimes in Burkina Faso and Niger. Russian expansion, 
coupled with the expulsion of the French and United Nations 
peacekeepers in Mali, could trigger chaos that would be 
difficult to recover from.
    I know we do not want to lose ground to Russia or China, 
but we should not fall into the trap of giving free passes to 
authoritarian and military regimes for the sake of Great Power 
competition. We made that mistake too often during the Cold 
War, mistakes for which our foreign relations still suffer with 
some countries today. I hope you will speak to how we are 
responding to these challenges.
    I understand that ultimately the course of history in other 
countries is up to the people who live there. However, we have 
the responsibility to at least do no harm through our approach, 
and to stand in solidarity along with millions of Africans 
whose democratic aspirations of living in a dictatorial regime, 
just as we supported the people of Eastern Europe for decades 
after World War II in their fight for democracy.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, we have lots to discuss. I look 
forward to that discussion. This has been a hearing that we had 
planned. It is an extremely important subject. We hope we can 
have a frank discussion during this hearing.
    I now turn to our distinguished Ranking Member, Senator 
Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Assistant Secretary Phee, for being here with us today. All of 
us here know that you deal with a portfolio that is difficult, 
troubling, which is a gross understatement, I suspect, but you 
deal with it. It is unfortunate you are here today alone 
without the support of representatives from USAID and the 
Department of Defense. It is a difficult task to address all of 
these issues in the Sahel without these perspectives, but here 
we are.
    There are concerning trends, much of which has been 
outlined by the Chairman here in the last few minutes, that we 
are witnessing in the region and the wider continent--a decline 
in democracy, challenges in U.S. diplomatic engagement, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally, and the effectiveness of our 
regional policy, if a clear one exists, including our 
incentives and deterrents, some of which have been outlined by 
the Chairman this morning. Global events have accelerated these 
changes, including Russia's war in Ukraine, interference with 
countries like China, Russia, and Iran, and the COVID-19 
pandemic. We have had seven coups in Africa--seven coups--
during the years of the Biden administration. Things are not 
working.
    The ongoing significant changes in the Sahel and West 
Africa affect our national security and that of our regional 
and global allies. The primary threat is Islamic terrorism. 
Large parts of Mali and Burkina Faso are controlled by groups 
linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and terrorist groups 
are expanding their attacks on governments and populations in 
many countries.
    In countries such as Mali, the presence of Wagner's 
mercenary is particularly concerning. This group is known for 
severe human rights abuses, spreading false information, and 
unjustly taking local resources. Since Prigozhin's demise, 
Wagner's activities in Mali have become a more significant 
threat to the United States national security, boosting the 
Russian state capacity for harmful global operations while 
providing questionable security gains in return.
    Many Sahel and Western African governments are unstable and 
lack public support. In areas controlled by military juntas, 
citizens' opinions are wholly ignored, and the government 
merely enforces military orders. The remaining democracies in 
the region struggle to meet the needs of their expanding youth 
populations, often fall short in combatting corruption and 
cannot handle security and economic challenges independently.
    That is not the whole story. These challenges make it 
difficult for Africa to prepare for upcoming threats like 
coups, terrorist attacks, election issues, or food crises, and 
not the least of which is their burgeoning population over the 
next decades.
    Secretary Phee, the last time you spoke to this Committee 
about the Administration's Sahel policy, you highlighted a 5-
year interagency strategy designed to address the region's 
challenges and better the lives of its people. You mentioned in 
your written testimony that this strategy would adapt to 
significant changes in context. However, given what has 
occurred in the Sahel and West Africa over the past 14 months, 
that strategy clearly is not working.
    I believe the fundamental assumptions and approach require 
significant revision. The Department must prioritize resources 
for the region and strengthen our diplomacy. When supporting 
our African partners and implementing regional solutions, we 
should lead, not merely be an active bystander.
    The leadership includes coordinating with our European 
allies as well. We have seen the Department demonstrate it can 
prioritize in times of crisis, like in Ukraine and most 
recently in Israel. We must similarly prioritize the crisis 
unfolding in the Sahel and West Africa or we are going to 
continue to face the consequences.
    Finally, I am concerned about the Administration's unclear 
policy on Sudan. I have asked President Biden to appoint a 
special envoy for Sudan. Given the many issues you and the 
Africa Bureau handle, we need a seasoned diplomat singularly--
singularly--devoted to Sudan to steer U.S. policy, assist the 
Sudanese people, coordinate with regional partners, and handle 
complex diplomacy to stabilize the nation and foster genuine 
democracy.
    I also encourage the Department to move quickly to make an 
official determination about the ongoing atrocities in Darfur 
and other areas of the country. Such a designation would go a 
long way in making clear to the world where we stand on the 
killings and human rights abuses occurring in Sudan.
    Again, I fully recognize that dealing with the issues in 
the region is a heavy lift. I hope you can point out ways in 
which Congress can help you.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Our witness today, Ambassador Molly Phee, is Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs. Ambassador Phee has led 
a long and distinguished career in the State Department before 
being sworn in as Assistant Secretary in September 2021. She 
served as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan 
Reconciliation. She was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from 
2015 to 2017. She served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in 
Ethiopia, Chief of Staff in the Office of Special Envoy for 
Sudan and South Sudan, and as Acting Assistant Secretary for 
International Organizations, among other positions that she 
served.
    Thank you for being here. We look forward to your 
testimony. Your statement will be made part of the record. We 
ask you summarize in about 5 minutes so we can get engaged in 
Committee questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. MOLLY PHEE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,  
  BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
  STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I start by thanking 
you and your colleagues for traveling to the Middle East. All 
of us are concerned about what is happening there and fearful 
of global impacts, so thank you for your service in advancing 
our interests and values. Thanks to the both of you for 
welcoming me here today. I will try and answer some of your 
questions in my prepared testimony and through dialogue.
    The urgent challenges in Ukraine and the Middle East at 
times overshadow the U.S. partnership with Africa, but we must 
prepare for the future. By 2050, one in four people on the 
planet will be an African. The talents today of more than 1 
billion Africans already enrich the world's culture, politics, 
and economy. The continent is the source of critical minerals 
such as cobalt. The Congo River basin is the largest carbon 
sink in the world. This is why the strategy of the Biden-Harris 
administration recognizes Africa as a major geopolitical force 
and why we seek to elevate African voices in institutions such 
as the U.N. Security Council, the G-20, and the IMF.
    The sub-region of the Sahel is integral to our relationship 
with the continent. The coups that have occurred recently in 
Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and now Niger illustrate the 
democratic regression that threatens not only the people of the 
Sahel, but their neighbors and our partners in coastal West 
Africa.
    Allow me to address the drivers of political instability 
and what the United States has done and could do. The primary 
problem is weak governance. Every country where a coup has 
taken place had previously experienced military takeovers. Many 
of these governments had engaged in corrupt practices, failed 
to provide basic services, and ignored democratic values by 
extending term limits or disregarding human rights. Such 
practices tested the presumption that democracy delivers, but 
context matters, too. Historical legacy, enduring poverty, 
climate change, and a decade of escalating terrorist violence 
further weakened the performance and resilience of Sahelian 
democracies. Atrocities by the Islamic State and the branch of 
al Qaeda known as JNIM, and predations by criminal armed 
groups, have placed unrelenting pressure on governments and 
civilians.
    Military rulers point to the supposed failure of democracy 
to justify their actions. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, military 
rule does not improve people's lives. In fact, military rule 
leaves populations poorer and less secure. The number of deaths 
from political violence increased by 150 percent in Mali and 77 
percent in Burkina Faso in 2022. Violence targeting civilians 
in Mali increased by 38 percent this year, nearly a third of 
these incidents perpetrated by Malian security forces or the 
Wagner Group. Violent incidents in Niger--which had been 
declining significantly due to President Bazoum's leadership 
and the partnership between Nigerien security forces and U.S. 
and European forces--rose by 42 percent in the month after the 
coup.
    How to foster a return to democracy? Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member, we are considering and adjusting based on these events. 
In the case of Niger, we are working closely with the regional 
organization ECOWAS. The African Union and Africa's regional 
economic commissions are essential partners in advancing peace 
and democracy. That is why, although we promptly paused the 
majority of U.S. assistance for Niger after the coup, we 
delayed at the request of our African partners the formal 
assessment that the outcome constituted a coup while they 
sought to restore President Bazoum to office. Acting Deputy 
Secretary Victoria Nuland traveled to Niamey in August to try 
and convince the generals to restore constitutional order. I 
later traveled to West Africa to consult on how to encourage a 
quick and credible restoration of democratic rule. Secretary 
Blinken met with ECOWAS Foreign Ministers at the recent U.N. 
General Assembly to propose a phased approach to resuming U.S. 
assistance based on concrete actions to return the country to 
democratic rule. Committed to the Nigerien people, the United 
States has maintained humanitarian and basic health and food 
assistance. Swiftly resolving the crisis in Niger could serve 
as a positive alternative, and we are now actively encouraging 
negotiations between the junta and ECOWAS.
    How to prevent coups? With the support of Congress and the 
Global Fragility Act, we are helping countries in coastal West 
Africa to strengthen governance by programming such as 
increased engagement in historically marginalized communities. 
We are also working to implement the African Democratic and 
Political Transitions initiative as well as the 21st Century 
Partnership for African Security, programs launched by 
President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.
    There is a perception that we spend too much on security, 
but in the past five fiscal years, from 2018 to 2022, the State 
Department provided approximately $2 billion in bilateral 
assistance to the Sahel, and of that, less than 15 percent was 
for security assistance.
    Adequate staffing is essential, so I ask you to support the 
Administration's budget request and to confirm ambassadors. We 
are now missing ambassadors in Nigeria, Gabon, and the African 
Union.
    Thank you again for scheduling this important discussion.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ms. Molly Phee

    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss the crisis in the Sahel and the U.S. role in 
promoting democracy, economic development, and security in West Africa.
    The urgent challenges in Ukraine and the Middle East at times 
overshadow the U.S. partnership with Africa. But we must prepare for 
the future. By 2050, one in four people on the planet will be an 
African. The talents of more than 1 billion Africans already enrich the 
world's culture, politics, and economy. The continent is the source of 
critical minerals such as cobalt. The Congo River basin is the largest 
carbon sink in the world. This is why the strategy of the Biden-Harris 
administration recognizes Africa as a major geopolitical force and why 
we seek to elevate African voices in institutions such as the UN 
Security Council, the G-20, and the IMF.
    The sub-region of the Sahel is integral to our relationship with 
the continent. The coups that have occurred recently in Mali, Guinea, 
Burkina Faso, and now Niger illustrate the democratic regression that 
threatens not only the people of the Sahel but their neighbors and our 
partners in coastal west Africa.
    Allow me to address the drivers of political instability and what 
the United States has done and could do. A primary problem is weak 
governance. Every country where a coup has taken place had previously 
experienced military takeovers. Many of these governments had engaged 
in corrupt practices, failed to provide basic services, and ignored 
democratic values by extending term limits or disregarding human 
rights. Such practices tested the presumption that democracy delivers. 
But context matters, too. Historical legacy, enduring poverty, climate 
change, and a decade of escalating terrorist violence further weakened 
the performance and resilience of Sahelian democracies. Atrocities by 
the Islamic State and the branch of al-Qaeda known as JNIM, and 
predations by criminal armed groups, have placed unrelenting pressure 
on governments and civilians.
    Military rulers point to the supposed failure of democracy to 
justify their actions. But military rule does not improve people's 
lives. In fact, military rule leaves populations poorer and less 
secure. The number of deaths from political violence increased by 150 
percent in Mali and 77 percent in Burkina Faso in 2022. Violence 
targeting civilians in Mali increased by 38 percent this year, nearly a 
third of these incidents perpetrated by Malian security forces or the 
Wagner Group. Violent incidents in Niger--which had been declining due 
to President Bazoum's leadership and the partnership between Nigerien 
and U.S. and European forces--rose by 42 percent in the month after the 
coup.
    How to foster a return to democracy? In the case of Niger, we are 
working with the regional organization ECOWAS. The African Union and 
Africa's regional economic commissions are essential partners in 
advancing democracy and peace. That is why--although we promptly paused 
the majority of U.S. assistance for Niger after the coup--we delayed at 
the request of our African partners the formal assessment that the 
outcome constituted a coup while they sought to restore President 
Bazoum to office. Acting Deputy Secretary Toria Nuland traveled to 
Niamey in August to try and convince the generals to restore 
constitutional order. I later traveled to west Africa to consult on how 
to encourage a quick and credible restoration of democratic rule. 
Secretary Blinken met with ECOWAS Foreign Ministers at the recent UN 
General Assembly to propose a phased approach to resuming U.S. 
assistance based on concrete actions to return the country to 
democratic rule. Committed to the Nigerien people, the United States 
has maintained humanitarian and basic health and food assistance. 
Swiftly resolving the crisis in Niger could serve as a positive 
alternative, and we are now encouraging negotiations between the junta 
and ECOWAS.
    How to prevent coups? With the support of Congress and the Global 
Fragility Act, we are helping countries in coastal west Africa to 
strengthen governance by programming such as increased engagement in 
historically marginalized communities. We are also working to implement 
the African Democratic and Political Transitions initiative, or ADAPT, 
as well as the 21st Century Partnership for Africa Security, or 21PAS--
programs launched by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.
    There is a perception that we spend too much on security, but in 
fiscal years 2018-2022, the State Department provided approximately $2 
billion in bilateral assistance to the Sahel. Of that, about less than 
15 percent was for security assistance.
    Adequate staffing is essential so I ask you to support the 
Administration's budget request and to confirm Ambassadors. We are now 
missing Ambassadors in Nigeria, Gabon, and the African Union, among 
other posts.
    Thank you again for scheduling this important discussion to renew 
our shared commitment to advance democracy, peace and security as the 
cornerstones of a successful U.S.-Africa partnership.

    The Chairman. Well, once again, thank you for being here 
and the work that you are doing. We will have 5-minute rounds.
    I want to start by challenging the delay in Niger on the 
determination. You said you did that because you were trying to 
restore the deposed leader. The coup occurred on July 26. It 
was 2 and a half months later before the declaration of coup 
was made.
    The delay did not work. Some of us think it may have shown 
the military authorities that the consequences of a coup are 
not going to be felt. They look at the fact that we have not 
imposed sanctions on any of the individuals involved in coups, 
which is, to me, a change in our previous policy. In Gambon you 
just announced, as I understand, last night a determination of 
coup that occurred on August 30. That was a 2-month delay.
    To me it is giving the wrong signals, looking at the number 
of coups we have seen in this region, that the consequences 
will not be there, so tell me why we are not considering 
sanctions. I understand Europe is. Why are we not considering 
sanctions against those who have allowed these coups to occur?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, I welcome and respect your 
perspective. Let me address both Niger and Gabon.
    Our friends and partners in ECOWAS and coastal West Africa, 
including the leaders of Ghana, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and 
Nigeria, all asked us to delay making our formal assessment 
because they were fully committed to trying to restore 
President Bazoum to power, and they thought that our statement 
would derail their efforts. We were trying to support the sub-
region in its leadership and efforts to promote democracy and 
to promote restoration of democracy. That is the reason for the 
delay, because they asked us. They asked me. They asked 
Secretary Blinken. They asked Acting Deputy Secretary Nuland.
    In Gabon, last week Senior Director for Africa Judd 
Devermont and Deputy Assistant Secretary Melanie Higgins from 
the Africa Bureau, traveled to talk with the coup leaders there 
about a restoration of democracy, and we announced the 7008 
designation following those consultations.
    In both cases, in contrast to how we responded to the 
problem in Mali, we actively engaged directly with the 
leadership of the region and with the leadership of the 
generals who had seized power to tell them they had a choice. 
The better choice, as described by the statistics I reported to 
you on the increase in violent incidents in Mali and Burkina 
Faso is to get back to a democratic path and to be able to 
resume their partnership with the United States and others in 
the international community to help develop their economies, 
provide stability, and progress their governance.
    That is why there was a delay in both of those cases. We 
tried to engage directly with the leaders to try and force a 
different path, and we also were responding to the requests and 
pleas from our allies.
    I want to assure you that we continuously look at options 
for sanctions, but in the current approach in which we are 
trying to direct the leaders back to a path of democratic 
transition, that is factor in the assessment.
    The Chairman. It seems like other than Mali dealing with 
those associated with the Wagner Group, none of the others have 
been even considered for sanctions. This seems like a shift in 
policy that, in the past, have made it clear that there will be 
a consequence. I do not see that in our policy today.
    Ms. Phee. I believe there have been consequences because we 
have suspended assistance----
    The Chairman. But you have not imposed any sanctions.
    Ms. Phee. No, sir, but in the case of Niger, we have not 
only suspended the assistance captured by Section 7008, but we 
have expanded the freeze to include assistance and cooperation 
not captured by the law. We are actually doing more than you 
have asked us to do because we believe that our engagement was 
very positive in Niger.
    The Chairman. In Niger, we see that they have requested the 
exit of other countries' military presence. We have a military 
presence in Niger. Tell me why it is important for us to 
maintain our military presence in that country.
    Ms. Phee. In 2022, according to data collected by reputable 
sources, there were approximately 5,000 violent incidents in 
Mali and 4,000 violent incidents in Burkina Faso. In the first 
6 months in Niger, there were only 450. The violent incidents 
had declined from about a third since 2021, and civilian 
casualties were declining. That is a result of the sacrifices 
of Nigerien security forces, the role of the United States and 
European partners, and our programming to strengthen the 
conduct of security forces, including the police and the 
gendarme and the judicial sector in Niger.
    It was the leadership of President Bazoum to talk to 
marginalized communities. We were making a positive difference. 
We believe the Nigerien leadership now recognizes that that was 
a positive difference. They have said they want to remain a 
partner with us, and we have said we cannot remain a partner 
with you unless you get on a serious, credible path back to 
democratic transition.
    The Chairman. In short, what would happen if we removed our 
troops?
    Ms. Phee. As Senator Risch pointed out, Ranking Member 
Risch pointed out, it would be preferable if the military were 
here to address that themselves. However, as I have described 
to you, we believe that we have made a significant difference 
in Niger. I also want to tell you that our partners in coastal 
West Africa believe our presence is important to them and to 
their security, and they are quite apprehensive about a 
scenario in which the French were gone and then we would leave 
as well.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, when can 
we expect that the State Department is going to make an 
atrocities determination for Sudan? I think we can note that 
the U.K. came out with a definitive statement, calling 
atrocities in Darfur ethnic cleansing last week, and there is 
no shortage of information about the crimes being committed 
against civilians in Darfur, Khartoum, and other parts of 
Sudan.
    When can we expect the State Department to make a 
determination?
    Ms. Phee. Senator Risch, the Office of Global Criminal 
Justice is actively reviewing the crimes that have been taking 
place in Darfur right now, and I expect that they, in the near 
future, will be able to make a recommendation to the Secretary. 
We asked them to look at that early on. We have made public 
statements about our concern, and we are working in Geneva with 
the Human Rights Council on these matters, including 
successfully seeking a Commission of Inquiry.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. To really answer the 
question, could you try to narrow that down a little bit more? 
We know that, like I say, U.K. acted last week. It seems to me 
we could be further along than where we are.
    Ms. Phee. I am trying to be very careful as someone 
responsible for policy, not to intervene in the legal review. I 
know that Beth Van Schaack and her team are closely and 
actively looking at this. I am sorry. I defer to their 
judgment, but I expect it to be soon. I will relay to them your 
concern and desire for ----
    Senator Risch. I assume you are interested in this also.
    Ms. Phee. I am absolutely interested. I, in fact, asked 
them to undertake this review. Just to be careful not to affect 
their legal deliberation, I just wanted you to understand it is 
their authority to make that decision.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. If you pass along all of 
our concerns, that may be helpful to you, and maybe you could 
get back to us with what you find out in that regard. I would 
appreciate it.
    Help me out here. How is the State Department working 
within the interagencies, namely with the Department of Defense 
and the National Security Council, to address the growing 
challenges including related to our counterterrorism efforts in 
the Sahel and West Africa? I know you have addressed that 
briefly, but I wonder if you could drill down on that a little 
bit for us please.
    Ms. Phee. Absolutely. As I have described, we have had 
important programs, not only what the military has been doing, 
but what the State Department has been doing in Niger--our 
Counterterrorism Bureau, our Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law, my own bureau, the Africa Bureau, in our support for 
civilian security assistance. We believe we were making a very 
positive impact in Niger.
    We have suspended those activities because of the coup, and 
we have told the authorities in Niger that our partnership was 
making a difference, and if they would like to resume that 
partnership they need to make changes.
    Niger has a history of coups. As I described, all of the 
countries where coups have taken place were vulnerable because 
they had experienced coups before. In Niger, they have a 
tradition of the military passing power back to the civilians 
often within a relatively short time frame, such as 1 year. 
That is what we are trying to do in order to address the 
counterterrorism concerns in Niger.
    In coastal West Africa, through the programming under our 
Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the same 
State Department offices I have described as well as our 
cooperation with the Defense Department and the intelligence 
community means we are trying to help those countries have more 
capability, both in the security area as well as in the 
governance and development area so that they are more resilient 
in responding to the terrorist threat from the Sahel.
    Senator Risch. How do those countries respond to you when 
you talk to them about the not very good situation with the 
coup for changing the governments as opposed to a nice clean 
election that the people could have a say in? How do they 
respond to you on that?
    Ms. Phee. I think it is really important that both the 
African Union and the Regional Economic Commissions--in the 
case of West Africa, ECOWAS--very strongly believe in their 
protocols and in their policies and in their conduct that coups 
and irregular changes of constitutional order are not good for 
the people of Africa, and they speak forcefully about it. In 
the case of Niger, ECOWAS has imposed very strong sanctions on 
Niger. They have cut off electricity, they have closed the 
borders, and they have also frozen the regional currency, 
Niger's access to the regional currency.
    They tell us that, in Niger, for example, they call it one 
coup too many. That is why, Mr. Chairman, we were trying to 
respect their request to us. We were trying to support them in 
their efforts to advocate for democracy and our shared values.
    They do also, when we spoke to them about what our options 
are--for example, one option is to just terminate our 
relationship in Niger and depart--they expressed a lot of 
concern about that option in coastal West Africa because, as I 
said, again, from their perspective they are fighting some of 
our enemies--ISIS, AQ, the Wagner Group--and they would like 
our partnership to help them deal with those challenges.
    Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
have got a couple more questions, but I will submit them for 
the record if that is okay.
    The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Assistant Secretary Phee, for being here this morning.
    In your opening statement you ended by talking about the 
importance of having personnel on the ground who could help in 
these countries, and I just want to point out--and this is 
really not for the State Department as much as it is for my 
colleagues--that in Africa alone there are 11 vacant 
ambassadorial posts, including, as you mentioned, the African 
Union. Burkina Faso, while it has an ambassador there now, I 
understand that ambassador is on their way out and the new 
ambassador has been nominated, but still has not been approved.
    When we are not there, we cannot compete with China and 
Russia. Can you talk about how the absence of U.S. ambassadors 
is affecting your ability to do your job and our ability to 
support democratic governance in countries?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. You probably said it better 
than I can. We have a unique system where the Secretary 
recommends, the President selects and nominates, and the Senate 
confirms. That gives the voice of an American ambassador 
weight. It gives us influence. It makes us more effective. When 
we are missing that voice, we are diminished in all of our 
efforts.
    There is also an internal impact. A strong leader attracts 
staff and is able to engage in the interagency more 
effectively.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to have 
joined Chairman Cardin on his HARM Act, to designate the Wagner 
Group as a foreign terrorist organization. It is clear that we 
are still seeing Russia engage in the Sahel and try to partner 
with anti-democratic leaders there. We also know that there is 
a real impact on what is happening in Ukraine and that war on 
African nations.
    What is our ability to track and rebut Russian information 
operations, because right now they are winning the information 
war in most of these African countries on who is responsible 
for the food shortages that they are experiencing and the 
rising costs.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting the challenge and the 
deleterious effects of Russian disinformation and 
misinformation. This is something our African partners also 
express great concern about.
    Our Global Engagement Center is actively working to help us 
be more effective in working with partners on the ground, so 
making sure accurate information is available to independent 
sources in the media and in civil society, making sure they 
have the correct information, and making sure they have a voice 
to share that information, but it remains a very difficult 
problem as it is here.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate the work of the Global 
Engagement Center. I am a big fan, but clearly, they are not 
accomplishing the task. Is the challenge that they do not have 
enough resources? Is the challenge that there is not enough 
coordination? Because we are still losing that battle.
    Ms. Phee. I do not think it is a problem of coordination, 
and of course more resources are always welcome. I would 
welcome more resources for my public diplomacy sections, for 
example, and embassies in the region. I think it is genuinely a 
tough problem. Russia devotes a lot of effective resources to 
this effort. I do not think it is a coincidence that they have 
focused their efforts in Francophone Africa. They are trying to 
exploit the complicated French colonial history. I think 
opportunities like this, Senator, where we can speak openly 
about this problem and provide the republics of Africa the real 
truth about what is happening if Wagner comes to your country 
are one way we can continue to address the challenge.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, tomorrow Senator Ricketts and I are 
going to chair a hearing on the Black Sea region, which 
obviously has the critical connection to what is happening in 
Africa. What can we do to better engage with our partners in 
the Black Sea region to help address the information problem we 
have got in Africa?
    Ms. Phee. The Ukrainians have been very active in trying to 
reach out and speak to African leaders and African publics, and 
continuing to encourage that approach, I think, would be 
helpful.
    I think when we think about the challenges in the Sahel as 
broadly for Africa, sort of the triple whammy of COVID, the 
loss of fertilizer, the loss of grains, the increase in 
petroleum prices, the increase in inflation, it has really 
damaged the ability of African governments to help support 
their constituents. That is why in the Administration's 
supplemental request you will see a request for some small 
assistance and some authorities that would leverage more money 
for the IMF and World Bank to make them better able to help 
Africans deal with this economic crisis.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time, but I would 
just encourage us to recognize that the Black Sea region and 
what is happening is a lot more than just what is happening in 
Ukraine, and to reach out to our partners in Romania and 
Moldova and Turkey, and even in Georgia, where they understand 
very directly what is happening and why it is causing the food 
insecurity and the rising costs. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Assistant Secretary, for being here. I would like to follow up 
on the Chairman's questions with regard to sanctions. My 
understanding is the European Union countries created a 
framework for sanctions that would target certain entities or 
individuals, freeze assets, hand out travel bans, that sort of 
thing. You also mentioned ECOWAS actually did implement a 
number of pretty restrictive sanctions such as cutting off 
electricity.
    Do the European countries, are they also holding off on 
these sanctions? Because they have established a framework, but 
they are not sanctions yet. Are they also holding off on doing 
the sanctions in deference to the ECOWAS countries' concerns 
about trying to get the junta in Niger to give up power and 
turn it back over to civilians?
    Ms. Phee. Yes. I think there are different ways to consider 
what sort of economic or other pressure we put on juntas, for 
example, and in this instance the EU has previously provided 
direct budget assistance to Niger, and they ended that direct 
budget assistance following the coup.
    Senator Ricketts. Sorry. Would that be the equivalent of 
what we did with the 7008?
    Ms. Phee. Yes. Similar. We do not provide direct budget 
assistance, but ending your aid, and that has also had a big 
economic impact on the situation in Niger.
    Senator Ricketts. Are you concerned, and I understand 
again, I heard your reasonings earlier about why you are 
holding off on the sanctions, but are you concerned this is 
sending the wrong message to other nations, to other African 
nations, where the governments may be under the threat of a 
coup?
    Ms. Phee. I think it is extremely important what you are 
saying, and I hear you. As I said, I think there are multiple 
ways to put pressure. I believe the economic pressure that we 
have placed on Niger and other governments is significant and 
profound. They desire, they have told us, for example, the 
resumption of our security assistance and cooperation. Those 
are factors that seem to us to be very persuasive in our 
negotiations, but I hear you on the travel restrictions, which 
we could do in terms of sanctions on individuals.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you. I will switch topics a little 
bit. You mentioned a little bit about the security, how much we 
have provided, but also in other areas as well, obviously, our 
approach to build up the militaries in different countries, to 
fight terrorists, training and equipping local forces. Over the 
past decade the U.S. has spent about $500 million to build up 
Niger's security forces to target terrorism.
    Obviously this is very important, but there is also the 
criticism now that the forces that we trained were part of the 
coup that replaced the civilian government. Are we somehow 
missing the boat here with regard to our strategy that we are 
training up these militaries and then they are responsible for 
participating in these coups? It is not just us. It is the 
French and other European countries' counterterrorism efforts 
as well.
    Can you talk a little bit about that criticism? Is that a 
fair criticism? What can we do to really mitigate the 
opportunity for us to train these troops and then have them 
participate in the coups?
    Ms. Phee. I want to say that we all share the 
disappointment that military leaders with whom we have worked 
would make a decision to support a coup. I do not know 
necessarily that that is fully representative of the large 
program that DoD runs, particularly the military training 
program. They trained tens of thousands, and of course they are 
better placed than I to discuss this, and generally speaking 
have positive results in terms of increased 
professionalization, increased respect for human rights, and 
increased respect for civil-military relations.
    I am not sure that some of these exceptional, spectacular, 
exceptional actions are representative of the program as a 
whole.
    I do believe that many times we have very productive 
relations with military leaders with whom we have engaged and 
with whom we have trained. It is certainly something we should 
review.
    Senator Ricketts. Are our efforts too narrowly focused on 
counterterrorism here and training of the militaries, or do we 
need to change our strategy with regard to how we do this in 
these countries to avoid these coups?
    Ms. Phee. I think our strategy, which is true also 
globally, not just in Africa, is to understand that when you 
have a problem of political legitimacy because of weak 
governance and the aggravation from this terrorist threat that 
the root cause is the political problem, but it cannot be 
resolved easily in an environment where the terrorist threat is 
so great.
    I actually think it is just hard. We have seen this in 
Afghanistan. We have seen this in Iraq. We have the best 
military in the world. We have really good impacts on managing 
security threats. The harder, tougher work is helping work with 
governments, helping work with economic development, which is 
also hard to accomplish when you are under a terrorist threat.
    It is a different type of human endeavor that I think 
requires a long investment.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Risch. Thank you in particular, Mr. Chairman, for 
helping organize, focus, and lead our recent trip to the Middle 
East that I think, as you said in your introduction, was very 
productive and critical at this time. Thank you for holding a 
full committee hearing on the Sahel.
    The Sahel is one of the critical areas in the world where 
the forces of chaos, whether it is Wagner or jihadists or other 
sources of chaos, frankly, are on the march against the forces 
of stability, democracy, and development. I am disappointed 
that we do not have representatives of our military and USAID 
here as well. Assistant Secretary Phee, thank you for your 
engagement, your hard work, your leadership in this area.
    To the point that Senator Ricketts was just asking, I think 
we need to stay on this and press both how the intelligence 
failure happened in Niger that we did not know that folks we 
had trained and we were very closely integrated with were about 
to overthrow the duly elected President Bazoum, and to then ask 
some tough questions about our path forward, given the 
departure of a critical security partner in the region, given 
the very urgent calls we are hearing from democratically-
elected Presidents, like Akufo-Addo of Ghana, who has over and 
over pressed for more priority to be placed by our military in 
security in the region, and then to make sure that we have a 
focused, coordinated strategy for defense, development, and 
diplomacy.
    This is a region--more people have died in terrorist 
attacks in West Africa in the last 5 years than the rest of the 
world combined, and Wagner sees an opening and is taking it and 
exploiting it. The last supplemental request included funding 
specifically to counter Wagner's influence in West Africa. It 
is not in the current supplemental. I hope we will consider 
adding some focused resources for security and development work 
in partnership with diplomacy.
    As you said, Assistant Secretary, we have, after 10 weeks, 
reached a coup designation, I think long overdue, but I 
understand the reasons why, in consultation with ECOWAS and 
with the remaining democratically-elected leaders in the 
region, that you were holding open space for a transition back 
to democracy, specifically in Niger. It is partly why we gave 
the Administration flexibility in 7008 waiver authority in the 
SFOPS bill this past year.
    Could you just be specific about whether there are now 
clear conditions for the junta under which full security 
partnership and development assistance can be restored, and 
where we are on that path? I am concerned about President 
Bazoum's security, and I am concerned about losing the progress 
that you described, that we were making towards reducing the 
number of terrorist attacks and improving security and 
stability in Niger when this coup unexpectedly happened.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. As I have discussed here, we 
have discussed with our ECOWAS partners, and Secretary Blinken 
talked directly to them, about how we could combine our efforts 
so we have leverage, our assistance and cooperation, the 
sanctions that they imposed, and to work with the junta on a 
package of actions they would take and actions we would take 
reciprocally.
    Those discussions are initial, I would say, at this stage. 
We are encouraging them. We have made very clear we will not be 
able to resume the partnership that is so important to both 
sides, I think, and to our neighbors, without action on their 
side. Those discussions are underway and not ripe for public 
discussion.
    Senator Coons. There is something like $500 million in 
assistance to Niger that is now hanging in the balance. The 
MCC, roughly $300 million compact that has been suspended, $200 
million at least in assistance that has been suspended. It is 
my hope you will work with Congress on plans for reprogramming. 
As you know, Senator Graham and I have worked for years on the 
Global Fragility Act, which has been referenced here. I am very 
disappointed at how this and previous Administration have 
chosen to prioritize regions and countries that I do not think 
fit the framing of that law, but coastal West Africa 
demonstrably does.
    I hope that we will work together to strengthen your voice 
in the interagency, to priority security assistance for coastal 
West Africa, and I would be interested in your comments on what 
we can do to support the use of the Global Fragility Act in 
this region, particularly in the coastal region that I think is 
now really under dramatic threat as a result of this series of 
coups and the loss of a stability partnership across the core 
of the Sahel.
    Ms. Phee. My colleague, Michael Heath, the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for West Africa, was just in Benin last 
week, meeting with U.S. ambassadors in the region in countries 
where the Global Fragility Act is being implemented. They 
welcome, and our partners in coastal West Africa welcome, those 
resources. As we move into the second year, Senator, I hope we 
are going to be in the position because metrics is a big part 
of that program, to give you updates.
    We are also talking with AFRICOM about how to increase our 
support to those governments in managing the threat, which they 
had originally been focused on the threat from the Gulf of 
Guinea. Now they are looking north because of the pressure from 
the Sahel.
    We are having wide-ranging conversations with them in 
coastal West Africa and with our partners in the interagency to 
see how we can do more, and I am confident that we are going to 
be in a position to provide the additional support.
    Senator Coons. Well, thank you. I would welcome a 
classified briefing at some point, Mr. Chairman, on the 
intersection between DoD, USAID, and State, and on the ongoing 
threat to stability posed by Wagner, by jihadists, by poor 
governance, as the Assistant Secretary said in her opening 
statement. This is a region where if we take our eye off the 
ball, we will be back, having more and more urgent hearings 
about the impact for the people of West Africa and for the 
governance of West Africa.
    Thank you for your hard work in this difficult area. I look 
forward to following up with you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons. We will try to 
arrange that type of information.
    We are going to have a vote perhaps later this week on our 
military presence in Niger, and I think it is incumbent upon 
the Administration to get information to this Committee prior 
to that vote as to the importance of our troops in that country 
as well as the impact that it has on the region. Because we are 
going to be asked, and we have little time.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you 
Secretary Phee. Just a word about Niger. One of the reasons 
this matters so much is we lost four servicemembers there in 
2017, and it was under circumstances that were pretty unusual. 
There were questions about whether there were ample legal 
authorities for the missions they were on, were they trained 
for the mission that they ended up having to execute? There 
were a whole lot of questions that came out of that. Then in 
the aftermath of the coup, the fact that we still have 1,000 
troops, and their mission has been redefined, there are a lot 
of questions about the utility. If the training we provided 
ended up leading to the coup, why?
    I do think sometimes we forget how unusual we are to have a 
military that is subordinate to civilian political leadership. 
In many nations around the world, the military is not really 
subordinate to civilian political leadership. They are a 
separate power base. Pakistan would be a good example. If you 
do even the right things to train a military that is not 
subordinate to civilian political leadership, you empower the 
military, and sometimes you empower them against the civilian 
military leadership with the best of intentions.
    In a nation where there has been a history of coups, in a 
nation where the military does not necessarily envision itself 
as completely subordinate to civilian military leadership, 
anything you do to empower the military could have this 
potential of a negative consequence. You are empowering them 
vis-a-vis the elected leadership and undermining democratic 
institutions, and I think that is something that bears a lot of 
thought.
    I wanted to ask you a question just about staffing. The GAO 
identified, in 2019--now this is a couple of years old--that 10 
percent of State's Africa Bureau total positions at overseas 
posts were vacant, and the figure seems to have increased based 
on State's most recent staffing report figures that have been 
shared with this Committee. Can you talk about how the 
Department is trying to address the staffing shortage?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting that. The whole team 
will be happy to know that you support. In the State Department 
as a whole, we have about an 89 percent fill, but for the 
Africa Bureau, particular in West Africa, it is about 83 
percent. There are a couple of reasons for that. As you know, 
the previous Administration did a freeze on hiring. Then we had 
a problem with attrition. That is why Secretary Blinken has set 
up robust budgets to try and get us back to proper staffing.
    Within the Bureau we have the biggest challenge at the mid-
level. That is usually at a time of life where folks have 
children that need schooling, may need medical care, and those 
are resources and facilities that are hard to find in places 
like West Africa.
    We are doing a lot to attract people. There are still many 
who are interested and going out and engaging in what has been 
called expeditionary diplomacy. We are trying to provide 
special incentives. Fundamentally, we need resources to make 
sure that we hire predictably and regularly. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Well, and I think your point about this mid-
level issue, that is a really important one, too. Resources is 
part of it, but there may be creative strategies to try to get 
people to either stay at the mid-level or come back if they 
have been as an FSO and exited the service. We may need to 
think about that a little more.
    I want to ask about Sudan. I join the Ranking Member and 
some others wrote a letter, asking about the appointment of a 
special envoy. Before we get to that, just to put some numbers 
to this, the horrific situation has been going on for about 6 
months. I have dialogued with my Sudanese community in 
Virginia. The U.N. reports 9,000 people have been killed, more 
than 7 million have been forcibly displaced, and nearly 25 
million are in need of humanitarian assistance.
    Can you share any updates pertaining to the ceasefire 
negotiations that are being held in Jeddah between the SAF and 
RSF?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you so much for raising this urgent and 
tragic problem. I am happy to report today that I do have some 
updates in this grim situation. I will start first, if you 
will, with what I am sure you will agree is our priority, which 
is the civilians. For the past few days, about 100 Sudanese 
civilians have been meeting in Addis Ababa. They are using the 
African Union as their house--they call it the ``African 
House''--to have discussions. They are working towards forming 
an inclusive and representative pro-democracy civilian front.
    It is an important group of Sudanese. It includes people 
from the resistance committees. It includes people from 
professional associations, universities, civil society groups, 
as well as the political parties that have previously dominated 
the discussions.
    They have taken some time to come together. There are a lot 
of divisions among the Sudanese folks, but we are actively 
encouraging those dialogues, and we hope that this is the start 
of a serious process to form the next Government of Sudan and 
to serve as a counterweight to the security forces. Ambassador 
John Godfrey has been in Addis with a team supporting those 
talks.
    Later this week, on the 26th of October, after a lot of 
hard work by Secretary Blinken, talks will resume in Jeddah. 
There will be a very important change. There will be an African 
co-facilitator to join the Saudis and the Americans. The 
regional group in East Africa known as IGAD, the executive 
director will participate in those talks, and he will be 
representing both IGAD and the African Union, based on an 
agreement between those leaders.
    These talks will be structured differently from before, but 
fundamentally they will be as they were before, emergency 
diplomacy limited on trying to pursue ceasefires and ultimately 
a cessation of hostilities, and given the relationship between 
reducing violence and allowing humanitarian assistance to get 
in, there will also be discussions on improving delivery of 
humanitarian aid. Martin Griffiths of OCHA has said Jeddah is 
very important for humanitarian aid.
    Senator Kaine. I am over my time, but both of those are 
positive development, the citizens' meeting in Addis Ababa and 
then the resumption of the somewhat reformatted talks in 
Jeddah. I know the Committee is going to want to follow up to 
get the State Department's take on how successful those efforts 
are.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant 
Secretary Phee, great to see you. I want to follow up on really 
some of Senator Ricketts' questions here.
    Back in August 2022, the Biden administration put forward 
its U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which explicitly 
said it was crafted to ``incorporate lessons learned from 
overly securitized approaches,'' to the Sahel. We have now, of 
course, seen a serious of coups, most recently in Niger, but 
also in Mali, other West African countries.
    My question is, what lessons have been learned about 
oversecuritization and did the most recent events mean we 
should go back and look even harder? Have you done that, and 
what lessons have you learned based on the most recent coups?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for that question, and I would like to 
answer it in two ways. I would like to compare how we responded 
to the situation in Mali and how we are now responding in 
Niger, and also in Gabon, in Central Africa.
    In Mali in 2020, when the previous President was 
overthrown, it was wildly popular because that President was 
very corrupt. We thought there was an opportunity to work with 
the generals to get to a better outcome. Over time--and I can 
list all the negative actions they have taken--it became clear 
that that was not possible, and most spectacularly, in December 
of 2022, when they invited in Wagner, and last year when they 
made clear they wanted MINUSMA to leave, and then in August 
when the Russians vetoed the sanctions regime for Mali.
    Correspondingly, we have hardened our approach to Mali, 
limiting the development assistance we provide there. We are 
already applying 7008 there more fully than we did initially, 
and we have done increased sanctions there, although not the 
sanctions of all the leaders as the chairman asked.
    In Gabon, similarly, there was a coup, and it was wildly 
popular because it overthrew a government that was considered 
inept, corrupt, and not democratic.
    What are we doing differently there and what are we doing 
differently in Niger? First of all, we are more actively 
engaged at a senior level. Victoria Nuland went to Niamey. I 
went to coastal West Africa to consult. Judd Devermont of the 
National Security Council went to Gabon last week.
    We are working with our partners. We are expanding what we 
are doing in terms of suspending assistance, not only 
assistance captured by 7008, but even security assistance and 
cooperation that is not required to be limited by the law. We 
are not invoking notwithstanding authorities. We are not 
invoking waivers. We are trying to make very serious that our 
partnership, which can be and has been positive, requires the 
leaders, the generals that have taken power to make active, 
concrete steps to get back to democracy, because we understand 
that democracy is the long-term solution to the root causes of 
problems.
    Senator Van Hollen. Right. No, I appreciate your sort of 
going back and taking a look at how we can better respond in a 
more targeted way. You mentioned that you have rolled back some 
of the security assistance that is not required by law to be 
rolled back. I do not know if you are referring to some of the 
DoD assistance, but I do want to ask you a question about the 
DoD assistance because the coup provision does halt State- and 
USAID-administered funds, but as you know, some DoD support has 
continued in Niger.
    Congresswoman Jacobs and I introduced legislation last 
Congress, and are planning to reintroduce it again, that would 
require Leahy Law vetting be applied also to the DoD Section 
127 Echo provision. When I asked Dr. Carlin about this at a 
hearing a little while back, the response from Dr. Carlin was, 
``I welcome working with my colleagues at the State Department 
to look at that.''
    As a representative of the State Department I would like to 
ask your opinion on whether we should not, as a matter of 
consistency, in cases where the coup provision is triggered, 
also halt the DoD assistance.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for that question. I would like to 
share with you, although I am a representative of the State 
Department, as you just said, my understanding is that our 
recommendation to the interagency has been, and that has been 
agreed, that we do suspend our security cooperation and 
assistance with Niger until we sort out a path forward. To the 
best of my knowledge we are not providing any security 
assistance, not from State and not from the DoD.
    We are in a good position because we have had conversations 
with the junta about operations that are necessary for force 
protection, but beyond that we are trying to make clear that if 
they want that partnership that has made such a positive impact 
they need to make changes in governance.
    With regard to the specific question, I would welcome an 
active discussion. That seems like a very positive suggestion 
from my perspective. I would have to consult with other 
stakeholders.
    I would also like to make a suggestion to the Committee 
which relates to the trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership 
program, which, when it was started in 2005, was very 
innovative in terms of cross-regional and cross-functional. 
Over time, I think its success has been impeded by several 
factors, including that there was no central authority as there 
is, for example, in the Global Fragility Act, and declining 
resources.
    I think it would be worthwhile if we could have a 
discussion with Congress about ways to improve that to deal 
with the changed environment in the Sahel.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Let me just comment on your statement that we 
have multiple ways to put pressure, but it seems like it is not 
working because we are going to from coup to coup to coup. I 
understand the strategy in Mali, but that did not work. In 
Niger it looks like the policies have not worked.
    I would just argue the fact that we do not have a 
consistent response to those who participate in coups has led 
to the view that you can commit a coup and still maintain a 
relationship with the United States. It may not be as strong as 
you want. You may get a suspension of aid. It may have other 
impacts, but it will not have the personal impact of preventing 
the use of travel or banking.
    I just want to stress the point that the failure--which was 
our previous policy, as I understand it, to consider 
immediately sanctions--has had a negative impact in 
discouraging the number of coups we have seen in that region. 
Our strategy is not working. At least the results are not 
there. Too many coups. One coup is too many.
    I still have not gotten a clear response from you as to 
whether we are adjusting--what is our policy? When we see a 
military takeover, what is our policy? I am not sure I 
understand. Do we immediately cut off the aid and consider 
sanctions and other actions to make it clear that this is 
unacceptable? All governments are unpopular. We recognize that, 
but the coup is not the answer. That has been our policy for a 
long time. It seems like what you are saying, we justified our 
delay because it was an unpopular regime. That just leads to 
others feeling they can commit coups even against popular 
regimes.
    Ms. Phee. I hear you and I agree with you. I was trying to 
explain how we have adjusted our policy because what we did in 
Mali did not work. What we are doing now, in Niger and in 
Gabon, is not only applying 7008, which applies to State and 
USAID, as you know well, but also incorporating other U.S. 
Government assistance and cooperation, so there is an across-
the-board suspension.
    There is an effort to coordinate effectively with our 
partners in the region, such as ECOWAS, with our European 
partners, so that everyone is united in saying you cannot have 
a partnership with us if you do not make changes. In fact, Mr. 
Chairman, we have tried to adjust based on the fact that what 
we did in Mali was different and not successful.
    It is true that each country is different and has their own 
circumstances, but as I described in my opening statement there 
are also many common factors which contribute to this 
situation. I want you to know that we are trying, actually, to 
be very strong about our rejection of these behaviors by taking 
what you gave us in terms of law and expanding it, making a 
policy choice to include all U.S. Government engagement, to 
make it very clear that these actions are not acceptable.
    The Chairman. I would argue that from Mali we should 
recognizing that our changing of policies and not imposing 
sanctions has not worked. We are learning from Mali, but in 
Mali we did not impose sanctions. The only sanctions that you 
are now imposing is against some of the Wagner Group people.
    Senator Risch, anything further?
    Senator Risch. No. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts?
    The Committee record will remain open for 2 days for 
questions for the record. We would ask that you respond to 
those questions promptly. Thank you very much for your service, 
and with that the hearing will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Is there any effort underway to review and revise the 
Sahel strategy and its implementation in light of these new events? If 
so, what is the scope and substance of this review, and what resources 
is the Administration proposing to Congress to help support its 
efforts?

    Answer. There is a fluid situation in the Sahel, and we constantly 
revisit our strategy considering changing dynamics. Our principles have 
not changed. We remain focused on working with our African partners and 
the people to address challenges and support democracy, which is the 
best foundation for development, social cohesion, prosperity, and 
stability across the Sahel and the African continent.

    Question. Do you plan to update the strategy for Mali? Do you 
commit to this Committee to respect legislative requirements going 
forward?

    Answer. The current Mali strategy remains applicable in most ways--
including our continued advocacy for a return to democracy and for the 
respect of human rights. Since the writing of the strategy, however, 
the transition government withdrew its consent of the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Mali (MINUSMA). As MINUSMA's continued presence underpinned 
our strategy, we will update it. I commit to respecting all legislative 
requirements.

    Question. In your view, what went wrong in Niger? What lessons have 
we learned?

    Answer. Our partnership with Niger led to concrete benefits for the 
Nigerien people in both development and security. We are deeply 
disappointed that the actions of a few men have put so much at risk for 
the people of Niger. Our response to the coup, which is different from 
how we have responded to recent coups in West Africa, is to restrict 
our assistance and relationship beyond what is required by law. 
Humanitarian, food, and health assistance for the benefit of the people 
in Niger will continue. Any resumption of assistance or cooperation 
will require the CNSP to take steps toward civilian-led democratic 
government.

    Question. Do you believe that the failure to impose consequences on 
junta leaders elsewhere in West Africa in any way emboldened military 
officers in Niger and also now Gabon to carry out coups?

    Answer. The United States has imposed consequences for coups, 
including restricting much-appreciated security and other assistance 
for governments pursuant to section 7008. Our limited partnership amid 
rising terrorist threats, however, creates opportunities for Russia and 
China to expand their influence. Motivations of individual actors in 
coups differ across the region. When democratically elected governments 
fail to effectively meet the needs of their people or tackle 
corruption, they provide motivation for coup leaders that cannot be 
overcome solely by the threat of U.S. visa restrictions. The suspension 
of U.S. assistance to governments run by junta leaders sends a clear 
message that they must return to democratic governance that is 
accountable to the people of their countries.

    Question. What will be the impact of a U.S. military withdraw on 
security in the Sahel and littoral West Africa?

    Answer. U.S. military withdrawal in the Sahel could have an impact 
on regional security and our ability to conduct counterterrorism 
operations in the Sahel. Additionally, coup countries will become 
increasingly vulnerable to Russian and Wagner influence if the United 
States withdraws completely from the Sahel. Wagner Group activity in 
Mali has coincided with a rise in civilian deaths. Military withdrawal 
would also render coastal West African states vulnerable as we already 
have witnessed a spillover of violence to their borders. We are working 
closely with our partners in Coastal West Africa to support their 
efforts to counter threats of violent extremism through the Strategy to 
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS).

    Question. Does the U.S. rely too much on a short-term, tactical, 
counter-terrorism approach in its security assistance efforts and not 
enough on institution building?

    Answer. The United States relies on a balanced approach to security 
assistance that includes programs focused on building both short- and 
long-term capacity at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 
U.S. assistance in the region includes programs that focus on military 
professionalization; the promotion of respect for human rights and 
democratic governance; and the development of stronger institutions to 
oversee these security forces. Our security assistance is designed to 
secure U.S. interests and mitigate threats while inculcating U.S. 
values like respect for human rights and healthy civil-military 
relations that make these institutions stronger and more responsive to 
their people over time.

    Question. Do the militaries of these countries perceive that the 
U.S. will give them a pass on coups and remain engaged because it 
privileges a security approach to addressing terrorism as opposed to 
one that addresses root causes of terrorism?

    Answer. The countries that have experienced coups all understand 
that the overthrow of a democratic government results in restrictions 
on U.S. foreign assistance previously supporting government actors, and 
therefore a diminution in their partnership with the United States. 
Some of the coup governments recognize that the United States is a 
vital partner in global and regional affairs and that U.S. assistance 
is important to their security and economic development goals. As a 
result, they may seek to maintain a positive relationship by taking 
steps to return to democratic governance. We have raised the cost of 
doing business with the Wagner Group by imposing sanctions on those who 
cooperate with it. We continue to message the importance of addressing 
root causes of violence and protecting civilians during 
counterterrorism operations.

    Question. Do security assistance programs provide leverage the U.S. 
can use to influence the military leadership in these countries? What 
does it allow us to do that we cannot otherwise? Can you provide 
examples?

    Answer. On its own merits, U.S. military assistance and training 
programs have had a positive influence in professionalizing military 
units and fostering greater respect for human rights and civil-military 
relationships. Our partners in the region value U.S. assistance due to 
the high quality of our training, equipment, logistical support, and 
other lines of support, and the prospect of losing or regaining access 
to this support can encourage sound decision-making within our 
partners. The degree to which this incentive is decisive depends on a 
multitude of other individual factors.

    Question. Do you still believe, over a year later, that visa 
restrictions or financial sanctions against coup leaders responsible 
for gross violations of human rights, serious corruption, or 
undermining basic democratic principles is ``incongruent'' with U.S. 
efforts to restore democracy and respect for the rule of law in the 
Sahel?

    Answer. We are committed to promoting accountability for human 
rights violations and abuses, democratic backsliding, and corruption 
using a variety of tools, including sanctions and visa restrictions, 
where appropriate. In Niger, we have sent a strong message that our 
relationship is no longer business as usual. The measures we have 
taken, including by not relying on available authorities to overcome 
section 7008 restrictions, will have a strong impact in our effort to 
achieve a credible transition to democratic rule in Niger. We continue 
to assess the use of financial sanctions and visa restrictions to 
respond to the crisis in the Sahel.

    Question. Do you still believe these illegitimate, undemocratic, 
and abusive military juntas are capable of, as you stated in July 2022, 
undertaking ``reforms that are demanded by their people to form the 
foundation of a more democratic system?''

    Answer. We constantly revisit our strategy considering changing 
dynamics. In Mali, we and international partners listened to claims by 
transition authorities that, backed by popular support, they would 
implement long-needed reforms and combat the corruption that had 
plagued the presidency of Ibrahim Keita. We took an expansive approach 
to using our notwithstanding authority to continue as much assistance 
as possible following the military coup in August 2020. Unfortunately, 
the collective optimism from the international community was misplaced. 
In Niger, we have not relied on available authorities to overcome 
section 7008 restrictions, and sent the message that it is no longer 
business as usual. We are using a phased approach where we must see 
concrete progress toward a credible transition to democracy in Niger in 
order to restart assistance under available authorities.

    Question. Has the Africa Bureau drafted a sanctions strategy for 
any of the coup countries in West Africa? I would include Chad, despite 
the State Department's finding that there was not a coup there. They 
got off on a technicality, in my view.

    Answer. As situations change, we continually review all tools 
available to us and determine what is the best tool to use to advance 
U.S. foreign policy goals. Sanctions and visa restrictions, where 
appropriate, can promote accountability and support policy priorities. 
The Bureau of African Affairs continues to consult with the Office of 
the Sanctions Coordinator to review sanctions-related points of 
leverage in West Africa. We continue to assess the use of sanctions and 
visa restrictions to respond to the crisis in the Sahel.

    Question. Can you clarify why the Administration decided to 
sanction three senior Malian military officers for coordinating with 
the Wagner group but has not sanctioned any Malian officials 
specifically for killing Malian civilians, sexual violence, or other 
gross violations of human rights?

    Answer. The arrival of the Wagner Group in Mali resulted in great 
suffering for the Malian people. More civilians were killed in 2022 
after the Group's arrival than in any other year since the conflict 
broke out in 2012. By sanctioning those individuals, including the 
Malian defense minister, who were instrumental in bringing the Wagner 
Group to Mali and making overtures to Burkina Faso, we hope to deter 
others from making similar mistakes. In May, we also imposed visa 
restrictions on two Malian military commanders for their involvement in 
gross violations of human rights committed in Moura in 2022.

    Question. What message does it send other military juntas or people 
in Mali and across the Sahel when the United States decides to sanction 
security force members for working with Russia but not for massacring 
their own people?

    Answer. As the Wagner Group is responsible for or contributed to 
much of the violence perpetrated against civilians in Mali, sanctioning 
those who worked to bring them into Mali does demonstrate our outrage 
for this violence. In addition, we imposed visa restrictions on two 
Malian commanders for their involvement in the killings in Moura in 
2022, a massacre the Wagner Group supported. We will continue to use 
various tools against those who are responsible for increasing violence 
in Mali and elsewhere.

    Question. Can you explain why the Department has not sanctioned any 
member of Chad's security force for the October 2022 massacre and 
subsequent campaign of forces disappearances, and torture?

    Answer. The U.S. Government condemned the violent clashes with 
protesters on October 20, 2022, as well as the arrests and deaths of 
protesters in custody following these protests. We have pressed for 
Chad's transitional government to conduct a full investigation of these 
events, and hold accountable those responsible for killing protesters, 
including several in front of the U.S. Embassy. On the 1-year 
anniversary of the deadly protests, we renewed our call for full 
investigation of these events and accountability for anyone responsible 
for human rights violations and abuses.

    Question. The standard of ``credible information'' articulated by 
Section 7031 is not a high bar. Does the Department lack credible 
information implicating Chadian security forces in these abuses despite 
what would appear to be numerous, credible reports by international 
organizations and the Chadian Government's own Human Rights Commission?

    Answer. The United States has urged the Government of Chad to 
investigate the violence in Chad on October 20, 2022, and facilitate an 
international inquiry in order to provide a full account of these 
events and identify those responsible for killing protesters. This 
includes the assailants in civilian clothes and private vehicles who 
cleared police checkpoints and killed four individuals outside the main 
gate of the U.S. Embassy. One year after these events, we have yet to 
receive any results from these investigations. We have also tried to 
independently identify those responsible, and we are working with civil 
society to gather more information.

    Question. My understanding is that both Gabon and Niger may lose 
their eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
as a consequence of recent coups. Can you explain how Chad, which also 
experienced a coup and is clearly going in the wrong direction when it 
comes to political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, the right to 
due process, or the protection of human rights--all of which are 
essential criteria for trade benefits under AGOA--manages to retain its 
AGOA eligibility?

    Answer. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) leads an 
annual interagency review of sub-Saharan countries' eligibility for 
AGOA benefits. We are using the AGOA Forum to discuss a forward vision 
for AGOA that reflects the opportunities for improvements, as well as 
the changes on the continent. For additional information, we refer you 
to USTR.

    Question. Do you think the United States should provide 
constitution drafting or election related assistance to military 
governments in, for example, Mali or Chad when these processes appear 
engineered to extend the current military government's grip on power?

    Answer. While transitional governments are often rife with 
corruption and lack the credibility to advance genuine reform, they are 
also opportunities to reframe historical grievances, establish 
accountability mechanisms for past abuses, and support reconciliation 
needed for social cohesion and long-term peace and prosperity. A 
successful democratic transition needs to be built from the ground up, 
ensuring public consultation and buy-in throughout the process, 
including a wide range of civil society actors.
    The Department continues to identify and deploy available resources 
to support sustainable democratic transitions across the continent and 
will leverage available expertise and ensure a coordinated response to 
the multiple dynamic transitions processes taking place, particularly 
where unique approaches are required. Programming will continue to be 
targeted and specific to each country's context.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Since 2020, military coups have occurred in Mali, Chad, 
Sudan, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon. In your testimony to the 
Committee, you note that a primary driver of political instability is 
weak governance, and that countries with a history of military 
takeover, government corruption, failing to provide basic services, and 
ignoring democratic values by extending democratic values or 
disregarding human rights are at risk for coups. I agree with your 
analysis, which points to a few countries at particular risk for coups 
moving forward, including Cameroon, Burundi, Mauritania, the Republic 
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, 
Senegal and Zimbabwe.
    What lessons have been learned from the recent coups that should be 
applied to other countries at risk? How is the Biden administration 
adjusting its approach to countries like Burundi, Cameroon, South 
Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria to ensure they remain on a positive democratic 
trajectory?

    Answer. Recent coups have brought into stark relief the critical 
importance of ongoing U.S. efforts, in partnership with regional allies 
and civil society, to stem democratic backsliding and confront human 
rights violations and abuses using a mix of punitive measures and 
positive inducements. Throughout the continent we are supporting civil 
society and working to ensure marginalized groups, including women and 
youth, have a voice in political processes. Where appropriate, we will 
provide resources and guidance to encourage democratic governance, 
effective service delivery, accountability, economic growth, anti-
corruption measures, and dialogue between capitals and communities, 
which are keys to ensuring long-term stability, development, and 
prosperity for countries and communities.

    Question. Do you assess that support for democracy and governance 
in countries at risk for coups is sufficient and appropriately 
targeted? Where should adjustments be made given lessons learned from 
the Sahel?

    Answer. We remain committed to supporting key stakeholders, 
including regional bodies, governments, democratic and inclusive 
political movements, and civil society, to advance the shared 
democratic goals of the United States and the majority of African 
publics. With the support of Congress and the Global Fragility Act, we 
are helping countries in coastal west Africa to strengthen democratic 
governance through foreign assistance programming. We are also working 
to implement the African Democratic and Political Transitions 
initiative (ADAPT) as well as the 21st Century Partnership for Africa 
Security, or 21PAS--programs launched by President Biden at the U.S.-
Africa Leaders Summit.

    Question. What guidance has Department leadership, including 
yourself, provided to our Ambassadors and Embassy personnel in 
countries in Africa at risk for coups on how to engage with 
stakeholders at post to make clear that support from the United States 
is dependent on credible constitutional transfers of power and to 
provide public support for such processes?

    Answer. I encourage our Ambassadors and Embassy personnel to engage 
with governments, political parties, and civil society to advance our 
shared democratic goals. Our public condemnation of coups, and 
announcements of the restrictions imposed as a result, are disseminated 
with regional partners. In the case of West Africa, our engagement with 
ECOWAS member states as the regional body has confronted the various 
coups has allowed us to clearly communicate the consequences, 
particularly regarding section 7008 restrictions.

    Question. Have lessons learned from situations in Mali and Sudan 
informed the State Department's sense of urgency in addressing 
protracted conflicts and failed peace processes in places like Cameroon 
and South Sudan? If yes, how? If no, why not?

    Answer. While all have unique causes, at the core of undemocratic 
transfers of power and violent conflicts on the continent is a lack of 
accountable democratic governance and open political space, and each 
requires a democratic governance solution. Sustainable peace and 
democracy require investments in institutional reforms and civil 
society, including by empowering civil society advocacy through 
programs like our Civil Society Partnerships for Civilian Security 
program.
    In South Sudan, the United States is working to mitigate and 
prevent sub-national violence, promote respect for human rights, better 
target U.S. assistance to communities in need, protect and defend civic 
space, independent media, and peaceful political voices, and hold the 
transitional government accountable to its commitments to manage the 
country's natural resources transparently. Since the submission of our 
annual report to Congress on South Sudan policy in March, we have taken 
additional steps, including, the release of a business advisory, the 
renewal of the arms embargo, support for civil society, and consistent 
messaging with our partners to advance our policy. We also continue to 
work with our African partners, international actors, and local civil 
society to support peace and stability across the central African sub-
region and to promote a peaceful resolution between the Government of 
Cameroon and separatists in the English-speaking northwest and 
southwest regions of Cameroon.

    Question. How is the United States demonstrating and communicating 
to local populations that we are a reliable partner committed to their 
long-term best interests?

    Answer. The United States communicates that we are a reliable, 
long-term partner in the Sahel by investing in host countries' human 
capital and cultivating credible voices among the local population in 
support of U.S. policy and values. Our public diplomacy tools include 
exchange programs that build lasting ties between local policymakers, 
influencers, and young leaders and their American counterparts. Almost 
without exception, these exchange alumni return to their countries with 
positive impressions of the United States and its role in the world, 
which they promote among their colleagues and audiences over the course 
of their careers.
    Our public affairs campaigns on traditional and social media use 
compelling images and language to highlight U.S. investments across the 
region in good governance, public health, quality education, and other 
universal benefits. U.S. diplomats also engage local audiences in 
person at public gatherings, in board rooms, in government offices, and 
in academia, making the case that we are there for them over the long 
haul.

    Question. Is the State Department making adequate use of resources, 
like local radio, to communicate with local populations about issues 
important to them, as well as the significant lifesaving assistance the 
U.S. provides?

    Answer. Our diplomatic missions in Africa employ all communications 
methods at their disposal to reach target audiences where they live. 
For example, the Bureau of African Affairs is currently expanding an 
innovative multi-platform media campaign in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
The Gambia to counteract PRC messaging around its many high-visibility 
infrastructure projects by highlighting the tangible benefits of long-
term U.S. investment in the health and education sectors. We are 
working to expand this program to more than 20 countries in the region.
    We also engage vulnerable, under-served audiences in the region 
through, for example, the U.S. Agency for Global Media's new Fula 
language Voice of America programming. This project, tentatively 
scheduled to be launched in early 2024, with an initial $700,000 grant 
via Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability funding, targets 
underserved audiences who are most at risk to adversarial influence 
with objective news and information.
    In addition, we are developing a second season of Limitless Africa, 
our radio and podcast series that addresses contemporary African 
issues. This program provides a potential regional audience of 15 
million listeners with an accurate picture of the positive impact of 
U.S. policy and engagement, while advancing narratives that oppose 
misinformation and disinformation from other actors.
    The Global Engagement Center (GEC) is supporting counterterrorism 
strategic communications projects in the Sahel region. These projects 
incorporate public service announcements and a radio drama series as 
strategic messaging to educate local populations on the manipulative 
tactics deployed by terrorist groups. The content is disseminated via 
radio in multiple local languages including Fula, Hausa, Kanuri, Shuwa 
Arabic, and French. Materials are available for posts' own use in 
developing similar programming.

    Question. Given the rapidly deteriorating conditions for 
constructive relations with the junta, what are the Biden 
administration's current top priorities for Mali?

    Answer. The United States remains committed to helping the Malian 
people achieve their aspirations for democracy, development, and 
stability. We continue to be the largest bilateral donor of development 
and humanitarian assistance that benefits people in Mali. Our priority 
is to provide people in Mali with access to humanitarian assistance, 
food, healthcare, and education while growing our relationships through 
cultural and exchange programs. While we support Mali's population, we 
will advocate for the transition government to return Mali to democracy 
and provide responsible security that respects human rights.

    Question. With the departure of the French, as well as significant 
anti-French sentiment by the junta, which allies does the United States 
view as having the most influence with the junta? How are we working 
with these allies to advance mutually beneficial outcomes?

    Answer. The transition government is not readily influenced by any 
allies, although it maintains relatively robust partnerships with some 
European partners, including Germany, Spain, and Italy. Russia is the 
transition government's preferred partner, which is unfortunate for the 
people of Mali who suffer from the abuses of the Wagner Group. The 
transition government has also increasingly sought to expand 
partnerships with China, Iran, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, and Niger. We continuously engage our allies on the ground in 
Bamako as well as through capitals and in Washington to advocate for 
mutually beneficial outcomes.

    Question. Please provide a detailed breakdown of the foreign 
assistance and security cooperation programs have been suspended, 
terminated, or cleared to continue in Niger following the decision to 
apply restrictions under Section 7008 of annual SFOPS appropriations 
measures.

    Answer. Please see attachment of current programs for Niger that 
have been restricted as a result of the military coup. $29 million in 
assistance benefitting the government that is currently continuing 
under available notwithstanding authorities includes the provision of 
life-saving health programs. $138 million in assistance for the 
government of Niger remains suspended under section 7008, the majority 
of which are programs in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and military 
professionalization programs benefitting the Nigerien military. The 
further use of available authorities to continue certain assistance 
will depend on the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland 
taking steps to usher in civilian-led democratic government. 

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    Question. In your testimony, you indicated that in addition to 
applying Section 7008, the Administration has decided, as a matter of 
policy, to suspend additional foreign assistance and security 
cooperation for Niger. What programs and security cooperation 
activities, specifically, has the Administration suspended pursuant to 
a policy decision (as opposed to legal restrictions)?

    Answer. The United States has paused military cooperation with the 
Nigeriens and declined to use available authorities that would allow us 
to continue much of the restricted assistance pending actions by the 
National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland to make concrete steps 
toward ushering in civilian-led democratic governance. In some recent 
coups in West Africa, we used available authorities to continue certain 
assistance without interruption. We are taking a different approach in 
Niger and have not exercised such authorities in order to encourage 
progress on a transition.

    Question. Under 22 USC Sec. 2349aa, the State Department is 
authorized to provide anti-terrorism assistance to foreign law 
enforcement personnel ``notwithstanding any other provision of law that 
restricts assistance to foreign countries''--including Section 7008. In 
which post-coup countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger) has the 
State Department continued to administer ATA programs, including under 
the Department's Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) program? 
What is the projected or requested budget for such programs in each 
country in FY2023 and FY2024?

    Answer. In accordance with section 7008 of the annual 
appropriations act, the Department has suspended its foreign military 
assistance for the governments of Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and 
Niger. The Department is in limited cases relying on available 
notwithstanding authorities for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, 
to strengthen civilian counterterrorism institutions. This includes 
some CT bureau programs, including ATA, CTPF, TIP, and TSCTP 
programming. State is currently weighing FY23 funding in West Africa 
against global priorities.

    Question. Please describe Ambassador Hammer's official mandate and 
priorities assigned to him by Department leadership as Special Envoy 
for the Horn of Africa.

    Answer. Special Envoy Ambassador Mike Hammer continues to work to 
advance peace in Ethiopia and support efforts to achieve a diplomatic 
resolution to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute involving 
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In addition, on Sudan, Special Envoy Hammer 
is engaging international partners in the region, starting with our 
African partners from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
for East Africa (IGAD) and the African Union, as well as other 
international partners, like the European Union, to support 
accountability and chart a path forward for restoring democratic 
civilian governance, while mobilizing support for humanitarian needs.

    Question. Do you agree with my assessment that the United States 
needs a presidential special envoy to Sudan?

    Answer. The Department of State agrees that the conflict in Sudan 
requires an urgent and robust response, and we have an all-hands-on-
deck effort led by Secretary Blinken. Our Ambassador to Sudan, John 
Godfrey, is leading the Embassy team and is focused on engaging 
Sudanese civilians and senior representatives of the belligerent 
parties. We have recalled Ambassador Daniel Rubinstein back to duty to 
lead the U.S. delegation in Jeddah that is co-facilitating talks, along 
with Saudi Arabia and IGAD, participating on behalf of the AU, between 
the belligerent parties to establish ceasefires, press for unhindered 
access for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and institute 
confidence building measures enabling progress toward a cessation of 
hostilities. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer is 
engaging our international partners, with a focus on African and 
European partners.

    Question. When was the last Principals Meeting on Sudan?

    Answer. There have been frequent interagency meetings since the 
beginning of this conflict, including the Principals Committee, the 
Deputies Committee and other meetings. Stemming from this, Secretary 
Blinken and other senior officials are frequently engaged in diplomatic 
engagements to coordinate with regional and international partners, 
support civilian dialogue, and to press the two parties to establish a 
ceasefire, protect civilians, and allow unhindered humanitarian access.

    Question. In response to questions for the records I sent to Mr. 
Riley for his confirmation for U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, he 
``committed to regularly travelling to Somaliland and engaging with the 
Government of Somaliland.''
    Will you support Mr. Riley in his efforts to travel to Somaliland 
and engage with the Government of Somaliland in Hargeisa?

    Answer. Yes, if he is confirmed, I will support Mr. Riley's efforts 
to travel to Somaliland safely and engage with officials in Hargeisa 
within the framework of our single Somalia policy.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker

    Question. How can you leverage the tools in programs like USAID's 
Democracy Delivers Initiative to not only strengthen democratic systems 
but also provide access to meaningful economic resources?

    Answer. The Democracy Delivers Initiative focuses on countries 
experiencing a promising democratic opening--when there's an 
opportunity to enact democratic reforms, strengthen transparency and 
the rule of law, advance human rights and development, and deliver 
economic dividends--to help governments, civil society, and citizens 
seize the moment. This program brings together the development and 
diplomatic tools of the U.S. Government, together with contributions by 
other bilateral and multilateral donors, the private sector, and the 
philanthropic community to support countries experiencing a moment of 
democratic opportunity to implement and expand their reform agendas. At 
present, the Democracy Delivers Initiative countries in Africa are 
Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia.
    While no countries in the Sahel currently participate in the 
Democracy Delivers Initiative, the Department of State and USAID 
leverage other types of foreign assistance resources and engage across 
all sectors to support democratic governance and promote economic 
progress. We remain focused on working with our African partners and 
the people to address challenges and support democracy, which is the 
best foundation for development, social cohesion, prosperity, and 
stability in the Sahel and across the African continent.

    Question. Is there more the DFC and MCC could be doing to provide a 
comprehensive approach?

    Answer. MCC and DFC have robust, dynamic programs in Africa that 
are highly respected and sought after by African governments. We work 
closely with MCC and DFC at the leadership and working levels to share 
our foreign policy priorities so that we can optimize their work on the 
continent.
    MCC is actively working in 14 African countries with about $3.7 
billion in signed compact and threshold programs, and another estimated 
$2.3 billion in the developing pipeline. Passage of the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Candidate Country Reform Act would expand MCC's 
candidate pool to the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development's graduation threshold. Such a change would add countries 
to MCC's candidate pool, including some in Africa.
    DFC has $9.7 billion in exposure in Sub-Saharan Africa across more 
than 280 projects in 38 countries. The private-sector led projects DFC 
finances have a far-reaching impact--they are expanding access to 
lifesaving vaccines and other essential healthcare, building data 
centers and other critical infrastructure, helping vulnerable 
communities address the climate crisis, bolstering food security, and 
expanding access to electricity.
    DFC mobilizes private sector capital, bringing much needed 
investment dollars to impactful projects, along with the highest 
standards for doing business. These investments help support African 
economies and create economic opportunities for Africans across the 
continent--both of which are critical to a comprehensive approach to 
USG engagement with our partners in the Sahel and beyond.

    Question. What tools and methods are most effective against 
disinformation in the Sahel and West Africa? Can we do more?

    Answer. In West Africa, building capacity has proven one of our 
most effective counter-disinformation strategies. Exchange programs and 
in-country workshops provide reliable partners in host governments, 
media, and civil society with the tools to detect and counter 
disinformation.
    The United States and its partners must edge out competitor 
narratives by filling the communications space with positive messages 
that underscore our values, partnerships, and commitment to shared 
prosperity in the region. Our Missions in West Africa are doing heroic 
work with limited resources. With more resources, we can further erode 
our adversaries' capacity to dominate these fragile information spaces, 
while strengthening our partners' ability to counter disinformation.
    One example of this work is the U.S.-West Africa Tech Challenge 
that U.S. Embassy Abidjan and the Global Engagement Center (GEC) hosted 
with Cote d'lvoire's Ministry of Communication and Digital Economy in 
September 2023 to encourage innovative solutions to combat 
disinformation from violent extremist groups and reinforce USG 
initiatives under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote 
Stability.
    The two small businesses that won the challenge will develop 
products to respectively combat agricultural disinformation in rural 
Cote d'Ivoire and support free and fair elections in Nigeria, 
addressing violent extremist group tactics to spread disinformation and 
exploit socio-economic issues and local grievances.

    Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure that our 
embassies across the Sahel and West Africa are fully staffed?

    Answer. The Department continues to use increased incentives for 
service in historically difficult to staff (HDS) posts around the 
world, including service needs differentials? for extended service, 
along with hardship differentials, and prioritized assignments. 
Additionally, several initiatives are underway, including development 
of regional support models, to better ensure that we are providing 
posts across the region with adequate support. In the last year the 
Department has reformed incentives to better focus bidders' attention 
on the most difficult to staff posts.

    Question. Lack of adequate participation mechanisms for civil 
society results in missed opportunities for frank exchange of 
information and ideas about how to properly address the root causes of 
instability.
    What steps is the Biden administration taking to ensure that civil 
society perspectives, particularly from women and youth, are 
incorporated into decision making processes at the national and 
regional level, particularly as it relates to governance and timelines 
for transition to civilian rule in coup-affected countries?

    Answer. Through concerted diplomatic efforts and the provision of 
U.S. foreign assistance across Sub-Saharan Africa, we seek to promote 
respect for human rights, free and fair elections that reflect the will 
of the people, an active civil society, accountable and participatory 
governance, and access to justice for all. Our foreign assistance 
resources help empower and bolster the impact of civil society, with a 
particular focus on women, youth, and other marginalized populations.
    Specifically, U.S. foreign assistance supports efforts to ensure 
democratic transitions, as well as governance writ large, are inclusive 
and take into account the input of a broad swathe of civil society. 
This includes support for civil society participation in national 
dialogues as well as longer-term civil society capacity building and 
advocacy training. Additionally, we work across sectors, including 
efforts to ensure civil society plays a role in strategic planning in 
sectors such as wash, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health, 
education, and economic growth. Taken together, these efforts ensure 
civil society is capable of advocating for the needs of the people of 
their countries and their input is heard by government actors.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. What message do you believe was sent to the region by our 
decision to delay these coup determinations? Do you assess that 
regional damage was inflicted by that decision?

    Answer. We have made clear that we stand with the Nigerien people 
in their aspirations for democracy, prosperity, and stability. We did 
not want to conclude that a military coup had taken place while we 
believed there was still some chance to preserve the constitutional 
order, potentially including having Mohamed Bazoum continue to serve as 
President. We are continuing to support ECOWAS efforts to work with 
Niger to achieve a quick and credible return to democratic rule. We 
regret that regional and international efforts were not successful in 
preserving the constitutional order, including with respect to 
President Bazoum. We now assess that former President Bazoum has been 
deposed.

    Question. You have said that the delay on Niger's designation was 
due in part to a request from ECOWAS, to enable the regional body to 
take steps to restore President Bazoum to power. Do you believe the 
delay had any impact on ECOWAS' success, or lack thereof?

    Answer. No. We have engaged with ECOWAS at every step since the 
events of July 26. For example, immediately following these events, we 
worked closely with ECOWAS to support efforts to preserve the 
constitutional order in Niger. When the situation made it clear that 
there had been a military coup and President Bazoum was in fact 
deposed, we announced that we were applying Section 7008 of the annual 
Appropriations Act to the Government of Niger.

    Question. I also understand there was a hesitancy to issue a coup 
designation on Niger for fear of triggering Section 7008 restrictions. 
Congress included a national security waiver in Section 7008 to enable 
administrations to promptly designate coups when they occur, without 
jeopardizing our national security interests. If the Administration was 
concerned about the impact a designation on Niger would have on our 
national security, can you explain why a waiver was not utilized in the 
immediate aftermath of such an obvious military coup.

    Answer. We initiated a pause on assistance for the Government of 
Niger on August 5 consistent with the restrictions in section 7008. Our 
deliberations on whether there had been a military coup triggering 
Section 7008 of the annual Appropriations Act were tied to the facts, 
including whether there was a path to preserve constitutional order in 
Niger. We assessed that there had been a military coup in Niger once we 
concluded that President Bazoum had been deposed and there was no 
constitutional path forward. The waiver only applies to FY 2023 
appropriations, as well as to FY 2024 appropriations under the CR. Now 
that the restrictions of Section 7008 are in effect, we will consider 
whether use of a waiver is appropriate.

    Question. To what degree have ongoing security assistance 
challenges impacted U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel and 
West Africa? How is the Administration addressing these challenges to 
ensure the effectiveness of ongoing counterterrorism efforts while 
simultaneously dealing with the instability caused by military coups?

    Answer. The U.S. Government continues to pursue robust 
counterterrorism coordination with our partners in West Africa. 
Department of State counterterrorism programs build partner capacity to 
constrain terrorists' ability to move resources and fighters, conduct 
terrorism investigations and prosecutions, mitigate and respond to 
terrorist incidents, and counter violent extremism. In support of 
regional efforts to promote coup countries' return to democracy, we 
continue to provide much-needed civilian counterterrorism support to 
build stronger institutions. We are aligning this support with 
important investments in Coastal West Africa under the Global Fragility 
Act to bolster resilience and stability in at-risk countries bordering 
the Sahel to prevent the spread of instability across remaining 
democracies in the region.

    Question. Do you believe the growing number of military coups has 
enabled or promoted terrorist activity in the region?

    Answer. Violence has quantifiably increased since the coups d'etats 
in all three Sahel states, rising 46 percent since 2021. In Mali in 
particular, attacks on civilians rose 50 percent in 2022, compared to 
the previous year, and have risen a further 38 percent in 2023. While 
terrorist violence accounts for nearly half of attacks in Mali since 
2021, violence by the Malian armed forces or Wagner Group represented 
29 percent. In Niger, terrorist attacks have increased 43 percent in 
the 3 months since its coup, as compared to the same period in 2022.

    Question. Have you assessed a trend in post-coup states in the 
region moving closer to China, Russia, or Iran? If so, what steps is 
the Department taking to counter this trend?

    Answer. Russian, Iranian, and PRC activity on the African continent 
remain fluid. Russia has continued to exploit instability in states 
like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, including through disinformation 
tactics. Mali is an example where military governance has paved the way 
for Russian influence. Russia--through the Wagner Group--has been a 
primary supporter of Malian counterterrorism operations. These 
operations, however, have only increased violence in Mali and have not 
diminished the terrorist threat. The PRC seeks to export its political 
governance model, including in post-coup states. Gaining support for 
its approach to governance is an integral part of Beijing's strategy 
toward Africa, which the PRC views as the vanguard of its effort to 
consolidate the Global South around the creation of a Sino-centric 
world order. The Department of State's Global Engagement Center has 
been working on countering disinformation in the Sahel. We reassure our 
partners that strong, accountable, and democratic institutions--
sustained by a deep commitment to respect for human rights--remain the 
most reliable avenue to long-term peace and prosperity and remain the 
best way to counter instability and dehumanization of authoritarian 
rule.
    Iran continues to explore opportunities to proliferate weapons and 
build relationships in Africa, and the United States will continue to 
enforce sanctions on Iran and impose costs on those who contravene 
these sanctions.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to modify or 
update the existing interagency strategy on the Sahel in response to 
the rapid destabilization we've seen over the past few months?

    Answer. There is a fluid situation in the Sahel, and we constantly 
revisit our strategy considering changing dynamics. However, our 
principles have not changed. We remain focused on working with our 
African partners and the people to address challenges and support 
democracy, which is the best foundation for development, social 
cohesion, prosperity, and stability across the Sahel and the African 
continent.

                                  [all]