[Senate Hearing 118-249]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-249
INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 24, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-043 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Phee, Hon. Molly, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs,
United States Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 22
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 25
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator
Cory A. Booker................................................. 29
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator Tim
Scott.......................................................... 30
(iii)
INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL AND WEST
AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Shaheen, Coons,
Murphy, Kaine, Van Hollen, Risch, and Ricketts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
First let me share with my colleagues, some of us just got
back early this morning from a visit to the Middle East. Ten of
our colleagues were there. I was joined by Senator Coons and
Senator Booker of this Committee. The trip was headed by
Senator Graham. It was a bipartisan group, five Democrats, five
Republicans. Joining Senator Graham on the Republican side were
Senator Collins, Senators Thune, Sullivan, and Britt. Senators
Blumenthal and Reed joined on the Democratic side, so there
were 10 of us there.
Our visit to Israel was shocking. We saw firsthand the
brutality of Hamas. We saw that in the scars in the country. We
saw the videos. We saw the photos. We saw things we would never
thought we would ever see in our lifetime, as we have
characterized Hamas as ISIS. It is evil. What it did is
unspeakable.
We made it clear that we stand with Israel and the right to
defend themselves. We met with the families of the hostages. It
was not an easy meeting. The pain, the uncertainty, the fate of
their loved ones, all that weighed very heavily on us as we
were able to meet with the Israeli officials to try to
understand the game plan. We stressed that Israel has a right
to defend itself, and we need to do everything we can to
provide the humanitarian assistance and safe harbor for those
Palestinians who are trying to escape Hamas.
It was a difficult trip and it is difficult times. As we
were there, there were rockets and missiles being fired in
parts of Israel and in Gaza, and we know the situation is
deteriorating. We made it clear that the United States stands
strongly against any escalation of this conflict by the enemies
of Israel who would try to take advantage of this situation.
We also visited first the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was a
very encouraging visit. We were there because we know Hamas was
trying to end the normalization talks between the Saudis and
the Israelis. We made it clear, and in our conversations with
the Crown Prince, that that could not happen. We need to stay
focused first on the tragedies of Hamas, what it caused in
Israel, but to keep alive the normalization and integration of
the countries in the Middle East, and we have received positive
conversations with the Crown Prince.
I just really wanted to update our Committee that we
thought this visit was extremely important, underscoring the
importance of bipartisan response by the United States Congress
to the tragedies that are taking place in the Middle East.
From the Middle East to the subject of this hearing, the
governing crisis in West Africa and Sahel.
Five nations in the region are suffering coups since 2020.
This includes Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, and most
recently, Niger. Mali and Burkina Faso have actually had two
coups. At the same time, there has been an alarming increase in
terrorist attacks by militant Islamist organizations.
Today we are going to examine this recent wave of coups and
violence and what it means for U.S. policy. I welcome Assistant
Secretary Phee. I want to thank you for the work that you and
your team are doing in this area. Your efforts to support this
region as it responds to the situations in West Africa and the
Sahel are vital.
The challenges are great, but we must acknowledge the
current trajectory is grim. It requires a critical evaluation
of our policies. Congress demanded that when we passed the
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act.
The junta leaders justified their coups by pointing to
their elected governments' failure to improve security, but
they themselves have failed to deliver as well. In both Mali
and Burkina Faso, security has sharply deteriorated. Even as
civilian deaths have skyrocketed, incidents in Niger are on the
rise, as well.
The spiraling security situation is already impacting
coastal West African nations. Attacks in Ghana, Togo, and Benin
are increasing. Sudan and Gabon have both had coups.
Instability now stretches from the Red Sea to the Atlantic.
Why? What is driving this dynamic?
It is hard to say our security assistance has been
effective in the Sahel or in countries in West Africa. We
certainly have very little to show in terms of improved
security, stability, or stronger democratic institutions, and
quite frankly, there is an uncomfortable truth in all of this.
Across the Sahel, the United States trained militias and
militaries responsible for the coups. We have trained the very
people overthrowing civilian governments. It is critical that
we take a brutally honest look at our approach to date.
Assistant Secretary Phee, I would like to hear your
thoughts. Is it time for the United States to change its
strategy? Is our security assistance helping or leading or
contributing to the negative outcomes? How should we adjust
these policies?
We also need to be consistent in our response to coups in
Africa. I understand one size does not fit all, but it is
important for the United States to take a principled stance
when coups occur. We need to lead with our values as we try to
advance an agenda of good governance in the region. I think we
need to make our position crystal clear: military takeovers of
civilian-led governments are coups. We should not mince words.
Anyone engaged in coups should be personally sanctioned. The
failure to sanction, a policy shift that has clearly taken
place here in our government, sends the wrong message.
The presence of the Russian Wagner mercenary group presents
an additional serious threat. The impact of Wagner's operation
in Mali have been disastrous for civilians. Wagner and the
Malian military stand accused of massacring as many as 500
people in Moura in 2022. Moscow is making overtures in the
military regimes in Burkina Faso and Niger. Russian expansion,
coupled with the expulsion of the French and United Nations
peacekeepers in Mali, could trigger chaos that would be
difficult to recover from.
I know we do not want to lose ground to Russia or China,
but we should not fall into the trap of giving free passes to
authoritarian and military regimes for the sake of Great Power
competition. We made that mistake too often during the Cold
War, mistakes for which our foreign relations still suffer with
some countries today. I hope you will speak to how we are
responding to these challenges.
I understand that ultimately the course of history in other
countries is up to the people who live there. However, we have
the responsibility to at least do no harm through our approach,
and to stand in solidarity along with millions of Africans
whose democratic aspirations of living in a dictatorial regime,
just as we supported the people of Eastern Europe for decades
after World War II in their fight for democracy.
Assistant Secretary Phee, we have lots to discuss. I look
forward to that discussion. This has been a hearing that we had
planned. It is an extremely important subject. We hope we can
have a frank discussion during this hearing.
I now turn to our distinguished Ranking Member, Senator
Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Assistant Secretary Phee, for being here with us today. All of
us here know that you deal with a portfolio that is difficult,
troubling, which is a gross understatement, I suspect, but you
deal with it. It is unfortunate you are here today alone
without the support of representatives from USAID and the
Department of Defense. It is a difficult task to address all of
these issues in the Sahel without these perspectives, but here
we are.
There are concerning trends, much of which has been
outlined by the Chairman here in the last few minutes, that we
are witnessing in the region and the wider continent--a decline
in democracy, challenges in U.S. diplomatic engagement, both
bilaterally and multilaterally, and the effectiveness of our
regional policy, if a clear one exists, including our
incentives and deterrents, some of which have been outlined by
the Chairman this morning. Global events have accelerated these
changes, including Russia's war in Ukraine, interference with
countries like China, Russia, and Iran, and the COVID-19
pandemic. We have had seven coups in Africa--seven coups--
during the years of the Biden administration. Things are not
working.
The ongoing significant changes in the Sahel and West
Africa affect our national security and that of our regional
and global allies. The primary threat is Islamic terrorism.
Large parts of Mali and Burkina Faso are controlled by groups
linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and terrorist groups
are expanding their attacks on governments and populations in
many countries.
In countries such as Mali, the presence of Wagner's
mercenary is particularly concerning. This group is known for
severe human rights abuses, spreading false information, and
unjustly taking local resources. Since Prigozhin's demise,
Wagner's activities in Mali have become a more significant
threat to the United States national security, boosting the
Russian state capacity for harmful global operations while
providing questionable security gains in return.
Many Sahel and Western African governments are unstable and
lack public support. In areas controlled by military juntas,
citizens' opinions are wholly ignored, and the government
merely enforces military orders. The remaining democracies in
the region struggle to meet the needs of their expanding youth
populations, often fall short in combatting corruption and
cannot handle security and economic challenges independently.
That is not the whole story. These challenges make it
difficult for Africa to prepare for upcoming threats like
coups, terrorist attacks, election issues, or food crises, and
not the least of which is their burgeoning population over the
next decades.
Secretary Phee, the last time you spoke to this Committee
about the Administration's Sahel policy, you highlighted a 5-
year interagency strategy designed to address the region's
challenges and better the lives of its people. You mentioned in
your written testimony that this strategy would adapt to
significant changes in context. However, given what has
occurred in the Sahel and West Africa over the past 14 months,
that strategy clearly is not working.
I believe the fundamental assumptions and approach require
significant revision. The Department must prioritize resources
for the region and strengthen our diplomacy. When supporting
our African partners and implementing regional solutions, we
should lead, not merely be an active bystander.
The leadership includes coordinating with our European
allies as well. We have seen the Department demonstrate it can
prioritize in times of crisis, like in Ukraine and most
recently in Israel. We must similarly prioritize the crisis
unfolding in the Sahel and West Africa or we are going to
continue to face the consequences.
Finally, I am concerned about the Administration's unclear
policy on Sudan. I have asked President Biden to appoint a
special envoy for Sudan. Given the many issues you and the
Africa Bureau handle, we need a seasoned diplomat singularly--
singularly--devoted to Sudan to steer U.S. policy, assist the
Sudanese people, coordinate with regional partners, and handle
complex diplomacy to stabilize the nation and foster genuine
democracy.
I also encourage the Department to move quickly to make an
official determination about the ongoing atrocities in Darfur
and other areas of the country. Such a designation would go a
long way in making clear to the world where we stand on the
killings and human rights abuses occurring in Sudan.
Again, I fully recognize that dealing with the issues in
the region is a heavy lift. I hope you can point out ways in
which Congress can help you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Our witness today, Ambassador Molly Phee, is Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs. Ambassador Phee has led
a long and distinguished career in the State Department before
being sworn in as Assistant Secretary in September 2021. She
served as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan
Reconciliation. She was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from
2015 to 2017. She served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in
Ethiopia, Chief of Staff in the Office of Special Envoy for
Sudan and South Sudan, and as Acting Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations, among other positions that she
served.
Thank you for being here. We look forward to your
testimony. Your statement will be made part of the record. We
ask you summarize in about 5 minutes so we can get engaged in
Committee questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. MOLLY PHEE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I start by thanking
you and your colleagues for traveling to the Middle East. All
of us are concerned about what is happening there and fearful
of global impacts, so thank you for your service in advancing
our interests and values. Thanks to the both of you for
welcoming me here today. I will try and answer some of your
questions in my prepared testimony and through dialogue.
The urgent challenges in Ukraine and the Middle East at
times overshadow the U.S. partnership with Africa, but we must
prepare for the future. By 2050, one in four people on the
planet will be an African. The talents today of more than 1
billion Africans already enrich the world's culture, politics,
and economy. The continent is the source of critical minerals
such as cobalt. The Congo River basin is the largest carbon
sink in the world. This is why the strategy of the Biden-Harris
administration recognizes Africa as a major geopolitical force
and why we seek to elevate African voices in institutions such
as the U.N. Security Council, the G-20, and the IMF.
The sub-region of the Sahel is integral to our relationship
with the continent. The coups that have occurred recently in
Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and now Niger illustrate the
democratic regression that threatens not only the people of the
Sahel, but their neighbors and our partners in coastal West
Africa.
Allow me to address the drivers of political instability
and what the United States has done and could do. The primary
problem is weak governance. Every country where a coup has
taken place had previously experienced military takeovers. Many
of these governments had engaged in corrupt practices, failed
to provide basic services, and ignored democratic values by
extending term limits or disregarding human rights. Such
practices tested the presumption that democracy delivers, but
context matters, too. Historical legacy, enduring poverty,
climate change, and a decade of escalating terrorist violence
further weakened the performance and resilience of Sahelian
democracies. Atrocities by the Islamic State and the branch of
al Qaeda known as JNIM, and predations by criminal armed
groups, have placed unrelenting pressure on governments and
civilians.
Military rulers point to the supposed failure of democracy
to justify their actions. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, military
rule does not improve people's lives. In fact, military rule
leaves populations poorer and less secure. The number of deaths
from political violence increased by 150 percent in Mali and 77
percent in Burkina Faso in 2022. Violence targeting civilians
in Mali increased by 38 percent this year, nearly a third of
these incidents perpetrated by Malian security forces or the
Wagner Group. Violent incidents in Niger--which had been
declining significantly due to President Bazoum's leadership
and the partnership between Nigerien security forces and U.S.
and European forces--rose by 42 percent in the month after the
coup.
How to foster a return to democracy? Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, we are considering and adjusting based on these events.
In the case of Niger, we are working closely with the regional
organization ECOWAS. The African Union and Africa's regional
economic commissions are essential partners in advancing peace
and democracy. That is why, although we promptly paused the
majority of U.S. assistance for Niger after the coup, we
delayed at the request of our African partners the formal
assessment that the outcome constituted a coup while they
sought to restore President Bazoum to office. Acting Deputy
Secretary Victoria Nuland traveled to Niamey in August to try
and convince the generals to restore constitutional order. I
later traveled to West Africa to consult on how to encourage a
quick and credible restoration of democratic rule. Secretary
Blinken met with ECOWAS Foreign Ministers at the recent U.N.
General Assembly to propose a phased approach to resuming U.S.
assistance based on concrete actions to return the country to
democratic rule. Committed to the Nigerien people, the United
States has maintained humanitarian and basic health and food
assistance. Swiftly resolving the crisis in Niger could serve
as a positive alternative, and we are now actively encouraging
negotiations between the junta and ECOWAS.
How to prevent coups? With the support of Congress and the
Global Fragility Act, we are helping countries in coastal West
Africa to strengthen governance by programming such as
increased engagement in historically marginalized communities.
We are also working to implement the African Democratic and
Political Transitions initiative as well as the 21st Century
Partnership for African Security, programs launched by
President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.
There is a perception that we spend too much on security,
but in the past five fiscal years, from 2018 to 2022, the State
Department provided approximately $2 billion in bilateral
assistance to the Sahel, and of that, less than 15 percent was
for security assistance.
Adequate staffing is essential, so I ask you to support the
Administration's budget request and to confirm ambassadors. We
are now missing ambassadors in Nigeria, Gabon, and the African
Union.
Thank you again for scheduling this important discussion.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Molly Phee
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the crisis in the Sahel and the U.S. role in
promoting democracy, economic development, and security in West Africa.
The urgent challenges in Ukraine and the Middle East at times
overshadow the U.S. partnership with Africa. But we must prepare for
the future. By 2050, one in four people on the planet will be an
African. The talents of more than 1 billion Africans already enrich the
world's culture, politics, and economy. The continent is the source of
critical minerals such as cobalt. The Congo River basin is the largest
carbon sink in the world. This is why the strategy of the Biden-Harris
administration recognizes Africa as a major geopolitical force and why
we seek to elevate African voices in institutions such as the UN
Security Council, the G-20, and the IMF.
The sub-region of the Sahel is integral to our relationship with
the continent. The coups that have occurred recently in Mali, Guinea,
Burkina Faso, and now Niger illustrate the democratic regression that
threatens not only the people of the Sahel but their neighbors and our
partners in coastal west Africa.
Allow me to address the drivers of political instability and what
the United States has done and could do. A primary problem is weak
governance. Every country where a coup has taken place had previously
experienced military takeovers. Many of these governments had engaged
in corrupt practices, failed to provide basic services, and ignored
democratic values by extending term limits or disregarding human
rights. Such practices tested the presumption that democracy delivers.
But context matters, too. Historical legacy, enduring poverty, climate
change, and a decade of escalating terrorist violence further weakened
the performance and resilience of Sahelian democracies. Atrocities by
the Islamic State and the branch of al-Qaeda known as JNIM, and
predations by criminal armed groups, have placed unrelenting pressure
on governments and civilians.
Military rulers point to the supposed failure of democracy to
justify their actions. But military rule does not improve people's
lives. In fact, military rule leaves populations poorer and less
secure. The number of deaths from political violence increased by 150
percent in Mali and 77 percent in Burkina Faso in 2022. Violence
targeting civilians in Mali increased by 38 percent this year, nearly a
third of these incidents perpetrated by Malian security forces or the
Wagner Group. Violent incidents in Niger--which had been declining due
to President Bazoum's leadership and the partnership between Nigerien
and U.S. and European forces--rose by 42 percent in the month after the
coup.
How to foster a return to democracy? In the case of Niger, we are
working with the regional organization ECOWAS. The African Union and
Africa's regional economic commissions are essential partners in
advancing democracy and peace. That is why--although we promptly paused
the majority of U.S. assistance for Niger after the coup--we delayed at
the request of our African partners the formal assessment that the
outcome constituted a coup while they sought to restore President
Bazoum to office. Acting Deputy Secretary Toria Nuland traveled to
Niamey in August to try and convince the generals to restore
constitutional order. I later traveled to west Africa to consult on how
to encourage a quick and credible restoration of democratic rule.
Secretary Blinken met with ECOWAS Foreign Ministers at the recent UN
General Assembly to propose a phased approach to resuming U.S.
assistance based on concrete actions to return the country to
democratic rule. Committed to the Nigerien people, the United States
has maintained humanitarian and basic health and food assistance.
Swiftly resolving the crisis in Niger could serve as a positive
alternative, and we are now encouraging negotiations between the junta
and ECOWAS.
How to prevent coups? With the support of Congress and the Global
Fragility Act, we are helping countries in coastal west Africa to
strengthen governance by programming such as increased engagement in
historically marginalized communities. We are also working to implement
the African Democratic and Political Transitions initiative, or ADAPT,
as well as the 21st Century Partnership for Africa Security, or 21PAS--
programs launched by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.
There is a perception that we spend too much on security, but in
fiscal years 2018-2022, the State Department provided approximately $2
billion in bilateral assistance to the Sahel. Of that, about less than
15 percent was for security assistance.
Adequate staffing is essential so I ask you to support the
Administration's budget request and to confirm Ambassadors. We are now
missing Ambassadors in Nigeria, Gabon, and the African Union, among
other posts.
Thank you again for scheduling this important discussion to renew
our shared commitment to advance democracy, peace and security as the
cornerstones of a successful U.S.-Africa partnership.
The Chairman. Well, once again, thank you for being here
and the work that you are doing. We will have 5-minute rounds.
I want to start by challenging the delay in Niger on the
determination. You said you did that because you were trying to
restore the deposed leader. The coup occurred on July 26. It
was 2 and a half months later before the declaration of coup
was made.
The delay did not work. Some of us think it may have shown
the military authorities that the consequences of a coup are
not going to be felt. They look at the fact that we have not
imposed sanctions on any of the individuals involved in coups,
which is, to me, a change in our previous policy. In Gambon you
just announced, as I understand, last night a determination of
coup that occurred on August 30. That was a 2-month delay.
To me it is giving the wrong signals, looking at the number
of coups we have seen in this region, that the consequences
will not be there, so tell me why we are not considering
sanctions. I understand Europe is. Why are we not considering
sanctions against those who have allowed these coups to occur?
Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, I welcome and respect your
perspective. Let me address both Niger and Gabon.
Our friends and partners in ECOWAS and coastal West Africa,
including the leaders of Ghana, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and
Nigeria, all asked us to delay making our formal assessment
because they were fully committed to trying to restore
President Bazoum to power, and they thought that our statement
would derail their efforts. We were trying to support the sub-
region in its leadership and efforts to promote democracy and
to promote restoration of democracy. That is the reason for the
delay, because they asked us. They asked me. They asked
Secretary Blinken. They asked Acting Deputy Secretary Nuland.
In Gabon, last week Senior Director for Africa Judd
Devermont and Deputy Assistant Secretary Melanie Higgins from
the Africa Bureau, traveled to talk with the coup leaders there
about a restoration of democracy, and we announced the 7008
designation following those consultations.
In both cases, in contrast to how we responded to the
problem in Mali, we actively engaged directly with the
leadership of the region and with the leadership of the
generals who had seized power to tell them they had a choice.
The better choice, as described by the statistics I reported to
you on the increase in violent incidents in Mali and Burkina
Faso is to get back to a democratic path and to be able to
resume their partnership with the United States and others in
the international community to help develop their economies,
provide stability, and progress their governance.
That is why there was a delay in both of those cases. We
tried to engage directly with the leaders to try and force a
different path, and we also were responding to the requests and
pleas from our allies.
I want to assure you that we continuously look at options
for sanctions, but in the current approach in which we are
trying to direct the leaders back to a path of democratic
transition, that is factor in the assessment.
The Chairman. It seems like other than Mali dealing with
those associated with the Wagner Group, none of the others have
been even considered for sanctions. This seems like a shift in
policy that, in the past, have made it clear that there will be
a consequence. I do not see that in our policy today.
Ms. Phee. I believe there have been consequences because we
have suspended assistance----
The Chairman. But you have not imposed any sanctions.
Ms. Phee. No, sir, but in the case of Niger, we have not
only suspended the assistance captured by Section 7008, but we
have expanded the freeze to include assistance and cooperation
not captured by the law. We are actually doing more than you
have asked us to do because we believe that our engagement was
very positive in Niger.
The Chairman. In Niger, we see that they have requested the
exit of other countries' military presence. We have a military
presence in Niger. Tell me why it is important for us to
maintain our military presence in that country.
Ms. Phee. In 2022, according to data collected by reputable
sources, there were approximately 5,000 violent incidents in
Mali and 4,000 violent incidents in Burkina Faso. In the first
6 months in Niger, there were only 450. The violent incidents
had declined from about a third since 2021, and civilian
casualties were declining. That is a result of the sacrifices
of Nigerien security forces, the role of the United States and
European partners, and our programming to strengthen the
conduct of security forces, including the police and the
gendarme and the judicial sector in Niger.
It was the leadership of President Bazoum to talk to
marginalized communities. We were making a positive difference.
We believe the Nigerien leadership now recognizes that that was
a positive difference. They have said they want to remain a
partner with us, and we have said we cannot remain a partner
with you unless you get on a serious, credible path back to
democratic transition.
The Chairman. In short, what would happen if we removed our
troops?
Ms. Phee. As Senator Risch pointed out, Ranking Member
Risch pointed out, it would be preferable if the military were
here to address that themselves. However, as I have described
to you, we believe that we have made a significant difference
in Niger. I also want to tell you that our partners in coastal
West Africa believe our presence is important to them and to
their security, and they are quite apprehensive about a
scenario in which the French were gone and then we would leave
as well.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, when can
we expect that the State Department is going to make an
atrocities determination for Sudan? I think we can note that
the U.K. came out with a definitive statement, calling
atrocities in Darfur ethnic cleansing last week, and there is
no shortage of information about the crimes being committed
against civilians in Darfur, Khartoum, and other parts of
Sudan.
When can we expect the State Department to make a
determination?
Ms. Phee. Senator Risch, the Office of Global Criminal
Justice is actively reviewing the crimes that have been taking
place in Darfur right now, and I expect that they, in the near
future, will be able to make a recommendation to the Secretary.
We asked them to look at that early on. We have made public
statements about our concern, and we are working in Geneva with
the Human Rights Council on these matters, including
successfully seeking a Commission of Inquiry.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. To really answer the
question, could you try to narrow that down a little bit more?
We know that, like I say, U.K. acted last week. It seems to me
we could be further along than where we are.
Ms. Phee. I am trying to be very careful as someone
responsible for policy, not to intervene in the legal review. I
know that Beth Van Schaack and her team are closely and
actively looking at this. I am sorry. I defer to their
judgment, but I expect it to be soon. I will relay to them your
concern and desire for ----
Senator Risch. I assume you are interested in this also.
Ms. Phee. I am absolutely interested. I, in fact, asked
them to undertake this review. Just to be careful not to affect
their legal deliberation, I just wanted you to understand it is
their authority to make that decision.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. If you pass along all of
our concerns, that may be helpful to you, and maybe you could
get back to us with what you find out in that regard. I would
appreciate it.
Help me out here. How is the State Department working
within the interagencies, namely with the Department of Defense
and the National Security Council, to address the growing
challenges including related to our counterterrorism efforts in
the Sahel and West Africa? I know you have addressed that
briefly, but I wonder if you could drill down on that a little
bit for us please.
Ms. Phee. Absolutely. As I have described, we have had
important programs, not only what the military has been doing,
but what the State Department has been doing in Niger--our
Counterterrorism Bureau, our Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law, my own bureau, the Africa Bureau, in our support for
civilian security assistance. We believe we were making a very
positive impact in Niger.
We have suspended those activities because of the coup, and
we have told the authorities in Niger that our partnership was
making a difference, and if they would like to resume that
partnership they need to make changes.
Niger has a history of coups. As I described, all of the
countries where coups have taken place were vulnerable because
they had experienced coups before. In Niger, they have a
tradition of the military passing power back to the civilians
often within a relatively short time frame, such as 1 year.
That is what we are trying to do in order to address the
counterterrorism concerns in Niger.
In coastal West Africa, through the programming under our
Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the same
State Department offices I have described as well as our
cooperation with the Defense Department and the intelligence
community means we are trying to help those countries have more
capability, both in the security area as well as in the
governance and development area so that they are more resilient
in responding to the terrorist threat from the Sahel.
Senator Risch. How do those countries respond to you when
you talk to them about the not very good situation with the
coup for changing the governments as opposed to a nice clean
election that the people could have a say in? How do they
respond to you on that?
Ms. Phee. I think it is really important that both the
African Union and the Regional Economic Commissions--in the
case of West Africa, ECOWAS--very strongly believe in their
protocols and in their policies and in their conduct that coups
and irregular changes of constitutional order are not good for
the people of Africa, and they speak forcefully about it. In
the case of Niger, ECOWAS has imposed very strong sanctions on
Niger. They have cut off electricity, they have closed the
borders, and they have also frozen the regional currency,
Niger's access to the regional currency.
They tell us that, in Niger, for example, they call it one
coup too many. That is why, Mr. Chairman, we were trying to
respect their request to us. We were trying to support them in
their efforts to advocate for democracy and our shared values.
They do also, when we spoke to them about what our options
are--for example, one option is to just terminate our
relationship in Niger and depart--they expressed a lot of
concern about that option in coastal West Africa because, as I
said, again, from their perspective they are fighting some of
our enemies--ISIS, AQ, the Wagner Group--and they would like
our partnership to help them deal with those challenges.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
have got a couple more questions, but I will submit them for
the record if that is okay.
The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Assistant Secretary Phee, for being here this morning.
In your opening statement you ended by talking about the
importance of having personnel on the ground who could help in
these countries, and I just want to point out--and this is
really not for the State Department as much as it is for my
colleagues--that in Africa alone there are 11 vacant
ambassadorial posts, including, as you mentioned, the African
Union. Burkina Faso, while it has an ambassador there now, I
understand that ambassador is on their way out and the new
ambassador has been nominated, but still has not been approved.
When we are not there, we cannot compete with China and
Russia. Can you talk about how the absence of U.S. ambassadors
is affecting your ability to do your job and our ability to
support democratic governance in countries?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. You probably said it better
than I can. We have a unique system where the Secretary
recommends, the President selects and nominates, and the Senate
confirms. That gives the voice of an American ambassador
weight. It gives us influence. It makes us more effective. When
we are missing that voice, we are diminished in all of our
efforts.
There is also an internal impact. A strong leader attracts
staff and is able to engage in the interagency more
effectively.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to have
joined Chairman Cardin on his HARM Act, to designate the Wagner
Group as a foreign terrorist organization. It is clear that we
are still seeing Russia engage in the Sahel and try to partner
with anti-democratic leaders there. We also know that there is
a real impact on what is happening in Ukraine and that war on
African nations.
What is our ability to track and rebut Russian information
operations, because right now they are winning the information
war in most of these African countries on who is responsible
for the food shortages that they are experiencing and the
rising costs.
Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting the challenge and the
deleterious effects of Russian disinformation and
misinformation. This is something our African partners also
express great concern about.
Our Global Engagement Center is actively working to help us
be more effective in working with partners on the ground, so
making sure accurate information is available to independent
sources in the media and in civil society, making sure they
have the correct information, and making sure they have a voice
to share that information, but it remains a very difficult
problem as it is here.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate the work of the Global
Engagement Center. I am a big fan, but clearly, they are not
accomplishing the task. Is the challenge that they do not have
enough resources? Is the challenge that there is not enough
coordination? Because we are still losing that battle.
Ms. Phee. I do not think it is a problem of coordination,
and of course more resources are always welcome. I would
welcome more resources for my public diplomacy sections, for
example, and embassies in the region. I think it is genuinely a
tough problem. Russia devotes a lot of effective resources to
this effort. I do not think it is a coincidence that they have
focused their efforts in Francophone Africa. They are trying to
exploit the complicated French colonial history. I think
opportunities like this, Senator, where we can speak openly
about this problem and provide the republics of Africa the real
truth about what is happening if Wagner comes to your country
are one way we can continue to address the challenge.
Senator Shaheen. Well, tomorrow Senator Ricketts and I are
going to chair a hearing on the Black Sea region, which
obviously has the critical connection to what is happening in
Africa. What can we do to better engage with our partners in
the Black Sea region to help address the information problem we
have got in Africa?
Ms. Phee. The Ukrainians have been very active in trying to
reach out and speak to African leaders and African publics, and
continuing to encourage that approach, I think, would be
helpful.
I think when we think about the challenges in the Sahel as
broadly for Africa, sort of the triple whammy of COVID, the
loss of fertilizer, the loss of grains, the increase in
petroleum prices, the increase in inflation, it has really
damaged the ability of African governments to help support
their constituents. That is why in the Administration's
supplemental request you will see a request for some small
assistance and some authorities that would leverage more money
for the IMF and World Bank to make them better able to help
Africans deal with this economic crisis.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time, but I would
just encourage us to recognize that the Black Sea region and
what is happening is a lot more than just what is happening in
Ukraine, and to reach out to our partners in Romania and
Moldova and Turkey, and even in Georgia, where they understand
very directly what is happening and why it is causing the food
insecurity and the rising costs. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Assistant Secretary, for being here. I would like to follow up
on the Chairman's questions with regard to sanctions. My
understanding is the European Union countries created a
framework for sanctions that would target certain entities or
individuals, freeze assets, hand out travel bans, that sort of
thing. You also mentioned ECOWAS actually did implement a
number of pretty restrictive sanctions such as cutting off
electricity.
Do the European countries, are they also holding off on
these sanctions? Because they have established a framework, but
they are not sanctions yet. Are they also holding off on doing
the sanctions in deference to the ECOWAS countries' concerns
about trying to get the junta in Niger to give up power and
turn it back over to civilians?
Ms. Phee. Yes. I think there are different ways to consider
what sort of economic or other pressure we put on juntas, for
example, and in this instance the EU has previously provided
direct budget assistance to Niger, and they ended that direct
budget assistance following the coup.
Senator Ricketts. Sorry. Would that be the equivalent of
what we did with the 7008?
Ms. Phee. Yes. Similar. We do not provide direct budget
assistance, but ending your aid, and that has also had a big
economic impact on the situation in Niger.
Senator Ricketts. Are you concerned, and I understand
again, I heard your reasonings earlier about why you are
holding off on the sanctions, but are you concerned this is
sending the wrong message to other nations, to other African
nations, where the governments may be under the threat of a
coup?
Ms. Phee. I think it is extremely important what you are
saying, and I hear you. As I said, I think there are multiple
ways to put pressure. I believe the economic pressure that we
have placed on Niger and other governments is significant and
profound. They desire, they have told us, for example, the
resumption of our security assistance and cooperation. Those
are factors that seem to us to be very persuasive in our
negotiations, but I hear you on the travel restrictions, which
we could do in terms of sanctions on individuals.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you. I will switch topics a little
bit. You mentioned a little bit about the security, how much we
have provided, but also in other areas as well, obviously, our
approach to build up the militaries in different countries, to
fight terrorists, training and equipping local forces. Over the
past decade the U.S. has spent about $500 million to build up
Niger's security forces to target terrorism.
Obviously this is very important, but there is also the
criticism now that the forces that we trained were part of the
coup that replaced the civilian government. Are we somehow
missing the boat here with regard to our strategy that we are
training up these militaries and then they are responsible for
participating in these coups? It is not just us. It is the
French and other European countries' counterterrorism efforts
as well.
Can you talk a little bit about that criticism? Is that a
fair criticism? What can we do to really mitigate the
opportunity for us to train these troops and then have them
participate in the coups?
Ms. Phee. I want to say that we all share the
disappointment that military leaders with whom we have worked
would make a decision to support a coup. I do not know
necessarily that that is fully representative of the large
program that DoD runs, particularly the military training
program. They trained tens of thousands, and of course they are
better placed than I to discuss this, and generally speaking
have positive results in terms of increased
professionalization, increased respect for human rights, and
increased respect for civil-military relations.
I am not sure that some of these exceptional, spectacular,
exceptional actions are representative of the program as a
whole.
I do believe that many times we have very productive
relations with military leaders with whom we have engaged and
with whom we have trained. It is certainly something we should
review.
Senator Ricketts. Are our efforts too narrowly focused on
counterterrorism here and training of the militaries, or do we
need to change our strategy with regard to how we do this in
these countries to avoid these coups?
Ms. Phee. I think our strategy, which is true also
globally, not just in Africa, is to understand that when you
have a problem of political legitimacy because of weak
governance and the aggravation from this terrorist threat that
the root cause is the political problem, but it cannot be
resolved easily in an environment where the terrorist threat is
so great.
I actually think it is just hard. We have seen this in
Afghanistan. We have seen this in Iraq. We have the best
military in the world. We have really good impacts on managing
security threats. The harder, tougher work is helping work with
governments, helping work with economic development, which is
also hard to accomplish when you are under a terrorist threat.
It is a different type of human endeavor that I think
requires a long investment.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Risch. Thank you in particular, Mr. Chairman, for
helping organize, focus, and lead our recent trip to the Middle
East that I think, as you said in your introduction, was very
productive and critical at this time. Thank you for holding a
full committee hearing on the Sahel.
The Sahel is one of the critical areas in the world where
the forces of chaos, whether it is Wagner or jihadists or other
sources of chaos, frankly, are on the march against the forces
of stability, democracy, and development. I am disappointed
that we do not have representatives of our military and USAID
here as well. Assistant Secretary Phee, thank you for your
engagement, your hard work, your leadership in this area.
To the point that Senator Ricketts was just asking, I think
we need to stay on this and press both how the intelligence
failure happened in Niger that we did not know that folks we
had trained and we were very closely integrated with were about
to overthrow the duly elected President Bazoum, and to then ask
some tough questions about our path forward, given the
departure of a critical security partner in the region, given
the very urgent calls we are hearing from democratically-
elected Presidents, like Akufo-Addo of Ghana, who has over and
over pressed for more priority to be placed by our military in
security in the region, and then to make sure that we have a
focused, coordinated strategy for defense, development, and
diplomacy.
This is a region--more people have died in terrorist
attacks in West Africa in the last 5 years than the rest of the
world combined, and Wagner sees an opening and is taking it and
exploiting it. The last supplemental request included funding
specifically to counter Wagner's influence in West Africa. It
is not in the current supplemental. I hope we will consider
adding some focused resources for security and development work
in partnership with diplomacy.
As you said, Assistant Secretary, we have, after 10 weeks,
reached a coup designation, I think long overdue, but I
understand the reasons why, in consultation with ECOWAS and
with the remaining democratically-elected leaders in the
region, that you were holding open space for a transition back
to democracy, specifically in Niger. It is partly why we gave
the Administration flexibility in 7008 waiver authority in the
SFOPS bill this past year.
Could you just be specific about whether there are now
clear conditions for the junta under which full security
partnership and development assistance can be restored, and
where we are on that path? I am concerned about President
Bazoum's security, and I am concerned about losing the progress
that you described, that we were making towards reducing the
number of terrorist attacks and improving security and
stability in Niger when this coup unexpectedly happened.
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. As I have discussed here, we
have discussed with our ECOWAS partners, and Secretary Blinken
talked directly to them, about how we could combine our efforts
so we have leverage, our assistance and cooperation, the
sanctions that they imposed, and to work with the junta on a
package of actions they would take and actions we would take
reciprocally.
Those discussions are initial, I would say, at this stage.
We are encouraging them. We have made very clear we will not be
able to resume the partnership that is so important to both
sides, I think, and to our neighbors, without action on their
side. Those discussions are underway and not ripe for public
discussion.
Senator Coons. There is something like $500 million in
assistance to Niger that is now hanging in the balance. The
MCC, roughly $300 million compact that has been suspended, $200
million at least in assistance that has been suspended. It is
my hope you will work with Congress on plans for reprogramming.
As you know, Senator Graham and I have worked for years on the
Global Fragility Act, which has been referenced here. I am very
disappointed at how this and previous Administration have
chosen to prioritize regions and countries that I do not think
fit the framing of that law, but coastal West Africa
demonstrably does.
I hope that we will work together to strengthen your voice
in the interagency, to priority security assistance for coastal
West Africa, and I would be interested in your comments on what
we can do to support the use of the Global Fragility Act in
this region, particularly in the coastal region that I think is
now really under dramatic threat as a result of this series of
coups and the loss of a stability partnership across the core
of the Sahel.
Ms. Phee. My colleague, Michael Heath, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for West Africa, was just in Benin last
week, meeting with U.S. ambassadors in the region in countries
where the Global Fragility Act is being implemented. They
welcome, and our partners in coastal West Africa welcome, those
resources. As we move into the second year, Senator, I hope we
are going to be in the position because metrics is a big part
of that program, to give you updates.
We are also talking with AFRICOM about how to increase our
support to those governments in managing the threat, which they
had originally been focused on the threat from the Gulf of
Guinea. Now they are looking north because of the pressure from
the Sahel.
We are having wide-ranging conversations with them in
coastal West Africa and with our partners in the interagency to
see how we can do more, and I am confident that we are going to
be in a position to provide the additional support.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. I would welcome a
classified briefing at some point, Mr. Chairman, on the
intersection between DoD, USAID, and State, and on the ongoing
threat to stability posed by Wagner, by jihadists, by poor
governance, as the Assistant Secretary said in her opening
statement. This is a region where if we take our eye off the
ball, we will be back, having more and more urgent hearings
about the impact for the people of West Africa and for the
governance of West Africa.
Thank you for your hard work in this difficult area. I look
forward to following up with you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons. We will try to
arrange that type of information.
We are going to have a vote perhaps later this week on our
military presence in Niger, and I think it is incumbent upon
the Administration to get information to this Committee prior
to that vote as to the importance of our troops in that country
as well as the impact that it has on the region. Because we are
going to be asked, and we have little time.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you
Secretary Phee. Just a word about Niger. One of the reasons
this matters so much is we lost four servicemembers there in
2017, and it was under circumstances that were pretty unusual.
There were questions about whether there were ample legal
authorities for the missions they were on, were they trained
for the mission that they ended up having to execute? There
were a whole lot of questions that came out of that. Then in
the aftermath of the coup, the fact that we still have 1,000
troops, and their mission has been redefined, there are a lot
of questions about the utility. If the training we provided
ended up leading to the coup, why?
I do think sometimes we forget how unusual we are to have a
military that is subordinate to civilian political leadership.
In many nations around the world, the military is not really
subordinate to civilian political leadership. They are a
separate power base. Pakistan would be a good example. If you
do even the right things to train a military that is not
subordinate to civilian political leadership, you empower the
military, and sometimes you empower them against the civilian
military leadership with the best of intentions.
In a nation where there has been a history of coups, in a
nation where the military does not necessarily envision itself
as completely subordinate to civilian military leadership,
anything you do to empower the military could have this
potential of a negative consequence. You are empowering them
vis-a-vis the elected leadership and undermining democratic
institutions, and I think that is something that bears a lot of
thought.
I wanted to ask you a question just about staffing. The GAO
identified, in 2019--now this is a couple of years old--that 10
percent of State's Africa Bureau total positions at overseas
posts were vacant, and the figure seems to have increased based
on State's most recent staffing report figures that have been
shared with this Committee. Can you talk about how the
Department is trying to address the staffing shortage?
Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting that. The whole team
will be happy to know that you support. In the State Department
as a whole, we have about an 89 percent fill, but for the
Africa Bureau, particular in West Africa, it is about 83
percent. There are a couple of reasons for that. As you know,
the previous Administration did a freeze on hiring. Then we had
a problem with attrition. That is why Secretary Blinken has set
up robust budgets to try and get us back to proper staffing.
Within the Bureau we have the biggest challenge at the mid-
level. That is usually at a time of life where folks have
children that need schooling, may need medical care, and those
are resources and facilities that are hard to find in places
like West Africa.
We are doing a lot to attract people. There are still many
who are interested and going out and engaging in what has been
called expeditionary diplomacy. We are trying to provide
special incentives. Fundamentally, we need resources to make
sure that we hire predictably and regularly. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Well, and I think your point about this mid-
level issue, that is a really important one, too. Resources is
part of it, but there may be creative strategies to try to get
people to either stay at the mid-level or come back if they
have been as an FSO and exited the service. We may need to
think about that a little more.
I want to ask about Sudan. I join the Ranking Member and
some others wrote a letter, asking about the appointment of a
special envoy. Before we get to that, just to put some numbers
to this, the horrific situation has been going on for about 6
months. I have dialogued with my Sudanese community in
Virginia. The U.N. reports 9,000 people have been killed, more
than 7 million have been forcibly displaced, and nearly 25
million are in need of humanitarian assistance.
Can you share any updates pertaining to the ceasefire
negotiations that are being held in Jeddah between the SAF and
RSF?
Ms. Phee. Thank you so much for raising this urgent and
tragic problem. I am happy to report today that I do have some
updates in this grim situation. I will start first, if you
will, with what I am sure you will agree is our priority, which
is the civilians. For the past few days, about 100 Sudanese
civilians have been meeting in Addis Ababa. They are using the
African Union as their house--they call it the ``African
House''--to have discussions. They are working towards forming
an inclusive and representative pro-democracy civilian front.
It is an important group of Sudanese. It includes people
from the resistance committees. It includes people from
professional associations, universities, civil society groups,
as well as the political parties that have previously dominated
the discussions.
They have taken some time to come together. There are a lot
of divisions among the Sudanese folks, but we are actively
encouraging those dialogues, and we hope that this is the start
of a serious process to form the next Government of Sudan and
to serve as a counterweight to the security forces. Ambassador
John Godfrey has been in Addis with a team supporting those
talks.
Later this week, on the 26th of October, after a lot of
hard work by Secretary Blinken, talks will resume in Jeddah.
There will be a very important change. There will be an African
co-facilitator to join the Saudis and the Americans. The
regional group in East Africa known as IGAD, the executive
director will participate in those talks, and he will be
representing both IGAD and the African Union, based on an
agreement between those leaders.
These talks will be structured differently from before, but
fundamentally they will be as they were before, emergency
diplomacy limited on trying to pursue ceasefires and ultimately
a cessation of hostilities, and given the relationship between
reducing violence and allowing humanitarian assistance to get
in, there will also be discussions on improving delivery of
humanitarian aid. Martin Griffiths of OCHA has said Jeddah is
very important for humanitarian aid.
Senator Kaine. I am over my time, but both of those are
positive development, the citizens' meeting in Addis Ababa and
then the resumption of the somewhat reformatted talks in
Jeddah. I know the Committee is going to want to follow up to
get the State Department's take on how successful those efforts
are.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant
Secretary Phee, great to see you. I want to follow up on really
some of Senator Ricketts' questions here.
Back in August 2022, the Biden administration put forward
its U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which explicitly
said it was crafted to ``incorporate lessons learned from
overly securitized approaches,'' to the Sahel. We have now, of
course, seen a serious of coups, most recently in Niger, but
also in Mali, other West African countries.
My question is, what lessons have been learned about
oversecuritization and did the most recent events mean we
should go back and look even harder? Have you done that, and
what lessons have you learned based on the most recent coups?
Ms. Phee. Thank you for that question, and I would like to
answer it in two ways. I would like to compare how we responded
to the situation in Mali and how we are now responding in
Niger, and also in Gabon, in Central Africa.
In Mali in 2020, when the previous President was
overthrown, it was wildly popular because that President was
very corrupt. We thought there was an opportunity to work with
the generals to get to a better outcome. Over time--and I can
list all the negative actions they have taken--it became clear
that that was not possible, and most spectacularly, in December
of 2022, when they invited in Wagner, and last year when they
made clear they wanted MINUSMA to leave, and then in August
when the Russians vetoed the sanctions regime for Mali.
Correspondingly, we have hardened our approach to Mali,
limiting the development assistance we provide there. We are
already applying 7008 there more fully than we did initially,
and we have done increased sanctions there, although not the
sanctions of all the leaders as the chairman asked.
In Gabon, similarly, there was a coup, and it was wildly
popular because it overthrew a government that was considered
inept, corrupt, and not democratic.
What are we doing differently there and what are we doing
differently in Niger? First of all, we are more actively
engaged at a senior level. Victoria Nuland went to Niamey. I
went to coastal West Africa to consult. Judd Devermont of the
National Security Council went to Gabon last week.
We are working with our partners. We are expanding what we
are doing in terms of suspending assistance, not only
assistance captured by 7008, but even security assistance and
cooperation that is not required to be limited by the law. We
are not invoking notwithstanding authorities. We are not
invoking waivers. We are trying to make very serious that our
partnership, which can be and has been positive, requires the
leaders, the generals that have taken power to make active,
concrete steps to get back to democracy, because we understand
that democracy is the long-term solution to the root causes of
problems.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. No, I appreciate your sort of
going back and taking a look at how we can better respond in a
more targeted way. You mentioned that you have rolled back some
of the security assistance that is not required by law to be
rolled back. I do not know if you are referring to some of the
DoD assistance, but I do want to ask you a question about the
DoD assistance because the coup provision does halt State- and
USAID-administered funds, but as you know, some DoD support has
continued in Niger.
Congresswoman Jacobs and I introduced legislation last
Congress, and are planning to reintroduce it again, that would
require Leahy Law vetting be applied also to the DoD Section
127 Echo provision. When I asked Dr. Carlin about this at a
hearing a little while back, the response from Dr. Carlin was,
``I welcome working with my colleagues at the State Department
to look at that.''
As a representative of the State Department I would like to
ask your opinion on whether we should not, as a matter of
consistency, in cases where the coup provision is triggered,
also halt the DoD assistance.
Ms. Phee. Thank you for that question. I would like to
share with you, although I am a representative of the State
Department, as you just said, my understanding is that our
recommendation to the interagency has been, and that has been
agreed, that we do suspend our security cooperation and
assistance with Niger until we sort out a path forward. To the
best of my knowledge we are not providing any security
assistance, not from State and not from the DoD.
We are in a good position because we have had conversations
with the junta about operations that are necessary for force
protection, but beyond that we are trying to make clear that if
they want that partnership that has made such a positive impact
they need to make changes in governance.
With regard to the specific question, I would welcome an
active discussion. That seems like a very positive suggestion
from my perspective. I would have to consult with other
stakeholders.
I would also like to make a suggestion to the Committee
which relates to the trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership
program, which, when it was started in 2005, was very
innovative in terms of cross-regional and cross-functional.
Over time, I think its success has been impeded by several
factors, including that there was no central authority as there
is, for example, in the Global Fragility Act, and declining
resources.
I think it would be worthwhile if we could have a
discussion with Congress about ways to improve that to deal
with the changed environment in the Sahel.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just comment on your statement that we
have multiple ways to put pressure, but it seems like it is not
working because we are going to from coup to coup to coup. I
understand the strategy in Mali, but that did not work. In
Niger it looks like the policies have not worked.
I would just argue the fact that we do not have a
consistent response to those who participate in coups has led
to the view that you can commit a coup and still maintain a
relationship with the United States. It may not be as strong as
you want. You may get a suspension of aid. It may have other
impacts, but it will not have the personal impact of preventing
the use of travel or banking.
I just want to stress the point that the failure--which was
our previous policy, as I understand it, to consider
immediately sanctions--has had a negative impact in
discouraging the number of coups we have seen in that region.
Our strategy is not working. At least the results are not
there. Too many coups. One coup is too many.
I still have not gotten a clear response from you as to
whether we are adjusting--what is our policy? When we see a
military takeover, what is our policy? I am not sure I
understand. Do we immediately cut off the aid and consider
sanctions and other actions to make it clear that this is
unacceptable? All governments are unpopular. We recognize that,
but the coup is not the answer. That has been our policy for a
long time. It seems like what you are saying, we justified our
delay because it was an unpopular regime. That just leads to
others feeling they can commit coups even against popular
regimes.
Ms. Phee. I hear you and I agree with you. I was trying to
explain how we have adjusted our policy because what we did in
Mali did not work. What we are doing now, in Niger and in
Gabon, is not only applying 7008, which applies to State and
USAID, as you know well, but also incorporating other U.S.
Government assistance and cooperation, so there is an across-
the-board suspension.
There is an effort to coordinate effectively with our
partners in the region, such as ECOWAS, with our European
partners, so that everyone is united in saying you cannot have
a partnership with us if you do not make changes. In fact, Mr.
Chairman, we have tried to adjust based on the fact that what
we did in Mali was different and not successful.
It is true that each country is different and has their own
circumstances, but as I described in my opening statement there
are also many common factors which contribute to this
situation. I want you to know that we are trying, actually, to
be very strong about our rejection of these behaviors by taking
what you gave us in terms of law and expanding it, making a
policy choice to include all U.S. Government engagement, to
make it very clear that these actions are not acceptable.
The Chairman. I would argue that from Mali we should
recognizing that our changing of policies and not imposing
sanctions has not worked. We are learning from Mali, but in
Mali we did not impose sanctions. The only sanctions that you
are now imposing is against some of the Wagner Group people.
Senator Risch, anything further?
Senator Risch. No. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts?
The Committee record will remain open for 2 days for
questions for the record. We would ask that you respond to
those questions promptly. Thank you very much for your service,
and with that the hearing will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Is there any effort underway to review and revise the
Sahel strategy and its implementation in light of these new events? If
so, what is the scope and substance of this review, and what resources
is the Administration proposing to Congress to help support its
efforts?
Answer. There is a fluid situation in the Sahel, and we constantly
revisit our strategy considering changing dynamics. Our principles have
not changed. We remain focused on working with our African partners and
the people to address challenges and support democracy, which is the
best foundation for development, social cohesion, prosperity, and
stability across the Sahel and the African continent.
Question. Do you plan to update the strategy for Mali? Do you
commit to this Committee to respect legislative requirements going
forward?
Answer. The current Mali strategy remains applicable in most ways--
including our continued advocacy for a return to democracy and for the
respect of human rights. Since the writing of the strategy, however,
the transition government withdrew its consent of the UN peacekeeping
mission in Mali (MINUSMA). As MINUSMA's continued presence underpinned
our strategy, we will update it. I commit to respecting all legislative
requirements.
Question. In your view, what went wrong in Niger? What lessons have
we learned?
Answer. Our partnership with Niger led to concrete benefits for the
Nigerien people in both development and security. We are deeply
disappointed that the actions of a few men have put so much at risk for
the people of Niger. Our response to the coup, which is different from
how we have responded to recent coups in West Africa, is to restrict
our assistance and relationship beyond what is required by law.
Humanitarian, food, and health assistance for the benefit of the people
in Niger will continue. Any resumption of assistance or cooperation
will require the CNSP to take steps toward civilian-led democratic
government.
Question. Do you believe that the failure to impose consequences on
junta leaders elsewhere in West Africa in any way emboldened military
officers in Niger and also now Gabon to carry out coups?
Answer. The United States has imposed consequences for coups,
including restricting much-appreciated security and other assistance
for governments pursuant to section 7008. Our limited partnership amid
rising terrorist threats, however, creates opportunities for Russia and
China to expand their influence. Motivations of individual actors in
coups differ across the region. When democratically elected governments
fail to effectively meet the needs of their people or tackle
corruption, they provide motivation for coup leaders that cannot be
overcome solely by the threat of U.S. visa restrictions. The suspension
of U.S. assistance to governments run by junta leaders sends a clear
message that they must return to democratic governance that is
accountable to the people of their countries.
Question. What will be the impact of a U.S. military withdraw on
security in the Sahel and littoral West Africa?
Answer. U.S. military withdrawal in the Sahel could have an impact
on regional security and our ability to conduct counterterrorism
operations in the Sahel. Additionally, coup countries will become
increasingly vulnerable to Russian and Wagner influence if the United
States withdraws completely from the Sahel. Wagner Group activity in
Mali has coincided with a rise in civilian deaths. Military withdrawal
would also render coastal West African states vulnerable as we already
have witnessed a spillover of violence to their borders. We are working
closely with our partners in Coastal West Africa to support their
efforts to counter threats of violent extremism through the Strategy to
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS).
Question. Does the U.S. rely too much on a short-term, tactical,
counter-terrorism approach in its security assistance efforts and not
enough on institution building?
Answer. The United States relies on a balanced approach to security
assistance that includes programs focused on building both short- and
long-term capacity at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
U.S. assistance in the region includes programs that focus on military
professionalization; the promotion of respect for human rights and
democratic governance; and the development of stronger institutions to
oversee these security forces. Our security assistance is designed to
secure U.S. interests and mitigate threats while inculcating U.S.
values like respect for human rights and healthy civil-military
relations that make these institutions stronger and more responsive to
their people over time.
Question. Do the militaries of these countries perceive that the
U.S. will give them a pass on coups and remain engaged because it
privileges a security approach to addressing terrorism as opposed to
one that addresses root causes of terrorism?
Answer. The countries that have experienced coups all understand
that the overthrow of a democratic government results in restrictions
on U.S. foreign assistance previously supporting government actors, and
therefore a diminution in their partnership with the United States.
Some of the coup governments recognize that the United States is a
vital partner in global and regional affairs and that U.S. assistance
is important to their security and economic development goals. As a
result, they may seek to maintain a positive relationship by taking
steps to return to democratic governance. We have raised the cost of
doing business with the Wagner Group by imposing sanctions on those who
cooperate with it. We continue to message the importance of addressing
root causes of violence and protecting civilians during
counterterrorism operations.
Question. Do security assistance programs provide leverage the U.S.
can use to influence the military leadership in these countries? What
does it allow us to do that we cannot otherwise? Can you provide
examples?
Answer. On its own merits, U.S. military assistance and training
programs have had a positive influence in professionalizing military
units and fostering greater respect for human rights and civil-military
relationships. Our partners in the region value U.S. assistance due to
the high quality of our training, equipment, logistical support, and
other lines of support, and the prospect of losing or regaining access
to this support can encourage sound decision-making within our
partners. The degree to which this incentive is decisive depends on a
multitude of other individual factors.
Question. Do you still believe, over a year later, that visa
restrictions or financial sanctions against coup leaders responsible
for gross violations of human rights, serious corruption, or
undermining basic democratic principles is ``incongruent'' with U.S.
efforts to restore democracy and respect for the rule of law in the
Sahel?
Answer. We are committed to promoting accountability for human
rights violations and abuses, democratic backsliding, and corruption
using a variety of tools, including sanctions and visa restrictions,
where appropriate. In Niger, we have sent a strong message that our
relationship is no longer business as usual. The measures we have
taken, including by not relying on available authorities to overcome
section 7008 restrictions, will have a strong impact in our effort to
achieve a credible transition to democratic rule in Niger. We continue
to assess the use of financial sanctions and visa restrictions to
respond to the crisis in the Sahel.
Question. Do you still believe these illegitimate, undemocratic,
and abusive military juntas are capable of, as you stated in July 2022,
undertaking ``reforms that are demanded by their people to form the
foundation of a more democratic system?''
Answer. We constantly revisit our strategy considering changing
dynamics. In Mali, we and international partners listened to claims by
transition authorities that, backed by popular support, they would
implement long-needed reforms and combat the corruption that had
plagued the presidency of Ibrahim Keita. We took an expansive approach
to using our notwithstanding authority to continue as much assistance
as possible following the military coup in August 2020. Unfortunately,
the collective optimism from the international community was misplaced.
In Niger, we have not relied on available authorities to overcome
section 7008 restrictions, and sent the message that it is no longer
business as usual. We are using a phased approach where we must see
concrete progress toward a credible transition to democracy in Niger in
order to restart assistance under available authorities.
Question. Has the Africa Bureau drafted a sanctions strategy for
any of the coup countries in West Africa? I would include Chad, despite
the State Department's finding that there was not a coup there. They
got off on a technicality, in my view.
Answer. As situations change, we continually review all tools
available to us and determine what is the best tool to use to advance
U.S. foreign policy goals. Sanctions and visa restrictions, where
appropriate, can promote accountability and support policy priorities.
The Bureau of African Affairs continues to consult with the Office of
the Sanctions Coordinator to review sanctions-related points of
leverage in West Africa. We continue to assess the use of sanctions and
visa restrictions to respond to the crisis in the Sahel.
Question. Can you clarify why the Administration decided to
sanction three senior Malian military officers for coordinating with
the Wagner group but has not sanctioned any Malian officials
specifically for killing Malian civilians, sexual violence, or other
gross violations of human rights?
Answer. The arrival of the Wagner Group in Mali resulted in great
suffering for the Malian people. More civilians were killed in 2022
after the Group's arrival than in any other year since the conflict
broke out in 2012. By sanctioning those individuals, including the
Malian defense minister, who were instrumental in bringing the Wagner
Group to Mali and making overtures to Burkina Faso, we hope to deter
others from making similar mistakes. In May, we also imposed visa
restrictions on two Malian military commanders for their involvement in
gross violations of human rights committed in Moura in 2022.
Question. What message does it send other military juntas or people
in Mali and across the Sahel when the United States decides to sanction
security force members for working with Russia but not for massacring
their own people?
Answer. As the Wagner Group is responsible for or contributed to
much of the violence perpetrated against civilians in Mali, sanctioning
those who worked to bring them into Mali does demonstrate our outrage
for this violence. In addition, we imposed visa restrictions on two
Malian commanders for their involvement in the killings in Moura in
2022, a massacre the Wagner Group supported. We will continue to use
various tools against those who are responsible for increasing violence
in Mali and elsewhere.
Question. Can you explain why the Department has not sanctioned any
member of Chad's security force for the October 2022 massacre and
subsequent campaign of forces disappearances, and torture?
Answer. The U.S. Government condemned the violent clashes with
protesters on October 20, 2022, as well as the arrests and deaths of
protesters in custody following these protests. We have pressed for
Chad's transitional government to conduct a full investigation of these
events, and hold accountable those responsible for killing protesters,
including several in front of the U.S. Embassy. On the 1-year
anniversary of the deadly protests, we renewed our call for full
investigation of these events and accountability for anyone responsible
for human rights violations and abuses.
Question. The standard of ``credible information'' articulated by
Section 7031 is not a high bar. Does the Department lack credible
information implicating Chadian security forces in these abuses despite
what would appear to be numerous, credible reports by international
organizations and the Chadian Government's own Human Rights Commission?
Answer. The United States has urged the Government of Chad to
investigate the violence in Chad on October 20, 2022, and facilitate an
international inquiry in order to provide a full account of these
events and identify those responsible for killing protesters. This
includes the assailants in civilian clothes and private vehicles who
cleared police checkpoints and killed four individuals outside the main
gate of the U.S. Embassy. One year after these events, we have yet to
receive any results from these investigations. We have also tried to
independently identify those responsible, and we are working with civil
society to gather more information.
Question. My understanding is that both Gabon and Niger may lose
their eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
as a consequence of recent coups. Can you explain how Chad, which also
experienced a coup and is clearly going in the wrong direction when it
comes to political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, the right to
due process, or the protection of human rights--all of which are
essential criteria for trade benefits under AGOA--manages to retain its
AGOA eligibility?
Answer. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) leads an
annual interagency review of sub-Saharan countries' eligibility for
AGOA benefits. We are using the AGOA Forum to discuss a forward vision
for AGOA that reflects the opportunities for improvements, as well as
the changes on the continent. For additional information, we refer you
to USTR.
Question. Do you think the United States should provide
constitution drafting or election related assistance to military
governments in, for example, Mali or Chad when these processes appear
engineered to extend the current military government's grip on power?
Answer. While transitional governments are often rife with
corruption and lack the credibility to advance genuine reform, they are
also opportunities to reframe historical grievances, establish
accountability mechanisms for past abuses, and support reconciliation
needed for social cohesion and long-term peace and prosperity. A
successful democratic transition needs to be built from the ground up,
ensuring public consultation and buy-in throughout the process,
including a wide range of civil society actors.
The Department continues to identify and deploy available resources
to support sustainable democratic transitions across the continent and
will leverage available expertise and ensure a coordinated response to
the multiple dynamic transitions processes taking place, particularly
where unique approaches are required. Programming will continue to be
targeted and specific to each country's context.
______
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Since 2020, military coups have occurred in Mali, Chad,
Sudan, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon. In your testimony to the
Committee, you note that a primary driver of political instability is
weak governance, and that countries with a history of military
takeover, government corruption, failing to provide basic services, and
ignoring democratic values by extending democratic values or
disregarding human rights are at risk for coups. I agree with your
analysis, which points to a few countries at particular risk for coups
moving forward, including Cameroon, Burundi, Mauritania, the Republic
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, South Sudan,
Senegal and Zimbabwe.
What lessons have been learned from the recent coups that should be
applied to other countries at risk? How is the Biden administration
adjusting its approach to countries like Burundi, Cameroon, South
Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria to ensure they remain on a positive democratic
trajectory?
Answer. Recent coups have brought into stark relief the critical
importance of ongoing U.S. efforts, in partnership with regional allies
and civil society, to stem democratic backsliding and confront human
rights violations and abuses using a mix of punitive measures and
positive inducements. Throughout the continent we are supporting civil
society and working to ensure marginalized groups, including women and
youth, have a voice in political processes. Where appropriate, we will
provide resources and guidance to encourage democratic governance,
effective service delivery, accountability, economic growth, anti-
corruption measures, and dialogue between capitals and communities,
which are keys to ensuring long-term stability, development, and
prosperity for countries and communities.
Question. Do you assess that support for democracy and governance
in countries at risk for coups is sufficient and appropriately
targeted? Where should adjustments be made given lessons learned from
the Sahel?
Answer. We remain committed to supporting key stakeholders,
including regional bodies, governments, democratic and inclusive
political movements, and civil society, to advance the shared
democratic goals of the United States and the majority of African
publics. With the support of Congress and the Global Fragility Act, we
are helping countries in coastal west Africa to strengthen democratic
governance through foreign assistance programming. We are also working
to implement the African Democratic and Political Transitions
initiative (ADAPT) as well as the 21st Century Partnership for Africa
Security, or 21PAS--programs launched by President Biden at the U.S.-
Africa Leaders Summit.
Question. What guidance has Department leadership, including
yourself, provided to our Ambassadors and Embassy personnel in
countries in Africa at risk for coups on how to engage with
stakeholders at post to make clear that support from the United States
is dependent on credible constitutional transfers of power and to
provide public support for such processes?
Answer. I encourage our Ambassadors and Embassy personnel to engage
with governments, political parties, and civil society to advance our
shared democratic goals. Our public condemnation of coups, and
announcements of the restrictions imposed as a result, are disseminated
with regional partners. In the case of West Africa, our engagement with
ECOWAS member states as the regional body has confronted the various
coups has allowed us to clearly communicate the consequences,
particularly regarding section 7008 restrictions.
Question. Have lessons learned from situations in Mali and Sudan
informed the State Department's sense of urgency in addressing
protracted conflicts and failed peace processes in places like Cameroon
and South Sudan? If yes, how? If no, why not?
Answer. While all have unique causes, at the core of undemocratic
transfers of power and violent conflicts on the continent is a lack of
accountable democratic governance and open political space, and each
requires a democratic governance solution. Sustainable peace and
democracy require investments in institutional reforms and civil
society, including by empowering civil society advocacy through
programs like our Civil Society Partnerships for Civilian Security
program.
In South Sudan, the United States is working to mitigate and
prevent sub-national violence, promote respect for human rights, better
target U.S. assistance to communities in need, protect and defend civic
space, independent media, and peaceful political voices, and hold the
transitional government accountable to its commitments to manage the
country's natural resources transparently. Since the submission of our
annual report to Congress on South Sudan policy in March, we have taken
additional steps, including, the release of a business advisory, the
renewal of the arms embargo, support for civil society, and consistent
messaging with our partners to advance our policy. We also continue to
work with our African partners, international actors, and local civil
society to support peace and stability across the central African sub-
region and to promote a peaceful resolution between the Government of
Cameroon and separatists in the English-speaking northwest and
southwest regions of Cameroon.
Question. How is the United States demonstrating and communicating
to local populations that we are a reliable partner committed to their
long-term best interests?
Answer. The United States communicates that we are a reliable,
long-term partner in the Sahel by investing in host countries' human
capital and cultivating credible voices among the local population in
support of U.S. policy and values. Our public diplomacy tools include
exchange programs that build lasting ties between local policymakers,
influencers, and young leaders and their American counterparts. Almost
without exception, these exchange alumni return to their countries with
positive impressions of the United States and its role in the world,
which they promote among their colleagues and audiences over the course
of their careers.
Our public affairs campaigns on traditional and social media use
compelling images and language to highlight U.S. investments across the
region in good governance, public health, quality education, and other
universal benefits. U.S. diplomats also engage local audiences in
person at public gatherings, in board rooms, in government offices, and
in academia, making the case that we are there for them over the long
haul.
Question. Is the State Department making adequate use of resources,
like local radio, to communicate with local populations about issues
important to them, as well as the significant lifesaving assistance the
U.S. provides?
Answer. Our diplomatic missions in Africa employ all communications
methods at their disposal to reach target audiences where they live.
For example, the Bureau of African Affairs is currently expanding an
innovative multi-platform media campaign in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
The Gambia to counteract PRC messaging around its many high-visibility
infrastructure projects by highlighting the tangible benefits of long-
term U.S. investment in the health and education sectors. We are
working to expand this program to more than 20 countries in the region.
We also engage vulnerable, under-served audiences in the region
through, for example, the U.S. Agency for Global Media's new Fula
language Voice of America programming. This project, tentatively
scheduled to be launched in early 2024, with an initial $700,000 grant
via Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability funding, targets
underserved audiences who are most at risk to adversarial influence
with objective news and information.
In addition, we are developing a second season of Limitless Africa,
our radio and podcast series that addresses contemporary African
issues. This program provides a potential regional audience of 15
million listeners with an accurate picture of the positive impact of
U.S. policy and engagement, while advancing narratives that oppose
misinformation and disinformation from other actors.
The Global Engagement Center (GEC) is supporting counterterrorism
strategic communications projects in the Sahel region. These projects
incorporate public service announcements and a radio drama series as
strategic messaging to educate local populations on the manipulative
tactics deployed by terrorist groups. The content is disseminated via
radio in multiple local languages including Fula, Hausa, Kanuri, Shuwa
Arabic, and French. Materials are available for posts' own use in
developing similar programming.
Question. Given the rapidly deteriorating conditions for
constructive relations with the junta, what are the Biden
administration's current top priorities for Mali?
Answer. The United States remains committed to helping the Malian
people achieve their aspirations for democracy, development, and
stability. We continue to be the largest bilateral donor of development
and humanitarian assistance that benefits people in Mali. Our priority
is to provide people in Mali with access to humanitarian assistance,
food, healthcare, and education while growing our relationships through
cultural and exchange programs. While we support Mali's population, we
will advocate for the transition government to return Mali to democracy
and provide responsible security that respects human rights.
Question. With the departure of the French, as well as significant
anti-French sentiment by the junta, which allies does the United States
view as having the most influence with the junta? How are we working
with these allies to advance mutually beneficial outcomes?
Answer. The transition government is not readily influenced by any
allies, although it maintains relatively robust partnerships with some
European partners, including Germany, Spain, and Italy. Russia is the
transition government's preferred partner, which is unfortunate for the
people of Mali who suffer from the abuses of the Wagner Group. The
transition government has also increasingly sought to expand
partnerships with China, Iran, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Burkina Faso,
Guinea, and Niger. We continuously engage our allies on the ground in
Bamako as well as through capitals and in Washington to advocate for
mutually beneficial outcomes.
Question. Please provide a detailed breakdown of the foreign
assistance and security cooperation programs have been suspended,
terminated, or cleared to continue in Niger following the decision to
apply restrictions under Section 7008 of annual SFOPS appropriations
measures.
Answer. Please see attachment of current programs for Niger that
have been restricted as a result of the military coup. $29 million in
assistance benefitting the government that is currently continuing
under available notwithstanding authorities includes the provision of
life-saving health programs. $138 million in assistance for the
government of Niger remains suspended under section 7008, the majority
of which are programs in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and military
professionalization programs benefitting the Nigerien military. The
further use of available authorities to continue certain assistance
will depend on the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland
taking steps to usher in civilian-led democratic government.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. In your testimony, you indicated that in addition to
applying Section 7008, the Administration has decided, as a matter of
policy, to suspend additional foreign assistance and security
cooperation for Niger. What programs and security cooperation
activities, specifically, has the Administration suspended pursuant to
a policy decision (as opposed to legal restrictions)?
Answer. The United States has paused military cooperation with the
Nigeriens and declined to use available authorities that would allow us
to continue much of the restricted assistance pending actions by the
National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland to make concrete steps
toward ushering in civilian-led democratic governance. In some recent
coups in West Africa, we used available authorities to continue certain
assistance without interruption. We are taking a different approach in
Niger and have not exercised such authorities in order to encourage
progress on a transition.
Question. Under 22 USC Sec. 2349aa, the State Department is
authorized to provide anti-terrorism assistance to foreign law
enforcement personnel ``notwithstanding any other provision of law that
restricts assistance to foreign countries''--including Section 7008. In
which post-coup countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger) has the
State Department continued to administer ATA programs, including under
the Department's Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) program?
What is the projected or requested budget for such programs in each
country in FY2023 and FY2024?
Answer. In accordance with section 7008 of the annual
appropriations act, the Department has suspended its foreign military
assistance for the governments of Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and
Niger. The Department is in limited cases relying on available
notwithstanding authorities for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger,
to strengthen civilian counterterrorism institutions. This includes
some CT bureau programs, including ATA, CTPF, TIP, and TSCTP
programming. State is currently weighing FY23 funding in West Africa
against global priorities.
Question. Please describe Ambassador Hammer's official mandate and
priorities assigned to him by Department leadership as Special Envoy
for the Horn of Africa.
Answer. Special Envoy Ambassador Mike Hammer continues to work to
advance peace in Ethiopia and support efforts to achieve a diplomatic
resolution to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute involving
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In addition, on Sudan, Special Envoy Hammer
is engaging international partners in the region, starting with our
African partners from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
for East Africa (IGAD) and the African Union, as well as other
international partners, like the European Union, to support
accountability and chart a path forward for restoring democratic
civilian governance, while mobilizing support for humanitarian needs.
Question. Do you agree with my assessment that the United States
needs a presidential special envoy to Sudan?
Answer. The Department of State agrees that the conflict in Sudan
requires an urgent and robust response, and we have an all-hands-on-
deck effort led by Secretary Blinken. Our Ambassador to Sudan, John
Godfrey, is leading the Embassy team and is focused on engaging
Sudanese civilians and senior representatives of the belligerent
parties. We have recalled Ambassador Daniel Rubinstein back to duty to
lead the U.S. delegation in Jeddah that is co-facilitating talks, along
with Saudi Arabia and IGAD, participating on behalf of the AU, between
the belligerent parties to establish ceasefires, press for unhindered
access for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and institute
confidence building measures enabling progress toward a cessation of
hostilities. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer is
engaging our international partners, with a focus on African and
European partners.
Question. When was the last Principals Meeting on Sudan?
Answer. There have been frequent interagency meetings since the
beginning of this conflict, including the Principals Committee, the
Deputies Committee and other meetings. Stemming from this, Secretary
Blinken and other senior officials are frequently engaged in diplomatic
engagements to coordinate with regional and international partners,
support civilian dialogue, and to press the two parties to establish a
ceasefire, protect civilians, and allow unhindered humanitarian access.
Question. In response to questions for the records I sent to Mr.
Riley for his confirmation for U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, he
``committed to regularly travelling to Somaliland and engaging with the
Government of Somaliland.''
Will you support Mr. Riley in his efforts to travel to Somaliland
and engage with the Government of Somaliland in Hargeisa?
Answer. Yes, if he is confirmed, I will support Mr. Riley's efforts
to travel to Somaliland safely and engage with officials in Hargeisa
within the framework of our single Somalia policy.
______
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. How can you leverage the tools in programs like USAID's
Democracy Delivers Initiative to not only strengthen democratic systems
but also provide access to meaningful economic resources?
Answer. The Democracy Delivers Initiative focuses on countries
experiencing a promising democratic opening--when there's an
opportunity to enact democratic reforms, strengthen transparency and
the rule of law, advance human rights and development, and deliver
economic dividends--to help governments, civil society, and citizens
seize the moment. This program brings together the development and
diplomatic tools of the U.S. Government, together with contributions by
other bilateral and multilateral donors, the private sector, and the
philanthropic community to support countries experiencing a moment of
democratic opportunity to implement and expand their reform agendas. At
present, the Democracy Delivers Initiative countries in Africa are
Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia.
While no countries in the Sahel currently participate in the
Democracy Delivers Initiative, the Department of State and USAID
leverage other types of foreign assistance resources and engage across
all sectors to support democratic governance and promote economic
progress. We remain focused on working with our African partners and
the people to address challenges and support democracy, which is the
best foundation for development, social cohesion, prosperity, and
stability in the Sahel and across the African continent.
Question. Is there more the DFC and MCC could be doing to provide a
comprehensive approach?
Answer. MCC and DFC have robust, dynamic programs in Africa that
are highly respected and sought after by African governments. We work
closely with MCC and DFC at the leadership and working levels to share
our foreign policy priorities so that we can optimize their work on the
continent.
MCC is actively working in 14 African countries with about $3.7
billion in signed compact and threshold programs, and another estimated
$2.3 billion in the developing pipeline. Passage of the Millennium
Challenge Corporation Candidate Country Reform Act would expand MCC's
candidate pool to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development's graduation threshold. Such a change would add countries
to MCC's candidate pool, including some in Africa.
DFC has $9.7 billion in exposure in Sub-Saharan Africa across more
than 280 projects in 38 countries. The private-sector led projects DFC
finances have a far-reaching impact--they are expanding access to
lifesaving vaccines and other essential healthcare, building data
centers and other critical infrastructure, helping vulnerable
communities address the climate crisis, bolstering food security, and
expanding access to electricity.
DFC mobilizes private sector capital, bringing much needed
investment dollars to impactful projects, along with the highest
standards for doing business. These investments help support African
economies and create economic opportunities for Africans across the
continent--both of which are critical to a comprehensive approach to
USG engagement with our partners in the Sahel and beyond.
Question. What tools and methods are most effective against
disinformation in the Sahel and West Africa? Can we do more?
Answer. In West Africa, building capacity has proven one of our
most effective counter-disinformation strategies. Exchange programs and
in-country workshops provide reliable partners in host governments,
media, and civil society with the tools to detect and counter
disinformation.
The United States and its partners must edge out competitor
narratives by filling the communications space with positive messages
that underscore our values, partnerships, and commitment to shared
prosperity in the region. Our Missions in West Africa are doing heroic
work with limited resources. With more resources, we can further erode
our adversaries' capacity to dominate these fragile information spaces,
while strengthening our partners' ability to counter disinformation.
One example of this work is the U.S.-West Africa Tech Challenge
that U.S. Embassy Abidjan and the Global Engagement Center (GEC) hosted
with Cote d'lvoire's Ministry of Communication and Digital Economy in
September 2023 to encourage innovative solutions to combat
disinformation from violent extremist groups and reinforce USG
initiatives under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote
Stability.
The two small businesses that won the challenge will develop
products to respectively combat agricultural disinformation in rural
Cote d'Ivoire and support free and fair elections in Nigeria,
addressing violent extremist group tactics to spread disinformation and
exploit socio-economic issues and local grievances.
Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure that our
embassies across the Sahel and West Africa are fully staffed?
Answer. The Department continues to use increased incentives for
service in historically difficult to staff (HDS) posts around the
world, including service needs differentials? for extended service,
along with hardship differentials, and prioritized assignments.
Additionally, several initiatives are underway, including development
of regional support models, to better ensure that we are providing
posts across the region with adequate support. In the last year the
Department has reformed incentives to better focus bidders' attention
on the most difficult to staff posts.
Question. Lack of adequate participation mechanisms for civil
society results in missed opportunities for frank exchange of
information and ideas about how to properly address the root causes of
instability.
What steps is the Biden administration taking to ensure that civil
society perspectives, particularly from women and youth, are
incorporated into decision making processes at the national and
regional level, particularly as it relates to governance and timelines
for transition to civilian rule in coup-affected countries?
Answer. Through concerted diplomatic efforts and the provision of
U.S. foreign assistance across Sub-Saharan Africa, we seek to promote
respect for human rights, free and fair elections that reflect the will
of the people, an active civil society, accountable and participatory
governance, and access to justice for all. Our foreign assistance
resources help empower and bolster the impact of civil society, with a
particular focus on women, youth, and other marginalized populations.
Specifically, U.S. foreign assistance supports efforts to ensure
democratic transitions, as well as governance writ large, are inclusive
and take into account the input of a broad swathe of civil society.
This includes support for civil society participation in national
dialogues as well as longer-term civil society capacity building and
advocacy training. Additionally, we work across sectors, including
efforts to ensure civil society plays a role in strategic planning in
sectors such as wash, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health,
education, and economic growth. Taken together, these efforts ensure
civil society is capable of advocating for the needs of the people of
their countries and their input is heard by government actors.
______
Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
Question. What message do you believe was sent to the region by our
decision to delay these coup determinations? Do you assess that
regional damage was inflicted by that decision?
Answer. We have made clear that we stand with the Nigerien people
in their aspirations for democracy, prosperity, and stability. We did
not want to conclude that a military coup had taken place while we
believed there was still some chance to preserve the constitutional
order, potentially including having Mohamed Bazoum continue to serve as
President. We are continuing to support ECOWAS efforts to work with
Niger to achieve a quick and credible return to democratic rule. We
regret that regional and international efforts were not successful in
preserving the constitutional order, including with respect to
President Bazoum. We now assess that former President Bazoum has been
deposed.
Question. You have said that the delay on Niger's designation was
due in part to a request from ECOWAS, to enable the regional body to
take steps to restore President Bazoum to power. Do you believe the
delay had any impact on ECOWAS' success, or lack thereof?
Answer. No. We have engaged with ECOWAS at every step since the
events of July 26. For example, immediately following these events, we
worked closely with ECOWAS to support efforts to preserve the
constitutional order in Niger. When the situation made it clear that
there had been a military coup and President Bazoum was in fact
deposed, we announced that we were applying Section 7008 of the annual
Appropriations Act to the Government of Niger.
Question. I also understand there was a hesitancy to issue a coup
designation on Niger for fear of triggering Section 7008 restrictions.
Congress included a national security waiver in Section 7008 to enable
administrations to promptly designate coups when they occur, without
jeopardizing our national security interests. If the Administration was
concerned about the impact a designation on Niger would have on our
national security, can you explain why a waiver was not utilized in the
immediate aftermath of such an obvious military coup.
Answer. We initiated a pause on assistance for the Government of
Niger on August 5 consistent with the restrictions in section 7008. Our
deliberations on whether there had been a military coup triggering
Section 7008 of the annual Appropriations Act were tied to the facts,
including whether there was a path to preserve constitutional order in
Niger. We assessed that there had been a military coup in Niger once we
concluded that President Bazoum had been deposed and there was no
constitutional path forward. The waiver only applies to FY 2023
appropriations, as well as to FY 2024 appropriations under the CR. Now
that the restrictions of Section 7008 are in effect, we will consider
whether use of a waiver is appropriate.
Question. To what degree have ongoing security assistance
challenges impacted U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel and
West Africa? How is the Administration addressing these challenges to
ensure the effectiveness of ongoing counterterrorism efforts while
simultaneously dealing with the instability caused by military coups?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to pursue robust
counterterrorism coordination with our partners in West Africa.
Department of State counterterrorism programs build partner capacity to
constrain terrorists' ability to move resources and fighters, conduct
terrorism investigations and prosecutions, mitigate and respond to
terrorist incidents, and counter violent extremism. In support of
regional efforts to promote coup countries' return to democracy, we
continue to provide much-needed civilian counterterrorism support to
build stronger institutions. We are aligning this support with
important investments in Coastal West Africa under the Global Fragility
Act to bolster resilience and stability in at-risk countries bordering
the Sahel to prevent the spread of instability across remaining
democracies in the region.
Question. Do you believe the growing number of military coups has
enabled or promoted terrorist activity in the region?
Answer. Violence has quantifiably increased since the coups d'etats
in all three Sahel states, rising 46 percent since 2021. In Mali in
particular, attacks on civilians rose 50 percent in 2022, compared to
the previous year, and have risen a further 38 percent in 2023. While
terrorist violence accounts for nearly half of attacks in Mali since
2021, violence by the Malian armed forces or Wagner Group represented
29 percent. In Niger, terrorist attacks have increased 43 percent in
the 3 months since its coup, as compared to the same period in 2022.
Question. Have you assessed a trend in post-coup states in the
region moving closer to China, Russia, or Iran? If so, what steps is
the Department taking to counter this trend?
Answer. Russian, Iranian, and PRC activity on the African continent
remain fluid. Russia has continued to exploit instability in states
like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, including through disinformation
tactics. Mali is an example where military governance has paved the way
for Russian influence. Russia--through the Wagner Group--has been a
primary supporter of Malian counterterrorism operations. These
operations, however, have only increased violence in Mali and have not
diminished the terrorist threat. The PRC seeks to export its political
governance model, including in post-coup states. Gaining support for
its approach to governance is an integral part of Beijing's strategy
toward Africa, which the PRC views as the vanguard of its effort to
consolidate the Global South around the creation of a Sino-centric
world order. The Department of State's Global Engagement Center has
been working on countering disinformation in the Sahel. We reassure our
partners that strong, accountable, and democratic institutions--
sustained by a deep commitment to respect for human rights--remain the
most reliable avenue to long-term peace and prosperity and remain the
best way to counter instability and dehumanization of authoritarian
rule.
Iran continues to explore opportunities to proliferate weapons and
build relationships in Africa, and the United States will continue to
enforce sanctions on Iran and impose costs on those who contravene
these sanctions.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to modify or
update the existing interagency strategy on the Sahel in response to
the rapid destabilization we've seen over the past few months?
Answer. There is a fluid situation in the Sahel, and we constantly
revisit our strategy considering changing dynamics. However, our
principles have not changed. We remain focused on working with our
African partners and the people to address challenges and support
democracy, which is the best foundation for development, social
cohesion, prosperity, and stability across the Sahel and the African
continent.
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