[Senate Hearing 118-96]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 118-96

                    WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. POLICY 
                            TOWARDS RUSSIA?
=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              MAY 16, 2023

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

 
                       C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Sullivan, Hon. John, Former Deputy Secretary of State and 
  Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation 
  (2020-2022)....................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Kendall-Taylor, Dr. Andrea, Senior Fellow and Director, 
  Transatlantic Security Program, Center for a New American 
  Security, Washington, DC.......................................     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ambassador John Sullivan to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    36

The Committee Received No Response From Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor 
  for the Following Questions by Senator Todd Young..............    38

                                 (iii)
 
                    WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. POLICY 
                            TOWARDS RUSSIA?

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Romney, 
Ricketts, and Young.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    The last time U.S.-Russia relations were this bad, Kennedy 
was President and Khrushchev had nuclear missiles pointed at us 
from Cuba.
    Today, our embassy in Moscow only has a skeleton staff that 
faces restrictions from a Russian Government working to 
undermine U.S. interests all over the world.
    In the wake of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, democratic 
nations came together to isolate his regime with coordinated 
condemnation and a punishing set of sanctions. They have 
reduced revenues from trade and petroleum products, pushed more 
than a thousand companies to pull out of Russia, and isolated 
the country's financial industry.
    Yet, the Russian economy only shrank by 2 percent in 2022 
and Russia has dramatically increased trade with other 
autocratic nations including China and Iran, not to mention 
India.
    We need to continue our coordinated global efforts to 
target Putin's war machine because beyond Ukraine and with 
support of the Wagner Group, Putin continues to be a 
destructive autocratic force on the world stage.
    Inside Russia, Kremlin cronies kidnap Americans, from 
basketball stars to Wall Street Journal reporters, to use as 
bargaining chips in their geopolitical gains. They have 
imprisoned Russian dissidents that threaten Putin's power like 
Vladimir Kara-Murza or Alexei Navalny, and they have shut down 
independent media to control the behavior and minds of Russian 
citizens.
    Beyond Russia's borders, far away from the headlines of 
Western nations, there is a very different picture. Sergey 
Lavrov is globetrotting around the world to shore up support, a 
so-called limitless partnership with China, which apparently 
includes working to shape international institutions in their 
own image, undermining the values of sovereignty, rule of law, 
and respect for human rights.
    The Russian embassy here in DC is throwing cocktail parties 
attended by diplomats from all over the Global South, who then 
abstain or even vote against resolutions to support Ukraine.
    At the United Nations, Russia uses its seat on the Security 
Council to make a mockery of any attempt to hold Putin and his 
regime accountable for the atrocities their forces are 
committing.
    While we can laud the fact that more than 140 U.N. members 
condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine versus 35 who abstained, 
as the Financial Times recently pointed out, those 35 countries 
represent more than half of the world's population.
    Underlying these Russian efforts is a sophisticated mis- 
and disinformation campaign that, quite frankly, I do not 
believe we are effectively dealing with.
    Through Wagner mercenaries exploiting instability across 
the Sahel and Africa to Russian cyber-attacks that destroy 
infrastructure to engineering a food crisis that now stretches 
halfway around the world, the Russian disinformation apparatus 
continues to find fertile ground for blatant lies that 
whitewash its own operations and undermine trust in the 
countries actually working to provide humanitarian assistance, 
promote peace and security, to say nothing of its targeted 
campaign against the United States and our electoral systems as 
well as those of our democratic allies who embrace the same 
fundamental human rights and freedoms that underpin our own 
system.
    Let me thank our witnesses for appearing today. I hope you 
will speak to these challenges and how the United States and 
our partners can overcome them.
    How can we better leverage sanctions and punitive tools to 
further cripple Russia's leadership? How can we better leverage 
international institutions to confront Russian influence? What 
tools can we utilize to hold Russian actors accountable for 
their crimes against humanity in Ukraine and human rights 
abuses at home?
    I also hope our witnesses will speak to how we can combat 
Putin's weaponization of energy from Georgia to Syria to 
Moldova.
    I am pleased that Senator Risch is working with me on a 
bill to support energy security in Eastern Europe and beyond, 
which will be critical to cutting off Putin's assets.
    I am also working on efforts to support Russian dissidents 
who have fled and welcome your thoughts on how we can best 
support those Russians who want to see a brighter future for 
their country.
    This question of the future of U.S.-Russia relations is, 
obviously, huge. I have not even touched on nonproliferation or 
Arctic security or climate change.
    At this point, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Risch 
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
    Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
thanks to our witnesses for appearing here this morning.
    There has been a lot of discussion in Washington about 
Russia and Ukraine, but very little about what U.S. policy 
towards Russia should be now and in the future. I am glad we 
get to have this conversation.
    Russia under Putin is an autocratic and imperialistic 
regime and poses an acute threat to the freedom and stability 
that the United States and our allies have fought to promote 
and defend.
    This is true in Ukraine, more broadly in Europe, and 
throughout Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic and in the 
emerging China-Russia cooperation.
    Despite these increasing challenges, it is clear that the 
United States lacks a coherent policy to confront Russia. It 
appears the White House never really thinks about Russia until 
Moscow makes a move and has never acted proactively to force 
the Kremlin to respond to our initiatives.
    Before Russia's unprovoked invasion last year, it reminded 
us that weakness invites aggression. This Administration's 
approach resembled the failed Obama reset. We all remember the 
reset. It did not work.
    As to this Administration, it started with the unilateral 
extension of the New START treaty on inauguration day. It 
continued to the refusal to impose Nord Stream 2 sanctions.
    It continued on to the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, which 
produced no deliverables, and then on to the suspension of 
military assistance to Ukraine in May and November 2021 because 
of concerns it would cause escalation.
    The Administration has offered olive branch after olive 
branch, but as predicted, Putin used every dialogue and 
concession to lend himself legitimacy and increase Russia's 
geopolitical status at our expense. We need to accept that 
Russia sees this kind of diplomacy as weakness and that it only 
seriously responds when we project strength.
    This discredited approach has allowed for war in Europe, 
renewed Russian presence in the Middle East, a militarized 
Arctic, and a growing Russian proxy footprint across Africa and 
Latin America.
    We need to be honest and acknowledge that under Putin, 
Russia is an adversary, not a willing partner. Our policies 
must confront Russia as it is now, not as it was 30 years ago.
    We must view Russia not only as a serious adversary in its 
own right, but also recognize its role in U.S.-China 
competition and other challenges of today's world.
    Domestically, Putin has turned Russia into a feudal kingdom 
where the whim of an autocrat is the only law. Political 
repression is at an all-time high. The opposition movement has 
been crushed with anyone who expresses dissent either jailed, 
exiled, assassinated, poisoned.
    Attacks on press freedom and state control of the media 
have reduced Russia to a propaganda state. Civil society has 
been muzzled and anyone who could flee has already done so.
    On sanctions, the United States has made a start, but there 
is so much more to do, particularly in targeting critical 
sectors like energy and, very importantly, cracking down on 
third-nation sanctions evasion.
    Likewise, we need a U.S. military strategy that accurately 
accounts for recent changes in Russia's diminishing 
conventional capabilities. At the same time, we should expect 
more nuclear threats. That has become consistent and, indeed, 
during the Ukraine conflict, commonplace because of its 
frequency to the point that it is largely ignored.
    This is dangerous, but not unexpected, given Russia's ham-
handed statecraft. Russian thinking is clear in this regard. 
Putin knows he can threaten to use nuclear weapons without any 
concrete response from the West.
    Instead, he seriously believes his threats will deter us 
from doing what we should to protect our interests. On all 
fronts, the United States needs to have a clearly defined 
policy for what we expect from Russia and what we are willing 
to do to pursue and protect our interests.
    We must also form this policy in the context of a more 
globally assertive China and its increasingly close strategic 
partnership with Russia.
    This Administration consistently and all too often worries 
about what Putin will do. We need a policy where Putin wakes up 
every morning worried about what we will do.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    In the interest of time, I am going to give condensed 
biographies for our distinguished witnesses.
    Ambassador John J. Sullivan is no stranger to the committee 
and I am sure he is happy there is no confirmation vote after 
this hearing.
    Currently a distinguished fellow at the School of Foreign 
Service of Georgetown University, his career spans four decades 
in the public sector for both Democratic and Republican 
administrations across the Departments of State, Justice, 
Defense, and Commerce, as well as in private law practice.
    Ambassador Sullivan served five presidents in prominent 
diplomatic and legal positions, including as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Russian Federation under Presidents Biden and Trump. Before 
his posts in Moscow, he served for almost 3 years as the U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State.
    Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director 
of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New 
American Security. Prior to joining CNAS, Dr. Kendall-Taylor 
served for 8 years as a senior intelligence officer, including 
as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia 
at the National Intelligence Council.
    She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's 
School of Foreign Service. Her work has been published in 
numerous political science and policy journals, and since the 
committee also champions the State Department's Education and 
Cultural Exchange Bureau, I will note that she was a Fulbright 
scholar in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan where she conducted 
dissertation research on oil and autocracy.
    We welcome you both to the committee. We thank you for the 
insights you will provide us.
    Ambassador, we are going to start off with you. I would ask 
you both to limit your presentations here to about 5 minutes. 
Your full statements will be included in the record without 
objection.
    Ambassador Sullivan, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN SULLIVAN, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF 
   STATE AND AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE RUSSIAN 
                     FEDERATION (2020-2022)

    Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 
Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee. It is 
good to be back. As the chairman said, it is also good to be 
back without seeking a confirmation vote from this committee.
    I am honored to be here today to discuss U.S. policy toward 
Russia. I hope to bring to the committee my experiences for the 
3 years I was in Moscow dealing with the Russians, negotiating 
with the Russians.
    When I arrived at my post in Moscow, I was resolved to do 
everything I could to stop the downward spiral in relations 
between our countries. U.S. policy toward Russia at the time 
was, on the one hand, to confront and push back hard on the 
Kremlin in the many areas where we were opposed, but on the 
other hand, to seek progress in those limited areas where the 
interests of our countries appeared more aligned--arms control, 
some regional conflicts, North Korea. At a minimum, I hoped 
that we could stabilize our respective diplomatic platforms.
    That policy approach failed. During my first 2 years as 
ambassador, there was no lasting progress on any issue on which 
we engaged. Nevertheless, persistent, my priorities remained 
even after the change in the White House in January 2021 to 
work to stabilize the U.S.-Russia relationship while defending 
U.S. interests and advocating for U.S. citizens wrongfully 
detained in Russia and the many U.S. businesses that operate 
there.
    This was reaffirmed--my approach was reaffirmed in June 
2021 when I accompanied President Joe Biden to meet Putin in 
Geneva. President Biden made clear we would continue to 
confront and oppose the Russians in the many areas where U.S. 
interests were threatened or undermined by them, but we would 
engage with them on, among other things, strategic stability, 
cybersecurity, and wrongfully detained Americans.
    Our engagement following the summit had barely begun when 
there was a seismic policy shift after U.S. intelligence 
agencies collected considerable evidence of Russia's plans for 
Ukraine.
    Beginning in November 2021, U.S. policy focused intensively 
on dissuading and deterring Russia from a further invasion of 
Ukraine. Despite these intensive diplomatic efforts, that 
policy failed when Russia launched on February 24, 2022, its 
so-called special military operation, a euphemism that would 
make George Orwell blush.
    It had been apparent well before then that the Russians 
were not negotiating in good faith and were going through a 
charade of diplomacy for Putin to lay the groundwork for a 
further invasion of Ukraine. In the 15 months since Russia's 
aggressive and brutal war began, U.S. policymaking has rightly 
focused on supporting Ukraine and sanctioning and isolating 
Russia.
    That must be the immediate and imperative policy focus. No 
country, let alone a permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council, can be allowed to succeed in waging an aggressive war 
of conquest replete with grotesque war crimes to redraw 
international borders, and make no mistake, Putin does not want 
to negotiate an end to his aggressive war short of victory on 
his terms.
    He believes that Ukraine is Russia's, and I quote, 
``historical lands.'' He said that in a recent speech in which 
he also assured his fellow Russians that, ``Step by step, 
carefully and consistently, we will deal with the tasks we have 
at hand, which are to de-Nazify and demilitarize Ukraine.'' 
That is President Putin just weeks ago.
    As Senator Risch mentioned, I think it is appropriate for 
us to consider the broader context of U.S. policy toward Russia 
now even as the war in Ukraine and Putin's failed special 
military operation continues.
    If I may, I thought I would just offer a few thoughts on 
context for policymaking and then would be happy to delve into 
many of the specific issues that the chairman mentioned.
    First, most important, Russia under Putin is an implacable 
adversary of the United States. Putin believes that Russia is 
at war with us in a clash of ``civilizations.'' They said this 
in their recent restatement of their foreign policy, their so-
called concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.
    Putin and many other Russian nationalists are committed to 
this concept. For any U.S. policy on Russia to succeed, we need 
to understand our adversary.
    Second, we must work to put in place security architecture 
through NATO and with intensive bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy that protects not just Ukraine, but Europe and the 
rest of the world from Russian aggression.
    Third, there could be no trust of any kind in the Russian 
Government. After repeated statements from Russian leadership 
in early 2022 that they would not attack Ukraine--indeed, they 
said they had no plans to do so--why would anyone trust that 
government?
    The Reagan era mantra of trust, but verify is quaint. It 
has no application now. There can be no trust, only 
verification and justice for Ukraine and the victims of Russian 
war crimes in Ukraine.
    Fourth, as difficult as it is to pursue diplomacy in this 
context, we should not give up entirely on engaging with the 
Russian Government when our interests so require, but our 
interests do not require pleading with the Russians for 
dialogue, whether it is on arms control or the war in Ukraine. 
That is what they want and it will lead only to more policy 
failure.
    The best advice I received as ambassador in Moscow was to 
never ask the Russians for anything. We should approach any 
proposed engagement or negotiation from a position of strength 
and confidence.
    Finally, Chairman Menendez mentioned our embassy in Moscow. 
To engage with Russia, we rely on a safe and functioning 
embassy in that capital. The price we pay to maintain that 
embassy is steep.
    The Russians, despite their professed commitment to 
reciprocity, have maintained an advantage. We have an embassy 
in Moscow and no consulates. They have an embassy in Washington 
and two consulates, Houston and New York. Moreover, they have 
more diplomats assigned to their bilateral mission to the 
United States than we have in Russia. We should insist on 
reciprocity.
    Thank you for allowing me to address the committee and I 
welcome the opportunity to discuss the foregoing issues or any 
other matters in which members are interested.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Sullivan follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Ambassador John Sullivan

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the committee, I am honored to appear before you to discuss U.S. policy 
toward Russia. 
I bring to the discussion my perspective as the U.S. Ambassador to 
Russia from December 2019 to October 2022.
    When I arrived at my post in Moscow, I was resolved to do 
everything I could to stop the downward spiral in relations between our 
countries. U.S. policy toward Russia at the time was, on the one hand, 
to confront and push back hard on the Kremlin in the many areas where 
we were opposed, e.g., election interference, cyber-attacks, and the 
wrongful detention of innocent Americans, to name some prominent topics 
on a growing list. But, on the other hand, to seek progress in those 
limited areas where the interests of our countries appeared more 
aligned, e.g., arms control, counterterrorism, and certain regional 
issues, including North Korea. At a minimum, I hoped we could stabilize 
our respective diplomatic platforms.
    That policy approach clearly failed. During my first 2 years as 
ambassador, there was no lasting progress on any issue on which we 
engaged. Moreover, the pace of deeply disturbing events in Russia was 
non-stop, notably the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, which was part of a 
sweeping crackdown on political opposition, on what was left of 
independent media in Russia, and on civil society generally. The 
crackdown was intimately related to the constitutional and legal 
reforms introduced by the Kremlin in early 2020 that allow President 
Vladimir Putin to avoid the terms limits in the Russian constitution 
and serve as President until 2036.
    Despite the lack of progress, my priorities as ambassador 
remained--even after the change in the White House in January 2021--to 
work to stabilize the U.S.-Russia relationship while defending U.S. 
national security and our democratic values; and to advocate for U.S. 
citizens detained in Russia and for U.S. businesses operating there. 
This was reaffirmed in June 2021, when I accompanied President Joe 
Biden to his meeting with Putin in Geneva. President Biden made clear 
that we would continue to confront and oppose the Russians in the many 
areas where U.S. interests were threatened or undermined by them, but 
we would engage with the Russians on, among other things, strategic 
stability, cyber security, and wrongfully detained Americans.
    Our engagement following the summit had barely begun when there was 
a seismic policy shift after U.S. intelligence agencies collected 
considerable evidence of Russia's plans for Ukraine. Until then, the 
painful and bloody history of Russia's intervention in and seizure of 
territory from Ukraine had cast a heavy pall on the relationship 
between the United States and Russia but had not yet completely broken 
it. Relations with Russia were terrible, but we were still trying to 
find some common areas on which to work with the world's only other 
nuclear superpower. Beginning in early November 2021, however, U.S. 
policy shifted to an exclusive focus on dissuading and deterring Russia 
from a further invasion of Ukraine.
    Despite intensive efforts in U.S.-Russia bilateral channels, in the 
NATO-Russia Council, and at the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, that policy failed when Russia's so-called 
``Special Military Operation''--a euphemism that would make George 
Orwell blush--began on February 24, 2022. It had been apparent to me 
well before then that the Russians were not negotiating in good faith 
and were going through a charade of diplomacy for Putin to lay the 
groundwork for a further invasion of Ukraine.
    In the 15 months since Russia's aggressive and brutal war began, 
U.S. policymaking has focused, quite rightly, on robustly supporting 
Ukraine in its defense and on sanctioning and isolating Russia. That 
must be our immediate and imperative policy focus. No country, let 
alone a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can be allowed to 
succeed in waging an aggressive war of conquest, replete with grotesque 
war crimes, to redraw international borders. And make no mistake, Putin 
does not want to negotiate an end to his aggressive war short of 
victory defined on his terms. He believes that Ukraine is Russia's 
``historical lands,'' as he said in a speech in February of this year 
in which he also assured his fellow Russians that, ``[s]tep by step, 
carefully and consistently we will deal with the tasks we have at 
hand,'' which are to ``de-nazify'' and ``de-militarize'' Ukraine. He 
does not make a statement like that lightly and we should take him at 
his word.
    But it is appropriate to consider the broader context of U.S. 
policy toward Russia, even as the war in Ukraine and Putin's failed 
Special Military Operation continue. I offer a few brief thoughts on 
this topic based on our recent failures to influence or deter Russian 
policy choices.
    First, it is important to understand as a policymaking threshold 
that Russia under Putin is an implacable adversary of the United 
States. He believes that Russia is at war with us. It is not a 
competition; it is a clash of ``civilizations,'' as reflected in the 
recently adopted Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation. Putin and many other Russian nationalists are committed to 
this concept to their core. We repeatedly underestimate the depth of 
their hostility when we try to influence Russia. For any U.S. policy on 
Russia to succeed, we must understand our adversary.
    Second, we must work to put in place security architecture through 
NATO and with intensive bilateral and multilateral diplomacy that 
protects not just Ukraine but Europe and the world from future Russian 
aggression by this implacable adversary.
    Third, there can be no trust of any kind in the Russian Government. 
After repeated statements from the highest levels in January and 
February 2022 that Russia would not attack Ukraine and had no plans to 
do so, who would trust that government? The Reagan-era mantra of trust 
but verify seems quaint now. There can be no trust, only verification 
and justice for the victims of Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
    Fourth, as difficult as it is to pursue diplomacy with Russia 
considering the foregoing, we should not give up entirely on engaging 
with the Russian Government when our interests require, e.g., in 
advocating for nuclear arms control, including inspections under the 
New START Treaty, or for the proper treatment and release of wrongfully 
detained Americans. But our interests do not include pleading with the 
Russians for dialogue on any topic, whether it is arms control or the 
war in Ukraine. That is what they want, and it will lead only to more 
policy failure. The best advice I received as ambassador was never to 
ask the Russians for anything. We should approach any engagement or 
negotiation from a position of strength and confidence. The more we 
signal that we really want something, the less likely it is that we 
will achieve our policy goals.
    Finally, to engage with Russia we rely on a safe and functioning 
embassy in Moscow. The price we have paid to maintain Embassy Moscow, 
however, is steep. The Russians, despite their professed commitment to 
reciprocity in our diplomatic relationship, have maintained an 
advantage over us. We have an embassy in Moscow and no consulates. They 
have an embassy in Washington and two consulates, in Houston and New 
York. Moreover, they have more diplomats assigned to their bilateral 
mission to the United States than we have in Russia, or at least they 
did some months ago when I was ambassador. We should take the Russians 
at their word and insist on reciprocity in our diplomatic relationship.
    Thank you for allowing me to address the committee. I welcome the 
opportunity to discuss the foregoing issues or any other matters in 
which members are interested.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor.

   STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, SENIOR FELLOW AND 
  DIRECTOR, TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW 
               AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak today about U.S. 
policy towards Russia, a topic that is both critical and 
fraught.
    It is critical because we are clearly locked in a period of 
intense and probably prolonged confrontation with Russia with 
the war for Ukraine at its center. Although the United States 
is not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, as 
the ambassador said, we should be very clear that Russia sees 
itself as being at war with us.
    The future of U.S. policy towards Russia is also fraught 
because so much is changing. Russia itself is changing as a 
result of its war in Ukraine in still unknowable ways.
    Nothing will improve so long as Putin is in power, but 
there is uncertainty about the political changes that the war 
might trigger inside Russia and what Putin's eventual departure 
will mean for future relations.
    Russia's war in Ukraine requires us to reexamine long held 
assumptions about Russia and it is those updated assessments 
that should guide Washington's approach.
    I will make four brief points, three that should shape our 
expectations of relations with Russia and a final point on what 
I see as the most important recommendation for putting U.S.-
Russia relations on more solid footing.
    First, the nature of U.S.-Russia relations will remain 
antagonistic so long as the war continues and the war is likely 
to be protracted. Putin believes that time is on his side and 
that the West will tire in its support for Ukraine.
    Fighting on is also in Putin's personal interest. Wartime 
autocrats rarely lose power. Being at war shuts down avenues 
for the country's citizens, military, and security forces to 
challenge their leadership.
    In my work, I have found that since the end of World War II 
only 7 percent of personalist authoritarians, as Putin is, have 
been unseated while an interstate conflict that began under 
their watch was ongoing.
    The same does not hold true for dictators who lose wars. 
They become more vulnerable to ouster. Even if Ukraine is 
wildly successful in its counter offensive, Putin has every 
incentive to fight through the hardship, meaning that this war 
will go on for a long time, significantly constraining the 
scope of U.S.-Russia relations.
    Second, not only is Putin poised to maintain power, but the 
confrontational nature of U.S.-Russia relations will very 
likely persist past him. The historical track record of these 
longtime personalist autocrats suggests that once these leaders 
make it to 20 years in power--and Putin has been there for 23--
they tend to make it to about 36 years.
    What is more, Putin is orchestrating changes inside Russia 
that make relations more problematic. He is moving Russia in a 
more totalitarian direction, and I do not use that word 
lightly, as he attempts to mobilize Russian society in support 
of his war not just on Ukraine, but also on the West.
    The contours of his policies are likely to endure beyond 
him. The historical record shows that authoritarianism persists 
past the departure of longtime autocratic leaders like Putin 92 
percent of the time. Moreover, my research shows that the same 
group of regime insiders often remains intact after longtime 
leaders depart.
    Such continuity in the Russian regime would bring 
continuity in Russia's external relations. Putin has saddled 
his successor with a long list of vexing problems, including 
how to end the war and settle the status of Crimea and whether 
to pay Ukraine wartime reparations and accept accountability 
for war crimes.
    These thorny issues will long complicate Russia's relations 
with the United States and Europe.
    Third, along with the enduring intent to challenge the 
United States, Russia will have significant capacity to do so, 
although we need to be attuned to how the nature of the threat 
is evolving.
    Russia will emerge from its war militarily, economically, 
and geopolitically weaker and there will therefore be a strong 
temptation to downgrade Russia as a threat.
    That would be a mistake. Russian power and influence may be 
diminished, but Russia will adapt. In particular, the more 
vulnerable that Putin feels about the degradation of his 
conventional forces, the more he will rely on unconventional 
methods to accomplish his objectives including relying more 
heavily on his nuclear weapons and other hybrid tactics.
    Finally, I have included several recommendations in my 
written statement, but I want to highlight one and that is the 
best path to a better relationship with Russia runs through 
Ukraine.
    The United States has very limited ability to shape 
directly the trajectory of U.S.-Russia relations and so the 
single most important way to shape that trajectory is by 
enabling Ukraine to defeat Russia.
    A Russia that makes gains in Ukraine is likely to be 
emboldened. A military defeat of Russia, in contrast, could be 
the type of seismic event that is required to catalyze bottom-
up pressure that will be needed to set Russia down a different 
path.
    A Ukrainian victory raises the prospect, even if just 
slightly, that Putin could be forced out of office, creating an 
opening for political change. That future comes with risks, but 
also opportunities.
    In sum, we are likely to remain in a long-term 
confrontation with Russia and the United States will need an 
effective and sustainable policy to meet the challenge, 
starting in Ukraine.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kendall-Taylor follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor

                            i. introduction
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak 
today about the future of U.S. policy towards Russia--a topic that is 
both critical and fraught. It is critical because we are quite clearly 
locked in a period of intense and what is likely to be prolonged 
confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of 
that confrontation. Because of the war, the risk of escalation, 
including direct military conflict between the United States and 
Russia, is higher than it has been in decades. Although the United 
States and its allies are not directly engaged in the war with Russia 
in Ukraine, we should be very clear that Russia sees itself as being at 
war with us.
    The future of U.S. policy towards Russia is also fraught. It is 
fraught because so much is changing--Russia itself is changing as a 
result of its war on Ukraine in still unknowable ways. The nature of 
the Russian threat is evolving. We can be sure that nothing will 
improve so long as Putin is in power, but there is uncertainty about 
the political changes that the war might trigger inside Russia and what 
Putin's eventual departure will mean for relations with Moscow. 
Russia's war in Ukraine requires us to re-examine long-held assumptions 
and understandings about Russia, and it is those updated assessments 
that should guide Washington's future policy approach to Russia.
        ii. expectations for the future of u.s.-russia relations
    I want to start by making three points that should inform our 
expectations and understanding of the future of U.S. relations with 
Russia.
First, the Nature of U.S.-Russia Relations Will Remain Confrontational 
        so Long as the War Continues, and the Conflict is Likely to be 
        Protracted
    Even as the Russian military struggles to make gains on the 
battlefield, Putin is confident that the West will eventually tire of 
its support for Ukraine or that political changes in the United States 
and Europe will result in less military assistance for Kyiv. But even 
more, continuing the war is in Putin's personal interest. Fighting on 
makes sense for Putin for one fundamental reason: wartime autocrats 
rarely lose power. Being at war shuts down avenues for a country's 
citizens, military, and security forces to challenge their leadership. 
In research I conducted with my colleague Dr. Erica Frantz, we found 
that since the end of World War II, only seven percent of personalist 
authoritarians--as Putin is-- have been unseated while an interstate 
conflict that began under their watch was ongoing.\1\ Other data 
similarly show that leaders who initiate wars are especially unlikely 
to be ousted amid them.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, ``Putin's Forever War: 
How the Invasion Empowers Russia's President,'' Foreign Affairs, March 
23, 2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war.
    \2\ Giacamo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, Leaders and International 
Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The same does not hold true for dictators who lose wars; they 
become more vulnerable to ejection. Although personalist dictators such 
as Putin tend to be among the most resilient to military defeats, 
Putin's expectations of what might happen if he is ousted are likely to 
shape his calculus.\3\ Leaders who worry that they will be jailed, 
exiled, or killed--a fate most common among personalist autocrats like 
Putin--suggest he will be especially sensitive to even small increases 
in risk to his stability. And Putin's very clear responsibility for the 
invasion makes him particularly vulnerable. According to one study, 
leaders who are culpable for wars are especially motivated to continue 
fighting them--even in the face of hardship--because domestic actors 
will want to punish them if they fail.\4\ Even if Ukraine is wildly 
successful in its counter-offensive, Putin has every incentive to fight 
through the hardship, meaning that this war will go on for a long time, 
significantly constraining the scope of U.S.-Russia relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sarah E. Croco and Jessica L.P. Weeks, ``War Outcomes and 
Leader Tenure,'' World Politics 68, no. 4 (October 2016): 577-607 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26347363.
    \4\ Sarah E. Croco, ``The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, 
War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment,'' The American Political Science 
Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 457-477 https://www.jstor.org/stable/
41480852.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, not Only is Putin Poised To Maintain Power, but the 
        Confrontational Nature of U.S.-Russia Relations Will Likely 
        Persist Past his Departure
    So long as the war continues, Putin is likely to be able to weather 
any blowback. Not only does the ongoing war improve his prospects for 
political survival, but so too does the political system he has built 
over his long tenure. Putin has created in Russia what political 
scientist Milan Svolik calls an established autocracy, wherein regime 
officials and elite are fully dependent on the leader and invested in 
maintaining the status quo from which they benefit.\5\ In research I 
conducted with Dr. Frantz, we find that the typical post-Cold War 
autocrat who had governed for 20 years (Putin has been in power for 23 
years) ended up ruling for a total of about 36 years. The changes he is 
orchestrating inside Russia make the future of U.S.-Russia relations 
more problematic. Putin is already taking Russia in a darker, more 
authoritarian direction. While authoritarianism in Russia has been 
hardening since Putin returned to power in 2012, his invasion of 
Ukraine has intensified this authoritarian turn. Russia's wrongful 
detainment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich in March 
and sentencing of opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to a 25-year 
jail term in April, for example, are eerily reminiscent of Soviet 
times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If anything, Putin is moving Russia in a more totalitarian 
direction as he attempts to mobilize Russian society in support of his 
war not just on Ukraine, but also on the West with the United States at 
its center. As Russian analyst Andrei Kolesnikov has observed, it is no 
longer possible for Russians to stay disengaged. As he notes, ``More 
and more, Russians who are economically dependent on the state are 
finding that they have to be active Putinists.'' \6\ Society is being 
militarized, public acts of support are growing, as are incidents of 
Russians reporting on the ``anti-patriotic'' activities of their fellow 
citizens. Putin's propaganda that frames the United States as the 
enemy, along with what is likely to be deep Russian resentment over 
Western sanctions and the role U.S. and European weapons have played in 
the very high number of Russian casualties, are likely to have long-
term effects on the way that Russians view the United States and the 
relations between the two countries. Amid the Kremlin's propaganda, 
many Russians appear to feel besieged and, often, just as embittered as 
Putin himself; these dynamics are very likely to sustain an aggressive 
Russia, even after Putin departs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Andrei Kolesnikov, ``Putin's Second Front: The War in Ukraine 
Has Become a Battle for the Russian Psyche,'' Foreign Affairs, April 7, 
2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-second-
front.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the societal changes taking place inside Russia, the 
expectation in Washington must be that authoritarianism and the 
contours of Russian foreign policy will outlast Putin. The historical 
record shows that for all post-Cold War autocrats (except monarchs) in 
power 20 years or more, authoritarianism persists past the leader's 
departure in 76-percent of cases. When such leaders are also older 
personalist autocrats, authoritarianism endures--either with the same 
regime or with the establishment of a new one--92-percent of the 
time.\7\ Moreover, the same authoritarian regime often remains intact 
after longtime leaders leave office--a prospect that would be made more 
likely if Putin exits on account of natural death or an elite-led 
coup.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, ``After Putin: Lessons 
from Autocratic Leadership Transitions,'' Washington Quarterly 45, no. 
1 (Spring 2022): 79-96 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
0163660X.2022.2057112.
    \8\ See also: Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ``When 
Dictators Die,'' Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 159-171 
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/when-dictators-die/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Such continuity would likely extend to the nature of the Russian 
regime and its external relations. Successors that deviate from the 
status quo are likely to provoke fierce resistance from the ``old 
guard'' who have considerable control over the levers of power in the 
system. Beyond sidelining (if they can) individuals who pose a 
particularly serious threat to them, new leaders who inherit office 
tend to adhere to the previous program. In countries such as Syria and 
Uzbekistan, for example, the successors of longtime leaders (Bashar al-
Assad and Shavkat Mirziyoyev, respectively) showed early signs of 
liberalization through actions such as the release of political 
prisoners, only to revert to traditionally more repressive practices.
    In part for these reasons, research by Sarah Croco finds that when 
successors come from the same regime as leaders involved with the 
initiation of a war, they are likely to continue the conflicts they 
inherit.\9\ By invading Ukraine, Putin has saddled future Russian 
leaders with vexing problems--ending the war, resolving questions about 
the illegal annexation of Crimea and the four Ukrainian territories, 
wartime reparations, and accountability for war crimes, for example--
that will long complicate Russia's relations with the United States and 
Europe. Although a new leader could change the tone of Russia's 
external relations--just as the transition from Putin to Medvedev 
created an opening for U.S.-Russia cooperation that did not exist with 
Putin as President--the broad contours of Russian foreign policy would 
likely endure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Croco, ``The Decider's Dilemma.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, Along With the Intent, Russia Will Retain Significant Capacity 
        To Challenge the United States, Although the Nature of the 
        Threat is Evolving
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a massive strategic blunder, 
leaving Russia militarily, economically, and geopolitically weaker. 
Given these facts, there will be a strong temptation to downgrade 
Russia as a threat. That would be a mistake. Russian power and 
influence may be diminished, but Russia will adapt. In particular, the 
more vulnerable Putin feels given the degradation of Russia's 
conventional forces in Ukraine, the more likely he is to rely on 
unconventional methods to accomplish his objectives. With its back 
against the wall, the Kremlin will also have less compunction about 
trying to destabilize its enemies through sometimes exotic and hard-to-
track methods in the biological, chemical, cyberspace, or artificial 
intelligence realms.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman, ``Russia's Dangerous 
Decline: The Kremlin Won't Go Down Without a Fight,'' Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2022 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-
dangerous-decline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For starters, the Kremlin will almost certainly intensify its 
disinformation campaigns. Russia has seen just how effective such 
campaigns can be: disinformation and propaganda have contributed to 
decisions by leaders in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to 
remain neutral or circumspect in the aftermath of Moscow's invasion of 
Ukraine. By accusing Ukraine of carrying out atrocities that Russian 
soldiers have committed in the war, framing Western sanctions instead 
of Russia's invasion as responsible for high food and energy prices, 
and convincing many that it is fighting a defensive war against an 
expanding NATO, Russia has diluted criticism of its military 
aggression.
    Cyberattacks are likely to be an ever more important and disruptive 
tool. And, most ominously, the more damage the Russian military incurs 
in Ukraine, the more likely it is to rely on the prospect of nuclear 
escalation to offset NATO's conventional superiority in Europe. The 
Russian military appears genuinely more comfortable with the notion of 
limited nuclear use relative to its Western counterparts. To be sure, 
the use of nuclear weapons is a political decision, but the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that Russia's political leadership 
might well consider limited nuclear use if faced with the kind of 
defeat that could threaten the regime or the state. A future crisis or 
conflict with NATO would leave Moscow with few conventional options 
before it decided to threaten or potentially use nuclear weapons, 
shortening the pathway to nuclear war.
    The growing import of nonstrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons to 
Russia's military means that the country is less likely than ever to 
agree to negotiated limits on its nuclear arsenal. Russia's decision to 
suspend its participation in New START underscores this dynamic. This 
is particularly problematic given that Russia has a more diversified 
nuclear arsenal than the United States does, with different types of 
nonstrategic weapons, and doctrinally appears to be more willing to use 
those weapons in a conflict. The current hostility in the U.S. Congress 
toward Russia and Moscow's record of violating the treaties it signs 
also lower the odds that the United States and Russia will agree to a 
replacement for the New START treaty once it expires in 2026. In the 
absence of an agreement, Russia's ability to produce strategic nuclear 
weapons and deploy new systems would be unchecked, and the United 
States would lose important insights into Russia's strategic nuclear 
arsenal. Notably, China is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal. As a 
result, the United States will find itself dealing with two 
unconstrained nuclear powers, both focused on the United States as the 
primary threat.
           iii. recommendations for u.s. policy toward russia
The Best Path to a Better Relationship With Russia Runs Through Ukraine
    The United States has very limited ability to directly shape the 
trajectory of U.S.-Russia relations. The single most important way to 
shape the future trajectory of the relationship is by enabling Ukraine 
to defeat Russia. A Russia that makes significant territorial gains in 
Ukraine is likely to be emboldened--a persistent if not growing threat 
to Europe and the United States. Such a Russia would not only pose 
direct threats to the United States and its allies, but its sustained 
aggression would distract the transatlantic partners from tackling 
other, pressing global challenges.
    A military defeat of Russia, in contrast, raises the prospect of 
more meaningful political change in Russia. Given the hardened 
environment Putin now operates in, significant political change is 
unlikely to occur absent a seismic shift. A Ukrainian victory in the 
war could provide a catalyst for change. Translating a Russian defeat 
into political change is far from guaranteed; the personalist nature of 
Putin's regime creates particularly strong headwinds to change. 
Research shows that because personalist dictatorships have few 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate coordination and their elite 
view their fates as being tied to that of the leader, personalist 
leaders are the most able to withstand military losses.
    Yet even personalist authoritarians are not immune to the aftermath 
of a poor military performance. Research by Chiozza and Goemans shows 
that of those leaders who were ousted as a result of a war, all had 
experienced a military defeat. In fact, approximately half of all 
leaders who lose a war also lose power. \11\ As with other seismic 
events--like economic or natural disasters--military defeats can expose 
leaders as incompetent, making visible cracks in the autocrat's shield 
that shatter their aura of invincibility. Such shocks also create a 
focal point for mobilization, facilitating the collective action that 
is necessary to dislodge entrenched regimes. A Ukrainian victory, then, 
raises the prospects for more meaningful political change in Russia, 
and critically, could provide future Russian elites and the Russian 
public with a valuable lesson about the limits of military power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Chiozza and Goemans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most immediately, the U.S. Congress must continue to provide the 
military aid and assistance that Ukraine needs to defeat Russia. In 
addition to sustaining military and economic assistance, Congress could 
adopt legislation that lays out a long-term schedule for delivering 
weapons to Ukraine. Such a clear, extended plan could make Moscow more 
pessimistic about the future of its campaign. Money and resources are 
far more likely than words to shape Putin's calculus about his wartime 
prospects.
    Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress can contribute to securing a Ukrainian 
victory by making clear that Kyiv has a guaranteed place in the West. 
The U.S. Congress should fully endorse Ukraine's war aims and lead the 
charge in building support for Ukraine's NATO membership, including for 
immediate steps that would deepen Ukraine's integration into NATO.
Constrict and Constrain the Kremlin
    Also critical to enabling Ukraine to defeat Russia is increasing 
and strengthening the sanctions against Russia. Such efforts are 
necessary both to alter Putin's calculus about his ability to sustain 
the war and to prevent the Kremlin from waging future aggression beyond 
its borders. Degrading Russian power requires Washington to build on 
the policies it set in motion following Putin's invasion of Ukraine. In 
particular, there are several actions the U.S. Congress could take. 
First, given the importance of Russia's energy sector, Congress should 
advocate for lowering the oil price cap down from its current price of 
$60/bbl. Second, Congress could continue to expand existing sanctions. 
For, example, Congress could place sanctions on Rosatam, including a 
ban on Russian uranium, as well as personal sanctions on the management 
of Rosatom and Rosatom officials active in Ukraine. Third, U.S. 
Congress must invest in the enforcement of existing sanctions and 
export controls. Already there is evidence that Russia is working to 
circumvent them. In particular, Congress should increase resources 
available to build enforcement capacity in key partner countries. 
Likewise, the creation of a unified database with all sanctioned 
entities and institutions, including related parties (such as 
subsidiaries and family members) could significantly strengthen export 
controls and their enforcement. Although these may not be short-term 
fixes, such actions are important in tightening existing measures in 
the longer-term.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 
``Working Group Paper #11: Strengthening Sanctions Against the Russian 
Federation,'' April 24, 2023 https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-
1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-04/russia_sanctions_working
_paper_11_action_plan_2.0_v2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthen Deterrence in Europe
    Russia is not in a position to start another war today, and 
certainly not with NATO. But this does not mean Western policymakers 
can be complacent. It may take Russia the better part of a decade to 
recapitalize its conventional forces in the aftermath of its attack on 
Ukraine, but NATO has its own recapitalization woes. European arsenals 
are being depleted. The United States, in cooperation with its NATO 
allies, must address shortcomings in the defense industrial base to 
ensure sustained supply to Ukraine over the long-term, and to ensure 
preparedness for future conflicts. Moreover, this war has demonstrated 
just how dependent Europe is on the United States for its security. 
Although it is tempting to argue that the United States should offload 
responsibility for deterring Russia to Europe given rising tensions 
with China, that is an unrealistic and dangerous proposition. It will 
take Europe decades to be ready. The United States, therefore, must 
remain committed to strengthening NATO, while working with its NATO 
allies to strengthen the European pillar within NATO over time.
Grow the Coalition of Countries Confronting Russia
    The unity and coordination between the United States and its allies 
in the wake of Putin's invasion has been extraordinary, but Russia is 
far from isolated internationally. Putin has doubled down on the 
information domain, effectively framing NATO and the West as 
responsible for the war; his narratives continue to resonate with many 
in the Global South. Only 34 countries have imposed sanctions on Russia 
since the war started. Russia continues to build ties in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East. China, India, and other states in 
the Global South have abstained on votes in favor of Ukraine at the 
United Nations. Trade between Russia and these countries has increased. 
Eighty-seven countries still offer Russian citizens visa-free entry, 
including Argentina, Egypt, Israel, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Venezuela.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, ``The Kremlin's Grand Delusions: 
What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Putin's Regime,'' Foreign 
Affairs, February 15, 2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/
kremlins-grand-delusions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To build the coalition of countries needed to effectively confront 
Russia and minimize Russia's negative influence in the Global South, 
the U.S. Congress should continue to fund the U.S. Agency for Global 
Media (USAGM). Importantly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also 
created opportunities that the United States and its allies can 
exploit. Russia, for example, will struggle to sustain arms sales--a 
historically important link that the Kremlin uses to tether countries 
to Moscow--given the degradation and poor showing of its military. The 
Unites States should look for opportunities to step in to replace those 
relationships, undermining needed revenue for the Kremlin and Russian 
influence more broadly. Likewise, some countries, particularly in 
Central Asia, that have close historical relationships with Russia have 
grown more skeptical of the Kremlin in the aftermath of its invasion of 
Ukraine. The U.S. Congress can send delegations to key countries to 
signal U.S. commitment. Such visits can help encourage these countries 
to better enforce sanctions on Russia, and over time, erode Russian 
influence.
Plan for and Mitigate the Impact of Deepening Russia-China Relations
    Russia's war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of 
Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia's invasion, China has remained an 
essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what 
Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital 
lifeline for the Kremlin, including by parroting Russian talking points 
about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and 
continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow 
that have been cut off by the West. If anything, the war in Ukraine and 
growing tensions between the United States and China have amplified the 
geopolitical factors pushing the two countries together. The impact is 
significant. Not only is Beijing diluting Western pressure on Russia, 
but the more dependent Moscow becomes on Beijing, the more likely the 
Kremlin will be to toe China's line, amplifying the threat that China 
poses to the United States. This is especially true in the defense 
domain, where Russia may provide China with increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities, including submarine quieting and other technologies that 
make China a more formidable threat.
    The U.S. Congress should think through now potential responses to 
China's providing lethal aid to Moscow. Likewise, the United States and 
its allies should prioritize intelligence collection on Russian and 
Chinese efforts to circumvent sanctions and export controls. Enhanced 
intelligence monitoring will also be required as more of their defense 
cooperation takes place out of the public eye. In addition, Washington 
should continue to work with Europe to build a common picture of the 
challenge that greater Russia-China coordination would pose and further 
encourage European leaders to articulate to China the potential costs 
of providing direct support for Russia's war effort. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See, ``Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nick Lokker, ``Russia-China 
Relations Deepening Military Cooperation and Its Implications: A CNAS 
Working Paper,'' https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/russia-
china-relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weaken Autocracy's Grip
    The United States should continue to pursue steps to improve the 
prospects of better relations with a future Russia. In particular, the 
United States can pursue measures now that can weaken autocracy's grip 
in the long run. Corruption, in particular, has been the lifeblood of 
Putin's regime. Longtime personalist regimes like Russia are the most 
corrupt type of authoritarian regime. Corrupt and illicit networks 
entrench regime interests and create high barriers to individuals 
outside the regime seeking to gain influence within the system. In this 
way, corruption facilitates the persistence of authoritarianism after a 
longtime leader's departure. Doubling down on anti-corruption--
including by effectively enforcing sanctions on corrupt oligarchs and 
tracking down their assets, stepping up efforts to fight money 
laundering, reforming campaign finance, enhancing transparency of the 
financial and real estate markets, and increasing funding for 
investigative journalism--can weaken the structural support for 
authoritarianism in Russia and thereby create opportunities for 
political change in a post-Putin era.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, ``After Putin: Lessons from 
Autocratic Leadership Transitions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to prioritizing anti-corruption efforts, the United 
States and its allies should step up support for Russian civil 
society--a key ingredient needed to sustain a more liberal and 
democratic Russia. Critically, Western actions can help Russian civil 
society actors to sustain their work in the face of the Kremlin's 
crackdown. In particular, large numbers of the opposition, journalists, 
and other Russian civil society actors have been forced to leave the 
country, creating new opportunities to support their work from outside 
Russia. Much can be done, for example, to support journalists that now 
operate outside Russia, including through visa support, fellowships, 
increased funding, and legal assistance. Such efforts are needed now 
more than ever and would make for a valuable investment in a better 
relationship with a future, post-Putin Russia.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya, ``Supporting 
Russian Civil Society,'' Center for a New American Security, December 
1, 2022 https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/supporting-russian-
civil-society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                *  *  *
    Invading Ukraine was a massive miscalculation that will leave 
Russia militarily, economically, and geopolitically weaker. But it is 
up to the United States and its allies to demonstrate that we are up to 
the task of capitalizing on that mistake. It is these personalist 
autocrats--Putin and increasingly Xi Jinping--that are the most prone 
to miscalculation because they surround themselves with yes men. 
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been an especially horrific 
miscalculation, but it is critical that the United States and its 
allies make the most of it. Getting Russia policy right--getting the 
competition with the world's autocracies right--starts with getting 
Ukraine right. \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ This testimony reflects the personal views of the author 
alone. As a research and policy institution committed to the highest 
standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, the 
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) maintains strict intellectual 
independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, 
projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS 
does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content 
of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In 
keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying 
activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and 
local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or 
advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that 
the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will 
be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related 
activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly 
acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will 
start a series of 5-minute rounds of questioning.
    Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the 
Biden administration has corralled the EU, the U.K., Japan, and 
other allies into a sanction regime that is really 
unprecedented in scope.
    While I give them a lot of credit, we have been leveraging 
sanctions on Russia for years, but it is clear that existing 
sanctions and export controls are not crushing the Russian 
economy in a way that will force it to stop waging war in 
Ukraine.
    For both of you, aside from cracking down on sanctions 
evasion by China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and other countries, what 
other pressure can or should we bring against Russia to 
reinforce and expand upon the impact of existing sanctions?
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Okay. Well, as you said, I mean, this 
is an unprecedented sanctions regime that we have put in place 
and I think the theory behind the case is that the longer that 
the sanctions remain in place the more effective they will 
become, and I do think that we have begun to see evidence that 
that is the case.
    Certainly in specific industries--the airline industry, the 
car industry--the impact of sanctions are slowly being felt. 
The sanctions on export--I am sorry, microchips and other 
things are slowing down Russia's defense industrial production.
    Over time, the sanctions, hopefully, will have greater 
effect, but there--as you indicate, there is multiple and 
additional steps that the United States could take to 
strengthen that regime.
    I think, first and foremost, is in the energy realm and I 
think that Congress could advocate for lowering the price cap 
down from its current price of $60 per barrel. That would be 
one area where Congress, I think, could advocate more vocally 
so that Russia continues to be squeezed particularly in the 
energy domain, which continues to be a key lifeline for its 
ability to sustain its war abroad. Advocating to bring that 
price cap down is one.
    I think there is also additional sectors that still have 
yet to be sanctioned, for example, companies like Rosatom, 
including a ban on Russian uranium. There are still other key 
sectors of the Russian economy that have not been targeted by 
sanctions and where additional sanctions could have a further 
impact on Russia's economic viability.
    Then, I think the most important thing, which you already 
referenced, is really about sanctions enforcement. This 
continues to be a major problem. There is already evidence that 
Russia is working very hard to evade the sanctions that are in 
place.
    For Congress to be able to build the enforcement capacity, 
not just in the United States, but also, critically, in the 
European Union, I think a lot of our allies do not have the 
same enforcement capacity as we have in the United States.
    Having U.S. Congress be able to fund those efforts to 
enhance the capacity of our allies and partners will help us 
tighten the screws, and there is other things that the U.S., 
not necessarily for Congress, could do, but creating a unified 
database with all sanctions, entities, and institutions.
    I think, again, going after energy there is more that we 
can do there, targeting additional sectors that have not yet 
been impacted and really thinking very hard about the 
enforcement piece, I think, is the way forward.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Sullivan.
    Ambassador Sullivan. I think Dr. Kendall Taylor has really 
hit the key points. I would emphasize energy, as well. One 
thing to keep in mind, and this--I base this statement on a 
comment that Putin himself made.
    He was asked by a Russian nationalist, why did we not do 
the special military operation earlier? Why did you wait so 
long? We knew this Nazi regime existed in Kyiv. Why did we 
wait?
    Putin said, we were not ready. It was not that we were not 
ready militarily. It was we were not ready to protect our 
economy.
    He has been working on this for a long time. He spent more 
time worrying about how he was going to protect his economy 
than he did, frankly, planning the military aspects of his 
special military operation, which have failed miserably.
    I thought that was a telling answer by him. They have been 
working on this for a long time. We had to--we basically 
started from a standing start. We had sectoral sanctions in 
place after Crimea, after the Donbas, sure, but nothing like we 
are doing now.
    Putin did not expect this, but he was planning for it and 
he has had time to work with his friends, his partners, his 
dear friend in Beijing, the new government in Brazil, the South 
Africans, the BRICS, in particular, China, India, Brazil have 
really been a lifeline for him.
    The Chairman. Which I am glad you said that because while 
we have been focused on Ukraine, the truth is that the United 
States and Russia are actively competing for alliances, 
economic and security partners, all over the world.
    Russia has been cultivating relationships with huge 
countries across Africa like, notably, South Africa and others 
in the Sahel, as well as with dictators in our own hemisphere.
    What tools, engagement, and outreach should we be thinking 
about to best posture the United States in this existential 
competition with Russia for partnerships across the globe?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Senator Kaine and I some months ago 
had a conversation somewhat related to this and I think I would 
summarize it as three ``Ds'': diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy.
    We need to be engaged and not badgering countries to say 
you need to support us on Ukraine. We need to do a better job--
I had a conversation with Sir John Scarlett, the former head of 
MI6--we do need to do a better job of explaining the brutality 
of Russia's war in Ukraine and this is a war waged, as I said 
in my opening statement, by a permanent member of the Security 
Council.
    For a country like Brazil, a country like India, Russia's 
presence in the Security Council renders that a null body for 
purposes of dealing with a problem like this, but it is 
diplomacy.
    The fact that the Security Council is now hamstrung means 
that it is more important for my former colleagues at the 
Department and across the U.S. Government and our embassies to 
be reaching out and establishing better relationships in 
Pretoria, in Delhi, et cetera, and I think the Biden 
administration is working on this.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree the diplomacy piece is key and 
I think one--the only thing I would add to that is I think a 
lot of the countries in the so-called Global South do not want 
to be forced to pick sides.
    I think there is many countries who do not buy into this 
kind of democracy versus authoritarianism. They do not want to 
be dragged into the U.S. confrontation with China. Working on 
discrete issues where the interests align is key to, I think, 
that effective diplomacy.
    The paying attention piece is really critical. As Senator 
Risch was saying, there are opportunities to exploit here in 
terms of going on the offensive and taking the fight to Russia.
    In regions like Central Asia, for example, many of these 
countries, particularly in Russia's kind of periphery, are 
extremely skeptical and wary of relations with Russia for the 
first time in a very long time. If we pay attention--the U.S. 
State Department, I believe, sent a delegation--a critically 
timed delegation to also work with those countries to help the 
enforcement of sanctions.
    Diplomacy and paying attention and picking up on the vacuum 
that Moscow is leaving behind in many places is key. Arms sales 
is another key opportunity with the Global South, the Middle 
East. Russia will have fewer arms to sell, going forward, as 
they have to choose to send arms into Ukraine or to sell them 
for export.
    Those relationships that Russia has with India, many 
countries in the Middle East, are relationships that Russia 
uses to tether those countries to Moscow. This is an opportune 
time for the United States to consider whether we can step in 
or have allies step in to break those relationships.
    Then, as you mentioned, I think, in the opening statements, 
the information domain is also critical and so continued 
funding for the U.S. Agency of Global Media and other efforts 
that help the United States to continue to engage in these 
media environments are all critical, I think, for competing 
with those countries.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    You both hit on a key that we are trying to work through in 
the China bill, which is how do we beef up our diplomatic 
abilities across the globe. China has more embassies, more 
personnel, across the globe than we do.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you. Let me pick up from where 
the chairman left off here and that is the diplomatic aspect of 
this.
    I think probably anybody that operates in this lane on 
diplomacy cannot be more disgusted with the U.N. than it is 
right now. I mean, what good is this institution where you have 
a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council violating the 
basic precept and the reason that the U.N. exists and that was 
for security for nations, for their sovereignty, and for their 
borders?
    I mean, it is just--I went round and round with the 
Secretary General on this. We send billions there and what do 
we get? Speeches, nothing more, and they cannot even--not only 
can they not stop this, which they should, they cannot even 
pass a resolution condemning it because of the way the U.N. is 
set up.
    I am disgusted there, but that just means that we have got 
to pay more attention on a bilateral basis with our diplomacy.
    That brings me to an interesting point that you made, Ms. 
Taylor, and that is I have been visited and I suspect other 
members of the Senate have been visited by countries that are 
former countries in the orbit and the Stans, obviously, is 
primarily what I am talking about, and I was amazed at their 
lack of support for what Russia is doing. They came to tell me, 
hey, we got nothing to do with this. I had not seen them. I 
have not talked to them in years, but they voluntarily showed 
up and said, look, we want you, the United States, to know we 
got nothing to do with this. I was amazed that Putin called on 
them to step up and send people and supplies and weapons and 
everything else and they have not done it.
    I think there is a real opportunity there and I think that 
we really ought to exploit it, and I think it underscores the 
disgust that the world has with what Russia is doing there.
    One of the other things that always strikes me is how--and 
I guess I should not because it is an autocracy where people 
cannot speak out, but it always amazes me how the Russian 
people come to the defense of this.
    I do not know how you can watch what has happened in 
Ukraine, the atrocities that have been committed there on a par 
with the kinds of things that happened in World War II and say, 
well, this is all right because they wanted to join NATO or 
something like that.
    What is your view on--is there any--both of you are experts 
in the area. What is it like at home in Russia?
    You lived there, Ambassador Sullivan. You lived there. What 
do you hear from the people there when they whisper in your 
ear?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator Risch. I 
think there are several things going on.
    First, the media environment in Russia is merely state 
propaganda. It is what the Russian people hear 24/7. They have 
to really seek out other sources of information if they do not 
just want to hear the Kremlin's propaganda and many of them 
they have got other things to do with their lives. They are 
just steeped in it all day long.
    Second, this is a country dating back to Soviet days where 
people just did what they needed to do to survive. They kept 
their heads down. They shut up. They did not make a scene, and 
that is what most Russians, I believe many Russians, are doing 
now.
    There are some who have fled. There are some who tried to 
protest. They have been sent to labor camps, but the vast--but 
there is a large segment of the population who, as they did in 
Soviet days, sort of keep their head down and try not to 
attract attention.
    There comes a point, however, where the effects in Russia 
of the special military operation will become so grave, in my 
opinion, whether it is because of casualties or the continuing 
effect on the economy, where there will--as Dr. Kendall-Taylor 
said, there will be that bubbling up from below.
    It is a country that has been, dating back again to Soviet 
days, they have dealt with this. The Russian people--the 
Russian Federation, part of the Soviet Union, they have dealt 
with these types of situations before in ways that Americans 
cannot imagine.
    Senator Risch. Even the younger generation?
    Ambassador Sullivan. The younger generation is--born since 
the Cold War ended, many of them are nationalists. They hear 
the World War II propaganda that Putin spews that this is what 
our grandparents did in defeating the Nazis. They want to rally 
around their country. There are a lot of young Russian 
nationalists who are buying into this, I am afraid.
    Senator Risch. I guess my time is up. Dr. Taylor, why do 
you not give us----
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes. Just to echo. I agree that there--
I think there is quite a lot of broad support and, certainly, 
Putin's public approval ratings have gone up since the 
invasion. Obviously, it is very difficult to understand engaged 
citizens' true preferences for the reasons that the ambassador 
was talking about.
    I think one thing we have to keep an eye on is I talked 
about Putin mobilizing Russian society. For years the apathy, 
the passivity, has been Putin's playbook, but what we are 
seeing is since he had to mobilize Russians and draw Russians 
into the war, there is much more active support. No longer can 
people be as passive as the ambassador is saying. That has been 
a real change. There is more citizens reporting on other 
citizens, the heartbreaking story of a father who was arrested 
because a little girl drew an anti-war picture. There is a lot 
of kind of citizens reporting on others.
    Russia is moving from a demobilized society to a mobilized 
society and I think we will have to keep an eye on that for 
what kind of implications that produces for the future.
    The one extra point I will very quickly make is there are 
many, many, many, hundreds of thousands--something like 300,000 
Russians have fled in the aftermath of the war.
    That provides an opportunity for the United States and I 
think that is another area where the U.S. Congress can do more 
to enable those Russians who have left. Not all--some of them 
were dodging having to fight in the war, but there is a hearty 
number of civil society actors who have now left Russia.
    Having U.S. Congress take actions and steps and provide 
resources that enable those Russians to continue their work 
from outside of Russia is very important. We could fund 
research on understanding what that community looks like. We 
can increase funding to support those who are outside, creating 
a title program for human rights defenders and journalists.
    Those are opportunities. Again, trying to find the 
opportunities that come out of this war in this huge population 
of Russians that are now outside the country, I do think 
represents an opportunity that we could tap into.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you both for being here.
    There is a question of whether Ukraine can ultimately carry 
the cost of this war for as long as is necessary and then there 
is this corresponding question of whether Russia can carry the 
cost of this war for as long as necessary, and it seems to me 
that we appropriately are engaged in public policy, trying to 
impact both sides of that coin, getting Ukraine everything it 
needs and trying to winnow the pathways through which Russia 
gets what it needs.
    You responded to a question from Senator Menendez about our 
sanctions regime, but there is also a set of bilateral 
relationships the United States has with countries that are 
still actively engaged with Russia, helping them either to 
manage or evade those sanctions regimes, and so there is two 
things at play here.
    One, we can talk about expanding our sanctions, but two, we 
can just talk about elevating this question of Russia lifelines 
with our friends. This is one of a myriad of articles you can 
find on this question.
    This is from the Center for European Policy Analysis, an 
article entitled ``UAE throws lifeline to beleaguered Russian 
tech sector.'' You could find similar stories about Turkey, 
India, countries in Central Asia, and it strikes me that this 
is a missed opportunity, maybe most particularly in the Gulf, 
where they are making individual decisions to support Russia 
sanctions evasion, but they are also helping to prop up the 
cost of oil in a way that allows Putin to power forward.
    Just a word on how you view our bilateral relationships 
with countries that are still helping Russia fund this war and 
why it is--I hope you believe it is important to elevate this 
as a priority in those bilateral relationships.
    I put this to you, Ms. Taylor.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes. I think the sanctions evasion is a 
big piece, but I think the important thing to think about with 
all of these different countries is that they all have very 
disparate interests.
    They are continuing to support Russia often for very 
different reasons--India, because they have this long military 
sales relationship, some for historical reasons, some because 
they do not want to be drug into the U.S.-China confrontation.
    As you noted, I think working it through bilateral channels 
is a critical way to go. India, for example, this is an 
excellent opportunity to step in--the United States, France, 
some of our allies--to try to wean India away from its defense 
sales. It is not going to happen overnight, but it is an 
important opportunity that we can exploit and take advantage 
of.
    I guess the bottom line is we have been talking about the 
role of diplomacy, kind of arms sales, working it through the 
sanctions channels. There is all--a number of different 
components and opportunities and pathways that the United 
States could pursue in these bilateral relationships.
    I agree, one of the goals of our policy should be to grow 
the coalition of countries that oppose Russia. That will be 
needed, especially if we are talking about this as a protracted 
conflict.
    That should be one of the explicit priorities of U.S. 
policy on Russia is to grow the number of countries and 
figuring out those issues where our interests overlying their 
specific relationships with Russia and how we can exploit them, 
I think, should be a central focus.
    Senator Murphy. Anything on this question, Mr. Sullivan?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Yes. I agree, first of all, with you, 
Senator, and with Dr. Kendall-Taylor. It is labor intensive. We 
need to push the message out to all our posts worldwide.
    All of those countries--I am focused on the 141 that voted 
for the resolution in the General Assembly. More than half of 
them have done nothing to implement that resolution. In fact, 
many of them keep trading with Russia.
    We have got the almost 40 that abstained. We need to be 
using all the tools and they--it may vary from country to 
country--Egypt, for example, making sure the Egyptians do not 
sell military equipment to the Russians and do sell equipment 
to the Ukrainians. It is labor intensive. It needs to be 
tailored to the particular countries.
    Senator Murphy. This comes back to Senator Menendez's 
original point. It is labor intensive, which means we need 
resources, which means we cannot continue to ask the State 
Department to fight Russia with one hand tied behind its back 
because there are so many things that our allies, our partners, 
could be doing that they are not today and our under investment 
in the tools of winning friends, in particular around fighting 
misinformation and propaganda, makes the job of our diplomats 
pretty difficult, which is another reason why we should be 
plussing up those resources so that we can win more of these 
fights.
    Listen, I think the Administration has done a great job of 
rallying our closest friends, but I do think we have to shed 
light on the fact that that sort of next set of friends in the 
next concentric circle is kind of playing China off against 
Russia, telling us they will work with us on China policy, but 
they are not with us on Russia policy.
    We have to elevate this dialogue on Russian sanctions 
evasions with some of our important allies not in Europe. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
our guests for being here.
    Ambassador Sullivan, I thought it was interesting you said 
that Vladimir Putin believes he is at war with the United 
States and, certainly, that is the way he is behaving when you 
think about what he has done with regard to our nuclear 
treaties.
    For example, the 1987 INF treaty eliminated a range of 
nuclear weapons and because he was fielding so many illegal 
weapons, it forced us to withdraw from that treaty--forced the 
U.S. to withdraw from that treaty in 2019.
    You think about Open Skies that allowed us and Russia to 
over-fly countries with reconnaissance planes in 32 other 
countries. His noncompliance there forced us to withdraw from 
that in 2020.
    Now you have got the New START treaty and this is one where 
the Biden administration reupped it for 5 years just as it was 
set to expire in 2021, but Russia has said they are not 
participating anymore with regard to that and this makes sense. 
If Putin again believes he is at war with us, why would he 
maintain any of these agreements?
    The Biden administration has made the decision to 
unconditionally extend the New START treaty. Should we continue 
to be a part of this? What is your thought with regard to what 
do we do with the New START treaty?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator. I was 
actually in Moscow and was the person who had to negotiate with 
the Russians on what should have been a fairly easy extension.
    Once President Biden had decided at the start of his term 
in January of 2021 to extend by 5 years the treaty, which is 
what the Russians wanted, it was--actually wound up being much 
more complicated than that and required some pretty intensive 
diplomacy with the Russians to actually get it done because 
nothing is easy with the Russians.
    We extend the treaty. It has now been extended. It cannot 
be extended beyond that. What the Russians have done, what 
Putin has done, is to the extent that the Russian Government 
already before his speech earlier this year, where he announced 
the suspension of Russia's compliance or participation in the 
treaty Putin announced it.
    The Administration, as I understand it, and in fact, I 
think the Administration just released yesterday the numbers 
for our strategic nuclear weapons as we do under--should do 
under the New START Treaty, but the Russians will not. I think 
that is important.
    I think maintaining our transparency, our continuing 
commitment to maintaining control over nuclear weapons when he 
is playing games, and I say games because I do not think he 
wants a nuclear war with the United States, but he does want to 
use nuclear blackmail and use one of the few things he has 
left, which is his nuclear weapons, to try to leverage that.
    Senator Ricketts. Secretary Blinken has said we are going 
to maintain the restrictions of the New START Treaty. What I 
hear you saying is that you think we should continue to live to 
those restrictions in the New START treaty?
    Ambassador Sullivan. The Russians have said they will, as 
well. What they have done, as I understand it, is there are 
inspections that are required under the treaty. The Russians 
will not allow us to inspect their facilities and we are not 
going to let the Russians in if they will not let us in.
    They have suspended inspections. They have suspended 
meetings of what is called a bilateral consultative 
commission--U.S. experts, Russian experts--to discuss issues 
under the treaty, but after Putin made that speech, the foreign 
ministry clarified and said they would continue to adhere to 
the numerical limitations under the treaty.
    Senator Ricketts. Given he cheated on the INF treaty and 
everything else, how can we possibly trust anything that they 
would say that they are going to live up to, the restrictions 
in the----
    Ambassador Sullivan. That was my point in my opening 
statement. Trust, but verify--there is no trust. What we need 
are and we do have--and Dr. Kendall-Taylor will know more about 
this than I--technical means to try to verify Russian 
compliance.
    What we are missing are the inspections that we are 
entitled to under the treaty. That is what Putin is denying us. 
I agree with you. It is a risk. We are not letting the Russians 
in. All that the United States is doing now is stating what--we 
are complying with the numerical limits under the treaty. Those 
are the numbers that the Administration released yesterday. It 
was a one-page document. We are not, because the Russians are, 
having Russians in to inspect our facilities.
    Senator Ricketts. What should be our strategy when it comes 
to our nuclear strategic force?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, first, we need to upgrade to 
make sure that we are not--we are not heading down a path, 
which I believe we were some years ago, to--in the hopes that 
there were going to be fewer and fewer nuclear weapons.
    Senator Ricketts. The efforts right now that the military 
is taking to upgrade is really important----
    Ambassador Sullivan. I think that is--my opinion--I 
participated in the last Administration as deputy secretary in 
the Nuclear Posture Review. I think that is important now more 
than ever to maintain U.S. deterrence with an aggressive Russia 
and more so a rising China, including in its nuclear weapons 
program.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Shaheen has kindly allowed me to 
swap places with her in the order and then she will take the 
helm until Senator Menendez returns.
    I want to thank you for the testimony. It has been very 
helpful. Dr. Kendall-Taylor, I just want to underline a point 
you made. I think that the 300,000 mostly young Russians who 
have departed the country, some to avoid war, but some out of 
protest over the war, is a valuable resource for us both in 
terms of understanding more deeply what the internal dynamic 
is, but also potentially to help organize pressure because they 
want to continue to see improvements in their home country. I 
really appreciate that suggestion.
    How big a deal is it that Finland is in NATO, and Sweden it 
is just a matter of time that they are going to be in NATO, 
both in terms of the military capacity of NATO, but also just 
sort of in the psychology of this, these two nations where 
polling for NATO accession would have been under 30 percent for 
decades, even up to 3 or 4 years ago, are now realizing they 
want to be part of NATO. How big a deal is that?
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. What we have seen so far is, obviously, 
Putin has very much tried to play down Finland's entry and 
Sweden's eventual entry in large part because the Russian 
military is so focused and overwhelmed with what is happening 
in Ukraine and, in fact, what we have seen is many of Russian 
forces that are stationed in the west of the country have been 
redeployed to the east. He has very much had to play it down.
    I think that we should expect that over time that there 
will be more of a military response to Finland and Sweden's 
entry into NATO. I think most immediately we are looking at 
hybrid tactics that Russia will try, like incursions into 
airspace, GPS jamming, all of those types of things just to 
express its displeasure.
    Over time, I think Russia will see a threat. When you think 
about now the kind of security architecture of the region has 
been fundamentally altered. The Baltic Sea is now basically 
ringed by NATO members with the exception of Kaliningrad.
    The other key change for Russia as I talked about is as its 
conventional forces are being degraded, Russia is going to 
place more importance and rely more heavily on its nuclear 
weapons. The Kola Peninsula in the Arctic is critical from that 
perspective.
    There are these changes in the security architecture that 
Russia will see not just around the Black Sea, but more 
frequent and more sophisticated NATO exercises in the area, 
closer integration of intelligence, the very capable 
intelligence collection assets that Finland and Sweden have.
    Russia will be looking at an altered threat picture and we 
should expect that over time they will take increasingly more 
aggressive steps up into that Arctic region.
    The United States and particularly NATO are going to need 
to be prepared. In the near term, Russia's military is 
degraded. We should expect more of the hybrid threats.
    I do think over the long term that is a significant change 
that Russia will react and respond to. They are also likely to 
view the Arctic as a region where they can remind the world 
that they are a great power so more kind of provocative actions 
that they could take in the region.
    The last thing I would highlight, too, is the Russia-China 
dynamic in the Arctic. As Russia is becoming increasingly 
dependent on China, they are going to have to toe the line on 
Chinese interests. We know China wants to play a larger role in 
the Arctic.
    What might China or what might Russia be willing to concede 
to China in the Arctic? That is a question we need to be 
watching. Already Russia and China have signed a cooperation 
agreement of their coast guards. That is the first.
    It is really an interesting data point because historically 
Russia has wanted to keep China out of the Arctic because it 
feels it is its own sphere.
    Senator Kaine. Let me segue on that----
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes, please.
    Senator Kaine. --Ambassador Sullivan, on the Russia-China 
relationship. I have been asking about this for years, the 
increasing closeness of the countries, and multiple 
administrations of both parties have tended to say you do not 
need to worry about--the history of enmity between these 
countries suggests that there will not be too much cooperation 
between them.
    I never really believed that to be the case. It seems like 
they are growing closer and closer. There is a dominant partner 
and a lesser partner, but they both seem pretty designed to 
work closely together to battle the West or however they want 
to put it.
    Is that your sense, Ambassador Sullivan?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Oh, absolutely, and I can quote 
President Xi.
    President Xi, when he is leaving Moscow after his meeting 
with President Putin, as he is walking out the door he looks at 
Putin and says, ``The changes that we are making in the world 
are unlike any that have seen--the world has seen in a hundred 
years. We are changing the system, you and I.'' Putin looked at 
him and said, ``I agree.''
    Absolutely this is a very troubling partnership, and to 
follow up on Dr. Kendall-Taylor's point, the--China has always 
tried to characterize itself as a near Arctic power and the 
Russians have resisted that, quite rightly.
    I think it is going to be more difficult for them to resist 
that. I note, for example, that Russia yesterday threatened to 
withdraw its--it was for the last 2 years, chair of the Arctic 
Council--withdraw from the Arctic Council, and as I said, I 
think the Russians really did not understand what I was saying 
when I said it, if China is a near Arctic power then that gives 
me some hope to pitch for the Red Sox. I can just describe 
myself as a near starting pitcher for the Red Sox. Why not?
    [Laughter.]
    Ambassador Sullivan. Facts are facts, right? The China 
partnership is vital for Putin, important, and something that 
Xi will leverage, but vital for Putin.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Can I make one very quick point, 
Senator, which is I think the--so it is important for Putin, 
but it also amplifies the China challenge and this is what we 
will have to watch as--again, as they are increasingly 
dependent, especially in the military domain, Russia will be 
sending increasingly sophisticated military systems, submarine 
quieting, and other things that basically make the Chinese a 
more capable military.
    They are getting data from Ukraine. They do not have combat 
experience. They are training. They are exercising. They are 
accessing data to train their AI. Russia amplifies the China 
challenge and makes it a more formidable adversary in the Indo-
Pacific.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Senator 
Kaine, for presiding.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador, as a Red Sox fan I can tell you I certainly 
hope you do not get a pitching slot for the Red Sox.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Shaheen. I actually thought they might do a little 
better.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Romney. Careful. Careful, Jeanne.
    I do not want to oversimplify the--our successful strategy 
relative to the former Soviet Union, but we out-competed them 
militarily, economically, and they finally cried uncle.
    Whether that was from internal pressure or just a collapse 
of their competitiveness, I really cannot say, but most 
successful strategies focus on a couple of things that are the 
most effective and I do not know what those items might be.
    I am just going to ask each of you to help me think about 
what should we really focus on. There are so many things we 
need to do as we confront a Russia that we cannot trust, a 
Russia that is assertive, aggressive, and brutal.
    Are there some things that we are really not getting right 
yet, that we are not focused on sufficiently that really ought 
to become the focus of our strategy?
    I hear a number of us thinking about we need to restrict 
their economy. It is a challenge when they have oil and gas and 
coal and uranium in such abundance. They are always going to 
have enough money and the Russian people put up with awful 
things, in part, the alternative is going to a gulag.
    Where is the pressure point? Where are the places we really 
ought to be applying more effort if we are going to try and 
change the course of Russian trajectory?
    Ambassador, why do I not begin with you and then turn to 
Dr. Kendall-Taylor?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I think Dr. Kendall-Taylor made 
the point in her opening statement. The key is Ukraine. It is 
interesting, Senator, that you mentioned the word competition.
    Putin does not like competition. He lost the competition in 
Ukraine. The Russians lost the competition in Eastern Europe. 
The Eastern Europeans--when I hear the Russians talk about, 
well, NATO is just moving west, what they do not acknowledge is 
their own behavior.
    The Russian behavior has pushed those Eastern European 
countries to the West--excuse me, NATO moving east. The Eastern 
European countries, they lost that competition. What has he 
resorted to? War, the oldest--one of the oldest forms of 
competition.
    We can compete on ideas, economy, et cetera. He has chosen 
the venue now to wage a war in Ukraine for his Russkiy mir, his 
Russian empire. He cannot win that.
    We can talk about weapon systems and how much financial 
support the United States as opposed to our allies can provide.
    If we do not defeat his imperial mission in Ukraine, then 
the system that the United States and our allies and partners 
and the whole world, including China, have benefited from over 
the 75-plus years since the end of the Second World War that 
will drive a final stake through it.
    The U.N. Security Council is already--unlike in 1990, when 
there was aggression by Iraq invading Kuwait, the Security 
Council authorizes what became Operation Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm.
    That was a U.N. Security Council authorized voted by the 
Soviet Union to expel militarily Iraq from Kuwait. That is not 
going to happen again.
    I think Putin has chosen the place where we are going to 
compete and he has chosen war because he has lost every other 
form of competition.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I will just foot stomp the Ukraine 
piece and it is so important for everything the ambassador 
said, but it is critical that Russia is defeated, that Ukraine 
wins, because it will help Russians shed their imperial 
ambitions and it teaches future Russian leaders important 
lessons about the limits of military power and I think it is 
critically important and we should not overstate it.
    I think on that front what we are lacking--obviously, there 
is more we can do in terms of ATACMS and longer-range weapons.
    One thing I am also concerned about is I do not think the 
Biden administration or Washington in general has a story about 
what happens to our support after the counter offensive and I 
think that shapes Putin's calculus.
    It is what convinces him that time is on his side and that 
the United States will tire. If there are things that the U.S. 
Congress could do to demonstrate that we will have credible 
deliveries of weapons out into the future, I think that shapes 
Putin's calculus about our staying power.
    If we could have something like that, I think it would be 
critically important and having you all, the President, and the 
Administration make a case to the American people about why 
this matters. I am concerned that we see some public support 
for Ukraine waning and that is what Putin is counting on.
    Your question was bigger than that and I do not think that 
there is any magic point of leverage that we have. This really 
is a long-term confrontation.
    It is almost like the kind of containment 2.0 on an updated 
version and so it is about constricting and constraining 
through sanctions, through export controls, by tightening those 
regimes.
    It is about strengthening deterrence in Europe. We have to 
be able to credibly commit to enhance and maintain deterrence 
in Europe. The Europeans, unfortunately, cannot.
    This war has shown that Europe is not ready to defend 
themselves and that the United States must remain committed for 
the foreseeable future, although we can encourage them to build 
the European pillar within NATO.
    We have to grow the coalition of countries countering 
Russia. We have to mitigate the Russia-China partnership and we 
have to continue to work to weaken autocracy's grip.
    There will be a post-Putin Russia. I am not optimistic 
necessarily about what it looks like, but there could be an 
opening that did not exist before. The civil society pieces, 
supporting investigative journalism, all of those pieces, anti-
corruption. I mean, that is what--the lifeblood of Putin's 
regime.
    The more the U.S. Congress can do on our real estate 
markets, on all of those types of things where we have seen so 
much progress in the aftermath, it is just staying the course 
and doing it for the long term because it is a long-term 
confrontation.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Dr.--I was going to say Dr. Shaheen, but 
Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. That works. Thank you both for being here.
    Ambassador Sullivan, I want to start with you because I 
want to go back to the Arctic, and you mentioned the Arctic 
Council. How important is it for us to get our ambassador to 
the Arctic Council confirmed?
    Ambassador Sullivan. The Arctic Council is important. I 
went to the Arctic Council countries, the ambassadors of those 
countries, in Moscow. We used to meet regularly.
    Those are the bilateral ambassadors to Russia. We will we 
would meet with Ambassador Korchunov, who was the Russian 
ambassador. The Arctic Council is very important and it is why 
the Russians are squealing the way they are now because every 
other member of the Arctic Council is united against them and 
has excluded them, so extremely important.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I would just say, Mr. 
Chairman and Senator Risch, that I hope this committee will 
move as quickly as we can on confirming that Arctic ambassador 
or at least having a hearing so it can move forward.
    I want to go--follow up a little bit on the--what will 
Congress do after the war and also in terms of your statements, 
Dr. Kendall-Taylor, about continuing to make the case about why 
this war is important.
    I could not agree more with both of you on that and it is 
something that I try and do when I am in New Hampshire whenever 
I have an opportunity.
    One of the things I find particularly frustrating is the 
continued questions that I get, and I am sure every member of 
this committee gets, from reporters who keep saying, well, is 
not support for the war deteriorating in Congress because we 
have extremists at either end who are talking about why we 
should stop funding this war.
    I have two questions for you both, really. One is what does 
that mean when we see those extremist voices and how does that 
affect the public as a whole, and when reporters magnify those 
voices, what does that do?
    Secondly, to what extent are we seeing any Russian 
disinformation or Chinese or other adversaries' disinformation 
to try and promote those divisions within our society to try 
and undermine the war effort?
    I will open to whoever wants to go first.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I think your point on the media is also 
critically important because they do tend to amplify and make 
quite a lot out of statements and no one remembers then when a 
statement gets walked back. They just remember the statement.
    I do think that the media has done a lot to amplify the 
divisions and to highlight very minority held views about 
calling into question whether or not we should sustain support 
for Ukraine.
    I do--obviously--we all know that the American public does 
take cues from the U.S. Congress and from the political elite 
and so when they hear those types of statements, I absolutely 
think it leads them to call into question.
    That is why I think it is critically important for members 
of Congress and for the President himself to continue to make 
the case. I think it is unfortunate that the President has--
obviously, he has traveled to Ukraine and that is wonderful and 
he has given important speeches in Warsaw and other places.
    He has not addressed the American people. It was not part 
of the State of the Union and other things. I think when you 
hear--it is the critical voices that call into question that 
are being amplified and we do not hear enough about the case 
for the sustained support and there is an imbalance there.
    On your question about disinformation, I am not aware and I 
have not followed that closely enough to answer that question. 
I am not certain, but it obviously seems like a ripe issue for 
targets of Russian and Chinese disinformation.
    Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Sullivan, do you have any 
thoughts about----
    Ambassador Sullivan. Just one quick thought. There is--I 
think it was Senator Murphy who earlier in the hearing said 
there is a burden that Ukraine needs to bear in waging this 
war. It cannot do it on its own financially or militarily. The 
Russians likewise need help.
    What I think needs to be acknowledged is the vital 
importance of Ukraine prevailing on its terms. Now, that 
support should not all come from the United States.
    We can discuss among us, among Americans and with our 
allies and partners, burden sharing, whether a particular 
weapon system is really something that would be used in the 
context of this conflict.
    What we cannot debate is the nature of the adversary and 
why the fight is being waged in the first place. It has to be 
waged, it has to be supported, and the world needs to come 
together. Only part of the world has now. It cannot just be the 
United States.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I have one final question 
and that has to do with Belarus, and I know that this hearing 
is about the U.S.-Russian relationship, but one of the--one of 
the few countries that has stood by Russia during this invasion 
has been Belarus.
    Can you speak to the relationship between Lukashenko and 
Putin and whether he is going to be able to continue to hold 
the line when he says no military involvement? Is that what is 
really going on or is there something else happening?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I was there--I was in Moscow in 
August of 2020 when Lukashenko really lost the presidential 
election and then crushed the demonstrators after the election 
on August 9, arrested almost 40,000 people. A lot of violence. 
Putin supported that.
    Before then my recollection is that Secretary Pompeo 
traveled to Minsk earlier in 2020 and met with Lukashenko, but 
Lukashenko became really dependent on Putin. He might not have 
survived in August of 2020 without that support. They already 
have a union state, Belarus and Russia, the union state. He has 
become--Lukashenko--much more dependent on Putin. I think he is 
the world leader who has had more meetings with Putin. I think 
he has had 14 since the special military operation began all in 
Moscow. Putin does not go to Minsk. Lukashenko is dependent on 
him and Putin has used Belarus as a platform to launch the 
special military operation, particularly the drive south to 
Kyiv.
    Lukashenko had ideas about a slightly more independent 
Minsk, but his--the reelection fiasco for him in August of 2020 
has driven him closer into the arms of his union state partner, 
Vladimir Putin, and he has resisted using Belarusian military 
in part because I am not sure there are military experts much--
I am not a military expert, but I think the Belarusian security 
services are more capable than the Belarusian military. I am 
not sure they add that much to what the Russians have.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Ambassador Sullivan, good to see you again. 
Dr. Taylor, good to see you, and thank you both for your years 
of service to our country and your thoughtfulness.
    Let me begin with the issue of burden sharing because you 
just mentioned it, Ambassador. I think we would all agree that 
there is now more enthusiasm than there was just a couple of 
years ago among our European partners for the NATO alliance and 
investment in that alliance in various ways.
    I believe it is crucial that the U.S. continue to use 
levers at its disposal to ensure that Europeans are as invested 
in their own security as the U.S. is in maintaining stability 
in Europe.
    Ambassador Sullivan, what mechanisms are available to us to 
ensure that all European members of NATO quickly meet in 
sustained defense spending at no less than 2 percent and 20 
percent thresholds agreed to in Wales nearly 10 years ago?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator. Good to see 
you again.
    Well, that has been a vital question for years going back 
to when I was deputy secretary and then-President Trump was 
railing about the fact that European allies, big countries, 
were not meeting the Wales commitment that had been made based 
on what had happened in Ukraine, recall.
    Since then, I think the shift since February 24, 2022, I 
think we have seen countries like Germany have a pretty 
dramatic shift. It is going to take a while for their systems 
to turn.
    Imagine our own system, right. Increasing defense--I mean, 
these are important, difficult questions. We have got to keep 
the pressure on, make the case for why it is important and the 
threat that they face from the East.
    Senator Young. That all makes sense with me and this is in 
part about sustaining domestic support for resourcing the 
Ukrainians, right. That is really what is most on my mind.
    Is there a way, in your mind, that we can do a better job 
of elevating those who are meeting their commitments and 
ensuring that people understand that they are shining examples 
of what other countries should aspire to?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well----
    Senator Young. The carrot as opposed to the stick.
    Ambassador Sullivan. Yes, the carrot. We cannot diminish, 
of course, the guarantees of the treaty so we cannot say, well, 
we might be slower coming to your rescue if you get invaded by 
Russia.
    Senator Young. Sure. Right.
    Ambassador Sullivan. Without undermining that, I think for 
those countries that need to be persuaded of the need to meet 
the Wales commitment, given what has happened in the 15 months 
since February 2022, that is a fair approach.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Could I add one quick point?
    Senator Young. Oh, please, Doctor.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree about the 2 percent is a 
critically important benchmark and I do hope at the Vilnius 
comment that there will be a shift of the 2 percent as the 
floor and not the ceiling.
    Just as important as the how much is the how allies are 
spending and I think that is another area where the United 
States can continue to put pressure on allies and partners to 
make sure that the spending is done appropriately and most 
effectively.
    Certainly, as we are thinking of a potential two-front war 
conflict--tensions heat up with China--I think many of us are 
concerned about what that would mean. What would the United 
States need to take out of Europe if we did have a 
confrontation with China?
    Ensuring that our European allies and partners understand 
what it is that we would take out--the logistics, the air-to-
air refueling, the ISR, those capabilities--that is where 
allies really need to be investing so that we are prepared for 
that kind of scenario. It is the how much, but it is also the 
how.
    Senator Young. Okay. I may follow up on that thoughtful 
point to try and get a better sense of what NATO is actually 
doing, what contingencies which are--might be publicly 
available can you or others speak to so that I have a measure 
of confidence that that conversation is happening.
    If I could with some remaining time here just briefly touch 
on New START.
    Senator Van Hollen and I have been pretty outspoken about 
the value of arms control between the U.S. and Russia over the 
years, both for its own sake, but also for the message it sends 
to other nuclear powers.
    In February, as we know, we saw Vladimir Putin announce the 
suspension of Russia's participation in New START, the last 
arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia.
    Despite Russia's noncompliance, the Administration has 
continued to indicate that it will continue to uphold its end 
of the treaty.
    Ambassador Sullivan, if you could just briefly indicate how 
you assess the effects of Russia's suspension of the treaty, 
especially in the risk of misunderstanding leading to a nuclear 
exchange.
    Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you, Senator. My understanding 
is that what Putin announced the Russian Government had 
actually already previously announced. The foreign ministry had 
said no more meetings of the bilateral consultative commission, 
no inspections.
    Putin announces the suspension of Russia under the New 
START treaty. I understand, though, that the foreign ministry 
clarified shortly thereafter and said that Russia would 
continue to comply with the numerical limits in the treaty. It 
is just that they have eliminated--by eliminating the 
inspections, they have eliminated one of the means for us to 
verify that they are complying with the treaty.
    It is problematic. We are not allowing the Russians to do 
inspections here if they are not allowing us to do them there. 
We have also said we will comply with the numerical limits 
under the treaty.
    Senator Young. Is that the best we can do at this point or 
do you have additional thoughts, either of you, about how we 
should evaluate our own nuclear posture and missile defense 
posture in Europe?
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. The only point I would add is a point 
that I made earlier, which is the more degraded that Russia's 
conventional forces become, the more they will rely on their 
nuclear weapons, including their nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
    The more vulnerable they feel, the more quickly they will 
go to the nuclear and so it really shortens the pathway to 
nuclear war.
    I do think that we are entering kind of in a new--where the 
threat of nuclear use is only rising and so not only do we need 
to continue to think about what role arms control can play in 
this, but I do think we have to think very hard about our 
deterrent posture.
    At NATO, do we need to bring back more of our nuclear 
exercises? How do we convince the Russians that we will fight 
through a nuclear war, for example?
    I think that--so in addition to the arms control piece, 
which I do continue to believe is critically important, I do 
think that we have to be aware that we are headed towards a 
future without arms control and we, along with allies and 
partners, are going to have to think about how we get better at 
deterrence.
    Senator Young. Thank you both. Your presence here is so 
valuable.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of 
you for your testimony and your service and I thank Senator 
Young for his work on the efforts on nuclear arms control.
    Let me ask you both about the role of China here because 
China has, clearly, been a malign actor. You have President Xi 
saying our--that their friendship with China knows, ``no 
boundaries, all in.'' Visiting Moscow, cozying up to Putin.
    We have been very clear that if we see any additional signs 
or signs that China is providing lethal aid to Ukraine, that we 
will respond strongly, primarily in the form of sanctions and, 
obviously, that will only be successful with our allies and 
partners around the world.
    I also noticed that Putin has said that he is considering 
deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. There have been 
some reports that President Xi and China have had a restraining 
influence on Putin when it comes to the possible use or 
threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Putin--excuse me--and 
one of--and China's diplomats as we speak are visiting various 
European capitals to sort of test different proposals that they 
want to advance in terms of a settlement.
    We have been very clear that any settlement has to be 
proposed by Ukrainians and President Zelensky. My question to 
you is we know all the bad things that China has done here. Is 
there any positive role, in your view, that they could play if 
they so chose and what would that be?
    If I could start with you, Ambassador Sullivan.
    Ambassador Sullivan. I think the visit by the Special 
Representative to Europe is a key indication of how sensitive 
they are to the EU market.
    We have--I have thought for a long time and others have as 
well that, obviously, Xi did not dissuade or try to dissuade 
Putin from launching this special military operation when they 
met before the Olympics in February of 2020 and I think from 
China's perspective they get some benefit from the United 
States focused on a conflict in Eastern Europe and not focused 
on as much as we could be on East Asia.
    The risk for Xi is in the EU and they are--that market is 
extremely important for him. I believe we have seen a shift in 
China under Xi from--I went with then-Treasury Secretary 
Paulson on his last trip to China in December of 2008 and all 
that our Chinese interlocutors wanted to talk about was the 
economy and economic growth.
    Now, and back then this was the strategic economic 
dialogue. They were focused on growing their economy, 
strengthening their economy. What we have seen with President 
Xi is a shift where geopolitics and security are now taking the 
lead.
    The geopolitical rationale for supporting his dear friend, 
the President of Russia, is now--but what--that is what he has 
been pursuing, but what is nagging at him now is that 
underlying need for economic growth and if they drive the 
Europeans farther away from China because they are supporting 
Putin in a war in Europe, that is not going to be popular with 
the Europeans and that is not going to help them in that really 
key market for them.
    Senator Van Hollen. Dr. Taylor.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree entirely. I think in many--
almost certainly the Europeans have more leverage than the 
United States does in pressuring China to play a constructive 
role in the conflict.
    I think the problem is, as we talked about before, that Xi 
and Putin have an incredibly deep relationship, that they see 
themselves united in pushing back on the United States and U.S. 
influence all across the globe.
    In that sense, I do not think that Xi will play a 
productive role in this conflict. I think Xi's interest is, A, 
ensuring that Putin does not lose, and in a scenario where 
Ukraine makes a very significant--makes significant progress in 
its counter offensive is the scenario that I could imagine Xi 
crossing America's red line and beginning to provide more 
lethal assistance to prevent his best and closest ally, really, 
from falling in Ukraine.
    I do not see evidence currently and, for example, in 
China's peace plan, I think in many ways is almost laughable, 
calling for a ceasefire without any withdrawal of Russian 
forces, which we all understand that Putin would just use to 
rest, refit, retry.
    Until we see a very significant change in the rhetoric 
coming out of Beijing or in the proposals that they put 
forward, I do not see them playing a constructive role in the 
peace process.
    Senator Van Hollen. It is primarily window dressing and 
theater for European public to make----
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. They want to have their cake and eat 
it, too.
    Senator Van Hollen. That is my assessment as well. I 
appreciate you both being here. A lot more questions, but I see 
my time is out.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    One last question for both of you. As we know, Russia is 
increasingly using wrongful detention of U.S. citizens as a 
foreign policy tool. As we speak, American citizens Paul Whelan 
and Evan Gershkovich remain wrongfully detained.
    I remain concerned about the welfare of Jimmy Wilgus, whose 
parents are New Jersey constituents. At the same time, Russia's 
most prominent opposition leaders, Alexei Navalny, Vladimir 
Kara-Murza languish in Russian prisons on trumped up charges.
    For both of you, if you have any insights, first, what can 
we do if anything to limit Russia's use of wrongful detention 
in this way, and second, what different approach could we be 
taking to the continuing detentions of Navalny and Kara-Murza?
    Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I spend a lot of time thinking 
about these issues, Mr. Chairman. I was there when Brittney 
Griner was arrested. Visited Paul Whelan many times--Trevor 
Reed.
    It is a policy of the Russian Government, but it is--the 
Russian Government under Putin uses every--every aspect of 
Russian society is put to what the goals that President Putin 
has for Russia--the Russian Orthodox Church, the national 
airline, the court system, the judicial system.
    Their courts look beautiful. Their courtrooms--it is a 
beautiful building. It is a beautiful courtroom. It is a 
Potemkin court. It is used by the Russian security services and 
the Kremlin to achieve their policy ends. There is no justice. 
There is no independent judiciary.
    They are, in my opinion and I think it is pretty widely 
shared, they are arresting Americans and when they catch an 
American and they are able to detain them and that American has 
certain characteristics, whether it is an Olympic gold medalist 
or a Wall Street Journal reporter that they can get their hooks 
in, they are going to use that person just as they use every 
other aspect of Russian society to their advantage against us 
in their war against us.
    I think the best I can come up with, Senator, in response 
to your question is to discourage Americans from traveling to 
Russia unless there is an extraordinary need, particularly 
Americans who have served in the military, have or had a 
security clearance, have some prominence.
    I also think we have to engage in multilateral diplomacy 
because it should not just be an American problem. When a Wall 
Street Journal reporter, a 31-year-old man who is doing his job 
as an international correspondent, is arrested on trumped up 
espionage charges that should not just be a problem of the 
United States.
    Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Those are all excellent points. The 
only thing I would add is a little bit tangential which is the 
detention of the Wall Street Journal reporter is--I think it is 
an intentional and intended to have a chilling effect on having 
other American and Western journalists in the country.
    It is another way that Vladimir Putin is ensuring that we 
cannot shine a light on his domestic repression and really have 
insight into the changes that are taking place in Russia.
    That is going to make it ever more difficult for the United 
States to be able to keep a pulse on these changes in Russian 
society and understand what is happening inside Russia.
    It is not a preventative measure, but it is a mitigation 
tactic, which is to continue to fund investigative journalists 
and the journalists who are doing their work outside of Russia. 
Many of them still have ways to contact their sources back 
inside Russia.
    It is going to leave a big black box that makes this ever 
harder for us to understand the Russia that we face, and if we 
cannot prevent it, we should at least try to mitigate the 
impact by continuing to fund those journalists outside and the 
other Russians who have left.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Well, you said something, Ambassador Sullivan, that I have 
been contemplating, which is some type of a universal 
convention sort of like an Article 5 on wrongful detention--if 
you wrongfully detained a citizen of a country of the 
convention then all countries spring into action and the 
consequences because then the ante would be up. The cost would 
be up for wrongfully detaining of citizens.
    I am thinking of Canadians who had a few citizens that were 
detained elsewhere. This is going to be a continuing problem, 
so long as the consequences are little and the rewards are big 
we will continue to lose people.
    With the thanks of the committee, this record for this 
hearing will remain open until the close of business on 
Wednesday, May 17.
    We appreciate your insights, and this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of Ambassador John Sullivan to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What conditions should the U.S. have for normalizing 
relations with Russia, and how flexible should we be in them?

    Answer. Ending Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine on terms 
that are acceptable to the democratically elected Government of Ukraine 
is the most basic condition. We should also insist on bringing to 
justice those who committed war crimes in Ukraine. Those should not be 
flexible. If the Ukrainian Government, on its own terms, wants to cede 
territory, I would advise against that but would have to defer to their 
judgment about their national interests. Putin, the leader of one of 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, cannot be 
allowed to succeed in waging an aggressive war in violation of the UN 
Charter and international law. Waging an aggressive war is a crime for 
which convicted perpetrators have been hanged in the past.

    Question. We have seen the Russian playbook for frozen conflicts 
before in both Georgia and Moldova. Can you speak to some of the 
dangers to the U.S. and our allies which are likely to emerge if there 
is a frozen conflict in a country as large and populated as Ukraine?

    Answer. The dangers to our NATO allies in the region, as well as 
NATO aspirants like Georgia and neighbors like Moldova, are very 
substantial. Those nations' interests were already subverted by Russia 
before February 24, 2022. The governments of the Eastern European 
countries with which I engaged while I was deputy secretary and later 
ambassador to Russia were clear in describing the hybrid war that 
Russia was already waging against them, including cyber-attacks and 
intelligence operations. We have seen the danger caused by Russian 
troops, and now nuclear weapons, moving into Belarus. The threat from a 
frozen conflict in Ukraine will be even greater.

    Question. What do you see as the path forward in the security 
architecture of Europe after the current war? The U.S. so far has 
resisted committing to providing a Membership Action Plan regarding 
Ukraine's NATO bid, or even discussing the matter at the upcoming NATO 
summit in Vilnius. How should we interpret this reluctance? Are there 
any other bilateral or multilateral agreements which we should be 
working towards to serve our security interests, either specific to 
Ukraine or with regard to Russia more broadly?

    Answer. No matter the form, Ukraine must have credible security 
guarantees (including from the United States) after the war ends 
(whenever that is). Without those guarantees, the country will have 
great difficulty rebuilding under the threat of renewed war by Russia. 
Another Budapest Memorandum will not suffice. But the form of the 
guarantees is also a vital issue. NATO membership is optimal. 
Guarantees by the U.S. and other major U.S. allies could be adequate.

    Question. Under your tenure the Kremlin ordered the United States 
to take a veritable axe to its staffing--from 1,200 to less than 150. 
Given your public remarks to POLITICO about the difficulty in keeping 
the Mission running on minimum staff, how often did you interact with 
Washington on resource needs and at what level? Do you feel you 
received the resources you needed?

    Answer. Engagement with Washington on these issues was quite 
frequent during my tenure as ambassador in both administrations. 
Sometimes it was daily, or even multiple times a day. At other points, 
it was several times a week. At a minimum, there was not a week that 
went by that I did not engage with the Department on these issues. I 
always got what Washington could provide without consulting the 
Russians. When we had to engage with the Russian MFA, we would 
inevitably hit delays and obstructions. Washington tried to help me 
work around those. The underlying problem was that we would not hold to 
a position of insisting on reciprocity with the Russians. There was a 
fear that the Russians would close our embassy, which I always thought 
was extremely unlikely because we would close their embassy (and 
intelligence platform) in response. Until we insist on reciprocity, we 
will continue to have the problems I had as ambassador.

    Question. If Russia were to permit us to fully staff our Embassy 
and Consulates, how long do you estimate it would take to return our 
U.S. and local staffing numbers to an appropriate level? How long would 
it take to reopen Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg?

    Answer. We should have very few third country nationals employed at 
our mission in Russia. They are too vulnerable to coercion by the 
Russian security services. To staff our embassy with hundreds of 
cleared Americans will take a long time--measured in years, not months. 
It will take even longer to reopen our consulates because we will have 
to identify new locations in each city. The old locations are now 
unsafe and insecure. The process of opening new diplomatic facilities 
with a cooperative host government usually takes years. With a hostile 
government in Kremlin, it will be challenging at best.

    Question. The Kremlin places significant pressure on our operations 
in Russia via expulsions, visa delays affecting regular staffing 
rotations, issues with accreditation, etc. Lack of personnel directly 
impact our ability to keep a complex and sophisticated diplomatic 
facility in good working order. What can the Administration do to exert 
corresponding pressure on Russian diplomats in the United States to 
remind them of their obligations under the Vienna Conventions?

    Answer. I have said for years that we must insist on reciprocity, 
which we never have done in this Administration or the last. 
Reciprocity means we should have the same number of diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities as the Russians. We should not have one set of 
rules for the United States and a different set of rules for the 
Russians. The ``visa overstay'' problem (Russian diplomats did not have 
to leave when their visas expired, but American diplomats did) was a 
good example of that, which has taken years to address, and still not 
fully.
                                 ______
                                 

 The Committee Received No Response From Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor for 
             the Following Questions by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What conditions should the U.S. have for normalizing 
relations with Russia, and how flexible should we be in them?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. We have seen the Russian playbook for frozen conflicts 
before in both Georgia and Moldova. Can you speak to some of the 
dangers to the U.S. and our allies which are likely to emerge if there 
is a frozen conflict in a country as large and populated as Ukraine?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What do you see as the path forward in the security 
architecture of Europe after the current war? The U.S. so far has 
resisted committing to providing a Membership Action Plan regarding 
Ukraine's NATO bid, or even discussing the matter at the upcoming NATO 
summit in Vilnius. How should we interpret this reluctance? Are there 
any other bilateral or multilateral agreements which we should be 
working towards to serve our security interests, either specific to 
Ukraine or with regard to Russia more broadly?

    [No Response Received]

                                  [all]