[Senate Hearing 118-183]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-183

  THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S HIGH ALTITUDE SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS 
                       AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

=======================================================================

                                BRIEFING

                                BEFORE A

                          SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

            COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            SPECIAL BRIEFING

                    FEBRUARY 9, 2023--WASHINGTON, DC
                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
         

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          Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
54-413 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024   


                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                    PATTY MURRAY, Washington, Chair
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine,Vice Chair 
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JACK REED, Rhode Island              MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
JON TESTER, Montana                  LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 JERRY MORAN, Kansas
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut          Virginia
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia      JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
GARY PETERS, Michigan                KATIE BRITT, Alabama
                                     MARCO RUBIO, Florida
                                     DEB FISCHER, Nebraska

                      Evan Schatz, Staff Director
              Elizabeth McDonnell, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                 Subcommittee on Department of Defense

                       JON TESTER, Montana, Chair
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
PATTY MURRAY, Washington             LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JACK REED, Rhode Island              LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
                                         Virginia

                           Professional Staff

                              Kate Kaufer
                             Mike Clementi
                             Laura Forrest
                             Abigail Grace
                               Katy Hagan
                             Brigid Kolish
                              Rob Leonard
                              Ryan Pettit
                            Kimberly Segura
                         Ryan Kaldahl(Minority)
                        Todd Phillips (Minority)
                        Jason Potter (Minority)
                       Jesse Tolleson (Minority)
                       Mike Wakefield (Minority)

                         Administrative Support

                           Gabriella Armonda
                         Alex Shultz (Minority)

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Opening Statement of Senator Jon Tester..........................     1

Statement of Senator Susan M. Collins............................     2

Statement of Hon. Melissa Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs...................     4

Statement of Lieutenant General Douglas Sims II, Director for 
  Operations, Joint Staff (J3)...................................     5

 
  THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S HIGH ALTITUDE SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS 
                       AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2023

                           U.S. Senate,    
     Subcommittee on Department of Defense,
                               Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m. in room SD-192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Tester (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Tester, Murray, Schatz, Baldwin, Collins, 
Murkowski, Moran, and Hoeven.


                opening statement of senator jon tester


    Senator Tester. I want thank you all for being here today 
for this very important briefing. Before we get started, I want 
to welcome Susan Collins.
    Senator, thank you for being here, I look forward to 
working with you. As the Vice Chair of this Committee, we have 
had a long working relationship, and we expect to do good 
things together.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. Before we get into this briefing, I want to 
start by setting the tone for what I hope can continue for the 
next 2 years. As I travel across my State every year, and meet 
with Montanans face-to-face, it doesn't matter if you are from 
a rural town, like the one I live in, or a college town, I 
always hear one thing, and that is: Why is Congress so divided? 
Last week was a sober reminder of just how petty and divided 
our politics have become.
    Make no mistake about it, what China did last week was 
completely unacceptable and a real threat to American 
sovereignty, and it deserves a real response from a United 
America.
    I was very discouraged by some of the responses from 
elected officials in the House and the Senate, decided this was 
a great opportunity to score some cheap political points and 
get attention on social media.
    China is a real threat and one we need to take seriously, 
which is exactly why we are here today.
    Senator Collins and I were in touch throughout the day last 
week when the news broke, we listened to each other, and we 
agreed, we need to take swift action to make sure China's 
reckless actions received real attention, not political talking 
points.
    We are holding this briefing today because American public 
deserves to hear from the Department of Defense, not play 
politics with the National Security. I do not care who is in 
the White House, we will always do our job, and we will always 
provide oversight. I trust that all of my colleagues here today 
recognize the importance of these jobs and need to work 
together to make sure that America is protected.
    So do our briefers. I appreciate you all joining this 
committee on relatively short notice. The American people 
deserve answers about this Chinese spy balloon that was first 
publicly reported to be in the United States airspace above my 
home State of Montana. This is the first congressional meeting 
open to the public to examine what happened.
    Montanans and folks all across this country value their 
freedom, they value their privacy. Those are American values, 
and China wants to destroy on their way to replacing us as the 
world's leading superpower.
    I, along with many of my colleagues on this committee, have 
been ringing the alarm bell on Chinese aggression long before 
last week's news. And I will take on anyone to make sure China 
does not weaken our country.
    That is why I am prepared to hold anyone accountable 
including the folks seated before this committee today, to get 
real answers. This Administration owes Americans answers, not 
only on what happened this past week, but also on what steps we 
are going to take to ensure that this never happens again.
    That is why it is critical that we look forward and have 
appropriate practices in place to stop any future provocations 
from China, or any other foreign adversary.
    We live in a time where our technological and defense 
capabilities are rapidly evolving. I, along with the rest of 
this committee, look forward to making sure these evolving 
capabilities are put to good use. That includes making sure 
that you, at the DoD (Department of Defense), get a budget that 
you need, on time.
    Before you make your opening statements, I want to turn it 
over to Senator Collins for her opening statement.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

    Senator Collins. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let 
me began by saying how much I am looking forward to working 
very closely with you in my new position on this subcommittee.
    And I want to thank you also for holding this important 
hearing on the brazen incursion into America's airspace by a 
Chinese surveillance balloon.
    So let me begin by noting the obvious. This was not a 
harmless weather balloon somehow blown wildly off course, as 
the Chinese have claimed. This was a serious and blatant 
attempt by the Chinese to collect valuable data.
    In fact, a sophisticated spy balloon such as this one 
provides certain advantages over high-tech satellites. A key 
element of the administration's calculus was to postpone 
shooting down the Chinese spy balloon resting upon the goal of 
avoiding undue risk to civilians on the ground.
    However, it defies belief that there was not a single 
opportunity to safely shoot down this spy balloon prior to the 
Coast of South Carolina.
    By the administration's logic we would allow the Chinese to 
fly surveillance balloons over the Pentagon, or other sensitive 
sites near populated areas. Obviously, every Administration has 
an obligation to protect Americans on the ground, but also to 
defend U.S. airspace against incursions by known foreign 
surveillance aircraft.
    A related question involves the timeline for destroying the 
spy balloon. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense) was 
tracking the balloon as it violated U.S. airspace over Alaska 
on January 28, yet deliberations with the President to shoot 
down the balloon apparently did not occur until 2 or 3 days 
later when it approached the lower 48 States.
    As the Senator from Alaska would tell us all, Alaskan 
airspace is American airspace, period. This balloon could have 
been shot down; it seems to me, over remote areas in Alaska, or 
our territorial waters surrounding Alaska.
    The best way to avoid conflict with China is for President 
Xi and the Chinese Communist Party to have no doubt regarding 
the resolve of the U.S. Government to defend our territory and 
our interests, as the Secretary of State has said repeatedly, 
this incursion violated American sovereignty, and international 
law.
    In my judgment, U.S. deterrence was weakened when the spy 
balloon was permitted to transverse Alaska, and several other 
States including, hovering over sensitive Military bases and 
assets.
    Finally, I shared the concerns that the Chairman has 
raised, that there was not a consistent answer. There was also 
not good communication between the administration and this 
committee. This incident highlights the ongoing and 
increasingly blatant threat to the United States posed by the 
People's Republic of China, which is a pacing threat not just 
for today but for the foreseeable future.
    Ultimately, our subcommittee is responsible for making sure 
that the Department of Defense has the resources needed to keep 
America safe. Regarding previous balloons, it is alarming that 
NORAD and NORTHCOM (Northern Command) were apparently unaware 
of these incidents in real time. That exposes questions about 
whether there are unacceptable gaps in the Military's ability 
to detect and address potential airborne threats.
    I look forward to hearing the testimony today, and to 
better understanding how the Department handled this 
surveillance, and how it will handle future violations of U.S. 
airspace.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Tester. Thank you, Vice Chair Collins, for those 
comments.
    We have four folks in front of us today. We have the 
Honorable Melissa Dalton who is Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
    We have Jedidiah Royal, who is the Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security 
Affairs.
    We have Lieutenant General Douglas Sims II, who is Director 
for Operations for Joint Staff (J3).
    And, we have Vice Admiral Sara Joyner, who is Director of 
Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, Joint Staff (J8).
    Opening statements will be made by Melissa Dalton, and by 
General Sims.
    Melissa Dalton, you may start.
STATEMENT OF HON. MELISSA DALTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
            OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND 
            HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS
    Ms. Dalton. Good morning, Chairman Tester, Vice Chair 
Collins, and Subcommittee Members. Thank you for convening this 
important roundtable this morning.
    I know that the recent events surrounding the PRC's 
(People's Republic of China) high altitude surveillance balloon 
have directly affected a number of your States. I wanted to 
provide you with a brief overview of events before turning over 
to my colleagues, and answering any questions that you have.
    The balloon entered our U.S. Air Defense Identification 
Zone and then airspace over Alaska, on Saturday January 28. It 
was over Alaska for a short period of time, and then flew over 
Canada. We continued to track and assess the balloon learning 
more about the PRC's capabilities and tradecraft.
    On Tuesday, January 31, the balloon entered U.S. 
continental airspace. We were able to protect against PRC 
intelligence collection, which was straightforward since we 
knew where the balloon was.
    The President was briefed that same day and through 
National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, directed the U.S. 
Military to refine and present options to shoot the balloon 
down.
    The Military recommended taking the balloon down over 
water, waiting to do so had three benefits. First, it gave us 
additional time to observe the balloon, again assessing the 
PRC's capabilities and tradecraft. Simultaneously, we protected 
against intelligence collection, which again, was relatively 
straightforward since we knew where the balloon was.
    Second, this allowed us to refine options and decrease the 
risk of debris causing harm to civilians. Please bear in mind, 
the balloon itself was 200 feet tall with a jetliner size 
payload. We consulted with NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's) who analyzed and assessed the potential 
debris field that the balloon would create based on trajectory, 
weather, and the estimated payload.
    And third, waiting to shoot the balloon down over water 
improved our prospects at recovery, which are ongoing. 
Throughout Wednesday and Thursday, we continued to track the 
balloon.
    And then on Friday, February 3, President Biden was briefed 
on the execution of a plan to shoot down the balloon once over 
water. This plan included the air assets that we would use to 
take down the balloon, as well as the joint forces we would use 
to recover it.
    He approved the plan, and throughout that night, National 
Security Staff and the Department of Defense including Joint 
Staff personnel worked to ensure this mission was successfully 
executed. Throughout the night, as the President had requested, 
National Security Advisor Sullivan provided him with regular 
updates.
    Saturday morning, February 4, President Biden spoke with 
Secretary Austin multiple times about the mission, and it was 
completed, as you are aware, on Saturday afternoon when the 
balloon was shot down and crashed in the ocean roughly 6 miles 
off the Coast of South Carolina, in our territorial waters.
    Due to rough seas, debris collection began on February 5. 
The USS Carter Hall is collecting debris in and around where 
the balloon came down. The USNS Pathfinder is using sonar to 
map the ocean floor and search for debris. The Coast Guard is 
ensuring that the area is kept safe for both the public and our 
Military personnel.
    The PRC is DoD's pacing challenge, and the PRC's 
irresponsible actions were visible for the American people and 
all of the world to see. Ultimately, we were able to collect 
intelligence from the balloon, we are recovering its contents, 
and we sent a clear message to the PRC that activity such as 
this is unacceptable.
    PDASD Jed Royal is here today to answer any questions you 
have about U.S. communications with the PRC and Indo-Pacific 
affairs. We thank you again for convening this morning's 
roundtable, and I look forward to answering your questions.
    Senator Tester. General Sims.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOUGLAS SIMS II, 
            DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF (J3)
    General Sims. Chairman Tester, Vice Chairwoman Collins, 
ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
    I appreciate today's opportunity to update you on the U.S. 
Military efforts related to the recent high altitude balloon 
from the People's Republic of China.
    As Ms. Dalton noted, we acquired the balloon on January 28, 
following the radar acquisition of the balloon as it approached 
Alaska, and given the determination, the balloon was not a 
threat to U.S. citizens or aviation traffic, and the lack of 
its ability to conduct significant intelligence collection at 
that time the NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander assessed and reported he 
would continue to observe and report the balloon's movements.
    He advised the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the 
Secretary of Defense, who ensured the appropriate senior 
leaders were aware of the ongoing situation. As the balloon 
crossed through Canada and approached the United States border 
the assessment for potential intel risk to sensitive, critical 
U.S. sites in the Upper Midwest increased, and the President 
asked for kinetic courses of action.
    In determining potential options the risk of Chinese 
intelligence collection was deemed to be low to moderate, while 
the risk to U.S. personnel on the ground was assessed at 
moderate to significant, given the various debris field models 
combined with potential weaponeering. As the assessment for 
risk to U.S. personnel outweighed the potential intelligence 
loss, the recommendation was made to shoot the balloon down 
over an area that minimized the risk to U.S. citizens. That 
location was in the U.S. territorial airspace and waters off 
the South Carolina Coast.
    The recommendation was approved by the President, and 
executed by the NORTHCOM Commander using an F-22 Raptor on 
February 4. The decision to shoot down the balloon in waters 
off South Carolina is allowing for the recovery of the balloon 
and its materials, and the opportunity to gain additional 
intelligence insights on Chinese balloon and surveillance 
activities.
    It is important to note at any point along the balloon's 
path the U.S. Military possessed the authorities and the 
ability to shoot down the balloon in defense of our citizens.
    I look forward to your questions and appreciate the chance 
to be here today. And I should add that Vice Admiral Joyner, 
the Joint Staff (J8), is here to address any resourcing 
questions. And I will do my best to cover operationally related 
items. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. I thank you for your testimony, General 
Sims. There will be questions. In my particular case, you can 
direct them anywhere you want to answer them. And keep in mind, 
at 11:30, I think we have a classified briefing in the SCIF 
(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) for all the 
Senators, so we are going to try to be prompt.
    So the first question I have is, when this entered U.S. 
airspace, did we know what the Chinese were trying to collect? 
Do we know? Do we know what they were doing? Do we know what 
they were trying to collect?

                               ASSESSMENT

    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for the question. As the 
NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander has said, when the balloon entered 
North American airspace, NORAD had custody of it, and was 
tracking it closely.
    Senator Tester. Yes.
    Ms. Dalton. As it transited across Alaska, through Canada, 
which is, of course, part of NORAD, I mean we were sharing 
intelligence of real time and tracking and assessing with the 
Canadians. And as it entered the Continental of the United 
States we were able to track, and assess, and to better 
understand----
    Senator Tester. I got the tracking, and I got that.
    Ms. Dalton. Yes.
    Senator Tester. I want to know if we knew what the Chinese 
were trying to collect with that balloon, with that 
reconnaissance balloon.
    Ms. Dalton. Jed, do you want to jump in?
    Mr. Royal. Senator, thanks for the question. We can 
probably get into details more in the classified setting in 
terms of what was the intent.
    Senator Tester. You can just say yes or no.
    Mr. Royal. Sir----
    Senator Tester. You don't need to get into the specifics. 
Just did we know what they were trying to collect, yes or no.
    Mr. Royal. Yes, sir. We understand it that this is a 
broader--part of a broader suite of operations that China is 
undertaking.
    Senator Tester. So we knew what they were looking for?
    Mr. Royal. Sir, I think we should talk about this more 
explicitly in the classified session but, yes sir, we 
understand that this is part of the broader suite of operations 
that China is undertaking to try and get a better understanding 
of U.S. certain----
    Senator Tester. I got it. I mean, there is all sorts of 
suites of operations we have with what is going on in outer 
space. But the question is, did we know what that balloon was 
trying to gather? Do we know what information it was trying to 
gather from the United States? It did not fly over us by 
accident. So it was intentional. Do we know what the Chinese 
Communist Government was looking for?
    Mr. Royal. Senator we have some very good guesses about 
that, and we are learning more as we exploit the contents of 
the balloon and the payload itself.
    Senator Tester. Okay. So it has been brought to the 
attention, not in classified session, but through the news that 
this isn't the first time this has happened, this has happened 
several times before. My question is, if we waited to shoot 
this one down over water why didn't we shoot the last ones down 
over water?
    Mr. Royal. Senator, I will take that question. We are 
learning more about the balloon program, we are more aware of 
this balloon program in recent months than we have been in the 
past. So Senator, I think that our assessments are maturing 
about the intent behind these balloons, and the operational 
activity.
    Senator Tester. So let me get this right. I put a lot of 
faith into the Military leadership. I have met with a lot of 
Generals, and they are top-flight folks, including the ones 
here, and Admirals. I put faith in them because I believe they 
know the issue better than I do. Okay. So the real question 
here is, if we had an incursion before, and we shot this one 
down when it hit water, why didn't we shoot the previous ones 
down and gather intelligence from those so we knew what was 
going to happen?
    And by the way, this is going to happen again. And so why 
haven't we--either this is no big deal in the Military's eyes, 
and I don't think you are going to say that, or there is not a 
consistent plan on how to deal with them. Talk to me.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for your question. And if I 
may, just to build upon what Jed was saying. The PRC Government 
surveillance balloons have transited the continental United 
States briefly, at least three times during the prior 
administration, and when----
    Senator Tester. Right. And so the question is, why didn't 
we shoot them down over water then?
    Ms. Dalton. The duration of this particular balloon was 
much longer.
    Senator Tester. Right.
    Ms. Dalton. And the information that we have since gleaned 
about the balloons that have transited globally was only 
recently discovered. We can share more in the classified 
setting.
    Senator Tester. Okay. So we are talking about putting a 
budget together for the Defense Department. It was a really 
robust budget last cycle. I do not remember hearing about 
anything that dealt with balloons in the budget. Do we have a 
plan and what we are going to do next time this happens?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. As you know, in the 
National Defense Strategy from 2022, the PRC is the pacing 
challenge, and Defense for Homeland is one----
    Senator Tester. I know, but what about the balloons? I got 
all the other stuff, and we deal with it.
    Ms. Dalton. Absolutely.
    Senator Tester. Is there money in the budget; or if you are 
not into that--if you are not in that pay grade.
    Ms. Dalton. Yes.
    Senator Tester. Do we have a plan for when this happens 
again, and what we are going to do, and when we are going to do 
it? I will tell you this, and I appreciate the--but the truth 
is we think we know what they were going to collect. We don't 
know. That scares the hell out of me.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. It is incredibly serious. 
And please know, as we are recovering the balloon and learning 
more about it, and also including that with what we learned 
last week, we are building our understanding of what 
capabilities they have, and what we need to do going forward.
    Senator Tester. Okay. And what about--and I am over time, 
and this is the last thing so you can answer, I hope. Do we 
have a plan for the next thing that happens and how we are 
going to deal with it? Because quite frankly, I will just tell 
you, I don't want a damn balloon going across the United States 
when we potentially could have taken it down over the Aleutian 
Islands--no offense to Alaska--or Alaska, or in some other 
areas in Montana?
    And I understand public health, I understand doing damage, 
I understand that could have been a nightmare. But the truth 
is, I have got a problem with a Chinese balloon flying over my 
State, much less the rest of the country.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, absolutely. We sent a very clear 
message to the PRC when we shot it down in our sovereign 
airspace, in our sovereign waters, that has established that 
deterrent line.
    Jed, maybe turn to you in terms of communications with the 
PRC.

                                OUTREACH

    Mr. Royal. Yes. Thank you, ma'am. We continue to conduct 
outreach to the PRC, we conducted outreach during the course of 
the events last week, and have attempted subsequently. Part of 
the plan is to encourage the Chinese administration to open 
their lines of communication with----
    Senator Tester. And you can tell the folks at 11:30, in 
classified session, I want to know what the response is going 
to be for the next balloon that comes over, Military response.
    Mr. Royal. Sir, thank you, sir.
    Senator Tester. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you. Secretary Dalton, according to 
your testimony, January 31 appears to be the first time that 
President Biden was briefed by the Pentagon about the 
surveillance balloon, which had been violating U.S. and 
Canadian airspace since January 28. Are you aware of any 
existing Department of Defense policy to treat violations of 
U.S. sovereign airspace over Alaska differently from violations 
over the lower 48 States?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator Collins, no, I am not aware of such a 
policy. Alaska is part of the United States, full stop.
    Senator Collins. Then what explains that delay, days of 
delay?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, on January 28 when the balloon entered 
U.S. airspace over Alaska, the Pentagon was tracking it very 
closely through NORAD, NORAD had custody of it, and there were 
communications with the White House to apprise them of the 
balloon's trajectory.
    Senator Collins. Was the President informed?
    Ms. Dalton. I would have to defer to the White House in 
terms of internal White House communications.
    Senator Collins. According to the White House Press 
Secretary, he was not. And according to the testimony that we 
heard there were 3 to 4 days before he was informed.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, I would have to defer to the White 
House. Thank you.
    Senator Collins. General Sims, the Commander of NORAD and 
NORTHCOM recently said that when NORAD first detected the 
balloon, as it approached Alaska, he determined that it was in 
fact a surveillance balloon, but that it did not present a 
physical military threat to North America. And he explained 
that he didn't take immediate action because it was not 
demonstrating hostile attack--or hostile intent. Why wouldn't a 
foreign military surveillance aircraft, violating U.S. airspace 
inherently be considered to have hostile intent?
    General Sims. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I think 
first of all, just to reiterate that General VanHerck did have 
all the authorities necessary should he have determined it to 
have been a threat. The key piece here I think, ma'am, is there 
was no hostile act, or hostile intent, that would be the first. 
There was no impact to Aviation routes, which would be another 
piece of that. The other would be there was no--at the time--
there was no suspected impact to critical intelligence 
gathering ability in terms of infrastructure.
    That changed as the balloon made--as its path continued, 
that changed, and that is what prompted a different decision, 
or a different conversation, as it crossed into the United 
States.
    Senator Collins. Well, Alaska has a lot of--and I am going 
to leave this to my colleague--but a lot of sensitive military 
installations.
    General Sims. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Collins. And the advantage of a balloon over a 
satellite is it can hover over those sensitive sites.
    General Sims. Yes, ma'am. And throughout the path, and as 
somebody who lived for a couple of years in Alaska, throughout 
its path, ma'am, they were tracking exactly where it was in 
relation to that sensitive critical infrastructure, and 
intelligence gathering capabilities, it was not near those 
locations, and as we reconstruct the path, we are not concerned 
with intelligence gathering in Alaska. And based on that the 
assessment continued from NORAD/NORTHCOM to continue to observe 
and report.
    Senator Collins. Well, it seems to me when you have a craft 
that is violating international airspace, and you have 
sensitive military installations whether they are in Hawaii, or 
Alaska, or the lower 48, we should treat it the same. Could you 
help educate the committee, the public, on why China is using 
balloons and what benefits do they offer over satellites, or 
other intelligence gathering platforms?
    General Sims. I don't have a light on here, I don't know 
if----
    Senator Collins. You still have 40 seconds.
    General Sims. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Ma'am, I think what we 
have learned is that there are some advantages, it can loiter, 
but what we think they gained was really very minor in 
comparison to what we think we can gain with low Earth--LEO, 
with low Earth orbiting. And that went into the conversation, 
as everybody was working through the risk.
    And as I mentioned earlier, we deem that risk as it moved 
from Alaska towards the lower 48, we deemed that risk to change 
a little, and we also knew that we had the ability to mitigate 
that risk. And we will be able to talk to that further in the 
session following.
    Senator Collins. But just to end. Formerly, Air Force 
General, Charlie Moore, who is Deputy Commander of Cyber 
Command, just has pointed out, that if you have a balloon that 
is moving extremely slowly, you have a persistence that you 
can't get from a satellite.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, if I may? Just to add. Because we knew 
where the balloon was tracking we took measures to protect 
those sites per established protocols, that included sensitive 
communications, and covering up certain facilities.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.

                              TRANSPARENCY

    Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Collins.
    Next, we have the Chair of the Full Appropriations 
Committee, Senator Murray.
    Senator Murray. Well thank you very much Senator Tester for 
holding this briefing. And I just want to say that the 
Appropriations Committee is really lucky to have you at the 
helm, here on the Defense Subcommittee. And I look forward to 
working with you and Senator Collins in this Congress.
    I want to start off, by echoing what Senator Tester said 
earlier. And I will tell you, as Chair of the Appropriations 
Committee, I appreciate all of you coming before us today. But 
on issues such as this, especially for Senators whose States 
were affected, I expect this administration to be timely and 
straightforward with information.
    And more broadly, as Chair, along with Vice Chair Collins, 
I further expect a very robust dialogue with the administration 
including the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs, and through that 
dialogue it is my priority to have information shared in a 
timely fashion to make sure that all the members of this 
Appropriations Committee have a solid handle on matters 
impacting this committee and this country. So I want to make 
sure you all knew that before we started questioning.
    Let me ask you, one of the aspects of this situation that 
really concerns me, is when you became aware that the 
surveillance balloon had entered our airspace. It seems to me 
it is critical, we are immediately identifying when something 
like this balloon is approaching, or has crossed into the 
United States, so we can act quickly and appropriately. And 
that is, of course, especially important for States on the West 
Coast, many on this committee, who could be the first impacted 
by these threats.
    So I want to know, as you tracked this balloon approaching 
over Alaska, when did you determine the threat; and did you 
have constant surveillance for the entire time it was in the 
U.S. and Canadian airspace?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you very much for your question. 
And it is absolutely our intent to provide timely information 
to this subcommittee, and to Congress as a whole.
    On Saturday, January 28, we tracked, through NORAD, that 
the balloon was entering U.S. Air Defense Identification Zone 
and U.S. airspace in Alaska. And from there NORAD had custody, 
and we were tracking it across the----
    Senator Murray. Did you have constant surveillance the 
entire time that the balloon was--yes or no?
    Ms. Dalton. Yes, it was.
    Senator Murray. Okay. Let me ask you, do you think there is 
any need for additional systems or investments to protect 
against these high altitude surveillance threats?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. I am happy to start there. 
And perhaps can turn to Vice Admiral Joyner as well.

                             MODERNIZATION

    As General VanHerck has mentioned, the Department continues 
to be acutely aware of the need to enhance persistent 
surveillance of the aerospace and maritime approaches to North 
America. To that end, we are working closely with our Canadian 
allies to modernize NORAD surveillance capabilities, pace to 
the current and future geopolitical environment.
    In the near term, we are taking steps with Canada to 
augment the existing North Warning System, including 
development of a new system of sensors called ``Crossbow'' that 
will enhance NORAD's ability to detect approaching airborne 
threats. Longer-term modernization efforts include, but are not 
limited to, the construction of the Over-the-Horizon radars, in 
both the United States and Canada, to augment the existing 
North Warning System and enhance NORAD's ability to perform its 
aerospace warning, control, and maritime warning missions.
    Vice Admiral Joyner.
    Admiral Joyner. Senator, we continue to modernize the 
existing systems that we have, so that has been an effort that 
has been ongoing in conjunction with this Committee. In '23 
significant investments in both the space architecture, which 
we think is key for future monitoring and understanding of our 
environment both within the United States, overseas, and 
abroad.
    And then undersea as well, investments have been made as 
well to counter other threats in an integrated Air and Cruise 
Missile Defense, the committees in Congress directed us to put 
forward an acquisition lead, and Air Force is now the 
acquisition lead for that effort. They are moving forward out 
on that mission.
    Army has the counter UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems), and 
then the overall systems and the modernization of the over-the-
horizon radars will enhance our ability to look long range and 
give us persistent forward look, in partnership with our 
northern neighbors, NORAD/NORTHCOM. So the modernization is 
important. The existing systems can meet our needs, we continue 
to maintain and invest in maintaining those systems as we 
modernize.
    Senator Murray. Well, it is really important that we all 
have a real clear handle on incidents like this in full 
situational awareness over West Coast States of the Pacific. So 
I know we are an open session today, but I hope all of you can 
brief me and my office separately on the ability and 
capability, to make sure we can adequately, identify and 
determine threats before they are over the U.S. territory.
    And let me just say this, this incident is greatly 
concerning to me, not just because of the breach of our 
airspace, but what it signals about our relationship with 
China, the strength of our diplomacy, and really the state of 
our domestic capabilities.
    This Appropriations Committee is going to be taking a very 
serious look at our approach to our relationship with China. 
And I look forward to working with Senator Collins, and with 
our colleagues here on this subcommittee, and others, on that. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Tester. Thank you Senator Murray.
    Senator from Alaska, Senator Murkowski.

                                 ALASKA

    Senator Murkowski. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate 
that you and the Vice Chair have called this meeting so timely.
    As an Alaskan, I am so angry. I want to use other words but 
I am not going to. The fact of the matter is, Alaska is the 
first line of defense for America, right? If you are going to 
have Russia coming at you, if you are going to have China 
coming at you, we know exactly how they come. They come up, and 
they go over Alaska, sometimes they go on the top, sometimes 
they go straight across, but Alaska is it.
    And thank goodness the Pentagon and the Department of 
Defense have recognized where we sit on the globe to take care 
of the rest of this country. And thank goodness that we have 
invested the resources to make sure that we have the eyes on 
the skies here and every place else.
    More fifth-generation fighters sit there in the State of 
Alaska. We know that we are proud of it and everything that we 
do to stay focused. Whether it is Cobra Dane out in the 
Aleutians, or Clear Space Force Station that has the long-range 
discrimination radar, or out in Greeley where we have the 
ground based missile defense, we are ready, we are ready, man.
    And to the point that Senator Collins makes, it is like 
this administration doesn't think that Alaska is any part of 
the rest of the country here. To get to the United States you 
have got to come through Alaska. So when we see it first, as we 
did, as we all knew; and as you have suggested, Mr. Royal, I 
think you suggested, we knew when we first got eyes on this, 
that this balloon was not a weather station, this was not 
collecting weather information. We knew that.
    And so think about it from Alaska's perspective. You said, 
Ms. Dalton, that the clear message here, we sent a clear 
message to the PRC when we shot this down in our sovereign 
waters.
    Seems to me the clear message to China is, we got free 
range in Alaska because they are going to let us cruise over 
that until it gets to more sensitive areas. Tell me, tell me 
where the sensitive areas are.
    Alaskans have stepped up willingly and support our 
Military, but when we are talking about the sovereign waters 
and the sovereign territories of this country, Alaska is part 
of that. I know we are going to have an opportunity for more 
information in the classified brief. I have already received 
one, and it was pretty thorough. And I think that the American 
public deserves more than they have seen in terms of 
transparency about why this spy balloon was allowed to spend 2 
days over our waters and over the State of Alaska, the State 
that is the guardian for everybody else?
    And you are saying that at that time there was not a threat 
to Alaska citizens, or to the assets that we have? Or that the 
risk assessment rose later as it was coming into the rest of 
the lower 48 there?
    You know, at what point, at what point do we say: A 
surveillance balloon, a spy balloon coming from China is a 
threat to our sovereignty? It should be the minute it crosses 
the line, and that line is Alaska.
    The question that I have; and I apologize that it has taken 
me this long to get to the question. But I am really concerned 
about what we have identified as these data gaps.
    We know that we have seen balloons previous that were also 
the surveillance balloons. We didn't realize until later 
because we weren't able to do the analysis until later. This 
committee is the Appropriations Committee. If we need to spend 
the money to make sure that we don't have gaps in our own data, 
that what we see is clearly understood, we need to know how to 
fund that.
    So Mr. Chairman, I am over my time. I don't think we will 
get the answers that we need here in this subcommittee. 
Unfortunately, we are going to have to get them in closed 
hearing. But I think people in this country deserve to know why 
the State that is the first line of defense was not able to 
keep the rest of the country from being more vulnerable when it 
came to collection of intelligence, as it flew over important 
installations.
    Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
    Senator from Hawaii, Senator Schatz.

                             CONUS V OCONUS

    Senator Schatz. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Vice 
Chair.
    In terms of the sovereignty of our airspace, is there any 
distinction between noncontiguous states and the continental 
United States?
    Ms. Dalton. No Senator, there is not.
    Senator Schatz. In terms of the sovereignty of our 
airspace, is there any distinction to be made in terms of 
international law between a brief flyover and a lingering 
flyover?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, the basis for us to shoot down the 
balloon where we did, had a strong grounding in both domestic 
and international law.
    Senator Schatz. Yes. I am just trying to figure out whether 
if they had been, you know, let us say they just clipped the 
corner of the Florida Peninsula. Like let us say they just, you 
know, go over Hawaii for 10 minutes, isn't that still a 
violation of international law? Isn't that still a violation of 
our airspace? And doesn't it merit the same kinetic action that 
was taken?
    Ms. Dalton. It is still a violation of our airspace.
    Senator Schatz. Is DoD policy changing in this space?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, what I would say is that as we learn 
more about these balloons, their global activities as we are 
able to assess the collection capabilities of this particular 
high altitude balloon, through the recovery efforts, we are 
going to be assessing our overall posture, and disposition, and 
strategic approach, and----
    Senator Schatz. And I respect the need to keep some of this 
classified, but we all understand that some of the desire to 
keep things classified has to do with not wanting to disclose 
to the public things that might be inconvenient, politically, 
for the Department.
    And so it seems to me that if we now--and look, I support 
the actions that were taken, but I don't see a downside to a 
signaling to any government that any violation of our airspace 
that is not inadvertent, and certainly any violation that is 
intentional and has a military component will be met with 
immediate kinetic action. And that just doesn't seem to me to 
be something that--that there is any benefit to keeping secret.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator that is not our intent. And I do 
believe we have sent that signal. This HAB was different than 
the others in terms of the duration of its flight.
    Senator Schatz. But that is what I am a little--first of 
all let us start with this. Did we just set a precedent?
    Ms. Dalton. I believe we established a deterrent line.
    Senator Schatz. Fine. Second of all, is that deterrent line 
contingent on where they go and how long they linger? Or just, 
is it a bright red line called: Don't come into our airspace?
    Ms. Dalton. It is when our airspace has been violated, we 
took action when it was safe to do so, given the risk to 
civilians on the ground per the advice of our Military 
commanders.
    Senator Schatz. Do you expect the PRC to proliferate these 
kinds of programs?
    Ms. Dalton. Jed, do you want to take that one?
    Mr. Royal. Senator, we understand this balloon program is, 
as I said earlier, a part of a broader suite. We understand 
that it is connected with a broad range of intrusive action 
from the PRC with its intent to coerce the United States, our 
allies, and partners.
    Senator Schatz. So I have heard two different things in a 
public setting. One is what the Vice Chair said, which is the 
persistence at lower altitudes gives them better fidelity on 
photos, and even, you know, other information. And the other 
is, look, these things are really deployed because they are 
cheaper than satellites.
    So those things seem to be in conflict with each other, my 
instinct was always that balloons are cheaper than satellites, 
and that is really what this is about. But are there 
capabilities that balloons have that satellites do not?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for the question. And we 
will be able to share more in a classified setting.

                           DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

    Senator Schatz. And when will the damage assessment be 
completed?
    General Sims. Thank you. Sir, that is ongoing now. And we 
continue to recover pieces each day, I think we are thinking 
days to 2 weeks in terms of everything. But it does continue in 
conjunction with the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). So 
I would like to offer a Military perspective to your comment 
about kinetic----
    Senator Schatz. Sure. You have 22 seconds.
    General Sims. Yes, sir. So I think having been in places 
where, once you take a shot you can't get it back. I think it 
is important for us to remember that if we establish that 
precedent that precedent may be met--we may meet the same 
precedent. In which case as opposed to thinking, and looking, 
and then reacting, we may create something in which we are--is 
to our detriment.
    Senator Schatz. Fair enough.
    Senator Tester. Senator from North Dakota, Senator Hoeven.
    Senator Hoeven. Secretary Dalton, I just was listening to 
one of your responses, when you then spoke with Senator 
Murkowski. If you had the opportunity to shoot the Chinese spy 
balloon down, either over the remote mountains of Alaska, or 
over water near Alaska, why didn't you? Why is it okay to have 
the Chinese fly some type of aircraft over Alaskan airspace?
    General Sims. Sir, let me, water to land for first. The 
first would be, and in terms of the water, General VanHerck, 
again assessed that it was not a--there was no hostile act, 
hostile intent, or potential impact to critical intelligence 
capabilities. More so, he was continuing to characterize the 
system.
    And it is for us now, looking back, there is an assertion 
that we were absolutely certain that it was in fact conducting 
surveillance, or intended to go in a certain space, and we will 
talk more about that in the next session, but that was--those 
were thoughtful actions.
    The other piece I would add, over the land of Alaska, you 
know, sir we spent a lot of time, as you know, determining 
where we will take a shot in combat when we are fighting--when 
we are fighting people who are fighting against us. And we work 
our way to a near zero probability of collateral damage when we 
take that shot.
    Although Alaska is, in places, not as inhabited as other 
places, it is inhabited. And at that time we didn't understand, 
through the modeling, if we shot that, what it would do on the 
ground. Ultimately, it came back to maybe a 20-mile by 20-mile 
piece of ground, and without being able to clear that, we 
wouldn't do that in combat, sir.
    And I think in this case we certainly didn't want to take 
that chance with Alaskans, or any other Americans throughout 
the flight path.
    Senator Hoeven. So we created a situation now where our 
adversaries are going to kind of try to figure out what they 
can and can't fly over our airspace? Well, maybe a balloon.
    What are they going to try next, the UAV (Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles)--a UAS? Or, I mean, is that where we are at now? They 
are going to all try to figure--I mean the Russians test our 
airspace all the time, and you scramble fighters to interdict 
them, because you are saying nothing can fly over our airspace. 
That is sovereign airspace. So now we are in a new day where 
our adversaries get to try to figure out what you are going to 
let fly over and what you are not?

                                 SAFETY

    General Sims. No, sir. So I think, and kind of back to 
Senator Tester's earlier comment; I would say, first of all, we 
are certainly grateful for the support from this committee and 
for your trust, sir. I would tell you that throughout this, 
General VanHerck and the men and women who were serving under 
him had American Safety in mind throughout. And at any moment 
had it presented some sort of intent to hurt Americans, they 
would have taken that balloon out of the sky. It would have 
happened.
    I would tell you that it is the same should something else 
happen. General VanHerck, the rest of the Military stands ready 
whatever threats come, but we do expect that they will assess 
and report. And in this case, sir, he assessed and reported 
based on the intent, and based on where it was at the time.
    Senator Hoeven. So there are some things they can fly over, 
or near Hawaii, there are some things they can fly over Alaska, 
but maybe not over California, or possibly over Montana, or 
North Dakota, it is just kind of, you know, you decide based on 
the circumstance. Doesn't that create a situation where our 
adversaries are going to test what you think can and can't fly 
over different, or proximity to different parts of the country 
on a regular basis?
    Ms. Dalton. Senator.
    Senator Hoeven. Is that good? Or how are you going to 
prevent that kind of thing from now being tested, you know, 
even more than you already are? And you are going to start 
making subjective decisions about different types of aircraft, 
and what proximity, and where they can fly? What States they 
can and can't fly over, over Guam, or you know, pick a spot?
    This is where, it seems to me, we are getting into a 
dangerous place, in terms of how this was handled.
    Ms. Dalton. Senator, if I may? This flight was different 
than all the rest, and that is why we took the action that we 
did. To the question of building upon General Sims' notes about 
why we didn't take it down over Alaska; a key piece of this is 
the recovery, for us to be able to exploit and understand this 
balloon and its capabilities fully.
    If we had taken it down over the State of Alaska, which is 
part of the United States, it would have been a very different 
recovery operation.
    As Senator Murkowski knows, the water depths offshore the 
Aleutians, at 6-plus nautical miles go very quickly from about 
150 feet to over 18,000 feet, you know, the Bering Sea. The 
winter water temperatures in the Bering Sea hover consistently 
in the low-30s, which would make recovery and salvage 
operations very dangerous.
    Additionally, the northern portion of the Bering Sea has 
ice cover, which can be extremely dangerous, which would induce 
additional risk. So again, a key part of the calculus for this 
operation was the ability to salvage, understand, and exploit 
the capabilities of the high altitude balloon. And we look 
forward to sharing that with you in a classified session, and 
also openly as we learn more.
    Senator Hoeven. With the indulgence of the Chairman, just 
finishing up here.
    Those are the kinds of things I think are important, people 
want to understand that. People support our men and women in 
uniform, we appreciate what you do, I mean we owe you our lives 
and we are deeply thankful for that, but Americans don't 
understand this situation. And so they need to understand why 
the decisions were made that were made and, you know, whether 
or not that is what is best for National Security.
    And just a final quick question is, could that balloon not 
be forced down some way, other than shooting it down? Obviously 
we have aircraft that can exceed that altitude, and so just the 
final question. Couldn't that have been forced down some way 
rather than shooting it down, which would have, in a lot of 
ways, been better? You avoid the risk to people on the ground, 
and you get it intact?
    General Sims. Yes sir. Sir, we were--there were--and we 
will talk in the next session, I believe, about some thoughts. 
We didn't have the ability to capture the balloon or bring the 
balloon down with a particular munition that we thought would 
make it less dangerous. And quite frankly, we didn't know where 
it would go if we were to somehow impact its flight path at 
that point, in terms of our ability to control it, what it 
would do if it hit the ground.
    But that is a great question, sir. I think we will address 
that greater in the next session.
    Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. Yes. So Secretary Blinken canceled a 
planned trip to Beijing over this incident, the Chinese lost 
their balloon, that nobody believed was a weather balloon as 
the Chinese Republic has stated. Do you--is it in your 
estimation that this was an error by the Chinese Government? Or 
was this planned?
    Mr. Royal. Senator, we are continuing to make assessments 
on the Chinese intent for this specific operation. And we will 
have further to share in the classified setting along the 
specific content. I think it would be false to try to 
characterize this operation as purely a mistake. My 
understanding, sir, is that this is consistent with a broader 
set of actions China is undertaking to intrude our sovereign 
territory and those of our allies and partners.
    Senator Tester. So generally speaking, as this balloon went 
over Alaska, Canada, and the United States, who got the most 
information out of this; the Chinese, or us?
    Mr. Royal. Sir, I don't have a judgment or evaluation to 
pass along those lines for you right now. I do believe that the 
United States collection on this particular balloon and on the 
broader program is ongoing, and is significant.
    Senator Tester. Senator Hoeven said something that is true, 
not only for the American people, it is true for us. We don't 
understand. We don't understand because, quite frankly, we have 
been briefed in this committee over, and over, and over again 
about the risk that China poses, both economically and 
militarily. We know for a fact, going back to Senator Schatz's 
comments, that there have been brief incursions on our 
airspace. We didn't do anything about that. We also know that 
China tends to push the envelope all the time, until a line is 
set down.
    It should not have been a surprise that China did this 
because nothing happened before, at least to our knowledge, 
nothing has happened before to them for these over flights.
    So the question is, and it goes back to everything that 
everybody on this committee has talked about, and that is, and 
I am not sure you can answer it in this forum, but a violation 
of airspace is a violation of airspace, and to know absolutely 
that this was of no military threat to us. Boy, I want to hear 
more about that in classified session too, because quite 
frankly I am not sure that you can say that unequivocally.
    And to the point that in Montana, for example, we have some 
pretty important military assets that we use as a deterrent for 
those folks who apparently, apparently, I don't know for sure 
but apparently fly over, not accidentally, some of those, and 
the same thing with assets in Alaska, and the same thing with 
assets in the Midwest.
    You guys have to help me understand why this ``baby'' 
wasn't taken out long before. And because I am telling you that 
this ain't the last time. We saw brief incursions. Now we have 
seen a long incursion, what happens next? I am sure you guys 
have modeled that out too, maybe. I hope. If you haven't, you 
should.
    But in the end either China is a threat or it isn't. And I 
think it is a huge threat. When this budget comes forth to 
Senator Collins and I, and the rest of people on this 
committee, and the rest of people in the Senate and Congress we 
are going to be working on, I hope this is addressed in some 
line item.
    And not only addressed with dollars but addressed with 
actions on how these monies will be put to work to make sure 
that this never happens again. Because quite honestly, and I 
get it, you guys have a tough job by the way, and as I said in 
my opening statement the folks who are the Military, whether 
rank and file, or the leadership, or the salt of the earth. But 
we really do depend upon you to make the right decision. And I 
am not sure I am bought and sold that the right decision was 
made. But we have another hearing that is in classified session 
that we will take that up further.
    Senator Collins, do you have other comments?
    Senator Collins. Just a few Mr. Chairman.
    First, I would associate myself with everything that you 
just said, and the other members of the committee, I think you 
hear great frustration, and a great deal of concern about the 
message that has been sent to China.
    General, as I look through publicly available sources at 
the flight of this balloon, and the bases, and sensitive 
military sites that it passed over, its flight pattern, 
clearly, is not accidental. Would you agree with that?
    General Sims. Ma'am, I do have some thoughts on that that 
will be in the next session. But you are right, the flight path 
took it over areas that we would think were concerning, and we 
are pretty certain we mitigated those. And we will discuss that 
in the next session.
    Senator Collins. Okay. I look forward to hearing the 
specifics on that. I want to go back to Senator Murkowski's 
point about Alaska. The U.S. airspace over and around Alaska is 
known as the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. It is a 
huge swath of air space that includes the airspace over 
territorial waters, military training ranges, and very sparsely 
populated areas.
    And that is why it is so hard for us to understand why the 
balloon wasn't taken out over Alaska. It is sparsely populated, 
they are territorial waters, and it is a huge Defense 
Identification Zone. It has bases, it has sensitive aircraft, 
it has military equipment that is of great interest to the 
Chinese for the exact reasons that Senator Murkowski said. And 
yet the statement was made that when the balloon was over 
Alaska it did not show evidence of hostile intent. Help me 
understand that? Why was it there?
    General Sims. Ma'am, while it was in Alaska we were 
characterizing the balloon, I would tell you, one of the things 
I think that is very different from our country than--and you 
can look at historical examples, is we think before we shoot. 
And in this case we thought before we shot. And again we will 
talk more about it in other sessions.
    I think that is something that as someone who flies around, 
and Admiral Joyner, certainly, more than I, that we would 
appreciate of our--of the rest of the world that they would 
think before they shoot. Once you shoot, you can't take it 
back.
    Ma'am, I will be quite honest, as an American I understand 
the impact and the unsettling feeling that is here. As someone 
in the Military who sees the other side of that, I am very 
confident in the authorities that were granted to the NORAD/
NORTHCOM Commander to make decisions here. That the decisions 
he made were in the best interest of the United States and our 
citizens, as were the decisions of our senior leadership, and 
we will present more of that conversation in the next session.
    Senator Collins. I am not implying that we want to be 
anything like the Chinese Government in asking this question. 
But do you think if we had an American surveillance balloon 
going over sensitive Chinese Military sites; that the Chinese 
Government would have, for a minute, hesitated before taking it 
down?
    General Sims. Ma'am, I will not answer on behalf of the 
Chinese. But I think as an American, if I was flying in that 
direction, I would hope that they would think before they made 
a decision.
    Senator Collins. Well, I have got to tell you, I think they 
would not hesitate if we violated their territorial airspace, 
to disable, and take down our surveillance platform.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Collins. One of the 
things that was brought up, and then I am probably going to 
wrap it up, unless you have more, Susan Collins, is that you 
spoke about communications, Mr. Royal, with China. Could you 
give me a brief update on where we are at from a communication 
standpoint with China? Is it totally cut off, or are people 
still communicating and talking?
    Mr. Royal. Sir, with respect to this particular operation, 
we engaged China on an urgent matter during the course of our 
observations of this particular operation, but subsequent to 
that, our diplomats engaged to make sure that the Chinese knew 
that Secretary Blinken's trip would no longer be possible under 
the current circumstances. And then further engaged the 
Chinese, subsequent to the successful downing of the balloon, 
to make sure they understood what activity we were undertaking 
and why we did that.
    I will say more broadly, sir, that it is really important, 
during moments like this, that we maintain open lines of 
communication.
    Senator Tester. Absolutely.
    Mr. Royal. And unfortunately the Chinese administration has 
declined a request from Secretary Austin to communicate 
directly with his counterpart in China. We believe that China 
needs to be more responsive to the United States when it comes 
to requests for further communication.
    Senator Tester. I couldn't agree with you more, a hundred 
percent, and the fact is, they are the ones that violated our 
airspace, and they should be open to communications, because it 
was a serious violation, I think, in everybody's opinion.
    We appreciate you all being here today. We appreciate you 
answering the questions, and your testimony. I think this was 
helpful as an initial conversation. But I will tell you that 
knowing Susan Collins very well, oversight isn't going to stop 
here. We have important responsibilities in that vein, and we 
will continue to do that, whether it is on Chinese threats to 
our airspace, or any other thing that deals with the Department 
of Defense.

                         CONCLUSION OF BRIEFING

    And so with that, thank you for the work you guys do every 
day. This Defense Subcommittee will reconvene on Tuesday, 
February 14, at 10 a.m., for a classified briefing to discuss 
other Chinese threats to the U.S. Homeland.
    Thank you all. And we stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., Thursday, February 9, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of 
the Chair.]

                                 [all]