    [Senate Hearing 118-119]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-119

                                 OPEN HEARING:
                     ON COUNTERING CHINA'S MALIGN INFLUENCE
                        OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    53-571                     WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.]

                       MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                      MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman

    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
    RON WYDEN, Oregon                    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado          JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia

                    CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                       JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio

                                  ----------

                         Michael Casey, Staff Director
                      Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
                       Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               SEPTEMBER 27, 2023
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.......................     1
    Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida...........................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Glenn Tiffert, PhD, Distinguished Research Fellow; Co-Chair,
      Project on China's Global Sharp Power, Hoover Institution,
      Stanford University............................................     6
        Prepared Statement...........................................     9
    Sarah Cook, Senior Advisor for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,
      Freedom House..................................................    18
        Prepared Statement...........................................    20
    Alan Kohler, President, Pamir Consulting; Former Assistant
      Director, Counter-Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation..................................................    47
        Prepared Statement...........................................    49

                                 OPEN HEARING:
                        COUNTERING CHINA'S MALIGN INFLUENCE.
                        OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                         WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
    Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, in open
    session, the Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman of the
    Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Warner (presiding), Rubio, Wyden,
    Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Cotton,
    Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, and Rounds.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
                                VIRGINIA

        Chairman Warner. Good afternoon. I want to call this
    hearing to order, and I want to welcome our witnesses: Glenn
    Tiffert, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.
    Sarah Cook, Senior Advisor for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, at
    Freedom House. And Alan Kohler, who is president of Pamir
    Consulting and former Assistant Director of the FBI's
    Counterintelligence Division. Alan, this is the first time you
    have appeared before the Committee not in an FBI capacity. We
    welcome all, but a particular welcome back for Alan.
        Let me also say, while I'm grateful for Senator Heinrich
    being here on time, Senator King almost on time, you know, as
    usual when it is an open hearing, we go by seniority. So, if
    Ron Wyden slides in a couple of minutes before, don't take it
    out on me personally.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to better understand the
    PRC's malign influence strategy targeting the United States.
    This builds on longstanding efforts by this Committee to track
    and expose malign activity where our Nation's foreign
    adversaries--we try in this Committee to help educate the
    public; warn social media platforms and news media; and
    enhance, frankly, interagency cooperation. Because the truth is
    we need that not just whole-of-government but whole-of-society
    to be able to recognize, acknowledge, and counter the PRC. The
    PRC's influence efforts are so widespread.
        This hearing will focus on two important vectors.
        One, the PRC's efforts to influence U.S. policy,
    particularly by targeting local and state levels, something
    that Senator Rubio was probably the first Member on the
    Committee to bring to our attention.
        The second is the PRC's tactics to shape U.S. political
    discourse and the media environment in their favor. In
    addition, the witnesses will discuss an area of increasing
    concern, what the U.S. government refers to as transnational
    repression: how the PRC is targeting U.S. nationals whom they
    perceived to be threatening to their narrative or to their
    interests. While the PRC has engaged in global influence
    operations for years, they have supercharged their efforts
    recently at the state and local level, using foreign investment
    and business opportunities as points of leverage, to impact the
    U.S. political process and to reduce United States criticism of
    China. And again, when I say China, my beef is with the PRC and
    Xi Jinping and their authoritarian leadership, but it's not
    with the Chinese people. Confronting this behavior is
    especially challenging, because frequently some of these
    activities don't fall into a classic illegal category.
    Lobbying, people-to-people exchanges, overt propaganda, trade
    deals--all governments engage in these activities.
        But what makes this different is, frankly, the scale of
    their efforts and the resources, methods, and organization they
    employ to advance these objectives, and the frequent
    obfuscation that covers the links between these efforts and the
    PRC's intelligence agencies. In both its influence and coercion
    activities, the PRC has focused attention on those perceived
    who shape U.S. policy, and that goes from business elites to
    mayors to journalists--even folks at think tanks.
        In addressing this challenge, the United States must not
    make, as I mentioned earlier, the mistake of linking Chinese-
    Americans, Asian-Americans, or the people of China with the
    Chinese Communist Party's efforts. Frequently, it is these
    individuals, particularly the Chinese diaspora, who are victims
    of the CCP's efforts, as we've seen, most recently with
    specific targeting by the CCP of a Chinese-American candidate
    for office in Congress.
        As Vice Chair and Chairman of the Committee, one area that
    has been alarming to me has been the ability of foreign
    adversaries to harness U.S.-developed communications
    technologies. In addition, a recent report from Mandiant, the
    great cyber firm, has shown that the PRC is successfully
    adopting the Russian playbook; for instance, using Western gig
    economy platforms to hire Americans to draft newswire content,
    stage protests, and artificially amplify political content on
    social media. In the case of the PRC, we've seen not only
    extensive efforts to manipulate American social media
    platforms, but also to extend its reach through homegrown
    communication projects. We've seen public research, for
    instance, documenting how WeChat, owned by PRC-based Tencent,
    has facilitated surveillance and censorship of users in the
    United States and Canada, again, targeting the Chinese diaspora
    as their main goal. An area where the Vice Chairman and I have
    shared concern, maybe different ideas on how to deal with it--
    but the growth of TikTok as a globally-competitive social media
    platform heightens these concerns. With TikTok achieving a
    level of U.S. adoption--150 million Americans, 90 minutes a
    day--and cultural prominence and profitability, this is an
    enormous challenge.
        Senator Rubio and I were remarking in the comments leading
    up--to see the amount of advertising and sponsorship. Frankly,
    there is not a morning political cheat sheet or tip sheet that
    has not been sponsored by TikTok and ByteDance over the last
    few months. That's all fair and legal. But it does question
    what kind of influence they're able to bring to bear.
        On top of that, we recently saw reports that even TikTok
    employees are starting to leave in droves as more and more
    people from their parent, ByteDance, come down into the TikTok
    operation, I believe, to try to further some of the CCP's
    goals. Again, much to the complete difference of what was the
    TikTok--Mr. Shou's--presentation when he talked before the
    House in terms of trying to deny that linkage between ByteDance
    and TikTok. And again, I point to a recent ``Wall Street
    Journal'' article that points some of this out.
        And we think about all this. And that's even before we
    think about the the enormous advent of how AI tools can
    literally take what we saw in past misinformation/
    disinformation tactics, and really amplify and expound that at
    virtually unlimited levels. So we've got to figure out what to
    do. I believe we need an overarching legal framework, which
    will give any foreign-based technology a day in court, and
    rights protected, but particularly from nation-states like
    China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Cuba, Venezuela. I think we
    still need a framework on how we deal with those technologies
    that come in, rather than the whack-a-mole approach that we've
    taken on companies like the Russian software company,
    Kaspersky. And the fact that we're still using taxpayer money
    to rip and replace Huawei equipment because we couldn't send an
    organized-enough signal ahead of time.
        How we get there? We've still got some legislating to do. I
    know the Commerce Committee--and appreciate Chair Cantwell,
    some of her efforts there. You know, I think this problem has
    not gone away. And we need to make sure that we continue to
    educate the American public, and frankly, all of our colleagues
    on this challenge.
        This has been something this Committee started working on
    in 2017. Together, we've hosted a series of what we call
    classified road shows where we briefed industry sectors. That's
    important. But we also need to continue to do as much of this
    as possible in the open, in the public, to make sure that folks
    are aware of this challenge and threat.
        So again, I welcome you all. And with that, I'll turn it
    over to the Vice Chairman.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
                                FLORIDA

        Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you for holding this open
    hearing. Thank you all for being here.
        Many countries, both friends and adversaries, try to
    influence and shape American public opinion and, ultimately,
    our political process--often through their embassies, which is
    what they're here for. And many other cases by getting others
    to echo points because they want us to fund something or
    support something.
        But what we're facing now from China goes far beyond
    anything the Nation has ever confronted, because we've never
    had a competitor adversary with these resources at their
    disposal, and with the complexity of reach. This is not simply
    a pure governmental--we're all set up to think about
    governmental efforts--this is not just governmental. This is a
    whole-of-society, whole-of-economy approach to how they try to
    influence our policies in the United States.
        Simply put, I think it's, first, important to define what
    it is we're talking about. There is traditional espionage from
    China happening at an extraordinary rate, both against our
    government and against our private sector. And that's not what
    we're here to talk about today, although we acknowledge it
    exists at levels that are equally disturbing.
        What we're talking about here is the effort of the Chinese
    Communist Party to basically subdue us without fighting--to get
    us to a point where we are doing the things they want us to do,
    because it's coming from within. And to do that they've
    employed tactics that we've never seen before from an
    adversary, because the Russians do this. They're pretty good at
    it. They did it during the Cold War, but they look like
    children next to what the Chinese are able to employ, and who
    they are able to deputize.
        Let's start with Wall Street investment firms and
    corporations, all of whom have been deputized for decades into
    arguing the Chinese viewpoint of economic policy, of trade,
    because they're making a lot of money in China. Now, they they
    may realize that one day they'll be put out of business once
    their Chinese competitors have been given all their
    intellectual property. But for the next few years, there's a
    lot of money invested. And they understand that in order to
    have access to that market, they have to make the people that
    give that access happy. And so they have come here to the
    Capitol for decades, marching to the White House, and basically
    say: we argue what the Chinese Communist Party wanted them to
    argue on their behalf. It's happening to this very day.
        We've all heard it in media; and what I mean by media is
    these newsletters, these print pieces. But in many cases,
    whether they're compromising or they're trading access, you
    know, somebody wants to have access to China, and they don't
    want their visa yanked. And so they've got to be careful how
    they report about China or what issues they focus on, out of
    fear, in that regard, in many cases, flat out buying media
    outlets or even injecting within normal media content, paid
    material that can be tracked back to Chinese Communist Party
    efforts here in the United States.
        We talk about academia; they knew how to play that really
    well. First of all, their students that they send here pay full
    rate and more. In many cases, universities have partnerships.
    You're dealing with researchers, in many cases who are used to
    this belief in open collaboration, even though with the
    Chinese, it's usually a one-way street. And then organizations
    on campus that they help fund that oftentimes are the first
    ones out there leading efforts to shut down any efforts to talk
    about Hong Kong or Tibet or you name it.
        You think about local governments, because I think they've
    now figured out, okay, at the federal level, there's strong
    bipartisan consensus. It's not fertile ground anymore. What is
    fertile ground to city halls and state capitals, where the
    issue is not talked about every day. And that's just easy
    picking. Imagine someone comes and says we're going to make a
    major investment in your state. Or likewise, we're going to
    yank a major investment in your state unless you do what we
    want you to do on these policy issues. They've learned how to
    use that against us.
        Think about the NBA for a second, okay? There was a time a
    few years ago, where you could literally show up with signs
    that said anything you wanted negative about America, and I
    mean anything, but you would be expelled from the arena if you
    had a shirt on that referenced Hong Kong. They would kick you
    out, they would literally--security guard would come and get
    you and tell you, you have to leave, especially if you're in
    camera shot, if this is something negative towards Hong Kong.
    That happened in the United States of America.
        Think about Hollywood; you will not find a major motion
    picture studio in America that will produce a film that has a
    Chinese government villain or even a Chinese villain. Why?
    Because the movie won't be distributed over there. And that's a
    big market for movies. So the list goes on and on. We could be
    here talking about it all day. It's a big deal and it's
    happening right underneath our nose. There's not enough
    attention being paid to it.
        And as the Chairman pointed to it, you know, it's difficult
    because, at the end of day, people have First Amendment rights
    in this country to speak and advocate for positions, including
    those that are against our national interests. You know, that's
    just the way it is.
        But this is a dedicated effort that, at minimum, the light
    has to come on so people can see these roaches, so people can
    see what's happening, what's really happening here, right
    underneath our nose, and the impact that that has potentially
    on our society and on our willingness in the future to act.
        I'll close with this. Everybody worries about Taiwan, and
    rightfully so. There's a lot of reasons--we're not going to get
    into all that today--as to why we should be worried. But in
    particular what it can mean not just to the world order and how
    people view our country, but to our national security.
        But envision a time when, if they have enough legwork they
    put into it, this is the narrative they're creating and they're
    setting up, and they're using it at our schools and our broad
    society. And that is when the day comes that there is a Taiwan
    conflict, the first thing some people are going to ask is, why
    should Americans die defending some small island halfway around
    the world just off the coast of China? I get it. It's bad, we
    should condemn it. But should we really go fight for that? Is
    it worth the sacrifice, that treasure and blood to do it?
    That's the narrative they're already setting the groundwork
    for. And they're not doing it among the people sitting up here.
    They're doing it among the people that one day will be sitting
    up here, or the people that will one day be working for us. And
    the people who will be writing about it. The experts that will
    be commenting on it.
        So these are the kinds of things that I think that deserve
    a lot more attention. I'm glad we're having an open hearing on
    it.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I'm not sure if
    you guys agreed on order. The floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF GLENN TIFFERT, PhD, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH FELLOW;
        CO-CHAIR, PROJECT ON CHINA'S GLOBAL SHARP POWER, HOOVER
                    INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Tiffert. Thank you very much Chairman Warner, Vice
    Chairman Rubio, Distinguished Members of the Committee.
        I'm honored to be here today to talk about China's malign
    foreign influence operations in the United States. At the
    Hoover Institution, I co-chair our project on China's Global
    Sharp Power, which analyzes the myriad ways in which China
    asserts itself around the world. And we have three main lines
    of effort, malign foreign influence being one of them.
        China's malign influence operations in the United States
    sprang from a conspiratorial tradition within the Chinese
    Communist Party that goes by the label of the United Front.
    Within China, the United Front seeks to mobilize, infiltrate,
    co-opt, or neutralize every individual or organization in
    society of any significance, so that they either contribute to
    the party's goals or are eliminated as a potential source of
    opposition or a threat. The party recognizes no autonomous zone
    of civil society. In principle, it reserves the right to
    supervise and control everything, and under Xi Jinping, it is
    exercising that right evermore intrusively. The conspiratorial
    logic of the United Front drives the party's behavior abroad as
    well, where it seeks to, as Senator Rubio pointed out, win
    without fighting to make the foreign serve China.
        If a society cannot be freed and someone has to manage it,
    there is a colossal bureaucracy within the PRC party state that
    administers United Front, most notably the United Front Work
    Department of the Party Central Committee, which employs many
    tens of thousands of workers at every level of administration
    in China. But it's more than that. Every CCP member is obliged
    to promote the United Front, and other organs of the party and
    state play important roles in advancing the United Front's
    goals, particularly the party's Propaganda Department, which
    supervises PRC traditional and online media and pushes online
    disinformation into our spaces; the Ministry of State Security,
    which is China's principal foreign intelligence agency; and the
    Party's International Liaison Department, which cultivates
    relationships with foreign political parties and leaders at the
    national and sub-national levels, especially rising political
    stars from around the world.
        These organs act directly, but they also act indirectly
    through a web of thousands of nongovernmental organizations
    that operate on academic, charitable, commercial, cultural,
    ethnic, and religious affairs, many of which engage in work
    with foreign partners, or who have international footprints,
    and are obliged to carry out party agendas within their spheres
    of work. The United Front provides a cover for espionage,
    transnational repression, and even abductions abroad, and we
    have, fortunately, law enforcement tools for dealing with
    those.
        In my remaining time, I would like very much to focus on
    something else. By American standards, as has been pointed out,
    a lot of United Front activity is lawful and falls within
    spheres of protected speech and association. It aims to win
    hearts and minds, harness the idealism and the self-interest of
    foreign elites--American elites--to contribute to CCP goals,
    create local constituencies in our societies that echo CCP
    talking points of their own volition, and alter incentive
    structures so that the costs for us of de-risking are
    prohibitively high. As an example of how that plays out in real
    life, consider the current debate over renewing our STA, the
    agreement between the U.S. and China on science and technology.
    This activity qualifies as malign if it obfuscates the origins,
    sources of funding and agendas behind it; if it trades in
    disinformation or misdirection; or advocates violations of law,
    fundamental rights, or democratic principles. Lawful but malign
    influence operations are among the most vexing for democratic
    societies to combat without infringing on our constitutional
    rights and liberties.
        The United Front contributes to a host of party goals, such
    as rebutting foreign criticism of China and playing up flaws in
    American democracy, technology transfer, co-opting the Chinese
    diaspora, and neutralizing dissent within it. In the United
    States, when it comes to malign foreign influence, U.S. states
    and localities are America's soft underbelly. Federalism
    focuses them on different priorities, local job creation, and
    investment, for example, not geopolitical competition. The CCP
    is highly aware of that difference and capitalizes on it,
    bypassing Washington to work directly with localities where
    consciousness of risk and institutional capacity to manage it
    are far lower than at the federal level.
        We need to change that, not necessarily by reflexively
    decoupling--because realistically, most of the world will not
    follow us down that road, and we'd only be isolating
    ourselves--but rather by developing the infrastructure and
    capacity to make better, more informed decisions about risk and
    manage our engagements with China more intelligently and
    safely.
        I have four recommendations with regard to that, which I
    discuss in greater detail in my written statement.
        Number one, increase funding for open source research and
    publication on malign foreign influence operations in the
    United States. We have a host of nongovernmental organizations
    and research centers that have capacity in this area and would
    love to do more.
        Provide integrated federal support to subnational
    governments and businesses, single interagency touchpoints
    distributed around the U.S., perhaps through the DHS fusion
    centers or Commerce's U.S. Commercial Service Offices.
        And then, number three, we need to look beyond espionage
    and law enforcement. We need to think of strategies for staying
    safe, drawn from public health as well as counterintelligence
    and prosecutions. In particular, we need to ensure that we
    protect the multi-ethnic Chinese diaspora that bears the brunt
    of CCP malign influence operations, to ensure that they have
    access to the same rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed
    to all Americans and can practice them safely.
        And then finally, we need to address systemic as well as
    acute risk. Headline grabbing incidents are important, but they
    should not distract us from the slow rolling climate change
    that the United Front activity tries to create. The most
    successful influence operations are those that run under the
    radar.
        Thank you very much for your time.
        [The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR CHINA, HONG KONG,
                       AND TAIWAN, FREEDOM HOUSE

        Ms. Cook. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio and
    Distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        My remarks focus on the media dimensions of the Chinese
    Communist Party or CCP's influence operations targeting the
    United States. They draw on the U.S. chapter of Freedom House's
    Beijing's Global Media Influence Study, which covered 30
    countries across six regions.
        The CCP and its proxies influence media and information
    abroad in complex and multifaceted ways. These extend beyond
    simple propaganda or overt public diplomacy. Rather they
    involve elements that are covert, coercive, or corrupting. In
    particular, we identified five categories of tactics:
    propaganda, disinformation, censorship and intimidation,
    control over content distribution infrastructure, and attempts
    to export the CCP's model of information control.
        Our research found that the United States faces a very high
    degree of media influence efforts from Beijing; in fact, second
    after only Taiwan, reflecting the large arsenal of tactics
    being deployed. Thankfully, the United States also displayed a
    very high degree of local response and resilience, earning it
    an overall status of resilient.
        In my time today, I'd like to focus on five aspects of this
    phenomenon.
        One, Beijing-backed content is appearing in mainstream U.S.
    media.
        This is the most significant avenue through which Chinese
    state-produced content reaches large American audiences,
    typically through content-sharing agreements, partnerships with
    local mainstream media comma or op eds, and television
    appearances by Chinese diplomats. For example, FARA filings
    show that from 2019 to 2020, one state-run ``China Daily'' paid
    print and online publications at least $7 million to insert
    their content alongside other news items. The clarity of
    labeling attached to such content is inconsistent, and in some
    cases entirely absent.
        Two, covert tactics and disinformation campaigns are being
    deployed on social media.
        China-linked actors have attempted to pay otherwise
    unaffiliated social media influencers in the United States to
    broadcast pro-Beijing content on topics ranging from conditions
    in Xinjiang to quote, saying good things about U.S.-China
    relations, to claims that COVID-19 originated in the U.S. deer
    population. Moreover, coordinated disinformation campaigns
    linked to China and targeting U.S. audiences are becoming more
    frequent and sophisticated.
        PRC linked actors are experimenting with new strategies
    across dozens of platforms, not only regarding rights
    violations in China, but also domestic politics in the United
    States. New tactics include use of generative artificial
    intelligence to create images of fake news anchors, recruiting
    unwitting Americans to produce content, and deploying multiple
    layers of content-laundering to obscure the CCP-linked origins.
    Evidence suggests these campaigns are increasing and reach
    engagement and effectiveness in some cases.
        Three, the use of coercive tactics is growing.
        Since 2019, Chinese officials and other pro-Beijing actors
    have aggressively restricted foreign correspondents in China,
    retaliated against families of U.S.-based journalists, and
    launched intrusive cyber-attacks against major news outlets.
    Pro-CCP trolls have viciously attacked ethnic Chinese
    journalists working for U.S. media, especially women. More
    indirectly, there have been isolated instances of corporate
    pressure on journalists that induce censorship coming from
    executives, as media companies fear that certain reporting
    could damage their ability to reach audiences in China.
        Four, CCP proxies are attempting to co-opt U.S. elites to
    spread Beijing's messages.
        One especially active proxy is the innocuously named China-
    U.S. Exchange Foundation or CUSEF. CUSEF is widely viewed as
    belonging to the CCP's United Front Work targeting the United
    States. It has taken at least 127 U.S. journalists from 40
    outlets to China since 2009. Another CUSEF-funded initiative
    since 2017 has targeted quote, key opinion leaders in African
    American communities. Pro-Beijing narratives also enter the
    U.S. media landscape through friendly local commentators,
    politicians, and former officials, especially at the
    subnational level, in some cases, also in collaboration with
    CUSEF or with its funding.
        And five, Beijing's influence over Chinese diaspora media
    is greater than many appreciate.
        This is especially true in the television sector and via
    the WeChat app owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent. WeChat is
    used by millions of Americans to maintain contact with people
    in China, yet clear evidence exists of Beijing aligned
    censorship or surveillance of these users. American news
    outlets and civic groups critical of the CCP, such as Radio
    Free Asia or Freedom House, for that matter, are excluded from
    opening official accounts to reach WeChat audiences with their
    content in Chinese. Some Chinese-Americans, both political
    dissidents and average users, have been censored for sharing
    content that is critical of the CCP.
        To conclude, the CCP's activities to influence U.S. media
    are likely to increase in the coming years, including in the
    form of social media manipulation campaigns surrounding the
    2024 elections. The good news is that momentum is on
    democracy's side, but there is still much work to be done.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     STATEMENT OF ALAN KOHLER, PRESIDENT, PAMIR CONSULTING; FORMER
      ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL
                        BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

        Mr. Kohler. Chairman Warner, Vice Chair Rubio, and Members
    of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today to
    discuss the malign foreign influence and transnational
    repression of the People's Republic of China.
        I appeared before this Committee many times when I was an
    executive in the FBI, and I always respected your efforts to
    both enlighten the American people and arm the government and
    private sector with the information and tools they need to make
    the sound decisions and protect their most valuable assets,
    ideas, and people. That was a priority for me as well when I
    worked at the FBI. And now, providing clarity and confidence to
    American businesses is a critical goal in my new role at Pamir.
        References to China throughout my remarks today referred to
    the Chinese government, which is controlled by the Chinese
    Communist Party. I do not believe, nor does the FBI, that the
    Chinese people are our adversary.
        And we certainly do not believe that Chinese-Americans are
    a risk. To the contrary, they are at risk. Chinese-Americans
    are often the targets of the Chinese government's harassment,
    and they deserve all the protections the U.S. Constitution
    affords them.
        The Chinese government, run by the Chinese Communist Party,
    is a threat to the American way of life. The Chinese Communist
    Party pursues every possible avenue to destroy our free and
    fair society--challenging international norms, stealing our
    innovation and jobs, and is skewing transparency, fairness, and
    reciprocity in its attempts to undermine the United States.
    China is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign to influence U.S.
    society and our leaders, to force alignment with Chinese
    economic and policy interests, and ensure the stability of its
    own political system.
        When those influence efforts are subversive, undeclared,
    coercive, or criminal, they fall into the category of malign
    foreign influence. And when the PRC government uses threats to
    achieve their influence goals, they are engaging in
    transnational repression, a term used to describe actions by
    foreign governments to silence, intimidate, harass, and even
    kidnap or murder, dissidents who dare to criticize them.
    China's approach to influence in the United States is to target
    broadly and use multiple vectors to achieve their goals. Their
    efforts to influence are directed not only at the federal
    government.
        The Chinese government has found subnational level
    influence to be a successful tool in their effort to manipulate
    the environment to their advantage. Subnational leaders are
    often more focused on things such as job creation, capital
    investment, and cultural exchanges; and are less attuned to the
    methods of Chinese political influence operations.
        Countering malign foreign influence and transnational
    repression are among the highest priorities of the FBI and the
    United States government, and the FBI leads the effort in three
    ways.
        First, through active and innovative investigations and
    robust intelligence collection, the FBI neutralizes threats and
    imposes consequences on those who would do us harm. China-
    related investigations now make up approximately 50 percent of
    all counterintelligence work, well over 2,000 active
    investigations, which is equal to the threat from all other
    countries combined.
        Second, partnerships are a hallmark of the FBI's work, and
    counterintelligence is no different. The United States'
    government agencies must collaborate and coordinate efforts to
    achieve a whole-of-government response to the whole-of-
    government attack from the government of China.
        Next week, the National Counterintelligence Task Force will
    celebrate its fourth anniversary; and the Foreign Influence
    Task Force, its sixth anniversary. Those multi-agency teams use
    the capabilities, authorities, and resources of nearly 50
    agencies to achieve strategic objectives. These collaborative
    efforts must continue to be supported and expanded if we are to
    be successful.
        And third, the FBI has increased intelligence sharing and
    its engagement with the public and private sectors. The
    American public needs to know how they can be targeted and
    manipulated so they can recognize influence efforts and insist
    on transparency and reciprocity in their interactions with
    China. If a silver lining is to be found in the Chinese spy
    balloon episode from earlier this year, it is that the American
    public could look up in the sky and see for themselves that the
    Chinese government is spying on them.
        And while a spy balloon is visible evidence, the threats
    from malign foreign influence, transnational repression, and
    economic espionage are often hidden. This hearing is one
    important way to enlighten the American people and make them
    more resilient to all the threats posed by China.
        Thank you again for having me. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Warner. Well, thank you all for your testimony and
    I think brought up some very important points.
        Alan, I actually want to start with you, and Dr. Tiffert
    made mention of this as well. And I think Ms. Cook did, at
    least in passing. Coming out of the FBI, you had to monitor a
    lot of the efforts against hate crimes and other things that
    took place in recent years against Asian-Americans, in
    particular Chinese-Americans.
        Can you give us a little more flavor of that? Of how the
    diaspora community, in many ways, not simply through unfounded
    discriminatory actions, but, frankly, by the MSS and the
    established Chinese spy networks that prey upon that diaspora.
    I'd love to hear from all of you on that.
        Mr. Kohler. Sure, thank you, Senator.
        Maybe I'll start with a quick story.
        After a recent arrest of a transnational repression actor,
    the FBI goes out and we do our normal interviews of coworkers
    and people in the community. And the response we got was
    essentially, what took you so long? And that was a
    heartbreaking thing to hear for an agency that prides itself on
    protecting the American people.
        And really what that meant was one of three things to us.
    One, either the community didn't know who to call. Two, they
    were afraid to call us because they were intimidated by the
    FBI. Or three, they were intimidated by what the Chinese
    government's reaction would be. And all three of those have to
    be efforts that the FBI redoubles its efforts to engage and
    make better.
        And it's also an effort--that the entire U.S. government
    needs to support what the Bureau is doing, but also find ways
    to reach out to these most effective communities to make them
    feel safe to identify and report these problems and realize
    that they're not going to feel retribution from the United
    States government or the Chinese government.
        Chairman Warner. Do you want to add to that?
        Dr. Tiffert. Right. Let me begin my answer with that.
    Talking about U.S. campuses, universities in particular.
    Protecting ethnic Chinese students of all origins, not just
    those from China but from the Chinese diaspora around the world
    who happen to be on our campuses, is critical to allowing us to
    deliver exactly the same education that we aspire to deliver to
    American students, to everyone.
        There's an incident from 2019 that comes to mind. You'll
    recall at this moment in time, many American hotel chains and
    airlines were under pressure from the Chinese government to
    remove Taiwan's designation as a country from their websites,
    and to refer to it as a territory of China. This played out on
    U.S. campuses, where offices of international students would
    often break down the number of international students that were
    present on their campuses from countries around the world by
    jurisdiction. And at one campus I have in mind, Taiwan was
    listed as a country along with China. There was an organized
    effort by Chinese students on that campus from the PRC to
    petition that university to remove Taiwan's designation as a
    country and to listed under China. Taiwanese students on campus
    did not share that perspective.
        And within Chinese-language private social media channels,
    an extremely vituperative and unpleasant situation unfolded in
    which Taiwanese students on campus felt threatened and unsafe.
    This was raised with local university administration who--
    because their due process procedures on campus required an open
    hearing in which the Taiwanese students would have confronted
    the PRC students implicated with saying some extremely
    threatening things to them--they felt they couldn't do that and
    pursue it, and so the matter was dropped. They didn't have the
    cover necessary. So that's one instance in which Taiwanese
    students felt marginalized and threatened by PRC students over
    the larger political environment. Same thing affects
    disruptions in the classroom.
        But within the Chinese diaspora, especially in the business
    community, the effect of United Front activity is felt acutely
    in that firms, businesspeople who are pro-CCP are rewarded with
    business. If you run a newspaper, for example--and Chinese-
    language media in the United States has felt this acutely--
    expressing positions that vary in any way from the PRC's
    talking points, you'll get punishment. Your advertisers will
    dry up. You'll lose business opportunities in China. They use
    the economic lever as a form of social control. And this has
    changed the landscape of Chinese-language media in the US.
        Chairman Warner. Ms. Cook, do you want to add something?
        Ms. Cook. One thing I would say is if you look at the
    different really, to the credit of the FBI's work looking at
    these transnational repression cases, you see the gamut of the
    parts of the diaspora community that are targeted. One will be
    about Hong Kong. One will be about practitioners of Falun Gong.
    Another will be the same person and they're running a police
    station that's affecting this group. Another is somebody who's
    a political dissident related to Tiananmen. Another is somebody
    trying to run as a candidate in Congress who's critical of the
    CCP. So I think there really is. There's diversity within the
    community, but there's also the broad targeting of all of these
    different parts, sometimes different parts, of the Chinese
    apparatus.
        The other thing I would say is that a group of Chinese-
    Americans got together and actually filed a lawsuit in
    California against Tencent regarding the WeChat app. And
    honestly, looking at the report stories of the plaintiffs is
    just really heartbreaking, because people's livelihoods were
    ruined. They would be using this app to have, you know, a
    business and people would come, and they share some cartoon
    about Xi Jinping. And one of the things I'll just read briefly
    from, that is that the people filing it talked about how WeChat
    users describe living in fear. That they and their loved ones
    will be punished for their postings, critical of the party
    state, and who describe having to suppress the human urge to
    voice their thoughts and feelings to their social networks out
    of such fear. That is to engage in extreme self-censorship.
        And I think Dr. Tiffert mentioned this in terms of how we
    really have so much to do to just allow Chinese-Americans to be
    able to express themselves in Chinese in the United States. And
    some of the people were censored talking about Asian-American
    issues with other Chinese-Americans but ended up getting
    shadow-banned by WeChat.
        Chairman Warner. Okay, thank you.
        I'm going to move to Senator Rubio, but I do think, you
    know, the stories and the extensiveness of which the diaspora
    community not only in United States but around the world
    follows WeChat. And sometimes any occasion where we don't make
    clear our differences with the CCP and Xi Jinping, you know,
    plays out manyfold.
        Senator Rubio.
        Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, there's there's a lot to cover.
    Some of my colleagues have covered one of the ones I wanted to
    focus on, which I think has been reported on, but I want to
    bring it all together.
        February of 2020 an individual was charged with acting as
    an agent of the Chinese government. They worked with the
    private investigator and local law enforcement to target an
    individual to forcibly repatriate individuals to China.
    Basically go to them and say we know who you are. We know your
    family is in China. You need to come back with us or they're
    going to pay the price. Then, in April '23, individuals
    connected to Chinese intelligence, Chinese efforts, were
    harassing Chinese nationals in the U.S. They use fake social
    media accounts to harass and intimidate dissidents.
        In another similar case, two were charged with opening and
    operating an illegal overseas police station, basically, in
    order to monitor and intimidate dissidents and those people who
    are critical of the government of the Communist Party of China.
    In May of '23, the FBI arrested a man for acting as an agent,
    because between 2018 and 2022, he provided Chinese intelligence
    officials with information on Boston-area individuals and
    organizations that included photographs of and information
    about these folks, and so forth. From all this, and these are
    the ones we know of those, there's obviously ongoing
    investigations and the ones we still don't know about. It's
    fair to say that the Chinese Communist Party has an active
    effort inside of the United States to target and harass people
    to either silence them, or to get them to go back to the
    country by threatening, by using whatever leverage they can,
    including threatening their families back in China. That's
    happening in the United States. It's not happening in Australia
    or Canada. We're talking about here. That's correct?
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, yes. You just read off many of the
    recent examples of transnational repression activity that the
    FBI has investigated in the last three or four years.
        Vice Chairman Rubio. So then, let's pivot now to the
    business community--the tactics they use there. So I'm just
    going to go through a couple here, which I mentioned the NBA
    one, obviously. You know this general manager for an NBA team
    put out a statement in support of Hong Kong. Chinese companies
    immediately suspended ties with the team. And the Chinese
    Basketball Association and the NBA's partnership, you know,
    terminated for a while. I'm sure that cost them a bunch of
    money and they were upset about that.
        We have the Department of Justice charged the China-based
    Zoom executive because they were disrupting video meetings that
    were being hosted by users that were commemorating the '89
    Tiananmen Square massacre.
        And this is the one I think is most interesting, because it
    was out in the open. In 2021, PRC officials told U.S. business
    leaders who had business interests in China to speak up and
    speak out and push the U.S. government to pursue a rational and
    pragmatic policy towards China. The interpretation there is
    push what China wants in our policy. But this is the line that
    really got me, adding: The business community cannot make a
    fortune in silence. So that's our business community.
        And then, this is the one that I really want to ask you
    about, because I don't think enough attention has been paid to
    this. The National Counterintelligence Security Center noted in
    their report. It states this, I'm just going to quote: Leaders
    in the U.S. at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels
    risk being manipulated to support hidden PRC agendas. Can you
    cite a specific case or perhaps you can describe a hypothetical
    that rings true? What does that mean? So people watching or who
    will watch this video clip will understand? Because I think a
    lot of people on a city council somewhere are, like, the
    Chinese are not going to be targeting me. But they do.
        Why, and how?
        Dr. Tiffert. So, we have examples at the state and local
    level, for example, of legislatures being approached by
    individuals who ask them to include statements of support for
    PRC policy in local and state legislation. We have multiple
    instances of sister city relationships in which the agreements
    between an American city and a Chinese sister city were written
    in such a way to endorse PRC policy on Taiwan in distinction
    from actual U.S. policy.
        There's an example, for example, from 2019. The city of
    Rockville, Maryland, had a preexisting relationship with a
    sister city in China and was contemplating signing a similar
    arrangement with Taiwan. Diplomats from the PRC Embassy here in
    Washington went to Rockville and said you can't do that because
    you've agreed to certain principles in your original agreement
    with us. And they dangled investment opportunities in front of
    Rockville and tried to get them not to sign that sister city
    agreement with Taiwan. Fortunately, the city stood firm and
    that agreement went forward.
        So we have multiple examples of them trying to sneak
    language into documents that are signed or authored by local
    governments and legislatures that support and endorse PRC
    policy.
        Ms. Cook. I spoke a little bit about CUSEF. Part of what
    happens is that the CCP works through multiple different levels
    of proxies. So, I was going through FARA filings for some of
    our research. And you see this foundation that has this
    innocuous name, but actually has a bunch of people who are
    linked to the United Front and the former Hong Kong government
    heading it. They work through a local PR firm and those are the
    contracts that are filed. That local PR firm will reach out to
    individuals from various different communities to invite them
    on trips to China. And so, you're getting an invitation. You
    don't necessarily--people might not necessarily think. And one
    of the ways they actually phrase the contract with the goal of
    creating, building, enhancing, and retaining positive
    relationships with key opinion leaders. In this case, it was
    African-American communities, students from underserved
    communities, and African-American media outlets. But they
    specifically say that the goal is to have those individuals
    formulate personalized perspectives that can be articulated as
    quote balanced opinions when presented with Sino-U.S.
    relationship issues.
        So you have a situation where there's this cultivation of
    relationships of people who are non-experts and may reasonably
    go on this type of trip. But really the purpose behind that is
    for them to come back and, as Senator Rubio said, to be
    articulating points of view regarding U.S.-China relations that
    align with the CCP's goals.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. The National
    Counterintelligence and Security Center noted that as part of
    PRC efforts focused on state and local governments, the PRC
    collects personal information about current officials to target
    them for future exploitation.
        Mr. Kohler, how broad are those kinds of efforts?
        And can you cite any specific examples of how the PRC is
    collecting and exploiting personal information of either state
    or local officials?
        Mr. Kohler. Thank you, Senator.
        A couple of examples I can give. So, the PRC has embraced
    technology in a way that other intelligence services and other
    countries have not. So, in other hearings, I'm sure you've
    heard about their massive intelligence collection capabilities,
    their cyber capabilities, and all the hacks that we've
    experienced over the last couple of years where most likely, if
    you're an adult in the United States, the Chinese government
    has collected your information.
        They can then use that information--overlay artificial
    intelligence on it, for example--and they can identify who your
    friends are, who your contacts are, who your business dealings
    are. And then, they can exert pressure on those individuals to
    then try and influence you in a decision that you're making.
    It's not a perfect system that they've created. We see them
    making mistakes. It's sort of overemphasizing who they think
    may have influence on somebody. But their intent is clear. They
    are trying to influence the decision-makers indirectly through
    people in their sphere. And they're identifying that sphere
    through the collection of information on all of us, every day.
        Senator Heinrich. Anyone want to add anything to that? Dr.
    Tiffert.
        Dr. Tiffert. Yes. There are Chinese firms and proxies who
    are harvesting data from the data providers that collect all of
    our personal information data in the United States and offer it
    for sale for marketing purposes, advertising purposes. Chinese
    proxies are acquiring that information, too, because it is for
    sale in the United States. And the safeguards are not in place.
    More than that, we have a really unequal, unlevel playing field
    in their engagements with the subnational level, simply because
    they have a vast apparatus whose job it is to collect
    information on every elected official at the state and local
    level that they plan to engage with.
        And we are completely outgunned. When they meet with our
    local elected officials and our business leaders, they have
    fully-briefed dossiers on all of them. And frankly, our side
    has very little.
        Senator Heinrich. Ms. Cook.
        Ms. Cook. I would just add to that, that even on the open
    source side, you know, they're looking at what different
    officials at the local level or who might be what their
    positions might be. And there was one 2019 study by a Chinese
    think tank that actually categorized U.S. governors as being
    either quote ``friendly'' or quote ``hard line'' or quote
    ``ambiguous.'' And you can take that for what it is, in terms
    of the assessment, but clearly that you know, that's how
    they're approaching and navigating and processing some of this
    data and information.
        Senator Heinrich. I know Microsoft recently reported that
    PRC influence campaigns on social media are increasingly
    leveraging generative AI technologies to create content for
    those operations, which allows them to create deceptive content
    much more quickly, much more effectively, and to spread that
    content. For any of you, talk about what you're seeing on this
    front from your perspective?
        Dr. Tiffert.
        Dr. Tiffert. So, up until recently, PRC online influence
    campaigns were characterized by very, very high quantitative
    volume, but relatively little genuine engagement from real
    audiences. The generative AI is changing that. It's simply more
    appealing content visually, and it's generating higher numbers.
    And this is extremely alarming because in the last midterm
    elections, there was evidence that PRC online disinformation
    campaigns were beginning to create and misrepresent themselves
    as U.S. voters for the first time. And when you put those
    pieces together, I think it portends very poorly for the next
    election. That they're honing their techniques to create straw
    U.S. voters and generative AI content. It's something we need
    to watch very, very, very closely.
        Senator Heinrich. Ms. Cook.
        Ms. Cook. I would second that, and I would add that
    sometimes what you're seeing is that there isn't necessarily a
    favoring of one side of the political spectrum or another. It's
    much more to sow discord, to sow distrust. And when you go
    through all of the different disinformation reports and the
    Google/YouTube takedowns, this isn't just one isolated
    incident. I think we see certain things getting headlines. This
    has been happening again and again over the last two or three
    years. This element of masquerading as U.S. voters across
    political spectrum is trying to get people to reshare content,
    particularly on divisive political and social issues in the
    United States. It's not just about Taiwan or Hong Kong or
    Xinjiang. They do that, too.
        Senator Heinrich. And I would just point out, having looked
    at the ads that were paid for in Rubles in the election just a
    few years ago, that is what I see the targeted ads in my state
    again and again. That was obviously not China, but it was the
    same thing. It was sow discord, sow discord, sow discord. The
    more divided we are, obviously, the more relatively powerful
    they become. So, I think there's a good lesson for all of us in
    that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This is a question for all three of you and that is
    following up on the questions of my colleagues. Do you assess
    that the Chinese government has been successful in changing a
    policy outcome? If I could have each of you respond. We'll
    start with you, doctor.
        Dr. Tiffert. So, I think if you approach that question from
    the perspective of--has it been successful at changing the
    incentive structures by which American actors operate in their
    calculations of self-interest then I would say absolutely, yes.
    Consider, for example, the rulemaking around the CHIPS and
    Science Act and the export restrictions with regard to
    semiconductors, and how American firms have lobbied very
    strongly to maintain market access to China because it's
    extremely important for them.
        China does not need to insert itself directly into those
    consultations, because the American firms' interests themselves
    point in that direction. Likewise, I think the effort to
    harness local business associations to affect legislation
    before Congress on trade and human rights in 2019 that Senator
    Rubio alluded to, I think is also significant in that regard.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Ms. Cook.
        Ms. Cook. I don't know of a specific example or policy that
    was altered, but sometimes it will affect whether something
    even gets voted on. There was an incident a few years ago at
    the California Legislature where there was a Representative who
    introduced a bill about human rights in China and religious
    freedom, I think specifically related to the persecution of
    Falun Gong. And a letter was sent from the embassy to all of
    the legislatures, essentially implying harmed economic
    relations if this were to go through. And it got killed in one
    of the Committees and didn't come up for a vote. And the
    Representative who sponsored it was posting videos on social
    media, livid that this had happened, that there had been that
    type of interference.
        But I think the question of whether they're having an
    impact, a real world impact, it goes beyond that. In one case,
    in a June 2020 speech, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien
    talked about how some of these conspiracy theories about how
    COVID originated in the U.S. actually meant that there was a
    soldier in her family in Maryland who needed security
    protection because people thought that she was the person who
    had brought COVID to China, because that was some of the
    conspiracy theory.
        So I think you see other ways in which this creates dangers
    and real world implications.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Kohler.
        Mr. Kohler. Thank you. Senator, I think my co-panelists are
    probably more expert on this topic than I am. But I will point
    out, though, I think in terms of if you see China's pivot away
    from focusing on the federal government into the subnational
    level, it may indicate that they feel like they haven't had as
    much impact at the federal level. But they do feel like the
    softer targets are at the state and local level, so that's
    where we see them moving now.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Dr. Tiffert, I noticed that you serve on the Executive
    Committee of the University Research Security Professionals
    Association, and I congratulate you for that. Two years ago, I
    encouraged the University of Southern Maine to terminate its
    Confucius Institute, and the FBI was helpful in providing a
    briefing on that. And the testimony of CIA Director Burns was
    also extremely helpful. However, we keep receiving briefs that
    Chinese influence within our universities has only increased
    through direct grants, sponsorships, fellowships, exchanges.
    All of which sound wonderful and sound like it builds great
    relationships, etc. Commenting in regard to our universities'
    research programs, I want to ask you how much of a national
    security threat does China pose with its presence in our
    schools?
        Dr. Tiffert. So, I think I can answer that in a couple of
    ways. Number one, it's about changing narratives. Increasingly,
    at the Hoover Institution, we have dialogs in China that are
    frank and open within closed doors. Because there are
    individuals who are American experts on China who feel like
    it's no longer possible for them to preserve their access to
    China by speaking freely, and so they would prefer not to go on
    the record on camera. And that's how they preserve their
    freedom within a safe space to speak. This would not have been
    true 10 or 15 years ago to the same degree. So, China is
    affecting the discourse in America about China in ways that
    favor its policies.
        Secondly, with regard to science and technology, I would
    say there is real risk there. And we at the Hoover Institution
    have documented it in ways that show how universities and
    researchers linked to China's military for many years had free
    access to U.S. universities, because no one was doing the basic
    due diligence to understand who they were partnering with. This
    was something that Senators Warner and Rubio have spent a lot
    of time also helping raise consciousness about.
        That problem still exists significantly, and unfortunately,
    we don't have a really good grasp on it, because there's not
    been the data collection yet to understand the scale of it and
    exactly where it exists. It's an area that we at the Hoover
    Institution are putting a lot of effort into.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden wondered if he'd wandered
    into the Arctic Caucus Room considering the temperature in this
    place. [Laughter.]
        But I'm going to go to Senator Wyden next.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my apologies.
    Pretty hectic as we try to work on these issues related to
    keeping the government open.
        I want to follow up on your testimony; and if each of you
    can give me a short answer, that'd be great. Your testimony
    indicated that the Chinese government uses purchased Americans'
    data to target Americans. So my question--and we'll start with
    you Dr. Tiffert and go down the row--would data privacy laws
    like those that many other countries have, help protect us from
    the PRC's influence efforts? Dr. Tiffert.
        Dr. Tiffert. I think the answer would be, yes. Many of the
    problems that we experience with regard to malign Chinese
    influence are--in some ways you can understand them as subsets
    of broader problems. And I think with regard to data privacy,
    that is clearly one. Senator Warner spoke about how we don't
    want to adopt whack-a-mole approaches. And I think up to this
    point, the whack-a-mole approach has been dominant. Having a
    strategic approach to data privacy--a strategic approach also
    to campaign finance--is critical, I think, to really getting a
    grasp on the larger malign foreign influence problem.
        Senator Wyden. Very good. Ms. Cook.
        Ms. Cook. I would second what Dr. Tiffert said. And I think
    Freedom House would really encourage some kind of comprehensive
    data protection legislation, and that would serve to also
    protect Americans' data vis-a-vis, for example, what an app
    like TikTok or what Tencent is doing in terms of this type of
    privacy data collection.
        Senator Wyden. Very good. Mr. Kohler.
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, I think anything that makes it harder
    for the Chinese Communist Party to get our data is a good
    thing. I will say, though, that they still have probably the
    best or one of the best cyber capabilities. So they're going to
    find a way to get to it one way or the other. But having a law
    that's going to prevent our own people from selling it outside
    our borders.
        Senator Wyden. Very good.
        Let me go to you, Ms. Cook, on the next issue with respect
    to what I consider--Senator Warner and I serve on the Senate
    Finance Committee--and I consider censorship in effect to be a
    trade barrier. And the same laws that crush free speech in
    China also prevent American companies from competing fairly
    there unless they censor themselves.
        Ms. Cook, I think it would be helpful if you could discuss
    how China's censorship policies not only curtail freedom of
    speech, but also act as this economic and trade barrier
    preventing American companies from competing in this
    extraordinarily large Chinese market, unless they comply with
    CCP rules.
        Ms. Cook. Absolutely. I think we think of the Great
    Firewall in China as blocking Chinese users from being able to
    access the uncensored Internet. But honestly, one of the most
    productive uses the CCP has made has been to block out
    international social media platforms. And that was, you know,
    15 years ago. And created this whole ecosystem of domestic
    alternatives. And honestly, not only for U.S. tech companies or
    social media platforms, but for a wide range of other
    companies, it costs many, many millions of dollars.
        And just one example in the media space: back in 2012, when
    the ``New York Times'' ran an article that was an investigative
    report about the finances of then Premier Wen Jiabao, their new
    Chinese-language website was blocked. And overnight their stock
    dropped by like 20 percent. And I think you see it took time
    because they basically lost all of the advertising they'd been
    planning. This had been a huge investment for the company. And
    of course, that creates both costs, but as Dr. Tiffert was
    saying, it creates leverage as well, right? It affects the
    incentives of how executives in particular at certain companies
    may think about.
        Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get a couple more in
    really quickly.
        Last year in response to direction from the Congress, the
    ODNI put out a report on protecting the privacy, civil
    liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent in
    the context of IC activities. As the IC addresses the real
    threat from the PRC, our intelligence had recommended greater
    efforts to identify and actively seek to protect bias against
    Chinese-Americans. Is it the view of all of you that the ODNI
    is right that it's critical if we're going to protect the
    rights of Americans? Anybody disagree?
        Mr. Kohler. I agree, Senator.
        Senator Wyden. Okay. Let's record that everyone agrees with
    the ODNI on that.
        Last point, and it's going to be for you Mr. Kohler, with
    respect to cyber-attacks. Your testimony mentions the PRC's use
    of cyber-attacks and spyware against U.S.-based political
    opponents, journalists, human rights advocates, and others. Can
    you elaborate for a moment on these operations and what
    recommendations you would have for additional measures that our
    government should be taking to protect these at-risk
    individuals from getting hacked by the Chinese government?
        Mr. Kohler. Thank you, Senator. While my expertise is more
    in counterintelligence versus cyber, I can tell you that the
    FBI is very focused on countering what China and Russia and
    others are doing in the cyber front. The best advice is
    executing proper cyber-hygiene on your devices. Not clicking
    links, it's that simple.
        But the effort that a nation-state can put into targeting
    individuals to get their information is daunting. And it's
    almost impossible for a civilian to counter that if they wanted
    to, which makes it all the more important that the U.S.
    government does all they can do to stop these threats where
    they start, so do everything they can to neutralize what China,
    for example, is using. And the infrastructure that they use,
    and the U.S. compromised computers that they use inside the
    United States. From an FBI perspective, that's the best tool.
        Senator Wyden. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you all for coming on this important
    topic. You know, we have a hearing like this in public on this
    Committee in part to inform the public of the scale of the
    threat, and sometimes when we do that, people are kind of
    shocked to learn about it for the first time. But there's
    nothing new here, right? This subterfuge, deception, influence,
    espionage has been a part of Chinese statecraft going back at
    least to Sun Tzu. Is that correct?
        Dr. Tiffert.
        Dr. Tiffert. The United Front has been present for--it's
    been actually--Lenin is the one who gave the first name to it.
    And it was a strategy by which the Bolsheviks were this tiny
    minority party that suddenly were in a position to rule the
    entire Soviet Union. It worked. The Chinese said, Wow, okay,
    let's copy that. Let's improve upon it.
        What has changed, I think, is the scale, the intensity, and
    also the levers that China has more recently--simply because
    it's a more powerful country that has many more resources that
    it can devote to this. And so, the United States is--what might
    have worked 15 years ago to resist Chinese influence is no
    longer working.
        Senator Cotton. And I'm glad you mentioned Russia, because
    whether in its Soviet form or Czarist form or now--and it's
    Putinist forum--they've used the same tools always, whether
    it's trying to influence how the West perceives Vladimir
    Putin's unprovoked war in Ukraine or the nuclear freeze
    movement in 1982 or 1983 or the origins of the World Wars or so
    on and so forth.
        The difference with China, especially relative to Russia,
    is those levers you talk about, right? It has an almost
    unlimited number of levers because of its deep entanglement in
    American society and economy where Soviet Russia was more or
    less sealed off from the West. As you're all nodding your head,
    that's great.
        Let me just give you one example of how this could happen.
    Let's say you have a boarding school. And 30 or 40 years ago
    the boarding school was populated mostly by students, say
    seventh through twelfth grade, from within a 300 to 500 mile
    drive. And now today, it's predominantly populated by Chinese
    nationals, students who are here on visas. That boarding
    school, and its local government, and its local Chamber of
    Commerce, and its local Economic Development Commission has in
    some ways become a de facto tool of Chinese influence. Has it
    not?
        Dr. Tiffert.
        Dr. Tiffert. I think we need to deal with this extremely
    carefully. We need to be attentive to where the risk is and
    develop the capacity to detect it. But at the same time,
    particularly under Xi Jinping, there's a very large segment of
    Chinese society that is unhappy with the direction their
    country is moving in. That really sees the United--this is an
    opportunity for the United States to reach out to them, not
    only because It's the right thing to do, but if you're thinking
    in geopolitical, competitive terms, these are individuals who
    have a tremendous amount to contribute to American society. And
    we need to remain open to that.
        Senator Cotton. I agree with that. And I'm very sympathetic
    to the fact that the Chinese people are the first and the worst
    victims of Chinese communism. I also have my doubts that many
    people who are allowed to leave China are not somehow either an
    arm of the PLA or the CCP or, for that matter, still under the
    influence of them because their family members stay there.
        But it's one thing--to go back to my analogy--for that
    headmaster or the board or the local Chamber of Commerce to
    come up here and lobby Senator Collins, Senator Cotton, and
    Senator Cornyn on student visas, something that's directly
    influencing them. But we also get people in those settings to
    come up here and lobby on things that have nothing to do with
    their immediate interests, like asking us to quiet down about
    the genocide of Uyghurs or their oppression of Hong Kong.
        It's kind of like the example Senator Rubio raised, right,
    with Daryl Morey, the former GM of the Houston Rockets? They
    weren't talking about market access for NBA television rights
    in China. They were talking about China's oppression of Hong
    Kong. So it's this secondary leverage that the Chinese
    Communist Party gets because of our economic entanglement.
        Ms. Cook, you're nodding your head vigorously.
        Ms. Cook. Yes, I think that's one side of it. I would just
    add to what Dr. Tiffert was saying is, I think, part of it is
    there's an opportunity, but there is just a changing
    circumstance where we--our schools--we haven't taken as much
    advantage of the fact that you have young Chinese people coming
    here. And I've had conversations with students. And we've had--
    that are very upset at the Chinese Communist Party. And in some
    cases, have the family who have experienced persecution in
    China. And that's one reason why they wanted to come and flee
    to the United States. And I think some of what happens at that
    local level is this lack of preparedness, both in terms of
    responding--if you get a request; or how do you deal with this,
    now you're asked to do this geopolitical thing? But also, how
    do we best prepare and protect and inform these Chinese
    students? What are their rights under U.S. law when they're
    here? If they get a call from the consulate, who can they turn
    to if they're being intimidated or things like that? Because a
    lot of times they don't have that knowledge or resources, as
    well.
        Senator Cotton. I just wanted to use that one example.
    There are many other examples, like, it could be a small,
    privately-held manufacturer who gets a key input from China.
    It's one thing for someone like that to come lobby all of us or
    Members of the House of Representatives on tariff rates and
    trying to get an exemption for their critical input from China.
    It's another thing for them to come up here and lobby us on the
    genocide of the Uyghurs or the persecution of Christians. My
    point is that there are almost innumerable points of leverage
    that China has created that we need to educate the public
    about. And when they come up here and act as de facto arms of
    the Chinese Communist Party.
        Chairman Warner. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We've spent practically all of this hearing talking about
    the problem, and I'm interested in some of the solutions. I
    believe that one of the great failures of American policy,
    going back at least three, maybe four Administrations is the
    lack of deterrence. We have been a free lunch for China in
    terms cyber, the OPM hack, the egregious stealing of
    intellectual property. Nothing ever happens as a result. We
    talk about--Presidents talk about we will respond in some way
    at some time of our choosing. It never happens.
        Dr. Tiffert, don't you think we need to develop a stronger
    deterrent, declaratory policy that if you interfere in this
    country in illegal and malevolent ways, you're going to pay a
    price?
        Dr. Tiffert. I would agree with that, absolutely. And
    developing tools of economic statecraft, I think, is something
    we need to devote significant attention to. Because obviously,
    we want tools that fall short of war with regard to deterrence.
    So, yes, for too long, we've indulged asymmetry throughout our
    relationship with China, everything from journalist visas to
    students to the way businesses operate, who can do business in
    China. There's a fundamental mismatch between a closed society,
    a one party dictatorship like China and an open multi-party
    democracy like the United States. This is something that I
    think a lot of countries are waking up to around the world.
        Senator King. If they want to compete, that's fine. We can
    compete. And I believe we can compete successfully. But if they
    are taking advantage of the openness of this society vis-a-vis
    the closed nature of their society, there should be some
    response. In 2016, the Russians were involved in our elections
    in a big way as this Committee knows. In 2018, not as much,
    because General Nakasone and the NSA took some active measures
    with regard to what was going on in Russia. And it appeared to
    have an effect.
        To change the subject slightly, you mentioned FARA, the
    Foreign Agent Registration. Is that something that should be
    strengthened, particularly as it deals with state and local
    officials?
        Thoughts?
        Ms. Cook. I think there's a lot more in terms of the
    current, how far is worded that could be enforced more as a
    transparency tool to uncover what's actually being done and how
    various CCP-linked actors are influencing or attempting to
    influence. As I had mentioned, that's where this comes in.
        Senator King. We broadened the definition, because clearly,
    they're using people that are not----
        Ms. Cook. Yes, I think the tricky thing with FARA is that
    it already--it's worded very vaguely, and there needs to be
    more of an update that perhaps focuses it more clearly on the
    type of foreign influence we're talking about. Because right
    now, it could be interpreted quite vaguely to be someone's
    grandmother in Canada. But I think being able to update it to
    better shed light on the modern forms that this type of
    influence takes.
        Senator King. Also specifically take note of the efforts to
    influence state and local officials.
        Ms. Cook. Yes, but I think----
        Senator King. Because this Congress or----
        Ms. Cook. Well, that's already--when it comes to who is the
    foreign principal and who are some of the American proxies that
    are engaging in this when they're reaching out to local
    officials? Those are some of the things that are already
    appearing. Or local media already appear in the FARA filings.
    But there seems like there's probably a lot more going on that
    isn't being reported or enforced.
        Senator King. So I would appreciate it if members of the
    panel would give our Committee suggestions for strengthening
    FARA. And it may be just greater enforcement, or it may be
    substantive content.
        Do we expect a higher level of intervention in the 2024
    elections?
        Dr. Tiffert.
        Ms. Cook. Yes.
        Dr. Tiffert. I would say absolutely, yes.
        Senator King. And their data. They are massive collectors
    of data. And using that data, they could target individual
    Americans with messages designed to appeal to that. If it's a
    fisherman or a gun owner or a racing enthusiast, they can use
    that data to target. Is that not correct?
        Dr. Tiffert. That's absolutely correct. And I think we've
    seen evidence of that for quite some time, particularly people
    who have a profile because they're active in issues that touch
    on China. They've already reached out to them. They're already
    blanketing them with information. And they're reaching out to
    other groups, too.
        You know, there was a very interesting article that I think
    brought to light Code Pink in the United States, and the very
    tight ties that the sources of funding that are connected to
    that organization have with China's propaganda apparatus. This
    was not always true, but China has pursued them.
        Senator King. Well, one another question. We talked about
    TikTok, which is a very widely used app. By the way, I'm not
    sure the Chinese fully control TikTok. I think cats control
    TikTok. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Tiffert. And the Internet.
        Senator King. But is there any evidence? I mean, what a
    powerful ideological tool it can be to spread subtly or not so
    subtly the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party. Is
    there any evidence that it's being used in that way? There are
    two issues with TikTok: data mining and ideology or persuasion.
    Are they using TikTok in that way, yet?
        Dr. Tiffert. Absolutely, they are. And in fact, you can see
    evidence of that with regard to amplification of narratives
    that coincide with China's interests with regard to the war in
    Ukraine. China--and this is relatively new--is taking talking
    points from Russian media and simply replicating them because
    they align with China's interests in trying to change the way
    we think about a potential engagement over Taiwan.
        Ms. Cook. I would say, I think in a lot of ways WeChat is
    even as much of a vulnerability. And of course, it's tricky
    because this is particularly Chinese-Americans using it. But
    many WeChat users are concentrated in certain districts or
    certain Congressional districts where there may be a large
    proportion of the voters. And we've seen in Canada already how
    the influence operation campaigns, including related to
    elections, have happened on WeChat. We've seen that in
    Australia. If I was the CCP, I honestly think targeting a
    campaign on WeChat would actually be lower-hanging fruit in a
    local race than trying to use TikTok. So I just wanted to
    mention that.
        Senator King. Well, I appreciate it, but I hope we can
    emphasize this principle of deterrence. That's been the
    fundamental policy of the United States in defense for 75
    years. And we're not applying it in this case.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. A few years ago, Senator Warner and Senator
    Richard Burr at the time and I were in Austin, Texas, and
    talking to a bunch of technology firms there about the
    counterintelligence issues relative to not just this CCP, but
    all other sorts of intelligence efforts targeting the United
    States. And I know we talked about the Cold War model spy-
    versus-spy, but now it seems like there's no end to the
    creativity of the Chinese Communist Party when it comes to
    collecting information, whether it's coercing students who are
    studying here, the creation of Confucius Institutes. You name
    it.
        But I want to follow up on Senator King's questions about
    the Foreign Agent Registration Act. A few years ago, when we
    passed a bill called JASTA, the Justice Against Sponsors of
    Terrorism Act, I became aware of the fact that lobbyists hired
    by foreign countries don't necessarily have to register under
    FARA, the Foreign Agents Registration Act. That's, of course,
    designed to put everybody on notice that this is a person hired
    by a foreign country that then is lobbying the United States,
    maybe not in the best interest of the American people, but at
    least we know who's paying the bills and who they're working
    for.
        But because of the commercial and lobbying loopholes in
    that, it became commonplace for people to lobby Congress. And
    Members of Congress have no idea who they're actually working
    for. In the case of the JASTA legislation, which we literally
    passed over the President's veto, I even had a group of
    veterans show up in my office and claiming to be opposed to the
    legislation. They were essentially financed and misled in terms
    of what they were actually there to talk to, on whose behalf
    they were there, but to lobby against this bill by a foreign
    government.
        So it's just insidious and it's pervasive and it seems like
    it's relentless.
        But I know Ms. Cook, you mentioned the updating of that a
    bill. We actually have a bill that I'd invite you to take a
    look at. We'll share it with you, called the Paid Off Act,
    which several of my colleagues, including Vice Chairman Rubio,
    Senator Grassley, and others, have been trying to get passed
    for some time now. But we'd invite you to work with us to see
    if we're getting this right. We know that, again, our
    adversaries can be very creative and relentless and certainly
    willing to use any tool in the toolbox to try to get access to
    us and to lobbyists in favor of laws, or against laws, that
    they've deemed to be against their interest.
        Mr. Kohler, you're a veteran of the FBI. Have you come
    across instances where foreign governments have hired lobbyists
    here in Washington, D.C., to come here and lobby for or against
    laws without disclosing the fact that they were actually
    working for a foreign government?
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, thank you for the question--and
    Senator King, as well--on the question about FARA.
        Absolutely, Senator. There's a concern that the Lobbying
    Disclosure Act has a loophole that allows some to influence
    Members of Congress and others and hide the hand of a foreign
    government. For example, companies may come and lobby you, but
    they may have a Chinese Communist Party cell in their Chinese
    parent company or maybe even in their United-States-based
    subsidiary. And they don't have to disclose that to you,
    because they're coming in as lobbyists. And they don't have to
    register as agents of a foreign power, because they're not
    necessarily representing a foreign government. One additional
    statute I'll recommend is, well, two other points is the 951
    charge, acting as an unregistered agent, which is more of a
    criminal charge. That does come with significant penalties for
    folks to do if they conduct illegal activity against the United
    States.
        And then one, I'd be remiss if I didn't take this
    opportunity, Senator, to talk about the need for a
    transnational repression law in the United States. There is
    activity that China is doing right now that we cannot, we, the
    FBI--keep saying we, I'm retired--but the FBI cannot prosecute
    because it is just not illegal. And three aspects of that law
    that I think would be important is one, enhanced penalties for
    people doing criminal acts on behalf of foreign nations. Two,
    is making illegal certain of those behaviors. For example, it's
    not illegal right now for a private investigator or anybody to
    do a surveillance of a U.S. person on behalf of a foreign
    country. In some states, you can even put a tracking device on
    somebody's car on behalf of China and it's not illegal. We need
    to fix that part of it. And then lastly, sanctions would be a
    great aspect of that law. We need to inflict some of the
    consequences on the Chinese officials that are actually
    directing and controlling these operations. We can only do that
    through our sanctions. And so, teeing up a new law, my
    recommendation would be it would include those three aspects.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. It did seem when you mentioned the fact
    that lobbyists were not necessarily always fully forthcoming on
    who they're working for, I kind of thought back to
    ``Casablanca'' when there was a charge of gambling in the
    casino. You have to be of a certain age frame. Luckily, Angus
    laughed at that.
        Kirsten, my apologies for doing this by seniority. Michael.
    Senator Bennet.
        Senator Bennet. I apologize.
        Senator Gillibrand. That's okay. You've dumped me twice
    today.
        Senator Bennet. If the Senator from New York is the only
    person to go ahead of me, I'd be happy to yield.
        Senator Gillibrand. I'm yielding to my senior senator,
    Senator Bennet. [Laughter.]
        Senator Bennet. Okay, I'll go ahead. I don't even know what
    movie you're talking about.
        No, I'm just kidding. I know. I grew up watching it too.
    [Laughter.]
        Ms. Cook, thank you very much for your testimony. Everybody
    else's.
        You know, when the Maui wildfires killed almost a hundred
    people and destroyed thousands of homes and buildings, we saw
    Chinese operatives, probably run by Beijing--we don't know--
    spread lies across the Internet claiming that the fires
    resulted from a secret, quote, weather weapon being tested by
    U.S. intelligence agencies and our military. This wasn't a
    mistake. It wasn't some random thing happening on the Internet.
    This was an act of sabotage, at least, or sabotage on behalf of
    Beijing. We saw these posts accompanied by AI-generated
    photographs proliferate on a variety of social media sites,
    including Facebook, Pinterest, Tumblr, Reddit, and TikTok in
    over 30 different languages. And there's been a lot of
    discussion. I heard some today here about lobbyists. And then,
    some talk about TikTok. I mean, it has been absolutely
    fascinating to me to watch a company that's wholly owned by
    Beijing, that's subject to the data privacy laws of Beijing,
    advertise on our national television about how they're the
    greatest friend that small businesses ever had, and Congress
    better not shut us down. We're the greatest friend that any
    veteran in America had. We better not have Congress shut us
    down.
        This is not about lobbyists, you know, pretending to be
    somebody else. This is literally on television. These poor
    people that are the staff here who don't get to go home to
    Colorado--all of you are welcome--over the weekend. They're
    stuck here instead. They have to watch an endless loop of
    TikTok telling everybody who's watching it in Washington, how
    great they are for small business, how great they are for our
    military community to drive economic growth, job creation.
        America, this is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Beijing
    company. They are saying they, quote-unquote, spark good. I
    don't have any idea what that means, but that's their tagline.
    And you know, I'm worried about the fact that--and I think
    others here are as well--that there are 150 million monthly
    American users on this platform, most of whom have no idea that
    it's owned by Beijing. That kids are spending in our country--I
    say this as a former heartbroken school superintendent--90
    minutes a day, more than three weeks a year, on this platform.
    Just this one platform that's owned by Beijing, that's running
    all this false advertising, you know, about how great they are
    for America. That's an amazing position we're in, by the way,
    Mr. Chairman. I mean, just imagine the world of AI where we're
    dealing with fake you and fake me. And we've got ads coming in.
    This is--seriously--this is stuff that could end our democracy.
    And certainly, it's stuff that is undermining our democracy.
        And it's particularly, I think, irritating to me, since I
    know that Beijing calls this stuff in their own country,
    digital heroin. Digital opium, I think they refer to it. And
    you can't, you know--I don't care how enterprising you are as a
    kid. In China, if you want to watch cat dance videos, that's
    not what you're going to watch, you know. You're going to watch
    physics experiments and you're going to watch math stuff. And
    there's a reason why the Chinese kids are saying they want to
    be teachers and astronauts and our kids are saying that they
    want to be social influencers.
        And I'm not saying that's all TikTok or all social media or
    that that's the most important problem America faces. But it is
    a problem that America faces. And I know that you've mentioned
    a different Chinese social media app in your testimony, WeChat,
    which is owned by a Chinese company, by Tencent, and also
    subject to national security laws in China. You said that clear
    evidence exists of censorship and monitoring U.S.-backed users
    of the app.
        So how do we deal with this level of foreign influence in
    our media? How do we deal with a foreign country that doesn't
    allow us to, obviously, use their social media platforms? How
    do we allow them to undermine our institutions, understanding,
    of course, that we--unlike their government--are committed to
    civil rights and to the First Amendment and our values?
        Ms. Cook. I think that having a hearing like this, just for
    more of the TikTok users out there who might be watching, to
    realize that it's owned by ByteDance, which is a China-based
    company. And that there are at least on the Chinese side
    especially ties there, elements of the CCP that are forced to
    be in Chinese companies.
        But I think a lot of it comes down also to a wide range of
    safeguards. Because, honestly, this isn't going to be the last
    app. This isn't the only app globally that's owned by a China-
    based company. ByteDance owns a news aggregator that Indonesia
    found to be manipulating content. There's another competitor
    that owns a very similar app to TikTok that's in Brazil and is
    very popular. So I think creating this kind of a more strategic
    and systematic ecosystem, where you have levels of different
    auditing and transparency requirements, reporting requirements,
    privacy and data protection, because ultimately, honestly, and
    to TikTok's credit, when they've been caught, they've been
    fairly responsive.
        So after Meta came out with, oh, there were these networks
    of disinformation, and they were also operating on TikTok. You
    did see then TikTok say, well, we took down these accounts. Are
    they proactively doing it? No. They're also stuck between a
    rock and a hard place. Anything we can do that makes them have
    to report these things, that creates third-party audits and
    assessments to help identify and nip these things in the bud
    and incentivize against bad behavior would be helpful, short of
    a blanket ban which could raise Constitutional questions.
        Senator Bennet. I know I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. But
    I'll just say again, the point on other countries is a really
    important one. And second, a reminder again why I think what we
    need is a separate agency to actually do this stuff. These
    things are going to change. Every single day, they're changing.
    Congress is never going to figure this out. We've got to figure
    out how to create a body of experts that can actually deal with
    this stuff.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Senator from New York
    for her indulgence.
        Chairman Warner. And the Senator from Idaho is going ahead.
    I just would add that I think on the TikTok case, there's about
    a dozen-plus governments now that have banned its governmental
    use. BBC has warned any of its reporters to get off because of
    their ability to have their data manipulated. And for those who
    are watching, that was the real Michael Bennet, not a deep
    fake.
        Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch. Are you sure of that? [Laughter.]
        Senator Bennet. Exactly. Senator who?
        Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I want
    to get you guys' take on this. I don't have, certainly, answers
    for these things, but I think there are some facts out there
    that we should talk about. I've got two items I want to talk
    about.
        One is the incredible influence that China has on our
    colleges and universities. I think most Americans have no idea
    that there are hundreds, hundreds of thousands of Chinese
    nationals studying at U.S. universities. We have about 12,000
    studying in China where there's 1.5 billion people. And the
    amount of money that flows into those colleges and universities
    from China, whether it's as tuition for the students or
    contracts or just plain donations, is absolutely staggering to
    me. And we've tried on the Foreign Relations Committee, we've
    actually tried to do some things with legislation shining a
    brighter light on this. I mean, most Americans have no idea the
    hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese money that's flowing
    into our colleges and universities. We don't allow foreign
    nationals to contribute to any of our campaigns for one reason,
    and that is we don't want foreign nationals or foreign
    governments to be having influence on policymakers, on people
    who run the government. Why, oh why, would we allow this kind
    of flow of money into our colleges and universities to
    influence the policies of those colleges and universities,
    which are so important to our society?
        The second question I've got is, Idaho is home to the Idaho
    National Lab. Most people have never heard of it. It is the
    flagship laboratory for nuclear energy in the world. The first
    use of nuclear energy was done right there at the lab. We've
    we've still got the first few light bulbs that were lit with
    nuclear energy in 1951. It is also becoming a flagship for
    cybersecurity issues.
        So as a result of that, I'm over there relatively
    frequently. And I've always been struck by the number of
    international people who visit there. More than 8,500 Chinese
    nationals have visited our national laboratories this year
    with, from what I can tell, zero reciprocity. These are people
    that came to collaborate on fundamental science initiatives.
    And the door does not swing both ways. It only swings one way.
    So again, this is something that a light needs to be shined on
    that there is all of this influence and it's just not being
    reciprocated.
        I'd like to get your thoughts on--that's the problem. I
    need smart people like you to tell us how we can do something
    about this.
        Dr. Tiffert. Well, fortunately, this is a problem that this
    institution actually has the levers to help solve.
        Senator Risch. So you're saying it is our problem, not your
    problem. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Tiffert. So, if you look at the statistics and the
    trends in the number of Chinese students who have arrived in
    the United States, they were growing gradually. And then the
    global financial crisis of 2008 was really where there was an
    inflection point. And this was a moment in which American
    states were disinvesting from their higher education systems
    because they were under enormous fiscal pressure. And for a
    number of years, the money simply dried up in our state
    university systems and they turned to whoever was writing
    checks. And China stepped into that gap. Tuition rates went way
    up. Chinese are paying full freight. They're paying out-of-
    state tuition. So it was a very easy source of money and
    incredible talent to draw upon.
        So that was a moment, I think, that really changed the
    narrative there. Likewise, federal support for basic
    fundamental research in America has not kept pace with
    inflation. So again, China is writing the checks, and
    universities are turning to those sources as well, to stay
    competitive. We have an opportunity to raise the resources to
    say, you know, look inward. Look domestically. Work on training
    kids who are coming out of our high schools instead of turning
    to ready-made supplies from abroad in order to solve those
    problems.
        And I think this gets to something I was thinking about
    when Senator Bennet spoke, and that is with regard to the
    things we're talking about today, so much of the solution lies
    in making America better, not simply being proscriptive--
    proscribing activities of the PRC and the CCP--but restoring
    faith in our institutions, making them stronger.
        I think every member of this Committee shares my belief in
    the promise of America. You know, if we can avoid undercutting
    America before our own people, they will be less receptive to
    the propaganda that comes from the CCP.
        Senator Risch. Yeah, and I think that's a really good
    analysis. It may be a little over-optimistic, but I think it is
    certainly something we should strive for. The Chinese that come
    here--look, a lot of them would like to stay here. But we all
    know they can't stay here for obvious reasons. They leave
    family behind that would be badly affected. But our culture
    certainly rubs off on them to some degree. My time is up.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, just one thing to add. I have heard of
    Idaho National Lab. My previous job in the FBI was the
    Assistant Director for Counterintelligence. And a little known
    fact is, of all the agencies that the FBI has detailed people
    out to, the Department of Energy has the most and it's just to
    protect the national labs. So we have agents working side by
    side with DOE counterintelligence professionals just to protect
    the people and innovation at those labs, and to screen the
    visitors as they come in.
        Chairman Warner. And we're very aware that what may be the
    first SMR in America, maybe happening at the Idaho National
    Lab.
        Senator Ossoff, and with apologies to Senator Gillibrand,
    who I think finally gave up the ghost.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
    panel.
        I'd like to hear a little bit more from each of you on
    threats to defense research. Across the country, of course, in
    Georgia with Georgia Tech, UGA, Georgia, State, Augusta
    University. Many institutions of higher education, conducting
    defense-related research. Sensitive research.
        Please characterize the nature of the information security
    threat posed by PRC, PRC-affiliated actors, to defense
    research.
        Beginning with you, Dr. Tiffert, please.
        Dr. Tiffert. Thank you.
        I think we're at a moment in time where the old categories
    that we inherited from the Cold War, dual-use technologies. The
    way of talking about them--small yards, high fences--no longer
    captures the nature of the way fundamental research connects
    with research that could be applied towards military
    applications. Look, the war in the Ukraine has showed us that
    commercialized drone technology, off the shelf, suddenly can be
    turned into a kamikaze weapon in a way that I don't think
    anyone might have appreciated beforehand. So those old concepts
    are starting to break down and we're not really coming up with
    anything new to replace them with.
        There are areas of fundamental research, for example, in
    generative AI and machine learning, in quantum technology, in
    chemical engineering that could be deployed to energetics in AI
    models that are being used for drug discovery to improve public
    health, but that can be weaponized to produce better chemical
    weapons that are not covered by our traditional categories. And
    they're occurring within the domain of fundamental research
    right now that is being published and is being harvested by
    countries of concern, like North Korea, by Iran, by Russia and
    China. And so, I'm engaged in regular consultations with those
    in the research enterprise and those in the funding agencies to
    devise a new strategy with regard to managing this fundamental
    research.
        But the challenge here is that many of those in our
    research enterprise profit by the old system. In some ways,
    they rose through the ranks in it. And it has required very
    little of them within the domain of fundamental research to do
    due diligence, to understand who their partners are, to think
    through the application--the social consequences of the
    applications of their technology--the military applications.
    I've documented fundamental research. And for example, AI
    models in acoustics, they are directly being applied by
    military universities in the PRC. And under existing U.S.
    rules, this is okay. That needs to change.
        Senator Ossoff. Ms. Cook.
        Ms. Cook. I will say this is pretty much outside my area of
    expertise, but I think to Dr. Tiffert's last point, is that you
    do see, I think, more efforts to make more awareness about this
    and to try to give researchers who might be looking into this
    the tools to understand that. And I think particularly there's
    a think tank in Australia that actually created a database of
    the different military universities in China. So if you're
    looking at something, you could actually--even if you didn't
    speak Chinese--you could actually look up and see who your
    partner is. So I think there's that element of how do we create
    resources so that if someone is more conscientious, even if
    it's maybe not required as part of the application process,
    might be actually able to find that information.
        Senator Ossoff. Mr. Kohler.
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, I think some of the changes instituted
    through the CHIPS and Science Act, NSPM-33, and the NDAA have
    all been a really good start to trying to force or encourage
    universities to protect critical research. I think universities
    have a lot more to do in terms of applying those and having a
    true robust research apparatus. And I think the engagement with
    the U.S. government with the military and the private sector to
    help them do that is going to be a good thing in the future.
        One other concept that--and it sort of echoes what Dr.
    Tiffert said--the information at risk is not necessarily
    strictly military research or classified government secrets.
    And the example I have given audiences before is just with
    brain science. We all have researchers here in the United
    States that may be trying to come up with ways for amputees to
    control artificial limbs using brain science. Well, that
    information and that technology is being stolen by China. And
    they are using it now, trying to adapt it so soldiers can
    launch weapons using their minds. It sounds farfetched, but
    that is absolutely how China views it through their strategy of
    military-civil fusion.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you all.
        Chairman Warner. Senator King.
        Senator King. Brief question. Back to TikTok.
        It seems to me there may be an alternative. I think a lot
    of what we've been talking about today is, do the consumers
    know what's going on and who may be trying to manipulate them?
    What about something short of a ban, but a requirement if an
    app is foreign owned or owned in a foreign country that there
    be a little tagline when you open the app? This app is owned by
    a company that's based in Beijing, China, or Frankfurt,
    Germany. I mean, again, disclosure, it seems to me, is a sort
    of middle ground here.
        Doctor, what do you think?
        Dr. Tiffert. Anything that increases transparency is good.
        Senator King. That's exactly what I'm suggesting.
        Dr. Tiffert. On the other hand, there's been good research,
    particularly on the requirements, for example, that YouTube
    videos list that they're funded by a state-owned media, for
    example. That indicates that even knowing that when viewers
    look at it, it doesn't materially affect the impact it has on
    them. The psychology still plays out in similar ways.
        So while I would support that, I would also say that we
    need to, I think, be humble about what we expect from it.
        Senator King. Sure. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Kohler. And Senator, just one last comment. This may be
    outside of the FBI's lane, but I think the answer to this
    starts in our classrooms with our children.
        Senator King. Of course.
        Mr. Kohler. We need to teach the next generation to be
    critical consumers of the information they take in. And
    understand that information, regardless of the source, may be
    sent to them to influence them.
        Senator King. You are absolutely right.
        Mr. Kohler. And I just don't think even as adults who those
    of us who didn't grow up with devices in our hands as children,
    we still sometimes need to have that reminder.
        Senator King. We need to be better consumers of
    information. And digital literacy should be part of every
    school starting in the first grade.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Cook. And Senator King, I would just add, I think it
    goes beyond even, say, a labeling on the app. But for example,
    if you're talking about labeling, print media of the inserts,
    print media tend to be better. Broadcast media. It's much
    harder for a news consumer to know that this is a China Radio
    International or CCTV footage that they're watching, or things
    like that.
        Senator King. Yeah, usually, at the bottom----
        Ms. Cook. And I think the FCC has been trying to, I think,
    implement rules.
        Senator King [continuing]. The bottom of the ad. It doesn't
    help if it says Citizens for Greener Grass or something.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. I would simply add--and I'm going to turn
    it over to Senator Rubio, and Senator Lankford is going to join
    us--I also think what's relevant is, you know, when TikTok/
    ByteDance started to spend enormous amounts of money lobbying
    against either one of our efforts, and we had different
    approaches saying, you know, we're trying to cut out
    creativity. And I think most of us simply thought that
    creativity is great, but it ought to be maybe on a Brazilian
    platform or a French platform or--it didn't even have to
    necessarily be an American. But the debate that's progressed
    since that time, that we're well over a dozen nations who've
    come to the same conclusion, that this is a security risk
    beyond the fact of the data collection, but of the ability to
    use and diffuse disinformation and misinformation in an
    extraordinarily provocative way.
        And I think this most recent story in the last couple of
    days where literally a number of the TikTok employees who had
    been relying on the assurances that--and had been told as
    TikTok employees--don't ever emphasize their ties to ByteDance.
    The number of those employees that are now leaving because
    they're seeing this again, undue influence being imposed by
    ByteDance, I believe, at least implicitly or indirectly or
    directly by the CCP, ought to have us all take a second look.
        So, with that, I'm going to turn it back over.
        My thanks. My apologies to the panel. I've got to head off.
    I think Senator Lankford is going to join us, but very much
    appreciate--And my only concern is that we've lost two-thirds
    of our audience. We may have to figure out a way to pump this
    up in terms of making sure we keep making the public
    presentation.
        [Now Presiding: Vice Chairman Rubio.]
        Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, I want to, as I wait for Senator
    Lankford to get here----
        I think on the TikTok one, first of all, if you turn on TV
    now, they're extensively advertising. And it's interesting to
    watch the advertising. It'll tell some great story. The one I
    saw today somewhere was, some veteran who was homeless or
    something along these lines, and how it wouldn't have been
    possible without TikTok. So the PR push is very extensive.
        But I think one of the challenges, and what I wanted to
    delve into a little bit with TikTok is explaining to people.
    It's not that the platform has videos, because all these
    platforms have videos that we would find unproductive at best,
    offensive and destructive and so forth at worst, and so forth.
    It is the data and how it flows. So basically, like any other
    platform, in order for it to work, it has to have an algorithm,
    a recommender engine. That recommendation engine that basically
    drives what you see, right? So they need to know about you.
    What do you like? What are you likelier to watch? In essence,
    the ultimate goal is to predict what you would want to buy if
    you knew about it. And even though you don't know you need it,
    you will determine that you need it once you see it. That's the
    design of it. And to do that it has to collect massive amounts
    of data.
        Under Chinese law, that algorithm that drives that engine,
    it is illegal to transfer that outside of China. And without
    that, there is no TikTok. That's just a platform without that.
        So, what people don't understand is it doesn't matter who
    owns TikTok. What matters is that that algorithm is incredibly
    powerful and continues to work. That's what matters. And so,
    you can store the data that drives the algorithm anywhere in
    the world you want. ByteDance in China has to have access to
    that data. And it's a massive amount of data. I'll tell you
    that on a couple of my devices, I have a security feature. And
    it is constant, I mean, I'm talking about I'm just going on
    regular news sites and things of this nature. It is constantly
    popping up: malicious block, malicious block, TikTok blocks. If
    you open it up, what is the malicious block? So they're
    collecting data, not just from users, from all these other
    places.
        So my question, really in terms of this malign influence
    work, how valuable is having that amount of data? Not just on
    the users of TikTok's but others in the hands of an organism
    that ultimately, if someone knocks on the door and says we want
    that data and we want you to use it a certain way, meaning we
    need you to tweak the recommender engine in the United States
    to feature this versus that. How valuable would that be
    primarily in a moment of impending conflict?
        So let's say that the Chinese are--Let's use a real world
    example. This conflict with the Philippines that's going on and
    is escalating. And they decided that they wanted to turn that
    data to get people to pressure public opinion in the United
    States against support for the Philippines. How valuable is
    that data? I mean, is there anything comparable in the hands of
    any government in the world that's able to unleash this social
    engineering mechanism against a potential adversary?
        Dr. Tiffert. The scenario you describe is the type that we
    think a lot about. And it's absolutely terrifying, because I
    think that it is possible. And it's conceivable that in the
    event of a conflict, an intense conflict with China, they would
    deploy those algorithms in ways that would seek to undermine
    our resolve. Absolutely.
        I am not aware of any other comparable set of data. And in
    particular, what is arresting is in the last several years,
    China has adopted data security legislation that is designed to
    ingest all of the world's data as much as it can and not leak
    any of it out. China, and Xi Jinping in particular, is trying
    to create the largest repository of data in the world so that
    it is available for whatever purpose the CCP would like to use
    it for. We need to be alert to that. It's a one-way street.
        For those who are talking about older metaphors, maybe
    ``Hotel California.'' It's a little newer than ``Casablanca.''
        Ms. Cook. What I would just add to that is that I think
    what you described, Senator Rubio, it's not just about the
    intelligence law or the data collection law, it's about how the
    CCP operates. And the CCP operates like a mafia. And so, even
    if it's not just about the law, but it's about whether they're
    going to the same type of transnational repression tactics that
    Mr. Koehler has been talking about, they use against people,
    including tech executives in China, including their family. So,
    even if a tech executive in all conscientiousness would feel
    that for, including for-profit reasons, it wasn't in their
    interest to activate this type of mechanism, part of the
    concern is that the CCP would be able to apply a wide range of
    pressures, legal repercussions, familial repercussions against
    them in China to essentially potentially force their hand.
        I think the flip side is how do we safeguard in terms of
    audits? How do we catch that this is happening? Because there's
    just so much opacity right now, particularly on this platform,
    but on the social media platforms, generally in terms of what
    is actually happening. What is the algorithm? Is the algorithm
    changing? Because we've seen how their moderation policies have
    also changed over time.
        Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. Senator Rubio, thank you.
        Thanks for being here. I appreciate very much your
    testimony and what you're bringing to the conversation today.
        I want to just set a bit of a story of what's happening in
    Oklahoma. In 2018, my state legalized medical marijuana. In
    2019, we had the largest amount of foreign land sales in the
    country the next year. And what we found are tens of thousands
    of acres that have been purchased by Chinese nationals in my
    state that they then have partnered with Mexican cartels to be
    able to grow marijuana in Oklahoma and then ship it all over
    the country. We have seen a proliferation of Chinese grow
    operations that's happened there.
        That has been a shock to the system, to a lot of folks in
    rural Oklahoma, of how many places that they can't drive down a
    rural road because there are folks standing there with ARs at
    the edge of a fence saying, hey, you're not allowed down this
    road anymore. It's been an enormous shift that has occurred.
        So saying all that on the criminal side of things on it, I
    engaged on this and have found several other folks that are
    watching Chinese purchases of agricultural land around the
    country and have seen a one-hundred-thousand-plus-acre increase
    just in the last year of Chinese purchases of agricultural land
    around the nation.
        I have a bill now called the SOIL Act, which just does the
    CFIUS process for foreign purchases of agricultural land that
    are currently exempt. You can do any foreign purchases of
    agricultural land and you don't have to go through the CFIUS
    process you have to do for technology. We have a ten-mile
    barrier around our military bases. I'd like to extend that to a
    50-mile barrier, knowing that if you're ten-and-a-half miles
    away from a military base on a high hill, you're still looking
    right down into a military base, and with the Chinese
    operation, that's owned. So there's a lot of questions that we
    have about just the ownership of agricultural land and some of
    the Chinese criminal activity that's actually happening in the
    United States, facilitating partnerships with others.
        My question to you: have you seen this in other areas of
    the country? What would you recommend on agricultural land
    purchases in particular? And also, the Chinese criminal
    organizations, where it seems the Chinese government is looking
    away, fully aware of what's actually happening in the
    engagement of that, but looking away to increase a negative
    influence on Americans by their activities here?
        Dr. Tiffert. I can address the Chinese agricultural land
    piece. You know, I would be in favor, in particular, of
    legislation that increases the capacity of USDA and other
    agencies to monitor sales. Right now, the reporting mechanisms
    that are in place have extremely weak enforcement and weak
    capacity behind them.
        Senator Lankford. Right.
        Dr. Tiffert. So, we don't actually have an accurate view,
    as far as I understand, of the picture of foreign land sales.
    And so for us to understand the scale and scope of any risk
    that might be there, we need to improve that. So that's one
    area that needs a lot of attention.
        Beyond just the military basing proximity issue, Xi Jinping
    in the last couple of years has declared food security be of
    paramount interest to the CCP. Because the CCP is highly
    dependent on foreign supplies of soybeans, wheat, other
    commodities, as well. Cooking oils. And you know, this is
    partly reducing their vulnerability to the ability of the U.S.
    to impose economic sanctions and cut off trade in the event of
    a conflict. So, food security is a top-line agenda item for the
    party. Various investment groups and Chinese conglomerates are
    responding to the market signal that the Communist Party sent,
    and saying, okay, this is important to them. We're going to go
    out to the world, not just the United States, and begin
    acquiring the technologies and the know-how to enhance our
    ability to generate more productivity in our domestic
    agricultural sector.
        So it isn't just about SIGINT, you know, with regard to
    military bases. It's also about developing farms in the United
    States that will have access to our seeds, to our cultivars, to
    our animal husbandry, to our techniques that make American
    agriculture so incredibly productive, so that they can learn
    all of that and take it back to China in the same way that
    they've done with other industries.
        Senator Lankford. Anyone else want to add to that?
        Ms. Cook. I was going to say, I'm not familiar with
    agriculture, but when you speak about organized crime, and when
    we talk about some of the examples of let's say transnational
    repression in Taiwan, there are close ties in terms of triads,
    or organized crime with links to the CCP. We've seen that in
    Hong Kong.
        And years ago, attacks on people like Jimmy Lai that were
    done by them. And I think more recently, one of these campaigns
    of disinformation networks that were taken down were also using
    networks that were run by businesses with organized crime ties
    in Southeast Asia. So, this phenomenon may not only be limited
    to the agriculture sector.
        Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more quick
    question?
        It's about the sister cities. I know you've talked about
    this a little bit as well, but this seems to be an active thing
    for the Chinese to now pursue cities. What are the real risks
    to communities if a city says, you know what? China's a growing
    economy. There's business there. We're engaging with Chinese
    business individuals. What is the threat to a community in one
    of these sister cities relationships? And who are the Chinese
    sending to the United States in that sister city relationship?
        Dr. Tiffert. So, there are a couple of threats. Number one,
    it undercuts American national foreign policy. A lot of these
    sister city agreements, the Chinese would like to assert claims
    and assertions about what U.S. policy is or isn't with regard
    to Taiwan, perhaps other places beyond that, too. That's the
    prerogative of the federal government, first of all. So, we
    shouldn't be dividing America internally that way.
        But most importantly, there are members of the multi-ethnic
    Chinese diaspora who live in these cities who are from Taiwan,
    who are from Tibet, who are from Xinjiang, who are from a vast
    array of places. And inserting language that endorses PRC
    policy on issues with regard to territory and ethnicity in
    those sister city agreements is an insult to them. And it also
    makes them feel unsafe. Because their communities suddenly are
    allying with a government that, in many instances, they've
    experienced oppression from personally.
        Ms. Cook. I would just add to that, about the leverage
    points, I think, even if there is a sister city government.
        One, is to look at the fine print. And this goes to also
    some of the Confucius Institute agreements. Like part of it is
    just knowing, at that negotiation stage, what to say no to.
        But two, to realize, at some point there may be a member of
    one of these communities who comes before the town council or
    the city council and asks for a resolution for the Dalai Lama's
    birthday or to support something else or to talk about how--and
    you're going to get a call from your sister city partner asking
    you to not support that resolution or the sister city
    relationship could be endangered.
        So I think that would be also being ready for that, being
    at the beginning to say even if you pursue a sister city
    relationship, to say we want you to understand that we have
    members in our community and we care about these causes. And we
    will continue to speak out. If you can do that at the beginning
    is less likely they'll even try later on.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you.
        Vice Chairman Rubio. One last question, Mr. Kohler. I
    wanted to ask you this. I know the answer, but I want people to
    hear it.
        Let's suppose that someone acting as an agent on behalf of
    the Chinese Communist Party--but obviously won't declare
    themselves that way--picked up the phone and called a private
    investigator in any city in America and said, we are willing to
    pay you X amount of money to surveil, to collect as much
    information, create a pattern of life, gather as much
    information as you can about individual so-and-so, maybe a
    Chinese-American who has spoken out against Chinese policies or
    a dissident who actually has been impacted by him and the like.
        That private investigator, if they don't know who the
    person calling on the other line is and just thinks it's an
    interested local party or what have you would not be violating
    any federal laws. There's no federal--but yet it sounds like an
    enormous loophole that can be exploited to hire people here to
    at least create the portfolio for harassment.
        Mr. Kohler. Senator, you're right. Section 951 only outlaws
    aiding a foreign power if it's an illegal act. So that example
    would be a traditional commercial transaction. So, a private
    investigator would be free to conduct surveillance on behalf of
    any foreign power that called them.
        Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you for coming in today. I think, I hope this was
    informative. And I'm glad we did it in an open setting like
    this. And again, thank you for your time.
        With that, the meeting's adjourned.
        [Whereupon at 4:28 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

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