[Senate Hearing 118-103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 118-103

                     REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2024
                 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
                           DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS



                             FIRST SESSION



                               __________

                             APRIL 26, 2023

                               __________





       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations






                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
               




                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov


                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

53-434 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023















                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina

                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          



                              (ii)        

  









                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Power, Hon. Samantha, Administrator, United States Agency for 
  International Development, Washington, DC......................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    39

Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    53

Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator 

  Benjamin L. Cardin.............................................   101

Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................   105

Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Bill Hagerty...................................................   120

WSJ Article, ``Solar and Wind Force Poverty on Africa,'' Dated 
  October 24, 2021, by President Museveni........................   130

Letter From USAID Providing Two Corrections for the Record for 
  Ms. Samantha Power, Dated April 28, 2023.......................   132

                                 (iii)

  






 
                     REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2024
                 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
                           DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Paul, Cruz, 
and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Administrator Power, thank you for joining us.
    As we meet today, horrific violence continues to unfold in 
Khartoum. Hundreds are dead. Thousands have been wounded. The 
staff of humanitarian aid organizations had been assaulted and 
killed, a reminder of the dangers our diplomats, humanitarian, 
and development workers at USAID face as they carry out their 
mission every day.
    I am sure I speak for all of us when I say how relieved I 
was to hear about the successful evacuation of our officials 
from Sudan, but I agree with Administration officials we cannot 
and must not abandon the Sudanese people nor will insecurity 
deter us from our work in other parts of the continent and 
other places in the world.
    Russia's war in Ukraine is driving up food, fertilizer, and 
energy costs all over the globe. Forty-eight million people in 
West Africa are experiencing food insecurity.
    Climate change is fueling record floods around the world 
from Pakistan to Nigeria and extreme droughts in Brazil and 
Central Asia.
    Additionally, the threat of state-sponsored death squads, 
criminal gangs, and sexual violence is driving millions and 
millions of people to flee their homes, creating a growing 
migration crisis across continents and hemispheres.
    Administrator Power, do you think we are prepared? Because 
while your budget request is an improvement compared to past 
years, given the challenges and risks we face right now and the 
shocks and stresses we will face in the future, I am concerned 
that this budget is not ambitious enough.
    Successful U.S. foreign policy requires a balance between 
the three ``Ds'' of defense, diplomacy, and development. 
Development is effectively the ounce of prevention for the 
pound of cure we see in places like Sudan right now.
    It cannot be an afterthought for the United States and it 
certainly is not an afterthought in Beijing. China is 
outspending us and outflanking us when it comes to 
international development and development diplomacy.
    I would argue American international development is driven 
by a desire to support people seeking to improve their own 
lives, to help build strong societal and governance structures 
that facilitate sustainable economic growth.
    That stands in stark contrast to China's development 
approach, which amounts to foreign infrastructure investments, 
which I think is fair to say does not come from the goodness of 
Xi Jinping's heart. Rather, it is a tool Beijing uses 
effectively to influence and shape the direction of nations 
around the globe.
    Their efforts ignore workers' rights, destroy the 
environment, saddle local communities seeking critical 
infrastructure projects with faulty bridges and roads.
    We need to up our game to be responsive to the types of 
infrastructure projects so many nations need. We can build the 
world's best hospitals, the smoothest roads, the most efficient 
power grids, but when the United States invests in local 
infrastructure, we also have to make sure that the host 
communities know what we are doing, that they know the United 
States model of development and investment brings needed, 
trusted, and sustainable partnerships for growth.
    I also think that when democratic nations try to do the 
right thing, USAID needs to be able to move quickly. We must be 
agile and ready to support those democracies facing economic 
hardship.
    I would like to hear your thoughts on whether USAID has 
what it needs to show that democracies can deliver for their 
people because oftentimes USAID moves slower than molasses.
    Case in point--the humanitarian crisis for Armenians in 
Nagorno-Karabakh is only getting worse. Where are we? Why are 
we not airlifting humanitarian supplies to those Armenians 
facing Baku's blockade?
    We need to respond to events quickly and we also need to 
address root causes. I think you would agree with me that 
international development must be about more than sending tents 
to people impacted by an earthquake or hurricane.
    It has to be about making strategic investments that 
address the needs of people on the ground, about strengthening 
the systems and institutions countries need to be resilient in 
the future, about creating good-paying local jobs and about 
supporting the peace and prosperity people need to raise a 
family rather than be forced to flee their homeland.
    Administrator Power, I look forward to hearing your 
testimony, updating us on your progress since the last year.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A year ago we had 
this same hearing, as we do every year--the budget hearing--and 
Ms. Power, I want to quote you as we start this hearing.
    You said last year, ``The work we do abroad matters to 
Americans here at home. It makes us safer, it makes us more 
prosperous, and it engenders goodwill that strengthens 
alliances and global cooperation.''
    Well said. Americans support that proposition, but it must 
be done well and it must be done right, and in that regard 
there are problems with this budget and I want to talk about 
them briefly. We will drill down as the hearing goes on.
    For example, the budget correctly identifies China's 
predatory and coercive activities as a major threat to the 
U.S., our allies, and our interests. Again, well said. It even 
includes a number of so-called outcompete China initiatives 
that I might be willing to support, but the decision to request 
this as mandatory funding without legally required offsets 
demonstrates a lack of seriousness, I believe, and an inability 
to make tough budget decisions.
    Also, by example, the Administration's climate and energy 
policies are self-defeating and misaligned with outcompeting 
China proposition. By rejecting low-carbon energy options like 
natural gas and clinging to only green-only approach, the 
Administration will not outcompete China and it will not reduce 
carbon.
    Why do I say that? Instead, it will push developing 
countries toward even more Chinese investment in high-carbon 
cheaper energy while simultaneously creating markets for solar 
panels built, as we know, on the backs of Uighur slave labor in 
China.
    This is not an appropriate use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. As 
administrator, you lead a world-class team of humanitarians 
working to address the highest levels of conflict and 
displacement in recorded history.
    Unfortunately, existing humanitarian crises are not going 
away and in places like Sudan are only getting more dangerous, 
as we all know.
    Remarkably, with this budget, the Administration wants to 
reduce humanitarian assistance while increasing contributions 
to a nontransparent green climate fund to $1.6 billion. This 
makes no sense.
    Regarding Ukraine, the Administration has spoken at length 
about its unwavering commitment to the Ukrainian people. Yet, 
this budget requests--the budget request you have in front of 
us pretends that the war is not happening and requests no 
funds. We need an explanation of this.
    Turning to the West Bank and Gaza, the Administration 
restarted Palestinian assistance 2 years ago, yet we have seen 
even higher levels of violence. Palestinians are identifying 
with terror groups to promote their interests more and the 
Palestinian Authority's abhorrent pay-for-slay policy continues 
unabated.
    Why is the Administration asking for an additional $250 
million? Whose interests will be advanced by this money? 
Certainly not America's interest and certainly not our ally, 
Israel.
    I am also compelled to point out the irony of requesting 
funds to empower women globally--it is certainly a laudable 
goal--but at the same time requesting flexibility to provide 
assistance to the Taliban--to the Taliban. Did we learn nothing 
during the 20 years we spent in Afghanistan? The Taliban 
certainly do not have the same values that we do.
    Finally, I would be remiss if I did not raise once again 
the need to make sure that the U.S. follows the ``do no harm 
principle'' in response to complex emergencies such as South 
Sudan and Ethiopia.
    We all know these are tough, but we still await the conduct 
of assistance reviews and investigations into humanitarian aid 
diversions. We need strong oversight on assistance and these 
issues need our view.
    There are a lot of areas in which we can and should work 
together. For example, I am eager to help ensure USAID has a 
workforce that is fit for purpose and fully capable of meeting 
today's complex development challenges. This applies not only 
to the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, where needs are 
particularly acute, but also at overseas missions, particularly 
in Africa.
    On balance, this budget appears to me to be written to 
pursue domestic progressive goals rather than meet crucial 
needs overseas. This imbalance makes it really difficult to 
support.
    It is clear we have got a very steep hill to climb when it 
comes to aligning priorities and resources. I hope we can get 
to a resolution on these and come together. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    With that, let us turn to our witness with us. To testify 
on the Administration's proposed fiscal year 2024 budget for 
USAID is the agency's administrator, Samantha Power.
    Obviously, just in the opening statements you heard a 
plethora of challenges both for the agency and the world and 
the challenges the agency faces and grows in complexity each 
and every year.
    You and the dedicated workforce at USAID have extremely 
difficult jobs to do. We are grateful for your efforts.
    With that, we will turn to you for your testimony. Your 
full statement will be included in the record, without 
objection. We would ask you to summarize it in about 5 minutes 
or so, so that we can have members engage in a conversation.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SAMANTHA POWER, ADMINISTRATOR, 
      UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
                      WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Ranking Member Risch. Thanks to all of you who have joined here 
today and those who will join us subsequently.
    As you each noted in your opening statements, the outbreak 
of discriminate violence in Sudan has upended hope for the 
democratic transition that millions of Sudanese risked their 
lives for.
    It has already claimed hundreds of lives and injured 
thousands more, but the challenges Sudan faces, it is fair to 
say, I think are emblematic of a wider story that each of you 
have alluded to that is unfolding in many parts of the world.
    After decades of development gains that laid the foundation 
for an era of relative peace, stability, and prosperity, those 
gains are now at serious risk. During our lifetimes, the United 
States has helped accelerate tremendous progress in reducing 
extreme poverty, in fighting disease and addressing hunger, and 
getting kids and girls especially to school, fueling 
democracies' rise.
    Now many of these trends have moved in reverse. The 
pandemic decimated health systems, leading to a resurgence in 
diseases from measles to tuberculosis. It also battered many 
nations' finances after a decade of heavy borrowing and more 
recently rising inflation exacerbated by Putin's war.
    Sixty percent of the world's poorest countries are 
currently at or near debt distress--60 percent--and natural 
disasters, as you noted, are increasing in frequency and 
intensity, leading to a sharp rise in humanitarian needs.
    The upshot of it all is stark. For the first time since the 
1950s, human life expectancy globally is on the decline while 
extreme poverty is on the rise. At the same time, democracies 
everywhere are under attack.
    Our rivals are using transnational corruption, digital 
repression, disinformation, and in Ukraine, of course, actual 
artillery and missile fire to undermine freedom, to elevate 
autocrats, and to curry favor.
    It is a daunting list of challenges and I know some 
question whether the United States should be taking on these 
challenges through our development investments while others 
wonder whether the scope of the challenges at this stage is 
simply too great to be able to make a meaningful difference.
    The fact is our national security hinges on this work. 
Deprivation and indignity abroad, as we well know, can fuel 
resource competition, political fragility, and extremism that 
endangers us here at home and Americans all around the world.
    Disease outbreaks can cross oceans and recessions in 
foreign markets can threaten our own economic growth, and if we 
do not lead efforts to take on these challenges it is fair to 
say the People's Republic of China and Putin are ready to step 
in whether through opaque loans on unfavorable terms or with 
mercenaries in tow.
    An international order that values democracy and human 
rights and that respects international borders is not a given. 
Indeed, authoritarian actors are challenging and aiming to 
reshape it as we sit here.
    We have to invest in the stable and humane world that we 
need. USAID is truly privileged to have a leading role in 
tackling the most significant challenges of our time in close 
coordination with our interagency partners advancing diplomacy 
and defense, and we are grateful to the American people and to 
you for giving us the resources to make a major difference.
    That said, we know that to drive progress on the scale that 
we need, on the scale this array of challenges that you have 
alluded to demands, we have to bring in other donor countries.
    We have to bring in the private sector at scale. We have to 
work with multilateral institutions and harness them in pursuit 
of our objectives. We have to work with foundations and local 
organizations in our partner countries.
    USAID has laid out a new reform agenda aimed at delivering 
progress beyond our development programs, beyond the resources 
that this Congress allocates to us where we are using our 
expertise, our convening power, our advocacy, our hustle to 
draw in others, to leverage more resources, to spark 
innovation, and to inspire broader movements for change.
    The Biden-Harris administration's FY2024 request of $32 
billion for USAID's fully and partially managed accounts will 
allow us to make more of that transformative impact.
    Alongside our partners, we will invest in countries 
experiencing democratic openings, helping them show, as the 
chairman said, that democracy delivers tangible results for 
citizens.
    We will work with nations to attract private sector 
investment and drive broadly shared economic growth. We will 
support countries that are rebuilding their decimated health 
systems and we will meet growing humanitarian needs not just 
with emergency assistance, but with long-term investments in 
resilience and, crucially, we will invest in our workforce to 
carry out this ambitious agenda.
    Since 2019, our operating expense funds have increased at 
half the rate that our programming has grown, giving us more to 
do with fewer people and resources, but this budget will help 
us invest in the people and systems that we need to power an 
agency that is nimble and that is responsive.
    We know that with the United States leading the way the 
world can drive meaningful progress against our toughest 
challenges because we have decades of gains in global health, 
in education, and in prosperity to prove it. It is on us now to 
resume that progress.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Power follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Samantha Power

    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and other 
distinguished members of the Committee.
    The challenge the world faces today is clear: The decades of 
development gains that have laid the foundation for an era of relative 
peace, stability, and prosperity are at serious risk.
    During our lifetimes, the United States has helped accelerate 
tremendous progress in reducing extreme poverty, fighting disease, 
addressing hunger, getting kids in school, and fueling democracy's 
rise.
    But now, many of these trends have moved into reverse. The pandemic 
decimated health systems, leading to a resurgence in diseases from 
measles to tuberculosis. It also battered many nation's finances. After 
a decade of heavy borrowing and more recently rising inflation--
exacerbated by Putin's war--60 percent of the world's poorest countries 
are at or near debt distress. And natural disasters are increasing in 
frequency and intensity, leading to a sharp rise in humanitarian needs. 
The upshot of it all is stark: For the first time in decades, human 
life expectancy is on the decline--while extreme poverty is on the 
rise.
    At the same time, democracies everywhere are under attack. Our 
rivals are using transnational corruption, digital repression, 
disinformation--and in Ukraine, actual artillery fire--to undermine 
freedom, elevate autocrats, and curry favor.
    It's a daunting list of challenges. And I know some question 
whether the United States should be taking on these challenges through 
our development investments, or whether the scope of the challenges is 
too great to make a meaningful difference.
    But the fact is our national security hinges on this work. 
Deprivation and indignity abroad can fuel resource competition, 
political fragility, and extremism that endangers us here at home. 
Disease outbreaks can cross oceans, and recessions in foreign markets 
can threaten our own economic growth.
    And if we don't lead efforts to take on these challenges, the 
People's Republic of China and Putin are ready to step in, whether 
through opaque loans on unfavorable terms, or with mercenaries in tow.
    An international order that values democracy and human rights and 
respects international borders is not a given. Indeed, authoritarian 
actors are challenging and aiming to reshape it. We have to invest in 
the stable and humane world we need.
    USAID is privileged to have a leading role in tackling the most 
significant challenges of our time, in close coordination with our 
interagency partners advancing diplomacy and defense. And we are 
grateful to the American people--and to you--for giving us the 
resources to make a major difference.
    That said, we know that to drive progress on the scale we need, we 
have to bring other donor countries, the private sector, multilateral 
institutions, foundations, and local organizations in our partner 
countries along with us.
    So USAID has set a new reform agenda aimed at delivering progress 
beyond our development programs--using our expertise, convening power, 
and advocacy to draw in others, leverage more resources, spark 
innovation, and inspire broader movements for change.
    The Biden-Harris administration's FY 2024 request of $32 billion 
for USAID's fully- and partially-managed accounts will allow us to make 
more of that transformative impact.
    Alongside our partners, we'll invest in countries experiencing 
democratic openings, helping them show that democracy delivers tangible 
results for citizens. We'll work with nations to attract private sector 
investment and drive broadly shared economic growth. We'll support 
countries that are rebuilding their decimated health systems. And we'll 
meet growing humanitarian needs not just with emergency assistance, but 
long-term investments in resilience.
    And, crucially, we'll invest in our workforce to carry out this 
ambitious agenda. Since 2019, our operating expense funds have 
increased at half the rate that our programming has grown--giving us 
more to do with fewer people and resources. But this budget will help 
us invest in the people and systems we need to power an Agency that is 
nimble and responsive.
    We know that, with the United States leading the way, the world can 
drive meaningful progress against our toughest challenges--because we 
have decades of gains in global health, education, and prosperity to 
prove it. It's on us, now, to resume that progress.
    A few months ago, President George W. Bush posed a question. 
``What's the role of a great country in the world? Is it to look 
inward? Is it to think about how to solve big problems?'' As he said, 
``We all decided to work together to solve big problems.'' Let's 
continue that legacy.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you. We will start a round of 5-minute 
questions.
    The Administration has sent over an ambitious mandatory 
spending proposal to outcompete China with line items for the 
compacts of free association, hard infrastructure spending, 
equity for the Development Finance Corporation, and the Indo-
Pacific strategy. What is USAID's role in the outcompete China 
proposal?
    Ms. Power. Well, we already are making great use of the 
countering Chinese influence fund. It gives us flexibility to 
do everything from support an open internet to supporting right 
to information laws that are being used increasingly around the 
world to actually publish for the first time these opaque 
contracts that charge these inordinate fees on infrastructure 
investments.
    Those contracts, as you know, are famously concealed often 
from the publics in the countries in which this debt is being 
incurred.
    I think the entire USAID model stands in contrast, as you 
noted, I think at the beginning in helping countries work 
toward----
    The Chairman. What I am trying to find out, Administrator, 
what specific--I gather the broad strokes.
    Ms. Power. Yes.
    The Chairman. Is there a specific component of the 
outcompete China that has been delegated to your agency?
    Ms. Power. Well, I think--there are a number of sub-
components, let us say, of the outcompete China approach. There 
is the request that Senator Risch alluded to with additional 
funding to really amp up what that looks like.
    At present, what USAID does is we are often the ground game 
for the Development Finance Corporation in identifying, for 
example, the Dominican Republic, a country you and I know--both 
know well where tenders are--can be put out in a manner that 
requires open and transparent competition in a manner that 
would almost necessarily benefit U.S. companies.
    That has happened in a major port in the Dominican 
Republic. We are opening a new mission finally in Fiji starting 
in September. That is part of the Pacific Islands amp up that 
is occurring as part of the outcompete China program, and happy 
to get you specifics within the mandatory funding proposal.
    The Chairman. I would very much appreciate seeing that.
    Turning to Sudan, are you making provisions for the safety 
and security of all USAID employees including local employees?
    Ms. Power. We are working around the clock in pursuit of 
that objective in a very challenging set of circumstances. Six 
USAID staff were evacuated as part of the evacuation that you 
mentioned at the outset, four Americans and two third country 
nationals from Pakistan. They arrived in Washington 2 days ago.
    We spoke yesterday to our Sudanese staff. We still have 29 
Sudanese staff who are in Sudan, 27 of whom are in Khartoum and 
are basically in--most of whom in neighborhoods that are--that 
are incredibly hard to move around in.
    We are helping them secure onward destinations in terms of 
our USAID mission, for example, in Egypt or in Ethiopia so that 
if they want to leave the country they will have someplace to 
work.
    We have given them advance payments, salary increases, 
those kinds of things, but to be honest, Mr. Chairman, it is 
extremely difficult to access banks right now because even 
banking employees cannot get to the bank.
    It just underscores, again, the irresponsibility and 
recklessness of the leader of the SAF and the RSF in pursuing 
this conflict, but we will not rest unless and until our people 
are safe.
    The Chairman. Please keep the committee abreast of where 
you are at in evacuating USAID employees, assuming they want to 
leave and I assume that under the present circumstances the 
majority of them would want to leave.
    Ms. Power. That is the impression we have for sure.
    The Chairman. Last year in our hearing with your budget, I 
raised my concerns about violence Armenians are facing in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.
    I appreciate--I see $40 million in the budget requesting 
assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, funds for 
Armenia in part to assist with recovery from the humanitarian 
impact from recent Azerbaijani assaults on Nagorno-Karabakh.
    I am concerned that these funds will be split among a 
number of assistance priorities and that the assistance will 
not reach vulnerable Armenian populations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    How much of this assistance would go towards meeting the 
needs of vulnerable communities in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
as they recover from Azerbaijani aggression?
    Ms. Power. I do not have that figure off the top of my head 
and I think everything is very fluid there, especially in light 
of developments this week.
    The Chairman. All right. Would you get that to the 
committee, please? I would like to----
    Ms. Power. As soon as we have it, but again, these are 
decisions that are made on a weekly basis on the basis of----
    The Chairman. Well, there must be some concept out of $40 
million for what you expect to use----
    Ms. Power. Well, we have conducted two assessment missions 
to the region to look at the needs specifically in Nagorno-
Karabakh.
    The Chairman. When you get the assessment, I would like to 
see the assessment.
    Ms. Power. Okay.
    The Chairman. Particularly how you are going to help be 
able to achieve delivering humanitarian assistance in the 
Lachin corridor.
    Lastly, I published a comprehensive plan for securing our 
borders and managing migration and refugees in the Americas, a 
plan recognizing the fact that most migrants and refugees on 
the move in our hemisphere are not seeking to come to our 
border.
    There is 20 million people who are displaced in the 
Southern Hemisphere already throughout countries, some 
refugees, some seeking asylum. Others are economic refugees. 
The bottom line is they are all over the hemisphere.
    Now, unless we work with those countries to create pathways 
of stability, there will be 20 million people on the march and 
what we are facing at the southern border now will be minor in 
comparison to what we can.
    It seems to me that we have to come with an approach that 
understands it is a hemispheric challenge, not just simply a 
southern border challenge.
    When the United Nations Commission for Refugees ultimately 
says that 20 percent of the world's refugee problems is in the 
Western Hemisphere, they only spend 8 percent of their funds on 
it.
    When Colombia takes in nearly 2 million Venezuelans, 
something has got to give, and the list goes on and on. Now, I 
know that USAID under your leadership has started to move in a 
direction to support the integration of displaced populations, 
but we have to do more to address the migration and refugee 
crisis not only from Ukraine and Syria, but also in our own 
hemisphere.
    What can be done to significantly scale up USAID funding 
for integration initiatives in the hemisphere and can I get 
your commitment to work with me in the appropriations process 
to encourage the establishment of a $300 million integration 
fund so that we can work towards making sure that we do not 
have 20 million people on the march?
    Ms. Power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me just say that I think the President is broadly 
aligned with the view that you have laid out and we are surging 
our support as best we can for integration efforts including 
the really incredible effort made by Colombia to integrate more 
than 2 million migrants.
    Those efforts at integration have a direct effect on, as 
you said, who comes to the border, who seeks to go further 
north, and just give you one example, Venezuelan arrivals to 
the U.S. border nearly doubled after Colombia actually cut off 
the TPS registration deadline back in May of last year.
    We see that also displacement increased--inside the 
hemisphere is increasing at a rate 17 times that which the rate 
to the border is increasing, which is extraordinary when you 
think about this--how substantial those flows are writ large.
    We already do work with the Colombians on TPS and in trying 
to provide support in the communities that are housing 
Venezuelans who have come in, but we would be very interested 
in talking to you about what more we can do for countries all 
along the route north.
    The Chairman. This is a question of stability in the 
hemisphere, stability for the countries that have shown their 
willingness to accept refugees, and stability at the southern 
border of the United States. It should be a no-brainer.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    On April 6 this year, your agency notified this committee 
of the discovery of widespread diversion of U.S. branded food 
aid in Tigray.
    The war in northern Ethiopia featured severely restricted 
humanitarian access, we understand, and looting of humanitarian 
warehouses. Since the initial notification from USAID, our 
committee has not been briefed on the diversion of U.S. food 
aid in Tigray despite requests.
    While I understand the acute situation in Sudan has 
captured attention within USAID, we should be able to do 
multiple things at the same time.
    I am sure you know that in our oversight capacity we are 
deeply troubled when these kinds of things happen and our 
constituents are even more deeply troubled, and for those that 
have reservations about all this stuff, this gives ammunition.
    Can you give us an update on the diversion of the U.S. food 
aid in Ethiopia?
    Ms. Power. Thank you. I absolutely share your outrage and 
that of your constituents at what looks to be fairly 
substantial diversion of assistance meant for what were people 
in Tigray who were facing famine conditions.
    We have dispatched our deputy assistant administrator for 
humanitarian affairs to the region and he and a team is 
actively looking into what happened and we do have some 
preliminary indications of, effectively, collusion between 
parties on both sides actually of the conflict.
    Senator Risch. Is that team still there or are they back 
here?
    Ms. Power. Our deputy assistant administrator, I believe, 
is back, but the team on the ground working out of our mission 
in Ethiopia is still uncovering this and we have engaged the 
Ethiopian Government as well as the Tigrayan authorities.
    It looks--there is plenty more to be said when we have the 
actual facts in a right position, I think, to convey to you, 
but it looks as though this is something that started in the 
wake of the cessation of hostilities so a more recent instance 
of collusion.
    We have retrieved much of the assistance that was out on 
open markets, but there is no question, again, that this is 
outrageous and above all, the people in Tigray are the ones to 
have suffered because they will not have received access to 
food in the course of distributions because of this criminal 
network that was established, again, it looks like somewhere 
between November and February of this year.
    Senator Risch. We are looking forward to that and I got to 
tell you, there is going to be a lot of pressure from this 
committee to see what you are going to do about this because 
this--just saying, well, this happened and we are concerned.
    Ms. Power. I could not agree more and----
    Senator Risch. We got to have a plan going forward that is 
much more reliable than what we have got here.
    Ms. Power. I want to stress how unusual the circumstance 
was, but not unique and so your concerns are very well-founded, 
but it really was, again, the denial of access for our disaster 
response team that deprived us of the safeguards and the 
oversight that we normally have.
    We did have third-party monitors and others we were relying 
upon, but, obviously, we have to look at what amounts to a 
system failure if, in fact, again, this was allowed to happen 
at scale.
    We know we owe you ample not only accounting for what has 
happened, but also some institution of additional safeguards 
that will give you the assurance that you need in light of all 
of the resources that we are expending globally to try to meet 
food needs.
    Senator Risch. Let me turn for a minute to the Palestinian 
question. You heard my opening statement. I am really 
distressed by the fact that we are bumping up money in this 
area.
    Look, we have been at this for decades and we keep trying 
to pound a round peg into a square hole. We keep doing the same 
thing. We keep getting the same results. What is the situation 
with this in what I think is a very significant increase in 
this area in the budget?
    Ms. Power. Well, I think that, again, while it is--there is 
no question that development assistance or humanitarian 
assistance has not brought peace to this region, I think the 
individuals who are affected by this programming have felt the 
impact of this programming over the years and whether that is 
those who access education through State Department funding who 
would otherwise not have access to schools, whether those who 
access clean water and, again, some of the sanitation 
programming we are trying to do would have cross-line benefit 
as well.
    Civil society programming is about holding also the 
Palestinian Authority to account and for there to be more 
pressure from the outside to improve governance, which I know 
is something that has concerned you.
    Even career skills training for young people--every one of 
the 10,000 youth that receive those career skills training has 
the opportunity potentially to find a career that they would 
not otherwise have found, which means potentially being less 
attracted to the path of extremism, which, of course, there are 
always people there willing to be--trying to exploit a sense of 
deprivation or grievance.
    Senator Risch. Well, Samantha, I do not disagree with what 
you have said about the money doing some good. The problem I 
have got is this is not our responsibility. This is not the 
responsibility of the American people.
    Certainly, we do our best to try to get people up on their 
feet and going, but when you get a situation like this that is 
not only gone on for decades, it has gone on for generations, 
and we do the same thing over and over and over again. They do 
the same thing over and over again, and I am just disgusted 
with it and through with it, to be honest with you, and yet 
here there is another $250 million going into it. It is just--I 
have real difficulty with this. Real difficulties. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Administrator Power, welcome. I want to 
associate myself with the chairman's comments. We are glad to 
see your budget is moving in the right direction.
    I do not believe there is enough being requested to meet 
the needs that are out there. I know I am joined by other 
members of our committee. Senator Coons raises this issue 
frequently in his role on the Appropriations Committee on the 
challenges that he has on the allocation of the funds.
    Let me start with the proposal that is coming out of the 
House Republicans, that as I understand it would mean about a 
45 percent cut in the foreign aid budget. What impact would 
that have on your ability to carry out your mission, 
recognizing that you said you are looking for partnerships? Can 
you sustain a 45 percent cut and America still be able to 
maintain its international presence?
    Ms. Power. Where to start? I think I testified last week 
and the number that was floating around was a 22 percent cut 
and so that was 13 million children who would not receive 
vaccinations with a 22 percent cut. Presuming one would double 
that, that would be 26 million kids without vaccinations.
    I think, again, at the same time that we see these 
proposals for these really substantial cuts, we see very strong 
demand signals up here from both parties, rightly, for the 
United States to be out there competing with the PRC, 
supporting democracy, fighting corruption, securing stable 
investment climates for American companies, showing, again, the 
contrast between the U.S. approach, pursuing an open free 
internet, supporting civil society on the one hand, again, in 
contrast with the more extractive approach that the PRC has 
taken in its development objectives.
    In terms of humanitarian assistance, you have 230 million 
people facing acute food insecurity right now. If you were to 
cut half of what we did this year--the United States is the 
leading humanitarian donor in Afghanistan and Somalia, in 
Ethiopia--if you imagine what Ukraine would look like without 
the support that we have been providing, Putin could win the 
war without having to fire a bullet if the Ukrainian Government 
collapsed.
    Senator Cardin. I am sure you could go on and on and on.
    Ms. Power. I could.
    Senator Cardin. I knew the answer to the question, 
obviously. We have traveled to many places in the world and we 
visit with the USAID people and they all are in need of 
additional resources in order to match the activities that are 
occurring in China globally as well as the needs that are out 
there to promote American national security.
    We recognize that would devastate your program. I want to 
raise one issue where I am disappointed you are not seeking 
more funds and that is in localization. When you look at the 
success of PEPFAR, it is not only dealing with HIV/AIDS.
    It is also local capacity to develop a health care 
infrastructure that can deal with pandemics or other types of 
challenges. You have a goal of 25 percent on local aid by, I 
think, 2025. When you look at the direct appropriations of your 
budget, it is actually a cut of close to 50 percent.
    You have other areas for local partnerships that could make 
up for some of those funds. Tell me how this budget will allow 
you to reach your goal of 25 percent.
    Ms. Power. Well, let me just acknowledge the degree of 
difficulty in meeting that goal. We in the last year have 
increased foreign assistance to local partners from what looks 
like it was around 7 percent to probably 10\1/2\ percent and 
that is with a concerted push that not only includes dedicated 
resources like Centroamerica Local, but also intensifying staff 
attention because to partner with a local organization, given 
the complexity of compliance requirements in working to be good 
stewards of taxpayer resources requires much more staff, focus, 
left-sy and right-sy with the local organization.
    I would look both at the budget request for our seriousness 
of purpose here, but also at the efforts we are making to 
reduce bureaucratic burdens on staff, and if you could look as 
well at our operating expense requests as we seek to increase 
the number of Foreign Service officers, civil service officers, 
and Foreign Service nationals who will help us actually work 
with those local organizations so they can compete with much 
larger established groups.
    Senator Cardin. I appreciate that, and I hope that you 
would keep us informed. We want you to meet that 25 percent 
goal, so we are interested in helping you.
    Ms. Power. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. One last question, if I might. We talked 
about Sudan. Let me talk about Haiti for one moment.
    We know the chaos of--I should not say chaos--the safety 
issues in Haiti itself. Are we able to provide humanitarian 
help to the people of Haiti, considering the challenges we have 
with safety in the country itself?
    Ms. Power. We are providing humanitarian assistance, but 
access to neighborhoods that even a year ago was relatively 
smooth is now severely impeded and there is no substitute, 
again, for marrying access and assistance.
    We have substantial assistance. The UN is issuing its 
largest appeal since the earthquake in terms of humanitarian 
needs, but whole parts of Port-au-Prince, neighborhoods you 
have probably visited, I visited, are now off limits for 
humanitarian actors because of the prevalence of the gangs. 
Again, humanitarian without security inevitably is going to 
limit access and it is only the Haitian people who suffer.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. Ms. Power, did USAID fund coronavirus 
research in Wuhan, China?
    Ms. Power. We did not fund gain of function research, as 
you know.
    Senator Paul. That is not the question. The question is did 
you fund coronavirus research in Wuhan, China.
    Ms. Power. Before my time, there was the PREDICT program 
with which you are familiar, which ended in China in 2019.
    Senator Paul. This is a $200 million program and the GAO 
has also identified that some of these grants went directly to 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology where there is a suspicion that 
the lab leak began that began the pandemic.
    Has USAID awarded funds to the Academy of Military Medical 
Sciences in China?
    Ms. Power. Not to my knowledge, but I would have to get 
back----
    Senator Paul. I think the answer is once again, yes. GAO 
has found that there have been sub awards of NIH money probably 
as well as USAID money that went to the Academy of not just 
Medical Research, Military Medical Research in China.
    Now, part of the unknowns here is we cannot get the records 
to look at this. I have been asking for months and months for 
records. In September of last year, I wrote, Ms. Power, USAID a 
request asking for records from the PREDICT program.
    These are not classified. These are simply records of 
scientific research and we want to read the grants to find out 
what they were doing and whether the research was dangerous or 
not.
    The response I got from your agency was USAID will not be 
providing any documents at this time. They are just unwilling 
to give documents on a scientific grant proposal. We are paying 
for it. They are asking for $745 million more in money and we 
get no response.
    Two weeks ago, the Ranking Member Risch, myself, and 25 
other Republican senators, unfortunately, so far signed a 
letter once again. Still no response. We are not asking for 
classified information. We are not asking for anything unusual.
    Twenty million people died around the world. You are 
supposed to be an agency that cares about the death of people 
around the world.
    We talk about starvation and famine, and 20 million people 
died from a virus and you will not give us the basic 
information about what grants you are funding around the world 
and who you are funding.
    Should we be funding the Academy of Military Medical 
Research in China? They are now off limits, but did we fund 
them and who was making the decision?
    You know who ran the PREDICT program? UC Davis. Have you 
had any conversations with UC Davis about research in China and 
whether it was advisable?
    Ms. Power. Again, to set the record straight, first of all, 
the PREDICT program ended in 2019. We have people----
    Senator Paul. Yet, it goes on in other forums in other 
names.
    Ms. Power. That is certainly not USAID programming.
    Senator Paul. Well, you have a program called emergency 
pandemic threats program still, do you not?
    Ms. Power. If I could just finish in response to the first 
set of allegations. We have provided hundreds and hundreds of 
pages of documents related to the PREDICT program for the very 
reason that you say, because we are----
    Senator Paul. Not to us.
    Ms. Power. We are, again, as I know you had an exchange 
with Secretary Blinken as well, consistent with long-standing 
practice----
    Senator Paul. Not going to give them to us.
    Ms. Power. --we have been responsive to the committees of 
jurisdiction including this----
    Senator Paul. Not going to--you have been consistent in not 
giving us any information, but what you are saying is----
    Ms. Power. That is not true. We have provided hundreds of 
pages in response to the chair and ranking.
    Senator Paul. To who? To whom?
    Ms. Power. To the Senate Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee, for example. We have had extensive 
engagement with this committee.
    Senator Paul. We have been requesting this and gotten none 
of it. I am on that committee as well.
    The thing is, is what we get from you and from the State 
Department at-large is that if Senator Menendez signs it, you 
will give it documents.
    Until then, you will give us nothing and we have gotten 
nothing, zero. You said will not be providing any documents. I 
now have 25 senators have sent you a letter and you all are not 
responding. We do not----
    Ms. Power. Well, we certainly respond----
    Senator Paul. We want to see the scientific grants. We give 
you the money. The taxpayers give you the money. We deserve to 
know where the money went, whether it happened.
    Look, you are right. It ended in 2019. When did the virus 
come about? In about 2019. Some of the research proposals that 
came about in 2018 were Wuhan Institute of Virology asking for 
money to create a virus with a furin cleavage site in it. 
Coronavirus, a SARS-like virus with a furin cleavage site, that 
is exactly what COVID turned out to be.
    They wanted money to create such a virus. We want to know 
are there other research proposals that you either granted or 
denied that were on the same veins of creating viruses that 
could have become COVID-19. We cannot tell because you will not 
give us the information.
    Ms. Power. Again, we--consistent with longstanding 
practice, we are providing extensive documentation. We have a 
whole team of people who do nothing----
    Senator Paul. That is just not true. That is just not true.
    Ms. Power. --other than look back at PREDICT.
    Senator Paul. That is not true.
    Ms. Power. It is factually accurate.
    Senator Paul. That is not true.
    Ms. Power. It is. It is accurate.
    Senator Paul. Everything we have asked we have not gotten. 
I have not seen one document on the PREDICT program.
    Ms. Power. I understand that. Again, consistent with common 
practice across the Administration----
    Senator Paul. Consistent that you are not going to give it 
to any senator who has asked.
    Ms. Power. No. No. No. We are providing all of the kinds of 
documentation that you are describing.
    Senator Paul. You are not. You are being dishonest.
    Ms. Power. We are. No, I am not. I am absolutely not.
    Senator Paul. We have not gotten one scrap of paper from 
you. Not one scrap of paper.
    Ms. Power. Again, with the committees of jurisdiction we 
are providing all of the paperwork that have been requested by 
the chair and the ranking member.
    Senator Paul. You are not. I am on the other committee. I 
am the ranking member on the other committee and I have not 
seen a scrap of paper from that committee either.
    Ms. Power. Well, that is----
    Senator Paul. See, here is what the American people----
    Ms. Power. I can tell you what is happening. Actually, I 
cannot tell you what is happening at the committee.
    Senator Paul. The American people think this, that because 
you will not respond and because you respond with a nonresponse 
that you have something to hide. I do not know if you have 
anything to hide or not.
    I want to see every grant proposal that had to do with 
coronaviruses that went to China from the U.S. Government, from 
all facets of the U.S. Government, and every bit of the Biden 
administration is stonewalling us and will not give us the 
information. It makes us think and it makes us suspicious that 
you are hiding something.
    It was not even you. This was the previous Administration. 
We go back two or three administrations. We just want to see 
the information and yet you sit there and you say we will do 
something--we are doing something, which is absolutely the 
opposite of the truth. You are not being honest.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you, Administrator Power, for your testimony 
today.
    Know that we are following closely developments in Sudan 
and care deeply about the security and safety of the 
development professionals who are there and about the 
restoration, hopefully, of stability and of your mission, going 
forward.
    Administrator? Hi. If I could, I would like to continue a 
conversation we were having at the State and Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing recently about resiliency 
and about how we can and should work together to address food 
security and food resiliency.
    The Feed the Future program, now expanded from 12 to 20 
countries, is a critical part of the long-term strategy of this 
Administration and previous administrations to invest in 
systems transformation and resiliency.
    Chairman Menendez, in his opening remarks, talked about the 
critical need to invest in systems transformation. I would be 
interested in hearing more from you about what you think Feed 
the Future is doing or could do to be more effective at systems 
transformation.
    In the last year, partly through supplementals, we invested 
a huge amount in humanitarian relief. In this year's budget 
request, you request a modest increase in humanitarian relief 
and there is a significant need for long-term systems 
transformation.
    I would love to focus for a moment on Feed the Future and 
where you see it going and how we might work together to 
strengthen it as an agriculture transformation program.
    I would also welcome any advice you have or input, because 
this is the Farm Bill year, on the challenges and opportunities 
you have as an agency in administering Food for Peace, one of 
the critical Title II programs in the Farm Bill. Thank you.
    Ms. Power. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
    Let me just actually echo something that Ranking Member 
Risch said at the beginning, which is a friendly amendment to 
what you have said, which is that actually compared to the 
$11.9 billion in humanitarian assistance we provided this year, 
this coming year, even though the needs, as we know from Sudan, 
from the earthquake in Syria and Turkey, the needs are going up 
and up and up, sixth straight season--failed rainy season in 
the Horn of Africa. We are actually coming in with a base 
request, right, which even if properly funded----
    Senator Coons. Yes.
    Ms. Power. --would be only half of what we had last year, 
despite the needs being up probably like close to 30 percent 
and we do not even know what Sudan holds in store for us.
    On Feed the Future, specifically, which is a great, great 
program and a great question, we have been operating with 
multiple lines of effort. Part of the idea is to ensure that we 
have the research into heat resistant, drought resistant, pest 
resistant seeds, the kind of cutting-edge research that 
American farmers are drawing from.
    Sometimes actually the research out of Feed the Future labs 
can benefit American farmers because the discoveries can happen 
anywhere on the earth, and then getting those discoveries, 
those innovations, into the bloodstream of the places in which 
we have Feed the Future programs. Most of those are in sub-
Saharan Africa. We increased the number of target countries 
this year.
    To be honest, Senator, we were able to match the selection 
of new target countries in Feed the Future with additional 
resources by virtue of the Ukraine supplementals and the 
recognition that Putin's war was having a catastrophic effect 
on farmers in Africa and beyond because of fertilizer prices, 
fuel prices, and the like.
    Senator Coons. This is an area of particular interest to 
me, especially given recent indications the Russians are once 
again threatening to not extend the grain deal, given the way 
we have seen destabilization, steady increases in the costs of 
inputs like fertilizer and fuel, and the real risk that there 
will be broad scale hunger.
    Let me briefly reference two other things since we are 
almost out of time. One is the Global Fragility Act, as you 
know, a law that Senator Graham and I worked on hard over a 
number of years, signed into law by the previous 
Administration, now more than 3 years in effect.
    I am following closely and very interested in its actual 
implementation, in particular in global West Africa and in 
Mozambique. Rob Jenkins from the Conflict Prevention and 
Stabilization Bureau led a very capable and engaged team from 
USAID in a conversation I had yesterday with State, DoD, AID, 
about sort of where are we really going in implementation.
    I want to know that I can count on your active engagement 
and support for this not just as a new funding stream, but as a 
new approach to bringing development, defense, and diplomacy 
into common alignment in areas that are genuinely fragile. Is 
that your view of this law and its path forward?
    Ms. Power. It absolutely is and I think has already had the 
desired approach. I know we have not moved out with 
implementation as quickly as you would have liked or 
circumstances on the ground would certainly have benefited 
from.
    I think we now have all the agencies of the U.S. Government 
aligned and, frankly, the list of countries that have been 
chosen are those that would not otherwise necessarily generate 
a lot of high-level governmental attention.
    Those countries have been neglected over the years in terms 
of interagency focus and push and the GFA provides a framework 
to ensure that does not happen, including in Papua New Guinea, 
which is--also overlaps with our broader effort to invest in 
the Pacific Islands in new ways.
    Senator Coons. Thank you.
    One last question, if I might, about economic growth. We 
have also discussed this. At a time when the debt burden, as 
you mentioned in your opening testimony, for so many countries 
in the Global South, so many developing countries has become 
overwhelming and so many countries are asking for our help with 
economic growth assistance, where does USAID fit into the 
challenge of providing critical resources, advice, support for 
economic growth and where could we help by providing you more 
tools and more capacity for that engagement with our 
development partners?
    Ms. Power. Well, I am sure, Senator, you know the 
statistic, but I have to repeat it because it is so staggering, 
that African countries will spend $70 billion in debt servicing 
payments in 2023. That is more than the entire total of 
development aid that will flow to those countries.
    I think USAID has a critical role. We are the ground game 
for American foreign policy. Our teams on the ground have 
economists, have the technical expertise, can find the 
implementing partners that could offer, again, the kind of 
technical counsel needed to go into these debt restructuring 
talks with private creditors as well as with the PRC who are 
the largest public holder of debt.
    As you know, we are a very earmarked agency. Many of the--
all of the earmarks are very worthy in areas that you and I 
both care an awful lot about and that the American people want 
to see us active in.
    The result of that is that while everybody would be for, I 
think, USAID stepping into this role when these countries are 
facing such debt crisis, recognizing that debt impedes 
education, health, governance, every other sector that we work 
in, the very limited amount of discretionary funding that USAID 
has on offer means that that kind of work gets crowded out, 
again, by these very----
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you, Administrator. I look 
forward to working with you to deliver the kind of flexibility 
that you believe the agency both needs and deserves in order to 
accomplish these complex goals in coordination with this 
committee.
    Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Administrator 
Power. Senator Menendez was called to another hearing so I will 
continue.
    Last week at the Appropriations Committee budget hearing, I 
talked about a recent trip that I made to Latin America and we 
discussed some of the work that USAID is doing in the region to 
counter efforts by the PRC and China.
    Part of our trip was specifically to assess what the PRC is 
doing in Latin America, and just to follow up on Senator 
Cardin's question about what the impact of the cuts that are 
being proposed by the House majority would have on USAID's 
ability to counter Chinese investments in Latin America, can 
you talk specifically about what the impact of that might be in 
a region where we have a lot of work to do at the outset to 
catch up with the kind of investments that China has been 
making?
    Ms. Power. Well, let me give you a couple examples, and 
thank you for your trip to the region and for engaging on this.
    I would say one of the demand signals that we have heard 
from Congress across both parties is why are we not doing more 
in the Caribbean, given the acute development needs, given the 
income inequality, and given the PRC investments that are being 
made.
    USAID is working with many up here to substantially 
increase our work with Caribbean countries who face these big 
development barriers. That would be impossible.
    If we are talking about cutting back from what we are doing 
now, never mind not meeting the President's budget request, but 
actually going back to earlier levels, that kind of work would 
not be possible. We would not even be present in the way we 
need to be, to be competing.
    I think also a lot of the countries in the region are 
suffering, and this affects Americans who work and travel in 
the region as well, cyber-attacks and intellectual property 
theft and crimes of that nature. We are working with many of 
the countries in the region to help them strengthen their 
cybersecurity safeguards.
    Then we talk a lot about the two different governance 
models--the democratic transparent civil society empowerment 
model on the one hand and then a more top-down authoritarian or 
autocratic model.
    A lot of the work that we do in the hemisphere is about 
strengthening democracy and the trend lines are not good at 
all.
    Whether it is supporting countries that are moving out on 
anti-corruption reforms, for example, the Dominican Republic, 
and trying to ensure that there is a dividend on democratic 
reform or whether it is supporting independent media, civil 
society, and others who are holding governments that are 
backsliding accountable, a lot of that work would fall away in 
the face of those cuts.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Ms. Power. I think I gave you the poll as well that PRC's 
standing is falling and has fallen substantially in just the 
last few years in the hemisphere. To miss a moment of 
opportunity and to actually dial back rather than dial up 
against that backdrop would be a travesty.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope that message will 
be heard.
    One of the countries where there is that internal battle 
going on between autocracy and democracy is the country of 
Georgia where it is very clear that the people of Georgia want 
to look west to Europe. They want a democracy.
    Senator Risch and I were there in 2012 to observe the 
elections when Georgian Dream took over in that country and 
what we have seen is the Government of Georgia move 
increasingly towards autocracy.
    One of the defining opportunities will be the upcoming 
elections in 2024 and we will have a critical role in 
supporting those elections and hopefully encouraging an 
election observer mission.
    Can you talk about how important that will be and whether 
USAID is proposing to be engaged in a long-term election 
observation mission to support Georgia?
    Ms. Power. I do not have the specifics yet of what that 
program is going to look like, but I wholeheartedly agree with 
you that the attacks on civil society, some of the laws that 
have been introduced of late, extremely troubling.
    On the other hand, the pushback shows the strength of civil 
society and the citizen power in Georgia to chart its own 
course or to fulfill its own democratic aspirations.
    I think, to your point, we broadly need to be targeting 
resources toward election integrity, knowing that this is the 
next real opportunity for the citizens to be heard from and I 
think that in all likelihood will include short-term 
observation and long-term at the same time. You need both.
    Senator Shaheen. I think this committee would be very 
supportive of that and I would hope that if you need additional 
funding in order to engage in that kind of a long-term mission 
that you will let the committee know so that we can ensure that 
those funds are available.
    My final question has to do with girls' education because, 
as we know, in countries around the world, girls, particularly 
when they get to the secondary education level, are much more 
likely to be out of school than boys for a variety of reasons, 
particularly in conflict countries.
    Can you talk about why it is important for us to ensure 
that adolescent girls have access to education and we have a 
global strategy to empower adolescent girls to address barriers 
that girls face? Can you talk about USAID's engagement on 
updating that plan?
    Ms. Power. Thank you. Again, wholeheartedly embrace the 
premise. Would just say our investments in basic education 
alongside our commitment to double our gender attribution 
funding this year or programs that have gender components, I 
think, create a great opportunity because we are looking across 
all of our programming across all sectors to look to see where 
we can make sure that women and girls are, again, a particular 
area of focus or a kind of design feature of our programming, 
recognizing how many more barriers they have to continuing 
education, particularly, as you say, at the adolescent level.
    I can get back to you on when that strategy will be 
revised. Just please know that I and our gender coordinator, 
Jamille Bigio, who I think you know, are looking to work across 
our education portfolio to make sure that in the wake of COVID, 
especially where so many girls have been left behind, that we 
are going out of our way to try to bring girls back to school 
and help ensure that the development environment that includes 
not only education programming, but, more broadly, barriers in 
health, barriers in governance, social norms, et cetera, what 
those things are as well as part of that ecosystem can be a 
major factor in holding them back, so thinking about it more 
comprehensively.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. For 
the benefit of anybody who may be watching, I think the 
important thing to remind everyone of is that when we empower 
women and girls in societies, we have more stable societies, 
they can give back more consistently to their communities and 
to their families and to their countries than men do, and so 
this is a very important foreign policy initiative that we need 
to stay focused on.
    Thank you, Administrator.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the 
administrator for all your good work.
    I want to follow up just really on two items. One, to 
Senator Paul's point, just to give it some context, nothing is 
more frustrating than to be a U.S. senator and to request 
information about a committee that you sit on and to not be 
given the information, and I had that experience in the 
previous Administration--making multiple requests for 
information and then would not get anything.
    I will give the ranking member, who was then chair at that 
time, some thanks because he would eventually go to bat for me 
so I could get information I needed, but it should not require 
that.
    You talked about, you are trying to respond, and I know the 
requests from 535 members can be voluminous, but you are trying 
to respond consistent with previous practice. Let me ask about 
that practice.
    Is there anything within the USAID budget that is not 
within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee?
    Ms. Power. No.
    Senator Kaine. Okay. Any questions about USAID projects, 
funding, et cetera, are all within the ambit of the SFRC? There 
may be overlapping jurisdictions.
    There occasionally are, but I do not think there is 
anything within the SFRC space that is not within the 
jurisdiction--I am sorry, within the USAID space that is not 
within our jurisdiction. Is that your understanding?
    Ms. Power. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. Okay. Then the second thing is consistent 
with previous practice, different administrations have been 
different on this practice. Does a records request from a 
committee member have to be sort of validated by the chair of 
the committee for you to believe that you have an obligation to 
respond?
    Ms. Power. I can check with our general counsel, but my 
understanding is that the chair and ranking, when requests from 
the committee of jurisdiction come in, then we are absolutely 
responsive and, again, have been responsive on COVID origins 
and on the PREDICT program from the----
    Senator Kaine. I may want to follow up on that. Because if 
a request from a committee member who is voting on the USAID 
budget, who is considering an authorizing bill, if that is not 
enough and if there needs to be a sign-off by the chair and 
ranking, that really disempowers committee members. I am not 
saying that about this committee, but it could be the--I 
certainly know other committees requiring the sign-off of both 
the chair and the ranking would lead to a high level of 
inequality in terms of who is able to get information about the 
jobs that they do.
    I may want to follow up on what that practice is, but I 
hope we may assist Senator Paul in getting answers to the 
questions that he has posed, particularly given your statement 
that the programs he is asking about terminated in 2019, it 
would seem like. Members should get that information and there 
should not be a reluctance to produce it.
    Second, be a problem solver with me because you have such a 
breadth of experience and I am thinking about your UN role in 
addition to your USAID role.
    I was in Latin America recently as well and visiting 
nations that have some really strong ties to the U.S. like 
Ecuador in the past 6 months--Ecuador, Chile, growing ties. 
Uruguay, strong ties. Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama.
    You are under some restrictions that we put on you about 
the degree to which USAID can provide support in nations once 
they pass a certain income threshold, and that is not your 
restriction--that is Congress' restriction.
    What we hear from some of these nations is, hey, we are the 
ones doing things right and the fact that we may have passed an 
income restriction does not mean they are not impacted areas 
that are either incredibly isolated or where the poverty is 
intense, and when we pass an income level and then suddenly 
USAID cannot be a partner, it is not like China says, oh, your 
median income is so high that we will not partner with you.
    I know this is not your challenge. It is ours, but what can 
we do to partner better with the nations of the Americas that 
are doing things right, but that may in doing things right have 
exceeded some of the limitations that then put restraints on 
the services that USAID can offer?
    Ms. Power. Thank you.
    Well, first of all, again, in a resource-constrained 
environment every day, regardless of the restrictions, we would 
be making choices and some of those choices would be on 
vulnerability grounds.
    As you said, there are countries that are doing very well, 
but communities, for example, in Panama, look at the Darien Gap 
and the communities along the path that so many are taking 
north.
    I was just in Panama as part of a U.S. delegation 
negotiating around some border enforcement questions and this 
was the very question posed to me by the Panamanian leadership 
to me and my colleagues, which is you want us to do integration 
along lines of what the chairman and I were talking about 
earlier of migrants who are passing through, but we do not have 
the additional resources to do that.
    It is politically a contentious issue, at the very least, 
even if it ends up being an economically beneficial one over 
time. What about helping us in this part of Panama even if your 
mission closed X number of years ago, and we do some 
programming through regional programming if there is some 
cross-border impact.
    Of course, more flexibility is only to the good for any 
Administration trying to be nimble in a world of complex 
challenges. At the same time, we do have to look at other major 
players in the development space.
    For example, I think the evolution conversation about 
multilateral development bank reform really speaks to your 
question because that is about looking at places that either 
countries where the World Bank would itself not be able to 
operate generally because it had also achieved a certain income 
status and yet maybe actually putting out a share of emissions 
that are contributing to the ravaging of Caribbean countries 
that are low-income countries.
    There are global public goods that we have an interest in 
advancing or protecting and that might require also investments 
and so that is part of the conversation about the MDB I take 
really seriously.
    Senator Coons and I have talked about this an awful lot, 
but our role at USAID is being vice chair of the DFC board and 
there, again, it is a mix because we want the DFC to do much 
more in poor countries and developing countries and be able to 
absorb more risk to operating in those kinds of difficult 
environments.
    At the same time we want the DFC, particularly as we talk 
about infrastructure projects and big investments like that, to 
be operating in places maybe where, again, there might be some 
temptation to foreclose their involvement.
    I think the more expansive, the more flexible, and then 
leaving it to the judgment about how then to make really hard 
choices about where you would dedicate your resources because 
the more flexibilities we have the more competition there will 
be, of course, for those resources.
    Senator Kaine. Right. Tough, tough challenges. I am over my 
time. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Administrator, great to see you. I understand that 
the Chairman and Senator Coons have raised some of the issues 
surrounding Sudan.
    I am really glad to see that our folks at the State 
Department, including the USAID contingent in Sudan, have been 
successfully evacuated. I look forward to working with you on 
next steps, going forward.
    Senator Coons and I took a trip there back in May 2021 and 
it was a time of hope, but it is also time that you could see 
what is playing out now. All the ingredients were there and I 
do think we have to look back to see what we might have done 
differently in the meantime. Obviously, much of it beyond our 
control.
    Let me turn to the issue of infrastructure. I have been a 
supporter of the President's announcement at the G-7 on the 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
    I think that that is a really important element of our 
overseas strategy including countering China's efforts to 
export its authoritarian model in many countries through 
infrastructure projects.
    Now, we have a lot to offer and USAID provides all sorts of 
important programs--health care, education, things that I think 
are vital and also can win the hearts and minds of people 
around the world.
    I also think that we need to be competing in areas of 
infrastructure because this is the primary tool that China uses 
to try to export its influence.
    I see in the budget you also have $4 billion over 5 years 
in mandatory funding to, ``create a new international 
infrastructure fund which will outcompete China by providing a 
credible, reliable alternative to PRC options and make game 
changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen partner 
economies.''
    Having just returned from a trip to that region with 
Senator Merkley, including stops in Vietnam and Indonesia, I 
think this is really important.
    Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between 
this program you are discussing this budget and the President's 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment?
    Ms. Power. One would want to almost go country-by-country 
to talk about the different ways that USAID would plug in.
    One of the aspects of USAID's governance work that we do--
and I had an exchange with Senator Coons as well about our 
desire to do more in the realm of economic development, of 
economic governance in these countries--but where USAID's sort 
of niche is against a backdrop, again, of huge resources coming 
in to do the infrastructure investments themselves, whether 
from the MDBs or from the DFC or from whomever, but our niche 
is on standards.
    It is on what the enabling environment actually is for 
those investments to be made. It is on the transparency of 
procurement, working with a country on a procurement law. If 
you are going to do the big infrastructure, well, that is a 
recipe for, potentially, some--could be a recipe in some of the 
countries in which we work for some problematic pilfering by 
various players.
    Well, that cannot happen. This has to be--we have to be 
stewards of taxpayer investments in infrastructure as well. I 
think that our work with nongovernmental actors as well to 
ensure, for example, environmental advocates, environmental 
actors, institutions on the ground, to make sure that the 
infrastructure investments we make are not extractive in their 
nature, that they respect labor rights, that there is 
accountability, again, for how these projects are conducted 
that would, again, be in marked contrast with the way some of 
those projects were done through the Belt and Road Initiative.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Maybe--and I realize 
that USAID only has a part of this overall.
    Ms. Power. A small part, yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Maybe if someone could get back to me 
just on the relationship between these two funds, what USAID's 
portion is, that would be helpful for me. I appreciate the role 
USAID plays in addressing exactly the kind of governance issues 
you raised.
    If I could quickly ask you about the request for ESF funds 
for Syria--northeastern Syria. I understand USAID has a piece 
of this, as well. I think that assistance has been very 
important in an area that is vital.
    Obviously, been impacted by earthquakes, but also by all 
the other fighting going on. Could you talk briefly about that 
money and its purpose?
    Ms. Power. Great. Well, just to distinguish the 
humanitarian assistance that we are also seeking the broad 
humanitarian assistance budget of which a large share would go 
to Syria and to Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and 
elsewhere.
    The ESF, I think, first of all, we do not do stabilization 
work in regime-held territories. We are looking a lot at the 
al-Hol challenge, which I know many up here are very interested 
in.
    You have about 18,000 of the people in that facility are 
Syrian, but to simply--given the backgrounds of many of them, 
also the--what actually has gone on in al-Hol, the question of 
reintegration is very complicated.
    Part of our request this year is also looking at not only 
support for their reintegration into communities, but also the 
communities to which they are returning to make sure that those 
communities are seen to benefit because there is a lot of 
stigma and desire not, in fact, to welcome people back.
    I think, generally, we also still are looking at 
accountability for atrocities, if there are stopgap ceasefires 
on the ground, how to be nimble and coming in in support of 
those ceasefires.
    Ultimately, even though it feels very elusive right now, 
still looking through our development resources to look at if 
there is any way to support political resolution, more broadly. 
Again, that feels very far afield at the moment.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Ms. Power. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Administrator Power, for being here today.
    We have no shortage of crises that we could talk about in 
the world today from Ukraine to Sudan to Haiti, from migration 
to public health and climate change.
    I think the news media tends to focus relentlessly on a 
response to these crises. They do pay significantly less 
attention to the work of our government, USAID in particular, 
to address the problems around the world before they become 
crises.
    I want to start by thanking you for your work in this 
regard. In February, I led a CODEL to Jakarta to engage with 
ASEAN as an institution and with Indonesia bilaterally. There I 
saw firsthand the eagerness of our partners for more, not less, 
U.S. engagement and more beyond just a military engagement.
    Can you explain how this budget will help address the 
continuing need to strengthen ties with allies and partners in 
the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with the ASEAN nations, 
in order to advance our Indo-Pacific objectives? In particular, 
can you highlight some key projects happening in the region in 
the global health environment space?
    Ms. Power. Okay. I guess I would say a couple of things.
    One of the main demand signals we are hearing from 
countries in Southeast Asia--and this is true, really, across 
the whole Indo-Pacific--but is around climate adaptation. I am 
sure you heard that.
    Indonesia is, of course--we are working very closely with 
them on clean energy renewable projects on mitigation, on 
lowering their emissions since they are a substantial emitter 
of carbon.
    Where they are really feeling the effects, and I myself was 
just in Vietnam and it is very much the same way there in the 
Mekong Delta region and beyond, but is--even rice farming now 
becoming--the weather patterns becoming too unpredictable so 
needing to do new skills training or provide new sources of 
livelihoods to farmers and so forth.
    I think this budget request and especially, again, our 
desire to get more discretionary money to do economic 
development, livelihood program, jobs programs, and so forth, 
much of this--the economic needs are growing as the effects of 
changing climate are ravaging particularly rural communities, 
but not only the agricultural sector.
    That is something we are looking for in this budget. We had 
an exchange earlier about the mandatory request, which is very 
substantial investments. You heard my exchange with Senator Van 
Hollen in infrastructure.
    In general, just being in a position to scale up when a 
country like Indonesia really wants to elevate the partnership 
or, for example, with Vietnam, we are celebrating 10 years of a 
comprehensive partnership and very eager to elevate that to a 
strategic partnership to be in a position to surge resources 
commensurate to that appetite and that is what the mandatory 
request seeks to put us in a position to do.
    Maybe just on global health I can get back to you with 
details across the ASEAN countries, but Indonesia really stands 
out because USAID is making a heightened emphasis now or 
putting much more focus on primary health investments and 
Indonesia stands out more than most countries in the world for 
actually moving from spending 10 percent of its health budget 
on primary care to 25 percent.
    We, our mission, but also working with the World Bank and 
others who are the big spenders in the health sector in 
Indonesia are looking to support that effort including through 
health care worker training because so many health care 
workers, mostly female, are unpaid or poorly paid.
    This is a new area of emphasis for USAID. It is, obviously, 
a crying need everywhere in the world, but we have been very 
disease-based in focusing on TB, malaria, HIV/AIDS, all these 
incredibly important diseases, even global health security and 
pandemic prevention risks.
    If you focus only on those threats and those villains and 
we miss out on the primary health care foundation, that would 
be a short-sighted investment indeed and Indonesia is one of 
our key partners now in a new primary impact program. Indonesia 
is one that has been chosen to partner with.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. In my remaining time I would 
like to talk about access to clean drinking water. It is a 
global driver of conflict, and in March of last year the Biden 
administration pledged to provide $1.2 billion in support of a 
U.S. global water strategy.
    Can you go into some detail about how this budget addresses 
that commitment in 2022 and how it will help meet the growing 
need for consistent access to clean drinking water?
    Ms. Power. Yes. I am really excited about this actually 
because, again, with water scarcity becoming a growing 
challenge and, indeed, there is a risk, I read the statistics, 
in fact, just a few days ago that by 2025, two-thirds of the 
world's population could face water scarcity.
    I think you are going to see--you have a long-standing 
interest in this. I do not hear a lot about it up here, but I 
think that is on the verge of changing.
    What we have asked for are $700 million to support 22 
priority country plans and this is with an eye, again, to 
reaching 22 million more people with safe water and 22 million 
more people with safe sanitation because that is something that 
is also lacking.
    This is over, of course, a longer period of time, but I 
think that U.S. leadership in this space, given the demand 
signals that we are hearing, really can be pivotal also in 
galvanizing resources from other donors. Thank you.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am out of time, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome, Administrator Power. I would like to talk about 
the energy policies reflected in the budget that is being 
proposed today.
    To develop economically, developing countries need reliable 
sources of energy. I would like to go to a specific example and 
that is Uganda.
    Uganda's President has said, ``Many developed nations are 
pushing an accelerated transition to renewables on Africa. This 
earns them praise in the U.S. and Europe, but leaves many 
Africans with unreliable and expensive electricity.''
    He goes on to say that, ``this stands to forestall Africa's 
attempts to rise out of poverty, which require reliable energy. 
African manufacturing will struggle to attract investment and, 
therefore, to create jobs without consistent energy sources.
    ``Agriculture will suffer if the continent cannot use 
natural gas to create synthetic fertilizer or to power 
efficient freight transportation.''
    Administrator Power, do you agree or disagree with Uganda's 
President?
    Ms. Power. Well, what I will say is that Power Africa, our 
flagship energy program, as you probably know, has gotten 
first-time electricity to about 165 million people in Africa.
    We are very much on the same page in seeking 
electrification, energy access, particularly for the poorest. 
Renewables are a critical part of the solution. We are now----
    Senator Hagerty. Let me go specifically to fossil fuels. Is 
USAID opposed to financing fossil fuel development, as Uganda's 
President is talking about?
    Ms. Power. I would have to get back to you on our 
engagements with President Museveni's ministers, but my 
impression actually in Uganda is that we have gotten very loud 
demand signals with regards to solar production and we do have 
exceptions.
    We have a preference for renewables because we do want to 
see carbon reduced, but there are circumstances in which, 
again, securing rapid access to clean energy in very low-income 
countries requires more stable or additionality and----
    Senator Hagerty. I believe that is exactly right. What I am 
concerned about, Administrator, and I want to make this very 
clear, is that the goals that are reflected in this budget, 
particularly with respect to energy, are really missing the 
mark and what it does--and I think Uganda's President 
articulates this well--is that it puts green colonialism over 
the real economic development needs of these countries.
    You take Uganda, for example. Thirty percent of the 
population lives on $1.77 a day. These countries have been 
devastated by the pandemic. They are trying to climb out of a 
true economic crisis. They have got crime that is rampant in 
many of these nations.
    They are trying to fulfill the most basic economic needs 
and to do that they need to have consistent, stable, reliable, 
and, frankly, affordable energy.
    That is what the President of Uganda is getting at and he 
is arguing that I think our policies, again, the policies 
touted by America, rich European nations, that in many cases 
discourage and will not support fossil fuel development are not 
allowing him to move along, not allowing his nation and others 
like it to move along a reliable progression.
    Instead, what we are trying to do is leapfrog our way into 
technologies that I think, perhaps, theologically or 
ideologically, again, receive praise and plaudits here, but do 
not fill the void--do not fill the need there in developing 
countries like Uganda, and when we fail to do that, we create a 
void and that void right now is being filled by China.
    I think it was former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers who 
just recently talked about his discussion with the leader of a 
developing nation who said that when it is time to think about 
economic development in his country, when China shows up, they 
deliver an airport. When we show up, we deliver them a lecture.
    My goal and my sincere hope is that we can get past the 
ideological underpinnings that are reflected in this and look 
at real pragmatic ways to deliver solid economic development, 
reliable energy, affordable energy to these countries that 
desperately need it.
    Ms. Power. Senator, I just would love to respond. I have 
made clear, again, that we support, for example, natural gas 
programming in instances where it can create energy access 
while not delaying plans toward clean energy because, again, 
the collective carbon emissions even from developing countries 
were all part of the solution when it comes to mitigation.
    We are working with countries, but I do not know if you 
have had a chance to travel to Uganda and engage directly, 
again, with entrepreneurs or with farmers. Again, the idea that 
USAID or with USAID staff, including our Ugandan staff--two-
thirds of our team in Uganda are in fact citizens of Uganda--
but the idea that we would be putting ideology and colonialism 
over the development needs of the people in that country, a 
country we have worked in, basically, since independence, I 
just reject that premise and I think if you--and I would love 
to travel with you if you would like to go and see up close the 
demand signals that we get, again, from everything from 
government officials to civil society organizations to farmers 
to entrepreneurs who want to do clean energy partnerships.
    This is not some imposed vision by Samantha Power or Joe 
Biden or John Kerry. This is about actually working in 
partnership with the communities that we have worked in for 
decades.
    Senator Hagerty. I will ask you to submit this piece for 
the record. It is titled ``Solar and wind force poverty on 
Africa'' and it is written by the President of Uganda.
    I hope you will take a look at this, Administrator Power. 
Again, he makes it very clear that he needs help today with 
reliable and affordable energy, not some aspirational goals 
that we are not supporting.
    Ms. Power. I hope you will allow us to provide you as well 
or maybe we can put in the record Uganda's own nationally 
determined contribution to the Paris Agreement, which is its 
plan for curbing emissions because that is actually the 
government's plan irrespective of what President Museveni, who 
says a lot of things, may have said in a particular speech. We 
are working with him on the implementation of their plan.
    Senator Hagerty. I hate to see us put carbon emission 
reduction over the actual needs to fulfill the rising from 
poverty that we are trying to accomplish here.
    Ms. Power. I hope you will agree that USAID cares an awful 
lot about helping lift people out of poverty and that we have 
demonstrated that over many decades and----
    Senator Hagerty. I want to ensure that we continue to do so 
and that----
    Ms. Power. We will continue to do----
    Senator Hagerty. --that USAID's goals is to basically win 
friends and bring about people into our fold as opposed to 
pushing them into the arms of China, which seems to be 
happening.
    The Chairman. I want to assure both of you that the record 
is replete with your views.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Without objection, Senator Hagerty's request 
shall be--document shall be included in the record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to can be found in 
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at 
the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Senator Paul has come back. He has another 
question and I am happy to recognize him at this time.
    Senator Paul. Will you be testifying, Ms. Power, to 
Homeland Security of your budget as you have done today to 
USAID?
    Ms. Power. No.
    Senator Paul. You mentioned that the records that I have 
requested from the PREDICT program is part of USAID concerning 
coronavirus research, that you gave them to the committee of 
jurisdiction.
    You are not testifying before Homeland Security. You are 
sitting here today before the Foreign Relations Committee. I 
would wonder why the Foreign Relations Committee would not be 
the committee of jurisdiction.
    Ms. Power. Thank you. Senator Kaine made a similar point 
and so let me just, I guess, clarify, but USAID has provided 
hundreds of documents----
    Senator Paul. To whom?
    Ms. Power. --to both--to both SFRC and the Homeland 
Security Government Affairs Committee.
    Senator Paul. You are saying that all the documents that I 
want from the PREDICT program you have already given to Senator 
Menendez?
    Ms. Power. I cannot--I know you are asking for a range of 
things. There are some that we are not----
    Senator Paul. Senator Menendez, are you aware of having 
documents on the coronavirus research that I am interested in?
    The Chairman. I am happy to let you ask questions of the 
witness. I do not intend to be put under this process.
    Senator Paul. No, I do not mean to be critical. I just----
    The Chairman. No, I am going to respond to you in my own--
--
    Senator Paul. Yes. I do not think he does because I have 
been requesting this and if his staff does have all this 
information you would think somebody would be forthcoming with 
saying, oh, we have already got all this.
    I do not think what you are saying is honest and so my 
question is you say you have given it to Senate Foreign 
Relations and you say you have also given it to Homeland 
Security. To whom with those committees have you given this 
information?
    Ms. Power. I have not personally handed over the 
information.
    Senator Paul. Somebody gave it. Did they give it to----
    Ms. Power. We will absolutely get back to your staff to 
ascertain exactly where the documents are.
    Senator Paul. The reason I need to know is we need to ask 
them did you give that to the Chairman of this committee--did 
you give it to the Chairman of Homeland Security?
    You do not know if the correspondence was with the Chairman 
or if it was with someone else. I would presume it would have 
to be through the Chairman.
    Ms. Power. What I know is that we have provided hundreds of 
documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
    Senator Paul. I am not worried about----
    Ms. Power. I apologize for not saying that earlier and 
mentioning only the other committee.
    Senator Paul. My question is not just about hundreds of 
documents. My question is about coronavirus research that USAID 
has funded in China.
    Ms. Power. Oh, sorry. Yes. I mean, on the PREDICT program 
specifically. I do not mean the documents in the abstract. Yes.
    Senator Paul. On the PREDICT program. On the PREDICT 
program, but specifically on coronavirus research either 
granted or denied. Some of the most important information we 
have is actually a DARPA grant where Wuhan Institute of 
Virology asked for money to create a virus that looks like what 
COVID became. We did not fund it, but it shows that they were 
already interested in creating a virus similar to what COVID-19 
is.
    We want to know did the PREDICT program give grant 
proposals for the creation of viruses that were similar to 
COVID-19 or that might have become COVID-19 and we also want to 
know if you denied any of these programs.
    It is important to us to know if they were asking for other 
money from you to do research that could have become COVID-19, 
but what I have gotten from you is not an answer.
    You are saying, oh, somebody else has all this information, 
and we will pursue it, but then you will be gone and then in 6 
months' time we will come back and say, well, we asked the 
Chairman of this committee and that committee. They do not have 
it.
    The thing is, is it makes us all suspicious. You will not 
give it to me. Oh, you are going to give it to somebody else. 
You are going to give it to a Democrat Chairman, but not to 
someone from the minority party. This is all very unfortunate 
and it makes us concerned about the transparency of your 
Administration.
    The Chairman. Senator Paul, if I may.
    First of all, it is not the question of a Democratic 
Chairman. The question is if the procedures historically have 
been that upon requests or when documents are provided, they 
are provided to the Chair of the committee regardless of who 
the Chair is at any given time. When Senator Risch was the 
Chair, it would have been the same thing.
    However, since you first raised this earlier today, my 
staff informs me that USAID has in fact provided a number of 
documents related to your area of interest on COVID and I am 
happy to work to facilitate a review of those documents with 
you.
    My understanding is at a staff level we have been 
discussing with Senator Risch's staff how to make those 
available to you. There are likely thousands of documents and 
we are working to set up a system so that can be viewed 
electronically in camera, which we believe is a workable set of 
circumstances. I am happy to follow up and make sure that we 
come to a conclusion on that.
    Senator Paul. Thank you very much.
    The only problem with not being able to actually hold the 
documents, print them out, and write on the documents is it is 
very limiting, as you know, for me to sit in your office and 
read them.
    None of these are classified. If there is anything in there 
that reveals some spy's name somewhere, which I do not know how 
that would be in a science grant, we can redact it.
    The Chairman. I am not suggesting that you have to read it. 
I am sure that we could have your staff read them on your 
behalf and give you an executive summary, but we will work to 
see if we can come up to an accommodation.
    The question here is a more precedent setting one and it 
has not been the role of the committee that when the Chair and/
or ranking member request documents to then just hand those 
documents over to members of the committee.
    It has always been that it has been kept in a process that 
then can be reviewed when the Chair and/or ranking member 
decide to do so. It is a bigger question than your specific 
interests.
    Senator Paul. It has also taken this exchange for me to 
even discover you have some of the documents. I still do not 
know if you have all of them that we requested.
    The Chairman. I do not know that I have all of them that 
you want. I have no idea of the universe, the totality of the 
universe.
    Whatever we have been given we are happy to--now that we--I 
know that we have been given documents, we are happy to find a 
way for you to review them and see if that, hopefully, 
satisfies your curiosity.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Power, welcome. Good to see you again.
    It is no secret that I have been deeply concerned with the 
direction of the Biden administration's foreign policy and you 
and I have had many discussions in this area.
    I would hope, though, that we both agree that, first, USAID 
has a valuable role to play regarding development assistance 
and, second, that USAID's mission should remain separate from 
controversial debates that often divide other parts of the 
State Department.
    One of the controversies has been the Biden 
administration's deliberate, systemic, and reckless appeasement 
of terrorist groups everywhere from the Western Hemisphere to 
the Middle East.
    From day one, the Administration has removed the terrorist 
designation and provided resources to Iranian-linked terrorist 
groups around Israel's border, including pouring money into 
Hamas-controlled territory.
    In the Western Hemisphere, they did the same thing with the 
revolutionary armed forces of Colombia, the FARC, which 
provided enormous and dangerous momentum to anti-American 
movements across the hemisphere.
    Now, we can disagree about the wisdom of those decisions, 
but I would have hoped we would have agreed that USAID should 
not be entangled in these deeply divisive decisions.
    I guess what I would ask--let us start by talking about 
Colombia and the FARC. Why is it that USAID actively 
participated and supported the revocation of the terrorist and 
narcotics-related designation of the FARC?
    Ms. Power. I would have to get back to you. I am not aware 
of the process and deliberations that you are talking about.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. Well, let me help you on that. On 
January 24, 2022, there was a decision memo in USAID. The 
USAID, the subject, has request for concurrence to modify USAID 
programming following revocation of the terrorist and 
narcotics-related designations of the FARC.
    You signed that memo. You approved that shift. The memo 
explicitly embraces modifying USAID programming to enhance our 
support in light of the revocation of terrorist and narcotics-
related designation of the FARC. Why is USAID getting in the 
middle of that?
    Ms. Power. Well, let me say what we are in the middle of in 
Colombia. We are in the middle of trying to support the peace 
process, the peace process that culminated in a peace, but the 
implementation of a peace, and we have worked for decades in 
the most underdeveloped areas from which the FARC recruited 
over so many years in agriculture, in livelihood support, and 
transitioning people away from growing things that are not in 
anybody's interest for them to be growing.
    I apologize for not being able to recall this particular 
piece of paper that you are describing, especially if my 
signature is on it. I will get back to you on that.
    On the general thrust of our programming on the ground in 
Colombia, we do work in trying to ensure that soldiers who have 
gone back to their communities have an alternative source of 
livelihood so they do not pick up guns again.
    I suspect that that is in general the logic of the 
adjustment to be able to do that.
    Senator Cruz. I will say the Biden administration's 
decision to embrace the FARC was a huge blow to Ivan Duque's 
government, which was pro-America, which was a strong ally, and 
the pattern we have seen from the Biden administration is they 
actively undermine strong allies, particularly in Latin 
America, and the result is--congratulations to the Biden 
administration--they pushed and ended up getting the first 
Marxist President in power in Colombia who is explicitly anti-
American, Gustavo Petro.
    By the way, Biden has managed to do the same thing in 
Brazil. Over and over again, the Biden administration is 
hurting U.S. national security interest because ideology is a 
higher priority.
    Let us shift to another part of the world, the Middle East, 
the Gaza Strip. USAID pours resources into the Gaza Strip and 
usually USAID lists its grants for public scrutiny and 
disclosure.
    Last year a mysterious $10 million grant appeared on the 
website. It was for $10 million, it had no recipient, and it 
was listed as going to the West Bank.
    After my office began investigating what this, was your 
office let us know that every detail of that was wrong, that 
the millions were actually not sent to the West Bank. They were 
sent to the Gaza Strip.
    The amount was wrong. It was $5 million and not $10 
million, and that the organization should have been listed, but 
it is an organization that only works in the Gaza Strip so if 
it had been listed it would have been obvious that it was going 
to the Gaza Strip and the public designation was wrong.
    Did you launch an investigation as to why that public 
disclosure was so wildly wrong, every aspect of it was less 
than forthcoming and accurate about what USAID was doing in the 
Gaza Strip?
    Ms. Power. I will, going forward, look into those 
discrepancies. That is unusual.
    Something like that has not been brought to my attention 
before, something that goes out publicly claiming one thing 
about a grant recipient when something else entirely is true. I 
will absolutely look into it. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. I appreciate the follow-up--the results of 
your investigation.
    Ms. Power. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Just a couple of final questions, 
Madam Administrator.
    Do you have any effort to get other countries in the world 
that are like-minded, share our values, in which we can join 
together in an effort to create a force multiplier in our 
development assistance globally?
    I think about what China does and I think about if many of 
our friends in Western Europe, Canada, Korea, and elsewhere 
were to engage in development assistance in a coordinated 
fashion, we would have a force multiplier that would equal to 
or surpass. Is that something that is at all being thought 
about in your operation?
    Ms. Power. It is our daily--obsession is probably too 
strong, but if we cannot multilateralize what we do, we cannot 
keep up, not only with the PRC, but with the needs in the 
communities in which we work.
    We have MOUs that we have signed just in the last few years 
with Japan, with the Republic of Korea. I just did a kind of 
sub-MOU last week or the week before with the United Kingdom on 
education specifically about how we leverage what we are doing 
in order to get the UK, which is cutting back assistance in so 
many sectors, but to get them at least to hold steady or 
potentially to increase in that sector.
    I know Ukraine is not really the focus of your question, 
but I do think it is noteworthy that a country like Norway has 
committed 1.7 percent of its GDP to Ukraine-funding and that is 
everything from humanitarian assistance to core development 
funding in terms of governance institutions.
    I can get you a rundown of where we are capitalizing on 
this. We just launched a partnership with Ireland, which has 
provided $50 million on ready-to-use therapeutic feeding to 
prevent wasting in children.
    The Chairman. I would appreciate seeing that.
    Ms. Power. That is country of a tiny population, but that 
is stepping up again in a specific sector. I think what is----
    The Chairman. I would appreciate seeing it because--and I 
appreciate some of the examples. In my mind, the question is 
more of a holistic coordinated approach versus a series of one-
offs.
    Can we ultimately engage in a joint compact in which we can 
leverage our collective assistance in a way that we will do the 
good that we seek to do on the USAID like create a force 
multiplier?
    Ms. Power. Yes. What I would say is the OECD and the DAC--
there is a Development Assistance Committee that is exactly, I 
think, what you are describing.
    Every country has its own politics just as we do and its 
own members of parliament, let us say, who have their own 
specific development agenda maybe or a specific line of effort 
that they want to see pursued.
    What the DAC does is, I think, finds synergies, but I think 
fundamentally we so far have found it more productive to work 
bilaterally and particularly in the field because that is where 
we identify where the greatest needs are or where we can 
reinforce----
    The Chairman. I will follow up with you.
    Ms. Power. Okay. That was a great question.
    The Chairman. I recently traveled to South Africa where the 
United States is doing some incredible development and 
humanitarian work, but my sense is that despite our success and 
people's perception still seems to be that China is the better 
partner for growth. This is bigger than just branding and 
slapping flags and logos on boxes, books, and plaques. This is 
about having a comprehensive strategic community outreach plan 
that reaches the masses.
    What is USAID doing to ensure the general populations of 
beneficiary communities not only see USAID's presence, but feel 
and understand how they benefit from USAID's work?
    Ms. Power. Well, as you know, we are very attentive to 
branding, but I agree with you that slapping a logo on a 
shelter that has been built or a school that has been built is 
not the same as communications.
    Look, I think we are--as part of our new policy framework, 
which we put out about 6 weeks ago, we have for the first time 
a dedicated reform effort on communications because I think it 
is not only the PRC's large loans and the infrastructure that 
has yielded and that is the backdrop for our assistance and 
where our grants because there is--China does nine to one loan 
to grant. We do nine to one grant to loan as a government in 
foreign assistance.
    It is also in the disinformation environment we operate in. 
I think, frankly, we have a long way to go in knowing how to 
project what we are actually doing in communities over the 
noise of false claims about what USAID or what the U.S. 
Government as a whole is doing.
    We are not terribly well-resourced in this domain. I think 
we did over the decades get used to the programs kind of--and 
the projects speaking for themselves, the impacts speaking for 
themselves. Anybody who has been touched by a USAID program, 
certainly, in my experience has never forgotten it.
    We are operating in a very different information ecosystem 
now and I think you are absolutely right that between 
disinformation and PRC kind of large infrastructure investments 
we have our work cut out for us.
    The Chairman. We would love to work with you to either 
resource and/or help. The American people are very generous 
with their money, but would like, at the end of the day that 
the beneficiaries say the United States of America did this for 
me and having that, I think, is a critical part of the ability 
to continue to find the support in Congress for that.
    If we can make that correlation, which I believe exists, 
but does not necessarily get realized by the beneficiaries, I 
think it would have--as part of our overall public diplomacy, 
it would be an important factor. We would like to work with you 
on that.
    I want to turn to food insecurity for a moment. Due to 
limited USAID resources, the World Food Programme is cutting 
food rations in refugee camps worldwide. Meanwhile, food 
insecurity is continuing to rise while people flee from 
violence in places like the Sahel, Sudan, Burma. Devastating 
choices are being made whose consequences will be borne by the 
world's most vulnerable people.
    How is USAID weighing and planning to deal with these 
competing food assistance needs to respond in differing 
contexts equitably and effectively?
    Ms. Power. Let me just say it is an impossible task. There 
is no other way around it. We, this year, will literally be 
debating where rations get cut all together, where they get cut 
in half.
    With the outbreak of violence in Sudan, you are both 
horrified and heartbroken for the people of Sudan and then you 
immediately think as well of all the people in other countries 
like the Horn of Africa, Somalia, who, because of these new 
needs, those resources inevitably will be scaled back.
    The only answer--we can brief you on what our methodology 
is. It is a very sophisticated methodology which takes UN 
appeals, including from the WFP, as a baseline and then looks 
at issues of access and--but again, vulnerability and the 
greatest need is the driver.
    Fundamentally, we are going to reach far fewer people with 
far less this year because last year through the Ukraine 
supplementals, you all were generous enough and farsighted 
enough to write those supplementals in the broadest terms, 
allowing us flexibility to use the humanitarian assistance in 
those supplementals in countries that were affected by Putin's 
war in Ukraine.
    Because the Horn of Africa and Somalia gets 95 percent of 
its wheat from Ukraine and Russia, for example, we were able 
then to draw on those supplemental resources. This year is just 
going to be excruciating.
    The Chairman. Well, we would love to see the--how you come 
to those decisions. Do you think we are treating food 
beneficiaries equally in the Global South as we are elsewhere?
    Ms. Power. Could you elaborate on the question?
    The Chairman. Yes. I mean, are we treating those in the 
Global South the same that we are treating elsewhere as we deal 
with the question of how--who do we feed and how do we succeed 
at feeding them?
    Ms. Power. We mainly operate in the Global South so I am 
not sure--do you mean across countries within the Global South?
    The Chairman. Right.
    Ms. Power. I think, again, the primary first factor is this 
question of vulnerability and so if you are in what is called 
IPC 5, facing almost famine levels of food insecurity, that is 
going to be our first port of call, but not if access is 
obstructed or if we have a government who is an unwilling 
partner in providing that assistance.
    If I understand your question, again, it is need based, but 
that is only part of the answer because we cannot meet all 
needs.
    The Chairman. Are we treating the Global South the same we 
are treating Ukraine?
    Ms. Power. Oh, that is what you mean. Okay. Sorry. I did 
not hear your reference to Ukraine. Well, I think the Congress 
has, again, provided very, very substantial resources to deal 
with Ukraine because of the massive carnage and the massive 
geopolitical stakes of that conflict.
    If you are asking per capita if a Ukrainian refugee is 
receiving more in Europe than a South Sudanese refugee in 
Uganda, the answer is yes, they are receiving more in Europe.
    Again, my objective would be to see everybody properly 
sheltered, properly cared for, properly schooled when they 
become a refugee and we are grateful, again, to Europe both for 
providing substantial assistance in Ukraine and----
    The Chairman. When we have just to----
    Ms. Power. Yes.
    The Chairman. --just to put a fine point on it, so when we 
have millions--we talk about the millions of refugees that have 
fled Ukraine and, of course, we should respond to that and be 
as helpful as we can, but we have had nearly 5 million 
Venezuelans flee Venezuela.
    Ms. Power. We have provided $1.8 billion in humanitarian 
assistance to Venezuelans who have fled, thanks to you all.
    The Chairman. I would look at that in comparison to what we 
have done with Ukraine and what would that number be.
    Ms. Power. Okay.
    The Chairman. Okay. Democracy and governance--final 
question. You recently wrote in Foreign Affairs that we have 
to, ``look at our all-economic programming that respects 
democratic norms as a form of democratic assistance.''
    Economic assistance, certainly, is popular with governments 
and it can help us move the needle on some things like labor 
protections and good governance, but it makes a very small 
percentage of USAID's programming.
    How are we--I am increasingly concerned that USAID moves 
away from its democracy, human rights, and governance part of 
its mission and when I hear economic assistance is going to be 
the essence of how we are looking at democracy assistance and I 
see such a small percentage of USAID's programming, we are not 
going to do much on democracy, human rights, and rule of law.
    Tell me why I am wrong because I see you shaking your head.
    Ms. Power. Yes. I would love to have a longer conversation 
with you, a deep dive on our expanded democracy assistance 
programming. It is everything from greater protections from--
and insurance for journalists who are--and civil society 
organizations that are coming under attack to greater 
transparency in extractive industries to the need, again, to 
fund programming that can bring about a digital and open 
internet in countries that are backsliding and moving in the 
wrong direction.
    It is election assistance and so much of the assistance 
that we know well from decades of seeing democracy assistance.
    What is new is the recognition that when there is a reform 
or the application of the recognition that when there is a 
reform opening in a country where a leader is doing hard 
things, bucking the anti-democratic trends globally, we are 
trying to see in our very slender sort of discretionary program 
area whether there is some way, for example, to create a 
private sector partnership where farmers will see low interest 
loans with a local bank more readily available, where--when a 
leader like the President of Zambia is doing away with a 
defamation law, but the economic headwinds are intense is there 
a little plus-up in our programming there in food security, 
given the fertilizer shortage, that we can mobilize.
    Again, our core democracy programming remains broadly 
familiar, but the fact that we are not doing economic 
development programming despite being a development agency at 
scale in the way that I firmly believe we should be means that 
we have to go looking into preexisting pots, like an 
agricultural pot, or maybe there would be a vaccine delivery 
that could occur in a high profile way with a leader, again, 
who is doing hard things in the political domain.
    The point here is it goes well beyond what USAID is doing. 
It can also be about high level visits. It can be about it 
encouraging tourism to places where, again, pro-democratic 
things are happening.
    I think if you look back over the last 20 years of 
democratic backsliding or 17 years of democratic backsliding, I 
think we can all agree we paid insufficient attention to those 
reform openings that occurred and if we can now do a better job 
flooding the zone and trying to be responsive to the needs of 
civil society or leaders who are doing hard things, I think 
then we have a better chance of supporting them, implementing 
their reform agenda.
    The Chairman. Yes. The slide in democratic backsliding is 
particularly relevant in the Western Hemisphere in our own 
front yard.
    Ms. Power. Sadly, it is relevant globally, but yes.
    The Chairman. Whereas one time there was only one country 
in the hemisphere that was totally a totalitarian dictatorship, 
which is Cuba. Now you have Venezuela, you have Nicaragua, you 
have Cuba continuing, and you have others moving in the wrong 
direction.
    When I see people like President Lasso of Ecuador, who is 
fully committed to a democratic agenda, aligned with American 
values, aligned with American issues, it seems to me that 
countries like that need to have the aid of the United States 
so that when you follow those values and you share them and you 
actually not just say it, but you implement them, that then 
there is a response by the United States that sends a message 
not only to that government that you are doing the right thing 
where you partner, but sends a message to others in the 
hemisphere that when you act in a way that is in pursuit of 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights there is a benefit.
    I just think that there is a disconnect between that 
reality and--the desire for achieving that and the reality of 
what we do. If it is a question of resources, we should talk 
about it because we are badly beaten in the Western Hemisphere, 
I can tell you that right now.
    I just finished a four-country tour in the recess. Before 
that, I was down there again. We are badly beaten in the 
Western Hemisphere and our allies are under siege and we do not 
seem to be able to be nimble enough to deal in ways to help our 
allies and send a message within the hemisphere that when you 
are aligned with us in terms of values and you execute on them, 
we are there. More for maybe a longer conversation than this 
hearing.
    The record for this hearing will remain open until the 
close of business on Friday, April 28, 2023. Please ensure that 
questions for the record are submitted no later than next 
Wednesday. Senator Risch, thank you.
    Administrator Power, with the thanks of the committee for 
your testimony this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said 
last week that the humanitarian situation in Sudan was ``already 
precarious and is now catastrophic.''
    What is the plan for humanitarian operations and the provision of 
aid to the Sudanese people in the current circumstances?
    What steps are you taking to raise resources, especially from the 
Gulf, to respond to the growing humanitarian need in Sudan?
    How are we supporting the Sudanese organizations that are trying to 
provide assistance in the midst of the current chaos?

    Answer. On April 23, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response 
Team (DART) to lead the U.S. Government's response to the humanitarian 
crisis in Sudan. USAID has worked with partners to use existing 
programs and resources to pivot emergency programming, and is now 
working with partners to identify where additional resources are needed 
both in Sudan and in neighboring countries. Additionally, USAID is 
working closely with our colleagues at the Department of State and the 
UN to advocate for increased humanitarian access and the scaling up of 
humanitarian operations in Sudan, including by exploring overland 
routes and air bridges from neighboring countries and within Sudan to 
facilitate the safe passage of goods and personnel. USAID is also 
asking government entities in Sudan and its neighboring countries to 
decrease bureaucratic barriers that limit relief organizations' ability 
to respond to this crisis at scale--for example, by expediting customs 
procedures, issuing visa waivers for aid workers, and waiving 
requirements issued by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
to fast-track humanitarian activities.
    USAID continues to engage with international donors, including 
those from the Gulf, to provide additional contributions to the Sudan 
response and to coordinate joint advocacy on humanitarian access in 
both bilateral and multilateral fora.
    USAID's long-standing humanitarian partners with strong national 
networks in health, nutrition, protection, agriculture, and water, 
sanitation, and hygiene are operating with limited capacity and using 
dwindling prepositioned supplies in pockets of Gedaref, Blue Nile, 
White Nile, South and West Kordofans, Khartoum, and the Greater Darfur 
region. Since April 15, they have relied significantly on national 
staff to continue life-saving activities. USAID's Bureau for 
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) is also supporting more than 37 Sudanese 
implementing partners as subrecipients through the USAID-funded Rapid 
Response Fund implemented by the International Organization for 
Migration and existing USAID awards with international non-governmental 
organizations. USAID also provides annual contributions to the United 
Nations Development Program-managed Sudan Humanitarian Fund, which can 
disburse emergency allocations to support multi-sectoral interventions 
across the country through national non-governmental organizations.

    Question. The Senate takes its oversight responsibilities very 
seriously, and I am grateful to USAID for keeping the Committee well 
informed about the numerous layers of protection we have on the direct 
budget support USAID is providing the Government of Ukraine.
    What are the accountability mechanisms that USAID is implementing 
to help protect taxpayer dollars while helping Ukraine endure Russia's 
brutality?

    Answer. USAID prioritizes oversight of and accountability for U.S. 
taxpayer dollars. USAID has an unprecedented level of oversight and 
accountability mechanisms built into our assistance to Ukraine. The 
following accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure oversight of 
Direct Budget Support (DBS), development, and humanitarian assistance.
                    direct budget support oversight
    USAID currently delivers DBS to Ukraine through the World Bank 
Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) 
mechanism, which reimburses the Government of Ukraine (GOU) for 
expenses incurred in pre-approved expenditure categories. Funding is 
only disbursed to the GOU following verification of expenses by the 
Ministry of Finance and World Bank, which minimizes risk of diversion. 
In addition to a reimbursement-only approach, the PEACE mechanism 
provides for accountability and transparency through monitoring, 
reporting, and audit requirements. The World Bank provides USAID with 
verification reports, Implementation Status and Results reports, 
progress reports, and other reporting.
    The World Bank anticipates that two project audits will be 
completed for the PEACE mechanism, and the Bank is required to provide 
USAID with those auditors' reports. In addition, the World Bank 
prepares an annual single audit report covering all World Bank cash-
based trust funds. The World Bank is supplementing these audits with 
several ``Agreed Upon Procedures'' reviews conducted by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (PwC).
    USAID contracted an independent third-party monitor, Deloitte, to 
review financial controls and procedures utilized by the GOU to track 
and oversee U.S. funds being used for DBS. Deloitte's experts are 
reviewing the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance's existing monitoring, 
transparency, verification and reporting systems and procedures, 
identifying and strengthening responses to gaps, and supporting 
reporting on DBS tranches. Deloitte is conducting three tiers of spot 
checks to trace payments from the U.S. Government (USG) through the 
World Bank to the GOU's Single Treasury Account (Tier 1), then to 
recipient governmental organizations and institutions (Tier 2), and 
ultimately down to individual beneficiaries (Tier 3).
    In addition, USAID is in the process of establishing a contract 
with a separate auditing firm to conduct an independent, third-party 
audit of DBS payments, to supplement and complement other audits and 
procedures. USAID is not planning for Deloitte to be the independent 
auditor since they assist the GOU in identifying gaps and strengthening 
Ukraine's systems, including those which involve the DBS transaction. 
USAID expects to award this contract no earlier than September 2023.
    USAID has also entered into an interagency agreement with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Center for Audit Excellence to 
build the capacity of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine to effectively 
and accurately monitor, audit, and report on U.S. budget assistance. 
The GOU will conduct its own audit of direct budget support funds.
    In addition to these measures, USAID has identified several 
existing GOU hotline systems established at Ministries, audit 
institutions, and for specific purposes (e.g., pensions) that can 
collect information on the potential misuse of DBS funding. The World 
Bank has its own grievance mechanism hotline, and the Inspector 
Generals for USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of 
Defense, have created a whistleblower hotline available in English and 
Ukrainian.
                    development assistance oversight
    USAID has several layers of oversight processes to ensure that 
taxpayer funds are accounted for while providing development 
assistance. This includes mission-level monitoring by staff at USAID's 
Mission in Ukraine, oversight by our implementing partner staff, and 
third-party monitoring of select activities.
    All 42 USAID programs continue to operate through the work of 
nearly 1,400 implementing partner staff. Despite the ongoing war, USAID 
continues to implement standard oversight, monitoring, and 
accountability procedures in line with Agency directives. Requirements 
for monitoring, accountability, and oversight of USG funds and USG-
funded equipment are included in all contracts and grants. Our 
implementing partner staff are vital to these efforts--of nearly 1,400 
implementing partner staff from USAID's Ukraine Mission programs, over 
1,000 remain in Ukraine.
    Mission staff continue to fulfill their activity management and 
monitoring responsibilities. They do this through in-person or virtual 
meetings with implementing partners and program beneficiaries and by 
reviewing reports, deliverables, photos, videos, and work plans to 
ensure activities are on track. To the extent possible they also 
conduct site visits.
    Project monitoring by individual staff is augmented through Mission 
processes and support. The overarching guiding procedures for 
monitoring and oversight include the Mission-wide Performance 
Management Plan, which is regularly updated and reviewed, and annual 
Portfolio Reviews, which examine each activity. Annual performance 
reporting through the Performance Plan and Report assesses the level of 
achievement of indicators and targets by activity/implementing 
mechanism. Quarterly financial reviews of all activities ensure that 
funding is tracked and allocated within legal and policy requirements. 
The Mission also uses Geographic Information Systems and draws upon a 
$16 million Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support Contract (2020-
2025) to enhance the effective monitoring of programs and learning from 
experience. Through this mechanism, USAID has trained 22 third-party 
monitors, who began to conduct monitoring visits for select activities 
across 8 oblasts in April.
    USAID engagement with Ukrainian Government counterparts and civil 
society organizations increases visibility on assistance delivery and 
impact. Almost all Mission activities undergo a third-party evaluation.
    Activity-specific accountability includes the role of the 
Contracting/Agreement Officer's Representative to ensure compliance 
with monitoring and evaluation procedures and policy. This is 
supplemented by the Mission's overarching monitoring and evaluation 
team. Every activity has a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan with specific 
indicators and quantifiable targets. Work plans, regular reporting, and 
Risk Assessment and Management Plans are all required.
    Finally, the Mission in Ukraine has established an internal 
Accountability Unit to ensure that all USAID programs are implemented 
in accordance with USAID's rules and regulations, ensure audit 
management is carried out efficiently and effectively, and that any 
audit findings are addressed and resolved in a timely and appropriate 
manner. The Unit meets monthly and is chaired by the Ukraine Mission's 
Office of Financial Management Controller.
                   humanitarian assistance oversight
    In order to implement humanitarian assistance, the USAID's Bureau 
for Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team, 
currently composed of humanitarian experts based in Rzeszow, Poland, 
and Kyiv, is augmented by a Response Management Team in Washington and 
supported by additional Monitoring and Evaluation and Risk Management 
specialists.
    USAID has developed a risk management framework to deliver timely 
and principled humanitarian assistance at scale in high-risk 
environments around the world. This approach seeks to ensure compliance 
with all policies, regulations, and laws in order to lead and 
coordinate an effective, accountable response to meet priority 
humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations in Ukraine. USAID has 
safeguards against diversion, waste, fraud, abuse, and other fiduciary 
risks in Ukraine consistent with its approach in other high-risk 
environments. Safeguards include award-specific risk assessment and 
management plans, established internal controls, safety and security 
plans for staff movements and transport of cash and program materials, 
and numerous reporting requirements. USAID requires partners operating 
in Ukraine to assess and manage the risk involved in their work before 
receiving funding. At application stage, all partners--public 
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations--are 
required to submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan, which 
outlines internal controls related to mitigating and managing the risks 
associated with the potential misuse of USG resources and additional 
safeguards to ensure the provision of U.S. foreign assistance does not 
result in a violation of applicable sanctions. USAID requires our 
partners to have a context-specific approach to risk management in 
Ukraine, which acknowledges the severe restraints to access and 
monitoring of activities, the USG sanctions in place against the 
Government of Russia, and the heightened exposure to risk commensurate 
with the scale of the response.
    USAID centrally tracks and follows up on the reports which partners 
submit to Agency and/or the OIG regarding diversion, fraud, waste, 
abuse, and sexual exploitation and abuse. Staff continually assess such 
incidents to ensure that USAID assistance is reaching those for whom it 
is intended, and that implementing partners have effective mitigation 
measures in place to help safeguard against similar incidents.
    USAID utilizes direct monitoring, third-party monitoring, and 
implementing partners' own monitoring and reporting, and continuously 
assesses and mitigates risks related to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in Ukraine. Despite a limited footprint in Kyiv, USAID 
conducts direct oversight of humanitarian assistance award activities 
with the approval of the U.S. Embassy's Ukraine Regional Security 
Officer. USAID also uses third-party monitoring in Ukraine to mitigate 
access limitations and independently monitor our humanitarian 
assistance partners' activities. Direct monitoring and third-party 
monitoring complement monitoring by implementing partners to provide 
greater oversight, accountability, and visibility into the efficacy of 
USAID programming.
          usaid's office of inspector general (oig) oversight
    USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) provides independent 
oversight of all USAID programs, personnel, and operations. The OIG 
Acting Deputy (performing the duties of the Inspector General) Nicole 
Ambarella recently testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
that ``providing timely, impactful, and independent oversight of 
USAID's Ukraine response is [her] office's top priority.''
    USAID OIG has been assigned two designated positions for their 
criminal investigators at Embassy Kyiv, which will greatly enhance 
their ability to investigate allegations concerning misuse of funds in 
Ukraine. In total, OIG has more than 60 staff supporting its Ukraine 
portfolio and over 22 planned and ongoing oversight projects. This work 
will provide oversight over USAID's major programs, objectives, and 
funding in Ukraine, including direct budget support, humanitarian 
assistance, agriculture resilience, energy security, and anti-
corruption efforts. The OIG also operates a hotline to provide a 
confidential, reliable means to report allegations of fraud, waste, and 
abuse of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. In January 2023, the OIG published 
a joint hotline poster with the State Department and Department of 
Defense, with information in both English and Ukrainian, encouraging 
the timely and transparent reporting of corruption and abuse.
    Further, the OIG has been working closely with its oversight 
counterparts at bilateral and multilateral organizations to ensure that 
it has the access, relationships, and sources necessary to conduct its 
comprehensive work to safeguard U.S. assistance in Ukraine. We defer to 
the OIG's congressional affairs office to respond to specific questions 
regarding its past, completed, and ongoing work.

    Question. Russia's war has caused significant damage and 
destruction to Ukraine's critical infrastructure.
    How is USAID working to mobilize the private sector to prepare bids 
on reconstruction projects?
    If U.S. partners are disinterested in these efforts, what are the 
risks of state-owned industries from China taking the lead on the task 
of rebuilding Ukraine?

    Answer. USAID is working in collaboration with the broader U.S. 
Government (USG) interagency (the National Security Council, Department 
of State, Department of Commerce, the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation (DFC), and others) to mobilize the private sector 
to invest in Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. For example, USAID 
is supporting this year's flagship Ukraine Recovery Conference in 
London, UK on June 21 by encouraging our private sector partners to 
sign a business compact for responsible and ethical investing in 
Ukraine's priority sectors. To unlock further foreign direct 
investment, we are working with the USG interagency to ensure that 
Ukraine continues making progress in its anti-corruption efforts in 
critical sectors such as the judiciary and energy, which are priorities 
to improve the business investment climate for U.S. companies 
considering investing in Ukraine. USAID, in collaboration with the 
American Chamber of Commerce of Ukraine, released a business climate 
report on April 13, 2023, surveying over 130 U.S. and Ukrainian 
companies. The report recommended priority reforms the Government of 
Ukraine should undertake to spur private sector investment, such as 
developing a more coherent foreign direct investment policy, 
strengthening a national level investment promotion agency, and 
continuing anti-corruption reforms. Finally, we are ensuring that the 
supplemental appropriations for Ukraine's economic support are 
implemented quickly and efficiently including looking to find ways that 
USG assistance can support Ukraine's export infrastructure and economic 
recovery needs.
    There is a risk that Chinese companies will participate in 
Ukraine's reconstruction. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has 
authority to direct its companies to invest even at a negative return 
on investment in aims to further its influence in a key region. USAID 
and the USG interagency have raised repeatedly and will continue to 
raise with the Government of Ukraine the risks and costs associated 
with Chinese companies, and the need to consider the full life cycle of 
a project before choosing a Chinese bidder. Unlike in the PRC, the USG 
cannot direct its companies to invest in Ukraine; U.S. companies will 
do their own assessment of the risks and business climate in Ukraine. 
For that reason, USAID continues to engage at the most senior levels 
within the Government of Ukraine to underscore the important linkages 
between Ukraine's reconstruction and anti-corruption and transparency 
reforms.

    Question. How is USAID engaging with Ukrainian authorities to 
ensure the equitable distribution of reconstruction efforts across 
Ukraine and avoid neglecting any regions or populations?

    Answer. USAID is actively collaborating with the interagency, 
international community, and the Government of Ukraine to coordinate 
development assistance and plan future investments to facilitate the 
massive task of rebuilding Ukraine and its economy after the war. Our 
Mission in Kyiv has close and regular contact with national, 
provincial, and municipal Ukrainian Government representatives. The 
Government of Ukraine actively seeks out USAID's engagement and input 
in its planning for recovery and reconstruction.
    USAID is encouraging Ukrainian authorities to include the 
participation of local civil society in the recovery conversation to 
ensure reconstruction processes are implemented with an inclusive lens. 
USAID envisions a decentralized, reform-based recovery for Ukraine and 
will engage multiple stakeholders at all levels, including civil 
society and the private sector. Transparency and the ability of civil 
society and the private sector to hold the Government of Ukraine 
accountable, fight corruption, and monitor progress on reforms will 
support a sustainable and resilient recovery for Ukraine.
    USAID's participation in international forums, including this 
year's 2023 Ukraine Recovery Conference in London and the prior year's 
Lugano Conference, are critical to helping Ukrainian authorities start 
preparing for resilient and inclusive reconstruction by emphasizing the 
need for reforms, transparency, and accountability mechanisms to ensure 
efficient use of funds, build public trust, and get communities and 
citizens on board with the recovery process.

    Question. The State Department is in process of standing up a 
Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy. Adm. Power announced 
the new Global Health Emergency Management Systems Response--an 
incident response management system for emerging health threats, based 
on lessons learned from humanitarian emergencies. It will be a rapid 
surge response with prevention, detection and response to emergency 
health threats/pandemic response.
    How do you see this new initiative coordinating with efforts of the 
proposed State Department Bureau of Global Health Security and 
Diplomacy? How will State and USAID ensure there is clear 
communication, collaboration and avoid duplication?

    Answer. The Global Health Emergency Management System (GHEMS), 
which Administrator Power announced on April 20, refers to a set of 
internal USAID Bureau for Global Health (USAID/GH) business processes 
for standardizing and managing the Bureau's operational responses to 
health emergencies. GHEMS provides consistency in planning, staffing, 
implementation and learning to ensure that technical expertise within 
USAID/GH is coordinated for swift and efficient responses to outbreak 
and non-outbreak health emergencies. As the internal USAID/GH focal 
point for response to a specific health emergency, an activated GHEM 
Team would strengthen and streamline engagement with the State 
Department (as well as all of our interagency partners), providing a 
clear node for communication and collaboration around specific 
emergency issues, thereby, avoiding duplication and ensuring that 
decisions are made transparently and collaboratively.

    Question. USAID has struggled to fill vacancies and staff in the 
Global Health Bureau both in Washington, DC as well as overseas. I 
expect the Government Accountability Office to issue a report I 
requested to examine this issue in the coming weeks. I hope that your 
staff will respond to the draft in a timely manner; agency comments are 
due May 5.
    How is USAID planning to staff these initiatives given what I 
understand are already existing vacancies?

    Answer. The Agency submitted a response to the GAO Draft audit 
report (report titled USAID: Management Improvements Needed to Better 
Meet Global Health Mission) on May 2, in advance of the deadline. 
USAID's response welcomed and agreed with the report and noted an 
eagerness to take action on each of the six audit recommendations, the 
first of which recommends that ``the USAID Administrator ensure that 
the Assistant Administrator for Global Health develop and implement a 
workforce plan for the Bureau.'' USAID will ensure that the plan 
developed in response to the recommendation communicates the Bureau's 
optimal mix of direct hire and non-direct hire staff, as well as senior 
leaders; outlines key actions to better align our staffing with our 
mission, priorities, and funding; and articulates how we plan to 
address persistent vacancies in civil service (CS) positions and the 
underrepresentation of certain racial or ethnic groups in our 
workforce.
    Even before implementation of this recommendation, the Bureau is 
pleased to report that great progress has been made in reducing the 
number of CS Operating Expense (OE) funded position vacancies in the 
Bureau. Currently, 126 out of the GH Bureau's allocated 136 CS 
permanent positions are filled. Hiring actions are underway for filling 
the 10 vacancies. This is a great improvement over the more than double 
the number of vacancies reported by the Bureau just 1 year ago.
    Similarly, the Bureau has also made great strides in reducing the 
number of vacancies in program funded CS positions (relying on specific 
legal authorities to use HIV/AIDS funding to hire CS positions in the 
GH Bureau's Office of HIV/AIDS). Currently 100 out of 134 GH Bureau's 
CS HIV program funded positions are filled. Although that means that 34 
positions are currently vacant, all 34 positions are currently actively 
under recruitment and this represents a significant reduction over the 
number of vacancies just 1 year ago.

    Question. The President has prioritized a Diversity, Equity, 
Inclusion, and Accessibility Initiative and repeatedly voiced his 
commitment to DEIA as have you. However, data from USAID continues to 
reflect significant racial, ethnic and gender disparities, especially 
at senior and mid-management levels.
    Can you provide concrete examples of how you have created visible 
impact, changes at senior and mid-level management?

    Answer.

   DEIA has been integrated into the governance and decision-
        making of the Agency with the creation of the DEIA Office in 
        early 2022 and through the development of an Agency-wide 
        Leadership Philosophy that reflects principles and priorities 
        of DEIA for all leaders at USAID, and a DEIA Statement to 
        display the Agency's commitments to DEIA and expectations of 
        the workforce. USAID is also actively working to update 
        automated directive systems (ADS) and policies to incorporate 
        DEIA into Agency missions and goals.

   In FY 2022, 48 percent of Civil Service (CS) employees and 
        34 percent of Foreign Service (FS) employees identified as 
        racial or ethnic minorities.

   USAID redesigned the FS promotion process beginning in 2019 
        and continuing into 2021. The 2021 FS Promotion Report found 
        that the 5-year average promotion rate was 20 percent for both 
        promotion eligible white employees and promotion eligible 
        employees who identified as a racial or ethnic minority.

   We have made some progress since 2020:

        We have more women reaching the senior levels of the Civil 
            and Foreign Service. The combined percentage of women in 
            senior level Civil and Foreign Service at USAID increased 
            from 40.3 percent in 2015 to 48.7 percent as of the end of 
            fiscal year 2022. Similarly, the percentage of women in 
            mid-level CS and FS increased from 53.2 percent to 56.8 
            percent as of the end of fiscal year 2022.

        Trends for racial and ethnic minorities were similar in 
            the senior level CS and FS. Asians increased from 2.9 
            percent to 6.2 percent, Hispanics/Latinos increased from 
            3.9 percent to 4.1 percent, and other racial and ethnic 
            minorities declined from 0.5 percent to 0 percent. 
            Similarly, the percentage of African Americans/Blacks 
            remained consistent at the senior levels (11 percent in 
            2015 and 11 percent in 2022).

   USAID tripled the number of participants in the 
        International Career Advancement Program (https://lnks.gd/l/
        eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJidWxsZXRpbl9
        saW5rX2lkIjoxMDYsInVyaSI6ImJwMjpjbGljayIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBz
        Oi8vd3d3LmljYXBhc3Blbi5vcmcvP3V0bV9tZWRpdW09ZW1ha
        WwmdXRtX3NvdXJjZT1nb3ZkZWxpdmVyeSIsImJ1bGxldGluX2lkIjoi
        MjAyMzA0MjguNzU5NDY4MzEifQ.1PvHj4XzSmdNor-mDTR9WG
        UZy5qfX4lLocUMEE4_70I/s/2141424411/br/167256632609-l), a 
        professional development and leadership program for mid-career 
        professionals in international affairs in the U.S. managed by 
        USAID's Office of Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM), 
        from six staff participants to 20 in 3 years.

   In FY2023, USAID embarked on a Skills and Competencies 
        Reform to identify and celebrate the critical skills that drive 
        USAID's success today, while actively enhancing the skills 
        needed to address emerging challenges. DEIA is one of those 
        critical skills and competencies. During the initial phase of 
        this initiative, stakeholder groups looked across the existing 
        critical skills and competencies needed for the Critical 
        Elements and identified areas where language could be updated 
        to better capture the essence of the DEIA competencies. The 
        Agency is currently working to update Annual Evaluation Forms 
        to capture updated DEIA language.

   HCTM's Office of Employee and Labor Relations kicked off a 
        year's worth of monthly trainings for Agency leaders on how to 
        better hold personnel, including our supervisors, accountable 
        for their behavior. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) similarly 
        bolstered their supervisory training resources and both offices 
        are working together to address specific incidents of 
        inappropriate behavior as they occur.

   From the lens of the OCR Affirmative Employment Division, 
        impact is achieved through the annual MD-715 report to help 
        USAID become and remain a model EEO Program at all levels and 
        in all areas of the employment lifecycle.

        In this report, there is a self-assessment checklist where 
            specific items are listed as required parts of manager/
            supervisor's performance plan. If these items are not 
            included in the plan, we have to develop an action plan to 
            address that.

        Barrier Analyses determine whether there are barriers that 
            exist to any particular group in getting into the Agency, 
            moving around the Agency, and generally enjoying the 
            benefits and privileges of employment at USAID. If a 
            Barrier Analysis shows that there is, for example, a trend 
            of certain types of complaints or unconscious biases, we 
            develop a plan to address those issues.

   Since May 7, 2021, OCR's Disability Employment Division's 
        Reasonable Accommodation Program (OCR/DE/RA) has been actively 
        meeting with senior- and mid-level management domestically and 
        overseas to provide training and build awareness of the 
        Agency's ADS 111--Procedures for Providing Reasonable 
        Accommodation for Individuals with Disabilities. To date, 700 
        domestic and overseas management officials have received this 
        training. OCR/DE/RA continues to meet with senior- and mid-
        level management to help them understand how to accommodate 
        their staff.

    Question. There is also concern that individuals who have been 
hired through mechanisms aimed at expanding diversity have not been 
retained for differing reasons, including an unwelcome working 
environment.
    What steps have you taken with regards to retention?

    Answer.

   In support of the global workforce, USAID is working to 
        expand and strengthen leadership, learning, and professional 
        development opportunities; build on the successes of its Staff 
        Care Center (SCC) services that promote well-being, work-life 
        balance, and organizational resilience; and strengthen human 
        resources operations and systems. Underpinning all of our 
        efforts is a focus on diversity, equity, inclusion, and 
        accessibility (DEIA).

   In October 2022, the Agency successfully launched the 
        inaugural DEIA survey to help USAID better understand our 
        workforce in order to better manage and meet their needs. The 
        survey had a 60 percent voluntary participation rate with a 
        full 70 percent of respondents having a favorable approval of 
        the Agency's DEIA efforts. The survey included data points on 
        expanded demographics and identity categories. This is also the 
        first DEIA survey to capture information across all hiring 
        mechanisms.

   To improve the working conditions and culture for the 
        Foreign Service Officer (FSO) corps, under the leadership of 
        the Agency Counselor, USAID is looking at ways to:

        expand professional development through better onboarding 
            of new officers and mission leaders, greater training, 
            coaching, and mentoring throughout a person's career;

        streamline, standardize, and make more transparent the 
            assignments process;

        enhance FSO performance management and address concerns 
            about promotions; and

        reinforce expectations and accountability among FSO 
            leaders.

   USAID is currently working on various initiatives designed 
        to enhance recognition for the value that Foreign Service 
        Nationals (FSNs) bring to the Agency, and to enhance morale 
        among this important part of the workforce. Specifically, USAID 
        is working to:

        increase leadership opportunities for FSNs at all levels;

        increase FSN Fellowship programs;

        increase the number of senior-level FSN-13 positions;

        expand professional development and training 
            opportunities; and

        expand the use of ladder positions within the FSN 
            workforce.

   In FY 2022, USAID established an Annual Performance Goal 
        (APG) to increase the hiring and retention of Persons with 
        Disabilities to make progress toward meeting government-wide 
        goals of 12 percent of our employees being Persons with 
        Disabilities and 2 percent being Persons with Targeted 
        Disabilities. We are currently at 6 percent of our goal of 
        employees being persons with disabilities.

        To support the recruitment of Persons with Disabilities, 
            USAID has joined the Workforce Recruitment Program through 
            the Department of Labor (DOL) and prioritized the use and 
            awareness of the Schedule A and Disabled Veteran non-
            competitive hiring mechanisms.

   The Agency provides a suite of program offerings managed by 
        the Office of Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) to 
        provide employment opportunities, career experiences, and 
        multiple approaches for Veterans including the USAID Temporary 
        Employment Program, SkillBridge Program, Military Spouse 
        Employment, and Veteran Appointing Authorities to non-
        competitively hire veterans.

   To ensure that staff from non-direct hiring mechanisms are 
        afforded more equity in working conditions, USAID is 
        implementing paid parental leave and relocation expense 
        benefits for our U.S. Personal Services Contractors (USPSCs); a 
        new relocation expense benefit that will provide eligible 
        USPSCs a miscellaneous expense amount; and a pre- departure 
        subsistence reimbursement to offset relocation transfer costs.

   USAID's Staff Care program, now in its 11th year, offers a 
        broad range of counseling, health and wellness programs, 
        assistance with day-to-day life responsibilities, 
        organizational and individual resilience support, and much 
        more.

        During FY 2022, USAID employees and their family members 
            accessed Staff Care support services and educational 
            resources more than 25,000 times, a 21 percent increase 
            compared to FY 2021. Highlights include:

             Conducting more than 3,500 counseling sessions;

             Designing and delivering 26 customized 
            Organizational Resilience programs benefiting 2,000 
            employees;

             Offering 82 Agency-wide webinars for 6,382 
            employees on a variety of health, wellness, and work-life 
            topics; and

             Hosting three engaging wellness challenges, with 
            over 1,855 participants.

   OCR's Affirmative Employment Division will be conducting 
        staff assistance visits across the Agency's footprint as a 
        measure within the annual Management Directive 715 (MD-715) 
        report. These visits will seek qualitative data from all hiring 
        mechanisms on their lived experiences within the Agency related 
        to the entire employee lifecycle, from recruitment to 
        separation. This data can be used to identify barriers or 
        conditions regarding retention and diversity and inclusion, and 
        provide insight that can help the Agency change appropriate 
        policies, practices, or procedures. While the MD-715 focuses on 
        U.S. Direct Hires, the data can be shared with M Bureau, DEIA, 
        HCTM, and other Agency stakeholders for further analysis, 
        regardless of staffing mechanism.

    The FY 2022 gains and losses from USAID 2022 permanent (direct 
hire) workforce show three potential triggers requiring further 
analysis to determine if a barrier exists. The following triggers were 
identified:

   Black/African American males and females are exiting the 
        agency at a higher rate than the group gains.

        Black/African American males are leaving the agency at a 
            rate of 10.60 percent in comparison to a 10.47 percent 
            entry rate, for a ^0.13 percent difference.

        Black/African American females are exiting the agency at a 
            rate of 19.35 percent, in comparison to entering the agency 
            at a rate of 15.20 percent, for a ^4.15 percent difference.

   Employees with targeted disabilities exited the agency more 
        than three times their entry rate of 1.35 percent, with an exit 
        rate of 5.17 percent, a difference of ^3.82 percent.

   OCR's Disability Employment Division (OCR/DE) actively 
        partners with HCTM, the Employees with Disabilities Employee 
        Resource Group (EWD ERG), and other internal stakeholders to 
        provide training and awareness, participate in forums, Agency 
        work groups and other subject matter expert panels, to be a 
        resource within the Agency on the ADS 111--Procedures for 
        Providing Reasonable Accommodations to Individuals with 
        Disabilities, and to promote the hiring, retention, and 
        promotion of individuals with disabilities. Each October, OCR/
        DE partners with the EWD ERG to promote and organize events for 
        National Disability Employment Awareness Month. USAID has 
        partnered with the Department of Labor's Office of Disability 
        Employment Policy and other internal and external resources to 
        provide quality events and training for all staff.

    Question. Due to limited USAID's resources, World Food Program 
(WFP) is cutting food rations in refugee camps worldwide. Meanwhile, 
food insecurity is continuing to rise while people flee from violence 
in places like the Sahel, Sudan, and Burma.
    How is USAID weighing and planning competing food assistance needs 
to respond in differing contexts, equitably and effectively?

    Answer. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) is focused 
on meeting emergency needs of populations who face the most life-
threatening conditions across the globe, and remains deeply committed 
to providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance to populations affected 
by the global food security crisis. The powerful, combined effects of 
climate change, the COVID-19 post-pandemic effect, protracted complex 
emergencies, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine will continue to create 
elevated levels of emergency needs for years to come.
    While USAID will continue to prioritize available resources for the 
most acute emergencies and needs, significant resources are needed to 
address unprecedented humanitarian needs worldwide. Humanitarian needs 
are far outpacing global resources and we are facing difficult trade-
offs for concurrent emergencies. As a result, USAID continues to 
advocate with other international donors to increase their 
contributions to responses and elevate best practices in program 
planning.
    Thanks to the generous supplementals enacted by Congress, USAID 
provided $5.8 billion to WFP in FY22 and remains its largest donor. 
USAID has continued to robustly support WFP operations in FY23 and has 
clearly communicated funding availability and constraints to WFP in 
order to facilitate program planning. USAID continues to encourage WFP 
to effectively prioritize its global programming and proactively manage 
operational pipelines, including through finding efficiencies across 
its emergency programming and prioritizing existing donor resources to 
ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are met.
    USAID/BHA's internal budget allocation process emphasizes the 
importance of addressing the most severe needs across the globe. It 
includes quantitative comparisons of the scale and severity of needs 
that inform internal budget allocation decisions. Our field teams work 
diligently to assess the scale and severity of needs in their countries 
and recommend response approaches that prioritize meeting the needs of 
populations that are in most dire need of emergency assistance. The 
Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) and reporting from the Famine 
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) are critical forecasting and 
analysis tools used to inform decision making by USAID, other 
governments, and implementing partners when responding to acute food 
insecurity. The IPC, a five-phase scale classifying food insecurity at 
household and area levels, allows the humanitarian community to compare 
the scale and severity of current and forecast food insecurity across 
countries and time horizons.

    Question. Are we are treating food beneficiaries equally in the 
global south as we are elsewhere?

    Answer. Yes, all USAID food assistance responses are designed to 
meet the same nutritional requirements, wherever project participants 
are in the world. USAID implementing partners design food assistance 
rations to address assessed nutrition gaps, although the exact food 
basket and commodities provided will vary based on cultural 
appropriateness. The modality through which food assistance is 
delivered may also vary depending on needs, market availability, and 
access. USAID follows minimum humanitarian standards, such as the 
Sphere Standards, in all of our responses. We also encourage our 
partners to participate in the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) 
Cluster System to establish common standards for each response that are 
adequate and culturally appropriate, striving to ensure that all 
project beneficiaries have access to an equitable minimum level of 
assistance.

    Question. Which donors could be doing more to address global food 
insecurity and what else can we do to convince them to contribute their 
fair share?

    Answer. The United States is working with donors to increase their 
long-term food security programming in order to sustainably address 
food insecurity and strengthen food systems that are more resilient. 
For example, USAID and Ireland's international development programme, 
Irish Aid, recently announced funding to build more sustainable food 
systems to help fight global hunger and prevent the next food crisis in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In a new co-partnership that invests more than $75 
million in sub-Saharan Africa, USAID will work with Congress to provide 
$38.6 million and Irish Aid will contribute at least $37 million to 
support the transformation of food systems to become more climate 
resilient, provide more nutritious food to the population, and support 
sustainable economic growth, including increased income for farmers, 
including female farmers.
    Between 2012 and 2017, international humanitarian assistance grew 
annually by more than 10 percent, but it has grown by just 2.6 percent 
in the 4 years since then. While USG funding has played a pivotal role 
in preventing famine to date in places like Somalia, the USG will not 
be able to shoulder the funding burden alone in the absence of 
significant funding from other donors. Significant global need 
necessitates a broadened and deepened bench of international donor 
support; however, that same high level of need also creates donor 
fatigue and overstretch. Nonetheless, we are engaging the G7, the G20, 
private-sector and multilateral organizations, and others, advocating 
for substantial increases in emergency and long-term development 
assistance targeting the most vulnerable countries already suffering 
from high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition.

    Question. I remain deeply concerned about the continued imbalance 
between our support for development, democracy, and defense in Chad.
    Why don't we have a direct hire Foreign Service officers in Chad to 
oversee development assistance programming?
    How much money are we providing to civil society organizations 
working on democracy and human rights?

    Answer. We are aware that Chad is of growing importance to U.S. 
policy in the Sahel, and this is reflected by the increase in 
development assistance (DA) to Chad from $1.5 million in FY 2021 to 
$4.9 million in FY 2022. Even with this increase, a DA budget of this 
size does not typically warrant a U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) Foreign 
Service position. Further, USAID faces significant limitations in our 
operating expense (OE) budget, which constrains our ability to place 
USDHs everywhere we would like them. However, USAID's Africa Bureau is 
currently examining its overall overseas footprint, and careful 
consideration will be given to Chad in that analysis.
    USAID supports civil society organizations working on democracy and 
human rights through our Chad Civil Society Strengthening Activity 
(CCSSA). The activity duration is 2019-2024 and a planned funding 
amount of $8.5 million (subject to availability of funding). CCSSA 
strengthens democratic culture in Chad in a number of ways including:

   Increasing the capacity of civil society organizations and 
        media sector organizations to support and promote citizen 
        participation in governance at local and national levels.

   Facilitating a better informed, engaged citizenry with 
        increased understanding of their civic rights and duties.

   Improving the enabling environment for civil society and 
        media organizations through building the Government of Chad's 
        capacity to engage civil society.

   Empowering civil society organizations and citizens to 
        recognize and combat mis- and dis-information.

   Strengthening participation and empowerment of people with 
        disabilities in governance.

    CCSSA's recent accomplishments include: supporting civil society 
organizations to participate in the National Dialogues; supporting 
several Chadian-led campaigns that help citizens know their civic 
rights and organize collective action; and working with the Ministry of 
Education's National Curriculum Center to update civic education 
textbooks for primary and secondary schools and create guides for 
teachers.

    Question. A perennial staffing issue that USAID struggles with are 
the constraints the Agency has to hire career professionals who are 
directly employed by the Agency, versus having to hire personnel as 
contractors using program dollars.
    What are the constraints, and the proposals, the Agency would 
pursue to make it easier for the Agency to hire personnel as staff as 
opposed to hiring contractors?

   1a. Constraint: Insufficient Operating Expenses (OE) over 
        many years has distorted the composition of USAID's workforce. 
        USAID's workforce now comprises 70 percent contracted staff and 
        30 percent U.S. direct hire (USDH) employees. More career USDH 
        employees are needed to manage inherently governmental 
        functions and other functions that are not appropriate for 
        contractor staff, to mitigate the labor-intensive and 
        administrative burdens generated by this severe staffing 
        imbalance, and to resolve equity challenges across staffing 
        mechanisms.

   1b. Proposal: The OE account is authorized as the sole 
        account to fund USDH positions (i.e., Civil Service and Foreign 
        Service), with limited exceptions. As USAID's programmatic 
        funding levels have increased to address global challenges, the 
        Agency has not received a commensurate increase in the OE 
        level. As a result, USAID has resorted to predominantly relying 
        on a program-funded contracted workforce. USAID requests 
        congressional support for a more robust OE account to keep up 
        with increased funding on the programming side. If an increase 
        in the OE account is not possible, USAID requests the authority 
        to allow for greater flexibility in the use of USAID's program 
        funds to cover permanent staffing and administrative costs.

   2a. Constraint: USAID faces ongoing challenges with hiring, 
        position management, retention, and professional development 
        for USAID's Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), our local staff. 
        This is because their employment agreements fall under Federal 
        Acquisition Regulations and other laws governing open 
        competition and federal contracts, which complicate these 
        efforts. FSNs make up over a third of USAID's total workforce 
        and 70 percent of our overseas workforce. Therefore, the 
        administrative burden placed on USAID's contracting staff who 
        must manage thousands of contracts for these staff members 
        reduces their bandwidth to focus on programmatic matters.

   2b. Proposal: USAID requests its own Personal Service 
        Agreement (PSA) authority, which would allow the Agency to 
        enter into employment agreements with FSNs that would allow the 
        Agency to establish human resources policies and procedures 
        that align with those for USDH staff more easily than Personal 
        Services Contract (PSC) authority allows (PSCs are subject to 
        U.S. Government contracting processes).

   3a. Constraint: USAID's crisis operations work currently 
        relies heavily on contractors, resulting in a workforce without 
        sufficient ability to perform certain inherently governmental 
        functions and that often experiences high vacancy rates.

   3b. Proposal: In the FY 2024 budget, USAID requested 
        continuation of the Crisis Operations Staffing (COS) authority, 
        which Congress first provided in the FY 2023 Omnibus 
        Appropriation Bill. The COS authority would ensure that USAID 
        can continue to hire and retain diverse talent, at the right 
        time, in the right place, for the right duration to address 
        complex crises. This authority does not add new positions but 
        allows USAID to use existing program funds to do this hiring, 
        converting existing contract positions to temporary federal 
        employee positions.

    Question. Rather than focusing solely on security assistance, the 
United States can broaden its cooperation with Pakistan to include 
supporting its energy transformation and agricultural innovation, as 
well as building resilience capacities to adapt to changing global 
climatic systems.
    How does USAID currently view its relationship with Pakistan in 
terms of bilateral assistance?

    Answer. USAID has long maintained a collaborative relationship with 
our Government of Pakistan counterparts. This relationship has a 
stronger bilateral focus post-withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan. The relationship will continue to remain an important one 
for USAID and the USG as we move forward on shared development 
priorities, such as broad-based climate-resilient economic growth, 
inclusive democratic governance and accountability, a healthy and 
educated population, and recovery from the 2022 floods.
    Energy is a key need for sustainable economic growth. The Pakistan 
Government is strongly concerned about climate trends that have led to 
increasing heat waves, glacial melt, flooding, and water insecurity in 
Pakistan. It has set its own targets and asked USAID for help reaching 
them. In Pakistan, carbon fuel for energy adds to the debt since it 
must be purchased or imported, so renewable is a much better option. FY 
2024 resources will support climate adaptation and mitigation, 
particularly in clean energy development, a sector that shows promising 
potential for U.S. investment in Pakistan. Success in this sector will 
draw in the private sector and boost the energy supply. Clean energy is 
not only more cost effective, it also does not add to Pakistan's 
significant loan debt.
    Regarding flood recovery, in 2022 alone, the United States provided 
over $100 million to support immediate flood relief efforts, disaster 
resilience, and food security needs, as well as financing for relief 
logistics. We know that the needs of flood-affected communities go 
beyond the one-time provision of emergency assistance. In Geneva this 
January, the United States pledged an additional $100 million dollars 
of recovery funding, bringing the U.S. Government's total contribution 
to more than $200 million dollars.
    The additional funding is helping to strengthen climate-smart 
agriculture and food security systems; scale up essential health 
services in flood-affected communities; and expedite a return to 
learning among marginalized populations, particularly girls. It also 
helps our Pakistani partners make critical investments in protection 
and citizen-responsive governance, disease surveillance, economic 
growth, clean energy, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, 
including drainage infrastructure.

    Question. Where is the Administration in terms of fulfilling its 
$200 million pledges for Pakistan's flood response and recovery?

    Answer. In 2022, the United States provided more than $100 million 
to support immediate flood relief efforts, disaster resilience, and 
food security needs, as well as financing for relief logistics. In the 
immediate aftermath of the flooding, USAID/BHA provided $80 million for 
urgently needed food, nutrition, multipurpose cash, health, protection, 
safe drinking water, improved sanitation and hygiene, and shelter 
assistance.
    Acknowledging that the needs of flood-affected communities go 
beyond the one-time provision of emergency assistance, in Geneva this 
January, the United States pledged an additional $103 million dollars 
of recovery funding, bringing the U.S. Government's total contribution 
to more than $203 million dollars since mid-August 2022.
    The additional funding is helping to strengthen climate-smart 
agriculture and food security systems; scale up essential health 
services in flood-affected communities; and expedite a return to 
learning among marginalized populations, particularly girls. It also 
helps our Pakistani partners make critical investments in protection 
and citizen-responsive governance, disease surveillance, economic 
growth, clean energy, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, 
including drainage infrastructure, and law enforcement facilities.
    The total U.S. Government commitment to flood recovery to date is 
greater than $200 million, of which $100 million was announced by 
Deputy Administrator Coleman at the Pakistan Pledge Conference in 
January.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Question. How has the United States worked with international 
donors to ensure that Pakistan's most urgent needs are being met?

    Answer. In the immediate aftermath of the floods, the Deputy Chief 
of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Andrew Schofer, 
coordinated monthly meetings at the Embassy with representatives of UN 
agencies, international financial institutions, and other donor nations 
on flood relief and recovery. USAID provided an early influx of $80 
million in emergency humanitarian assistance for the floods in order to 
play a leadership role to encourage other donors. Overall, the United 
States has provided support to the flood response, food security, 
nutrition assistance, disaster preparedness, and capacity building 
efforts.
    USAID Deputy Administrator Isobel Coleman communicated a message of 
burden sharing in bilateral meetings with donor country counterparts 
from Germany, the UK, and others during the January 9 International 
Conference on Climate Resilient Pakistan in Geneva, from which more 
than $9 billion in new grants and loans for flood relief and recovery 
emerged. The Embassy also participated in the March 2023 International 
Partner Support Group for Flood Recovery, hosted by the Pakistan 
Minister of Economic Affairs.
    Administrator Power's visits to the flood affected areas, and 
meetings with the international community reinforced U.S. Government 
(USG) priorities of a closely coordinated international response and 
the importance of ensuring the financial burden is shared among donors 
to respond to the unmet humanitarian and recovery needs. As a whole, 
the USG is among the largest donors to the flood response in Pakistan, 
having provided more than $200 million to date. In addition to the 
humanitarian response funding, the USAID/Pakistan Mission has 
reprogrammed resources to support food security and nutrition 
programming, as well as ensuring funding to support the implementation 
of effective climate-smart approaches that are acceptable and 
beneficial to smallholder producers, including women.
    The USG continues to advocate, in concert with like-minded donors 
and UN agencies, for greater Government of Pakistan (GoP) support for 
flood victims. These advocacy efforts have helped catalyze new 
spending, such as the GoP's recent decision to increase coverage of the 
Benazir Income Support Program (BISP)'s Nashonuma program--a GoP 
initiative to provide conditional cash assistance and supplemental 
nutritious foods to vulnerable women and children--in 80 flood-affected 
districts. The change is expected to help BISP Nashonuma expand its 
reach from the current 600,000 to approximately 1 million beneficiaries 
over the coming months, according to the World Food Program. With the 
growing concerns of acute malnutrition in the country, the concerted 
efforts of the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome has not only 
prompted other donors, like Australia, to fund emergency nutrition 
activities, but also helped prioritize nutrition amongst the highest 
levels of the Pakistani authorities.
    USAID will continue to monitor humanitarian conditions in Pakistan 
and to work with the GoP and international partners to support critical 
relief and recovery activities.

    Question. Credible and transparent elections in December 2023 are 
crucial for future peace and security in Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).
    What can USAID do, between now and the December election, to 
increase the transparency and thereby the credibility of the DRC 
electoral process?

    Answer. USAID's programming is working to increase the transparency 
of the electoral process. For example, through our Electoral Integrity 
Activity, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and 
the International Republican Institute are working with the National 
Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and civil society to improve 
elections administration, including by supporting civil society efforts 
to engage with CENI. Additionally, national and international 
monitoring of the electoral process is also critical to fostering a 
more transparent and credible electoral process.
    This programming has already played a key role in increasing CENI's 
transparency. Following a challenging start to voter registration, CENI 
took the advice of our implementer, IFES, to rework its operational 
plan, publicize the changes, and publicly acknowledge the process's 
shortcomings. Additionally, CENI allowed unimpeded access to the 450 
USAID-supported domestic election observers to monitor the voter 
registration process. CENI promptly accredited the domestic observation 
mission and USAID staff as observers, allowing our partners to deploy 
to one-in-three voter registration sites nationwide and collect 
important information on the performance of the voter registration 
system. USAID and our interagency partners are also engaging 
diplomatically with CENI to encourage greater transparency.
    There is still more work to be done to press for greater 
transparency and this is, and will continue to be, a top priority of 
our teams in Kinshasa and in Washington, as transparency is essential 
to building the public confidence that will be required for DRC to hold 
successful elections in December.

    Question. What actions by CENI leadership would prompt us to 
withdraw our support, and/or move forward with sanctions on CENI 
leadership?

    Answer. While there have been issues, we assess that CENI has the 
capacity and will to professionally organize DRC's presidential, 
legislative, and local elections in December in accordance with 
internationally recognized norms and standards, and in conformity with 
the DRC constitution and relevant legislation. However, we will 
continue to update our assessment as key upcoming milestones are 
reached, the redistricting and legislative seat allocation process, 
candidate registration, and accreditation of domestic and international 
observers for election day monitoring.
    As USAID has done throughout the voter registration process, we 
will closely monitor these milestones. USAID will also monitor the 
conduct of the campaign period, as it is critical that candidates can 
campaign without intimidation and that state resources are not used to 
favor certain candidates over others. If circumstances were to warrant 
it, a decision to withdraw support or otherwise change U.S. diplomatic 
posture towards CENI would be taken in coordination with interagency 
partners.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Management: Presence and Risk Management: As I've said 
many times, effective diplomacy and development cannot be conducted 
from behind the walls of an Embassy compound. Even as USAID operates in 
some of the most dangerous places in the world, the agency needs to 
take a forward leaning approach towards risk management so staff can 
directly engage with local partners and beneficiaries while conducting 
direct oversight of its programs and operations.
    Do you believe that the Agency's current risk tolerance in medium-
to-high-threat posts is appropriately tailored? Do you believe that it 
should be improved, and if so, how? What will you do to bring about 
that improvement?

    Answer. USAID applies an intentional risk management approach to 
identify, evaluate, and mitigate critical risks to our programming and 
core operations. USAID has a long history of operating in higher risk 
environments and a wall of remembrance that honors our USAID colleagues 
who have died or been killed as a part of their service.
    USAID depends on the interagency to enable our Foreign Service 
Officers to conduct site visits and work closely with local partners 
and beneficiaries. At Post, USAID staff are under the security 
authority of the Chief of Mission, who sets policies and guidelines for 
our staff to conduct fieldwork. We work closely with Diplomatic 
Security and their Regional Security Officers (RSO) to identify USAID's 
field work requirements and inform their security support.
    USAID has implemented measures to prepare our foreign service 
officers for higher risk areas, and provide security advice and 
assistance to our implementing partners. USAID has increased its 
security training for new officers, and travels to our Missions to 
provide tailored security training for the environment.
    USAID continues to expand its security advisory support to our 
implementing partners. This effort includes analyzing and sharing 
security information, advising partners on their security plans, and 
establishing a network of networks amongst the partners to keep them 
safe.
    USAID purposely participates in the National Security process and 
coordinates with the interagency to communicate its needs and risk 
tolerance. Additionally, USAID has staff assigned to Diplomatic 
Security and liaisons between the Combatant Commands to ensure 
effective security assistance planning and day-to-day support.
    USAID is grateful for the support of our State and DoD colleagues 
who have provided us security support as we strive to implement our 
programs. We recognize the sacrifices of our State colleagues to assist 
us, as demonstrated in the loss of life of local employed staff members 
in Nigeria in May 2023 when a convoy advancing a USAID site visit was 
attacked. USAID will continue to advocate for additional resources for 
Diplomatic Security, where appropriate, to further enable our forward 
leaning approach in high and medium risk areas.
    The Agency utilizes an Enterprise Risk Management framework to both 
identify, evaluate, mitigate and elevate critical risks to our 
programming and core operations.
    The Agency has successfully revised and integrated its Risk 
Appetite Statement to support Missions, Bureaus and Independent Offices 
in risk management, which includes understanding our tolerance for risk 
in key areas and in developing tailored responses that are sensitive to 
various country contexts and operating environments.
    The risk appetite statement provides guidance on the programmatic, 
operational, reputational, legal, information technology, security and 
human capital concerns that may impact medium-to-high threat posts and 
emphasizes an inclusive ``whole of mission'' approach to identifying 
and mitigating threats. The risk appetite statement has been improved 
to enable more direct engagement with local partners balanced with the 
provision of training and oversight.
    At the Country level, USAID deploys numerous program and activity 
specific safeguards to manage risks and enable additional tailoring to 
include pre-award surveys and risk assessments, representation and 
certification requirements, special award conditions, partner vetting, 
entity screening/restrictions and corruption reporting, financial and 
accounting requirements. The Agency will continue to provide training 
and resources to further hone this discipline.

    Question. What lessons has USAID learned from its evacuations from 
Afghanistan and Ukraine that may be applied in future circumstances in 
which security conditions rapidly deteriorate, particularly with regard 
to: early warning; staff evacuations, care and support (including 
locally engaged staff and American implementing partners); and remote 
monitoring and evaluation to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse?

    Answer. USAID continues to learn from the evacuations from 
Afghanistan and Ukraine and has conducted an After Action Review (AAR) 
after the Afghanistan evacuation which has further informed our 
protocols. The Agency holds in the highest priority the safety and 
security of staff, as well as the effective delivery of assistance. In 
every location USAID responds, we work closely with individual Missions 
and with the Department of State to anticipate security conditions, 
respond in crisis situations, and learn from challenging experiences to 
continue to adapt and improve Agency response to staff safety and care.
    Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, USAID has 
repositioned and prioritized operational readiness. The Agency 
established the USAID Critical Coordination Structure to bring together 
the inputs of relevant Bureaus and Independent Offices, establishing 
Task Forces as needed, and advancing Agency-level operational emergency 
response strategies focused on the protection and safety of the USAID 
workforce, facilities, and overseas management operations. The Agency 
established the USAID Command Center as a 24/7 resource to monitor 
significant activities, notify and support leadership and staff, and 
coordinate with the Department of State's Operations Center and 
Department of Homeland Security's National Operations Center. We 
increased our collaboration with the Department of State and 
established quantifiable standards for readiness, memorializing them in 
the Joint Strategic Plan FY 2022-2026. We also drafted the Strategic 
Action Plan for Operational Readiness FY 2022-2026, which establishes 
an Agency-wide integrated approach to maintaining a comprehensive and 
effective readiness posture consistent with the Federal Mission 
Resilience Strategy.
    Before a Crisis: While all USAID staff overseas are directly 
accountable to the Chief of Mission, USAID has responsibility for our 
workforce and must be operationally ready to assist our staff, 
coordinate with our implementing partners, and support our interagency 
colleagues during a crisis event. We developed the Mission Continuity 
Plan Template to assist Missions in developing Agency-level crisis 
response plans that account for USAID equities unique to the Missions' 
operating conditions; equities which include the safety and security of 
USAID's entire overseas workforce and our implementing partners. 
USAID's Office of Security provides security training to support USAID 
staff and the Missions, to include tailored training provided at our 
Missions based on the security environment.
    The Office of Security manages a personnel recovery program that is 
based on providing advanced training to prepare staff for emergencies 
and isolating events, and to teach and equip them with communication 
devices, including satellite phones and personal locator beacons. We 
developed a toolkit for Contracting Officers to expedite coordination 
with implementing partners, devised new crisis response training for 
Missions, created new training for domestic staff to better respond to 
a crisis, and are finalizing a standard operating procedure for 
Emergency and Crisis Management for Locally Employed Staff. USAID 
provides additional support to staff whenever possible, including pre-
departure briefings and training, mental and emotional health services, 
and assists in supporting both staff and their families during and 
after critical incidents that impact their wellbeing.
    USAID draws from the challenges that were faced and lessons learned 
through Afghanistan, Ukraine, Sudan, and other evacuations to shape our 
Staff Care Center offerings, which include training sessions on 
resilience, stress management, and adapting to change. USAID develops 
these training programs and other forms of support in close 
coordination with the Department of State's Center for Excellence in 
Foreign Affairs Resilience and Employee Consultation Services, who also 
collaborate on a Resiliency Working Group that is building a 
comprehensive strategy for promoting staff resilience and protecting 
mental health.
    USAID partners use their own individual security models. However, 
USAID has regular communication with partners in our Posts, both 
between individual partners and USAID's Contracting Officer's 
Representative or Agreement Officer's Representative on day-to-day 
coordination and oversight, and collectively on a regular basis between 
Mission leadership and partners. This includes sharing security-related 
information as appropriate. USAID provides safety and security support 
to its implementing partners around the globe via the Partner Liaison 
Security Office program at numerous high-threat posts and remotely 
during emergencies through the Office of Security. Partners 
implementing humanitarian and development relief operate independently 
of the U.S. Government and are responsible for all of their risk 
management decisions and for providing staff support related to their 
operations.
    During a Crisis: USAID coordinates with, and provides support to, 
the Department of State where appropriate during an evacuation, 
including by liaising between the Office of the Assistant Administrator 
for the USAID Bureau for Management and the Office of the Under 
Secretary for Management at State. Within USAID, the Bureau for 
Management's Crisis Response Unit coordinates with the Regional Bureau, 
the Mission, the Regional Support Mission and offices across the Agency 
to coordinate an operational response focused on operational services 
and the health and safety of personnel at post. The USAID Office of 
Security has a liaison assigned to Diplomatic Security to ensure close 
coordination and information sharing.
    While each crisis has unique circumstances, USAID has learned from 
prior experience to inform crisis response, including increased access 
to Staff Care services, situation-specific training on safety and 
security, augmented staff to ensure continuity of operations and 
connectivity to the workforce and implementing partners, and liaison 
staff to coordinate with the Department of State. For example, we 
applied learning from previous evacuations when the crisis in Sudan 
broke out in April 2023. Within hours, we had verified the location and 
security situation of all USAID staff.
    Post-Crisis: USAID uses multiple tools to conduct evaluation post-
crisis. The Agency maintains a repository of Lessons Learned Cables and 
relevant After Action Reports to develop policies and procedures 
related to a crisis. The Critical Coordination Structure then organizes 
an Agency response to implement key lessons learned. USAID, through its 
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) conducts performance 
evaluations, impact evaluations and response level evaluations for 
specific global responses.
    Remote monitoring and evaluation to prevent waste, fraud, and 
abuse: USAID recognizes the importance of assessing risk and 
integrating risk management into all of our foreign assistance. USAID 
has found that when a crisis event occurs, implementing partners and 
the host government often evacuate to common safe locations; therefore, 
USAID seeks to position staff for continued coordination and oversight 
directly with the partners. Development programs may pause temporarily 
during the onset of the crisis event as the focus is on immediate needs 
of staff. Though a crisis event may be ongoing, after implementing 
partners or host governments reconstitute operations, USAID assesses 
risks and may implement increased monitoring or control measures to 
mitigate the increased risk. USAID is working closely with the 
Department of State on application of the Secure Embassy Construction 
and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 for temporary operating locations to 
position staff in a safe location in close proximity to the crisis.
    For humanitarian awards, USAID implements risk management practices 
beginning at the application phase. We require humanitarian partners to 
take appropriate and necessary steps to ensure that they are 
demonstrating that they have assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse, 
including mitigating the risk that the provision of U.S. foreign 
assistance does not result in violating U.S. law. BHA's risk mitigation 
approach includes a requirement for all Non-Governmental Organization 
partners to submit risk assessment and management plans, specifying how 
the organization plans to mitigate and manage the risks of potentially 
misusing U.S. Government resources in their proposed activities/
modalities.
    In addition, for any humanitarian partners operating in high-risk 
environments, such as Afghanistan and Ukraine, BHA requires 
humanitarian partners to submit additional risk mitigation measures 
they will take to decrease present risks associated with complex 
operating environments. This includes requiring them to detail the 
measures they have in place to mitigate the risk of engaging in 
transactions with or providing material support to sanctioned groups 
and/or individuals, including policies for screening vendors, 
contractors, and suppliers, money transfer service providers, as well 
as measures to mitigate the risk of sanctioned group(s) and/or 
individuals interfering with, or influencing beneficiary 
identification, selection, and verification processes.
    Finally, USAID's monitoring and evaluation has built on these 
experiences to ensure effective prevention of waste, fraud, and abuse 
in both crisis and steady-state contexts through external technical 
guidance and internal monitoring site visit guidance. These documents 
provide both BHA and implementing partners with monitoring, evaluation, 
and reporting standards, templates, and best practices that aim in part 
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.

    Question. Staffing: As I've stated in each of the past 3 years, 
USAID's most valuable asset is its people. Unfortunately, with at least 
22 different hiring mechanisms and outdated assumptions about how 
specific missions, bureaus, and offices should be supported, the agency 
is in desperate need of a modernized strategic staffing plan that is 
flexible and adaptive to today's challenges.
    Noting that the FY 2024 budget includes a request for an additional 
230 direct hires, when will I see USAID's comprehensive strategic 
staffing plan that aligns positions, skills, and resources across the 
agency, transparently and effectively streamlines hiring mechanisms, 
and reduces reliance upon program funds, costly institutional 
contracts, and Participating Agency Service Agreements (PASAs) to meet 
modern staffing needs?

    Answer. The current request for 230 new positions includes 105 CS 
and 125 FS positions. The Agency's Global Development Partnership 
Initiative (GDPI) seeks to change our workforce composition by 
increasing the number and percentage of direct hire, but specifically, 
career employees, both Civil Service (CS) and Foreign Service (FS). 
Currently, USAID's workforce is about \1/3\ U.S. contracted staff, \1/
3\ Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and \1/3\ U.S. direct hire staff 
(both career and term-limited FS and CS). If GDPI were fully funded 
alongside our term-limited direct hire authorities, USAID would be able 
to shift this to about 22 percent U.S. contracted staff and 43 percent 
U.S. direct hire staff while maintaining a similar level of FSNs.

    Question. Will the request for an additional 230 direct hire 
positions (105 civil service and 125 foreign service) be funded with OE 
or program funds?

    Answer. The request is for OE-funded positions.

    Question. Will the proposed increase in direct-hire positions be 
paired with a decrease in contractors? If not, why not?

    Answer. The goal of GDPI is to increase the number and percentage 
of career employees (both Civil Service and Foreign Service) and 
accordingly decrease the number and percentage of non-career employees. 
While the Agency will continue to need and utilize non-career staffing 
mechanisms, an increase in career employee opportunities promotes DEIA, 
increases institutional knowledge, and provides improved career paths 
for our top talent. Under the current GDPI planning, USAID would reduce 
the U.S. contracted staff from about 33 percent of our workforce 
composition to about 22 percent.

    Question. How will new direct hire positions be prioritized and 
allocated?

    Answer. For the CS, USAID is prioritizing management positions 
including human resources (HR), administrative management, security, 
legal, and contracting; gender and inclusive development; diversity, 
equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA); global health security; 
and humanitarian assistance. The Agency would also like to increase CS 
staffing in climate and democracy. Approximately half of the increase 
in FY 2022 for the CS was for fundamental staffing requirements that 
have gone unfilled or that have been filled with short-term approaches. 
This includes priority areas like contracting officers (including for 
humanitarian assistance programming), as well as desk officers, 
lawyers, and HR specialists.
    FS priorities will be determined by our Overseas Workforce Planning 
Model; currently identified priorities include Program Officers, 
Contracting Officers, Health Officers, Democracy Officers, Executive 
Officers and Humanitarian Assistance Officers.

    Question. Travel: What is the agency's Temporary Duty (TDY) travel 
budget?

    Answer. The Agency does not develop a specific budget for Temporary 
Duty (TDY) travel for the President's Budget Request, but instead 
provides budget allocations to operating units that determine their 
individual travel requirements. In FY 2022, the Agency obligated 
approximately $29.7 million in Operating Expenses (OE) and $62.8 
million in program funds for TDY travel. USAID estimates a slight 
increase in these levels for FY 2024. Please note that TDY travel is 
discretionary and excludes mandatory travel, such as post assignments 
and permanent change of station (PCS), home leave, rest & recuperation 
(R&R) and other mandatory entitlement travel.

    Question. Is TDY travel from headquarters (whether overseas or 
domestic) funded by OE, program funds, or both? If both, please provide 
a breakdown by category and purpose.

    Answer. TDY travel is funded by both OE and program funds, 
depending on the account that funds the traveler's salaries and 
benefits. Thus, with limited exceptions, the OE account funds travel 
for OE-funded staff while program accounts cover travel for program-
funded staff.
    TDY travel includes operational travel, site visits, conferences, 
seminars, meetings, and retreats. Since the Agency's financial 
management system cannot easily identify TDY travel solely from 
headquarters, the information below includes all TDY travel (from 
headquarters and missions).
    OE and program obligations in FY 2022 for TDY travel are shown in 
the table below.




    Question. How many TDY coach class air travel waivers were granted 
in FY 2022 and FY 2023, to date? Please break such waivers down by 
category.

    Answer. The following information is based on data in E2, the 
Agency's travel system.
    In FY 2022, USAID issued 165 TDY coach-class air-travel waivers. 
The waivers include medical disability, travel in excess of 14 hours, 
no space in coach, paid for by a non-federal source, and for safety and 
security reasons.
    In FY 2023 to date, USAID issued 248 coach-class air-travel 
waivers. The waivers include medical disability, travel in excess of 14 
hours, no space in coach, paid for by a non-federal source, and for 
safety and security reasons.

    Question. Have any blanket waivers for TDY coach class air travel 
been issued? If so, how many, under what circumstances, and at what 
cost?

    Answer. USAID does not issue blanket waivers for TDY coach class 
air travel.

    Question. Global Health: Global Health Security: Of the $1.245 
billion requested for Global Health Security, $745 million is for the 
U.S. Agency for International Development and $500 million is for the 
newly established Pandemic Fund, housed at the World Bank. The Global 
Health Security and Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response 
Act, enacted as part of the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, 
caps U.S. contributions to the Pandemic Fund at 33 percent.
    What is the status of other donor contributions to the Pandemic 
Fund? Is the $500 million U.S. contribution proposed in the budget 
request realistic or aspirational?

    Answer. As of April 26, 2023, the Pandemic Fund has received signed 
Contribution Agreements totaling $1,664,970,000. This includes $450M 
contributed by the United States Government.
    The World Bank and WHO estimate that an additional $10.5 billion 
per year will be needed from multilateral development banks to 
strengthen pandemic preparedness and response capacities in low- and 
middle-income countries. This is in addition to almost $20 billion per 
year that low-and middle-income countries will also need to contribute 
through domestic resources. President Biden's FY 2024 budget request 
includes an additional $500 million for the Pandemic Fund, within the 
GHP-STATE account, to help bridge this funding gap and catalyze 
additional funding from partner governments and organizations.
    With current and proposed Pandemic Fund contributions, the U.S. 
Government will continue to consider the amounts of future 
contributions by other donors over the course of the 5-year period 
designated in the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.

    Question. To date, USAID has exercised dangerously poor oversight 
of its partners engaged in research of pathogens of pandemic potential.
    What safeguards have you put in place to ensure that the resources 
in the FY 2024 budget request, as well as prior-year funding that has 
yet to be obligated, are not directed toward partners that have 
demonstrated poor compliance with U.S. requirements relating to 
research of dual-use concern, data quality, data sharing, performance 
standards, and fiscal controls?

    Answer. First and foremost, USAID has never authorized or funded 
Dual Use Research of Concern or Gain of Function Research nor is there 
an intent to do so in the future. USAID takes biosafety and biosecurity 
considerations very seriously. The Agency is working to continually 
improve and refine how we survey the landscape of biothreats, examine 
risks associated with activities, as well as design stringent 
safeguards to address the full range of biosafety and biosecurity 
concerns.
    USAID implementing partners are required to comply with all 
standard provisions included in their awards, including those related 
to data submission, performance, fiscal responsibility, and others. 
USAID ADS Chapters 302 and 303 contain a detailed description of USAID 
and partners' roles and responsibilities related to the administration 
and monitoring of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. As a 
general matter, the USAID Agreement Officer's Representative performs 
award oversight and management of assistance awards within the scope of 
USAID's permitted substantial involvement. For sub-awards, the prime 
implementing partner is required to flow down all requirements to sub-
awards, and to monitor compliance of its sub-awardees.

    Question. Has USAID's Office of Acquisitions and Assistance 
reviewed EcoHealth Alliance's compliance with all obligations, both in 
body and in spirit, with U.S. requirements relating to data 
transparency and fiscal and performance management?
    Has EcoHealth Alliance been subject to suspension or debarment 
proceedings? If not, why not?
    Does EcoHealth Alliance continue to receive funding from USAID for 
any purpose, whether as a prime, sub-, or sub-sub awardee? If so, where 
and for what purposes?

    Answer. In October 2021, USAID became aware of information raising 
concerns about EcoHealth Alliance's work under an NIH award. In 
addition, several members of Congress have requested that HHS and USAID 
investigate and determine whether EcoHealth Alliance should be excluded 
from receiving federal contracts and grants based on concerns related 
to NIH work. USAID referred the information to USAID's Office of the 
Inspector General and facilitated a conversation with interested 
congressional parties.
    As of April 26, 2023, EcoHealth Alliance is not under review for 
suspension and debarment consideration by USAID's Compliance Division 
within the Bureau for Management, Office of Management Policy, Budget, 
and Performance, which coordinates its work with USAID's Office of 
Acquisitions and Assistance. USAID Compliance recommends suspension and 
debarment efforts on an on-going basis and those decisions are posted 
in the System for Award Management (sam.gov) for suspensions, proposed 
debarments (under the Federal Acquisition Regulation only) and 
debarments. Matters leading up to these actions are pre-decisional and, 
as such, are not shared beyond a need-to-know basis.
    EcoHealth Alliance is currently the prime implementing partner for 
the Conservation Works Activity in Liberia. Conservation Works employs 
One Health strategies to conserve biodiversity and promote sustainable 
economic growth throughout Liberia by improving protection of forest 
resources and biodiversity and building conservation-compatible 
economic opportunities for communities relying on those natural 
resources. USAID does not have any other direct awards or sub-awards to 
EcoHealth Alliance at this time.

    Question. Sexual and Reproductive Health: Does the term ``sexual 
and reproductive health'', as it relates to USAID assistance, programs, 
and engagement in development forums, include access to ``safe and 
legal'' abortion?

    Answer. No, it does not. USAID does not fund abortions. We take 
seriously all applicable laws and implement measures with Missions and 
partners to ensure compliance with these requirements in their 
programs.

    Question. Can you confirm that all USAID grants and contracts, 
including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for the 
utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of account 
and regardless of targeted health sector, include specific prohibitions 
on the use of funds to perform or promote abortion, or lobby for or 
against the legalization of abortion overseas?

    Answer. Yes, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and 
USAID's annual appropriations acts set forth a number of statutory 
restrictions related to abortion, including the Helms, Leahy, Siljander 
and Biden Amendments. These restrictions apply to all U.S. foreign 
assistance funds, including through subawards and subcontracts, across 
all sectors and partners, and have been in place for a number of 
decades. USAID implements the abortion restrictions through mandatory 
standard provisions included in our grants and contracts.

    Question. Can you confirm the same for all USAID grants and 
contracts, including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for 
the utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of 
account, to promote human rights and gender equality?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Is access to ``safe and legal'' abortion included among 
the health, human rights, and/or gender equality initiatives that USAID 
seeks to advance through utilization of U.S. foreign assistance 
funding?

    Answer. No, it is not. USAID does not fund abortions and takes 
seriously the legislative restrictions and compliance measures related 
to all applicable laws.

    Question. Does USAID utilize U.S. foreign assistance funds, 
regardless of account, to provide gender affirming surgery or therapy?

    Answer. USAID does not fund gender affirming medical interventions, 
which include surgeries and hormone therapy.
    USAID, via the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
supports comprehensive HIV services for key populations or those at 
increased risk for HIV due to structural barriers, including stigma and 
discrimination in health settings and specific higher-risk behaviors, 
irrespective of the epidemic type or local context. Transgender 
individuals are one of these key populations, as defined by UNAIDS, and 
are 34 times more likely to be living with HIV.
    In select HIV programs, national authorities have elected to offer 
gender-affirming hormone therapy as a strategy to increase the use of 
HIV services. While not using PEPFAR funds for hormones, program 
partners coordinate with and leverage other development partners and 
governments to offer these services as a comprehensive package targeted 
at high-risk transgender individuals. For example, in South Africa, the 
National Department of Health procures hormones for use in clinics 
supported by USAID partners. In India, clinics provide HIV services 
through USAID support, but use other means to cover the cost of the 
hormones, such as clients paying out of pocket. No U.S. foreign 
assistance funding is used to provide hormone replacement therapy or 
gender-affirming medical interventions.
    USAID also strengthens mental health and psychosocial support 
(MHPSS) services available to LGBTQI+ individuals and other 
marginalized communities. This includes offering services and referrals 
for LGBTQI+ mental health and gender-based violence support; developing 
training materials for MHPSS providers working with these clients; and 
developing resources for LGBTQI+ individuals to mitigate challenges 
associated with violence, discrimination, stigma, and abuse.

    Question. Malaria: The President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) has 
undertaken a market shaping effort to bring a diversity of 
manufacturers into the malaria commodity market to ensure a resilient 
supply chain for the millions and millions of malaria commodities it 
purchases each year.
    What are the policy changes or priorities that PMI has identified 
as critical to its effort to shape a healthy market for malaria 
commodities?

    Answer. The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) promotes a 
healthy market for malaria products to ensure the sustained 
availability of high quality, affordable life-saving products. PMI 
defines a healthy market around four dimensions: (1) global capacity 
(sufficient supply to meet demand), (2) affordability, (3) supply risk 
(diversified supply base), and (4) product quality/appropriateness 
(quality and innovation). To promote a healthy market, PMI works on all 
of these critical priority areas. For example, PMI allocates demand 
across multiple suppliers and manufacturing sites for a secure, 
diversified supply base. In 2022, PMI procured malaria pharmaceuticals 
from 12 suppliers with manufacturing sites in six countries. PMI also 
supports new product introduction to bring innovative products to 
market and make them affordable. Working with key partners--including 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaid, 
MedAccess, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation--PMI supported the 
introduction of the first insecticide-treated net with two active 
insecticides (dual AI nets) in areas with high insecticide resistance. 
Our collective efforts brought the nets to market faster, reduced the 
price of the net by half, and expanded production capacity three times 
from the initial capacity.

    Question. Is prioritizing manufacturers that invest in innovating 
the next generation of malaria tools one of the criteria PMI has 
identified is crucial to their market shaping initiative? If so, how is 
PMI or its procuring partners ensuring that malaria innovators are 
prioritized in the evaluation criteria?

    Answer. PMI uses several approaches to support critical innovation 
across its commodity portfolio. We fund multiple product development 
partnerships that work with industry to ensure a healthy research and 
development pipeline of innovative products including new drugs for 
treatment and prevention of malaria and new insecticides. We also 
include evaluation criteria in our tenders that award points for 
manufacturers that are investing in innovation. Finally, we work to 
reduce the development to market timeframe, as described above for dual 
AI nets, to make innovative products available and affordable so they 
reach more people more quickly.

    Question. How does the market shaping initiative take into account 
U.S. company suppliers versus supplier companies headquartered outside 
of the United States?

    Answer. PMI does not evaluate where a company is headquartered in 
our tendering and evaluation process. PMI does, however, look at where 
the product is manufactured to ensure a geographically diverse supply 
base and promote supply chain resiliency. From 2022, PMI includes 
evaluation criteria related to manufacturing in Africa to bring supply 
closer to demand and ensure a responsive and resilient malaria supply 
chain. This shift reflects that 95 percent of malaria cases and 96 
percent of malaria deaths are in Africa, but manufacturing of quality 
malaria commodities on the continent is currently negligible. Inclusion 
of the evaluation criteria has increased our allocation to qualified 
manufacturers in Africa and provides a demand signal to industry to 
invest in expanding African-based manufacturing. Several current 
suppliers are actively working on technology transfers or partnerships 
with local manufacturers to strengthen their capacity.

    Question. Food Aid and Food Security: The budget request ``reflects 
the importance of in-kind agricultural commodities to humanitarian 
response, but also acknowledges the opportunity to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. food assistance programs through 
the reauthorization of the Food for Peace Act.''
    What reforms are you seeking to make U.S. food aid more efficient 
and effective? Please be specific.

    Answer. At this time of record global hunger, the reauthorization 
of the Farm Bill provides an opportunity for Congress and USAID to work 
together to ensure the U.S. Government has the best tools at its 
disposal to meet global need. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian 
Assistance (BHA) has identified several technical changes to the Title 
II authorities which would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
our Title II food assistance programs, without reducing the use of U.S. 
commodities, to more efficiently feed those in need.
Provide Partners More Choice in Programming Without Reducing Use of 
        U.S. In-Kind Commodities
    USAID's non-emergency Title II programs are designed to build 
resilience in vulnerable communities, reducing communities' reliance on 
food aid and potential need for humanitarian assistance in the long 
term. This programming can include a broad range of critical activities 
including natural resource management, disaster risk reduction, and 
training. However, there is a cap on the amount of Title II funding 
that can be used for these purposes, and this cap often requires 
partners to program in-kind commodities even when different 
interventions would create a more lasting impact on the resilience of a 
specific community. USAID can build more sustainable outcomes with non-
emergency programs by allowing partners to design programs around the 
needs of each community, whether that includes the provision of in-kind 
commodities, resilience-building activities, or both over the course of 
the program.
    USAID analysis indicates that the cost per metric ton (MT) to 
program U.S. in-kind commodities for non-emergency programs is 
approximately twice as high as the cost to program them for emergency 
programs. For the same price, shifting the commodities used for non-
emergency programs over to emergency programs would allow USAID to 
potentially purchase more commodities and increase the number of people 
receiving U.S. food assistance, while maximizing efficiency and 
effectiveness of food assistance programming.
    Proposal: Directly authorize the provision of assistance to 
eligible organizations for non-emergency programs, while exempting non-
emergency programs from the 202(e) funding cap and removing the 
directive to provide a minimum level of U.S. in-kind commodities for 
such programs each year.

   USAID would be authorized to provide assistance directly to 
        partners that is not subject to the 202(e) cap and would not be 
        required to provide a minimum of 1,875,000 metric tons each 
        fiscal year for non-emergency programming. The requirement to 
        spend not less than $365 million on non-emergency programming 
        would remain.
Simplify Overly Burdensome Accounting Requirements
    Current law imposes a rigid and complicated accounting structure on 
Food for Peace Act food assistance, which costs the Agency time and 
resources that could be better spent on programming. The law also 
requires the same of our partners, often requiring them to invest in 
expensive, custom financial tracking software to comply.
    Proposal: Eliminate cost categories for Title II, making the 
authority similar to the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and 
Development Assistance (DA) authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act, 
which do not specify separate cost categories.

   USAID would rely on the ``necessary expense doctrine'' as it 
        does when programming IDA and DA funding, where a specific 
        appropriation can be used to pay any associated expense, 
        provided that it is necessary or incident to the achievement of 
        the underlying objectives of the appropriation; not prohibited 
        by law; and not otherwise provided for (i.e., not within the 
        scope of some other appropriation).

   Include a floor of approximately 30 percent (based on prior 
        year average) of Title II funding to be spent on U.S. in-kind 
        commodities for emergency programming.

   This change would reduce barriers to entry for new and local 
        partners who are interested in programming Title II assistance.
Consolidate Food Assistance Reporting Requirements
    Current law requires a report on international food assistance 
provided through the Food for Peace Act and another report on 
international food assistance provided through the Foreign Assistance 
Act. Each of these reports paints an incomplete picture of U.S. food 
assistance programs, so USAID is proposing to consolidate them into a 
single report.
    Proposal: Consolidate the Emergency Food Security Program report 
and the International Food Assistance Report into a single report 
covering the breadth of food assistance funded by both IDA and Title 
II.

   The single, consolidated report would include all the 
        information currently captured by the two individual reports, 
        creating a more holistic view of USAID's food assistance 
        programming while still providing the same level of granular 
        detail.

   Consolidating the two reports would also save 160 staff 
        hours and approximately $6,000 taxpayer dollars per year.
Streamline Monitoring and Evaluation of Programming
    While USAID often has multiple food assistance funding streams in a 
given country, current law only permits the Agency to use Food for 
Peace Act funding to monitor Food for Peace Act food assistance 
programs. BHA staff and partners carrying out these types of technical 
assistance activities must either deal with the administrative burden 
of allocating and accounting from different funding streams in the same 
country to track expenses or they must enter into separate awards to 
carry out these activities by funding stream. In either case the result 
is inefficient, leads to delays in carrying out activities when funding 
may not be readily available, and undermines the effectiveness of USAID 
food assistance programming.
    Proposal: Broaden the authorizations for 202(h) and 207(f) to allow 
Title II funds authorized in these sections to support all BHA food 
assistance programs, regardless of funding stream.

   Congress has already provided the authority for Community 
        Development Funds (CDF) to be broadly used for Title II 
        purposes; however, there is no comparable authority to allow 
        Title II to be used for CDF, IDA, or ESF purposes. This change 
        would allow USAID to use Title II funds for food aid quality 
        and for monitoring, oversight, and evaluation purposes across 
        all food assistance programs.

    We look forward to working with Congress ahead of the upcoming Farm 
Bill reauthorization to maximize the ability of the legislation to 
support USAID to more effectively respond to crises, build resilience 
among communities, and improve stewardship of taxpayer dollars.

    Question. What are the current cost differentials between USAID's 
existing food aid modalities, including: (1) food aid provided in the 
form of ``market-based assistance,'' such as biometrically verified 
electronic transfers and vouchers; (2) food aid commodities procured 
locally or regionally; and (3) food aid commodities procured and 
shipped from the United States?
    What are the key drivers of those cost differentials?

    Answer. The exact cost differentials between different food aid 
modalities vary widely based on the unique response context, including 
the type of commodities provided as food aid; the geographic location 
and its proximity to ports; and, to a certain extent, the efficiencies 
gained when USAID implementing partners are able to provide food aid at 
scale. In general, when sufficient quantity and quality of commodities 
are available in local markets, buying locally--whether through 
individual cash and voucher assistance or humanitarian organization's 
local procurement--often saves money over U.S.-based or other 
international procurement of the same or similar commodities.
    However, there are many exceptions to these broad trends, 
including, for example, instances in which the local food prices remain 
very high compared to the international market price or the U.S., or 
instances where the types of food that cash or vouchers are intended to 
purchase are relatively more expensive than the non-perishable bulk 
staples usually provided in large in-kind food assistance programs.
    For market-based food commodities, the key drivers of price 
differentials include A) local market conditions and prices, and B) 
financial service provider fees. The types of food that the cash and 
vouchers are intended to purchase will also factor into the per-unit 
price of cash or voucher assistance.
    For in-kind food commodities, the key drivers of price 
differentials are A) the price of the food commodity in the country 
where it is procured, B) the price of transporting that food commodity 
to the country where it will be distributed, and C) the cost of 
warehousing and physically distributing the commodities in-country. 
Procurement and contracting economies of scale often factor heavily 
into these drivers; procuring larger quantities of food at a single 
time will often result in lower per-unit prices.
    Illustratively, in 2022 in Burkina Faso, USAID implementing 
partners could provide a 60 percent ration using food commodities 
procured and shipped from the U.S. for $14.80 per person per month. An 
equivalent cash ration for a household to purchase food in local 
markets costs $13.46 per person per month--a 9 percent savings. In 
South Sudan, USAID partners could provide a 50 percent ration for 
$21.19 per person per month using food commodities procured and shipped 
from the U.S. or $20.41 per person per month using regionally-procured 
commodities--a 4 percent savings over food commodities procured and 
shipped from the U.S. An equivalent cash ration for household food 
purchased in local markets in South Sudan cost $17.80 per person per 
month--a 16 percent savings compared to food commodities procured and 
shipped from the U.S. It is worth noting that USAID intentionally 
programs U.S. purchased commodities where they represent a good value--
cost differences between local purchase, regional procurement, and food 
commodities procured and shipped from the U.S. could be significantly 
higher in different contexts, demonstrating the value of utilizing 
flexible food assistance options.
    Cost-efficiency is only one of several important factors that USAID 
uses to determine which type of food assistance is optimal for a given 
response context. Other components include the availability of food in 
markets, local market functionality, the operational feasibility of a 
specific modality, the specific objective that USAID is trying to 
achieve with the food assistance program, beneficiary preference, and 
any assessed protection risk factors associated with certain modalities 
of food assistance. USAID uses the USG Modality Decision Tool (https://
www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/USG_MDT_Final_2017.pdf) to 
guide this process.

    Question. What is the current cost differential between U.S.-
flagged and foreign-flagged ocean transport vessels carrying U.S. food 
aid commodities overseas?

    Answer. USAID relies on two types of ships to transport U.S. food 
aid commodities overseas: liner vessels, which are appropriate for 
packaged food, and bulk vessels, which are appropriate for bulk grains 
or other commodities. Based on USAID's FY 2022 packaged and bulk 
procurements, U.S.-flagged Ocean liner vessel rates were approximately 
25 percent higher than foreign-flagged ocean liner vessel rates. U.S.-
flagged Ocean bulk vessel rates were approximately 48 percent higher 
than foreign-flagged ocean bulk vessel rates.

    Question. To your knowledge, how many U.S.-flagged ocean transport 
vessels carrying U.S. food aid overseas remain in the U.S. commercial 
fleet? By whom are they owned?

    Answer. Today, there are only four bulk vessels in the U.S.-flag 
fleet, three of which are owned by a single company, Liberty Maritime.
    We understand that a primary limiting factor to increasing bulk 
vessel availability is the statutory 3-year waiting period for joining 
the cargo preference program. The Maritime Administration has also 
raised concerns about the impact of the waiting period on the supply of 
vessels in the fleet, including in a recent GAO report, ``Actions 
Needed to Enhance Cargo Preference Oversight.''

    Question. In FY2021, how many Ocean Transportation Requests for 
Proposal (RFPs) were issued by USAID? FY 2022? FY 2023, to date?
    Of those RFPs, how many received bids from more than one U.S.-
flagged carrier? How many received no bids from U.S.-flagged carriers?

    Answer. In accordance with the 1954 Cargo Preference statute, USAID 
performed the following Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Food 
Aid freight procurements/shipments by Vessel Type: Bulker (Bulk) and 
Liner vessels.
    Under the Bulk Vessel category, during the 3-year period FY 2021 
through 2023, the following number of freight solicitations with total 
corresponding commodity volumes (per metric ton/MT) were recorded:
Fiscal Year 2021
   19 Solicitations

   Total Tonnage: 1,295,020 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 399,210 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 895,810 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. Flag offer: 
        714,110 MT

    **** Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty 
Maritime Corporation and United Ocean Services. Due to a lack of U.S. 
flag bulk capacity, when a U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is 
awarded. No USAID bulk freight solicitation received more than one U.S. 
flag carrier offer.
Fiscal Year 2022
   19 Solicitations

   Total Tonnage: 1,454,350 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 541,270 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 913,080 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 
        800,610 MT

    ****Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty 
Maritime Corporation. Due to a lack of U.S. flag bulk capacity, when a 
U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is awarded. No USAID bulk freight 
solicitation received more than one U.S. flag carrier offer.
Fiscal Year 2023
   Released 6 Solicitations (YTD)

   Total Tonnage: 638,970 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 228,370 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 410,600 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 
        254,600 MT

    ****Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty 
Maritime Corporation. Due to a lack of U.S. flag bulk capacity, when a 
U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is awarded. No USAID bulk freight 
solicitation received more than one U.S. flag carrier offer.
    Under the Liner Vessel category, during the 3-year period FY 2021 
through 2023 the following number of freight solicitations with total 
corresponding commodity volumes (per metric ton/MT) were recorded:
Fiscal Year 2021
   19 Solicitations

   Total Tonnage: 438,156 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 250,638 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 187,517 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 1,915 
        MT
Fiscal Year 2022
   20 Solicitations

   Total Tonnage: 371,746 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 197,712 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 174,034 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 0 MT
Fiscal Year 2023
   Released 11 Solicitations (YTD)

   Total Tonnage: 201,909 MT

   U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 91,034 MT

   Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 110,875 MT

   Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 20,967 
        MT

    **** Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: over the 
3-year period Maersk Lines LTD. was the primary U.S. Liner carrier and 
often sole U.S. flag carrier. USAID receives limited U.S. Flag (P2) 
offers from APL/CMA and periodically from Hapag Lloyd. Liner offers are 
received sporadically from U.S. flag Break/Bulk carriers for limited 
destinations, those carriers are U.S. Ocean and Schuyler Lines. During 
FY 2023 (YTD), USAID only received offers from more than one U.S. flag 
carrier on 2 of the 11 freight solicitations issued.

    Question. What is the average length of time required to program 
each of the existing U.S. food aid modalities, including: (1) food aid 
provided in the form of ``market-based assistance,'' such as 
biometrically verified electronic transfers and vouchers; (2) food aid 
commodities procured locally or regionally; and (3) food aid 
commodities procured in and shipped from the United States?

    Answer. USAID does not currently track the speed of program 
implementation by modality across the entire food assistance portfolio 
of multiple countries. For market-based assistance through electronic 
transfers and vouchers, the length of time required to program depends 
significantly on whether a humanitarian organization has pre-
established contracts with service providers or vendors. With 
agreements in place with banks, mobile money providers, or other local 
financial institutions, cash transfers can potentially be distributed 
immediately after humanitarian organizations are able to establish a 
list of eligible recipients. Card-based cash/voucher operations will 
take longer, as will operations using paper vouchers. If agreements 
have to be developed with new service providers and/or voucher vendors, 
this may take several weeks before distributions can commence.
    Food assistance commodities procured locally or regionally may be 
available within days of an emergency depending significantly on the 
emergency's proximity to the nearest prepositioning warehouse and 
whether any commodity shipments in transit can be re-routed. The World 
Food Program (WFP) maintains a stock of prepositioned food in regional 
warehouses and, in select countries, may preposition food in advance of 
anticipated shocks, which can be deployed in the early days of a 
response. New procurement still requires a tendering process that will 
typically take a couple of weeks, but availability for distribution 
varies widely depending on where the commodities are coming from.
    A similar prepositioning dynamic applies to U.S. in-kind, 
prepositioned commodities. For new commodity procurement in the U.S., 
the time between issuing a procurement solicitation and its arrival in-
country would average approximately 18-22 weeks.

    Question. The recently reauthorized Global Food Security Act 
provides a framework to help food insecure populations move across the 
full continuum of U.S. food assistance--from emergency food aid to 
agriculture-led economic growth.
    How is USAID linking these two initiatives? How and where is that 
reflected in the budget?

    Answer. Strategically coordinating humanitarian and development 
assistance is crucial for building resilience and linking immediate 
needs with longer-term systems, growth, and sustainability. To do this, 
USAID is creating stronger linkages between our humanitarian assistance 
and peacebuilding initiatives through our long-term development work. 
We bring together experts from across these areas to work together to 
identify common problems, design responses; learn and adapt to 
increasing challenges. USAID highlights the necessity of coordinated 
investments across humanitarian and development assistance not only in 
the Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS), which is a requirement of the 
Global Food Security Act, but also in USAID's 2012 Policy on Building 
Resilience to Recurrent Crisis and BHA's Strategic Framework for Early 
Recovery, Risk Reduction, and Resilience (ER4).
    By transitioning food-insecure populations from emergency 
assistance that focuses on sustaining them during periods of acute 
shortage, to longer-term efforts that re-establishes livelihoods and 
builds resilience to future shocks, USAID reduces the likelihood of 
future humanitarian assistance needs. For more than a decade, USAID, 
led by the Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (RFS) and the Bureau 
for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), has worked across Bureaus to 
prioritize support and investment to strengthen resilience to recurrent 
and protracted crises and advance progress.
    Since 2012, USAID has selected 15 Resilience Focus Countries that 
prioritized for support and investment to build resilience to recurrent 
and protracted crises and advance progress: Burkina Faso, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe. All of these countries are also GFSS target or aligned 
countries. Each country has a subnational resilience focus zone where 
USAID concentrates planning and programming across humanitarian, 
development, and peace resources.
    For Resilience Focus Countries, RFS collaborates closely with BHA 
on transitioning affected populations from needing food assistance to 
providing food for themselves through restored livelihoods, so that 
resilience approaches and programming can then set the stage for long-
term agriculture-led growth and more resilient livelihoods. This 
includes coordination on the selection and design of Resilience Food 
Security Activities (RFSAs), multiyear programs designed to address 
chronic food and nutrition insecurity. RFSAs often serve as a 
foundational layer of programming that facilitate multi-sectoral and 
market-based development investments by RFS, Missions, and other 
development actors that intentionally leverage and integrate with BHA 
programming to maximize long-term resilience outcomes.
    For example, the Nawiri RFSAs in Kenya aim to sustainably reduce 
levels of persistent acute malnutrition in Kenya's arid and semi-arid 
lands (ASALs) prone to cyclical food insecurity. In addition, in South 
Sudan, we are graduating farmers impacted by ongoing conflict and 
record flooding from multiyear BHA humanitarian emergency programming 
to resilient agriculture programming that strengthens market systems. 
We are integrating psychosocial support throughout this transition and 
coordinating with and through community groups to ensure local voices 
are front and center.
    Over the last few years, approximately 25 percent (about $250 
million) of RFS's annual budget for Feed the Future has supported 
programming in the resilience focus zones of USAID's Resilience Focus 
countries. These resources are complemented by approximately $300 
million in resilience programming annually from BHA that are 
concentrated in the resilience focus zones of USAID's Resilience Focus 
countries.
    USAID also addresses these issues at an organizational level. Last 
year, USAID published the Programming Considerations on Humanitarian 
Development Peace Coherence Note, after extensive consultation with 
partners, which provides a set of HDP principles and examples of HDP 
coherence in action. USAID is currently developing best practices and 
peer learning opportunities both internally and with partners to 
further HDP coherence.

    Question. Localization: Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM): With 
demands upon U.S. foreign assistance and other donor support on the 
rise, it is more important than ever that developing countries commit 
to raising and investing more of their own domestic resources to 
improve the health, education, and economic well-being of their people. 
Domestic resource mobilization (DMR) is vital to long-term self-
reliance and accelerating country transitions from aid to broader forms 
of partnership with the United States.
    What is USAID doing to build the capacity of partner countries to 
mobilize domestic resources in a manner that enhances self-reliance and 
reduces long-term dependence upon U.S. foreign assistance?

    Answer. USAID provides technical assistance in domestic resource 
mobilization (DRM) in approximately 20 countries, both at the national 
and subnational level, and commits approximately $20.5 million to such 
technical assistance annually. This assistance includes helping 
countries to improve legislation and level the playing field for 
citizens and domestic and foreign businesses. USAID's support also 
includes helping governments institute the processes and systems that 
ensure revenues are collected at low cost to the government and without 
undue burdens to the economy. This assistance is complemented by 
USAID's support to the management of public finances to ensure 
resources are allocated effectively, spent as planned, and generate 
value for money. USAID is also actively working to convene other donors 
and multilateral organizations to increase available support and 
promote policy coherence in this area, including as a founding member 
and co-chair of the Addis Tax Initiative.

    Question. How is the agency connecting its DMR work with its 
localization efforts?

    Answer. Effective DRM reform requires the buy-in and the political 
will of local actors, including host governments, civil society 
organizations, citizens, and businesses. USAID's DRM interventions are 
therefore co-designed with local counterparts and designed to reflect 
local demand and plans for reforms, as well as existing development 
objective agreements with host governments. USAID's DRM activities 
necessarily include components aimed at developing local capacity for 
DRM analysis and supporting the advocacy efforts of local civil society 
organizations. In its current local governance activity in Senegal, for 
example, USAID worked to involve citizens in over 40 communities in 
assessing what property was available to be taxed and in decisions 
about future spending. USAID noted increased revenue opportunities in 
communities where mayors committed to agreed upon spending priorities. 
For example, the commune of Bagadadji in Senegal, which had struggled 
to mobilize resources, was able to increase tax collections from $221 
to $6000 (a multiple of 27, or 2700 percent) after USAID partnered with 
the mayor to engage residents in revenue and spending decisions. The 
commune leveraged these funds to build classrooms and complete bridge 
repairs. Where local capacity permits, USAID has deployed agreements to 
finance reforms undertaken by local actors.

    Question. Do you have the necessary tools and resources for USAID's 
DRM work to be successful?

    Answer. USAID continues to develop the skills of its staff to 
undertake DRM activities and to incorporate DRM interventions in 
support of other sectors. USAID provides a 4-day ``Domestic Resource 
Mobilization'' course, in which staff learn about the design and 
implementation of government revenue systems, national and subnational 
DRM trends and issues, as well as DRM programming choices and 
experiences. USAID also provides technical guides such as the Tax 
Policy Reform Primer. These resources are yielding results at the 
country level. For example, with USAID support between 2014 and 2018, 
the government of the Philippines netted an extra $6.2 billion in tax 
revenues and was able to raise infrastructure spending as percent of 
GDP by 1.6 percentage points. More recently, the Philippine Department 
of Budget Management repurposed funds of similar magnitude for the 
COVID-19 response.

    Question. Definitions & Indicators: The definition of ``local 
partner'' under the Administration's ``localization'' initiative has 
opened a lively debate. Chapter 303 of USAID's Automated Directives 
System (ADS) references both ``Local Entities'' and ``Locally 
Established Partners (LEPs),'' which raises questions about just how 
``local'' an organization needs to be in order to be counted toward the 
``localization'' targets. The proposal to track an even looser 
indicator--i.e., a grantees' SAM number--could further muddy the waters 
by allowing virtually any organization that says they are registered 
and headquartered locally to count towards the 25 percent localization 
target.
    How will USAID make the determination that an entity is truly 
``local'' in order to meet its targets?

    Answer. USAID uses a multi-prong formula to determine whether a 
partner is ``local'' for purposes of the direct local funding 
indicator, for which USAID has a target of 25 percent. Specifically, we 
classify partners as ``local'' if:

  1.  The identified ``country of incorporation'' in the Federal System 
        for Award Management (SAM) matches the ``physical country'' in 
        SAM and the ``place of performance--country'' in USAID's Global 
        Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS); and

  2.  The physical country is classified as a developing country.

    For obligations to partners that are not registered in SAM or who 
are utilizing a generic Unique Entity Identifier (UEI), a partner 
obligation is alternatively classified as ``local'' if:

  1.  The identified ``vendor country'' in GLAAS (pulled from USAID's 
        financial system, Phoenix) matches their ``place of performance 
        country'' in GLAAS; and

  2.  The ``vendor country'' is classified as a developing country.

    We selected these methodologies recognizing that the concept of 
what it means to be ``local'' is complex and often contextually 
nuanced. And that any effort to define it specifically will ultimately 
be imperfect. So we know that our indicator is a proxy for local 
partnership. Our goal was to come up with as good a proxy as possible, 
while minimizing the reporting burden on staff and local partners and 
using centrally reported, automated systems to the maximum extent 
possible. Using these systems also allows us to easily track progress 
compared to previous years, and on a real-time basis going forward.
    We are committed to transparency around our Direct Local Funding 
data. Because there are a number of ways to measure funding to local 
actors, it's important to be clear about what we're counting. So when 
we release our progress report, we will also be publishing our complete 
dataset that codes awards as local, regional, and not local in order to 
enable independent analysis of the Agency's Direct Local Funding data.

    Question. Transparency: How does USAID plan to publicly share data 
on the objectives and progress toward meeting Administrator Power's 
localization goals?

    Answer. USAID uses two targets to track our progress on 
localization. First, by FY 2025, USAID will channel a quarter of its 
funding directly to local partners and second, by 2030, at least half 
of USAID programs will enable local actors to exercise leadership over 
priority setting, activity design, implementation, and defining and 
measuring results.
    The first localization progress report, Moving toward a Model of 
Locally Led Development: Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Localization Progress 
Report (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/FY 2022 
Localization Progress Report-June-12-23_vFINAL_1.pdf), was released on 
June 12, 2023. It documents USAID's recent progress toward these goals 
and outlines the efforts we are making, as an Agency, to further these 
objectives. In issuing this progress report, USAID is holding itself 
accountable for implementing its commitment to a model of more 
inclusive, locally led development and humanitarian assistance.
    The report highlights initial signs of progress. Notably, in FY 
2022, direct funding to local partners--organizations, firms, and 
individuals based in the countries in which we work--reached nearly 
$1.6 billion, or 10.2 percent of attributable obligations. This is the 
highest level and percent of direct local funding in at least a decade, 
and, in dollar terms, a 66 percent increase from last year. We also 
provided $199 million in government-to-government assistance and 
another $57 million to partners working regionally. The report explores 
these data in more detail by sector, Bureau, region, and country. To be 
maximally transparent, we also published, alongside the report, the 
underlying data (https://www.usaid.gov/localization/measurement) for 
the analysis presented (with partner names redacted, as necessary, in 
alignment with redactions implemented in other public datasets).
    The Progress Report also outlines the new indicator USAID will use 
to track progress on the equally important goal of shifting power and 
enabling more local leadership of USAID-funded programming. We will 
report initial data for this indicator in our FY 2023 localization 
report.

    Question. Is USAID planning to make country-level data publicly 
available on both its 25 percent and its 50 percent indicators? If not, 
why not?

    Answer. USAID released its first progress report on localization on 
June 12, 2023 ``Moving Toward a Model of Locally Led Development: FY 
2022 Localization Progress Report (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/2023-06/FY 2022 Localization Progress Report-June-12-
23_vFINAL_1.pdf).''
    The report includes disaggregated country-level data on FY22 direct 
funding to local partners, for which the agency has a target of 
reaching 25 percent by 2025. Alongside the report, we also published 
our complete dataset (https://www.usaid.gov/localization/measurement) 
that underlies the analysis. We will first report data on the new 
Locally Led Programs indicator, for which USAID's target is 50 percent 
by 2030, in the FY23 progress report.

    Question. Foreign Aid Transparency: When, if ever, will USAID make 
available information on contractors and subgrantees on the foreign 
assistance dashboard, www.foreignassistance.gov?

    Answer. ForeignAssistance.gov publishes contractors under the field 
``implementing partners.'' This information can be found in the Data 
Query as well as on the ``By Country'' and ``By Agency'' pages. 
ForeignAssistance.gov does not publish subgrantees. There are currently 
no plans to make subgrantees available as that data is maintained by 
the prime recipients.

    Question. How does USAID track and report information on Negotiated 
Indirect Cost Rate Agreements (NICRA)?

    Answer. USAID's Negotiated Indirect Cost Agreements are maintained 
in contract files in our Agency Secure Image and Storage Tracking 
(ASIST) System. Implementing partners with NICRAs are required to 
undergo annual audits to ensure that they fully comply with U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and applicable Cost 
Accounting Standards (CAS). The indirect cost rates within NICRAs are 
reviewed and renegotiated regularly, based on annual audits, to reflect 
actual costs incurred in previous accounting periods and ensure rates 
moving forward continue to reflect estimated future indirect costs. 
Annually, NICRAs are updated and related documents are maintained in 
the respective contract files in the ASIST System. USAID does not 
report on NICRAs.

    Question. What is the average NICRA rate for USAID's implementing 
partners working in the humanitarian space, including for international 
organization, international non-governmental organizations, local non-
governmental organization, and contractors? Please note that this 
response, if deemed procurement sensitive, may be shared in a Committee 
Confidential manner.

    Answer. Organizations determine how they will recover their costs, 
either directly or indirectly, and may elect to use one or multiple 
indirect cost rates. These cost recovery decisions and the associated 
indirect cost rates are all captured in NICRAs. As a result of the 
variability, there is no direct comparability of indirect cost rates 
between organizations and relatedly no average NICRA rate for USAID's 
implementing partners. The indirect cost rates within NICRAs must be 
considered within the context of their associated bases of application. 
For example, a ``lower'' 5 percent rate applied to a base of 
application (e.g., total direct costs) of $1 million will total $50,000 
whereas a ``higher'' rate of 35 percent applied to a smaller base of 
application (e.g., total direct labor costs) of $140,000 will total 
$49,000. The 5 percent and 35 percent rates are not comparable as they 
are applied to different bases of application and may not recover the 
same costs.
    To compare costs between organizations, USAID evaluates the total 
proposed price to the USG for the same scope of work or program 
delivery. The proportion of an implementing partner's budget that is 
direct vs. indirect reflects how the organization has elected to 
categorize and recover its costs; an organization with a higher 
proportion of indirect costs may still be less expensive overall. To 
ensure best value to the USG and good stewardship of taxpayer dollars, 
USAID's contracting and agreement officers ensure the correct usage of 
an organization's NICRA and consider what total benefits will be gained 
at what total cost when reviewing proposal budgets. Federal regulations 
governing cost accounting standards and NICRAs can be found in 48 CFR 
(FAR) part 30, 31.2, 42.707, and Chapter 99 for acquisition and in 2 
CFR 200, in particular Subpart E, for assistance.

    Question. USAID recently updated its Agency-Wide Learning Agenda to 
comply with the Evidence Act and to reflect the Administration's 
priorities.
    How are you implementing this agenda, and how is your leadership 
team using lessons learned in your past programs and projects to adjust 
current and future programs?

    Answer. USAID's Agency Learning Agenda, covering Fiscal Year 2022 
to 2026, articulates USAID's priorities for learning and evidence to 
inform Agency decision-making. It advances learning and improvement in 
achieving priorities articulated in USAID's Policy Framework by working 
with operating units to channel resources towards Agency priority 
questions in their Performance Management Plans, evaluations, and 
learning efforts. USAID uses the Agency Learning Agenda to guide and 
link learning initiatives across USAID's partners, communities of 
practice, and working groups, and to coordinate sharing and use of 
available evidence. Most recently at the end of the first year of 
implementing the agenda, USAID hosted a month-long series of events 
under the theme, ``Agency Learning and Evidence Month,'' to champion 
the use of evidence in programming and elevate evidence-building and 
use as a priority for the Agency. Throughout the month of April, USAID 
staff participated in over 35 events, with 19 sessions open to the 
public, tied to each of the nine Agency Learning Agenda questions, 
reaching more than 2,459 unique attendees from 115 countries and over 
150 organizations.
    USAID evaluations and research fill knowledge gaps prioritized by 
the nine Agency Learning Agenda questions, and lessons are shared 
across USAID in a variety of ways for staff to use in adjusting current 
and future programs. Lessons learned are used by Agency leaders to 
inform budget, policy, and management decisions, and by program 
managers to adjust the way in which projects deliver assistance for the 
greatest impact. For example, evidence of the efficacy of different 
types of mosquito netting used to prevent malaria allows project 
managers to fund distribution of the most effective equipment. Evidence 
generated through USAID evaluations are also used to inform and improve 
host country government policies and practices. For example, a recent 
evaluation of a USAID activity found that enhancing accountability and 
transparency can increase taxpayers' willingness to pay taxes, thereby 
improving local revenue collection. As a result, the host country 
increased revenues by changing the way they used projections and 
accounting information, and by updating financial procedures.

    Question. Under the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act 
(FATAA), USAID is required to make its evaluations public within 90 
days of their completion.
    How many evaluations has USAID made public by posting to the 
Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) in FY 2022 and FY 2023, to 
date?
    Do you have plans to upgrade the DEC so that it is more user-
friendly and conducive toward public access to its information?

    Answer. USAID made 701 evaluations available to the public on the 
Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) in fiscal year 2022 and has 
made 271 evaluations available to the public so far in fiscal year 
2023, for a total of 972 evaluations from this time period. The 
evaluations are available for viewing through the DEC website at 
https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/search.aspx.
    USAID is planning to replace the DEC to make it more user-friendly 
and conducive toward public access to its information through the 
Consolidated Digital Repository (CDR) project. The CDR will consolidate 
both DEC and the Development Data Library (DDL). The project is 
expected to kick off in FY 2024 Q1 with a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) 
implemented to replace the DEC in FY 2024 Q4.

    Question. Energy: You stated in your hearing that: ``We 
support...natural gas programming in instances where it can create 
energy access while not delaying plans toward clean energy because 
again the collective carbon emissions even from developing countries, 
we are all part of the solution when it comes to mitigation.''
    Please provide a list and description of all natural gas projects 
that USAID has supported or is supporting now since January 1, 2022.

    Answer. Please see the table below.


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    Question. Is your statement that USAID will only support natural 
gas programs if it does not delay plans toward clean energy the 
official U.S. policy of the Biden administration? If so, please provide 
us with documentation where that is laid out or otherwise stated.

    Answer. It is Administration policy not to provide U.S. Government 
financing to unabated natural gas projects, consistent with Executive 
Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. This 
policy has exceptions in rare cases when there is compelling national 
security, geostrategic, or development/energy access benefits and no 
viable lower carbon alternatives accomplish the same goals. This policy 
has informed USAID's program implementation.

    Question. In USAID programming on energy, how do you weigh net 
emissions reductions versus the energy needs of a partner countries? To 
say it another way: if a country puts forward a request or proposal for 
working on natural gas with the United States because of its energy 
needs, but USAID finds that the project would not result in a net 
reduction of emissions, do you in most cases decide not to fund the 
project?

    Answer. USAID seeks to support our partner countries' energy sector 
development objectives across energy security, economic development, 
and decarbonization goals. If a partner seeks assistance that would 
increase natural gas generation, we assess whether there are credible 
alternatives to supporting natural gas that would also meet our mutual 
objectives per U.S. Government guidance. In cases where we find no 
credible alternatives, and the country is of geostrategic interest to 
the United States or is conflict affected, a small island developing 
state, or eligible for International Development Association funding, 
we may elect to move forward with supporting the natural gas project 
under U.S. Government guidelines. Net emissions considerations are a 
factor, but not the only factor in making determinations.

    Question. What is USAID's definition of ``clean energy''?

    Answer. Clean energy programs may encompass a variety of climate 
mitigation activities and are fully inclusive of renewable energy 
technologies and their enabling environments. Clean energy programs 
reduce and/or avoid greenhouse gas (GHG) and other climate-warming 
emissions while increasing access to affordable, modern energy 
services, providing economic opportunity and energy independence, 
reducing extreme poverty, and/or promoting opportunities for U.S. 
businesses. Clean energy programs help countries achieve their national 
climate mitigation goals, and support developing countries to develop 
and implement low-emission development strategies that further partner 
countries' domestic priorities and international commitments. Clean 
energy practices include, but are not limited to: decarbonization 
strategies; renewable energy; renewable energy technology supply chain 
resiliency; end-use efficiency and electrification; energy storage; 
grid modernization, low-carbon transportation and industry programs; 
green hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, and nuclear; GHG accounting 
and inventory systems; evaluating economic and development benefits of 
clean energy, enabling environment and energy sector reforms necessary 
to support sustainable investments and energy systems; waste to energy; 
enhanced transmission, distribution, and operating systems; and 
renewable energy generation grid integration. Per U.S. Government 
guidance, expenditures on oil and natural gas are only allowed in 
instances where they address the emissions intensity of existing 
equipment or infrastructure, such as carbon capture, utilization and 
storage (CCUS) or work on short-lived climate pollutants.

    Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come 
from Africa?

    Answer. According to the most recent data available from Climate 
Watch, as of 2020, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 7.6 percent of 
current global emissions. This calculation includes emissions from 
Land-use Change and Forestry and all other major emissions sectors and 
includes all major greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide and fluorinated gases).

    Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come 
from Latin America?

    Answer. According to the most recent data available from Climate 
Watch, as of 2020, the Latin America and Caribbean Region contributed 
8.2 percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions. This 
calculation includes emissions from Land-use Change and Forestry and 
all other major emissions sectors and includes all major greenhouse 
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases)

    Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come 
from South and Central Asia, other than India?

    Answer. USAID works in a number of countries across both South and 
Central Asia. Many of these countries are still working on energy 
security and have identified energy transition as a key priority of 
their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National 
Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Many of the countries are members of the 
Global Methane Pledge and are working to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from land-use and land-use change. Based on the most current 
estimates from Global Climate Watch (https://www.climatewatchdata.org/
), there were 49.76 Gt of CO2e emissions in 2019. GHG emissions for 
South and Central Asia where USAID works, excluding India, in the same 
year totaled 1.44 Gt of CO2e, as summarized in the table below. This 
would represent approximately 2.9 percent of global emissions.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come 
from Southeast Asia?

    Answer. USAID works in a number of countries in Southeast Asia. 
Many of these countries are still working on energy security and have 
identified energy transition as a key priority of their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). 
Many of the countries are members of the Global Methane Pledge and are 
working to limit emissions from land-use and land-use change. Based on 
the most current estimates from Global Climate Watch (https://
www.climatewatchdata.org/), there were 49.76 Gt of CO2e emissions in 
2019. GHG emissions for Southeast Asian countries where USAID works 
totaled 3.43 Gt of CO2e, as summarized in the table below. This would 
represent approximately 6.9 percent of global emissions.




    Question. Are there any earmarks or other statutory requirements 
that prevent USAID from supporting programming related to natural gas 
and nuclear energy? If so, please list them out in full.

    Answer. The Clean Energy Directive definition adopted by the 
Department of State and USAID prohibits the use of Clean Energy 
Directive funding for natural gas assistance programming. Nuclear 
energy support is allowed under the definition. Natural gas work that 
is supported with funding outside of the clean energy earmark must be 
approved under the Administration's international energy assistance 
guidance. It is Administration policy not to provide U.S. Government 
financing to unabated natural gas projects, consistent with Executive 
Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. This 
policy has exceptions in rare cases when there are compelling national 
security, geostrategic, or development/energy access benefits and no 
viable lower carbon alternatives accomplish the same goals.

    Question. AFRICA: U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: The Biden 
administration committed $55 billion in investments in Africa over the 
next 3 years during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS), ``working 
closely with Congress.''
    How is this $55 billion investment reflected in the FY24 budget 
request?

    Answer. The President announced $55 billion for Africa at the 
second U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022. This funding level 
consisted of funding from many U.S. Government agencies, including 
State and USAID, over three fiscal years (FY 2021 through FY 2023) for 
North and sub-Saharan Africa. The FY 2024 Request total was not 
included in the $55 billion total announcement.
    The FY24 budget request supports sustained U.S. commitment to 
Africa thru investments in sectoral areas such as Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Governance (DRG), climate, security, health care, youth, 
and education to address shared priorities with African nations. It 
also supports the new African Democratic and Political Transition 
Initiative (ADAPT) and Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA). The 
Request continues funding for Prosper Africa, Power Africa, and the 
Young Africa Leaders Initiative (YALI).

    Question. I understand that the $55 billion figure is largely made 
up of prior year funds. How will USAID message to African governments, 
who have high hopes for a large influx of new U.S. investment, that 
this commitment is actually just a continuation of regular programming?

    Answer. The Vision Statement for the U.S.-Africa Partnership 
affirmed ``commitment to reinforce long standing areas of cooperation 
and expand our partnership to better meet the shared challenges and 
opportunities.'' Sustained cooperation is a joint priority and we will 
continue to enhance existing partnerships in sectors such as health, 
agriculture, and education. The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit also 
emphasized that this investment is not just a continuation of regular 
programming; we are shifting our approaches to reflect greater 
cooperation and advance shared goals across a number of sectors such as 
expanded trade and investment, climate adaptation and resilience, and 
digital transformation. Our support will also help countries address 
emerging issues through innovative approaches.

    Question. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) 
program was announced during the ALS, to ``support emerging democratic 
governments and civil society at critical moments.''
    What criteria will be used to determine ``critical moments''?

    Answer. A signature initiative of the Administration, President 
Biden announced Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) in December 
2022. DTA--referred to last year by the colloquial placeholder 
``Digital Africa''--aims to expand digital access and literacy and 
strengthen digital enabling environments across the continent. DTA aims 
to facilitate over $450 million in financing, private investment, and 
donor funding for Africa in line with the African Union's Digital 
Transformation Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa. DTA will support increased economic opportunity and improved e-
government service delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient 
African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an 
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.

    Question. How will ADAPT be managed and implemented to ensure funds 
can be released quickly in order to enable a timely response to 
opportunities in critical moments?

    Answer. The National Security Council is currently leading 
interagency discussions on the management and implementation of ADAPT, 
which USAID is engaging in. The discussions have prioritized rapid 
availability of funds to maximize ADAPT's responsiveness to the needs 
of fluid situations surrounding transition. USAID and the interagency 
plan to utilize all available mechanisms to ensure these goals are met.

    Question. I understand that $25 million of FY22 funds and $25 
million of FY23 funds will be combined with the $25 million FY24 
request to make up the initial $75 million investment in ADAPT. Where 
was the $50 million from FY22 and FY23 taken from to make it available 
for ADAPT?

    Answer. The funding allocations for FY 2022 and FY 2023 are still 
being finalized, and additional funding will be sought from the FY 2024 
and FY 2025 budgets, subject to the availability of funds.

    Question. The FY24 request includes $50 million for an initiative 
announced at ALS called Digital Transformation in Africa. This follows 
a FY23 $20 million request for Digital Africa.
    Can you please provide more information on the new program Digital 
Transformation in Africa?

    Answer. A signature initiative of the Administration, President 
Biden announced Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) in December 
2022. DTA--referred to last year by the colloquial placeholder 
``Digital Africa''--aims to expand digital access and literacy and 
strengthen digital enabling environments across the continent. DTA aims 
to facilitate over $450 million in financing, private investment, and 
donor funding for Africa in line with the African Union's Digital 
Transformation Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan 
Africa. DTA will support increased economic opportunity and improved e-
government service delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient 
African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an 
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.

    Question. Prosper Africa: Prosper Africa brings together 17 U.S. 
Government departments and agencies to foster two-way trade and 
investment between the U.S. and Africa, with a secretariat led by 
USAID. The FY24 request includes $100 million for Prosper Africa. This 
follows a $100m FY23 request, $77 million FY22 request and a $75 
million FY21 request.
    What are the concrete accomplishments of Prosper Africa to date?

    Answer. Prosper Africa established a continent-wide deal 
facilitation platform with a pipeline of nearly 500 deals valued at 
over $25 billion; launched robust continental services, including 
networks of African suppliers and U.S. buyers, and a catalytic 
investment facility, which are expected to boost African exports and 
U.S. investment by $2 billion in the next 5 years; and helped mobilize 
$1.5 billion of investment in climate, health, and sustainable 
infrastructure via new partnerships between the U.S. pension community 
and African counterparts.

    Question. What will an additional $100 million investment help 
Prosper Africa accomplish?

    Answer. Prosper Africa used dedicated funding through USAID to 
launch an innovative, continent-wide program with offices in North and 
sub-Saharan Africa to de-risk transactions, scale opportunities, and 
attract new firms to African markets. Prosper Africa is redoubling its 
efforts by planning to invest $171 million that will increase U.S. 
investment in Africa and African exports to the U.S. by $2 billion in 
the next 5 years--a conservative estimate. The additional $100 million 
in FY 2024 funds will enable Prosper Africa to dramatically increase 
the number of supported transactions, broaden its geographic coverage, 
bolster the activities and staff capacity of other U.S. Government 
agencies, and create more opportunities to leverage private capital. In 
Kenya alone, $5.3 million in Prosper Africa funds have leveraged more 
than $265 million to date--a 50:1 return.

    Question. Somalia: The largest request for Democracy, Human Rights 
and Governance funding in Sub-Saharan Africa for FY24 is for Somalia 
($33 million), a 73.7 percent increase over the FY23 request. The 
security environment in Somalia, lack of political will for democratic 
reforms, an inability to hold one-person-one-vote elections for 50 
years and limited freedom of movement of Somali and implementing 
partners makes democracy, human rights and governance programs 
difficult to implement and expensive.

    Question. What adjustments in strategy, as compared to the strategy 
pursued from 2017-2022, will USAID pursue to ensure that investments of 
significant democracy, human rights and governance funds in Somalia 
achieve results?

    Answer. In 2021, USAID developed a new country development 
cooperation strategy (CDCS) to guide its development and humanitarian 
investments in Somalia. The strategy focuses on two objectives: (1) 
preventing and countering violent extremism; and (2) strengthening 
capacity of individuals and households to prepare for and recover from 
crises such as drought and reduce the humanitarian caseload over time. 
USAID democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs were 
adapted to contribute to both objectives.
    To advance these goals, USAID works to overcome the historical 
marginalization that al-Shabaab manipulates to build support and that 
makes households and communities more vulnerable to future climatic 
shocks. To do this USAID seeks to bolster governance processes that are 
more inclusive, particularly among traditionally marginalized groups 
such as women and members of minority clans. USAID will use DRG funds 
to launch a new local governance program in summer 2023 that will work 
with local governments and citizens to make governance processes more 
inclusive, effective, legitimate, and responsive to citizen needs. 
Additionally, USAID will support these local governments to expand or 
improve the delivery of basic services to marginalized communities.
    Al-Shabaab uses real and perceived grievances among clans to gain 
support, playing on feelings of marginalization and inequitable access 
to power and resources. To mitigate this, USAID puts a heavy emphasis 
on community-level reconciliation. In Somalia, USAID is using DRG funds 
for stabilization programming and a new reconciliation activity that 
works to build trust between communities.
    USAID is also using DRG funding to advocate for the Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS) to advance technical reforms, develop 
governance institutions, and advance national and state level 
reconciliation. The 2-year election impasse from 2020-22 highlighted 
the fundamental lack of trust between Federal Government and federal 
member states.
    Finally, in response to the unprecedented community uprisings 
against al-Shabaab that began in June 2022, USAID has taken on a 
leadership role in supporting the FGS efforts to establish and maintain 
control of newly liberated communities, pivoting USAID's strategy to 
support this opportunity. To stabilize these newly liberated areas, 
USAID support helps establish initial governance structures, supports 
reconciliation, works to increase communication between the local 
government and community members in those villages most affected by 
current security operations, and rehabilitates damaged community 
infrastructure.

    Question. Does the conduct of one-person-one-vote elections 
continue to be the focus of USAID's democracy and governance programs 
in Somalia? If yes, why. If no, what is the revised approach?

    Answer. In 2022, USAID organized a series of workshops with the UN 
and donors to reflect on the 2020-2021 electoral process. The UN and 
donors agreed that roadblocks to a more inclusive, transparent, and 
timely electoral process were political in nature. Looking forward to 
the 2026 electoral cycle, all agreed that securing political agreement 
from a more inclusive range of stakeholders on the electoral model must 
precede further direct donor investments. However, together with other 
donors, USAID is promoting political reconciliation between elites and 
seeking broad-based consensus on a realistic and feasible electoral 
model in line with prevailing security conditions.
    These efforts have already re-established dialogue between the 
federal and state governments and begun to yield agreements on power 
sharing. These agreements will lay the foundation for finalizing the 
constitution and moving Somalia towards universal suffrage elections in 
the future. If the agreed-upon electoral model for 2026 falls short of 
universal suffrage, USAID is committed to advocating for a model that 
is maximally inclusive and representative and serves as the building 
block towards future one-person-one-vote elections. In coordination 
with State, USAID will continue to encourage regular and constructive 
dialogue between the Federal Government and member states on the 2026 
electoral cycle and is standing by to support a maximally inclusive and 
representative process once agreement is reached. Somalia's President 
has made reconciliation one of his priorities and thus far has focused 
his administration on building political consensus on issues that have 
previously been unresolved such as elections, the constitution, and 
power and resource sharing between the Federal Government and federal 
member states.

    Question. Given the Biden administration's focus on counter-
terrorism efforts in Somalia, how is USAID supporting legitimate state 
institutions to provide services and project control over territory 
liberated from al-Shabaab?

    Answer. Since August 2022, security operations against al-Shabaab 
have liberated more than 100 towns and villages. In response, USAID has 
taken a leadership role in supporting the Federal Government of 
Somalia's (FGS) efforts to establish and maintain control of newly 
liberated communities, pivoting USAID's strategy to support this 
opportunity. Pivoting Mission funds and utilizing an additional $5 
million from USAID's Complex Crisis Fund, USAID surged stabilization 
support into these areas and is currently supporting 54 interventions. 
These interventions have supported interim administrations to conduct 
outreach to liberated communities, partnered with local governments to 
repair community infrastructure damaged by al-Shabaab, and supported 
the government to reconcile long-held clan grievances.
    Recognizing that the development of legitimate governance 
institutions that are capable of providing services requires a long-
term approach, USAID is working to expand education, health, economic 
growth, local governance, and resilience programming to support these 
newly liberated areas.
    As part of our ongoing efforts, USAID will continue to promote 
greater political, social, and economic integration between conflicting 
groups, including those from historically marginalized communities, by 
addressing unresolved grievances that drive communities towards al-
Shabaab. We will also leverage our programs focused on strengthening 
Somalia's resilience to recurring shocks--whether climate, economic or 
political, by aimings to address real and perceived economic injustices 
that also contribute to violent extremism in the country.

    Question. Nigeria: The FY24 request for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Governance funding for Nigeria ($25.5 million) is a 56.4 percent 
increase over the FY23 request.
    Does USAID regard support to elections in Nigeria as a cyclical or 
continuous need?

    Answer. USAID regards support to elections in Nigeria as a 
continuous need. USAID's support is for the full spectrum of the 
elections process, at state and national levels, in support of 
Nigeria's democratic consolidation. USAID's elections assistance is 
designed to build systems and processes over the long term so that the 
outcome is viewed as free and fair; educate the public on their civic 
rights to vote; help all Nigerians--including women--see a future 
running for office; give voice to youth to feel seen and heard; and 
assist people with disabilities to assert their rights under the law. 
This work requires continuous engagement to achieve results, which is 
why USAID partners with Nigerian Government agencies and civil society 
on these issues to increase citizen political participation and promote 
electoral reforms.

    Question. What is the rationale for such a significant increase in 
the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance budget for Nigeria, given 
that national elections (approaching elections are typically the 
rationale for an increased budget) were just held within the last 2 
months?

    Answer. USAID's Development Assistance request of $24.5 million in 
DRG funding for FY 2024 reflects a broader request across USAID 
Missions in Africa for increased funding for a range of DRG 
programming. Election support is one component of a diverse DRG 
portfolio in Nigeria. DRG activities also enhance civic voice and 
accountability tools, increase accountability and effectiveness of 
public institutions, and help prevent conflict. Increasing citizen 
political participation and reforming electoral processes is an 
important, but not the sole, element of USAID/Nigeria's continuous, 
multi-faceted effort to strengthen accountable, inclusive, and 
responsive governance. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and 
largest democracy, faces immense democratic governance and security 
challenges. Working on issues across 36 states encompassing 
approximately 90 million registered voters and characterized by a 
growing youth population requires a significant increase in funding to 
address critical needs such as anti-corruption efforts, drivers of 
insecurity, and countering ISIS-WA influence.

    Question. Cameroon: On January 1, 2021, the Senate passed 
unanimously S.Res.684, regarding the conflict in Anglophone Cameroon, 
calling for U.S. Government departments and agencies to undertake 
several actions.
    How has the Agency pressed the Government of Cameroon over the past 
2 years to provide unfettered humanitarian access to vulnerable 
populations in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon?

    Answer. Thank you for your concern. USAID remains deeply concerned 
about the humanitarian situation in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest 
regions and we continue to work with international and local partners 
to provide life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, despite 
the challenges posed by ongoing violence. We continue to collaborate 
closely with our Ambassador in Yaounde and other State Department 
colleagues to press for progress in addressing access constraints and 
bureaucratic impediments to aid delivery with the Government of 
Cameroon, such as at the recent African Leaders Summit that President 
Biden hosted in December 2022. Furthermore, we have engaged with the 
UN, other donors, and appropriate local authorities on efforts that 
support principled humanitarian response and access by humanitarian 
actors, such as improving humanitarian civilian-military coordination. 
USAID staff is happy to brief you further on this.

    Question. Since 2021, how has USAID supported credible efforts to 
address the root causes of the conflict and to achieve sustainable 
peace and reconciliation in the Northwest and Southwest regions?

    Answer. USAID supports diplomatic efforts deployed by the 
Department of State and other international actors to reach a peaceful 
resolution between the Government of Cameroon and Anglophone 
separatists in the northwest and southwest regions of the country.
    USAID is addressing immediate humanitarian needs in this region 
through assistance focused on emergency food, health, and other 
lifesaving support to vulnerable populations, such as internally 
displaced persons.
    USAID's new PARC-Cameroun activity, awarded in March 2022, works in 
the far north of the country to strengthen the collective performance 
of CSOs to address the underlying causes of insecurity and conflict. 
PARC-Cameroun does this by advocating for citizen rights and service 
provision, addressing the marginalization of women and youth, and 
collectively responding to counter the restricted civic space for, and 
stigmatization of, northern communities.

    Question. In the past 2 years, in what ways has the Agency 
supported humanitarian and development programming in Cameroon?

    Answer. In the past 2 years, USAID has increased its work in 
Cameroon through a number of new activities that address the 
development challenges Cameroon faces, as well as responding to 
humanitarian needs.
    Our new activities include PARC-Cameroun in the far north, which 
strengthens the collective performance of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to advocate for citizen rights and service provision, address 
the marginalization of women and youth, and collectively respond to 
counter the restricted civic space for, and stigmatization of, northern 
communities.
    USAID has supported Cameroon's development of its health sector as 
a Global Health Security Agenda Intensive Support country. Cameroon 
received funding to build its capacity to prevent, detect, and respond 
to emerging infectious disease threats, which has helped the country 
build systems to respond to the COVID 19 pandemic and prepare to 
respond to Marburg if the recent outbreak of Marburg in Equatorial 
Guinea spills over to Cameroon. Additionally, USAID continues to 
implement robust PMI and PEPFAR activities in Cameroon, reaching 
insecure areas throughout the country.
    Cameroon is supported by the USAID/West Africa regional platform to 
build the next generation of Cameroonian leaders and boost business 
opportunities through the West Africa Trade Hub, Young African Leaders 
Initiative, and Power Africa Off-Grid programs. Over the last 2 years, 
USAID continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Cameroon as a 
result of conflict and insecurity in the Anglophone region, the impact 
of the Lake Chad Basin crisis in the Far North, and CAR refugees in 
eastern Cameroon. In FY 2022, BHA increased its funding in Cameroon 
from almost $45 million to more than $65 million, scaling up multi-
sectoral emergency and livelihood support for internally-displaced and 
conflict-affected households, food and nutrition assistance to 
refugees, and bolstering humanitarian logistics, analysis, and 
coordination efforts across the country. Cameroon is also susceptible 
to the effects of flooding during the rainy season, which last year had 
devastating impacts in the Far North of Cameroon. In response, a 
Declaration of Humanitarian Need was issued, and USAID's partners 
provided food aid, shelter, and clean water and sanitation services for 
flood-affected communities.

    Question. In your role as the head of USAID, what actions have you 
taken to ensure the crisis in the Anglophone regions is discussed in 
international fora?

    Answer. USAID is engaged with international and local partners to 
alleviate the effect of the crisis on vulnerable populations by 
providing assistance to those who are internally displaced. Our staff 
in Cameroon regularly work with international partners including UN 
agencies, other bilateral missions, and NGOs to advocate for access to 
the areas to deliver both development and humanitarian assistance in 
the Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions. These discussions are 
elevated with United Nations leadership in New York and Geneva as part 
of our regular exchanges through key leaders of the Agency, as well as 
the wider U.S. Government.

    Question. How does the FY24 Budget request respond to the key U.S. 
Government actions the Senate outlined in S.Res.684?

    Answer. The FY 2024 Budget request maintaining our development 
assistance levels and increasing our health programming in Cameroon. 
USAID's efforts to start new activities that respond to the underlying 
drivers of conflict in Cameroon are supported by a consistent budget 
request from FY 2021 through FY 2024. Increasing the Health budget 
request allows USAID's reach to expand, including areas affected by 
conflict across Cameroon, and providing more necessary basic health 
services to people experiencing conflict.
    Additionally, USAID continues to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Cameroon as a result of conflict and insecurity in the Anglophone 
region, the impact of the Lake Chad Basin crisis in the Far North, and 
CAR refugees in eastern Cameroon. In FY 2022, BHA increased its funding 
in Cameroon from almost $45 million to more than $65 million, scaling 
up multi-sectoral emergency and livelihood support.

    Question. South Sudan: On December 9, 2021, the Senate passed 
S.Res.380, reiterating U.S. support for the South Sudanese people and 
calling for a review of our policy toward South Sudan.
    Since 2021, how have you ensured that U.S. assistance adheres to 
the principle of ``Do No Harm'' by pausing any funding, including 
humanitarian aid, found to enrich any party of the Revitalized 
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South 
Sudan (R-ARCSS) or active spoilers to the agreement?

    Answer. USAID takes seriously its role as a steward of the 
resources of the American people. USAID places the highest priority on 
ensuring our humanitarian assistance adheres to Do No Harm Principles 
and effectively reaches millions of people in need, including in South 
Sudan where approximately 7.8 million people (roughly 70 percent of the 
population) are on the brink of starvation.
    Within our humanitarian assistance programs, we require our 
partners to have proper safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place 
to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. For 
example, we require partners to complete a comprehensive pre-award risk 
assessment and have their own robust safety and security measures in 
place, as well as to report any irregularities immediately. USAID 
conducts continuous monitoring of our programs through both direct 
monitoring and through use of a third-party monitor of our humanitarian 
assistance programming. Furthermore, we maintain consistent 
communication and oversight with our partners in an effort to ensure 
U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance reaches intended beneficiaries, and 
our programs remain flexible should we need to modify methods or 
activities.

    Question. How have you applied your leadership of the Agency to 
ensure that all bureaus cooperate and work to support a comprehensive 
review of USAID-administered assistance to South Sudan?

    Answer. We have worked with stakeholders across the interagency and 
within relevant bureaus at USAID--both in Washington and in South 
Sudan--to ensure that assistance is aligned with U.S. strategic 
interests and goals and that there is sound stewardship of taxpayer 
funds. USAID participated in an Embassy-wide policy and program review 
and conducted a mid-point review of its strategy for South Sudan. We 
are happy to brief the committee further.
    Furthermore, USAID has enhanced its due diligence for new awards. 
In addition, USAID awards in South Sudan, as in other parts of the 
world, continue to include substantial compliance provisions, both 
required by law and enhanced through USAID-specific policies.

    Question. What steps have you taken to complete the comprehensive 
review of United States assistance programs to South Sudan, started in 
2018 to ``ensure our assistance does not contribute to or prolong the 
conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior,'' and have its 
findings publicized?

    Answer. As part of the National Security Council-led review of U.S. 
assistance programs in South Sudan, USAID undertook an analysis of U.S. 
Government assistance flows to the private sector in South Sudan at 
that time. As a result of this, USAID enhanced its due diligence for 
new awards. In addition, USAID awards in South Sudan, as in other parts 
of the world, continue to include substantial compliance provisions, 
both required by law and enhanced through USAID-specific policies, to 
ensure that the Agency is an effective steward of taxpayer funds. 
Similarly, awards are monitored by USAID staff to ensure compliance 
with award terms and conditions and to ensure the achievement of the 
intended results. USAID/South Sudan staff are appropriately trained 
for, and properly implement, robust award management and oversight 
duties. USAID will continue to monitor the impact of our assistance 
flows in South Sudan and will take corrective action when necessary.
    We would be pleased to brief the Committee further.

    Question. While a reduction in the budget request for South Sudan 
is appropriate given the general failure of the parties in South Sudan 
to make good on their commitments outlined in the Revitalized Agreement 
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the dire 
humanitarian situation faced by the South Sudanese people, and the 
continuation of localized proxy conflicts, it is curious that the line 
items for Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization, and Democracy, Human 
Rights and Governance were reduced.
    What is USAID, alongside the State Department, trying to achieve in 
South Sudan? How does this budget request reflect those goals?

    Answer. USAID is committed to supporting the South Sudanese 
people's demands for an inclusive transition and a peaceful, stable 
future and will work with Congress to best align appropriated funds. We 
continue to work to mitigate and prevent sub-national violence, protect 
human rights, better target U.S. assistance to communities in need, 
protect and defend civic space for civil society, independent media, 
and peaceful political voices, and hold the transitional government 
accountable to its commitments.

    Question. Sudan: What is the plan for USAID's American, third-
country national, and Sudanese implementing partners, who were left 
behind following the recent evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum?

    Answer. We remain very concerned about our staff and partners who 
remain in Sudan. While many of USAID's implementing partner staff have 
successfully been evacuated, we continue to monitor the situation with 
the Interagency, communicate pathways available to partners, and 
coordinate various avenues of evacuation including by providing 
information for air and overland routes. Some staff chose to remain in 
Sudan due to family, logistics challenges, or other personal 
circumstances. We continue to work with our partners to confirm the 
safety and accountability of partner staff, especially those that 
remain in Sudan and stand ready to support them in partnership with our 
colleagues at the Department of State.

    Question. How will USAID continue to support a civilian transition?

    Answer. USAID remains focused on building trust among Sudanese 
stakeholders and driving a process of direct, sustained engagement with 
a broad array of civilians--including marginalized groups and those 
from Sudan's peripheries--to ensure that any future political process 
can lead to a civilian government. The Sudanese people have not given 
up, and neither have we. USAID continues to engage with a broad group 
of civilians including youth, activists, human rights defenders, 
women's groups, communities, resistance committees, and professional 
associations who have heroically stepped-up amid the chaos to support 
their fellow citizens. It is imperative that Sudanese civilians regain 
control of their country, and they will have our full support to do so.

    Question. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: Strategic Competition: In 
the wake of the China-Saudi-Iran normalization agreement, China 
continues to make inroads in the Middle East in an effort to displace 
the United States as the partner of choice.
    Do you agree that recent Chinese inroads in the Middle East run 
contrary to U.S. national security objectives?

    Answer. Yes. The PRC's foreign assistance policy, including 
negative and inappropriate influence, actions and messaging, is one of 
the biggest challenges USAID faces. USAID's approach is to put forward 
a positive, affirmative vision for global development that is 
fundamentally different from efforts to advance the centralized, 
authoritarian model of development that Beijing advocates. That model 
is at odds with our values, which are grounded in the interests of our 
partners, and guided by the conviction that democratic principles form 
the strongest foundation upon which to build open, transparent, 
accountable, sustainable, prosperous, and sovereign societies.
    We defer to the Department of State for additional policy context.

    Question. Please describe in detail USAID's role and contributions 
to strategic competition in the Middle East.

    Answer. When it comes to economic ties that promote growth and job 
creation, the United States is the better, more capable, and reliable 
partner in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, despite the 
People's Republic of China's (PRC) status as the region's largest 
trading partner in recent years resulting from the drop in U.S. 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil. We invest more, employ more, donate 
more, train more, and educate more.
    Across the Middle East, we are advancing these objectives. For 
example, as the PRC invests billions in energy, transport, water and 5G 
technology in Jordan, USAID's approach has been to prioritize technical 
assistance to support Jordan's ability to assess foreign investment 
risk and avoid bad deals, thereby mitigating PRC influence on water 
infrastructure and financing decisions. These efforts strengthen 
transparency and governance to avoid opaque foreign involvement and/or 
investments.
    We would be pleased to brief the Committee in further detail.

    Question. While countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates do not receive assistance from USAID, how does 
USAID engage with our gulf partners to ensure the United States remains 
the partner of choice in the Middle East?

    Answer. We engage in a broad range of bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral fora to enhance our partnership and cooperation with Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other 
Gulf countries. Senior USAID officials attend events hosted by Gulf 
partners throughout the region, meet with counterparts during their 
U.S. visits, and maintain relationships with Gulf Ambassadors in the 
U.S. to discuss assistance priorities and potential areas of 
collaboration.
    In addition, USAID has conducted outreach to Gulf donors on 
humanitarian and development issues over decades, through sustained 
staff-level engagements and high-level USG official meetings. As part 
of the Fifth Strategic Dialogue in March 2023, the United States and 
Qatar discussed the need for greater support for women and children in 
vulnerable environments, rising global food insecurity levels, and the 
importance of rapid responses to emerging humanitarian crises. 
Similarly, the United States and the UAE continue to engage on women's 
economic empowerment, food and water security, global health security, 
and health cooperation--topics expected to be discussed during the next 
Economic Policy Dialogue between both countries later this year.
    In 2020, USAID signed separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) 
with Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait to advance bilateral humanitarian and 
development assistance cooperation. These agreements catalyzed deeper 
bilateral engagement, including the signing of a funding agreement 
between USAID and Qatar's foreign development assistance agency to 
support Syrian Civil Defence (``White Helmets'') core operations in 
Northwest Syria following the 2023 earthquake.
    In 2022, the United States joined Israel, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, and 
Morocco in establishing the Negev Forum to enhance regional prosperity 
and stability. USAID serves as the U.S. Government lead for two of the 
six Negev Forum Working Groups (Food Security and Water Technology and 
Tourism), and also provides expertise to the Health, Clean Energy, and 
Education and Coexistence Working Groups.

    Question. West Bank and Gaza: Will you seek to prioritize violence 
reduction and de-radicalization programs in the West Bank and Gaza to 
ensure programs for accessibility, combatting gender-based violence, 
and others are not undermined?

    Answer. USAID funding supports U.S. foreign policy goals for equal 
measures of security, prosperity, and freedom for both Israelis and 
Palestinians and builds the foundation for a future Palestinian state. 
In a time of increased insecurity, USAID programming targets some of 
the daily inequities that lead to rising frustration and outbreaks of 
violence while also addressing the drivers of violence directly.
    USAID has a strong track record of delivering assistance even in 
contexts of violence and instability, and we will leverage that 
experience to ensure that vulnerable communities continue to benefit 
from our programming even as we direct resources specifically to the 
challenge of reducing violence and instability.
    To address the current, acute increase of violence in the West 
Bank, USAID launched a pilot rapid response program in 2023 to target 
conflict-prone areas in the West Bank, such as Jenin and Nablus. USAID 
is already working closely with the U.S. Security Coordinator to 
identify opportunities to strategically mitigate the drivers of 
violence. Pending Congressional approval, USAID would launch a larger 
rapid response activity with FY22 funds.
    Some of our work may have an indirect impact on violence levels. 
For example, research shows that violence among youth is strongly 
correlated with violence in the home. This makes programming to provide 
psycho-social support and to prevent gender-based violence (GBV) an 
important contributor to the overarching goal of broad-based violence 
reduction within the region. USAID will therefore heighten its focus on 
GBV programming as part of its overall approach to violence reduction.

    Question. While I understand that funding levels to the West Bank 
and Gaza are driven by appropriations law, assistance to the West Bank 
and Gaza increased dramatically from $75 million in fiscal years 2020 
and 2021 to $225 million in fiscal year 2022.
    What steps is USAID taking to address absorption challenges with 
the $219 million appropriated for the West Bank and Gaza?

    Answer. The USAID/WBG Mission is fully confident it can absorb the 
FY22 level.
    During the pause in assistance in January of 2019, USAID slowed 
Foreign Service Officer (FSO) assignments to the WBG Mission and 
assigned many of its local staff to serve with other Missions and 
offices within the USG on Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). Since 
the relaunch of assistance in January of 2021, USAID has returned all 
of the local staff to work full time on the WBG portfolio, bringing the 
total to 76. USAID is also increasing the number of FSOs, and the 
mission will be fully staffed with 13 by summer's end. In addition, 
there are a variety of trusted international and local partners who are 
qualified and prepared to implement USAID programs.
    Given rising instability in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) and 
pressing development needs, the increased level of funding for fiscal 
year 2022 will allow the USAID/WBG to support economic and development 
assistance programs that improve the lives of millions of Palestinians 
by providing immediate relief and advancing progress across sectors 
such as health, economic growth, civil society, climate, and water. To 
address the increased insecurity, especially in the West Bank, USAID 
programming targets some of the daily inequities that lead to rising 
frustration and outbreaks of violence while also addressing the drivers 
of violence directly.

    Question. Despite 2 years of Palestinian assistance under the Biden 
administration, Israeli-Palestinian violence is at record levels, there 
is no political horizon, and we have not seen substantial movement on 
``pay-for-slay'' reforms.
    How are you linking Palestinian assistance to strategic outcomes in 
the West Bank and Gaza?
    What are USAID's strategic outcomes linked to Palestinian 
assistance?
    What efforts is USAID undertaking, in conjunction with State, to 
ensure that Palestinian assistance is synchronized with USCC security 
operations, MEPPA, and State engagement on ``pay-for-slay'' reforms?

    Answer. USAID is deeply integrated into the interagency process to 
establish the Integrated Country Strategy, and USAID funding supports 
the goals of the ICS to (1) advance peace and a two-state solution, (2) 
strengthen non-PA Palestinian institutions at the local level, (3) 
build a prosperous Palestinian economy, and (4) ensure regional 
integration.
    USAID programming supports each of these goals and advances the 
overarching U.S. foreign policy goal of ensuring equal measures of 
security, prosperity, and freedom for both Israelis and Palestinians.
    USAID makes progress toward these strategic goals through a wide 
range of programming that targets the most vulnerable in Palestinian 
society, builds bridges of trust and peace with Israelis, and focuses 
its assistance in order to prevent radicalization and extremism in 
communities prone to violence.
    USAID works closely with interagency partners, including the State 
Department, the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), and the Development 
Finance Corporation, to deliver the most responsible development 
programs in service of these objectives.
    USAID meets regularly with these interagency partners to discuss 
shared strategic objectives; to outline planned interventions; and to 
ensure that our messaging and programming, including USAID's bilateral 
and MEPPA funds, are mutually reinforcing and fully in compliance with 
all relevant legislation and regulations, including the Taylor Force 
Act.
    To address spiraling violence in the West Bank, USAID is deepening 
its partnership with USSC to work on a pilot program targeting 
conflict-prone areas such as Jenin and Nablus. Pending Congressional 
approval, it would launch a broader rapid response program with FY22 
funds to build on this collaboration.
    USAID has been very clear on our position that the prisoner payment 
system is abhorrent. USAID, in concert with other U.S. officials, has 
repeatedly raised the issue directly with Palestinian leadership to 
urge them to end it. The State Department is leading efforts to 
pressure the PA into reform of the program, and we defer questions on 
that progress to the State Department. In the meantime, USAID is fully 
committed to maintaining compliance with the Taylor Force Act in all 
our programming.

    Question. Syria: The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act prohibits 
``reconstruction'' in Syria.
    How does USAID distinguish between early recovery, earthquake 
relief, and reconstruction?

    Answer. USAID humanitarian assistance support in the aftermath of 
an earthquake focuses on rescuing victims and providing immediate 
relief to survivors, and could include search and rescue, evacuation, 
the distribution of tents/tarpaulins, ready-to-consume foods, water 
bladders/jerrycans, kitchen sets, blankets and other items needed for 
short-term survival until medium-term support from governments and 
other actors can commence. This aid usually builds on what surviving 
communities have already started doing themselves after an earthquake. 
In response to the February 6 earthquakes in Syria, USAID partners were 
able to draw on the existing major humanitarian infrastructure to 
quickly mobilize to provide life- saving support including rubble 
removal, shelter rehabilitation, emergency shelter kits, food 
assistance, provision of water, distribution of hygiene kits, 
distribution of non-food items, and mobile medical units.
    Early recovery is a type of humanitarian assistance designed to 
make vulnerable people more resilient and reduce the need for 
humanitarian assistance. USAID-funded early recovery programs in Syria 
are very limited in scale and conducted by independent and impartial 
humanitarian agencies. Like all other humanitarian assistance, these 
programs are channeled through UN and NGO partners, not governments. An 
example of early recovery would be a humanitarian organization 
rehabilitating a conflict-damaged water network to ensure continued 
access to clean water.
    USAID does not do reconstruction activities there. In other 
contexts, reconstruction focuses on essential services delivered by the 
state through its own capacity. Given the current operational context 
and constraints, USAID does not do reconstruction in Syria.

    Question. Please provide definitions, expenditure thresholds, or 
other data that USAID relies on to ensure it is not in violation of the 
Caesar Act.

    Answer. USAID stabilization programs do not operate in Regime-held 
parts of Syria. USAID stabilization awards elsewhere in Syria--like all 
USAID stabilization awards--include explicit requirements to adhere to 
all applicable laws, including the Caesar Civilian Protection Act. 
During the kick-off post-award orientation with each partner for every 
new award, USAID informs partners of the OFAC licenses and their 
responsibilities to adhere to them. USAID also shares OFAC guidance 
during each award's kickoff, including the U.S. Treasury Department 
communique that includes Sanctions Compliance Guidance. Contracts 
include the FAR clause 52.225-13 Restrictions on Certain Foreign 
Purchases. Assistance awards include an applicable standard provision 
entitled, ``Preventing Transactions With, or the Provision of Resources 
or Support to, Sanctioned Groups and Individuals.''

    Question. Tunisia: President Kais Saied has taken dramatic steps 
that have dismantled Tunisia's democratic institutions, upset checks on 
the power of the executive, and have failed to address the root causes 
of Tunisia's economic woes.
    What actions is USAID, in conjunction with the State Department, 
taking to prevent democratic backsliding and restore the integrity of 
Tunisia's democratic institutions?

    Answer. The United States remains committed to the long-standing 
partnership with the Tunisian people, and we have been clear about the 
reversal of many of the Tunisian people's hard-won democratic gains 
over the past 21 months. Since July 2021, the Secretary of State and 
other senior U.S. officials have conveyed our deep concern over 
Tunisia's negative democratic trajectory and urged President Saied to 
take concrete steps to restore confidence in Tunisian democracy. The 
United States has coordinated closely with our European and 
international partners to deliver a united message, when possible.
    We continue to support the Tunisian people's aspirations for a 
democratic and accountable government that respects human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This includes using U.S. assistance strategically 
and targeting our programs to support civil society and economic growth 
while maintaining core security interests.
    USAID's work focuses on building democratic resilience in Tunisia 
through support to civil society, countering mis- and disinformation, 
supporting credible elections and advancing inclusion of all Tunisians 
into political processes. We also recognize that to counter democratic 
backsliding and build Tunisian resilience to political shocks, we must 
concurrently work to address the country's fragile economic state. Our 
investment in the Tunisian private sector is also vital to mitigate the 
severe impact of rising unemployment, inflation, and commodity 
shortages, and prevent thousands of Tunisian businesses from failing.

    Question. What challenges does USAID face when transitioning from 
programming through a foreign government to programming through civil 
society organizations?

    Answer. USAID has partnered with civil society organizations in 
Tunisia since 2011, and given our longstanding partnerships with civil 
society, we did not experience major challenges in pivoting assistance. 
The recalibration of U.S. assistance from the Government of Tunisia to 
the Tunisian people enabled us to augment support to existing 
partnerships with civil society and created opportunities to invest in 
new organizations. Our existing programs work with civil society groups 
across the country to promote the integrity of elections and other 
democratic processes, empower youth, and combat mis- and disinformation 
across all forms of media. Our long-term investment in civil society 
allowed us to pivot in the face of growing threats to freedom of 
expression and association, helping to advance information integrity 
and support calls for inclusive reform.

    Question. Why haven't USAID and State conditioned assistance to 
Tunisia based on clearly articulated democratic benchmarks? Is there a 
benefit or risk to this approach?

    Answer. The United States continues to engage with the Tunisian 
people, partner with civil society, and work with international 
partners to communicate our concerns at the highest levels about the 
negative trajectory for democracy and human rights in Tunisia.
    Despite our concerns over the Government of Tunisia's anti-
democratic trends, we feel it is important to maintain direct support 
to the Tunisian people as they grapple with the twin economic and 
democratic crises. U.S. assistance empowers Tunisian civil society 
pressing for government accountability, combats dis- and 
misinformation, informs citizens about their rights and political 
processes, and supports citizen oversight of political processes, 
including elections. U.S. assistance also supports Tunisians as they 
grapple with the declining economic conditions and food insecurity 
exacerbated by Russia's aggression in Ukraine amidst domestic political 
turmoil and closing civic space.
    At this stage, we assess that messaging against the recent actions 
of the Tunisian Government can be calibrated with our assistance which 
is aimed at sustaining our long-term relationship with the Tunisian 
people. As we continue to plan for the future of development assistance 
in Tunisia, we will keep pushing for a return to a democratic path 
while balancing our broader national security interests.

    Question. What balance should the U.S. strike between forcing 
democratic reforms and strategic competition with China?

    Answer. USAID's democracy assistance in Tunisia is an extension of 
our strategic competition with the People's Republic of China and other 
competitors who prefer to advance or advocate for a centralized, 
authoritarian model of development. USAID programming works to counter 
the authoritarian narrative in Tunisia by promoting economic 
opportunity and inclusive, democratic values and by building resilience 
to autocracy with a particular focus on civil society and marginalized 
communities.

    Question. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA: SIGAR John Sopko recently 
testified that U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is subject to widespread 
diversion and abuse by the Taliban.
    Does USAID maintain a policy of ``no direct benefit'' to the 
Taliban?

    Answer. USAID assistance is not provided to the Taliban and does 
not directly benefit the Taliban. All USAID humanitarian and 
development assistance supports the work of UN agencies and 
experienced, carefully chosen international NGOs with extensive 
experience working in challenging environments. These partners have 
robust risk mitigation procedures in place to ensure that our funded 
assistance reaches its intended recipients.

    Question. What specific mechanisms has USAID developed to prevent 
direct benefit to the Taliban, to include associated mission orders?

    Answer. USAID takes its duty as a steward of U.S. taxpayer funding 
seriously and holds implementing partners to the highest standards to 
ensure that taxpayer funds are used wisely, effectively, and for their 
intended purposes. USAID assistance is not provided to the Taliban and 
does not directly benefit the Taliban.
    USAID implementers have extensive experience operating in high-risk 
environments around the world. USAID requires them to have proper 
safeguards and risk-mitigation systems in place to help ensure that 
principled development and humanitarian aid reaches those who need it 
most.
    RAMPs: USAID employs risk analytic processes that include an 
examination of the risks associated with the diversion of assistance to 
the Taliban and Haqqani Network in Afghanistan. USAID requires that 
partners submit Risk Assessment and Management Plans (RAMPs) as part of 
their applications for funding. USAID utilizes these RAMPs, along with 
our robust internal analysis, to examine how applicants for funding 
will mitigate the risk of our assistance benefiting sanctioned 
entities, among other risks.
    OIG: Per USAID standard provisions in awards, partners are required 
to report to USAID's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) all 
incidents of fraud, waste and abuse, including diversion. USAID staff 
continually coordinate with our partners to ensure both that our 
assistance is reaching those for which it is intended and that our 
partners have effective mitigation measures in place to help safeguard 
against similar incidents occurring. USAID requires all cases of fraud, 
waste, and abuse to be reported. These instances are all documented, 
tracked, and reported to USAID's OIG.
    PROGRAM REPORTING: USAID staff regularly meet with partners, as 
well as review programmatic and financial reports corresponding with 
their respective awards, to assess the progress of award implementation 
and obtain key contextual and programmatic updates, including access to 
beneficiary populations, safety and security, and attempted Taliban 
interference. Partners are required to provide regular program updates 
on the progress of their activities and report any diversions, 
seizures, or losses. We monitor these reports to verify not only that 
our assistance reaches those for whom it is intended, but also that our 
partners have effective mitigation measures in place to help safeguard 
against incidents occurring.
    THIRD PARTY MONITORING: USAID programming is dynamic and adjusted 
to meet the requirements of monitoring and evaluating our programs from 
outside Afghanistan. USAID and our implementing partners monitor 
programs through numerous methods, including by remote monitoring, 
post-distribution monitoring, and third-party monitoring. USAID 
utilizes a third-party monitoring (TPM) contractor to provide in-person 
oversight of awards and promptly follows up with partners on reported 
findings, including diversion or other program irregularities. USAID's 
Afghanistan Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Activity TPM helps 
ensure that USAID's development and humanitarian programs in 
Afghanistan achieve their intended results. This is done through strong 
evaluation of technical support services, learning and adaptive 
management services, and program support services.
    SANCTIONS RISK ANALYSIS: All USAID partners are required to comply 
with USG legal authorizations restricting transactions with the 
Taliban, including annual appropriations restrictions. However, USAID 
and our partners also have authorization via various OFAC licenses to 
engage in incidental transactions necessary to facilitate the provision 
of assistance (i.e., fuel, electricity, etc.). This is not unique to 
Afghanistan. USAID, and our partners, have authorization via various 
OFAC licenses to engage in incidental transactions to facilitate the 
provision of assistance across OFAC sanctions programs (including, 
e.g., Yemen, Venezuela, and Horn of Africa countries) in non-permissive 
environments. While USAID has legal authorizations in place to 
safeguard against sanctions violations, we still require our 
implementing partners to report any instances of diversion, fraud, 
waste, and abuse, including incidents involving the Taliban and Haqqani 
Network, and will suspend funding if necessary.
    TERRORIST FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT: USAID has a track record of 
ensuring that our assistance does not benefit terrorists or other 
blocked persons. In 2009, the Mission implemented a Terrorist Financing 
Risk Assessment, a document that requires USAID staff to adhere to 
policies that ensure USAID-financed projects and activities are 
insulated against their benefits being provided, even inadvertently, to 
terrorists.
    VETTING: USAID's partner vetting policies are outlined in ADS 
Chapter 319 (https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/agency-policy/series-300/
319), which includes requirements for pre-award vetting and an option 
for post-award vetting for urgently needed humanitarian assistance (see 
ADS 319.3.6.3). Special standard operating processes are further 
described in the country specific partner vetting orders.
    MISSION ORDER: USAID/Afghanistan's vetting Mission Order 201.06 
outlines the vetting process in detail. Generally, USAID vets proposed 
non-U.S. prime or sub-awardees when the proposed award amount exceeds 
$25,000. Vetting is done by award, and is redone annually for multi-
year awards. U.S. citizens generally are not vetted; per M.O. 201.06; 
however, USAID reserves the right to vet any entity, or any person, at 
any time when there is a noted concern of being involved with a 
prohibited party. The Mission Order (and other information on the 
vetting process) is provided to implementing partners (IPs) as part of 
the pre-award process and at other times, as requested. The Vetting 
Support Unit provides virtual one-on-one briefings, instructions, and 
vetting customer service support to all IPs and potential IPs prior to 
and throughout the vetting process.

    Question. The State Department transmitted to Congress on May 3, 
2018, that assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is considered 
``directly benefitting'' the Palestinian Authority according to the 
following conditions: The intended primary beneficiary or end user of 
the assistance; Whether the Palestinian Authority is the direct 
recipient of the assistance; Whether the assistance involves the 
payment of Palestinian Authority creditors; The extent of ownership or 
control the Palestinian Authority exerts over an entity or individual 
that is the primary beneficiary or end user of the assistance; Whether 
the assistance or services provided directly replace assistance or 
services provided by the Palestinian Authority.
    What legal definition of ``direct benefit'' is USAID using to 
govern assistance in Afghanistan?

    Answer. Section 7044(a)(1) of the Department of State, Foreign 
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOAA), 2022 
imposes a restriction on the use of any FY 2022 or prior year 
assistance funds, including Economic Support Funds, ``for direct 
assistance to the Taliban.'' The provision applies to any new 
obligations and new sub-obligations under a bilateral agreement of FY 
2022 or prior year assistance funds made available to the Department of 
State and USAID.
    ``Direct assistance'' is not defined in the SFOAA and the term is 
not otherwise a term of art, therefore USAID evaluates the scope of the 
restriction on a case-by-case basis. Because the United States has not 
yet made a decision as to whether to recognize any entity, including 
the Taliban, as the Government of Afghanistan, the provision raises 
difficult questions regarding its potential application to Afghan 
Government entities, such as ministries, etc., which continue to exist 
and operate regardless of any U.S. recognition decision. The Department 
of State and USAID expect that the restriction would apply to any 
assistance provided directly to the Taliban as a group and could also 
apply to entities controlled by the Taliban, depending on the 
circumstances. Because the term ``direct assistance'' is not defined, 
USAID analyzes on a case-by-case basis whether particular programs or 
activities are subject to this restriction.

    Question. WESTERN HEMISPHERE: Colombia: The FY24 Budget request 
would direct additional resources to ``address root causes of illegal 
migration.'' However, in the last 2 years, the Administration has only 
been able to report lower illegal immigration numbers as a result of 
the legally dubious parole programs it began implementing late in 2022.
    Please provide evidence that USAID programs in Central America are 
directly related to lower illegal immigration numbers.

    Answer. The budget request expands economic prosperity while 
supporting human rights and citizen security--both clear drivers of 
migration. Programs will respond to irregular hemispheric migration in 
the region by addressing the root causes of migration from Central 
America, while also providing legal pathways for migration, and 
promoting the socio-economic integration of migrants in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
    The Administration is committed to long-term development solutions 
that address the root causes of migration and collaboratively manage 
migration in the Western Hemisphere. We know that making progress 
requires sustained political commitment and cooperation across a broad 
range of stakeholders, combined with both private sector and foreign 
assistance investments.
    We fully understand the headwinds in the region, particularly 
democratic backsliding in El Salvador and Guatemala, an uncertain 
trajectory in Honduras. However, there are clear signs of progress amid 
a challenging strategic environment. The Root Causes Strategy has 
yielded some clear results.
    Intentions to go to live or work in another country, as measured by 
Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys conducted in 2022, 
fell by double digits in Guatemala and Honduras (with almost no change 
in El Salvador), compared to 2021 survey results. Rates of GDP growth 
per capita rebounded after steep drop-offs due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, and national homicide rates in all three countries continued 
their multi-year decline.

    Question. The FY24 budget request asks for $43.3 million to support 
implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord in Colombia. According to 
Colombia's Attorney General, about 412 accused murderers of demobilized 
FARC members, human rights defenders, and relatives of FARC demobilized 
members remain at large because they are protected under the cease fire 
decrees issued by President Petro in December 2022.
    Please describe how the cease fire decrees may impact the 
implementation of USAID programs related to the 2016 Peace Accord.

    Answer. Thus far, Petro administration talks with armed groups have 
not impacted USAID's programs related to the 2016 Peace Accord. The 
Accord remains Colombia's best tool to consolidate peace, expand the 
state's presence to violent rural areas, and promote the well-being of 
Colombia's most vulnerable populations. USAID has been a steadfast ally 
of Colombia for many years before, during, and after the signing of the 
Accord. We are closely monitoring the Petro administration's talks with 
armed groups and will continue to assess changes in the context. Should 
the situation merit program adjustments we will do so in consultation 
with Congress.

    Question. USAID plays a significant role in Colombia's efforts to 
substitute illicit coca crops. A 2020 review by the State Department's 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement found that social 
leaders were more-than-twice likely to have been killed in areas where 
there was no forced eradication and with levels of coca cultivation.
    Please explain USAID's current understanding of how many 
assassinations and attacks on human rights defenders and social leaders 
take place in areas were eradication takes place?

    Answer. Advancing human rights is a U.S. Government priority in 
Colombia; one defender killed is one too many. In Colombia, USAID 
focuses on prevention, protection, and response measures to address 
human rights challenges. Despite steady advances in Colombia's human 
rights over the past decade, attacks against human rights and 
environmental defenders remain far too frequent, particularly along 
lucrative narcotrafficking and illegal mining routes and in 
environmentally protected areas.
    The vacuum left in some areas of Colombia by inadequate state 
presence is quickly filled by illegal armed groups. In those areas coca 
cultivation can flourish, and with it levels of violence increase 
significantly, including the killing of social leaders. U.S. assistance 
supports the Colombian Government's efforts to not only reduce levels 
of coca cultivation but also to increase state presence and by 
extension, decrease violence. The United Nations' Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) Colombia's team collects and 
disseminates data on the incidence and impact of violence (See, for 
example: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/reporta-
Informe-Violencia-Territorial-en-Colombia-Recomendaciones-para-el-
Nuevo-Gobierno-Oficina-ONU-Derechos-Humanos.pdf). We partner with 
UNOHCHR and support their work (more details below).
    USAID's strategy focuses on protecting leaders, preventing violent 
attacks against them, and reducing impunity for these crimes.
    USAID quadrupled its funding in the past 2 years to the United 
Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR)--
from about $1 million annually to $4.6 million--to monitor Colombia's 
human rights situation, assist the Colombian Government in protecting 
human rights, and help the Colombian Attorney General's Office secure 
nearly 70 convictions in human rights defender homicide cases.
    USAID also directly supports the Attorney General's Office to 
dismantle complex criminal structures and target those responsible for 
human rights defender crimes.
    USAID partners with the Inspector General's Office (IGO) to 
facilitate dialogue between social leaders and key government 
authorities. USAID also elevates human rights defenders through the 
Lidera la Vida campaign that seeks to raise public awareness, and spur 
action around the need to protect social leaders and human rights 
defenders. In addition, USAID supports IGO efforts to advance 
disciplinary actions for public officials who fail to protect leaders 
and implement Ombudsman Early Warning Alerts as required by law.
    USAID has trained thousands of leaders and civil society 
organizations in self-protection measures. Not one leader trained has 
been killed. USAID has partnered with the National Protection Unit, 
police, and other Government of Colombia institutions to scale these 
efforts and focus on particularly threatened leaders, such as crop 
substitution leaders.

    Question. Please explain how failure to eradicate illicit coca 
crops will impact the success of USAID efforts to support 
implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord.

    Answer. Despite continuing challenges of violence and coca 
production, the Peace Accord has provided the most important forcing 
mechanism to push the Colombian state to areas where coca is grown, 
increasing public investments and state presence. Colombians living in 
these regions detest living under the control of violent drug gangs and 
are looking for a better life. A lack of sufficient eradication may 
result in increased illicit cultivation which will impede both USAID 
and Colombian Government efforts to implement programs and expand 
services and licit economic opportunities in these regions.
    At the March 2023 High Level Dialogue meetings in Washington, both 
the U.S. and Colombia re-committed to a holistic approach to 
counternarcotics and strengthening peace. USAID collaborates closely 
with the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), Department of Defense, and Colombian 
stakeholders on this holistic approach, supporting peace through 
reducing illicit coca crops and helping communities to transition to 
licit livelihoods. This approach also includes a strong focus on 
environmental protection and combating environmental crimes as well as 
broader metrics of success.
    In terms of crop substitution, USAID supports various modalities, 
including those focused on entering into agreements with communities to 
transition out of coca and, in return, receive improved public goods 
and services, land titles, economic opportunities, and payments for 
environmental services. Our efforts support the entire community.
    In the many places where USAID has built stronger licit options, 
people's lives have been transformed through the production and sale of 
licit crops like cacao, coffee, dairy, and rubber. Coca replanting 
rates in communities where USAID is present are generally significantly 
lower than in communities where USAID is not working.

    Question. Honduras: In January, Taiwan joined a USAID-led effort to 
provide education to about 300,000 children in Honduras. Has the Castro 
Government's recognition of the People's Republic of China in March had 
any impact on U.S. support for this program?

    Answer. The Government of Honduras's diplomatic recognition of the 
People's Republic of China led the Government of Taiwan to pull all 
development support out of Honduras, including the $2 million Taiwan 
had pledged in support of a USAID-led education alliance.
    However, the alliance has been able to continue with U.S. 
Government funding as well as private sector and community support. The 
alliance continues to build and improve school infrastructure, promote 
student enrollment and retention, develop alternative education options 
for out-of-school youth, and work to prevent school-based violence.

    Question. Haiti: Please explain whether and how the absence of a 
U.S. Ambassador in Haiti has impacted the work of USAID in that 
country.

    Answer. As you have noted eloquently in the past, the U.S. is best 
able to promote its national security interests abroad with a Senate-
confirmed ambassador at post. Accordingly, USAID supports the 
confirmation of a U.S. Ambassador to Haiti.
    In the meantime, USAID has full access to our government 
counterparts and continues to provide development and life-saving 
humanitarian assistance. USAID has a close working relationship with 
the Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Ambassador Eric 
Stromayer. USAID regularly briefs the Charge on humanitarian response 
issues and the U.S. Government's humanitarian and development 
assistance. Ambassador Stromayer regularly and effectively engages with 
the Government of Haiti, UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) 
partners, and other external stakeholders on humanitarian priorities. 
He also represents the Mission at various external events in support of 
Haiti and the Haitian people, including the upcoming 2023 National 
Nutrition Survey (l'Enquete Nutritionnelle Nationale) hosted by H.E. 
Prime Minister Dr. Ariel Henry, with the Ministry of Public Health and 
Population (MSPP), and in collaboration with UNICEF.
    USAID's development programs continue implementation to build a 
stable and economically viable Haiti, focusing on improving health and 
education outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving 
the independence and accountability of government institutions. Our 
development assistance provides economic opportunity through inclusive, 
environmentally sustainable agriculture development and micro-, small-, 
and medium-sized business development, and improves the economic and 
environmental resilience of communities. USAID health programs work to 
fight infectious disease and improve primary healthcare services and 
increase access to water and sanitation services.

    Question. EUROPE & EURASIA: War in Ukraine: Russia continues to 
make clear its unhappiness with the Black Sea Grain Deal and seems 
increasingly likely to withdraw from it when the Deal comes up for 
renewal again.
    If Russia does indeed abrogate its participation in the Black Sea 
Grain Deal, what contingency plans does USAID have to help transport 
Ukrainian grain to those nations that need it most?

    Answer. Continuing to support the efforts of the Black Sea Grain 
Initiative (BSGI) is a priority for USAID. Ukraine's ability to export 
grain is particularly critical in light of the uncertainty surrounding 
the BSGI renewal. Based on Russia's prior behavior in talks with UN 
Secretary-General (SG) Guterres and active efforts to undermine the 
Black Sea Grain deal, we have modest expectations of any extension of 
the deal. Any interruption would be detrimental to food-insecure 
populations worldwide, global food prices, and Ukraine's economy.
    USAID will continue to utilize the generous support provided by 
Congress to support Ukraine's agriculture needs. USAID's Agriculture 
Resilience Initiative--Ukraine (AGRI) funding, which has increased from 
$100 million to $350 million, will be key to support Ukraine's 
agriculture sector at this critical time. Additionally, USAID is 
advocating with other donors and the private sector to leverage 
additional external funding to add to the $150 million USAID has helped 
to raise since the launch of AGRI. Since the beginning of the war, 
USAID has provided over 13,700 farmers with seeds, fertilizer, storage, 
and other services to help them continue to produce despite the high 
uncertainties. To support the spring sowing campaign in 2023, USAID's 
initiatives are distributing fertilizer and seeds to farmers in 15 
oblasts most affected by the war, and offering more opportunities to 
farmers to access needed finance. Should Ukraine face a deficit in 
storage due to shrinking export capacity, USAID will look to find ways 
to support farmers with storage solutions and services, using the 
network of local storage service providers that the Agency established 
in 2022, which provided 1.5 million metric tons of storage capacity 
last year. Additionally, USAID is co-investing with private sector 
partners (Kernel, Grain Alliance, and Nibulon) to expand grain export 
capacity and operations of alternative export routes, namely through 
two Danube ports (Reni and Izmail) and Cierna nad Tisou in Slovakia. 
Those combined $44 million investments are projected to increase 
Ukraine's grain shipping capacity by more than 3.35 million tons 
annually, bolstering Ukraine's economy and bringing much-needed grain 
to the global market.
    USAID is also considering different sources and modalities of food 
assistance--including U.S. in-kind food commodities--to ensure that 
there are no interruptions in lifesaving food assistance in the nations 
where USAID is currently sending Ukrainian grain. These include grain 
procurement in other countries such as Australia and India, where 
production was very good this year. USAID partner the World Food 
Program also plans to revert to shipping grain and oilseeds out via the 
Danube and rail networks though this option would only meet about 40 
percent of monthly export requirements.

    Question. Does the U.S. Government believe that it may be necessary 
to acquiesce to Russia's demands to open the ammonia pipeline across 
Ukraine and permit more exports of Russian and Belarusian fertilizer in 
order to keep grain flowing from Ukraine? If yes, please explain your 
reasoning.

    Answer. Russia's consistent actions to undermine the Black Sea 
Grain Initiative (BSGI)--by imposing unilateral deadlines, threatening 
to withdraw, and obstructing ship movements--are further evidence that 
Russia is weaponizing food in its war against Ukraine, at the expense 
of the world's hungry people. Russia's obstruction of the BSGI is a 
violation of the commitments it made to the United Nations last summer. 
The data we have suggests that Russia is exporting grain and fertilizer 
at the same levels--if not higher--than it was before its full-scale 
invasion of Ukraine. Whether to reopen the Togliatti-Pivdenny pipeline 
for ammonia export is a matter for discussion between the parties. 
Regardless, Ukraine's grain should flow unimpeded.

    Question. Despite the growing and acute humanitarian needs in 
Ukraine, your FY24 budget request maintains funding level for Ukraine 
that are very similar to pre-war requests.
    Does USAID believe that its funding needs in Ukraine will shortly 
return to pre-war levels?

    Answer. The FY24 budget request allocated for Ukraine reflects the 
world's new multifaceted and intertwined challenges resulting from 
Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion in February 2022.
    The FY24 budget request accounts for an increase in resource 
requirements from the renewed base budget to meet substantial needs, 
taking into account that Ukraine received no base funding in FY23 
because all funding that year was included in supplemental 
appropriations. This budget request reflects USAID's efforts to 
appropriately respond to one of the greatest threats to democratic 
freedom and sovereignty of our generation. Specifically, the FY24 
request for USAID- and State-managed Assistance to Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (AEECA) funding is almost 80 percent higher than the level 
requested in FY22 and appropriated in FY21, and there is a 100 percent 
increase to the Global Health Programs-USAID (GHP-USAID) funds. This 
increase reflects our effort to right-size and normalize funding levels 
to appropriately and adequately respond to the monumental challenges 
facing our work in Ukraine. Given the enormity of the challenges from 
continued and elevated Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the 
daunting task of reconstruction and rehabilitation that lies ahead, we 
do not anticipate that funding needs will shortly return to pre-war 
levels.

    Question. Does the Administration expect to continue to rely on 
supplemental requests to fund U.S. assistance to Ukraine?

    Answer. We stand with Ukraine and greatly appreciate the 
supplemental appropriations Congress has passed, which have been 
indispensable in providing necessary support to the citizens and 
Government of Ukraine while advancing U.S. Government (USG) objectives. 
We will be forward-leaning in utilizing our available funding to 
address the highest needs and in working with other donors to leverage 
additional support to help meet Ukraine's budget gaps and assistance 
needs.
    Despite this historic support, Ukraine continues to face monumental 
challenges in meeting the needs of its people and, ultimately, 
recovering. Given the fluidity of the situation on the ground, we will 
continue to assess requirements and available resources and request 
funding from Congress, as needed. We are in close coordination with our 
colleagues at the State Department, NSC and OMB about the ongoing 
challenges and our ability to meet USG objectives in Ukraine.

    Question. Compared to last year's budget request, $5 million less 
has been requested for State Department OIG, while $5 million more has 
been requested for USAID OIG.
    Is this adjustment in funding correlated? If so, what is the 
reasoning behind the $5 million shift to USAID OIG?
    How will USAID prioritize funding for OIG oversight over assistance 
to Ukraine?
    How will USAID OIG coordinate with the State Department and Defense 
Department OIGs on funding for joint oversight projects?

    Answer. As Offices of Inspector General are independent of the 
Agencies they oversee, USAID has no functional role in prioritizing 
funding for USAID's Office of Inspector General. The increase in USAID 
OIG funding is unrelated to the decrease in State Department OIG 
funding. We would refer you directly to the USAID OIG for further 
information.

    Question. Central Europe: In 2022, USAID started a program in 
Central Europe ``with the goal of strengthening democratic 
institutions, civil society, and independent media.''
    Although little time has elapsed since this program began, please 
describe what you see as the successes of this program thus far.

    Answer. In fiscal year 2021, USAID received an allocation of $8 
million out of the $20 million in congressionally directed funding to 
strengthen democracy and civil society in Central Europe. There is an 
additional $7.5 million in FY 2022 appropriations allocated for USAID. 
We anticipate our work in Central Europe to continue for 5 years. We 
have formally launched the Central Europe program and briefed 
leadership and staff from the Embassies of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Poland about the nature and scope of the program. The program 
focuses on building the skills and ability of local media, 
organizations, and actors to reach beyond the bubble of large cities to 
encourage greater civic participation in the regions.
    USAID has promoted collaboration and networking among leading local 
European human rights organizations in a 2-year capacity- and alliance-
building program that helps human rights defenders and civic space 
advocates from across the EU meet, learn, and strategize together. 
Between October 2022 and May 2023, the Recharging Advocacy for Rights 
in Europe Network had four convening events that promoted networking, 
exchanging ideas, and learning. The participants also practiced new 
skills in how to communicate effectively and deliver effective 
messages, speak confidently, and write persuasive policy briefs.
    In December 2022, the German Marshall Fund partnered with five 
local organizations in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria to bolster the 
capacity of civil society and watchdog organizations to increase their 
management, financial sustainability, constituency-building, and 
communication skills through training, mentoring, networking, and 
microgranting. The Power of Humanity Foundation in Hungary received 130 
applications from local organizations (formal and informal) expressing 
their interest in participating.
    In January 2023, the Central Europe Media Program that aims to 
strengthen the competitiveness, financial independence, and 
sustainability of the independent media sector in Central Europe, 
finalized the selection of 10 media outlets from Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia. Following needs assessment, digital audit and 
organizational capacity assessment, each individual media outlet will 
receive a tailored package of support.
    On May 2, as part of UNESCO's World Press Freedom Day events, 
USAID, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), 
and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice announced the 
launch of Reporters Shield. Reporters Shield is a membership program 
that defends investigative reporting around the world from legal 
threats, including libel, defamation, and strategic lawsuits against 
public participation (or SLAPP suits), meant to silence critical 
voices. The program is for media outlets and non-government 
organizations that report in the public interest. Private donor 
contributions fund the program to support U.S. media. Reporters Shield 
is accepting applications worldwide and is reviewing applications in a 
phased approach starting with Phase I, which includes organizations 
based in most countries in South America, North America, Europe, and 
Central Asia. USAID allocated $1 million in FY 2021 funds for Central 
Europe to OCCRP for this effort.

    Question. Georgia: The last two elections in Georgia were 
grudgingly deemed free by international observers, but they highlighted 
the role that state resources played in meaning that in many cases, 
elections were not necessarily fair.
    As the October 2024 elections approach, how is USAID working to 
help ensure that these elections will be truly free and fair? Please be 
specific.

    Answer. USAID has a robust elections and political processes 
portfolio that supports independent oversight of electoral processes to 
ensure that elections are free and fair. Through awards with the 
Consortium for Election and Political Processes (CEPPS) and local civil 
society organizations, USAID will support the following activities to 
safeguard the integrity of Georgia's 2024 parliamentary elections.
    Pre-Election Assessment Missions: Through CEPPS, USAID will support 
international non-profit organizations to conduct at least two high-
level pre-election missions, one in the year leading up to the 
elections and at least one approximately 2-3 months before the 
elections, emphasizing the international community's expectations to 
all stakeholders about the responsibility to comply with international 
standards for democratic elections.
    Long-Term Observation: Through CEPPS, USAID will support leading 
international non-profit organizations to deploy long-term observers 
and analysts in the 6 months prior to Election Day, enabling both wide 
geographic and in-depth thematic coverage of key electoral 
developments. Long-term observers will provide geographic coverage of 
all 10 Georgian regions and the broader Tbilisi metropolitan area, as 
well as analyze key electoral themes. Key observers will remain in 
Georgia following Election Day to monitor post-election events.
    Short-Term Observation: Through CEPPS, USAID will support leading 
international non-profit organizations to organize delegations of 
observers on Election Day. In the week leading up to the polls, CEPPS 
will deploy teams of international delegates and staff to assess 
preparations for Election Day and the conduct of elections. CEPPS will 
recruit high-profile delegates from the U.S. and Europe, including 
former diplomats, elected officials, civil society leaders, academics, 
and regional experts from its global network of election experts.
    Reporting: In the months leading up to Election Day, USAID will 
support, through CEPPS, leading international non-profit organizations 
to conduct a series of Georgia Watcher updates, which serve as 
situation reports and interactive conference calls for relevant U.S. 
Government and European Union stakeholders to engage in Q&A and 
analysis, followed by post-election reports.
    Grants to Local Elections Monitoring Organizations: USAID supports 
the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the 
Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International Georgia, 
and Public Movement Multinational Georgia, to conduct parallel vote 
tabulation and monitor campaign finance, use of state resources, and 
electoral dispute resolution processes.
    In addition, we will be coordinating with our colleagues at the 
Department of State, Embassy Tbilisi, and the National Security 
Council, and others to ensure that the United States has a fully 
comprehensive set of interventions to try to ensure that the electoral 
process is free, fair, and credible, and meets international and 
European standards for elections.

    Question. INDO-PACIFIC: What is USAID's anticipated role in the 
mandatory spending packages to ``out-compete China,'' specifically the 
infrastructure request ($2 billion over 5 years) and the Indo-Pacific 
request ($2 billion over 5 years)? Please ensure your answer is 
forward-looking, rather than only prior examples of USAID's work.

    Answer. A mandatory funding stream will empower USAID to fill 
strategic investment and programming gaps in sustainable infrastructure 
investments, private sector-led financing, and long-term planning that 
lays the foundations for thriving, open, transparent and just 
societies. It will also send a clear message that the United States is 
fully committed to joining with our allies, friends, and partners in 
building a free and open Indo-Pacific for years to come.
    This funding will support new and innovative ways--and scale 
existing efforts--to support our allies and partners around the world 
by providing a viable alternative to the PRC Government's predatory and 
coercive practices and expansion and offer alternatives at a scale that 
discretionary spending simply cannot meet.
    To fortify host government systems against the ``People's Republic 
of China (PRC) Government's corrupting influence, new, integrated anti-
corruption programming will focus on strategic corruption in key 
sectors, specifically critical minerals, energy, technology, 
telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure. USAID will bring 
to scale the partnerships necessary to improve the transparency of 
infrastructure, transportation, and trade initiatives that risk harming 
people, the environment, and creating vulnerabilities to coercion.
    USAID's tailored efforts will support partner priorities to deploy 
renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies, transform and 
modernize utilities, drive regional cooperation, and stimulate private-
sector participation and investments. Together, these efforts will help 
diversify energy systems away from the PRC and Russia while also 
reducing costs and fighting climate change. For example, in support of 
the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda Partnership and India's 
national target of deploying 500 gigawatts of renewable energy by 2030, 
additional mandatory funding will accelerate large-scale renewable 
energy deployment, promote grid flexibility to integrate renewables, 
advance energy efficiency, and support the large-scale rollout of 
public electric vehicle charging infrastructure throughout South Asia. 
USAID will mitigate the PRC's regulatory tactics and supply chain 
monopolization of essential medical products, utilizing additional 
mandatory funding to build local capacities of partner countries' 
competitive manufacturing, procurement, regulatory systems, technology 
development and investment, financing, and workforce development. These 
efforts will increase supply chain diversification and reduce 
dependence on products supplied by PRC in local, regional, global, and 
U.S. pharmaceutical markets.
    As the PRC seeks to shape digital development through its Digital 
Silk Road initiative, Pacific Island countries require national and 
regional digital transformation and cybersecurity strategies that are 
aligned with international best practices. Mandatory funding will scale 
USAID's successful partnership with the Taiwan International 
Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) to build partners' 
capacity to detect and mitigate cybersecurity risks and provide proper 
incident response while showcasing the benefits to countries of 
partnering with Taiwan.
    Reliable access to Asia's critical water assets is more challenging 
due to climate change and the PRC's leveraging of water to exploit 
transnational tensions over shared waters. New USAID efforts will 
directly illuminate the ill effects of PRC infrastructure projects on 
water assets, empowering partners to pursue self-reliant growth, and 
rebuff external pressures. The $2 billion mandatory infrastructure 
request will be managed by the State Department through a global 
infrastructure fund. USAID will endeavor to utilize the fund for 
programs in the Pacific Islands, which require more concentrated grant 
financing to meet their unique infrastructure needs, due to their 
geographic remoteness, small economies, and dispersed populations. With 
mandatory funding, USAID will blend grant funding with conventional 
technical assistance models, allowing for more comprehensive, 
strategic, and sustainable infrastructure investment in the Pacific. 
More flexible financing will mobilize private finance and leverage 
investment from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Bringing these 
critical resources to bear will strengthen U.S. leadership on key 
Pacific priorities, improve U.S. competitiveness against the PRC's 
approach of visible infrastructure projects, and ensure regional 
initiatives such as the Partners in the Blue Pacific and the Quad 
deliver on commitments.

    Question. What kind of programming is USAID doing in agriculture in 
the Philippines?

    Answer. USAID is the largest grant donor to the Philippines' 
Department of Agriculture and is working with the Department to help 
harmonize regulatory requirements for food and agricultural 
commodities. USAID is also supporting the improvement of crop 
varieties, including the development of Golden Rice, a more nutrient-
dense rice variety, and the Feed the Future Insect-Resistant Eggplant 
Partnership project, which advances the development of eggplant 
varieties that are highly resistant to pests.
    In partnership with the Philippine Department of Trade and Industry 
and the private sector, USAID supported the development of warehouse 
receipt systems and the adoption and scaling of cold storage 
technology.
    USAID is also connecting farmers with buyers through the use of 
digital platforms to support livelihoods. As of last year, USAID's 
DELIVER-E initiative has already moved 422 tons of fresh farm produce 
valued at $700,000, enabling about 600 farmers to double incomes, and 
small and medium enterprises to increase their profit margins by six-
fold.
    At the local level, USAID is working with more than 10,000 
cooperative members and small and medium agribusinesses across 80 
cooperatives. Our assistance includes strengthening governance and 
financial management and facilitating access to finance and 
participating in domestic and global value chains. As a next step, 
USAID intends to partner with public-private networks, such as the 
Philippine Partnership for Sustainable Agriculture, to explore 
expanding cooperative development support to the fisheries sector to 
support a request from the Cooperative Development Authority.
    Recognizing that fisheries are a major protein and food staple in 
the Philippines, USAID helped protect 2.58 million hectares of oceans 
in the country to support its long-term sustainability. This includes 
efforts around rebuilding stocks of smaller fish species critical to 
the food chain, particularly the use of the Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Index and Threat Assessment Tool in municipal 
waters and in the fisheries management areas. This tool assesses the 
status of IUU fishing in a given area, identifies other longer-lasting 
and targeted solutions to reducing IUU fishing, and tracks the progress 
towards preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing in 
Philippine waters across various levels of governance, from municipal 
to fisheries management areas to the entire country. By using this 
tool, USAID is improving the productivity of wild fisheries to achieve 
food security by securing community tenure rights of fisheries 
resources and promoting market-based approaches. Additionally, USAID 
developed Fish Tiangge, a Facebook marketplace that enables buyers to 
purchase fish directly from fishers during the COVID-19 pandemic to 
support livelihoods and nutrition and connected 6,000 fishers with more 
than 300,000 households. Through various post-harvest, fish processing 
and financial management training with fishing communities and 
fisherfolk organizations, USAID also ensures that fisherfolk have the 
capacity to properly handle, consolidate and process fish, thus 
enabling them to meet market requirements for responsibly sourced 
seafood and reduce waste.
    In addition, USAID's disaster risk reduction and preparedness 
programs support the resilience of the most vulnerable farming 
households. Examples of this support include supporting at-risk farming 
communities to integrate preparedness frameworks and resilience 
strategies, such as promoting climate smart agriculture practices, 
establishing Climate Resilient Farmer Field Schools, and assessing and 
supporting the development of preparedness and response plans for 
farming households. These efforts help the most vulnerable populations 
prepare for and recover from disasters by helping to mitigate the 
impacts of disasters at the household level.
    USAID, in partnership with Buktamaco, the economic arm of the 
Bukidnon Tagoloanon tribe, is implementing the 2-year Mindanao Bamboo 
Value Chain Development Project. Working with a diverse team of 
indigenous population nurseries, planters and private sector actors 
from Mindanao and the United States, the Project aims to stimulate a 
bamboo value chain that will allow Mindanao planters to participate in 
the multi-billion-dollar global bamboo economy. Additionally, bamboo 
absorbs greenhouse gasses, and because of its rapid growth, is very 
useful as a tool for carbon sequestration. Bamboo also helps avoid 
fossil fuel use, and reduce deforestation, by offering an alternative, 
highly renewable source of biomass energy.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Ukraine: Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 
February 2022, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations 
laws, providing a total of $113 billion in emergency funding for FY 
2022 and FY 2023. This includes approximately $88 billion for foreign 
assistance, including to Ukraine and to other countries impacted by the 
war.
    How have the four Ukraine supplemental aid packages enacted since 
the February 2022 invasion enabled USAID to meet its goals to promote 
humanitarian and development aid in Ukraine?

    Answer. We stand with Ukraine and greatly appreciate the 
supplemental aid packages Congress has provided to date, which have 
been indispensable in providing the necessary support to the citizens 
and Government of Ukraine while also advancing U.S. Government 
objectives. As a complement to the security assistance, the direct 
budget support provided through bipartisan congressional appropriations 
has enabled the Government of Ukraine to continue to keep the 
government functioning and to preserve key services for its citizens 
like healthcare and education. This is an economic war as well as a 
military war, and our support is essential to Ukraine on both fronts.
    These aid packages have enabled indispensable development 
programming on priorities ranging from supporting energy workers to 
keep heat and power flowing to supporting critical energy 
infrastructure repairs during winter; supporting human rights activists 
to document and report on war crimes and human rights abuses; and 
assisting farmers with critical inputs such as seeds and fertilizers 
and finance support of more than $49 million in grants and loans. They 
have also enabled more than $500 million in assistance across sectors 
including local and national governance; anti-corruption initiatives to 
ensure accountability of foreign assistance funding flowing into the 
country; and funding to help advance reforms, civil society and media 
support, trade and finance, and health sector programming among others. 
In addition, these assistance packages have allowed USAID to 
appropriately respond to the humanitarian impact of the Ukraine crisis 
by providing life-saving humanitarian assistance in Ukraine as well as 
to 44 countries around the world whose populations are increasingly 
food insecure because of the impacts of Putin's war. Congress' 
supplemental funding allowed USAID to provide the most vulnerable 
Ukrainians with thermal blankets, medical supplies, emergency health 
kits, safe drinking water, shelter materials, protection services, and 
other lifesaving support.

    Question. How would USAID operations in Ukraine be impacted if 
Congress does not enact further supplemental aid packages in the next 
fiscal year?

    Answer. Despite the historic support Ukraine has received from the 
United States and other countries, Ukraine continues to face monumental 
challenges in funding its requirements to meet the needs of its people, 
and ultimately, recovering from the conflict's devastation. 
International Disaster Assistance funding appropriated through the 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations 
Act allowed USAID to maintain robust levels of humanitarian assistance 
in Ukraine this fiscal year. USAID is working to tighten the focus of 
humanitarian assistance in Ukraine in FY24, and strengthen the 
coordination between humanitarian and development assistance, as well 
as increasingly engage the Government of Ukraine in responding to 
needs. Further, USAID is monitoring the global effects of the war in 
Ukraine on prices and availability of agricultural commodities and 
inputs, particularly for vulnerable countries who relied on the Black 
Sea food exports and who have large populations facing increased food 
prices and insecurity. However, absent additional supplemental 
appropriations, USAID projects a significant decrease to humanitarian 
assistance inside Ukraine as well as to other major crises worldwide.

    Question. Georgia: The FY 2024 request indicates that Georgia would 
continue to be the second-highest aid recipient in Europe and Eurasia 
after Ukraine. Georgia would receive $88 million in the budget, 
compared to $107 million in FY 2022 funding. At the same time, Georgia 
has seen dramatic democratic backsliding in recent years. Billionaire 
businessman and former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili holds an 
oligarchic-like grip on Georgia's government from behind the scenes. 
Transparency International has reported on the rapidly deteriorating 
state of anti-corruption enforcement and declining media and civil 
society freedoms, which have jeopardized its European Union accession 
hopes. Additionally, various high-ranking officials of the ruling 
Georgian Dream Party also launched verbal attacks on U.S. Ambassador 
Kelly Degnan last year after she spoke up for independent voices and 
institutions.
    Please explain why the Administration proposes to maintain a 
relatively high level of assistance for Georgia in light of recent 
concerns about the pace of Georgia's European integration efforts and 
declining democratic trends more broadly?

    Answer. USAID's work in Georgia is critically important to protect 
Georgia's democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration, and sovereignty, 
especially in light of Georgia's significant democratic backsliding, 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and Russia's ongoing occupation of 20 
percent of Georgia's territory.
    USAID programming in Georgia is designed to slow democratic 
backsliding; provide critical support to civil society and independent 
media partners actively working to counter anti-Western disinformation; 
and ensure that the Georgian Government remains accountable to 
citizens, the majority of which support Georgia joining the EU and 
NATO, especially in the lead up to Georgia's critical 2024 and 2025 
elections. Programs also build resilience in vulnerable communities, 
including those along the Administrative Boundary Lines of Georgian 
territories occupied by Russia; support Georgia's economic and energy 
independence away from Russia; and promote greater regional 
cooperation, stability, and peace in the South Caucasus.
    Reducing assistance would only lessen the U.S. Government's ability 
to push Georgia in the right direction; undermine our relationship with 
Georgia's citizens, the vast majority of which aspire for Western 
integration; and benefit malign actors that seek to keep Georgia from 
the West, threatening U.S. Government interests in Georgia and the 
Caucasus. This funding, which supports actors and initiatives who are 
working to move Georgia in the right direction--towards Europe--is more 
important than ever.

    Question. Global Health Systems: In December 2022, USAID launched 
Primary Impact (formerly known as Accelerating Primary Health Care 
Collaborative (APHC-C)) to work with five partner countries in Africa 
to develop comprehensive strategies to improve primary health care and 
bridge silos to foster resilient health systems. At the same time, we 
know that the health workforce is integral to support a country's 
health system. I appreciate USAID's growing focus on frontline health 
workers, including through the Global Health Worker Initiative.
    Reducing the estimated 10 million global health worker shortage is 
essential to delivering primary health care, responding to emerging 
threats, and reducing inequities in health and survival. Health workers 
depend on all of the building blocks of a health system working 
together. For example, health workers are less likely to succeed and 
remain on the job if they are not fairly compensated and paid in a 
timely manner, do not have access to adequate resources such as 
medications and equipment, or if they do not have access to reliable 
patient data.
    As USAID looks to develop more comprehensive approaches to support 
health systems, how are you leveraging programs, such as the Global 
Health Worker Initiative or the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative, 
that focus on a specific area, to strengthen health systems more 
broadly?

    Answer. USAID funds both program area-specific and cross-cutting 
health systems strengthening (HSS) programming. Foundational, cross-
cutting investments in HSS complement and amplify the effect of program 
area-specific programs, prevent duplication and inefficiency, and are 
critical to achieving lasting and sustainable progress in all USAID's 
health program areas and investments. USAID's cross-cutting approach to 
HSS activities--such as sustainable financing interventions, support 
for better delivery and management of commodities, and improved use of 
human resources data systems--positively benefit all health areas. 
These comprehensive and cross-cutting HSS approaches are closely 
aligned with and supportive of key initiatives including USAID's 
Primary Impact and the USG's Global Health Worker Initiative (GHWI).
    Program area-specific investments also play an essential role in 
strengthening health systems. For example, the U.S. President's Malaria 
Initiative (PMI) delivers malaria services in an integrated manner and 
invests in platforms for providing prevention and treatment services 
that strengthen the underlying health system. In many countries, 
community health workers trained by PMI test and care for children with 
malaria, as well as other deadly diseases, such as diarrhea and 
pneumonia, and provide nutrition and maternal health services. 
Investments in laboratories and platforms for malaria campaigns also 
strengthen countries' diagnostic capacity and delivery of vaccines for 
other diseases. Further leveraging these investments across global 
health program areas will advance efforts to leave our partner country 
primary health systems stronger.

    Question. Democracy Support--Concentration in EPP Funding: A vital 
component of USAID's broad range of assistance efforts worldwide is to 
support those people in other countries who are seeking to strengthen 
democracy and rights-respecting governance in the face of authoritarian 
resurgence, and the Committee is strongly supportive of the Agency's 
initiatives in this regard. Yet, as Administrator Power said in her 
speech on a Global Revolution of Dignity on June 7, 2022, ``USAID and 
other development agencies have supported elections for decades, but we 
have not always kept up with these pernicious methods [of repressive 
government].'' The Committee is also strongly supportive of the core 
objective of USAID's recently released Acquisition and Assistance 
Strategy's goal to achieve ``a more diverse set of partners engaged to 
implement locally led development solutions.'' As the Strategy states, 
``the A&A workforce should proactively seek diverse prospective 
partners, consider the benefits of making awards to new and local 
partners, and work to lower barriers through flexible A&A approaches.'' 
(A&A Strategy p.14)

        ``We understand that there are more than 20 well-regarded 
        nongovernmental organizations in the U.S.--and many scores more 
        around the world--that have developed capacity and skills and 
        networks to do good work in the field Elections and Political 
        Processes (EPP). Yet since 1995, USAID has awarded more than $2 
        billion in funding for Elections and Political Processes 
        programs to a single recipient, the Consortium for Elections 
        and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). Moreover, the 
        proportion of funding going to CEPPS has been trending up. In 
        FY 2021 alone CEPPS received 66 percent of USAID EPP funding 
        (labeled Political Competition and Consensus Building), 
        according to data from USAID's foreignassistance.gov website 
        (using a similar approach to USAID's own localization 
        indicators--i.e., excluding funding to foreign governments, 
        interagency agreements, personal services contracts, and 
        agreements with multilateral organizations). This seems like a 
        curiously high concentration of large amounts of resources in 
        very few hands.

        ``CEPPS has been the recipient, over a period now spanning more 
        than 25 years, of five successive global, single-award EPP 
        programs. This would appear to be inconsistent with the spirit 
        of the A&A strategy cited above, and its goal of making awards 
        to new and local partners.

        ``The most recent--the Democratic Elections and Political 
        Process (DEPP) Leader With Associates (LWA) agreement awarded 
        in 2021, with a ceiling of $835 million--seems to have been the 
        largest mechanism in Democracy, Rights, and Governance ever 
        made by USAID.

        ``Agency Risk in Political Party Programming: The USAID Office 
        of Inspector General concluded in November 2019 that, `USAID's 
        reliance on a single consortium to implement the majority of 
        political party assistance in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle 
        East exposes the Agency to risks that can diminish its ability 
        to achieve political strengthening and democracy goals and 
        damage the Agency's reputation.'

        ``Directive for CEPPS in FY2021 Joint Explanatory Statement: In 
        directing spending by USAID on Elections and Political 
        Processes support around the world, the Joint Explanatory 
        Statement of the FY 2021 Omnibus Appropriations Act expressly 
        named one organization, the Consortium on Elections and 
        Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). Specifically, the 
        Joint Explanatory Statement stated:

        `Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening 
        (CEPPS)--The agreement includes funds at not less than the 
        prior fiscal year level for CEPPS. The USAID Administrator is 
        directed to ensure that the follow-on solicitation encourages 
        consortia applicants and that the award is made to an 
        organization or consortium that meets the following criteria: 
        (1) history of quality past performance; (2) demonstrated 
        institutional capabilities and expertise in democracy, 
        elections, and quick response to political crises; and (3) 
        worldwide geographic reach including in non-permissive 
        environments.' ''

    Has USAID felt constrained by the language in the Joint Explanatory 
Statement quoted above, specifically referencing the dominant 
implementer in this field, from widening the circle of the Agency's 
partners?

    Answer. The solicitation USAID issued for its global Democratic 
Elections and Political Processes (DEPP) Leader with Associate (LWA) 
award followed the guidance and criteria of this Congressional language 
referenced above and resulted in only one qualified application. The 
successful applicant, CEPPS, however, is a consortium that includes 
more than one implementer. In addition to the three prime holders--the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI)--it includes four senior technical partner 
organizations: the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA 
ROLI), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 
Democracy Arch (D-Arch), and Internews, all of which have an equal 
opportunity to bid on associate awards and shape the technical approach 
of work being carried out through the DEPP LWA.

    Question. What could be done to enhance competition in this area--
such as encouraging individual missions worldwide to openly compete for 
awards for Elections and Political Processes programs?

    Answer. The Agency's preference is for competition, and USAID 
Missions are already encouraged to openly compete elections and 
political processes programs. Missions have numerous options for 
supporting qualified international, United States-based, regional, and 
local partners to carry out electoral assistance activities. While some 
Missions have relied on the pre-competed global mechanism for elections 
and political processes programming, others have used full and open 
competition or restricted competition to local and regional 
organizations, in line with Agency localization efforts. In a number of 
cases, Missions have chosen to award one or more election and political 
processes activities to a variety of partners to best meet their needs.

    Question. Would you consider in future solicitations for worldwide 
EPP mechanisms doing what the Agency did in 2021 for the Civil Society 
and Media--Strengthened Together and Advancing in New Directions (CSM-
STAND) LWA, when two parallel awards were made? While those awards were 
divided by regions, one could also envision two (or more) parallel 
global awards--which could provide Missions with more opportunities to 
diversify their partners.

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Given USAID's emphasis on diversifying and localizing its 
partner base, what is the Agency doing specifically in Elections and 
Political Processes programs to ensure there are more opportunities for 
new, local, and nontraditional partners to partner with USAID?

    Answer. USAID is committed to channeling a larger portion of funds 
directly to credible local partners through its localization agenda. 
USAID has set an ambitious agency-wide goal for increasing funding 
directly to local partners. Washington and Mission operating units are 
being actively encouraged to consider funding for local partners where 
appropriate, including in the elections and political processes 
subsector. In addition, the Agency's procurement policies in ADS 303 
were updated in 2023 to allow for restricted competition for local and 
underutilized partners, thereby giving more flexibility to missions and 
Washington operating units in their selection process, including for 
elections and political processes programs. Agency staff are encouraged 
to consider the full range of procurement options. Some examples 
include:

   Kenya: Through a locally-competed annual program statement 
        (APS), USAID dedicated $14 million to three Kenyan-led 
        consortiums to provide support to government bodies with 
        election-related responsibilities, conduct civic and voter 
        education and carry out peacebuilding and conflict mitigation 
        activities around Kenya's 2022 election process.

   Paraguay: In 2022 USAID awarded, through a competitive APS 
        process limited to local organizations, a grant to a local 
        civil society organization to conduct surveys to assess the 
        general public's awareness of organized crime and corruption in 
        politics, and use the results to inform actions taken by civil 
        society to mitigate this problem.

   Tanzania: USAID currently has a Strengthening Inclusive, 
        Democratic, Participatory, and Accountable Governance (SIDPAG) 
        Annual Program Statement for local organizations--up to 
        $15,000,000--that covers electoral assistance and support for 
        civic and political leadership of women and girls.

   Uganda: USAID localized a significant portion of its 
        elections and political processes work by awarding a large, 
        multi-year activity--Supporting Citizen Engagement in Elections 
        (SCENE)--to a local implementing partner. As the CEPPS award 
        came to a close in 2022, USAID issued a 5-year extension to the 
        local SCENE activity, which has taken on much of the scope of 
        the now-ended CEPPS award.

   Southern Africa: USAID issued a solicitation limited to 
        local groups for the Southern Africa Political Parties and 
        Dialogue Program (SAPPD) which works to strengthen the 
        democratic structures and institutions of political parties in 
        several countries in Southern Africa to better respond to and 
        represent the needs of their constituents, particularly in the 
        areas of water and energy resource management. The implementer 
        is a South African organization, Democracy Works Foundation.

   Regional Leader with Associate Awards: USAID issued a 
        solicitation limited to local and regional partners, which 
        resulted in two Regional Elections and Political Transitions 
        Leader with Associates awards, one covering Africa and awarded 
        to South African organization Electoral Institute for 
        Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and one covering Asia 
        and the Pacific and awarded to Indonesian organization 
        Perludem. USAID missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and 
        Liberia have procured associate awards through the Africa 
        Regional LWA.

    Question. How has the Agency responded to, or acted upon, the 
observation quoted above from the November 2019 OIG report?

    Answer. USAID fully responded to OIG Audit 8-000-20-001-P; found on 
the OIG webpage: https://oig.usaid.gov/node/3616.
    USAID agreed with all six recommendations of the OIG Audit to 
improve USAID's policies and processes to further minimize the risk of 
bias in the Agency's DRG programs.
    As part of this response, USAID identified the follow-on to the 
Global Elections and Political Transitions (GEPT) award as the best 
opportunity to explore ways to work with a broader range of 
implementers providing political party assistance. USAID committed that 
it would use the design processes for the new follow on award to 
explore opportunities to use innovative methods for co-creation to 
increase the diversity of partnerships for the new award.
    The DRG Center worked with USAID's Office of Acquisition and 
Assistance (M/OAA) to issue a Request For Information (RFI) in December 
of 2019. USAID received 15 submissions on January 30, 2020, from a 
variety of interested parties. The DRG Center conducted a consultation 
with USAID procurement reform team and M/OAA, an internal analysis of 
the RFIs and a gap analysis of other potentially interested companies. 
Based on that analysis, USAID invited 27 organizations to a half-day 
facilitated pre-solicitation conference on February 26, 2020. USAID 
conducted another internal review of all the feedback from the RFIs and 
the pre-solicitation conference notes in early April. The Agency used 
that as the basis of a Program Description for the solicitation and 
incorporated directive language contained in the FY 2021 Appropriation 
Law.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. USAID regularly awards contracts and grants to United 
Nations agencies, such as the World Food Program, UNAIDS, and UNDP. 
This past March, UNAIDS supported the launch of a report by the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) titled, ``The 8 March 
Principles for a Human Rights-Based Approach to Criminal Law 
Proscribing Conduct Associated with Sex, Reproduction, Drug Use, HIV, 
Homelessness and Poverty.'' That report included a recommendation that 
national laws regarding the minimum age of consent be re-evaluated 
because it asserted that ``sexual conduct involving persons below the 
domestically prescribed minimum age of consent to sex may be consensual 
in fact, if not in law.''
    This recommendation gives credence to claims made by sexual 
predators that justify their crimes by claiming their underage victims 
can provide consent and undermines efforts by the United States to 
protect children from sexual exploitation. Do you agree with the 
recommendations of the ICJ report?

    Answer. No. USAID does not support and does not suggest that 
children can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults, 
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where 
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights 
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our 
shared goals.
    USAID requires that all cost-type agreements with the United 
Nations, its specialized agencies, and related organizations contain a 
provision which states that, the parties have a zero-tolerance-for-
inaction approach to tackling sexual exploitation and sexual abuse 
(SEA) and sexual harassment (SH). Under this provision, when UNAIDS is 
the recipient of a public international organization grant, it and its 
implementing partners, will take all reasonable and adequate steps to 
prevent SEA and SH of any person linked to the delivery of the 
agreement by both its employees and any implementing partner and 
respond appropriately when reports of SEA and SH arise. The provision 
further requires the recipient to apply the InterAgency Standing 
Committee (IASC) Six Core Principles relating to Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse when implementing USAID funded agreements. IASC core 
principle no. 2 specifically prohibits sexual activity with children 
(persons under the age of 18) regardless of the age of majority or age 
of consent locally.
    USAID's website has a publicly available toolkit on child 
safeguarding standards, including our specific award requirements, 
frequently asked questions, and best practices, along with policy and 
implementation guidance to assist our implementing partners and staff. 
These materials communicate our expectations and requirements to our 
partners and reinforce that an individual under the age of 18 is a 
child regardless of the legal age of majority or consent, that a child 
cannot give informed consent to sexual activity, that any sexual 
activity with a child is prohibited, that allegations of such behaviors 
must be reported to USAID and the Office of Inspector General, and that 
we will take action to address such allegations and hold perpetrators 
accountable.

    Question. What is the Administration's position on this ICJ report?

    Answer. USAID does not support and does not suggest that children 
can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults, 
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where 
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights 
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our 
shared goals.

    Question. Did USAID award any funding to UNAIDS during the 5-year 
period between 2018 and 2022 when UNAIDS worked with ICJ on compiling 
the report?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has partnered with and provided funding 
to UNAIDS since its inception in 1994, and USAID continued to award 
funding to UNAIDS during the period of 2018 to 2022. USAID followed 
standard processes prior to awarding such funds, including 
Congressional notification of the use of funds that included monies for 
the U.S. Government's annual contributions, technical assistance to 
support countries in achieving their national HIV targets, and PEPFAR 
field support activities, such as for community-led monitoring.

    Question. Can you commit to ensuring that USAID will not award any 
future funding to UNAIDS until it retracts its endorsement of the ICJ 
report?

    Answer. USAID does not support and does not suggest that children 
can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults, 
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where 
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights 
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our 
shared goals.

    Question. The Biden administration has rightly recognized that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the only international adversary with 
``both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, 
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.'' 
Historically, the CCP has avoided investing many resources overseas, 
but this has changed under Xi Jinping and his newly announced Global 
Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative. Since 2021, 
Congress has appropriated millions of dollars for a ``Countering 
People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund.'' While this sounds 
good on paper, I am not sure this is leading to an actual increase in 
assistance that counters the PRC's rising influence across the 
developing world. Many recipients of U.S. assistance complain that 
``working with China means we get an airport, while working with the 
United States means we get a lecture.'' Can you detail what types of 
programming USAID defines as ``countering PRC Malign Influence''?

    Answer. We are grateful for Congress appropriating resources for 
the Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF), which allows the Agency to 
strategically invest in key sectors to counter PRC influence.
    USAID development practices elevate inclusion, transparency, 
independence, partnership, sustainability, and respect for human rights 
and democratic norms--and builds on our decades- long history of 
supporting partners to achieve their own priorities and self-
determination.
    This approach, starting with our values, allows us to address the 
unique and broad impact of the PRC's detrimental development model, not 
by forcing countries to choose but by offering a better, more 
sustainable, and affirmative approach that advances accountable 
governance, the rule of law, and human rights protections and 
strengthens the foundations of open, just, transparent, prosperous, and 
sovereign societies.
    USAID has identified four lines of efforts where development 
expertise, investments, and tools can be especially critical in 
supporting sustainable development. These include:

   Supporting partner countries to transparently conserve and 
        manage natural resources, address and adapt to the climate 
        crisis, and better protect the environment.

        For example, the FY 2024 budget proposal will support the 
            countries of the Mekong to jointly and transparently 
            address transboundary challenges on water security, smart 
            hydropower, infrastructure planning, and sustainable 
            development.

        Our Green and Prosperous: Responsible Mining for our 
            Future project is a FY 2021 CCIF-funded activity jointly 
            managed by DDI and ACTF in the green energy minerals sector 
            designed to advance transparent and accountable management 
            of critical minerals as well as supply chain security.

   Empowering partner countries to develop open and secure 
        digital ecosystems--including robust cybersecurity--and 
        policies and regulations consistent with international 
        standards.

        For example, through the South Asia Regional Digital 
            Initiative, USAID propels digital connectivity and economic 
            development in South Asia by strengthening the digital 
            capacity of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), 
            raising awareness around critical cybersecurity issues, and 
            fostering opportunities for MSMEs and governments to engage 
            on digital and ICT policy issues.

        USAID is leading in the International Open RAN Initiative, 
            which is focused on increasing open radio access network 
            market opportunities and demonstrating the development 
            impact of opening up hardware and software markets. The 
            activity is the main U.S.-backed alternative to PRC-based 
            telecom companies and is part of a broader set of 
            programming designed to address PRC efforts to re-shape the 
            internet and telecommunications industry by demonstrating 
            the value of an open, inclusive, and secure internet that 
            respects human rights and reflects democratic values. 
            Implementers for these Open RAN projects include: DAI/
            INVEST (research and planning), Indo-Pacific Opportunities 
            (the Asia ORAN Academy), USAID/Peru CR3CE Alliance, and the 
            Africa Trade and Investment contract.

   Helping partner countries demonstrate that democratic 
        institutions, respect for human rights, and adherence to the 
        rule of law will deliver tangible results for societies and 
        individuals.

        For example, in Timor-Leste, the FY 2024 budget proposal 
            will strengthen civil society and support the Timorese 
            Government's accountability and integrity public 
            administration reform program, which seeks better 
            management of state public resources and improved service 
            delivery.

        At the global level, USAID is working through its Greater 
            Internet Freedom (GIF) project. GIF has two objectives: (1) 
            increase the digital security capacity of civil society 
            organizations, independent media, and human rights 
            defenders, and (2) increase civil society engagement in 
            digital rights policy advocacy in support of a free, open, 
            secure, and interoperable internet. The project advances a 
            model of internet freedom and digital rights that contrasts 
            with authoritarian and sovereign models of the internet. 
            GIF works with a network of international, regional, and 
            local actors in 38 countries throughout the world.

   Ensuring that partner countries can enhance their own 
        resilience and independence so that they can more effectively 
        make their own sovereign decisions.

        For example, in the Philippines, USAID will diversify 
            trade and supply chain linkages related to critical 
            minerals, boost domestic processing capacity, and improve 
            minimum governance standards in the mining sector, thus 
            increasing fair and transparent extraction and weaning the 
            Philippines off its export dependence.

        Another example is from Africa, where USAID is supporting 
            the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF). ALSF is a public 
            international organization housed at the African 
            Development Bank providing legal and technical assistance 
            to African governments on structuring complex transactions 
            related to natural resources, energy, infrastructure, etc. 
            The organization also provides assistance on avoiding 
            unsustainable debt.

    These lines of efforts are also represented in the FY22 State and 
USAID guidance for applying for DA and ESF-CPIF resources, which 
required that all proposals from Posts and Operating Units offer 
programming solutions to address specific problematic PRC influence 
efforts.

    Question. Last April, Solomon Islands signed a security agreement 
with the People's Republic of China, which potentially gives the 
People's Liberation Army a naval presence in the Pacific that threatens 
our allies. The week before that agreement was signed, the State 
Department released a report criticizing the Solomon Islands' stance on 
LGBT rights. What initiatives was USAID supporting in the Solomon 
Islands when that agreement was signed?

    Answer. USAID is committed to supporting Solomon Islands' 
development goals. We have expanded our work in Solomon Islands from 
climate and disaster assistance to additional programming in economic 
development, sustainable fisheries, democracy and governance, health, 
and the environment. Additionally, the recent reopening of the U.S. 
Embassy in Honiara is an important milestone in strengthening our long-
term partnership.
    USAID's largest bilateral initiative in Solomon Islands is the 
Strengthening Competitiveness, Agriculture, Livelihoods and Environment 
(SCALE) Program. Working closely with the Solomon Islands Government, 
the project focuses on economic growth and trade, with specific 
emphasis on the development of the agribusiness sector and improved 
transparent management of the forestry sector. Through SCALE, more than 
20 community groups and organizations have formally registered and 
received funds to pursue locally identified activities that will expand 
reforestation, livelihoods, and environmental protection efforts. SCALE 
also launched a $1 million partnership agreement with the largest cocoa 
exporter in Solomon Islands to enable local farmers to extend their 
network into previously unserved areas and increase cocoa processing 
for domestic consumption and export to New Zealand. SCALE further 
partnered with public, private, and civil society organizations to 
identify 11 agribusiness small scale infrastructure projects that USAID 
will support.
    USAID also has ongoing recovery, disaster risk reduction, and 
resilience bilateral programming in Solomon Islands, with a current 
total estimated investment of $2.3 million. Our activities focus on 
building community-level capacity to understand natural hazards, risks, 
and vulnerabilities, manage and mitigate disaster risks, and improve 
knowledge on early warning systems.

    Question. Similarly, Hungary is likely the most pro-CCP government 
in Europe. Nowhere else in Europe is the need most dire for assistance 
to counter the CCP's influence there. However, this January, you 
traveled to Hungary to meet with leaders of their LGBT community and to 
critique Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's stance on LGBT issues. How 
does that counter CCP influence in Europe?

    Answer. In October 2022, USAID relaunched work in several Central 
European countries including Hungary, with a focus on strengthening 
civil society, democratic institutions, and independent media. With 
USAID undertaking this new programming, I subsequently traveled to 
Hungary in February 2023 to underscore for the Hungarian people, 
government, and our partners on the ground the strong commitment of the 
U.S. on issues such as fighting corruption, promoting the rule of law, 
and expanding civic engagement--priorities for USAID that also counter 
the governance model advanced by the People's Republic of China. During 
the trip, I engaged with various groups, including youth, governance 
and transparency advocates, and members of Hungary's LGBTQI+ community. 
In meeting with this community, I had the opportunity to hear about the 
very difficult experiences of many LGBTQI+ people in Hungary, who often 
face marginalization, discrimination, and fears about their safety and 
livelihoods. I emphasized that the United States stands with LGBTQI+ 
people, and supports their right to live lives free of interference and 
persecution. I believe that support for core tenets of democracy, 
including equality, dignity and human rights, is a distinguishing 
feature of U.S. foreign policy when compared to that of the People's 
Republic of China. More broadly, U.S. investments in the people of 
Hungary--like those launched by USAID--demonstrate the importance of 
our long friendship and contribute to countering PRC influence in the 
region. The trip also offered an opportunity to engage in candid 
conversation with Hungarian leaders, including the Ministers of 
Justice, Defense, and Chair of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Committee, where I discussed key concerns and encouraged a 
constructive approach to bolster our relationship at this critical 
juncture.

    Question. According to USAID's website, USAID still provides 
development assistance to the People's Republic of China. While this 
does not go to the Government of the PRC or to the CCP, some of this 
funding goes to ``addressing key cross-border challenges of global 
consequence'' including ``reducing greenhouse gas emissions,'' 
``preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS,'' and ``combating wildlife 
trafficking.'' Can you confirm whether any of this development 
assistance benefits the CCP or the government of the PRC, including 
local level government bodies?
    Does this assistance benefit Chinese companies, or non-government 
organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party?

    Answer. USAID does not provide assistance to or through the 
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), nor does USAID 
assistance directly benefit companies or non-governmental organizations 
affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. Besides activities 
supporting ethnic Tibetans within the PRC, USAID's only activities in 
the PRC are focused on countering wildlife trafficking, a transnational 
crime with global economic and security impacts as well as public 
health risks. These activities help reduce the availability of and 
demand for illegal wildlife products in China. We are working on 
updating USAID's website to reflect this.

    Question. Is China a developing country?

    Answer. No. The PRC should not receive preferential treatment or 
assistance as a result of having the status of a developing country, as 
defined by the World Bank given its per capita income.

    Question. Does China lack the resources, financial or otherwise, or 
the capability to handle these ``cross border challenges of global 
consequence'' itself?

    Answer. While the People's Republic of China has the resources and 
capacity to handle ``cross border challenges of global consequences'' 
itself, it does not have the will or the inclination to be a 
cooperative global partner on many issues that are of concern to the 
region and the rest of the world. COVID-19 proved that there are many 
areas where international cooperation or pressure are still vital to 
solve transnational challenges that directly harm U.S. citizens like 
pandemics, climate resilience, and the flow of illicit drugs and 
wildlife.

    Question. How does development assistance provided to entities in 
the PRC help combat the CCP's malign influence?

    Answer. USAID assistance does not directly benefit the PRC 
Government or CCP entities. USAID's TRAPS Wildlife Trafficking activity 
helps reduce the trade in illegal and/or high-risk wildlife and related 
products in the PRC. This trade harms wildlife populations in Africa 
and other regions outside of China, increases the risk of zoonotic 
disease spillover, while also benefiting criminal networks and corrupt 
individuals.
    Separately, under an annual $10 million congressional directive, 
USAID implements six awards in regions that have significant Tibetan 
populations in the PRC. In the face of PRC pressure to assimilate, our 
assistance helps ethnic Tibetan communities become more self-reliant 
and resilient, as well as helping to preserve their cultural heritage. 
USAID does not provide assistance to or through the government of the 
PRC. There are currently six activities, the first four of which run 
through 2024, while the last two run through 2027. For activities that 
will end in 2024, new activities are in the design process. These 
activities will build on current programs that aim to engage local 
Tibetan communities in cultural preservation, develop market linkages 
for established Tibetan businesses, identify community-led restoration 
plans and best management practices of soil, grassland, forest, and 
water resources with a focus on traditional Tibetan livelihoods, and 
increase the availability of basic health services for Tibetans.

    Question. If we're going to more effectively compete with China, we 
have to start investing in trade and infrastructure and move away from 
antiquated models of aid. In 2018, Congress established the 
International Development Finance Corporation to directly compete with 
the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative, but the DFC still remains fairly 
isolated from other U.S. efforts to compete with China and often does 
not focus on projects that would actually advance U.S. interests. How 
does USAID plan to work more closely with the DFC to actually invest in 
infrastructure to help countries build markets rather than perpetuate 
dependence on foreign aid?

    Answer. In establishing the DFC, Congress put forth a number of 
institutional linkages between USAID and DFC, which we have been 
working in close partnership to implement since the DFC launched. 
USAID's transactional partnership with DFC is centered on mobilizing 
much needed investment in the countries where we work. These 
investments are crucial in supporting USAID's work to catalyze private 
sector-led economic development in our partner countries and help build 
markets while offering alternative financing to that of PRC.
    Since DFC launched, it has completed 66 transactions and invested 
more than $900 million towards USAID development objectives. These are 
deals that USAID missions helped originate and support because of the 
impact on local markets, including investing in micro, small and medium 
and enterprises (MSMEs) that are vital parts of economic development in 
our partner countries. One example, which was supported by funds made 
available from the Countering China Influence Fund (CCIF), was a 
partnership with DFC and the African Union Development Agency to 
bolster financial inclusion and drive economic opportunity in low- and 
lower-middle income countries and increase food security and bolster 
food systems across sub-Saharan Africa.
    DFC is best positioned to speak to its work to align with U.S. 
efforts to compete with PRC and advance U.S. interests. However, as a 
Board member of DFC, USAID has seen the advancement of a number of 
geopolitically important projects over the past 2 years which the USAID 
Administrator has voted to approve when presented to the Board. For 
example, the Board recently voted to approve an equity investment to 
TechMet, an investment platform focused on mine assets that produce 
minerals and metal, to support a downstream investment to Brazilian 
Nickel for operations and the expansion of its open pit nickel and 
cobalt mine in Brazil. These types of investments help counter and 
diversify away from PRC dominated supply chains.

    Question. To what extent is USAID working with DFC to address 
complex issues, like diversifying the supply chains of developing 
countries away from China?

    Answer. USAID and DFC work very closely to address complex 
development issues globally. Over the past 2 years our teams have 
partnered to advance 66 DFC investments and more than $900 million of 
commitments towards USAID development objectives, including a host of 
complex issues--whether supporting businesses through economic recovery 
from the COVID-19 pandemic, combating food insecurity and global shocks 
in agriculture supply chains, supporting Venezuelan migrant communities 
in Colombia to help them grow their businesses and drive economic 
growth, or ensuring that Ukrainian small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
have capital for much needed operational expenses.
    USAID's Supply Chain Integrity and Freedom program is working with 
DFC to identify opportunities where DFC might be able to support 
investments in private companies to advance vital supply chains for 
American prosperity & security of newly emerging supply chains to 
include critical minerals, vital construction materials, agricultural 
inputs, pharmaceutical precursors, and microchip manufacturing 
equipment.
    As a Board member, the USAID Administrator continues to support 
DFC's ability to mobilize capital to advance U.S. development and 
foreign policy interests.

   In December 2021, the Board voted to approve a $500 million 
        loan to First Solar, an American solar manufacturing company, 
        to construct a solar PV module manufacturing facility in Tamil 
        Nadu, India--a critically important project to advance 
        alternative supply chains within the energy sector.

   In September 2022, the Board voted to approve an equity 
        investment to TechMet, an investment platform focused on mine 
        assets that produce minerals and metal, to support a downstream 
        investment to Brazilian Nickel for operations and the expansion 
        of its open pit nickel and cobalt mine in Brazil. The Board 
        approved potential follow-on investments from TechMet in other 
        eligible markets. These types of investments help counter and 
        diversify away from PRC dominated supply chains.

    We look forward to continuing to partner with and support DFC in 
combating complex global development challenges.

    Question. According to USAID's Scaling Up Renewable Energy (SURE) 
website, the program aims to meet international climate commitments, 
strengthen energy security via private investment and procurement of 
clean electricity. However, many of the clean energy aid programs, such 
as solar-powered aid projects and wind turbine projects, source these 
products or components made in China. Besides USAID subsidizing China's 
industry by using solar panels and wind turbines parts for aid 
projects, the production of these items in China is anything but 
``clean'' and simply provides the veneer that these USAID projects 
somehow reduce Co2 emission. Further, there is ample concern that 
components used in these projects are likely connected to forced labor 
in China. How does USAID ensure that solar panels, wind turbines, or 
other ``clean'' energy products/components are not made in China by 
slave labor?

    Answer. The vast majority of USAID energy sector assistance is 
unrelated to the procurement of renewable energy generation technology, 
such as solar panels, either directly or through its implementing 
partners. Nonetheless, all USG contract and assistance awards include 
an unambiguous prohibition on the use of forced labor in the 
performance of the award. In addition, for certain awards (as 
prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation), USAID requires 
certification from both contractors and recipients that they have a 
compliance plan in place to prevent this prohibited activity (See ADS 
303mav (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/303mav.pdf), 
paragraph 5 and FAR 52.222-56 (https://www.acquisition.gov/far/52.222-
56)). USAID further advises all of its implementing partners, as well 
as USAID staff overseeing awards, to make use of a number of U.S. 
Government-provided resources that identify entities who have been 
determined to engage in forced labor practices (such as DHS's UFLPA 
Entities List (https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list)). This 
prohibition is enforced by USAID through its contract and grant 
management processes, and violations may result in termination of the 
award and referral to USAID's Suspending and Debarring Official. 
However, in the rare instances in which items such as solar panels are 
directly procured, they are deemed ``commercial products'' under 
government-wide procurement regulations, and as such USAID is obligated 
to rely on contractors' existing quality assurance systems as a 
substitute for government inspection. This reliance does not alleviate 
contractors of their legal obligation to refrain from using forced 
labor in the performance of federal awards.

    Question. Are implementing or third-party partners for these 
``clean'' energy aid projects required to source from non-China 
suppliers?

    Answer. Consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements, all 
commodities and services procured under a USAID contract or assistance 
award generally must be sourced from the United States, the recipient 
country, or a developing country. Notably, in this context, USAID 
regulations define ``sourced'' to mean, in relevant part, ``the country 
from which a commodity is shipped to the cooperating/recipient country 
. . . irrespective of the place of manufacture or production.'' China 
is not considered a developing country for this purpose, so 
implementing partners cannot source from China unless a waiver has been 
issued, in accordance with USAID's regulations and policies.

    Question. Do current or future ``clean'' energy aid products, 
funded by USAID, contain Chinese produced solar panels or wind 
turbines?

    Answer. USAID does not maintain a centralized database of the point 
of origin for all equipment purchased by USAID through our programs to 
be able to answer this question definitively. However, only a small 
percentage of USAID Clean Energy funding is used for direct purchases 
of equipment, and USAID does not purchase energy equipment directly 
from China. However, given the prevalence of products across all supply 
chains that were initially manufactured in the PRC and then integrated 
into commodities sourced from the U.S. or developing countries, our 
experts assess that some components produced in the PRC are likely to 
be contained within globally sourced energy equipment at this time 
until competitive alternative supply chains are available. USAID fully 
embraces the need for alternative supply chains and supports 
development of manufacturing capabilities in partner countries where 
practical, such as facilitating domestic smart meter production in 
Pakistan.

    Question. With rising prices for gas, food, schools and housing, 
working families across America remain rightly concerned that their 
taxpayer dollars must be fairly and effectively spent. We owe it to 
American taxpayers to provide them with information and certainty that 
their money is not going to fund some Ukrainian oligarch's personal 
slush fund. Repeated reports from USAID's Office of Inspector General 
have found no evidence that assistance funds have been misused. While 
this looks like good news, this seems too good to be true. I would find 
it hard to believe that even a federal program in the United States 
would mean absolutely zero incidents of misuse. Do you stand by the 
findings of these OIG reports?

    Answer. USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has declared that 
providing independent oversight of USAID's support of Ukraine and its 
people is its top priority. Information concerning their efforts can be 
found on OIG's website specifically dedicated to Ukraine oversight: 
https://oig.usaid.gov/our-work/ukraine-oversight. We have no reason or 
basis to question the findings of OIG's reports. While we defer to OIG 
to answer specific questions about its work, we note the following 
statement from USAID Acting Deputy (performing the duties of the 
Inspector General) Nicole Angarella before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on March 29, 2023:

        ``Our investigators have provided more than 20 fraud awareness 
        briefings to nearly 1,000 individuals employed by at least 9 
        organizations receiving USAID funds for programming in Ukraine. 
        In these briefings, our special agents train aid workers and 
        contractors to identify fraud indicators, potential misconduct, 
        and other program vulnerabilities at an early stage, and report 
        allegations directly to OIG. Our special agents and legal 
        counsel also explain the whistleblower protections available 
        under U.S. law to individuals from any country who elect to 
        come forward. Specifically, our work relies on the ability of 
        complainants to report information affecting USAID awards 
        without fear of reprisal, and we aggressively investigate 
        allegations of whistleblower retaliation. We also worked 
        closely with our colleagues at the State Department and DoD 
        OIGs to produce joint hotline materials in English and 
        Ukrainian. Since broadcasting our joint message to report fraud 
        to the OIGs, my office has received a substantial influx of 
        reports. Specifically, since the issuance of our hotline 
        materials, USAID OIG's hotline has received 178 reports related 
        to Ukraine. This represents a 556 percent increase in reports 
        from the previous 11-month period. To date, we have no serious 
        criminal findings associated with USAID assistance to Ukraine. 
        However, this increase in reporting shows that our outreach is 
        working, and individuals know how to report potential misuse of 
        USAID funds.''

    USAID is confident in OIG, its oversight work in Ukraine, and its 
current reporting. USAID is in regular communication with OIG regarding 
direct budget support to Ukraine, and has provided OIG with relevant 
information to help ensure they can effectively perform their 
independent oversight role. OIG has alter-ego authority to access the 
same documents or records that USAID has access to, in order to carry 
out OIG's independent oversight responsibilities. As Acting Deputy IG 
Angarella noted in her House Foreign Affairs Committee testimony:

        ``[OIG] recently issued three products related to USAID's 
        Direct Budget Support (DBS) to the Government of Ukraine. The 
        first report was an Information Brief that described the three 
        different World Bank trust funds that USAID's money has gone 
        through, and the oversight mechanisms associated with each 
        fund. The second and third DBS products detailed and assessed 
        the monitoring and safeguards in place to prevent corruption 
        and ensure accountability within USAID's DBS programming. In 
        these reports, we found that the oversight mechanisms aligned 
        with the U.S. Government Accountability Office's standards for 
        internal control. In a future report, we plan to assess the 
        effectiveness of these established mechanisms.''

    Question. According to these reports, USAID primarily relies on 
Deloitte's Ukraine branch to audit Ukrainian Government spending of 
U.S. assistance funds and that all of these employees are Ukrainian 
nationals. Do U.S. auditors play any part in verifying Ukrainian 
Government spending of U.S. taxpayer dollars?

    Answer. Under USAID's State-Owned Enterprise Reform Activity 
(SOERA), Deloitte provides technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Finance and other Ukrainian Government institutions on existing 
processes and procedures to oversee and report on direct budget support 
funding provided by USAID. This includes reporting on the use of funds, 
results achieved, and metrics used to measure results. The USAID 
Mission in Kyiv is working to procure an independent, third-party 
auditor to audit DBS funding, which will not include Deloitte given its 
role in providing technical assistance to the Government of Ukraine 
under SOERA. Deloitte has 12 Ukrainian nationals and 21 Americans 
engaged in DBS verification.

    Question. How many direct hire USAID employees are physically 
working in Ukraine?

    Answer. As of April 26, 2023, USAID's Mission in Ukraine is staffed 
with 110 people, of which 47 (40 Foreign Service Nationals and 7 U.S. 
Direct Hires) are working inside Ukraine. Under an Embassy cap of 106 
U.S. Direct Hire positions operating in Kyiv, 7 of those belong to 
USAID (6 Mission U.S. Direct Hire and one Disaster Assistance Response 
Team lead). USAID's Mission in Ukraine follows the U.S. Embassy 
security guidelines and maintains a limited staffing footprint in 
Ukraine.

    Question. Has USAID used implementing partners or USAID direct hire 
employees to verify oversight of USAID aid and programs in Ukraine?

    Answer. USAID uses both direct hire employees and implementing 
partners to verify oversight of USAID aid and programs in Ukraine. All 
42 USAID programs in Ukraine continue to operate through the work of 
nearly 1,400 implementing partner staff.
    There are currently direct hire employees working for USAID's 
Ukraine Mission in Ukraine and remotely who provide monitoring and 
oversight of U.S. Government (USG) funding and programs. Mission staff 
hold in-person or virtual meetings with implementing partners and 
program beneficiaries and review reports, deliverables, photos, videos, 
and work plans to ensure activities are on track. Despite the ongoing 
war, USAID continues to implement oversight, monitoring, and 
accountability procedures in line with Agency directives. Requirements 
for monitoring, accountability, and oversight of USG funds and USG-
funded equipment are included in all contracts and grants. Our 
implementing partner staff are also vital to these efforts--of nearly 
1,400 implementing partner staff from USAID Ukraine Mission programs, 
over 1,000 remain in Ukraine--in addition to 47 Ukraine Mission staff 
still in-country (of 102 total). Activity-specific accountability 
includes the role of the Contracting/Agreement Officer's Representative 
to ensure compliance with monitoring and evaluation procedures and 
policy. This is supplemented by the Mission's overarching monitoring 
and evaluation team. Every activity has a Monitoring and Evaluation 
Plan with specific indicators and quantifiable targets. Work plans, 
regular reporting, and Risk Assessment and Management Plans are all 
required. USAID engagement with Ukrainian Government counterparts and 
civil society organizations increases visibility on assistance delivery 
and impact. Almost all Mission activities undergo a third-party 
evaluation.
    In order to implement humanitarian assistance, the USAID Disaster 
Assistance Response Team team, currently composed of humanitarian 
experts based in Rzeszow, Poland, and in Kyiv, is augmented by a 
Response Management Team in Washington and supported by additional 
Monitoring and Evaluation and Risk Management specialists. USAID 
utilizes direct monitoring, third-party monitoring, and implementing 
partners' own monitoring and reporting, and continuously assesses and 
mitigates risks related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in 
Ukraine. Despite a limited footprint in Kyiv, USAID conducts direct 
oversight of humanitarian assistance award activities with the approval 
of the U.S. Embassy's Ukraine Regional Security Officer. USAID also 
uses third-party monitoring to mitigate access limitations and 
independently monitor our humanitarian assistance partners' activities. 
In addition, every partner is required to abide by an approved 
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, which is reviewed by USAID prior to 
implementation. Direct monitoring and third-party monitoring complement 
the monitoring by implementing partners to provide greater oversight, 
accountability, and visibility into the efficacy of USAID programming.
    USAID currently delivers Direct Budget Support (DBS) to Ukraine 
through the World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity 
Endurance (PEACE) mechanism, which reimburses the Government of Ukraine 
(GOU) for expenses incurred in pre-approved expenditure categories. 
Funding is only disbursed to the GOU following verification of expenses 
by the Ministry of Finance and World Bank, which minimizes risk of 
diversion. USAID contracted an independent third-party monitor, 
Deloitte, to review financial controls and procedures utilized by the 
GOU to track and oversee U.S. funds being used for DBS. Deloitte's 
experts are reviewing the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance's existing 
monitoring, transparency, verification and reporting systems and 
procedures, identifying and strengthening responses to gaps, and 
supporting reporting on DBS tranches. Deloitte is conducting three 
tiers of spot checks to trace payments from the U.S. Government through 
the World Bank to the GOU's Single Treasury Account (Tier 1), then to 
recipient governmental organizations and institutions (Tier 2), and 
ultimately down to individual beneficiaries (Tier 3).

    Question. Since the start of the invasion in February 2022, the 
U.S. has provided billions of dollars in ``direct budgetary support'' 
to the Ukrainian Government to offset its shortfalls in tax collection. 
This support is going to pay the salaries and pensions of Ukrainian 
public officials, to ensure continuation of Ukrainian public services. 
While this may have made sense at the beginning of the invasion when 
there was an urgent need to help Ukraine handle a dramatic shock to its 
public finances, Ukraine has now had the time to adjust. What 
assistance is USAID providing to ensure Ukraine regains its ability to 
be self-reliant in paying public sector salaries?

    Answer. The U.S. Government, and USAID in particular, continues to 
focus on helping Ukraine win the war and set the right conditions for a 
speedy recovery, reconstruction, and ultimately self- reliance. USAID 
is working to help Ukraine's economy--critical to help Ukraine regain 
its fiscal strength--through activities such as implementing critical 
infrastructure for export, investing in digitization, supporting 
Ukrainian businesses, advancing economic reforms, and facilitating 
private and foreign direct investment. We are helping Ukraine expand 
trade throughout the country and build import and export relationships 
with the European Union and the United States, with the goal of 
restarting and expanding the production of goods and services in 
Ukraine, increasing access to markets for Ukrainian products, creating 
jobs, and restoring government tax revenues. We are also focused on 
helping specific vulnerable groups, such as veterans, persons with 
disabilities, female-headed households, and internally displaced 
persons and returnees. This will enable Ukraine to more fully utilize 
its labor potential and generate revenue needed for recovery.

    Question. Has USAID approached the Ukrainian Government on the need 
to consider other possibilities to remain solvent, such as reducing the 
salaries of government workers, or re-examining the steep tax cuts 
Ukraine announced at the start of the war?

    Answer. USAID assesses that it is unlikely that the Government of 
Ukraine (GOU) will be able to increase revenue while Russia continues 
to wage its illegal war through its indiscriminate and destructive 
bombing campaign. While USAID has not approached the GOU about further 
reducing salaries for government employees or re-evaluating previous 
tax cuts in order for the GOU to raise revenues, we note, however, that 
the GOU has already instituted austerity measures, which includes 
downsizing their government. All national ministries are downsizing by 
30 percent, even as the country looks to cut unemployment and get at 
least 1 million people back to work. The goal is to combine redundant 
parts of ministries, streamline actions, and redefine what the 
government should be doing. The result of these efforts has reduced 
their fiscal budgetary needs from $5 billion per month to $3.5 billion 
per month. USAID is also working with the GOU on reforms in critical 
sectors of the economy and infrastructure, so that Ukraine has the 
ability to raise revenues in the future through increased market 
activity.

    Question. How much are our European counterparts contributing to 
ensuring that the Ukrainian Government remains solvent?

    Answer. Since the start of Russia's war of aggression, the European 
Union (EU), Member States, and the European Financial Institutions--in 
a Team Europe approach--are making available up to =37.8 billion in 
financial, humanitarian, and budget support to Ukraine as of April 
2023. To ensure the Ukrainian Government remains solvent, the EU is 
providing up to =25.2 billion in direct budget support through highly 
concessional loans through 2023 in addition to =2.3 billion in EU 
guarantees. Of the =18 billion allocated for 2023, the EU disbursed the 
first =3 billion in January 2023 and has been distributing =1.5 billion 
a month since March with a third installment of =1.5 billion made on 
April 25. This package will support paying wages and pensions and 
maintaining essential public services, such as hospitals, schools, and 
housing for relocated people. It will also ensure macroeconomic 
stability and help restore critical infrastructure that has been 
destroyed.
    The EU has provided approximately 4 million people from Ukraine 
with temporary protection status since February 2022, granting 
displaced people fleeing the war in Ukraine certain rights in the EU, 
including a residence permit, access to the labor market and suitable 
accommodation or housing, medical care, and access to education for 
children. The EU has made up to =17 billion available to member states 
to assist with refugees in the EU. Unofficially, the European 
Commission estimates total EU member state spending on refugees at =20 
billion in 2022, and =30 billion per year in 2023 and 2024.
    Other donors are also stepping up. Norway, Canada, and Japan have 
committed more than the United States when calculating funding as a 
percentage of gross domestic product. On February 16, 2023, Norway 
announced a $7.3 billion, 5-year support package to Ukraine--the 
breakdown for all years has not been announced, but will likely include 
approximately $3.7 billion in civilian assistance. On March 15, Denmark 
announced the creation of a new $1 billion Ukraine Fund to include 
military, civil, and commercial support. The fund will provide $770 
million for military assistance; $170 million for civilian support, 
including humanitarian efforts and long-term reconstruction; and $60 
million for business subsidies to assist Danish businesses contributing 
to the rebuilding of Ukraine.
    The scope and scale of Putin's brutality requires a sustained, 
shared response. The United States has rallied our partners to respond 
swiftly and as a unified force. USAID continues to use every 
opportunity to raise the importance of sustained financial support to 
Ukraine with European and other like-minded donor counterparts.

    Question. Next year, Venezuela is scheduled to hold general 
elections. The democratic opposition faces an uphill battle to win 
these elections, to say the least. As long as the Maduro regime 
controls the central election commission, it is absolutely certain the 
results will be rigged in their favor.
    What assistance is USAID providing to the Venezuelan democracy 
movement to give them the best chance possible to compete in next 
year's elections?

    Answer. The Maduro regime has yet to demonstrate willingness to 
allow necessary conditions for free and fair elections in 2024. 
However, the Venezuelan opposition has won important elected positions 
under unfavorable conditions in the past. The October 22 primaries are 
an opportunity for the opposition to regain momentum and expand their 
appeal in Venezuela, while the Maduro regime itself is nearing an all 
time low in popularity.
    USAID is supporting the Venezuelan pro-democracy movement through 
technical assistance, focusing on activities that promote the 
democratic opposition's consensus and collective action, including a 
primary. USAID supports activities to monitor and improve electoral 
conditions, report irregularities, and ensure that news of 
irregularities is shared widely. USAID supports independent 
stakeholders and civil society to mobilize Venezuelans in the defense 
of their political rights and advocate for a more competitive, 
inclusive, and transparent electoral process. USAID does not support 
specific candidates or political parties.

    Question. Is USAID considering providing any other assistance to 
help the opposition respond to the possibility that elections will end 
up handing the Maduro regime a rigged victory?

    Answer. USAID supports democratic civil society and independent 
media organizations in holding the regime accountable for its actions. 
Our assistance includes activities to monitor and improve electoral 
conditions, report irregularities, and ensure news of irregularities is 
shared widely.
    USAID will continue our long-standing support for outreach and 
communication efforts that describe standards and procedures for 
electoral participation to the Venezuelan public. USAID will also 
provide assistance to facilitate and mobilize Venezuelans to register 
or update their voter registration and mobilize citizens to defend free 
and fair elections should the regime subvert a competitive democratic 
process in the run up to, the day of, and after election.
    In the event that rigged elections hand the Maduro regime a tainted 
victory, USAID will continue to support independent stakeholders and 
civil society to mobilize Venezuelans in the defense of their political 
rights and a more competitive, inclusive, and transparent electoral 
process.

    Question. Late last year, the Unitary Platform and the Maduro 
regime agreed to establish a humanitarian fund, under the auspices of 
the United Nations, to provide assistance to Venezuela. Given USAID's 
long experience of providing humanitarian experience in Venezuela, what 
is USAID's main role in this process?
    Has USAID briefed Congress on the distribution of these funds? If 
not, when is Congress expected to be briefed?
    What are the chances that a UN administered fund will result in 
money being directed towards the Maduro regime?
    What participation, if any, is USAID considering providing in this 
proposed humanitarian fund?

    Answer. USAID is tracking closely that the Unitary Platform and 
Maduro regime officials signed the Mesa Social humanitarian agreement 
on November 26, 2022, committing both parties to pursue joint 
initiatives to benefit the Venezuelan people and address humanitarian 
needs using frozen Government of Venezuela funds for assistance in 
Venezuela. USAID's role is strictly advisory, providing information on 
the humanitarian response in Venezuela to the interagency and to the UN 
as discussions proceed regarding the possibility of establishing a 
trust fund. Thus far, USAID has shared experiences working with various 
UN agencies and has reiterated the importance of maintaining 
humanitarian principles.
    USAID has not briefed Congress on the establishment of a trust fund 
or distribution of funds. To the best of our knowledge, no funds have 
been distributed to date, but we defer to our colleagues at the 
Department of State and Department of Treasury, who are in the lead on 
this initiative.
    USAID is not currently planning to put any funding into the 
proposed UN-managed trust fund, nor would USAID have a management role 
to play.

    Question. The Biden administration has spent far too much time 
alienating allies and far too little time strengthening partnerships 
with key countries, especially in our hemisphere. For example, the 
Dominican Republic has been overwhelmed by the collapse of Haiti--yet 
instead of working together to assist them, the Biden administration 
accuses the Dominican Government of discrimination. How is USAID 
assisting the Dominican Republic deal with the negative consequences 
caused by the instability in Haiti?

    Answer. USAID's budget in the Dominican Republic has risen 
significantly, from $37.6 million in Fiscal Year 2019 to $64.4 million 
in Fiscal Year 2022, helping us to more effectively address development 
challenges in the Dominican Republic, including as a result of 
instability in Haiti. Our efforts support the Government of the 
Dominican Republic's priorities in areas such as: Citizen Security and 
Anti-Corruption; Education; Climate Resilience; Energy; Biodiversity; 
Food Security; Health; and Vulnerable Populations and Human Rights.
    Our transboundary approach allows us to address conflict mitigation 
and management, health disparities for those living with HIV, and 
economic and environmental threats along the Dominican-Haitian border 
and throughout the Dominican Republic. For instance, our health 
programs provide migrants and people of Haitian descent with tailored 
services, given their increased risks of HIV/AIDS infection and low 
treatment coverage. USAID-supported community justice houses increase 
access to justice for vulnerable populations, including migrants and 
people of Haitian descent. Under the Caribbean Basin Security 
Initiative, USAID addresses transnational crime threats by supporting 
youth at risk of becoming involved in crime or violence and helping key 
security institutions, including the Dominican National Police, to more 
effectively and transparently address crime.
    We have designated the Dominican Republic both under the Democracy 
Delivers and Partnership for Democratic Development initiatives. As 
such, we are directing additional resources to support the Government 
of the Dominican Republic's commitment to democracy, including by 
mitigating the effects of instability in Haiti. One way USAID is doing 
this is by advancing economic development to support trade, investment, 
and employment in the Dominican Republic's northwest region, which 
borders Haiti.

    Question. The political, economic, and humanitarian situation in 
Haiti has deteriorated significantly in recent years. The situation is 
so severe that more than 75 percent of Port-au-Prince and 60 percent of 
the country are controlled by violent gangs that disrupt people's 
access to food, fuel, education, and a normal life. The gangs have made 
providing humanitarian aid to some parts of the country all but 
impossible. How is USAID working across humanitarian, development, and 
stabilization programs to address the extraordinary level of need in 
Haiti?

    Answer. USAID has been actively working to address the significant 
challenges faced by Haiti, including political, economic, and 
humanitarian issues. In response to the deteriorating situation, USAID 
has implemented a comprehensive approach that encompasses humanitarian, 
development, and stabilization programs in Haiti.
    Humanitarian Assistance: Despite the highly insecure operating 
environment that challenges humanitarian access, humanitarian 
organizations, including USAID partners, continue to reach people in 
need in Haiti. The United States is the single largest donor of 
humanitarian assistance to Haiti. This funding is helping partners meet 
the urgent humanitarian needs of people across Haiti. USAID's partners 
provide emergency food and nutrition assistance; deliver protection 
services, including gender-based violence prevention and response; 
distribute medical supplies and medicines; and improve access to safe 
water, including to respond to the ongoing cholera epidemic.
    USAID remains deeply concerned by the adverse impacts of ongoing 
violence and insecurity on civilians. To ensure the protection of 
civilians in Haiti, we are working with our humanitarian partners to 
overcome access constraints and effectively deliver needs-based 
assistance to the most vulnerable while mitigating harm. USAID 
continues to advocate for unhindered humanitarian access with relevant 
parties to reach people in need with critical aid. Free and open roads 
and access for aid workers are essential for the successful delivery of 
life-saving assistance.
    Since USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team to Haiti 
in mid-October 2022, we have transported a total of more than 450 MT of 
critical supplies including health, logistics, and water, sanitation, 
and hygiene commodities to partners responding to needs from the 
complex humanitarian emergency and cholera epidemic. In addition, the 
UN announced a system-wide scale-up of humanitarian response activities 
in Haiti on April 17, 2023. The scale-up will be in place for an 
initial 3 months, from April through July 14, 2023. Along with the 
scale-up, the humanitarian community is activating a number of 
humanitarian clusters in order to address the high level of need in 
Haiti. The UN also released the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 
for Haiti on April 21, requesting $719.9 million--the largest appeal 
since Haiti's 2010 earthquake to target 3.2 million people of the 
estimated 5.2 million people in need across the country. The HRP 
prioritizes food and nutrition; health, protection; and water, 
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance.
    Development Programs: USAID works to build a stable and 
economically viable Haiti, focusing on improving health and education 
outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving the 
independence and accountability of government institutions. Our 
development assistance provides economic opportunity through inclusive, 
environmentally sustainable agriculture development and micro-, small-, 
and medium-sized business development, and improves the economic and 
environmental resilience of communities. USAID health programs work to 
fight infectious disease and improve primary healthcare services, and 
increase access to water and sanitation services. USAID also seeks to 
strengthen the organizational capacity to respond to natural and 
manmade emergencies, and to advance citizen-responsive government 
institutions.
    Stabilization Efforts: Given the security challenges posed by 
violent gangs, USAID incorporates stabilization efforts into its 
programs. USAID aims to create a secure environment that allows for the 
provision of essential services and the reestablishment of normalcy in 
affected areas. This includes community engagement, and violence 
prevention initiatives. For example, USAID will soon launch a 5-year 
citizen security program to reduce the level of violence in targeted 
neighborhoods. This activity uses a three-pronged approach that 
connects police and other Haitian Government entities, the communities 
they serve, and social services providers in targeted neighborhoods of 
greater Port-au-Prince.

    Question. How is Haiti prioritized in the FY24 budget? Please list 
specific proposals.

    Answer. The Request prioritized $146.2 million in development and 
global health assistance for Haiti will help build a more stable and 
economically viable Haiti, focused on improving health and education 
outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving the 
independence and accountability of government institutions. Increased 
resources will support violence prevention and reception and 
reintegration activities for returned migrants. Specifically, USAID 
programs will:

   Promote citizen security, good governance, and capacity-
        building for elections; increase multi-sector resilience; and 
        expand locally driven development and civil society. USAID will 
        help administer elections while strengthening the capacity of 
        the provisional electoral commission to administer credible 
        elections.

   Strengthen the justice sector, including reducing pretrial 
        detention and providing justice for violence-affected 
        communities. Funds will strengthen Haiti's supreme audit 
        institution to oversee public spending and conduct performance 
        audits.

   Support better planning, financing, and implementation to 
        mitigate threats to water security, improve water resource 
        management, strengthen the excreta management value chain, and 
        increase access to safe water and sanitation.

   Strengthen decentralized water utilities, community service 
        providers, and relevant local authorities in Haiti. USAID will 
        provide technical assistance to ensure efficient and 
        financially-sound operation of water utilities.

   Provide bilingual, phonics-based literacy instruction and 
        materials, and socio-emotional learning support for 
        marginalized and vulnerable children in elementary schools. 
        USAID will provide entrepreneurial and life skills training, 
        and psychosocial support to develop skills that lead to 
        successful participation in the workplace.

   Support investment facilitation particularly for high-growth 
        small and medium enterprises to support job creation and 
        retention.

   Expand income generating activities in at-risk communities. 
        Activities will strengthen the capacity of people in vulnerable 
        communities to access economic opportunities, jobs, and to 
        reduce economic instability and violence in select areas 
        through skills development and entrepreneurship, particularly 
        for at-risk youth and women.

   Support smallholder farmers to increase yields, sales, and 
        investment in key crops and commodities, including livestock.

   Conserve and restore key watersheds through agriculture, 
        reforestation, land management, and livelihood opportunities 
        for vulnerable households. Funds will mitigate and adapt to 
        climate change impacts, environmental degradation, and natural 
        disasters. USAID will support clean energy initiatives for 
        electric and solar grids and microgrids to increase economic 
        opportunities and private sector growth.

   Confront challenges posed by irregular migration out of 
        Haiti and support reception services for returning migrants by 
        providing cash, medical and social services, and other tools 
        upon arrival in Haiti.

    Given the continuing high levels of urgent humanitarian need, 
USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance anticipates continuing to 
provide significant funding to Haiti in FY24. In FY23, the United 
States has been the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to 
Haiti. Our funding is helping partners meet urgent humanitarian needs 
of people across Haiti by providing emergency food and nutrition 
assistance; delivering protection services, including gender-based 
violence prevention and response; distributing medical supplies and 
medicines and improving access to safe water, including responding to 
the ongoing cholera epidemic.

    Question. What assistance is USAID providing to the newly announced 
transition council intended to provide the framework for holding new 
elections in Haiti by the end of this year?

    Answer. In May, USAID started a new elections program that will 
support the High Council of the Transition (HCT) to provide the 
framework for holding elections in Haiti by the end of this year. The 
program will provide assistance to the Provisional Electoral Commission 
(CEP) to help it implement its institutional mandate, exercise 
oversight functions, and foster greater responsiveness to citizens' 
needs. Technical assistance will be provided to formulate a realistic 
electoral framework and timeline in the current political environment.
    The program will also assist with electoral and constitutional 
reform as requested in areas that include synchronization of national 
and subnational elections, rebalancing power between the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government, and reform of 
electoral law. USAID will facilitate dialogue and participation by a 
broad spectrum of citizens, civil society, and political actors to 
ensure citizen input.
    To educate citizens on the transition process, we will also provide 
strategic communications support to the CEP and HCT.

    Question. As we know all too well in Florida, hurricanes and 
natural disasters frequently impact the Caribbean. USAID has been a 
critical provider of disaster relief for these countries. In 2021 
alone, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance provided $8 billion 
in humanitarian aid. While this spending is important to ensure that 
natural disasters do not drive illegal immigration, this is a 
significant amount of money. As even FEMA is projecting to fall short 
on the Disaster Relief Fund, as soon as this summer, we need to find 
more efficient ways to use foreign aid dollars. In many cases, a modest 
investment in disaster resilience before a hurricane strikes can mean 
much less spending after the fact. We saw this in 1998 with Hurricane 
Mitch in Central America and in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. 
Stronger infrastructures in LAC region countries can be more cost-
effective and contribute to U.S. national security by helping stabilize 
disaster-stricken countries, facilitating faster recovery and 
reconstruction, and reducing pressures for affected populations to 
emigrate. What is USAID doing to support pre-disaster efforts in the 
Caribbean?

    Answer. Populations in the Caribbean are vulnerable to a range of 
natural disasters, including drought, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, 
landslides, and wildfires. These hazards compound existing 
vulnerabilities faced by many communities in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). In FY 2022, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance 
(BHA) provided approximately $110 million to partner organizations 
conducting early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience (ER4) 
activities in 16 countries across LAC. BHA partners with local, 
regional, and national disaster management agencies, non-government 
organizations, civil society, the UN and others to advance countries 
and populations' capacity for disaster preparedness, risk reduction, 
and timely frontline disaster response.
    In the Caribbean, USAID contributed to the establishment of what is 
now known as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency 
(CDEMA), a regional intergovernmental body for disaster coordination 
and management in the Caribbean, and we've continued that enduring 
partnership since 1991. BHA currently funds the UN World Food Program 
(WFP) to strengthen the operational capacity of CDEMA. In FY22, with 
USAID's support, WFP activities enhanced the capacities of CDEMA and 
its 19 member states and territories to strengthen social protection 
systems, emergency telecommunications, and end-to-end humanitarian 
supply chain management.
    USAID utilizes agreements with the U.S. Forest Service and U.S. 
Geological Service to provide technical support to countries to enhance 
their disaster preparedness in the face of wildfires and volcanic 
eruptions. BHA also funds early warning systems such as the Volcanic 
Disaster Assistance Program that monitors volcanic activity in the 
region, enabling early evacuations and preparedness.
    In addition, BHA is prepared to respond to the 2023 hurricane 
season in the Atlantic basin with an experienced team of disaster 
management professionals strategically located throughout LAC, pre-
positioned emergency relief supplies and communications equipment, and 
agreements with partners and service providers to support the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance. BHA has prepositioned USAID-branded relief 
commodities in Miami and Barbados for quick distributions to the most 
vulnerable after a disaster. BHA also maintains agreements with other 
U.S. federal agencies regarding specialized assistance for disaster 
response and ER4 activities, including the National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration, the U.S. Forest Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture; and the Department of Defense (DoD). BHA 
maintains two humanitarian assistance advisors to the military at 
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM, a Regional Civil Military Affairs Coordinator, 
and two BHA staff in Washington, DC, who assist in coordinating USAID 
and DoD humanitarian assistance in LAC.

    Question. Is there an opportunity to pilot a solid partnership 
between universities in the United States and governments willing to 
learn from some of America's most successful disaster mitigation 
researchers in Florida?

    Answer. USAID works in partnership with host country and U.S. 
higher education institutions (HEIs) to ensure higher education 
institutions in our partner countries have the capacity to be central 
actors in disaster risk reduction and development. Faculty and students 
contribute to strengthening all sectors of the economy, including 
agriculture, energy, business services, technology, health, 
engineering, disaster risk reduction and more.
    As part of USAID's partnerships, programs leverage university 
research expertise to solve global development challenges and establish 
global networks of universities to strengthen the capacity of 
individuals and institutions to identify knowledge gaps, discover new 
information, and translate that knowledge into actionable solutions.
    HEIs can play an important role in supporting disaster mitigation. 
USAID is currently partnering with Florida International University 
(FIU) on the Disaster Resilience and Climate in the Americas Program. 
The project works to advance disaster risk reduction (DRR) in Latin 
America and the Caribbean by institutionalizing risk management through 
higher education organizations and encouraging broader participation by 
the academic and scientific communities in disaster preparedness, risk 
reduction, response, recovery, and resilience-building actions. The 
program also works to address the drivers of existing risks and their 
consequences, as well as helping avoid the creation and accumulation of 
new risk, and developing capabilities and mechanisms for building 
resilience. The DRR project is located within the Extreme Events 
Research department at FIU. The Department utilizes FIU's research and 
applications leadership at the global level in extreme events, 
reflecting an institutional interest in development and multi-hazard 
disaster resilience, including disaster risk management, risk 
reduction, preparedness, emergency response, resilience, and ``smart'' 
recovery.
    Additional Examples of Partnerships with Universities in Florida: 
USAID has strong partnerships with HEIs in Florida and welcomes all 
organizations interested in working with USAID to explore publicly 
listed partnership opportunities. Information on partnership 
opportunities is provided on USAID's website (https://www.usaid.gov/
partner-with-us). Examples of current partnerships with HEIs in Florida 
include:

   Florida International University (FIU) signed a Memorandum 
        of Understanding (MOU) with USAID as part of USAID's Minority-
        Serving Institution Partnership Initiative in March 2022 to 
        promote diversity, equity, and inclusion in the workforce for 
        the international development field. The MOU builds on USAID 
        and FIU's long-time collaboration on international development 
        initiatives, such as disaster risk resilience, and marks the 
        first MOU the agency has signed with a Hispanic-Serving 
        Institution (HSI) of higher education. USAID's Innovation, 
        Technology, and Research (ITR) Hub plans to meet with 
        leadership and faculty from FIU's Jack D. Gordon School of 
        Public Policy, on Tuesday May 16, to discuss potential 
        opportunities for engagement.

   University of Florida hosts the U.S. Government's Feed the 
        Future Innovation Lab for Livestock Systems, which uses 
        research to support international agriculture and development 
        in low- and middle-income countries. The goal of the Lab is to 
        sustainably improve livestock production in order to improve 
        the nutrition, health, incomes and livelihoods in partner 
        countries. Through research projects, capacity building, and 
        education, the Lab seeks to reduce poverty, improve food 
        security, enhance nutrition and build resilience. Projects 
        integrate health, food systems, and environment-friendly 
        approaches to ensure sustainability.

   Florida State University's Learning Systems Institute (LSI) 
        is leading a $15.6 million project sponsored by USAID to 
        improve teacher training in Malawi: the Strengthening Teacher 
        Education and Practice (STEP) project. LSI faculty are working 
        with 16 teacher training colleges across the country to improve 
        teacher education programs and develop new training materials 
        related to literacy and numeracy education. The project will 
        also provide support to the Ministry of Education to deliver 
        continuous professional development courses to teachers who are 
        already in classrooms. The STEP project is a landmark 
        investment by USAID to support local institutions of higher 
        education that provide pre-service teacher education.

   University of South Florida (USF) received a $3.6 million 
        grant from USAID to support the Research Initiative for 
        Supporting Education in the Caribbean, also known as the RISE 
        Caribbean Initiative, a project that launched a new 
        interdisciplinary educational research center to support 
        education policy development and timely decision-making on 
        issues impacting schools in the sub-region. The initiative 
        brings together researchers from both USF and The University of 
        the West Indies (UWI) Cave Hill to collaborate on research and 
        activities to help solve ongoing challenges facing the region's 
        schools.

    Question. The President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) purchases 
millions of dollars' worth of commodities, such as medicine, medical 
equipment, and bed nets, to drive malaria elimination in countries all 
around the world. In order to ensure the supply chain resiliency of 
these commodities, PMI has undertaken a market shaping effort to bring 
a diversity of manufacturers into the malaria commodity market. In a 
time where global supply chains can be disrupted by a war in Europe or 
a pandemic sprung from a lab leak in China, it is important that these 
lifesaving goods are sourced from reliable providers in the United 
States. Over the last 5 years, can you provide the volume that PMI has 
procured for malaria-related commodities that has been procured from 
U.S. companies and from non-U.S. companies?

    Answer. The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) works to 
promote a healthy market and operate a resilient supply chain that is 
able to continue to deliver life-saving malaria commodities during both 
global and local disruptions. A core component of this is developing a 
diversified supply base both in terms of the number of qualified 
suppliers from which PMI procures, and the geographic location of the 
manufacturing sites. For example, in 2022, PMI procured malaria 
pharmaceuticals from 12 suppliers with manufacturing sites in six 
countries. This approach helped ensure that malaria commodities 
continued to flow to PMI partner countries during the COVID-19 
pandemic, even as the global supply chain experienced significant 
disruptions.
    Currently, there is limited manufacturing of malaria commodities in 
the United States, including no manufacturing of insecticide-treated 
nets (ITN) or antimalarial pharmaceuticals, our largest spending 
categories. This is primarily because there is not a domestic market 
for malaria commodities given that there are less than 2,000 malaria 
cases in the United States annually. Historically, there was a U.S.-
based supplier of malaria rapid diagnostic tests (mRDT) that were 
manufactured in New Jersey. However, the supplier received a notice of 
concern due to quality issues in 2020, and therefore, was not eligible 
for procurement until the issues were resolved. The supplier has since 
shifted to manufacturing COVID-19 tests. PMI does, however, procure 
laboratory supplies and personal protective equipment manufactured in 
the United States.
    Over the last 5 years, the value of malaria commodities 
manufactured in the United States was $16 million (laboratory supplies, 
mRDTs, PPE) and the value of malaria commodities manufactured outside 
of the United States was $943 million (including ITNs, pharmaceuticals 
and mRDTs).
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. On USAID support natural gas programing: (In your 
testimony on April 26, 2023, you stated that ``[USAID] support[s], for 
example, natural gas programming in instances where it can create 
energy access while not delaying plans [for?] clean energy.''
    Please provide a list of all natural gas deals, including prime 
awardees and subawardees, that have received any funding from USAID 
beginning January 1, 2021, to the present day. The list should include 
the names of the prime awardees and sub awardees receiving any U.S. 
funding, the date and duration of the funding provided, the total 
amount of funding that has been and will be provided, the 
instrumentality of the United States Government that is providing the 
funding, and the stated purpose of the funding.

    Answer. USAID energy programs do not typically fund deals directly 
through either prime awardees or subawardees. The majority of our 
support focuses on the enabling environment for sound energy sector 
development and private sector investment in the sector for long term 
financial sustainability and provision of low cost, reliable energy 
services.
    A list of our assistance to the gas sector that has been vetted 
through our internal vetting procedures is provided below.

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       WSJ Article, ``Solar and Wind Force Poverty on Africa,'' 
             Dated October 24, 2021, by President Museveni

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    Letter From USAID Providing Two Corrections for the Record for 
               Ms. Samantha Power, Dated April 28, 2023 

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