[Senate Hearing 118-119]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-119
OPEN HEARING:
ON COUNTERING CHINA'S MALIGN INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2023
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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-571 WASHINGTON : 2025
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.]
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
JON OSSOFF, Georgia
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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SEPTEMBER 27, 2023
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia....................... 1
Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida........................... 3
WITNESSES
Glenn Tiffert, PhD, Distinguished Research Fellow; Co-Chair,
Project on China's Global Sharp Power, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University............................................ 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 9
Sarah Cook, Senior Advisor for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,
Freedom House.................................................. 18
Prepared Statement........................................... 20
Alan Kohler, President, Pamir Consulting; Former Assistant
Director, Counter-Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.................................................. 47
Prepared Statement........................................... 49
OPEN HEARING:
COUNTERING CHINA'S MALIGN INFLUENCE.
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, in open
session, the Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman of the
Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Warner (presiding), Rubio, Wyden,
Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Cotton,
Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, and Rounds.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Chairman Warner. Good afternoon. I want to call this
hearing to order, and I want to welcome our witnesses: Glenn
Tiffert, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.
Sarah Cook, Senior Advisor for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, at
Freedom House. And Alan Kohler, who is president of Pamir
Consulting and former Assistant Director of the FBI's
Counterintelligence Division. Alan, this is the first time you
have appeared before the Committee not in an FBI capacity. We
welcome all, but a particular welcome back for Alan.
Let me also say, while I'm grateful for Senator Heinrich
being here on time, Senator King almost on time, you know, as
usual when it is an open hearing, we go by seniority. So, if
Ron Wyden slides in a couple of minutes before, don't take it
out on me personally.
The purpose of today's hearing is to better understand the
PRC's malign influence strategy targeting the United States.
This builds on longstanding efforts by this Committee to track
and expose malign activity where our Nation's foreign
adversaries--we try in this Committee to help educate the
public; warn social media platforms and news media; and
enhance, frankly, interagency cooperation. Because the truth is
we need that not just whole-of-government but whole-of-society
to be able to recognize, acknowledge, and counter the PRC. The
PRC's influence efforts are so widespread.
This hearing will focus on two important vectors.
One, the PRC's efforts to influence U.S. policy,
particularly by targeting local and state levels, something
that Senator Rubio was probably the first Member on the
Committee to bring to our attention.
The second is the PRC's tactics to shape U.S. political
discourse and the media environment in their favor. In
addition, the witnesses will discuss an area of increasing
concern, what the U.S. government refers to as transnational
repression: how the PRC is targeting U.S. nationals whom they
perceived to be threatening to their narrative or to their
interests. While the PRC has engaged in global influence
operations for years, they have supercharged their efforts
recently at the state and local level, using foreign investment
and business opportunities as points of leverage, to impact the
U.S. political process and to reduce United States criticism of
China. And again, when I say China, my beef is with the PRC and
Xi Jinping and their authoritarian leadership, but it's not
with the Chinese people. Confronting this behavior is
especially challenging, because frequently some of these
activities don't fall into a classic illegal category.
Lobbying, people-to-people exchanges, overt propaganda, trade
deals--all governments engage in these activities.
But what makes this different is, frankly, the scale of
their efforts and the resources, methods, and organization they
employ to advance these objectives, and the frequent
obfuscation that covers the links between these efforts and the
PRC's intelligence agencies. In both its influence and coercion
activities, the PRC has focused attention on those perceived
who shape U.S. policy, and that goes from business elites to
mayors to journalists--even folks at think tanks.
In addressing this challenge, the United States must not
make, as I mentioned earlier, the mistake of linking Chinese-
Americans, Asian-Americans, or the people of China with the
Chinese Communist Party's efforts. Frequently, it is these
individuals, particularly the Chinese diaspora, who are victims
of the CCP's efforts, as we've seen, most recently with
specific targeting by the CCP of a Chinese-American candidate
for office in Congress.
As Vice Chair and Chairman of the Committee, one area that
has been alarming to me has been the ability of foreign
adversaries to harness U.S.-developed communications
technologies. In addition, a recent report from Mandiant, the
great cyber firm, has shown that the PRC is successfully
adopting the Russian playbook; for instance, using Western gig
economy platforms to hire Americans to draft newswire content,
stage protests, and artificially amplify political content on
social media. In the case of the PRC, we've seen not only
extensive efforts to manipulate American social media
platforms, but also to extend its reach through homegrown
communication projects. We've seen public research, for
instance, documenting how WeChat, owned by PRC-based Tencent,
has facilitated surveillance and censorship of users in the
United States and Canada, again, targeting the Chinese diaspora
as their main goal. An area where the Vice Chairman and I have
shared concern, maybe different ideas on how to deal with it--
but the growth of TikTok as a globally-competitive social media
platform heightens these concerns. With TikTok achieving a
level of U.S. adoption--150 million Americans, 90 minutes a
day--and cultural prominence and profitability, this is an
enormous challenge.
Senator Rubio and I were remarking in the comments leading
up--to see the amount of advertising and sponsorship. Frankly,
there is not a morning political cheat sheet or tip sheet that
has not been sponsored by TikTok and ByteDance over the last
few months. That's all fair and legal. But it does question
what kind of influence they're able to bring to bear.
On top of that, we recently saw reports that even TikTok
employees are starting to leave in droves as more and more
people from their parent, ByteDance, come down into the TikTok
operation, I believe, to try to further some of the CCP's
goals. Again, much to the complete difference of what was the
TikTok--Mr. Shou's--presentation when he talked before the
House in terms of trying to deny that linkage between ByteDance
and TikTok. And again, I point to a recent ``Wall Street
Journal'' article that points some of this out.
And we think about all this. And that's even before we
think about the the enormous advent of how AI tools can
literally take what we saw in past misinformation/
disinformation tactics, and really amplify and expound that at
virtually unlimited levels. So we've got to figure out what to
do. I believe we need an overarching legal framework, which
will give any foreign-based technology a day in court, and
rights protected, but particularly from nation-states like
China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Cuba, Venezuela. I think we
still need a framework on how we deal with those technologies
that come in, rather than the whack-a-mole approach that we've
taken on companies like the Russian software company,
Kaspersky. And the fact that we're still using taxpayer money
to rip and replace Huawei equipment because we couldn't send an
organized-enough signal ahead of time.
How we get there? We've still got some legislating to do. I
know the Commerce Committee--and appreciate Chair Cantwell,
some of her efforts there. You know, I think this problem has
not gone away. And we need to make sure that we continue to
educate the American public, and frankly, all of our colleagues
on this challenge.
This has been something this Committee started working on
in 2017. Together, we've hosted a series of what we call
classified road shows where we briefed industry sectors. That's
important. But we also need to continue to do as much of this
as possible in the open, in the public, to make sure that folks
are aware of this challenge and threat.
So again, I welcome you all. And with that, I'll turn it
over to the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you for holding this open
hearing. Thank you all for being here.
Many countries, both friends and adversaries, try to
influence and shape American public opinion and, ultimately,
our political process--often through their embassies, which is
what they're here for. And many other cases by getting others
to echo points because they want us to fund something or
support something.
But what we're facing now from China goes far beyond
anything the Nation has ever confronted, because we've never
had a competitor adversary with these resources at their
disposal, and with the complexity of reach. This is not simply
a pure governmental--we're all set up to think about
governmental efforts--this is not just governmental. This is a
whole-of-society, whole-of-economy approach to how they try to
influence our policies in the United States.
Simply put, I think it's, first, important to define what
it is we're talking about. There is traditional espionage from
China happening at an extraordinary rate, both against our
government and against our private sector. And that's not what
we're here to talk about today, although we acknowledge it
exists at levels that are equally disturbing.
What we're talking about here is the effort of the Chinese
Communist Party to basically subdue us without fighting--to get
us to a point where we are doing the things they want us to do,
because it's coming from within. And to do that they've
employed tactics that we've never seen before from an
adversary, because the Russians do this. They're pretty good at
it. They did it during the Cold War, but they look like
children next to what the Chinese are able to employ, and who
they are able to deputize.
Let's start with Wall Street investment firms and
corporations, all of whom have been deputized for decades into
arguing the Chinese viewpoint of economic policy, of trade,
because they're making a lot of money in China. Now, they they
may realize that one day they'll be put out of business once
their Chinese competitors have been given all their
intellectual property. But for the next few years, there's a
lot of money invested. And they understand that in order to
have access to that market, they have to make the people that
give that access happy. And so they have come here to the
Capitol for decades, marching to the White House, and basically
say: we argue what the Chinese Communist Party wanted them to
argue on their behalf. It's happening to this very day.
We've all heard it in media; and what I mean by media is
these newsletters, these print pieces. But in many cases,
whether they're compromising or they're trading access, you
know, somebody wants to have access to China, and they don't
want their visa yanked. And so they've got to be careful how
they report about China or what issues they focus on, out of
fear, in that regard, in many cases, flat out buying media
outlets or even injecting within normal media content, paid
material that can be tracked back to Chinese Communist Party
efforts here in the United States.
We talk about academia; they knew how to play that really
well. First of all, their students that they send here pay full
rate and more. In many cases, universities have partnerships.
You're dealing with researchers, in many cases who are used to
this belief in open collaboration, even though with the
Chinese, it's usually a one-way street. And then organizations
on campus that they help fund that oftentimes are the first
ones out there leading efforts to shut down any efforts to talk
about Hong Kong or Tibet or you name it.
You think about local governments, because I think they've
now figured out, okay, at the federal level, there's strong
bipartisan consensus. It's not fertile ground anymore. What is
fertile ground to city halls and state capitals, where the
issue is not talked about every day. And that's just easy
picking. Imagine someone comes and says we're going to make a
major investment in your state. Or likewise, we're going to
yank a major investment in your state unless you do what we
want you to do on these policy issues. They've learned how to
use that against us.
Think about the NBA for a second, okay? There was a time a
few years ago, where you could literally show up with signs
that said anything you wanted negative about America, and I
mean anything, but you would be expelled from the arena if you
had a shirt on that referenced Hong Kong. They would kick you
out, they would literally--security guard would come and get
you and tell you, you have to leave, especially if you're in
camera shot, if this is something negative towards Hong Kong.
That happened in the United States of America.
Think about Hollywood; you will not find a major motion
picture studio in America that will produce a film that has a
Chinese government villain or even a Chinese villain. Why?
Because the movie won't be distributed over there. And that's a
big market for movies. So the list goes on and on. We could be
here talking about it all day. It's a big deal and it's
happening right underneath our nose. There's not enough
attention being paid to it.
And as the Chairman pointed to it, you know, it's difficult
because, at the end of day, people have First Amendment rights
in this country to speak and advocate for positions, including
those that are against our national interests. You know, that's
just the way it is.
But this is a dedicated effort that, at minimum, the light
has to come on so people can see these roaches, so people can
see what's happening, what's really happening here, right
underneath our nose, and the impact that that has potentially
on our society and on our willingness in the future to act.
I'll close with this. Everybody worries about Taiwan, and
rightfully so. There's a lot of reasons--we're not going to get
into all that today--as to why we should be worried. But in
particular what it can mean not just to the world order and how
people view our country, but to our national security.
But envision a time when, if they have enough legwork they
put into it, this is the narrative they're creating and they're
setting up, and they're using it at our schools and our broad
society. And that is when the day comes that there is a Taiwan
conflict, the first thing some people are going to ask is, why
should Americans die defending some small island halfway around
the world just off the coast of China? I get it. It's bad, we
should condemn it. But should we really go fight for that? Is
it worth the sacrifice, that treasure and blood to do it?
That's the narrative they're already setting the groundwork
for. And they're not doing it among the people sitting up here.
They're doing it among the people that one day will be sitting
up here, or the people that will one day be working for us. And
the people who will be writing about it. The experts that will
be commenting on it.
So these are the kinds of things that I think that deserve
a lot more attention. I'm glad we're having an open hearing on
it.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I'm not sure if
you guys agreed on order. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GLENN TIFFERT, PhD, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH FELLOW;
CO-CHAIR, PROJECT ON CHINA'S GLOBAL SHARP POWER, HOOVER
INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Tiffert. Thank you very much Chairman Warner, Vice
Chairman Rubio, Distinguished Members of the Committee.
I'm honored to be here today to talk about China's malign
foreign influence operations in the United States. At the
Hoover Institution, I co-chair our project on China's Global
Sharp Power, which analyzes the myriad ways in which China
asserts itself around the world. And we have three main lines
of effort, malign foreign influence being one of them.
China's malign influence operations in the United States
sprang from a conspiratorial tradition within the Chinese
Communist Party that goes by the label of the United Front.
Within China, the United Front seeks to mobilize, infiltrate,
co-opt, or neutralize every individual or organization in
society of any significance, so that they either contribute to
the party's goals or are eliminated as a potential source of
opposition or a threat. The party recognizes no autonomous zone
of civil society. In principle, it reserves the right to
supervise and control everything, and under Xi Jinping, it is
exercising that right evermore intrusively. The conspiratorial
logic of the United Front drives the party's behavior abroad as
well, where it seeks to, as Senator Rubio pointed out, win
without fighting to make the foreign serve China.
If a society cannot be freed and someone has to manage it,
there is a colossal bureaucracy within the PRC party state that
administers United Front, most notably the United Front Work
Department of the Party Central Committee, which employs many
tens of thousands of workers at every level of administration
in China. But it's more than that. Every CCP member is obliged
to promote the United Front, and other organs of the party and
state play important roles in advancing the United Front's
goals, particularly the party's Propaganda Department, which
supervises PRC traditional and online media and pushes online
disinformation into our spaces; the Ministry of State Security,
which is China's principal foreign intelligence agency; and the
Party's International Liaison Department, which cultivates
relationships with foreign political parties and leaders at the
national and sub-national levels, especially rising political
stars from around the world.
These organs act directly, but they also act indirectly
through a web of thousands of nongovernmental organizations
that operate on academic, charitable, commercial, cultural,
ethnic, and religious affairs, many of which engage in work
with foreign partners, or who have international footprints,
and are obliged to carry out party agendas within their spheres
of work. The United Front provides a cover for espionage,
transnational repression, and even abductions abroad, and we
have, fortunately, law enforcement tools for dealing with
those.
In my remaining time, I would like very much to focus on
something else. By American standards, as has been pointed out,
a lot of United Front activity is lawful and falls within
spheres of protected speech and association. It aims to win
hearts and minds, harness the idealism and the self-interest of
foreign elites--American elites--to contribute to CCP goals,
create local constituencies in our societies that echo CCP
talking points of their own volition, and alter incentive
structures so that the costs for us of de-risking are
prohibitively high. As an example of how that plays out in real
life, consider the current debate over renewing our STA, the
agreement between the U.S. and China on science and technology.
This activity qualifies as malign if it obfuscates the origins,
sources of funding and agendas behind it; if it trades in
disinformation or misdirection; or advocates violations of law,
fundamental rights, or democratic principles. Lawful but malign
influence operations are among the most vexing for democratic
societies to combat without infringing on our constitutional
rights and liberties.
The United Front contributes to a host of party goals, such
as rebutting foreign criticism of China and playing up flaws in
American democracy, technology transfer, co-opting the Chinese
diaspora, and neutralizing dissent within it. In the United
States, when it comes to malign foreign influence, U.S. states
and localities are America's soft underbelly. Federalism
focuses them on different priorities, local job creation, and
investment, for example, not geopolitical competition. The CCP
is highly aware of that difference and capitalizes on it,
bypassing Washington to work directly with localities where
consciousness of risk and institutional capacity to manage it
are far lower than at the federal level.
We need to change that, not necessarily by reflexively
decoupling--because realistically, most of the world will not
follow us down that road, and we'd only be isolating
ourselves--but rather by developing the infrastructure and
capacity to make better, more informed decisions about risk and
manage our engagements with China more intelligently and
safely.
I have four recommendations with regard to that, which I
discuss in greater detail in my written statement.
Number one, increase funding for open source research and
publication on malign foreign influence operations in the
United States. We have a host of nongovernmental organizations
and research centers that have capacity in this area and would
love to do more.
Provide integrated federal support to subnational
governments and businesses, single interagency touchpoints
distributed around the U.S., perhaps through the DHS fusion
centers or Commerce's U.S. Commercial Service Offices.
And then, number three, we need to look beyond espionage
and law enforcement. We need to think of strategies for staying
safe, drawn from public health as well as counterintelligence
and prosecutions. In particular, we need to ensure that we
protect the multi-ethnic Chinese diaspora that bears the brunt
of CCP malign influence operations, to ensure that they have
access to the same rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed
to all Americans and can practice them safely.
And then finally, we need to address systemic as well as
acute risk. Headline grabbing incidents are important, but they
should not distract us from the slow rolling climate change
that the United Front activity tries to create. The most
successful influence operations are those that run under the
radar.
Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
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STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR CHINA, HONG KONG,
AND TAIWAN, FREEDOM HOUSE
Ms. Cook. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio and
Distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
My remarks focus on the media dimensions of the Chinese
Communist Party or CCP's influence operations targeting the
United States. They draw on the U.S. chapter of Freedom House's
Beijing's Global Media Influence Study, which covered 30
countries across six regions.
The CCP and its proxies influence media and information
abroad in complex and multifaceted ways. These extend beyond
simple propaganda or overt public diplomacy. Rather they
involve elements that are covert, coercive, or corrupting. In
particular, we identified five categories of tactics:
propaganda, disinformation, censorship and intimidation,
control over content distribution infrastructure, and attempts
to export the CCP's model of information control.
Our research found that the United States faces a very high
degree of media influence efforts from Beijing; in fact, second
after only Taiwan, reflecting the large arsenal of tactics
being deployed. Thankfully, the United States also displayed a
very high degree of local response and resilience, earning it
an overall status of resilient.
In my time today, I'd like to focus on five aspects of this
phenomenon.
One, Beijing-backed content is appearing in mainstream U.S.
media.
This is the most significant avenue through which Chinese
state-produced content reaches large American audiences,
typically through content-sharing agreements, partnerships with
local mainstream media comma or op eds, and television
appearances by Chinese diplomats. For example, FARA filings
show that from 2019 to 2020, one state-run ``China Daily'' paid
print and online publications at least $7 million to insert
their content alongside other news items. The clarity of
labeling attached to such content is inconsistent, and in some
cases entirely absent.
Two, covert tactics and disinformation campaigns are being
deployed on social media.
China-linked actors have attempted to pay otherwise
unaffiliated social media influencers in the United States to
broadcast pro-Beijing content on topics ranging from conditions
in Xinjiang to quote, saying good things about U.S.-China
relations, to claims that COVID-19 originated in the U.S. deer
population. Moreover, coordinated disinformation campaigns
linked to China and targeting U.S. audiences are becoming more
frequent and sophisticated.
PRC linked actors are experimenting with new strategies
across dozens of platforms, not only regarding rights
violations in China, but also domestic politics in the United
States. New tactics include use of generative artificial
intelligence to create images of fake news anchors, recruiting
unwitting Americans to produce content, and deploying multiple
layers of content-laundering to obscure the CCP-linked origins.
Evidence suggests these campaigns are increasing and reach
engagement and effectiveness in some cases.
Three, the use of coercive tactics is growing.
Since 2019, Chinese officials and other pro-Beijing actors
have aggressively restricted foreign correspondents in China,
retaliated against families of U.S.-based journalists, and
launched intrusive cyber-attacks against major news outlets.
Pro-CCP trolls have viciously attacked ethnic Chinese
journalists working for U.S. media, especially women. More
indirectly, there have been isolated instances of corporate
pressure on journalists that induce censorship coming from
executives, as media companies fear that certain reporting
could damage their ability to reach audiences in China.
Four, CCP proxies are attempting to co-opt U.S. elites to
spread Beijing's messages.
One especially active proxy is the innocuously named China-
U.S. Exchange Foundation or CUSEF. CUSEF is widely viewed as
belonging to the CCP's United Front Work targeting the United
States. It has taken at least 127 U.S. journalists from 40
outlets to China since 2009. Another CUSEF-funded initiative
since 2017 has targeted quote, key opinion leaders in African
American communities. Pro-Beijing narratives also enter the
U.S. media landscape through friendly local commentators,
politicians, and former officials, especially at the
subnational level, in some cases, also in collaboration with
CUSEF or with its funding.
And five, Beijing's influence over Chinese diaspora media
is greater than many appreciate.
This is especially true in the television sector and via
the WeChat app owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent. WeChat is
used by millions of Americans to maintain contact with people
in China, yet clear evidence exists of Beijing aligned
censorship or surveillance of these users. American news
outlets and civic groups critical of the CCP, such as Radio
Free Asia or Freedom House, for that matter, are excluded from
opening official accounts to reach WeChat audiences with their
content in Chinese. Some Chinese-Americans, both political
dissidents and average users, have been censored for sharing
content that is critical of the CCP.
To conclude, the CCP's activities to influence U.S. media
are likely to increase in the coming years, including in the
form of social media manipulation campaigns surrounding the
2024 elections. The good news is that momentum is on
democracy's side, but there is still much work to be done.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
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STATEMENT OF ALAN KOHLER, PRESIDENT, PAMIR CONSULTING; FORMER
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Kohler. Chairman Warner, Vice Chair Rubio, and Members
of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today to
discuss the malign foreign influence and transnational
repression of the People's Republic of China.
I appeared before this Committee many times when I was an
executive in the FBI, and I always respected your efforts to
both enlighten the American people and arm the government and
private sector with the information and tools they need to make
the sound decisions and protect their most valuable assets,
ideas, and people. That was a priority for me as well when I
worked at the FBI. And now, providing clarity and confidence to
American businesses is a critical goal in my new role at Pamir.
References to China throughout my remarks today referred to
the Chinese government, which is controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party. I do not believe, nor does the FBI, that the
Chinese people are our adversary.
And we certainly do not believe that Chinese-Americans are
a risk. To the contrary, they are at risk. Chinese-Americans
are often the targets of the Chinese government's harassment,
and they deserve all the protections the U.S. Constitution
affords them.
The Chinese government, run by the Chinese Communist Party,
is a threat to the American way of life. The Chinese Communist
Party pursues every possible avenue to destroy our free and
fair society--challenging international norms, stealing our
innovation and jobs, and is skewing transparency, fairness, and
reciprocity in its attempts to undermine the United States.
China is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign to influence U.S.
society and our leaders, to force alignment with Chinese
economic and policy interests, and ensure the stability of its
own political system.
When those influence efforts are subversive, undeclared,
coercive, or criminal, they fall into the category of malign
foreign influence. And when the PRC government uses threats to
achieve their influence goals, they are engaging in
transnational repression, a term used to describe actions by
foreign governments to silence, intimidate, harass, and even
kidnap or murder, dissidents who dare to criticize them.
China's approach to influence in the United States is to target
broadly and use multiple vectors to achieve their goals. Their
efforts to influence are directed not only at the federal
government.
The Chinese government has found subnational level
influence to be a successful tool in their effort to manipulate
the environment to their advantage. Subnational leaders are
often more focused on things such as job creation, capital
investment, and cultural exchanges; and are less attuned to the
methods of Chinese political influence operations.
Countering malign foreign influence and transnational
repression are among the highest priorities of the FBI and the
United States government, and the FBI leads the effort in three
ways.
First, through active and innovative investigations and
robust intelligence collection, the FBI neutralizes threats and
imposes consequences on those who would do us harm. China-
related investigations now make up approximately 50 percent of
all counterintelligence work, well over 2,000 active
investigations, which is equal to the threat from all other
countries combined.
Second, partnerships are a hallmark of the FBI's work, and
counterintelligence is no different. The United States'
government agencies must collaborate and coordinate efforts to
achieve a whole-of-government response to the whole-of-
government attack from the government of China.
Next week, the National Counterintelligence Task Force will
celebrate its fourth anniversary; and the Foreign Influence
Task Force, its sixth anniversary. Those multi-agency teams use
the capabilities, authorities, and resources of nearly 50
agencies to achieve strategic objectives. These collaborative
efforts must continue to be supported and expanded if we are to
be successful.
And third, the FBI has increased intelligence sharing and
its engagement with the public and private sectors. The
American public needs to know how they can be targeted and
manipulated so they can recognize influence efforts and insist
on transparency and reciprocity in their interactions with
China. If a silver lining is to be found in the Chinese spy
balloon episode from earlier this year, it is that the American
public could look up in the sky and see for themselves that the
Chinese government is spying on them.
And while a spy balloon is visible evidence, the threats
from malign foreign influence, transnational repression, and
economic espionage are often hidden. This hearing is one
important way to enlighten the American people and make them
more resilient to all the threats posed by China.
Thank you again for having me. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Well, thank you all for your testimony and
I think brought up some very important points.
Alan, I actually want to start with you, and Dr. Tiffert
made mention of this as well. And I think Ms. Cook did, at
least in passing. Coming out of the FBI, you had to monitor a
lot of the efforts against hate crimes and other things that
took place in recent years against Asian-Americans, in
particular Chinese-Americans.
Can you give us a little more flavor of that? Of how the
diaspora community, in many ways, not simply through unfounded
discriminatory actions, but, frankly, by the MSS and the
established Chinese spy networks that prey upon that diaspora.
I'd love to hear from all of you on that.
Mr. Kohler. Sure, thank you, Senator.
Maybe I'll start with a quick story.
After a recent arrest of a transnational repression actor,
the FBI goes out and we do our normal interviews of coworkers
and people in the community. And the response we got was
essentially, what took you so long? And that was a
heartbreaking thing to hear for an agency that prides itself on
protecting the American people.
And really what that meant was one of three things to us.
One, either the community didn't know who to call. Two, they
were afraid to call us because they were intimidated by the
FBI. Or three, they were intimidated by what the Chinese
government's reaction would be. And all three of those have to
be efforts that the FBI redoubles its efforts to engage and
make better.
And it's also an effort--that the entire U.S. government
needs to support what the Bureau is doing, but also find ways
to reach out to these most effective communities to make them
feel safe to identify and report these problems and realize
that they're not going to feel retribution from the United
States government or the Chinese government.
Chairman Warner. Do you want to add to that?
Dr. Tiffert. Right. Let me begin my answer with that.
Talking about U.S. campuses, universities in particular.
Protecting ethnic Chinese students of all origins, not just
those from China but from the Chinese diaspora around the world
who happen to be on our campuses, is critical to allowing us to
deliver exactly the same education that we aspire to deliver to
American students, to everyone.
There's an incident from 2019 that comes to mind. You'll
recall at this moment in time, many American hotel chains and
airlines were under pressure from the Chinese government to
remove Taiwan's designation as a country from their websites,
and to refer to it as a territory of China. This played out on
U.S. campuses, where offices of international students would
often break down the number of international students that were
present on their campuses from countries around the world by
jurisdiction. And at one campus I have in mind, Taiwan was
listed as a country along with China. There was an organized
effort by Chinese students on that campus from the PRC to
petition that university to remove Taiwan's designation as a
country and to listed under China. Taiwanese students on campus
did not share that perspective.
And within Chinese-language private social media channels,
an extremely vituperative and unpleasant situation unfolded in
which Taiwanese students on campus felt threatened and unsafe.
This was raised with local university administration who--
because their due process procedures on campus required an open
hearing in which the Taiwanese students would have confronted
the PRC students implicated with saying some extremely
threatening things to them--they felt they couldn't do that and
pursue it, and so the matter was dropped. They didn't have the
cover necessary. So that's one instance in which Taiwanese
students felt marginalized and threatened by PRC students over
the larger political environment. Same thing affects
disruptions in the classroom.
But within the Chinese diaspora, especially in the business
community, the effect of United Front activity is felt acutely
in that firms, businesspeople who are pro-CCP are rewarded with
business. If you run a newspaper, for example--and Chinese-
language media in the United States has felt this acutely--
expressing positions that vary in any way from the PRC's
talking points, you'll get punishment. Your advertisers will
dry up. You'll lose business opportunities in China. They use
the economic lever as a form of social control. And this has
changed the landscape of Chinese-language media in the US.
Chairman Warner. Ms. Cook, do you want to add something?
Ms. Cook. One thing I would say is if you look at the
different really, to the credit of the FBI's work looking at
these transnational repression cases, you see the gamut of the
parts of the diaspora community that are targeted. One will be
about Hong Kong. One will be about practitioners of Falun Gong.
Another will be the same person and they're running a police
station that's affecting this group. Another is somebody who's
a political dissident related to Tiananmen. Another is somebody
trying to run as a candidate in Congress who's critical of the
CCP. So I think there really is. There's diversity within the
community, but there's also the broad targeting of all of these
different parts, sometimes different parts, of the Chinese
apparatus.
The other thing I would say is that a group of Chinese-
Americans got together and actually filed a lawsuit in
California against Tencent regarding the WeChat app. And
honestly, looking at the report stories of the plaintiffs is
just really heartbreaking, because people's livelihoods were
ruined. They would be using this app to have, you know, a
business and people would come, and they share some cartoon
about Xi Jinping. And one of the things I'll just read briefly
from, that is that the people filing it talked about how WeChat
users describe living in fear. That they and their loved ones
will be punished for their postings, critical of the party
state, and who describe having to suppress the human urge to
voice their thoughts and feelings to their social networks out
of such fear. That is to engage in extreme self-censorship.
And I think Dr. Tiffert mentioned this in terms of how we
really have so much to do to just allow Chinese-Americans to be
able to express themselves in Chinese in the United States. And
some of the people were censored talking about Asian-American
issues with other Chinese-Americans but ended up getting
shadow-banned by WeChat.
Chairman Warner. Okay, thank you.
I'm going to move to Senator Rubio, but I do think, you
know, the stories and the extensiveness of which the diaspora
community not only in United States but around the world
follows WeChat. And sometimes any occasion where we don't make
clear our differences with the CCP and Xi Jinping, you know,
plays out manyfold.
Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, there's there's a lot to cover.
Some of my colleagues have covered one of the ones I wanted to
focus on, which I think has been reported on, but I want to
bring it all together.
February of 2020 an individual was charged with acting as
an agent of the Chinese government. They worked with the
private investigator and local law enforcement to target an
individual to forcibly repatriate individuals to China.
Basically go to them and say we know who you are. We know your
family is in China. You need to come back with us or they're
going to pay the price. Then, in April '23, individuals
connected to Chinese intelligence, Chinese efforts, were
harassing Chinese nationals in the U.S. They use fake social
media accounts to harass and intimidate dissidents.
In another similar case, two were charged with opening and
operating an illegal overseas police station, basically, in
order to monitor and intimidate dissidents and those people who
are critical of the government of the Communist Party of China.
In May of '23, the FBI arrested a man for acting as an agent,
because between 2018 and 2022, he provided Chinese intelligence
officials with information on Boston-area individuals and
organizations that included photographs of and information
about these folks, and so forth. From all this, and these are
the ones we know of those, there's obviously ongoing
investigations and the ones we still don't know about. It's
fair to say that the Chinese Communist Party has an active
effort inside of the United States to target and harass people
to either silence them, or to get them to go back to the
country by threatening, by using whatever leverage they can,
including threatening their families back in China. That's
happening in the United States. It's not happening in Australia
or Canada. We're talking about here. That's correct?
Mr. Kohler. Senator, yes. You just read off many of the
recent examples of transnational repression activity that the
FBI has investigated in the last three or four years.
Vice Chairman Rubio. So then, let's pivot now to the
business community--the tactics they use there. So I'm just
going to go through a couple here, which I mentioned the NBA
one, obviously. You know this general manager for an NBA team
put out a statement in support of Hong Kong. Chinese companies
immediately suspended ties with the team. And the Chinese
Basketball Association and the NBA's partnership, you know,
terminated for a while. I'm sure that cost them a bunch of
money and they were upset about that.
We have the Department of Justice charged the China-based
Zoom executive because they were disrupting video meetings that
were being hosted by users that were commemorating the '89
Tiananmen Square massacre.
And this is the one I think is most interesting, because it
was out in the open. In 2021, PRC officials told U.S. business
leaders who had business interests in China to speak up and
speak out and push the U.S. government to pursue a rational and
pragmatic policy towards China. The interpretation there is
push what China wants in our policy. But this is the line that
really got me, adding: The business community cannot make a
fortune in silence. So that's our business community.
And then, this is the one that I really want to ask you
about, because I don't think enough attention has been paid to
this. The National Counterintelligence Security Center noted in
their report. It states this, I'm just going to quote: Leaders
in the U.S. at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels
risk being manipulated to support hidden PRC agendas. Can you
cite a specific case or perhaps you can describe a hypothetical
that rings true? What does that mean? So people watching or who
will watch this video clip will understand? Because I think a
lot of people on a city council somewhere are, like, the
Chinese are not going to be targeting me. But they do.
Why, and how?
Dr. Tiffert. So, we have examples at the state and local
level, for example, of legislatures being approached by
individuals who ask them to include statements of support for
PRC policy in local and state legislation. We have multiple
instances of sister city relationships in which the agreements
between an American city and a Chinese sister city were written
in such a way to endorse PRC policy on Taiwan in distinction
from actual U.S. policy.
There's an example, for example, from 2019. The city of
Rockville, Maryland, had a preexisting relationship with a
sister city in China and was contemplating signing a similar
arrangement with Taiwan. Diplomats from the PRC Embassy here in
Washington went to Rockville and said you can't do that because
you've agreed to certain principles in your original agreement
with us. And they dangled investment opportunities in front of
Rockville and tried to get them not to sign that sister city
agreement with Taiwan. Fortunately, the city stood firm and
that agreement went forward.
So we have multiple examples of them trying to sneak
language into documents that are signed or authored by local
governments and legislatures that support and endorse PRC
policy.
Ms. Cook. I spoke a little bit about CUSEF. Part of what
happens is that the CCP works through multiple different levels
of proxies. So, I was going through FARA filings for some of
our research. And you see this foundation that has this
innocuous name, but actually has a bunch of people who are
linked to the United Front and the former Hong Kong government
heading it. They work through a local PR firm and those are the
contracts that are filed. That local PR firm will reach out to
individuals from various different communities to invite them
on trips to China. And so, you're getting an invitation. You
don't necessarily--people might not necessarily think. And one
of the ways they actually phrase the contract with the goal of
creating, building, enhancing, and retaining positive
relationships with key opinion leaders. In this case, it was
African-American communities, students from underserved
communities, and African-American media outlets. But they
specifically say that the goal is to have those individuals
formulate personalized perspectives that can be articulated as
quote balanced opinions when presented with Sino-U.S.
relationship issues.
So you have a situation where there's this cultivation of
relationships of people who are non-experts and may reasonably
go on this type of trip. But really the purpose behind that is
for them to come back and, as Senator Rubio said, to be
articulating points of view regarding U.S.-China relations that
align with the CCP's goals.
Chairman Warner. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. The National
Counterintelligence and Security Center noted that as part of
PRC efforts focused on state and local governments, the PRC
collects personal information about current officials to target
them for future exploitation.
Mr. Kohler, how broad are those kinds of efforts?
And can you cite any specific examples of how the PRC is
collecting and exploiting personal information of either state
or local officials?
Mr. Kohler. Thank you, Senator.
A couple of examples I can give. So, the PRC has embraced
technology in a way that other intelligence services and other
countries have not. So, in other hearings, I'm sure you've
heard about their massive intelligence collection capabilities,
their cyber capabilities, and all the hacks that we've
experienced over the last couple of years where most likely, if
you're an adult in the United States, the Chinese government
has collected your information.
They can then use that information--overlay artificial
intelligence on it, for example--and they can identify who your
friends are, who your contacts are, who your business dealings
are. And then, they can exert pressure on those individuals to
then try and influence you in a decision that you're making.
It's not a perfect system that they've created. We see them
making mistakes. It's sort of overemphasizing who they think
may have influence on somebody. But their intent is clear. They
are trying to influence the decision-makers indirectly through
people in their sphere. And they're identifying that sphere
through the collection of information on all of us, every day.
Senator Heinrich. Anyone want to add anything to that? Dr.
Tiffert.
Dr. Tiffert. Yes. There are Chinese firms and proxies who
are harvesting data from the data providers that collect all of
our personal information data in the United States and offer it
for sale for marketing purposes, advertising purposes. Chinese
proxies are acquiring that information, too, because it is for
sale in the United States. And the safeguards are not in place.
More than that, we have a really unequal, unlevel playing field
in their engagements with the subnational level, simply because
they have a vast apparatus whose job it is to collect
information on every elected official at the state and local
level that they plan to engage with.
And we are completely outgunned. When they meet with our
local elected officials and our business leaders, they have
fully-briefed dossiers on all of them. And frankly, our side
has very little.
Senator Heinrich. Ms. Cook.
Ms. Cook. I would just add to that, that even on the open
source side, you know, they're looking at what different
officials at the local level or who might be what their
positions might be. And there was one 2019 study by a Chinese
think tank that actually categorized U.S. governors as being
either quote ``friendly'' or quote ``hard line'' or quote
``ambiguous.'' And you can take that for what it is, in terms
of the assessment, but clearly that you know, that's how
they're approaching and navigating and processing some of this
data and information.
Senator Heinrich. I know Microsoft recently reported that
PRC influence campaigns on social media are increasingly
leveraging generative AI technologies to create content for
those operations, which allows them to create deceptive content
much more quickly, much more effectively, and to spread that
content. For any of you, talk about what you're seeing on this
front from your perspective?
Dr. Tiffert.
Dr. Tiffert. So, up until recently, PRC online influence
campaigns were characterized by very, very high quantitative
volume, but relatively little genuine engagement from real
audiences. The generative AI is changing that. It's simply more
appealing content visually, and it's generating higher numbers.
And this is extremely alarming because in the last midterm
elections, there was evidence that PRC online disinformation
campaigns were beginning to create and misrepresent themselves
as U.S. voters for the first time. And when you put those
pieces together, I think it portends very poorly for the next
election. That they're honing their techniques to create straw
U.S. voters and generative AI content. It's something we need
to watch very, very, very closely.
Senator Heinrich. Ms. Cook.
Ms. Cook. I would second that, and I would add that
sometimes what you're seeing is that there isn't necessarily a
favoring of one side of the political spectrum or another. It's
much more to sow discord, to sow distrust. And when you go
through all of the different disinformation reports and the
Google/YouTube takedowns, this isn't just one isolated
incident. I think we see certain things getting headlines. This
has been happening again and again over the last two or three
years. This element of masquerading as U.S. voters across
political spectrum is trying to get people to reshare content,
particularly on divisive political and social issues in the
United States. It's not just about Taiwan or Hong Kong or
Xinjiang. They do that, too.
Senator Heinrich. And I would just point out, having looked
at the ads that were paid for in Rubles in the election just a
few years ago, that is what I see the targeted ads in my state
again and again. That was obviously not China, but it was the
same thing. It was sow discord, sow discord, sow discord. The
more divided we are, obviously, the more relatively powerful
they become. So, I think there's a good lesson for all of us in
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a question for all three of you and that is
following up on the questions of my colleagues. Do you assess
that the Chinese government has been successful in changing a
policy outcome? If I could have each of you respond. We'll
start with you, doctor.
Dr. Tiffert. So, I think if you approach that question from
the perspective of--has it been successful at changing the
incentive structures by which American actors operate in their
calculations of self-interest then I would say absolutely, yes.
Consider, for example, the rulemaking around the CHIPS and
Science Act and the export restrictions with regard to
semiconductors, and how American firms have lobbied very
strongly to maintain market access to China because it's
extremely important for them.
China does not need to insert itself directly into those
consultations, because the American firms' interests themselves
point in that direction. Likewise, I think the effort to
harness local business associations to affect legislation
before Congress on trade and human rights in 2019 that Senator
Rubio alluded to, I think is also significant in that regard.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Ms. Cook.
Ms. Cook. I don't know of a specific example or policy that
was altered, but sometimes it will affect whether something
even gets voted on. There was an incident a few years ago at
the California Legislature where there was a Representative who
introduced a bill about human rights in China and religious
freedom, I think specifically related to the persecution of
Falun Gong. And a letter was sent from the embassy to all of
the legislatures, essentially implying harmed economic
relations if this were to go through. And it got killed in one
of the Committees and didn't come up for a vote. And the
Representative who sponsored it was posting videos on social
media, livid that this had happened, that there had been that
type of interference.
But I think the question of whether they're having an
impact, a real world impact, it goes beyond that. In one case,
in a June 2020 speech, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien
talked about how some of these conspiracy theories about how
COVID originated in the U.S. actually meant that there was a
soldier in her family in Maryland who needed security
protection because people thought that she was the person who
had brought COVID to China, because that was some of the
conspiracy theory.
So I think you see other ways in which this creates dangers
and real world implications.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Kohler.
Mr. Kohler. Thank you. Senator, I think my co-panelists are
probably more expert on this topic than I am. But I will point
out, though, I think in terms of if you see China's pivot away
from focusing on the federal government into the subnational
level, it may indicate that they feel like they haven't had as
much impact at the federal level. But they do feel like the
softer targets are at the state and local level, so that's
where we see them moving now.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Dr. Tiffert, I noticed that you serve on the Executive
Committee of the University Research Security Professionals
Association, and I congratulate you for that. Two years ago, I
encouraged the University of Southern Maine to terminate its
Confucius Institute, and the FBI was helpful in providing a
briefing on that. And the testimony of CIA Director Burns was
also extremely helpful. However, we keep receiving briefs that
Chinese influence within our universities has only increased
through direct grants, sponsorships, fellowships, exchanges.
All of which sound wonderful and sound like it builds great
relationships, etc. Commenting in regard to our universities'
research programs, I want to ask you how much of a national
security threat does China pose with its presence in our
schools?
Dr. Tiffert. So, I think I can answer that in a couple of
ways. Number one, it's about changing narratives. Increasingly,
at the Hoover Institution, we have dialogs in China that are
frank and open within closed doors. Because there are
individuals who are American experts on China who feel like
it's no longer possible for them to preserve their access to
China by speaking freely, and so they would prefer not to go on
the record on camera. And that's how they preserve their
freedom within a safe space to speak. This would not have been
true 10 or 15 years ago to the same degree. So, China is
affecting the discourse in America about China in ways that
favor its policies.
Secondly, with regard to science and technology, I would
say there is real risk there. And we at the Hoover Institution
have documented it in ways that show how universities and
researchers linked to China's military for many years had free
access to U.S. universities, because no one was doing the basic
due diligence to understand who they were partnering with. This
was something that Senators Warner and Rubio have spent a lot
of time also helping raise consciousness about.
That problem still exists significantly, and unfortunately,
we don't have a really good grasp on it, because there's not
been the data collection yet to understand the scale of it and
exactly where it exists. It's an area that we at the Hoover
Institution are putting a lot of effort into.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden wondered if he'd wandered
into the Arctic Caucus Room considering the temperature in this
place. [Laughter.]
But I'm going to go to Senator Wyden next.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my apologies.
Pretty hectic as we try to work on these issues related to
keeping the government open.
I want to follow up on your testimony; and if each of you
can give me a short answer, that'd be great. Your testimony
indicated that the Chinese government uses purchased Americans'
data to target Americans. So my question--and we'll start with
you Dr. Tiffert and go down the row--would data privacy laws
like those that many other countries have, help protect us from
the PRC's influence efforts? Dr. Tiffert.
Dr. Tiffert. I think the answer would be, yes. Many of the
problems that we experience with regard to malign Chinese
influence are--in some ways you can understand them as subsets
of broader problems. And I think with regard to data privacy,
that is clearly one. Senator Warner spoke about how we don't
want to adopt whack-a-mole approaches. And I think up to this
point, the whack-a-mole approach has been dominant. Having a
strategic approach to data privacy--a strategic approach also
to campaign finance--is critical, I think, to really getting a
grasp on the larger malign foreign influence problem.
Senator Wyden. Very good. Ms. Cook.
Ms. Cook. I would second what Dr. Tiffert said. And I think
Freedom House would really encourage some kind of comprehensive
data protection legislation, and that would serve to also
protect Americans' data vis-a-vis, for example, what an app
like TikTok or what Tencent is doing in terms of this type of
privacy data collection.
Senator Wyden. Very good. Mr. Kohler.
Mr. Kohler. Senator, I think anything that makes it harder
for the Chinese Communist Party to get our data is a good
thing. I will say, though, that they still have probably the
best or one of the best cyber capabilities. So they're going to
find a way to get to it one way or the other. But having a law
that's going to prevent our own people from selling it outside
our borders.
Senator Wyden. Very good.
Let me go to you, Ms. Cook, on the next issue with respect
to what I consider--Senator Warner and I serve on the Senate
Finance Committee--and I consider censorship in effect to be a
trade barrier. And the same laws that crush free speech in
China also prevent American companies from competing fairly
there unless they censor themselves.
Ms. Cook, I think it would be helpful if you could discuss
how China's censorship policies not only curtail freedom of
speech, but also act as this economic and trade barrier
preventing American companies from competing in this
extraordinarily large Chinese market, unless they comply with
CCP rules.
Ms. Cook. Absolutely. I think we think of the Great
Firewall in China as blocking Chinese users from being able to
access the uncensored Internet. But honestly, one of the most
productive uses the CCP has made has been to block out
international social media platforms. And that was, you know,
15 years ago. And created this whole ecosystem of domestic
alternatives. And honestly, not only for U.S. tech companies or
social media platforms, but for a wide range of other
companies, it costs many, many millions of dollars.
And just one example in the media space: back in 2012, when
the ``New York Times'' ran an article that was an investigative
report about the finances of then Premier Wen Jiabao, their new
Chinese-language website was blocked. And overnight their stock
dropped by like 20 percent. And I think you see it took time
because they basically lost all of the advertising they'd been
planning. This had been a huge investment for the company. And
of course, that creates both costs, but as Dr. Tiffert was
saying, it creates leverage as well, right? It affects the
incentives of how executives in particular at certain companies
may think about.
Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get a couple more in
really quickly.
Last year in response to direction from the Congress, the
ODNI put out a report on protecting the privacy, civil
liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent in
the context of IC activities. As the IC addresses the real
threat from the PRC, our intelligence had recommended greater
efforts to identify and actively seek to protect bias against
Chinese-Americans. Is it the view of all of you that the ODNI
is right that it's critical if we're going to protect the
rights of Americans? Anybody disagree?
Mr. Kohler. I agree, Senator.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Let's record that everyone agrees with
the ODNI on that.
Last point, and it's going to be for you Mr. Kohler, with
respect to cyber-attacks. Your testimony mentions the PRC's use
of cyber-attacks and spyware against U.S.-based political
opponents, journalists, human rights advocates, and others. Can
you elaborate for a moment on these operations and what
recommendations you would have for additional measures that our
government should be taking to protect these at-risk
individuals from getting hacked by the Chinese government?
Mr. Kohler. Thank you, Senator. While my expertise is more
in counterintelligence versus cyber, I can tell you that the
FBI is very focused on countering what China and Russia and
others are doing in the cyber front. The best advice is
executing proper cyber-hygiene on your devices. Not clicking
links, it's that simple.
But the effort that a nation-state can put into targeting
individuals to get their information is daunting. And it's
almost impossible for a civilian to counter that if they wanted
to, which makes it all the more important that the U.S.
government does all they can do to stop these threats where
they start, so do everything they can to neutralize what China,
for example, is using. And the infrastructure that they use,
and the U.S. compromised computers that they use inside the
United States. From an FBI perspective, that's the best tool.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all for coming on this important
topic. You know, we have a hearing like this in public on this
Committee in part to inform the public of the scale of the
threat, and sometimes when we do that, people are kind of
shocked to learn about it for the first time. But there's
nothing new here, right? This subterfuge, deception, influence,
espionage has been a part of Chinese statecraft going back at
least to Sun Tzu. Is that correct?
Dr. Tiffert.
Dr. Tiffert. The United Front has been present for--it's
been actually--Lenin is the one who gave the first name to it.
And it was a strategy by which the Bolsheviks were this tiny
minority party that suddenly were in a position to rule the
entire Soviet Union. It worked. The Chinese said, Wow, okay,
let's copy that. Let's improve upon it.
What has changed, I think, is the scale, the intensity, and
also the levers that China has more recently--simply because
it's a more powerful country that has many more resources that
it can devote to this. And so, the United States is--what might
have worked 15 years ago to resist Chinese influence is no
longer working.
Senator Cotton. And I'm glad you mentioned Russia, because
whether in its Soviet form or Czarist form or now--and it's
Putinist forum--they've used the same tools always, whether
it's trying to influence how the West perceives Vladimir
Putin's unprovoked war in Ukraine or the nuclear freeze
movement in 1982 or 1983 or the origins of the World Wars or so
on and so forth.
The difference with China, especially relative to Russia,
is those levers you talk about, right? It has an almost
unlimited number of levers because of its deep entanglement in
American society and economy where Soviet Russia was more or
less sealed off from the West. As you're all nodding your head,
that's great.
Let me just give you one example of how this could happen.
Let's say you have a boarding school. And 30 or 40 years ago
the boarding school was populated mostly by students, say
seventh through twelfth grade, from within a 300 to 500 mile
drive. And now today, it's predominantly populated by Chinese
nationals, students who are here on visas. That boarding
school, and its local government, and its local Chamber of
Commerce, and its local Economic Development Commission has in
some ways become a de facto tool of Chinese influence. Has it
not?
Dr. Tiffert.
Dr. Tiffert. I think we need to deal with this extremely
carefully. We need to be attentive to where the risk is and
develop the capacity to detect it. But at the same time,
particularly under Xi Jinping, there's a very large segment of
Chinese society that is unhappy with the direction their
country is moving in. That really sees the United--this is an
opportunity for the United States to reach out to them, not
only because It's the right thing to do, but if you're thinking
in geopolitical, competitive terms, these are individuals who
have a tremendous amount to contribute to American society. And
we need to remain open to that.
Senator Cotton. I agree with that. And I'm very sympathetic
to the fact that the Chinese people are the first and the worst
victims of Chinese communism. I also have my doubts that many
people who are allowed to leave China are not somehow either an
arm of the PLA or the CCP or, for that matter, still under the
influence of them because their family members stay there.
But it's one thing--to go back to my analogy--for that
headmaster or the board or the local Chamber of Commerce to
come up here and lobby Senator Collins, Senator Cotton, and
Senator Cornyn on student visas, something that's directly
influencing them. But we also get people in those settings to
come up here and lobby on things that have nothing to do with
their immediate interests, like asking us to quiet down about
the genocide of Uyghurs or their oppression of Hong Kong.
It's kind of like the example Senator Rubio raised, right,
with Daryl Morey, the former GM of the Houston Rockets? They
weren't talking about market access for NBA television rights
in China. They were talking about China's oppression of Hong
Kong. So it's this secondary leverage that the Chinese
Communist Party gets because of our economic entanglement.
Ms. Cook, you're nodding your head vigorously.
Ms. Cook. Yes, I think that's one side of it. I would just
add to what Dr. Tiffert was saying is, I think, part of it is
there's an opportunity, but there is just a changing
circumstance where we--our schools--we haven't taken as much
advantage of the fact that you have young Chinese people coming
here. And I've had conversations with students. And we've had--
that are very upset at the Chinese Communist Party. And in some
cases, have the family who have experienced persecution in
China. And that's one reason why they wanted to come and flee
to the United States. And I think some of what happens at that
local level is this lack of preparedness, both in terms of
responding--if you get a request; or how do you deal with this,
now you're asked to do this geopolitical thing? But also, how
do we best prepare and protect and inform these Chinese
students? What are their rights under U.S. law when they're
here? If they get a call from the consulate, who can they turn
to if they're being intimidated or things like that? Because a
lot of times they don't have that knowledge or resources, as
well.
Senator Cotton. I just wanted to use that one example.
There are many other examples, like, it could be a small,
privately-held manufacturer who gets a key input from China.
It's one thing for someone like that to come lobby all of us or
Members of the House of Representatives on tariff rates and
trying to get an exemption for their critical input from China.
It's another thing for them to come up here and lobby us on the
genocide of the Uyghurs or the persecution of Christians. My
point is that there are almost innumerable points of leverage
that China has created that we need to educate the public
about. And when they come up here and act as de facto arms of
the Chinese Communist Party.
Chairman Warner. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We've spent practically all of this hearing talking about
the problem, and I'm interested in some of the solutions. I
believe that one of the great failures of American policy,
going back at least three, maybe four Administrations is the
lack of deterrence. We have been a free lunch for China in
terms cyber, the OPM hack, the egregious stealing of
intellectual property. Nothing ever happens as a result. We
talk about--Presidents talk about we will respond in some way
at some time of our choosing. It never happens.
Dr. Tiffert, don't you think we need to develop a stronger
deterrent, declaratory policy that if you interfere in this
country in illegal and malevolent ways, you're going to pay a
price?
Dr. Tiffert. I would agree with that, absolutely. And
developing tools of economic statecraft, I think, is something
we need to devote significant attention to. Because obviously,
we want tools that fall short of war with regard to deterrence.
So, yes, for too long, we've indulged asymmetry throughout our
relationship with China, everything from journalist visas to
students to the way businesses operate, who can do business in
China. There's a fundamental mismatch between a closed society,
a one party dictatorship like China and an open multi-party
democracy like the United States. This is something that I
think a lot of countries are waking up to around the world.
Senator King. If they want to compete, that's fine. We can
compete. And I believe we can compete successfully. But if they
are taking advantage of the openness of this society vis-a-vis
the closed nature of their society, there should be some
response. In 2016, the Russians were involved in our elections
in a big way as this Committee knows. In 2018, not as much,
because General Nakasone and the NSA took some active measures
with regard to what was going on in Russia. And it appeared to
have an effect.
To change the subject slightly, you mentioned FARA, the
Foreign Agent Registration. Is that something that should be
strengthened, particularly as it deals with state and local
officials?
Thoughts?
Ms. Cook. I think there's a lot more in terms of the
current, how far is worded that could be enforced more as a
transparency tool to uncover what's actually being done and how
various CCP-linked actors are influencing or attempting to
influence. As I had mentioned, that's where this comes in.
Senator King. We broadened the definition, because clearly,
they're using people that are not----
Ms. Cook. Yes, I think the tricky thing with FARA is that
it already--it's worded very vaguely, and there needs to be
more of an update that perhaps focuses it more clearly on the
type of foreign influence we're talking about. Because right
now, it could be interpreted quite vaguely to be someone's
grandmother in Canada. But I think being able to update it to
better shed light on the modern forms that this type of
influence takes.
Senator King. Also specifically take note of the efforts to
influence state and local officials.
Ms. Cook. Yes, but I think----
Senator King. Because this Congress or----
Ms. Cook. Well, that's already--when it comes to who is the
foreign principal and who are some of the American proxies that
are engaging in this when they're reaching out to local
officials? Those are some of the things that are already
appearing. Or local media already appear in the FARA filings.
But there seems like there's probably a lot more going on that
isn't being reported or enforced.
Senator King. So I would appreciate it if members of the
panel would give our Committee suggestions for strengthening
FARA. And it may be just greater enforcement, or it may be
substantive content.
Do we expect a higher level of intervention in the 2024
elections?
Dr. Tiffert.
Ms. Cook. Yes.
Dr. Tiffert. I would say absolutely, yes.
Senator King. And their data. They are massive collectors
of data. And using that data, they could target individual
Americans with messages designed to appeal to that. If it's a
fisherman or a gun owner or a racing enthusiast, they can use
that data to target. Is that not correct?
Dr. Tiffert. That's absolutely correct. And I think we've
seen evidence of that for quite some time, particularly people
who have a profile because they're active in issues that touch
on China. They've already reached out to them. They're already
blanketing them with information. And they're reaching out to
other groups, too.
You know, there was a very interesting article that I think
brought to light Code Pink in the United States, and the very
tight ties that the sources of funding that are connected to
that organization have with China's propaganda apparatus. This
was not always true, but China has pursued them.
Senator King. Well, one another question. We talked about
TikTok, which is a very widely used app. By the way, I'm not
sure the Chinese fully control TikTok. I think cats control
TikTok. [Laughter.]
Dr. Tiffert. And the Internet.
Senator King. But is there any evidence? I mean, what a
powerful ideological tool it can be to spread subtly or not so
subtly the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party. Is
there any evidence that it's being used in that way? There are
two issues with TikTok: data mining and ideology or persuasion.
Are they using TikTok in that way, yet?
Dr. Tiffert. Absolutely, they are. And in fact, you can see
evidence of that with regard to amplification of narratives
that coincide with China's interests with regard to the war in
Ukraine. China--and this is relatively new--is taking talking
points from Russian media and simply replicating them because
they align with China's interests in trying to change the way
we think about a potential engagement over Taiwan.
Ms. Cook. I would say, I think in a lot of ways WeChat is
even as much of a vulnerability. And of course, it's tricky
because this is particularly Chinese-Americans using it. But
many WeChat users are concentrated in certain districts or
certain Congressional districts where there may be a large
proportion of the voters. And we've seen in Canada already how
the influence operation campaigns, including related to
elections, have happened on WeChat. We've seen that in
Australia. If I was the CCP, I honestly think targeting a
campaign on WeChat would actually be lower-hanging fruit in a
local race than trying to use TikTok. So I just wanted to
mention that.
Senator King. Well, I appreciate it, but I hope we can
emphasize this principle of deterrence. That's been the
fundamental policy of the United States in defense for 75
years. And we're not applying it in this case.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. A few years ago, Senator Warner and Senator
Richard Burr at the time and I were in Austin, Texas, and
talking to a bunch of technology firms there about the
counterintelligence issues relative to not just this CCP, but
all other sorts of intelligence efforts targeting the United
States. And I know we talked about the Cold War model spy-
versus-spy, but now it seems like there's no end to the
creativity of the Chinese Communist Party when it comes to
collecting information, whether it's coercing students who are
studying here, the creation of Confucius Institutes. You name
it.
But I want to follow up on Senator King's questions about
the Foreign Agent Registration Act. A few years ago, when we
passed a bill called JASTA, the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act, I became aware of the fact that lobbyists hired
by foreign countries don't necessarily have to register under
FARA, the Foreign Agents Registration Act. That's, of course,
designed to put everybody on notice that this is a person hired
by a foreign country that then is lobbying the United States,
maybe not in the best interest of the American people, but at
least we know who's paying the bills and who they're working
for.
But because of the commercial and lobbying loopholes in
that, it became commonplace for people to lobby Congress. And
Members of Congress have no idea who they're actually working
for. In the case of the JASTA legislation, which we literally
passed over the President's veto, I even had a group of
veterans show up in my office and claiming to be opposed to the
legislation. They were essentially financed and misled in terms
of what they were actually there to talk to, on whose behalf
they were there, but to lobby against this bill by a foreign
government.
So it's just insidious and it's pervasive and it seems like
it's relentless.
But I know Ms. Cook, you mentioned the updating of that a
bill. We actually have a bill that I'd invite you to take a
look at. We'll share it with you, called the Paid Off Act,
which several of my colleagues, including Vice Chairman Rubio,
Senator Grassley, and others, have been trying to get passed
for some time now. But we'd invite you to work with us to see
if we're getting this right. We know that, again, our
adversaries can be very creative and relentless and certainly
willing to use any tool in the toolbox to try to get access to
us and to lobbyists in favor of laws, or against laws, that
they've deemed to be against their interest.
Mr. Kohler, you're a veteran of the FBI. Have you come
across instances where foreign governments have hired lobbyists
here in Washington, D.C., to come here and lobby for or against
laws without disclosing the fact that they were actually
working for a foreign government?
Mr. Kohler. Senator, thank you for the question--and
Senator King, as well--on the question about FARA.
Absolutely, Senator. There's a concern that the Lobbying
Disclosure Act has a loophole that allows some to influence
Members of Congress and others and hide the hand of a foreign
government. For example, companies may come and lobby you, but
they may have a Chinese Communist Party cell in their Chinese
parent company or maybe even in their United-States-based
subsidiary. And they don't have to disclose that to you,
because they're coming in as lobbyists. And they don't have to
register as agents of a foreign power, because they're not
necessarily representing a foreign government. One additional
statute I'll recommend is, well, two other points is the 951
charge, acting as an unregistered agent, which is more of a
criminal charge. That does come with significant penalties for
folks to do if they conduct illegal activity against the United
States.
And then one, I'd be remiss if I didn't take this
opportunity, Senator, to talk about the need for a
transnational repression law in the United States. There is
activity that China is doing right now that we cannot, we, the
FBI--keep saying we, I'm retired--but the FBI cannot prosecute
because it is just not illegal. And three aspects of that law
that I think would be important is one, enhanced penalties for
people doing criminal acts on behalf of foreign nations. Two,
is making illegal certain of those behaviors. For example, it's
not illegal right now for a private investigator or anybody to
do a surveillance of a U.S. person on behalf of a foreign
country. In some states, you can even put a tracking device on
somebody's car on behalf of China and it's not illegal. We need
to fix that part of it. And then lastly, sanctions would be a
great aspect of that law. We need to inflict some of the
consequences on the Chinese officials that are actually
directing and controlling these operations. We can only do that
through our sanctions. And so, teeing up a new law, my
recommendation would be it would include those three aspects.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. It did seem when you mentioned the fact
that lobbyists were not necessarily always fully forthcoming on
who they're working for, I kind of thought back to
``Casablanca'' when there was a charge of gambling in the
casino. You have to be of a certain age frame. Luckily, Angus
laughed at that.
Kirsten, my apologies for doing this by seniority. Michael.
Senator Bennet.
Senator Bennet. I apologize.
Senator Gillibrand. That's okay. You've dumped me twice
today.
Senator Bennet. If the Senator from New York is the only
person to go ahead of me, I'd be happy to yield.
Senator Gillibrand. I'm yielding to my senior senator,
Senator Bennet. [Laughter.]
Senator Bennet. Okay, I'll go ahead. I don't even know what
movie you're talking about.
No, I'm just kidding. I know. I grew up watching it too.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Cook, thank you very much for your testimony. Everybody
else's.
You know, when the Maui wildfires killed almost a hundred
people and destroyed thousands of homes and buildings, we saw
Chinese operatives, probably run by Beijing--we don't know--
spread lies across the Internet claiming that the fires
resulted from a secret, quote, weather weapon being tested by
U.S. intelligence agencies and our military. This wasn't a
mistake. It wasn't some random thing happening on the Internet.
This was an act of sabotage, at least, or sabotage on behalf of
Beijing. We saw these posts accompanied by AI-generated
photographs proliferate on a variety of social media sites,
including Facebook, Pinterest, Tumblr, Reddit, and TikTok in
over 30 different languages. And there's been a lot of
discussion. I heard some today here about lobbyists. And then,
some talk about TikTok. I mean, it has been absolutely
fascinating to me to watch a company that's wholly owned by
Beijing, that's subject to the data privacy laws of Beijing,
advertise on our national television about how they're the
greatest friend that small businesses ever had, and Congress
better not shut us down. We're the greatest friend that any
veteran in America had. We better not have Congress shut us
down.
This is not about lobbyists, you know, pretending to be
somebody else. This is literally on television. These poor
people that are the staff here who don't get to go home to
Colorado--all of you are welcome--over the weekend. They're
stuck here instead. They have to watch an endless loop of
TikTok telling everybody who's watching it in Washington, how
great they are for small business, how great they are for our
military community to drive economic growth, job creation.
America, this is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Beijing
company. They are saying they, quote-unquote, spark good. I
don't have any idea what that means, but that's their tagline.
And you know, I'm worried about the fact that--and I think
others here are as well--that there are 150 million monthly
American users on this platform, most of whom have no idea that
it's owned by Beijing. That kids are spending in our country--I
say this as a former heartbroken school superintendent--90
minutes a day, more than three weeks a year, on this platform.
Just this one platform that's owned by Beijing, that's running
all this false advertising, you know, about how great they are
for America. That's an amazing position we're in, by the way,
Mr. Chairman. I mean, just imagine the world of AI where we're
dealing with fake you and fake me. And we've got ads coming in.
This is--seriously--this is stuff that could end our democracy.
And certainly, it's stuff that is undermining our democracy.
And it's particularly, I think, irritating to me, since I
know that Beijing calls this stuff in their own country,
digital heroin. Digital opium, I think they refer to it. And
you can't, you know--I don't care how enterprising you are as a
kid. In China, if you want to watch cat dance videos, that's
not what you're going to watch, you know. You're going to watch
physics experiments and you're going to watch math stuff. And
there's a reason why the Chinese kids are saying they want to
be teachers and astronauts and our kids are saying that they
want to be social influencers.
And I'm not saying that's all TikTok or all social media or
that that's the most important problem America faces. But it is
a problem that America faces. And I know that you've mentioned
a different Chinese social media app in your testimony, WeChat,
which is owned by a Chinese company, by Tencent, and also
subject to national security laws in China. You said that clear
evidence exists of censorship and monitoring U.S.-backed users
of the app.
So how do we deal with this level of foreign influence in
our media? How do we deal with a foreign country that doesn't
allow us to, obviously, use their social media platforms? How
do we allow them to undermine our institutions, understanding,
of course, that we--unlike their government--are committed to
civil rights and to the First Amendment and our values?
Ms. Cook. I think that having a hearing like this, just for
more of the TikTok users out there who might be watching, to
realize that it's owned by ByteDance, which is a China-based
company. And that there are at least on the Chinese side
especially ties there, elements of the CCP that are forced to
be in Chinese companies.
But I think a lot of it comes down also to a wide range of
safeguards. Because, honestly, this isn't going to be the last
app. This isn't the only app globally that's owned by a China-
based company. ByteDance owns a news aggregator that Indonesia
found to be manipulating content. There's another competitor
that owns a very similar app to TikTok that's in Brazil and is
very popular. So I think creating this kind of a more strategic
and systematic ecosystem, where you have levels of different
auditing and transparency requirements, reporting requirements,
privacy and data protection, because ultimately, honestly, and
to TikTok's credit, when they've been caught, they've been
fairly responsive.
So after Meta came out with, oh, there were these networks
of disinformation, and they were also operating on TikTok. You
did see then TikTok say, well, we took down these accounts. Are
they proactively doing it? No. They're also stuck between a
rock and a hard place. Anything we can do that makes them have
to report these things, that creates third-party audits and
assessments to help identify and nip these things in the bud
and incentivize against bad behavior would be helpful, short of
a blanket ban which could raise Constitutional questions.
Senator Bennet. I know I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. But
I'll just say again, the point on other countries is a really
important one. And second, a reminder again why I think what we
need is a separate agency to actually do this stuff. These
things are going to change. Every single day, they're changing.
Congress is never going to figure this out. We've got to figure
out how to create a body of experts that can actually deal with
this stuff.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Senator from New York
for her indulgence.
Chairman Warner. And the Senator from Idaho is going ahead.
I just would add that I think on the TikTok case, there's about
a dozen-plus governments now that have banned its governmental
use. BBC has warned any of its reporters to get off because of
their ability to have their data manipulated. And for those who
are watching, that was the real Michael Bennet, not a deep
fake.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Are you sure of that? [Laughter.]
Senator Bennet. Exactly. Senator who?
Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I want
to get you guys' take on this. I don't have, certainly, answers
for these things, but I think there are some facts out there
that we should talk about. I've got two items I want to talk
about.
One is the incredible influence that China has on our
colleges and universities. I think most Americans have no idea
that there are hundreds, hundreds of thousands of Chinese
nationals studying at U.S. universities. We have about 12,000
studying in China where there's 1.5 billion people. And the
amount of money that flows into those colleges and universities
from China, whether it's as tuition for the students or
contracts or just plain donations, is absolutely staggering to
me. And we've tried on the Foreign Relations Committee, we've
actually tried to do some things with legislation shining a
brighter light on this. I mean, most Americans have no idea the
hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese money that's flowing
into our colleges and universities. We don't allow foreign
nationals to contribute to any of our campaigns for one reason,
and that is we don't want foreign nationals or foreign
governments to be having influence on policymakers, on people
who run the government. Why, oh why, would we allow this kind
of flow of money into our colleges and universities to
influence the policies of those colleges and universities,
which are so important to our society?
The second question I've got is, Idaho is home to the Idaho
National Lab. Most people have never heard of it. It is the
flagship laboratory for nuclear energy in the world. The first
use of nuclear energy was done right there at the lab. We've
we've still got the first few light bulbs that were lit with
nuclear energy in 1951. It is also becoming a flagship for
cybersecurity issues.
So as a result of that, I'm over there relatively
frequently. And I've always been struck by the number of
international people who visit there. More than 8,500 Chinese
nationals have visited our national laboratories this year
with, from what I can tell, zero reciprocity. These are people
that came to collaborate on fundamental science initiatives.
And the door does not swing both ways. It only swings one way.
So again, this is something that a light needs to be shined on
that there is all of this influence and it's just not being
reciprocated.
I'd like to get your thoughts on--that's the problem. I
need smart people like you to tell us how we can do something
about this.
Dr. Tiffert. Well, fortunately, this is a problem that this
institution actually has the levers to help solve.
Senator Risch. So you're saying it is our problem, not your
problem. [Laughter.]
Dr. Tiffert. So, if you look at the statistics and the
trends in the number of Chinese students who have arrived in
the United States, they were growing gradually. And then the
global financial crisis of 2008 was really where there was an
inflection point. And this was a moment in which American
states were disinvesting from their higher education systems
because they were under enormous fiscal pressure. And for a
number of years, the money simply dried up in our state
university systems and they turned to whoever was writing
checks. And China stepped into that gap. Tuition rates went way
up. Chinese are paying full freight. They're paying out-of-
state tuition. So it was a very easy source of money and
incredible talent to draw upon.
So that was a moment, I think, that really changed the
narrative there. Likewise, federal support for basic
fundamental research in America has not kept pace with
inflation. So again, China is writing the checks, and
universities are turning to those sources as well, to stay
competitive. We have an opportunity to raise the resources to
say, you know, look inward. Look domestically. Work on training
kids who are coming out of our high schools instead of turning
to ready-made supplies from abroad in order to solve those
problems.
And I think this gets to something I was thinking about
when Senator Bennet spoke, and that is with regard to the
things we're talking about today, so much of the solution lies
in making America better, not simply being proscriptive--
proscribing activities of the PRC and the CCP--but restoring
faith in our institutions, making them stronger.
I think every member of this Committee shares my belief in
the promise of America. You know, if we can avoid undercutting
America before our own people, they will be less receptive to
the propaganda that comes from the CCP.
Senator Risch. Yeah, and I think that's a really good
analysis. It may be a little over-optimistic, but I think it is
certainly something we should strive for. The Chinese that come
here--look, a lot of them would like to stay here. But we all
know they can't stay here for obvious reasons. They leave
family behind that would be badly affected. But our culture
certainly rubs off on them to some degree. My time is up.
Thank you.
Mr. Kohler. Senator, just one thing to add. I have heard of
Idaho National Lab. My previous job in the FBI was the
Assistant Director for Counterintelligence. And a little known
fact is, of all the agencies that the FBI has detailed people
out to, the Department of Energy has the most and it's just to
protect the national labs. So we have agents working side by
side with DOE counterintelligence professionals just to protect
the people and innovation at those labs, and to screen the
visitors as they come in.
Chairman Warner. And we're very aware that what may be the
first SMR in America, maybe happening at the Idaho National
Lab.
Senator Ossoff, and with apologies to Senator Gillibrand,
who I think finally gave up the ghost.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
panel.
I'd like to hear a little bit more from each of you on
threats to defense research. Across the country, of course, in
Georgia with Georgia Tech, UGA, Georgia, State, Augusta
University. Many institutions of higher education, conducting
defense-related research. Sensitive research.
Please characterize the nature of the information security
threat posed by PRC, PRC-affiliated actors, to defense
research.
Beginning with you, Dr. Tiffert, please.
Dr. Tiffert. Thank you.
I think we're at a moment in time where the old categories
that we inherited from the Cold War, dual-use technologies. The
way of talking about them--small yards, high fences--no longer
captures the nature of the way fundamental research connects
with research that could be applied towards military
applications. Look, the war in the Ukraine has showed us that
commercialized drone technology, off the shelf, suddenly can be
turned into a kamikaze weapon in a way that I don't think
anyone might have appreciated beforehand. So those old concepts
are starting to break down and we're not really coming up with
anything new to replace them with.
There are areas of fundamental research, for example, in
generative AI and machine learning, in quantum technology, in
chemical engineering that could be deployed to energetics in AI
models that are being used for drug discovery to improve public
health, but that can be weaponized to produce better chemical
weapons that are not covered by our traditional categories. And
they're occurring within the domain of fundamental research
right now that is being published and is being harvested by
countries of concern, like North Korea, by Iran, by Russia and
China. And so, I'm engaged in regular consultations with those
in the research enterprise and those in the funding agencies to
devise a new strategy with regard to managing this fundamental
research.
But the challenge here is that many of those in our
research enterprise profit by the old system. In some ways,
they rose through the ranks in it. And it has required very
little of them within the domain of fundamental research to do
due diligence, to understand who their partners are, to think
through the application--the social consequences of the
applications of their technology--the military applications.
I've documented fundamental research. And for example, AI
models in acoustics, they are directly being applied by
military universities in the PRC. And under existing U.S.
rules, this is okay. That needs to change.
Senator Ossoff. Ms. Cook.
Ms. Cook. I will say this is pretty much outside my area of
expertise, but I think to Dr. Tiffert's last point, is that you
do see, I think, more efforts to make more awareness about this
and to try to give researchers who might be looking into this
the tools to understand that. And I think particularly there's
a think tank in Australia that actually created a database of
the different military universities in China. So if you're
looking at something, you could actually--even if you didn't
speak Chinese--you could actually look up and see who your
partner is. So I think there's that element of how do we create
resources so that if someone is more conscientious, even if
it's maybe not required as part of the application process,
might be actually able to find that information.
Senator Ossoff. Mr. Kohler.
Mr. Kohler. Senator, I think some of the changes instituted
through the CHIPS and Science Act, NSPM-33, and the NDAA have
all been a really good start to trying to force or encourage
universities to protect critical research. I think universities
have a lot more to do in terms of applying those and having a
true robust research apparatus. And I think the engagement with
the U.S. government with the military and the private sector to
help them do that is going to be a good thing in the future.
One other concept that--and it sort of echoes what Dr.
Tiffert said--the information at risk is not necessarily
strictly military research or classified government secrets.
And the example I have given audiences before is just with
brain science. We all have researchers here in the United
States that may be trying to come up with ways for amputees to
control artificial limbs using brain science. Well, that
information and that technology is being stolen by China. And
they are using it now, trying to adapt it so soldiers can
launch weapons using their minds. It sounds farfetched, but
that is absolutely how China views it through their strategy of
military-civil fusion.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Senator King.
Senator King. Brief question. Back to TikTok.
It seems to me there may be an alternative. I think a lot
of what we've been talking about today is, do the consumers
know what's going on and who may be trying to manipulate them?
What about something short of a ban, but a requirement if an
app is foreign owned or owned in a foreign country that there
be a little tagline when you open the app? This app is owned by
a company that's based in Beijing, China, or Frankfurt,
Germany. I mean, again, disclosure, it seems to me, is a sort
of middle ground here.
Doctor, what do you think?
Dr. Tiffert. Anything that increases transparency is good.
Senator King. That's exactly what I'm suggesting.
Dr. Tiffert. On the other hand, there's been good research,
particularly on the requirements, for example, that YouTube
videos list that they're funded by a state-owned media, for
example. That indicates that even knowing that when viewers
look at it, it doesn't materially affect the impact it has on
them. The psychology still plays out in similar ways.
So while I would support that, I would also say that we
need to, I think, be humble about what we expect from it.
Senator King. Sure. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kohler. And Senator, just one last comment. This may be
outside of the FBI's lane, but I think the answer to this
starts in our classrooms with our children.
Senator King. Of course.
Mr. Kohler. We need to teach the next generation to be
critical consumers of the information they take in. And
understand that information, regardless of the source, may be
sent to them to influence them.
Senator King. You are absolutely right.
Mr. Kohler. And I just don't think even as adults who those
of us who didn't grow up with devices in our hands as children,
we still sometimes need to have that reminder.
Senator King. We need to be better consumers of
information. And digital literacy should be part of every
school starting in the first grade.
Thank you.
Ms. Cook. And Senator King, I would just add, I think it
goes beyond even, say, a labeling on the app. But for example,
if you're talking about labeling, print media of the inserts,
print media tend to be better. Broadcast media. It's much
harder for a news consumer to know that this is a China Radio
International or CCTV footage that they're watching, or things
like that.
Senator King. Yeah, usually, at the bottom----
Ms. Cook. And I think the FCC has been trying to, I think,
implement rules.
Senator King [continuing]. The bottom of the ad. It doesn't
help if it says Citizens for Greener Grass or something.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. I would simply add--and I'm going to turn
it over to Senator Rubio, and Senator Lankford is going to join
us--I also think what's relevant is, you know, when TikTok/
ByteDance started to spend enormous amounts of money lobbying
against either one of our efforts, and we had different
approaches saying, you know, we're trying to cut out
creativity. And I think most of us simply thought that
creativity is great, but it ought to be maybe on a Brazilian
platform or a French platform or--it didn't even have to
necessarily be an American. But the debate that's progressed
since that time, that we're well over a dozen nations who've
come to the same conclusion, that this is a security risk
beyond the fact of the data collection, but of the ability to
use and diffuse disinformation and misinformation in an
extraordinarily provocative way.
And I think this most recent story in the last couple of
days where literally a number of the TikTok employees who had
been relying on the assurances that--and had been told as
TikTok employees--don't ever emphasize their ties to ByteDance.
The number of those employees that are now leaving because
they're seeing this again, undue influence being imposed by
ByteDance, I believe, at least implicitly or indirectly or
directly by the CCP, ought to have us all take a second look.
So, with that, I'm going to turn it back over.
My thanks. My apologies to the panel. I've got to head off.
I think Senator Lankford is going to join us, but very much
appreciate--And my only concern is that we've lost two-thirds
of our audience. We may have to figure out a way to pump this
up in terms of making sure we keep making the public
presentation.
[Now Presiding: Vice Chairman Rubio.]
Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, I want to, as I wait for Senator
Lankford to get here----
I think on the TikTok one, first of all, if you turn on TV
now, they're extensively advertising. And it's interesting to
watch the advertising. It'll tell some great story. The one I
saw today somewhere was, some veteran who was homeless or
something along these lines, and how it wouldn't have been
possible without TikTok. So the PR push is very extensive.
But I think one of the challenges, and what I wanted to
delve into a little bit with TikTok is explaining to people.
It's not that the platform has videos, because all these
platforms have videos that we would find unproductive at best,
offensive and destructive and so forth at worst, and so forth.
It is the data and how it flows. So basically, like any other
platform, in order for it to work, it has to have an algorithm,
a recommender engine. That recommendation engine that basically
drives what you see, right? So they need to know about you.
What do you like? What are you likelier to watch? In essence,
the ultimate goal is to predict what you would want to buy if
you knew about it. And even though you don't know you need it,
you will determine that you need it once you see it. That's the
design of it. And to do that it has to collect massive amounts
of data.
Under Chinese law, that algorithm that drives that engine,
it is illegal to transfer that outside of China. And without
that, there is no TikTok. That's just a platform without that.
So, what people don't understand is it doesn't matter who
owns TikTok. What matters is that that algorithm is incredibly
powerful and continues to work. That's what matters. And so,
you can store the data that drives the algorithm anywhere in
the world you want. ByteDance in China has to have access to
that data. And it's a massive amount of data. I'll tell you
that on a couple of my devices, I have a security feature. And
it is constant, I mean, I'm talking about I'm just going on
regular news sites and things of this nature. It is constantly
popping up: malicious block, malicious block, TikTok blocks. If
you open it up, what is the malicious block? So they're
collecting data, not just from users, from all these other
places.
So my question, really in terms of this malign influence
work, how valuable is having that amount of data? Not just on
the users of TikTok's but others in the hands of an organism
that ultimately, if someone knocks on the door and says we want
that data and we want you to use it a certain way, meaning we
need you to tweak the recommender engine in the United States
to feature this versus that. How valuable would that be
primarily in a moment of impending conflict?
So let's say that the Chinese are--Let's use a real world
example. This conflict with the Philippines that's going on and
is escalating. And they decided that they wanted to turn that
data to get people to pressure public opinion in the United
States against support for the Philippines. How valuable is
that data? I mean, is there anything comparable in the hands of
any government in the world that's able to unleash this social
engineering mechanism against a potential adversary?
Dr. Tiffert. The scenario you describe is the type that we
think a lot about. And it's absolutely terrifying, because I
think that it is possible. And it's conceivable that in the
event of a conflict, an intense conflict with China, they would
deploy those algorithms in ways that would seek to undermine
our resolve. Absolutely.
I am not aware of any other comparable set of data. And in
particular, what is arresting is in the last several years,
China has adopted data security legislation that is designed to
ingest all of the world's data as much as it can and not leak
any of it out. China, and Xi Jinping in particular, is trying
to create the largest repository of data in the world so that
it is available for whatever purpose the CCP would like to use
it for. We need to be alert to that. It's a one-way street.
For those who are talking about older metaphors, maybe
``Hotel California.'' It's a little newer than ``Casablanca.''
Ms. Cook. What I would just add to that is that I think
what you described, Senator Rubio, it's not just about the
intelligence law or the data collection law, it's about how the
CCP operates. And the CCP operates like a mafia. And so, even
if it's not just about the law, but it's about whether they're
going to the same type of transnational repression tactics that
Mr. Koehler has been talking about, they use against people,
including tech executives in China, including their family. So,
even if a tech executive in all conscientiousness would feel
that for, including for-profit reasons, it wasn't in their
interest to activate this type of mechanism, part of the
concern is that the CCP would be able to apply a wide range of
pressures, legal repercussions, familial repercussions against
them in China to essentially potentially force their hand.
I think the flip side is how do we safeguard in terms of
audits? How do we catch that this is happening? Because there's
just so much opacity right now, particularly on this platform,
but on the social media platforms, generally in terms of what
is actually happening. What is the algorithm? Is the algorithm
changing? Because we've seen how their moderation policies have
also changed over time.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Senator Rubio, thank you.
Thanks for being here. I appreciate very much your
testimony and what you're bringing to the conversation today.
I want to just set a bit of a story of what's happening in
Oklahoma. In 2018, my state legalized medical marijuana. In
2019, we had the largest amount of foreign land sales in the
country the next year. And what we found are tens of thousands
of acres that have been purchased by Chinese nationals in my
state that they then have partnered with Mexican cartels to be
able to grow marijuana in Oklahoma and then ship it all over
the country. We have seen a proliferation of Chinese grow
operations that's happened there.
That has been a shock to the system, to a lot of folks in
rural Oklahoma, of how many places that they can't drive down a
rural road because there are folks standing there with ARs at
the edge of a fence saying, hey, you're not allowed down this
road anymore. It's been an enormous shift that has occurred.
So saying all that on the criminal side of things on it, I
engaged on this and have found several other folks that are
watching Chinese purchases of agricultural land around the
country and have seen a one-hundred-thousand-plus-acre increase
just in the last year of Chinese purchases of agricultural land
around the nation.
I have a bill now called the SOIL Act, which just does the
CFIUS process for foreign purchases of agricultural land that
are currently exempt. You can do any foreign purchases of
agricultural land and you don't have to go through the CFIUS
process you have to do for technology. We have a ten-mile
barrier around our military bases. I'd like to extend that to a
50-mile barrier, knowing that if you're ten-and-a-half miles
away from a military base on a high hill, you're still looking
right down into a military base, and with the Chinese
operation, that's owned. So there's a lot of questions that we
have about just the ownership of agricultural land and some of
the Chinese criminal activity that's actually happening in the
United States, facilitating partnerships with others.
My question to you: have you seen this in other areas of
the country? What would you recommend on agricultural land
purchases in particular? And also, the Chinese criminal
organizations, where it seems the Chinese government is looking
away, fully aware of what's actually happening in the
engagement of that, but looking away to increase a negative
influence on Americans by their activities here?
Dr. Tiffert. I can address the Chinese agricultural land
piece. You know, I would be in favor, in particular, of
legislation that increases the capacity of USDA and other
agencies to monitor sales. Right now, the reporting mechanisms
that are in place have extremely weak enforcement and weak
capacity behind them.
Senator Lankford. Right.
Dr. Tiffert. So, we don't actually have an accurate view,
as far as I understand, of the picture of foreign land sales.
And so for us to understand the scale and scope of any risk
that might be there, we need to improve that. So that's one
area that needs a lot of attention.
Beyond just the military basing proximity issue, Xi Jinping
in the last couple of years has declared food security be of
paramount interest to the CCP. Because the CCP is highly
dependent on foreign supplies of soybeans, wheat, other
commodities, as well. Cooking oils. And you know, this is
partly reducing their vulnerability to the ability of the U.S.
to impose economic sanctions and cut off trade in the event of
a conflict. So, food security is a top-line agenda item for the
party. Various investment groups and Chinese conglomerates are
responding to the market signal that the Communist Party sent,
and saying, okay, this is important to them. We're going to go
out to the world, not just the United States, and begin
acquiring the technologies and the know-how to enhance our
ability to generate more productivity in our domestic
agricultural sector.
So it isn't just about SIGINT, you know, with regard to
military bases. It's also about developing farms in the United
States that will have access to our seeds, to our cultivars, to
our animal husbandry, to our techniques that make American
agriculture so incredibly productive, so that they can learn
all of that and take it back to China in the same way that
they've done with other industries.
Senator Lankford. Anyone else want to add to that?
Ms. Cook. I was going to say, I'm not familiar with
agriculture, but when you speak about organized crime, and when
we talk about some of the examples of let's say transnational
repression in Taiwan, there are close ties in terms of triads,
or organized crime with links to the CCP. We've seen that in
Hong Kong.
And years ago, attacks on people like Jimmy Lai that were
done by them. And I think more recently, one of these campaigns
of disinformation networks that were taken down were also using
networks that were run by businesses with organized crime ties
in Southeast Asia. So, this phenomenon may not only be limited
to the agriculture sector.
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more quick
question?
It's about the sister cities. I know you've talked about
this a little bit as well, but this seems to be an active thing
for the Chinese to now pursue cities. What are the real risks
to communities if a city says, you know what? China's a growing
economy. There's business there. We're engaging with Chinese
business individuals. What is the threat to a community in one
of these sister cities relationships? And who are the Chinese
sending to the United States in that sister city relationship?
Dr. Tiffert. So, there are a couple of threats. Number one,
it undercuts American national foreign policy. A lot of these
sister city agreements, the Chinese would like to assert claims
and assertions about what U.S. policy is or isn't with regard
to Taiwan, perhaps other places beyond that, too. That's the
prerogative of the federal government, first of all. So, we
shouldn't be dividing America internally that way.
But most importantly, there are members of the multi-ethnic
Chinese diaspora who live in these cities who are from Taiwan,
who are from Tibet, who are from Xinjiang, who are from a vast
array of places. And inserting language that endorses PRC
policy on issues with regard to territory and ethnicity in
those sister city agreements is an insult to them. And it also
makes them feel unsafe. Because their communities suddenly are
allying with a government that, in many instances, they've
experienced oppression from personally.
Ms. Cook. I would just add to that, about the leverage
points, I think, even if there is a sister city government.
One, is to look at the fine print. And this goes to also
some of the Confucius Institute agreements. Like part of it is
just knowing, at that negotiation stage, what to say no to.
But two, to realize, at some point there may be a member of
one of these communities who comes before the town council or
the city council and asks for a resolution for the Dalai Lama's
birthday or to support something else or to talk about how--and
you're going to get a call from your sister city partner asking
you to not support that resolution or the sister city
relationship could be endangered.
So I think that would be also being ready for that, being
at the beginning to say even if you pursue a sister city
relationship, to say we want you to understand that we have
members in our community and we care about these causes. And we
will continue to speak out. If you can do that at the beginning
is less likely they'll even try later on.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Rubio. One last question, Mr. Kohler. I
wanted to ask you this. I know the answer, but I want people to
hear it.
Let's suppose that someone acting as an agent on behalf of
the Chinese Communist Party--but obviously won't declare
themselves that way--picked up the phone and called a private
investigator in any city in America and said, we are willing to
pay you X amount of money to surveil, to collect as much
information, create a pattern of life, gather as much
information as you can about individual so-and-so, maybe a
Chinese-American who has spoken out against Chinese policies or
a dissident who actually has been impacted by him and the like.
That private investigator, if they don't know who the
person calling on the other line is and just thinks it's an
interested local party or what have you would not be violating
any federal laws. There's no federal--but yet it sounds like an
enormous loophole that can be exploited to hire people here to
at least create the portfolio for harassment.
Mr. Kohler. Senator, you're right. Section 951 only outlaws
aiding a foreign power if it's an illegal act. So that example
would be a traditional commercial transaction. So, a private
investigator would be free to conduct surveillance on behalf of
any foreign power that called them.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you for coming in today. I think, I hope this was
informative. And I'm glad we did it in an open setting like
this. And again, thank you for your time.
With that, the meeting's adjourned.
[Whereupon at 4:28 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]