[Senate Hearing 118-71]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                         S. Hrg. 118-71

                  FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                    THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING
                                
                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
                       SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
                          AND COUNTERTERRORISM

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
                    
                             FIRST SESSION                        
                           
                              __________

                              MAY 31, 2023

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-152 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          


             SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,        
               CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM        

           CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  TED CRUZ, Texas
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           MARCO RUBIO, Florida

                              (ii)        

                       C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut..........     1

Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana......................     3

Leaf, Hon. Barbara, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

Pryor, Jeanne, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for 
  the 
  Middle East, United States Agency for International 
  Development, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    11
    Prepared Statement...........................................    12

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ambassador Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Jeanne Shaheen.........................................    32

Responses of Ambassador Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Chris Van Hollen.......................................    32

                                 (iii)

 
                  FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                    THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, 2023

                           U.S. Senate,    
             Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
                Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher 
Murphy presiding.
    Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Kaine, Young, and Cruz.
    Also Present: Senator Van Hollen.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Murphy. Good morning to our witnesses, colleagues, 
and guests who are convening the subcommittee today to discuss 
the FY24 budget request for the Middle East and North Africa.
    We do this on a week in which we may be getting a little 
bit more clarity into what our budget levels will be for the 
coming year and we are looking forward as the authorizing 
committee working hand-in-hand with the Appropriations 
Committee as we set budget numbers and investment levels for 
the Middle East and North 
Africa.
    This is, of course, a region where the bulk of our 
assistance dollars go. Since 1946, the Middle East and North 
Africa has received $372 billion of U.S. assistance. That is 
equivalent to the regions of Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America combined.
    It is worth asking if this investment--this pretty massive 
investment has achieved its strategic objectives and if not, 
why not.
    Here is a more pointed question. Seventy percent of the aid 
for this region is security assistance. What has been the 
return on that investment?
    For instance, do we have more reliable security partners 
today? Do we have more democracy in the region? Do we have less 
conflict?
    I do not know that any of the answers to those questions is 
a definitive ``yes.'' It is possible that the primary outcome 
of much of this assistance has been to simply enable 
dictatorships that use the military more often for domestic 
repression than countering external threats.
    Now, I am sure our witnesses will paint a slightly rosier 
picture and there certainly are success stories, but one of the 
defenses of this investment often is that it is necessary to 
make sure that the energy product produced in the region 
continues to move to the United States, especially when we 
really need it in times of global crisis.
    Last summer when the United States asked our partners in 
the Middle East to help ease the global energy price crisis 
caused by Russia's war in Ukraine, for the most part our 
partners, the ones who were the recipients of these billions of 
dollars in foreign aid, turned their backs on us. We should 
talk about that today, too.
    In addition to these big picture questions, it is worth 
drilling down into many of these countries that really matter 
and asking if our assistance levels make sense in 2024 the way 
it did when these relationships began many years ago.
    Does it make sense for Congress to automatically renew 
again basically the same exact amount of military aid to Egypt 
the way we have done every single year since 1987, or do 60,000 
political prisoners and little evidence of political reform 
argue for us to take a fresh look?
    Does it make sense for us to renew the same level of aid to 
Tunisia's military this year compared to last year when that 
institution is regularly participating in military trials 
against the President's political opponents?
    As we continue to put billions of dollars into supporting 
the Iraqi military since ISIS took over broad swaths of the 
country in 2014, are we confident that that institution can 
stand up and defend their country today in ways that it could 
not do, obviously, 10 years ago today?
    As I mentioned, let us be clear, there are targeted 
meaningful success stories where our aid has delivered outcomes 
that are good for us and good for our partners in the region.
    Just a couple quick examples--Lebanon, where our support 
for the Lebanese Armed Forces has been crucial in keeping 
Hezbollah at bay, keeping protesters protected as the country's 
economic and political crises deepen.
    Once a small, constantly threatened country whose very 
existence was always in peril, today Israel now boasts a strong 
military capable of defending itself from external attack.
    In places like Yemen and Syria, humanitarian assistance 
just undoubtedly has saved tens of thousands of lives over the 
last decade.
    This hearing and a broader commitment that I think the full 
committee has to have to reviewing policy in this region, it is 
really important because I would argue that too much of our 
assistance today has locked in decades-old assumptions about 
the region while the sand is shifting under our feet and the 
region is changing rapidly.
    We convene the subcommittee today to have this 
conversation. We look forward to working with our colleagues on 
the Appropriations Committee in the coming weeks to draft the 
State and Foreign Operations portion of the FY24 Appropriations 
Act and, hopefully, the answers we will get to questions today 
will help in that effort.
    With that, I will turn to the ranking member for his 
opening remarks.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this 
hearing today to review the State Department's budget request 
for the Middle East and North Africa.
    As we consider what the Department and USAID has requested, 
we must also consider the policies and realities that undergird 
the budget request.
    Seven out of $10 that the Department requests for the MENA 
region are directed toward foreign military financing. Millions 
of dollars more in programs managed by the Department of 
Defense flow towards counterterrorism and train, advise, and 
equip missions.
    Finally, tens of billions of defense articles are sold to 
partner and allied governments every year in the region. This 
has been the trend not because security relationships are 
easier nor is this the case because the United States is not 
willing or able to purposefully perform economic, humanitarian, 
and development programs across the MENA region.
    Quite the contrary, in fact. The United States focus on 
security assistance has been and will likely continue to be the 
trend because this is a region of the world where hard power 
decisions still carry the most weight.
    Security for their people, economies, and interests is 
still the primary concern of every single partner and ally the 
United States has in the region. With security first on 
everyone's mind, we must confront the government most in favor 
of undermining or destroying what fragile stability exists: 
Iran.
    I continue to be concerned by the Biden administration's 
position or sometimes lack thereof on stopping Iran since it 
has become clear Iran could not be stopped at the negotiating 
table, a realization that took far too long.
    Iran has not stood still even while we have. It has 
deepened its conventional military ties with Russia and China, 
improving its own conventional military capabilities and 
industrial base while fueling Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
    It has supported China's economy with discounted oil, sales 
the Administration has repeatedly turned a blind eye towards. 
Its proxies in Gaza just launched more than a thousand rockets 
at Israel, including towards Jerusalem, and just last week had 
tested yet another ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel 
and beyond.
    In the face of these advances, I have yet to hear the 
Administration articulate a clear policy towards the regime in 
Tehran that utilizes every tool in our unilateral and 
multilateral toolbox.
    This is not an Iran hearing, but these concerns and our 
discussion today is educated by the lack of answers the Senate 
received 2 weeks ago and because Iran's attempts to upset 
regional security manifest themselves in many of the decisions 
we make about policy and budgetary priorities.
    In an era of strategic competition, dollars, force posture 
and prioritization of strategic assets are not fungible. The 
threat from Iran draws our focus and resourcing away from 
Europe and especially East Asia, the priority theater for the 
United States.
    Likewise, within the region, if our counterterrorism focus 
is directed towards Iran and its proxies then we are required 
to pull our attention from groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, in Yemen, or ISIS.
    In our hearing today I hope to hear from our witnesses 
about how they first and foremost are positioning the 
Department and USAID to tackle the question of security in the 
region.
    The decades-long quest--the contest with China remains our 
nation's highest geostrategic priority even as our focus is 
drawn towards Europe in response to Putin's war in Ukraine.
    We still have a persistent interest in the stability, 
security, and over time the progress of democracy and 
accountability in the Middle East and North Africa. The 
American people and our economic and national security are 
impacted by developments in the Middle East.
    It is both a space for competition with strategic rivals in 
Russia and China, but also a region where adversaries, allies, 
and partners are vying for influence, prosperity, and security.
    Both of these parallel tracks will be disturbed if we 
permit the further erosion of regional stability and erosion 
driven by our lack of firm resolve and action in the face of 
increasingly complex threats.
    With that, I once again thank our witnesses for their 
appearance today. I look forward to our discussion. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
    Let me introduce our witnesses and ask you to present us 
with testimony. Keep it to 5 minutes, if you could, and we will 
submit any additional remarks for the record.
    Neither of you really need an introduction, but we are 
joined today first by the Honorable Barbara Leaf, who is the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at the 
U.S. Department of State, and Ms. Jeanne Pryor, the Deputy 
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of the Middle East at 
USAID.
    Welcome to you both. I will hand the floor to you, 
Ambassador Leaf.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEAF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ambassador Leaf. Thank you, Chairman Murphy and Ranking 
Member Young, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
inviting me to testify here today on the President's $7.57 
billion fiscal year 2024 budget request and our priorities in 
the Middle East and North Africa.
    The region remains, as both of you have noted, of vital 
importance to U.S. interests. President Biden has articulated a 
forward-looking approach to the region based on five elements: 
Partnership, deterrence, diplomacy, regional integration, and 
values.
    We have made some significant progress. We launched the 
Negev Forum and I2U2 on the back of the historic Abraham 
Accords, helped deescalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions, 
advanced a U.N.-facilitated truce in Yemen, facilitated and 
negotiated an historic maritime boundary agreement between 
Israel and Lebanon, and helped secure the largest ever purchase 
of Boeing planes in Saudi Arabia.
    Our assiduous diplomacy has repaired riffs and we now 
benefit from a region that while still fragile can itself 
undertake the work with us of stabilization and repair.
    We are as diplomatically engaged and committed to the 
region as we have ever been. Doing the hard work to demonstrate 
our vision for the region's peace and prosperity and stability 
can deliver a more compelling future. Your support for this 
request will cement U.S. success.
    Our regional engagement begins with partnership. Building 
on our decades-long relationships and our track record of 
partnership focused on solving shared problems and building 
shared prosperity and security.
    In an era of strategic competition, these partnerships are 
what set us apart. Our FY24 request supports partners like 
Israel, Jordan, Egypt, as well as Iraq, and creates the 
conditions that sustain our cooperation.
    Deterrence--our unrivaled network of relationships and 
partnerships creates integrated deterrence to counter malign 
actors including Iran. The President has been clear that he is 
committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear 
weapon.
    Diplomacy is the best means to address the issue, coupled 
with deterring Iran's adventurism by building a deep coalition 
of partners with integrated defense capabilities and the 
willingness to hold Iran to account.
    Support for our partners' security enhances deterrence. The 
President's FY24 request includes $5.3 billion in foreign 
military financing as a result.
    Our commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. Consistent 
with our MOU for Israel, the request includes $3.3 billion to 
support Israel's security.
    On diplomacy, to build sustainable regional security we 
must rely on diplomacy to build out coalitions that deescalate 
conflict and work collectively. The $42.55 million request for 
Yemen as an example sustains our efforts that led to the key 
elements of the April 2022 truce, which continues to hold 14 
months later.
    We remain focused on the enduring defeat of ISIS. The $97 
million request for stabilization assistance in northeast 
Syria, particularly our effort on al-Hol, ensures ISIS cannot 
leverage instability in Syria or recruit vulnerable displaced 
populations to reconstitute and threaten the United States.
    Together with our partners we helped secure a ceasefire in 
Libya, shifting the focus to political negotiation. Our $16 
million request supports Libya's eventual transition via 
national elections to a democratic, stable and, hopefully, 
unified state.
    Regional integration--through this request we will continue 
to promote regional integration to unlock the region's 
potential for sustained and wide-ranging economic growth, which 
in itself will help provide greater stability and security.
    The Negev Forum is one example, designing and delivering 
the tangible benefits of regional integration. Along with the 
GCC we have also developed a regional approach to Gulf 
security.
    These fora and more would benefit from the MENA Opportunity 
Fund, a new $90 million flexible funding mechanism we propose 
to take advantage of both progress or potential breakthroughs 
to advance regional peace and integration.
    We are also cognizant that these efforts are no substitute 
for a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. 
A two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel's future 
as a Jewish democratic state living in peace alongside a 
viable, sovereign, democratic Palestinian state.
    Our request includes $309 million in economic and security 
assistance for the Palestinian people and support for people-
to-people connections under the Middle East Partnership for 
Peace Act.
    Finally, values. We will keep our values at the center of 
our approach. We do this because it is who we are as Americans 
and because this also serves our interests in the region.
    We want the people of this region to know what we stand for 
and know that what we are offering is in the long run more 
likely to produce shared security, shared prosperity.
    Our request reflects our commitment to respond to changes 
that impact our values. The request prioritizes support for the 
Tunisian people to address both economic stability and 
democratic openings should they emerge. Through the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative--MEPI--regional programs empower women 
in the workforce and embrace or enhance economic growth.
    Our policy today is designed to build the sustainable 
integrated partnerships necessary to develop shared solutions 
to these challenges so that we can build a better future that 
we and our partners and, indeed, the people of this region 
seek.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify here and for your 
continued support for our efforts in the region, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Leaf follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Ambassador Barbara Leaf

    Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, Members of the Subcommittee, 
thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to testify on the 
President's FY 2024 Budget Request and how it supports our priorities 
in the Middle East and North Africa. I welcome the opportunity to 
testify with my USAID colleague Jeanne Pryor, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for the Middle East Bureau. To advance the President's 
regional agenda, the FY 2024 President's Budget Request includes $7.57 
billion in foreign assistance for the Middle East and North Africa with 
the goal of continuing the work to build a more stable, integrated, and 
prosperous region.
    President Biden has articulated a forward-looking approach to the 
region based on five elements: Partnership, Deterrence, Diplomacy, 
Regional Integration, and Values. Through this framework, we have made 
real progress de-escalating tensions and building a more stable, 
secure, and prosperous region. Our Budget Request allows us to carry 
this work forward, shoring up our successes and bolstering our efforts 
to address the challenges that remain.
    Our approach to the region is anchored in two realities that shape 
our request and our commitment.
    The first reality is that First, the Middle East and North Africa 
is vital to U.S. interests. The region is replete with strategic 
natural resources, is home to critical transit points in global 
shipping and trade, and our regional partners remain essential to our 
ability to achieve our broader foreign policy priorities. The region is 
also a vital theater for strategic competition with Russia and the PRC, 
and it is ever more important to demonstrate that we are committed to 
remaining deeply engaged. As the President has said, ``we are not going 
to leave a vacuum in the Middle East for Russia or China to fill.'' 
While Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine poses an immediate threat to 
international stability, as the Secretary has emphasized, ``China 
represents the most consequential geopolitical challenge we face today: 
a country with the intent and, increasingly, the capability to 
challenge our vision for a free, open, secure, and prosperous 
international order.''
    Which brings us to our second reality--our assiduous diplomacy has 
repaired regional rifts, and we now benefit from a region that, while 
still fragile, can itself undertake the work of stabilization and 
repair. Today, we are as diplomatically engaged and committed to the 
region as we've ever been, doing the hard work to demonstrate why our 
vision for the region's peace and prosperity can deliver a more 
compelling future for our partners. Your support for this request will 
undergird the vigorous diplomatic engagement that drives current and 
future efforts to cement U.S. success across the region.
    And we've had important successes over the past year. Our sustained 
efforts through the D-ISIS coalition and working with partners has 
eliminated key ISIS leaders and diminished ISIS's capacity to a level 
where it is not currently able to pose a significant threat to the 
United States, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In Yemen, 
we propelled a UN-facilitated truce that has resulted in the longest 
period of calm--well over a year--since the conflict began more than 9 
years ago. Our sustained engagement with Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, 
and other regional partners has supported the work to bring the war in 
Yemen to a close. We facilitated a historic agreement between Israel 
and Lebanon to establish a permanent maritime boundary opening the door 
for greater peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. We've 
launched the Negev Forum and I2U2, building on the historic Abraham 
Accords and normalization agreements, to deliver tangible benefits from 
regional integration. Our participation in the Aqaba-Sharm process has 
helped our partners make important strides to deescalate Israeli-
Palestinian tensions. I recently returned from Iraq, where we conducted 
intensive, hands-on work to mediate tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, 
and between our Kurdish partners. Their ability to work productively 
together across a myriad of economic, security, energy and social 
issues will contribute to--or detract from--Iraq's larger stability and 
security. In addition, our sustained engagement has resulted in steps 
toward Iraq's energy reform and interconnection with the region. We've 
helped maintain international unity behind UN Special Representative 
Bathily to push Libya towards national elections. At COP in Egypt this 
past year and in Dubai later this year, we are building the global 
consensus to fight climate change. And we've helped secure major wins 
for U.S. companies, including a nearly $37 billion agreement for the 
largest ever purchase of Boeing planes by Saudi Arabia earlier this 
year.
                              partnership
    Our regional engagement begins with partnership. Building on our 
decades-long track record of commitment to the region, our partnerships 
focus on solving shared problems and building shared prosperity and 
security. We supported Israel, Jordan, and the UAE to launch Project 
Prosperity, opening the door to regional cooperation on clean energy 
and water security. We are working with Saudi Arabia to develop the 
next generation of 5G, 6G, and OpenRAN technology. We are helping Egypt 
to build 10 gigawatts of renewable power. And our partners have offered 
overwhelming support within the United Nations on key votes condemning 
Russia's aggression against Ukraine and to elect strong U.S. leaders at 
the International Telecommunications Union and the International 
Organization for Migration. In an era of strategic competition, these 
partnerships are what set us apart.
    And, last June, President Biden and other G7 leaders launched the 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, or PGII, to 
address enormous infrastructure needs in low- and middle-income 
countries and to meet the challenge of securing and diversifying global 
supply chains. Many of our Middle East partners, particularly in the 
Gulf, pledged multibillion-dollar investments to PGII. Those 
investments will advance strategic projects from ports, to rail, 
electricity lines, and essential minerals across Africa, to Asia, to 
the Middle East region.
    As Secretary Blinken has said, we are not forcing countries to 
choose, but giving them a choice. Our partnership and our values--
underwritten by your support for this request--can show why we remain a 
better choice.
    The Request reaffirms our enduring commitment to partners like 
Israel, Jordan, Egypt, as well as Iraq, and create the conditions that 
sustain our cooperation. Most importantly, the FY 2024 request 
demonstrates our sustained engagement in and commitment to the region.
                               deterrence
    Working with our partners, we remain committed to ensuring that 
malign actors--in particular Iran and its proxies--are deterred from 
aggressive actions that undermine global security or threaten strategic 
lines of trade and communication. Our approach to regional security 
relies on leveraging our unrivaled network of partnerships creating 
integrated deterrence, through which, as Secretary Austin has 
emphasized, ``multilateral efforts tackle shared threats, and 
operations are more integrated, and defense relationships grow 
deeper.''
    Iran remains the pre-eminent regional threat as it continues to 
advance its nuclear program; support terrorist groups and destabilizing 
partners and proxies; support Russia in its war of aggression in 
Ukraine; and, as the world has seen, crack down on peaceful protests 
and forcefully suppress the rights of Iranians.
    President Biden has been clear that he is committed to ensuring 
that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy is the best means 
to address that issue, but we are also deterring Iran's adventurism by 
building a deep coalition of partners with integrated defense 
capabilities and the willingness to hold Iran to account.
    The United States employs a wide range of tools to counter 
destabilizing Iranian activities across the region. We have hardened 
our defenses, conducted dynamic force deployments to the region, 
including long-range bomber overflights, deepened our intelligence 
cooperation, boosted the capacity of our partners, interdicted Iranian 
weapons and financial flows, and conducted defensive strikes to restore 
deterrence with Iran and its partners and proxies.
    One of our most substantial tools to enhance deterrence remains our 
support for our partners through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The 
FY 2024 President's Budget Request for the region includes $5.3 billion 
in FMF, maintaining our enduring commitments to Israel, Jordan, and 
Egypt, and supporting countries like Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia.
    Our commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. Consistent with 
our MOU with Israel, the request includes $3.3 billion in FMF to 
support Israel's security.
    Our request of $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt supports our enduring 
security interests and partnership with Egypt to include maritime 
security, border security, and counterterrorism.
    In Jordan, $400 million in FMF will support F-16 aircraft 
procurement and modernization, sustain existing programs, and support 
other bilateral security priorities such as countering illicit drug 
trafficking.
    Our request of $75.5 million in FMF for Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) will assist Iraqi and Peshmerga security 
forces, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and that Iraq is able to 
effectively exercise its own sovereignty independent of foreign 
influence. This ensures the U.S. remains Iraq's security partner of 
choice in the face of Russian and Chinese competition.
    In Lebanon, a spiraling economic and political crisis threatens to 
spill over into security threats to our closest partners in the region. 
The request includes $150 million in FMF to continue U.S. support for 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a vital national security institution 
which enjoys broad support across sectarian lines and is the only true 
defender of Lebanon and the Lebanese people.
                               diplomacy
    To build sustainable regional security, we must rely on diplomacy 
to build coalitions that de-escalate conflict and work collectively. We 
are making vital progress toward this end, and this request seeks 
funding for sustained support for our efforts.
    The Biden administration has fully recommitted to the United 
Nations and its efforts in support of peace. We support UN-facilitated 
political and peace building processes in Yemen, Syria, and Libya.
    Our efforts in Yemen helped lead to the April 2022 truce, of which 
the key elements continue to hold despite the formal end of the truce 7 
months ago. While negotiations on reinstatement of a broader ceasefire 
agreement continue and the situation is fragile, the truce continues to 
provide Yemen with the longest period of calm since the war began in 
2014, and this profound decrease in hostilities continues to bring 
tangible relief to Yemenis, including a significant reduction in 
civilian casualties. The requested $42.55 million for Yemen will help 
sustain this effort, maintaining and expanding stabilization and 
development assistance objectives while continuing to support UN 
mechanisms.
    In Syria, our steadfast opposition to normalization with the regime 
has not changed, nor will we lift any sanctions on the regime or those 
who aid it. We have also made it clear to our Arab partners, through 
repeated high-level diplomacy, that any engagement with the Assad 
regime must produce concrete actions that benefit the Syrian people. 
Our advocacy is shifting Arab partners' agenda with Assad toward key 
issues that matter to Syrians--providing unhindered humanitarian aid 
access through the cross-border mechanism authorized by the UN Security 
Council and pursuing a political resolution to the conflict as outlined 
in UN resolutions. Our investment in accountability efforts is also 
having real impact--just last year, documentation collected by our 
civil society partners was used in a German court to help support the 
first conviction of a Syrian regime official for war crimes.
    We are focused on the enduring defeat of ISIS alongside our 
Coalition partners. In combination with our military efforts in 
partnership with Iraqi security forces and local forces in northeast 
Syria, and continued advocacy and support for repatriations of ISIS 
fighters and their family members from the northeast, continued 
stabilization support is essential to avoid an ISIS resurgence. The 
request of $97 million for U.S.-funded stabilization assistance in 
northeast Syria would support critical community security efforts, 
revive economic activity and livelihoods, support youth rehabilitation, 
and restore essential services necessary for the reintegration of 
displaced Syrians to their home or host communities--including those 
returning from al-Hol, Roj, and other displacement camps. A key 
component of this request is funding to address the security concerns 
emanating from al-Hol, even as we work methodically to reduce the 
camp's population through returns of families to their home countries. 
This work--particularly our effort on al-Hol--is critical to ensure 
that ISIS cannot leverage instability in Syria or recruit vulnerable 
displaced populations to reconstitute and threaten the United States.
    In Libya, our regional partnerships have played a central role in 
helping to secure a ceasefire that has now held for over 2 years and a 
political process that has shifted the focus from violent confrontation 
to political negotiation. Our request includes $16 million to support 
Libya's eventual transition to a democratic, stable, and unified state, 
complemented by targeted resources from the Prevention and 
Stabilization Fund. This work is driven by our 10-year Strategy to 
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in Libya and the Global 
Fragility Act. We are actively engaged now in a multilateral effort to 
support UN Special Representative Bathily's work to define a roadmap 
for national elections, with the goal of the Libyan people finally 
securing a unified government and enduring stability.
                          regional integration
    Through this request we will continue to promote regional 
integration to unlock the region's potential for sustained and wide-
ranging economic growth. The World Bank has identified the MENA region 
as the least economically integrated region in the world, and this 
condition is reflected in the political and security realms. We have 
been proactive in building interconnections between our partners, from 
Iraq to Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel. Additionally, the ongoing 
effort to promote Israel's integration is at the center of our work, 
building on the Abraham Accords and normalization efforts more broadly 
between Israel and its neighbors.
    Expanding upon the Abraham Accords, the Negev Forum brings the 
United States together with Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and the 
UAE to design and deliver the tangible benefits of regional 
integration. This past January, we launched the Forum's six working 
groups in a meeting hosted by our UAE partners that was the largest 
multilateral Arab Israeli gathering since the 1991 Madrid conference. 
The working groups are developing projects in Regional Security, Clean 
Energy, Food Security and Water Technology, Health, Tourism, and 
Education and Coexistence that the Forum will discuss at its next 
Ministerial later this summer. This request provides ongoing support 
for these regional initiatives, which can also catalyze investments by 
our partners.
    We have deepened our cooperation with the GCC to develop a regional 
approach to Gulf security and, along with the United States Central 
Command, plant the seeds of a cooperative regional security 
architecture. International Military and Educational Training (IMET) 
funds for Bahrain and Oman will improve our interoperability and build 
capacity for greater regional partnerships.
    We can build upon the progress of regional integration to develop 
globally transformative partnerships like the I2U2--connecting the 
United States, Israel, the UAE, and India--to work on innovative 
initiatives that address food security and climate change.
    These fora and more would benefit from the MENA Opportunity Fund, a 
new $90 million flexible funding mechanism that will allow us to take 
advantage of our progress or of potential breakthroughs to advance 
regional peace and integration. Given the velocity of change within the 
region, we envision this fund as ready seed money to address emerging 
opportunities or crises in countries such as Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen, while also allowing the U.S. Government to seize on emerging 
regional opportunities revealed through the work of Negev Forum and the 
Abraham Accords relationships themselves, in order to have maximum 
regional impact.
    While we focus on deepening, and building upon, the Abraham 
Accords, we also are cognizant that these efforts are no substitute for 
a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians.
    As Secretary Blinken has said, ``we all must build on these 
relationships and growing normalization to make tangible improvements 
in the lives of Palestinians, and to make progress toward the 
longstanding goal of advancing a negotiated peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Palestinians and Israelis deserve equal measures of 
freedom, security, opportunity, and dignity.''
    A two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel's future as a 
Jewish, democratic state, living in peace alongside a viable, 
sovereign, and democratic Palestinian state. Our request includes $309 
million in economic and security assistance for the Palestinian people 
in the West Bank and Gaza that will improve the lives of millions of 
Palestinians by addressing immediate needs on health, climate, water, 
and economic growth; promoting rule of law; enhancing civil society; 
and supporting people to people connections under the Middle East 
Partnership for Peace Act.
                                 values
    And finally, we will keep our values at the center of our 
approach--support for human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms, 
the empowerment of women and girls, and protection for members of 
historically underrepresented communities. We will continue to 
encourage our partners to improve the rule of law, and we will do all 
that we can to bolster the strength and voices of civil society.
    We do this because it is who we are as Americans, and because this 
also serves our interests. In an era of strategic competition, we must 
be steadfast in demonstrating the American value proposition. We want 
the people of the region to know what we stand for, see us stand up for 
these values, and know that what we're offering is, in the long run, 
more promising, more responsive to the aspirations and longings of 
people everywhere, including in this fragile region, and more likely to 
produce the shared security and prosperity we all seek.
    Our request reflects our commitment to respond to changes that 
impact our values. The Request reduces overall support for programs 
that benefit the Government of Tunisia to signal the United States' 
continued concern over the consistent weakening of democratic 
institutions. At the same time, the request prioritizes support for the 
Tunisian people and civil society as they grapple with an economic 
crisis exacerbated by Russia's war on Ukraine and strive for a 
democratic future for all. As part of our comprehensive approach to 
Tunisia, a portion of the funding within the MENA Opportunity Fund 
would also provide us with flexible resources to provide further 
support for the Tunisian people to address both economic stability and 
political openings should they emerge. It also ensures we can maintain 
the security cooperation critical to advancing regional security 
objectives and create the stability needed for a return to democratic 
governance.
    The states that will be best equipped to meet the challenges of our 
changing world--whether a global pandemic or climate change--will be 
those with resilient, inclusive governments that treat civil society as 
a partner rather than a threat. It will be those who respect the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of their people, such as freedom of 
expression, including for members of the press as well as political 
opponents and critics. And our request includes $65 million for Near 
East Regional Democracy (NERD)--a $10 million increase from last year--
to continue and expand support in the areas of Internet freedom, 
including digital freedom, and human rights, using tools that are 
responsive to the dynamic environment on the ground to support the free 
flow of information to citizens.
    Our diplomatic and assistance efforts empower women in the 
workforce and tap into the potential for economic growth to compete on 
a global level. The MENA region's female labor participation is under 
20 percent--the lowest rate globally--pales in comparison to a global 
average of 50 percent. Women are a hugely untapped resource in our 
region. Promoting gender equity, inclusion, and women's participation 
in decision-making is part of our affirmative approach--recognizing 
that doing so is essential to addressing the region's most pressing 
challenges. We need women's full economic integration to effectively 
lead an inclusive recovery from the COVID pandemic, lead in resolving 
conflict, and innovation to tackle the climate crisis.
    Through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), regional 
programs play a critical role in changing perceptions and conditions in 
the public and private sector so that women can participate and lead in 
governance and the economy.
    As Secretary Blinken said earlier this year, ``closing the gender 
gap in the workforce by 2025 would add up to $28 trillion to the global 
economy. Especially at a time when we are working to recover from 
COVID, deal with the impact of climate change, address the many 
conflicts that are also holding back the global economy--that 
contribution is more vital than ever.''
    The region's future and our future engagement with the region will 
be shaped by these shared global trends and challenges. Our policy 
today is designed to build the sustainable and integrated partnerships 
necessary to develop shared solutions to these challenges so we can 
build the better future that we and our partners seek.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's FY 2024 
budget request. I want to close by thanking this Subcommittee for your 
continued support for our efforts in the region. I look forward to 
answering your questions.

    Senator Murphy. Thank you.
    Ms. Pryor.

 STATEMENT OF JEANNE PRYOR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF 
   THE BUREAU FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 
           INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Pryor. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member 
Young, and members of the committee.
    The past year has been marked by severe and increasing 
pressures on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. 
Shortages in wheat supplies and food price increases worsened 
food security and strained fragile economies across the region.
    Earthquakes in Syria added to the devastation already 
brought by Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime. Crises of 
governance and economic mismanagement continue to threaten 
stability in Lebanon and Tunisia, and violence increased 
significantly between Israelis and Palestinians.
    USAID has worked diligently to protect development progress 
while building forward momentum. The investments proposed in 
our fiscal year 2024 budget continue efforts to partner with 
the people of the region, build inclusive economic 
opportunities, and support a peaceful and democratic trajectory 
for a strategically important area of the world.
    Countries of the region face a wide variety of pressures 
from both inside and outside their borders. More than half of 
the population is under the age of 30. USAID is helping prepare 
these young people for the future.
    We develop curricula to improve reading and math skills in 
Lebanon's primary public schools, help more than 4 million 
Moroccan students read at grade level, and provide scholarships 
for deserving students across Egypt and Lebanon.
    However, as these young people transition into the 
workforce, opportunities lag. More than a quarter of young 
people are unemployed and less than 20 percent of women in the 
region participate in the workforce.
    U.S. investments offer critical opportunities for young 
people and women. For example, in Lebanon our investments in 
the private sector have benefited more than 20,000 enterprises 
including more than 2,000 women-owned businesses.
    Regional challenges spill across borders. Since the 
beginning of Assad's war more than 5\1/2\ million Syrians have 
sought refuge in bordering countries.
    The conflict in Yemen has displaced more than 4.5 million 
people internally and now the unfolding violence in Sudan has 
already prompted more than 150,000 people to flee into the MENA 
region.
    The People's Republic of China further complicates regional 
dynamics. USAID is assisting governments to understand the 
risks associated with PRC financing and technology.
    For example, in Jordan USAID supports the government's 
ability to assess foreign investment risks to protect Jordanian 
sovereignty and avoid bad deals that would enable outside 
influences to affect infrastructure or financing decisions.
    The impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 
food security is another immediate pressure on the region. 
Thanks to Congress' generous supplemental funding, USAID has 
been able to slightly alleviate the pressures of dramatically 
decreased imports of critical foodstuffs such as wheat and 
cooking oil.
    However, given the region's outsized dependence on imports 
from Ukraine and Russia, addressing shortfalls in domestic 
production is essential. Improving agricultural production in 
the world's most water scarce region requires consideration of 
climate change impacts in our work.
    The fiscal year 2024 request significantly increases 
funding for climate change adaptation. For example, in Jordan, 
groundwater is depleted twice as fast as it can be replenished. 
USAID is working with the Government of Jordan to strengthen 
infrastructure and oversight of water management and 
incentivize water conservation.
    Although food security and water scarcity are shared risks 
for the region, these threats are also opportunities for 
collaboration. Notably, USAID has seen expanded interest in 
MERC grants, particularly from Abraham Accord countries. MERC 
has received a record number of applications.
    Advancing the relationship between Israel and its neighbors 
is integral to the long-term prospects for the region. To build 
on this momentum, the fiscal year 2024 budget seeks continued 
funding for MEPPA and includes flexibility to invest in 
emerging opportunities.
    For example, a portion of the $90 million requested for the 
Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund could be utilized 
if the Negev Forum working groups yield tangible areas for 
investment.
    The request also increases support for the West Bank and 
Gaza by $40 million to advance public health, climate, economic 
growth, and other development priorities.
    U.S. assistance alone is not enough to address the region's 
challenges. Governments must protect human rights and take 
meaningful steps to improve governance and freedom of 
expression.
    However, through Congress and the American people's 
generosity USAID has been able to not only provide some relief 
to the extreme pressures the region faces, but also to help 
shape meaningful paths to the future for the MENA region.
    Thank you for your support and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Pryor follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Jeanne Pryor

    The past year has been marked by severe and increasing pressures on 
the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Shortages in 
wheat supplies caused by Putin's continued war on Ukraine worsened 
already tenuous food security across the region, which also saw poor 
domestic harvests due to severe droughts and water shortages. Food 
price increases, driven by supply chain issues related to the COVID-19 
pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine, strained fragile economies across 
the region. Earthquakes in north and central Syria earlier this year 
added to the devastation already wrought by Bashar Al-Assad's brutal 
regime. Crises of governance and economic mismanagement continue to 
threaten stability in Lebanon and Tunisia, and violence has 
significantly increased between Israelis and Palestinians.
    The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked 
diligently to protect development progress while building forward 
momentum where possible. Strong Congressional support and generous 
resources for USAID have allowed us, thus far, to mitigate the worst 
impacts of growing food insecurity in the region. The United States 
continues to work with the private sector and civil society to offer 
the region's citizens pathways to prosperous futures and to empower 
collective advocacy and action. USAID sustained and expanded 
peacebuilding work across the region through the Nita M. Lowey Middle 
East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA) activities, as well as the 
Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) Program and the Negev Forum to 
advance initiatives that encourage regional integration, cooperation, 
and development.
    Advancing development support in the face of mounting pressures is 
particularly critical as strategic competitors such as the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) invest in predatory alternatives and seek to 
expand their influence. The investments proposed in our Fiscal Year 
2024 budget continue efforts to partner with the people of the region, 
build inclusive economic opportunities, empower historically 
underrepresented communities, improve the delivery of social services, 
and support a peaceful and democratic trajectory for this strategically 
important area of the world.
                     addressing mounting pressures
    Countries of the region face a wide variety of pressures from both 
inside and outside their borders. Within their borders, the region's 
large youth population pushes against democratic backsliding, 
corruption, and economic malaise. Regional conflicts have spillover 
effects as people are displaced into neighboring countries and increase 
demands on scarce resources. Global interference introduces further 
complications as actors such as the PRC, Iran, and Russia meddle to 
advance their own ends. We can predict and invest for some of this, but 
other unanticipated challenges and opportunities can be met with $90 
million requested for the Middle East and North Africa Opportunity 
Fund, such as addressing emerging opportunities related to crises in 
countries such as Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
    More than half of the regional population is under the age of 30, 
presenting both unique opportunities and challenges. Through assistance 
programs, the United States has made significant progress in helping 
prepare these young people for the future. USAID renovated 130 schools 
in Jordan over the past 5 years, developed curricula to improve reading 
and math skills in all of Lebanon's primary public schools, helped more 
than 4 million Moroccan students read at grade level, and provided 
higher education scholarships for deserving students across Egypt and 
Lebanon.
    However, as these young people transition into the workforce, 
opportunities lag in the fragile economies of the region. More than a 
quarter of young people between the ages of 15 and 24 are unemployed. 
Despite rising undergraduate graduation rates, less than 20 percent of 
women in the region participate in the workforce. U.S. Government 
investments in economic growth offer critical opportunities for young 
people and women who can no longer rely on bloated public sectors for 
employment.
    Over the past years, USAID helped more than 44,000 small businesses 
increase sales by $580 million and create 48,000 jobs in Tunisia. In 
Lebanon, our investments in the private sector have benefitted more 
than 20,000 enterprises, including more than 2,500 women-owned 
businesses. In Libya, USAID's work to strengthen the energy sector 
dramatically decreased power outages from 158 hours in the first 
quarter of 2022 to only 3 hours in the first quarter of 2023, providing 
a significant increase in reliable power for Libyans and their economy.
    Although more than 25 percent of young people in the region express 
low satisfaction with the current economic situation, nearly half 
remain optimistic it will improve in the future. Through the Fiscal 
Year 2024 budget, USAID will invest in anti-corruption and governance 
efforts that will not only empower these young people to advocate for 
their vision of the future, but also support governments that work to 
improve their ability to respond to citizens' needs and aspirations.
    Thanks to Congressional support, USAID invested prior year funds to 
help the Government of Iraq improve procurement processes that limit 
corruption and reactivate more than 1,500 suspended public works 
projects. In Egypt, investments in water and sanitation infrastructure 
have ensured 25 million Egyptians have access to water and wastewater 
services. In locations without credible government partners, USAID 
worked directly with civil society to better equip citizens with tools 
to engage their authorities, advance their interests, and protect their 
rights.
Regional Pressures
    In addition to the local challenges MENA countries face, regional 
challenges spill across borders. Since the beginning of Assad's war, 
more than 5.5 million Syrians have sought refuge in bordering 
countries. Destabilizing military action and violence in northern and 
eastern Syria, northern Iraq, and southern Turkiye further impedes the 
return of internally displaced people, and outside interference, such 
as Iran's support for the Houthis in Yemen, prolongs a conflict that 
has displaced more than 4.5 million people internally and left more 
than 21.6 million in need of humanitarian assistance.
    In addition to these enduring challenges, the unfolding violence in 
Sudan has already prompted more than 330,000 Sudanese to flee into 
neighboring countries, including over 150,000 in the MENA region, since 
April 15. Over 1 million people have already been displaced within 
Sudan, including thousands who were in Sudan already as refugees of 
other conflicts.
    The impacts of this violence quickly cross borders and strain 
governments' limited resources. In Lebanon, more than 90 percent of 
Syrian refugees are in need of humanitarian assistance, and in Jordan, 
despite the Government of Jordan's support, more than 90 percent of 
Syrian refugee households still report being in debt.
    In response to the regional pressures generated by these conflicts, 
U.S. humanitarian assistance helps address immediate needs, while 
continuing stabilization and development efforts essential to create a 
post-conflict pathway to recovery, such as funding for the Syrian Civil 
Defense, commonly known as the White Helmets. This past fall, Secretary 
Blinken signed the United States' fourth memorandum of understanding 
with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, deepening our partnership with a 
regional ally that not only acts as host to a large number of Syrian 
refugees, but also serves as a stabilizing force in the region. The 
fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $1.45 billion to support the 
second year of this memorandum of understanding, which includes 
provision of direct budget support as well as programs to improve 
Jordan's economy, governance, and water systems.
Global Pressures
    Increased engagement from non-regional actors such as the PRC 
further complicates regional dynamics as Beijing's purported policy of 
``non-interference'' extends financing as a source of leverage. USAID 
is assisting governments to understand the risks associated with PRC 
financing and technology both through programming and engagement with 
our local partners.
    For example, in Morocco, USAID is funding technology alternatives 
to Chinese companies such as Huawei by assisting the Ministry of 
Education to develop learning management systems that employ U.S. 
educational models, opening the Moroccan market for collaboration with 
trusted technology providers. In Jordan, USAID supports the 
government's ability to assess foreign investment risks to protect 
Jordanian sovereignty and avoid opaque foreign involvement through bad 
deals that would enable outside influences to affect infrastructure or 
financing decisions. Jordan's telecom providers recently made the 
momentous decision to switch to trusted and secure vendors for their 5G 
rollout, which we look to support moving forward.
                             food security
    Another immediate pressure from a non-regional actor is the impact 
of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on food security in the 
region. When USAID last presented the President's Budget to Congress in 
June 2022, the MENA region was already suffering the impacts of Putin's 
war. Since last year, thanks to Congress' generosity with supplemental 
funding related to that war, USAID has been able to slightly alleviate 
the pressures of dramatically decreased imports of critical foodstuffs 
such as wheat and cooking oil.
    Last year in Tunisia, USAID provided $60 million to support a 
social safety net to keep food on the table and kids in schools, and 
this year USAID funded the purchase of 25,000 metric tons of American 
durum wheat. However, given the region's outsized dependence on grain 
and food oil imports from Ukraine and Russia, addressing shortfalls in 
domestic production is essential to provide long-term relief.
    With Congress' support, USAID has expanded work with agriculture 
and food production to help domestic suppliers better fill the gap 
between supply and demand. In Egypt, the world's largest grain 
importer, USAID helped agricultural collection centers improve their 
storage capacity to decrease grain losses due to spoiling. USAID 
accomplished this through the introduction of 30 low or no cost 
solutions for irrigation, cooling, drying, and harvesting that cut 
post-harvest losses by a third. USAID programs also helped farmers get 
more from their seeds, reducing planting costs by 60 percent.
    In Lebanon, U.S. assistance helped sustain local vegetable, legume, 
and dairy production by providing everything from seeds and compost to 
technical assistance and training. In Yemen, USAID scaled up our 
agriculture work to train an additional 1,200 farmers on modern 
approaches like greenhouses, tunnel farming, drip irrigation, and 
solar-water pumping.
    COP 27, the United Nations Conference of Parties on Climate Change, 
hosted last year by Egypt, was particularly timely given record-
breaking heat waves across the region in 2022. According to experts, 
the Middle East is currently warming at nearly double the rate of the 
rest of the world. In the future, if average global temperatures rise 
by two degrees, rainfall is projected to decline by 20-40 percent. As 
70 percent of agriculture is rain-fed, this could significantly reduce 
food security and trigger climate-induced migration and greater 
political instability in the region. Approximately 52 million people in 
the MENA region are chronically undernourished and increasing droughts 
will push more people in that direction.
    The Fiscal Year 2023 Request significantly increased funding for 
climate change adaptation, and does so again in the Fiscal Year 2024 
Request to continue this vital work. Sustainable domestic agriculture 
production in the world's most water-scarce region requires 
consideration of climate change impacts in all our work.
    For example, in Jordan, groundwater is depleted twice as fast as it 
can be replenished, and leaks, theft, or broken meters lead to water 
and revenue losses. USAID is working with the Government of Jordan's 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation to strengthen infrastructure and 
oversight and incentivize water conservation.
    With Fiscal Year 2024 resources, USAID will continue valuable 
partnerships, such as our work with the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology to develop energy and water saving irrigation systems. This 
partnership yielded low-drip technology that cuts energy requirements 
in half and costs 40 percent less than existing systems, which the 
irrigation company Toro is now commercializing.
    Although food security and water scarcity are shared risks for the 
region, these threats also offer opportunities for collaboration to 
address one of the region's largest challenges.
                            advancing peace
    Advancing the relationship between Israel and its regional 
neighbors is integral to any discussion of the long-term prospects for 
our region. USAID has seen expanded interest in MERC grants, 
particularly from Abraham Accord countries. In its most recent call for 
proposals, MERC received 102 applications for joint Arab-Israeli 
applied research and scientific workshop concepts. This is a near all-
time record number of applications for the program over its 40-year 
history.
    To build on this momentum for regional cooperation and 
peacebuilding with Israel, the Fiscal Year 2024 budget not only 
sustains ongoing efforts, such as MERC, but also includes flexibility 
to invest in emerging opportunities, such as initiatives stemming from 
the Negev Forum, among other regional opportunities, with $90 million 
requested for the Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund.
    Earlier this year, USAID attended the inaugural Working Group 
meetings of the Negev Forum in Abu Dhabi and serves as the U.S. 
Government lead for the Food Security and Water Technology and Tourism 
Working Groups. A portion of funding within the Opportunity Fund is 
planned to supplement existing resources should these working groups 
yield tangible areas for investment to further regional cooperation.
    In addition to building peaceful relations with regional neighbors, 
supporting peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is essential 
to USAID's mission in the region. The Fiscal Year 2024 Budget also 
requests increased economic support for the West Bank and Gaza by $40 
million to advance development across sectors such as public health, 
climate, wastewater treatment, and economic growth, providing 
opportunities. These efforts provide a stabilizing effect, offer 
alternatives to violence, and improve the lives of millions of 
Palestinians. The Request also seeks continued funding for the 
important work of building the trust necessary for an eventual 
negotiated two-state solution through MEPPA. USAID has completed the 
first year of programming and is now reviewing applications to build on 
progress through our second year of funding. All of these programs 
bolster broader Administration efforts to support equal measures of 
freedom, security, opportunity, and dignity for Israelis and 
Palestinians.
                               conclusion
    The United States' continued engagement as a partner for progress, 
through foreign assistance efforts, technical support, and coalition 
building ensures that people around the region are aware of the 
American people's friendship and support for their aspirations. While 
some governments may criticize the United States, their nation's shop 
owners proudly display signs announcing USAID's support to their 
clientele. The United States' commitment to working with the people of 
the region maintains ties needed for them to withstand meddling from 
outside influences and to advance reforms for durable prosperity and 
stability.
    U.S. assistance alone is not enough to fully address the region's 
challenges. Russia's military campaign in Syria in support of the Assad 
regime must end to help set the conditions for a political solution to 
the conflict in line with UNSCR 2254. Governments must protect human 
rights and take meaningful steps to improve governance and freedom of 
expression. And people across the region must work together to protect 
limited natural resources. However, through Congress and the American 
people's generosity, USAID has been able not only to provide some 
relief for the extreme pressures the region faces, but also to help 
shape meaningful paths to the future for so many in the MENA region. 
Thank you for your support and I look forward to your questions.

    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much to both of you for your 
testimony and for your work.
    Ambassador Leaf, let me start with this question of how 
this budget reflects and communicates American values in the 
region. This budget cuts funding for democracy assistance in 
Tunisia while leaving support for the military largely 
unchanged.
    It essentially carries on business as usual with respect to 
the $1.3 billion that Egypt gets with some minimal conditions 
attached to it. Makes no real fundamental change in our 
relationship with Gulf countries despite their deepening 
commitment to political repression.
    I worry that this budget does not communicate the values 
that we share in that it does not make any significant changes 
to the way in which we flow dollars to countries that either 
have worsening human rights records like Tunisia or countries 
that have shown no meaningful commitment to change like Egypt, 
despite the fact that we attach occasional conditionalities on 
top of the dollars year after year. Am I wrong?
    Ambassador Leaf. Senator, let me start with Tunisia, which 
is one of the toughest nuts to crack, as it were, in terms of 
just what you have laid out, this complex of issues, the values 
that we uphold--that we intend to uphold both through our 
assistance and also through our diplomatic work side by side 
with real security concerns that we--and U.S. national security 
interests--that we address through FMS and security assistance 
more broadly.
    I take this back to the summer, of course, of 2021. It has 
been a 2-year process of adjusting downward our assistance to 
Tunisian Government authorities and calibrating, scoping 
downward, even our security assistance.
    Let me leave that aside for a moment. Human rights work is 
done through a variety of other buckets in terms of 
programming. It has not been zeroed out as part of an approach 
writ large by the Department.
    I can tell you that our advocacy is unstinting, is 
unflagging, and it has made for quite a bit of friction, 
frankly, in the relationship that we have with the Government 
of Tunisia.
    That is as it has to be. We have seen this steady 
relentless closing of civil space, civil society space, 
pressure on individual activists, individual politicians, 
including the aging leader of Ennahda, the clamor against the 
press, the clamor against Western and other diplomatic 
missions. It is a really fraught environment.
    Our advocacy is relentless publicly and privately. We have 
scoped downward the security assistance to a degree that we 
think adequately addresses enduring security interests that we 
have there, literally, operationally the security of our own 
diplomatic personnel, but more broadly the effort that we want 
to see the Tunisian armed forces and law enforcement agencies 
continue to do their missions in terms of maritime, border 
security, counterterrorism work and----
    Senator Murphy. I understand that.
    Ambassador Leaf. Yes.
    Senator Murphy. The military is participating in President 
Saied's campaign of repression. They are holding military 
tribunals against his political opponents. They were there at 
the parliament denying entry.
    I understand there are these limited important missions 
that the military perform that are commensurate to U.S. 
national security interest. The question is, is the price for 
that worth it when our funding of a military that is engaged in 
this kind of political repression signals a complicity with the 
Saied regime?
    Ambassador Leaf. I would say the following, Senator.
    We judge the military, the armed forces, as largely 
apolitical and that is unquestionably a benefit or, rather, a 
byproduct of our long relationship with them.
    We do not-- of course, we have made it very clear and we 
have advocated against the use of military tribunals to judge 
civilians. I understand that civilian judges are essentially 
delegated over those courts. It is a tactic of intimidation, 
frankly.
    We have every reason to think that the armed forces 
themselves find this distasteful, but we judge them as largely 
apolitical in this very difficult environment and we do have 
abiding interests that extend in terms of Tunisia's place on 
the eastern edge of NATO and its ability to do its tasks.
    Senator Murphy. I do not judge them to be apolitical. I do 
not think that they have fashioned themselves in a way that 
would communicate that to the Tunisian people and I am just as 
bothered about the lack of commitment that we have made to 
civil society.
    I understand that is tough because you got to make sure 
that the money gets to the right places, but I continue to look 
forward to working with the Administration on this committee 
and on the Appropriations Committee to try to get this right.
    I guess my focus has been so laser-like on Tunisia because 
I am kind of giving up that we are going to be able to 
dramatically change our assistance to Saudi Arabia or to Egypt 
in a way that telegraphs to the world and to the region that we 
care in the way that we spend money on human rights.
    Tunisia is a place that has slid away from democratic norms 
very, very fast and I think a reorientation of our policy there 
would send an important signal beyond Tunisia that your 
partnership with us is dependent on your commitment to 
continuing to head your democracy and your civil protections in 
the right direction.
    I am well beyond my time so I will turn it over to Senator 
Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    Assistant Secretary Leaf, I would like to begin with the 
Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement. Surprised, I think, all of us that 
it took place the way it did, brokered by China.
    I think where China can play a constructive role, and I 
believe this is the position of the Administration--certainly, 
I have heard as much, I think, from the spokesperson at the 
State Department--that we want to encourage China to do 
positive things as opposed to negative things around the world.
    I also am hopeful that this agreement, moving forward, will 
continue to reduce tensions in the region. I think that is a 
hope that has been articulated by the Secretary as well.
    I am going to ask you about how we measure progress towards 
monitoring whether or not this agreement is effective, moving 
forward, and how the agreement has altered our diplomatic 
posture.
    Before I get into those matters, let us step back. What 
made the role of China amenable to both parties?
    Ambassador Leaf. Thanks very much for that question, 
Senator. It is a fascinating one and it is one that, as you 
say, the revelation on March 10 of this detente--and that is 
what I would really define this as. It is a detente. It is not 
a reconciliation, a big rapprochement, or a full normalization.
    It did surprise a lot of people. It did not entirely 
surprise us because we have been in a constant dialogue with 
the Saudis over the course of 2 years, supporting them in their 
quest to find some modus vivendi to get--using one tool, 
diplomatic engagement, not putting down all the other harder 
tools that we use bilaterally or collectively but one tool, 
direct engagement with Tehran to try to get a mitigation of the 
national security threats that Iran has posed directly and 
through its proxies principally through the Houthi, but not 
only with direct attacks on Saudi soil.
    More recently--so this has been an effort that has been 
ongoing through the good offices of the Government of Iraq and 
the Government of Oman. Saudi Arabia was consistently 
frustrated in its quest to get the Iranians to acknowledge 
their role in destabilizing Yemen and in essentially training 
and equipping with lethal support the Houthis in such a way 
that they could just launch at will complex attacks on Saudi 
soil.
    More recently the Saudis were really determined since last 
fall to use a bilateral channel that they had opened up to 
drive to an end of their engagement in the Yemen conflict and, 
indeed, to drive to an end of the conflict itself. They did not 
want the Iranians to scupper that.
    This agreement, I would stipulate, is--was not brokered by 
the Chinese. They hosted it. The Iranians and the Saudis did 
all of the agreements and the discussions themselves.
    What do they want out of it? It is, in the first instance, 
as I say, focused on Yemen. How will we help them measure it? 
Partly through the work that we do every day on the high seas, 
which is interdicting and monitoring and not just monitoring, 
but interdicting flows of weaponry, but it is a detente that 
the Saudis drove for a wider calm in the region so that they 
could pursue their socioeconomic modernization project.
    Senator Young. Well, you know how it looks.
    Ambassador Leaf. Yes, I do.
    Senator Young. It looks like we have diplomatically 
overplayed our hand vis-a-vis the Saudis and pressing them to 
come into positions of better behavior on various fronts like 
human rights and they are hedging their geopolitical bets.
    They are extending an arm of if not friendship, certainly, 
partnership with the Chinese and that is the perception. 
Diplomatically beyond the hope that this reduces tensions, 
moving forward, and it is a hope that I and others harbor, it 
seems as though diplomatically it is a bit of a--it is a hit, 
so to speak, but I will let you respond to that reflection.
    Ambassador Leaf. Sure. Senator, the Chinese obviously have 
established a relationship with Iran that the U.S. does not 
have and so, in a sense, the Chinese are on a hook to help 
police Iranian actions. That is also the way many people saw it 
in the region and what the Saudis, frankly, hoped to get out of 
it.
    I would say the Saudis are very clear-eyed about the 
prospects for getting a sudden change in Iranian behavior, a 
change that would alter four decades of their behavior in the 
region, but they want to get at it through one tool and they 
want a general calming in the region and that is to everybody's 
good. They did not go into this because we pressured them. This 
was a sovereign decision on their own.
    Senator Young. Just very briefly because I have got other 
colleagues who want to ask questions, how has this in your mind 
altered our--and how will it alter our diplomatic posture of 
the Department in the region?
    Ambassador Leaf. It will not. It does not alter our 
posture. I mean, this is something--this is a detente agreement 
that may have a relaxing effect on the region, may be short 
lived. It does not--it does not alter our own very robust 
engagement with all of our Gulf partners, including the Saudis.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Let me thank both of you.
    I want to follow up on the chairman's point on U.S. values. 
Both of you have said that our foreign policy and your--our aid 
needs to be wrapped in our values and to protect human rights.
    The chairman, I think, raised a very valid point of whether 
that is true in Tunisia. I am going to--he sort of wanted to 
give up on Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I am not.
    Senator Murphy. I am not giving up.
    Senator Cardin. Okay, but let me talk about Egypt first 
because we have had it looks like a running battle with the 
Administration on Egypt on conditionality of aid.
    Last year there was a disagreement between the 
Administration and those of us in Congress on meeting the 
conditions of conditionality, but one thing is clear. There was 
some progress made. Five hundred prisoners were released, but 
at the same time, 750 were detained, so the net was actually 
more political prisoners than the year before.
    Conditionality brought this to the attention. Can you 
explain to me that if we are wrapping our foreign policy in our 
values, why you are not suggesting conditionality in our 
assistance to Egypt?
    Ambassador Leaf. Senator, we abide by the conditions 
obviously set by the Congress, but our going in proposition is 
that we seek unconditioned aid so that we can use it with the 
greatest flexibility.
    I will not disagree with what you cited in terms of the 
numbers of those----
    Senator Cardin. Can I just challenge that for one moment?
    Ambassador Leaf. Please.
    Senator Cardin. One of the advantages of our system of 
government, the separation of branches, that we can use the 
power of both branches working together for the same 
objectives.
    If your objective is for us to advance our values, why 
would you put us in a difficult position? When we disagreed 
last year on some of these issues, you said we worked together. 
We really did not. Why did you not seek help from Congress in 
regards to the budget you submitted?
    Ambassador Leaf. Senator, I would just say that we do each 
have our separate roles. I think the work that the Congress 
does in this space sends a powerful signal to the Egyptian 
Government, but we seek aid, generally speaking, across the 
board. We seek assistance that is unconditioned, that we can 
use flexibly, but we have abided by the conditions that 
Congress has set.
    We have evaluated each year carefully and the Secretary has 
carefully considered the ledger, the record, in making his 
decisions about whether to grant a waiver or not.
    I think we have our respective roles which actually work in 
synchronicity.
    Senator Cardin. Let me move to the second point and that is 
your request for funding to try to promote more regional 
cooperation. The funding sources, you mentioned several, and 
you also--Ms. Pryor mentioned the Abraham Accords.
    Tell me directly where there is funding here to advance the 
expansion of the Abraham Accord-type arrangements. There has 
been some progress made in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Certainly, they are not an Abraham Accord country. We recognize 
that. There has been some progress made there.
    Where in this budget do we see your priorities of expanding 
normalization between countries in the region with Israel?
    Ambassador Leaf. I would offer the following.
    A large part of our activities are in the diplomatic space, 
which just go to our normal operating budget and that is what 
we have used over the course of 2 years to construct the 
frameworks that we have.
    Senator Cardin. You are a former ambassador to UAE. You 
know that UAE's interest in normalizing with Israel is 
complicated, but the economics is certainly a large part of 
that. Where is the economics in your budget to expand the 
Abraham Accords?
    Ambassador Leaf. Well, I do not think--what I am saying is 
if the Congress accords us the Opportunity Fund, I think we 
will draw on that for seed money for things, but we are at the 
starting point in these structures. We are at the starting 
point in some of the things that we have negotiated.
    Special Presidential Envoy Kerry negotiated and helped 
design this Project Prosperity, for instance, which does not 
involve us putting money on the table, but helped design a 
project that is UAE funding to Jordan to set up solar plants, 
providing electricity to Israel, which in turn provides much 
needed water to Jordan and it is things like that that do not 
require direct money from us, but we will identify such 
opportunities along the way. We have a lot going on in the 
diplomatic space that is not yet visible, frankly.
    Senator Cardin. Well, I just want to associate myself with 
the chairman. It, to me, is important that we are visible with 
showing that our foreign policy is based upon our values and I 
think we could have put a much brighter spotlight on human 
rights and on our values on these areas than I see in the 
budget you submitted.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Biden foreign policy, unfortunately, has made America 
less safe in every region of the world, but there is no region 
of the world where it has proven a bigger disaster than the 
Middle East. In every country in the Middle East, America's 
position is worse today than it was 2 years ago.
    Ms. Leaf, I want to focus in particular on Israel and the 
PLO. The United States Congress has determined that the 
Palestine Liberation Organization and its affiliates are a 
terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the 
United States.
    It is written in the United States law 22 U.S. Code Chapter 
61. Do you agree with that assessment?
    Ambassador Leaf. I agree with the assessment. Yes, I do.
    Senator Cruz. Yes. You agree with Congress' assessment that 
the PLO is a terrorist organization?
    Ambassador Leaf. Yes.
    Senator Cruz. Congress, in light of that determination, has 
imposed multiple sanctions on the PLO. One set of sanctions 
prohibits the President from granting visas to PLO leaders to 
enter the United States. Another prohibits Americans from doing 
business with them.
    In October, the Administration waived some of those 
sanctions and went to the Treasury Department to circumvent 
others. You did that specifically to bring the secretary 
general of the PLO to Washington. You held press briefings for 
him with top State Department officials.
    Why did you do that? Why did you bring a terrorist leader 
to the United States?
    Ambassador Leaf. Senator, we have the authority to waive in 
the national interest and we did so.
    Senator Cruz. I did not ask if you had the authority to 
waive. I said why did----
    Ambassador Leaf. We brought the delegation here to the 
United States to have discussions that would go to a number of 
interests that we have that go to Israel's security, frankly.
    Senator Cruz. You were not concerned with the fact that the 
PLO has been determined to be a terrorist organization. You 
were not concerned with the fact that you were violating 
congressional determinations that we should not bring terrorist 
leaders to Washington.
    Instead, you sought a specific waiver and your 
justification--your public justification, which you gave a 
variant of that right now, is that you think we should engage 
with terrorists.
    The problem, Ms. Leaf, is that your strategy is failing and 
it is failing catastrophically. On Friday, you sent a report to 
Congress officially certifying that the Palestinian Authority 
and the PLO, and I am going to quote, that they have not met 
legal requirements for ``terminating payments for acts of 
terrorism against Israeli and U.S. citizens.''
    Now, publicly when the Administration defends engaging with 
terrorists, you claim things are going well, but when you file 
a statutorily mandated report with Congress, you admit the PLO 
is continuing what are called ``pay to slay'' payments.
    They are paying for terrorists to murder Americans and to 
murder Israelis and, nonetheless, this Administration is 
bringing those terrorist leaders to Washington, is bringing 
them to cocktail parties to wine and dine political leaders in 
the Administration, and is also funneling--last year the Biden 
administration--USAID said--USAID--this is another quote--``has 
invested $150 million this past year to empower Palestinians to 
build thriving and resilient communities'' in violation of at 
least the spirit if not the letter of the Taylor Force Act.
    Given that you have now certified to Congress that the PLO 
is continuing to pay terrorists to murder Americans and murder 
Israelis, why is the Administration sending $150 million to 
them?
    Ambassador Leaf. I will let my colleague answer that in a 
moment, but I would like to get to the question you ask that 
goes to the issue of both the engagement here in Washington as 
well as the regular engagements that we have with PA officials.
    We are working to bring ``pay to slay'' to an end, period.
    Senator Cruz. Have you succeeded?
    Ambassador Leaf. Not yet. We are working to do so.
    Senator Cruz. You are still sending them money?
    Ambassador Leaf. We are working to do so.
    Senator Cruz. Are you still sending them money?
    Ambassador Leaf. We do not provide assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority. We have----
    Senator Cruz. Does USAID? Does the Administration?
    Ambassador Leaf. No. Please.
    Senator Cruz. Your testimony is the USAID does not provide 
money to the PLO?
    Ms. Pryor. We do not. We abhor prisoner payments and we 
have raised these concerns repeatedly to the Palestinian 
leadership. We are fully compliant with the Taylor Force Act. 
No money goes to the Palestinian Authority.
    Senator Cruz. Who have you given the $150 million to?
    Ms. Pryor. To support the Palestinian people.
    Senator Cruz. Who got the money? Not to support the 
Palestinians. Like, who specifically deposited the check?
    Ms. Pryor. For example, Palestinian civil society 
organizations to hold the Palestinian Authority accountable----
    Senator Cruz. Is it your testimony that none of the groups 
that you have sent that money to are in any way affiliated with 
the PLO or other terrorist organizations that are paying to 
murder Americans and Israelis? Is that your testimony to this 
committee?
    Ms. Pryor. We work hard to put in place a series of risk 
mitigation measures to prevent the diversion of assistance to 
terrorists and terrorist organizations through partner vetting 
and--
    Senator Cruz. Okay. I am going to try one more time. Is it 
your testimony that the recipients of that money have no 
affiliation with terrorist groups that are paying to murder 
Americans and Israelis?
    Ms. Pryor. Based on the results of our vetting, and when we 
get allegations that suggest otherwise, we investigate them 
carefully and take action as needed.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
both for being here and for your testimony.
    Assistant Secretary Leaf, I would like to begin with you. 
Chairman Murphy mentioned Lebanon in his opening statement and 
I think most of us watching the multiple crises in Lebanon 
believe it is teetering on being a failed state, and I wonder 
if there are more in the way of incentives and disincentives 
that we can and should be doing to address what is happening in 
Lebanon right now. Can you speak to that?
    I would say the one exception to that is the LAF, which is 
the one institution that seems to be functioning in Lebanon. I 
would hope that we are continuing to support their efforts.
    Ambassador Leaf. Thank you, Senator.
    Well, you are absolutely right that the state of Lebanon--
Lebanese society is in a terrible state at this point and it 
was precisely to avoid the prospect which seemed quite real in 
2021 and still seems--feels very real as a prospect to avoid 
the prospect of state collapse.
    We set about a whole series of efforts well beyond 
humanitarian assistance, but that is an important piece of 
this, of course, to buck up the resiliency of the population.
    To your point, we have used a variety of tools. We have 
used in-kind assistance to the LAF and the ISF, which, as you 
say, are two critical state institutions, national 
institutions, cross confessional, which still have a high 
degree of public confidence and support, and they are not, 
perhaps, the last leg standing on this very shaky table, but it 
is getting that way.
    We do regard the direct salary support that Congress has 
been generous enough to approve to be critical to that task of 
keeping them able to do not only their security tasks, but all 
the multiplicity of tasks that have been heaped upon them as 
this crisis has deepened.
    I will let Jeanne talk about the array of programs we have 
underway, but I will just say one other thing--oh, sorry.
    Senator Shaheen. I think rather than programs that we have 
underway, I appreciate that we are doing a number of things to 
address the humanitarian situation. What I want to know is is 
there more that we can be doing that we think might move the 
Lebanese----
    Ambassador Leaf. Move the dial. Yes.
    Senator Shaheen. Yes. The Lebanese Government. That is what 
I want to know.
    Ambassador Leaf. Well, I mean, it is a source of enormous 
frustration, I can tell you, and we are working collaboratively 
with several regional partners, European partners, to push the 
Lebanese parliament to do its job.
    The elected representatives of the Lebanese people have 
failed to do their jobs. The speaker of the parliament has 
failed to hold a session since January to allow members to put 
candidates forward for the presidency, to vote on them up or 
down, and to get to a choice, to get to elect a President who 
will then appoint and----
    Senator Shaheen. Well, so, again, should we be thinking 
about sanctioning some of these players?
    Ambassador Leaf. We are looking at those tools. Yes. We 
are----
    Senator Shaheen. Because there is a big Lebanese diaspora--
I happen to know, I am married to one--in the United States who 
I think could be helpful in pushing, but as long as we continue 
to allow this kind of activity to continue, it is hard to get 
people to provide the kind of pressure from the United States 
that they need. I want to know what else we can do.
    Ambassador Leaf. We--okay. Well, I can assure you, Senator, 
we are engaging with the diaspora. I meet regularly with 
members of the Lebanese parliament who come through town. I put 
heat on them.
    I just heard from a senior member of the parliament 
yesterday asking for some further thoughts. I gave them 
thoughts when they left. I gave them some more thoughts. We 
have other partner governments doing the same thing. It is a 
collective effort.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I hope that we might think about 
what else we can do because what we are doing so far does not 
seem to be working very well.
    I want to move on to al-Hol because you mentioned that, 
Assistant Secretary Leaf, in your opening comments, and the 
National Democracy Institute--NDI--is releasing a report on the 
governance of al-Hol, which finds that camp management and 
local institutions need urgent governance-related assistance to 
facilitate the orderly and safe return of Syrians to 
communities in northeast Syria. Certainly, that is true. Many 
of the other detainees as well.
    CENTCOM Commander Kurilla has made a number of public 
statements about his concerns about what is happening in the 
camp and the potential for terrorists--for us to be really 
cultivating a whole another round of terrorists at that camp.
    Again, I wonder what specifically we are doing to 
facilitate proper governance at the camp.
    Ms. Pryor. We are working closely with the Self 
Administration of North and East Syria (SANES) and the SDF to 
encourage countries to take back their citizens. Most of the 
residents of al-Hol are women and children and every day those 
children remain is another chance for them to get radicalized.
    There has been progress in third country nationals 
returning home and, most notably, the largest percentage of the 
population in the camp are Iraqis and the Iraqi Government has 
begun to brought home some of the families that are in al-Hol.
    We are working closely with the State Department to make 
sure that those families are reintegrated back into their 
communities of origin successfully. We are also looking at 
plans for how we can reintegrate Syrians in al-Hol and have 
them return home to their communities of origin. Between those 
two groups, those are the overwhelming majority of the 
population in the camp.
    Senator Shaheen. In February, Senator Graham and I, along 
with the chair and ranking member of this committee, 
reintroduced the Syria Detainee and Displaced Persons Act to 
empower a senior coordinator to synchronize a whole-of-
government effort to address the growing crises in the camps in 
Syria.
    The role is currently filled by the coordinator for 
counterterrorism, which is a position that remains unfilled due 
largely to the obstruction of members of this committee.
    I would urge the chair and ranking member to encourage the 
full committee to block the hold on that position and to move 
this legislation in a way that is going to be critical if we 
are going to address what needs to happen in that camp.
    Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Joining our subcommittee today, Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, 
and thank you both for your testimony and your service, and I 
want to associate myself with the comments the chairman made in 
his opening.
    Ambassador Leaf, I have a question regarding our efforts to 
secure accountability in the case of the shooting death of 
Shireen Abu Akleh. As you know, she is an American citizen. She 
is a journalist. The President and others have spoken out 
strongly about the importance of protecting journalists, 
especially in conflict zones.
    Your deputy testified in front of this committee on May 4, 
Yael Lempert. She said in response to a question I asked, ``I 
can tell you that we continue to underscore at the level of the 
Secretary of State the importance of accountability in her 
killing and we will continue to do so.''
    Do you endorse and support that statement?
    Ambassador Leaf. I do.
    Senator Van Hollen. As you probably know, I have been 
trying for weeks and weeks now to get a hold of the updated 
summation report done by the General Fenzel, the USSC, 
regarding his--the shooting death of Shireen Abu Akleh.
    I just want to tell you I have run out of patience. I 
expect to be able to view the report wherever you want in a 
classified setting by Friday and I will otherwise use whatever 
powers I have here in ways that I have never done before.
    I am a dear friend of the Foreign Service, but I can tell 
you I am at the end of my rope in terms of a simple request for 
a report.
    Ambassador Leaf. I understand, Senator, and I do apologize 
for the delay and we expect to bring that report forth shortly 
to the committee for your viewing. I do apologize.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, I appreciate that, Madam 
Ambassador. I know how much you have worked on these issues.
    Let me ask you about a recent operation that was conducted 
in the West Bank by an Israeli border security unit that falls 
under the authority of the minister of security, Ben-Gvir, who, 
as you know, has responsibility for the national police and 
border security.
    First, I think it is worth reminding people about Ben-Gvir 
and his history. As I am sure you know, he was previously 
convicted by an Israeli court for racist incitement against 
Palestinian Arabs and for supporting the Jewish supremacist 
Kahanist terror organization, which for some time had been 
designated as a terrorist organization by the United States 
Government.
    He now heads a far right party called ``Jewish Power,'' 
which is the ideological successor to Kahane's party, and he is 
now a member of the Netanyahu cabinet, a very far right 
cabinet.
    He recently participated in the flag march through the old 
city of Jerusalem where marchers chanted, ``Death to Arabs.'' 
You can view it on video.
    He days later visited the Temple Mount al-Haram al-Sharif, 
where he declared, ``We are in charge here in Jerusalem and all 
of the land of Israel,'' a statement where the State Department 
expressed its concern with, ``the provocative visit and the 
accompanied inflammatory rhetoric.''
    This is the individual who is the minister of security and 
I wanted to ask you if you saw this piece that appeared in The 
Washington Post just the other day, headline ``Israeli agents 
conducted raid against militants in civilian area, killing a 
child.'' Did you see that, Madam Ambassador?
    Ambassador Leaf. I saw it, yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. They point out in this very 
detailed article where they examined video evidence that an 
innocent 14-year-old boy was killed in the crossfire in a raid 
that was part of an extrajudicial killing.
    The Washington Post shared its findings with five experts 
in international law, all of whom said that the deadly raid 
appeared to violate the prohibition on extrajudicial killings. 
That is a ``finding'' from the article.
    My question to you is, as you know, the Leahy Law prohibits 
the provision of U.S. security assistance to foreign security 
force units where there is credible information that the unit 
has committed a gross violation of human rights which includes 
extrajudicial killings.
    Has the State Department vetted this unit that is the 
subject of this Washington Post report?
    Ambassador Leaf. I do not know offhand, but I will get you 
an answer, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. If you could, and when you do if you 
could also give me a list of all the other units that have been 
vetted.
    Ambassador Leaf. Absolutely.
    Senator Van Hollen. Both those under the control and 
command of Ben-Gvir, but also those other units in the 
military, and I appreciate that and look forward to your 
response. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Pryor, U.S. aid to the region is pretty heavily focused 
on foreign military sales, but it is the region's young 
population which is a very dynamic one that is going to 
determine the future of the region.
    Talk a little bit about the development goals the U.S. is 
focused on in this region and particularly with respect to 
programs that might affect young people.
    Ms. Pryor. Thank you. Yes, we are deeply concerned that 
half the population of the region is under the age of 30. They 
could be a destructive force or a great force for change. We 
are focusing on the latter.
    We are doing extensive work in getting scholarships to 
needy students in the region, developing their skills to enable 
them to be able to get jobs, and then also there is a real 
entrepreneurial spirit amongst the youth in the region.
    I had the opportunity last fall in Iraq to visit young 
people who are not waiting on the public sector. They are going 
out and starting their own businesses, and so we are working 
hard to try and make sure that they get the technical 
assistance and know-how in setting up a business and then also 
access to financing to make their dreams a reality.
    Also, we are supporting civil society and youth are 
actively engaged in civil society throughout the region, again, 
to help them advocate for change within their own countries. 
Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Secretary Leaf, let me ask you this. The 
President's budget makes a $271 million request for 
partnerships with Iraq and that puts Iraq on par with some of 
our closest global partners.
    Together with the ranking member, Senator Young, and many 
others--Senator Murphy--we have advocated for the repeal of the 
Iraq war authorizations on the grounds that a partner is not an 
enemy and we are now in a position, thank goodness--I mean, it 
is a tribute to both U.S. investment and Iraqi magnanimity--we 
are a partner and Iraq can play--really, is playing and can 
continue to play a really important role in the region.
    If you could talk about the strategic goal for this 
particular request and the partnership--the security 
partnership we have with Iraq, please.
    Ambassador Leaf. Certainly.
    Senator, it is a great question and I will just say I have 
been to Iraq twice in the last 6 or 7 months and even in that 
period I have seen some real dynamic change, change to the good 
much like Jeanne discussed. This sort of economic vitality for 
the first time is really evident in that country, and I have 
been going to Iraq since 2010.
    Strategically, what I would say is our approach to Iraq 
is--Alina Romanowski, our brilliant ambassador out there, puts 
it as it is a 360-degree relationship. It is no longer the 
singular security CT mil-mil relationship. It is full spectrum.
    I also like to think of another analogy, which is that Iraq 
is a keystone state. It is a keystone in the arch of regional 
security and stability. What is good within Iraq in terms of 
its achievement of security, stability, and greater and greater 
sovereignty internal and external, what is good for Iraq then 
becomes good for, certainly, the near neighborhood, but for the 
broader region.
    Our FMF relationship is solid and strong and, I think, over 
the course of time has brought some really significant results 
to the point that we are far away from the days of 2014 when we 
saw that just calamitous collapse of parts of the Iraqi 
Security Forces in the face of waves of ISIS fighters.
    We are a long way from that to the point where the Iraqi 
air force can itself do counter ISIS missions. The Iraqi 
Security Forces can hold territory that they have cleared of 
ISIS fighters. They are a more professional force. They are 
increasingly capable, but we are in it for the long game both 
on the sort of civilian economic side of things and then in 
terms of our security assistance. It is a complex partnership, 
I will say, and things do not change under just one Prime 
Minister or one government.
    We are seeing Iraq lean into the regional integration, 
which is also a hallmark of our approach is to encourage in 
both directions the neighborhood to embrace Iraq and Iraq to 
embrace the neighborhood.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you for that, and just two comments as 
I close.
    We have now gone more than 2 years without a Senate-
confirmed counterterrorism coordinator even as terrorism 
networks grow and expand around the globe, and they remain a 
threat not only to our partners, but to the United States, to 
Israel, many other nations.
    The nominee for the position--the Biden administration's 
nominee, Elizabeth Richard, is a highly qualified FSO. This 
committee has cleared her twice, once in the 117th Congress and 
now again in the 118th, and I would really hope we could get 
her confirmed on the floor because this is a bill that is very 
important.
    Then, lastly, if I could just say to you, Secretary Leaf, I 
am really worried about Hezbollah's networks in Latin America. 
I am the chair of the Americas Subcommittee so I spend a lot of 
time in the Americas.
    As I do I hear more and more and more about activities of 
Hezbollah and other Middle East-based organizations--terrorist 
organizations--and they are getting--their level of activity in 
the Americas is picking up.
    I would just encourage coordination between your section 
and Assistant Secretary Nichols.
    Ambassador Leaf. I will certainly do so.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    The ranking member and I will ask a few final questions in 
a short second round. I will turn it over to Senator Young to 
start.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to ask a 
couple of questions about Yemen since I have you both here. 
Probably not a surprise for those repeat visitors.
    The United States, we have been the extensive provider of 
humanitarian assistance amidst the conflicts in Yemen and in 
recent years. If a stable and verifiable peace agreement were 
to manifest itself in Yemen, what immediate steps is the 
Department and USAID preparing to take to get a potential new 
era of Yemen's history off to the right start?
    Ambassador Leaf. Thank you, Senator. I will speak first to 
the diplomatic efforts and then I will ask Jeanne to jump in on 
the assistance side.
    This has been a 2-plus-year, almost 2\1/2\-year quest. When 
the Administration took office, of course, there was a raging 
war. There were myriad attacks every day on Saudi Arabia and 
eventually on the UAE as well coming from the Houthi and these 
were complex attacks that were almost impossible to defend 
against, given the use of drones and rockets and missiles and 
so forth.
    With a lot of hard work--diplomatic work--coupled with the 
U.N. envoy, the Saudis, and so forth, we were able to 
collectively drive to a truce in April of last year, which has 
not miraculously, but has held through hard, hard work 
principally by the Saudis and buttressed by the work of the 
Omanis, the UAE to some degree, but, of course, our own great 
envoy, Tim Lenderking, our mission in the field.
    The Saudis are conceivably in the end game of their 
discussions to take their discussions with--their negotiations 
with the Houthi from this bilateral channel to flip it to the 
UN.
    The UN Envoy, Hans Grundberg, was here last week. We had 
intensive consultations with him. He is charting out the work 
that he will do on the other side. I know, having spoken to one 
of our Gulf partners, they are eager to host these talks that 
would be Yemeni-Yemeni talks.
    We--suffice to say we are--our sleeves are already rolled 
up, ready to plunge in and this would be UN-mediated, but U.S.-
assisted and we would bring in other partners as needed.
    Senator Young. Ms. Pryor.
    Ms. Pryor. Unfortunately, we had to pull out--our 
assistance out of the north because we were no longer able to 
assure that assistance could not be diverted to terrorist 
organizations.
    If there were a durable peace agreement, one of the first 
things that we would do--and this is where the Opportunity Fund 
that we requested would be invaluable to us--is we would want 
to move back into the north to help those communities recover 
from conflict.
    Senator Young. The money would be used to help those 
communities that were otherwise engaged in terrorist activities 
or threatening activities towards their neighbors begin 
economic activity and sustain themselves. Maybe you could tease 
out what you intend to use them for.
    Ms. Pryor. We would need to be mindful and we do use 
partner vetting in Yemen because we would not still want our 
assistance to go to any terrorist or terrorist organizations in 
the north.
    For example, we could help women set up small businesses, 
ensure there is primary health care for children. Those are 
just a couple of examples.
    Ambassador Leaf. I would also add, Senator Young, that it 
would be our full expectation--and not just expectation, we 
know this would be the case--we would turn to our GCC partners 
for their stabilization and development assistance as well.
    Senator Young. Okay. If you could continue to keep me 
posted, especially if we see a longer-term agreement being 
struck in this area about the sort of preparations you are 
taking and, as importantly, the assistance you might require 
from the Hill, I would really appreciate that.
    Ambassador Leaf. Absolutely.
    Senator Young. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
    Two final questions from me.
    Fred Wehrey, who knows more about Libya than most anybody 
else in this town, has an interesting piece from last month in 
Foreign Policy and it is entitled ``Why is not the U.S. in 
Libya?'', subtitled ``Outside powers take a growing interest in 
this oil-rich African state where the U.S. Embassy has been 
closed since 2014.''
    Ambassador Leaf, the budget request includes a request for 
a 6.6 percent increase in worldwide security protection dollars 
for additional local guard forces and the potential resumption 
of a diplomatic presence inside Libya.
    Obviously, we have been trying to supplement from Tunisia 
our activities and diplomatic efforts in Libya, but it does 
seem time that we bring back a physical presence there. Can you 
just update us on progress?
    Ambassador Leaf. Absolutely. I would say we are making good 
progress. I am not going to put down a timeframe yet, but we 
are moving in that direction.
    I will just say that our--my staff in the Libya external 
office, temporarily resident in Tunis gets over to Libya at 
least once if not several times a month. I went there myself in 
March and overnighted in Tripoli and had a day in Benghazi, as 
well. The security conditions are never as quite solid as you 
think they are. We had a reflection of that over the weekend.
    Nonetheless, we think the security conditions are moving 
exactly in the direction where we could put a persistent 
presence. Certainly, lots of our European friends and regional 
partners are there.
    What I was gratified to see as I made the rounds--and I 
went all over Tripoli and Benghazi to see sort of all the local 
chieftains, if you will, as well as some people outside 
government--what I was struck by was how well-known and liked 
my staff were in Tripoli and Benghazi, how much our counsel was 
sought. There is a hunger for us to be back and I am eager to 
get us back on the ground.
    Senator Murphy. That is good news. I think you are right. 
We have enormous influence and leverage there made much easier 
by an embassy reopening. I look forward to continuing to work 
with you on that.
    A final question is this. Senator Cardin was asking 
questions about the expansion of the Abraham Accords. There has 
been plenty of open source reporting about early talks or early 
interest being expressed by Saudi Arabia in some normalization 
process.
    Those reports have included a list of requests that the 
Saudis have made of us as a condition of normalization. I am 
not asking you to get into the details of those talks today. 
Undeniably, a normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia 
and Israel would be a pivotal and immensely positive 
development, in many ways a sort of certification of a detente 
that has been underway for years. We should be actively engaged 
in trying to help make that happen.
    One of the requests that have been reported in open source 
reporting is that the Saudis are seeking a defense guarantee 
from the United States--some kind of security guarantee--and I 
guess the only question I would ask right now is to simply 
confirm that any security or defense guarantee provided to 
Saudi Arabia would be submitted to Congress for ratification. 
That is, obviously, something that cannot be done without 
congressional consent.
    Ambassador Leaf. You are absolutely right, and without 
getting into the details of private discussions to date, we are 
very mindful of the sort of the right and left limits of what 
becomes a treaty versus something else.
    Let me just offer a couple of comments, though. There is a 
lot of misreporting and a lot of hyperventilation in the press, 
a lot of excitable rumint, I would say, in the press, 
especially in the Israeli press.
    I mean, they are just electric with the idea that Saudi 
Arabia might take that step, and I would say there is no 
question that is an end goal for us that we bring Saudi Arabia 
and Israel together.
    We would love to bring the entire region in that direction, 
but, clearly, Saudi Arabia is a real mover in that space and I 
think it is fair to say that the Crown Prince has been very 
candid with folks outside of government, Americans and others--
that that is very much on his mind.
    He has a lot of other things in play, a lot of other balls 
in the air, mostly related to Vision 2030, but that is clearly 
something that he has got in mind as a step he wants to move 
to.
    There are a lot of things in the mix in that space, and 
just as with other countries we see plenty of space to get 
things done even before normalization were to be achieved and 
those are in the realm of people to people, sports, 
educational, cultural, just a gradual opening up and relaxation 
of what heretofore were criminalized activities between Saudis 
and Israelis.
    Of course, we not only worked to get done a really 
important piece, which was opening airspace for Israeli 
airliners, but we got the end piece opened as well, which is 
Oman's airspace.
    Even with two countries that do not have formal relations, 
there is a lot of room there to work.
    Senator Murphy. I appreciate that response. Full or partial 
security assurances should not be given, and are not given, 
lightly.
    Ambassador Leaf. No, I understand that. Yes.
    Senator Murphy. I think this committee would have a lot to 
say about whether the conduct of Saudi Arabia over the course 
of the last 5-10 years has merited that kind of commitment. I 
look forward to continuing to be in a discussion with you about 
this broader topic.
    I think that is it for testimony. I appreciate our 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle for being with us today. 
Really important topic.
    We are going to keep the record open until the close of 
business Friday, and with that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


           Responses of Ambassador Barbara Leaf to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. Amidst serious and enduring repression, Egypt is 
scheduled to hold presidential elections in 2024. Does the 
Administration intend to fund any election monitoring or other 
initiatives connected to the upcoming elections in Egypt? If so, why is 
the Administration choosing to invest in the elections process given 
the impossibility of having a free and fair election without drastic 
reforms to existing laws and policies on free expression, free 
association, and free assembly in the country?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration does not intend to fund any 
election monitoring initiatives in connection with the upcoming 
Egyptian elections.

    Question. Please explain if any U.S. assistance is currently 
funding or will be funding the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, Ministry 
of Justice or National Police. If U.S. funding is going to any of these 
entities, please detail the nature of the assistance and why the United 
States is funding these bodies, given their central and influential 
role in carrying out Tunisian President Kais Saied's alarming 
repression.

    Answer. We share concerns over the Tunisian Government's troubling 
escalation against political opponents and perceived critics. While 
U.S. assistance to Tunisia has decreased since July 25, 2021, we 
provide targeted support to the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
Justice, and National Police, strictly focused on the vital national 
interests of protecting U.S. citizens, diplomatic personnel and 
facilities, and countering terrorism, while promoting accountability 
and the rule of law.
                                 ______
                                 

           Responses of Ambassador Barbara Leaf to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. In Senator Van Hollen's questioning, he referenced a 
Washington Post investigation that ``shared its findings with five 
experts in international law, all of who said the deadly raid appeared 
to violate the prohibition on extrajudicial killings.'' A unit known as 
``Yamam'' in Israel's border police conducted the raid. When asked by 
the Senator whether this unit has been vetted pursuant to the Leahy 
Law, Ass. Sec. Leaf confirmed that ``I'll get you an answer.'' Given 
the evidence presented by The Washington Post, has the State Department 
determined if it should vet this unit to determine whether providing it 
with U.S. assistance would violate the Leahy Law?

    Answer. The Department is aware of The Washington Post article 
detailing recent operations by Israeli security forces. I understand 
Israel is investigating the incident; we continue to urge 
investigations into all such operations that result in civilian 
casualties, in order to ensure accountability if a gross violation of 
human rights has occurred and to prevent similar events in the future. 
The Department has a process to assess whether any Israeli security 
force units are ineligible for security assistance, consistent with the 
Leahy Law, and public reports of alleged violations are considered 
during this process. As part of this ongoing process, a list of any 
units assessed to be ineligible will be transmitted to Congress 
consistent with the Leahy law, which requires such list be transmitted 
regularly to the recipient government and Congress.

    Question. Have other Israeli units been vetted, or are any 
currently being vetted, under the Leahy provision? If so, please 
describe the outcome of each such case. How many, if any, have been 
deemed ineligible for U.S. security assistance?

    Answer. The United States concluded a Leahy Ineligible Unit 
Agreement with Israel in December 2021. The Department has established 
procedures to develop a list of any ineligible Israeli security forces 
and will provide any such list of units assessed as ineligible to the 
Government of Israel and transmit any such list to Congress, consistent 
with the Leahy law.

    Question. How many Israeli or Egyptian units, if any, have been 
remediated pursuant to the State & DoD joint remediation policy for 
U.S. security assistance due to Egypt and/or Israel ``taking effective 
steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to 
justice?''
    According to the State Department's 2022 Human rights report, in 
Egypt there are ``credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, 
including extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents . . . 
torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment by the government . . . '' A Human Rights Watch 
investigation from 2021 noted that evidence they examined of 14 
individuals killed by Egyptian security forces during multiple raids 
were probable extrajudicial executions. An Amnesty International report 
cites four videos posted online between July and August 2022 depicting 
potential extrajudicial execution of three unarmed men in custody by 
the military and affiliated tribal militias in North Sinai.

    Answer. To date, the Secretary has not determined that any 
otherwise ineligible Egyptian or Israeli security forces unit should be 
remediated on the basis of those governments ``taking effective steps 
to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to 
justice.''

    Question. Given the evidence presented by Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, has the State Department determined if it should 
vet these units to determine whether providing them with U.S. 
assistance would violate the Leahy Law?

    Answer. Yes, the Department is currently engaged in a review. 
Globally, the Department reviews allegations of gross violations of 
human rights (GVHR) by security force units that receive U.S. foreign 
security assistance, to assess whether such security force units are 
credibly implicated in a GVHR and whether the government is taking 
effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces 
unit to justice.

    Question. Have other Egyptian units been vetted, or are any 
currently being vetted, under the Leahy provision? If so, please 
describe the outcome of each such case. How many, if any, have been 
deemed ineligible for U.S. security assistance?

    Answer. The Department continues to regularly vet Egyptian security 
forces units that are identified as potential recipients of applicable 
assistance. The Department makes publicly available, to the maximum 
extent practicable, an annual list of units from which it withheld 
assistance pursuant to the Leahy law. To date, no Egyptian security 
force unit has appeared on these lists. A unit's absence from the 
public list does not mean a given unit is eligible for applicable 
assistance.

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