[Senate Hearing 118-245]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                          S. Hrg. 118-245

                          EVALUATING U.S.-CHINA POLICY IN THE ERA 
                                   OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS



                             FIRST SESSION



                               __________

                            FEBRUARY 9, 2023

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          



                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Sherman, Hon. Wendy, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department 
  of State, Washington, DC.......................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific 
  Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC...    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    11

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    36

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    50

Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    64

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Jeanne Shaheen.................................................    68

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    70

Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    74

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Todd Young.....................................................    76

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    77

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Bill Hagerty...................................................    79

Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Bill Hagerty...................................................    81

Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Tim Scott......................................................    84

Press Statement by U.S. Department of State, Dated January 30, 
  2023, ``U.S. Sanction Three Fentanyl Traffickers Contributing 
  to the U.S. Opioid Crisis''....................................    87

Article by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Dated January 30, 
  2023, ``Treasury Sanctions Three Fentanyl Traffickers 
  Contributing to the U.S. Opioid Crisis''.......................    90

Letter to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken From Senator Rand 
  Paul, Dated September 13, 2022, Requesting Information 
  Regarding the State Department's Activities and Operations.....    92

Letter to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken From Senator Rand 
  Paul, Dated November 7, 2022, Requesting Additional Information 
  Regarding the State Department's Activities and Operations.....    94

                                 (iii)

  

 
    EVALUATING U.S.-CHINA POLICY IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:51 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Rubio, 
Romney, Ricketts, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Hagerty, and Scott.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Before we start with the hearing, although they may not be 
here because they have other assignments as well, but I do want 
to welcome three new members to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee--Senators Duckworth, Scott, and Ricketts, who each 
bring valuable and varied experience.
    Senator Duckworth has demonstrated a long-standing 
commitment to advancing U.S. national security and values 
through her military service and position on the Armed Services 
Committee.
    It is a pleasure to be joined by Senator Scott, who serves 
also as the ranking member of the Banking Committee, which is 
where he is now of which I sit on as well, and Senator 
Ricketts, who serves as Governor of Nebraska.
    We look forward to working with all of our new colleagues 
on China and other critical issues the United States faces 
around the world and we warmly welcome them to the committee.
    Inside the barbed-wired fences of China's concentration 
camps, guards force Uyghur detainees to sing patriotic songs 
praising Xi Jinping to drown out screams from torture, rape, 
and forced sterilizations. Show them ``absolutely no mercy,'' 
Xi said in a secret speech which was leaked to The New York 
Times.
    For many years Chinese leaders' focus was directed inward, 
but that is no longer the case as we saw with the recent spy 
balloon passing over the United States, a blatant violation of 
our sovereignty by a country that claims to be a responsible 
actor.
    Either this was a huge mistake by some entity within the 
Chinese Government or it was a test of our resolve by Xi. If it 
was, he got a clear answer.
    Whether it was the cancellation of Secretary Blinken's 
bilateral visit to Beijing or the debris recovered from the 
bottom of the Atlantic, the U.S. response should settle any 
question of our resolve to stand up to such brazen violations 
of our sovereignty.
    We responded with strength and I believe that is the way 
you deal with Xi. We have to remain vigilant because Beijing is 
reaching beyond its borders, spreading authoritarian values by 
exporting high-tech surveillance tools to any dictator that 
wants them, wielding influence at international institutions 
like the United Nations so Xi can block debate on critical 
issues and avoid scrutiny.
    China has made huge financial investments across the world, 
from ports in Sri Lanka to railroads in Kenya to bridges 
management and logistics in the Panama Canal, each adding to 
Xi's leverage over nations who find themselves heavily indebted 
to China and unable to push back on Beijing's demands.
    This puts pressure on countries committed to democracy like 
Lithuania when they took steps to deepen their unofficial 
relationship with Taiwan, and we think about our own posture in 
the world, we must recognize that China has also invested 
heavily in proactive diplomacy.
    China now has more diplomatic posts than any other country. 
Chinese diplomats are on the ground making the case for China's 
values, pushing for Chinese investment, and the United States 
is not keeping up.
    While China is pouring money into Africa, for example, we 
have got a 40 percent vacancy rate at our embassy in Niger and 
chronic staffing shortfalls from Mali to Mauritania to Chad.
    Secretary Sherman and Dr. Ratner, let me be clear. I am 
planning a robust agenda in Congress--in this particular 
Congress and China will be a big part of it.
    I have had conversations with the ranking member, working 
together to come together, which I think we will on a 
comprehensive China legislation.
    Today I released a detailed 46-page majority staff 
committee report outlining what needs to happen to realize the 
Administration's vision for the Indo-Pacific, but I will give 
you the short version.
    The China challenge affects every region in the world and 
you are going to have to do a better job of resourcing these 
efforts. That means more people in our embassies. It means 
modernizing the way we do business. It means offering an 
alternative to China.
    Secretary Sherman, since the buck stops with you on China 
in the State Department, I want to hear what you believe you 
need to do to ensure that happens.
    We appreciate your appearing before us today. I will note 
that the Secretary will have a hard stop at about 11:15 because 
the leadership decided to hold an all-members briefing at 11:30 
and she needs to be there for that. We will get to as many 
questions as we can.
    I am looking for a full and frank assessment of what the 
Administration is doing well and what it needs to do better.
    I applaud the passage last year of the CHIPS Act and the 
Inflation Reduction Act, although I was disappointed that 
ultimately the legislation did not include the Senate-passed 
Strategic Competition Act that Ranking Member Risch and I 
authored with so many members of this committee.
    I look forward to working with my colleagues to reintroduce 
and expand upon that legislation this Congress. These efforts 
to secure our supply chains and increase our domestic 
competitiveness are critical for American families' bottom 
line.
    When it comes to our global competition, right now China 
has the upper hand. I am pleased that, in contrast to the last 
Administration, you are working to shore up allies and 
partners.
    This is difficult and essential work, but if we are serious 
about this competition with China, the State Department needs 
to be more ambitious. The Biden administration needs to be more 
ambitious.
    We here in Congress want to do more and right now we have 
got something in Congress unheard of in today's Washington, 
which on this issue is bipartisan consensus.
    I hope you will not squander it, because while you have 
laid out a compelling vision on paper for what we need to do, 
it does not seem to me that we have an equally ambitious 
resourcing strategy to make it happen.
    The State Department you inherited is simply not postured 
for a global competition with China and it is harder for us to 
argue for more resources or authorities if you are not out 
there arguing for more yourselves.
    United States has to step up and defend democratic values, 
not just the might of our military, but the power of our 
diplomatic persuasion, and I expect you to make the Senate and 
this committee in particular a partner in this effort.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his 
opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As we all know for a long time the China challenge was 
foremost on our minds and, of course, along came the Ukraine 
war, which presents new challenges.
    Having said that, we cannot take our eye off the ball 
either since China is, I think we all agree, the challenge of 
the 21st century.
    While this hearing was planned before the unfortunate 
Chinese spy balloon flyover, last week's episode highlights 
just how important addressing this competition really is. China 
messed up publicly, but this only highlights what it has been 
doing behind the scenes for years.
    Every country around the world should take note because the 
Chinese will do this to other countries also. Secretary 
Blinken's trip postponed was a good step.
    I hope, Deputy Sherman, that you will shed more light on 
where we go from here. This was an egregious assault on U.S. 
sovereignty and, obviously, it requires a response and it 
requires a plan, going forward.
    Another note, I am concerned that the Administration still 
does not consider Congress a true partner on China, I believe. 
I have heard about a lot of briefings and phone calls from 
reporters and think tanks since last week regarding the balloon 
incident, but the outreach to the Hill was slow and sloppy at 
best.
    I have said for years that we Republicans and Democrats--
the executive and legislative branch--have to work together if 
we are going to confront what China is doing. Without that, we 
will not be successful.
    The first place--and this is not a partisan issue. This is 
truly an American issue and a bipartisan issue. The first place 
where we should demonstrate resolve is through better support 
for Taiwan. Nothing is more urgent than ensuring Taiwan has the 
capabilities and training to deter Chinese aggression. If we do 
not help them prepare now, we may all pay a much higher cost 
later.
    Another priority this year will be oversight of the 
implementation of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act signed 
into law last December, but it was not adequately funded in the 
appropriations process. I was very disappointed in this.
    The Biden administration said over and over again that it 
supports security assistance to Taiwan. However, it did nothing 
to advocate for Taiwan during the appropriations process.
    Similarly, this committee and the Armed Services Committee 
has asked the Administration last summer for a prioritized list 
of Taiwan's military needs. Despite repeated requests, we still 
do not have that list.
    Beyond Taiwan, we must counter the CCP's malign influence 
both in the U.S. and abroad. I expect to hear about how the 
Department addresses issues like influence in universities, 
Chinese police stations here in the United States and in other 
countries, and corruption.
    I also hope to hear that the Administration is going to 
counter the flow of Chinese fentanyl into the United States via 
third countries like Mexico. Steps we take domestically, of 
course, matter, but China actively avoids actions that could 
reduce the supply of chemicals that are illegally sent to the 
United States.
    Various parts of the U.S. Government, including myself, 
have asked the Chinese Government to take basic steps like 
passing a ``Know Your Customer'' type law.
    The CCP's response? That it will not cooperate until we 
remove a Chinese scientific institute from the Entity List and 
that we should just tell U.S. citizens not to do drugs.
    The Chinese Government's tacit endorsement of this massive 
drug trade is just not right.
    Also, we need the Chinese to do more to alleviate human 
suffering in the U.S. and abroad on this very important drug 
issue.
    Finally, I want to highlight legislative priorities. As the 
chairman has already stated, the chairman and I have met and 
discussed at length our ideas on China.
    China is certainly our high priority in this legislative 
session as we go forward and we are going to have a joint bill, 
we hope, to be introduced and, of course, that will include 
parts of the Senate bill in 2021 that we passed, the Strategic 
Competition Act.
    The chairman and I have already discussed collaborating on 
China legislation this year and I look forward to working with 
him on that.
    Also, we have the ECON Act that was previously introduced 
and probably will be part of what we put in our joint bill.
    With that, we have a lot to cover and I thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch, and we do look 
forward to working together on this.
    Our witnesses today are Deputy Secretary of State Wendy 
Sherman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Indo-Pacific 
Security Affairs Dr. Ely Ratner.
    I understand that Deputy Secretary Sherman provides some 
brief opening remarks as will the Assistant Secretary. Both 
will be available to answer any questions we may have.
    I will remind members again that there is an all-senators 
classified briefing on the PRC surveillance balloon scheduled 
at 11:30 immediately following this hearing.
    That is a setting which our witnesses may be better able to 
answer some of your questions on the balloon specifically, 
although this hearing was called well before the balloon 
incident and it is focused on broader China policy.
    With that, Secretary Sherman, why do we not begin.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. WENDY SHERMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Sherman. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    Please let us add our welcome to the newest additions to 
the rostrum--Senators Duckworth, Scott, and Ricketts. I and 
this entire State Department looks forward to working with you.
    Before we address our main topic, I just want to make one 
quick comment about the deadly earthquake in Turkey and Syria. 
The numbers of those lost keep rising. Our hearts ache for the 
families and communities devastated by this tragedy.
    I know that we all express our solidarity and are doing 
whatever we can for those who are suffering and will do 
whatever we can to support the recovery in the days and months 
ahead. It is truly a tragic, tragic situation for all the 
people in the region.
    Now to the subject at hand, the People's Republic of 
China--the geopolitical challenge, quite frankly, that will 
test American diplomacy like few issues in recent memory, and I 
associate myself with both of the comments of the chairman and 
the ranking member about the challenges that we face.
    The PRC is the only competitor with the intent and means to 
reshape the international order, a fact borne out in the PRC's 
provocations in the South China Sea, its human rights abuses, 
its use of economic coercion, its threatening behavior against 
Taiwan and, of course, what we have just witnessed and much 
more.
    Last week, the American people saw the latest example of 
that reality after the U.S. Government detected, closely 
tracked, and shot down the PRC's high-altitude surveillance 
balloon that had entered our territorial airspace in clear 
violation of our sovereignty and international law.
    The Biden-Harris administration responded swiftly to 
protect Americans and safeguard against the balloon's 
collection of sensitive information.
    We made clear to PRC officials that the presence of this 
surveillance balloon was unacceptable and along the way we 
learned a thing or two, which you will hear in the classified 
briefing, about the PRC's use of the balloon.
    Last Friday, Secretary Blinken called Director Wang Yi to 
say it would not be appropriate to visit Beijing at this time.
    On Saturday, as you all know, at the President's direction 
the U.S. military successfully brought down the balloon off the 
East Coast. This lawful and deliberate action was achieved with 
no harm to civilians and with maximum ability to recover the 
payload. Again, more to say about this in the classified 
briefing. I look forward to joining you in that briefing to go 
through the full details with my interagency colleagues.
    Our response to this incident reaffirmed our core 
priorities, as the President said Tuesday evening. We will 
always act decisively to protect the American people.
    We will never hesitate to defend U.S. interests and the 
rules-based international order. We will confront the dangers 
posed by the PRC with resolve and keep demonstrating that 
violations of any country's sovereignty are unacceptable.
    This irresponsible act put on full display what we have 
long recognized, that the PRC has become more repressive at 
home and more aggressive abroad.
    It reinforced the need for us to double down on our 
strategy--invest, align, compete. Simply put, with legislation 
like the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act and the bipartisan 
infrastructure law we are investing in the foundations of our 
strength on our shores.
    We are also modernizing our work at the State Department, 
as the chairman has implored us--and the ranking member--to do, 
to mobilize our embassies and resources to take on this 
challenge, particularly through the China House, which we stood 
up with your support in December.
    We are aligning with like-minded allies and partners 
overseas with the G-7 and the EU--that tough work the chairman 
talked about--with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, with India and countries on every continent.
    We have made a concerted effort to share information that 
reinforces the scale of the threats posed by the PRC and the 
necessity of unity in confronting them.
    We do not seek another Cold War, but we do ask everyone to 
play by the same set of rules. Investing in ourselves and 
aligning with our partners strengthens our hands to compete 
with the PRC.
    With authorities provided with bipartisan congressional 
support we will keep pushing back against the PRC's aggressive 
military, diplomatic, and economic practices.
    We will continue to oppose Beijing's unlawful acts in the 
South and East China Seas, hold accountable those involved in 
human rights violations in Tibet and Xinjiang, support the 
people of Hong Kong, and do everything possible to bring home 
unjustly-detained Americans.
    If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would ask for just a few more 
seconds for my opening remarks.
    We will continue to warn the PRC against providing military 
support to Russia, crack down on PRC entities engaged in 
harmful activities, and address the PRC's transnational 
repression including, as the ranking member mentioned, the 
overseas police stations designed to restrict the rights of 
Chinese diaspora.
    Almost done. We will continue to prevent the PRC's 
exploitation of U.S. technology to enable its own military 
modernization. We will continue--and I will be glad to answer 
questions--about working for peace and stability across the 
Taiwan Strait.
    We remain committed to our long-standing One China policy 
and oppose any unilateral changes to the cross strait status 
quo.
    Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's 
growing coercion. We will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining 
a sufficient self-defense capability. Through it all we have 
and will maintain open lines of communication so we can 
responsibly manage the competition between our countries.
    We do not seek conflict with the PRC. We believe in the 
power of diplomacy to prevent miscalculations that can lead to 
conflict.
    We are ready to work together where areas of cooperation 
are vital for our own interests, from climate and public health 
to food security, narcotics, and more, anywhere it can enhance 
U.S. interests and global peace and security.
    As President Biden said in his State of the Union, ``Today, 
we are in the strongest position in decades to compete with 
China or anyone else,'' adding that, ``winning the competition 
with China should,'' as the chairman and the ranking member has 
said, ``unite all of us.''
    With your bipartisan support, with the resources approved 
by this committee, as the chairman has challenged us on, we 
will stand unified in the face of this challenge.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Wendy Sherman

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: thank you for the opportunity 
to testify today and thank you for your consistent, bipartisan focus on 
our nation's approach to the People's Republic of China.
    The PRC is the pacing geopolitical challenge of our era--one that 
touches nearly every facet of our Department's leadership on a daily 
basis; one that will test American diplomacy like few issues in recent 
memory.
    The PRC is also the only competitor with the intent and the means 
to reshape the international order. We see proof of this point across 
the globe--in the PRC's provocative acts in the South China Sea; its 
human rights abuses in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang; its use of 
economic coercion; its threatening behavior against Taiwan; and more.
    Last week, the American people saw the latest example of that 
reality, after the United States Government detected, closely tracked, 
and ultimately shot down the PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon 
that had entered our territorial airspace in what was a clear violation 
of our sovereignty and international law.
    We worked swiftly and deliberately. We kept leaders and members of 
Congress up-to-fate and informed on the latest developments. We stayed 
in close touch with our allies. We communicated directly with PRC 
officials, making it clear that the presence of this surveillance 
balloon in our airspace was an unacceptable violation of our 
sovereignty and a breach of international law.
    On Saturday, at the President's direction, the U.S. military 
successfully brought down the balloon off the east coast. This was 
achieved without posing undue risk to American civilians under the 
balloon's path.
    We also took immediate steps to protect against the balloon's 
collection of sensitive information. Shooting the balloon down 
prevented it from returning to the PRC and enabled us to recover debris 
for investigation.
    I would make one additional note: while we took all necessary steps 
to protect sensitive information, the surveillance balloon's overflight 
of U.S. territory was of intelligence value to us. We were able to 
study and scrutinize the balloon and its equipment, and I look forward 
to briefing you further in a classified setting.
    Taking the surveillance balloon down was a lawful and deliberate 
action reaffirming our core priorities: we will always act responsibly 
and decisively to protect the safety and security of the American 
people. We will continue to answer the dangers posed by the PRC with 
determination and resolve. We will make clear to the PRC that 
violations of our sovereignty and the sovereignty of other countries 
are unacceptable.
    As you know, in the course of these developments, Secretary Blinken 
called Director Wang Yi and made clear that it would not be appropriate 
to visit Beijing at this time.
    From the start of this Administration, we have been clear-eyed 
about the challenge posed by the PRC. This unacceptable and 
irresponsible action put on full display what we've long recognized--
that the PRC has become more repressive at home and more aggressive 
abroad.
    It reinforced the need for us to double-down on our strategy: to 
never hesitate to defend U.S. interests and ideals, promote universal 
human rights, and stand up for the rules-based international order--and 
to keep reinvigorating the core pillars of our policies: ``Invest, 
Align, Compete.''
    Here's what that means: with your help, we are investing in the 
foundations of our strength on our shores, with funding from bills like 
the CHIPS and Science Act, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the 
Inflation Reduction Act.
    We are aligning with likeminded partners around the world to 
strengthen our shared interests and values--of democracy, openness, and 
fairness--and to address the challenges posed by the PRC.
    To that end, over the past 2 years, we have brought together the 
G7, and used it to drive outcomes on the world's most pressing 
problems. We have never been more aligned with our partners in Europe. 
We have deepened our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. We have invested in the Quad 
partnership with India, Australia, and Japan. We have advanced 
Transatlantic cooperation and democratic approaches to trade, 
technology, and security through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology 
Council (TTC).
    We have instructed our diplomats to engage on this challenge in the 
Indo-Pacific and in every region and on every continent. We have made a 
consistent and concerted effort to share information with our partners 
to reinforce the scale and scope of the threats posed by the PRC--and 
the necessity of our unity in confronting them.
    To be clear, we don't seek another Cold War. But we do ask that 
everyone play by the same set of rules. We want to ensure that all 
countries have the ability to make their own choices, free from 
coercion.
    Investing in ourselves and aligning with our partners gives us a 
stronger hand to compete with the PRC and push back against their 
aggressive military, diplomatic, and economic practices that seek to 
coerce other nations, distort markets, and undermine American workers 
and businesses.
    With the resources and authorities provided by this committee and 
the Congress, we will keep taking concrete actions to meet this moment.
    We will continue to oppose Beijing's unlawful acts in the South and 
East China Seas.
    We will continue to do everything possible to bring home unjustly 
detained American citizens.
    We will continue to make clear to the PRC that providing military 
support to Russia in its war against Ukraine, or systemic evasion of 
sanctions, would have significant consequences for its relationships 
with the United States and countries around the world.
    We will continue to support the people of Hong Kong, as they 
confront the steady erosion of their rights. Just 2 weeks ago, 
President Biden authorized a 2-year extension of Deferred Enforced 
Departure for Hong Kong residents in the U.S.
    We will continue to call out the egregious and unacceptable human 
rights violations in Tibet and Xinjiang and hold accountable those 
involved in these practices.
    We will continue to crack down on PRC entities engaged in harmful 
activities, such as those with ties to their military or those 
violating sanctions on Iran's oil industry or that support Russia's war 
against Ukraine.
    We will continue to work with allies and partners to address PRC 
transnational repression efforts, including the establishment of so-
called ``overseas police stations.'' These stations raise serious 
issues of respect for sovereignty and the rights and interests of 
Chinese diaspora communities around the world.
    We will continue to take decisive steps to prevent the PRC's 
exploitation of U.S. technology to enable its own military 
modernization. In October, this Administration imposed systematic and 
technology-specific restrictions on the PRC's ability to purchase and 
manufacture certain advanced semiconductors and related equipment. With 
the CHIPS and Science Act, we have more tools to build up the strength 
of our industry at home while protecting our technology across the 
globe.
    Finally, we will continue to maintain peace and stability across 
the Taiwan Strait, which the PRC's provocative behavior is undermining, 
and to support Taiwan in line with our longstanding policy.
    Our approach to Taiwan has been consistent across decades and 
administrations: we remain committed to our longstanding one China 
policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes 
to the cross-Strait status quo. But while our policy has not changed, 
what has changed is Beijing's growing coercion.
    In response, we will continue to deepen our unofficial relations 
with Taiwan, to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to 
assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability, to 
maintain our own capacity to resist any resort to force or forms of 
coercion that would threaten Taiwan, and to work with our allies and 
partners to underscore that peace and stability in the Strait is 
critical to regional and global security and prosperity.
    Even with everything already on our agenda, we know we must bring 
an elevated level of expertise to meet this challenge at the State 
Department. Thanks to bipartisan support from Congress, we are doing so 
with the launch of the China House, which opened its doors in December 
to guide a shift in how the State Department makes, manages, and 
messages policy on the PRC.
    This office will help us better coordinate efforts across our 
bureaus and our embassies worldwide. It will grow our capabilities to 
share information more quickly, sharpen our communications more 
effectively, and adapt to developments in real time. It will ensure 
that data and intelligence flow in all directions--moving back and 
forth between China House, our posts in the PRC, our bureaus at 
headquarters, and our diplomats throughout the globe.
    It will ensure that we see the PRC for what it is: a challenge that 
touches virtually every issue under the sun--security, trade, 
technology, human rights, and more.
    China House serves as a force multiplier for our Department's 
leadership on the PRC. It is a key piece of our broader modernization 
agenda, as we seek to apply the right resources to the big-picture 
issues of our time, from the PRC to cybersecurity and digital diplomacy 
to public health.
    For our country, the PRC is a generational challenge, and there is 
no higher priority at the State Department than answering it.
    We will compete vigorously with the PRC, while managing that 
competition responsibly. We will maintain open lines of communication, 
so we can keep miscalculations from veering into conflict and 
responsibly manage the competition between our countries.
    We do not seek conflict with the PRC, and we are ready to work 
together on areas where our cooperation is vital--from climate and 
public health to food security, narcotics, and more--to enhance U.S. 
interests and global prosperity and security.
    We bear no illusions about the road ahead. This competition will 
intensify. The stakes couldn't be higher.
    The commitment of this Administration--to upholding our interests 
and values, to collaborating with our partners, to defending global 
norms--will remain steadfast.
    There are few issues where bipartisan action is more critical. In 
coordination with this committee and with your colleagues across 
Capitol Hill, we are confident that we can sustain the resources and 
policies we need to compete with the PRC and fortify our country's 
position.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Ratner.

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                    DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Ratner. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on U.S. policy toward the PRC.
    The National Defense Strategy rightly identifies the PRC as 
the Defense Department's pacing challenge. This is because, as 
articulated in the Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, the 
PRC is, ``combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and 
technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the 
Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world's most influential 
power.''
    China's military is central to these aims. In fact, in 
recent years the PRC has increasingly turned to the PLA as an 
instrument of coercive statecraft in support of its global 
ambitions including by conducting more dangerous, coercive, and 
aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.
    In contrast to these revisionist goals, today I would like 
to provide an update on the steps we are taking with our allies 
and partners to advance an alternative vision of a free and 
open Indo-Pacific, a vision that is widely shared throughout 
the region and the world.
    In particular, I would like to highlight the steps we are 
taking, first, to strengthen our alliances capabilities, 
second, to develop a more distributed and resilient force 
posture, and third, to build stronger networks of like-minded 
allies and partners.
    Let me underscore the Department's view that today our 
deterrent is strong and that these efforts will play an 
essential role in sustaining and further strengthening 
deterrence in the years and decades ahead.
    I will say at the outset that 2023 has already been a 
groundbreaking year for U.S. alliances and partnerships in the 
Indo-Pacific.
    First, as it relates to alliance capabilities, with Japan 
we have expressed our support for Tokyo's decision to acquire 
new capabilities that will strengthen regional deterrence, 
especially counterstrike capabilities.
    Under AUKUS we remain encouraged by the significant 
progress we have made on developing the optimal pathway for 
Australia to acquire a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered 
submarine capability.
    Additionally, we are making significant investments in our 
defense ties with India to uphold a favorable balance of power 
in the Indo-Pacific, and we will continue to fulfill our 
commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and its principles, 
which include providing Taiwan with self-defense capabilities 
and maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force 
that jeopardizes the security of the people of Taiwan.
    Second, on force posture, DoD has recently announced major 
upgrades throughout the region that will make our force posture 
more mobile, more distributed, more resilient, and lethal.
    In December, with Australia, we announced several new force 
posture initiatives that increase our capabilities across a 
range of domains in Australia, including U.S. bomber task force 
rotations, fighter rotations, and future rotations of Navy and 
Army capabilities.
    Weeks later the United States and Japan announced the first 
U.S. forward deployment of a Marine littoral regiment to Japan, 
and just days ago Secretary Austin was in Manila, where the 
United States and the Philippines announced four new EDCA sites 
at strategic locations across the country.
    Third, on networking, despite PRC efforts to divide the 
United States from our allies and partners, DoD is focused on 
developing a constellation of coalitions to address emerging 
threats.
    That includes enhanced trilateral cooperation with Japan 
and Australia and with Japan and the Republic of Korea. It also 
includes our work in the Indo-Pacific with ASEAN, AUKUS, the 
Quad, and European allies.
    In closing, as I have done before, I will conclude today by 
noting, as you did, Mr. Chairman, the powerful bipartisan 
consensus that has emerged around the China challenge and the 
commensurate need for the U.S. Government to focus its time, 
energy, and resources on the Indo-Pacific region.
    It is my enduring belief that we should be vigilant in 
preserving and advancing a bipartisan approach which will 
remain fundamental to our ability to compete effectively 
against the PRC.
    Thank you for your time and attention today and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Dr. Ely Ratner

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members 
of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S. 
policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly identifies the PRC 
as the Department's ``pacing challenge.'' This is because, as 
articulated in the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, the PRC is 
``combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might 
as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to 
become the world's most influential power.'' China's military is 
central to these aims. In fact, in recent years, the PRC has 
increasingly turned to the PLA as an instrument of coercive statecraft 
in support of its global ambitions, including by conducting more 
dangerous, coercive, and aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.
    In contrast to these revisionist goals, today I would like to 
provide an update on the steps we are taking alongside Department of 
State colleagues with our allies and partners to advance an alternative 
vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region; a vision that is widely 
shared throughout the region and the world. This is the ``align'' 
pillar of the Administration's ``invest, align, compete'' China 
strategy. In particular, I would like to highlight the steps we are 
taking: First, to strengthen our alliance capabilities; second, to 
develop a more distributed, resilient, and lethal force posture; and 
third, to build stronger networks of likeminded allies and partners. 
Let me underscore the Defense Department's view that today our 
deterrent is strong, and that these efforts will play an essential role 
in sustaining and further strengthening deterrence in the years and 
decades ahead.
               strengthening ally and partner capability
    I'll say at the outset that 2023 has already been a groundbreaking 
year for U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.
    With Japan, we have expressed our support for Tokyo's decision to 
acquire new capabilities that will strengthen regional deterrence, 
especially counterstrike capabilities.
    Under AUKUS, we remain encouraged by the significant progress we've 
made on developing the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire a 
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. And we 
thank the Members of this Committee for their continued support of this 
initiative, which will reinforce deterrence and advance our shared 
vision for a free, open, and secure region.
    With the Republic of Korea, DoD and the Department of State joined 
in September in the Under Secretary-level Extended Deterrence Strategy 
and Consultation Group, a forum for comprehensive discussions on 
strategy and policy issues to strengthen Alliance deterrence on the 
Korean Peninsula and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Additionally, we are making significant investments in our defense 
ties with India to uphold a favorable balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific region. Earlier this month, the U.S. Government launched our 
inaugural technology initiative (iCET) with India, including in-depth 
discussions about opportunities for co-production of major defense 
platforms.
    Finally, we will continue to fulfill our commitments under the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which include providing Taiwan with self-
defense capabilities and maintaining our own capacity to resist any use 
of force that jeopardizes the security of the people of Taiwan. The TRA 
is backed by strong, bipartisan support and has formed the bedrock of 
peace, stability, and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait over the last 
four decades.
     developing a distributed, resilient, and lethal force posture
    DoD has also announced major upgrades throughout the region that 
will make our forward posture more distributed, resilient, and lethal. 
In just the past several months, we have seen that hard work come to 
fruition in several important ways.
    First, in December, Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken joined 
their Australian counterparts for the 2022 Australia-U.S. Ministerial 
Consultations, where they announced several new force posture 
initiatives to increase the rotational presence of our capabilities 
across a range of domains in Australia, including U.S. Bomber Task 
Force rotations, fighter rotations, and future rotations of U.S. Navy 
and U.S. Army capabilities.
    Weeks later in early January, Secretary Austin co-chaired the Japan 
2+2 ministerial meeting with Secretary Blinken, where the United States 
and Japan announced the first U.S. forward deployment of a Marine 
Littoral Regiment (MLR) to Japan. The MLR is the Marine Corps' most 
advanced formation, and it exemplifies how DoD is working with one of 
our closest regional allies to bolster deterrence and enhance our 
ability to respond rapidly to regional contingencies.
    Finally, just days ago, Secretary Austin was in Manila, where the 
United States and the Philippines announced four new Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) Annex sites at strategic locations across 
the country. This achievement will not only bolster U.S. rotational 
presence--it will also strengthen our combined ability to address a 
range of shared challenges across the Indo-Pacific region.
               networking likeminded allies and partners
    Meanwhile, despite PRC efforts to divide the United States from our 
allies and partners, DoD is developing a constellation of coalitions to 
address emerging threats.
    Trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and 
Australia represents one of our most advanced network of alliances. We 
invited Japan to participate in force posture initiatives in Australia, 
we held our first trilateral asset protection exercise, and we are 
expanding collaboration on research and development.
    With Japan and the Republic of Korea, we are continuing to enhance 
trilateral security cooperation and address common security challenges 
in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Finally, in addition to ongoing efforts with ASEAN, we are also 
working with a range of partners to bring greater transparency to the 
region, including through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime 
Domain Awareness (IPMDA). This initiative aims to provide space-based 
maritime domain awareness to countries across the region--including in 
Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Islands.
                  seeking open lines of communication
    Before I close, I would like to offer a brief word on DoD's belief 
in the importance of maintaining open and constructive lines of 
communication between the United States and the PRC in order to 
responsibly manage our relationship. On Saturday, February 4, 
immediately after taking action to down the PRC high-altitude 
surveillance balloon, the Department of Defense submitted a request for 
a call between Secretary Austin and PRC Minister of National Defense 
Wei Fenghe. Lines between our militaries are particularly important in 
moments like this. Unfortunately, the PRC has declined our request. Our 
commitment to open lines of communication and to responsibly managing 
the relationship will continue.
                               conclusion
    As I have done before, I'll conclude today by noting the powerful 
bipartisan consensus that has emerged around the China challenge and 
the commensurate need for the U.S. Government to refocus its time, 
energy, and resources on the Indo-Pacific region. It is my enduring 
belief that we should be vigilant in preserving and advancing a 
bipartisan approach, which will remain fundamental to our ability to 
compete effectively against the PRC.
    Thank you for your time and attention today, and I look forward to 
your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you both. We will start a series of 5-
minute rounds. We will go as long as we can.
    Let me start off, Madam Secretary.
    I view the China challenge as a multi-dimensional issue. It 
is not simply a simple economic competition, security, 
cultural. It goes across so many different dimensions and in so 
many different parts of the world.
    I look at that multi-dimensional challenge and, in my view, 
it is no secret that I believe that our diplomacy and 
resourcing lags when it comes to meeting China's investments in 
diplomacy.
    I will be asking OMB to--and the Administration to 
significantly staff up if we want to meet the China challenge. 
This is a huge dimension of what we need to meet.
    How is the Department looking at making sure that its 
operations and resourcing, particularly through staffing and 
personnel expertise, are sufficient to meet the diplomatic 
challenges we face with an increasing influential China around 
the world?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Could not agree with you more that the scale and scope of 
the challenge is enormous and as a result the Secretary of 
State asked me to take special responsibility, as you pointed 
out, for the organization and I want to thank this committee 
and the Congress for supporting us in launching what is the 
China Office of Coordination, better known as China House, in 
the Department.
    This is really a new matrix organization that is not just a 
rearrangement of the chairs at the State Department, but rather 
a way to make sure that we have a multi-dimensional, multi-
domain awareness, integration of everything we are doing around 
the world--that we not only have an integrated strategy towards 
China working with the interagency as well, but every single 
mission around the world has a bespoke China strategy because, 
as you pointed out, China is everywhere in the world.
    I run a China strategy group on a regular basis, bringing 
together all of those dimensions. I cannot give you specifics 
because we are still working on the FY24 budget to be released 
next month.
    You will see in the budget a deep and broad commitment and 
a significant increase in our resources for the Indo-Pacific, 
as you have long advocated for. In the FY23 budget, our foreign 
assistance reached $1.8 billion, a 50 percent increase from 
just 7 years ago.
    Yes, I would agree with you we are not where we need to be 
yet, but I believe we are changing our approach. To give you 
one specific example, in the Indo-Pacific and the Pacific 
Islands where, quite rightly, China has positioned itself, we 
have taken a very new and bold approach, again, with bipartisan 
support.
    We just opened an embassy in the Solomon Islands. We are 
working on posts and will be announcing them soon in Tonga and 
Kiribati. We are returning the Peace Corps to that part of the 
world.
    Every single place we have a bespoke approach. We are 
following through on those strategies and we are working on the 
resources to match that ambition.
    The Chairman. I look forward to seeing the budget proposal 
as a pursuit of that.
    Here is another dimension when we talk about multi-
dimensional. The PRC is pursuing new and alarming ways to 
influence and control the United Nations, including attempts to 
curtail or defund U.N. efforts to improve its human rights 
system.
    Recently in the U.N. Budget Committee the PRC led efforts 
with Russia to slash budgets for several key human rights 
investigative mechanisms.
    How is the Department pushing back against their systematic 
effort to subvert the ability of the United Nations human 
rights systems to confront abuses in China and beyond?
    Ms. Sherman. I think it is a very important point. It is 
why it was important for the United States to be able to rejoin 
the Human Rights Council and to engage in a much more effective 
way at the U.N.
    You are quite right, the Chinese operate in the U.N. system 
very effectively for years. They have put people in junior 
positions, which you simply can sign up for financially, and 
put people into slots and then those people move up the chain 
in the U.N. system.
    Our U.N. Ambassador, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, is very 
engaged in looking at all the ways that the Chinese have 
penetrated the U.N. system and figuring out with our 
international organization bureau ways to challenge all of 
that.
    I quite agree with you. We have a lot of work to do.
    The Chairman. If we could take--again, not to want to copy 
too many things from the Chinese----
    Ms. Sherman. Sure.
    The Chairman. --but we could definitely take a page from 
their book. They have systematically, methodically implemented 
their people in a way that ultimately leads them to have 
influence in a wide variety of cross sections of the U.N.
    That is not the only place--World Health Organization. I 
could go on and on.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    The Chairman. Finally, what is the Administration doing? 
Chinese imports of Iranian oil have exceeded 1 million barrels 
per day over the past 3 months. That relationship is mutually 
beneficial. Iran gets to export its oil despite U.S. sanctions 
and Beijing receives a steep discount.
    What is the Administration doing to increase the costs on 
China for helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions? How does it plan 
to make a measurable dent in Iran's oil exports to China and 
others such that Iran is not reaping the benefits of steady oil 
prices?
    Ms. Sherman. Excellent question. I do not have a full 
answer for you today, Mr. Chairman, but I will get back to you 
on that.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    The United States remains concerned about Iran's sanctions evasion 
activity, including activity involving the PRC. We regularly engage 
with the PRC and strongly discourage them from taking steps vis-a-vis 
Iran that contravene U.S. sanctions. Special Envoy for Iran Malley 
delivered this message to PRC Director General for Arms Control and 
Disarmament Sun in a February 1 phone call.
    On February 9, the United States sanctioned nine entities across 
multiple jurisdictions that have played a critical role in the 
production, sale, and shipment of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian 
petrochemicals and petroleum to buyers in East Asia. The United States 
has taken numerous actions against sanctions evaders around the world 
under the Biden administration, including several recent rounds of 
sanctions designations targeting Iran's petroleum and petrochemical 
trade.

    Ms. Sherman. What I will say is that we are working on 
sanctions evasion including by seeing what is happening to 
tankers around the world and taking actions that we can to 
interdict and stop those oil shipments and to sanction those 
companies that are undermining our sanctions regime around 
Iranian oil.
    I agree with you this is a problem and it is----
    The Chairman. I look forward to hearing back from you and 
the Administration.
    Listen, you do not hide a million barrels a day for the 
last 3 months and not know it is out there and it is happening 
and it is happening, largely, with impunity. A multi-
dimensional China challenge is another one, but it also 
involves Iran, which is also part of our target. We should be 
doing much better.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to pick up on a point that the chairman raised and 
that is we are all aware--you too and the Department is--of the 
intrusion of China all over the globe--different countries, 
different entities.
    The chairman mentioned the U.N. They have got a particular 
target for the U.N. to get involved there in every nook and 
cranny that they can.
    One that concerns me is they are doing a similar thing here 
in the United States at the colleges and universities and that 
went on for years pretty much under the radar with most people 
not knowing what was going on in the former what they called 
the Confucius Institutes on these campuses. Now, the first 
thing that happened is it stopped. The universities quit adding 
them and now they are actually dismantling them and there is 
getting to be less and less.
    Having said that, the Chinese now instead of going through 
the Confucius Institute are buying chairs in the various 
departments or they are funding research in places like that 
and, again, this goes widely unreported and occasionally it 
rears its head as we saw when we had a confirmation from a 
person from the University of Pennsylvania and I was staggered 
by the amount of money that China is putting into these 
universities.
    They are not doing it out of the goodness of their heart or 
to see that our universities are doing a good job. What kind of 
program--what kind of effort do you have in that regard to 
monitor that and do what is necessary to unwind that?
    Because it is--when this happens there is no doubt that 
those colleges and universities are going to get soft on China. 
They just are. Money has a way of doing that.
    Your thoughts on that, please?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
    As you point out, after peaking at a hundred Confucius 
Centers in 2018, there are now only about 15, and so putting a 
spotlight on these issues is very critical to putting pressure 
on universities to understand what is happening and what they 
are doing. I greatly appreciate the work that was done by this 
Congress and by the State Department to put a spotlight on the 
Confucius Centers.
    In addition, we are, in fact, doing the same thing, putting 
a spotlight where, in fact, there are other things you 
mentioned in your opening statement--police stations that are 
being created. One was closed down in New York.
    When I was in Europe recently, in every capitol where I 
know there are police stations. I have raised this issue and 
putting a spotlight on this. Asking governments, asking 
universities to take a look at what they are doing is critical.
    I do want to make one point, though, which I think we all 
have to be very careful of. We think that people-to-people 
exchanges are important. This Congress on a bipartisan basis 
has supported over the years people-to-people exchanges.
    We have, I think, over 290,000 Chinese students who come to 
American universities. We are very careful about looking at 
visas and making sure that in strategic departments where it 
might influence or create a problem for national security we do 
not have those students come, but it is very important that we 
not close down these people-to-people exchanges.
    On the other hand, we only have about, I think, 385 
Americans who are studying in China and we probably need to do 
something to increase the number of Americans who are willing 
to study in China.
    The final thing I would say is we all know that anti-Asian 
American hate has increased and we have to be very careful as 
we put a spotlight on China that we not increase hate against 
Asian Americans.
    It has led, as we have all seen, to horrifying 
circumstances in our country and we need to make sure that does 
not happen as we, in fact, crack down on exactly the kinds of 
things that you have outlined, Senator.
    Thank you.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate those thoughts.
    We have asked for that list about what the Taiwanese are 
asking for. Do you know anything about that? Is that in your 
wheelhouse about the----
    Ms. Sherman. What the Taiwanese are asking for in what 
sense?
    Senator Risch. In materials. Military materials.
    Ms. Sherman. Oh, sure. Jessica Lewis, who----
    Senator Risch. We know Jessica.
    Ms. Sherman. I know you know Jessica well--is the Assistant 
Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, and last year we 
notified 13 different sales to Taiwan, including 10 new sales, 
three amendments to previously notified sales.
    It represents the largest single number of notifications 
for Taiwan in the last 20 years. These included F-16 munitions, 
spare parts for the Taiwan Air Force, Army and Navy's existing 
capabilities and continued support for Taiwan's radar program.
    Since 2010 we have notified Congress of over $37 billion in 
arms sales to Taiwan, including more than $21 billion since 
2019.
    We think this is quite critical. We believe we need to help 
them in asymmetric weapons capabilities, help them train and 
integrate their reserves, make sure that they have mobile and 
agile systems, and this is what Jessica is very focused on to 
make sure that Taiwan has what it needs.
    I do not know whether Dr. Ratner would like to add 
something from the defense point of view on this.
    Senator Risch. Briefly, because my time is up.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I will just echo what Secretary 
Sherman said.
    We are extremely focused on understanding and communicating 
with Taiwan about what specific articles--defensive articles 
they need for their defense and for deterrence, and we are 
laser focused on that with all of the attention and urgency it 
deserves.
    Senator Risch. Thanks to both you. I do want to underline 
that in September of last year we wrote a letter asking some 
specific questions about what the Taiwanese were asking for and 
what it had given.
    If you would dig that out and see if we could get an answer 
to that it would be very helpful.
    Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 
appreciate you raising the challenge of resources at the State 
Department right now.
    A quick example of how this plays out in reality. Prior to 
the pandemic, I was in Dublin and our embassy there told me 
that in the lead up to my visit there had been a dramatic 
infusion of Chinese diplomatic personnel to their embassy 
there.
    The reason was there was a pending telecommunications 
tender in Ireland at the time and the Chinese were able to send 
in literally dozens of individuals to help Huawei compete.
    We were represented in our embassy by a very capable 
defense attache, but we did not have the ability as the Chinese 
did to be as nimble in making sure that we are supporting our 
efforts, to make sure that it is Western companies and Western 
technology that is ultimately being able to keep pace with 
Chinese technologies. Just another example about how our 
resources just do not match Chinese resources now and I 
appreciate the chairman for making that a priority.
    I am trying to sneak in one question for each of you. I 
wanted to talk to you, Secretary Sherman, about the challenge 
of fentanyl.
    We saw in 2019 that things changed. China had been the 
primary driver of illicit fentanyl and related equipment into 
the United States. China made some decisions internally and the 
pace of that trade changed, but it just moved. All of a sudden 
the precursor and the equipment was moving to Mexico.
    We had had a collaboration with China that we do not have 
today and it has not resumed since the President's meeting with 
Xi.
    Can you talk about how we can rebuild this cooperation if 
cooperation is, indeed, the way to go and what practical effect 
did the 2020 designations of a few forensic institutes and 
laboratories in China have on our ability to work together on 
this challenge?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, I suspect that every single one of us 
knows a parent who has lost a child to an overdose. I certainly 
do.
    This is an incredibly high priority for the President, as 
you heard in the State of the Union, an incredibly high 
priority for Secretary Blinken, and certainly will be when he 
does get back to meeting in Beijing, which we will do when we 
think conditions are right. This will be a topic of 
conversation.
    Previously, as you noted, the PRC agreed to impose class-
wide controls on fentanyl in 2019, which brought direct 
shipments to the United States to almost zero, but we still 
continue to see PRC precursor chemicals, which are quite 
concerning, being used in illicit fentanyl production and, as 
you noted, we are now seeing fentanyl come in through Mexico.
    We have engaged not only Mexico, but other countries to put 
pressure on China and other countries where there are precursor 
chemicals in not only fentanyl, but methamphetamine and other 
illicit synthetic drugs.
    This is a really terrible problem. We are taking a laser-
focus on organizing an international effort to stop this.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Secretary Ratner, a short question for you.
    Recently, U.S. Air Force General Mike Minihan suggested in 
a memo to his troops that, ``My gut tells me we will fight 
China in 2025. I hope I am wrong.'' This kind of rhetoric 
around the U.S.-China relationship, it undermines rather than 
furthers our goal of avoiding war. We want to be ready for 
conflict, but our goal is to avoid war.
    Two questions. One, do you believe that China has made the 
decision to pursue reunification with Taiwan through force? 
And, two, do you believe that armed conflict between the United 
States and China is, as this general suggested, inevitable?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, as Secretary Austin has now said 
repeatedly, he and the Department do not believe that an 
invasion of Taiwan is imminent or inevitable. That continues to 
be our assessment.
    The Department is laser-focused on maintaining deterrence 
today, tomorrow, and into the future and we are going to 
continue working with our allies and partners to do what is 
necessary to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you both for being here. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    I want to get a little broader because I think it is 
important to understand sort of the strategic vision behind our 
tactics on everything that we do.
    If we go back to the late eighties, early nineties, end of 
the Cold War, the gamble at the time was if we created this 
international economic order led by the U.S. and the West built 
on this global commitment to free trade and commerce would bind 
nations together via trade, via commerce, international 
interest, and economic interests, that it would lead to more 
wealth and prosperity, that it would lead to democracy and 
freedom, basically, domestic changes in many countries, and 
that it would ultimately ensure peace.
    The famous saying now seems silly, that no two countries 
with McDonald's in them have ever gone to war. That is 
obviously no longer the case.
    The point being is that that was the notion behind it. It 
was what the then Secretary General or Director General of the 
WTO called that world without walls, rules-based international 
order. Others call it globalization. Basically, our foreign 
policy has been built around that. Even though it is an 
economic theory, basically, it is what we have built our 
foreign policy on.
    I think it is now fair to say that--we admitted China to 
the World Trade Organization, Russia as well--I think it is now 
fair to say that while wealth certainly increased, particularly 
in China through its export-driven economy--a massive, 
historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that 
regard--I do not think we can say either China or Russia are 
more democratic.
    In fact, they are more autocratic. I do not think we can 
say that they are more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now 
twice and the Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the 
coast of Taiwan.
    I think it is fair to say that gamble failed and I think 
the President actually hinted at some of that in his speech the 
other night--and we are now entering a new era.
    What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world 
in which not just the global international order and world 
without walls did not pacify or buy nations, but, in fact, have 
now placed us into situations where autocracies through a joint 
communique are openly signaling that we need to reject Western 
visions of democracy and the like.
    Before we can talk about what we are going to do, we have 
to understand what our strategic vision is. What is the 
strategic vision of this Administration on what the new order 
of the world is?
    Secretary Sherman?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator Rubio, that is a----
    Senator Rubio. Can you answer that in 2 minutes and 30? 
Yes.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes. I was going to say that is a really 
profound question that I probably cannot fully answer in 2 
minutes and 30 seconds.
    Let me say this. I think we all hoped for that vision, but 
what changed is that Xi Jinping is not the Xi Jinping of the 
1990s that we all thought we knew. He is a man, as the 
President, as the Secretary, as the Secretary of Defense has 
said, is the pacing challenge, the only country that wants to 
change that rules-based order that can successfully do so and 
are trying to make that happen.
    It is true that our way of life, our democracy, our belief 
in our values, in the rules-based international order, is being 
challenged and we have to meet that challenge and I believe we 
can meet that challenge by, as the President discussed in the 
State of the Union, making sure we invest in our own country, 
which is why the bipartisan support for the CHIPS Act, for the 
infrastructure bill, what we are doing in the Inflation 
Reduction Act--all of the bipartisan efforts that have taken 
place here in Congress are essential to making sure we can 
invest in our own country to be able to meet that competitive 
need.
    Second, that we align with our partners and allies. When 
President Biden began his presidency, he said that it was 
critical to reinvest in those partnerships and alliances and it 
is paying off because we are putting forward those values. Look 
at what is happening in our pushing back against Russia in 
Ukraine.
    Finally, we have to be ready to compete, which is why we 
have to look at supply chains and make sure we either can 
produce things here in our own country or we can do it with 
partners or allies that ensure we have the resilience and the 
redundancy we need to meet this challenge.
    It is, above all else, a challenge about our values and it 
is why the President really ended his State of the Union 
speaking about democracy, what it means, how we have to show 
what that means here at home, and what it means around the 
world.
    Senator Rubio. All right. I only have 10 seconds left.
    Secretary Ratner, a real quick question. I am going to ask 
you about invasion of Taiwan. Very simple. Is there any way 
that we end this decade without China doing something about 
Taiwan one way or the other? Is there any way you can envision 
getting to the end of this decade without China wanting to do 
something about Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, wanting to is quite different than 
doing it so which--I think they have intention, but absolutely 
I think we can get to the end of this decade without them 
committing major aggression against Taiwan.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both 
of you for your testimony today.
    Madam Secretary, great to see you. I want to follow up on 
some of the things you just spoke about as well as in your 
testimony, which is that we know China has the ambition of 
becoming the dominant country and self-sufficient in key 
leading-edge technologies and they have a plan to do it. They 
have their 10-year plan and they try to follow those plans.
    I agree with you and with the President that the number-one 
thing we need to do is get our house in order here at home. The 
CHIPS and Science Act was a very important piece of 
legislation.
    The CHIPS piece, as you know, is funded. We need to fully 
fund the science part of the CHIPS and Science Act to maintain 
our competitive edge.
    At the same time we need to do everything we can to prevent 
the most sensitive high-end technologies that are--that 
originate in the United States or with our partners from 
falling into China's hands in a way that they can use them, 
incorporate them in their military.
    I do want to applaud the Administration for its efforts. 
You mentioned in your testimony the October 2022 rules 
prohibiting the export of U.S.-origin technologies. That is an 
important step.
    I strongly supported the prior Administration's efforts 
with regard to Huawei. What the Biden administration has done 
is really expand that not just from one company, but across the 
board. It is very sensitive technologies.
    I also want to applaud you for the agreement that is either 
finalized or in shape with respect to preventing the export of 
high-end manufacturing equipment for semiconductors that we are 
reaching with Japan and the Netherlands. That is an important 
part.
    Obviously, the success of a strategy to prevent our most 
sensitive U.S.-origin technologies from going to China relies 
on our partners. It also relies on our partners who have also 
developed technologies from agreeing not to export their most 
sensitive technologies.
    That one example we just--I just mentioned is a good case, 
but obviously to be successful we need to do this across the 
board--our EU partners, our other democratic partners in East 
Asia, and elsewhere.
    Can you talk about the progress we are making in enlisting 
help from those countries?
    Ms. Sherman. A very critical subject. I thank all of you 
for your support when it comes to what we have done to make 
sure that sensitive technologies here do not find their way to 
China.
    I think we are also looking at a pilot, potentially, on 
outbound investment as well of sensitive technologies and that 
is something that we are continuing to discuss and will consult 
with all of you on Capitol Hill before we go forward should we 
go forward, but I think it is important.
    Early on, my first trip as Deputy Secretary of State was to 
Brussels to launch the U.S.-EU-China dialogue. Out of 
conversations we also began Indo-Pacific consultations with the 
EU. We have made a lot of progress in that regard.
    I think we are really together in a way we have not been 
before on China writ large and Taiwan specifically, which was a 
topic that the EU did not want to talk about at first and now 
it is in every document. Whether it is the G-7 or the EU or 
NATO, China is now a strategic component of every discussion 
that we have.
    The TTC--the Trade and Technology Council--that is led by 
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce is laser-
focused on technology. The Secretary in his modernization of 
the State Department with your support--bipartisan support--has 
stood up a cyber and digital policy bureau and an emerging tech 
envoy because we understand this arena is the future.
    I think we are making good progress with allies and 
partners around the world, but it is very painstaking work, but 
critical.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes. If I could--well, thank you.
    No, I appreciate the recognition of the urgency of this 
matter and I know you are working on it because getting this 
right is key to the success. If you are trying to prevent the 
export of key technologies, one hole in the boat can ruin the 
whole enterprise.
    I do want to mention a bill that I authored with former 
Senator Ben Sasse called Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property 
that gives the executive branch many more tools to go after 
those who steal U.S. technologies. A report is due on that in 
180 days, so I look forward to receiving that from you as 
another part of this strategy, going forward, and look forward 
to it.
    Another case--the critical minerals piece, obviously, is 
another big piece and supply chains, but I am out of time.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to 
move quickly. Got a lot to cover here.
    Deputy Secretary Sherman, my first question is going to be 
directed to you, and welcome. The 7-day Chinese spy balloon 
incident was one of the most visible, persistent, and egregious 
violations of U.S. sovereignty and airspace since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.
    It was shocking for me to see in real time the Chinese spy 
balloon fly with impunity over the states that are home to some 
of America's most sensitive military and nuclear weapon sites, 
including my home state of Tennessee, but the Chinese Communist 
Party is also responsible for less visible, but nevertheless 
deadly violations of American sovereignty that are taking place 
every day.
    I am talking about China's exportation of fentanyl chemical 
precursors. The CDC found that over 100,000 Americans died of 
drug overdoses in 2021. The vast majority of those deaths, over 
71,000, are deaths from fentanyl.
    The DEA has reported that China is a primary source of the 
fentanyl-related substances that are trafficked directly into 
the United States.
    My first question, Deputy Secretary Sherman, since taking 
office how many sanctions designations has the Biden 
administration imposed on Chinese entities that are involved in 
the manufacture and exportation of fentanyl precursors that are 
annually killing over 71,000 Americans, including children?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, I will have to get back to you on the 
specific number of sanctions and what those sanctions have 
been, but I----
    Senator Hagerty. I will look forward to getting that 
number, Secretary Sherman.
    Ms. Sherman. Sure.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    The Department of State is committed to continued close 
collaboration with the Department of the Treasury in support of 
Executive Order 14059 and other sanctions programs targeting the 
fentanyl supply chain. Since the issuance of Executive Order 14059 in 
December 2021, the Department provided concurrence to the Department of 
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control on 31 fentanyl related 
designations. A majority of these designations focused on targets in 
Mexico and the PRC. For further specifics on designation numbers, we 
recommend that questions be directed to the Department of the Treasury.

    Senator Hagerty. I am today interested in what the State 
Department is doing to hold China accountable and I want to 
flag for you something that is quite disturbing.
    On January 30 of this year, when the United States imposed 
sanctions against Mexican drug lords, the Treasury Department's 
press release called out a major drug lord for importing 
``precursor chemicals from China into Mexico, which are then 
used to manufacture synthetic drugs, including fentanyl.''
    The Treasury Department's press release even named the 
Chinese entity that is involved in the illicit fentanyl trade. 
I have got a copy of that press release right here that I would 
like to enter into the record, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Without objection.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Hagerty. In contrast, Secretary of State Blinken's 
press statement on these same sanctions completely omitted any 
mention of China or Chinese entities. This was a missed 
opportunity, in my mind, for the State Department to publicly 
hold China accountable for their fentanyl precursors.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter the second statement as 
well from the Department of State that fails to mention China 
at all.
    Senator Kaine. So ordered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Hagerty. Deputy Secretary Sherman, why did the 
State Department omit any mention of China in the Secretary of 
State's press release statement on the fentanyl sanctions 
against Mexican drug lords?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, as I said earlier, Secretary Blinken 
makes the ending of this horrible, horrible ability to kill 
Americans over. He certainly would have had this as a key topic 
in his meetings in Beijing and at some point. When we believe 
the conditions are right we will be going to Beijing, but----
    Senator Hagerty. I will reclaim my time again, Deputy 
Secretary Sherman. A lot to cover here.
    Communist China is a state sponsor of fentanyl----
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Senator Hagerty. --and I am gravely concerned that the 
State Department omitted mentioning China for these fentanyl 
sanctions because the Secretary of State wanted to have this 
trip to Beijing. They did not want to infuriate Xi Jinping.
    Ms. Sherman. Absolutely not the case. Absolutely not the 
case, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. News reports that you run the State 
Department's biweekly PRC strategy group that oversees the 
State Department's China policy decisions and I feel like you 
missed a great opportunity here by pulling back on a chance to 
mention the fentanyl sanctions, to publicly hold China 
accountable for its role in the fentanyl scourge that is 
killing children in America.
    When you add the recent news reports that the Biden 
administration did not cancel Secretary Blinken's trip to 
Beijing until 5 or 6 days after learning about the Chinese spy 
balloon's initial violation of our U.S. sovereignty, it is just 
not a good look and it does not inspire confidence.
    I think the Administration can do a better job of holding 
China accountable. I appreciate your expertise in moving in 
that direction.
    I would like to go to a different topic now, Taiwan. I was 
proud to contribute to, support, and vote for Chairman 
Menendez's law in the FY23 NDAA known as the Taiwan Enhanced 
Resilience Act, but time is not on our side. The United States 
has roughly $19 billion backlogged in annual arms sales--in 
arms sales to Taiwan and at a recent public event, CIA director 
William Burns said that the United States knows ``as a matter 
of intelligence that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has 
ordered China's military to be capable of conducting an 
invasion of Taiwan by 2027.''
    Chairman Menendez's Taiwan law annually authorizes as much 
as $2 billion in grants of foreign military financing to Taiwan 
between now and 2027.
    Deputy Secretary Sherman and Assistant Secretary Ratner, do 
you support the full implementation of Menendez's laws--the 
Menendez law's $2 billion in annual grants of foreign military 
financing to Taiwan?
    I would just appreciate a yes or no answer.
    Ms. Sherman. I certainly think we have to look at every way 
possible to make sure that we meet the needs of Taiwan. I think 
you all are aware that there are production and delivery delays 
worldwide and reviewing those systems and talking to the 
private sector about those long lead production timelines and 
delivery delays because they are affecting all our FMS 
partners, not just Taiwan.
    Senator Hagerty. I understand. I just want to know if you 
support this move. Is that a yes?
    Ms. Sherman. I believe we need to look at every single 
option we have.
    Senator Hagerty. Mr. Ratner, can you answer me yes or no on 
this?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, the Department was clear that any 
authorization in the National Defense Authorization Act should 
be met with an appropriation as it relates to Taiwan security 
support.
    Senator Hagerty. Chairman Menendez's Taiwan law also 
authorizes a billion dollars annually and presidential drawdown 
authority for Taiwan. My next question to the two of you----
    Senator Kaine. Senator Hagerty, you are about 50 seconds 
over your time.
    Senator Hagerty. Oh, thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I will come back to this.
    I would just like to say that China is a serious and 
comprehensive threat to Taiwan and I just want to see us do 
everything we can to learn the lessons that we learned in 
Ukraine, to make them tough, to make this--to deter what might 
happen.
    Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Sherman. We agree.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you to the witnesses.
    I want to ask a question that has sort of a Virginia tie to 
it. China has one of the most sophisticated global campaigns of 
repression against dissidents around the world of any nation 
and, in particular, the FBI has warned that China is conducting 
a global campaign to target Uyghur human rights activists.
    The Uyghur community in Virginia is one of the largest in 
the United States and we have a number of constituents who have 
been engaged in Uyghur human rights issues who have been 
targeted and harassed here, but also find their family members 
still living in the Xinjiang area affected.
    What is the United States Government, particularly the 
State Department, doing to make sure that the authoritarian 
reach of China against people living in the United States is 
limited?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, one of the things that we have 
immediately done working with the FBI is to look at the police 
stations that China is creating here and around the world.
    New York's police station, so to speak, was closed down. 
These are not police stations at all. What they are, are 
policing the diaspora Uyghurs and others in the Chinese orbit, 
harassing them, putting them at great risk.
    We are working with law enforcement here very closely to 
make sure that China cannot reach into the United States and 
harass and further undermine the human rights of Uyghurs, 
ethnic minorities, and Chinese and Chinese Americans.
    Senator Kaine. The Chinese do--actually have imprisoned a 
number of the family members of American residents who have 
advocated for Uyghur human rights. What is the U.S. Government 
doing to try to intercede on behalf of those unjustly 
imprisoned in China?
    Ms. Sherman. The Secretary of State and I have met with all 
of the families or a group of the families that are quite 
concerned about this and concerned about their family members, 
and when we have met with the Chinese or communicated with the 
Chinese we have raised these cases.
    In some instances families do not want us to raise the 
cases because they are afraid it will target their family 
members so we are really guided by what the families want, but 
we will try to do whatever we possibly can, and I have to tell 
you meeting with those Uyghur families just as when we meet 
with all of the families of those detained in China or held in 
exit bans in China are some of the hardest meetings I have to 
do.
    Senator Kaine. Let me switch topics.
    The title of today's hearing is ``Evaluating U.S.-China 
Policy in an Era of Strategic Competition,'' and I think we all 
know the competition is intense across multiple fronts and in 
many areas it is more than competition. China is an adversary.
    One of the things that we probably should do for our own 
good and for the good of the world is seek other areas of 
cooperation because it would benefit the world greatly if they 
could see as tough as this competition and even adversarial 
relationship is, there is at least enough communication to 
recognize on some small set of issues the need to find common 
cause and work together. That would be good for the United 
States, good for China, but it would be good for the world to 
see that too in terms of sending a stability message.
    What are areas--as you stand up China House and run U.S.-
China policy--what are areas that might be most likely to find 
some cooperation for the good of our countries and the good of 
the world?
    Ms. Sherman. The ones that we talk about the most, starting 
with the one that Senator Hagerty mentioned, which is counter 
narcotics, which is quite critical for all the reasons that he 
said, that others and that Ranking Member Risch raised as well, 
working on climate. Quite frankly, we cannot meet the challenge 
on climate unless China is working with the rest of the world.
    I am glad that they have reopened communications between 
their envoy and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John 
Kerry. I hope that that conversation can continue even in this 
difficult time.
    We have talked about working together on global health, 
which may sound sort of strange given that the Chinese have 
been very protective of their data and genomic sequencing on 
COVID-19. I know there is great concern up here about the 
origins of COVID-19, which remains not resolved yet by the 
intelligence community.
    I urge any briefings you might want on that to have with 
the intelligence community, but I do think we have to work 
together on global health because we are going to see more 
pandemics and we need to be working together in this regard.
    Those are three and, of course, people-to-people exchanges, 
ways that we can have our folks safely know each other in a 
better way because we do not seek conflict with the Chinese 
people.
    We do many things and have discovered things together in 
our scientific community where it is in our security interest 
to do so. We have to be careful, thoughtful, but nonetheless I 
hope that we can engage in people-to-people exchanges 
appropriately.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you.
    Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. Ms. Sherman, it is estimated that between 5 
million and 18 million people died from COVID-19 worldwide. To 
a significant number of scientists the evidence suggests that 
this originated from a lab leak in Wuhan. Does the State 
Department fund coronavirus research in China?
    Ms. Sherman. Do we fund coronavirus? I do not believe so, 
but I do not know. I will double check and we will get back to 
you on that, Senator.
    Senator Paul. The answer is yes, you do, and it has been 
going on for more than a decade and it is done through a 
program called PREDICT, and in the Global Virome, and why this 
is important is we had a million Americans die and we really 
have not had any discussion of this. No hearings. Nothing. 
People are unaware that they are even funding the research.
    We found out recently through the House unclassified report 
that money was going from the NIH to American universities to 
the Academy of Military Medical Sciences Research in China. We 
are subcontracting money and sending it over, but millions is 
coming from the State Department.
    The idea is this. We will identify all the viruses in the 
world. We will be safer because we identified them, but here is 
the question. Are we safer to have some guy or some woman 
crawling down a cave 10 hours away from Wuhan, coming up with 
bat guano, coming up with viruses, and bringing it to a city of 
15 million like Wuhan?
    This is what has been going on for a decade. It is a setup 
for an accident, it is a setup for a mistake, and nobody is 
doing anything about it. We continue to fund it.
    The main group that has been getting this money is 
EcoHealth Watch, over $100 million, a lot of it through the 
State Department. They continue to get money. They do not file 
their reports on time. They did not stop their experiments, and 
yet, we reward them with more money.
    Fifteen million people died and we have not done a thing 
about it. Nobody seems to care. We are not even sure we fund 
it. The State Department is a big funder of this project. It is 
a multi-decade long project, but there are scientists as we 
speak from Stanford, from MIT, from prestigious universities 
around the country--these are not partisans, most of them are 
not Republicans--who stand up and say, oh, my God, what are we 
doing, bringing these viruses from remote bat caves to major 
metropolitan areas and with no controls over this?
    We have been asking for information from the State 
Department because we want to know more about this. U.S. Right-
to-Know has been sending FOIA requests for 2 and a half years 
and they do not get anything.
    Mr. Chairman, I have sent two letters--some of them are 6 
months old now--and we get a whatever, we are not going to give 
you any information.
    What I would hope for is that we could have--people always 
talk about bipartisanship--could we not get bipartisan support 
for records? This is not partisan. We want to know what the 
U.S. State Department is funding. NIH resists our requests on 
their funds.
    The two things that we know for certain that have led us to 
believe this came from the lab that are big came because one 
was leaked, and this was a DARPA request. The Chinese 
researchers in China wanted from DARPA money to create a virus 
that guess what, looks exactly like COVID-19. They asked for it 
in 2018. We turned them down. Fortunately, we did the right 
thing for once. We turned them down. That does not mean they 
did not do the research.
    Many scientists had an ``a-ha'' moment. They saw this and 
they said, oh, my goodness, they asked for money to create 
something that looks almost exactly what we got.
    In nature, you do not have coronaviruses that infect people 
that have what is called a furin cleavage site. Chinese said, 
give us money. We are going to stick a furin cleavage site to 
allow it to infect humans more.
    We found out that not because you let us know or not 
because the NIH let us know. They still resist. This is top 
secret. This is classified. This is the whole problem of 
classification, but it is also to cover up things. We do not 
know anything about 2018, but we had an illegal leak. They went 
to somebody in the media that is now public that said the 
Chinese wanted to create a virus just like COVID-19 in 2018.
    The other thing we know is three researchers in the Wuhan 
lab and the Wuhan Institute of Virology got very sick with flu-
like symptoms similar to COVID in November. We only know that, 
though, because the Trump administration on the way out 
declassified it.
    We have to get over all the classification. We also have to 
be more forthcoming, and I am hoping the chairman will consider 
looking at our request. These are not partisan.
    We want to know all the information about funding of 
research in China. We want to know the interactions. There were 
cables going back and forth between the State Department 
saying, holy cow, they are not wearing gloves. They do not wear 
masks in doing this research. They are doing it in what is 
called a BSL-2 as opposed to a BSL-4.
    Most of the research that we think escaped was not done in 
the appropriate lab and the State Department knew about it, but 
we have had no hearings about this. They refuse to give us 
information. Fifteen million people died, a million Americans 
died, and you will not give us information.
    What I would ask is look at our request. This is not 
partisan. This should be about discovering the origins of this. 
The scientific community is about 50/50 now and I would hope 
that--we suspect the Chinese of not being honest and 
withholding information, but it is sad that the U.S. Government 
is withholding information from its representatives.
    Ms. Sherman. I will take back your request. Again, Senator, 
I would urge a briefing, perhaps in a SCIF, with the 
intelligence community on this because, as you know, there is 
not a single view about this particular set of issues, but I 
understand your desire to understand what occurred.
    Senator Paul. We are asking you for unclassified 
information that you hold, not intel.
    Ms. Sherman. I understand that.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
welcome to both of you and thank you for the work that you are 
doing.
    I want to echo Tim Kaine's concern about transnational 
repression. The Congressional Executive Commission on China, 
which I chaired the last 2 years, has done a lot of work on 
this and it has just been such an expansion.
    I just want to mention people like the American citizen, 
Gulshan Abbas, whose sister, a Uyghur doctor, continues to 
serve a 20-year sentence for the crime of participating in a 
terrorist organization, meaning that she is being retaliated 
against because her sister here in the United States is an 
advocate for human rights.
    I do not see how we can tolerate a relationship in which 
the Chinese are targeting American citizens. They are not the 
only ones, but they are the biggest perpetrator of this and 
every other country is looking at this and going, can we adopt 
this model as well.
    I know the State Department, Secretary Sherman, is taking 
this seriously, but I want to mention a couple things.
    One is that there has to be a sense that other diplomatic 
efforts with China all have to involve saying this 
transgression against people in the U.S. is a red line and I 
just do not feel we have elevated it to that.
    Second of all, I spoke with the FBI about creating a 
particular tip line specifically for transnational repression 
or specifically from China because the FBI wants people to call 
their general tip line and then they have been referred to a 
most wanted tip line. It is, like, no, you have got to have 
people who speak Chinese, who understand the culture, who 
understand this history, who we can circulate that connection 
where they know that they are going to have an experienced 
individual on the other end of the line who can work with them 
and not get them into more trouble, not endanger, if you will, 
their folks--their relatives back home more.
    If we want to truly understand the scope of what China is 
doing, we have to have much better feedback from the Chinese 
community and we are not going to get it through just a 
generalized FBI tip line.
    I just wanted to mention that, and say I think this is 
something that I would like to persuade the Department to 
pursue, that I think would be helpful in understanding the 
scope and starting to address it in an effective manner.
    I will just pause and see if you would like to share any 
comment on this.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you. We quite agree that transnational 
repression is a terrible, terrible situation for so many and, 
as I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State and I met with 
families here in America who are concerned about their Uyghur 
families abroad as well as the fact that families are repressed 
in Xinjiang because of advocacy by family members here in the 
United States.
    We raise these issues with the Chinese in every appropriate 
meeting that we can. We are working hard to shut down so-called 
police stations, which really go after the diaspora here and 
Chinese-American citizens.
    I think your suggestion about the tip line will certainly 
go back to law enforcement. We work very closely with the FBI, 
which shut down the police station in New York. These are very 
tough issues, but I understand your concern for them. It is 
quite horrible.
    Senator Merkley. We are absolutely not going to get a sense 
of the scope of the problem if people are directed to some 
generalized criminal line. That does not work. You cannot 
publicize that among the human rights community and have people 
trust it or feel.
    Secretary Ratner, I want to turn to military deconfliction 
with China, and deconfliction is extremely important when you 
have tensions with another country. We went all through this 
for many years with the Soviet Union over the concerns of 
especially the risks of nuclear war, but we cannot have 
deconfliction if the other side will not pick up the phone. How 
are we doing in deconfliction? I assume we have some recent 
evidence from having responded to the balloon over the United 
States.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator Merkley, thank you for your question.
    It is a really important one, and Secretary Austin has said 
repeatedly how important it is that we have open lines of 
communication between the United States military and our 
counterparts in China. That is because we need to communicate 
our priorities. It is because our militaries need to be having 
serious conversations about strategic issues like space and 
cyber and nuclear weapons.
    Senator Merkley. All very important, but my question is how 
are we doing on that. How are the Chinese responding? Are they 
open to it? Have we built better lines or is it really still a 
big problem?
    Dr. Ratner. It remains a problem, Senator. We have--
Secretary Austin has met with his counterpart face-to-face both 
at the Shangri La Dialogue last year in Singapore and again in 
Cambodia in November.
    However, over the last several months the PLA has continued 
to view the mil-mil relationship as something that they turn on 
and off to express displeasure with other things that are 
happening in the relationship.
    We think that is really dangerous. We continue to have an 
outstretched hand including immediately following the downing 
of the balloon and unfortunately to date, the PLA is not 
answering that call.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. As I had announced earlier, we are going to 
at some point have to close the hearing a little early because 
of the joint briefing that will take place which the Secretary 
has to be at.
    Right now, I have Senator Young next and then Senator 
Cardin, assuming no one comes next and maybe we will try to get 
to Senator Romney and that probably will be it.
    We welcome, as I did earlier, Senator Scott to the 
committee, who is playing his role as ranking member on the 
Banking Committee and that is why he was not here earlier.
    Welcome, again.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our 
panelists for being here today.
    I would like to change gears a bit, discuss economic 
coercion. As I know our panelists understand, China has 
effectively weaponized the economic interdependence that the 
world economy has on their workshop of the world, as we 
colloquially have been calling it.
    They have been intimidating multinational firms, denying 
market access, and retaliation for even mere utterances from 
world leaders, and engaging in all manner of other activities 
to apply pressure, especially to smaller island nations 
throughout the Asia Pacific.
    The obvious goal here is to intimidate these various 
countries and to give them a choice--either they can 
accommodate the desires of the Chinese Communist Party, they 
can facilitate their ability to realize geopolitical ends 
through this economic interdependence, or these nations can 
take a chance on a free and open order, on democracy, on the 
United States and our partners and allies.
    China is not the only offender--not the only country to try 
and weaponize economic interdependence. We saw Russia do this 
in the lead up to the invasion of Ukraine last year with 
weaponization of the oil and gas dependency of Europe.
    What is the United States doing? I know we are attempting 
diplomatically to deal with this. There been some other 
activities that, perhaps, you can touch on when I turn it over 
to you, but I just came back from the Asia Pacific. I visited 
with President Tsai in Taiwan and Japanese leaders and I heard 
a lot about economic coercion more than any other topic.
    Taiwan has been on the receiving end of this, as has Japan, 
but Japan has been formalizing a policy to counter economic 
coercion and they want the United States to act, and to that 
end I have introduced bipartisan legislation with Senator Coons 
and the aim is to allow the United States to quickly 
appropriate tangible assistance, give it to those who are on 
the receiving end of this coercion, provide other tangible 
benefits to partners and allies who have been victimized by 
malign behavior.
    Specifically, we propose providing the President of the 
United States--this one and future presidents--with a range of 
tools and authorities that include boosting trade with an 
affected ally or partner, requesting Congress provide aid loan 
guarantees or export financing, and temporarily adjusting 
duties on select U.S. imports to make up for an affected 
country's lost exports or to disadvantage an adversary's 
imports in our market.
    Now, crucially, we also call for coordination of all these 
activities with our economic partners and allies. The G-7 
meeting will be held in Japan in Hiroshima in May. This will be 
item number one on the agenda and I commend Prime Minister 
Kishida for making this a priority.
    My sense is the Administration is on board with this 
approach and I am complemented by that and we are going to have 
more of my colleagues join in this effort as well.
    Deputy Secretary Sherman, it seems to me, based on 
everything I just said, that we do not have sufficient tools to 
properly deal with these coercive activities.
    Do you agree with this assessment and, very briefly, why?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator. Our teams, I 
think, are in very close touch with yours and Senator Coons' to 
work on this legislation. We are trying to expand our economic 
coercion toolbox.
    We have learned a lot because of Lithuania, Australia, and 
others----
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Ms. Sherman. --and as you point out in the Russia-Ukraine 
situation as well. We agree with you that Prime Minister 
Kishida making this a top priority for his G-7 presidency is 
critical. We have done tabletop exercises on this. We think 
this is a critical area.
    We have managed to support Lithuania and other countries 
that have faced this and learned a lot in the process. Thank 
you for your efforts and we look forward to continuing to work 
closely with you on this.
    Senator Young. Great. I heard everything I needed 
sufficient for this briefing. I am going to move on very 
briefly to a CHIPS and Science implementation question.
    Beijing has been stealing our stuff--our intellectual 
property--for a lot of years now. We do not want them to steal 
this stuff. This cutting-edge national security-oriented 
research, funded through CHIPS and Science, and CHIPS and 
Science Act appropriates $500 million to the Department of 
State in part to support international IT security to protect 
this intellectual property.
    Could you very briefly indicate what the consequences are 
of the lack of IT security and how the PRC is exploiting our 
current system? Then to the extent you have already implemented 
some of the CHIPS and Science provisions, give us a summary, 
please.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you. Thank you very much for the ITSI 
Fund, which is promote, protect, and ICT provision at the State 
Department in support of the foreign diplomacy in concert with 
the Commerce Department, which has the enormous lion's share of 
those funds.
    We have notified up to the Hill some of the projects and 
lines of effort. We are creating baselines this year leading up 
to making significant progress in the 5-year horizon that you 
all laid out in the provision of this fund. I look forward to 
discussing details with you in a private setting.
    Senator Young. My office will follow up. Thank you, 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin, then Senator Romney, and then that will be 
the end of the hearing.
    Senator Cardin. Let me thank both of you for being here. I 
want to follow up on Senator Young's point.
    I was with our chairman, Senator Menendez, in our 
hemisphere and saw the challenges of China penetration on the 
debt diplomacy issue. Let me just mention a country like 
Argentina.
    Argentina has a debt problem. It is not terribly attractive 
for private investment because of its debt policies and, yet, 
when they need to borrow money China is willing to be there.
    We know China does it on the cheap. They do not get their 
value, but they get hooked by this debt diplomacy, which can be 
against our national security interests.
    I just really want to underscore it is more than East Asia 
and the Pacific. It is our own hemisphere where we see China 
very much penetrating and using this as leverage for their 
geopolitical agenda.
    I know that you set up the China House. I believe it is in 
the East Asia and Pacific Bureau, but can you just assure us 
that there is a coordinated strategy beyond East Asia and 
Pacific, which is critically important, but also in our own 
hemisphere?
    Ms. Sherman. Very quickly on both. On debt, as I think you 
all are probably aware, when Secretary Yellen went to Africa, 
debt was front and center an issue for her.
    In Zambia she underscored that all creditors, including 
Beijing, must meaningfully participate in debt relief efforts 
for Zambia. In Sri Lanka, indeed, debt is a huge problem. The 
Paris Club has now taken some action and pressure, and India 
has stepped forward, but we are putting pressure on China to, 
in fact, also come to the table since most of the debt is with 
the Chinese.
    Agree with you in Latin America they can use their SOE 
capability to just put money on the table, but ultimately it 
often ends up in debt for countries, Argentina being a good 
example. Agree with you, and we are working on all of that.
    In terms of the China House, I want to commit several 
things to you. As Senator Risch knows well because he really 
focused us on this, China House has liaisons coming from every 
part of the Department who spend some time in China House, go 
back to their home bureaus so there is truly an integrated 
beyond EAP strategy. It all comes up through EAP, but to me, 
who has responsibility for everything all over the world.
    Quite frankly, yes, it may be housed in EAP, but that is 
just the anchor. It goes out throughout the world.
    Senator Cardin. I look forward to working with you with 
that. In order to get a little bit of credit on this committee, 
can I yield my 2 minutes to Senator Booker so that--my 
remaining 2 minutes?
    The Chairman. You may.
    Senator Cardin. I like to get on the good side of New 
Jersey.
    Senator Booker. That is an extraordinary act of grace and 
generosity. It is only topped by your wisdom and sagacity, my 
friend. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Do not use your whole 2 minutes complimenting 
him.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Booker. I really appreciate that. I really want to 
get into the Development Finance Corporation and the real 
power, I think, of that.
    Congress created it in part as a response to the rust 
belt--the rust and boat and road--Belt and Road initiatives and 
you know it is important to providing loans, equity 
investments, and more.
    The DFC has limits, but I really think it could be 
something that could be used in a stronger way. The agency, I 
think, has the potential to boost international development 
opportunities and really help to level the playing field and 
expand opportunities for us, not just economically, but also in 
terms of national security.
    There is a famous saying that if you are not at the table; 
you are on the menu, and I want to see if there is ways that we 
can be more at the table using the DFC.
    I am wondering--things like the DFC, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, can we use this to really expand our 
toolbox not just for economic opportunity, but economic 
diplomacy?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, this is so important and, in fact, 
thank you all for looking at what the DFC can do and whether 
its opportunities can be expanded in ways that are helpful, 
particularly to countries that maybe not are at the bottom of 
the development ladder, but sort of in-between trying to raise 
up.
    The Development Finance Corporation is also working very 
closely with our PGII initiative--the Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure Investment--with the private sector as well, 
with MCC.
    We have to use every single tool we have because our 
greatest strength is bringing the private sector together with 
what we are doing in the public arena. China cannot do that.
    Yes, it can put money on the table without strings 
attached, but the strings come later. Countries go into debt. 
Chinese take their assets. They do not transfer capabilities to 
countries to do their own development.
    Could not agree with you more. Love to work with you in 
deepening this ability.
    Senator Booker. Thank you. Please.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney will close us out.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for keeping us all 
here so I get my few moments, but there are just a few things I 
want to mention, which is Chairman Menendez and I last year 
authored an amendment which was passed in the NDAA that 
requires the United States State Department to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to address the threat of an emerging 
China.
    Ranking Member Risch and I sent a letter to President Biden 
urging the Administration to start implementing our 
legislation. In our letter, we requested an update on the 
progress after 60 days. The 60 days mark has passed.
    Now, Secretary Blinken has laid out three principles that 
the Administration is pursuing in dealing with China--invest, 
align, and compete, but I would note that we need to go from 
principles to a comprehensive strategy and include tactics and 
that includes our approach to developing countries, to our 
global trade arrangements, to economic measures we might want 
to put in place, to our research and development investments 
here, to our military procurement, to global communication 
strategies, to access to our universities, access to our 
laboratories, to visas we provide to the Chinese, international 
institutions that we are going to be involved with, to our 
social media strategies, to raw materials strategies and our 
processing here of those raw materials, to the role of USAID, 
to defending the tactics that Chinese are using.
    You get where I am going, which is a comprehensive strategy 
includes dozens upon dozens of strategic and tactical decisions 
that are combined. Changed over the years, but it is essential, 
in my view, that we develop that kind of strategy and that it 
is kept in the classified setting. Does not have to go out 
publicly.
    We really need that. We also in this legislation looked at 
the strategies of that nature that were developed by Presidents 
Truman and Reagan and others, the work of George Kennan and 
Dean Acheson, and said, okay, how were these strategies 
developed back then? How did they put them together as they 
were dealing with strategies to deal with the Soviet Union?
    They involved outside individuals, not just internal, 
because they knew internal people would be captured by 
groupthink. They wanted people from the outside, some who 
were--had experience in developing these kinds of strategies.
    I spent my private sector career doing something called 
strategy consulting. That is, we helped companies develop 
strategies. I have to tell you it drives me nuts to watch us 
deal with China and have objectives, but to see everybody going 
in different--we do not have a comprehensive let us put it 
together strategy.
    The legislation which Chairman Menendez and I submitted and 
was passed calls for bringing in an advisory panel of outside 
experts. It would include people probably from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, from AEI, from Brookings--
a whole range of individuals that would come in and offer ideas 
and suggestions--comprehensively put that together.
    If we do that it is likely to exist beyond just one 
Administration and becomes the basis for our strategy, going 
forward. I strongly encourage the State Department to take the 
lead in making sure that we assemble that advisory board, we 
lay out what would be included in a strategy, we consider the 
widest array of options, and that we actually put that together 
and, ultimately, brief Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
and others in the committee on that--the strategy--that this 
process is being undertaken and what some of the conclusions 
are.
    I think it is essential. I am going to close off with that 
comment. I am not going to ask for a response. You have to run 
to another briefing and I am not going to hold you up from 
doing that, but I just want to underscore how critical it is 
that we go from ad hoc principles that we--and tactics that we 
apply from time-to-time to instead fashioning with the help of 
outside minds a comprehensive series of options. We select the 
option that is our strategy. We move on that basis.
    Not doing so, in my opinion, will leave us in something 
less than the leadership position we so desperately need to 
preserve our freedom and prosperity.
    Ms. Sherman. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator, we agree with you. We are, in fact, working on 
every one of those tactical areas that you identified, every 
single one. Bringing them together and doing the deep work on 
each one is incredibly time consuming, but we are doing that 
work.
    The Secretary does have a Foreign Affairs Policy Board. We 
have an International Security Board. I will take back your 
idea that we have an ongoing China-focused council, which we do 
not have a specific, though we do consult with outside 
consultants and outside experts on a constant basis. The 
Secretary did so in his run-up to the potential trip he was 
making to Beijing, which we postponed.
    I think all of the areas that you laid out are absolutely 
ones on which we have to be laser-focused and bring together 
those tactics into an integrated strategy. That is what we are 
working on doing, and having every single mission around the 
world have a bespoke strategy for their country because every 
country is different and China is present in every single one.
    Thank you.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Deputy Secretary. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Let me just echo Senator Romney's view, which 
is why I joined with him in the amendment and which is why it 
is law now.
    I think, Madam Secretary, maybe one of the benefits of 
hearing your answer would be a more in detail opportunity to--
in some briefing to share with members who are interested about 
exactly how you are going about and the universe that is being 
advised. I just want to echo Senator Romney's concerns.
    Senator Paul has asked that his two letters that he 
referenced to be included in the record. Without objection it 
shall be included.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. This record will remain open until the close 
of business tomorrow. I would urge our witnesses to answer 
questions--I know I will have some that I did not get to--with 
some degree of specificity.
    With the thanks of the committee for both of your 
appearances here today, I am looking forward to seeing you at 
the intelligence briefing.
    This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Our discovery of a surveillance balloon over the 
United States, on the eve of Secretary of State Antony 
Blinken's scheduled trip to Beijing, was a brazen and 
unequivocal violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law 
by a country that claims to be a responsible actor. Can you 
tell us why the Administration chose not to down the 
surveillance balloon before it entered U.S. airspace?

    Answer. I would respectfully refer you to the Department of 
Defense on this.

    Question. What can the U.S. do to push back on this norms-
violating practice by Beijing--not just unilaterally, but with 
others who share concerned about violations of their own 
sovereignty?

    Answer. The PRC still has failed to provide a credible 
explanation for its high-altitude surveillance balloon's 
intrusion into our airspace without our consent or for similar 
intrusions in over 40 countries across five continents. Its 
unwillingness to do so demonstrates a lack of respect for 
longstanding and fundamental principles of international law 
and shows the world the challenge the PRC poses to the 
maintenance of international law. We are working with allies 
and partners to share details about PRC violations of their 
airspace as we learn more about the nature and extent of the 
PRC's surveillance balloon program.

    Question. What are we doing to assist countries in their 
efforts to identify when and where these breaches occur, and to 
take appropriate action?

    Answer. Air domain awareness is an essential component of 
our security assistance for allied and partner countries. 
Through Foreign Military Financing in particular, the 
Department of State provides aerial surveillance technologies, 
sensors, and capabilities for a wide range of security and 
defense activities, especially prevention of and response to 
potential airspace incursions. The PRC balloon incursion is 
something we will consider as we work with our partners on 
future air domain awareness programs.

    Question. Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine is an urgent 
threat, but the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains the 
most significant long-term competitor for the United States, 
posing challenges across every dimension of national security--
militarily, economically, and diplomatically. What is your 
assessment of China's ambitions for the next 5, 10, 20 years 
under the leadership of President Xi Jinping?

    Answer. The PRC is the greatest geopolitical challenge that 
we face. The PRC aims to displace U.S. alliances and security 
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, revise the 
international order to be more advantageous to Beijing's 
authoritarian system and national interests, undercut America's 
longstanding technological advantage, and exploit cutting-edge 
technology and big data analytics for social control at home, 
regional military dominance, and global influence.

    Question. What does President Xi's unprecedented third term 
and his consolidation of allies on the Politburo Standing 
Committee mean for U.S.-China relations and Beijing's global 
ambitions?

    Answer. The PRC today is more repressive at home and 
aggressive abroad in challenging the interests and values of 
the United States and our allies and partners. We expect the 
scale and scope of the challenge posed by the PRC to test 
American diplomacy like nothing we have seen before. We see 
growing convergence with allies and partners about the need to 
approach relations with Beijing with more coordinated efforts. 
The United States will continue to defend our interests, 
values, and affirmative vision for the world, even as we 
continue to do the work at home to better live up to the idea 
of America enshrined in our founding documents.

    Question. What is Xi's objective with respect to 
competition with the United States?

    Answer. Under President Xi's leadership, the PRC is the 
greatest geopolitical challenge that we face because it is the 
only competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the 
capability to remake the international order. We will continue 
to compete with the PRC and defend U.S. interests and values 
around the world, while responsibly managing the competition. 
Recognizing the PRC is the pacing challenge of our time, we are 
executing a strategy to invest in ourselves at home, align with 
our allies and partners abroad, and compete with the PRC.

    Question. What are Xi's ambitions with respect to Taiwan 
over the next few years?

    Answer. President Xi has stated publicly that 
``reunification'' with Taiwan is necessary for national 
rejuvenation, and that while the PRC prefers to use peaceful 
means, the PRC will not renounce the use of force.

    Question. We saw massive protests in cities all around 
China due to their strict Zero-COVID measures--and ultimately 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relented. What lessons should 
we learn from the CCP's reversal on Zero-COVID? Does this 
expose weakness in the CCP or is it an indication of the 
adaptability of their authoritarian system?

    Answer. There were likely multiple factors behind Beijing's 
decision to quickly loosen COVID controls after the 20th Party 
Congress, including the protests, but also economic concerns. 
The Biden administration has been clear that people have a 
right to exercise their freedoms of expression and peaceful 
assembly in protest without intimidation, harassment, or harm, 
including in China, and will continue to monitor reports of 
protestor arrests closely.

    Question. As China reopens, what impacts should we expect 
to see, including on the global market (especially the energy 
market, which is already under tremendous pressure) and in 
terms of our global efforts to address COVID-19?

    Answer. Near-term PRC growth has improved the short-run 
global economic outlook. Economies reliant on exports to the 
PRC is projected to be buoyed by increased consumer demand, and 
prices for crude oil, coal, and industrial metals are likely to 
rise. As China reopens, its oil demand is projected to rise 
more than 700,000 oil barrels per day, accounting for more than 
half the global increase in 2023. We continue to monitor the 
PRC COVID-19 outbreak and work to prevent, prepare for, and 
respond to COVID-19 and future health threats.

    Question. As you know, last year we were able to secure the 
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (previously known as the Taiwan 
Policy Act) into the FY23 NDAA. The T.E.R.A. is designed to 
dramatically enhance the United States' defense partnership 
with Taiwan by authorizing up to $10 billion in security 
assistance over the next 5 years to modernize Taiwan's security 
capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression by 
the People's Republic of China. We were told over and over 
again that PRC would retaliate if Congress passed our Taiwan 
legislation. How did the PRC react to the enactment of the 
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act as part of the National Defense 
Authorization Act?

    Answer. The PRC strongly objected to the TERA both 
privately and publicly.

    Question. What adjustments in PRC posture or operational 
tempo have we seen since the visit of Speaker Pelosi in 2022? 
If Speaker McCarthy visits Taiwan early this year, as he has 
said he will do, what response do you expect to see from the 
PRC in response? How will it likely differ from their reaction 
to Speaker Pelosi's trip in August?

    Answer. The PRC used then-Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan 
in August 2022 as a pretext to intensify its pressure campaign 
against Taiwan in the military, economic, diplomatic, and 
information spaces. The PRC's higher level of military activity 
in the Taiwan Strait includes a significant increase in 
crossings of the ``center line'' and operations in Taiwan's 
self-declared air defense identification zone. Additionally, 
the People's Liberation Army's tempo of joint exercises and 
presence of maritime forces around Taiwan has increased.

    Question. In your assessment, is it more likely that the 
PRC will attempt to take Taiwan by force or use a similar 
``salami slicing'' strategy as they have in the South China 
Sea, such as taking an outlying island or using ``lawfare'' as 
they have with Hong Kong, to pressure Taiwan?

    Answer. The PRC has accelerated its destabilizing and 
provocative tactics against Taiwan in all of the key domains--
political, military, economic, cyber, and informational. The 
increasing intensity of the PRC's pressure campaign against 
Taiwan, including a significant increase in incursions into 
Taiwan's self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and 
frequent ``centerline'' crossings, is a reminder that Beijing 
has never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan. In 
keeping with our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, we 
contribute directly and substantively to strengthen Taiwan's 
self-defense capabilities and will continue to do so.

    Question. Recent reports suggested that Chinese researchers 
had supposedly found a way to bypass standard encryption with 
the use of quantum computing technology. While their actual 
success is unclear, their intentions certainly are not: the PRC 
is working fast to beat the United States and the rest of the 
world to this once-in-a-generation technological milestone. How 
do the United States and China currently size up in the race 
towards quantum computing technology?

    Answer. A 2022 Department of Defense-sponsored RAND report 
on the U.S. and PRC industrial bases in quantum technology 
determined ``the United States' overall scientific research 
output in quantum information science is broad, stable, and at 
or near the global forefront in every application domain.'' 
Still, the PRC's quantum enterprise is integrated into the 
larger global community; hence, careful stewardship of our 
domestic efforts and engagement with likeminded partners is 
essential to U.S. leadership. Ultimately, the State Department 
defers assessments of this nature to U.S. agencies that fund 
quantum research.

    Question. How are we cooperating with like-minded partners 
to secure this technology before the PRC, and how can we be 
more effective?

    Answer. International cooperation is a pillar of the U.S. 
National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Sciences, 
as it enables the U.S. scientific community to access the best 
resources from around the world. As detailed in National 
Quantum Initiative annual reports submitted pursuant to the 
National Quantum Initiative Act, the U.S. Government engages in 
a number of international cooperation activities in support of 
larger policy goals to expand the discovery space, increase the 
global talent pool, and grow the marketplace for quantum 
concepts and technologies.

    Question. In October last year, the Biden administration 
took a significant step in escalating our tech competition with 
China when it issued export controls for advanced 
semiconductors and components, with rare use of the Foreign 
Direct Product Rule and its broad ranging impacts. There's no 
denying that this action has caused significant friction with 
close allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, despite 
recently reaching an export control agreement with them, and 
the U.S. cannot achieve its policy objectives over the medium- 
or long-term without its partners. What impact are we seeing 
since the invocation of this rule? What unintended impacts are 
we observing? How do we assess the net effect of these controls 
right now taking into consideration the unintended side 
effects?

    Answer. On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration 
announced new export controls targeting the PRC's ability to 
obtain advanced computing chips, develop and maintain 
supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors. It is 
too early to see the direct impacts of these regulations; we 
expect to see a reduction in PRC capabilities in supercomputing 
and advanced semiconductor manufacturing over time. The 
regulations were designed to minimize the impact on ally and 
partner companies; however, some unintended impacts owing to 
overcompliance were observed from varying interpretations of 
the ``U.S. persons'' restriction. The Department of Commerce 
published FAQs in October 2022 to clarify these aspects of the 
rule and initial overcompliance has since subsided.

    Question. How do you assess the durability of the export 
control agreement with the Netherlands and Japan? Will these 
controls go far enough?

    Answer. Any export control decisions that the Netherlands 
and Japan make will be sovereign decisions based in their own 
technical and national security analysis. We are not in a 
position to assess any controls that have not been published.

    Question. Beijing seems undeterred in its efforts to crush 
Hong Kong's autonomy and its democracy. The fall of Hong Kong 
and the United States' response, along with our coordination 
with like-minded partners, has ramifications for the future of 
the liberal international order--including regarding the future 
of Taiwan. How is the Department using all available tools 
authorized by Congress to hold the PRC accountable for its 
actions in Hong Kong? What more can be done to underscore that 
Hong Kong no longer remains a place for U.S. companies can 
conduct ``business as usual?''

    Answer. As part of our ongoing effort to promote 
accountability, the United States has imposed sanctions on PRC 
and Hong Kong officials who have led the implementation of the 
National Security Law (NSL) and are responsible for undermining 
Hong Kong's autonomy. In July 2021, we issued an advisory to 
U.S. businesses highlighting increased risks of operating in 
Hong Kong as a result of the erosion of protected rights and 
freedoms since the imposition of the NSL. We will continue to 
publicly and privately stand up to the PRC and urge respect for 
the rule of law, human rights, and protected rights and 
freedoms in Hong Kong that are not only enshrined in the Sino-
British Declaration and the Basic Law, but are also key to the 
city's viability as a financial hub.

    Question. How can the United States--working with our 
partners in the international community--be effective in 
supporting the people of Hong Kong?

    Answer. The Administration has just renewed Deferred 
Enforced Departure for an additional period for those residents 
of Hong Kong presently residing in the United States as part of 
our global efforts to provide Hongkongers with safe harbor 
overseas. We would welcome Congressional action to augment such 
safe harbor efforts. We are working closely with allies and 
partners to demonstrate unified support to people in Hong Kong 
and to discourage further backsliding on the rights and 
freedoms in Hong Kong, including those protected under the 
Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and the rule 
of law, including the recent trial under National Security Law 
trial of 47 prominent opposition figures. On February 5, U.S. 
Consulate General Hong Kong personnel joined diplomats from 
more than 10 like-minded missions in attending these trials.

    Question. In Xinjiang, the People's Republic of China has 
committed a despicable campaign of genocide against the Uyghurs 
and other Turkic minorities. The PRC's abuses in Xinjiang 
continue--and their effort to persecute intimidate and mistreat 
Uyghurs living abroad have intensified. Given the release of 
the long-awaited report by the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human rights, and the subsequent failure to 
get the Human Rights Council to take up discussion of that 
report, what is the next in the Department's effort to hold the 
PRC accountable for its actions in Xinjiang?

    Answer. The United States will continue to take strong 
action to promote accountability for the PRC's actions and 
strengthen defenses against transnational repression. To this 
end, the U.S. Government has deployed tools to promote 
accountability for PRC individuals and entities responsible for 
human rights abuses. While we share your disappointment with 
the Human Rights Council vote, it successfully put the PRC on 
the defensive and made clear it is not above scrutiny. We are 
working with likeminded allies on next steps to promote 
accountability for the PRC's genocide and crimes against 
humanity in Xinjiang.

    Question. How are we coordinating with allies and partners 
in confronting Beijing on their crimes against humanity?

    Answer. Our unrivaled network of alliances and partnerships 
provides a comparative advantage in our competition with the 
PRC. We work with allies and partners to take concrete measures 
to promote respect for human rights and accountability for 
atrocities and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including at 
the UN Human Rights Council, as well as by implementing 
financial sanctions, visa restrictions, export controls, and 
import restrictions, and releasing business advisories. We have 
also coordinated with the EU, UK, and Canada on the imposition 
of sanctions on several individuals and entities connected to 
serious human rights abuse in Xinjiang.

    Question. In our own hemisphere, China's engagement with 
the Maduro regime in Venezuela stands out as a disturbing 
warning to countries across the region about the dangers of 
deepening relations with China. Instead of making Venezuelans 
more economically prosperous and secure, the PRC has 
contributed to Venezuela's economic collapse and abetted 
Maduro's effort to set up a police state. How is the Biden 
administration working to address China's role in the 
Venezuelan crisis and to what extent have you highlighted 
China's role in Venezuela as a cautionary tale for other 
governments in the region?

    Answer. The PRC takes advantage of the Maduro's regime 
isolation and provided more than $64 billion in loans to the 
regime in Venezuela, exacerbating regime corruption and 
supporting non-transparent business practices. We continue to 
monitor the PRC's engagement with the Maduro regime. Further, 
we will continue to impose costs on entities involved in 
sanctions evasion.
    Free and fair elections in 2024 offer the best path to 
reduce the influence of malign actors in Venezuela. We work 
with partners to support the Venezuelan opposition in efforts 
to revitalize Venezuela's democracy.

    Question. Over the last decade China has played a direct 
and indirect role in fueling the U.S. opioid epidemic. Whether 
it's better regulating its domestic pharmaceutical sector, 
requiring more detailed labeling of pharmaceutical products 
shipping out of China, or addressing related money laundering, 
the PRC needs to step up in a serious way. How is the Biden 
administration pursuing cooperation with the PRC to address 
these challenges? And, what steps will the Administration take 
to hold Chinese companies and their representatives accountable 
if the PRC won't act?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken is mobilizing an effort to lead 
an international coalition of countries to partner with the 
United States on this global health and security threat. The 
PRC can and must do more. We continue to call on the PRC at all 
levels to strengthen its oversight of chemical supply chains to 
prevent chemical diversion. We have used and will continue to 
use sanctions and rewards tools, such as Executive Order 14059 
and the Narcotics Rewards Program, to hold individuals and 
companies accountable.

    Question. In February 2022, the Wall Street Journal 
reported on U.S. efforts to counter Chinese plans to build a 
military base in Equatorial Guinea. The Journal noted that a 
high-level U.S. delegation--which ultimately included senior 
State, White House, and DoD officials--intended to travel to 
Equatorial Guinea to offer U.S. counter-piracy assistance and 
``other inducements'' to Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro 
Obiang. In February 2023, meanwhile, the WSJ reported that 
Kenyan authorities were threatening to turn to China if the 
U.S. declined to pay $50 million to expand a joint 
counterterrorism base at Manda Bay. Are African countries--
Equatorial Guinea, or Kenya for that matter--using the threat 
of partnership with China as a means of blunting criticism from 
the United States on issues such as democracy and human rights?

    Answer. The PRC's efforts to increase its presence and 
influence in Africa are intended to advance and ultimately 
export its domestic political, security, information, and 
economic model and justify its domestic agenda on the world 
stage. We lead with an affirmative agenda for Africa, 
demonstrating that our governance and economic models, 
including rule of law and respect for human rights, foster 
investment and stability. U.S. policy does not ask our partners 
to choose between the United States and the PRC, but rather to 
offer options in pursuing economic development and achieving 
other national objectives.

    Question. How will the Administration balance the need to 
ensure security of the Atlantic coast with the political costs 
of engaging with the Obiang regime, which is widely viewed as 
dictatorial, abusive, corrupt, and untrustworthy?

    Answer. The PRC desires to establish a military presence on 
the Atlantic coast of Africa are well documented but have not 
been realized. The United States will continue to maintain 
positive and active defense-related engagements with several 
African nations on the Atlantic coast, including ones that may 
be vulnerable to PRC pressure. We are working with African 
nations to present a positive, rights-respecting, rules-based 
alternative through maritime governance, building climate 
resilience capacity, and the development of sustainable blue 
economies.

    Question. Recently, several countries that owe money to 
China have defaulted on their sovereign debt or have suspended 
payments, and many others are risking similar situations. While 
internal and external economic pressures undoubtedly contribute 
to these decisions, perhaps countries are also reconsidering 
aspects of their economic relationships with China. How is 
China using debt as a political tool to impede accountable, 
transparent, and democratic governance in Zambia or other 
developing countries?

    Answer. The PRC has indicated willingness to engage in 
coordinated debt restructurings though the Common Framework, 
but the timeline for debt treatments is long, often due to PRC 
delays. The PRC's lack of transparency, unwillingness to 
coordinate with other creditors, and its sheer size as a 
creditor gives it leverage to effectively block International 
Monetary Fund programs and debt treatments. For instance, in 
Zambia the PRC has not progressed on promised debt treatment, 
which risks derailing Zambia's International Monetary Fund 
program and inhibiting Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema's 
reform agenda.

    Question. Is China rethinking how it engages with borrowers 
and how it uses debt as a foreign policy tool in light of the 
recent defaults? How are we pushing China to be a better 
participant in G-20 Common Framework negotiations?

    Answer. We are committed to coordinated multilateral action 
to address debt vulnerabilities in developing countries. We 
expect all bilateral creditors, including the PRC, to 
participate fully on timely debt restructuring on a comparable 
basis, and to pursue sustainable and transparent lending 
practices.
    We have insisted and continue to insist on the principle of 
comparable treatment for all bilateral creditors and continue 
to call on the PRC to fulfill its G20 commitments to 
participate in debt treatments through the Common Framework.

    Question. What has contributed to the recent defaults? What 
steps can African countries take to prevent political coercion 
and unfavorable terms on contracting with regards to 
infrastructure deals and mining concessions due to debt owed to 
China?

    Answer. The economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, and subsequent slowing in growth, significantly 
eroded the budgetary reserves of many African governments. This 
has exacerbated high public debt levels and made it even more 
difficult for governments to respond to current inflationary 
pressures globally. Where possible, African governments should 
enact legislation requiring greater transparency on foreign 
debt obligations, openly and transparently compete government 
infrastructure contracts, participate in the Common Framework 
process, and work with the International Monetary Fund to 
maintain sustainable macroeconomic frameworks.

    Question. China has been making a clear bid for influence 
in the Middle East for quite some time, with President Xi 
attending the first ever China-Arab States summit in December. 
As we reorient our foreign policy to strategic competition, we 
must ensure that China does not take advantage to expand its 
military footprint and political influence in the region. Where 
do you assess are the biggest risks of Chinese successfully 
increasing its security presence in the Middle East? What is 
China offering wealthier countries in exchange for this 
cooperation? What aspects of China's non-military expansion in 
the Middle East pose the greatest threats to U.S. interests in 
the region?

    Answer. We regularly caution our partners about PRC 
investments that could compromise their sovereignty, including 
surveillance technology that further enables authoritarian 
goals.
    We assess the PRC has a global strategy of building 
military installations worldwide, including in the Middle East, 
prioritizing its own interests over enhancing regional 
stability. With all partners, we directly address the risks a 
PRC military installation would pose to our bilateral security 
cooperation as well as their security.

    Question. What message is the Administration sending to 
U.S. partners who are contemplating security cooperation or 
arms purchases from the PRC? How can we ensure that U.S. 
systems remain competitive while maintaining a high standard 
for human-rights and end-use monitoring?

    Answer. Human rights, international humanitarian law, 
national security, and the recipient's ability to protect 
sensitive technology are central tenets to the U.S. 
Conventional Arms Transfer policy. Those principles are 
critical to our decision-making when adjudicating arms sales. 
It is also a priority to reduce partners' dependence on PRC 
defense articles, and we are confident that our Foreign 
Military Sales' total package approach, which includes robust 
U.S. engagement, training, and spare parts, remains 
competitive, particularly when compared to the PRC's approach 
to arms transfers.

    Question. I am a firm believer that the world is watching 
how we respond to the PRC's economic coercion of Lithuania. If 
Beijing believes that they can continue to use economic means 
to intimidate smaller countries without repercussions, allies 
and partners may be more likely to appease the PRC instead of 
standing up to them. Last year, the NDAA included a provision 
creating a Countering Economic Coercion Task Force and 
directing the State Department to create a strategy to help 
countries victimized by the PRC's economic intimidation. How 
are we positioning the United States to lead the G7 and other 
advanced economies in collectively pushing back against 
Beijing's economic coercion? Are there additional authorities 
you believe you need in order to be effective?

    Answer. The economic coercion challenge cuts across many 
issue areas. At a macro level, we are engaging broadly to 
improve supply chain diversity, security, and resilience. Over-
dependency on the PRC increases coercion risks, and we are 
engaging to improve resilience across strategic sectors of 
concern. Where Beijing seeks to apply economic coercion, we are 
working to strengthen our response playbook, in coordination 
with allies and partners, so that we can step in and support 
those economies. The Department looks forward to working with 
Congress to support these efforts.

    Question. The recently released China military power report 
assessed that China now has more than 400 operational nuclear 
warheads in its stockpile. According to the report if China's 
modernization plan remains on track it will field about 1,500 
warheads by 2030, the vast majority of which will be targeted 
at the United States. Has the Administration at the highest 
levels explained the consequences for our bilateral relations 
of China's decision to vastly increase the nuclear threat its 
poses to the United States? Is the United States seeking arms 
control discussions with China?

    Answer. The United States has made clear that the PRC, as a 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons State and P5 
member, has a responsibility to engage in substantive talks to 
reduce the risk of miscalculation and address destabilizing 
military dynamics. Such talks could lay the groundwork for 
additional discussion of mutual restraints in capabilities and 
behavior. There is no benefit to either of our nations, or for 
the world, for the PRC to resist substantive engagement on 
these issues.

    Question. What is China seeking to achieve with its nuclear 
buildup? How is China's nuclear modernization linked to its 
other strategic objectives?

    Answer. The PRC has yet to acknowledge the pace, scale, or 
purpose of its nuclear weapons buildup. I respectfully defer to 
the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community on the 
PRC's nuclear weapons aims. The Administration will strengthen 
deterrence and our alliances while seeking risk reduction with 
the PRC to ensure U.S., allied, and partner security amid the 
PRC's rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup.

    Question. Is the increasing size and sophistication of 
China's nuclear forces raising doubts among our East Asian 
allies about the United States willingness and ability to 
defend them?

    Answer. U.S. security commitments to our East Asian allies 
remain steadfast in the face of growing nuclear and missile 
developments in the PRC. The United States is working with our 
allies in the region including Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, to ensure an effective 
mix of capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises, and 
tailored options to deter and, if necessary, respond to 
coercion and aggression. The Administration is also seeking to 
assure allies through the pursuit of measures to reduce 
strategic risk with the PRC.

    Question. China's status as ``developing country'' under 
various multilateral agreement regimes is both substantively 
and politically salient matter to address. Many countries 
labeled ``developing countries,'' including China, have 
economically developed and no longer need the additional 
assistance initially contemplated when these treaties entered 
into force.
    Is [it] appropriate to address the issue of reviewing and 
updating what countries are treated as ``developing v. 
developed'' in various treaty regimes more and if so, what are 
your thoughts on how we should engage diplomatically for these? 
What is the U.S. Government doing to address this issue, with 
respect to China and more generally?

    Answer. Multilateral agreements vary significantly with 
regard to their governance structures and whether obligations 
and benefits are differentiated based on a party's level of 
development or other factors. Accordingly, there is no one-
size-fits-all approach to addressing this important issue, and 
as we seek to ensure the PRC does not benefit inappropriately, 
it is important to design approaches that will be effective in 
a particular context and that will not backfire or 
inadvertently rally other countries to support PRC positions. 
The Department therefore seeks opportunities on a case-by-case 
basis to work with like-minded parties in order to reduce or 
eliminate assistance the PRC might receive under an agreement 
or multilateral framework, regardless of any designation the 
PRC may have under that agreement or framework.

    Question. Addressing the climate crisis require global 
action and global cooperation. It is widely reported that while 
China is currently the world's largest emitter, and it is also 
the world's largest user of renewable energy. While it may be 
important to call out China's current role as the world's top 
emitter . . . the PRC and others frequently retort with the 
fact that the U.S. is still the world's largest historical (or 
aggregate) emitter. Given all the tit-for-tat rhetoric on who 
is responsible for climate change, China as the world's largest 
current emitter or the U.S. as the world's largest historic 
emitter, does China see it in their interest to cooperate with 
the U.S. and the rest of the world on global climate action? Is 
it realistic to isolate climate cooperation from other issues 
in the bilateral relationship in order to make progress on this 
pressing issue?

    Answer. The PRC accounts for nearly 30 percent of annual 
global emissions, and we cannot keep within reach a 1.5 degree 
Celsius limit on warming without accelerated reductions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. The PRC has a 
responsibility to step up its efforts. Given the global and 
existential nature of the climate crisis, U.S.-PRC engagement 
is in the interest of both countries and the world.

    Question. Despite China's developing country status, I 
believe the Paris Agreement still serves as the most effective 
body for the world to come together to fight climate change. It 
provides a vehicle to hold one another accountable for our 
international commitments and creates pressure and incentive to 
ratchet up ambition. Does the Paris Agreement place any binding 
requirements on the U.S. to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions? 
Under the UNFCCC of 1992, the U.S. is required to report its 
annual greenhouse gas emissions, correct? And for decades non-
Annex countries, including China and India, were not required 
to do so, is that also correct? But Article 4 of the Paris 
Agreement now evens the reporting and transparency requirements 
between annex and non-annex countries--i.e. the U.S. and China 
and India and so on, correct?

    Answer. The Paris Agreement does not place binding 
requirements on the United States to mitigate its emissions of 
greenhouse gas emissions; rather, while parties are required to 
submit nationally determined contributions, the emissions 
targets in those nationally determined contributions are not 
legally binding. In terms of reporting, and for other purposes, 
the Paris Agreement dispenses with the concepts of ``Annex I'' 
and ``non-Annex I'' parties that were included in the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Article 13 sets out a 
single transparency framework that applies to all parties, with 
the guidelines under that Article setting out certain limited 
types of flexibility.

    Question. Further, there is a long list of political and 
religious prisoners, in addition to Americans being held, 
including Ayshe Turkel, Cardinal Zen, and the Hong Kong 47, 
Beijing could release immediately to provide a concrete step 
forward in improving our bilateral relationship. What have been 
the Department's efforts to date on securing the release of 
political and religious prisoners?

    Answer. We continue to call for the immediate and 
unconditional release of PRC nationals who are unjustly 
detained or subject to exit bans. The Department is working 
closely with Embassy Beijing to advocate directly with the PRC 
Government at the highest levels on PRC priority cases of 
concern, including Ayshem Mamut. In Hong Kong, we note that 
Cardinal Zen has avoided a harsh penalty and was recently able 
to travel to the Vatican. This outcome reflects the concerted 
pressure of the international community, which was again 
visible on February 5 when U.S. Consulate General staff joined 
diplomats from more than 10 partner missions at a National 
Security Law trial of 47 opposition figures.

    Question. Embassy Beijing is among the more challenging 
posts for personnel, in large part due to COVID and the 
restrictions imposed by the Chinese Government. Ambassador 
Burns has done a superb job of navigating the many challenges 
for personnel and standing up to the CCP. With the heightened 
tensions between the U.S. and China, what is the Department 
doing to ensure our personnel have the resources and support to 
maintain morale and be effective at their jobs?

    Answer. In 2022, the Department improved service incentives 
for Mission China by enhancing post hardship differential and 
reducing the tour of duty length. These measures, coupled with 
robust recruitment by the Department and Mission China 
leadership, enabled us to fill most positions opening in Summer 
2023. Ambassador Burns set a redline in 2022 on our Mission 
personnel's compliance with the now-lifted PRC's Zero-COVID 
measures, which markedly improved morale. The lifting of Zero-
COVID has also removed a major morale barrier to our employees 
and family members.

    Question. Last year, I introduced the Economic Statecraft 
for the Twenty-First Century Act--a bill that provides a 
comprehensive plan to confront the anti-competitive and 
predatory nature of China's international economic policies. 
This bill will allow us to lead through our values by 
strengthening our supply chains with re-shoring and nearshoring 
strategies, by achieving our energy-related sustainability 
goals, by fostering cooperation in multilateral institutions, 
and by building global resiliency. What tools do we have to 
compete with China in the economic domain that you believe are 
currently working? What tools aren't working as effectively as 
they could be?

    Answer. To be effective in the economic statecraft domain, 
the United States needs to offer partners a high-standard, 
values-based alternative on issues ranging from development to 
food security to supply chain diversification. The U.S. must 
also be empowered to step in and support those facing PRC 
economic coercion. The U.S. is deploying multiple tools to 
compete in the economic domain, including via initiatives such 
as the Blue Dot Network, the Strategic Ports Initiative, 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, Mineral 
Security Partnership, Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity 
Partnership, debt sustainability engagements, and others.

    Question. What additional authorities do you believe would 
be beneficial for leading our economic diplomacy?

    Answer. The Department works to boost economic 
opportunities for all Americans and keep the United States 
secure. We leverage bilateral and multilateral relationships to 
build more prosperous and resilient partner-nations that 
support the rules-based economic order. We look forward to 
continuing our consultations with the Committee on further 
authorities that may be helpful.

    Question. Where do you see the biggest challenges ahead?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains committed 
to countering unfair economic practices, such as economic 
coercion, and building resilient supply chains. The United 
States will continue to collaborate with a wide range of 
stakeholders and likeminded partners to bolster supply chain 
resiliency guided by the principles of transparency, 
diversification, security, and sustainability. The CHIPS Act, 
including the $500 million International Technology Security 
and Innovation Fund, will strengthen the United States' long-
term economic security and stability by investing in secure 
semiconductor supply chains as well as the development and 
adoption of secure telecommunications networks.

    Question. In the event China invades Taiwan, Beijing would 
presumably use whatever economic leverage it could to deter 
other countries from imposing sanctions for its aggression, as 
has been done against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. What 
preparations are being done to support foreign partners from 
Chinese economic blackmail should it invade Taiwan?

    Answer. PRC economic coercion is a broad challenge that 
cuts across many areas. Over-dependency on the PRC increases 
economic coercion risks, and we are engaging to improve 
resilience across multiple strategic sectors of concern. At a 
macro level, we are working with partners to improve supply 
chain diversity, security, and resilience. In cases where 
Beijing does target other economies with economic coercion, we 
are working to strengthen and diversify the scope of our 
potential responses so that we have a wide range of economic 
tools we can use to support those partner countries.

    Question. Does the Administration need additional 
authorities or appropriations in order to be able to provide 
such support to our partners?

    Answer. Countering instances of economic coercion requires 
a flexible and swift policy response. The United States will 
continue to seek opportunities to take rapid action to publicly 
call out, mitigate and counter the impacts of economic 
coercion. The Department looks forward to working with Congress 
to support these efforts.

    Question. How is the Department working to ensure that 
Americans visiting China are not falling victim to unjust exit 
bans that prevent U.S. citizens from leaving the country?

    Answer. The Department warns U.S. citizens traveling to the 
PRC about the arbitrary enforcement of local laws, in 
particular the way some exit bans have been imposed on U.S. 
citizens. Information is shared through consular information 
products, including the Travel Advisory for the PRC, as well as 
the website travel.state.gov. When U.S. citizens have raised 
the challenges they experience with exit bans in the PRC, the 
Department has provided all appropriate consular assistance and 
urges that they receive fair and transparent treatment under 
PRC law.

    Question. China has become a significant arms exporter, 
instilling dependency in its customers on its continuing 
supply, and therefore enhancing its political leverage with 
those countries. Are there efforts to identify the most 
promising arms customers in the Indo-Pacific region that could 
be persuaded to decrease their Chinese arms purchases? If so, 
are you working on programs that could enhance U.S. or Western 
arms sales to these countries?

    Answer. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Department 
has renewed efforts to reduce partners' reliance on PRC and 
Russian defense articles. State and the interagency are 
utilizing all potential security cooperation tools to entice 
priority partners in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere to decrease 
arms sales from the PRC.

    Question. I have been supportive of the Administration's 
efforts to deepen our economic ties with our European allies 
and partners--including with the establishment of the U.S.-EU 
Trade and Technology Council. However, more work needs to be 
done to ensure our friends understand the systemic challenge 
that the People's Republic of China poses to our shared 
interests and values of democracy, economic prosperity, and 
respect for human rights. How effective has the U.S.-EU Trade 
and Technology Council been in bringing Europe around on China? 
What are our obstacles to being strategically aligned on the 
challenge that the PRC poses to the liberal international 
order?

    Answer. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council continues 
to be an effective forum for aligning U.S.-EU strategic 
perspectives on China and advancing transatlantic cooperation 
on economic policy, including boosting supply chain resilience 
and addressing non-market economic policies and practices. The 
United States and the EU are working together to share 
information, identify shared concerns, and explore policy tools 
to address such policies and practices and to counter economic 
coercion and the misuse of technology.

    Question. It is no secret that our diplomacy and resourcing 
lags when it comes to meeting China's investments in diplomacy. 
As we do so, are there thoughts on how we can better recruit 
and utilize the Department's diverse talent in the region, 
given the extreme lack of gender and racial diversity in the 
senior ranks?

    Answer. The Department's leadership believes that a more 
diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible Department leads 
to a stronger, more effective, and creative foreign policy and 
workforce. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) 
invests in robust efforts to attract and retain the brightest 
and most diverse workforce, including targeted outreach to 
underrepresented groups. EAP is proud to have achieved gender 
parity at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary and senior 
advisor and above and in the recent slate of selectees for 
deputy chief of mission and principal officer positions. Still, 
there is more work to do, including on racial equity, and we 
are committed to doing it.

    Question. I am deeply concerned about the outlook and 
conditions of wrongfully detained Americans Mark Swidan, Kai 
Li, and Pastor David Lin, whose combined time spent unjustly 
imprisoned by the PRC adds up to over three decades. 
Unfortunately, China is just one of a growing number of 
countries that seek to use American citizens as political 
pawns. I am fearful that China's willingness to issue exit bans 
on U.S. citizens will only exacerbate this issue. Can you 
please provide an update on this Administration's efforts to 
reunite these three Americans with their family and loved ones?

    Answer. We are committed to seeing the release of Kai Li, 
David Lin, and Mark Swidan from the PRC. The Administration 
regularly raises these cases in bilateral engagements with the 
PRC; President Biden discussed these U.S. citizens with 
President Xi last November. In coordination with the Office of 
the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, we are 
working to find avenues to secure the release of these U.S. 
citizens.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The Biden administration has repeatedly said it 
wants to ``put a floor'' under its relationship with China and 
that this floor has never been defined. What makes the 
Administration believe this goal is achievable?

    Answer. The United States will continue to compete 
vigorously with the PRC to uphold our values and advance our 
interests and our affirmative vision of the world. At the same 
time, as we have said time and again, we do not seek conflict 
with the PRC. This is not about a new Cold War. The United 
States will manage competition with the PRC responsibly and 
maintain open and constructive lines of communication with 
Beijing, even when tensions arise.

    Question. What does this ``floor'' consist of?

    Answer. As we have made clear, the United States will 
manage competition with the PRC responsibly and maintain open 
and constructive lines of communication with Beijing, even when 
tensions arise.

    Question. What is the plan if the ``putting a floor'' 
exercise yields no progress?

    Answer. The United States will continue to implement the 
Administration's China strategy to invest in the foundations of 
our strength at home, align with allies and partners on our 
approach abroad and compete with the PRC. At the same time, we 
remain committed to developing commonsense guardrails to bound 
the competition. We recognize that how we manage our 
relationship in the coming years will have significant 
consequences for the entire world, and certain transnational 
issues require action from the PRC. That is why competition 
with Beijing will not, however, preclude cooperation in areas 
where our interests intersect, and why we will keep lines of 
communication open.

    Question. The Biden/Xi summit last year was intended to 
restart or unlock certain avenues of dialogue and communication 
that had been shut down between the U.S. and China. What is the 
current progress?

    Answer. Following the unacceptable and outrageous incursion 
of a PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon into U.S. 
territorial airspace, we have made clear to the PRC that such a 
violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law must never 
occur again. Secretary Blinken's February 18 meeting with 
Chinese Community Party Central Foreign Affairs Office Director 
Wang Yi in Munich demonstrated the United States' continued 
commitment to responsibly managing our competition with the 
PRC, including keeping open lines of communication, even when 
tensions arise.

    Question. Have the Chinese taken any action on the 
discussions from that meeting?

    Answer. During his February 18 meeting with Chinese 
Communist Party Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang 
Yi, Secretary Blinken directly raised the unacceptable 
violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law by the PRC 
high-altitude surveillance balloon in U.S. territorial 
airspace, underscoring that this irresponsible act must never 
again occur. The Secretary made clear the United States will 
not stand for any violation of our sovereignty. As President 
Biden has said, it is important that the United States and the 
PRC maintain diplomatic dialogue and open lines of 
communication. The Secretary also warned about the implications 
and consequences if China provides material support to Russia 
or assistance with systemic sanctions evasion in support of 
Russia's brutal war against Ukraine. We continue to watch PRC 
actions very closely.

    Question. How are we using this episode to U.S. advantage 
in our broader competition with China, especially to apply 
pressure while China is on its back foot here?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken and I, along with State 
Department colleagues at all levels, have reiterated publicly 
and privately that the PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon 
flown over U.S. territory was an unacceptable violation of U.S. 
sovereignty and international law, and underscored that this 
irresponsible act must never occur again. We have also 
mobilized our diplomats around the world to expose the PRC's 
broader surveillance efforts and its high-altitude surveillance 
balloon program--which has intruded into the air space of over 
40 countries across 5 continents in recent years. More broadly, 
the United States will continue to compete vigorously with the 
PRC and unapologetically stand up for our values and interests.

    Question. Are we seeking to impose diplomatic, 
reputational, or other costs on China?

    Answer. As the President said in his State of the Union: 
``If the PRC threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect 
our country.'' The United States will continue to take actions 
that it deems necessary for its national security, its 
interests, and its values.After the PRC surveillance balloon 
violated U.S. sovereignty, we mobilized our diplomats around 
the world to expose the PRC's broader surveillance efforts and 
its high altitude surveillance balloon program--which has 
intruded into the air space of over 40 countries across 5 
continents in recent years.

    Question. Are we putting pressure on them to extract 
particular concessions? If so, what concessions are on the 
table?

    Answer. During his February 18 meeting with Chinese 
Communist Party Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang 
Yi, Secretary Blinken directly raised the unacceptable 
violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law by the PRC 
high-altitude surveillance balloon in U.S. territorial 
airspace, underscoring that this irresponsible act must never 
again occur. The Secretary made clear the United States will 
not stand for any violation of our sovereignty. As President 
Biden has said, it is important that the United States and the 
PRC maintain diplomatic dialogue and open lines of 
communication.

    Question. How does the balloon episode affect how the Biden 
administration plans to pursue ``putting a floor'' under the 
relationship?

    Answer. The PRC's irresponsible actions were visible for 
the American people and the world to see. The United States 
will continue to take action to respond to violations of our 
sovereignty and international law and to protect our interests 
and values. At the same time, President Biden has been clear--
we have been and will continue to keep open lines of 
communication with the PRC. Secretary Blinken underscored these 
points during his meeting with Chinese Community Party Foreign 
Affairs Office Director Wang Yi on the margins of the Munich 
Security Conference on February 18.

    Question. Does the Administration support FMF grants for 
Taiwan?

    Answer. We look forward to discussing the FY 2024 budget 
request after the President releases it in early March 2023. As 
a general matter, we have been quite clear that our support to 
Taiwan is firm, and we are committed to working with Congress 
to explore avenues for bolstering our assistance.

    Question. Will the President ask for security assistance 
for Taiwan in his FY24 budget request?

    Answer. We look forward to discussing the FY 2024 budget 
request after the President releases it in early March 2023. As 
a general matter, we have been quite clear that our support to 
Taiwan is firm, and we are committed to working with Congress 
to explore avenues for bolstering our assistance.

    Question. Last September, SFRC and SASC sent a request for 
information to the Administration about Taiwan defense issues. 
As of today, we know the Departments of State and Defense did 
the analysis required to answer these questions, but have 
received nothing. Why hasn't Congress received information it 
has asked for?

    Answer. We are working across the interagency to provide 
the information Congress has requested.

    Question. Do you commit to providing us with this 
information within the next 30 days?

    Answer. We cannot commit to providing this information 
within a specific timeframe, but we welcome the opportunity to 
continue to discuss Taiwan's defense.

    Question. The Department of State has said that it is 
conducting a review of the Foreign Military Sales because of 
slow delivery timelines--an issue that is especially 
problematic for Taiwan. How much progress has been made on this 
review and what are its findings so far? When will it be 
complete?

    Answer. The Department reviews the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) process on an ongoing basis. Delivery dates are not 
normally connected to the time it takes the Department to 
process FMS, which we have expedited for Taiwan. The problems 
impacting Taiwan are the same as those impacting other FMS 
partners, including slow acquisition and contracting processes, 
and limited U.S. industrial production capacity.

    Question. Does the Administration plan to make any 
announcements or brief Congress on the outcome of the review?

    Answer. Yes, once complete, we will brief Congress on the 
outcome of State's review of Foreign Military Sales processes. 
In the interim, I understand that we have already provided some 
information to HFAC and SFRC staffers, and will continue to do 
so as the review continues. We look forward to providing a 
formal briefing at the conclusion of our review.

    Question. There were two instances last year where the 
Biden administration delayed or ``bundled'' arms sales to 
Taiwan. What happened?

    Answer. The Department does not ``bundle'' Taiwan 
Congressional Notifications (CNs). State received two cases on 
the same day (AIM-9X and AGM-84L) and we processed them as 
separate cases. The Taiwan Air Force had deliberately chosen to 
procure these munitions via separate cases. The CNs arrived at 
Congress on the same day because that's when they were both 
ready for notification.

    Question. Does the Biden administration commit that it will 
not ``bundle'' arms sales to Taiwan in the future?

    Answer. Yes. Consistent with the position of this 
Administration, we have no intention of bundling sales to 
Taiwan.

    Question. What is your involvement in ensuring swift and 
proper implementation of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act?

    Answer. The Department is actively working with the 
interagency to examine ways to implement new security 
assistance authorities for Taiwan. We are also working with the 
American Institute in Taiwan to implement the Taiwan Fellowship 
program and continuing our ongoing efforts to expand Taiwan's 
international space.

    Question. What can we expect to see from the Biden 
administration in the coming year on enhancing U.S.-Taiwan 
relations and deterring PRC aggression?

    Answer. We will continue to make available to Taiwan 
defense articles and services to strengthen its self-defense 
capabilities. The Biden-Harris administration has notified more 
than $5 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, and last 
year, we notified the largest single-year number of 
notifications for Taiwan. We will continue to engage our allies 
and partners, as well as others to ensure that they understand 
cross-strait peace and stability is a matter of regional--and 
global--security and prosperity.

    Question. As part of strengthening economic ties with 
Taiwan, does the Department of State support an Avoidance of 
Double Taxation Agreement with Taiwan? I know that other U.S. 
Government agencies would be involved in such an agreement, but 
I expect a direct answer on the Department's views.

    Answer. We are aware of the double taxation concerns raised 
by the private sector and by our Taiwan counterparts. The 
Department of State is working with the Department of the 
Treasury and other agencies to address these issues and looks 
forward to engaging with Congress. Taiwan is a critical 
economic partner in areas such as semiconductors, and we will 
continue to explore ways to deepen our longstanding trade and 
investment relationship.

    Question. Taiwan depends on imports for 98 percent of its 
energy needs--a potentially huge vulnerability in the event of 
a PLA invasion or coercion. Where can we support Taiwan on 
energy?

    Answer. The United States is working to support Taiwan's 
energy security and energy resilience by encouraging Taiwan's 
regulatory bodies to require a larger emergency energy 
stockpile, to modernize its grid to enhance reliability, and to 
better integrate renewable power generation resources. The 
Department of State is working with Taiwan to accelerate its 
deployment of renewable energy and decrease its reliance on 
energy imports.

    Question. What steps is China taking, if any, to harden 
itself against economic sanctions resulting from aggression 
towards Taiwan?

    Answer. We do not typically comment on U.S. sanctions 
policy, nor do we preview sanctions actions. We believe 
sanctions remain highly effective tools to advance U.S. 
national security interests.

    Question. To what extent is the U.S. prepared to impose 
economic sanctions or other punitive financial measures against 
China if it uses aggression against Taiwan?

    Answer. The United States is prepared to appropriately use 
all its tools against the PRC if Beijing moves aggressively 
toward Taiwan.

    Question. China and Europe Question: In last year's NATO 
Strategic Concept, the alliance added China as one of its major 
challenges. What steps has the alliance taken towards hardening 
itself against China's cyber and hybrid operations concerns 
stated in the Strategic Concept?

    Answer. At the 2022 NATO Summit, Allies highlighted the 
importance of countering threats to Allies' collective defense 
from all directions and recognized that the PRC's stated 
ambitions and policies challenge NATO and U.S. interests, 
security, and values. Against the backdrop of PRC-related 
challenges and other threats, Allies have committed to 
significantly strengthening cyber defenses through enhanced 
civil-military cooperation and expanded partnerships with 
industry.

    Question. How is the State Department contributing to this 
effort?

    Answer. The U.S. Mission to NATO facilitates national-level 
security and intelligence community engagement and sharing of 
cyber-threat information on the PRC with NATO committees and 
organizations to assist in the protection of NATO Enterprise 
networks and to contribute to the shared situational awareness 
of the Alliance. The State Department supports efforts to 
enhance civilian-military cooperation and build cyber capacity 
with all partners and allies in order to address cyber threats, 
including those posed by the PRC.

    Question. It has become increasingly clear that China is 
helping Russia evade U.S. and allied sanctions. This is 
particularly true on our export controls, which are designed to 
keep Russia from procuring the items--like semiconductors and 
electronic circuitry--that help its war machine run. What steps 
is the U.S. Government taking to put an end to China's 
assistance of Russia's war in Ukraine?

    Answer. The Administration takes materiel assistance to 
Russia's defense sector very seriously. Since Russia's full-
scale invasion of Ukraine last February, the United States 
designated Spacety China under E.O. 14024 following its 
provision to Russia of synthetic aperture radar satellite 
imagery orders over locations in Ukraine. Since the full-scale 
invasion, the Administration has also added 12 PRC entities to 
the Department of Commerce's Entity List.

    Question. Has the Administration considered using secondary 
sanctions on China for the increase in shipments and trans-
shipments of these items to Russia?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken used his travel to the Munich 
Security Conference to reinforce both our concern and the 
potential repercussions of the PRC materially supporting 
Russia's war effort. We have made clear to the PRC there would 
be real consequences in our relationship if the PRC were to 
provide Russia lethal assistance or systematic assistance 
evading sanctions. We have already sanctioned the PRC firm 
Spacety for providing satellite imagery to Wagner forces in 
Ukraine and continue to monitor this space very closely.

    Question. Is it the Department's assessment that Russia's 
experience in Ukraine is accelerating Xi Jinping's sense of 
urgency to achieve peaceful or forceful unification of Taiwan?

    Answer. The United States continues to oppose any 
unilateral changes to the status quo from either side and 
expects cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful 
means. Though there are some analogies that can be drawn 
between Taiwan and Ukraine, the two situations have very 
important differences that should not be overlooked. There is 
no doubt that Vladimir Putin severely miscalculated in invading 
Ukraine, and we remain determined to ensure that his 
premeditated, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is a strategic 
failure.

    Question. What potential diplomatic blind spots have been 
identified within the U.S. and the PRC's responses to a cross-
Strait conflict based on lessons learned from the Russian 
invasion?

    Answer. The Administration has dedicated significant 
resources and personnel to address critical security issues in 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Our focus has been to work closely 
with our allies and partners to send a clear and collective 
message to the PRC on the costs of its pressure against Taiwan. 
Deterrence is not limited to arms sales but also includes our 
work across the diplomatic, economic, and military spectrum.

    Question. How are we addressing U.S. shortfalls and 
exploiting China's blind spots?

    Answer. We continue to work with Taiwan to build Taiwan's 
economic and military deterrence capabilities. We are also 
working with allies and partners to strengthen Taiwan's 
resiliency to PRC pressure and highlight Taiwan as a leading 
democracy that can address global challenges. Our diplomatic 
engagement with countries around the world has increased 
international awareness of the PRC's provocative behavior 
toward Taiwan, resulting in greater coordination with our 
allies and partners, including highlighting the need to 
preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

    Question. Some of our longstanding Middle Eastern partners 
have argued that the Biden administration's policies towards 
the region are pushing them towards Russia or China. They point 
to overly restrictive arms sales policies, an advertised pivot 
to the Indo-Pacific, repudiation of the Abraham Accords, and 
the Afghanistan withdrawal as signals of American disengagement 
from the Middle East. The President's trip did little to repair 
relationships. What concrete actions is the Administration 
taking to compete strategically with China in the Middle East?

    Answer. Our affirmative agenda of regional engagement is 
anchored by work with partners to mitigate food insecurity, 
address climate change, enhance maritime security, and 
cooperatively bolster air and missile defense. This 
Administration strongly supports the Abraham Accords and has 
built upon them to foster continued regional integration, which 
is key to securing stability and prosperity into the future. We 
also continue to maintain robust security cooperation with our 
partners in a variety of different ways across the region, 
including through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS). Our partners strongly prefer U.S. 
military equipment while PRC sales to the region remain 
comparatively minuscule.

    Question. China engages in coercive financial and economic 
diplomacy throughout the Middle East and North Africa and is 
heavily invested in dual-use facilities, to include ports. The 
Administration's Strategic Ports Initiative is doing little to 
curb China's inroads. What technical or infrastructure 
assistance are we providing to our Middle Eastern partners to 
block China's infrastructure overtures in the Middle East?

    Answer. The Strategic Ports Initiative has a global 
mandate, but with limited resources, programming has been 
prioritized in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
    However, the Department has encouraged partners to 
strengthen their national security tools, including investment 
screening and other authorities, to ensure port infrastructure 
investment does not raise national security risks. We also 
provide technical assistance to improve our partners' capacity 
to evaluate bids for critical infrastructure projects. We 
continue to work with the Development Finance Cooperation, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank to 
provide access to financing for strategic infrastructure 
projects.

    Question. What levels of funding would the Department need 
to help partners keep China out of their strategic ports?

    Answer. The Department appreciates Congressional interest 
in securing partners' strategic ports. We are continuing to 
assess resources for the Strategic Ports Initiative in current-
year and future-year budgets, including to support regional 
coverage, improve capacity building, create early warning 
mechanisms, and facilitate exchange programs. For example, a 
line item of approximately $6,000,000 per year would support 
four full-time employees ($800,000); exchange programs 
($2,000,0000); capacity building ($2,500,000); and the creation 
of an early warning system ($700,000).

    Question. Chinese purchases of Iranian oil are 
significantly weakening both U.S. and international sanctions 
against the Iranian regime. The Administration has rolled out 
preliminary sanctions, but Chinese purchases continue to rise. 
How do you plan to address Chinese purchases of Iranian oil?

    Answer. The increasing alignment between the PRC and Iran 
remains a top concern for the United States. The United States 
designated more than 20 PRC persons involved in the Iranian 
petroleum or petrochemical trade in 2022. The United States is 
continuing to consider all options to mitigate PRC support for 
the Iranian petrochemical and petroleum industry.

    Question. Russia recently announced that it is taking steps 
to integrate its financial systems with Iran. How can we 
prevent China from taking similar steps or otherwise further 
deepening its relations with Iran?

    Answer. The United States continues to enforce our 
sanctions against Iran, and we do not hesitate to take action 
against sanctions evaders. We remain concerned about Iran's 
sanctions evasion activity, including activity involving the 
PRC.
    We regularly engage with the PRC and strongly discourage 
them from taking steps vis-a-vis Iran that contravene U.S. 
sanctions. Special Envoy for Iran Malley delivered this message 
to PRC Director General for Arms Control and Disarmament Sun in 
a February 1 phone call.

    Question. What is the status of China's efforts to 
establish additional military (including naval) basing 
infrastructure in Africa?

    Answer. The PRC desires to establish a military presence on 
the Atlantic coast of Africa are well documented but have not 
been realized. We are tracking the establishment of PRC 
military bases globally and will defend U.S. interests while 
working with our African partners on these issues.

    Question. How has the Administration responded to Chinese 
efforts to establish additional military basing, including 
construction of dual-use infrastructure?

    Answer. We are closely tracking the possible establishment 
of additional PRC military bases in Africa and globally. We 
maintain strong, positive, and active defense-related 
engagements with several African nations on the Atlantic coast, 
including ones that may be vulnerable to PRC pressure and 
influence. We are also working with African nations to present 
a positive, rules-based alternative through maritime governance 
and climate resilience capacity building, and the development 
of sustainable blue economies.

    Question. Are there sufficient U.S. personnel, legal 
authorities, and financial resources available for these 
efforts? If not, please explain.

    Answer. The Department has been doing its best to steadily 
increase its resources and staffing toward counter-PRC 
activities over the past several years. Our Africa-based 
regional China officers monitor and report on PRC activities 
detrimental to U.S., host country or global interests, build 
local security capacity, work with partners and allies, and 
support our network of China watchers at all U.S. diplomatic 
missions in Africa. Our public diplomacy resources enable the 
United States to engage with foreign audiences on our 
affirmative agenda and to counter information manipulation from 
the PRC, and funds from the Countering PRC Influence Fund and 
the new Peacekeeping Operations-funded Countering Strategic 
Competitors program allow us to support various capacity 
building projects, including cybersecurity, energy security, 
countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and 
countering disinformation. We look forward to discussing 
resources and staffing supporting these efforts once the FY 
2024 budget is released.

    Question. Have there been instances when PRC military 
personnel have threatened or impeded U.S. personnel in Africa? 
If so, how has the United States responded?

    Answer. The People's Liberation Army navy operates a 
military support base in Djibouti. In the past, PRC personnel 
directed lasers at U.S. aircraft operating in Djibouti. The 
United States engaged both Djibouti and the PRC to protest the 
action. The United States expects PRC forces operating in 
Djibouti to engage professionally and in accordance with 
international standards and obligations. U.S. embassies 
continuously evaluate conditions and make recommendations to 
mitigate risk to U.S. citizens and personnel. I defer to the 
Department of Defense for further information on its posture.

    Question. What plans are in place for responding to 
incidents when PRC military personnel have threatened or 
impeded U.S. personnel in Africa in the future?

    Answer. The United States expects PRC forces operating 
anywhere to engage professionally and in accordance with 
international standards and obligations. Should issues arise, 
the relevant U.S. embassy would work with the appropriate U.S. 
military command to register any concerns with the host 
government and the PRC. The Department prioritizes the safety 
of U.S. citizens and U.S. Government personnel overseas. 
Embassies constantly evaluate conditions and make 
recommendations to mitigate risk. I defer to the Department of 
Defense for further information on its posture.

    Question. How would you characterize Chinese cyber security 
threats in Africa?

    Answer. The PRC's cyber-espionage operations have included 
compromising telecommunications firms, providers of managed 
services and broadly used software, and other targets for 
intelligence collection, cyber-enabled disruption, or influence 
operations. PRC-linked actors have reportedly compromised 
African Union networks and exfiltrated email communications 
between member states as recently as April 2022. As African 
countries build out their telecommunications networks, the 
Department is engaging them on the merits of selecting trusted 
vendors to secure their information communications and 
technology infrastructure.

    Question. How is the United States responding to Chinese 
cyber security threats in Africa?

    Answer. For over a decade, State Department capacity 
building programs and initiatives have helped African partners 
strengthen abilities to respond to cybersecurity incidents, 
draft national cybersecurity strategies, increase investment in 
secure technology, and combat cybercrime. The Department also 
promotes the UN-affirmed Framework of Responsible State 
Behavior in Cyberspace with African governments to counter 
peace and security threats from adversaries such as the PRC. We 
continue to engage African countries to use trusted vendors as 
they upgrade their information and communications 
infrastructure.

    Question. The Biden administration has identified China's 
``dominant position (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf) in 
cobalt mining and processing of materials extracted'' from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as a U.S. supply chain concern. 
What specific actions is the Administration proposing to 
challenge China's dominance over DRC's cobalt mining 
production?

    Answer. We have a strong partnership with the Tshisekedi 
administration to support mining sector governance, labor, and 
human rights through technical assistance. Through the Mineral 
Security Partnership, we catalyze high environmental, social, 
and governance standard investment into critical mineral supply 
chains including cobalt. The United States signed an MOU during 
the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022 to signal 
support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo's and Zambia's 
goal to build an electric vehicle batteries supply chain.

    Question. What impact have these efforts had on U.S. 
relations with the DRC Government, which is also implicated in 
human rights abuses and corruption?

    Answer. The United States continues to work closely with 
the Government of the DRC to implement the MOU signed during 
the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022 to support the 
DRC and Zambia's goal to build an electric vehicle batteries 
supply chain. The U.S. supports mining sector governance, 
labor, and human rights through technical assistance to the DRC 
Government. The MOU also encourages international best 
practices that facilitate the prevention, detection, and 
prosecution of corruption, as well as applicable obligations 
under the UN Convention Against Corruption.

    Question. In November 2020, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee released a report calling for greater U.S.-Europe 
cooperation on China. Among the recommendations were for the 
United States and Europe to work toward a comprehensive 
strategy that ``affirms the close linkage between democracy, 
good governance, and sound economic management.'' What is the 
State Department doing to coordinate U.S. and European 
messaging for African political leaders and publics regarding 
China's engagement in the region?

    Answer. The State Department meets routinely with European 
partners to discuss and coordinate messaging on PRC engagement, 
including in Africa. Department officials meet with European 
counterparts in multilateral formats such the U.S.-EU High 
Level Dialogue on China, which I lead, and the G7 Africa 
Directors Meeting. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
regularly speaks with European counterparts to coordinate 
European and U.S. messaging in Africa on the PRC. The 
Department provides guidance to U.S. embassies in Africa to 
engage audiences on the PRC's harmful practices in Africa.

    Question. To what extent is the Administration working with 
European partners to deter Chinese-funded dual-use 
infrastructure construction at African ports?

    Answer. The Department has initiated talks with UK and EU 
partners on how we can better coordinate efforts to provide 
transparent, rules-based infrastructure financing to developing 
countries, which includes partners in Africa.

    Question. What role do you expect to play in implementing 
deliverables announced by the White House during the December 
2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS)?

    Answer. The Department remains committed to Summit goals 
and strengthening our relationship with African partners. Since 
the Summit, the Department has focused its efforts in Sub-
Saharan Africa on priority areas identified at the Summit and 
continuing to align our resources with those, the State-USAID 
Joint Regional Strategy, and the U.S. Strategy Towards Sub-
Saharan Africa. The Department is working closely with 
Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Special Presidential Representative 
for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation, to design the 
architecture of a sustained engagement with African leaders 
across business, development, governance, people-to-people, and 
other dimensions.

    Question. The Administration pledged during the ALS, among 
other things, to expand U.S. support for leadership training, 
economic and trade integration, digital access and literacy, 
health system capacity, food security, climate adaptation, and 
security sector reform in Africa. How, and according to what 
benchmarks, does the State Department intend to measure success 
in achieving these objectives?

    Answer. As part of this announcement, the Biden-Harris 
administration announced plans to work with Congress on new 
programs, such as Digital Transformation for Africa, African 
Women's Entrepreneurship Program--Reimagined, and a new 
security sector consortium. It also announced plans to work 
with Congress on new investments in existing programs such as 
Prosper and Power Africa, Feed the Future, the U.S. President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and the Adaptation Fund. 
Programs will be designed and regularly evaluated to determine 
if they are achieving results or if adjustments are needed to 
ensure their success. Another measure of success will be the 
Department's ability to elevate our African partners to lead in 
addressing shared priorities.

    Question. During the 2022 ALS, the Administration announced 
a new initiative to ``engage with complex political transitions 
in Africa and demonstrate U.S. Government support to 
governments and civil society at critical moments.'' What will 
this initiative mean, concretely, for U.S. engagement with 
political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Sudan and 
Mali?

    Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions 
(ADAPT) initiative, totaling $75 million over 3 years, enables 
the U.S. Government to support democratic transitions by 
surging experts to the field and funding programming. The 
Bureau of African Affairs (AF), through an Interagency 
Agreement with the U.S. Institute of Peace, is supporting 
ongoing transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea. AF is 
also engaged in Sudan and Mali, supporting each transition 
through implementing partners. These initiatives will inform 
ADAPT and future work in these countries.

    Question. Noticeably absent from the ALS were U.S. 
ambassadors to African countries, who remained at post. Who 
made the decision to keep our ambassadors at their posts in 
Africa instead of having them attend the ALS alongside the 
delegations from the African countries they serve in?

    Answer. Recent practice for summits has been that Chiefs of 
Mission were not asked to travel back to attend. This was the 
case for the most recent ASEAN Summit and the Summit of the 
Americas. The same approach was used for the U.S.-Africa 
Leaders Summit.

    Question. What was the rationale for keeping our 
ambassadors at their posts in Africa instead of having them 
attend the ALS alongside the delegations from the African 
countries they serve in?

    Answer. Recent practice for summits has been that Chiefs of 
Mission were not asked to travel back to attend. This was the 
case for the most recent ASEAN Summit and Summit of Americas. 
The same approach was used for the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.

    Question. Was keeping our ambassadors at their posts in 
Africa instead of having them attend the ALS alongside the 
delegations from the African countries they serve in a missed 
opportunity?

    Answer. The Summit was an opportunity to advance our most 
pressing issues, both regionally and globally, with leaders 
from the continent. African leaders were able to interact with 
the President, Vice President, Cabinet officials, and Members 
of Congress to discuss numerous new policies and programs that 
not only aim to help mitigate ongoing crises, but also elevate 
our partnerships to collaboratively address core challenges.

    Question. An American citizen, Ryan Koher, has been 
detained without trial in Mozambique for 3 months. I spoke with 
President Nyusi about this case on the sidelines of the ALS in 
December 2022, and he personally promised to examine the 
situation and report back to me. I also understand that 
Ambassador Vrooman and others at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo 
have engaged with Mozambican officials on Mr. Koher's case. 
Yet, there appears to be no movement toward either charging or 
releasing him.

    Answer. We are aware that a U.S. citizen, Ryan Koher, is 
detained in Mozambique. The Department is providing all 
appropriate consular assistance and will continue to monitor 
Mr. Koher's case closely. Consular officers at our Embassy in 
Maputo have regularly visited Mr. Koher and remain in 
communication with his family.

    Question. How and when does the State Department plan to 
engage with the Mozambican Government on Mr. Koher's case if 
there is no forward movement on either charging or releasing 
him?

    Answer. We are aware that a U.S. citizen, Ryan Koher, is 
detained in Mozambique. The Department of State is providing 
all appropriate consular assistance and will continue to 
monitor Mr. Koher's case closely. Consular officers at our 
Embassy in Maputo have regularly visited Mr. Koher and remain 
in communication with his family. Senior Department of State 
officials have stressed to the Government of Mozambique that 
Mr. Koher must be treated fairly under Mozambican and 
international law, and the Department will continue to stress 
this.

    Question. Tensions have continued to escalate between the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, as the M23 
conflict continues to worsen. In January, Rwanda's military 
fired on a DRC military aircraft, asserting that it had 
violated Rwandan airspace. Secretary of State Blinken has 
called on Rwanda to stop supporting the M23 and for DRC 
officials to end all military cooperation with anti-Rwandan 
armed groups and counter hate speech against Congolese 
Rwandaphone communities. You have met several times with 
Rwanda's Foreign Minister over the past year, including on 
February 1, 2023, when you ``underscored U.S. support for 
regional mediation on eastern DRC,'' according to the 
Department's public readout. The readout also indicated that 
you discussed ``how to promote stability in the Central African 
Republic,'' where Rwanda has deployed troops under national 
command and as UN peacekeepers. What is the Administration's 
plan for diplomatic engagement to support a decrease in 
tensions between DRC and Rwanda and an end to the M23 conflict?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned about the situation in 
eastern DRC and have been engaging at high levels in support of 
African-led mediation efforts to deescalate tensions. The 
Department of State has made it clear to President Kagame and 
Foreign Minister Biruta that Rwandan support to the M23 rebel 
group must stop. We are also engaging the Government of the DRC 
on Rwanda's stated concerns. We will maintain high-level 
diplomatic engagement--with a focus on regional mediation 
efforts--and consider every tool available to accomplish a 
diplomatic end to the violence in eastern DRC.

    Question. The Administration adopted an interagency 
strategy for the Sahel in March 2022. Since then, the security 
situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has continued to 
deteriorate, Mali has drawn closer to Russia and the Wagner 
Group, and Burkina Faso's military junta has decided to expel 
French military forces that were working with our military to 
counter terrorism in the region. What has been the concrete 
impact of the 2022 Sahel strategy, to date?

    Answer. The Sahel strategy outlines our medium- and long-
term policy and resource investments in the region. Since 
drafted, conditions on the ground have worsened, requiring us 
to revise some near-term tactics. Nevertheless, we continue to 
prioritize activities to strengthen democratic institutions 
across the region; support sustainable democratic transitions 
in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali; slow the spread of violent 
extremist organizations southward; and push the Wagner Group 
from the region. In accordance with the strategy, we are also 
collaborating more effectively across the interagency and 
engaging partners in new ways to complement our activities.

    Question. What is the Administration's plan for deterring 
and responding to Russia's malign influence, including the 
Wagner Group's presence, in the Sahel?

    Answer. We are quite attuned to the threat of the Wagner 
Group in Africa, and are working closely with U.S. and allied 
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to identify 
all the elements of their network and limit the Wagner Group's 
ability to continue their criminal exploitation of African 
resources and abuse of human rights. In order to fully respond 
to these questions, give you our unvarnished assessment of the 
network, and present our plan for thwarting them, the 
Department would like to offer a classified briefing at your 
convenience.

    Question. What changes to the Sahel strategy has the 
Administration made in response to developments on the ground 
since early 2022?

    Answer. The countries of the Sahel face a crisis of 
governance that has enabled the spread of violent extremism. In 
the long-term, we must confront security challenges by 
addressing their underlying causes. In light of on-the-ground 
changes, however, we are focused on disrupting and responding 
to terrorist activity and bolstering criminal justice actors' 
ability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism-
related crimes. Through the Global Fragility Act and the 
corresponding U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote 
Stability, we are promoting social cohesion, improving 
government responsiveness, and enhancing security force 
responsiveness and accountability.
    In Burkina Faso, the transition authorities are being 
courted by the Wagner Group, which is trying to run the same 
playbook as it did in Mali. We must encourage Burkina Faso to 
rely on our likeminded partners, including those in the region, 
who have an interest in restoring stability as well as 
returning the country to democratic rule. We are working to 
expose the Wagner Group's exploitative methods and to highlight 
its goal to promote its own interests through the extraction of 
Africa's natural resources, the undermining of democratic 
processes, and social media campaigns that manipulate public 
opinions through lies.
                                ------                                


               Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. U.S.-China Relations: The Biden administration 
has repeatedly said it wants to ``put a floor'' under its 
relationship with China and that this floor has never been 
defined.
    What makes the Administration believe this goal is 
achievable?

    Answer. It is not in the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
or our interest to allow competition to turn into conflict. I 
do not believe the PRC wants to see tensions with the United 
States spiral out of control.

    Question. What does this ``floor'' consist of?

    Answer. We have been clear that we are committed to 
responsibly managing competition and engaging with PRC 
officials at the highest levels to ensure this competition does 
not veer into conflict. The United States will continue to seek 
open lines of communication with the PRC, even when tensions 
arise.

    Question. What is the plan if the ``putting a floor'' 
exercise yields no progress?

    Answer. DoD remains steadfast in implementing the 
priorities laid out in the National Defense Strategy through 
strengthening integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building 
enduring advantages. We are working to ensure we have the right 
operational concepts, capabilities, and plans to bolster 
deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage.

    Question. The Biden/Xi summit last year was intended to 
restart or unlock certain avenues of dialogue and communication 
that had been shut down between the U.S. and China.
    What is the current progress?

    Answer. After President Biden and President Xi agreed on 
reopening lines of military-to-military communication between 
our two countries in November 2023, Chairman Brown spoke with 
his PRC counterpart for the first time in December 2023, and 
the Department hosted the 17th U.S.-PRC Defense Policy 
Coordination Talks in January 2024. The Department will 
continue to engage in active discussions with PRC counterparts 
about future engagements between defense and military officials 
at multiple levels to ensure that competition does not veer 
into conflict.

    Question. Have the Chinese taken any action on the 
discussions from that meeting?

    Answer. After President Biden and President Xi agreed on 
reopening lines of military-to-military communication between 
our two countries in November 2023, Chairman Brown spoke with 
his PRC counterpart for the first time in December 2023, and 
the Department hosted the 17th U.S.-PRC Defense Policy 
Coordination Talks in January 2024. The Department will 
continue to engage in active discussions with PRC counterparts 
about future engagements between defense and military officials 
at multiple levels to ensure that competition does not veer 
into conflict.

    Question. Spy Balloon: How are we using this episode to 
U.S. advantage in our broader competition with China, 
especially to apply pressure while China is on its back foot 
here?

    Answer. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this 
matter in a classified setting.

    Question. Are we seeking to impose diplomatic, 
reputational, or other costs on China?

    Answer. The U.S. Government added six PRC entities to the 
Entity List on February 14 for their support to the PRC's 
military modernization efforts, specifically the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) aerospace programs including airships and 
balloons and related materials and components.

    Question. Are we putting pressure on them to extract 
particular concessions? If so, what concessions are on the 
table?

    Answer. No, but we are also looking at broader efforts to 
expose and address the PRC's larger surveillance activities 
that pose a threat to our national security, and to our allies 
and partners.

    Question. How does the balloon episode affect how the Biden 
administration plans to pursue ``putting a floor'' under the 
relationship?

    Answer. The President has been clear--we have been and will 
continue to pursue open lines of communication with the PRC. We 
will continue to manage the competition between our two 
countries so it does not veer into conflict, while standing up 
for our national security, values, and interests.

    Question. Taiwan: Does the Administration support FMF 
grants for Taiwan?

    Answer. The Department supports Taiwan's efforts to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability and strengthen 
its resilience. As Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are 
programmed by the Department of State, however, we would 
respectfully defer this question to the Department of State.

    Question. Will the President ask for security assistance 
for Taiwan in his FY24 budget request?

    Answer. The Department respectfully defers questions on 
future fiscal year FMF budget requests to the State Department 
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

    Question. Last September, SFRC and SASC sent a request for 
information to the Administration about Taiwan defense issues. 
As of today, we know the Departments of State and Defense did 
the analysis required to answer these questions, but have 
received nothing.
    Why hasn't Congress received information it has asked for?

    Answer. In May 2023, the Departments of State and Defense 
provided their response to Section 5502(e)(1) of the Taiwan 
Enhanced Resilience Act. The Department of Defense is 
accelerating the provision of both materiel and non-materiel 
support to Taiwan to enhance cross-Strait deterrence. Any 
additional authorities and corresponding appropriations that 
Congress makes available will only further enable our efforts 
to meet critical gaps Taiwan faces and bolster its self-defense 
capabilities.

    Question. Do you commit to providing us with this 
information within the next 30 days?

    Answer. DoD and its interagency partners are working to 
provide the requested information as soon as possible.

    Question. What is your involvement in ensuring swift and 
proper implementation of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act?

    Answer. Department leadership across the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
(INDOPACOM), and the Military Departments/Services is focused 
on bolstering Taiwan's self-defense across the range of 
capabilities highlighted in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(TERA). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
[OSD(P)] will continue to coordinate these materiel and non-
materiel efforts with our interagency partners in an effort to 
accelerate the provision of support amidst ongoing PRC pressure 
and coercion.

    Question. What can we expect to see from the Biden 
administration in the coming year on enhancing U.S.-Taiwan 
relations and deterring PRC aggression?

    Answer. The Administration will continue to meet our 
commitments consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act to provide 
Taiwan with the defense articles and services needed to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This includes 
mobile, distributed capabilities, and corresponding non-
materiel support, that best support cross-Strait deterrence. I 
would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter further in 
a classified setting.

    Question. China and Europe: In last year's NATO Strategic 
Concept, the Alliance added China as one of its major 
challenges.
    What steps has the alliance taken towards hardening itself 
against China's cyber and hybrid operations concerns stated in 
the Strategic Concept?

    Answer. NATO serves as a hub for expertise to support and 
coordinate Allies' efforts to identify national vulnerabilities 
and strengthen their own resilience to cyber or hybrid 
operations, including those by the PRC. Among Allies, NATO has 
an agreed and evolving set of Baseline Requirements and related 
Resilience Guidelines, which provide a basis for this work and 
include PRC challenges, and NATO is now developing more 
granular resilience objectives to guide Allies' planning. NATO 
has also increased engagement with its partners in the Indo-
Pacific region, including to exchange experience on national 
approaches to countering hybrid threats from the PRC.

    Question. How is the Defense Department contributing to 
this effort?

    Answer. The Department is active in the interagency process 
developing U.S. policies and positions to bolster those NATO 
documents and activities. The Department also contributes 
substantial expertise and intelligence in NATO as well as 
bilaterally to improve Allies' ability to detect and attribute 
cyber and hybrid operations from the PRC and to inform their 
national resilience efforts.

    Question. It has become increasingly clear that China is 
helping Russia evade U.S. and allied sanctions. This is 
particularly true on our export controls, which are designed to 
keep Russia from procuring the items--like semiconductors and 
electronic circuitry--that help its war machine run.
    What steps is the U.S. Government taking to put an end to 
China's assistance of Russia's war in Ukraine?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has taken important steps to 
respond to the PRC's assistance to Russia's war in Ukraine. For 
example, on February 24, the U.S. Government released a package 
of Entity List additions, which called out five PRC entities 
and three of their overseas subsidiaries for significantly 
contributing to Russia's military and/or defense industrial 
base.

    Question. Has the Administration considered using secondary 
sanctions on China for the increase in shipments and trans-
shipments of these items to Russia?

    Answer. The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons (SDN) List is maintained by the Department of Treasury. 
The Department would therefore defer questions on the use of 
secondary sanctions to the Department of the Treasury.

    Question. Is it the Department's assessment that Russia's 
experience in Ukraine is accelerating Xi Jinping's sense of 
urgency to achieve peaceful or forceful unification of Taiwan?

    Answer. No.

    Question. What potential diplomatic blind spots have been 
identified within the U.S. and the PRC's responses to a cross-
Strait conflict based on lessons learned from the Russian 
invasion?

    Answer. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this 
matter further in a classified setting.

    Question. What potential political blind spots have been 
identified within the U.S. and the PRC's responses to a cross-
Strait conflict based on lessons learned from the Russian 
invasion?

    Answer. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this 
matter further in a classified setting.

    Question. How are we addressing U.S. shortfalls and 
exploiting China's blind spots?

    Answer. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this 
matter further in a classified setting.

    Question. China and Africa: What is the status of China's 
efforts to establish additional military (including naval) 
basing infrastructure in Africa?

    Answer. We are closely following the PRC's overseas basing 
ambitions globally. Further details related to this matter 
would be more appropriate to discuss in a classified setting.

    Question. How has the Administration responded to these 
efforts, including construction of dual-use infrastructure?

    Answer. The Administration engages foreign governments 
considering such arrangements to ensure that they understand 
the risks associated with hosting a PLA presence, and urges 
foreign governments to closely review PRC investments in 
potential dual-use infrastructure to ensure it does not become 
an entry point for PRC military equipment or personnel.

    Question. Are there sufficient U.S. personnel, legal 
authorities, and financial resources available for these 
efforts? If not, please explain.

    Answer. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) remains postured to 
meet current Department priorities in Africa. The Department 
will continue to evaluate appropriate personnel, legal 
authority, and financial requirements to address PRC overseas 
basing ambitions in Africa.

    Question. Have there been instances when PRC military 
personnel have threatened or impeded U.S. personnel in Africa? 
If so, how has the United States responded?

    Answer. PLA personnel at its base in Djibouti have violated 
international norms by lasing U.S. military equipment, and the 
PRC has sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over 
the base. The Department has coordinated on a demarche to the 
PRC condemning the incidents and has increased operational 
security measures at Camp Lemonnier in response to PLA actions.

    Question. What plans are in place for responding to PRC 
military personnel threatening or impeding U.S. personnel in 
Africa in the future?

    Answer. This topic would be more appropriate to discuss in 
a classified setting.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. In order to effectively compete with China, the 
United States must provide strong economic support to help 
countries resist the seemingly attractive deals that China 
provides. That is why last year, I introduced the Transatlantic 
Telecommunications Security Act, which would offer U.S. 
financing to Eastern European countries to invest in trusted 
and secure 5G networks to protect the transatlantic 
telecommunications infrastructure, and why I am proud to co-
sponsor the Increasing American Jobs through Greater Exports to 
Africa Act to require a strategy to significantly increase 
trade to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. What is your 
message to countries in central and Eastern Europe in 
particular--including those contending with challenges to 
safeguarding their own fragile democracies--who are most 
vulnerable to low-cost options like Huawei and looking for U.S. 
support for trusted, alternative options to Chinese 
infrastructure?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about the 
dangers of installing networks with equipment that can be 
manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by the PRC, which has no 
regard for privacy or human rights. Huawei has a history of 
unethical, unlawful, and otherwise inappropriate behavior. The 
United States is committed to working with allies and partners 
to develop alternatives to PRC telecommunication networks such 
as Huawei, and I am encouraged that many countries in Eastern 
and Central Europe have already taken steps to limit Huawei's 
presence.

    Question. As part of the Administration's efforts to adapt 
our agencies to compete more effectively with China, how can 
the Development Finance Corporation's (DFC) remit and authority 
be expanded to increase the number of countries we can invest 
in?

    Answer. The BUILD Act of 2018 created DFC to help address 
global development challenges and foreign policy priorities of 
the United States. As the Chair of DFC's board, the Secretary 
of State has worked to create a framework for DFC to support 
strategic projects in upper-middle income countries if the 
projects meet certain developmental criteria or strategic 
priorities, in order to enable DFC to help meet the 
geostrategic moment.

    Question. I welcome the Administration's efforts to partner 
with multilateral institutions, particularly the European Union 
and NATO, to address and respond to China and keep ahead of 
China's technological and military advancements. Please 
describe the Administration's efforts to coordinate with NATO 
and the European Union to advance our Indo-Pacific strategy and 
align our efforts in confronting China's military and economic 
ambitions.

    Answer. Through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, 
Dialogue on China, and the High-Level Consultations on the 
Indo-Pacific, the United States and EU are working together to 
address pressing challenges, including those posed by the PRC. 
Together with our Allies and partners, we have emphasized the 
importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan 
Strait, which the PRC undermines through repeated provocations.
    We continue to coordinate with our Allies in NATO and the 
Indo-Pacific to understand and counter threats posed by the 
PRC.

    Question. What opportunities are there for the NATO 
Alliance to live up to the concerns raised in the 2022 
Strategic Concept, which identifies China as a threat to our 
common security, and support security and democracy in the 
Indo-Pacific while responding to the acute threat of Russian 
aggression?

    Answer. At the 2022 NATO Summit, Allies highlighted the 
importance of countering threats to Allies' collective defense 
from all directions, and recognized the PRC's stated ambitions 
and policies challenge our interests, security, and values. 
Allies committed to work together to address these systemic 
challenges, and are considering the PRC's military 
developments, technological advances, growing cyber and hybrid 
activities, and Allied resilience to these activities, in 
various committees. NATO is also continually engaging with its 
partners in the Indo-Pacific to increase coordination on shared 
security challenges.

    Question. Beijing and Moscow's declaration of a ``no 
limits'' strategic partnership--a declaration that was made 1 
year ago this week--is cause for significant concern. One year 
later, does the Administration see any reluctance by Beijing to 
continue developing this partnership with Putin?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken used his travel to the Munich 
Security Conference to reinforce our concern and the potential 
repercussions of the PRC materially supporting Russia's war 
effort. We have made clear to the PRC there would be real 
consequences in our relationship if the PRC were to provide 
Russia lethal assistance or systematic assistance evading 
sanctions. We have already sanctioned the PRC firm Spacety for 
providing satellite imagery to Wagner forces in Ukraine, and we 
continue to monitor this space very closely.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. General Secretary Xi is correctly regarded as the 
most ideological Chinese Communist Party leader since Mao 
Zedong. He has personally tasked the Party with ``liberating 
all of humanity'' and to serve as the ``gravediggers of 
capitalism.'' He is pushing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
to focus its efforts on countering the ``powerful enemy 
adversary,'' which the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission argues is a code word for the U.S. Is General 
Secretary Xi a partner with the U.S.?

    Answer. The PRC is the greatest geopolitical challenge the 
United States faces because it is the only competitor with the 
intent and increasingly the capability to remake the rules-
based international order. Under President Xi, the Chinese 
Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more 
aggressive abroad in challenging the interests and values of 
the United States and our allies and partners. We will continue 
to defend our interests, values, and affirmative vision for the 
world. At the same time, we recognize that how the United 
States and the PRC manage our relationship in the coming years 
will have consequences for the entire world. That is why 
competition with Beijing will not preclude cooperation in areas 
where our interests intersect, including on transnational 
challenges.

    Question. Do you believe General Secretary Xi when he says 
he wants the Party to serve as a ``gravedigger of capitalism''?

    Answer. There is no doubt that the United States is engaged 
in a vigorous economic competition with the PRC. We are focused 
on concerns with Beijing's market-distorting policies and 
practices, including subsidies and market access barriers, 
forced technology transfer, and IPR theft, which the PRC 
Government has used for years to gain competitive advantage. 
PRC- based companies enjoy far greater access to our markets 
than our companies have in China; the lack of reciprocity is 
unacceptable and unsustainable. The President will use all the 
tools at his disposal and develop new tools as needed to defend 
U.S. economic interests, create reciprocity, and ensure a level 
playing field for U.S. workers.

    Question. Many U.S. allies and partners, from Colombia to 
India, to Thailand, depend on Soviet-era military equipment. 
Ukraine, a former Soviet state that also was home to a large 
share of the Soviet Union's defense industry, was a critical 
source of parts and components needed to maintain this 
equipment. Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine now means our 
allies overseas will struggle to maintain their military 
readiness. How has your Department responded to requests from 
allied and partner countries to upgrade their equipment?

    Answer. We are working with a variety of foreign partners 
to potentially reduce the reliance on Russian-origin equipment 
through transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles. In some 
cases, depending on the condition and willingness of the 
partner nation, those Russian-origin articles may subsequently 
be transferred to Ukraine. However, this process is not 
universal, and frequently the sequencing of these transfers is 
impacted by the time it takes to get replacement defense 
articles to the donating partners.

    Question. Has the State Department swiftly conveyed this 
need to the Department of Defense and our domestic defense 
industry?

    Answer. Yes. We are in constant contact with both the 
Department of Defense and defense industry partners on this 
issue.

    Question. How are we communicating to allies and partners 
that our defense industry is ready and able to maintain our own 
national defense stockpiles as well as supply their needs?

    Answer. We communicate this message to our partners both 
directly and indirectly. We directly meet with foreign partners 
to discuss potential capability gaps that the United States 
could fulfill in support of our own foreign policy and national 
security objectives. Indirectly, we signal this ability by 
issuing marketing licenses to U.S. industry in support of 
partners' own independent pursuits, which still supports our 
foreign policy and defense strategy goals.

    Question. This week, public reporting shows that state-
owned companies in China are providing navigation equipment, 
jamming technology, and jet-fighter parts to sanctioned Russian 
companies. Just one example is the Chinese firm AVIC 
International Holding Corporation, which, according to public 
trade records, shipped $1.2 million worth of parts for Su-35 
fighters in October 2022 to a subsidiary of Rostec, a company 
sanctioned by the Administration last June. Despite this clear 
evidence, the Administration has not yet sanctioned nearly 
enough Chinese entities providing material support to Russia or 
Russian proxies. Instead, there is some indication that the 
Administration sees China as a potential partner on resolving 
the Ukraine crisis, which makes absolutely no sense based on 
everything we've seen and know. Do you believe that we can 
depend on Beijing to enforce international sanctions on Russia? 
What is the Administration doing to expose Chinese support for 
Russia's invasion to our allies and partners?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken used his travel to the Munich 
Security Conference to reinforce our concern and potential 
repercussions of the PRC materially supporting Russia's war 
effort. We have made clear to the PRC there would be real 
consequences in our relationship if the PRC were to provide 
Russia lethal assistance or systematic assistance evading 
sanctions. We have already sanctioned the PRC firm Spacety for 
providing satellite imagery to Wagner forces in Ukraine, and 
Secretary Blinken has been clear that we continue to monitor 
this space very, very closely.

    Question. This Administration's stance on advancing human 
rights in China has been lackluster. I would note that in 2021, 
the Washington Post reported that you personally lobbied 
against my bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 
(UFLPA), apparently out of fear that the law would damage ties 
with Beijing. Fortunately, we were able to pass that law and we 
are working on its implementation. Although I believe the 
Forced Labor Task Force is trying to do the right thing, I fear 
that they are not getting enough support from the 
Administration. Do you support the full implementation of the 
UFLPA?

    Answer. Yes. In April of last year, we submitted to 
Congress a report outlining the United States' diplomatic 
strategy to address forced labor in Xinjiang, as required by 
the UFLPA. Our strategy adopts a whole-of-government approach 
to increasing awareness and addressing forced labor as one of 
the many human rights abuses being committed amidst the ongoing 
genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. We continue 
to work with CBP and interagency colleagues to enhance their 
enforcement of UFLPA. We also continue to rally our allies and 
partners to make global supply chains free from the use of 
forced labor, to speak out against atrocities in Xinjiang, and 
to join us in calling on the government of the PRC to 
immediately end atrocities and human rights abuses, including 
forced labor.

    Question. Does the Administration still hold that the 
Chinese Communist Party's actions against Uyghurs and other 
ethnic groups constitute genocide?

    Answer. Yes. The Secretary of State determined in January 
2021 that the Government of the PRC has committed genocide and 
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and members of other 
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. This position 
has not changed.
    The ongoing crimes against humanity include imprisonment, 
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including the 
use of forced labor and the imposition of draconian 
restrictions on the freedoms of religion or belief, expression, 
and movement.

    Question. How are you holding Beijing accountable for its 
crimes against Uyghurs and other ethnic groups?

    Answer. We continue to work with partner states and in 
multilateral fora to promote accountability for the PRC's 
ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs 
and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in 
Xinjiang, and other human rights abuses throughout China. Human 
rights are highlighted in every high-level engagement with the 
PRC. The U.S. Government continues to take actions which 
include but are not limited to visa restrictions, financial 
sanctions, export controls, import restrictions, and the 
release of a business advisory to warn U.S. companies of the 
potential reputational, economic, and legal risks of conducting 
business with entities tied to Xinjiang.

    Question. Sanctioned Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee 
made clear that he does not intend to enforce U.S. sanctions 
against foreign actors entering the city-state after he allowed 
Russian oligarch Alexei Mordashov to dock his yacht in Hong 
Kong. What is the U.S. doing to counter Hong Kong's blatant 
sanctions evasion?

    Answer. We have been clear that we are prepared to act 
against sanctions evasion and backfilling, as well as act 
against those who provide material support to sanctioned 
entities and individuals. We will continue to consider 
sanctions on individuals or entities helping to prop up 
Russia's military-industrial complex and support its illegal 
war against Ukraine.

    Question. Does the U.S. plan to grant a waiver to Chief 
Executive John Lee to attend the APEC Summit in San Francisco 
in November?

    Answer. The United States plans to invite Hong Kong Chief 
Executive John Lee to attend APEC. As the host, we believe it 
is important to foster regional economic dialogue and for the 
United States and the PRC to work together to maintain global 
macro-economic stability. However, an invitation to APEC does 
not absolve individuals of their role in undermining Hong 
Kong's autonomy and eroding protected rights and freedoms in 
Hong Kong. We will continue to raise our concerns and work with 
allies to press Beijing and Hong Kong authorities to restore 
Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and rule of law.

    Question. Hong Kong Attendance at 2023 APEC Leaders' 
Meeting: Does the U.S. plan to grant a waiver to Chief 
Executive John Lee to attend the APEC Summit in San Francisco 
in November?

    Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about 
the deterioration of protected rights and freedoms and the 
grave restrictions on Hong Kong's autonomy under the National 
Security Law. As host of APEC in 2023, the United States has 
committed to work towards participation of delegations from the 
21 member economies in APEC events, but has consistently made 
clear this participation must be in accordance with U.S. laws 
and regulations, including with respect to sanctions. The 
United States has not issued invitations and has not made any 
commitments regarding invitations to the APEC Economic Leaders' 
Week program in November. The Administration will continue to 
consult closely with Congress on this issue.

    Question. Similarly, how does the U.S. plan to ramp up 
efforts to target Hong Kong's practice of money laundering for 
rogue regimes like Russia, North Korea, Iran, Burma, and 
others?

    Answer. Addressing money laundering threats is a priority 
for the Department. We work closely with Treasury and Justice 
to promote implementation of standards relating to money 
laundering and support programs to increase the capacity of 
foreign law enforcement, financial intelligence units, and 
policy makers across the world to counter money laundering and 
illicit finance by state and non-state actors, including those 
with a PRC link. We are evaluating opportunities to increase 
capacity building efforts directed at modalities or criminal 
actors associated with rogue states.
                                ------                                


               Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. General Secretary Xi is correctly regarded as the 
most ideological Chinese Communist Party leader since Mao 
Zedong. He has personally tasked the Party with ``liberating 
all of humanity'' and to serve as the ``gravediggers of 
capitalism.'' He is pushing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
to focus its efforts on countering the ``powerful enemy 
adversary,'' which the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission argues is a code word for the U.S.
    How can the U.S. military prepare to deter a PLA whose goal 
is to counter ``the powerful enemy adversary'' when others in 
the Administration are focused on striking a climate deal with 
General Secretary Xi?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is implementing the 
President's National Security Strategic Guidance and the 
Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy, the latter of 
which recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the 
Department's pacing challenge. The Department is posturing the 
Joint Force for a long-term competition with the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), with the intent to deter aggression 
against our interests both now and in the future.

    Question. A few weeks ago, a report by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies concluded that the war in 
Ukraine has severely depleted both American and European stocks 
of munitions critical for a conventional war. This is 
especially cause for concern given that the Chinese Communist 
Party is stepping up aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific, 
including towards Taiwan and India. It is my belief that 
deterring Beijing in the region must be the top priority for 
the U.S. and our assistance to Ukraine--though important--
should not come at the cost of leaving us unprepared deterring 
China or degrade the ability of the U.S. to defend ourselves at 
home.
    What capabilities are the U.S. sending that would also be 
needed to deter a Chinese attack against Taiwan?

    Answer. Support to Ukraine and support to Taiwan are not 
mutually exclusive, and all decisions on assistance provided to 
Ukraine are made with consideration of our readiness 
requirements around the globe. We continue to diligently work 
to provide asymmetric capabilities to Taiwan, including anti-
ship missiles, command and control networks and secure 
communication systems, data links, early warning radar, and 
integrated air and missile defense, as fast as possible--while 
also supporting Ukraine to defend itself against Russian 
aggression.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure 
that U.S. stockpiles are quickly replenished to ensure that the 
U.S. is prepared for another major conflict and to defend 
itself?

    Answer. Thanks to congressional support, the Department is 
replenishing stocks of munitions transferred to Ukraine. The 
Department is working with industry to increase production of 
certain capabilities to continue meeting the needs of Ukrainian 
forces, while ensuring the United States is ready to defend 
itself and our Allies and partners.
    The Reed-Inhofe Amendment, or Section 1244 within the 2023 
NDAA, granted the Department the authority to execute multiyear 
procurements for our most critical munitions. In PB24, the 
Department proposed investments of $30.6B in munitions--over a 
300 percent increase in munitions investments since FY15 and a 
24 percent increase over PB23. PB24 also requested several 
multi-year procurements--and associated industrial base 
investments.
    Authorizing suppliers to acquire long-lead-time items in 
advance reduces future production times and establishes 
additional U.S. and allied sources for critical components. 
Long-term industrial base resilience will depend on increased 
use of these authorities, as well as consistent buying 
behavior, to send the appropriate demand signals to industry.

    Question. Have the militaries of Taiwan, or our other 
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, requested any 
of the capabilities and equipment we are providing Ukraine?

    Answer. Although Taiwan and U.S. Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners have procured, or are in the process of procuring, 
capabilities the United States is providing to Ukraine, there 
have not been major impacts to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
cases caused by our support to Ukraine.

    Question. If so, how is the Department handling competing 
Foreign Military Sales requests between our Indo-Pacific allies 
and partners and our European allies? Which are being 
prioritized for fulfilment?

    Answer. FMS deliveries are based on the agreed-upon 
estimated delivery and payment schedules within the implemented 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance agreement. While the Department 
has the authority to reorder FMS delivery schedules, doing so 
presents various financial, programmatic, and policy 
complications that require careful consideration regarding the 
impact to our foreign ally/partner. Any reprioritization on 
account of strategic and operational needs will be assessed at 
very senior levels of the Department.

    Question. Recently, many experts have assessed that China 
is actively preparing a military invasion of Taiwan. Senior 
military officers have suggested the invasion could occur as 
early as 2025.
    Given that short timeframe, what steps has the Department 
of Defense and the service branches, particularly the Air Force 
and Navy, taken to ensure the readiness of our forces in Asia?

    Answer. Our armed forces are manned, trained, and equipped 
to execute the strategic objectives in the Secretary of 
Defense's National Defense Strategy which recognizes the PRC as 
the Department's pacing challenge. Building and maintaining our 
strategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region requires that we 
remain prepared to confront challenges in the near term, while 
ensuring that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready in 
the future. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this 
matter further in a classified setting.

    Question. Does the Department of Defense have the correct 
weapons systems in the region to defeat a PLA amphibious or 
airborne assault on Taiwan? If not, what actions are being 
taken?

    Answer. The Department is strengthening our forward 
presence in the Indo-Pacific region while making it more 
distributed and resilient. That will require the right mix of 
capabilities, warfighting concepts, and--over time--force 
design to realize our strategy. I would welcome the opportunity 
to discuss this matter further in a classified setting.

    Question. Has the Department taken steps to harden our 
facilities in Guam and Japan so they can continue to be 
effective should China attempt to prevent U.S. military support 
to Taiwan?

    Answer. The Department is working to strengthen the 
resiliency, survivability, and sustainability of infrastructure 
on U.S. bases, including in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Specifically, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2023 
(FY 2023) included $1.2 billion in Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative (PDI) funding for infrastructure improvements in 
Guam, Japan, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, 
and Australia, which will enhance the resiliency and 
responsiveness of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region. The 
President's Budget request for FY 2023 also included over $850 
million in PDI funding for continued development of integrated 
air and missile defense capabilities, including $539 million 
for the defense of Guam. We appreciate Congress's continued 
partnership and support as we build on these investments going 
forward.
    To implement these priorities, the Department is also 
supportive of Japan's initiatives to increase Japanese base 
resiliency, as part of Japan's December 2022 National Defense 
Strategy.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Are you concerned about the safety of American 
travelling through Russian airspace?

    Answer. The Department is concerned about foreign carriers 
that continue to overfly Russia on routes to and from the 
United States. We continue to track the issue closely with 
interagency colleagues to identify potential responses 
consistent with our domestic and international legal 
obligations.

    Question. Do you think Russia would consider taking 
military action against a carrier flying in their airspace with 
Americans on board as a potential retaliatory action?

    Answer. While we cannot predict what Russia might do in the 
wake of its unprovoked and unjustified further invasion of 
Ukraine, a top priority remains the protection of U.S. citizens 
traveling overseas. We have conveyed this directly in our 
engagements with the Russian Government. We continue to track 
airspace issues closely with interagency colleagues to ensure 
the safety of all Americans.

    Question. What level of escalation from Russia will it take 
for the Administration to take steps to ensure Americans flying 
to the United States are protected?

    Answer. Protecting the safety and security of U.S. citizens 
traveling abroad remains our top priority. We have conveyed 
this directly in our engagements with the Russian Government, 
and, as evidenced by our travel warning, we continue to caution 
U.S. citizens not to travel to Russia.

    Question. Should the United States restrict any foreign 
carrier travelling to or from the United States from using 
Russian airspace and how would such a policy impact U.S. 
carriers' ability to compete?

    Answer. The Department is concerned about third country air 
carriers that operate flights to and from the United States via 
Russian airspace. We continue to track and coordinate closely 
with interagency colleagues to identify potential responses 
consistent with domestic and international legal obligations.

    Question. There is a legal opinion that the Administration 
has authority to restrict air carriers' use of Russian airspace 
for flights traveling to or originating from the United States 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Have you 
considered using this or any other authority to protect 
Americans travelling to the U.S.?

    Answer. The Department is concerned about foreign air 
carriers that operate flights through Russian airspace on 
routes to and from the United States. We, along with 
interagency colleagues, continue to explore potential responses 
consistent with domestic and international legal obligations.

    Question. We understand senior Administration officials 
have decided not to take any further action restricting non-
U.S. flag carriers for geopolitical reasons. These officials 
understand how this puts U.S. carriers at a disadvantage with 
their Chinese competitors--but they cited concerns how such an 
action could push China closer to Russia. Isn't China's 
alliance with Russia already well-documented?

    Answer. We continue to track the issue closely with 
interagency colleagues to identify potential responses 
consistent with domestic and international legal obligations. 
We have been deeply concerned about the PRC and Russia's ``no 
limits'' partnership, announced just weeks before Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine, and we remain vigilant as their 
partnership grows. We are concerned that among the lack of 
limits would be PRC support for Russia's war against Ukraine. 
We continue to monitor this space very closely.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. Treasury Secretary Yellen spoke last year of the 
importance of ``friend- shoring''--bringing global supply 
chains to trusted countries in order to secure market access. 
There has been progress on this through the Minerals Security 
Partnership from last summer. In a related development, the 
U.S. recently signed an MOU with DRC and Zambia on electrical 
vehicle battery supply chains, which will support DRC and 
Zambia to build a productive supply chain using their natural 
resources, instead of relying on the PRC to refine the raw 
materials. Where is the U.S. working to enact friend shoring 
agreements with countries in possession of domestic resources, 
in an effort to break PRC's global dominance on critical 
minerals refining? Who in the State Department is responsible 
for leading this effort?

    Answer. The Department's Under Secretary for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose Fernandez leads the 
Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and our efforts to 
diversify global critical minerals refining away from the PRC. 
The MSP is assessing several projects to diversify supply 
chains that are dominated by any one country; however, this 
proceeds at the project-level, not country-level. Apart from 
the DRC-Zambia MOU, we are not aware of similar agreements.

    Question. Taiwan is the United States' largest trading 
partner with whom we do not currently have an income tax 
treaty. The U.S. already has multiple tax agreements in place 
with Taiwan, including a transportation income tax agreement 
and an agreement to facilitate implementation of the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Last year, former Senator 
Sasse and I introduced a resolution encouraging the President 
to begin negotiating a tax agreement with Taiwan in order to 
promote business and among other things, to secure our 
semiconductor supply chain. U.S. and Taiwanese businesses are 
double-taxed due to the lack of a formal joint tax agreement, 
which is hurting Americans. Does the State Department support 
beginning negotiations with Taiwan for a tax agreement? How 
would such an agreement boost bilateral trade and investment, 
and our mutual security and prosperity?

    Answer. We are aware of the double taxation concerns raised 
by the private sector and by our Taiwan counterparts. The 
Department of State is working with the Department of the 
Treasury and other agencies to address these issues and looks 
forward to engaging with Congress. Taiwan is a critical 
economic partner in areas such as semiconductors, and we will 
continue to explore ways to deepen our longstanding trade and 
investment relationship.

    Question. You have been very clear about the State 
Department's concerns with the PRC's actions in the 
telecommunications marketplace, particularly in developing 
nations. PRC is pushing Huawei around the world, and you have 
noted that ``when countries choose Huawei, they are potentially 
giving up their sovereignty.'' Can you expand on the threat 
posed by PRC telecoms like Huawei, and what sovereignty 
countries surrender when they choose PRC companies?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about the 
dangers of installing networks with equipment that can be 
manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by the PRC, which has no 
regard for privacy or human rights. Huawei has a history of 
unethical, unlawful, and otherwise inappropriate behavior, 
including intellectual property theft. When countries choose 
companies like Huawei, they are turning over their data to 
another country and subjecting their sovereignty to 
interference from the PRC.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. Was there any internal disagreement within the 
State Department--for example, between the EAP Bureau and INL 
Bureau--on whether to omit China and Chinese entities in 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken's press statement titled 
``U.S. to Sanction Three Fentanyl Traffickers Contributing to 
the U.S. Opioid Crisis'' (January 30, 2023)? Please begin your 
answer with a ``Yes'' or ``No.'' If ``Yes,'' please describe in 
detail. In the rollout of sanctions against three Mexican drug 
traffickers on January 30, 2023--less than a week before 
Secretary Blinken's planned trip to China--the Treasury 
Department's press statement titled ``Treasury Sanctions Three 
Fentanyl Traffickers Contributing to the U.S. Opioid Crisis 
(January 30, 2023) explicitly named (https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/jy1229) Chinese entities (``OFAC-designated 
Chinese chemical transportation company Shanghai Fast-Fine 
Chemicals'') and prominently cited (https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/jy1229) the Mexican drug traffickers' 
importation of ``precursor chemicals from China into Mexico, 
which are then used to manufacture synthetic drugs, including 
fentanyl,'' while the Secretary of State's parallel press 
statement omitted any mention (https://www.state.gov/u-s-to-
sanction-three-fentanyl-traffickers-contributing-to-the-u-s-
opioid-crisis/) of China's involvement in fentanyl 
proliferation or links of Chinese entities to the sanctioned 
Mexican drug traffickers.

    Answer. Any press statement is the result of a standard 
clearance process that incorporates input from across all 
relevant elements of the Department.

    Question. Does the State Department support the full 
implementation of the up-to-$2 billion in grants of Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) to Taiwan between now and 2027 that 
was authorized in SFRC Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan 
Enhanced Resilience Act (``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? 
Please begin your answer with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. I cannot prejudge the President's budget request, 
but as a general matter, we have been quite clear that our 
support for Taiwan is firm, and we are committed to working 
with Congress to explore any avenue for bolstering our 
assistance. We look forward to discussing the FY 2024 budget 
request after the President releases it in early March 2023.

    Question. Does the State Department support the President's 
Budget request for Fiscal Year 2024 including a request to fund 
the up-to-$2 billion in grants of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) to Taiwan between now and 2027 that was authorized in 
SFRC Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? Please begin your answer 
with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. It would be premature for me to get ahead of the 
President's budget request, but as a general matter, we have 
been quite clear that our support to Taiwan is firm, and we are 
committed to working with Congress to explore avenues for 
bolstering our assistance. We look forward to discussing the FY 
2024 budget request after the President releases it in early 
March 2023.

    Question. Does the State Department support the full 
implementation of annual $1 billion in Presidential Drawdown 
Authority (PDA) to support Taiwan that was authorized in SFRC 
Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? Please begin your answer 
with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. Yes, the Department recognizes that the drawdown 
authority is one of the U.S. Government's most valuable tools 
to quickly provide defense articles to foreign partners. There 
are numerous policy and national security implications the 
United States must consider before the President decides 
whether to authorize a drawdown. The Pentagon, State 
Department, and interagency partners closely review all 
potential security cooperation tools, including the drawdown 
authorities, to decide the most appropriate mechanisms to 
support Taiwan.

    Question. On the implications of China's High-Altitude 
Platform System (HAPS) that Violated U.S. Sovereignty for 7 
Days: What is the State Department's position on the vertical 
limits of national sovereignty? In other words, at what 
altitude does outer space end and U.S. sovereignty in ``near 
space'' begin in the State Department's view?

    Answer. International law does not delimit the precise 
vertical boundary where national airspace ends and outer space 
begins, although some states and commentators use a notional 
line at 100 kilometers.That said, the PRC surveillance 
balloon's operations were well within U.S. territorial airspace 
and its entry into that airspace without authorization was a 
clear violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law.

    Question. Are you concerned about the safety of American 
traveling through Russian airspace? Do you think Russia would 
consider taking military action again a carrier flying in their 
airspace with Americans on board as a potential retaliatory 
action? When Russia's campaign into Ukraine began, the FAA 
closed U.S. airspace to Russian carriers and Russia responded 
by closing its airspace for our carriers. However, nothing has 
been done to address other foreign carriers using Russian 
airspace to travel to the United States, often with American 
citizens on board those carriers. There are American citizens 
at JFK, LAX, and other airports right now getting ready to 
board flights that will go through Russian airspace.

    Answer. The protection of U.S. citizens traveling overseas 
is a top priority for the Department. We are concerned about 
foreign carriers that continue to overfly Russia on routes to 
and from the United States. We continue to track the issue 
closely with interagency colleagues to identify potential 
responses consistent with domestic and international legal 
obligations.

    Question. Are you concerned that the current policy 
negatively impacts U.S. carriers ability to compete since they 
cannot use Russian airspace? Some have argued that the most 
prudent action be to restrict any foreign carrier traveling to 
or from the United States from using Russian airspace.

    Answer. The Department shares concerns regarding the impact 
on the competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry due to 
other countries that permit their carriers to overfly Russia. 
We continue to track and coordinate closely with interagency 
colleagues to identify potential responses consistent with 
domestic and international legal obligations.

    Question. Has the Executive Branch considered using the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or any 
other authority to restrict any foreign carrier traveling to or 
from the United States from using Russian airspace?

    Answer. The Department is concerned about third-country air 
carriers that operate flights via Russian airspace on routes to 
and from the United States. We continue to track and coordinate 
closely with interagency colleagues to identify potential 
responses consistent with domestic and international legal 
obligations.
                                ------                                


               Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. On the Defense Department's Position on Full 
Implementation of SFRC Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan 
Enhanced Resilience Act (``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law''): 
Does the Defense Department support the full implementation of 
the up-to-$2 billion in grants of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) to Taiwan between now and 2027 that was authorized in 
SFRC Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? Please begin your answer 
with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. The Department supports Taiwan's efforts to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability and strengthen 
its resilience. As FMF grants are programmed by the Department 
of State, however, we would respectfully defer this question to 
the Department of State.

    Question. Does the Defense Department support the 
President's Budget request for Fiscal Year 2024 including a 
request to fund the up-to-$2 billion in grants of Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) to Taiwan between now and 2027 that 
was authorized in SFRC Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan 
Enhanced Resilience Act (``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? 
Please begin your answer with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. The Department respectfully defers questions on 
future fiscal year FMF budget requests to the State Department 
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

    Question. Does the Defense Department support the full 
implementation of annual $1 billion in Presidential Drawdown 
Authority (PDA) to support Taiwan that was authorized in SFRC 
Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? Please begin your answer 
with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. Yes--the Department supports using all available 
authorities and corresponding appropriations, in coordination 
with interagency partners, to bolster Taiwan's self-defense 
capabilities.

    Question. Does the Defense Department support the 
President's Budget request for Fiscal Year 2024 including a 
request to fund the annual $1 billion in Presidential Drawdown 
Authority (PDA) to support Taiwan that was authorized in SFRC 
Chairman Robert Menendez's Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(``TERA'' or the ``Menendez Law'')? Please begin your answer 
with a ``Yes'' or ``No.''

    Answer. Yes, the Department supports the appropriation of 
replenishment funds to match this PDA authority. However, I 
must defer questions on future budget requests to OMB.

    Question. On the Implications of China's High-Altitude 
Platform System (HAPS) that Violated U.S. Sovereignty for 7 
Days: The U.S. Space Force has said that the domain of space 
they are responsible for starts at 100 kilometers (a.k.a. the 
``Karman Line''). What is the Defense Department's position on 
the vertical limits of national sovereignty below the domain of 
space? In other words, at what altitude does outer space end 
and U.S. sovereignty in ``near space'' begin in the Defense 
Department's view? I request an unclassified answer, but also 
welcome any elaboration in classified annex.

    Answer. As noted, the United States continues to hold the 
view that there is no need to seek a legal definition or 
delimitation as to where airspace ends and outer space begins. 
Although there is not a demarcation point, there are two 
distinct bodies of law that apply to airspace and outer space. 
States exercise sovereignty over their airspace.

    Question. Does the Defense Department believe that the 
United States should have the means to patrol and control who 
and what flies above the United States and its territories in 
near space--at high-altitudes below the Karman line, but well 
above commercial airspace? I request an unclassified answer, 
but also welcome any elaboration in classified annex.

    Answer. As noted, the United States continues to hold the 
view that there is no need to seek a legal definition or 
delimitation as to where airspace ends and outer space begins. 
Although there is not a demarcation point, there are two 
distinct bodies of law that apply to airspace and outer space. 
States exercise sovereignty over their airspace.

    Question. On Improving Information Sharing with Japan: In 
November 2022, a Japanese news source reported that the Japan-
based Secom Group-- under contracts with Japan's Defense 
Ministry--has installed ``made-in- China'' Hikvision 
surveillance cameras in various parts of Japan, and described 
risks of potential information leaks related to economic 
security. Moreover, in January 2023, the same Japanese news 
source reported on additional risks of Secom's use of China-
made surveillance equipment, including the possibility that 
data from Japan's Ministry of Defense and U.S. military bases 
are at risk. United States has taken significant steps to 
address the national security risks posed by our Federal 
Government's use of camera equipment made by Hikvision and 
other PRC companies--for example, the FY 2019 NDAA's Section 
889 banned the use of Hikvision and the Commerce Department 
imposed Entity List export controls on Hikvision in 2019.
    I request unclassified answers to the following questions, 
but also welcome any elaboration in classified annex.
    What is the Department of Defense's assessment of the risks 
that PRC-made surveillance cameras by Hikvision and comparative 
entities pose to Japan's security--whether information 
security, economic security, or national security?

    Answer. Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY 2021), directs the 
Secretary of Defense to produce a list of ``Chinese military 
companies'' operating directly or indirectly in the United 
States. This list is intended to serve as a critical due 
diligence tool for the U.S. Government, allies, and partners to 
reference when considering vendors and business partners, and 
is an important step in securing the Department's supply chains 
and removing entities that support the People's Republic of 
China's (PRC) military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy. The 
Department added Hikvision to its Section 1260H list on June 3, 
2021. The Department, alongside the interagency, works closely 
with the Government of Japan (GOJ) to improve Japan's cyber and 
information security and practices. At the recent Ministerial 
2+2 meeting in January 2023, Secretary Austin and his 
counterparts decided to address information security issues 
through ongoing bilateral consultations.

    Question. What does the Defense Department assess to be 
Japan's receptivity and limitations to working with the United 
States to address the risks posed by Japan's use of Hikvision 
and other PRC-based surveillance equipment manufacturers?

    Answer. The Department is determined to highlight and 
counter the People's Republic of China's (PRC) military-civil 
fusion strategy, a PRC Government policy designed to ensure 
that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has access to advanced 
technologies developed by both Chinese and foreign companies, 
universities, and other entities that can facilitate the 
modernization of the PLA and the enhancement of PRC military 
capabilities.
    Adding Hikvision to the Department's Section 1260H list is 
an important step in highlighting and countering the PRC's 
military-civil fusion strategy.
    The Department stands against the misuse of U.S. technology 
to support the PRC's military and its technology-enabled 
authoritarianism. We will also act to secure the security and 
resiliency of the U.S. defense industrial base and supply 
chains. We continue to cooperate with Japan on cyber and 
information security best practices, including on background 
investigations, industrial security, and security 
professionalization.

    Question. What threat do PRC-made surveillance cameras pose 
to the U.S.-Japan Alliance? What are the vulnerabilities that 
Beijing can exploit through these cameras? And what is the 
Defense Department doing to improve broaden its intelligence 
sharing with Japan on this issue?

    Answer. As previously stated, adding Hikvision to the 
Department's Section 1260H list is an important step in 
highlighting and countering the PRC's military-civil fusion 
strategy. The Department, together with interagency partners, 
continues to work closely with Japan on cybersecurity and 
information security best practices, including on background 
investigations, industrial security, joint cybersecurity 
advisories, and security professionalization. Additional 
information will be provided in a classified annex.

    Question. On Deployment of Post-INF Ballistic Missiles in 
the Indo-Pacific: What are current plans for the United States 
to deploy land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and 
missile launchers with ranges of 1,000km-5,500 km in the Indo-
Pacific? I request here a classified answer to this question.

    Answer. See Classified Annex.

    Question. U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) has opened up new potential 
opportunities for the United States and its Allies and partners 
to strengthen deterrence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. I 
strongly encourage the United States to discuss these new 
potential opportunities with Japan, Australia, and other Allies 
and partners in the region. To what extent has the United 
States discussed these new potential opportunities with Japan, 
Australia, and other Allies and partners in the region? I 
request here a classified answer to this question.

    Answer. See Classified Annex.
                                ------                                


              Responses of Ms. Wendy Sherman to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. At the U.S.-Africa Summit 2022, President Biden 
declared that the U.S. is ``all in on Africa's future.'' He 
announced a commitment of $55 billion in economic, health, and 
security aid to Africa over 3 years. According to White House 
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, the funds will address 
``a wide range of sectors to tackle the core challenges of our 
time.'' However, a significant portion of the funds are from 
previously announced programs and budgets, and it is unclear 
how the $55 billion adds up. Please detail for me the State 
Department's Africa strategy with respect to this substantial 
U.S. taxpayer investment, including an agency-level breakdown 
of the $55 billion committed to Africa and the amount pending 
approval from Congress.

    Answer. At the Africa Leaders Summit the President 
announced plans to work with Congress on the $55 billion in 
interagency deliverables needed to advance U.S. policy goals 
and priorities throughout Africa. The Department plans to meet 
its $47 billion portion with resources from FY 2021 through FY 
2023. Of the total $47 billion for the Department and USAID, 
approximately $9.4 billion is the total in the FY 2023 Request 
for State and USAID within north Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Funding for FY 2021 is in the implementation stage. The 
Department will work with Congress to complete notification for 
FY 2022 and FY 2023 funds.




    Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has an 
aggressive overseas acquisition strategy to obtain valuable 
intellectual property (IP) in emerging technologies. China is 
responsible for 80 percent of IP theft in the U.S., accounting 
for up to $600 billion in American IP losses annually. An 
example is a former Dutch semiconductor ASML engineer, a 
Chinese national, charged with stealing chip technology for a 
Chinese tech firm and fleeing to Beijing. The engineer 
contributed to the development of high-end Chinese products for 
AI and 5G industries. He set up research labs and applied for 
dozens of patents, receiving recognition from the local tech 
industry in China. IP theft is part of the CCP's incentive 
programs delivering critical technologies for their 
semiconductor initiative. An arbitration process has been 
established under the USTR's Phase One Agreement with China. It 
is concerning that we have not used it to safeguard our 
intellectual property as China continues to steal our 
industrial technology. Can you explain how the State Department 
isn't using this to hold Chinese companies accountable for IP 
thefts?

    Answer. The Department fully supports all necessary 
measures to support U.S. firms and workers who are 
disadvantaged by an unlevel playing field. We are engaging 
allies and partners to build a common front against unfair, 
anticompetitive PRC economic practices. We are making good 
progress, and this is one of my top priorities. I respectfully 
refer you to USTR for additional information regarding the 
Phase One Agreement.

    Question. Also, how does the State Department differentiate 
between IP theft committed by the individual versus the act 
done on behalf of the state? How are those two prosecuted 
differently by the Administration?

    Answer. I respectfully refer you to the Department of 
Justice on questions related to criminal prosecution of IP-
related crimes.
    We engage with allies and partners to counter unfair, 
anticompetitive economic practices, including IP theft 
committed by both individuals and state actors. All countries, 
including the PRC, rely on the rules-based global trading 
system for our prosperity. We will continue to coordinate with 
others, call on Beijing to play by the rules, and hold the PRC 
accountable for its unfair economic practices.

          Press Statement by U.S. Department of State, Dated 
     January 30, 2023, ``U.S. Sanction Three Fentanyl Traffickers 
                Contributing to the U.S. Opioid Crisis''

                                  Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	



           Article by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Dated 
   January 30, 2023, ``Treasury Sanctions Three Fentanyl Traffickers 
                Contributing to the U.S. Opioid Crisis''

                                  Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	


Letter to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken From Senator Rand Paul, 
 Dated September 13, 2022, Requesting Information Regarding the State 
                 Department's Activities and Operations

                                     Submitted by Senator Rand Paul
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	



Letter to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken From Senator Rand Paul, 
Dated November 7, 2022, Requesting Additional Information Regarding the 
                          State Department's 
                       Activities and Operations

                                     Submitted by Senator Rand Paul
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	


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