[Senate Hearing 118-96]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-96
WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS RUSSIA?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 16, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-280 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Sullivan, Hon. John, Former Deputy Secretary of State and
Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation
(2020-2022).................................................... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Kendall-Taylor, Dr. Andrea, Senior Fellow and Director,
Transatlantic Security Program, Center for a New American
Security, Washington, DC....................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador John Sullivan to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 36
The Committee Received No Response From Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor
for the Following Questions by Senator Todd Young.............. 38
(iii)
WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS RUSSIA?
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TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Romney,
Ricketts, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
The last time U.S.-Russia relations were this bad, Kennedy
was President and Khrushchev had nuclear missiles pointed at us
from Cuba.
Today, our embassy in Moscow only has a skeleton staff that
faces restrictions from a Russian Government working to
undermine U.S. interests all over the world.
In the wake of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, democratic
nations came together to isolate his regime with coordinated
condemnation and a punishing set of sanctions. They have
reduced revenues from trade and petroleum products, pushed more
than a thousand companies to pull out of Russia, and isolated
the country's financial industry.
Yet, the Russian economy only shrank by 2 percent in 2022
and Russia has dramatically increased trade with other
autocratic nations including China and Iran, not to mention
India.
We need to continue our coordinated global efforts to
target Putin's war machine because beyond Ukraine and with
support of the Wagner Group, Putin continues to be a
destructive autocratic force on the world stage.
Inside Russia, Kremlin cronies kidnap Americans, from
basketball stars to Wall Street Journal reporters, to use as
bargaining chips in their geopolitical gains. They have
imprisoned Russian dissidents that threaten Putin's power like
Vladimir Kara-Murza or Alexei Navalny, and they have shut down
independent media to control the behavior and minds of Russian
citizens.
Beyond Russia's borders, far away from the headlines of
Western nations, there is a very different picture. Sergey
Lavrov is globetrotting around the world to shore up support, a
so-called limitless partnership with China, which apparently
includes working to shape international institutions in their
own image, undermining the values of sovereignty, rule of law,
and respect for human rights.
The Russian embassy here in DC is throwing cocktail parties
attended by diplomats from all over the Global South, who then
abstain or even vote against resolutions to support Ukraine.
At the United Nations, Russia uses its seat on the Security
Council to make a mockery of any attempt to hold Putin and his
regime accountable for the atrocities their forces are
committing.
While we can laud the fact that more than 140 U.N. members
condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine versus 35 who abstained,
as the Financial Times recently pointed out, those 35 countries
represent more than half of the world's population.
Underlying these Russian efforts is a sophisticated mis-
and disinformation campaign that, quite frankly, I do not
believe we are effectively dealing with.
Through Wagner mercenaries exploiting instability across
the Sahel and Africa to Russian cyber-attacks that destroy
infrastructure to engineering a food crisis that now stretches
halfway around the world, the Russian disinformation apparatus
continues to find fertile ground for blatant lies that
whitewash its own operations and undermine trust in the
countries actually working to provide humanitarian assistance,
promote peace and security, to say nothing of its targeted
campaign against the United States and our electoral systems as
well as those of our democratic allies who embrace the same
fundamental human rights and freedoms that underpin our own
system.
Let me thank our witnesses for appearing today. I hope you
will speak to these challenges and how the United States and
our partners can overcome them.
How can we better leverage sanctions and punitive tools to
further cripple Russia's leadership? How can we better leverage
international institutions to confront Russian influence? What
tools can we utilize to hold Russian actors accountable for
their crimes against humanity in Ukraine and human rights
abuses at home?
I also hope our witnesses will speak to how we can combat
Putin's weaponization of energy from Georgia to Syria to
Moldova.
I am pleased that Senator Risch is working with me on a
bill to support energy security in Eastern Europe and beyond,
which will be critical to cutting off Putin's assets.
I am also working on efforts to support Russian dissidents
who have fled and welcome your thoughts on how we can best
support those Russians who want to see a brighter future for
their country.
This question of the future of U.S.-Russia relations is,
obviously, huge. I have not even touched on nonproliferation or
Arctic security or climate change.
At this point, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Risch
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thanks to our witnesses for appearing here this morning.
There has been a lot of discussion in Washington about
Russia and Ukraine, but very little about what U.S. policy
towards Russia should be now and in the future. I am glad we
get to have this conversation.
Russia under Putin is an autocratic and imperialistic
regime and poses an acute threat to the freedom and stability
that the United States and our allies have fought to promote
and defend.
This is true in Ukraine, more broadly in Europe, and
throughout Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic and in the
emerging China-Russia cooperation.
Despite these increasing challenges, it is clear that the
United States lacks a coherent policy to confront Russia. It
appears the White House never really thinks about Russia until
Moscow makes a move and has never acted proactively to force
the Kremlin to respond to our initiatives.
Before Russia's unprovoked invasion last year, it reminded
us that weakness invites aggression. This Administration's
approach resembled the failed Obama reset. We all remember the
reset. It did not work.
As to this Administration, it started with the unilateral
extension of the New START treaty on inauguration day. It
continued to the refusal to impose Nord Stream 2 sanctions.
It continued on to the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, which
produced no deliverables, and then on to the suspension of
military assistance to Ukraine in May and November 2021 because
of concerns it would cause escalation.
The Administration has offered olive branch after olive
branch, but as predicted, Putin used every dialogue and
concession to lend himself legitimacy and increase Russia's
geopolitical status at our expense. We need to accept that
Russia sees this kind of diplomacy as weakness and that it only
seriously responds when we project strength.
This discredited approach has allowed for war in Europe,
renewed Russian presence in the Middle East, a militarized
Arctic, and a growing Russian proxy footprint across Africa and
Latin America.
We need to be honest and acknowledge that under Putin,
Russia is an adversary, not a willing partner. Our policies
must confront Russia as it is now, not as it was 30 years ago.
We must view Russia not only as a serious adversary in its
own right, but also recognize its role in U.S.-China
competition and other challenges of today's world.
Domestically, Putin has turned Russia into a feudal kingdom
where the whim of an autocrat is the only law. Political
repression is at an all-time high. The opposition movement has
been crushed with anyone who expresses dissent either jailed,
exiled, assassinated, poisoned.
Attacks on press freedom and state control of the media
have reduced Russia to a propaganda state. Civil society has
been muzzled and anyone who could flee has already done so.
On sanctions, the United States has made a start, but there
is so much more to do, particularly in targeting critical
sectors like energy and, very importantly, cracking down on
third-nation sanctions evasion.
Likewise, we need a U.S. military strategy that accurately
accounts for recent changes in Russia's diminishing
conventional capabilities. At the same time, we should expect
more nuclear threats. That has become consistent and, indeed,
during the Ukraine conflict, commonplace because of its
frequency to the point that it is largely ignored.
This is dangerous, but not unexpected, given Russia's ham-
handed statecraft. Russian thinking is clear in this regard.
Putin knows he can threaten to use nuclear weapons without any
concrete response from the West.
Instead, he seriously believes his threats will deter us
from doing what we should to protect our interests. On all
fronts, the United States needs to have a clearly defined
policy for what we expect from Russia and what we are willing
to do to pursue and protect our interests.
We must also form this policy in the context of a more
globally assertive China and its increasingly close strategic
partnership with Russia.
This Administration consistently and all too often worries
about what Putin will do. We need a policy where Putin wakes up
every morning worried about what we will do.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
In the interest of time, I am going to give condensed
biographies for our distinguished witnesses.
Ambassador John J. Sullivan is no stranger to the committee
and I am sure he is happy there is no confirmation vote after
this hearing.
Currently a distinguished fellow at the School of Foreign
Service of Georgetown University, his career spans four decades
in the public sector for both Democratic and Republican
administrations across the Departments of State, Justice,
Defense, and Commerce, as well as in private law practice.
Ambassador Sullivan served five presidents in prominent
diplomatic and legal positions, including as U.S. Ambassador to
the Russian Federation under Presidents Biden and Trump. Before
his posts in Moscow, he served for almost 3 years as the U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State.
Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director
of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security. Prior to joining CNAS, Dr. Kendall-Taylor
served for 8 years as a senior intelligence officer, including
as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia
at the National Intelligence Council.
She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's
School of Foreign Service. Her work has been published in
numerous political science and policy journals, and since the
committee also champions the State Department's Education and
Cultural Exchange Bureau, I will note that she was a Fulbright
scholar in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan where she conducted
dissertation research on oil and autocracy.
We welcome you both to the committee. We thank you for the
insights you will provide us.
Ambassador, we are going to start off with you. I would ask
you both to limit your presentations here to about 5 minutes.
Your full statements will be included in the record without
objection.
Ambassador Sullivan, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN SULLIVAN, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE AND AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION (2020-2022)
Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee. It is
good to be back. As the chairman said, it is also good to be
back without seeking a confirmation vote from this committee.
I am honored to be here today to discuss U.S. policy toward
Russia. I hope to bring to the committee my experiences for the
3 years I was in Moscow dealing with the Russians, negotiating
with the Russians.
When I arrived at my post in Moscow, I was resolved to do
everything I could to stop the downward spiral in relations
between our countries. U.S. policy toward Russia at the time
was, on the one hand, to confront and push back hard on the
Kremlin in the many areas where we were opposed, but on the
other hand, to seek progress in those limited areas where the
interests of our countries appeared more aligned--arms control,
some regional conflicts, North Korea. At a minimum, I hoped
that we could stabilize our respective diplomatic platforms.
That policy approach failed. During my first 2 years as
ambassador, there was no lasting progress on any issue on which
we engaged. Nevertheless, persistent, my priorities remained
even after the change in the White House in January 2021 to
work to stabilize the U.S.-Russia relationship while defending
U.S. interests and advocating for U.S. citizens wrongfully
detained in Russia and the many U.S. businesses that operate
there.
This was reaffirmed--my approach was reaffirmed in June
2021 when I accompanied President Joe Biden to meet Putin in
Geneva. President Biden made clear we would continue to
confront and oppose the Russians in the many areas where U.S.
interests were threatened or undermined by them, but we would
engage with them on, among other things, strategic stability,
cybersecurity, and wrongfully detained Americans.
Our engagement following the summit had barely begun when
there was a seismic policy shift after U.S. intelligence
agencies collected considerable evidence of Russia's plans for
Ukraine.
Beginning in November 2021, U.S. policy focused intensively
on dissuading and deterring Russia from a further invasion of
Ukraine. Despite these intensive diplomatic efforts, that
policy failed when Russia launched on February 24, 2022, its
so-called special military operation, a euphemism that would
make George Orwell blush.
It had been apparent well before then that the Russians
were not negotiating in good faith and were going through a
charade of diplomacy for Putin to lay the groundwork for a
further invasion of Ukraine. In the 15 months since Russia's
aggressive and brutal war began, U.S. policymaking has rightly
focused on supporting Ukraine and sanctioning and isolating
Russia.
That must be the immediate and imperative policy focus. No
country, let alone a permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council, can be allowed to succeed in waging an aggressive war
of conquest replete with grotesque war crimes to redraw
international borders, and make no mistake, Putin does not want
to negotiate an end to his aggressive war short of victory on
his terms.
He believes that Ukraine is Russia's, and I quote,
``historical lands.'' He said that in a recent speech in which
he also assured his fellow Russians that, ``Step by step,
carefully and consistently, we will deal with the tasks we have
at hand, which are to de-Nazify and demilitarize Ukraine.''
That is President Putin just weeks ago.
As Senator Risch mentioned, I think it is appropriate for
us to consider the broader context of U.S. policy toward Russia
now even as the war in Ukraine and Putin's failed special
military operation continues.
If I may, I thought I would just offer a few thoughts on
context for policymaking and then would be happy to delve into
many of the specific issues that the chairman mentioned.
First, most important, Russia under Putin is an implacable
adversary of the United States. Putin believes that Russia is
at war with us in a clash of ``civilizations.'' They said this
in their recent restatement of their foreign policy, their so-
called concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.
Putin and many other Russian nationalists are committed to
this concept. For any U.S. policy on Russia to succeed, we need
to understand our adversary.
Second, we must work to put in place security architecture
through NATO and with intensive bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy that protects not just Ukraine, but Europe and the
rest of the world from Russian aggression.
Third, there could be no trust of any kind in the Russian
Government. After repeated statements from Russian leadership
in early 2022 that they would not attack Ukraine--indeed, they
said they had no plans to do so--why would anyone trust that
government?
The Reagan era mantra of trust, but verify is quaint. It
has no application now. There can be no trust, only
verification and justice for Ukraine and the victims of Russian
war crimes in Ukraine.
Fourth, as difficult as it is to pursue diplomacy in this
context, we should not give up entirely on engaging with the
Russian Government when our interests so require, but our
interests do not require pleading with the Russians for
dialogue, whether it is on arms control or the war in Ukraine.
That is what they want and it will lead only to more policy
failure.
The best advice I received as ambassador in Moscow was to
never ask the Russians for anything. We should approach any
proposed engagement or negotiation from a position of strength
and confidence.
Finally, Chairman Menendez mentioned our embassy in Moscow.
To engage with Russia, we rely on a safe and functioning
embassy in that capital. The price we pay to maintain that
embassy is steep.
The Russians, despite their professed commitment to
reciprocity, have maintained an advantage. We have an embassy
in Moscow and no consulates. They have an embassy in Washington
and two consulates, Houston and New York. Moreover, they have
more diplomats assigned to their bilateral mission to the
United States than we have in Russia. We should insist on
reciprocity.
Thank you for allowing me to address the committee and I
welcome the opportunity to discuss the foregoing issues or any
other matters in which members are interested.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador John Sullivan
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the committee, I am honored to appear before you to discuss U.S. policy
toward Russia.
I bring to the discussion my perspective as the U.S. Ambassador to
Russia from December 2019 to October 2022.
When I arrived at my post in Moscow, I was resolved to do
everything I could to stop the downward spiral in relations between our
countries. U.S. policy toward Russia at the time was, on the one hand,
to confront and push back hard on the Kremlin in the many areas where
we were opposed, e.g., election interference, cyber-attacks, and the
wrongful detention of innocent Americans, to name some prominent topics
on a growing list. But, on the other hand, to seek progress in those
limited areas where the interests of our countries appeared more
aligned, e.g., arms control, counterterrorism, and certain regional
issues, including North Korea. At a minimum, I hoped we could stabilize
our respective diplomatic platforms.
That policy approach clearly failed. During my first 2 years as
ambassador, there was no lasting progress on any issue on which we
engaged. Moreover, the pace of deeply disturbing events in Russia was
non-stop, notably the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, which was part of a
sweeping crackdown on political opposition, on what was left of
independent media in Russia, and on civil society generally. The
crackdown was intimately related to the constitutional and legal
reforms introduced by the Kremlin in early 2020 that allow President
Vladimir Putin to avoid the terms limits in the Russian constitution
and serve as President until 2036.
Despite the lack of progress, my priorities as ambassador
remained--even after the change in the White House in January 2021--to
work to stabilize the U.S.-Russia relationship while defending U.S.
national security and our democratic values; and to advocate for U.S.
citizens detained in Russia and for U.S. businesses operating there.
This was reaffirmed in June 2021, when I accompanied President Joe
Biden to his meeting with Putin in Geneva. President Biden made clear
that we would continue to confront and oppose the Russians in the many
areas where U.S. interests were threatened or undermined by them, but
we would engage with the Russians on, among other things, strategic
stability, cyber security, and wrongfully detained Americans.
Our engagement following the summit had barely begun when there was
a seismic policy shift after U.S. intelligence agencies collected
considerable evidence of Russia's plans for Ukraine. Until then, the
painful and bloody history of Russia's intervention in and seizure of
territory from Ukraine had cast a heavy pall on the relationship
between the United States and Russia but had not yet completely broken
it. Relations with Russia were terrible, but we were still trying to
find some common areas on which to work with the world's only other
nuclear superpower. Beginning in early November 2021, however, U.S.
policy shifted to an exclusive focus on dissuading and deterring Russia
from a further invasion of Ukraine.
Despite intensive efforts in U.S.-Russia bilateral channels, in the
NATO-Russia Council, and at the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, that policy failed when Russia's so-called
``Special Military Operation''--a euphemism that would make George
Orwell blush--began on February 24, 2022. It had been apparent to me
well before then that the Russians were not negotiating in good faith
and were going through a charade of diplomacy for Putin to lay the
groundwork for a further invasion of Ukraine.
In the 15 months since Russia's aggressive and brutal war began,
U.S. policymaking has focused, quite rightly, on robustly supporting
Ukraine in its defense and on sanctioning and isolating Russia. That
must be our immediate and imperative policy focus. No country, let
alone a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can be allowed to
succeed in waging an aggressive war of conquest, replete with grotesque
war crimes, to redraw international borders. And make no mistake, Putin
does not want to negotiate an end to his aggressive war short of
victory defined on his terms. He believes that Ukraine is Russia's
``historical lands,'' as he said in a speech in February of this year
in which he also assured his fellow Russians that, ``[s]tep by step,
carefully and consistently we will deal with the tasks we have at
hand,'' which are to ``de-nazify'' and ``de-militarize'' Ukraine. He
does not make a statement like that lightly and we should take him at
his word.
But it is appropriate to consider the broader context of U.S.
policy toward Russia, even as the war in Ukraine and Putin's failed
Special Military Operation continue. I offer a few brief thoughts on
this topic based on our recent failures to influence or deter Russian
policy choices.
First, it is important to understand as a policymaking threshold
that Russia under Putin is an implacable adversary of the United
States. He believes that Russia is at war with us. It is not a
competition; it is a clash of ``civilizations,'' as reflected in the
recently adopted Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation. Putin and many other Russian nationalists are committed to
this concept to their core. We repeatedly underestimate the depth of
their hostility when we try to influence Russia. For any U.S. policy on
Russia to succeed, we must understand our adversary.
Second, we must work to put in place security architecture through
NATO and with intensive bilateral and multilateral diplomacy that
protects not just Ukraine but Europe and the world from future Russian
aggression by this implacable adversary.
Third, there can be no trust of any kind in the Russian Government.
After repeated statements from the highest levels in January and
February 2022 that Russia would not attack Ukraine and had no plans to
do so, who would trust that government? The Reagan-era mantra of trust
but verify seems quaint now. There can be no trust, only verification
and justice for the victims of Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
Fourth, as difficult as it is to pursue diplomacy with Russia
considering the foregoing, we should not give up entirely on engaging
with the Russian Government when our interests require, e.g., in
advocating for nuclear arms control, including inspections under the
New START Treaty, or for the proper treatment and release of wrongfully
detained Americans. But our interests do not include pleading with the
Russians for dialogue on any topic, whether it is arms control or the
war in Ukraine. That is what they want, and it will lead only to more
policy failure. The best advice I received as ambassador was never to
ask the Russians for anything. We should approach any engagement or
negotiation from a position of strength and confidence. The more we
signal that we really want something, the less likely it is that we
will achieve our policy goals.
Finally, to engage with Russia we rely on a safe and functioning
embassy in Moscow. The price we have paid to maintain Embassy Moscow,
however, is steep. The Russians, despite their professed commitment to
reciprocity in our diplomatic relationship, have maintained an
advantage over us. We have an embassy in Moscow and no consulates. They
have an embassy in Washington and two consulates, in Houston and New
York. Moreover, they have more diplomats assigned to their bilateral
mission to the United States than we have in Russia, or at least they
did some months ago when I was ambassador. We should take the Russians
at their word and insist on reciprocity in our diplomatic relationship.
Thank you for allowing me to address the committee. I welcome the
opportunity to discuss the foregoing issues or any other matters in
which members are interested.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak today about U.S.
policy towards Russia, a topic that is both critical and
fraught.
It is critical because we are clearly locked in a period of
intense and probably prolonged confrontation with Russia with
the war for Ukraine at its center. Although the United States
is not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, as
the ambassador said, we should be very clear that Russia sees
itself as being at war with us.
The future of U.S. policy towards Russia is also fraught
because so much is changing. Russia itself is changing as a
result of its war in Ukraine in still unknowable ways.
Nothing will improve so long as Putin is in power, but
there is uncertainty about the political changes that the war
might trigger inside Russia and what Putin's eventual departure
will mean for future relations.
Russia's war in Ukraine requires us to reexamine long held
assumptions about Russia and it is those updated assessments
that should guide Washington's approach.
I will make four brief points, three that should shape our
expectations of relations with Russia and a final point on what
I see as the most important recommendation for putting U.S.-
Russia relations on more solid footing.
First, the nature of U.S.-Russia relations will remain
antagonistic so long as the war continues and the war is likely
to be protracted. Putin believes that time is on his side and
that the West will tire in its support for Ukraine.
Fighting on is also in Putin's personal interest. Wartime
autocrats rarely lose power. Being at war shuts down avenues
for the country's citizens, military, and security forces to
challenge their leadership.
In my work, I have found that since the end of World War II
only 7 percent of personalist authoritarians, as Putin is, have
been unseated while an interstate conflict that began under
their watch was ongoing.
The same does not hold true for dictators who lose wars.
They become more vulnerable to ouster. Even if Ukraine is
wildly successful in its counter offensive, Putin has every
incentive to fight through the hardship, meaning that this war
will go on for a long time, significantly constraining the
scope of U.S.-Russia relations.
Second, not only is Putin poised to maintain power, but the
confrontational nature of U.S.-Russia relations will very
likely persist past him. The historical track record of these
longtime personalist autocrats suggests that once these leaders
make it to 20 years in power--and Putin has been there for 23--
they tend to make it to about 36 years.
What is more, Putin is orchestrating changes inside Russia
that make relations more problematic. He is moving Russia in a
more totalitarian direction, and I do not use that word
lightly, as he attempts to mobilize Russian society in support
of his war not just on Ukraine, but also on the West.
The contours of his policies are likely to endure beyond
him. The historical record shows that authoritarianism persists
past the departure of longtime autocratic leaders like Putin 92
percent of the time. Moreover, my research shows that the same
group of regime insiders often remains intact after longtime
leaders depart.
Such continuity in the Russian regime would bring
continuity in Russia's external relations. Putin has saddled
his successor with a long list of vexing problems, including
how to end the war and settle the status of Crimea and whether
to pay Ukraine wartime reparations and accept accountability
for war crimes.
These thorny issues will long complicate Russia's relations
with the United States and Europe.
Third, along with the enduring intent to challenge the
United States, Russia will have significant capacity to do so,
although we need to be attuned to how the nature of the threat
is evolving.
Russia will emerge from its war militarily, economically,
and geopolitically weaker and there will therefore be a strong
temptation to downgrade Russia as a threat.
That would be a mistake. Russian power and influence may be
diminished, but Russia will adapt. In particular, the more
vulnerable that Putin feels about the degradation of his
conventional forces, the more he will rely on unconventional
methods to accomplish his objectives including relying more
heavily on his nuclear weapons and other hybrid tactics.
Finally, I have included several recommendations in my
written statement, but I want to highlight one and that is the
best path to a better relationship with Russia runs through
Ukraine.
The United States has very limited ability to shape
directly the trajectory of U.S.-Russia relations and so the
single most important way to shape that trajectory is by
enabling Ukraine to defeat Russia.
A Russia that makes gains in Ukraine is likely to be
emboldened. A military defeat of Russia, in contrast, could be
the type of seismic event that is required to catalyze bottom-
up pressure that will be needed to set Russia down a different
path.
A Ukrainian victory raises the prospect, even if just
slightly, that Putin could be forced out of office, creating an
opening for political change. That future comes with risks, but
also opportunities.
In sum, we are likely to remain in a long-term
confrontation with Russia and the United States will need an
effective and sustainable policy to meet the challenge,
starting in Ukraine.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kendall-Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor
i. introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members
of the Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak
today about the future of U.S. policy towards Russia--a topic that is
both critical and fraught. It is critical because we are quite clearly
locked in a period of intense and what is likely to be prolonged
confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of
that confrontation. Because of the war, the risk of escalation,
including direct military conflict between the United States and
Russia, is higher than it has been in decades. Although the United
States and its allies are not directly engaged in the war with Russia
in Ukraine, we should be very clear that Russia sees itself as being at
war with us.
The future of U.S. policy towards Russia is also fraught. It is
fraught because so much is changing--Russia itself is changing as a
result of its war on Ukraine in still unknowable ways. The nature of
the Russian threat is evolving. We can be sure that nothing will
improve so long as Putin is in power, but there is uncertainty about
the political changes that the war might trigger inside Russia and what
Putin's eventual departure will mean for relations with Moscow.
Russia's war in Ukraine requires us to re-examine long-held assumptions
and understandings about Russia, and it is those updated assessments
that should guide Washington's future policy approach to Russia.
ii. expectations for the future of u.s.-russia relations
I want to start by making three points that should inform our
expectations and understanding of the future of U.S. relations with
Russia.
First, the Nature of U.S.-Russia Relations Will Remain Confrontational
so Long as the War Continues, and the Conflict is Likely to be
Protracted
Even as the Russian military struggles to make gains on the
battlefield, Putin is confident that the West will eventually tire of
its support for Ukraine or that political changes in the United States
and Europe will result in less military assistance for Kyiv. But even
more, continuing the war is in Putin's personal interest. Fighting on
makes sense for Putin for one fundamental reason: wartime autocrats
rarely lose power. Being at war shuts down avenues for a country's
citizens, military, and security forces to challenge their leadership.
In research I conducted with my colleague Dr. Erica Frantz, we found
that since the end of World War II, only seven percent of personalist
authoritarians--as Putin is-- have been unseated while an interstate
conflict that began under their watch was ongoing.\1\ Other data
similarly show that leaders who initiate wars are especially unlikely
to be ousted amid them.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, ``Putin's Forever War:
How the Invasion Empowers Russia's President,'' Foreign Affairs, March
23, 2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war.
\2\ Giacamo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, Leaders and International
Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same does not hold true for dictators who lose wars; they
become more vulnerable to ejection. Although personalist dictators such
as Putin tend to be among the most resilient to military defeats,
Putin's expectations of what might happen if he is ousted are likely to
shape his calculus.\3\ Leaders who worry that they will be jailed,
exiled, or killed--a fate most common among personalist autocrats like
Putin--suggest he will be especially sensitive to even small increases
in risk to his stability. And Putin's very clear responsibility for the
invasion makes him particularly vulnerable. According to one study,
leaders who are culpable for wars are especially motivated to continue
fighting them--even in the face of hardship--because domestic actors
will want to punish them if they fail.\4\ Even if Ukraine is wildly
successful in its counter-offensive, Putin has every incentive to fight
through the hardship, meaning that this war will go on for a long time,
significantly constraining the scope of U.S.-Russia relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sarah E. Croco and Jessica L.P. Weeks, ``War Outcomes and
Leader Tenure,'' World Politics 68, no. 4 (October 2016): 577-607
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26347363.
\4\ Sarah E. Croco, ``The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability,
War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment,'' The American Political Science
Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 457-477 https://www.jstor.org/stable/
41480852.
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Second, not Only is Putin Poised To Maintain Power, but the
Confrontational Nature of U.S.-Russia Relations Will Likely
Persist Past his Departure
So long as the war continues, Putin is likely to be able to weather
any blowback. Not only does the ongoing war improve his prospects for
political survival, but so too does the political system he has built
over his long tenure. Putin has created in Russia what political
scientist Milan Svolik calls an established autocracy, wherein regime
officials and elite are fully dependent on the leader and invested in
maintaining the status quo from which they benefit.\5\ In research I
conducted with Dr. Frantz, we find that the typical post-Cold War
autocrat who had governed for 20 years (Putin has been in power for 23
years) ended up ruling for a total of about 36 years. The changes he is
orchestrating inside Russia make the future of U.S.-Russia relations
more problematic. Putin is already taking Russia in a darker, more
authoritarian direction. While authoritarianism in Russia has been
hardening since Putin returned to power in 2012, his invasion of
Ukraine has intensified this authoritarian turn. Russia's wrongful
detainment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich in March
and sentencing of opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to a 25-year
jail term in April, for example, are eerily reminiscent of Soviet
times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If anything, Putin is moving Russia in a more totalitarian
direction as he attempts to mobilize Russian society in support of his
war not just on Ukraine, but also on the West with the United States at
its center. As Russian analyst Andrei Kolesnikov has observed, it is no
longer possible for Russians to stay disengaged. As he notes, ``More
and more, Russians who are economically dependent on the state are
finding that they have to be active Putinists.'' \6\ Society is being
militarized, public acts of support are growing, as are incidents of
Russians reporting on the ``anti-patriotic'' activities of their fellow
citizens. Putin's propaganda that frames the United States as the
enemy, along with what is likely to be deep Russian resentment over
Western sanctions and the role U.S. and European weapons have played in
the very high number of Russian casualties, are likely to have long-
term effects on the way that Russians view the United States and the
relations between the two countries. Amid the Kremlin's propaganda,
many Russians appear to feel besieged and, often, just as embittered as
Putin himself; these dynamics are very likely to sustain an aggressive
Russia, even after Putin departs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Andrei Kolesnikov, ``Putin's Second Front: The War in Ukraine
Has Become a Battle for the Russian Psyche,'' Foreign Affairs, April 7,
2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-second-
front.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the societal changes taking place inside Russia, the
expectation in Washington must be that authoritarianism and the
contours of Russian foreign policy will outlast Putin. The historical
record shows that for all post-Cold War autocrats (except monarchs) in
power 20 years or more, authoritarianism persists past the leader's
departure in 76-percent of cases. When such leaders are also older
personalist autocrats, authoritarianism endures--either with the same
regime or with the establishment of a new one--92-percent of the
time.\7\ Moreover, the same authoritarian regime often remains intact
after longtime leaders leave office--a prospect that would be made more
likely if Putin exits on account of natural death or an elite-led
coup.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, ``After Putin: Lessons
from Autocratic Leadership Transitions,'' Washington Quarterly 45, no.
1 (Spring 2022): 79-96 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
0163660X.2022.2057112.
\8\ See also: Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ``When
Dictators Die,'' Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 159-171
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/when-dictators-die/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such continuity would likely extend to the nature of the Russian
regime and its external relations. Successors that deviate from the
status quo are likely to provoke fierce resistance from the ``old
guard'' who have considerable control over the levers of power in the
system. Beyond sidelining (if they can) individuals who pose a
particularly serious threat to them, new leaders who inherit office
tend to adhere to the previous program. In countries such as Syria and
Uzbekistan, for example, the successors of longtime leaders (Bashar al-
Assad and Shavkat Mirziyoyev, respectively) showed early signs of
liberalization through actions such as the release of political
prisoners, only to revert to traditionally more repressive practices.
In part for these reasons, research by Sarah Croco finds that when
successors come from the same regime as leaders involved with the
initiation of a war, they are likely to continue the conflicts they
inherit.\9\ By invading Ukraine, Putin has saddled future Russian
leaders with vexing problems--ending the war, resolving questions about
the illegal annexation of Crimea and the four Ukrainian territories,
wartime reparations, and accountability for war crimes, for example--
that will long complicate Russia's relations with the United States and
Europe. Although a new leader could change the tone of Russia's
external relations--just as the transition from Putin to Medvedev
created an opening for U.S.-Russia cooperation that did not exist with
Putin as President--the broad contours of Russian foreign policy would
likely endure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Croco, ``The Decider's Dilemma.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, Along With the Intent, Russia Will Retain Significant Capacity
To Challenge the United States, Although the Nature of the
Threat is Evolving
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a massive strategic blunder,
leaving Russia militarily, economically, and geopolitically weaker.
Given these facts, there will be a strong temptation to downgrade
Russia as a threat. That would be a mistake. Russian power and
influence may be diminished, but Russia will adapt. In particular, the
more vulnerable Putin feels given the degradation of Russia's
conventional forces in Ukraine, the more likely he is to rely on
unconventional methods to accomplish his objectives. With its back
against the wall, the Kremlin will also have less compunction about
trying to destabilize its enemies through sometimes exotic and hard-to-
track methods in the biological, chemical, cyberspace, or artificial
intelligence realms.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman, ``Russia's Dangerous
Decline: The Kremlin Won't Go Down Without a Fight,'' Foreign Affairs,
November/December 2022 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-
dangerous-decline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For starters, the Kremlin will almost certainly intensify its
disinformation campaigns. Russia has seen just how effective such
campaigns can be: disinformation and propaganda have contributed to
decisions by leaders in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to
remain neutral or circumspect in the aftermath of Moscow's invasion of
Ukraine. By accusing Ukraine of carrying out atrocities that Russian
soldiers have committed in the war, framing Western sanctions instead
of Russia's invasion as responsible for high food and energy prices,
and convincing many that it is fighting a defensive war against an
expanding NATO, Russia has diluted criticism of its military
aggression.
Cyberattacks are likely to be an ever more important and disruptive
tool. And, most ominously, the more damage the Russian military incurs
in Ukraine, the more likely it is to rely on the prospect of nuclear
escalation to offset NATO's conventional superiority in Europe. The
Russian military appears genuinely more comfortable with the notion of
limited nuclear use relative to its Western counterparts. To be sure,
the use of nuclear weapons is a political decision, but the
preponderance of evidence suggests that Russia's political leadership
might well consider limited nuclear use if faced with the kind of
defeat that could threaten the regime or the state. A future crisis or
conflict with NATO would leave Moscow with few conventional options
before it decided to threaten or potentially use nuclear weapons,
shortening the pathway to nuclear war.
The growing import of nonstrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons to
Russia's military means that the country is less likely than ever to
agree to negotiated limits on its nuclear arsenal. Russia's decision to
suspend its participation in New START underscores this dynamic. This
is particularly problematic given that Russia has a more diversified
nuclear arsenal than the United States does, with different types of
nonstrategic weapons, and doctrinally appears to be more willing to use
those weapons in a conflict. The current hostility in the U.S. Congress
toward Russia and Moscow's record of violating the treaties it signs
also lower the odds that the United States and Russia will agree to a
replacement for the New START treaty once it expires in 2026. In the
absence of an agreement, Russia's ability to produce strategic nuclear
weapons and deploy new systems would be unchecked, and the United
States would lose important insights into Russia's strategic nuclear
arsenal. Notably, China is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal. As a
result, the United States will find itself dealing with two
unconstrained nuclear powers, both focused on the United States as the
primary threat.
iii. recommendations for u.s. policy toward russia
The Best Path to a Better Relationship With Russia Runs Through Ukraine
The United States has very limited ability to directly shape the
trajectory of U.S.-Russia relations. The single most important way to
shape the future trajectory of the relationship is by enabling Ukraine
to defeat Russia. A Russia that makes significant territorial gains in
Ukraine is likely to be emboldened--a persistent if not growing threat
to Europe and the United States. Such a Russia would not only pose
direct threats to the United States and its allies, but its sustained
aggression would distract the transatlantic partners from tackling
other, pressing global challenges.
A military defeat of Russia, in contrast, raises the prospect of
more meaningful political change in Russia. Given the hardened
environment Putin now operates in, significant political change is
unlikely to occur absent a seismic shift. A Ukrainian victory in the
war could provide a catalyst for change. Translating a Russian defeat
into political change is far from guaranteed; the personalist nature of
Putin's regime creates particularly strong headwinds to change.
Research shows that because personalist dictatorships have few
institutional mechanisms to facilitate coordination and their elite
view their fates as being tied to that of the leader, personalist
leaders are the most able to withstand military losses.
Yet even personalist authoritarians are not immune to the aftermath
of a poor military performance. Research by Chiozza and Goemans shows
that of those leaders who were ousted as a result of a war, all had
experienced a military defeat. In fact, approximately half of all
leaders who lose a war also lose power. \11\ As with other seismic
events--like economic or natural disasters--military defeats can expose
leaders as incompetent, making visible cracks in the autocrat's shield
that shatter their aura of invincibility. Such shocks also create a
focal point for mobilization, facilitating the collective action that
is necessary to dislodge entrenched regimes. A Ukrainian victory, then,
raises the prospects for more meaningful political change in Russia,
and critically, could provide future Russian elites and the Russian
public with a valuable lesson about the limits of military power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Chiozza and Goemans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most immediately, the U.S. Congress must continue to provide the
military aid and assistance that Ukraine needs to defeat Russia. In
addition to sustaining military and economic assistance, Congress could
adopt legislation that lays out a long-term schedule for delivering
weapons to Ukraine. Such a clear, extended plan could make Moscow more
pessimistic about the future of its campaign. Money and resources are
far more likely than words to shape Putin's calculus about his wartime
prospects.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress can contribute to securing a Ukrainian
victory by making clear that Kyiv has a guaranteed place in the West.
The U.S. Congress should fully endorse Ukraine's war aims and lead the
charge in building support for Ukraine's NATO membership, including for
immediate steps that would deepen Ukraine's integration into NATO.
Constrict and Constrain the Kremlin
Also critical to enabling Ukraine to defeat Russia is increasing
and strengthening the sanctions against Russia. Such efforts are
necessary both to alter Putin's calculus about his ability to sustain
the war and to prevent the Kremlin from waging future aggression beyond
its borders. Degrading Russian power requires Washington to build on
the policies it set in motion following Putin's invasion of Ukraine. In
particular, there are several actions the U.S. Congress could take.
First, given the importance of Russia's energy sector, Congress should
advocate for lowering the oil price cap down from its current price of
$60/bbl. Second, Congress could continue to expand existing sanctions.
For, example, Congress could place sanctions on Rosatam, including a
ban on Russian uranium, as well as personal sanctions on the management
of Rosatom and Rosatom officials active in Ukraine. Third, U.S.
Congress must invest in the enforcement of existing sanctions and
export controls. Already there is evidence that Russia is working to
circumvent them. In particular, Congress should increase resources
available to build enforcement capacity in key partner countries.
Likewise, the creation of a unified database with all sanctioned
entities and institutions, including related parties (such as
subsidiaries and family members) could significantly strengthen export
controls and their enforcement. Although these may not be short-term
fixes, such actions are important in tightening existing measures in
the longer-term.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions,
``Working Group Paper #11: Strengthening Sanctions Against the Russian
Federation,'' April 24, 2023 https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-
1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-04/russia_sanctions_working
_paper_11_action_plan_2.0_v2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthen Deterrence in Europe
Russia is not in a position to start another war today, and
certainly not with NATO. But this does not mean Western policymakers
can be complacent. It may take Russia the better part of a decade to
recapitalize its conventional forces in the aftermath of its attack on
Ukraine, but NATO has its own recapitalization woes. European arsenals
are being depleted. The United States, in cooperation with its NATO
allies, must address shortcomings in the defense industrial base to
ensure sustained supply to Ukraine over the long-term, and to ensure
preparedness for future conflicts. Moreover, this war has demonstrated
just how dependent Europe is on the United States for its security.
Although it is tempting to argue that the United States should offload
responsibility for deterring Russia to Europe given rising tensions
with China, that is an unrealistic and dangerous proposition. It will
take Europe decades to be ready. The United States, therefore, must
remain committed to strengthening NATO, while working with its NATO
allies to strengthen the European pillar within NATO over time.
Grow the Coalition of Countries Confronting Russia
The unity and coordination between the United States and its allies
in the wake of Putin's invasion has been extraordinary, but Russia is
far from isolated internationally. Putin has doubled down on the
information domain, effectively framing NATO and the West as
responsible for the war; his narratives continue to resonate with many
in the Global South. Only 34 countries have imposed sanctions on Russia
since the war started. Russia continues to build ties in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. China, India, and other states in
the Global South have abstained on votes in favor of Ukraine at the
United Nations. Trade between Russia and these countries has increased.
Eighty-seven countries still offer Russian citizens visa-free entry,
including Argentina, Egypt, Israel, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and
Venezuela.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, ``The Kremlin's Grand Delusions:
What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Putin's Regime,'' Foreign
Affairs, February 15, 2023 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/
kremlins-grand-delusions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To build the coalition of countries needed to effectively confront
Russia and minimize Russia's negative influence in the Global South,
the U.S. Congress should continue to fund the U.S. Agency for Global
Media (USAGM). Importantly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also
created opportunities that the United States and its allies can
exploit. Russia, for example, will struggle to sustain arms sales--a
historically important link that the Kremlin uses to tether countries
to Moscow--given the degradation and poor showing of its military. The
Unites States should look for opportunities to step in to replace those
relationships, undermining needed revenue for the Kremlin and Russian
influence more broadly. Likewise, some countries, particularly in
Central Asia, that have close historical relationships with Russia have
grown more skeptical of the Kremlin in the aftermath of its invasion of
Ukraine. The U.S. Congress can send delegations to key countries to
signal U.S. commitment. Such visits can help encourage these countries
to better enforce sanctions on Russia, and over time, erode Russian
influence.
Plan for and Mitigate the Impact of Deepening Russia-China Relations
Russia's war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of
Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia's invasion, China has remained an
essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what
Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital
lifeline for the Kremlin, including by parroting Russian talking points
about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and
continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow
that have been cut off by the West. If anything, the war in Ukraine and
growing tensions between the United States and China have amplified the
geopolitical factors pushing the two countries together. The impact is
significant. Not only is Beijing diluting Western pressure on Russia,
but the more dependent Moscow becomes on Beijing, the more likely the
Kremlin will be to toe China's line, amplifying the threat that China
poses to the United States. This is especially true in the defense
domain, where Russia may provide China with increasingly sophisticated
capabilities, including submarine quieting and other technologies that
make China a more formidable threat.
The U.S. Congress should think through now potential responses to
China's providing lethal aid to Moscow. Likewise, the United States and
its allies should prioritize intelligence collection on Russian and
Chinese efforts to circumvent sanctions and export controls. Enhanced
intelligence monitoring will also be required as more of their defense
cooperation takes place out of the public eye. In addition, Washington
should continue to work with Europe to build a common picture of the
challenge that greater Russia-China coordination would pose and further
encourage European leaders to articulate to China the potential costs
of providing direct support for Russia's war effort. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See, ``Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nick Lokker, ``Russia-China
Relations Deepening Military Cooperation and Its Implications: A CNAS
Working Paper,'' https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/russia-
china-relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weaken Autocracy's Grip
The United States should continue to pursue steps to improve the
prospects of better relations with a future Russia. In particular, the
United States can pursue measures now that can weaken autocracy's grip
in the long run. Corruption, in particular, has been the lifeblood of
Putin's regime. Longtime personalist regimes like Russia are the most
corrupt type of authoritarian regime. Corrupt and illicit networks
entrench regime interests and create high barriers to individuals
outside the regime seeking to gain influence within the system. In this
way, corruption facilitates the persistence of authoritarianism after a
longtime leader's departure. Doubling down on anti-corruption--
including by effectively enforcing sanctions on corrupt oligarchs and
tracking down their assets, stepping up efforts to fight money
laundering, reforming campaign finance, enhancing transparency of the
financial and real estate markets, and increasing funding for
investigative journalism--can weaken the structural support for
authoritarianism in Russia and thereby create opportunities for
political change in a post-Putin era.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, ``After Putin: Lessons from
Autocratic Leadership Transitions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to prioritizing anti-corruption efforts, the United
States and its allies should step up support for Russian civil
society--a key ingredient needed to sustain a more liberal and
democratic Russia. Critically, Western actions can help Russian civil
society actors to sustain their work in the face of the Kremlin's
crackdown. In particular, large numbers of the opposition, journalists,
and other Russian civil society actors have been forced to leave the
country, creating new opportunities to support their work from outside
Russia. Much can be done, for example, to support journalists that now
operate outside Russia, including through visa support, fellowships,
increased funding, and legal assistance. Such efforts are needed now
more than ever and would make for a valuable investment in a better
relationship with a future, post-Putin Russia.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya, ``Supporting
Russian Civil Society,'' Center for a New American Security, December
1, 2022 https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/supporting-russian-
civil-society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Invading Ukraine was a massive miscalculation that will leave
Russia militarily, economically, and geopolitically weaker. But it is
up to the United States and its allies to demonstrate that we are up to
the task of capitalizing on that mistake. It is these personalist
autocrats--Putin and increasingly Xi Jinping--that are the most prone
to miscalculation because they surround themselves with yes men.
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been an especially horrific
miscalculation, but it is critical that the United States and its
allies make the most of it. Getting Russia policy right--getting the
competition with the world's autocracies right--starts with getting
Ukraine right. \17\
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\17\ This testimony reflects the personal views of the author
alone. As a research and policy institution committed to the highest
standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, the
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) maintains strict intellectual
independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas,
projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS
does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content
of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In
keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying
activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and
local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or
advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that
the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will
be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related
activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly
acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will
start a series of 5-minute rounds of questioning.
Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
Biden administration has corralled the EU, the U.K., Japan, and
other allies into a sanction regime that is really
unprecedented in scope.
While I give them a lot of credit, we have been leveraging
sanctions on Russia for years, but it is clear that existing
sanctions and export controls are not crushing the Russian
economy in a way that will force it to stop waging war in
Ukraine.
For both of you, aside from cracking down on sanctions
evasion by China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and other countries, what
other pressure can or should we bring against Russia to
reinforce and expand upon the impact of existing sanctions?
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Okay. Well, as you said, I mean, this
is an unprecedented sanctions regime that we have put in place
and I think the theory behind the case is that the longer that
the sanctions remain in place the more effective they will
become, and I do think that we have begun to see evidence that
that is the case.
Certainly in specific industries--the airline industry, the
car industry--the impact of sanctions are slowly being felt.
The sanctions on export--I am sorry, microchips and other
things are slowing down Russia's defense industrial production.
Over time, the sanctions, hopefully, will have greater
effect, but there--as you indicate, there is multiple and
additional steps that the United States could take to
strengthen that regime.
I think, first and foremost, is in the energy realm and I
think that Congress could advocate for lowering the price cap
down from its current price of $60 per barrel. That would be
one area where Congress, I think, could advocate more vocally
so that Russia continues to be squeezed particularly in the
energy domain, which continues to be a key lifeline for its
ability to sustain its war abroad. Advocating to bring that
price cap down is one.
I think there is also additional sectors that still have
yet to be sanctioned, for example, companies like Rosatom,
including a ban on Russian uranium. There are still other key
sectors of the Russian economy that have not been targeted by
sanctions and where additional sanctions could have a further
impact on Russia's economic viability.
Then, I think the most important thing, which you already
referenced, is really about sanctions enforcement. This
continues to be a major problem. There is already evidence that
Russia is working very hard to evade the sanctions that are in
place.
For Congress to be able to build the enforcement capacity,
not just in the United States, but also, critically, in the
European Union, I think a lot of our allies do not have the
same enforcement capacity as we have in the United States.
Having U.S. Congress be able to fund those efforts to
enhance the capacity of our allies and partners will help us
tighten the screws, and there is other things that the U.S.,
not necessarily for Congress, could do, but creating a unified
database with all sanctions, entities, and institutions.
I think, again, going after energy there is more that we
can do there, targeting additional sectors that have not yet
been impacted and really thinking very hard about the
enforcement piece, I think, is the way forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Sullivan.
Ambassador Sullivan. I think Dr. Kendall Taylor has really
hit the key points. I would emphasize energy, as well. One
thing to keep in mind, and this--I base this statement on a
comment that Putin himself made.
He was asked by a Russian nationalist, why did we not do
the special military operation earlier? Why did you wait so
long? We knew this Nazi regime existed in Kyiv. Why did we
wait?
Putin said, we were not ready. It was not that we were not
ready militarily. It was we were not ready to protect our
economy.
He has been working on this for a long time. He spent more
time worrying about how he was going to protect his economy
than he did, frankly, planning the military aspects of his
special military operation, which have failed miserably.
I thought that was a telling answer by him. They have been
working on this for a long time. We had to--we basically
started from a standing start. We had sectoral sanctions in
place after Crimea, after the Donbas, sure, but nothing like we
are doing now.
Putin did not expect this, but he was planning for it and
he has had time to work with his friends, his partners, his
dear friend in Beijing, the new government in Brazil, the South
Africans, the BRICS, in particular, China, India, Brazil have
really been a lifeline for him.
The Chairman. Which I am glad you said that because while
we have been focused on Ukraine, the truth is that the United
States and Russia are actively competing for alliances,
economic and security partners, all over the world.
Russia has been cultivating relationships with huge
countries across Africa like, notably, South Africa and others
in the Sahel, as well as with dictators in our own hemisphere.
What tools, engagement, and outreach should we be thinking
about to best posture the United States in this existential
competition with Russia for partnerships across the globe?
Ambassador Sullivan. Senator Kaine and I some months ago
had a conversation somewhat related to this and I think I would
summarize it as three ``Ds'': diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy.
We need to be engaged and not badgering countries to say
you need to support us on Ukraine. We need to do a better job--
I had a conversation with Sir John Scarlett, the former head of
MI6--we do need to do a better job of explaining the brutality
of Russia's war in Ukraine and this is a war waged, as I said
in my opening statement, by a permanent member of the Security
Council.
For a country like Brazil, a country like India, Russia's
presence in the Security Council renders that a null body for
purposes of dealing with a problem like this, but it is
diplomacy.
The fact that the Security Council is now hamstrung means
that it is more important for my former colleagues at the
Department and across the U.S. Government and our embassies to
be reaching out and establishing better relationships in
Pretoria, in Delhi, et cetera, and I think the Biden
administration is working on this.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree the diplomacy piece is key and
I think one--the only thing I would add to that is I think a
lot of the countries in the so-called Global South do not want
to be forced to pick sides.
I think there is many countries who do not buy into this
kind of democracy versus authoritarianism. They do not want to
be dragged into the U.S. confrontation with China. Working on
discrete issues where the interests align is key to, I think,
that effective diplomacy.
The paying attention piece is really critical. As Senator
Risch was saying, there are opportunities to exploit here in
terms of going on the offensive and taking the fight to Russia.
In regions like Central Asia, for example, many of these
countries, particularly in Russia's kind of periphery, are
extremely skeptical and wary of relations with Russia for the
first time in a very long time. If we pay attention--the U.S.
State Department, I believe, sent a delegation--a critically
timed delegation to also work with those countries to help the
enforcement of sanctions.
Diplomacy and paying attention and picking up on the vacuum
that Moscow is leaving behind in many places is key. Arms sales
is another key opportunity with the Global South, the Middle
East. Russia will have fewer arms to sell, going forward, as
they have to choose to send arms into Ukraine or to sell them
for export.
Those relationships that Russia has with India, many
countries in the Middle East, are relationships that Russia
uses to tether those countries to Moscow. This is an opportune
time for the United States to consider whether we can step in
or have allies step in to break those relationships.
Then, as you mentioned, I think, in the opening statements,
the information domain is also critical and so continued
funding for the U.S. Agency of Global Media and other efforts
that help the United States to continue to engage in these
media environments are all critical, I think, for competing
with those countries.
The Chairman. Thank you.
You both hit on a key that we are trying to work through in
the China bill, which is how do we beef up our diplomatic
abilities across the globe. China has more embassies, more
personnel, across the globe than we do.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. Let me pick up from where
the chairman left off here and that is the diplomatic aspect of
this.
I think probably anybody that operates in this lane on
diplomacy cannot be more disgusted with the U.N. than it is
right now. I mean, what good is this institution where you have
a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council violating the
basic precept and the reason that the U.N. exists and that was
for security for nations, for their sovereignty, and for their
borders?
I mean, it is just--I went round and round with the
Secretary General on this. We send billions there and what do
we get? Speeches, nothing more, and they cannot even--not only
can they not stop this, which they should, they cannot even
pass a resolution condemning it because of the way the U.N. is
set up.
I am disgusted there, but that just means that we have got
to pay more attention on a bilateral basis with our diplomacy.
That brings me to an interesting point that you made, Ms.
Taylor, and that is I have been visited and I suspect other
members of the Senate have been visited by countries that are
former countries in the orbit and the Stans, obviously, is
primarily what I am talking about, and I was amazed at their
lack of support for what Russia is doing. They came to tell me,
hey, we got nothing to do with this. I had not seen them. I
have not talked to them in years, but they voluntarily showed
up and said, look, we want you, the United States, to know we
got nothing to do with this. I was amazed that Putin called on
them to step up and send people and supplies and weapons and
everything else and they have not done it.
I think there is a real opportunity there and I think that
we really ought to exploit it, and I think it underscores the
disgust that the world has with what Russia is doing there.
One of the other things that always strikes me is how--and
I guess I should not because it is an autocracy where people
cannot speak out, but it always amazes me how the Russian
people come to the defense of this.
I do not know how you can watch what has happened in
Ukraine, the atrocities that have been committed there on a par
with the kinds of things that happened in World War II and say,
well, this is all right because they wanted to join NATO or
something like that.
What is your view on--is there any--both of you are experts
in the area. What is it like at home in Russia?
You lived there, Ambassador Sullivan. You lived there. What
do you hear from the people there when they whisper in your
ear?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator Risch. I
think there are several things going on.
First, the media environment in Russia is merely state
propaganda. It is what the Russian people hear 24/7. They have
to really seek out other sources of information if they do not
just want to hear the Kremlin's propaganda and many of them
they have got other things to do with their lives. They are
just steeped in it all day long.
Second, this is a country dating back to Soviet days where
people just did what they needed to do to survive. They kept
their heads down. They shut up. They did not make a scene, and
that is what most Russians, I believe many Russians, are doing
now.
There are some who have fled. There are some who tried to
protest. They have been sent to labor camps, but the vast--but
there is a large segment of the population who, as they did in
Soviet days, sort of keep their head down and try not to
attract attention.
There comes a point, however, where the effects in Russia
of the special military operation will become so grave, in my
opinion, whether it is because of casualties or the continuing
effect on the economy, where there will--as Dr. Kendall-Taylor
said, there will be that bubbling up from below.
It is a country that has been, dating back again to Soviet
days, they have dealt with this. The Russian people--the
Russian Federation, part of the Soviet Union, they have dealt
with these types of situations before in ways that Americans
cannot imagine.
Senator Risch. Even the younger generation?
Ambassador Sullivan. The younger generation is--born since
the Cold War ended, many of them are nationalists. They hear
the World War II propaganda that Putin spews that this is what
our grandparents did in defeating the Nazis. They want to rally
around their country. There are a lot of young Russian
nationalists who are buying into this, I am afraid.
Senator Risch. I guess my time is up. Dr. Taylor, why do
you not give us----
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes. Just to echo. I agree that there--
I think there is quite a lot of broad support and, certainly,
Putin's public approval ratings have gone up since the
invasion. Obviously, it is very difficult to understand engaged
citizens' true preferences for the reasons that the ambassador
was talking about.
I think one thing we have to keep an eye on is I talked
about Putin mobilizing Russian society. For years the apathy,
the passivity, has been Putin's playbook, but what we are
seeing is since he had to mobilize Russians and draw Russians
into the war, there is much more active support. No longer can
people be as passive as the ambassador is saying. That has been
a real change. There is more citizens reporting on other
citizens, the heartbreaking story of a father who was arrested
because a little girl drew an anti-war picture. There is a lot
of kind of citizens reporting on others.
Russia is moving from a demobilized society to a mobilized
society and I think we will have to keep an eye on that for
what kind of implications that produces for the future.
The one extra point I will very quickly make is there are
many, many, many, hundreds of thousands--something like 300,000
Russians have fled in the aftermath of the war.
That provides an opportunity for the United States and I
think that is another area where the U.S. Congress can do more
to enable those Russians who have left. Not all--some of them
were dodging having to fight in the war, but there is a hearty
number of civil society actors who have now left Russia.
Having U.S. Congress take actions and steps and provide
resources that enable those Russians to continue their work
from outside of Russia is very important. We could fund
research on understanding what that community looks like. We
can increase funding to support those who are outside, creating
a title program for human rights defenders and journalists.
Those are opportunities. Again, trying to find the
opportunities that come out of this war in this huge population
of Russians that are now outside the country, I do think
represents an opportunity that we could tap into.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you both for being here.
There is a question of whether Ukraine can ultimately carry
the cost of this war for as long as is necessary and then there
is this corresponding question of whether Russia can carry the
cost of this war for as long as necessary, and it seems to me
that we appropriately are engaged in public policy, trying to
impact both sides of that coin, getting Ukraine everything it
needs and trying to winnow the pathways through which Russia
gets what it needs.
You responded to a question from Senator Menendez about our
sanctions regime, but there is also a set of bilateral
relationships the United States has with countries that are
still actively engaged with Russia, helping them either to
manage or evade those sanctions regimes, and so there is two
things at play here.
One, we can talk about expanding our sanctions, but two, we
can just talk about elevating this question of Russia lifelines
with our friends. This is one of a myriad of articles you can
find on this question.
This is from the Center for European Policy Analysis, an
article entitled ``UAE throws lifeline to beleaguered Russian
tech sector.'' You could find similar stories about Turkey,
India, countries in Central Asia, and it strikes me that this
is a missed opportunity, maybe most particularly in the Gulf,
where they are making individual decisions to support Russia
sanctions evasion, but they are also helping to prop up the
cost of oil in a way that allows Putin to power forward.
Just a word on how you view our bilateral relationships
with countries that are still helping Russia fund this war and
why it is--I hope you believe it is important to elevate this
as a priority in those bilateral relationships.
I put this to you, Ms. Taylor.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes. I think the sanctions evasion is a
big piece, but I think the important thing to think about with
all of these different countries is that they all have very
disparate interests.
They are continuing to support Russia often for very
different reasons--India, because they have this long military
sales relationship, some for historical reasons, some because
they do not want to be drug into the U.S.-China confrontation.
As you noted, I think working it through bilateral channels
is a critical way to go. India, for example, this is an
excellent opportunity to step in--the United States, France,
some of our allies--to try to wean India away from its defense
sales. It is not going to happen overnight, but it is an
important opportunity that we can exploit and take advantage
of.
I guess the bottom line is we have been talking about the
role of diplomacy, kind of arms sales, working it through the
sanctions channels. There is all--a number of different
components and opportunities and pathways that the United
States could pursue in these bilateral relationships.
I agree, one of the goals of our policy should be to grow
the coalition of countries that oppose Russia. That will be
needed, especially if we are talking about this as a protracted
conflict.
That should be one of the explicit priorities of U.S.
policy on Russia is to grow the number of countries and
figuring out those issues where our interests overlying their
specific relationships with Russia and how we can exploit them,
I think, should be a central focus.
Senator Murphy. Anything on this question, Mr. Sullivan?
Ambassador Sullivan. Yes. I agree, first of all, with you,
Senator, and with Dr. Kendall-Taylor. It is labor intensive. We
need to push the message out to all our posts worldwide.
All of those countries--I am focused on the 141 that voted
for the resolution in the General Assembly. More than half of
them have done nothing to implement that resolution. In fact,
many of them keep trading with Russia.
We have got the almost 40 that abstained. We need to be
using all the tools and they--it may vary from country to
country--Egypt, for example, making sure the Egyptians do not
sell military equipment to the Russians and do sell equipment
to the Ukrainians. It is labor intensive. It needs to be
tailored to the particular countries.
Senator Murphy. This comes back to Senator Menendez's
original point. It is labor intensive, which means we need
resources, which means we cannot continue to ask the State
Department to fight Russia with one hand tied behind its back
because there are so many things that our allies, our partners,
could be doing that they are not today and our under investment
in the tools of winning friends, in particular around fighting
misinformation and propaganda, makes the job of our diplomats
pretty difficult, which is another reason why we should be
plussing up those resources so that we can win more of these
fights.
Listen, I think the Administration has done a great job of
rallying our closest friends, but I do think we have to shed
light on the fact that that sort of next set of friends in the
next concentric circle is kind of playing China off against
Russia, telling us they will work with us on China policy, but
they are not with us on Russia policy.
We have to elevate this dialogue on Russian sanctions
evasions with some of our important allies not in Europe. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our guests for being here.
Ambassador Sullivan, I thought it was interesting you said
that Vladimir Putin believes he is at war with the United
States and, certainly, that is the way he is behaving when you
think about what he has done with regard to our nuclear
treaties.
For example, the 1987 INF treaty eliminated a range of
nuclear weapons and because he was fielding so many illegal
weapons, it forced us to withdraw from that treaty--forced the
U.S. to withdraw from that treaty in 2019.
You think about Open Skies that allowed us and Russia to
over-fly countries with reconnaissance planes in 32 other
countries. His noncompliance there forced us to withdraw from
that in 2020.
Now you have got the New START treaty and this is one where
the Biden administration reupped it for 5 years just as it was
set to expire in 2021, but Russia has said they are not
participating anymore with regard to that and this makes sense.
If Putin again believes he is at war with us, why would he
maintain any of these agreements?
The Biden administration has made the decision to
unconditionally extend the New START treaty. Should we continue
to be a part of this? What is your thought with regard to what
do we do with the New START treaty?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator. I was
actually in Moscow and was the person who had to negotiate with
the Russians on what should have been a fairly easy extension.
Once President Biden had decided at the start of his term
in January of 2021 to extend by 5 years the treaty, which is
what the Russians wanted, it was--actually wound up being much
more complicated than that and required some pretty intensive
diplomacy with the Russians to actually get it done because
nothing is easy with the Russians.
We extend the treaty. It has now been extended. It cannot
be extended beyond that. What the Russians have done, what
Putin has done, is to the extent that the Russian Government
already before his speech earlier this year, where he announced
the suspension of Russia's compliance or participation in the
treaty Putin announced it.
The Administration, as I understand it, and in fact, I
think the Administration just released yesterday the numbers
for our strategic nuclear weapons as we do under--should do
under the New START Treaty, but the Russians will not. I think
that is important.
I think maintaining our transparency, our continuing
commitment to maintaining control over nuclear weapons when he
is playing games, and I say games because I do not think he
wants a nuclear war with the United States, but he does want to
use nuclear blackmail and use one of the few things he has
left, which is his nuclear weapons, to try to leverage that.
Senator Ricketts. Secretary Blinken has said we are going
to maintain the restrictions of the New START Treaty. What I
hear you saying is that you think we should continue to live to
those restrictions in the New START treaty?
Ambassador Sullivan. The Russians have said they will, as
well. What they have done, as I understand it, is there are
inspections that are required under the treaty. The Russians
will not allow us to inspect their facilities and we are not
going to let the Russians in if they will not let us in.
They have suspended inspections. They have suspended
meetings of what is called a bilateral consultative
commission--U.S. experts, Russian experts--to discuss issues
under the treaty, but after Putin made that speech, the foreign
ministry clarified and said they would continue to adhere to
the numerical limitations under the treaty.
Senator Ricketts. Given he cheated on the INF treaty and
everything else, how can we possibly trust anything that they
would say that they are going to live up to, the restrictions
in the----
Ambassador Sullivan. That was my point in my opening
statement. Trust, but verify--there is no trust. What we need
are and we do have--and Dr. Kendall-Taylor will know more about
this than I--technical means to try to verify Russian
compliance.
What we are missing are the inspections that we are
entitled to under the treaty. That is what Putin is denying us.
I agree with you. It is a risk. We are not letting the Russians
in. All that the United States is doing now is stating what--we
are complying with the numerical limits under the treaty. Those
are the numbers that the Administration released yesterday. It
was a one-page document. We are not, because the Russians are,
having Russians in to inspect our facilities.
Senator Ricketts. What should be our strategy when it comes
to our nuclear strategic force?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, first, we need to upgrade to
make sure that we are not--we are not heading down a path,
which I believe we were some years ago, to--in the hopes that
there were going to be fewer and fewer nuclear weapons.
Senator Ricketts. The efforts right now that the military
is taking to upgrade is really important----
Ambassador Sullivan. I think that is--my opinion--I
participated in the last Administration as deputy secretary in
the Nuclear Posture Review. I think that is important now more
than ever to maintain U.S. deterrence with an aggressive Russia
and more so a rising China, including in its nuclear weapons
program.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Senator Shaheen has kindly allowed me to
swap places with her in the order and then she will take the
helm until Senator Menendez returns.
I want to thank you for the testimony. It has been very
helpful. Dr. Kendall-Taylor, I just want to underline a point
you made. I think that the 300,000 mostly young Russians who
have departed the country, some to avoid war, but some out of
protest over the war, is a valuable resource for us both in
terms of understanding more deeply what the internal dynamic
is, but also potentially to help organize pressure because they
want to continue to see improvements in their home country. I
really appreciate that suggestion.
How big a deal is it that Finland is in NATO, and Sweden it
is just a matter of time that they are going to be in NATO,
both in terms of the military capacity of NATO, but also just
sort of in the psychology of this, these two nations where
polling for NATO accession would have been under 30 percent for
decades, even up to 3 or 4 years ago, are now realizing they
want to be part of NATO. How big a deal is that?
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. What we have seen so far is, obviously,
Putin has very much tried to play down Finland's entry and
Sweden's eventual entry in large part because the Russian
military is so focused and overwhelmed with what is happening
in Ukraine and, in fact, what we have seen is many of Russian
forces that are stationed in the west of the country have been
redeployed to the east. He has very much had to play it down.
I think that we should expect that over time that there
will be more of a military response to Finland and Sweden's
entry into NATO. I think most immediately we are looking at
hybrid tactics that Russia will try, like incursions into
airspace, GPS jamming, all of those types of things just to
express its displeasure.
Over time, I think Russia will see a threat. When you think
about now the kind of security architecture of the region has
been fundamentally altered. The Baltic Sea is now basically
ringed by NATO members with the exception of Kaliningrad.
The other key change for Russia as I talked about is as its
conventional forces are being degraded, Russia is going to
place more importance and rely more heavily on its nuclear
weapons. The Kola Peninsula in the Arctic is critical from that
perspective.
There are these changes in the security architecture that
Russia will see not just around the Black Sea, but more
frequent and more sophisticated NATO exercises in the area,
closer integration of intelligence, the very capable
intelligence collection assets that Finland and Sweden have.
Russia will be looking at an altered threat picture and we
should expect that over time they will take increasingly more
aggressive steps up into that Arctic region.
The United States and particularly NATO are going to need
to be prepared. In the near term, Russia's military is
degraded. We should expect more of the hybrid threats.
I do think over the long term that is a significant change
that Russia will react and respond to. They are also likely to
view the Arctic as a region where they can remind the world
that they are a great power so more kind of provocative actions
that they could take in the region.
The last thing I would highlight, too, is the Russia-China
dynamic in the Arctic. As Russia is becoming increasingly
dependent on China, they are going to have to toe the line on
Chinese interests. We know China wants to play a larger role in
the Arctic.
What might China or what might Russia be willing to concede
to China in the Arctic? That is a question we need to be
watching. Already Russia and China have signed a cooperation
agreement of their coast guards. That is the first.
It is really an interesting data point because historically
Russia has wanted to keep China out of the Arctic because it
feels it is its own sphere.
Senator Kaine. Let me segue on that----
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Yes, please.
Senator Kaine. --Ambassador Sullivan, on the Russia-China
relationship. I have been asking about this for years, the
increasing closeness of the countries, and multiple
administrations of both parties have tended to say you do not
need to worry about--the history of enmity between these
countries suggests that there will not be too much cooperation
between them.
I never really believed that to be the case. It seems like
they are growing closer and closer. There is a dominant partner
and a lesser partner, but they both seem pretty designed to
work closely together to battle the West or however they want
to put it.
Is that your sense, Ambassador Sullivan?
Ambassador Sullivan. Oh, absolutely, and I can quote
President Xi.
President Xi, when he is leaving Moscow after his meeting
with President Putin, as he is walking out the door he looks at
Putin and says, ``The changes that we are making in the world
are unlike any that have seen--the world has seen in a hundred
years. We are changing the system, you and I.'' Putin looked at
him and said, ``I agree.''
Absolutely this is a very troubling partnership, and to
follow up on Dr. Kendall-Taylor's point, the--China has always
tried to characterize itself as a near Arctic power and the
Russians have resisted that, quite rightly.
I think it is going to be more difficult for them to resist
that. I note, for example, that Russia yesterday threatened to
withdraw its--it was for the last 2 years, chair of the Arctic
Council--withdraw from the Arctic Council, and as I said, I
think the Russians really did not understand what I was saying
when I said it, if China is a near Arctic power then that gives
me some hope to pitch for the Red Sox. I can just describe
myself as a near starting pitcher for the Red Sox. Why not?
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Sullivan. Facts are facts, right? The China
partnership is vital for Putin, important, and something that
Xi will leverage, but vital for Putin.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Can I make one very quick point,
Senator, which is I think the--so it is important for Putin,
but it also amplifies the China challenge and this is what we
will have to watch as--again, as they are increasingly
dependent, especially in the military domain, Russia will be
sending increasingly sophisticated military systems, submarine
quieting, and other things that basically make the Chinese a
more capable military.
They are getting data from Ukraine. They do not have combat
experience. They are training. They are exercising. They are
accessing data to train their AI. Russia amplifies the China
challenge and makes it a more formidable adversary in the Indo-
Pacific.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Senator
Kaine, for presiding.
Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, as a Red Sox fan I can tell you I certainly
hope you do not get a pitching slot for the Red Sox.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. I actually thought they might do a little
better.
[Laughter.]
Senator Romney. Careful. Careful, Jeanne.
I do not want to oversimplify the--our successful strategy
relative to the former Soviet Union, but we out-competed them
militarily, economically, and they finally cried uncle.
Whether that was from internal pressure or just a collapse
of their competitiveness, I really cannot say, but most
successful strategies focus on a couple of things that are the
most effective and I do not know what those items might be.
I am just going to ask each of you to help me think about
what should we really focus on. There are so many things we
need to do as we confront a Russia that we cannot trust, a
Russia that is assertive, aggressive, and brutal.
Are there some things that we are really not getting right
yet, that we are not focused on sufficiently that really ought
to become the focus of our strategy?
I hear a number of us thinking about we need to restrict
their economy. It is a challenge when they have oil and gas and
coal and uranium in such abundance. They are always going to
have enough money and the Russian people put up with awful
things, in part, the alternative is going to a gulag.
Where is the pressure point? Where are the places we really
ought to be applying more effort if we are going to try and
change the course of Russian trajectory?
Ambassador, why do I not begin with you and then turn to
Dr. Kendall-Taylor?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I think Dr. Kendall-Taylor made
the point in her opening statement. The key is Ukraine. It is
interesting, Senator, that you mentioned the word competition.
Putin does not like competition. He lost the competition in
Ukraine. The Russians lost the competition in Eastern Europe.
The Eastern Europeans--when I hear the Russians talk about,
well, NATO is just moving west, what they do not acknowledge is
their own behavior.
The Russian behavior has pushed those Eastern European
countries to the West--excuse me, NATO moving east. The Eastern
European countries, they lost that competition. What has he
resorted to? War, the oldest--one of the oldest forms of
competition.
We can compete on ideas, economy, et cetera. He has chosen
the venue now to wage a war in Ukraine for his Russkiy mir, his
Russian empire. He cannot win that.
We can talk about weapon systems and how much financial
support the United States as opposed to our allies can provide.
If we do not defeat his imperial mission in Ukraine, then
the system that the United States and our allies and partners
and the whole world, including China, have benefited from over
the 75-plus years since the end of the Second World War that
will drive a final stake through it.
The U.N. Security Council is already--unlike in 1990, when
there was aggression by Iraq invading Kuwait, the Security
Council authorizes what became Operation Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.
That was a U.N. Security Council authorized voted by the
Soviet Union to expel militarily Iraq from Kuwait. That is not
going to happen again.
I think Putin has chosen the place where we are going to
compete and he has chosen war because he has lost every other
form of competition.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I will just foot stomp the Ukraine
piece and it is so important for everything the ambassador
said, but it is critical that Russia is defeated, that Ukraine
wins, because it will help Russians shed their imperial
ambitions and it teaches future Russian leaders important
lessons about the limits of military power and I think it is
critically important and we should not overstate it.
I think on that front what we are lacking--obviously, there
is more we can do in terms of ATACMS and longer-range weapons.
One thing I am also concerned about is I do not think the
Biden administration or Washington in general has a story about
what happens to our support after the counter offensive and I
think that shapes Putin's calculus.
It is what convinces him that time is on his side and that
the United States will tire. If there are things that the U.S.
Congress could do to demonstrate that we will have credible
deliveries of weapons out into the future, I think that shapes
Putin's calculus about our staying power.
If we could have something like that, I think it would be
critically important and having you all, the President, and the
Administration make a case to the American people about why
this matters. I am concerned that we see some public support
for Ukraine waning and that is what Putin is counting on.
Your question was bigger than that and I do not think that
there is any magic point of leverage that we have. This really
is a long-term confrontation.
It is almost like the kind of containment 2.0 on an updated
version and so it is about constricting and constraining
through sanctions, through export controls, by tightening those
regimes.
It is about strengthening deterrence in Europe. We have to
be able to credibly commit to enhance and maintain deterrence
in Europe. The Europeans, unfortunately, cannot.
This war has shown that Europe is not ready to defend
themselves and that the United States must remain committed for
the foreseeable future, although we can encourage them to build
the European pillar within NATO.
We have to grow the coalition of countries countering
Russia. We have to mitigate the Russia-China partnership and we
have to continue to work to weaken autocracy's grip.
There will be a post-Putin Russia. I am not optimistic
necessarily about what it looks like, but there could be an
opening that did not exist before. The civil society pieces,
supporting investigative journalism, all of those pieces, anti-
corruption. I mean, that is what--the lifeblood of Putin's
regime.
The more the U.S. Congress can do on our real estate
markets, on all of those types of things where we have seen so
much progress in the aftermath, it is just staying the course
and doing it for the long term because it is a long-term
confrontation.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr.--I was going to say Dr. Shaheen, but
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. That works. Thank you both for being here.
Ambassador Sullivan, I want to start with you because I
want to go back to the Arctic, and you mentioned the Arctic
Council. How important is it for us to get our ambassador to
the Arctic Council confirmed?
Ambassador Sullivan. The Arctic Council is important. I
went to the Arctic Council countries, the ambassadors of those
countries, in Moscow. We used to meet regularly.
Those are the bilateral ambassadors to Russia. We will we
would meet with Ambassador Korchunov, who was the Russian
ambassador. The Arctic Council is very important and it is why
the Russians are squealing the way they are now because every
other member of the Arctic Council is united against them and
has excluded them, so extremely important.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I would just say, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Risch, that I hope this committee will
move as quickly as we can on confirming that Arctic ambassador
or at least having a hearing so it can move forward.
I want to go--follow up a little bit on the--what will
Congress do after the war and also in terms of your statements,
Dr. Kendall-Taylor, about continuing to make the case about why
this war is important.
I could not agree more with both of you on that and it is
something that I try and do when I am in New Hampshire whenever
I have an opportunity.
One of the things I find particularly frustrating is the
continued questions that I get, and I am sure every member of
this committee gets, from reporters who keep saying, well, is
not support for the war deteriorating in Congress because we
have extremists at either end who are talking about why we
should stop funding this war.
I have two questions for you both, really. One is what does
that mean when we see those extremist voices and how does that
affect the public as a whole, and when reporters magnify those
voices, what does that do?
Secondly, to what extent are we seeing any Russian
disinformation or Chinese or other adversaries' disinformation
to try and promote those divisions within our society to try
and undermine the war effort?
I will open to whoever wants to go first.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I think your point on the media is also
critically important because they do tend to amplify and make
quite a lot out of statements and no one remembers then when a
statement gets walked back. They just remember the statement.
I do think that the media has done a lot to amplify the
divisions and to highlight very minority held views about
calling into question whether or not we should sustain support
for Ukraine.
I do--obviously--we all know that the American public does
take cues from the U.S. Congress and from the political elite
and so when they hear those types of statements, I absolutely
think it leads them to call into question.
That is why I think it is critically important for members
of Congress and for the President himself to continue to make
the case. I think it is unfortunate that the President has--
obviously, he has traveled to Ukraine and that is wonderful and
he has given important speeches in Warsaw and other places.
He has not addressed the American people. It was not part
of the State of the Union and other things. I think when you
hear--it is the critical voices that call into question that
are being amplified and we do not hear enough about the case
for the sustained support and there is an imbalance there.
On your question about disinformation, I am not aware and I
have not followed that closely enough to answer that question.
I am not certain, but it obviously seems like a ripe issue for
targets of Russian and Chinese disinformation.
Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Sullivan, do you have any
thoughts about----
Ambassador Sullivan. Just one quick thought. There is--I
think it was Senator Murphy who earlier in the hearing said
there is a burden that Ukraine needs to bear in waging this
war. It cannot do it on its own financially or militarily. The
Russians likewise need help.
What I think needs to be acknowledged is the vital
importance of Ukraine prevailing on its terms. Now, that
support should not all come from the United States.
We can discuss among us, among Americans and with our
allies and partners, burden sharing, whether a particular
weapon system is really something that would be used in the
context of this conflict.
What we cannot debate is the nature of the adversary and
why the fight is being waged in the first place. It has to be
waged, it has to be supported, and the world needs to come
together. Only part of the world has now. It cannot just be the
United States.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I have one final question
and that has to do with Belarus, and I know that this hearing
is about the U.S.-Russian relationship, but one of the--one of
the few countries that has stood by Russia during this invasion
has been Belarus.
Can you speak to the relationship between Lukashenko and
Putin and whether he is going to be able to continue to hold
the line when he says no military involvement? Is that what is
really going on or is there something else happening?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I was there--I was in Moscow in
August of 2020 when Lukashenko really lost the presidential
election and then crushed the demonstrators after the election
on August 9, arrested almost 40,000 people. A lot of violence.
Putin supported that.
Before then my recollection is that Secretary Pompeo
traveled to Minsk earlier in 2020 and met with Lukashenko, but
Lukashenko became really dependent on Putin. He might not have
survived in August of 2020 without that support. They already
have a union state, Belarus and Russia, the union state. He has
become--Lukashenko--much more dependent on Putin. I think he is
the world leader who has had more meetings with Putin. I think
he has had 14 since the special military operation began all in
Moscow. Putin does not go to Minsk. Lukashenko is dependent on
him and Putin has used Belarus as a platform to launch the
special military operation, particularly the drive south to
Kyiv.
Lukashenko had ideas about a slightly more independent
Minsk, but his--the reelection fiasco for him in August of 2020
has driven him closer into the arms of his union state partner,
Vladimir Putin, and he has resisted using Belarusian military
in part because I am not sure there are military experts much--
I am not a military expert, but I think the Belarusian security
services are more capable than the Belarusian military. I am
not sure they add that much to what the Russians have.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Ambassador Sullivan, good to see you again.
Dr. Taylor, good to see you, and thank you both for your years
of service to our country and your thoughtfulness.
Let me begin with the issue of burden sharing because you
just mentioned it, Ambassador. I think we would all agree that
there is now more enthusiasm than there was just a couple of
years ago among our European partners for the NATO alliance and
investment in that alliance in various ways.
I believe it is crucial that the U.S. continue to use
levers at its disposal to ensure that Europeans are as invested
in their own security as the U.S. is in maintaining stability
in Europe.
Ambassador Sullivan, what mechanisms are available to us to
ensure that all European members of NATO quickly meet in
sustained defense spending at no less than 2 percent and 20
percent thresholds agreed to in Wales nearly 10 years ago?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, thank you, Senator. Good to see
you again.
Well, that has been a vital question for years going back
to when I was deputy secretary and then-President Trump was
railing about the fact that European allies, big countries,
were not meeting the Wales commitment that had been made based
on what had happened in Ukraine, recall.
Since then, I think the shift since February 24, 2022, I
think we have seen countries like Germany have a pretty
dramatic shift. It is going to take a while for their systems
to turn.
Imagine our own system, right. Increasing defense--I mean,
these are important, difficult questions. We have got to keep
the pressure on, make the case for why it is important and the
threat that they face from the East.
Senator Young. That all makes sense with me and this is in
part about sustaining domestic support for resourcing the
Ukrainians, right. That is really what is most on my mind.
Is there a way, in your mind, that we can do a better job
of elevating those who are meeting their commitments and
ensuring that people understand that they are shining examples
of what other countries should aspire to?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well----
Senator Young. The carrot as opposed to the stick.
Ambassador Sullivan. Yes, the carrot. We cannot diminish,
of course, the guarantees of the treaty so we cannot say, well,
we might be slower coming to your rescue if you get invaded by
Russia.
Senator Young. Sure. Right.
Ambassador Sullivan. Without undermining that, I think for
those countries that need to be persuaded of the need to meet
the Wales commitment, given what has happened in the 15 months
since February 2022, that is a fair approach.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Could I add one quick point?
Senator Young. Oh, please, Doctor.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree about the 2 percent is a
critically important benchmark and I do hope at the Vilnius
comment that there will be a shift of the 2 percent as the
floor and not the ceiling.
Just as important as the how much is the how allies are
spending and I think that is another area where the United
States can continue to put pressure on allies and partners to
make sure that the spending is done appropriately and most
effectively.
Certainly, as we are thinking of a potential two-front war
conflict--tensions heat up with China--I think many of us are
concerned about what that would mean. What would the United
States need to take out of Europe if we did have a
confrontation with China?
Ensuring that our European allies and partners understand
what it is that we would take out--the logistics, the air-to-
air refueling, the ISR, those capabilities--that is where
allies really need to be investing so that we are prepared for
that kind of scenario. It is the how much, but it is also the
how.
Senator Young. Okay. I may follow up on that thoughtful
point to try and get a better sense of what NATO is actually
doing, what contingencies which are--might be publicly
available can you or others speak to so that I have a measure
of confidence that that conversation is happening.
If I could with some remaining time here just briefly touch
on New START.
Senator Van Hollen and I have been pretty outspoken about
the value of arms control between the U.S. and Russia over the
years, both for its own sake, but also for the message it sends
to other nuclear powers.
In February, as we know, we saw Vladimir Putin announce the
suspension of Russia's participation in New START, the last
arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia.
Despite Russia's noncompliance, the Administration has
continued to indicate that it will continue to uphold its end
of the treaty.
Ambassador Sullivan, if you could just briefly indicate how
you assess the effects of Russia's suspension of the treaty,
especially in the risk of misunderstanding leading to a nuclear
exchange.
Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you, Senator. My understanding
is that what Putin announced the Russian Government had
actually already previously announced. The foreign ministry had
said no more meetings of the bilateral consultative commission,
no inspections.
Putin announces the suspension of Russia under the New
START treaty. I understand, though, that the foreign ministry
clarified shortly thereafter and said that Russia would
continue to comply with the numerical limits in the treaty. It
is just that they have eliminated--by eliminating the
inspections, they have eliminated one of the means for us to
verify that they are complying with the treaty.
It is problematic. We are not allowing the Russians to do
inspections here if they are not allowing us to do them there.
We have also said we will comply with the numerical limits
under the treaty.
Senator Young. Is that the best we can do at this point or
do you have additional thoughts, either of you, about how we
should evaluate our own nuclear posture and missile defense
posture in Europe?
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. The only point I would add is a point
that I made earlier, which is the more degraded that Russia's
conventional forces become, the more they will rely on their
nuclear weapons, including their nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
The more vulnerable they feel, the more quickly they will
go to the nuclear and so it really shortens the pathway to
nuclear war.
I do think that we are entering kind of in a new--where the
threat of nuclear use is only rising and so not only do we need
to continue to think about what role arms control can play in
this, but I do think we have to think very hard about our
deterrent posture.
At NATO, do we need to bring back more of our nuclear
exercises? How do we convince the Russians that we will fight
through a nuclear war, for example?
I think that--so in addition to the arms control piece,
which I do continue to believe is critically important, I do
think that we have to be aware that we are headed towards a
future without arms control and we, along with allies and
partners, are going to have to think about how we get better at
deterrence.
Senator Young. Thank you both. Your presence here is so
valuable.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of
you for your testimony and your service and I thank Senator
Young for his work on the efforts on nuclear arms control.
Let me ask you both about the role of China here because
China has, clearly, been a malign actor. You have President Xi
saying our--that their friendship with China knows, ``no
boundaries, all in.'' Visiting Moscow, cozying up to Putin.
We have been very clear that if we see any additional signs
or signs that China is providing lethal aid to Ukraine, that we
will respond strongly, primarily in the form of sanctions and,
obviously, that will only be successful with our allies and
partners around the world.
I also noticed that Putin has said that he is considering
deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. There have been
some reports that President Xi and China have had a restraining
influence on Putin when it comes to the possible use or
threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Putin--excuse me--and
one of--and China's diplomats as we speak are visiting various
European capitals to sort of test different proposals that they
want to advance in terms of a settlement.
We have been very clear that any settlement has to be
proposed by Ukrainians and President Zelensky. My question to
you is we know all the bad things that China has done here. Is
there any positive role, in your view, that they could play if
they so chose and what would that be?
If I could start with you, Ambassador Sullivan.
Ambassador Sullivan. I think the visit by the Special
Representative to Europe is a key indication of how sensitive
they are to the EU market.
We have--I have thought for a long time and others have as
well that, obviously, Xi did not dissuade or try to dissuade
Putin from launching this special military operation when they
met before the Olympics in February of 2020 and I think from
China's perspective they get some benefit from the United
States focused on a conflict in Eastern Europe and not focused
on as much as we could be on East Asia.
The risk for Xi is in the EU and they are--that market is
extremely important for him. I believe we have seen a shift in
China under Xi from--I went with then-Treasury Secretary
Paulson on his last trip to China in December of 2008 and all
that our Chinese interlocutors wanted to talk about was the
economy and economic growth.
Now, and back then this was the strategic economic
dialogue. They were focused on growing their economy,
strengthening their economy. What we have seen with President
Xi is a shift where geopolitics and security are now taking the
lead.
The geopolitical rationale for supporting his dear friend,
the President of Russia, is now--but what--that is what he has
been pursuing, but what is nagging at him now is that
underlying need for economic growth and if they drive the
Europeans farther away from China because they are supporting
Putin in a war in Europe, that is not going to be popular with
the Europeans and that is not going to help them in that really
key market for them.
Senator Van Hollen. Dr. Taylor.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. I agree entirely. I think in many--
almost certainly the Europeans have more leverage than the
United States does in pressuring China to play a constructive
role in the conflict.
I think the problem is, as we talked about before, that Xi
and Putin have an incredibly deep relationship, that they see
themselves united in pushing back on the United States and U.S.
influence all across the globe.
In that sense, I do not think that Xi will play a
productive role in this conflict. I think Xi's interest is, A,
ensuring that Putin does not lose, and in a scenario where
Ukraine makes a very significant--makes significant progress in
its counter offensive is the scenario that I could imagine Xi
crossing America's red line and beginning to provide more
lethal assistance to prevent his best and closest ally, really,
from falling in Ukraine.
I do not see evidence currently and, for example, in
China's peace plan, I think in many ways is almost laughable,
calling for a ceasefire without any withdrawal of Russian
forces, which we all understand that Putin would just use to
rest, refit, retry.
Until we see a very significant change in the rhetoric
coming out of Beijing or in the proposals that they put
forward, I do not see them playing a constructive role in the
peace process.
Senator Van Hollen. It is primarily window dressing and
theater for European public to make----
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. They want to have their cake and eat
it, too.
Senator Van Hollen. That is my assessment as well. I
appreciate you both being here. A lot more questions, but I see
my time is out.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One last question for both of you. As we know, Russia is
increasingly using wrongful detention of U.S. citizens as a
foreign policy tool. As we speak, American citizens Paul Whelan
and Evan Gershkovich remain wrongfully detained.
I remain concerned about the welfare of Jimmy Wilgus, whose
parents are New Jersey constituents. At the same time, Russia's
most prominent opposition leaders, Alexei Navalny, Vladimir
Kara-Murza languish in Russian prisons on trumped up charges.
For both of you, if you have any insights, first, what can
we do if anything to limit Russia's use of wrongful detention
in this way, and second, what different approach could we be
taking to the continuing detentions of Navalny and Kara-Murza?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, I spend a lot of time thinking
about these issues, Mr. Chairman. I was there when Brittney
Griner was arrested. Visited Paul Whelan many times--Trevor
Reed.
It is a policy of the Russian Government, but it is--the
Russian Government under Putin uses every--every aspect of
Russian society is put to what the goals that President Putin
has for Russia--the Russian Orthodox Church, the national
airline, the court system, the judicial system.
Their courts look beautiful. Their courtrooms--it is a
beautiful building. It is a beautiful courtroom. It is a
Potemkin court. It is used by the Russian security services and
the Kremlin to achieve their policy ends. There is no justice.
There is no independent judiciary.
They are, in my opinion and I think it is pretty widely
shared, they are arresting Americans and when they catch an
American and they are able to detain them and that American has
certain characteristics, whether it is an Olympic gold medalist
or a Wall Street Journal reporter that they can get their hooks
in, they are going to use that person just as they use every
other aspect of Russian society to their advantage against us
in their war against us.
I think the best I can come up with, Senator, in response
to your question is to discourage Americans from traveling to
Russia unless there is an extraordinary need, particularly
Americans who have served in the military, have or had a
security clearance, have some prominence.
I also think we have to engage in multilateral diplomacy
because it should not just be an American problem. When a Wall
Street Journal reporter, a 31-year-old man who is doing his job
as an international correspondent, is arrested on trumped up
espionage charges that should not just be a problem of the
United States.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor. Those are all excellent points. The
only thing I would add is a little bit tangential which is the
detention of the Wall Street Journal reporter is--I think it is
an intentional and intended to have a chilling effect on having
other American and Western journalists in the country.
It is another way that Vladimir Putin is ensuring that we
cannot shine a light on his domestic repression and really have
insight into the changes that are taking place in Russia.
That is going to make it ever more difficult for the United
States to be able to keep a pulse on these changes in Russian
society and understand what is happening inside Russia.
It is not a preventative measure, but it is a mitigation
tactic, which is to continue to fund investigative journalists
and the journalists who are doing their work outside of Russia.
Many of them still have ways to contact their sources back
inside Russia.
It is going to leave a big black box that makes this ever
harder for us to understand the Russia that we face, and if we
cannot prevent it, we should at least try to mitigate the
impact by continuing to fund those journalists outside and the
other Russians who have left.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Well, you said something, Ambassador Sullivan, that I have
been contemplating, which is some type of a universal
convention sort of like an Article 5 on wrongful detention--if
you wrongfully detained a citizen of a country of the
convention then all countries spring into action and the
consequences because then the ante would be up. The cost would
be up for wrongfully detaining of citizens.
I am thinking of Canadians who had a few citizens that were
detained elsewhere. This is going to be a continuing problem,
so long as the consequences are little and the rewards are big
we will continue to lose people.
With the thanks of the committee, this record for this
hearing will remain open until the close of business on
Wednesday, May 17.
We appreciate your insights, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador John Sullivan to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What conditions should the U.S. have for normalizing
relations with Russia, and how flexible should we be in them?
Answer. Ending Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine on terms
that are acceptable to the democratically elected Government of Ukraine
is the most basic condition. We should also insist on bringing to
justice those who committed war crimes in Ukraine. Those should not be
flexible. If the Ukrainian Government, on its own terms, wants to cede
territory, I would advise against that but would have to defer to their
judgment about their national interests. Putin, the leader of one of
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, cannot be
allowed to succeed in waging an aggressive war in violation of the UN
Charter and international law. Waging an aggressive war is a crime for
which convicted perpetrators have been hanged in the past.
Question. We have seen the Russian playbook for frozen conflicts
before in both Georgia and Moldova. Can you speak to some of the
dangers to the U.S. and our allies which are likely to emerge if there
is a frozen conflict in a country as large and populated as Ukraine?
Answer. The dangers to our NATO allies in the region, as well as
NATO aspirants like Georgia and neighbors like Moldova, are very
substantial. Those nations' interests were already subverted by Russia
before February 24, 2022. The governments of the Eastern European
countries with which I engaged while I was deputy secretary and later
ambassador to Russia were clear in describing the hybrid war that
Russia was already waging against them, including cyber-attacks and
intelligence operations. We have seen the danger caused by Russian
troops, and now nuclear weapons, moving into Belarus. The threat from a
frozen conflict in Ukraine will be even greater.
Question. What do you see as the path forward in the security
architecture of Europe after the current war? The U.S. so far has
resisted committing to providing a Membership Action Plan regarding
Ukraine's NATO bid, or even discussing the matter at the upcoming NATO
summit in Vilnius. How should we interpret this reluctance? Are there
any other bilateral or multilateral agreements which we should be
working towards to serve our security interests, either specific to
Ukraine or with regard to Russia more broadly?
Answer. No matter the form, Ukraine must have credible security
guarantees (including from the United States) after the war ends
(whenever that is). Without those guarantees, the country will have
great difficulty rebuilding under the threat of renewed war by Russia.
Another Budapest Memorandum will not suffice. But the form of the
guarantees is also a vital issue. NATO membership is optimal.
Guarantees by the U.S. and other major U.S. allies could be adequate.
Question. Under your tenure the Kremlin ordered the United States
to take a veritable axe to its staffing--from 1,200 to less than 150.
Given your public remarks to POLITICO about the difficulty in keeping
the Mission running on minimum staff, how often did you interact with
Washington on resource needs and at what level? Do you feel you
received the resources you needed?
Answer. Engagement with Washington on these issues was quite
frequent during my tenure as ambassador in both administrations.
Sometimes it was daily, or even multiple times a day. At other points,
it was several times a week. At a minimum, there was not a week that
went by that I did not engage with the Department on these issues. I
always got what Washington could provide without consulting the
Russians. When we had to engage with the Russian MFA, we would
inevitably hit delays and obstructions. Washington tried to help me
work around those. The underlying problem was that we would not hold to
a position of insisting on reciprocity with the Russians. There was a
fear that the Russians would close our embassy, which I always thought
was extremely unlikely because we would close their embassy (and
intelligence platform) in response. Until we insist on reciprocity, we
will continue to have the problems I had as ambassador.
Question. If Russia were to permit us to fully staff our Embassy
and Consulates, how long do you estimate it would take to return our
U.S. and local staffing numbers to an appropriate level? How long would
it take to reopen Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg?
Answer. We should have very few third country nationals employed at
our mission in Russia. They are too vulnerable to coercion by the
Russian security services. To staff our embassy with hundreds of
cleared Americans will take a long time--measured in years, not months.
It will take even longer to reopen our consulates because we will have
to identify new locations in each city. The old locations are now
unsafe and insecure. The process of opening new diplomatic facilities
with a cooperative host government usually takes years. With a hostile
government in Kremlin, it will be challenging at best.
Question. The Kremlin places significant pressure on our operations
in Russia via expulsions, visa delays affecting regular staffing
rotations, issues with accreditation, etc. Lack of personnel directly
impact our ability to keep a complex and sophisticated diplomatic
facility in good working order. What can the Administration do to exert
corresponding pressure on Russian diplomats in the United States to
remind them of their obligations under the Vienna Conventions?
Answer. I have said for years that we must insist on reciprocity,
which we never have done in this Administration or the last.
Reciprocity means we should have the same number of diplomats and
diplomatic facilities as the Russians. We should not have one set of
rules for the United States and a different set of rules for the
Russians. The ``visa overstay'' problem (Russian diplomats did not have
to leave when their visas expired, but American diplomats did) was a
good example of that, which has taken years to address, and still not
fully.
______
The Committee Received No Response From Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor for
the Following Questions by Senator Todd Young
Question. What conditions should the U.S. have for normalizing
relations with Russia, and how flexible should we be in them?
[No Response Received]
Question. We have seen the Russian playbook for frozen conflicts
before in both Georgia and Moldova. Can you speak to some of the
dangers to the U.S. and our allies which are likely to emerge if there
is a frozen conflict in a country as large and populated as Ukraine?
[No Response Received]
Question. What do you see as the path forward in the security
architecture of Europe after the current war? The U.S. so far has
resisted committing to providing a Membership Action Plan regarding
Ukraine's NATO bid, or even discussing the matter at the upcoming NATO
summit in Vilnius. How should we interpret this reluctance? Are there
any other bilateral or multilateral agreements which we should be
working towards to serve our security interests, either specific to
Ukraine or with regard to Russia more broadly?
[No Response Received]
[all]