[Senate Hearing 118-104]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 118-104

                  FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                       EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
                     THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
                          CYBERSECURITY POLICY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              MAY 2, 2023

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-436 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                       
                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk        


            SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,        
             AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY        

              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland, Chairman        
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 MITT ROMNEY, Utah
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska

                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Van Hollen, Hon. Chris, U.S. Senator From Maryland...............     1

Romney, Hon. Mitt, U.S. Senator From Utah........................     3

Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East 
  Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Schiffer, Hon. Michael, Bureau for Asia, United States Agency for 
  International Development, Washington, DC......................     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Tim Scott..............................................    41

                                 (iii)

 
                  FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                       EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                              ----------                              


                          TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2023

                           U.S. Senate,    
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
                International Cybersecurity Policy,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chris Van 
Hollen presiding.
    Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Schatz, 
Duckworth, Romney, Cruz, Hagerty, and Ricketts.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Van Hollen. Good afternoon. This hearing of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the 
Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy will come to 
order.
    I want to start by recognizing and thanking my colleague, 
Senator Mitt Romney, the ranking member, for his partnership on 
this subcommittee. We have much work to do.
    Senator Schatz, welcome. Great to have you on the 
subcommittee, and I am very pleased to welcome our two 
witnesses, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink and USAID Assistant Administrator 
for Asia Michael Schiffer.
    Welcome to both of you. Thank you both for your service to 
our country, and before I turn it over to you, I have a few 
opening remarks and then Senator Romney will make a few remarks 
and then we will take your testimony.
    The National Security Strategy laid out by President Biden 
and this Administration clearly establishes the goals and 
mission of our national security and foreign policy.
    The United States seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and 
universal human rights through an international rules-based 
order grounded in freedom and respect for sovereignty.
    Nowhere is the successful application of that strategy more 
important than in the Indo-Pacific region. East Asia and the 
Pacific, which is the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, 
includes the world's fastest growing economies and the world's 
busiest trade routes. Forty percent of the world's trade moves 
through the Strait of Malacca.
    This region, home to over 2 billion people, will be at the 
center of 21st century geopolitics. That is why it is essential 
that we match our strategy with the resources and the means to 
implement it and that is what today's hearing is all about.
    Given the critical importance of this region and as a 
Pacific nation ourselves, the United States will continue to 
promote a free and open Indo-Pacific for ourselves and for the 
benefit of all the nations of the region and the world.
    This region is, of course, also home to the People's 
Republic of China. We do not seek conflict with China, but we 
will defend our security interests, support our allies and 
partners, and continue to actively promote a free and rules-
based system that respects the sovereignty of nations.
    To protect those interests and those principles we must 
continue to strengthen our bilateral relationships with 
countries throughout the area and work with the central 
regional organizations like ASEAN as well as through other 
arrangements like the Quad, AUKUS, the Mekong-U.S. Partnership, 
the Pacific Community, and the Pacific Islands Forum.
    A key part of our strategy for maintaining peace and 
growing prosperity is preserving the status quo across the 
Taiwan Strait.
    Let us be clear. It is not the United States that seeks to 
change that status quo and we oppose any unilateral efforts to 
do so.
    Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, we will continue 
to provide Taiwan with the means to deter aggression and to 
defend itself. Taiwan is not alone in facing a more aggressive 
PRC.
    As stated in the National Security Strategy, and I quote, 
``Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-
Pacific, stand on the front lines of the PRC's coercion and are 
rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, 
security, and prosperity.''
    It goes on to state, and I quote, ``We will support their 
ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their 
interests and values free from external pressure and work to 
provide high standard and scale investment, development 
assistance, and markets.''
    A major part of today's hearing will focus on how we aim to 
provide that promised support. The wise use of economic 
statecraft will be essential to its success.
    A sound economic strategy begins with a strong economy here 
at home and many of the measures we enacted in the last 
Congress, including the bipartisan infrastructure bill, the 
CHIPS and Science Act, and the vital clean energy investments 
made in the Inflation Reduction Act provide a strong 
foundation.
    In order to ensure our own long-term prosperity, help other 
countries raise their standards of living, and counter the 
PRC's efforts to export their mercantilist and authoritarian 
model, we must deploy the right global economic policy tools.
    I encourage all of my colleagues to read three recent 
important speeches on this matter, one delivered by Secretary 
Yellen at SAIS on April 20, another delivered by National 
Security Adviser Jake Sullivan at Brookings on April 27, and 
one by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
before she embarked on her visit to the PRC in April of this 
year. Taken together, those three speeches create a very 
important framework for our strategy.
    I also commend the Biden administration for launching 
important economic initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Framework for Prosperity, the Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure and Investment, and the Just Energy Transition 
Partnership, or JETP.
    I recently returned from a CODEL organized by Senator 
Merkley to Vietnam and Indonesia and these initiatives were a 
key part of that agenda.
    As we implement a strategy to promote peace and prosperity, 
we must also work with countries in the region to combat the 
climate crisis. Rising sea levels are literally an existential 
threat to many Pacific Islands and large parts of the countries 
in East Asia.
    That means implementing a two-fold strategy, one, to 
support measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and 
to stop cutting down the forests that are such important carbon 
sinks. It also means helping these countries build resiliency 
to confront the impacts of climate change.
    Let me close with this. Implementing our National Security 
Strategy and foreign policy in East Asia and the Pacific cannot 
be done on the cheap. It requires resources.
    At this point, I believe the greatest threat to our success 
lies not in any adversary overseas, but division and 
polarization here at home.
    Most immediately, any default on America's debts and 
obligations would be an irreparable self-inflicted wound. It 
would destroy our economy here at home and destroy our 
credibility around the world.
    Nothing would better serve the interests of our 
adversaries. Let us work together on a bipartisan basis to keep 
America strong at home and around the world.
    I will now turn it over to Ranking Member Romney for his 
statement.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be with 
you today, and also Senator Schatz and Senator Ricketts.
    I appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak with our 
colleagues today and learn from them about our prospects in the 
Indo-Pacific and to address the budget request that they have 
provided.
    I think there is broad agreement that the critical foreign 
policy challenge that we face and opportunity we have arises 
from China's emergence as a great power, a nation which is not 
playing by the rules, and the fact that it is not playing by 
the rules presents particular challenges for us and for the 
world.
    It is essential, in my view, as we think about spending the 
money that Chairman Van Hollen has indicated that we spend it 
according to a comprehensive strategy that we have developed 
that focuses our resources on those things that we think will 
be most effective.
    In the last Congress, Chairman Menendez and I actually 
passed legislation which would require the Administration to 
produce a comprehensive strategy to deal with China.
    During the Cold War, Presidents Ford and Eisenhower and 
Reagan directed similar undertakings as we confronted the 
Soviet Union and I believe we should carry out the same type of 
strategic effort with regards to China.
    I am concerned that the Administration is sort of hoping 
this will go away or that a speech of grand principles will 
suffice.
    I very much support the principles that have been described 
by Secretary Blinken and Secretary Yellen. Both have given 
addresses with matters in this regard.
    When I talk about a grand strategy and as Senator Menendez 
does, we are talking about something far more comprehensive 
than just principles. Just to tick off some of the things that 
are in China's program, they have a talent program, as you 
know.
    They have a theft of intellectual property program. They 
have the Confucius Institute program. They have trade 
agreements that they put in place that they think will promote 
their interests.
    They have massive investments in Africa and Latin America 
and the Caribbean and other places. They have a propaganda 
program. They have a spy program. They have a raw materials 
program to achieve monopolies in key raw materials.
    They send students into American universities with a plan 
for them to come back and provide technology that they have 
learned, and one of the most troubling aspects of their 
strategy is their effort to live by different trade rules than 
the rest of the nations live by, monopolizing certain 
industries, predatory pricing to achieve that monopoly, 
establishing pathways around the national trade rules.
    We are very anxious to learn that the Administration has 
begun the process of completing a development of a 
comprehensive strategy. Part of our legislation called for 
outside voices, not just members of the Administration, but 
outside voices--members of Republican administrations in the 
past--to make sure this is a strategy that has bipartisan 
support and lasts beyond one President, but also people in the 
foreign policy world that are focused on this area, to get 
their input and to consider the widest range of options.
    There are other issues that I am going to get a chance to 
talk about today, but I want to underscore that, underscore, 
again, my support for the comments that have been made by the 
chairman of this committee.
    I want to make sure that we do not do anything that weakens 
our positions relative to China. I would note a comment which 
has been made by several people that basically every strategic 
and every funding decision we make should be considered through 
the lens of how it affects our strength relative to China 
because it is the foreign policy challenge of our era.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the questions 
that we will hear from you and from our colleagues.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Romney, and also 
welcome, Senator Ricketts. Now we will turn to today's 
witnesses.
    Daniel Kritenbrink became Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asia and Pacific Affairs in September 2021. He came to 
this job with a wealth of experience and knowledge during his 
nearly three decades of distinguished public service.
    Mr. Kritenbrink served as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 
2017 to 2021 and his deep background in Indo-Pacific affairs 
includes time as senior director for Asian affairs at the 
National Security Council and service as deputy chief of 
mission at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.
    Welcome, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.
    Let me now also welcome back to the committee Michael 
Schiffer, who is well known to us from serving on this side of 
the dais on the committee for a decade as a senior advisor and 
counselor to the committee.
    It is wonderful to see him again and see him continue to 
make a difference on the global stage now as USAID Assistant 
Administrator for Asia.
    Mr. Schiffer also brings an abundance of experience. Prior 
to his service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he 
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia 
and as a program officer at the Stanley Foundation responsible 
for the foundation's Asia programs.
    Thank you both again for your service. We look forward to 
your testimony. I respectfully ask that both of you try to keep 
your opening statements to 5 minutes, and anything you are not 
able to cover will be entered into the record.
    With that, let me turn it over to you, Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink.

    STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT 
   SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, members of this 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 
you today to testify regarding the President's fiscal year 2024 
budget request for the East Asia and Pacific region. It is 
truly an honor to be here.
    As President Biden stated in our National Security 
Strategy, U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific, which, of 
course, includes the EAP region, is paramount as the Indo-
Pacific fuels much of the world's economic growth and will be 
the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics.
    As an Indo-Pacific nation, we must work to build the 
collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends to 
promote a vision for the region that is free and open, 
connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.
    The EAP Bureau holds the key responsibility to advance the 
Administration's priorities for the Indo-Pacific as our region 
is home to all but six countries of the broader Indo-Pacific 
region and, of course, includes the People's Republic of China.
    Our Indo-Pacific strategy includes our approach to the 
People's Republic of China, of course, but it is not defined by 
it. In other words, we have an Indo-Pacific strategy of which 
China is a part and not the other way around.
    That said, while strategic competition with the PRC remains 
a global challenge, tensions are most acute in the Indo-Pacific 
region, which is the primary focus of the PRC's growing 
influence and ambitions.
    The Administration's approach to the PRC is to invest, 
align, and compete. We are investing in the foundations of our 
strength at home, aligning with partners and allies on our 
approach abroad, and competing with the PRC to defend our 
interests and build our vision for the future.
    Our objective is not to change the PRC, but rather to shape 
the strategic environment in which it operates, building a 
balance of influence that is favorable to the United States, 
our allies and partners, and the interests and values that we 
share.
    In support of the Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, 
the President's fiscal year 2024 budget request for the EAP 
region includes a diplomatic engagement budget of $533 million 
and a foreign assistance budget of $1.36 billion.
    In addition, the President's budget request includes $2 
billion in mandatory funding to support the Indo-Pacific 
strategy and $7.1 billion in mandatory funding to support the 
Compacts of Free Association, or the COFA.
    Further, the fiscal year 2024 budget includes $2 billion in 
mandatory funding to support international infrastructure 
globally, including presumably projects in the East Asia and 
Pacific region.
    Here I would like to provide a brief overview of how the 
President's budget for EAP directly supports the five 
objectives of our Indo-Pacific strategy.
    First, we are advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The 
fiscal year 2024 budget supports our continued investment in 
democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil 
society that will improve fiscal transparency to expose 
corruption.
    These efforts complement our expanded diplomatic presence 
across the Indo-Pacific, including a new embassy in the Solomon 
Islands and proposed new embassies in Kiribati, Tonga, and 
Vanuatu.
    These efforts also support our commitment to respect 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, unimpeded lawful 
commerce, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the freedom 
of navigation and over flight, including in the South China Sea 
and the East China Sea.
    Second, we are building connections in the Indo-Pacific and 
beyond. The President's request supports our bilateral 
relationships as well as our engagement with regional groupings 
and institutions including ASEAN, the Quad, the Pacific Islands 
Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Mekong-U.S. Partnership 
to build capacity and address regional challenges.
    Third, we are driving Indo-Pacific prosperity. With the 
continued negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 
for Prosperity, or IPEF, and the launch of the Partnership for 
Global Infrastructure and Investment, the President's budget 
will ensure economic engagement that will promote a connected, 
resilient, and fair Indo-Pacific economy.
    The President's budget will also enable us to follow 
through on the commitments made during the 2023 U.S. APEC host 
year.
    Fourth, we are bolstering Indo-Pacific security. 
Recognizing that security is a necessary condition for 
prosperity, the President's budget will build the capacity of 
our Indo-Pacific partners to respond to and resolve both 
domestic and transnational security threats.
    We also remain committed to maintaining peace and security 
across the Taiwan Strait. Our ``One China'' policy, which has 
remained consistent, has helped to maintain cross strait peace 
and stability for the past 40 years.
    In line with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States 
will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient 
self-defense capability.
    Fifth, we are building regional resilience. U.S. security 
depends on our collaboration with our allies and partners to 
address shared challenges.
    The President's budget supports health security, climate 
adaptation and mitigation efforts, and energy security to build 
regional resilience to transnational threats.
    In summary, the U.S. role in the region must be more 
effective and enduring than ever before. As is often said at 
these hearings, resources determine priorities and, as such, 
our partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific are keenly looking 
at our ability to deliver resources as a sign of our commitment 
and durability in the region.
    The President's fiscal year 2024 budget request will allow 
us to further strengthen our commitment in this vitally 
important region.
    Thank you again for inviting me to testify. I look forward 
to answering your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink

    Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, and Members of the 
Subcommittee--thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
to testify regarding the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget 
request for East Asia and the Pacific (EAP).
    As President Biden stated in our National Security Strategy, U.S. 
leadership in the Indo-Pacific, which includes the EAP region, is 
paramount as the Indo-Pacific fuels much of the world's economic 
growth, and it will be the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics. And 
as an Indo-Pacific nation, we must work to build the collective 
capacity of our allies, partners, and friends to promote a vision for 
the region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and 
resilient.
    The EAP Bureau holds a key responsibility to advance the 
Administration's priorities for the Indo-Pacific, as our region is home 
to all but six countries of the broader Indo-Pacific region and, of 
course, includes the People's Republic of China. Our Indo-Pacific 
strategy (or IPS) includes our approach to the People's Republic of 
China but is not defined by it. In other words, we have an Indo-Pacific 
strategy, of which China is a part, and not the other way around.
    That said, while strategic competition with the PRC remains a 
global challenge, tensions are most acute in the Indo-Pacific, which is 
the primary focus of the PRC's growing influence and ambitions. The 
Administration's approach to the PRC, which Secretary Blinken laid out 
in his May 26, 2022, speech, is to ``invest, align, and compete.'' We 
are: 1) investing in the foundations of our strength at home; 2) 
aligning with partners and allies on our approach abroad; and 
harnessing those two key assets 3) to compete with the PRC to defend 
our interests and build our vision for the future. We recognize that 
American interests can only be advanced if we firmly anchor the United 
States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region itself, alongside 
our closest allies and partners. Our objective is not to change the PRC 
but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a 
balance of influence that is favorable to the United States, our allies 
and partners, and the interests and values we share.
    In support of the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, the 
President's FY 2024 budget request for the EAP region includes a 
diplomatic engagement budget of $533 million and a foreign assistance 
budget of $1.36 billion. In addition, the President's budget request 
includes $2 billion in mandatory funding to support the Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, and $7.1 billion in mandatory funding to support the Compacts 
of Free Association (COFA). Further, the FY 2024 budget includes $2 
billion in mandatory funding to support international infrastructure 
globally, which will include projects in the East Asia and Pacific 
region.
    Here, I'd like to provide a brief overview of how the President's 
Budget for EAP directly supports the five objectives of the Indo-
Pacific Strategy.
    First, we are advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The FY 2024 
Budget supports our continued investment in democratic institutions, a 
free press, and a vibrant civil society that will improve fiscal 
transparency to expose corruption and drive reform. These efforts 
complement our expanded diplomatic presence across the Indo-Pacific, 
including a new Embassy in the Solomon Islands and planning for new 
embassies in Kiribati, Tonga, and Vanuatu. These efforts also support 
our commitment to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
unimpeded lawful commerce, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the 
freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime domain, including 
in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
    Second, we are building connections in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. 
The President's Request supports our bilateral relationships, as well 
as our engagement with regional groupings and institutions, including 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), AUKUS, the Quad, 
the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community (SPC), and the Mekong-
U.S. Partnership, to build capacity and address regional challenges.
    A notable example of how we are building connections is through our 
support of the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the Young 
Pacific Leaders Program, which serve as the U.S. Government's signature 
leadership development programs for youth across Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific Islands.
    Third, we are driving Indo-Pacific prosperity. With the continued 
negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity 
(IPEF), which seeks high-ambition outcomes, and the launch of the 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the 
President's budget will foster economic engagement that will promote a 
connected, resilient, and fair Indo-Pacific economy. The President's 
Budget will also enable us to follow through on the commitments made 
during the U.S. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation host year in 2023.
    Fourth, we are bolstering Indo-Pacific security. Recognizing that 
security is a necessary condition for prosperity, the President's 
Budget will build the capacity of our Indo-Pacific partners to respond 
to and resolve both domestic and transnational security threats.
    We remain committed to maintaining peace and security across the 
Taiwan Strait. Our one China policy, which has remained consistent, has 
helped to maintain cross-strait peace and stability for the past 40 
years. In line with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States will 
continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense 
capability.
    For example, our cybersecurity capacity building programs have 
assisted our ASEAN and Pacific Islands partners by developing their 
incident response capability to protect and defend against malign cyber 
actors.
    Fifth, we are building regional resilience. U.S. security depends 
on our collaboration with our allies and partners to address shared 
challenges. The President's Budget supports health security, climate 
adaptation and mitigation efforts, and energy security to build 
regional resilience to transnational threats. For example, we are 
supporting our Pacific Islands partners through an agreement with NOAA 
to co-develop new environment and ocean observing technologies that 
will help them better prepare for rising sea levels.
    In summary, the United States' role in the region must be more 
effective and enduring than ever before. As is often said at these 
budget hearings--resources determine priorities--and as such our 
partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific are keenly looking at our 
ability to deliver resources as a sign of our commitment and durability 
in the region. The President's FY 2024 budget request will allow us to 
build on our existing efforts and will further strengthen our 
commitment in the region.
    With that, I'd like to thank you for inviting me to testify today. 
I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you for your testimony.
    Assistant Director Schiffer.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, BUREAU FOR ASIA, UNITED 
  STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Schiffer. Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify on USAID's role in advancing U.S. foreign policy 
priorities in East Asia and the Pacific.
    It is good to be back in this room, although I have to say 
sitting behind you in the dais is a much more comfortable view 
than the view from this table.
    As my colleague, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, laid out, 
the importance of the East Asia and Pacific region for the 
United States cannot be understated.
    The region is home to the majority of humanity, the world's 
fastest growing economies, the busiest maritime trade routes. 
These countries are essential partners in creating a free and 
open Indo-Pacific that improves lives in Asia, underwrites 
regional stability and security, and helps generate prosperity 
here at home.
    USAID is clear-eyed about the strategic context of the 
region as well as the People's Republic of China and China's 
intent to rewrite existing national regional rules and global 
rules and norms for its own narrow advantages.
    Our development approach starts not with the question of 
what we are against, but rather what we are for. USAID embodies 
what the United States can offer the region as a partner and 
friend development to communities and families who are seeking 
to transform their lives and, more broadly, as a leader in U.S. 
efforts to advance a free and open, connected, prosperous, 
secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.
    That is what the region wants and that is what we strive to 
provide. The President's Indo-Pacific strategy serves as the 
primary thrust of our fiscal year 2024 budget request, which 
aims to improve resilience to health and climate threats, 
foster sustainable, inclusive, and transparent economic growth, 
and strengthen democratic institutions to support good 
governance and human rights.
    This corresponds most directly with the most pressing 
challenges to sustainable development in the region and the 
requests we receive from our partners: support to address 
rising authoritarianism, the ease and proliferation of 
information manipulation, and the climate crisis, all of which 
seriously threaten food security, citizen-responsive 
governance, and national sovereignty in the region.
    To tackle these challenges, the President's fiscal year 
2024 budget request for USAID includes $964.4 million for East 
Asia and the Pacific, which is a $194 million increase, or 25 
percent, over the fiscal year 2023 request.
    We believe that this increase is merited by the scope and 
scale and urgency of the challenges that we face in the region. 
In line with the Administration's priorities, USAID's request 
prioritizes key sectors that advance U.S. national security and 
prosperity alongside that of our partners and our allies in 
Asia and the Pacific.
    First, to boost inclusive economic growth USAID will 
promote trade and investment, private sector productivity, and 
digital connectivity.
    Second, our demand-driven climate change activities will 
help reduce emissions, protect critical infrastructure and 
ecosystems, implement regulatory reforms, mitigate resource 
conflict, and help partners transition to renewable energy.
    Third, we will work to reverse democratic backsliding and 
strengthen democratic institutions and norms.
    Fourth, to bolster women's economic empowerment, gender 
equity, and human rights, USAID will work to increase women's 
political, civic, and economic engagement, address gender 
inequality, and combat gender-based violence.
    Finally, to strengthen health systems to detect and respond 
to emerging threats, USAID will continue to bolster the 
resilience of partner countries and economies to prevent, 
detect, and respond to pandemic threats and increase their 
ability to withstand future shocks.
    With your continued support this budget request will allow 
USAID to deliver on our commitment to East Asia and the 
Pacific.
    As Administrator Power has noted, it is in America's best 
interest to help feed the world, to help protect fellow 
democracies, to advocate for the dignity of all people, not 
only to reflect an America that is generous, compassionate, and 
moral, but also to protect the safety and prosperity of the 
American people.
    With your continued support and on behalf of the American 
people, USAID you will continue our central role in realizing 
this vision, will increase in partner countries resilience, 
capacity, and advancing sustainable prosperity and security for 
communities across the Indo-Pacific.
    I look forward to your counsel and to your questions. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Schiffer

                              introduction
    Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, Distinguished Committee 
Members: Thank you for inviting me to testify on USAID's role in 
advancing U.S. foreign policy priorities in East Asia and the Pacific 
and our FY 2024 Budget Request.
    The East Asia and Pacific region is home to over 2 billion people, 
the world's fastest-growing economies, the busiest maritime trade 
routes, and many rapidly urbanizing societies. It is also quickly 
becoming one of the most digitally connected regions. These countries 
are essential partners in creating a free and open Indo-Pacific that 
improves lives in Asia, underwrites regional stability and security, 
and helps generate prosperity here at home as well.
    Our approach to the region starts not with the question of what we 
are against but rather the question of what we are for. We are clear-
eyed about the People's Republic of China's (PRC) capabilities and 
intent to wield its financial, economic, political and military power 
to advance its own interests and rewrite, for its own narrow advantage, 
existing regional and global rules and norms. But, we know what the 
United States can offer to the region, as a partner and as a friend, in 
advancing a shared vision for a free and open, connected, prosperous, 
secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.
    USAID sees tremendous opportunities in the region and is well 
positioned to support our nation's Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), which 
is the primary thrust of our budget request for FY 2024. Our efforts 
under the IPS focus on three primary areas: improving resilience to 
health and climate threats; fostering sustainable, inclusive, and 
transparent economic growth; and strengthening democratic institutions 
to support good governance and human rights. The increases in climate, 
energy security, and economic growth funding in the region are directly 
responsive to requests from our partners in the region, who 
consistently raise these areas as opportunities for additional support 
and engagement. Our commitment to supporting good governance, economic 
growth, and sustainable resource management are all critical to the 
achievement of the goals of the IPS. This request also supports the 
Administration's objectives under the Pacific Partnership Strategy.
    We are also aware that the region's continued growth and prosperity 
are hindered by rising authoritarianism, which threatens human dignity, 
freedom, and equality. Authoritarian practices across the region are 
undermining democratic values and threatening sustainable development, 
food security, citizen-responsive governance, and national sovereignty. 
These practices include an acceleration and diffusion of information 
manipulation. Exacerbating these challenges, countries across East Asia 
and the Pacific are still grappling with the consequences of an 
unprecedented global pandemic, through which autocrats have attempted 
to further concentrate their power and control.
    On top of this, the climate crisis has become a threat multiplier. 
Drought and heavy rains are restricting countries' ability to feed 
themselves. Hunger and food security concerns have only increased as 
the Kremlin's unjust war in Ukraine continues to disrupt global supply 
chains.
    All of these challenges have combined to inflict significant 
economic harm on the most marginalized communities in the region.
    The development challenges of today are more formidable than those 
the world has faced at any time since World War II, with significant 
implications for America's national security. Due to the generous 
support of Congress, USAID stands at the forefront of U.S. Government 
efforts to address these challenges and provide affirmative global 
leadership in alignment with U.S. National Security Strategy 
priorities. Our ability to translate our development and humanitarian 
assistance into progress beyond programs is key to achieving long-
lasting prosperity and stability for our partners in East Asia and the 
Pacific, as well as for the United States.
                               priorities
    The President's FY 2024 budget request for USAID includes $964.4 
million for East Asia and the Pacific in the Development Assistance, 
Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Global Health Programs-USAID accounts. 
This is a $194 million increase, or 25 percent, over the FY 2023 
request. In addition, the FY 2024 budget request includes new 
multifaceted mandatory resources to out-compete the PRC and strengthen 
our role in the Indo-Pacific region. The request includes $2 billion 
over 5 years to accelerate implementation of an affirmative vision for 
the Indo-Pacific, which is defined by U.S. values and advances a free 
and open, connected, prosperous, secure and resilient region.
    Through critical, targeted investments, this request will help our 
East Asian and Pacific partners build regional capacity and resilience 
to the growing threat posed by the PRC, uphold shared values, and 
continue to provide affirmative leadership in the region. This request 
will also advance the U.S. commitment to a free, open, connected, 
prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific. In line with 
Administration priorities, the FY 2024 request prioritizes a set of key 
themes to advance U.S. national security and prosperity alongside that 
of our partners and allies in Asia and the Pacific: boost inclusive 
economic growth, especially regarding post-COVID-19 recovery and 
including support for free and open emerging digital technologies and 
connectivity; continue to address challenges posed by climate change; 
reverse democratic backsliding and strengthen democratic institutions 
and norms against authoritarianism, corruption, disinformation, and 
coercion; and bolster women's economic empowerment, gender equity, and 
human rights. In addition, USAID will continue to strengthen health 
systems to prevent, detect, and respond to emerging threats, 
strengthening global health security.
    With FY 2024 funding, USAID will continue to build regional 
capacity and resilience to address regional challenges from political 
and humanitarian crises, to climate concerns and digital connectivity 
and security. It will also support U.S. coordination, bilaterally and 
regionally, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Pacific Community (SPC), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Partners 
in the Blue Pacific (PBP), and the Australia-India-Japan-United States 
Indo-Pacific Quad.
    I will now detail the FY 2024 budget request by strategic sector 
and share several country highlights.
                            economic growth
    In East Asia and the Pacific, USAID's FY 2024 budget request 
includes $122.6 million for economic growth, which is a $48.3 million 
increase, or 65 percent over the FY 2023 request. This budget will 
allow USAID to advance inclusive, broad-based economic growth, a 
critical factor for enabling and supporting democratic governance that 
delivers for the people. While resourcing all elements of our Indo-
Pacific Strategy is an Administration priority, funding to advance our 
economic strategy in the region is our top resource need.
    This budget will fund USAID efforts to support economic growth and 
the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) through sectors such as 
trade and investment, private sector productivity, and digital 
connectivity--contributing toward a more connected, resilient, green, 
and fair economy across the Indo-Pacific. Currently, USAID has on-the-
ground presence in five IPEF member countries in the East Asia and the 
Pacific region: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. We expect IPEF to drive private sector capital into the region 
and tackle economic priorities that we have not addressed in past trade 
arrangements, including supply chain resilience, the clean energy 
transition, and efforts to combat corruption. These are all issues that 
are increasingly significant economic drivers of growth and essential 
to U.S. competitiveness.
    USAID assistance will help partners resist coercive, unfair, and/or 
corrupt PRC trade practices and advance policy, institutional, legal, 
and regulatory reforms that improve transparency, regulatory quality, 
and competition standards. These reforms will result in increased trade 
and investment diversification away from PRC state-owned enterprises, 
and toward more inclusive and sustainable partnerships.
    USAID will continue working toward IPS objectives through private 
sector engagement to improve competitiveness and connectivity. For 
example, with FY 2024 funding, USAID will provide technical support to 
help Indonesia plan, finance, and implement clean energy programs and 
expand access to energy. USAID will support digital development in 
Indonesia, especially cybersecurity, to drive inclusive economic growth 
and attract greater, and mutually beneficial, U.S. investment. USAID 
will integrate climate change programming into its workforce 
development programs, preparing young Indonesians for the ``green 
jobs'' of the future. These programs will emphasize private sector 
partnerships, especially with U.S. businesses.
    In Mongolia, USAID will continue to promote economic 
diversification so that the market is more enticing to private 
businesses seeking to invest and trade. USAID will help Mongolian 
micro-, small- and, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) access the 
financing and skills they need to grow their businesses, enter the 
digital economy, and become more competitive. This is significant given 
that MSMEs make up nearly 98 percent of all enterprises in Mongolia and 
employ 52 percent of the country's workforce. This work builds on 
previous success: since 2019, USAID has helped 2,640 small and medium 
enterprises throughout Mongolia to receive $39 million in financing.
    Similarly, in Laos, USAID will build a more inclusive economy by 
expanding access to markets and financing for MSMEs. We will support 
businesses as they continue to rebuild after the COVID-19 pandemic, 
particularly in agricultural areas and the hard-hit tourism sector. 
USAID will also assist Laotian MSMEs to adopt the latest digital 
solutions for e-commerce so that they can thrive in the post-pandemic 
economic environment.
                      climate and energy security
    For East Asia and the Pacific, USAID's FY 2024 budget request 
includes $279.3 million for climate, which is a $108.8 million 
increase, or 64 percent, over the FY 2023 request. The FY 2024 request 
emphasizes the Administration's priority of addressing climate change 
by reducing emissions, protecting critical ecosystems, implementing 
legal and regulatory reforms, mitigating resource conflicts, helping 
nations transition to renewable energy, and building resilience against 
the impacts of climate change. With this funding, USAID seeks to 
address climate change and its increasing and interconnected impacts.
    The FY 2024 request includes a significant increase for regional 
programming on climate adaptation in IPEF countries. With this 
additional funding, USAID will be able to respond to IPEF partners' 
requests, as articulated in the course of the IPEF negotiations, to 
help them implement IPEF commitments and grow their economies, as well 
as the economy of the United States. We will support them in adapting 
to climate change through investments in systems for agriculture and 
food supplies, nature-focused solutions, resilient cities, and 
financial investments in adaptation, particularly climate-friendly 
infrastructure, in alignment with the Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
    Across the region, USAID will enhance climate change adaptation and 
mitigation by improving access to, and use of, information and tools 
that can help countries slow, stop, and reverse rapid deforestation, 
improve land management, and prepare and respond to the impacts of 
climate change. USAID will support of net-zero energy grid development 
in Asia by promoting power sector reforms, supporting the deployment of 
state-of-the-art energy technologies, and modernizing power grids.
    With FY 2024 resources, USAID will help our Pacific Islands 
neighbors realize their ambitious climate adaptation and mitigation 
goals by advancing the adoption of renewable energy sources, increasing 
access to infrastructure resilient to a changing climate, and 
strengthening early warning systems for climate-induced disasters. To 
promote transformative adaptation and resilience solutions, FY 2024 
resources will facilitate more residents to adopt climate-smart 
livelihoods and mobilize climate financing. Since 2016, USAID has 
mobilized more than $500 million dollars for Pacific Island countries 
from international climate finance institutions and supported local 
institutions to receive full accreditation to directly access 
international climate finance. With FY 2024 resources, USAID will also 
improve the performance of energy utilities, increase transparent 
private sector investments in the energy sector, and expand off-grid 
clean energy systems in Pacific Island countries.
    In addition, the request will allow USAID to boost the resilience 
of communities around the region so that they can keep working and 
earning a living--despite the negative impacts of climate change. 
Adaptation programming protects lives, promotes productive livelihoods, 
and supports resilient ecosystems in countries like Vietnam, where low-
lying cities and delta regions are extremely vulnerable to climate 
change-related flooding. In Vietnam, USAID will use FY 2024 resources 
to protect the landscapes and biodiversity that agricultural 
communities depend on. We will continue to develop sustainable, 
climate-smart livelihoods, building on success creating jobs in parks, 
conservation zones, and watershed protection areas as well as in 
ecotourism. In the Philippines, which the 2022 World Risk Index ranked 
as the country with highest disaster risk, USAID will improve the 
coping capacities of vulnerable communities in the face of disaster and 
capitalize on the use of climate-smart technologies to advance U.S. 
leadership in addressing climate security, as well as food security. In 
Timor-Leste, USAID will support the incorporation of improved, climate-
smart agricultural practices, increasing the availability of nutritious 
food while also leading to lower use of fertilizers and associated 
emissions.
    USAID will also continue to engage our partners in the region and 
identify adaptation needs in Pacific Island countries, where extreme 
weather and shifting climate patterns pose an existential threat. 
Although collectively these nations contribute less than half a percent 
of global greenhouse emissions, they are on the frontlines of the 
struggle against climate threats.
                         democratic governance
    For East Asia and the Pacific, USAID's FY 2024 request includes 
$181.9 million for democracy, rights, and governance programming, which 
is a $5.5 million, or 3 percent, increase from the FY 2023 request.
    Against a backdrop of rising authoritarianism, this budget will 
allow USAID to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law 
that are critical for peace and stability. It will allow USAID to 
further promote and protect a free press and civil society across the 
region; address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization; and 
counter disinformation and malign influence. Critically, it will enable 
USAID to support democratic institutions as a bulwark against 
corruption and coercion.
    In the Philippines, USAID will use FY 2024 resources to fortify the 
Philippines' democratic foundations and enable the country to become a 
more stable and open partner to the United States. To bolster 
responsive, democratic governance, USAID will protect human rights and 
the rule of law while broadening citizen participation to increase 
public support for democratic systems. USAID will improve delivery of 
basic social services, combat corruption, and curtail transnational 
criminal activities--such as the trafficking of persons. USAID will 
assist the Philippine Government to perform key governmental and public 
administration functions effectively and efficiently. With this 
request, USAID will strengthen governance structures at the local 
level, promote decentralization, and promote youth engagement, 
political participation, and leadership. Empowering citizens to produce 
leaders responsive to their constituents can increase resilience 
against the malign influence of the PRC. This work will build on 
USAID's progress in increasing civil society participation in local 
governance; for example, in 2022, USAID supported the government to 
streamline accreditation for civil society organizations (CSOs), 
increasing the number of accredited CSOs by 85 percent. Accreditation 
has enabled these organizations to participate in government processes 
and advance key development priorities in their communities.
    In Timor-Leste, which celebrated 20 years of democracy last year, 
democracy champions are now working to build still-nascent 
institutions, bolster human capital, and overcome significant health 
and economic challenges. To support the country's development 
trajectory, USAID will use FY 2024 funds to strengthen civil society 
and support the Timorese Government's accountability and integrity 
reform program, which seeks better management of state public resources 
for improving service delivery for citizens. This includes 
strengthening health sector governance and the capacity of civil 
society organizations. Funding will allow USAID to implement programs 
that reduce opportunities for corruption and builds on a cooperative 
and fruitful partnership with the government; for example, in 2022, a 
USAID-supported copyright law designed to protect digital creativity 
and innovation was approved by parliament and is set to come into force 
in June 2023. Additionally, with the request, USAID will assist Timor-
Leste to meet the requirements to join ASEAN as a full member state.
    Support to Indonesia, a member of the G20, home to ASEAN 
headquarters, and a nation in strategic proximity to over one-third of 
the world's commercial shipping, demonstrates U.S. commitment to this 
growing democracy and the overall connectivity and prosperity of the 
Indo-Pacific. With FY 2024 funding, USAID will support the government 
to improve basic public services, increase transparency, promote 
tolerance, and build inclusive coalitions for advocacy that engage 
citizens as the voice for accountability and reform. Building on 
Indonesia's strong democratic foundation, funds will also expand access 
to information; support the protection of constitutional rights, 
including for journalists and Indonesia's most vulnerable populations; 
and address corruption. For instance, since 2018, USAID has provided 
crucial support to Indonesia Corruption Watch to create an online 
learning platform that has educated tens of thousands of youth, 
community members, and civil servants on corruption prevention.
                                 health
    For East Asia and the Pacific, USAID's FY 2024 request includes 
$196.3 million for the Global Health Programs (GHP)-USAID account, 
which is a $5.8 million increase, or 3 percent, over the FY 2023 
request.
    Health programs that support stronger health systems play a 
critical role in sustainable, inclusive development gains and support a 
free, open, and resilient East Asia and Pacific region over the long 
term. With this request, USAID will continue to bolster the resilience 
of partner countries and economies to prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease threats--including future outbreaks--and increase 
their ability to withstand future shocks. FY 2024 resources will also 
help address tuberculosis, malaria, and other diseases; improve 
nutrition and health among mothers and babies; and promote resilient 
health supply chains, all of which will also contribute to 
strengthening health systems to recover from COVID-19-related 
disruptions.
    At the global level, the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the link 
between public health, emerging diseases, and the economy. The FY 2024 
request will allow USAID to support ASEAN health security priorities 
through technical support and capacity building in partnership with the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC)'s regional office in Hanoi. USAID 
activities will promote coordination and information sharing across 
ASEAN member states through the ASEAN Public Health Emergency 
Coordination System, as well as support ASEAN's goal to establish a One 
Health approach to address emerging infectious diseases based on the 
relationships between human and animal health and the environment. 
Funds requested in the FY 2024 Budget will support the region in 
identifying and addressing emerging infectious disease threats at the 
national, regional, and community levels; strengthen laboratory and 
surveillance capabilities; improve risk communication; and prevent, 
detect, and reduce the spread of antimicrobial resistant pathogens.
    Across the East Asia and Pacific region, USAID will continue to 
support the goal of combating infectious diseases. Malaria and drug-
resistant malaria, in particular, remain serious and persistent threats 
to public health, particularly in Southeast Asia, which has the second 
highest estimated malaria burden globally.\1\ With FY 2024 funding, 
under the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative, USAID will scale up 
proven preventive and treatment interventions and new approaches with 
the aim of eliminating drug resistant strains in the Mekong Delta. For 
example, in Thailand, USAID helped integrate drug efficacy monitoring 
within routine surveillance systems to ensure complete patient 
treatment and to detect early signs of drug resistance, an approach 
that is now being replicated in other Greater Mekong Subregion 
countries, contributing to a safer, more secure, and resilient Indo-
Pacific.
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    \1\ https://www.who.int/southeastasia/health-topics/
malaria#::text=Malaria%20is%20a%20
serious%20and,highest%20estimated%20malaria%20burden%20globally
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    In Laos, USAID will strengthen health systems and expand services 
for maternal child health and nutrition (MCHN) programming. FY 2024 
funds will improve much-needed health and nutrition outcomes among 
pregnant and postpartum women, newborns, children, and adolescents in 
hard-to-reach communities. These efforts will also strengthen local 
level health care providers' ability to engage with communities to 
improve nutrition and build local-level health governance and 
resilience. This MCHN initiative--a priority for the Government of 
Laos--serves as an important trust building measure in our growing 
bilateral relationship as well as an activity with a strong 
localization focus and an excellent way to strengthen local governance, 
accountability, and local voices.
    USAID will use FY 2024 resources to address the myriad health 
crises in Burma precipitated by the coup, including the near collapse 
of the public health system, large-scale population displacements, and 
the inequitable COVID-19 and routine childhood immunization coverage in 
areas out of the regime's control. In the past year, TB incidence 
increased by 17 percent, malaria cases increased by 64 percent, and 
coverage of routine childhood immunizations plummeted to catastrophic 
levels. Fifty percent of the public health workforce remains on strike, 
leaving critical gaps in service delivery for the most vulnerable and 
marginalized people. With FY 2024 funding, USAID will expand TB 
services through non-regime-controlled channels, including the private 
sector. Funding will intensify malaria prevention and treatment efforts 
in ethnic-administered areas along Burma's borders, which are 
contending with a dual catastrophe: a severe malaria spike and hundreds 
of thousands of displaced people facing an elevated risk of malaria 
transmission and death. The funding will also build the capacity of 
ethnic health organizations to monitor health threats and deliver 
lifesaving services in resistance areas, including the administration 
of routine immunizations for children.
                gender equality and women's empowerment
    For East Asia and the Pacific, USAID's FY 2024 request includes 
$119.1 million attributed for gender, which is a $5.9 million increase, 
or 5 percent, over the FY 2023 request.
    USAID recognizes that the full participation of all people--
including women, girls, and marginalized groups--is essential to a 
resilient and prosperous region. With FY 2024 resources, USAID will 
continue to promote gender equality and women's empowerment across East 
Asia and the Pacific. We will increase women's political, civic, and 
economic engagement; address gender norms and systems that perpetuate 
inequalities; and combat gender-based violence so that more individuals 
can live safer, healthier lives and contribute more fully to their 
societies.
    In Papua New Guinea (PNG), USAID will use FY 2024 resources to 
prioritize the empowerment and protection of marginalized populations, 
with a focus on women and girls--who are increasingly vulnerable to 
gender-based violence and human trafficking. It will allow USAID to 
boost women's skills and increase their access to credit so that more 
women can participate in the formal economy. USAID will expand 
investments that directly increase women's political and social 
participation in PNG, building on recent successes; in 2022, USAID 
increased inclusion in PNG's national election by supporting women 
parliamentary candidates, with one USAID-trained candidate, Kessy 
Sawang, winning her election and becoming one of only two women 
currently serving in PNG's national parliament.
    USAID will use FY 2024 resources to implement shared U.S. and ASEAN 
priorities of gender mainstreaming, women's economic empowerment, 
addressing gender-based violence, and women, peace, and security as 
agreed upon in the September 2022 U.S. ASEAN Gender Ministerial led by 
Administrator Power. USAID will expand gender equity and inclusion 
across ASEAN sectors in support of the ASEAN Gender Mainstreaming 
Framework. USAID will also support ASEAN to implement the Regional Plan 
of Action for Women, Peace, and Security which was launched in December 
2022. Within economic sectors, USAID will support ASEAN Member States 
to better address Gender Based Violence in the workplace as well as 
promoting women's economic empowerment through supporting women-owned 
small and medium enterprises to fully participate in the digital 
economy through training and introduction to new technologies.
                               conclusion
    USAID remains committed to our friends and partners across East 
Asia and the Pacific, and we have heard from leaders and communities 
across the region of the importance of continued U.S. commitment and 
presence in the region. This budget request allows us to provide the 
necessary resources for USAID to deliver on our commitments and 
continue our central role in strengthening U.S. security and prosperity 
through investments that increase partner country resilience. Our 
efforts aim to contribute to greater stability and economic opportunity 
for all. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 
look forward to your counsel and questions.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.
    Now we are going to begin with questioning and we will have 
multiple rounds of questioning for members who are interested. 
There is a lot of ground to cover in a short period of time.
    I am going to start with some security-related questions 
and that means, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, these 
questions will be directed to you.
    We all know that President Xi and the PRC have been 
following very closely what has happened in Ukraine, both the 
response of the Ukrainian people as well as the support the 
United States and our allies and partners have provided to 
Ukraine both on the military front as well as united action on 
the economic front, which, while not perfect, I think China has 
taken notice of the unity of that effort as they consider their 
options and future options with respect to Taiwan.
    My question is this. When it comes to our ability to 
organize a united economic response in the event that China 
were to provide lethal assistance to Russia in its war against 
Ukraine, where does that stand now, and part two of that 
question is do you agree that in the interests of deterring any 
Russian aggression against--excuse me, any PRC aggression 
against Taiwan, it makes sense to signal in advance not just 
the fact that we are continuing to provide Taiwan with the 
means to defend itself, but does it make sense to signal in 
advance a united partnership with our EU colleagues as well as 
our democratic partners in East Asia to impose very tough 
economic consequences in the event of any aggression by the PRC 
against Taiwan, which in and of itself, obviously, would create 
a huge amount of economic stress and tension?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 
much for your questions, which are incredibly important.
    I would say that we have continued to express our deep 
concern regarding the support that China has continued to 
provide Russia in its illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.
    We have also specifically made clear that there would be 
significant consequences if China were to provide lethal 
assistance to Russia and I think that is something that not 
only the United States has made clear, but that many of our 
partners around the world in Europe and Asia have made clear as 
well.
    We do think that is vitally important that, again, as you 
noted at the outset, in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States we make clear that we support globally a rules-
based order that has helped to undergird the peace and 
prosperity for these past many decades and that rules-based 
international order is currently under assault and the key 
example of that, again, is Russia's invasion.
    We have continued to make that clear to counterparts in 
Beijing, as have our partners, and we will continue to do so.
    I also agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that we know that 
countries around the world are watching closely and carefully 
what is happening in Ukraine and I would hope that everyone 
around the world including in Beijing would note the incredible 
unity in the international community opposing Russia's invasion 
and the collective imposition of costs on Russia.
    In the context of Taiwan, we have continued to signal, Mr. 
Chairman, that there is no change to our long-standing ``One 
China'' policy of which you are familiar. That framework has 
helped to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait 
for more than four decades now.
    The United States of America is committed to maintaining 
that peace and stability, we support the status quo, and we 
oppose changes to that status quo by either side, and I think 
it is important and has been gratifying that many partners 
around the world have also recognized that peace and stability 
across the Taiwan Strait is a key matter of international 
concern. It is not just an internal Chinese matter.
    You referenced the 50 percent of global shipping that 
passes through the Taiwan Strait on any given day. We talk 
about the large number of high-end chips that are manufactured 
in Taiwan, including 90 percent of high-end chips.
    Any kind of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait would 
be devastating to the global economy. I think it is very much 
in our interest and our collective interest with allies and 
partners and friends to continue to signal that--just how 
important it is to maintain peace and stability across the 
Taiwan Strait and, again, to send a message to China that we 
would oppose any efforts to use other than peaceful means to 
try to change the situation there.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I may circle back to some of 
those to follow-up on some of those points.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Let me turn it over to Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Chairman Menendez and 
I worked together on legislation calling for a comprehensive 
strategy to be developed with regards to China and deep--with 
deep granular and tactical aspects as well as outside 
involvement.
    Our legislation became law in the NDAA 2 years ago. Senator 
Risch and I wrote a letter to the President last November 
requesting an update on that progress. We have not received a 
response to that.
    By law, the Administration must submit the China 
comprehensive strategy 270 days after they submit the National 
Security Strategy. Given the fact that that was submitted 
October 12, it means that the final strategy on China is due on 
July 8.
    More than 200 days have now passed since the National 
Security Strategy was put in place. What progress has been made 
by the Administration in developing that kind of comprehensive 
tactically included grand strategy with regards to China, Mr. 
Kritenbrink?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very much 
for your question and yes, sir, we are very much aware of the 
letter from you and Ranking Member Risch.
    As you outlined at the top, Senator, obviously, the United 
States has made very clear what our approach to China is. It 
was outlined in the speech that Secretary Blinken gave last 
year.
    I can assure you, Mr. Ranking Member, that the 
Administration will fulfill the requirement outlined in the 
NDAA. We will share our comprehensive China strategy with China 
in the coming weeks.
    This Administration obviously has regularly briefed 
Congress on matters related to China. We will continue to do 
so. We look forward to doing so and we appreciate your support 
on that and we will deliver that strategy. We expect to deliver 
that strategy well ahead of the deadline that you have 
referenced.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. I would note that I would hope 
numerous aspects of that would be classified----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Romney. --and would only be available to a----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I believe almost all of it would be, sir.
    Senator Romney. Yes. Yes. Excellent.
    Are there outside people being involved in that effort?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I would say that, obviously, we 
are aware of the language in the NDAA regarding giving the 
President an option to establish this advisory board.
    I think it is fair to say that we do regularly consult with 
outside experts and former practitioners on our approach to 
China.
    I do not know that I could say that they are formally 
involved in the formation and the execution of our classified 
China strategy, but obviously we have benefited a great deal 
from outside expertise as we have crafted our strategy.
    Senator Romney. I would only underscore that I think the 
credibility and the permanence of that strategy would be 
enhanced by having the perspective of people from both parties 
and people outside the governmental sphere.
    I would--is there a point person that is responsible for 
this or is there some--are you the one that is leading this 
effort or who in the State Department is leading that effort? 
Do you know?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. On the strategy or the consulting?
    Senator Romney. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. As with many things, Mr. Ranking Member, 
this is a collaborative effort across the interagency, but I 
think it is safe to say and I would hope would be apparent that 
the White House has the lead on crafting the government-wide 
U.S.-China strategy, but certainly the State Department and my 
bureau has played a----
    Senator Romney. That would be Jake Sullivan or----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, the National Security Advisor 
and his team.
    Senator Romney. All right. I just cannot resist elaborating 
on a point that was raised by the Chairman at this committee, 
which is Taiwan, and I was of the view that it was unlikely 
that China would immediately invade Taiwan.
    There were some who thought that when Russia went into 
Ukraine, that China would immediately follow suit. I did not 
think that was a particularly wise thing to suggest for 
numerous reasons, but one being that China would learn that 
many times there are unintended consequences for that type of 
action and nations that have invaded a sovereign neighbor have 
often found that some unintended consequences have come back to 
hurt them very badly as, clearly, Russia has found with regards 
to Ukraine.
    China invading Taiwan would potentially have those 
consequences, one of which relates not just to chips, but to 
the proprietary products that go into manufacturing various 
high-tech products.
    It is my understanding that Taiwan manufactures literally 
hundreds of items beyond semiconductors that could be produced 
nowhere else and that if those were to be disrupted, the 
China's economy would be severely impacted.
    I would only encourage us to evaluate how many of those 
products there are, how much impact would be felt in this 
economy were there to be interruption of some kind, but it is 
my hope and belief that the extraordinary proprietary 
capabilities that Taiwan has will serve as perhaps one of the 
most effective deterrents of--to keep China from carrying out 
kinetic activity.
    Therefore, at least in my own view--I am sorry I am going 
on here--but in my own view that China is going to look for not 
just a military, if you will, takeover of Taiwan, but looking 
for a gradual economic and geopolitical takeover and that we 
should be focused not just on our military strengthening, but 
also on those geopolitical efforts that are going to be 
necessary to keep Taiwan's backbone strong.
    If you have any comment on that, either one of you, I am 
happy to hear it if the chairman will oblige.
    Senator Van Hollen. I will. Please keep it----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. [Inaudible]
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Ranking Member, I would just say I think you have 
outlined clearly the case for why it is vitally important to 
maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and why 
it is in no one's interest, including the PRC's, to take 
precipitous action that would lead to conflict. There would be 
serious consequences for the entire world if such an event were 
to happen.
    I would say, Mr. Ranking Member, I would just add that we 
are focused on not just the maintenance of peace and stability, 
but doing so through deterrence and we believe that that 
involves a wide range of efforts, not just the provision of 
arms of a defensive nature to Taiwan, but also working to build 
out Taiwan's international space and to ensure that Taiwan 
continues to play a key role globally as well.
    We are committed to using all means at our disposal to 
contribute to that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait 
and I think you have outlined the case very well, Mr. Ranking 
Member.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you both for 
being here.
    Assistant Secretary, I am closely monitoring the 
negotiations with the Freely Associated States. I met with 
Ambassador Yoon. I think we are on a very positive track, but 
we are now at the point where we, obviously, have to land this 
particular airplane, but then we have to get it through the 
legislative process.
    Two questions. First, we just want your commitment to work 
with us to find a moving vehicle that we can put this into. I 
think it is unlikely to get floor time on its own. That is a 
simple yes or no.
    The second question for you is if you could just briefly 
talk about how important it is to renew this Compacts of Free 
Association.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator Schatz, thank you very much for 
your question.
    Obviously, we are committed to working closely with members 
of this body to ensure that we conclude successfully the 
negotiations over the Compacts of Free Association and that we 
work to ensure that those compacts are reflected in U.S. law.
    Senator, I would say that concluding the Compacts of Free 
Association are in America's vital national interests. They are 
absolutely central to our entire approach to the region, 
certainly, vitally important to our entire position in the 
Pacific, not just the Northern Pacific, but the entire Pacific.
    We have--as you well know, Senator Schatz, we have long-
standing historic relations with the three Freely Associated 
States, reflecting our special history together.
    The compacts--of course, the nature of those agreements are 
very important not just to the three Freely Associated States, 
but also to U.S. national security interests as well, and those 
compacts ensure not only America's strategic position across 
the Pacific, but also the continued peace and stability and 
prosperity across much of the Pacific.
    We think it is vitally important. We are very grateful for 
your support, Senator.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    As you know better than I do, this is a big year for 
expanding the U.S. presence in the Pacific. Just to check in, 
are you on track for opening all four planned new missions this 
year?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. What I would say, Senator, is this. As you 
know, we have already opened our new embassy in the Solomon 
Islands. We are on track this month to open our new embassy in 
Tonga and we continue to engage with our friends in Vanuatu and 
Kiribati as well on our proposed new embassies there.
    The President's budget request reflects these efforts and 
we are committed to carrying out the diplomacy to get those 
done.
    Now, the only reason why I am not giving you a definitive 
answer, Senator, is, obviously, for each of these embassies it 
requires negotiation and consent, of course, with----
    Senator Schatz. Yes. Absolutely. I----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We are working diligently and we are on 
track, but I cannot guarantee the timeframes, for example, for 
Vanuatu and Kiribati, which are not worked out.
    Senator Schatz. I got it, but if you could get back to the 
committee with some additional fidelity, understanding that 
this has got to be an iterative process and----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Schatz. --nothing about me without me. We cannot 
just do this without the cooperation of the other governments.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Of course.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    U.S. Embassy Honiara, Solomon Islands opened on January 27, 2023. 
U.S. Embassy Nuku'alofa, Tonga will open on May 9, 2023.
    For Kiribati, we are in discussion with the Kiribati Government and 
developing plans for a potential embassy, the opening of which would be 
subject to congressional consultation and notification. We anticipate 
that the timeline for opening Embassy Tarawa will, in large part, 
depend on how quickly the Kiribati finalize internal deliberations.
    For Vanuatu, State has consulted the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding plans to open an embassy in Port Vila. State has 
sent assessment teams to Port Vila to identify potential embassy 
facility options. Provided no unanticipated delays and subject to 
congressional notification, our goal is to open Embassy Port Vila in 
calendar year 2023.

    Senator Schatz. I understand that.
    I do not think there is anything that I hear more about 
from my Filipino-American constituents than the visa operations 
in the Philippines, and I know COVID sort of smashed consular 
operations everywhere and you have got tech issues and staffing 
issues.
    I am just--would like to be reassured that coming out of 
COVID and understanding the importance. Tomorrow, President 
Marcos visits with President Biden and we are, I think, on a 
relatively positive track.
    I want to be careful about how we characterize this because 
we have had some difficulty in terms of aligning our values 
between the United States and the Philippines, particularly on 
human rights.
    I am cautiously optimistic about that, but the people-to-
people relationships depend on the efficiency of those offices 
and I am wondering if you can give me some good news.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, well, first of all, thank you 
very much for raising this issue.
    We had the honor of hosting President Marcos in the White 
House yesterday and then joining at dinner with him last night, 
and I think--as you outlined and as was announced in the joint 
statement that we just released in the context of his visit, I 
think President Marcos' visit here has strengthened to a great 
deal our long-standing alliance and friendship, and this is a 
broad-ranging very deep partnership that you have outlined.
    Certainly, people-to-people ties are key to that, including 
the 4 million Filipino Americans here in the United States.
    Regarding consular issues, and I assume, Senator, you are 
referring to visa delays and the like?
    Senator Schatz. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I am happy to take that back and talk with 
my colleague, Assistant Secretary Rena Bitter. I know from my 
previous conversations with her that she and her colleagues in 
the Consular Affairs Bureau are very focused on reducing those 
wait times. I do not know exactly where we stand right now in 
the Philippines, but I will take that back and find out.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.

[Editor's note.--The requested information follows:]

    The Department of State is committed to safeguarding national 
security while facilitating legitimate travel to the United States. In 
the first 6 months of this fiscal year, the U.S. Embassy in Manila has 
issued more nonimmigrant visas than during the same time period in pre-
pandemic FY 2019.
    We are lowering visitor visa interview wait times worldwide, 
including in the Philippines. This is a direct result of hard work in 
the field and a focus on innovation and efficiency in our processes 
while staffing continues to recover. Embassy Manila is on track to 
process more nonimmigrant visas this year than any previous year. For a 
visitor visa, the interview appointment wait time in Manila as of May 8 
was 155 days, which is less than a quarter of its peak last year. Wait 
times for work, student, crew, and exchange visitor visas are 
substantially shorter; for example, the wait time for a student visa 
interview is 16 days.
    The embassy has offered tens of thousands of additional 
nonimmigrant visa appointments over the last several months, primarily 
for tourist and business applicants, and will continue to add interview 
slots to accommodate demand from Philippine travelers.
    Immigrant visa interview wait times are also decreasing and have 
been eliminated in most immediate relative categories and for 
healthcare workers.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    I do want to welcome Senator Duckworth to the committee and 
now turn it over to Senator Ricketts for questions.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, when you were going through the credentials 
of Secretary Kritenbrink, you forgot to mention that he is from 
Nebraska so----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Ricketts. Now, he is a Loper, so I did not say 
Cornhusker from Nebraska.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Ricketts. I had the privilege of doing a trade 
mission to Vietnam when he was Ambassador.
    Speaking of Nebraska, we certainly had the firsthand 
experience with the malign ambition and threats the Chinese 
Communist Party faces to Nebraskans when the spy balloon 
floated across our airspace as well as a number of other 
airspace--states' airspace and, of course, Nebraska is home to 
the Strategic Command, which manages our nuclear forces, so 
very concerning with regard to that.
    It is nothing--it pales in comparison to what the Chinese 
Communist Party does to Taiwan, whether it is cyber attacks, 
fighter jets, war planes, and that sort of thing and, of 
course, President Xi in his most recent Party Congress again 
reiterated his desire to unify with Taiwan if--by force if 
necessary, and, obviously, this has been a topic of 
conversation here already. Obviously, it is important for us to 
be able to provide to the Government of Taiwan the arms they 
need to protect themselves.
    I think we have got former INDOPACOM Commander Admiral 
Davidson, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gilday, Air 
Mobility Commander General Mike Minihan.
    All have said that China could be attempting to take over 
Taiwan sometime in the next few years, and President Biden has 
been strong in talking about defending Taiwan, sometimes so 
much his staff has had to walk back some of his comments.
    My question gets to the budget proposal where--help me, 
because I am looking through this and I do not see, as I am 
walking through this budget, very many mentions of Taiwan, in 
fact, just one in the entire budget where Taiwan is even 
mentioned as a priority.
    You got the new global FMF line, which provides only $16 
million baseline for Indo-Pacific and that is not just for 
Taiwan, that is the entire Indo-Pacific.
    Talk to me about what this budget means for helping to make 
sure Taiwan can defend itself should the Chinese Communist 
Party want to take over Taiwan by force.
    Sixteen million dollars does not sound like very much money 
and, again, I think that USAID--you are talking about--you are 
proposing a 25 percent increase in your budget. It was $193 
million, something like that.
    There seems to me a disconnect there.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your 
questions and, again, let me just underscore what a priority it 
is and how important it is to the United States of America that 
we continue to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan 
Strait and that we deter any possibility of precipitous PRC 
action aimed at Taiwan.
    I think, as you have outlined, we noted, of course, China's 
stated policies in which they claim that the so-called great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is incomplete without 
``reunifying with Taiwan.'' This is deeply concerning.
    We are deeply concerned by the range of Chinese coercive 
actions aimed at Taiwan that threaten to undermine the status 
quo and the peace and stability that is so important to all of 
us.
    I can underscore and make--I want to make absolutely clear, 
Senator, that not everything that we are doing on Taiwan is 
going to be reflected in the budget lines before you.
    Just under this Administration--just last year, actually, 
we notified 13 different arms sales to Taiwan. We have notified 
$15 billion--rather, $5 billion, excuse me--$5 billion in 
foreign military sales to Taiwan under the Biden administration 
and that accounts for in the larger picture $37 billion since 
2010 and $21 billion since 2019.
    We are committed to making available to Taiwan the 
necessary defensive arms so that it can maintain a sufficient 
defense capacity.
    I will point out, Senator, we are open to and we are 
grateful for the various options that have been made available 
to the Administration to assist Taiwan to maintain self-defense 
capacity.
    We are open to exploring all of those different avenues. I 
think that foreign military sales have been the primary channel 
that has been used to date, but we are open to exploring all of 
those means and, again, we are absolutely committed to meeting 
our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
    Senator Ricketts. In your opinion, do we need--given the 
potential threat here from the Chinese Communist Party to take 
Taiwan by force, is it your opinion that we need to accelerate 
arms sales to Taiwan and are there specific things that you 
would recommend that the Government of Taiwan focus on with 
regard to the types of military sales?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, we are doing everything possible 
to accelerate all of the arms sales that have already been 
notified and some of that is related to improvements that the 
U.S. Government can make--needs to make.
    Some of that is related to supply chain and industrial base 
challenges and I know that we work with members of the Senate 
to address those as well.
    Again, we will meet our obligations under the Taiwan 
Relations Act to assist Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense. At the same time, arms sales alone do not represent 
everything that we are doing, of course.
    We are consulting with our Taiwan partners on a daily basis 
on the things that they can do to better defend themselves and 
that relates to the various defense reforms that President Tsai 
and others have carried out in Taiwan.
    That includes mobilizing an ``all-society defense.'' It 
means investing in asymmetric defense capabilities that we 
believe better deter the possibility of a precipitous action 
against Taiwan and it also involves things like extending the 
mandatory service or conscription period for Taiwan youth to 1 
year.
    We are--and it also has involved quite a substantial 
increase in Taiwan's own defense budget. We think, together 
with meeting our obligations, friends in Taiwan have done a 
great deal to increase their own defensive capacity.
    Then I would add, Senator, as I mentioned to the ranking 
member, we are also working with partners around the world who, 
like us, share an interest in maintaining peace and stability 
so that we can build out deterrence in that way as well.
    Thank you.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, welcome. One of the consistent messages I hear 
from our partners in the region is the exceptional value they 
place on United States-provided training, whether through the 
Fulbright program, the YSALI program, the Young Southeast Asian 
Leaders Initiative, or the IMET program through DoD.
    I know that English language training also remains in high 
demand to help improve interoperability and facilitate future 
collaboration. These programs build relationships that leave 
positive impacts over decades as recipients move into senior 
leadership positions in their own countries.
    Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, how does this--welcome. 
Good to see you again, by the way.
    How does this budget expand our ability to offer these key 
programs and others like them to our Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners and what more can we be doing?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator Duckworth, ma'am, nice to see you 
again. Thank you very much for your question.
    I could not agree more that I think people-to-people ties 
forms a bedrock for almost every bilateral relationship that we 
have in the region, and you outlined many of the key exchange 
programs. There are many more, of course--Fulbright, YSALI, 
IMET, and others.
    In the President's budget request, it includes a 13 percent 
increase in our diplomatic engagement budget and that covers 
both our staffing across the region and also our public 
diplomacy program.
    If you would like further details on exactly what would be 
involved, I would be happy to come back to you with that.
    We do agree with you that it is building people-to-people 
ties and it is also being active in the information space to 
counter lots of the disinformation coming from various parts of 
the region that we think are vitally important for our long-
term interests, but we are very much committed to people-to-
people ties.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and do come back with me with 
more detail.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I will, ma'am.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    The Department's FY 2024 request reflects the Administration's 
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and our prioritization of 
people-to-people engagements that underpin our strong and growing 
relationships in the region.
    We have requested a total increase of $10.7 million USD in .7 PD 
funds to support staffing for Expo Osaka, new U.S. direct hire 
positions, and countering disinformation programs. Of that total 
request, $5.7 million USD in .7 PD funds will be used to support the 
152,000-member (and growing) Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
(YSEALI) and the Young Pacific Leaders (YPL) program. Both programs sit 
squarely within EAP's goal of building networks of individuals who 
share and advance democratic values and support U.S. policies. Both 
programs are also critical to developing a robust, U.S.-oriented 
generation of leaders to support our economic, security, and democracy 
building goals. These participants are a tailor-made audience for our 
positive vision for the region in the face of the PRC's information 
operations and economic coercion.
    EAP supports ECA's FY 2024 request for $6.2 million in ECE funds to 
fulfill the Administration's commitment to doubling YSEALI exchanges, 
as announced at last year's ASEAN summit, so that 900 emerging leaders 
will benefit from YSEALI's academic and professional opportunities 
every year.
    EAP has coordinated with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs (ECA) to develop a robust plan to expand American Spaces in the 
Pacific Islands, which provide a platform for outreach, training, 
English language learning, and countering disinformation.
    We support Embassy Vientiane's top mission resource request 
priority, the construction of a new American Center in Laos, to 
increase English language instruction as well as educational and 
training opportunities that will have an outsized impact.

    Senator Duckworth. I do want to continue on a topic I 
discussed with Administrator Power last week regarding how this 
budget request helps prioritize consistent, clean, safe 
drinking water access for the priority countries and I 
understand that priority list includes countries like Indonesia 
and Philippines.
    Assistant Administrator Schiffer, can you share more 
details with us regarding the investments and activities 
planned in both of these countries, Philippines and Indonesia, 
under the U.S. Global Water Strategy and, specifically, I would 
like to hear a bit about how USAID has found success 
prioritizing local partners and local solutions that result in 
lasting improvements with domestic partners.
    Mr. Schiffer. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    Working with local communities through the Administrator's 
focus on localization so that we are pushing programs out to 
those that know best the problems that they face so that we can 
work with them to help build their capacity to face them, is at 
the heart of much of the work that we do and that is for water 
and sanitation as well as across a whole range of our works.
    On the programs in Indonesia and the Philippines 
specifically, I will be happy to get back to you because we are 
still very much in keeping with the spirit of the localization 
effort and consulting and working with local partners so that 
we are taking on board their priorities as we develop those 
programs.
    We are still in the process of determining the pathway 
forward, but I can tell you that we have had tremendous success 
in Vietnam, as Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink knows from his 
time there, as well as in the Pacific Islands in working with 
local communities on clean water and sanitation issues, and 
that is an area that we get a tremendous return on our foreign 
assistance and development dollars for building better 
relationships in those countries that then have all sorts of 
additional overflow equities for our diplomatic posture.
    Senator Duckworth. If you could get back to me at a later 
point with your plans on clean water initiatives in Indonesia 
and Philippines, in particular, I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Schiffer. We would be happy to.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, I want to talk to you about 
accessibility--ADA compliance. The lack of accessibility at so 
many of our facilities is a serious obstacle to full 
participation in the State Department with persons with 
disabilities both for our own staff, but also when we host 
nation members at events at the embassies, and it is also 
really tough for individuals with family members who may be 
disabled.
    When I went to Japan a couple years ago, I found the 
mission to not be accessible. I was offered a stay in a hotel 
room that I was told was going to be accessible. I got there. 
It was not accessible.
    My entire CODEL had to move very late in the evening to a 
different hotel. This last time that I went to Japan, I was 
offered a hotel room, luckily before we went, that was the same 
one that was found to be not accessible the last time I was 
there, and we flagged it and we were put in one that was 
accessible.
    I saw that the State Department's fiscal year 2024 budget 
request--and by the way, I think the ambassador's residence is 
still not fully accessible in Japan. Yes.
    I saw that the State Department's fiscal year 2024 budget 
request includes $5 million for the accessible housing program 
through which the Department intends to provide at least one 
residence accessible to employees with disabilities at every 
post with a housing pool.
    Of those posts with a housing pool, how many missions in 
the EAP region currently lack accessible housing, and given the 
current funding available, how long do you expect it would take 
the Department to ensure at least one accessible residence at 
every such mission in your region?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for raising 
this very important issue.
    I will need to take that back and come back to you with the 
details. I know that we are committed across the U.S. 
Government and across our bureau to make sure that our 
facilities are accessible.
    I will need to take that back to come back with you on the 
details. I do know that we have worked very hard to make our 
facilities accessible.
    It sounds to me like based on your direct experience we 
have a long ways to go, but I am happy to take that back and I 
will get you a specific answer.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Currently nine posts in EAP have at least one residence that is 
fully compliant with the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), and 34 posts 
do not. We estimate between 1 and 6 months, at a cost of $150,000-
$200,000, to bring one residence into full compliance. The time and 
amount of funding that would be required to make at least one housing 
pool residence at each EAP post fully ABA compliant varies depending on 
the operating environment and size of residence.
    The Department is addressing this issue globally through 
initiatives like the Staff Housing Opportunity Purchase Program, the 
Build to Lease Program, and the Adaptable-Accessible Housing 
Acquisition Program to expand readily available, adaptable, and 
accessible housing to accommodate members of the Foreign Service and 
their families globally. The goal is to ensure employees with 
disabilities can almost immediately occupy suitable housing on arrival, 
rather than wait for posts to lease new units or renovate existing 
ones. These programs focus on government-owned or leased adaptable, 
accessible residences at posts with housing pools.

    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Let me turn it over to Senator Hagerty, and thank you for 
hosting a Japanese delegation here on the Hill yesterday led by 
Mr. Motegi.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes. Thank you, and he was very 
appreciative as well, Senator Van Hollen, of the respect and 
the showing that we had there with 10 senators, I think. It 
underscores how important the bilateral relationship is and 
they were very appreciative. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes, indeed.
    Senator Hagerty. It is good to see old friends here today. 
I have been looking forward to this discussion. I am sorry we 
do not have more time to talk today, but I am going to spend my 
time with you if I might, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, to 
talk to you about a couple of items that concern me.
    One of them is regarding a report that I saw in the 
Financial Times on April 14. They reported--I am going to read 
this directly--that, ``China is refusing to let the U.S. 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken visit Beijing over concerns 
that the FBI will release the results of an investigation into 
the downed suspected Chinese spy balloon.''
    The spy balloon issue has not gone away. The FBI report, I 
think, is something that the American public will value in 
terms of letting us finally get authoritative facts about what 
actually happened with the spy balloon and their egregious 
violation of U.S. sovereignty.
    My first question, Secretary Kritenbrink, do you support 
the full release of the FBI report on this Chinese spy balloon 
to Congress?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I absolutely support making sure 
that people are aware of what happened. I think that this 
incident--I know many members of the Administration have had an 
opportunity to brief on this. This was a completely 
unacceptable incident. It violated American sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.
    Senator Hagerty. I agree, and I hope that----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I think our reaction--our actions taken in 
response to it were crystal clear.
    Senator Hagerty. I hope the EAP will be responsible for the 
full report to be released to Congress.
    Next question----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would say, sir, given that these are 
matters beyond my responsibility, I would of course have to 
refer you to the Department of Justice and FBI.
    Senator Hagerty. There, I presume, would be an unclassified 
version of this report, too. Again, I would just like to see 
EAP being supportive of the release of this and not the 
contrary.
    The other question that I think that the point raised by 
the Financial Times comment is whether the Chinese pressure to 
obtain--whether our desire to obtain an official visit with 
China is going to in any way affect our decision to release the 
report and my question of you is if you support releasing the 
FBI report on the Chinese spy balloon prior to any senior level 
visit to China.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would respond to it in a couple of ways.
    Again, Senator, I would have say on the details of any FBI 
report, I would have to refer you to the Department of Justice 
and FBI.
    If I could say, though, very specifically we continue to 
make clear to our Chinese counterparts that we will always 
stand up and defend American national interests, full stop.
    Senator Hagerty. Let me come back to the quote again.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We are also committed, sir, to managing 
responsibility--managing responsibly this intense competition 
between the United States and China and part of that, in our 
mind, has to involve senior level communication and keeping 
channels open. It is the only way to responsibly manage----
    Senator Hagerty. Even if China conditions that sort of 
dialogue on meeting their demands like not releasing the FBI 
report on the China spy balloon?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We do not believe in engagement based on 
demands and preconditions. We think that responsible nations 
ought to engage with one another and do everything possible 
to----
    Senator Hagerty. I hope that means that you will not meet 
their preconditions then at least relating to the FBI report on 
the spy balloon.
    I would like to come to another issue and that relates to 
fentanyl. As you know, China is the principal source of 
chemical precursors that the Mexican cartels are synthesizing 
into fentanyl. They are smuggling it across our border and 
killing our kids with it.
    Top Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Qin Gang, 
have publicly demanded that the United States accept certain 
preconditions before China will cooperate on fentanyl. China's 
preconditions include delisting Chinese entities involved in 
the Uighur genocide.
    My next question is whether it is your view that China 
expects the United States to accept certain preconditions 
before it will discuss potential cooperation with us on the 
fentanyl crisis?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I will have to leave to Beijing 
to talk about what its position is. Our position is crystal 
clear. China needs to do everything possible to stop the 
chemicals that feed the fentanyl trade and now China has 
demonstrated in the past it has the capacity to do so. When we 
had agreements in 2019 to register those chemicals, there was a 
dramatic drop in fentanyl.
    What we see now oftentimes are these precursor chemicals 
that in many instances are technically legal that are diverted 
to the cartels and then synthesized into fentanyl.
    We have made clear that there are many things that the 
Chinese could do to cut down on that trade. I know that 
Treasury and others in the U.S. Government have recently taken 
action to sanction certain entities to make that----
    Senator Hagerty. Treasury has. It is interesting. The State 
Department has actually pulled back any condemnation. At the 
same time, the Treasury has been willing to go forward and name 
Chinese entities.
    What I hate to see, Secretary Kritenbrink--and I have the 
utmost respect for you, as you know--but what I hate to see is 
us find ourselves in a situation where the CCP is making 
demands on us and that we in some way are acceding to those 
demands just so we can get some sort of high-level visit over 
in Beijing and a photo opportunity. We need to be pressing them 
at every level.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, we do not believe in dialogue for 
dialogue's sake. Dialogue needs to be focused on a purpose. At 
a minimum, the necessary communication channels need to be open 
so that we can do everything possible to avert a miscalculation 
that could lead to conflict.
    There are many other reasons why we ought to be talking to 
one another including, as you outlined here, Senator, very 
important issues including fentanyl, which is one of our 
absolute top priorities. There are several others as well.
    Senator Hagerty. We agree on that. I appreciate it, but 
this is absolutely critical that their preconditions not be 
accepted.
    Thank you, Secretary.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.
    Let me just say, Assistant Secretary, I share Senator 
Hagerty's view that we cannot allow China to establish 
preconditions for the opportunity to talk to them.
    Let me--we are going to have a second round of questions 
now for members who are interested. As we heard, we are going 
to be soon welcoming today or tomorrow President Marcos from 
the Philippines and, of course, we had a very busy week last 
week with the South Korean President Yoon and I thought a lot 
of positive developments came out of that meeting between 
President Yoon and President Biden including the announcement 
of the Washington Declaration.
    Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, if you could just expand 
on the--exactly what the new declaration means. Is this a 
reinforcement of existing policy? Is it any change in existing 
policy?
    If you could take that opportunity just to discuss the 
threat being posed by North Korea, and also as part of your 
answer, I am one of the authors of the Otto Warmbier BRINK Act 
along with former Senator Toomey, which was designed to impose 
secondary sanctions on any country or entity that is 
undermining the sanctions that we have on North Korea, and I 
have been very concerned about leakage in that sanctions 
regime.
    If you could just take this opportunity to answer those 
questions in the context of North Korea and the threat it 
poses.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 
these incredibly important questions.
    I fully agree that the visit by Republic of Korea President 
Yoon was incredibly successful and it represented, I think, a 
powerful expansion and further strengthening of our vitally 
important alliance.
    Mr. Chairman, the Washington Declaration was issued 
primarily because of the unprecedented and growing nature of 
the threat from North Korea, which continues to launch 
regularly ballistic missiles, continues to issue irresponsible 
and threatening rhetoric that threatens violence against South 
Korea and the United States as well.
    In response to that, our two presidents issued the 
Washington Declaration. They made clear that as a result of the 
Washington Declaration, the U.S. is committed to making every 
effort to consult with the R.O.K. in nuclear crises and we have 
also created a new bilateral mechanism that is designed to help 
us engage and plan on nuclear and strategic issues.
    We have also agreed to regular strategic asset deployments 
and better integration of R.O.K.--of Republic of Korea 
conventional assets into U.S. strategic planning. This is being 
done, really, just for one reason and that is the nature of the 
growing DPRK threat.
    I would say as a result of that threat our alliance with 
the Republic of Korea has never been stronger, our alliance 
with Japan has never been stronger, and the trilateral work 
between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul has never been more 
robust.
    The United States continues to make clear to Pyongyang that 
we are open to diplomacy and dialogue, which will be the only 
sustainable long-term means of resolving this matter.
    In the meantime, in the face of the growing DPRK threat and 
threatening rhetoric, we will take the steps that we need to 
defend our allies and the American people, and I think in a 
nutshell that is what the Washington Declaration means.
    Mr. Chairman, I would also say as North Korea continues to 
refuse to engage diplomatically, we will also not just take 
these steps to strengthen our defenses, but we will also 
continue to implement and to expand the sanctions regime that 
is imposed on North Korea and we will continue to impose costs 
for their irresponsible behavior.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Just on that last 
point on the sanctions--and I have met with the deputy 
secretary of the Treasury Department and others--if you look at 
the annual U.N. reporting on the leakage in North Korea 
sanctions, it is substantial, and I look forward to following-
up with you and your team and the Department of Treasury on 
what more we can do to close those gaps because I am not 
convinced that we are nailing down everything that we can 
there.
    Let me just--there is so much to ask on the economic front, 
but I am just going to focus in on one area because I am trying 
to get clarification, especially on the infrastructure budget 
that is before us and you, I think, outlined some of this in 
your testimony.
    The Congressional Budget Justification requests $250 
million for a State-USAID co-managed Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure and Investment Fund. The justification also 
requests $2 billion in mandatory funds for an international 
infrastructure fund.
    The budget also mentions the Trade Development Agency and 
says that it will, ``prepare infrastructure projects,'' via the 
interagency process and support the Administration's goal to 
mobilize $200 billion from the PG--from the global 
infrastructure account over the next 5 years and it notes that 
there will be $2 billion for the Indo-Pacific region.
    I have been a longtime believer in the fact that we need to 
leverage more of our tools on the infrastructure front. You 
cannot beat something with nothing and, obviously, the Belt and 
Road Initiative includes a number of infrastructure 
investments, some of them funds misspent and we have been clear 
and warned countries about the fact that those investments 
comes with strings that come back to bite them.
    Can you clarify, Mr. Kritenbrink, all these different 
infrastructure proposals that are set forth in the budget?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I can certainly do my best. 
I am not an infrastructure expert either, but I believe I 
understand the requests.
    There is--of course, with the DFC and TDA and many others 
we continue to work with our discretionary funding to try to 
create the appropriate environment to facilitate sound 
infrastructure investment across the region and as part of that 
effort and as part of the President's PGII initiative, there is 
a $250 million discretionary request this coming year.
    Mr. Chairman, you had mentioned two other important 
components of the President's budget that involve not just the 
discretionary requests, but also a number of mandatory 
requests.
    I had mentioned the $7.1 billion related to COFA. Then 
there is another $6 billion in mandatory requests including $2 
billion mandatory requests related to the new International 
Infrastructure Fund and $2 billion related to other economic-
related initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
    The thinking behind that is that for the International 
Infrastructure Fund, mandatory funding would give us the 
ability to focus over multi years long-term projects and focus 
on hard infrastructure where we find many of the greatest needs 
are around the world and in the Indo-Pacific.
    Regarding the separate $2 billion mandatory request related 
to economic initiatives specifically in the Indo-Pacific 
region, again, based on the mandatory multiyear funding we 
believe this would give us the capacity to engage in long-term 
unprecedented economic engagements that we think would advance, 
obviously, our national interest.
    It involves things like resilient supply chains, 
connectivity, and also anti-corruption efforts which, 
unfortunately, the PRC uses corruption to its end.
    Again, the key here is to try to safeguard long-term 
funding for these strategic economic initiatives across the 
Indo-Pacific. I hope that helps to clarify the request.
    Senator Van Hollen. It does.
    Mr. Schiffer, I do not know if you want to briefly comment 
on it and then I am going to turn it over to Senator Ricketts.
    Mr. Schiffer. Sure. No, I appreciate the opportunity.
    As Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink laid out, as we think 
about this issue, there are different purposes even to the same 
ends that the mandatory and the discretionary funds are able to 
provide.
    For example, in the Pacific Islands we partner with Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, and others on projects like the Papua 
New Guinea Electrification Partnership where we are able to 
come in with technical assistance, they can come in with hard 
infrastructure, and then we can each leverage each other's 
comparative advantages so that we can leverage those 
partnerships.
    To be able to do that, though, requires our being able to 
make long-term commitments to these projects over multiple 
years and so as we focus on improving the enabling environment 
across the Indo-Pacific, removing transaction level barriers 
and building like-minded partner consortiums to compete on 
projects and to mobilize financing from the U.S. Government, 
the private sectors, and others, we find that both the 
discretionary and the mandatory pieces are essential if we are 
going to be able to move forward in building the sort of 
economic environment for the Indo-Pacific that I know we all 
strive for.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, at the end of your last question 
answered to me, you talked about how there is more than just 
arm sales that will help deter the People's Republic of China 
and I could not agree more.
    We need to shore up existing alliances, develop new 
security partnerships, and one of the things that a lot of 
countries in Asia care about is trade and that seems to be 
missing from this overall strategy.
    The President unveiled his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 
in October 2021 that set a high-level outline for things like 
labor standards and environment, open digital data flows, free, 
fair, and open trade in investment policies, resilient supply 
chains. You just mentioned that.
    It does not really do that--it is not a vision to the 
concept of a traditional trade agreement to talk about tariffs 
or market access and, to me, does not seem like that actually 
will help fundamentally shift supply chains, does not help 
promote U.S. agriculture or manufacturing--specifically, if you 
think about Nebraska, we are--we have a lot of trade exports in 
agriculture--does not help encourage countries to really 
embrace these standards.
    In fact, it is not even really an agreement at all, but 
just talks about an outline about how talks might begin down 
the road.
    In the meantime, the People's Republic of China is not 
wasting any time. They have entered into a regional 
comprehensive economic partnership, a free trade pact that 
includes many of our allies and covers about 30 percent of the 
world's population.
    The chairman mentioned the Belt and Road Initiative where 
the People's Republic of China is making significant 
investments in Pacific nations. I think they are the largest 
investor in Pacific nations and it is building goodwill for 
them.
    My question is how does the Biden administration expect to 
effectively compete with the People's Republic of China's 
influence in the region if we do not have a more ambitious and 
comprehensive trade strategy for how we are going to develop 
these trade relationships with countries in that part of the 
world?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your 
question.
    We are quite excited by the prospects involved in IPEF 
where, as you noted, it is true that tariff liberalization will 
not be part of IPEF, but nevertheless among the four pillars in 
IPEF is a trade pillar that we think is incredibly important to 
breaking down a range of nontariff barriers and creating a 
common set of high standard rules across the region.
    We believe in IPEF. We have the regions, 14, including the 
United States, of the most important dynamic economies in the 
region and we are aiming to set the rules of the road for the 
21st century economy.
    As I mentioned--and the trade pillar does not include 
tariff liberalization, but it includes many other elements that 
we think are important including issues related to labor, 
environment, the digital economy, and the like. The other 
pillars of IPEF are related to supply chains, clean energy, and 
then what we call the fair economy, tax and anti-corruption.
    We believe that IPEF will be a transformational agreement. 
It includes many elements that are unprecedented and we are 
committed to concluding it at an early date and I think you can 
see through its membership it shows as well, I think, the 
appetite for U.S. engagement including U.S. economic engagement 
across the region.
    Senator Ricketts. You do not believe that tariffs need to 
be a part of that overall equation as well? This is the hard 
dollars, right, that countries care about and you just 
acknowledged that the tariffs are not part of this.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. They are not part of the current 
conversations, Senator, but we are confident that IPEF, when 
concluded, will be an important and transformational agreement 
that is very much in America's national interest and in the 
interests of America's farmers and workers.
    Senator Ricketts. Okay. I do want to follow-up real quick 
on one of the things that the chairman was talking about with 
regard to the sanctions on North Korea.
    I believe that in the 3 months since the White House 
announced some of their--announced that Pyongyang was covertly 
supplying rockets and missiles to U.S.-sanctioned Wagner Group, 
that only one Slovakian individual has been sanctioned for 
attempting to negotiate the North Korean-Russia arms deal and I 
am wondering what is the status of implementing these sanctions 
on North Korea that were overwhelmingly passed on a bipartisan 
basis.
    Besides the Slovakian national sanction in late March of 
2023, why has the Administration not sanctioned North Korean 
and Russian entities, individuals, and banks involved in these 
Pyongyang-Moscow proliferation activities?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, we remain deeply concerned by a 
range of North Korean actions including the action you have 
referred to of it providing weapons to the Wagner Group for 
Russia's use in Ukraine.
    As you noted, we have applied sanctions related to that 
action and we are committed to taking whatever actions we can 
to penalize those involved in that action and to deter further 
transactions, but this is a deeply concerning and disturbing 
action, no doubt about it.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. Then, if no Democrat arrives, Senator 
Cruz.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just a brief follow-up question. Again, Secretary 
Kritenbrink, I would like to come to you, if I might, to talk 
about Taiwan and specifically the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience 
Act that Chairman Menendez led. I was proud to join him and we 
included that in the 2023 NDAA.
    That law provides for $2 billion worth of foreign military 
finance between now and 2027 and a billion dollars per year of 
presidential drawdown authority that would all be used to help 
support Taiwan's military posture.
    The other thing that the Menendez law included was the 
requirement for a spending plan that was due March 1, 2023, and 
I am certain that you and Jessica Lewis are working closely on 
this, but I wanted to get your sense for when we will have this 
report ready.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I will have to take that back and 
come back to you with a specific answer.
    The only thing I could say on the spot would be, as I 
indicated, we are grateful for the support of this committee 
and the various authorities and tools that have been made 
available to us.
    We are open to exploring using all tools available to us to 
assist Taiwan in maintaining a credible self-defense capacity, 
but I will have to take your question back and come back with 
this.
    Senator Hagerty. This is an area you know very well and you 
understand the threat posture there. We have got now a $19 
billion backlog in foreign military sales to Taiwan. Again, we 
have got these new authorities that the Menendez law has put 
forward and the spend plan is absolutely critical.
    Again, it is due March 1. I cannot imagine a more 
threatening concern that we have in the region--East Asia, 
Pacific--than the situation in the Taiwan Strait.
    I will look forward to hearing right away when this will be 
provided to us and, hopefully, it will be very, very soon. 
Thank you.

[Editor's note.--The requested information follows:]

    The Department of State is currently drafting the report and will 
transmit very soon.

    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kritenbrink, you and I have spoken several times about 
my concerns that the Biden administration has been consistently 
weak on China and, in particular, weak in supporting Taiwan.
    One area we have discussed multiple times is this 
Administration's continued prohibition on our Taiwanese allies 
from displaying symbols of their sovereignty on American soil, 
and you know the history of this policy. It was the Obama 
administration that first implemented the policy at the behest 
of the Chinese Communist Party.
    When President Trump became Trump--became President, I 
spent 4 years battling the Trump administration, urging them to 
change the policy and, finally, at the end of the 
Administration I was successful and the State Department 
changed the policy to allow Taiwan to do what all of our other 
allies can do, which is to appear on U.S. soil, to appear on 
U.S. Government properties with Taiwanese flags, wearing 
Taiwanese military uniforms.
    When President Biden became President and he nominated Tony 
Blinken to be Secretary of State, I asked Mr. Blinken about 
this question before this committee and Secretary Blinken 
committed at the time to keep the policy in place ``for the 
time being.''
    It turned out that phrase ``for the time being'' meant just 
so long--just enough time for him to get confirmed and get in 
office because shortly after he got there, he reversed the 
policy. He returned to the same appeasement of the Chinese 
Communist Party that had prevailed under the Obama 
administration, and I have to say it occurred at a particularly 
bad time when China is engaging in more and more aggressive and 
bellicose actions towards Taiwan.
    Now, at your confirmation hearing, I asked you about this 
and you committed to this committee, and I quote--you said, ``I 
am committed in every way to growing our partnership in 
Taiwan.''
    Now, every way presumably includes allowing the Taiwanese 
to display their flags, their uniforms, their symbols of 
sovereignty. Has the State Department done so and, if not, why?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator Cruz, thank you for your question.
    Respectfully, I would say, Senator, that the U.S. 
Government's policy related to symbols of sovereignty, that 
policy and those restrictions have been in place since the very 
beginning of the implementation of our ``One China'' policy and 
our unofficial partnership----
    Senator Cruz. With respect, that is not true because the 
Trump State Department reversed them and allowed Taiwan to 
display the symbols of sovereignty.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, these were not new policies that 
came about in the Obama administration. These are restrictions 
that from the very beginning----
    Senator Cruz. Is it true the Trump administration reversed 
the policy?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. It is true that near the end of the Trump 
administration, the contact guidelines that have traditionally 
guided U.S. Government interaction with Taiwan were rescinded.
    Senator Cruz. The policy was they could display their 
symbols of sovereignty and then the Biden administration came 
in and acquiesced once again to the Chinese Communists.
    I will point out this view is not an esoteric view. I have 
not once, but twice introduced legislation to allow the 
Taiwanese to display their symbols of sovereignty and this 
committee has passed that legislation with an overwhelming 
bipartisan vote multiple times.
    If you have Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee telling the State Department respect the 
Taiwanese and treat them as allies, why does the Biden State 
Department refuse to follow that guidance?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, since 1979 we have not had formal 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taiwan is an important, but 
unofficial partner with whom we have an incredibly robust 
relationship. I would argue----
    Senator Cruz. Well, all right. Let me ask a different 
question.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, if I could just----
    Senator Cruz. I want to ask another aspect. My time is 
running out.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would argue, Senator, that our 
partnership with Taiwan has never been stronger. We have--and I 
think----
    Senator Cruz. All right. Well, let me give another example 
then, Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Kritenbrink----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cruz. --another area where I am very concerned 
concerns Taiwan's participation in the International Civil 
Aviation Organization.
    Last Congress, I authored legislation, which became law 
with bipartisan support, requiring the Administration to 
formulate and transmit a strategy for securing Taiwan's 
inclusion in ICAO.
    We saw particularly during the COVID pandemic with the 
incredible number of flights going through Taiwan that it was 
asinine not to include discussions with Taiwan. It should be a 
no-brainer. Taiwan is a global hub for civil aviation.
    Well, the State Department recently transmitted that 
report. I have it in my hand here. Without being unkind, it 
does not approach remotely the urgency of the legislation--the 
urgency of the issue that the legislation required.
    I want to ask you what is State Department's specific 
concrete strategic plan to secure Taiwan's participation in the 
International Civil Aviation Organization?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, we agree with you that Taiwan 
ought to participate meaningfully not just in ICAO, but in many 
other international institutions, given Taiwan's important 
matter--important role in global affairs and the global 
economy.
    I will have to take back your question on our specific 
strategy for doing so, but I hope our position is clear and 
just one----
    Senator Cruz. By statute it should have been in this report 
and it is not?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I am happy to take that back and take a 
look at that, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Increasing Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system and 
in other international and regional organizations is an important 
priority for the U.S. Government. As noted in the report, our efforts 
to support Taiwan's increased participation at the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) strongly ramped up in the fall of 2022. 
After Secretary Blinken delivered a clear message on Taiwan to ICAO 
leadership in a face-to-face meeting in October 2022, our Mission to 
ICAO stepped up engagement with like-minded partners in Montreal to 
further increase the pressure.
    Our strategy has been to put together a substantial group of 
likeminded states that continues to meet with ICAO leadership and 
Taiwan counterparts to lay the groundwork for direct Taiwan 
participation. The main goal--as voiced by Taiwan--is to increase 
Taiwan's participation in ICAO technical meetings and ultimately 
participate in ICAO's next assembly in 2025. We are also working 
closely with Taiwan to continue to promote its international status in 
the aviation world, including through co-sponsorship of an August 2023 
event in Taipei that will showcase Taiwan's work in aviation security.

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
    Just a couple more areas of inquiry, and thank you both, 
again, for your testimony and for your efforts on all these 
areas.
    I want to turn quickly to the question of Burma and quickly 
get both of your assessments of the situation there, which by 
my own evaluation is just a continuing miserable situation.
    We raised this issue--we, meaning our delegation--when we 
went to Indonesia since Indonesia is currently chairing ASEAN 
and received some briefings from their point person on this.
    Can you talk a little bit about the Administration's 
current approach to Burma, Mr. Kritenbrink? Mr. Schiffer, if 
you could talk a little bit about USAID's efforts because I 
know USAID is also using some funding to try to address some of 
the civil society issues.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Since the coup d'etat that took place in Burma in February 
1, 2021, I think what has happened in Burma is an absolute 
travesty and the junta continues to carry out a pattern of 
violence and murder, bombing innocent civilians, schools, 
beheading activists, carrying out a campaign of terror that is 
simply shocking to the conscience.
    The United States continues to work with a range of 
partners in the international community to put pressure on the 
junta to, first, stop the violence and, second, to return to a 
democratic path.
    We continue to support the efforts of ASEAN. I am sure, Mr. 
Chairman, you heard about this when you were in the region. We 
support the ASEAN five-point consensus. We support the work of 
the U.N.
    I think we have to be very candid and honest in our 
assessment that the regime has not changed course. As a result, 
we continue to take a range of our own unilateral efforts to 
place pressure on the regime and that has included the 
designation of 82 individuals and 32 entities who have been 
involved in carrying out this indiscriminate violence against 
the Burmese population.
    We are also carrying out more than $100 million in 
assistance programming for the Burmese people, for the Burmese 
opposition and the democratic movement, but perhaps on that I 
could turn to my colleague, Mr. Schiffer, who I am certain has 
more depth on the details of those programs.
    Mr. Schiffer. Thank you, and thank you, Senator, for 
raising this important question.
    Burma's military regime must be held accountable for the 
atrocities that they have committed and the violence that they 
have inflicted on the people of Burma since that country's very 
founding during the Rohingya genocide and, most recently, 
following the February 2021 coup.
    As Administrator Power has offered on numerous occasions, 
USAID stands with the people of Burma including the pro-
democracy opposition, ethnic minority groups, and the brave 
civil society actors who are fighting for civil and political 
rights and an inclusive federal and democratic future for their 
nation in the face of a brutal military dictatorship.
    I cannot really add to the items that Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink enumerated, that do indeed shock the conscience.
    We at USAID, along with our State Department colleagues, 
have been working over the past several months to assess the 
situation on the ground in Burma and to determine what 
additional options and opportunities there may be to both 
assure that humanitarian assistance gets to the people that are 
most in need in Burma and in the refugee communities that have 
spilled out across Burma's borders, as well as to determine 
what nonlethal assistance consistent with the requirements of 
the Burma Act we might be able to provide, particularly 
assistance that can help the people of Burma to prevent 
atrocities.
    We are still in the process of making determination on 
that. We are very happy to come up here, hopefully, in the not 
too distant future with our colleagues from State and to brief 
the committee about the options that we have identified and our 
proposal for a way forward.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.
    Let me also just take this opportunity to thank you and 
Administrator Power and all your colleagues at USAID for the 
terrific work you are doing in this region.
    As I mentioned, I was in Indonesia and Vietnam. We met with 
the USAID teams and they were doing first-rate work, and thank 
you. I got word this morning in another committee, the 
Appropriations Foreign Ops Subcommittee, that we have cleared 
the agreement with the Indonesian Government so we can move 
forward on our biodiversity and other efforts there. Thank you 
for those.
    Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, we 
are going to continue the discussion on Indonesia.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
    Senator Ricketts. Obviously, as we look to bolster our 
relationships with countries in Asia and counter the PRC's 
influence, Indonesia has become a challenge.
    Just over the last decade China has deepened its ties with 
Indonesia, in many cases in direct competition to the United 
States. China has delivered sizable investments, pouring 
billions of dollars into developing the world's largest nickel 
deposits, has been a major partner in the country's 
infrastructure push, including a high-speed train that is, 
admittedly, over budget and late.
    China has invested in the first 9 months of 2022 $5 billion 
in Indonesia compared to the United States' $2 billion, and in 
return Indonesia has been delivering back for the People's 
Republic of China.
    It voted in favor of the PRC's position at the U.N. on the 
persecution of the Uighurs, and ASEAN--Indonesia has 
consistently been on the PRC's side as far as unrestricted 
economic access to the 10 member nations on the defense front.
    While the U.S. and Indonesia have held recent joint 
military exercises, the PRC and Indonesia have also announced 
that they will hold and resume exercises on their own.
    I believe Indonesia has expressed unhappiness with the 
recent Australia-U.K.-U.S. submarine agreement with some 
officials threatening to not allow Australia's nuclear-powered 
submarines to travel through their sea lanes. Given its 
strategic location and miles of vital sea lanes, Indonesia is a 
defensive necessity if the PRC decides to take Taiwan by force.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, what actions is the Biden 
administration considering to strengthen our ties with 
Indonesia considering how important their geostrategic position 
in the world is?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator Ricketts, thank you very much.
    I could not agree with you more about the importance of 
Indonesia and, certainly, Indonesia remains one of our most 
important partners in the region as reflected in the strategic 
partnership that we--the formal strategic partnership that we 
have with them.
    I would say, as the world's largest Muslim majority nation, 
the world's third largest democracy and, obviously, as a long-
standing leader in ASEAN, they have been one of our primary 
partners in the region for some time.
    We were gratified with the leadership that Indonesia showed 
last year in the G20 where I think they navigated a very 
difficult circumstance involving, obviously, Russia's illegal 
invasion of Ukraine and also pressure from the PRC, and I think 
the outcomes of the G20 were quite productive and we have 
similar expectations for how they will approach their chair 
here in ASEAN.
    I would say, Senator, that we have made significant 
investments in our relationship. I know last November, when 
President Biden traveled to Bali for the G20 summit, we 
announced a new Millennium Challenge Corporation program--
compact, rather--of $698 million.
    We announced $20 billion in public and private support for 
the new Just Energy Transition Partnership with Indonesia and I 
think, Senator, I would say that friends in Indonesia often 
underscore that they live in a tough neighborhood.
    Like many partners in the region, they have often 
underscored that they do not want to be forced to choose, and 
our message to our friends in Indonesia and to all of our 
friends across ASEAN is we are not asking you to choose. That 
is not the game that we play. Others may. We do not.
    We want to give countries like Indonesia choices, give them 
a better offer and make sure they have the opportunity to make 
their own decisions free from coercion. I am confident in the 
future of our partnership with Indonesia. I know that 
Indonesia, like others in the region, they do not want to be 
dominated or coerced by anyone.
    I am confident that like we do, they value the partnership 
that we have together and we are engaged in a whole range of 
areas from the economic and the infrastructure side to people-
to-people ties to security ties, including in the maritime 
domain, and I am confident we will continue to do that, going 
forward.
    Again, I think as long as we continue to demonstrate our 
leadership and commitment to the region and to Indonesia, I am 
optimistic about our future together.
    Senator Ricketts. Okay. Great. Thank you very much, 
Secretary. Appreciate your being here today as well as Mr. 
Schiffer as well. Thank you.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.
    I agree with Senator Ricketts that we do need to up our 
game in East Asia and the Pacific. That does require resources 
and a commitment which, of course, gets back to your budgets 
and mission today, and I look forward to working with my 
colleagues to make sure that we have the resources to match our 
strategy.
    We had a very good meeting with the Indonesian President, 
President Jokowi, along with other top leaders in Indonesia. 
They expressed great interest in the new JETP program, but that 
is going to require dollars. I know the DFC was there. They 
were on the ground before we got there.
    In order to make these commitments of the resources for our 
different institutions, the State Department, DFC, others, are 
going to be absolutely required. I do agree with Senator 
Ricketts that we need to identify those.
    In terms of the mandatory funding, I also sit on the 
Appropriations Committee. Members of the Appropriations 
Committee look a little askance at mandatory funding, but I do 
believe when you are talking about trying to make longer-term 
commitments, mandatory funding plays a very, very important 
role.
    Let me just also, finally, say in closing to both of you, 
thank you for what you are doing. I do want to just say with 
respect to Taiwan, Ambassador Kritenbrink, thank you for laying 
out very clearly and firmly what our policy is.
    We want to preserve the status quo. We will provide Taiwan 
with the military assistance and equipment it needs to make 
itself a porcupine, to deter aggression, and to defend itself.
    I do not think there is--Taiwan has, as you have testified 
to, purchased lots of U.S. military equipment. We do need to 
address the pipeline issue. I could not agree with you more, 
Senator Ricketts and others, who have made that point.
    I do not think it is any secret that some of us had 
concerns last year when one of the provisions in the 
legislation that passed this committee was to create a new 
foreign assistance program for Taiwan.
    My view is Taiwan is a friend. They are also a very 
advanced economy. They purchased billions of dollars of 
assistance for defense, and my concern at the time was that by 
authorizing a certain amount of assistance--military assistance 
for Taiwan, if the Administration or others down the road do 
not ask for the full amount, it would be seen as not meeting 
our commitments.
    I actually thought that was a mistake to do that because I 
do believe that Taiwan has the economic punch to purchase 
equipment, but we need to make sure that they get what they 
need and what they want and also to advise them as we have on 
purchasing equipment that does take advantage of asymmetric 
defenses and make them a porcupine.
    I just want to close. I thank you, Mr. Schiffer, and your 
colleagues at USAID.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink, please give our thanks to all your 
colleagues at the State Department, both the Foreign Service 
officers as well as the civil servants. Always impressed when 
we go overseas and also grateful for your service and testimony 
here today. Thank you.
    Let me just get some housekeeping out of the way here. I 
know I was given a piece of paper about--here we go. For the 
information of the members, the record will be open until close 
of business tomorrow, Wednesday, May 3, for the submission of 
any questions for the record.
    Again, thank you both for your testimony and service. The 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. President Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) 
is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific by 
promoting a progressive model of economic development. It aims to 
attract regional partners on the pretext of trade without offering any 
tariff reduction or market access. Instead, this Administration focuses 
on promoting a radical global green and progressive labor agenda.
    Critics argue that the U.S. cannot effectively build regional 
allies to counter China's malign activities without a robust and 
enforceable trade component. It is concerning that the Biden 
administration may not fully grasp the importance of robust and 
enduring trade policy as foreign policy in Asia. Moreover, this 
Administration appears to have abandoned the pursuit of lasting 
agreements--that require ratification by Congress--to advance our 
economic and national security interests for non-binding, shortsighted 
arrangements for political expediency.
    Can you offer insights on how the U.S. can further leverage IPEF to 
boost regional cooperation and ensure its long-term sustainability?

    Answer. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) 
represents an affirmative vision of economic cooperation among allies 
and likeminded partners in the region. Importantly, the membership of 
IPEF reflects the economic diversity of the region as well as the 
interconnectivity among the partner countries that drives economic 
growth, job creation, and innovation.
    IPEF is intended to address the economic priorities of the 21st 
century, including rules for trade, supply chain resilience, and the 
clean energy transition, that are increasingly major economic drivers 
and critical both to our competitiveness and to greater economic 
integration. IPEF will also improve the trade and investment 
environment in the region by enhancing our collective efforts to combat 
corruption.
    To date, negotiations have been constructive, and there remains a 
strong commitment and positive momentum to deliver concrete economic 
outcomes. Partners have shared their enthusiasm for driving sustainable 
and inclusive economic growth throughout the region.

    Question. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific face tremendous economic 
and security threats from an increasingly aggressive China. Effective 
deterrence is needed to ensure the region remains free, open, and 
prosperous.
    In March, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom 
announced an unprecedented plan to enable Australia to acquire 
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under what's referred 
to as Pillar One of the AUKUS Agreement. If implemented properly, AUKUS 
has the potential to be a useful tool for deterrence and I'm eager to 
see what role the experts at the Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) in 
Charleston, South Carolina can play in the process of executing Pillar 
One.
    However, I am concerned about Pillar Two of the AUKUS Agreement--
trilateral cooperation on research and development of the advanced 
capabilities we need to address the threats of tomorrow. It is my 
understanding that the State Department has been reluctant to address 
some of the regulatory barriers that could limit cooperation with our 
key allies.
    While I realize these concerns may originate in another bureau of 
the Department, I am asking if you can provide insight into some of 
these reservations and recommendations on how we can address them so as 
not to hinder critical security cooperation with our allies?

    Answer. Through AUKUS, the United States, Australia, and the UK are 
significantly deepening our long-standing cooperation on a range of 
security and defense capabilities. The Department of State recognizes 
the need to foster even more efficient and flexible export control 
systems to support operational readiness and interoperability of U.S. 
allies and meet the security challenges of the future, including 
through AUKUS.
    The United States is working with both allies to facilitate secure 
transfers of technologies key to achieving the vital goals of AUKUS. 
AUKUS partners continue robust discussion to review our systems to 
develop solutions to optimize our defense trade and actualize AUKUS as 
quickly, efficiently, and safely as possible. I have full confidence 
that our combined efforts will ensure that our sensitive military 
technology is protected from nations who seek to harm our interests.

    Question. Xi Jinping's ambition to expand China's nuclear 
capabilities is evident as the country's nuclear warheads are currently 
projected to reach 1,500 by the mid-2030s. Recently, Xi and Putin 
signed an agreement to extend their nuclear cooperation, with Russia 
delivering 25 tons of highly enriched uranium to China to help their 
build-up program. They are also cooperating on a joint nuclear project 
to benefit both their stockpiles, creating the possibility that the 
U.S. would be facing two nuclear superpowers by the mid-2030s.
    This is one of the most challenging periods for the global nuclear 
order--potentially more so than during the Cold War.
    What are your assessments to address the urgency of the problem and 
curb China's nuclear proliferation, from the State Department's 
perspective?

    Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the PRC's rapid and opaque 
expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal, which exceeds previous 
efforts in both scale and complexity. The PRC has been reluctant to 
substantively engage on practical measures to reduce nuclear risks. 
Such confidence building measures are vital to reduce the possibility 
of misunderstanding or miscalculation. We will continue to press the 
PRC to engage in substantive bilateral and multilateral talks on 
strategic risk reduction measures and crisis communications to reduce 
the risk of accidental nuclear war.

    Question. Last year, Congress provided considerable resources to 
increase our engagement with Pacific Island nations, as China seeks to 
expand its influence in the region.
    Can you provide an update on if/how those dollars have been 
obligated since the end of 2022?

    Answer. The Department appreciates Congressional support for this 
region and intends to continue advancing the Biden administration's 
Pacific Partnership Strategy, announced at the U.S.-Pacific Island 
Country Summit in September 2022. U.S. prosperity and security depend 
on a free and open Pacific region. The strategy aims to enhance 
enduring relationships through expanded diplomatic presence and 
assistance, leverage allies and partners to address Pacific priorities, 
and empower the Pacific to build resilience to 21st century challenges 
and capitalize on opportunities. The FY 2023 653(a) report will reflect 
allocations for the $150 million in foreign assistance for Pacific 
Island Countries provided in the FY 2023 omnibus. The Department and 
USAID will consult with appropriate committees prior to obligation of 
funds.

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