[Senate Hearing 118-100]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-100

                              OPEN HEARING:
   NOMINATIONS OF LT. GEN. TIMOTHY D. HAUGH TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
    SECURITY AGENCY, AND MICHAEL C. CASEY TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             JULY 12, 2023
                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
      
      
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]      


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
53-313                   WASHINGTON : 2024   


                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

           (Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.)

                   MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                  MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ANGUS S. KING Jr., Maine             JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado          JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
JON OSSOFF, Georgia

                CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                 MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                  JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
                              ----------                              

                     Michael Casey, Staff Director
                  Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                             JULY 12, 2023
                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page
Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.......................     1
Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida...........................     3

                               WITNESSES

Lt. Gen. Timothy D. Haugh, Nominated to be Director, National 
  Security Agency................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8
Michael C. Casey, Nominated to be Director, National 
  Counterintelligence and Security Center........................    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13

                         SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Nomination Material for Lt. Gen. Timothy D. Haugh
    Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........    40
    Additional Pre-Hearing Questions.............................    57
    Post-Hearing Questions.......................................    66
Nomination Material for Michael C. Casey
     Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees.......    76
    Additional Pre-Hearing Questions.............................    90
    Post-Hearing Questions.......................................   113

 
  OPEN HEARING: ON THE NOMINATIONS OF LT. GEN. TIMOTHY D. HAUGH TO BE 
 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AND MICHAEL CASEY TO BE DIRECTOR, 
            NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

                        WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in 
Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R. 
Warner, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Warner (presiding), Rubio, Feinstein, 
Wyden, Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Ossoff, 
Risch, Cotton, Cornyn, Lankford, and Rounds.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            VIRGINIA

    Chairman Warner. I'm going to call this hearing to order 
and want to thank you all for being here today. General Haugh, 
it's great to see you again. And Mike Casey, good to see you as 
always.
    Congratulations on both of your nominations to be, 
respectively, the Director of the National Security Agency, or 
NSA, and the Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center, NCSC. I want to also recognize your families. 
I know General Haugh has got both his wife Sherie and his 
daughter here. And Mike has got his wife Sarah here. Although 
there are a series of former staff members from the SSCI, from 
both teams, I'm not sure whether they're here to root you on or 
fully disclose when we say if anyone here, you know, speak your 
peace or forever hold your peace--we'll see what happens at 
that point. But congratulations to both of you.
    General Haugh is a career intelligence officer. He served 
for 31 years in the United States Air Force, the Joint Forces, 
and in the Intelligence Community. Currently, Deputy Commander 
of the United States Cyber Command, General Haugh previously 
served as Commander of the 16th Air Force, Commander of Air 
Force's Cyber, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters Cyber 
at Joint Base San Antonio, where he was responsible for more 
than 44,000 personnel conducting worldwide operations.
    General Haugh, you have an impressive background. You also 
have very big shoes to fill--as Senator Rubio and I said when 
we got with you yesterday--in replacing General Paul Nakasone. 
It has been one of the great opportunities of my tenure, first 
as Vice Chair and now Chair, to work with General Nakasone. And 
we do wish him all the best. Obviously, as soon to be both head 
of the NSA and head of Cyber Command, you have enormous, 
enormous responsibilities. I look forward to hearing more from 
you about how you plan to make sure that NSA and Cyber Command 
are continuing to be poised to deal with a wide range of cyber 
issues, one of which is the China hack on Microsoft and the 
ramifications that has real time.
    Obviously, Mike Casey, I'm not sure it's a good sign or not 
that so few Members from the Majority decided to show up for 
this hearing. But Mike needs no introduction to the Members or 
staff on the Committee. Former Chairman Feinstein brought over 
Mike from the House in 2016 and he served as staff director. 
When I came in as Vice Chair, I asked him to stay and then to 
stay on when I became Chair, and what a wild ride it has been. 
I think about our work with so many of the former staff who are 
here who worked on the bipartisan Russia investigation, which 
took enormous amounts of effort. And I think, generally his 
understated style and the fact that he knows virtually 
everything and everyone in the IC, has been a real asset to 
this Committee. And the fact that he has got the former staff 
director from the Republican side here is an indication, I 
think, of the kind of bipartisan approach that we desperately 
need. I think you'll be a great choice to be the Director of 
the NCSC.
    We all know, the whole notion, in my mind, and a lot of the 
work on this Committee of national security is changing. It is 
no longer simply who has the most planes, ships, tanks, and 
guns. It really is--and again, this Committee has done a lot of 
good work on this--it is about technology competition, whether 
on subjects that are current interests, like AI. But it also 
includes quantum computing; it includes the work this Committee 
has done on 5G; it is a host of areas. Again, both of you will 
have responsibility in those domains.
    Obviously, cyber becomes increasingly an enormous challenge 
in everything we do, not only on the national security side, 
but basically on the whole running of our economy. And we've 
got to make sure that we are well prepared, as we've seen, some 
of the interest we've seen in China's recent hack into 
Microsoft, these authoritarian regimes are not backing off in 
terms of the competition with us and competition with free 
nations around the world. Both of you are going to have 
responsibilities to take on this challenge, whether it be 
China, whether it be Russia. These are the issues that are not 
going away.
    We also know--and this was something that again, this 
Committee--I'm proud of its work--took on a pretty unsexy topic 
a few years back: security clearance reform. We've got to make 
sure we continue to get the best and brightest people in an 
orderly process through a security clearance that both invites 
people in, but also does the appropriate background checks that 
we need to make sure the kind of incident that we had with the 
accused, Mr. Texeira, doesn't happen again. And again, many of 
us on this Committee are working on not only security clearance 
reform, but the whole notion of how many things are classified 
and how we go through a more rational declassification process. 
So, I am very excited about both of your nominations. We're 
grateful for your potential service and for your family's 
willingness to be supportive. We believe that the Intelligence 
Community is the backbone of our national defense, and you are 
both going to play extraordinarily important roles, should you 
be confirmed. Very, very big jobs.
    On a personal note, I just want to say to Mike, thank you 
for your help educating me in the Intelligence Committee. Thank 
you for your wisdom both to encourage me on some projects to 
take on and discourage me strongly on others. I'm grateful for 
that service. And I'm, well, reluctant to see you go. I think 
you're going to do an extraordinary job for our country going 
forward.
    So, with that, I'll turn it over the Vice Chairman.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            FLORIDA

    Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, thank you. But first of all, I 
always thank everyone that appears before us for their 
willingness to serve in these positions.
    General, thank you for your service to our country writ 
large--to both of you really--because you've done that in 
public service in different ways. But now, your willingness to 
step up to these important roles. As the Chairman said, Mr. 
Casey is not a stranger to this Committee. And yet, despite the 
fact that he's so well known, I think he might even have a 
chance to be confirmed. So, we'll see as this plays out.
    I think one of most interesting things about this hearing 
is it really goes to the very foundation of what this is all 
about--what we do in the Intelligence Community in our country. 
We spy on people, we spy on other countries particularly, and 
their leaders and their governments, and they try to spy on us. 
A lot of what we gain--and for the purpose of our national 
security, some of the most foundational intelligence this 
country has collected--continues to be through technical means. 
And that's what, General, you will be stepping up to do here. 
And it's critically important. It informs not just the IC and 
the Department of Defense. Frankly, it informs all kinds of 
public policy that allows them not just to see what's coming in 
a month or in a year, but what long-term trends could be like. 
Perhaps in this era, in which so much is interconnected through 
technical means, it is about the most foundational piece of 
intelligence that we collect on a regular basis and informs all 
the other agencies. It serves everyone in that regard.
    And so, it's critically important to protect those 
capacities. As you know, we're coming up at the end of this 
year on the need to reauthorize what is basically at the heart 
and soul of our ability to collect on foreign targets: 702. And 
it's something I hope that the current Administration will 
prioritize their efforts to move on that, because we are 
running out of time here to get that done.
    On the counterintelligence front, I think that's been as 
challenging as it's ever been for a long time. We are facing a 
return to an era of great power competition. It's a phrase 
that's thrown around a lot. I got here in 2010, when the 
singular focus, not just of this Committee but of the national 
security apparatus, was counterterrorism. And it remains a 
challenge. But now it's increasingly about China and Russia, 
but also what's happening with North Korea, a rogue state with 
nuclear weapons. Iran and its ambitions. This emerging 
alignment of countries around the world who may not be our 
enemies, but who aren't going to be our allies and are looking 
for different ways to leverage the international stage to their 
advantage and play both sides.
    But embedded in that is a real counterintelligence 
challenge for two reasons. The first is, with great power comes 
the ability to also do technical collection. But the other is 
that it's increasingly challenging for us because propaganda 
and disinformation and influence operations have existed in the 
case of every war fought in the last, you know, 5,500 years of 
recorded history. But never before have they been so easy to do 
at such a low cost. And I think that is in the realm of 
counterintelligence--the effort to drive messages that divide 
and pit Americans against each other, that seed information 
into our ecosystem in which free speech is protected by our 
Constitution, in ways designed to demoralize and undermine our 
willingness to fight and, in many ways, our capability to unite 
behind important causes. And that has to be balanced with the 
reality that we still need to ensure that our intelligence 
agencies can never be turned upon our citizens. In fact, the 
worst moments, the most dangerous moments in the history of our 
Intelligence Community have been when it was revealed that they 
were spying on people who were against the Vietnam War. Our 
political enemies are those in office--I'm not talking about 
now; I'm talking about the sixties, seventies, and eighties--to 
the point where those revelations almost destroyed our 
intelligence agencies in our country.
    So, whether it's the foundational elements of our 
intelligence collected through technical means, or our ability 
to withstand not just great power competition in terms of 
counterintelligence, but the influence operations of not-so-
great powers, but who have the ability to do that, whether it's 
through cut-outs, through different methods that they use, we 
face unique challenges that look very different than they did 
ten years ago, and that are rapidly evolving. So, you're both 
stepping into these roles at a critical time for our country, 
for the future of geopolitics.
    I'm thankful for your willingness to serve and look forward 
to hearing your testimony and answers today.
    Chairman Warner. I thank the Vice Chairman.
    General Haugh and Mr. Casey, I'm going to ask you both to 
stand and raise your right hands.
    Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the 
full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. Please be seated.
    I will now go about asking you the five standard questions 
the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. 
Actually, I'm not sure whether these five questions started 
with you, Mike, or with you, Chris. But all things come around. 
They just require a simple yes or no answer for the record.
    One. Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in 
other venues when invited?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. Two, if confirmed, do you agree to send 
officials from your office to appear before the Committee and 
designated staff when invited?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. Three, do you agree to provide documents 
and other materials requested by the Committee in order to 
carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. That's an important question. We had some 
challenges on that more recently.
    Four, will you both ensure that your office and your staff 
provide such materials to the Committee when we request it?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. And five, do you agree to inform and fully 
brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this 
Committee on intelligence activities and covert action, rather 
than only the Chair and Vice Chair?
    General Haugh. Yes.
    Mr. Casey. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General Haugh and Mr. 
Casey.
    We'll now proceed to your opening statements, after which 
I'll recognize Members by seniority for five minutes each for 
questions.
    The floor is yours, gentlemen.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR, 
                    NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

    General Haugh. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee. I am honored to testify 
today for my nomination as Director of the National Security 
Agency and Chief, Central Security Service. I want to thank 
President Biden, Secretary Austin, Director Haines, and General 
Milley for their trust in nominating me for these critical 
positions.
    I'd also like to thank my bride, Sherie, who has served 
with me for the last 31 years. I would also like to thank our 
children, Michael and Chandler, who sacrificed as military 
children and are now thriving as adults. Michael is a captain 
and company commander in the North Carolina National Guard, and 
Chandler is a commercial cybersecurity analyst. Sherie and I 
are incredibly grateful for their sacrifices to enable our 
service as a family.
    I also would like to thank General Nakasone and Susan 
Nakasone for their service to the National Security Agency. 
General Nakasone has 36 years of dedicated service culminating 
as Director of NSA for the last five years. His commitment to 
both the mission and the people during a time of unparalleled 
global change has continued the legacy captured in the Agency's 
watchwords, ``Defend the Nation, Secure the Future.'' I truly 
believe the Nation is defended and the future is secure due to 
his leadership. A special thanks to Susan Nakasone for her 
commitment to her family and for her willingness to focus on 
and address tough issues facing Army and Agency spouses and 
families.
    I am a career intelligence officer who has served 31 years 
in the United States Air Force, within the Joint Force, and the 
Intelligence Community. My service in command and staff 
positions at all levels, to include multiple assignments within 
NSA and the cryptologic enterprise, have given me a deep 
appreciation of NSA's critical importance to the Nation. I am 
honored to have been nominated to lead NSA and serve with its 
incredibly talented professionals.
    NSA's excellence in signals intelligence and cybersecurity 
create unparalleled advantage for the Nation. If confirmed, my 
focus will be to strengthen that advantage. As our Nation's 
competitors seek to reshape the international order and 
challenge our military advantages, we must leverage our 
competitive strengths: people, innovation, and partnerships.
    I believe every great success starts with the people. NSA 
has great people and an incredible mission. To sustain that 
success, NSA must continue to attract diverse talent from 
across the Nation while also providing the environment where 
they can thrive and develop. If confirmed, I will ensure that 
whether an individual stays for a few years or dedicates their 
entire professional career to NSA, people will continue to be 
our foundation and legacy.
    Technology continues to advance at an incredible rate. I 
have always been impressed with how NSA successfully innovates 
to remain on the cutting edge of technological advances. Its 
culture of innovation, its highly skilled workforce, and its 
record of success in applying artificial intelligence and 
advanced computing posture it well to adapt and apply the 
latest technologies to further advance its mission. Throughout 
NSA's history it has learned the great value of partnerships, a 
lesson significantly reinforced by recent experiences in 
response to Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine, and by 
initiatives to meet the near- and long-term challenges of the 
PRC. NSA's ability to work in collaboration across the 
interagency, the private sector, and foreign partners is one of 
the Agency's greatest strengths and critically important to our 
Nation's success in a world of accelerating change.
    If confirmed, I will focus on ensuring the health and 
effectiveness of NSA and its world-class employees in 
delivering outcomes against national priorities, by delivering 
foreign intelligence, ensuring cybersecurity, protecting 
national security systems, and providing combat support to the 
Department of Defense. I will focus on strengthening the 
workforce, ensuring a culture of compliance, investing to 
leverage new technologies, and prioritizing threats facing the 
Nation, especially the pacing challenge posed by the People's 
Republic of China.
    In closing, I am humbled and honored to be considered for 
these positions. The Nation faces challenges at unprecedented 
scale. If confirmed, I look forward to teaming with this 
Committee to posture ourselves to quickly seize opportunities 
to meet and outmaneuver those challenges.
    Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here this 
afternoon. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of the nominee follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. CASEY, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
            COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

    Mr. Casey. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the 
Committee. I'm honored to appear before you as the nominee to 
be Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center. I'm deeply grateful to President Biden for nominating 
me for this position and to Director of National Intelligence 
Haines for her recommendation.
    Like all of us, I'm only here because of the support and 
efforts of others. I'd like to thank in particular my parents, 
Robert and Carol Casey, for raising my brother, sister, and me 
and instilling in us a desire to do the right thing, work hard, 
and make a difference. My father passed away last year, but 
without the example he set for me throughout his life, I would 
not be here. My wife, Sara McLean, who's sitting behind me, and 
my daughter, Erin, who could not be here, have been unstinting 
in their support for my career. And as I've moved through this 
process, I really couldn't do it without them.
    I'd also like to thank those Senators and Members of the 
House who brought me onto Capitol Hill and provided examples of 
what true public service really looks like. I began my service 
28 years ago in the House working for Representative Carrie 
Meek and then Representative Vic Snyder. From them, I learned 
what Members dedicated to helping their constituents and making 
hard decisions look like.
    Chairman Ike Skelton asked me to join the House Armed 
Services Committee and entrusted me with responsibilities far 
in excess of what I deserved.
    Ranking Member Adam Smith, one of the smartest Members of 
the House, provided the constant example of how the best 
Members struggle with the difficult issues and do their best to 
make the right choices for the country.
    Seven and a half years ago, Senator Feinstein asked me to 
join the staff of this Committee as the then-Minority Staff 
Director. I remain deeply grateful to her for giving me that 
opportunity.
    And I'd like to single out Chairman Warner for thanks. He 
kept me on as a staff director when he ascended first to Vice 
Chairman and then Chairman of this Committee. As everyone here 
knows, he's one of the most energetic and dedicated Members of 
the Senate, constantly interested in pushing to find new ways 
to do more to help the country, often much faster than the 
Senate or the entire United States government is capable of 
handling. Thank you for never accepting that there are limits 
to what we accomplished if only we push a little bit more.
    I've been fortunate to serve as a member of two excellent 
committee staffs; that is, the House Armed Services Committee 
and now the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the 
moment I started until the day I left, I never stopped learning 
from the other staff members on HASC, who were always among the 
most professional and experienced staff members I've ever met. 
Serving as the minority staff director and now staff director 
of this Committee has been one of the greatest honors of my 
life. It's not always been a smooth ride. But the staff on both 
sides of the aisle have struggled to always do it right and 
provide bipartisan, effective oversight of the Intelligence 
Community, almost always in ways that the public will never 
hear about but would deeply appreciate if they did.
    I'd be remiss if I didn't thank the current and former 
Members of this Committee for their work also. Joining SSCI is 
often thankless, resisted by your personal offices and your 
campaign staff, and no one who isn't dedicated to ensuring U.S. 
national security would never agree to do this. Former Chairman 
Burr probably provided the best example of this, dedicating 
almost his entire time in Congress to serving on the 
intelligence committees, and spending untold hours with the men 
and women in the IC, working constantly to make the community 
better.
    Finally, I'd like to take a moment to thank the men and 
women of the Capitol Police who guard the doors of the 
Committee and more importantly, become part of the SSCI 
community. The Committee couldn't function without them, and we 
don't remember that often enough.
    I've spent my entire professional life in public service on 
Capitol Hill, working almost exclusively on national security 
issues--from the war in Iraq to Afghanistan, terrorism, Iran 
sanctions, covert action, and the other important matters this 
Committee works on but can never talk about. I'm particularly 
proud of the work this Committee undertook, in which I played a 
small part, to investigate the Russian interference in the 2016 
election. When we started, I don't think we envisioned that it 
would take three and a half years and become a definitive 
counterintelligence look at that episode.
    As it turned out, counterintelligence has become a growth 
business for this Committee and the entire country as we face 
an unprecedented level of threats from foreign actors. In 
addition to the traditional intelligence threat posed by Russia 
and other foreign intelligence services dedicated to sealing 
government secrets, a broad array of other hostile actors has 
emerged. China's ongoing and massive effort to steal U.S. 
intellectual property and that of our allies threatens the 
basis of our past success and economic future. North Korea has 
become a center of hacking for profit. And at the same time, 
Iran has expanded its own cyber capability, as well as showing 
its ability in traditional espionage. And of course, non-
government groups like hackers not only steal for profit, but 
we've seen them rent or lend their services to governments.
    These threats and many others I didn't name will only be 
exacerbated by emerging technology. We're already seeing how 
artificial intelligence can enhance malign influence efforts 
and potentially assist hackers in their efforts. Other 
technologies, like quantum or synthetic biology or autonomous 
systems, could have similar impacts. At the same time, those 
emerging technologies, and many others like advanced energy, 
are essential for the economy of the future and continued U.S. 
success in the world.
    The National Counterintelligence and Security Center at 
ODNI sits at the center of many of the efforts to combat these 
threats and protect emerging technology, leading and supporting 
critical counterintelligence and security efforts across the 
IC, the United States government, and even the private sector. 
If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed as Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, I will seek 
to ensure that our Nation's counterintelligence efforts are 
integrated and effective; accelerate the work currently 
underway; and, I might add--strongly encouraged by this 
Committee--to reform the security clearance process, enhance 
ongoing efforts across the United States government to protect 
our supply chains--especially in the digital space, and 
continue the important work started by past directors of this 
Committee to educate the private sector and academia on the 
threats they face from foreign actors, and to help those 
private sector and academic institutions protect themselves.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, 
thank you again for your consideration of my nomination. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of the nominee follows:]

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    Chairman Warner. Thank you both for very good opening 
statements. I've got a couple of questions for each of you. And 
again, I remind Members we're going to go not by order of 
arrival--we're going to go by seniority in five-minute rounds, 
and you can go ahead and start the clock. I'll make sure I 
adhere to that five-minute effort--or try to.
    General, I want to echo a comment that Senator Rubio made. 
We desperately need to get 702 reauthorized. I'm going to ask 
you, in your experience, how that has been a useful tool, not 
just in terms of the counterterrorism efforts of the decade 
past, but on a going-forward basis in terms of our near-peer 
adversaries? I think in many cases we have not done a very good 
job, the IC and the FBI and the Administration, in making clear 
that the 702 we're talking about today is very different from 
the 702 that was reauthorized back in 2018. There have been 
improvements; we need to do a better job of documenting of 
that.
    Can you speak to the important role that Section 702 plays 
in terms of protecting our Nation?
    General Haugh. Yes, thank you for the question, Senator 
Warner. In terms of Section 702, it is a critical authority for 
the Intelligence Community to be able to target foreign persons 
overseas, to be able to collect intelligence that provides 
critical foreign intelligence on cybersecurity, counter-
proliferation, counterterrorism, and a whole host of threats. 
In my experience, it's absolutely essential.
    As I have reviewed products, in every product that goes to 
the senior leaders of our government, Section 702 has an 
impact. It's a critical authority. And it is also critical that 
as we use that very necessary authority. I have also seen, 
through my experience with the National Security Agency, a 
culture of compliance to ensure that through every execution of 
that authority, that the protection of civil liberties of 
Americans is a cornerstone of how that's executed.
    Chairman Warner. Well, I agree, and I want your commitment 
that when you are confirmed you will help keep the pressure on 
the balance of the IC and particularly our friends at the FBI. 
I'm not only making the case of how essential this tool is, but 
also the level of reforms that have been put in place.
    Very briefly, because I'll make sure I can get to Mr. Casey 
as well on a question or two. But one of the things that we've 
had conversations with General Nakasone a number of times, the 
fact that we may not have seen from Vladimir Putin the level of 
all of his cyber tools. The Ukrainians have really stepped up. 
Companies like Microsoft help in the private sector. But in 
light of the fact that we've seen the recent China hack on 
Microsoft, how do we make sure that we stay abreast of what's 
going on with near-peer adversaries like China and Russia?
    General Haugh. Senator, I think first and foremost, the 
National Security Agency, in terms of its role of foreign 
intelligence and being able to inform on threats, is critical. 
But the power of partnerships--and as you have seen over the 
last few months--the work that has gone on collaboratively 
between SSCI, FBI, the National Security Agency, foreign 
partners, and also industry to produce very clear, 
unclassified, releasable advisories on how China is targeting 
our critical infrastructure and service providers, is a good 
example of how to do that collaboratively--to be able to 
illuminate those threats that attack our economy and 
potentially our national security.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you. I think you mentioned this, 
Mike, in your opening comments, but I'm going to get it again, 
on the record. Should you be confirmed, will you continue to 
work with this Committee on our security clearance reform 
efforts?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. Yes. 
Closely. And often.
    Chairman Warner. All right, good. We're going to hold you 
to that. I know the Members of the Committee and many of the 
folks who've worked with you here in the audience--, but I'm 
not sure all of the members of the public fully understand the 
role of the NCSC. Briefly, can you describe that, and what you 
think your priorities will be should you be confirmed?
    Mr. Casey. Sure. The NCSC plays an important role in 
developing policy, overseeing counterintelligence efforts 
across the United States government. So, it focuses mostly on 
counterintelligence. They have a Center for Security 
Evaluation; the Special Security Directorate, which does 
personnel vetting. There's a fair amount of supply chain work 
that they oversee and coordinate across the government. They 
essentially provide that function for the DNI that coordinates 
the IC in all matters of security across----
    Chairman Warner. And what would your goals with this entity 
be, should you be confirmed?
    Mr. Casey. If I'm lucky enough to be confirmed, and I think 
as I said in my opening statement, one, I want to ensure that 
our counterintelligence efforts are fully coordinated. There 
are a lot of players in that space. And we need to make sure we 
cover the waterfront in an appropriate way and evolve to meet 
the evolving threats. Two, to continue to work on security 
clearance that you've already mentioned. I think there's a 
great deal we can do to move that work forward. And then, 
three, the Director of National Intelligence has asked me to 
look at supply chain, particularly with regard to the cyber 
contents of what software the government is using, as a deep 
interest and concern to her.
    Chairman Warner. My final question is, and I want to make 
sure the press sees this for the record: We have this picture 
here. Is this actually a photo of you undercover? Can we 
validate whether this is really a picture of Mike Casey or not? 
I'd ask all of my----
    Mr. Casey. I don't think I can comment on this.
    Chairman Warner. Well, we'll take that under consideration 
when it comes to the vote.
    With that, I'll turn it over the Vice Chairman.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. Maybe he has a body double just like 
Putin, I don't know. That's what I read in The Guardian anyway, 
whatever those tabloids are.
    Let me start with NSA--this dual-hat issue. And we've 
raised that in our conversation, meaning that you're at 
CYBERCOM now, but now also the NSA. First, I'm just curious, to 
the extent that you know what the answer is, and I think you 
do, to what extent does CYBERCOM now, today, currently rely on 
NSA personnel to execute its mission?
    General Haugh. There is a really good collaborative 
relationship between Cyber Command and NSA. There are NSA 
personnel that serve within Cyber Command. Those dollars, for 
every individual, are reimbursed by U.S. Cyber Command. That 
partnership has been incredibly complimentary to the execution 
of NSA's missions, and we really see that at comparative 
strength for our Nation to have the dual-hat leadership of both 
the NSA and Cyber.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. And the reason why this has come up is 
the issue of the delegated authorities, where U.S. Special 
Operations Command and Cyber Command are the only two unified 
military commands that can operate under NSA-delegated signals 
intelligence authorities. Now, while the use of these delegated 
authorities at SOCOM is well understood, the use of those 
delegated authorities at CYBERCOM--I'm not sure we could 
describe it or even write about it in terms of having a clear 
understanding.
    As the Deputy Commander of Cyber Command, what's your 
awareness of the oversight and compliance standards used by the 
Command in executing the delegated signals authority?
    General Haugh. Senator, as U.S. Cyber Command does execute 
signals intelligence authorities. It follows every rule 
provided by the National Security Agency; and oversight is 
conducted consistent with all of the rules that govern signals 
intelligence, and closely coordinated with the National 
Security.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. I guess the fundamental question is, 
why does U.S. Cyber Command have raw SIGINT access when such 
access is limited within the broader IC? What's the argument in 
favor of that?
    General Haugh. Senator, the overlap between activities in 
cyberspace and within signals intelligence--those things are 
inextricably linked. And the partnership and how we've 
developed that, to be able to leverage the authorities, both 
within U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, have 
been a power and have really been an enabler for outcomes for 
the Nation. And I think as we walk through that, if confirmed, 
I will certainly be committed to ensuring your visibility.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. Yeah, I mean, you didn't design the 
infrastructure. So, we're not blaming you for it. You just have 
to, I think, from our perspective, it's simply that when it 
translates over to Cyber Command, our ability to conduct 
oversight over intelligence dollars and activities become 
severely constrained in many cases. And I think that's the 
problem that we're confronting on a regular basis in that 
regard. In the past, we've raised that concern, and I think 
it's one you'll wrestle with as you come into this role.
    And Mr. Casey, I know you're aware of this because you've 
worked on it, but there is no authoritative definition for 
offensive counterintelligence or strategic counterintelligence. 
And the Committee--and you're well aware of what we've been 
working on in terms of a Committee report on this--thinks it's 
really important to establish these terms to better define the 
counterintelligence responsibilities within the Intelligence 
Community. And as you know, those recommendations are 
forthcoming. I think you're pretty aware of what those are 
going to be.
    In your view, what is the best way to define offensive 
counterintelligence and strategic counterintelligence?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, sir.
    As you note, the Committee struggled with this and they 
address it in a forthcoming Committee report that may be voted 
on in the near future. As you note, there's no government-wide 
definition of either, and I think the Committee staff and 
Committee Members struggled with a definition; ultimately 
didn't put it in law but suggested that the Director of 
National Intelligence provide one. Frankly--having some 
knowledge of what the Committee's definition was and some input 
into it--I think those definitions are pretty good.
    And if it's okay with you, I'd like to just read them:
    Offensive counterintelligence means clandestine 
counterintelligence activity conducted for national security, 
strategic, and counterintelligence purposes against the target 
having suspected or known affiliation with a foreign 
intelligence entity, to counter clandestine activities that 
threaten the United States or the national interests of the 
United States. And strategic counterintelligence means the 
processes and product of developing the context, tradecraft 
capabilities, knowledge, and understanding of the strategic 
environment, including the intentions and capabilities of 
foreign adversaries, and the national resources necessary to 
engage in counterintelligence activities to support United 
States national security interests, policy development, and 
planning processes.
    I think as the Committee struggled with it, we all agreed 
we're not sure it's a perfect definition, but it is a pretty 
good working one, and there's probably some utility in having 
it.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. It sounds like a pretty wise 
definition to me. You would agree the DNI should just take it 
up and just implement whatever we put in that report. Right?
    Mr. Casey. Seems like an excellent thing for her to 
consider.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. Good. Excellent. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. Senator 
Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like a moment to speak about Mike Casey, and his 
nomination to the Director of the National Counterintelligence 
and Security Center. For those Members of the Committee who 
might not know, I originally hired Mike Casey to be the Staff 
Director in January of 2016 while I was the Vice Chairman for 
the Committee. Mike did great work that year, overseeing 
several classified items, including several counterintelligence 
issues. And then we were lucky, Senator Warner decided to keep 
Mike on as Staff Director when he took over as Vice Chairman in 
2017. Accordingly, we have had the ability over the past seven 
and a half years to observe Mike, and I find him fully 
qualified for the position.
    Mike, well done. And I think we all look forward to your 
confirmation.
    Let me ask this question. Can one of you give us a sense of 
the effectiveness of Russian cyber efforts in Ukraine, and our 
ability to help the Ukrainians in countering them? What else 
should we do?
    General Haugh. Senator, in terms of Russia's capabilities, 
they have certainly used a number of cyber capabilities against 
Ukraine. Ukraine gets great credit in terms of how they 
prepared for what they have expected and experienced from 
Russian cyberspace. By partnering with NATO members, by 
partnering with various elements of the U.S. government, and 
also with U.S. industry, they were much more resilient to these 
cyber-attacks. They continue today. And we would expect that 
Russia will continue to use every cyber capability that they 
have as part of their unlawful conflict. And wherever we can 
provide assistance, we should continue to do that, Senator.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I think that's good 
advice.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Congratulations, gentlemen, to both of you 
for your nominations. Thank you for your past service and for 
your ongoing service.
    General, we've already talked a little bit about Section 
702 because it's coming up for reauthorization. You talked 
about how significant it is to the work of the Agency and to 
our national security. To put it in very plain terms, 702 is 
about spying on foreigners in foreign countries, right?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. And the reason why it implicates America at 
all is that it can either be passing through an American 
telecommunication system, is that correct?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. So, you have one Iranian bad guy in Vienna 
and another one in Bangkok, and they decide to use Gmail, for 
instance. It allows you to target, with the requested Gmail, 
their communications.
    General Haugh. If it's a valid foreign intelligence target, 
yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. And a second reason why it might implicate 
America when we're dealing with foreigners and foreign soil, is 
that bad guy in Iran, or working for Iran around the country 
and maybe speaking to a bad guy here in America, as well?
    General Haugh. And if the target is the foreign target, 
yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. So, this obviously has become a very 
heated controversy and there's some question about whether it 
can be reauthorized or not. But that the nub of the controversy 
is not that first category, I think, but the second one, right? 
And the prospect for what's known as reverse targeting?
    General Haugh. That is not authorized.
    Senator Cotton. I understand. Can you explain to us how you 
go about ensuring that something that's not authorized doesn't 
actually happen?
    General Haugh. In my experience, Senator, there are very 
strong procedures for ensuring that the target of the use of 
702 is a valid foreign intelligence target and that that target 
is overseas. There are a number of series of oversight 
mechanisms that I've had experience with to ensure that that 
not only is that always the case, but if there is a mistake, or 
an inadvertent action, that it's immediately reported, both to 
Congress and to, of course, the National Security Agency.
    Senator Cotton. Can you get into a little more detail in 
this setting about those oversight precautions to ensure those 
abuses don't occur? Or is that something that you're 
uncomfortable discussing?
    General Haugh. Well, I think, Senator, I can talk broadly 
in my current role about what I have seen from the National 
Security Agency, which is a culture of compliance--a group of 
Americans that want to protect their fellow Americans' civil 
liberties and do that in a way that's consistent with our laws, 
our policies, and our values. To go into the exquisite detail, 
Senator, what I'd request is, if confirmed, to come back to you 
and have a conversation.
    Senator Cotton. Sure, that's fine. We're all human, 
mistakes happen. Sometimes abuses happen. Some of those abuses 
have been widely reported in the news. If such a thing happens, 
what mechanisms do you have in place to identify such mistakes 
or abuses and what kind of corrective actions are taken in 
those circumstances?
    General Haugh. Senator, I think that what NSA laid out with 
ODNI in the Transparency Report lays out just those use cases--
that if there was something that has happened inadvertently, 
it's reported: the number of times it's occurred and ensuring 
that that is reported back to the court as well as to the 
Congress.
    Senator Cotton. OK, thank you. If confirmed, I think you 
probably still have a little bit more work to do and probably 
in a classified setting with Members, not only in the Senate 
but in the House as well, to get 702 reauthorized.
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Mr. Casey, I want to review a conclusion 
about the NCSC: NCSC as U.S. government lead for 
counterintelligence lacks a clear mission as well as sufficient 
and well-defined authorities and resources to effectively 
confront this landscape. Moreover, NCSC's placement within the 
Office of Director of National Intelligence may hinder its 
ability to scale and respond to threats in an agile manner. 
Despite these challenges, there is no consensus among 
counterintelligence officials on the way forward for the NCSC.
    Are you familiar with that statement?
    Mr. Casey. I believe it came from the Committee's audits 
and projects team look at NCSC.
    Senator Cotton. It's from our Committee and their take on 
the NCSC. We made 17 recommendations to try to improve NCSC. Do 
you agree with all those recommendations?
    Mr. Casey. Broadly, yes. I think the one that was sort of 
taken under advisement and to be considered was the placement--
whether it should be an independent agency. There are 
potentially advantages to it, disadvantages to it.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. All right, thank you. Well, I think 
our Nation vitally needs a strong and effective NCSC, 
especially for the threat that we face against China. And if 
confirmed, I hope that you'll be able to pursue and implement 
as many of those recommendations as possible.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see both of 
you and trying to keep a straight face looking at Mr. Casey, 
who's worked so hard and so well with us for so long. And 
congratulations.
    Let me start with you, Mr. Haugh, if I might. With a few 
exceptions, NSA currently requires a probable cause 
determination for U.S. person queries of communications 
collected pursuant to Executive Order 12333. My question is, is 
there any reason that standard couldn't be applied to 
communications collected under Section 702 of FISA? And one of 
the reasons--and you can see the interest here in the Committee 
with respect to 702--I don't understand why if it works for 
12333, it can't work for 702. And it would certainly provide 
more protection for Americans who are concerned about their 
privacy rights.
    Your thoughts?
    General Haugh. Senator, I share your focus on protecting 
American civil liberties. As in my experience of working with 
E.O. 12333 collection, I've got a good understanding of that. 
What I would ask Senator, in my current role, I am not into the 
details of how each 702 authorization is executed. I'd ask to 
be able to come back if confirmed and have a conversation with 
you.
    Senator Wyden. Let's speed it up a little bit, though. I'd 
like a written answer why we couldn't have that before the 
vote. Can you get that to----
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wyden [continuing]. Within a week in writing?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I will do that 
Senator.
    Senator Wyden. No, no. We need to have your----
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wyden [continuing]. Assessment of it before we vote 
within a week.
    General Haugh. Understood, Senator.
    Senator Wyden. Can you do that?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wyden. Great, thank you. Let's talk about your role 
as functional manager for cyber. General Haugh, the NSA 
Director is the functional manager for signals intelligence, 
which means the director develops and implements IC-wide 
policies, practices, and procedures for SIGINT. Does this role 
extend to computer network exploitation?
    General Haugh. Senator, the overall responsibility of the 
SIGINT functional manager is to direct and have oversight of 
all SIGINT collection, processing, analysis, and reporting and 
dissemination of SIGINT products. And that includes computer 
network operations.
    Senator Wyden. You're the point guy with respect to all of 
those things that the public usually thinks is----
    General Haugh. So, in terms of using all of the tools of 
the United States SIGINT system, the Director of the National 
Security Agency is responsible.
    Senator Wyden. Good. On encryption, every day, it becomes 
more and more obvious that Americans' security, their safety, 
and their well-being depends on strong encryption. If you're 
confirmed, will you commit that NSA will not seek to insert 
backdoors into or otherwise weaken encryption technology used 
by Americans?
    General Haugh. Senator, encryption is a critical 
responsibility of the National Security Agency. It's critical 
to defend our national security systems and our weapons 
systems. If confirmed, I will not weaken encryption for 
Americans.
    Senator Wyden. That's an important statement. So, on your 
watch encryption is going to be preserved?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wyden. Very good. Let me ask one other question, if 
I might, on the definition of signals. General, last October 
there was a new Executive Order on signals, and two weeks ago 
the IC issued a whole array of procedures implementing that 
Executive Order. What's missing is any Intelligence-Community-
wide definition of signals. That makes it hard to know what all 
these procedures actually cover? In your view, should there be 
an Intelligence-Community-wide definition of signals? And I 
know that we've had some discussion up here already about that.
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator. In terms of where the 
definition of signals intelligence is defined, it's defined in 
National Security Council Intelligence Directives, in E.O. 
12333, and in the United States SIGINT systems intelligence 
directives. They are all very consistent in terms of what 
comprises SIGINT in terms of communications intelligence, 
electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals 
intelligence. So, I think there is a common definition that is 
aligned across the Executive Branch.
    Senator Wyden. As you and I talked in the office, with 
respect to the lack of a consistent IC-wide definition, I know 
we'll continue that. And I look forward to particularly getting 
your response in writing to that question I asked about Section 
702, before we vote in the Committee, and I appreciated your 
candor in the office.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Congratulations to both of you for your 
nominations.
    I don't think it's an overstatement to say we're living at 
a time of--certainly in my lifetime--unprecedented distrust of 
our government institutions and challenges to those 
institutions. Unfortunately, some of that, I think, in the 
case, for example, of the FBI, is justified by the abuses that 
occurred in recent years that we all are familiar with and been 
well documented. And I know Director Wray is committed to 
attempting to regain the public trust. And indeed, there's one 
thing both of you should be happy about today. And that is 
you're not in the House of Representatives where Director Wray 
is testifying today, and your name isn't Chris Wray.
    But I just want to get an understanding from you, General. 
How can the American people be confident that these incredible 
tools, which you said are essential to the mission of NSA and 
Cyber Command--how can they be assured that these tools will 
not be abused to their detriment?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator, I think it's incredibly 
important, if confirmed, to build a trusting confidence that 
for myself as a leader, that you will trust the inputs, because 
I know I have faith and confidence in all of the individuals of 
the National Security Agency. In my experience, an incredible 
workforce that is focused on the protection of their fellow 
Americans. And they do a service to their Nation every day. And 
the ability for us to provide transparency on their activities 
is something, if confirmed, that I would like to be able to 
partner with this Committee on.
    Senator Cornyn. And Mr. Casey, as you're well aware of the 
concerns about the FBI's activities, since you're going to be 
so involved in counterintelligence matters oversight at the 
DNI, I'd be interested in your views about the FBI's unique 
role. They are a law enforcement agency, but they're also a 
counterintelligence agency. And in the course of dealing with 
some of this lawfully-collected intelligence on foreign--on 
people overseas, occasionally a U.S. person's name will come up 
that can even potentially be used in the course of an 
investigation that has nothing to do with the 
counterintelligence matter, but other law enforcement matters.
    What's your view about how we do best to try to regain the 
public's trust that the FBI, as the primary counterintelligence 
agency for the U.S. IC, isn't able to use that lawfully-
collected foreign intelligence for an improper purpose against 
an American citizen or a U.S. person, which of course as you 
know, is broader than a U.S. citizen?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. First, NCSC 
is not an operational----
    Senator Cornyn. Right.
    Mr. Casey [continuing]. Part of the government. They're 
very much a strategy oversight and policy----
    Senator Cornyn. But you're supposed to integrate 
counterintelligence and security missions areas under one 
organizational construct.
    Mr. Casey. Correct, sir. But there are other agencies that 
actually carry them out.
    Senator Cornyn. So, you won't be part of the operations, 
but you will be part of the oversight.
    Mr. Casey. Correct. And the NCSC's purpose in devising all 
counterintelligence strategies, plans. One, there's a heavy 
involvement in the Civil Liberties Office. There's a real 
attempt to achieve transparency and I think to your question 
about the FBI, as much transparency as humanly possible into 
how the FBI operates is probably the best way to regain the 
trust of the American people.
    I know as Congress considers 702 reauthorization, there are 
a number of proposals for increasing transparency or putting 
limits on how that information that's collected can be used, 
and there's certainly work that can be done in that area.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, part of the conundrum in trying to 
convince the American people, much less Members of Congress, 
about these authorities--is a lot of the information that would 
demonstrate the necessity of that is classified information by 
its nature. And I know the DNI and others have attempted to 
declassify certain things that they could give us the 
information we can use then to make the case why 702 should be 
reauthorized.
    But I think we've got a very heavy lift on our hands, and 
frankly, it's going to start with the House of Representatives. 
We're going to have to make some changes with the FBI's 
authority, particularly as regards U.S. citizens and U.S. 
persons, when they use lawfully-collected 702 information for 
law enforcement purposes.
    But finally, let me just ask you, General, since we talked 
about this yesterday. You know, it's a big concern of mine, 
given the incredible responsibilities of Cyber Command and NSA, 
the global responsibilities, and all the hot spots in 
particular you have to prioritize. I'm worried that we are 
losing the war on counternarcotics efforts in Mexico and south. 
And I worry that we don't have the bandwidth we need for the 
NSA to provide the intelligence that we can then use with our 
partners in the region to go after the bad guys, and to cut off 
the flow of some of these narcotics.
    Could you share with us some of your thoughts about how we 
might be able to augment those current authorities, or the 
means by which those authorities are exercised?
    General Haugh. Senator, it's an important question in terms 
of counternarcotics, specifically Fentanyl and what that has 
meant to our Nation. That is certainly a mission that is a 
responsibility, from a foreign intelligence perspective, of the 
National Security Agency to understand those threats. If 
confirmed, I'm committed to be able to work that and also to 
look for new partners to be able to collaborate with, to be 
able to address that threat.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. I want to start just by thanking Senator 
Cornyn for that last question, because I think it's a really 
pressing issue that deserves your focus.
    Lieutenant General Haugh, this has been covered a little 
bit, but I want to return to it and just make sure I understand 
your plan for moving forward. A number of prehearing questions 
asked about Section 702, FISA collection, and the compliance 
regime that NSA has in place for its Section 702 collection 
authorities to ensure the protection of U.S. persons in 
particular. So, in your answers, you largely deferred to the 
current NSA leadership, stating that you have limited 
familiarity with the issue in your current role with CYBERCOM. 
And I have to say, I don't view that answer as good enough. I'm 
disappointed. NSA very much depends on FISA Section 702 
authorities to collect the communications of critical foreign 
intelligence targets located outside of the United States who 
use our U.S. infrastructure and services to communicate.
    And especially with 702's expiration looming, it would 
simply serve you well as the nominee to lead the NSA to 
demonstrate more than a limited familiarity with those 
procedures and compliance governing the protection of 
Americans' data. So, I would just ask for your commitment to 
expedite that process to become very familiar with that 
compliance regime as you seek the confirmation.
    General Haugh. Senator, I absolutely agree with you that 
this is the priority issue in terms of being able to 
understand, to a granular level of detail, how this is 
conducted. If confirmed, this is my first priority: to be able 
to understand that.
    Senator Heinrich. I'm glad to hear that.
    I'm going to pop over to you, Mr. Casey, very quickly, and 
I certainly don't have to tell you about the importance of 
promoting supply chain security for increasing American 
competitiveness, for driving innovation. What's the role of the 
NCSC in preventing and mitigating foreign, state, or even non-
state actors from compromising U.S. supply chains?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. It's one of 
the major roles that NCSC has. An entire directorate is 
dedicated to supply chain issues and cyber. And as I mentioned, 
particularly on cyber/supply chain, it's one of the DNI's 
highest priorities. For me, were I fortunate enough to be 
confirmed and move into this job, the NCSC is the lead for 
supply chain issues for the IC, and throughout, frankly, the 
United States government. Having said that, there are a lot of 
players in this space, and so an important part of that is 
coordinating the efforts, ensuring that lessons learned are 
shared among the agencies and sometimes with the private 
sector.
    Senator Heinrich. Talk a little bit about that. How do you 
plan to make sure that NCSC keeps ahead of advancing technology 
in order to provide threat awareness information to industry, 
and for that matter, federal and other partners?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you, Senator. First, with a caveat that as 
I've not been confirmed, I'm not deeply versed in the NCSC's 
current efforts. But I think the single biggest question is 
understanding what the current efforts of the United States 
government and various different parts of it are. DoD has a 
number of efforts ongoing. Other parts of NSA have efforts 
ongoing. I think there should be a big effort in understanding 
what the waterfront looks like at the moment and ensuring that 
we have adequately covered it. Frankly, if I'm lucky enough to 
be confirmed, I'd like to come back to you with a better answer 
on the next two or three steps we could take.
    Senator Heinrich. We'll look forward to that. Thank you 
very much, Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Let me just, before I go to Senator 
Lankford, we have heard from Senator Cornyn, Senator Heinrich, 
and obviously Senator Wyden as well on 702 concerns. One of the 
things--we just have to do a better job as we ask our 
colleagues to reauthorize this critical tool and convince the 
American public. Again, there are many changes in terms of FBI 
operating procedures. But also at NSA, operating procedures 
that are very different than they were even a year or two ago, 
let alone what we reauthorized in 2018.
    And we just have to do a better job of documenting that and 
making that case. That's an editorial comment, obviously, but 
for those of us who understand the importance of this tool, 
we've got some work to do., I do think making clear how the 
decrease in inadvertent contacts or the number of people that 
may actually receive a victim notification through a 702 tool 
is a case we've got to make.
    Senator Lankford.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks to both 
of you, and for your service already to the country and what 
you've done.
    General, I want to be able to zero in on some of the things 
that Senator Cornyn brought up as well on the counter narcotics 
work that's happening currently. There are a lot of threats 
that Americans have around the world.
    There's a lot of work that needs to be done, but people 
feel what's happening on the streets, and 100,000 families are 
dealing with a family member that died from illegal narcotics 
that came into the country last year. So, we feel this threat 
faster than we feel other threats on it. What I'm interested in 
is what your commitment is to be able to actually go after the 
information and the infrastructure that's actually bringing 
these drugs in that are killing Americans every single day.
    General Haugh. Senator, I agree with you. This is a 
national security issue. And from a National Security Agency 
perspective, the role of foreign intelligence to be able to 
understand the threat and communicate that threat to elements 
that can take action, that will be a priority, Senator, if 
confirmed.
    Senator Lankford. Okay, I appreciate that. We'll follow up 
on that in the days ahead. Unfortunately, every director that's 
a recent director of NSA has dealt with a major security breach 
within the Agency. So, you get to walk in and say, okay, not on 
my watch. So, let me just ask you, as you approach trying to 
deal with how are we not going to have a security breach on 
your watch, what are your first thoughts about what to do 
different? How to be able to deal with this?
    General Haugh. Senator, the protection of our national 
security information is critical. Classified, in and of itself, 
by its very definition, if disclosed causes great harm to the 
Nation. So, this is paramount for leaders in the national 
security community. For me, I think about it in two different 
ways. Personal accountability. So, we need to make sure that we 
have the highest talent, and I'm very confident in the talent 
we have in the National Security Agency. We have to ensure that 
continues, and then we have to have technical means to ensure 
that we are able to be confident in the oversight and the 
control of classified information.
    So, if confirmed, I'll review all of our current processes, 
and ensure that from a National Security Agency perspective, 
that we're doing everything we can and then we'll partner with 
the rest of the national security community and the 
Intelligence Community to ensure that we're sharing what we 
believe are best practices.
    Senator Lankford. Yes, that would be helpful in the days 
ahead. Obviously, there's work to be done. Every director has 
said that. It's a challenge. You're dealing with a lot of 
people and a lot of complexity. And having the opportunity to 
be able to verify what's out there and what's not out there is 
important.
    There's been this balance between contractors and full-time 
employees. It's much faster to hire a contractor; they get 
people in immediately and are able to take care of it. A lot of 
them have experience in the IC and they're able to get there 
quickly on it. It's hard to be able to get full-time folks that 
are there, and then there's different sets of rules on it. How 
will you strike that balance between the contractor and full-
time?
    General Haugh. Senator, I do believe it's a balance, and we 
have to ensure that. There are things that, from a National 
Security Agency perspective, the workforce with the mission 
focus and the technical capability is a critical asset to the 
Nation. And having them be able to do inherently government 
functions and to be able to do that in a world-class way is 
certainly the priority in terms of being able to sustain that 
world-class foreign intelligence and cybersecurity that NSA 
provides.
    Senator Lankford. Okay. We're going to count on that in the 
days ahead, as well.
    You were asked a question just in the prehearing questions 
about describing your view about when it's appropriate to 
withhold pertinent and timely information from the 
Congressional intelligence committees. You answered 
appropriately: It's not appropriate to withhold information 
that's within the jurisdiction of a Congressional committee.
    That may seem like a silly question, but the challenge that 
we've had around this dais, both sides of the aisle, has been 
that we would have a hearing in a closed-door setting. We would 
go through all the different issues, and then within 24 hours 
something would be in the New York Times that was not discussed 
with us, that was clearly known, and it became an issue of we 
just didn't ask the right question at the right time.
    And it was like, I would have told you if you would have 
asked me directly. But we don't know whether to ask people 
directly. So, I think the basis of this question that was 
coming to you was, we don't want to have to know how to ask the 
magic question. If there are issues that we need to be aware 
of, we need to know, and it needs to be forthcoming in an 
opening statement from you and to say, hey, this is something 
that's on the horizon.
    Are we still okay with that?
    General Haugh. Senator, if I'm confirmed, I commit to a 
partnership to ensure that you have the necessary information.
    Senator Lankford. Thank you. We appreciate that very much, 
and we look forward to that partnership.
    Mr. Casey, I need to know, is this nomination really a 
discreet way to get out from under Senator Warner's authority?
    Mr. Casey. One hundred percent, sir.
    Senator Lankford. That was what I assumed, that was the 
prehearing question that had not been asked to you directly on 
this.
    I do want to ask for just a philosophical statement from 
you as well, because the counterintelligence efforts--and you 
approach this in your opening statement as well--is you made 
the statement of counterintelligence efforts--I'm going to 
abbreviate some of it--is to deflect, understand, anticipate, 
and hopefully deter foreign intelligence efforts. I want to 
drill down on the last of them, philosophically, strategically. 
What does it mean to deter foreign intelligence efforts to you?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. The way I 
think about it is success looks like this: when we get intel 
that the foreign government, foreign intelligence services, 
went somewhere else to try to steal secrets that they thought 
were too hard to get here and they were too likely to get 
caught. And that covers a variety of efforts across the 
security, counterintelligence, offensive counterintelligence 
activities. But that when we put those things together, they 
just decide they can't operate here.
    Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that and 
appreciate your engagement, obviously, your service here to the 
Committee as well, and the way you've handled so many issues. 
As you're dealing with private industry and talking about 
threats that they're facing, I would encourage you to do what 
has been done in the past and to make sure that private 
industry is fully aware that any of their cooperation, their 
data, is voluntary in the way they share that and engage, so 
that their rights are also protected because they're a victim. 
Not now suddenly to be victimized by their own government. 
Again, by having to share information in ways that are not 
comfortable, or PII and such. And so, there's this strange 
balance that you've got to be able to work to be able to help 
protect those companies, individuals, and American citizens as 
the attack is coming to private business, but also protecting 
the rights of those individuals as well.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for that, Senator.
    Senator Lankford. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. And while I will take issue with his 
characterization of Mr. Casey, I would say I want to double 
down on your comment to General Haugh. You're going to find no 
better ally than this Committee. But that trust--and it's 
happened with many of the folks who've appeared before us--
disappears if we don't ask the magic question, and we then 
subsequently find there was a piece of information that 
somebody had and didn't reveal to us when they had an 
opportunity.
    Senator Lankford. One hundred percent. And may I remind 
you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Casey was under oath when he answered 
that first question.
    Chairman Warner. Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, I want to focus on a word that you used four or 
five times in one of your first couple of answers, and that 
word is collaborate and collaborative. The cyber conflict is 
different than conflict in history. We're not talking about 
army against army, and air force against air force, navy 
against navy. We're talking about 85 percent of the target 
space in the private sector. So, collaboration and really a new 
level of trust and collaboration, it seems to me, is going to 
be necessary.
    Is this something that you believe that in your history 
with the military, you will be able to transition to having 
that kind of relationship of trust and collaboration with the 
private sector, and NSA when you take over that position?
    General Haugh. Senator, this is an important issue, and I 
think it's been enabled both by the Congress and by the 
Department of Defense to have that collaboration with industry, 
both from U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. 
The ability to share directly with industry, while also teaming 
with our teammates in DHS and FBI, has been a really critical 
enabler.
    NSA has been enabled by the Department to do a partnership 
with the defense industrial base and build a collaborative 
relationship to share information in both ways from a threat 
perspective. And NSA has also begun to provide cybersecurity 
services to the defense industrial base. Those are the types of 
partnerships that, as we see those initial indicators, those 
are the potential things, that if confirmed, I'll look at how 
do we scale that?
    Senator King. Well, I think your answer is exactly right, 
but the resulting product of this is a kind of collaboration 
that doesn't come naturally to either side, and trust has to be 
established. And I hope that's something that's also in your 
calculation. As Senator Lankford said, the companies have to 
feel comfortable in a trustful way to share this information 
with you. I was asked a question this morning in a public forum 
about Ukraine and why we didn't have more cyberattacks from 
Russia as a result, because everyone was expecting this. Part 
of it, as you testified, was the Ukrainian skill working with 
us and the work that was done to help them defend their 
networks and to be more able to be resilient. But part of it, I 
said publicly, I think the Russians were afraid of Paul 
Nakasone. There's a deterrent effect that is very important. 
The concept that he established was called Defend Forward.
    Do you subscribe to that concept that we have to have a 
deterrent that adversaries feel that coming against us in a 
cyber-attack of some kind is not a free lunch?
    General Haugh. Senator, I think we need to engage our 
adversaries if they're conducting activities that are malign 
and have a negative impact on the national security of the 
United States, or a negative impact on our allies and partners. 
And that ability to do that and the ability to put pressure on 
them, expose their activities, while also making our allies and 
partners more resilient, is absolutely critical every day so 
that they know that they're contested.
    Senator King. Well, and the key phrase you just used was, 
``they know.'' It's not a deterrent if they don't know it, if 
they don't know that we have the capability. And I think you 
have to be aggressive in terms of letting our adversaries know 
that if they attack the United States in cyberspace, there will 
be a proportional and hurtful response.
    General Haugh. I think, if confirmed, Senator, in the roles 
that I will play, it will be my role to be able to produce 
options that are also consequential and ensure that across how 
we integrate with all the other elements of our national 
capabilities, to be able to ensure that we do have a realistic 
deterrent and to be able to present that.
    Senator King. Well, I hope to see intelligence over the 
next several years where one of our adversaries said, we better 
not do this because we're afraid of that General Haugh guy. So, 
that's a mission.
    Insider threats and counterintelligence. If I think back to 
our major intelligence briefs going back to Aldridge Ames and 
after that, we cannot possibly vet people to the point where 
there is a zero chance of somebody turning on their country. 
Therefore, you mentioned technical means, General. I was 
surprised, for example, in the recent case, that we didn't know 
when information was being exfiltrated from a classified 
system. Are we working on technical means to have a greater 
grasp of our secure information, rather than hoping that the 
people that we have hired will never succumb to whatever the 
temptation is to betray their country?
    Let's start with you, Mike.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. Not sitting 
in the seat, I don't know all the details, but my understanding 
is there's a certain amount of agency by agency--different 
agencies have implemented different technical means to do that.
    Senator King. Well, that's a problem right there.
    Mr. Casey. Yes, Senator.
    Senator King. And you're in charge of this Center. How 
about some uniformity of process?
    Mr. Casey. So, my understanding is that there's a current 
Intelligence Community review of the recent disclosures 
underway at the moment. And when that's finished, my 
expectation, were I to be confirmed, that through the role of 
the involvement of the National Insider Threat Task Force, that 
those lessons would be shared with different agencies. And then 
it's a matter of essentially shaming them into getting the job 
done.
    Senator King. General, I hope you're going to be astride of 
a highly capable technical agency. I hope that it will have as 
one of its missions figuring out how to protect this 
information using, as you say, technical means.
    Do you see that as part of your mission?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator. I think overall, the National 
Security Agency is relied upon to provide--if it's not within 
the specific role of the National Manager for National Security 
Systems--it certainly is to provide advice on how best to use 
technology to protect our national security information.
    Senator King. Thank you both, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. I think those were good questions, Senator 
King. I do think, at least in my conversations under General 
Nakasone's leadership, and also, frankly, because the NSA has 
been the victim of so many of these issues, the notion of 
copying documents and walking out, they have taken corrective 
action the rest of the IC can learn from. I don't think, if Mr. 
Teixeira ends up being proven guilty, that he would have gotten 
away with it at the NSA.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, to 
both of you, thank you for your service to our country. General 
Haugh, it's not just you, it's your family. And when you've 
deployed multiple times, your family is away from you, they put 
up with that. And so, I want to say thank you to your family as 
well.
    Mr. Casey, you're probably not deployed in the same way as 
General Haugh has been, but as several other Members have 
indicated, putting up with a Committee and working through the 
bureaucracy of Washington, D.C., for years and to do a number 
of successful items also says a lot about your capabilities, as 
well.
    So, thank you to both of you.
    I want to begin with General Haugh. I share the admiration 
that Senator King has expressed with regard to what General 
Nakasone has been able to accomplish. And part of this has been 
because he has taken on and has challenged the issues 
surrounding a dual-hat. I happen to be a proponent of the dual-
hat approach. I think it works well. It's probably not perfect, 
but it's better than having separation and then having 
disagreements or silos in which you try to communicate back and 
forth.
    One of the areas that I felt had been very successful was 
the implementation of NSPM 13, which is a classified document. 
It basically, in broad terms, would suggest a clear way, a 
quick way in which to respond to foreign threats or 
opportunities for cyber intervention by us. And since that was 
intervened or approached, it has been an item making our cyber 
operations, I would consider, to be much more successful.
    The question I have is, moving forward, NSPM 13, while 
modified slightly over the last ten years or so, is still in 
effect. Do you believe that you need additional capabilities, 
or do you see additional capabilities that are necessary to 
continue your mission in terms of the dual-hat approach that we 
expect today?
    General Haugh. Senator, in my experience, there is a really 
good alignment between the law and what has been produced by 
the Congress, by our national policy, and by the authorities 
that have been given to U.S. Cyber Command and the National 
Security Agency. So, I think what that then allows is 
complementary action under those sets of authorities that 
produce the best outcome for the Nation.
    Senator Rounds. One of those areas, as a number of the 
Members here have talked about, is 702. Could you just briefly, 
because there's a lot of folks back home saying, what are they 
talking about? What is a 702? Could you briefly, in terms of 
the magnitude of the importance to the defense of our country, 
could you share in this open session a little bit about how 
critical and how much we use 702 authorities?
    General Haugh. Senator, I think that, first and foremost, 
ensuring that the American people understand that this is an 
authority to collect against foreign persons overseas.
    Senator Rounds. Just, like, once every month or so?
    General Haugh. It is extensively used and it is an 
irreplaceable authority for the Intelligence Community.
    Senator Rounds. Give me an example, if you could, the 
magnitude of the value of that program. Can you share that?
    General Haugh. I will give you an example of the products 
that are produced for the President's daily brief. One hundred 
percent of those that have SIGINT input that have 702 
reflections in them.
    Senator Rounds. It's not an item that we want to lose, so 
we want to make sure that we protect and that Members of the 
House and the Senate feel a great degree of comfort that the 
protection of American citizens' private information continues 
and is improved upon in the reauthorization. Fair statement?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Mr. Casey, I'm just curious. You've had a chance sitting 
here to look at a number of different opportunities that we've 
had to improve or to look at the execution of 
counterintelligence operations. And while you would not be an 
operator of those, you clearly would be the overseer of a lot 
of them and the coordinator of a lot of them.
    Does the Director of the NCSC have the necessary 
authorities to appropriately lead the CI enterprise? And that 
includes assistance to our private sector.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. I think the 
Committee's audits and projects team had a number of 
suggestions for improving that. If I'm fortunate enough to be 
confirmed, I'd like to, frankly, take some time to look at it 
and get back to you.
    Senator Rounds. I want you to go on a little bit. It seems 
to me that you've expressed in the past a real desire to 
perhaps make some repairs here. Is that a fair statement?
    Mr. Casey. That's a fair statement, sir.
    Senator Rounds. How strongly do you believe in that? Tell 
me, how serious is it that this has got to be done?
    Mr. Casey. I think we've all sat here before and talked 
about the threats that we're facing from the PRC, from Russia, 
to thefts of intellectual property--where the United States is 
facing an across-the-board threat by a whole of society, to say 
nothing of terrorist hackers, the usual gamut. And it is 
extremely urgent that we get a system in place that works on 
every possible level to protect against all those threats.
    Senator Rounds. Including those against private enterprise?
    Mr. Casey. Absolutely. And, in fact, that's been a priority 
of the PRC. And as I think I said in my opening statement, that 
threatens our current economic success in the future. And as 
the Chairman has pointed out more times than I can count, if 
the Chinese are able to, frankly, get ahead of technology, 
start setting the international standards, over time that locks 
us and Western Europe and the Japanese and South Koreans not 
only out of the game, but plays to our disadvantages and 
affects our personal freedoms.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Casey.
    Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 
both the nominees for your, as Senator Rounds said, your 
service to the country, your willingness to continue in service 
of the Nation. This Casey will not have questions for Nominee 
Casey at this time.
    Mr. Casey. Deeply disappointed, sir.
    Senator Casey. But we might later.
    But General, I want to thank you for taking time to sit and 
talk, as we did. And I'm noting for the record your Lehigh 
University credentials, among others. We're grateful for that. 
I just have one comment and then two questions for you, 
General. One is, I won't reiterate or ask for reiteration of 
the questions pertaining to 702, but like so many of us, I 
think virtually every one of us we've seen, because of the 
briefings we've received, the benefit of 702. And it's a 
critical set of authorities for our ability to keep the Nation 
safe. I don't think I have to reiterate that anymore, but we 
have to keep making that case. But the question I had was, and 
I'm referencing your testimony on page two, you talked about in 
the third full paragraph on page two, the value of 
partnerships.
    And you say in reference to, in particular Russia and the 
People's Republic of China, you say, quote: NSA's ability to 
work in collaboration across the interagency, the private 
sector, and foreign partners is one of the Agency's greatest 
strengths and critically important to our nation's success in a 
world of accelerating change. End quote.
    Here's a question.
    Obviously, NSA has a focus on both of those nations and the 
threats posed by them. So, how do you plan to continue to lead 
that effort to adapt both the mission and the capabilities of 
NSA in order to focus on those two threats?
    General Haugh. Senator, in terms of how we think about 
partnerships, it's really the men and women of the National 
Security Agency, the ability to create advantage for those 
other interagency partners. They all perform critical roles for 
our Nation. But NSA is providing both foreign intelligence and 
cybersecurity--foundational to the other activities that we 
do--both within the department and within the interagency.
    When we think about foreign partners sharing those common 
threats, how do we work with them to also ensure that our 
Nation is secure, but also enabling them where we have shared 
interest, to be able to defend against foreign activity, 
whether that's in cyberspace, whether it's disinformation, or 
it's some other coercion, and be able to provide insights and 
be able to enable resilience to those activities.
    So, as we think about partnerships, it really is about how 
to make others effective, and to be able to ensure that we're 
doing the best thing for the national defense by leveraging our 
authorities, doing it in a very legal and compliant way with 
our laws, policies, and values.
    Senator Casey. Thank you. I know that you share the real 
concern we have about the threats posed by both Russia and the 
People's Republic of China.
    Last question is this. One of the areas of focus for me on 
the Committee, as I've tried to do across a number of 
committees and jurisdictions that I serve on, is the 
Intelligence Community's efforts to both create more accessible 
facilities and implement assistive technologies in order to 
enable people with disabilities to contribute to the IC's 
mission. Talk to me about that and the efforts you can continue 
to undertake in that area.
    General Haugh. Senator, I think this is an area that NSA 
has been one of the leaders in the community, ensuring that we 
have the talent that can do the highly technical, very mission-
focused set of activities that go on at the National Security 
Agency. NSA has been very successful to go across the country 
and to be able to tap into the talent that exists both within 
disabled and neurodiverse communities, to be able to do very 
important missions for our Nation. If confirmed, I look forward 
to being a part of that and to be able to continue that and 
continue to grow it.
    Senator Casey. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Casey. I appreciate you 
raising that last issue and thought it was appropriate to 
mention the community that, frankly, I had to get educated 
about in terms of neurodiverse and what a role they can play. I 
appreciate you raising that.
    Senator Gillibrand.
    Senator Gillibrand. General Haugh, thank you so much for 
your service. You're taking on a very big job, and we're very 
grateful for it.
    In response to additional prehearing questions, you 
discussed the collateral benefits for the protection of 
commercial networks outside the defense industrial base, which 
come from NSA's engagement with the private sector.
    In a time of war, do you feel confident that our civilian 
digital infrastructure, to include emergency services, can be 
sufficiently protected by the current commercial providers? Or 
are there adjustments to your authorities needed to use NSA and 
CYBERCOM capabilities to protect things like hospital networks, 
public utilities, and other critical infrastructure?
    General Haugh. Senator, I think that the National 
Cybersecurity Strategy starts to lay out that framework in 
terms of how we collaborate across the U.S. government with 
state and local partners. And I think NSA will have a critical 
role to play, particularly with our teammates in DHS and the 
FBI, to be able to put us in the best position as a Nation to 
be able to do that defense. But I do believe there's work to be 
done.
    Senator Gillibrand. I would imagine some of that work would 
include what happened in Guam most recently.
    General Haugh. And Senator, I think it's a really good 
example, because understanding what the threat is and now being 
able to inform that threat and NSA's role from the National 
Manager of National Security Systems will certainly be at that 
table to partner with all the other elements of the U.S. 
government with INDOPACOM as the element that's responsible, 
from a Department of Defense perspective, to understand the 
threat and then be able to work solutions collaboratively, with 
both the local all the way through to the other federal 
partners.
    Senator Gillibrand. I think it's just a very apt example, 
because if the civilian-owned infrastructure is taken down, you 
can't complete operations, especially if it's critical 
infrastructure in the United States. And without the review and 
analysis of what risks we have and what vulnerabilities we 
have, we will not be prepared to protect, defend, and be able 
to continue to use all the infrastructure we need in the United 
States to project worldwide.
    General Haugh. Senator, if confirmed, I look forward to 
partnering with our teammates in DHS and also within the 
elements in the Department as we look at defense-critical 
infrastructure.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    As a Member of this Committee and the Armed Services 
Committee, I've seen firsthand, oftentimes it is intelligence 
relationships and military relationships with other countries, 
sometimes developed confidentially, which produce some of the 
biggest results in our bilateral relationships. Our ability to 
develop robust coalitions is crucial to safeguarding our 
national interests. But when we operate together, sometimes 
we're only as strong as our weakest link.
    Being mindful that we are in an open setting, can you 
discuss any work that you've done to date to raise the 
cybersecurity acumen of our partners and what types of enhanced 
cooperation would you like to advance, if confirmed?
    General Haugh. Senator, I do have a lot of experience in 
this area. Previously, I was the Commander of the Cyber 
National Mission Force when we initiated the Defend Forward 
operations, which based off authorities from Congress and then 
from the Executive Branch. This allowed us to now go and be 
able to partner with other nations, to be able to identify 
threats on their networks collaboratively, and really allow us 
to do two things simultaneously: put pressure on one of the 
other nation-states that we're attempting to influence that 
nation, and also allow them to get a deeper understanding of 
our tradecraft and how we do that every day.
    Additionally, I think what we have seen as part of the 
overall coalition to support Ukraine is a collaboration of 
nations that has had to do that together on networks that also 
we had to spend significant time with European Command and NATO 
to ensure that those networks that we're using collaboratively 
with each of those partners are cybersecure.
    Senator Gillibrand. As an example, I just visited some of 
our assets in Portugal, and they had a recent cyberattack that 
put NATO confidential materials at risk. That country still 
hasn't reached its two percent investment in military. One 
recommendation would be to really encourage our allies to 
choose that their investment will be in cyber-capacity or in 
space capacity or in new intelligence capacity that's helpful 
for the alliances.
    Is that something you will endeavor to do?
    General Haugh. Senator, well certainly, we have a great 
partnership with General Cavoli today. We'll certainly work 
very closely with General Cavoli on what capabilities the 
alliance needs.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And then last, in last 
year's NDAA, I established--and expanded in this year's NDAA--a 
scholarship program for college students to gain education in 
cybersecurity and digital services, with an ensuing service 
obligation to the Department of Defense or the IC. Do I have 
your commitment, if confirmed as NSA Director, you will welcome 
these students, once cleared, as part of your dedicated and 
trained workforce, and do everything you can to support the 
Cyber academy?
    General Haugh. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I also think you 
raised a very interesting point about other ways that our NATO 
allies could get to those requisite investments, and, frankly, 
might actually be more valuable than another 50 soldiers.
    Senator Gillibrand. Correct. Which is why I wanted to 
highlight it to the future NSA Director, because he can lead 
that effort. It's also a way to project power with countries 
that want to align with us, that have enormous potential, like 
India. So, military sales are typically the way we project 
power, but you can also do it through development of new 
capabilities in cyber, in space, in future technologies--with a 
different kind of industrial base.
    Chairman Warner. I think a very good point.
    Senator Ossoff.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Casey, 
thank you for your career of service to the Congress. 
Congratulations on this nomination. General Haugh, thank you 
for your service in the Air Force. Congratulations to you, as 
well.
    One would have thought that after the Snowden affair hard 
lessons learned would have been applied consistently across DoD 
and the IC to prevent serious and preventable disclosures of 
classified information. But the recent unauthorized 
disclosures, allegedly by an Air guardsman in Massachusetts, 
suggest to me that there remains, at least in pockets of the 
U.S. government, significant complacency and incompetence about 
the protection of classified information. So, beginning with 
you, General Haugh, could you please detail to the Committee 
how, in this role, if confirmed, you will, with intensity and 
precision, use both your formal authorities and your influence 
and example to prevent such unauthorized disclosures, which put 
U.S. national security at risk, in the future?
    General Haugh. Senator, protection of our classified 
information is paramount. If confirmed, the role that the 
Director of NSA plays to be the national manager of national 
security systems, that sets the starting point in terms of how 
do we secure those systems, and how do we monitor them in terms 
of understanding threats--as we think about foreign threats. 
But we do have insight in how to deal with insider threats. So, 
if confirmed, I pledge to work with the other elements of the 
IC and within the department to help support efforts to ensure 
that our systems are secure.
    Senator Ossoff. How about standardizing best technical 
practices?
    General Haugh. We'll certainly be an advocate for that. 
Yes, Senator.
    Senator Ossoff. Mr. Casey.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for the question, Senator. If 
confirmed, the Director of NCSC also plays a role in a number 
of different ways in helping to prevent insider threats. So, 
one, the NCSC coordinates damage assessments when they're 
ordered to ensure that we capture what actually happened and 
what lessons we can learn from it. Secondly, the DNI and the AG 
co-chair, but the NCSC largely staffs, the National Insider 
Threat Task Force that's charged with sharing best practices 
and encouraging agencies across the government to effectively 
implement security.
    And then finally, the personnel vetting, which NCSC is, 
again with DoD, helping to lead the development and roll out of 
Trusted Workforce 2.0 to hopefully head off some of the 
insiders, frankly, before they become insider threats.
    Senator Ossoff. Mr. Casey. Thank you.
    How will you characterize or measure success in your role 
if confirmed?
    Mr. Casey. Thank you for that question, Senator. I think 
there's a few different ways that if I'm confirmed, I would 
measure success. One is the continued and hopefully successful 
rollout of Trusted Workforce 2.0. Second thing, I think we can 
do a better job of doing more coordinated outreach to the 
private sector and academia about the threats they're facing 
and ways they can mitigate it.
    And finally, the ultimate way of measuring success, as I 
think I was alluding to with Senator Lankford, is when General 
Haugh gets SIGINT in from some foreign adversary that it's too 
hard to operate in the United States, and they're going to go 
somewhere else.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Casey.
    General Haugh, with the immense capabilities that would be 
at your disposal as NSA Director, of course, there emerge 
privacy and civil liberties concerns for American citizens. 
Will you pledge to be fully attentive to those concerns, both 
as a matter of law and as a matter of ethics and best practice, 
and fully candid with the Committee when we bring questions to 
you on that subject?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Ossoff. And General Haugh, of course, NSA Georgia, 
which will be a significant contributor to your efforts if 
confirmed, brings unique capabilities to the National Security 
Agency. Can you characterize the value of the contribution of 
the personnel at NSA Georgia and opportunities for growth you 
see at that facility?
    General Haugh. Yes, Senator. In terms of my current role 
and in my previous roles, NSA Georgia is a critical part of the 
United States SIGINT system, and it's also very critical to 
U.S. Cyber Command in terms of the forces we've aligned with 
Army Cyber. The specific areas that I think are unique with NSA 
Georgia is NSA's combat support role, and that's support to 
commanders in the field. NSA Georgia has been a leader, and I 
would expect that to continue and expand in terms of the 
demands to ensure that there's resilience across the United 
States SIGINT system, while also partnering and expanding 
training. The infrastructure that has now been built between 
the Cyber Center of Excellence and the work that NSA is doing 
at NSA Georgia is an opportunity for us to ensure that we've 
got the trained talent, both within NSA and Cyber Command, and 
NSA Georgia will be significant to that.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you both for your continued 
willingness to serve.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
    All right, I've got one last question. General Haugh, 
you're going to not be the victim of this question, but I am 
reinforcing what Senator Lankford brought up about being on the 
record. You have repeatedly indicated that you are going to 
continue the efforts of this Committee on security clearance 
reform and the whole process of security clearance. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Casey. That's correct, Senator.
    Chairman Warner. Okay. One way, and remember, I will remind 
you, you're on the record, one way that you could make that 
commitment, at least in my mind, more diligent would be a 
commitment that you will return Jon Rosenwasser's calls within 
four hours, regardless of where you may be in-country, out-of-
country, or anywhere else.
    Mr. Casey. If I'm fortunate enough to be confirmed, sir, 
I'll certainly look at that issue and get back to you within 60 
days.
    Chairman Warner. I think I may borrow Senator Wyden's 
technique and ask you to give a fulsome response to that in 
writing.
    Senator King. He'll give that question all the 
consideration it deserves.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you, Senator King.
    Chairman Warner. Well, once again, Angus King coming to 
your rescue.
    Well, let me let me thank both of you for your testimony 
and I appreciate Senator King hanging in. You both have 
imminent qualifications for the jobs you've been nominated for. 
I want to thank, as I think other Members have mentioned, the 
fact that your families are both here. These are tough jobs and 
tough careers to take on.
    We appreciate and support their service, as well. And I do 
want to just note on a personal basis how proud I am of you, 
Mike, and the fact that so many former colleagues, of their own 
volition and on their own time, came up here to show support 
for you. I think that speaks volumes.
    Mr. Casey. Thank you, Senator. I suspect they had mixed 
motives.
    Chairman Warner. Well, we are going to hold you on the 
Rosenwasser thing.
    And General Haugh, I think Senator Lankford made a very 
good point, and you will have no better allies than this 
Committee on a totally bipartisan basis. But some of the most 
disappointing times in my tenure here have been when someone, 
not, say, on purpose, but for whatever reason, had information 
they didn't share. It then came out, and yet they'd appeared 
before the Committee previously.
    So, leaning in, and if it needs to be on a classified 
setting, we will understand that. But leaning in to make sure 
that you share and trust us, we will be that kind of partner.
    Any final comments on this? This may be a record. And I 
want to thank Vice Chairman Rubio for his cooperation on this.
    If any Members of the Committee wish to submit questions 
for the record after today's hearing, please do so no later 
than noon on Thursday, July 13--Chris, I'm not sure you ever 
had a turnaround that quick--so that gives you less than 24 
hours.
    But I'm grateful for the Vice Chairman's cooperation to see 
if we can move this proceeding along.
    Again, Mr. Casey and General Haugh, thank you for appearing 
before the Committee today. Thank you, as well, to your 
families. They should all be proud of you, and good luck going 
forward.
    We are adjourned.
    (Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 4:10 p.m.)

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