[Senate Hearing 118-60]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-60

                      THE GLOBAL INFORMATION WARS: 
                     IS THE U.S. WINNING OR LOSING?

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE
                          DEPARTMENT AND USAID
                       MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL
                       OPERATIONS, AND BILATERAL
                       INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 3, 2023

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       


                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-054 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          


           SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT AND USAID        
           MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, AND        
              BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      RAND PAUL, Kentucky

                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     1

Hagerty, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................     3

Bennett, Hon. Amanda, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Agency for 
  Global Media, Washington, DC...................................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

Brandt, Jessica, Policy Director, Artificial Intelligence and 
  Emerging Technology Initiative, Brookings Institution, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    24
    Prepared Statement...........................................    27

Walker, Christopher, Vice President for Studies and Analysis, 
  National 
  Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC........................    32
    Prepared Statement...........................................    34

Stilwell, Hon. David, Fox Fellow for Future Pacing Threats, Air 
  Force Academy Institute for Future Conflict, Former Assistant 
  Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............    38
    Prepared Statement...........................................    40

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Amanda Bennett to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Bill Hagerty...................................................    84

                                 (iii)

 
                     THE GLOBAL INFORMATION WARS: 
                     IS THE U.S. WINNING OR LOSING?

                              ----------                              


                         WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 2023

                               U.S. Senate,
        Subcommittee on State Department and USAID 
Management, International Operations, and Bilateral 
                         International Development,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m., in 
room 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. 
Cardin, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Kaine, Booker, 
Hagerty, Ricketts, and Barrasso.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Cardin. The subcommittee on State Department and 
USAID Management, International Operations and Bilateral 
International Development of the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee will come to order.
    Let me welcome our guests. We are here today to talk about 
global information wars. Is the United States winning or 
losing? This is our second hearing of our subcommittee, and I 
want to thank Senator Hagerty, my ranking member, for the help 
in putting together this important oversight hearing.
    We believe that oversight is one of the most important 
functions of our subcommittee. Our first hearing was on the 
USAID, on localization and building up local capacity. This 
hearing will be on the U.S. Agency for Global Media, USAGM, and 
I might acknowledge this is the first opportunity that we have 
our new leader of the agency appearing before this committee, 
and we look forward to your views and a discussion as to how 
the recent changes in law has affected the ability of the 
agency to perform its mission.
    Today, we will turn our attention to USAGM and the topic of 
global information wars, with the goal of identifying ways in 
which the USAGM and its affiliated organizations can operate 
more effectively in the context of competition for influence in 
global information space.
    With malign actors like China, and Russia, Iran, and Cuba 
elevating their efforts to use disinformation and propaganda to 
basically try to co-opt the knowledge of their own people in 
their own country and around the world. Questions whether the 
peoples of the world can any longer tell fact from fiction, 
news from lies.
    USAGM reaches 410 million viewers worldwide on a weekly 
basis through information sources from two federal 
organizations, the Voice of America, and the Office of Cuba 
Broadcasting, and four nonprofit organizations that are 
grantees, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the 
Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Open Technology 
Fund.
    These organizations have spent decades earning the 
credibility of local audiences worldwide. Behind the USAGM 
brands are clearly established and strongly enforced rules that 
the information provided to the public is unbiased and honest. 
When propaganda and disinformation jam the information seers, 
populations worldwide know they can turn to USAGM outlets for 
valid and trustworthy information.
    Countries, including Russia and China, deploy immense 
resources to wage global information campaigns, attempting to 
shape the narratives of their actions to their advantage, most 
often by twisting the truth or deflecting attention to distract 
the public from their true goals.
    Russia's blatant disregard for the truth, including by 
conducting disinformation campaigns and spamming content feeds 
with narratives from the paid troll farms, creates a muddied 
information environment in which it is incredibly difficult for 
the average citizen to differentiate between fact and fiction.
    Russia's state-directed media and diplomatic account online 
operated deliberative, coordinated effort to spread propaganda 
that aims to justify or deflect blame from their ongoing 
unprovoked violence against Ukraine. They continue to broadcast 
this propaganda worldwide, including in Latin America and 
Africa.
    In many of these areas that contain both U.S. partners and 
friends of Moscow, public opinion about the conflict is still 
an unresolved competition area open for shifting influence. 
China's large scale propaganda campaigns spread by pro-Beijing 
content worldwide, dismiss its true intentions.
    China regularly sets up alliances with international media 
organizations providing free content to feed to local 
populations, often with strings attached contracts that 
prohibit these organizations from using content from credible 
news sources. In exchange for kickbacks to corrupt individuals 
that sign these contracts, the citizens of these countries are 
denied access to quality and credible information.
    It is at this challenging environment that we are here 
today to examine the critical role of USAGM, operating within 
the context in which global players like Russia and China are 
actively attempting to misinform the public for their own gain. 
It is through this hearing that we hope to better understand 
the global context in which the competition for influence is 
underway.
    The challenges this presents to USAGM in disseminating its 
news products, and the way in which USAGM can improve its work. 
We look forward to the witnesses. We have two panels today. Let 
me first yield to Senator Hagerty.

                STATEMENT OF HON. BILL HAGERTY, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. It is great to 
be with you today here, and I am looking forward to talking 
with our distinguished panel of witnesses. First, if I might, 
open by introducing for the record an attachment here.
    It is going to accompany the written statement that Dr. 
David Stilwell, is a Fox Fellow for Future Pacing Threats, 
Institute of Future Conflict in the U.S. Air Force Academy, and 
a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific 
Affairs, as provided. I might enter that for the record. It 
will be useful later.
    Senator Cardin. Without objection. It will be part of the 
record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in ATCH 2 within the ``Prepared Statement of Mr. David 
Stilwell'' section of this hearing.]

    Senator Hagerty. Chairman Cardin, first of all, again, 
thank you for convening this hearing today. I also want to 
recognize our two panels of witnesses who graciously agreed to 
join us, and we look forward to hearing from them today. In the 
age of rapid technological change and digital connectivity, the 
United States faces unprecedented challenges, competing with 
formidable opponents such as China and Russia.
    Today, our subcommittee is focusing on the topic of 
information wars. Is the United States winning or losing? The 
hearing title itself inherently prompts a series of related 
questions. What does winning look like? What are our 
adversaries' goals in promoting their narrative and story to a 
domestic or to an international audience?
    How serious is the threat of disinformation from China and 
Russia to U.S. interests? What specific tactics are these 
countries using to spread disinformation? For the sake of this 
hearing, is the United States Government doing enough to ensure 
that there is efficient oversight and support of our public 
institutions to compete in this space?
    U.S. Agency for Global Media is positioned to play a vital 
role in this fight by promoting American ideals across the 
world. However, USAGM and its affiliates in this regard have at 
times fallen short of its mission.
    Additionally, USAGM faces external challenges, including 
the rise of new technologies and social media platforms that 
have made it easier for our adversaries to spread 
disinformation and sow division among our citizens. It is time 
that we think about the information space as a critical line of 
effort and strategic competition.
    We need tailored messaging and programing developed from 
people who do not apologize for America and know that America 
is the most exceptional nation in the history of the world.
    As ranking member of the subcommittee, I am committed to 
ensuring that the USAGM receives the proper oversight to 
effectively and efficiently carry out its work. Today's hearing 
provides an opportunity to examine the USAGM's operations, 
identify areas for improvement, and assess strategies for 
countering the information warfare tactics of our adversaries.
    To put it bluntly, we cannot allow the United States to 
fall behind our adversaries in the information wars, and we 
must innovate and continue to support independent journalism 
and promote free and open sources of information.
    We cannot afford to have a USAGM that is performing sub-
optimally. The stakes are simply too high. I look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses today and working together to 
strengthen America's position in this space. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back to you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Senator Hagerty. Our first 
witness is Amanda Bennett, who is the CEO of the U.S. Agency 
for Global Media. She served as Director of the Voice of 
America from 2016-2020.
    Previously, she was the Executive Editor of Bloomberg News, 
Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, Editor of the Herald-
Leader in Lexington, Kentucky, and managing editor of The 
Oregonian in Portland, Oregon.
    Ms. Bennett also worked as The Wall Street Journal reporter 
for 23 years. She is, in one word, a highly regarded 
professional journalists. It is a pleasure to have you here. 
Your full statement will be made part of the record. You may 
proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. AMANDA BENNETT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, U.S. 
            AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Bennett. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member 
Hagerty, and the other members of the subcommittee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to speak to you today about the U.S. Agency 
for Global Media's work on the front lines of the global 
information war. First, Chairman Cardin, on behalf of our 
entire agency, thank you for your steadfast support of 
independent media.
    Throughout the years, your tireless advocacy has enabled 
our networks to continue their crucial work, and we wish you 
the very best and know that the Senate will not be the same 
without you.
    As many of you know, through the work of our six entities, 
the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio 
Free Asia, Middle East Broadcasting Networks, the Office of 
Cuba Broadcasting, and the Open Technology Fund, USAGM provides 
fact-based news and information to parts of the world that do 
not have a free and open press.
    If I may, I would like to play a quick video that shows 
what we do.
    [Video media playing.]
    Ms. Bennett. Thank you very much. Today on World Press 
Freedom Day, I would like to also extend our thanks to the 
Administration for the strong statement that was made in 
support of a free press, and also to advocate on behalf of 
imprisoned journalists around the world like Evan Gershkovich, 
in Russia right now, according to The Wall Street Journal.
    As all of this shows, we are at a critical moment in 
history. As we speak, the People's Republic of China, Russia, 
and Iran are making heavy investments to both control the flow 
of information inside their countries, and rapidly expand their 
malign influence abroad.
    Equally troubling, they often work together to amplify this 
malign influence on a global scale. The reality is that if we 
miss this opportunity to make strategic investments now, we may 
run the risk of losing the global information war. We should be 
alarmed about this, but still optimistic.
    Alarmed because we are being vastly outspent, but 
optimistic because we still have the competitive advantage. We 
have measurable data showing that our networks are 
outperforming the PRC and Russia in many key markets. Make no 
mistake, this is a moment that USAGM was built for, as it was 
during World War II and the Cold War, to combat malign foreign 
influence.
    In times of crisis, audiences seek us out from their closed 
environments, and they trust us to report the truth, especially 
when it is a truth their own governments would prefer to hide. 
The legislative firewall, which ensures the editorial 
independence of our broadcasters, is essential to our high 
trust and credibility. It is not too late for us to secure this 
competitive advantage.
    In China, the PRC has built one of the most repressive 
information environments in the world, and it has been working 
hard to export this model to other countries, but despite the 
PRC's best efforts, VOA is still vastly outperforming the reach 
of PRC's local language brands in Latin America and Africa. 
Inside China, our audiences are willing to go to great lengths 
to reach our content.
    Even in the context of the PRC sophisticated internet 
censorship, Radio Free Asia's coverage of the 2022 protests in 
China broke records for web traffic and social media 
engagement, and the Open Technology Fund is critical to the 
success.
    Our newest grantee supports virtual public networks, VPNs, 
in China, which right now help over 4 million monthly active 
users securely access the internet and our journalism. When 
Russia invaded Ukraine, the Kremlin quickly silenced dissenting 
voices inside of Russia, while rapidly expanding its malign 
influence abroad.
    Equipped with OTF supported tools and by translating 
coverage in real-time, USAGM was able to take the work of RFE/
RL and VOA's brave journalists on the ground in Ukraine and 
expose the horrible reality of Putin's war for the rest of the 
world to see. Remarkably, we are also reaching a growing 
audience in and near Russia.
    In fact, RFE/RL and VOA video content in Russian and 
Ukrainian was viewed 8 billion times in the year since the 
full-scale invasion, more than double the year before. The 
crucial reporting, however, did not come without grave risks, 
and tragically last year, RFE/RL's Vera Gyrych paid the 
ultimate price for her commitment to sharing the truth, no 
matter how dangerous.
    In Iran, the government is escalating its crackdown of 
independent media and its own citizens as it continues malign 
foreign influence operations, but that did not stop VOA and 
RFE/RL journalists from fearlessly covering the historic 
protests that followed Mahsa Amini's death in 2022, with record 
audience numbers.
    Even as the Iranian regime severely blocked the internet 
during these protests, one-in-four Iranian adults used OTF-
supported circumvention tools to access information. Our true 
power lies in our ability to harness the reach of the entire 
USAGM network for greater global impact.
    We know that even the very best journalism is of no use if 
people cannot see it or hear it. With the support of Congress 
for our Fiscal Year 2024 budget request of $944 million, USAGM 
will continue to find new ways to reach audiences, improve our 
infrastructure from digital security to physical safety, lead 
new forms of engaging content, and leverage this global reach.
    Through a growing network of over 4,000 media partners, we 
are positioned to serve larger audiences around the world for 
just pennies per person. With our size and scalable impact 
worldwide, our work represents a powerful investment.
    We are more committed than ever to delivering on our 
mission in today's dangerous world of information manipulation 
and heavy investment by authoritarian regimes, and we cannot do 
that without the support of Congress. Chairman Cardin, Ranking 
Member Hagerty, and members of the subcommittee, thank you 
again. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Bennett follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Amanda Bennett

                              introduction
    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Hagerty, and distinguished members 
of the Subcommittee: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss U.S. 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM)'s work on the frontlines of the global 
information war as authoritarian regimes like the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), Russia, and Iran deepen their efforts to block the free 
flow of information and spread malign influence.
    Our agency provides accurate, objective, and professional news and 
information to parts of the world that do not have a free and open 
press. As a journalist by training, I often explain our mission by 
saying we export the First Amendment.
    The history of U.S. international media spans more than 80 years, 
starting with the creation of Voice of America's first radio show 
during World War II. Since then, U.S. international media has evolved 
from its origins in radio to include a full spectrum of modern delivery 
methods. Whether on radio, television, or online--from satellite 
streams to Telegram accounts--we meet our audiences where they are. In 
fact, 410 million people in over 100 countries turn to us every week 
for news and information in 63 languages.
    We meet our mission through the work of six entities: Voice of 
America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the Office of 
Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), Radio Free Asia (RFA), the Middle East 
Broadcasting Networks (MBN), and the Open Technology Fund (OTF). Each 
USAGM network contributes to our mission by fulfilling a unique role in 
their respective markets. VOA provides comprehensive regional and world 
news to local audiences, while also covering the United States in all 
its complexity. RFE/RL, RFA, and OCB act as surrogate broadcasters, 
providing access to professional and fact-based regional and local news 
in their markets. MBN serves as a hybrid of the two models, providing 
accurate and comprehensive news about the region and the United States. 
OTF, our newest grantee, works to advance internet freedom worldwide, 
enabling audiences to access and share independent news, and empowering 
our journalists to do their jobs in the face of repressive censorship 
and surveillance.
            a critical moment in the global information war
    We are at an inflection point. Authoritarian regimes are using 
malign influence, disinformation, propaganda, and information 
manipulation to close the flow of information and undermine those 
seeking fact-based information about the world around them. The 
governments of the PRC, Iran, and Russia often work together to amplify 
their malign influence, obscure the facts, and cause confusion on a 
global scale.
    If we miss this opportunity to target investments to counter 
inroads Russia, the PRC, and Iran are making, we run the risk of losing 
the global information war. Right now, we have a head start in many 
markets due to the credible and unbiased information we provide, but 
these next 2 years will be absolutely critical. We should be alarmed, 
but optimistic--alarmed because we are being vastly outspent, but 
optimistic because the quality and impact of our investments is great 
and we still have a chance to secure our competitive advantage if we 
act now.
    This is a moment that USAGM was built for, as it was during World 
War II and the Cold War, to combat malign foreign influence. While the 
governments of China, Russia, and Iran expand state-sponsored 
propaganda not only in their own countries but also into regions 
including Latin America, South and Central Asia, and Africa--USAGM, 
with over 4,000 media partners around the world, is well-positioned to 
counter this authoritarian influence offensive. We have measurable data 
showing we are outperforming PRC and Russian state-controlled media in 
many key markets. And USAGM's credibility and trust with our audiences 
are high because we tell the truth. It is not too late for us to secure 
our competitive advantage.
    To stay competitive in the 21st century, USAGM will continue to 
find new ways to reach audiences, improve our infrastructure from 
digital security to physical safety, lead new forms of engaging content 
and build on what is already working, and leverage the reach of each 
individual network for greater global impact. By leveraging our global 
media partnerships, we can continue to expand the delivery of fact-
based journalism to larger audiences around the world for just pennies 
per person. USAGM represents a powerful investment that continues to 
show an outsized and scalable impact across the globe. By maximizing 
the best use of available resources and the talent of our journalists 
and staff, USAGM remains committed to meeting our mission at a time 
when it is more important than ever.
            countering malign foreign influence from the prc
    Under the PRC's rule, mainland China's media environment is one of 
the most restricted in the world and the PRC Government has been 
working hard to export this model to other countries. Within mainland 
China, the government exercises near-total control over both mass media 
and the internet, through a sophisticated system of content blocking, 
filtering, and surveillance.
    Outside its borders, the PRC is deliberately and effectively 
extending its reach far beyond the Indo-Pacific, and rapidly moving 
into Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and 
Eastern Europe. In Latin America for example, the PRC Government is 
conducting extensive marketing campaigns and offering media executives 
lavish trips to China to promote placement of PRC-controlled media 
content. In Africa, the PRC is installing low-cost satellite dishes to 
provide poor and rural citizens with limited, government-controlled 
programming. The energy with which the PRC Government drove its Belt 
and Road expansion a decade ago is now being replicated in the 
information space to spread malign influence broadly and deeply.
    Despite operating with only a fraction of the budget of the PRC's 
state-controlled media, USAGM's networks have made significant gains in 
getting information to audiences in China and diaspora communities 
outside of the country, and bolstering media partners in regions 
targeted by the PRC. VOA and RFA broadcast in Mandarin, Cantonese, 
Uyghur, and Tibetan, providing a variety of news, political and 
cultural programming as well as English-language instruction. VOA's 
English-language fact-checking project, Polygraph, includes a website 
dedicated to producing videos and articles in Mandarin to confront PRC 
disinformation efforts and present evidence to debunk falsehoods. 
Similarly, in 2022, RFA launched the Asia Fact Check Lab, a project in 
both English and Mandarin that monitors and fact-checks the PRC's false 
narratives and misinformation campaigns.
    VOA and RFA represent some of the only sources of credible 
information for people living in China, while OTF increases their 
access to information--and their combined impact is powerful. Audiences 
in China yearn for a comprehensive, uncensored view of China, the U.S., 
and the world. Chinese citizens often express gratitude when VOA and 
RFA cover events the PRC Government would prefer to hide or distort, 
including the 2022 protests against the PRC Government's zero-COVID 
policy. Last year, RFA's timely coverage of these protests broke 
records for web traffic and social media engagement. RFA experienced 
historic surges on social media, as RFA Mandarin gained 75,000 new 
followers on Twitter between November 24 and December 1, 2022 and saw a 
233 percent increase in traffic from mobile Google searches. RFA 
Cantonese's Facebook video views increased by 10 times in 1 week alone. 
One RFA Mandarin Service video showing these protests was viewed over 4 
million times on Twitter.
    The PRC's state-controlled media presence is expanding across 
Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, and RFE/RL's journalists 
increasingly witness and report on growing connectivity between 
disinformation from the PRC and Russia. From Serbia and Hungary, to 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and inside Russia itself, they cover Beijing's 
growing military, technological, and investment footprint across the 
region. RFE/RL is also working with RFA to uncover the PRC's newest 
online censorship methodologies and find ways to counter them before 
they are widely adopted.
    Audiences in China are also intensely interested in coverage of 
U.S.-China relations. When former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi 
traveled to Taiwan last year, VOA Mandarin received over 4 million 
pageviews on their website in 1 week as the network live-streamed the 
speech, interviewed former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and several 
Senators from both sides of the aisle, and published articles with in-
depth analysis. This type of coverage is a window into the U.S. and the 
world for many: one loyal audience member described how she started 
listening to VOA's Mandarin Service on a shortwave radio in 2001 and 
continues to listen to this day through the network's digital 
platforms.
    Our audiences in China show that they not only prefer USAGM network 
content, but also that they are willing to go to great lengths to 
overcome the ``Great Firewall'' to reach that content. For example, 
last year VOA's Mandarin Service content on YouTube earned nearly 
double the video views as the PRC's CCTV. When thinking about our 
impact, we must consider that the PRC has the most sophisticated 
internet censorship in the world. OTF supports leading VPNs in China, 
which help over 4 million monthly active users protect their privacy 
while they access the internet.
            countering malign foreign influence from russia
    Russian President Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine 
sparked the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. The 
war's consequences reverberated around the world, bringing the global 
information war into sharp focus. For many in our audience, the full-
scale invasion forced them to question their entire worldview. As the 
Kremlin consolidated power, eliminated opposition, and silenced 
dissenting voices inside of Russia, it also launched wide-ranging 
malign influence operations abroad, with a specific focus on Russian 
speakers in its immediate region. It is in this context that USAGM's 
role in providing fact-based, independent, and reliable reporting to 
the Russian public, to Ukrainians, and to people across the globe 
became even more important. Through coordination and collaboration to 
share and translate war coverage in real time, USAGM continues to 
leverage the combined reach of each network, equipped with OTF-
supported circumvention tools, to ensure billions of people across the 
globe have access to the facts.
    Since the invasion of Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the 
occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea, RFE/RL and VOA have been 
on the literal front lines of this war, reporting from the fields and 
trenches of heavily bombed towns of Ukraine, highlighting the horrible 
reality of Russia's invasion for audiences across the globe. When the 
full-scale invasion began, USAGM networks were uniquely positioned on-
the-ground to deliver exceptional multi-platform breaking news coverage 
to millions of people in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and around 
the world. This crucial reporting did not come without grave risks. 
Vira Hyrych, a talented journalist and producer for RFE/RL's Ukrainian 
Service, paid the ultimate price for her commitment to sharing the 
truth about Russia's aggression against Ukraine. On April 29, 2022, 
Vira was killed in Kyiv after a Russian missile strike hit the 
residential building where she lived. With great bravery, 
correspondents continue to report from the frontlines, drawing on their 
deep local knowledge to bring nuance and context to a fast-evolving 
historic moment.
    As the brutal war grinds on, RFE/RL's fact-based news reaches 
larger and larger audiences every day. Ukrainian and Russian audiences 
are seeking out RFE/RL coverage of recent events in the war in 
unprecedented numbers despite extensive Kremlin attempts to block RFE/
RL's websites and most social media platforms. Between February 24, 
2022, and February 23, 2023, RFE/RL web and social media videos in 
Russian and Ukrainian were viewed billions of times. For example, RFE/
RL's Ukrainian Service video views on Facebook alone were viewed 1.1 
billion times, an increase of 119 percent compared to the same period 
the year before.
    USAGM's networks are maximizing resources to reach an even larger 
audience in the Russian language. Despite the Russian Government's 
unprecedented censorship of independent media inside its borders, which 
forced RFE/RL to make the difficult decision to shutter its Moscow 
bureau and relocate to Riga, Latvia, there has been a surge in demand 
for VOA and RFE/RL Russian-language content. RFE/RL and VOA video 
content in Russian and Ukrainian was viewed 8 billion times in the year 
since the full-scale invasion--2.5 times the numbers from the year 
before. To put that number into context, just under 300 million people 
speak either Russian or Ukrainian. The RFE/RL Current Time project 
`Footage vs. Footage' exposes Russian disinformation campaigns to 
debunk the lies behind propaganda and examines how falsehoods get 
constructed by Russian state-controlled media. ``Systema,'' an RFE/RL 
Russian-language Investigative Unit conducts deep investigative 
journalism modeled after the Ukrainian Service's successful project 
``Schemes,'' which has uncovered Russian atrocities in Ukraine, filling 
a void left by Russian state-controlled media.
    Launched in April 2023 and developed with USAGM's Office of 
Technology, Services, and Innovation, Votvot is RFE/RL's new on-demand 
Russian-language streaming platform for voices targeted and silenced by 
the Putin regime. As part of RFE/RL's comprehensive strategy to counter 
Kremlin disinformation, Votvot features cultural content inaccessible 
inside Russia from creators who are often banned because of their 
criticism of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Votvot is a platform 
for uncensored, free expression for Russian-speaking audiences, 
including younger demographics, interested in alternatives to 
traditional news programming. Through documentaries, theater 
performances, concerts, satire, children's educational programming, and 
more, Votvot will make censored cultural content available once again 
to a wide audience. Votvot offers stories that unite and content that 
makes audiences think, such as exclusive access to the sold-out 
performance of FACE, an internationally-renowned 25-year-old Russian 
rap artist who can no longer return to Russia because of his 
denunciation of the Kremlin's full-scale war on Ukraine.
    In the months following Russia's invasion, Current Time, the 24/7 
Russian-language television and digital network led by RFE/RL in 
cooperation with VOA, signed over 50 new media partners in countries 
like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova--just as media outlets in 
those countries were dropping Russia's state-controlled channels. 
Despite significant censorship, between February 2022 and February 
2023, Current Time Facebook videos were viewed 2 billion times, an 
increase of 163 percent compared to the year before. Current Time 
videos routinely trend number one on Russian YouTube, a sign that 
Russian-language audiences want access to trusted news. In a powerful 
on-the-ground example, we received evidence that activists inside 
Russia took it upon themselves to begin posting flyers with QR codes 
disguised as furniture ads; but when scanned, the QR codes direct 
Russians to Current Time's YouTube channel. Together, RFE/RL and VOA 
reach 11.7 million Russian adults each week. Our research shows that 
our networks have a measured weekly audience of over 10 percent of 
adults inside Russia, an objectively high audience for a closed media 
environment dominated by state propaganda. For context, this is about 
half the audience that the most popular U.S.-based news outlets reach 
domestically, in a completely free media environment.
    USAGM is providing a trusted alternative to Russia's malign 
influence in nearby countries by flooding the zone with fact-based news 
in many different local languages and in English. USAGM networks serve 
audiences in languages including Ukrainian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, 
Romanian, Serbian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, and Georgian, among 
others. Through projects like Polygraph, VOA's English-language fact-
checking website, we are confronting Russia's disinformation efforts in 
English for a global audience. VOA launched an Eastern Europe bureau to 
deepen coverage across a region vulnerable to Russian malign influence 
and military aggression. RFE/RL's 23 broadcast services are focused on 
bringing the truth of the war to their audiences, who are buffeted by 
Russian disinformation about the full-scale invasion and its costs. 
RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service is producing a special program stream with 
content designed for refugees and exposing alleged war crimes by 
Russian forces, while services reaching audiences across the Caucasus 
nations and Central Asia are investigating the plight of local 
residents sent by Russia to fight--and die--in Ukraine.
    For Ukrainian and Russian-speaking audiences, VOA created new 
initiatives and a surge in programming, primarily focusing on breaking 
news complemented by official and expert perspectives from the U.S. 
including simultaneously translated official statements, major 
addresses, policy pronouncements, press conferences, congressional 
hearings, and U.N. Security Council sessions. To increase programming 
in Ukraine, VOA leveraged a new 24/7 satellite channel with targeted 
programming from VOA and RFE/RL.
    In addition to its reporting for Ukrainian and Russian-speakers, 
VOA covered this story for the world. VOA showed the rippling effects 
the war had across the globe--the refugee crisis, interrupted energy 
supplies, threats to food security, and far-reaching geopolitical and 
economic fallout in many nations. Leading up to the full-scale invasion 
and to this day, Russia continues to deploy a variety of false 
narratives in Russia and around the world to justify an unjustifiable 
war. Much of this disinformation involves the U.S.--including the false 
claim that NATO and the West were the aggressors threatening Russia's 
security and escalating the war. This is where VOA comes in. Interest 
in VOA's trusted, holistic coverage of the war and the U.S. response 
was extremely high worldwide and in many target regions: places like 
China, Vietnam, Iran, Latin America, Indonesia, Georgia, Albania, and 
Burma. In the year since Russia invaded Ukraine, VOA's coverage of the 
war attracted more than 2.4 billion video views on social media and 
144.4 million engagement actions across social media platforms, as well 
as over 83 million visits to VOA websites. With its measured weekly 
audience of 326 million people and thousands of media partners 
worldwide, VOA tells America's story in all its complexity, so that 
authoritarian propaganda and malign influence cannot win by default.
    OTF-supported circumvention tools have played a critical role in 
enabling people in closed societies around the world to access the 
uncensored internet and USAGM networks' coverage of the war. This 
became especially evident as Russia imposed unprecedented levels of 
censorship on its citizens. Use of OTF-supported circumvention tools 
surged in Russia from only 250,000 monthly active users prior to the 
full-scale invasion in Ukraine to over 8 million today. In addition, 
OTF-supported mirror sites have received over 200 million visits per 
month. With the help of OTF, both RFE/RL's and VOA's digital audience 
in Russia has grown significantly despite ongoing censorship of their 
digital platforms.
           supporting the free flow of information into iran
    The Iranian Government continues to aggressively surveil and censor 
Iranian citizens in an effort to limit their access to the free flow of 
information and intimidate those who seek the truth. One key tool the 
Iranian Government uses to extend malign influence is the state-
controlled media corporation, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
(IRIB), and its brands, including Al-Alam in the Arabic language, Press 
TV in English and French, HispanTV in Spanish, and Jam-e-Jam in the 
Persian language for diaspora audiences, among others. Despite the 
Iranian regime's escalating crackdown on independent media and the open 
exchange of ideas, USAGM networks continue to provide audiences in Iran 
and across the globe with independent, fact-based journalism as an 
alternative to IRIB's state-controlled content, while OTF-supported 
technology enables the people of Iran to access this journalism and the 
internet in the face of repressive censorship and surveillance.
    MBN's Alhurra Television regularly reports on the fight against 
Iran's malign influence in the MENA region through its newscasts and 
programs focused on Lebanon and Syria, and it has a large audience for 
this type of reporting in the Palestinian Territories. MBN's fact-
checking program and investigative reporting unit counter 
misinformation and uncover stories that are omitted in the local press 
related to malign influence from Russia, Iran, and the PRC in the 
region. The network regularly interviews human rights and international 
relations experts to counter Iran's narratives. Recent coverage 
includes the U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC), human rights concerns after the number of executions in 
Iran rose 75 percent in 2022, and reports that Iranian police have 
installed cameras in public places to monitor and punish women who are 
not wearing the hijab.
    VOA's Persian Service and RFE/RL's Radio Farda covered the historic 
protests that followed 22-year-old Mahsa Amini's death, documenting the 
number of demonstrators killed by security services and telling their 
stories. When Amini was arrested, RFE/RL's Radio Farda broadcast the 
first interview with her mother. After 16-year-old protestor Nika 
Shakarami was beaten to death by security forces, VOA's Persian Service 
provided an exclusive interview with her mother that garnered more than 
1 million views on Instagram alone. RFE/RL journalists documented the 
truth about the regime's victims--including confirming the identities 
of 353 casualties--despite the Iranian Government's ongoing campaign to 
deceive the public and intimidate minority communities.
    Coverage by RFE/RL's Radio Farda garnered more than 2.0 billion 
total video views between September 2022 and January 2023 on Instagram 
alone. VOA provided global coverage that attracted millions of viewers 
as raging protests in Iran sparked solidarity movements abroad in 
places like Istanbul, DC, New York, and Sulaymaniyah. By increasing 
live coverage, expanding special programming, and staffing a 24/7 
digital presence, VOA's Persian Service accrued 380.5 million social 
video views, a 282 percent increase, between September 2022 and January 
2023.
    Because of their commitment to exposing realities the Iranian 
Government would prefer to hide, both VOA and RFE/RL have been targeted 
by Iranian leadership on multiple occasions. In October 2022, Iran's 
supreme leader Ali Khamenei took to Instagram to warn his 4.9 million 
followers that VOA and RFE/RL are threats to the Islamic Republic. In 
2023, the government added RFE/RL President and CEO Jamie Fly to its 
sanctions list, which has included RFE/RL's Radio Farda since December 
2022.
    After the Iranian regime severely blocked the internet to prevent 
its citizens and the world from watching its violent crackdown on 
demonstrators, the number of monthly active users of OTF-supported 
censorship circumvention tools grew dramatically--one-in-four Iranians 
used these tools to access the internet. Over 90 percent of USAGM's 
Iranian audience uses OTF-supported Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to 
access USAGM network content. Backed by OTF to reach users in Iran, 
RFE/RL's Farda and VOA's Persian Service partnered with Toosheh, a 
U.S.-funded satellite file-casting app that does not need internet 
access. This one-way file distribution system can download content 
packages via satellite datacasting that can then be shared on messaging 
apps. This helped the networks maintain accessibility for audiences at 
key moments during protests. While these tools have a very economical 
monthly cost of only 7 cents per user, OTF's budget has been strained 
by the enormous demand for their tools in Iran, Russia, China, and 
other countries where it is increasingly dangerous to access the 
internet and seek out truthful information.
  stronger together: leveraging the usagm network for greater global 
                    impact against malign influence
    Our true power lies in our ability to harness the reach of the 
entire USAGM network for greater impact. Through translation of war 
coverage into dozens of languages, USAGM takes the work of RFE/RL's 
brave journalists on the ground in Ukraine and shows the impact of 
Russia's invasion not only to nearby countries like Belarus, Moldova, 
and Kazakhstan but also brings this global story to audiences in places 
like Cuba, Iraq, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Nicaragua. USAGM takes VOA's 
footage of the protests in Iran, or RFA's exclusive reporting on Uyghur 
detention camps in China and brings this news to audiences all over the 
world who rely on us.
    But even the very best journalism is of no use if people cannot see 
or hear it. As authoritarian regimes become increasingly sophisticated 
in blocking information, OTF is ensuring we become even more 
sophisticated in breaching those barriers. Over the last 3 years, use 
of OTF-supported circumvention tools has quadrupled globally, 
increasing from about 9 million monthly users to over 40 million 
monthly users.
    Our research from 2022 shows that audiences are choosing USAGM 
networks' content over that of Russia and the PRC in a number of key 
target markets across Eurasia, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East.
    Through its extensive network of media partnerships, VOA is 
successfully reaching audiences in regions that are major targets of 
malign influence from the PRC and Russia, including Africa, Latin 
America, and Southeast Asia. In Nigeria, for example, VOA reaches a 
third of all adults while Russia's state-controlled network, RT, 
reaches just 1 percent, and China Radio International, less than 3 
percent. Last year VOA Spanish reached a measured weekly audience of 
more than 66 million adults in Latin America--for a price of just 8 
cents per audience member reached for an entire year. Neither Russia 
nor the PRC's Spanish-language brands in Latin America comes close to 
the reach of VOA. For example, VOA reaches 47 percent of adults weekly 
in Bolivia, 24 percent in Colombia, 51 percent in the Dominican 
Republic, and 39 percent in Ecuador, all while Russia's RT Spanish 
reaches 5 percent or less in each market and the PRC's CGTN reaches 6 
percent or less. In Cambodia, despite a government crackdown on the 
free press, RFA and VOA together reach 16 percent of adults, compared 
with the PRC's state-controlled network, CGTN, at less than 2 percent.
    MBN is consistently competitive with and, in some cases, 
outperforming Russia's widely available RT Arabic channel. For example, 
MBN's Alhurra reaches more than twice as many adults weekly as RT 
Arabic in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. MBN's weekly digital series `Did It 
Really Happen?' fact-checks prominent dis- and misinformation on social 
media in Arabic, including that being disseminated by Russia, Iran, and 
the PRC, while the television program `Alhurra Investigates' focuses 
much of its investigative reporting on Russia, Iran, and China by fact-
checking false narratives and shedding light on stories omitted by the 
local press.
    Despite facing challenging circumstances, OCB remains committed to 
fulfilling its mission for the people of Cuba and staying competitive 
in the 21st century, especially as the governments of Cuba, Russia, and 
the PRC work together in an attempt to promote rampant disinformation 
on the island. The PRC and Russia's propaganda machines have been 
highly active in Cuba in recent years, and the PRC has grown its 
presence within the island's digital infrastructure. Since 2020, 
Russia's RT continues to broadcast around the clock, in high-
definition, and on digital platforms to the Cuban public in the Spanish 
language. In May 2022, Russia's RT met with Cuban President Miguel 
Diaz-Canel, and held a workshop in Havana with his communications team. 
Six months later, President Putin welcomed Diaz-Canel himself in Moscow 
for a visit to RT headquarters. As an alternative to Russia's malign 
influence, OCB started a series of podcasts entitled ``Witnesses of the 
War in Ukraine,'' which featured the voices of Ukrainians from several 
cities across the country. OCB was the only outlet that broadcast 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's speech before Congress in 
December 2022 live, with simultaneous Spanish translations, to 
audiences in Cuba. That coverage achieved historic reach across Latin 
America--with 20 different media organizations across eight countries 
also broadcasting the signal of OCB's Radio and Television Marti. This 
year, OCB's Marti and the Ukrainian fact-checking outlet, StopFake.org, 
launched a joint project to counter Russia's propaganda circulating in 
the Spanish language in Cuba.
    Our levels of credibility across all the broadcasters are 
objectively high--over 70 percent of our weekly audience considers our 
reporting to be trustworthy. Both our mission and the editorial 
firewall, which prohibits U.S. Government interference in the editorial 
autonomy of the broadcasting networks, underpin the worldwide 
credibility that USAGM's broadcasters enjoy. The legislated firewall is 
essential to that credibility, ensuring editorial independence and 
protecting USAGM and its journalists from government interference. This 
firewall is what sets us apart from state-controlled propaganda 
networks like Russia's RT and the PRC's CGTN. Audiences see our example 
of openness and candor in exercising press freedom in a democratic 
society as proof of our credibility. In so many countries, people yearn 
for the truth--even if it is a painful truth. In times of crisis, 
traffic to our networks' websites and social media often spikes as 
audiences seek us out. We have seen this again and again in recent 
years, from the coup in Burma to the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in 
Ukraine, the recent protests in Cuba and Iran, and the earthquakes in 
Turkey and Syria. In accordance with the legislated firewall, our 
agency is committed to continuing to work with interagency partners, 
with external stakeholders, with this Committee and all of Congress in 
a bipartisan fashion, to ensure USAGM has the operational support and 
resources necessary to fulfill its mission.
                               conclusion
    This is the most important time for this agency since the Cold War, 
and perhaps since World War II. USAGM must be positioned to be 
consistently competitive in today's dangerous world of information 
manipulation and heavy investment by authoritarian regimes and other 
bad actors. To do so, we will stay true to our agency-wide priorities: 
modeling transparency and accountability in everything we do; 
maintaining mission focus; expanding and improving access to USAGM 
content; ensuring journalistic independence for every broadcaster and 
entity; and bolstering journalistic safety, security, training and 
ethics.
    USAGM remains committed to delivering on our mission to inform, 
engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and 
democracy. We cannot do this without the partnership of Congress. We 
are confident that any increased investment you might consider making 
in our work will be crucial in our role on the frontlines of the global 
information war. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Hagerty, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, we are deeply grateful for 
your support of and interest in our work and we value your oversight 
role.
    Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may have.

    Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much for your 
testimony. We are going to start with Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ms. Bennett, good to 
see you again. I was pleased to see that one of the panelists 
on the second panel, and I am going to duck out for a minute, 
but then come back for the second panel, Jessica Brandt, in her 
written testimony, urged greater resourcing for USAGM and VOA 
in Latin America.
    Given the presence of over 40 million native Spanish 
speakers here and the inherent linkages we have with the 
region, given the increasing footprint of both Russia and 
Chinese efforts in the region, do we have sufficient resources 
dedicated to our needs in Latin America?
    Ms. Bennett. We do not. We do not. We have been severely 
under-resourced in both of those areas in particular, and as we 
are talking about--this is now a global problem. This is not a 
problem of the mis- and disinformation being just inside the 
countries. It is coming everywhere.
    We actually need a lot more resources in order to reach 
these people. There are many, many ways in which we could be 
better resourced, including technologically, personnel, and 
also in terms of journalists' safety as well, because we are 
increasingly putting journalists into harm's way.
    Senator Kaine. I wanted to ask about the journalists' 
safety on World Press Freedom Day. How have we responded to 
repressive environments? In particular, I am going to stick 
with the Americas.
    Independent media in Nicaragua have been severely abused 
and their resources cut, but there is also an increasingly 
dangerous environment for journalists in neighboring countries. 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico has had a horrible set of 
challenges for journalists.
    What are we doing and what more can we do to try to provide 
safety for independent journalists in Latin America?
    Ms. Bennett. That is one thing we are really working 
extremely hard to make sure that we have basically whatever the 
state of the art protection is for journalists, and that 
includes equipment, includes protection, physical protection.
    It includes protection in the buildings that they occupy. 
It includes training about how to handle themselves in very 
difficult situations. It also includes making sure that we have 
the resources to remove journalists from dangerous areas and to 
find other places to take them when they find themselves in 
danger.
    Is something, as you have seen, we faced around the world, 
particularly in Russia. I just returned from a trip to see 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, where we had met with the 
Russian journalists who have had to move 4-6 times now because 
they had to flee from inside Russia.
    Some of them with only a bag in their hand. One of them 
very plaintively said, I hope my neighbor is taking care of my 
dog and they have been gone for a year and they hope they will 
be back in a couple of months, and I leave it to you to decide 
whether that is the case.
    Being able to support those people and find them other 
places to go, other places to live, help them deal with the 
trauma they have endured, all of those things are critical. 
Because of what we asked them to do, we are asking them to put 
themselves in harm's way, and we owe them at least the best 
protection we can give them.
    Senator Kaine. Last question I want to ask is just an 
oversight question on internal management. Your agency is one 
that in employee surveys recently--but it has not just been 
recently--it has been ranked pretty lowly in terms of the 
morale of employees.
    You are new to the position. You have a lot of experience 
in working at some very, very high watt news organizations. 
What are you doing as the CEO to try to bring up morale at 
USAGM?
    Ms. Bennett. Senator, I appreciate your discretion in 
talking about the lowest. We were actually dead last for a long 
time, and we probably deserved it.
    Last year, however, we got an award from the Partnership 
for Public Service for being the most improved agency, I 
believe, in the entire Government under the leadership of the 
Acting CEO and the Acting Director of Voice of America, and of 
the returned heads of all the other agencies.
    That shows that it can change, and literally giving people 
good equipment, giving people the proper leadership, giving 
people direction, making sure that we do the job of clearing 
away the red tape that often entangles them and makes it 
difficult for them even to get plane tickets to get to the 
places they are trying to work, all those things are important.
    We are really committed to basically increasing the 
communication and the engagement with our employees. Again, 
because whether or not they are in harm's way, we deserve to 
give them the best that they can possibly have. I think that is 
part of my responsibility.
    Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Cardin. As you were saying, how much you improved, 
I was thinking, well, it must have been the actions of Senate 
Foreign Relations committee and the bills that we passed that 
allowed that to----
    Ms. Bennett. Very clearly. Must have been. No question 
about it.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, I think there is a very astute 
answer, Ms. Bennett, that you gave our Chairman. Thank you 
again for being here today. I also want to thank you for 
bringing up the plight of Evan Gershkovich. That is a tragic 
situation, and I very much appreciate you raising that issue 
here, because I think the world needs to know what Russia has 
done in that circumstance.
    Today, USAGM is before us requesting $944 million. That is 
a $59 million increase for Fiscal Year 2024, 7 percent above 
what we passed last year. As a lifelong businessperson, I have 
always had to justify any request for investments that I had to 
make to demonstrate that that is a good investment, that we are 
meeting stated goals and objectives, and that we are going to 
deliver value for shareholders.
    I think that USAGM owes the same sort of accountability to 
the American taxpayers and, of course, to Congress. I wanted to 
put you in the shoes I have been in a number of times before, 
and to just ask you for the 1-minute elevator pitch, if you 
will, about how USAGM is a good investment for American 
taxpayers.
    Ms. Bennett. Yes, Senator, thank you very much. I am very 
much in line with your way of thinking. Remember my first half 
of my life was spent at the Wall Street Journal. I have a lot 
of respect for that way of thinking about things. Why is it a 
good investment?
    Because we are in an information war. As we have seen, 
particularly in the invasion in Ukraine and watching how that 
unrolled at the beginning, information may be as powerful as 
tanks. The information that we all saw helped change the course 
of, I think, what was going to happen there.
    We are seeing now how malign influencers are using their 
own information to help change the narrative and change the 
direction of things as well. By using the additional funds that 
we are hopefully going to be provided, we are going to be able 
to get more journalists, better technology, and basically reach 
more people. Reaching more people is what causes the impact.
    Having people engage with an alternative to the malign 
influences and to the corrupt information that they are being 
given. We do not push back on their narrative. That is not an 
effective thing. What we do is we provide alternatives in 
places where there are no other alternatives.
    Senator Hagerty. You have mentioned certain metrics in your 
opening statement about how we are outperforming competitors. 
Could you shed a little more light on what those metrics are?
    Also, you mentioned that a specific metric in terms of per 
pennies, we are reaching people. Do you have any trend lines in 
terms of what it is costing us and how efficiently--are you 
gaining efficiency, are you flat? How can you sort of clarify 
that for me a bit?
    Ms. Bennett. Senator, I would be absolutely delighted to 
come and share in great detail those metrics, because we have 
all these things. I have just actually finished a paper on what 
the actual cost of each individual that we reach is, and I 
would be happy to share that with you right now. It varies in 
different parts of the world, but let me give you the----
    Senator Hagerty. I think what I am interested in is not 
only the absolute cost per person reach, but also what is the 
trend. Again, I am trying to get at where you are taking the 
agency and again, why this is a good investment for the 
American taxpayer.
    Ms. Bennett. Yes, the trend is towards greater efficiency. 
Again, I would be happy to get you the figures that can 
buttress that argument. I think the thing you asked originally 
was how do I know that we still have a chance, that we still 
have a foothold there? I just pulled a couple of things, this 
is about Africa and Latin America.
    In Nigeria right now, Voice of America reaches a third of 
all adults. Russia state-controlled network reaches 1 percent. 
China Radio International, less than 3 percent. That is despite 
massive, massive investments on both their parts in those 
areas.
    In Latin America, VOA reaches 47 percent of adults weekly, 
in Bolivia, 24 percent in Colombia, 51 percent in Dominican 
Republic, and 39 percent in Ecuador. While Russia's RT Spanish 
reaches 5 percent or less in each market, and the PRC, CGTN 
reaches 6 percent or less. In Cambodia, despite----
    Senator Hagerty. I would love to get maybe the full 
schedule that you are looking at----
    Ms. Bennett. I can give you the whole thing. I have got a 
great map with all----
    Senator Hagerty. Yes, I would like to see that----
    Ms. Bennett. --with all the pictures.
    Senator Hagerty. There are a couple of measures though, and 
this is what I am struggling with, as well. We talk about the 
goals being freedom and democracy. How do you think about 
metrics that assure us that you are obtaining the goals of 
freedom and democracy? If you had a way to get at that?
    Ms. Bennett. Yes. In fact, I do highly respect the use of 
the taxpayers' funds and to make sure that we are trending in 
the direction of greater efficiency. While I have not brought 
you a sheet with me to demonstrate all that, I do have it at 
hand, and I am able to give it to you in any form you would 
like.
    Senator Hagerty. I look forward to that. You can connect 
with my staff to do it. Again, it is beyond just the trend 
lines and volume of people reached, but I am very interested in 
metrics that you have to demonstrate that we are achieving 
greater freedom and democracy as we do that.
    Ms. Bennett. We also developed a measurement under the 
previous, the second previous CEO, John Lansing, that was 
called an ``impact measure,'' which pulled together both the 
size of the audience, the growth of the audience, and things 
that we worked on that helped try and demonstrate the impact, 
such as, for example, you can say that it has got an impact 
when the Ayatollah personally denounces us in his Twitter feed.
    There must be a good reason he is doing that. When 
defectors from Korea say that they and their families listen to 
Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, despite the fact that 
they face very grave dangers in doing so. There are other 
impact measures you can see. For example----
    Senator Hagerty. I will be interested to see how you turn 
those anecdotes into measurable----
    Ms. Bennett. I have got all those things.
    Senator Hagerty. Okay, great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
can be found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the 
Record'' section at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Well, clearly, as you point out, 
your mission includes our National Security. We are seeing the 
growth of a new weapon that is being used against our 
democratic institutions, and it is called disinformation.
    We see it deployed around the world. We recognize that we 
have challenges in order to be able to deal with that. You 
already mentioned with Senator Kaine that you could use 
additional resources in order to counter the influence in our 
own hemisphere.
    I want to sort of talk about how you can adjust the 
priorities that are necessary as international circumstances 
change. Two years ago, we would not have predicted a war in 
Ukraine would be as challenging as it has been, and we did not 
know that Russia would actually invade Ukraine.
    We were worried about it, but now it is reality. We did not 
realize that Russia would invest so much in news as they are 
investing and preparing to do more. They do not have to worry 
about appeasing appropriators or dealing with a Senate 
committee. They can just do what they want to do.
    We have a very open system. We guard very carefully the 
journalistic independence of your agency, and we will defend 
that, but we, as policymakers, want to make sure that we are 
placing our resources and priorities in those parts of the 
world where we are the most vulnerable.
    That is our responsibility collectively. Now, we have 
changed your structure a couple of times in the last few years. 
One of the issues I have always been concerned about with the 
local turf issues of the different grantees or organizations 
you have--are you as nimble as you need to be to respond to the 
current challenges?
    We know what China is up to, and it is not in our National 
Security interests to allow their disinformation to move 
unchallenged. We know what Russia is--are you able to marshal 
the resources to deal with the contemporary needs that we have 
on our National Security?
    Ms. Bennett. There is a lot of things to unpack in that 
question, Senator, and let me try it. First off, I think one 
thing that is necessary is in our own house, and I believe that 
we are all now rising to that challenge, which is we cannot 
operate as six different entities, each going their own way 
with their own strategies.
    The world is now much more interlinked, and we need to 
restructure ourselves and also restructure our habits and our 
ways of thinking in order to use USAGM as a whole to fight the 
fact that this disinformation is coming from three primary 
actors and spreading out around the entire world.
    When you talk about the fact that we get kind of caught on 
the wrong foot, you mentioned the fact there is--similarly, you 
mentioned the fact that the Latin America region is very 
underfunded. That is because for years and years it was kind of 
considered a reasonably--it needed information, but it was not 
the prime target of such amazing disinformation as it is now.
    We have to adjust to meet that. That is true in other parts 
of the world as well. Let us see, the other question. Are we 
nimble enough and able to get our resources up quick enough?
    Well, Congress has, in fact, been extremely responsive to 
these challenges and we appreciate that, but we need to be able 
to get funds and deploy them more quickly. Also, we need to 
think about different structures that will help us be more 
flexible and take red tape, take friction out of the system, 
help us get our work to the audiences.
    They need to be much more efficiently, much more quickly.
    Senator Cardin. Do you have the legal authority to adjust 
the resources to meet the current priorities of our nation? 
Knowing that you have grantees, knowing that you have 
commitments of personnel around the world, can you adjust that 
under the authority that you have? Do you feel like you can do 
that in order to meet what may be the current priorities?
    Ms. Bennett. Technically, I believe that authority rests 
with me practically. The question is, do you have the authority 
and can use that authority? Congress does also pretty much lay 
out where they want those resources to be spent. If we want 
greater flexibility, we have to both learn to work together on 
how we----
    Senator Cardin. Which brings me to that point--and I 
understand that. We have our own political hurdles here that 
sometimes will make it less--we cannot move as quickly as our 
adversaries can move.
    The question is, how do we work together? How do we get 
that information from you as to what we need to do in adjusting 
resources? We may not be able to add, but we may want to adjust 
where the resources are being placed. How do we make sure we 
have that information?
    Ms. Bennett. Senator, I am thrilled to hear your interest 
in that. That is something that we are always evaluating inside 
our own operation.
    We right now have evaluations of what you know, where Radio 
Free Asia would like to go with its funding. Where Radio Free 
Europe would like to go with its funding. Where the Office of 
Cuba Broadcasting, which is also the target of malign influence 
from the Chinese via Cuba into Latin and South America.
    There is always ways in which we need to think about how to 
reallocate those resources, and certainly a greater flexibility 
and greater openness and willingness on the part of this 
committee to engage with us. We would be absolutely eager to 
rise to that challenge.
    Senator Cardin. I will just conclude on this. Every one of 
your partners are carrying out very important missions, and 
they are going to protect their ability to be effective in 
doing that, but if our priority is to shift to a different 
region, we may have to adjust resources in order to meet the 
current risks. That is sometimes difficult politically to do, 
but we have to have a way in which we can try to make those 
decisions.
    Ms. Bennett. In every budget, no matter how generous and 
large it is, you always have to make tough choices about the 
allocation of the assets to meet whatever the greatest 
challenge is.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. 
Bennett, for being here today. The threat of disinformation, 
weaponizing information against the United States and our 
allies to divide us, divide our citizens is on the rise.
    I think we all feel that. It is especially so because we 
all have access to one of these now, so citizens and 
policymakers all have access to that through social media or 
other sorts of platforms, but the idea that our adversaries 
would try to use disinformation to divide us is not new.
    That was certainly something, for example, the Soviet Union 
prioritized during the Cold War, as an element of their 
statecraft to destabilize the United States and our allies at 
the time. I believe that in 1980, for example, there was a 
conservative estimate, the Soviet Union spent $3 billion on 
disinformation campaigns as part of their overall strategy.
    With an increasingly aggressive China and Russia, we have 
entered into what seems like--it feels like a new Cold War. 
Certainly, it is true that we have, for the first time in our 
history, two near-peer nuclear competitors that are competing 
against us, and we see the spread of this disinformation.
    When you and I spoke in our office, in my office last week, 
you emphasized the need for more resources for USAGM to compete 
against China and Russia. I think you describe that China alone 
as outspending the U.S. 10 to 1 with regard to their campaigns.
    How much did the U.S. spend back during the Cold War 
against the Soviet Union, if the Soviet Union was spending $3 
billion? Do you know, ballpark, what was the U.S. spending to 
be able to counter that?
    Ms. Bennett. Yes, Senator. As soon as I left your office, I 
went back, and we looked at our research department to see if 
we could figure out something like that. I do not have the 
exact figures here in front of me at the moment, but it was 
very similar to the ratio that we have today.
    One of the lessons from that could be that the advantages 
that we have in terms of providing trusted, believable, 
independent news information is actually a great asset that 
enables us to do it much more efficiently. I would suggest that 
we are now not just facing one powerful adversary in Russia.
    We are facing several in Russia, China, and Iran. China and 
Iran in particular are very, very skillful in using technology 
to help both close off their own areas and reach into other 
areas. I think you get two results from that information, that 
the ratio is probably pretty close to what it is today.
    One is that we have something to offer. We have a weapon 
that is worth using and deploying. The second is that we had 
certain ratios, the same facing one major adversary, whereas 
today we face at least three, and increasing technological 
hurdles to leap over.
    Senator Ricketts. What lessons can we draw from the 
previous Cold War against the Soviet Union that allowed us to 
be successful--and ultimately the Soviet Union fell apart, and 
we certainly worked on getting our message out then. What 
lessons can we draw from that to apply to today's scenario?
    Ms. Bennett. One of the things is, I am sure many of you 
have traveled around to various parts of the world, and one of 
the things I tell people, I would like them to have the 
opportunity 50 years from now to have people say about what we 
are doing today, what people say about what we were doing then.
    Virtually any country you travel to, you will find people 
coming up to you and saying, ``I got hope from Voice of 
America, Radio Free Europe, which are the two ones working 
there. We kept on believing we could win this. We could break 
out of this. I learned English. I moved to a different country. 
I had a career. We had the blankets over our heads.'' This was 
a tremendously powerful tool that we had in telling people 
objective news information. It was the fact that it was 
objective and believable, and the information they were getting 
from their own countries was not. We face that identical 
situation today.
    Our critical advantage still remains our independence and 
our believability. I believe that 50 years from now, we are 
going to have people coming up to us and saying, you are the 
reason I believed that we were all going to get through this, 
and the information we were hearing from Russia and China was 
not correct.
    Senator Ricketts. Are there other tactics though we could 
learn from the old Cold War that we should be applying today?
    Ms. Bennett. One of the tactics is we should be working 
technologically extremely rigorously. Through our Open 
Technology Fund is one way we absolutely are doing that to get 
into closed environments.
    The environments are closing rapidly around the world, and 
not just in China, not just in Iran, not just in Russia, but in 
many, many other markets, but the lessons we can learn from the 
Cold War, given the state of the technology available to us in 
those days, we were equally shut out of those markets.
    As a matter of fact, I think in many places we did not even 
know if anyone was listening until after those countries fell, 
and people were able to get in and see it here. In Albania, for 
instance, I traveled to Albania a couple of years ago, and I do 
not think we had a very good idea of what our audience was.
    It turned out that our audience was massive and very, very 
profoundly affected by it. My lesson that I would draw is that 
we should not be afraid of the closed markets, that we still 
have something to offer, but we do need to do everything we can 
to get our news and information into those markets despite the 
fact that they are closed.
    Senator Ricketts. All right. Well, thank you, Ms. Bennett, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this 
opportunity. Thank you to the ranker as well. How are you?
    Ms. Bennett. Thank you, Senator. I am fine, thank you.
    Senator Booker. Good. I want to ask some questions that are 
more focused on Africa. As you know, it is home to about 1.46 
billion people, the world's eighth--excuse me, the world's 
youngest population.
    The continent has an average age of about 19.5 years old. 
In many ways, it is really important, as you know, for the 
United States to show up and provide a platform for fair 
reporting. Recognizing the success of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Free Asia, what is the viability of a similar program in 
Africa?
    Ms. Bennett. I think that it is something we ought to 
investigate. I think we ought to investigate the best way of 
reaching into the African continent and into the Latin 
American, South America. I think we ought to look at it and see 
whether or not that is a viable way of operating. I am heading 
to Kenya next week.
    What I am going to do is I am going to meet, thanks to 
USAGM and pulling them all together, 40 of the African 
continent largest media CEOs, and the purpose is to say, ``What 
are you getting from China that you are not getting from us? 
Tell us what they are doing. Tell us if you are satisfied. Tell 
us what we can do to better reach you. Tell us how we can 
better reach you, how we can be better partners to you.'' I 
think we ought to investigate every possible means of reaching 
the continent.
    Senator Booker. No, I appreciate that. Because what the PRC 
does on the continent is stunning. They use the media in Africa 
really to amplify and spread pro-China propaganda. According to 
a recent U.S. Institute of Peace report, China uses local 
outlets and influential African voices to disseminate and 
authenticate its Africa-focused propaganda.
    This is really disturbing. I am wondering how closely does 
the USAGM work with local journalists to discredit this 
misinformation on the continent.
    Ms. Bennett. We have a large number of affiliates in both 
the continents that we are talking about right now, in Africa 
and Latin America. We have a large number of local affiliates, 
but part of the reason I am going down there is to make sure 
that I can see that we keep those affiliates and do not lose 
them to China and Russia.
    Also, to see what it is we need to do to expand our 
partnership reach in this vital area, because getting our news 
and information through local partners is really efficient, and 
it gives us credibility in being able to do that.
    We have a large number of partners right now. We need more.
    Senator Booker. When you say partners, African journalists 
are extraordinary, but there is almost like a competition going 
on for their hearts and minds, right.
    Ms. Bennett. One of the things is we do train journalists.
    The other thing we do is we work together with local 
journalists to do perhaps important investigations that they 
need to have done because we can provide the kind of safety and 
security, but the kind of distance that makes them more willing 
to take the risks of doing vital investigations.
    They find that working with us gives them a little bit of 
security. We are in fact doing that quite a bit, is partnering 
with local journalists.
    Senator Booker. USAGM, how is it working really on emerging 
technologies and digital platforms? Because this is a lot of 
the ways that young people are communicating. With such a huge 
youth bubble, it seems to me that we need to sort of find ways 
to communicate on those platforms effectively. What extent is 
the Open Technology Fund part of that kind of effort?
    Ms. Bennett. The Open Technology Fund incubates and 
develops and provides the kind of circumvention technology that 
enables people to get past the digital shutdowns in these areas 
and to reach out into other places where they can reach the 
information they want and need.
    We had to, basically late last year as a result of the 
demonstrations that took place as a result of the young woman 
who was killed for being detained by the morality police, we 
basically ran through the entire circumvention, close to the 
entire circumvention budget in a little over a month, 2 months, 
because the demand for our circumvention technology was so 
great.
    That is a really important thing, the Open Technology fund, 
its ability to provide means for people to get news and 
information through the vital technology.
    Senator Booker. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and to the ranker, 
I know there is no coincidence that you are all holding this 
hearing on World Press Freedom Day, and it has probably been 
mentioned already.
    You cannot have a democracy without the free press. It is 
essential. It is not a luxury. It is vital not just for 
democracy, but also for human rights. I have a feeling this was 
already mentioned, but I just want to join the chorus of 
bipartisan senators calling on the Russian Government to 
immediately release American journalist Evan Gershkovich.
    His wrongful detention is not only outrageous and 
unacceptable, it is an affront to the ideals of freedom and 
freedom of the press.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Senator. It has been mentioned 
by Senator Hagerty in his opening statement or his comments, 
and we all join you in those comments.
    Senator Booker. I know you know that Senator Hagerty and I 
are aligned far more than people seem to know.
    Senator Cardin. We do know that. We are reporting on that 
every day. That is independent journalism.
    Senator Booker. Rumors has it, I do not know if this is 
propaganda or not, but he is thinking about shaving has had to 
be more like me.
    Senator Cardin. I thought you were going to let your hair 
grow.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cardin. Exactly, exactly. You seem to get along in 
this committee. I want to thank Senator Booker for raising 
Africa from the point of view of having a physical presence of 
an organization, news organization in Africa, and your reply 
about Africa and also Latin America, our own hemisphere.
    China is extremely active in both Africa and our 
hemisphere. It has been reported that they have 45 contracts 
with news organizations in our hemisphere. That is China. We 
know that their contracts many times exclude fair reporting of 
accurate information.
    I think to have a physical presence is something that 
really needs to be explored. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. 
Bennett. It has been great to see you again. Thanks--I just 
wanted to congratulate you on the work you are doing, the men 
and women who work with you, getting the truth out.
    It is harder and harder to do these days. In March, I 
think, of 2023, this year, the Russian court announced the 
bankruptcy of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty's operations 
for failure to comply with their foreign agent law.
    Wonder how safe you feel your journalists are of being--
potential for being detained. I do not know how many you have 
in Russia, and I do not--I am not going to ask you to display 
that number here today. Just give us your thoughts.
    Ms. Bennett. Thank you, Senator. We talk about being 
flexible, being nimble. There was a situation that required the 
ultimate in flexibility and the ability to move fast because we 
had to very quickly work to get the majority of our journalists 
out of the country and to someplace safe, and neighboring 
countries were very accommodating.
    The Czech Republic, for example, and Latvia were very 
welcoming in receiving those. We have had to turn to Congress 
to help us get funding to create new centers for these 
journalists to work out of in places on the Russian periphery. 
Yes, that had a tremendous impact on our work inside Russia.
    As I say, being shut out of malign countries by forcible 
means is nothing new to this organization, and we intend to 
fully continue to do that. I would just like to say one thing. 
Radio Free Europe and Voice of America in Russian currently 
reach about 10 percent of adults inside Russia.
    That may not sound like a lot until you realize that 
America's two most popular news-based programs only reach right 
about 20 percent, and that is in the freest media market in the 
world. So, in a closed environment, we are able to reach 10 
percent of the adults there, despite what is happening.
    Senator Barrasso. We are also--you are dealing with the 
disinformation that comes out within Russia. January, their 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted on social media claim that 
they had obtained 20,000 documents regarding a supposed secret 
U.S. biological weapons program in Ukraine.
    This is not the first time Russia has made us a victim of 
disinformation campaign. What is our current experience 
teaching us about countering the kind of disinformation that 
comes out?
    Ms. Bennett. Two things: One is that each one of our major 
entities now has a very robust fact checking operation. That is 
one thing that is very important. Checking the facts that 
provided to the people who consume our products.
    On the other hand, I think a lot of our power comes from 
not countering and not pushing back, but providing 
alternatives. Because if the only thing you see and hear is the 
disinformation, then it is the only thing you see and hear.
    For us putting out credible news and information--and 
again, I have a chart that I would be happy to show everybody 
that shows what happens to the audiences of each one of our 
networks when something happens inside the country, when the 
people inside that country are receiving news and information 
that they do not trust from their own government, and that is 
the headscarf--the headscarf protests, our Iranian audience 
went like this, or digitalized went like this.
    I mean, it was that much of a thing. The same thing with 
the China COVID protest. People, during the time when they 
cannot believe their own governments, despite the volume of 
information they are getting, they turn to us, they come to us, 
they seek us out.
    Senator Barrasso. My final question is that China and 
Russia seem to be joining forces in a number of different 
things, and part of it this. In April, Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Liberty reported that they had received some leaked documents 
and recordings which confirmed reports of Russia and China 
collaborating on censorship and internet control tactics.
    The information provided showed that officials from Russia 
and China shared strategies for tracking dissidents, for 
controlling the internet. They have asked each other for help 
in blocking what they call dangerous news, we might call the 
truth, and for advice on how to impede some of the technology 
that is coming.
    What are the key elements that you are focusing on, the 
United States is focusing on, to counter the Chinese and 
Russian messaging?
    Ms. Bennett. Yes. No, that is absolutely true. We are 
seeing that on the ground. I am actually hoping that that is 
something I am going to get much more insight into when I make 
my trip to Kenya to meet with the media executives, because 
they are the ones that have the real foot on the ground because 
they are actually the targets.
    The CEOs of existing news organizations in these continents 
are the targets. Finding out from them exactly what is 
happening and how we can defend ourselves against that, but 
make sure that we are providing good and reliable alternatives 
to give them the option.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, thank you for the great job you are 
doing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Bennett. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Cardin. Let me thank you for your dedication to 
this mission. We are very proud of your leadership and thank 
you for your testimony today.
    Ms. Bennett. Senator, thank you very much. Thank you, all 
of you. I really appreciate your attention. Thank you so much.
    Senator Cardin. We will now turn to our second panel. Let 
me welcome our three witnesses. Our first is Jessica Brandt, 
who is the Policy Director for the Artificial Intelligence and 
Emerging Technology Initiative at Brookings.
    Her recent publication focused on foreign interference, 
disinformation, digital authoritarianism, and the implications 
of emerging technologies for liberal democracies. Ms. Brandt 
was previously head of Policy and Research for the Alliance for 
Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund and held 
fellowships at Brookings and the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard University.
    Our second on this panel is Christopher Walker, Vice 
President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment 
for Democracy. In this capacity, he oversees the International 
Forum of Democratic Studies at the Center for the Analysis and 
Discussion of Democratic Development. Prior to joining the NED, 
Walker, Mr. Walker was Vice President for Strategies and 
Analysis at Freedom House.
    Our third member of this panel is David Stilwell, who has 
already been mentioned by Senator Hagerty, who is the Fox 
Fellow for Future Pacing Threats at the Air Force Academy's 
Institute for Future Conflict. In this role, he educates cadets 
and faculty on the growing military threat presented by the 
People's Republic of China, as well as PRC strategy of 
political warfare, especially in the use of information warfare 
to undermine democracies.
    He served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2019-2021. Prior to that, he 
served in the Air Force for 35 years. He enlisted as a Korean 
linguist in 1980. Served as a fighter pilot and a commander for 
25 years, then as defense attache to Beijing.
    He retired in 2015 as Brigadier General, serving as the 
Asia Advisor to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A pretty busy 
guy. That is an incredible resume. It is impressive that all 
three of you here. We thank you for your dedication and service 
on this type of issue, and we will start with Ms. Brandt.

   STATEMENT OF JESSICA BRANDT, POLICY DIRECTOR, ARTIFICIAL 
  INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, BROOKINGS 
                  INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Brandt. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, 
Ranking Member Hagerty, distinguished members of the committee 
for inviting me to address you today. As you are aware, the 
United States is engaged in a persistent asymmetric competition 
with authoritarian challengers, and the information space is a 
critical theater.
    As part of this competition, autocrats in Moscow and 
Beijing, but also elsewhere, have leveraged multiple 
asymmetries. Russia and China both deliberately spread or 
amplify information that is false or misleading. Both operate 
vast propaganda networks that use multiple modes of 
communication to disseminate their preferred versions of 
events. Both spread numerous, often conflicting conspiracy 
theories designed to deflect blame for their wrongdoing, dent 
the prestige of the United States, and cast doubt on the notion 
of objective truth. Both frequently engage in whataboutism to 
frame the United States as hypocritical while using a network 
of proxy influencers to churn up anti-American sentiment around 
the world. For Putin and Xi, the goal of these pursuits is to 
tighten their grip on power at home and to weaken their 
democratic competitors abroad.
    For the United States, like other democracies, an open 
information environment confers tremendous long-term 
advantages, but it also creates near-term vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited using low cost, often deniable tools and 
tactics. Where democracies depend on the idea that the truth is 
knowable, autocrats have no such need for a healthy information 
space to thrive. In fact, they benefit from widespread public 
skepticism that the truth exists at all. Strict control over 
their information environments affords autocrats a degree of 
insulation from critics, so they freely exploit Western social 
media platforms that they ban at home, and in doing so, face 
virtually no normative constraints online.
    As a result of these asymmetries, autocrats have made 
remarkable advances. Distinguished members, the information 
space may be the most consequential terrain over which states 
will compete in the decades to come, and the United States 
needs a strategy to prevail, one that is rooted in considerable 
asymmetric advantages of our own.
    What should such a strategy entail?
    I think to start with, the United States can seize the 
initiative by harnessing truthful information to defend our 
interests and the integrity of the global information 
environment. To do this, Washington should undertake concerted 
campaigns, grounded in truthful messaging, to expose the 
failures and false promises of dictatorship.
    It should also uphold freedom of information worldwide, not 
just because it is consistent with democratic principles, but 
because it puts Russia and China in a defensive position. We 
should support high quality journalism abroad, particularly in 
places where democracy is backsliding, since independent media 
keep citizens informed and hold power to account.
    Ultimately, defending democratic interests in the 
information domain will require thinking beyond it. Washington 
should use the economic tools and cyber capabilities at its 
disposal--of course, where appropriate and within existing 
authorities--to deter autocratic regimes from conducting 
information operations and to undercut their capabilities.
    We should do all of this in partnership with other 
democratic governments, recognizing that this is ultimately a 
contest over principles and that our strong network of partners 
and allies is perhaps our greatest advantage. There are 
numerous steps USAGM can take to advance this strategy and to 
position itself for success in an era of information 
competition. Let me propose five.
    First, focus attention and resources on Latin America. 
Throughout the first quarter of this year, three of the five 
most retweeted Russian state media accounts on Twitter messaged 
in Spanish. Five of the 10 fastest growing ones targeted 
Spanish language audiences.
    On TikTok, RT en Espanol is among the most popular Spanish 
language media outlets. It is 29.6 million likes makes it more 
popular than Telemundo, Univision, BBC Mundo, and El Pais. 
Likewise, on Facebook, RT en Espanol currently has more 
followers than any other Spanish language international 
broadcaster.
    Others, too, are succeeding in the region. China's CGTN en 
Espanol has roughly six times more followers on Facebook than 
VOA Spanish, and Venezuela's Telesur and Iran's HispanTV have 
also amassed sizable followings. I think this reflects, at 
least in part, a resource prioritization problem. In 2023, the 
budget for VOA's Latin America division was slightly more than 
$10 Million.
    That is less than half of its Eurasia Division and less 
than a quarter of its East Asia and Pacific Division. Of the 12 
overseas bureaus operated by VOA, none are in Latin America.
    Spanish is the fourth most spoken language in the world, 
and content produced for Latin American audiences could have 
enormous reach. USAGM should increase investments in VOA 
Spanish and consider the feasibility of opening a bureau within 
the region. It could also do things like using public private, 
partnerships to create low-cost distribution agreements that 
would allow material created by Spanish speakers right here in 
the United States to reach audiences through local, trusted 
sources.
    Second, USAGM should leverage 21st century digital tools, 
continuing to invest in social media analysis capabilities that 
enable it to understand the concerns of its audience. By doing 
so, USAGM can equip itself to develop tailored and compelling 
editorial positions. These are essential for staying relevant 
in a crowded, modern media market.
    USAGM should also use analytics to evaluate the performance 
of its content, since success will depend on continuously 
identifying and prioritizing the most impactful materials. In 
addition, USAGM should continue supporting cutting edge, open 
internet and circumvention tools that enable journalists to 
provide independent news coverage. Doing so is a means of 
combating the censorship that enables autocrats to thrive, and 
it also facilitates reporting that speaks truth to power and 
promotes engaged citizenry, and therefore builds resilience 
against disinformation and propaganda in societies around the 
world.
    USAGM could also consider whether AI systems, for example, 
could be used to translate high quality content for 
dissemination in multiple languages. Recent advances could make 
it possible to do so quickly and at low cost, boosting the 
reach of its most compelling materials.
    Third, center authentic local voices. Moscow and Beijing 
frequently use local influencers to improve the reach and 
resonance of their messaging. Without wavering from its 
commitment to journalistic excellence or editorial 
transparency, USAGM could borrow an element of its approach and 
center the voices of local investigative journalists and civil 
society leaders in its content. Doing so may help that content 
strike a chord with local audiences, especially in places where 
the United States may not be inherently trusted.
    Fourth, focus on themes that attract global audiences. The 
United States and other liberal democracies have struggled to 
develop a coherent post-Cold War message, and as a result, 
Washington has frequently defaulted to emphasizing support for 
human rights or efforts to root out corruption, narratives that 
may resonate primarily with elites or be seen as--worse, be 
seen as hypocritical.
    U.S. public diplomacy should focus on themes that appeal to 
broad audiences, including America's incredible capacity for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, and its support for free 
expression. In its coverage of the United States, VOA should 
not hesitate to present the American experience in its full 
complexity.
    This includes critical assessments of U.S. policy. It is a 
sign of strength, not weakness, for a U.S. Government funded 
entity to reckon honestly with its challenges. I think doing so 
may resonate with those who are struggling to nurture their own 
democracies.
    Finally, do not try to be everywhere all the time. As it 
works toward impact, USAGM should focus on places where people 
get their news. In many countries, Facebook and YouTube, much 
more so than Twitter. Also drawing on the knowledge of 
professional content marketers and might also explore whether 
there are best practices for reaching audiences on WhatsApp, 
given its popularity as a source of news.
    Ultimately, I think there is wisdom in USAGM's 
acknowledgment that it cannot adopt every new platform in every 
target market.
    Distinguished Members, the information space is a critical 
feature of the emerging competition between the United States 
and its authoritarian challengers, and we need a strategy to 
prevail.
    One that meets the moment and draws on our considerable 
strengths. By taking these steps, USAGM can play a central 
role, positioning us and itself for success.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Brandt follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Jessica Brandt

    Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Hagerty, and 
Distinguished Members of the Committee for inviting me to address you 
today. As you are aware, the United States is engaged in what I would 
characterize as a persistent, asymmetric competition (https://
securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/linking-values-and-strategy/) with 
authoritarian challengers that is taking place across at least four, 
interconnected, non-military domains:

   Politics, and here I am thinking primarily, but not solely, 
        about interference in democratic processes and efforts to 
        denigrate democratic governments;

   Economics, specifically the accumulation and application of 
        coercive leverage (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
        0163660X.2022.2124016) and the use of strategic corruption 
        (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-
        09/rise-strategic-corruption);

   Technology, which intersects with all other domains, but is 
        a competitive domain in its own right; and

   Information, which may be the most consequential terrain 
        over which states will compete in the next decades.

    The last is where I will focus today.
    It is within the information domain that autocrats--in Moscow and 
Beijing, but also elsewhere--have leveraged (https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902) some of the 
sharpest asymmetries. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping deliberately spread 
or amplify information that is false or misleading. Both operate vast 
propaganda networks that use multiple modes of communication to 
disseminate their preferred, often slanted, versions of events. Both 
spread numerous, often conflicting, conspiracy theories designed to 
deflect blame for their own wrongdoing, dent the prestige of the United 
States, and cast doubt on the notion of objective truth. And both 
frequently engage in ``whataboutism (https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/whataboutism) '' to frame the United States and its way of 
doing business as hypocritical, while using a network of proxy 
influencers to churn up anti-American sentiment around the world. For 
Putin and Xi, the goal of these pursuits is to tighten their grip on 
power at home and weaken their democratic competitors abroad. For Xi, 
it is also about positioning China as a responsible global player.
    For the United States, like other democracies, an open information 
environment confers tremendous long-term advantages, but it also 
creates near-term vulnerabilities that can be exploited using low-cost, 
often deniable tools and tactics. Where democracies depend on the idea 
that the truth is knowable (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902) and citizens can discern it to govern 
themselves, autocrats have no such need for a healthy information 
environment to thrive. In fact, autocrats benefit from widespread 
public skepticism that objective truth exists at all. Because autocrats 
tightly control their information environments, they are more insulated 
from critics than their democratic competitors. Although Moscow and 
Beijing effectively ban many Western social media platforms at home, 
they are able to use them quite effectively to engage audiences abroad. 
In doing so, they face virtually no normative constraints on lying nor 
concern for commercial repercussions (https://carnegieendowment.org/
2021/08/02/how-democracies-can-win-infor%20mation-contest-without-
undercutting-their-values-pub-85058). As a result of these asymmetries, 
autocrats have made remarkable information advances.
    To date, the United States and other liberal democracies have been 
slow to appreciate the nature of the contest (https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902) and to 
develop a proactive strategy to push back on those advances. This is 
partially driven by the challenge of developing a coherent threat 
assessment when so much of the relevant activity is taking place on 
smart phones instead of traditional battlefields. But it is primarily a 
result of the hands-off approach that democratic societies have 
traditionally taken to dealing with information--and for good reason, 
given that they risk contravening George Kennan's admonition not to 
become like those against whom they are ``coping (https://
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm).'' Those 
constraints make it hard for democratic societies to contend with this 
challenge, but they need not prevent success.
    Recognizing that competition is ultimately about the pursuit and 
use of advantages, the United States should develop a strategy (https:/
/securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/linking-values-and-strategy/) to leverage 
myriad asymmetric advantages of its own--both within the information 
domain and beyond it--to push back on Moscow and Beijing's information 
advances.
             an information strategy for the united states
    To start with, the United States can seize the initiative (https://
web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/detail/
detail?vid=2&sid=ec0e98ea-8760-40d2-9c80-
9e5eb2aba080%40redis&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHNoaWImc
2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZlJnNjb3BlPXNpdGU%3d#AN=142781666&db=asn) by 
harnessing truthful information to defend its interests and the 
integrity of the global information environment. To do this, Washington 
should take the so-called persistent engagement (https://
www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3198878/cyber-101-defend-forward-
and-persistent-engagement/) approach that the United States has applied 
to cyberspace and carry it into the information domain (https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771045). This would 
involve concerted campaigns that are grounded in truthful messaging 
designed to expose the failures and false promises of dictatorship, 
including corruption and repression. Such an approach would be in 
keeping with a strategy of exploiting Moscow and Beijing's weaknesses 
(https://www.lawfareblog.com/washington-needs-plan-pushing-back-
autocratic-advances), recognizing that competition is ultimately about 
the pursuit and use of advantages.
    Importantly, the focus of these efforts (https://
carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/02/how-democracies-can-win-
infor%20mation-contest-without-undercutting-their-values-pub-85058) 
should not be on refuting false information, but on affirmatively 
highlighting the strengths of democratic governance models and exposing 
the corruption and repression of autocratic challengers. There are at 
least two audiences for this content. First, individuals who live 
within repressive societies. Second, those in societies where democracy 
is backsliding or not fully consolidated, where truthful information 
can help build resilience against disinformation and propaganda.
    To that end, recognizing that independent media keeps citizens 
informed and holds power to account, Washington should support high 
quality journalism abroad (https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/02/
how-democracies-can-win-infor%20mation-contest-without-undercutting-
their-values-pub-85058), particularly in places where democracy is 
backsliding. And it should promote freedom of information globally--not 
just because it is in keeping with democratic values, but because it 
puts autocrats at a disadvantage, given that their grip on power 
depends on strict control of information.
    Ultimately, succeeding in the information domain will require 
action beyond it, since that is where some of the United States's most 
valuable advantages lie. These include advanced cyber capabilities, 
global financial markets, robust rule of law, and a vibrant network of 
partners. Washington could, for example, use its cyber capabilities to 
undermine the ability of its competitors to carry out malign activity 
online--as it reportedly did by taking the Kremlin's proxy troll farm 
operation offline (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-
russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-
11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9--story.html) for a few days around the 2018 
midterms, by conducting an operation that targeted Iran (https://
www.cnn.com/2020/11/03/politics/us-cyber-operation-iran-election-
interference/index.html) ahead of the 2020 presidential election, and 
by conducting ``full spectrum operations (https://therecord.media/
cyber-command-conducted-offensive-operations-to-protect-midterm-
elections)'' before, during, and after the midterms in 2022. Washington 
could also use the power and centrality of its economy to impose costs 
on those who carry out destructive, state-backed information 
manipulation campaigns.
    The United States should do all of this in coordination with other 
democratic societies, leveraging what might well be its most important 
strategic advantage: a strong network of partners and alliances. This 
should include sharing information about threats and collaborating on 
responses that are rooted in democratic values, because those values 
are strengths (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/
2020-12-22/democratic-values-are-competitive-advantage). Ultimately, 
the information competition is not just a contest between nations, but 
a struggle (https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/02/how-democracies-
can-win-information-contest-without-undercutting-their-values-pub-
85058) over systems and principles.
               advancing this strategy: the role of usagm
    The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) has a critical role to 
play in advancing this strategy. As I have argued in a forthcoming 
paper, co-written with colleagues at the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States and elsewhere, there are numerous steps that it can take 
to update its strategy for success in an era of information competition 
with autocrats. These include:

  1.  Focusing attention and resources on Latin America;

  2.  Leveraging 21st Century digital tools to build a sophisticated 
        picture of its audiences, assess the performance of its 
        content, circumvent censorship, and boost the reach of its most 
        compelling material;

  3.  Centering authentic local voices, borrowing an element of its 
        competitor's strategy while keeping its commitment to 
        journalistic excellence;

  4.  Focusing on themes that attract global audiences; and

  5.  Avoiding the temptation to be everywhere always, instead 
        prioritizing the platforms where people get their news while 
        utilizing the State Department's existing Content Commons.
             focus attention and resources on latin america
    Through the first quarter of 2023, three of the five most retweeted 
Russian state media accounts on Twitter messaged in Spanish, and 5 of 
the 10 fastest growing ones targeted Spanish-language audiences. On 
YouTube too, RT en Espanol has also proven capable of building large 
audiences, despite the platform's global ban (https://www.reuters.com/
business/media-telecom/youtube-blocks-russian-state-funded-media-
channels-globally-2022-03-11/) on Russian state-funded media channels. 
On TikTok, RT en Espanol is among the most popular Spanish-language 
media outlets. Its 29.6 million likes make it more popular than 
Telemundo, Univision, BBC Mundo, and El Pais. Likewise, on Facebook, RT 
en Espanol currently has more followers than any other Spanish-language 
international broadcaster.
    China too, is succeeding in the region. Its Spanish-language 
broadcaster, CGTN en Espanol, has roughly six times more followers on 
Facebook than the United States' Spanish-language outlet, Voz de 
America. Venezuela's TeleSur and Iran's HispanTV also have amassed 
sizeable followings.
    This at least partly, if not primarily, reflects a resource 
prioritization problem. In 2023, the budget (https://www.usagm.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/USAGMBudget_FY23_CBJ_03-25-22-FINAL.pdf) for 
Voice of America (VOA)'s Latin America division was slightly more than 
$10 million USD. That is less than half of the budget appropriated for 
its Eurasia division and less than a quarter of the budget appropriated 
for its East Asia and Pacific division. Of the 12 overseas bureaus 
(https://www.voanews.com/a/voa-around-the-world/4113370.html) operated 
by VOA, none are in Latin America. This reflects broader trends. From 
2015 to 2020, U.S. public diplomacy financing overseen by the State 
Department (educational and cultural affairs spending, excluding 
broadcasting) consistently deprioritized (https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/
pdfs/gf1_00_combined.pdf) the Western Hemisphere.
    Recognizing the extent of Russia's information manipulation efforts 
in Latin America (https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/
FP_20221216_russia_propaganda_brandt_wirtschafter.pdf)--and that with 
Spanish the fourth-most spoken language in the world (https://
rubric.com/en-US/%20most-spoken-languages-in-the-world), Kremlin 
content produced for Latin American audiences could reach far beyond 
the region--USAGM should focus attention and resources there. This 
approach should include increasing investments in VOA broadcasting in 
Spanish and considering the feasibility of opening a regional bureau 
within Latin America. To the extent possible, it should also include 
facilitating exchanges between Spanish-language journalists in the 
United States and their counterparts in Latin America, as well as 
public-private partnerships to create low-cost distribution and content 
sharing agreements that would allow for material created by Spanish 
speakers in the United States to reach audiences through local, trusted 
sources.
    As a country with 40 million native Spanish speakers and whose 
national security interests are directly affected by events in the 
region, the United States cannot afford to cede the information space 
in Latin America to its geopolitical competitors.
                  leverage 21st century digital tools
    What foreign audiences find appealing about the United States 
almost certainly differs from country to country and region to region. 
USAGM regional bureaus are best positioned to create and distribute 
material that resonates with their respective audiences--but not based 
on ``best guesses.'' USAGM should continue to invest in social media 
analysis tools (https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/
Strategic-Plan-2022-2026_74Y22-02-23-22.pdf) that enable regional 
bureaus to understand the interests and concerns of their audiences. 
Doing so can equip them to develop tailored and compelling editorial 
propositions, which are essential for staying relevant in a crowded 
modern media market. These tools should be coupled with market research 
and social media analytics to evaluate the performance of USAGM 
content, since success will depend on continuously identifying and 
prioritizing the types of materials that are most impactful. This 
approach is in keeping with the State Department's commitment to data-
informed diplomacy (https://www.state.gov/data/).
    USAGM should also continue supporting cutting-edge open internet 
and circumvention tools (https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
03/Strategic-Plan-2022-2026_74Y22-02-23-22.pdf) that enable its 
journalists, among others, to provide independent, comprehensive, and 
objective news coverage. Doing so brings two advantages. First, it is a 
means of combatting the censorship that enables autocrats to thrive. 
Second, by facilitating news coverage that speaks truth to power and 
promotes an engaged citizenry, it builds resilience against 
disinformation propaganda in target societies around the world.
    Finally, Washington should also consider whether AI systems could 
be used to translate USAGM or other high-quality content for 
dissemination in multiple languages. Recent advances could make it 
possible to do so quickly and at low cost, boosting the reach of 
USAGM's most compelling materials.
                     center authentic local voices
    Moscow and Beijing frequently use authentic domestic voices--for 
example, those of local journalists and activists--to improve the reach 
and resonance of their messaging, recognizing that doing so lends their 
content a degree of credibility. Moscow has experimented (https://
securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russias-maturing-information-manipulation-
playbook/) with a range of techniques, including co-locating (https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/africa/russia-madagascar-
election.html) trolls within a target population, renting the social 
media accounts of local users (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/
world/europe/ukraine-russia-election-tampering-propaganda.html/) with 
the goal of using them to publish political ads or plant articles, and 
hiring freelance journalists (https://www.reuters.com/article/%20us-
usa-election-facebook-russia/duped-by-russia-freelancers-ensnared-in-
%20disinformation-campaign-by-promise-of-easy-money-idUSKBN25T35E) to 
write political stories for an online publication secretly run by 
individuals linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), among others. 
Beijing, for its part, has long used foreigners in Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) propaganda. ``We have always attached great importance to 
`borrowing a mouth to speak' and used international friends to carry 
out foreign propaganda,'' proclaimed (http://borrow/) Zhu Ling, then-
China Daily editor-in-chief, in a speech celebrating the newspaper's 
30th anniversary.
    Without wavering from its commitment (https://www.usagm.gov/our-
work/strategy-and-results/strategic-priorities/) to uphold journalistic 
excellence, report facts without bias, and prioritize editorial 
transparency, USAGM could borrow an element of this approach and center 
the voices of local investigative journalists and civil society 
leaders, including rights defenders, in its content. Doing so may help 
that content strike a chord with local audiences, especially in places 
where the United States may not be inherently trusted. It is an 
approach that is also in keeping with USAGM's commitment to engaging 
and empowering local populations.
             focus on themes that attract global audiences
    The United States and other liberal democracies have struggled to 
develop a coherent post-Cold War message. As a result, Washington has 
frequently defaulted to emphasizing support for human rights and 
efforts to root out corruption--narratives that may resonate primarily 
with elites, or worse, be seen as hypocritical. Instead, U.S. public 
diplomacy should focus on themes that continue to attract global 
audiences, including the United States's capacity for innovation and 
entrepreneurship, its technological and scientific achievements, and 
its support for freedom of expression.
    In its coverage of the United States, VOA should not hesitate to 
present the American experience in its full complexity. This includes 
critically assessing U.S. policy. It is a sign of strength, not 
weakness, for a United States Government-funded entity to reckon with 
its challenges. In fact, doing so may resonate (https://www.usagm.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Strategic-Plan-2022-2026_74Y22-02-23-22.pdf) 
in societies that are struggling to establish or consolidate their own 
democracies.
    As appropriate, USAGM networks and programs could highlight 
authoritarian efforts to undermine democratic societies and 
institutions, as well as stories of resilience and resistance to 
repression. When relevant and as prudent, they could consider calling 
attention to the information manipulation strategies of Russia and 
China--in particular, whataboutism--giving care not to draw attention 
to content from Moscow and Beijing that would have otherwise gone 
unnoticed. In the fact of whataboutism, they should resist the 
temptation to rebut each claim (https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/gf01/
gf01-06/Autocratic-Approaches-to-Information-Manipulation-A-
Comparative-Case-Study.html), recognizing that doing so only prolongs 
the conversation on the competitor's terms.
                don't try to be everywhere all the time
    As it works to disseminate content that audiences not only trust 
but use, USAGM should focus on the places where people get their news 
(https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2022/
country-and-market-data): in many countries, Facebook and YouTube, much 
more so than Twitter. Drawing on the knowledge of professional content 
marketers, it might also explore whether there are best practices for 
reaching audiences on Whatsapp, given its popularity as a source of 
news in many contexts. There is wisdom in USAGM's acknowledgment 
(https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Strategic-Plan-2022-
2026_74Y22-02-23-22.pdf) that it cannot adopt every new platform in 
every target market.
    At the same time, USAGM could also share its originals within the 
State Department's Content Commons (https://commons.america.gov/) so 
that they may be amplified by relevant public diplomats. The Content 
Commons is an important resource that provides public diplomacy 
professionals access to a searchable library of on-demand, cleared, 
license-free content. But users report that the current repository 
offers limited, and at times underwhelming, options--especially in 
video format. A sharing arrangement could help mitigate that challenge, 
while helping to facilitate the dissemination of USAGM material to new 
audiences.
                             looking ahead
    The emerging competition between the United States and its 
authoritarian challengers is asymmetric in nature, and increasingly 
taking place far from traditional battlefields. Digital technologies 
are making it increasingly possible for autocrats to exploit the 
openness of democratic societies to disrupt them from within and to 
spread misleading propaganda around the world, to the detriment of U.S. 
interests. The United States needs a strategy for pushing back on these 
activities--one that meets the moment and draws on its considerable 
strengths. There are myriad steps such an approach could entail, some 
within the information domain, others beyond it. USAGM can play a 
central role. By focusing attention and resources on Latin America, 
leveraging 21st Century digital tools, centering authentic local 
voices, focusing on themes that attract global audiences, and avoiding 
the temptation to be everywhere always, USAGM can position itself for 
success in today's information environment.

    Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Walker.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER WALKER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES AND 
   ANALYSIS, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Walker. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking 
Member, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
invitation to speak with you today. If there ever were a time 
for the United States and its democratic allies to make 
competition in the information domain a top order global 
priority, it would be now.
    Over a protracted period of time, authoritarian regimes 
have massively scaled up their capabilities to suppress 
unfavorable information and amplify authoritarian pro-regime 
messaging across the global information sphere.
    Although there are differences in the shape and tone of the 
Chinese and Russian approaches, both stem from a governance 
model that privileges state power over individual liberty, and 
it is fundamentally hostile to free expression, open debate, 
and independent thought.
    A picture of these regimes' intent can be found in their 
domestic media landscapes. It has long been standard operating 
procedure for Beijing and Moscow, among other regimes, to 
suppress dissent, smear or silence political opponents, and 
inundate their populations with propagandistic content.
    Authorities in China, Russia, Iran, and other autocracies 
systematically intimidate, harass, and imprison their own media 
professionals. In an era of rising impunity, these regimes are 
more inclined to impose such harsh measures on foreign 
journalists. For instance, the Washington Post's Jason Rezaian 
was imprisoned in Iran for 544 days.
    Russia's detention of the Wall Street Journal's Evan 
Gershkovich is the most recent, deeply disturbing case of this 
kind and deserves particular attention on World Press Freedom 
Day. In the quest for information dominance, however, nowhere 
is the manipulation of media and ideas more embedded in the 
system than in today's China.
    Domestically, the Chinese authorities have built a 
formidable infrastructure of social management that 
increasingly relies on advanced technologies to surveil and 
engineer societal behavior. In recent months, the authorities 
in Beijing have effectively obscured the deaths of 1 million 
people who are believed to have perished due to the abrupt 
turnabout in the country's zero COVID policy.
    The real-world impact of Beijing's controlling approach to 
the information domain was felt internationally through its 
manipulation of the WHO. The hobbled response of the world's 
leading public health body at the outset of the pandemic was no 
doubt related to the PRC's furtive approach to the breakout of 
the virus, for which millions of people within and beyond China 
have paid a terribly high price.
    This episode speaks to the situation in which we find 
ourselves today. In a globalized information environment, the 
media norms and behaviors of the authoritarians do not stay 
neatly confined within the borders of their own repressive 
systems. Let me take a moment to put into perspective the 
extent to which the global mobilization of media undertaken by 
Russia and China is impacting us.
    Over the past two decades, Beijing and Moscow, along with 
like-minded regimes, have developed a diverse range of efforts 
to shape perceptions and project their preferred worldview, 
while contesting the ideas they find undesirable. Russia 
reportedly puts more than $300 million annually into RT, which 
is one of its principal engines for content generation. One 
recent estimate places Moscow's outward facing information 
related investments at $1.5 billion.
    The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, which functions 
as the Iranian regime's state propaganda agency, in 2022 saw 
its budget increase to an estimated $1.2 billion. China has 
spent--and continues to spend--tens of billions of dollars to 
shape public opinion and perceptions around the world, 
including thousands of people-to-people exchanges, wide-ranging 
cultural activities, and development of media enterprises with 
global reach.
    In this new environment, authoritarian regimes have 
exploited trends to muddy the information space, create 
cleavages in our societies, and obscure their own actions. 
Ultimately, authoritarian information strategies seek to 
undermine trust in democratic institutions and ideas.
    The autocrats have built out massive outward-facing 
strategic communications capabilities. The large and complex 
challenge posed by authoritarian regimes requires a response on 
multiple fronts. For its part, the National Endowment for 
Democracy supports independent journalism internationally to 
provide citizens with pluralistic and fact-based journalistic 
information.
    In 2022, NED made $51 million in grants to organizations 
working to protect democracy by strengthening independent media 
and freedom of information in some of the world's most 
repressive environments.
    In this competitive and evolving context, the fact that the 
U.S. international broadcasters--the Voice of America and the 
surrogates--are doing their work according to a fundamentally 
different set of values is as important today as at any time 
since the end of the Cold War.
    As part of a multifaceted response to today's global 
information competition, U.S. international broadcasters have 
an especially crucial role to play, including systematically 
providing accurate and uncensored news in a growing number of 
places where free media is hobbled or severely at risk.
    The critical importance of such work can be seen in 
settings such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Russia or Belarus, where 
under extraordinarily repressive conditions, U.S. entities such 
as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty unearth and 
report on issues that the authorities work so hard to keep from 
public view.
    Finally, the threats to democratic freedoms and security 
that arise from today's competitive global information 
environment require a shift in strategic thinking among the 
democracies, which should seize the challenge posed by the 
autocrats as an opportunity to level up our commitments in free 
media and democratic innovation so that we are not perpetually 
playing catch-up with the mal-intentioned autocrats. Thank you 
for your time and attention.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Mr. Christopher Walker

    Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the 
Subcommittee.
    If there ever were a time for the United States and its democratic 
allies to make competition in information domain a top order, global 
priority, it would be now. This is because the contemporary information 
revolution touches nearly every aspect of life as we know it. And over 
a protracted period of time, authoritarian regimes--whose worldview is 
at direct odds with that of the democracies--have massively scaled up 
their capabilities to suppress unfavorable information and amplify 
distorted pro-regime messaging across the global information sphere.
    Plainly said, we are in a fiercely competitive information 
environment, in which leading authoritarian powers, principally China 
and Russia, have mobilized in ways that are threatening the interests 
of the United States and its democratic partners--and more 
fundamentally undermining democratic principles and interests globally.
    As my colleagues and I have written, although there are differences 
in the shape and tone of the Chinese and Russian approaches, both stem 
from a governance model that privileges state power over individual 
liberty and is fundamentally hostile to free expression, open debate, 
and independent thought.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Christopher Walker & Jessica Ludwig (Eds.). (2017). Sharp 
Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. International Forum for 
Democratic Studies. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A picture of these regimes' intent can be gleaned from their own 
domestic media landscapes. It has long been standard operating 
procedure for Beijing and Moscow to suppress dissent, smear or silence 
political opponents, and inundate their populations with propagandistic 
content. The paramount power holders in these countries brook no 
pluralism or dissent. Authorities in China, Russia, Iran and other 
autocracies, systematically intimidate, harass, and imprison their own 
media professionals. In an era of rising impunity, these regimes, which 
possess unchecked and arbitrary power, are more inclined to impose such 
harsh measures on foreign journalists. The Committee to Protect 
Journalists reported in December 2022 that the number of jailed 
journalists had reached a 30-year high, with 363 individuals behind 
bars, and named Iran, China, Myanmar, Turkey, and Belarus, as the top 
five offenders, respectively.\2\ The Washington Post's Jason Rezaian 
was imprisoned in Iran's notorious Evin prison for 544 days. Russia's 
detention of the Wall Street Journal's Evan Gershkovic is the most 
recent, deeply disturbing case of this kind--and deserves particular 
attention, given that today is World Press Freedom Day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Number of jailed journalists spikes to new global record. 
(n.d.). Committee to Protect Journalists. https://cpj.org/reports/2022/
12/number-of-jailed-journalists-spikes-to-new-global-record/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the quest for information dominance, nowhere is the manipulation 
of media and ideas more embedded in the system than in China. 
Domestically, the Chinese authorities have built a formidable 
infrastructure of intrusive social management that increasingly relies 
on advanced technologies to surveil, coerce, and engineer societal 
behavior. This system incentivizes compliance with Communist party 
doctrine in daily life and punishes even minor forms of dissent or 
opposition. In the digital era, decision makers in China have 
constructed a powerful censorship architecture that is redefining the 
boundaries of information management and manipulation.
    For China's governors such ambitions to dominate the information 
environment is a feature, not a bug, of the system. In one illustrative 
example of the studious authoritarian avoidance of sensitive domestic 
issues, China's state-run media did not report at all on the country's 
massive stock-market collapse in August 2015.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Chris Buckley. (2015, August 25). China's Party-Run Media Is 
Silent on Market Mayhem. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/26/world/asia/chinese-news-media-largely-silent-amid-stock-
market-turmoil.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent months, the authorities in Beijing have effectively 
obscured the deaths of some 1 million people who are believed to have 
perished due to the abrupt turnabout from the country's ``zero covid'' 
policy. \4\ The authorities in Beijing are rewriting the way ``the 
pandemic is remembered in China by withholding data on its impact and 
censoring people who contradict the government line that its handling 
of the virus was a triumph.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Michael Schuman. (2023, February 24). Can a Million Chinese 
People Die and Nobody Know? How China Can Hide a Million COVID Deaths. 
The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/
02/china-million-covid-deaths-communist-party/673177/.
    \5\ Wenxin Fan & Shen Lu. (2023, April 23). China Seeks to Write 
Its Own History of Battle With Covid-19. Wall Street Journal. https://
www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-to-write-its-own-history-of-battle-
with-covid-19-1f6f8939.
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    The real world impact of Beijing's controlling approach was felt 
internationally through its manipulation of the World Health 
Organization: the hobbled response of the world's leading public-health 
body at the outset of the covid pandemic was no doubt related to the 
PRC's furtive approach to the breakout of the virus, for which millions 
of people within and beyond China's borders have paid the highest 
price.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Elizabeth C. Economy. (2022). The World According to China. 
Polity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This episode speaks to the situation in which we find ourselves 
today: in a globalized information environment, the media norms and 
behaviors of authoritarians do not stay confined within the borders of 
their own repressive systems. Let me take a moment to put into 
perspective the extent of the global mobilization undertaken by China 
and Russia in the realm of information and ideas.
              the authoritarian global media mobilization
    Over the past two decades, Beijing and Moscow along with like-
minded regimes have developed a diverse constellation of efforts to 
shape perceptions and project their preferred worldview, while 
contesting the ideas they find intolerable.
    Authoritarian regimes are engaged in what my colleagues William J. 
Dobson and Tarek Masoud describe as a ``hidden war on democracy,'' 
given the extent to which autocrats have leveraged the democracies' 
open systems, including media and information, to their advantage. \7\ 
China and Russia in their own malign ways are vibrant 
internationalists, and upped the competition in the global information 
arena at a time when the world's leading democratic states have tended 
to turn inward. This imbalance has played into the autocrats' hands and 
to their advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power, forthcoming 
July 2023 from the Johns Hopkins University Press. https://
www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/12791/defending-democracy-age-sharp-
power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia's propaganda machine reportedly puts more than $300M 
annually into RT alone.\8\ One recent estimate places Moscow's outward-
facing information-related investments at $1.5 billion.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews. (2016). The Russian 
``Firehose of Falsehood'' Propaganda Model. RAND. https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf.
    \9\ Aleksandra Michalowska-Kubs & Jakub Kubs. (2022). Coining lies. 
Kremlin spends 1.5 Billion per year to spread disinformation and 
propaganda. Debunk.org. https://www.debunk.org/coining-lies-state-
budget-financing-of-russian-propaganda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which functions 
as the Iranian regime's state propaganda agency, in 2022 saw its budget 
increase by 46 percent to approximately $1.26 billion. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Ali Fathollah-Nejad, & Mahdi Ghodsi. (2022). Raisi's shrinking 
budget cements the Islamic Republic's ``trinity.'' Middle East 
Institute. https://mei.edu/publications/raisis-shrinking-budget-
cements-islamic-republics-trinity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China has spent tens of billions of dollars to shape public opinion 
and perceptions around the world, employing a toolkit that includes 
thousands of people-to-people exchanges, wide-ranging cultural 
activities, and the development of media enterprises with global reach. 
Writing in the Journal of Democracy in 2015, China expert Anne-Marie 
Brady observed that: ``The scale and range of China's current annual 
investment in foreign-propaganda activities is so great that it would 
be impossible to come up with an accurate total budget.'' Brady went on 
to say that ``international reports have cited figures ranging from $7 
billion to $10 billion, but these numbers include only the subsidies 
given to media targeted at non-Chinese foreigners.'' \11\ In the 
ensuing period, there is little to suggest the decision makers in China 
have scaled back such media investments, on the contrary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Anne-Marie Brady. (2015). Authoritarianism Goes Global: 
China's Foreign Propaganda Machine. Journal of Democracy, 26(4), 51-59. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0056.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But the fact is we do not really know with any real confidence the 
exact amounts these regimes spend on outward-facing media and 
information activities due to the non-transparent and unaccountable 
nature of these authoritarian systems.
    This is an especially critical point in the context of today's 
hearing. These authoritarian regimes operate with few if any 
institutional checks on their power and decision making; the media 
outlets that operate in service of these regimes also do so without 
accountable and transparent governance norms or structures. On the 
surface, these enterprises can appear to be like instruments of soft 
power. But China's state media outlets, such as CGTN, and the Russian 
state's RT are not the BBC or Deutsche Welle, which operate according 
to codes of conduct oriented toward freedom, human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. These entities that operate in democratic 
settings, similar to U.S. international broadcasters, are subject to 
institutional scrutiny and accountability mechanisms.
    A public hearing of the sort we are having today would be 
unimaginable in the Russian Duma or in China's National People's 
Congress, both of which are rubber stamp bodies that play no meaningful 
oversight role.
    In autocracies, because editorial accountability for state media 
outlets ultimately rests with political leadership with unchecked 
power, the content that they produce is systematically compromised, 
through either editorial omission or commission. RT, for instance, 
slavishly follows the Kremlin line, rationalizing the status quo that 
the regime seeks to maintain by cynically portraying all systems, 
whether autocratic or democratic, as corrupt. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Christopher Walker. (2016). The Authoritarian Threat: The 
Hijacking of ``Soft Power.'' Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 49-63. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russian authorities have long prioritized the development of an 
elaborate apparatus for the dissemination of Kremlin-friendly 
narratives around the globe. Over the past year, this outward-facing 
communications machinery's chief aim has been ``to deflect attention 
from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, blame Kyiv or NATO countries 
for the conflict, and dampen support for Ukraine's cause.'' The Russian 
Government's investments in the information sphere have yielded 
significant results in regions such as Latin America and Africa where 
the Kremlin's jaundiced messaging may go unchallenged. In Latin 
America, for example, the Russian Government has continued to intensify 
its manipulation of public opinion through the use of friendly local 
influencers on Facebook and Twitter. \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Adam Fivenson, Galyna Petrenko, Veronika Vichova, & Andrej 
Polescuk. (2023). Shielding Democracy: Civil Society Adaptations to 
Kremlin Disinformation about Ukraine. International Forum for 
Democratic Studies. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/
NED_Forum-Shielding-Democracy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Authoritarian powers take information seriously and democracies 
should as well. The autocrats invest in international media because 
they appreciate that these are the arenas in which ideas take hold and 
today's political battles are fought and won.
    As part of its efforts to shape public opinion and serve the 
ideological aims of the CCP across the globe, the Chinese authorities 
are ``training foreign journalists, buying space in overseas media, and 
expanding its state-owned networks on an unprecedented scale.'' \14\ 
For example, with respect to Beijing's evolving global media approach 
China expert Sarah Cook describes how China has ``developed a wide-
ranging toolkit that can distort democratic media environments through 
propaganda, censorship, disinformation, and control over content 
delivery systems.'' Media partnerships between Xinhua or CGTN and both 
public and private media outlets around the world have yielded content-
sharing and coproduction agreements that insinuate Beijing-friendly 
content seamlessly into local media outlets. As Cook observes, ``Most 
news consumers in these countries are unlikely to note Xinhua's 
presence in the byline of an article, and even if they do, they may not 
be aware of the agency's subservience to the CCP.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Sean Mantesso & Christina Zhou. (2019). China's multi-billion 
dollar media campaign ``a major threat for democracies'' around the 
world. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-08/chinas-foreign-
media-push-a-major-threat-to-democracies/10733068.
    \15\ Sarah Cook (2022). Countering Beijing's Media Manipulation. 
Journal of Democracy, 33(1), 116-130. https://doi.org/10.1353/
jod.2022.0008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the autocrats take information and ideas seriously, they are 
not engaged in a form of communications and public diplomacy as 
democracies would understand it. Instead, they often are pursuing more 
malign objectives that associated with new forms of outwardly directed 
censorship and information manipulation, which my colleagues and I have 
described as ``sharp power.''
                        meeting the competition
    In recent years, the proliferation of digital media globally has 
been one of the key drivers of deep, structural changes within the news 
industry, hobbling the production of fact-based news and leading to 
fragmentation and polarization. We need to acknowledge that the leading 
authoritarian powers have seized asymmetric advantages afforded to them 
by the modern media and information environment. Too often, observers 
in democracies have been complacent about the authoritarians' designs 
and ambitions.
    As NED President and CEO Damon Wilson recently observed (March 28, 
2023) to this full committee, ``with Russia and China at the vanguard, 
authoritarian powers have grown increasingly more assertive and 
ambitious . . . and in an era of global interconnectivity, [these 
autocrats] recognize that keeping their own citizens in check is no 
longer enough to cement their power, and so they're partnering with 
other like-minded autocracies to share ideas, resources, and 
technologies.''
    In this new media and information environment, authoritarian 
regimes have exploited trends to muddy the information space, create 
societal cleavages, and obscure their own actions. This manipulation of 
the media ecosystem can have the effect of corroding the environment 
for democracy by marginalizing civil society voices, weakening 
democratic norms around reasoned and civil debate, and amplifying local 
voices who exploit divisive narratives for their own ends. Ultimately, 
authoritarian information strategies seek to undermine trust in 
democratic institutions and ideas.
    This large and complex challenge posed by authoritarian regimes in 
the modern information environment requires a response on multiple 
fronts.
    For its part, the National Endowment for Democracy supports 
rigorous independent journalism internationally to provide citizens 
with pluralistic and fact-based information, as well as the 
dissemination and adoption of widely-accepted standards of journalistic 
practices and integrity. In 2022, NED made $51 million in grants to 
organizations working to protect democracy by strengthening independent 
media and freedom of information in some of the world's most repressive 
environments. NED grantees use a wide-range of approaches to address 
these challenges, including monitoring and documenting the actors and 
strategies behind information manipulation campaigns; leveraging 
research and analysis by contributing critical insights to policy 
discussions; and developing ways to mitigate the impact of 
authoritarian information manipulation through awareness-raising and 
public education initiatives that aim to build media literacy, 
proactively refuting harmful narratives spread through campaigns 
supported by China, Russia, and other such regimes.
    NED supports cross-regional collaboration to compare research 
findings and discern patterns and trends in different parts of the 
world that have resulted in a shared understanding of threats emerging 
in the information environment. This is particularly important for 
democracy activists who are concerned about the role that foreign 
authoritarian disinformation campaigns play in their societies, where 
autocrats take advantage of weaknesses in the social fabric to 
undermine trust in democratic institutions.
    NED has prioritized fighting for freedom of expression and media 
freedom for years, providing support for independent media and those 
who fight for a legal environment that enables the full enjoyment of 
freedom of expression. This remains one of the most important 
contributions to a healthy information space globally.
    But there is a good deal more that needs to be done, given the 
scale of the authoritarians' media activities. According to an analysis 
by the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) at NED, just 
0.3 percent of official U.S. development assistance is dedicated to 
independent media. The U.S. can encourage its partners at the OECD to 
spend more on democracy support, including for the media sector. 
Furthermore, members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) could be encouraged to adopt a common set of principles to ensure 
that existing support to information ecosystems is guided by best 
practices and up-to-date knowledge on effectiveness. A draft of such 
principles is currently being developed by DAC members with input from 
CIMA, the Global Forum for Media Development, and other civil society 
partners.
    In this highly competitive and evolving context, the fact that U.S. 
international broadcasters--and public service-oriented international 
media entities in like-minded democracies--are doing their work 
according to a fundamentally different set of values is as important 
today as at any time since the end of the Cold War. As part of a 
multifaceted response to today's global information wars, U.S. 
international broadcasters have an especially crucial role to play, 
including systematically providing accurate and uncensored news in the 
growing number of settings where a free media is hobbled or at risk, 
including top order cases such as China, Russia, and Iran.
    Given the standards being projected by the authoritarians in the 
global media context, it is all the more reason for the U.S. and other 
democracies to take a leadership role in modeling journalistic 
practices and standards that are grounded in trust, transparency, 
accountability, and integrity. This model stands in contrast to that of 
authoritarian regimes, which have built out massive outward-facing 
global strategic communications capabilities. To achieve greater 
leverage and surge capacity, these regimes increasingly align their 
anti-democratic narratives with each other. These narratives include a 
library of old lies that are often repeated and must be rebuffed again 
and again.
    Meanwhile, international broadcasters, local independent media and 
NGOs are often doing the work of countering this media manipulation in 
isolation; those of us committed to democracy must identify ways to 
implement new forms of cooperation if we are to retake the initiative 
and counter the combined efforts of well-resourced authoritarians.
    Finally, we cannot afford to suffer a failure of imagination. The 
threats to democratic development and security that arise from today's 
competitive global information environment requires a shift in 
strategic thinking among the democracies, which too often have taken a 
sluggish approach to competing in the modern information environment. 
Democracies should seize the challenge posed by autocrats as an 
opportunity to level up our investments in free media and democratic 
innovation, so that we are not perpetually playing catch up with mal-
intentioned authoritarians.
    Thank you for your time and attention.

    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Walker. We will now hear 
from Mr. Stilwell.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID STILWELL, FOX FELLOW FOR FUTURE PACING 
   THREATS, AIR FORCE ACADEMY INSTITUTE FOR FUTURE CONFLICT, 
  FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST 
     ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Stilwell. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Hagerty, 
thank you for the opportunity. I am not going to repeat the 
problem. I think we are pretty clear on what the problem is. 
The solution, I think, is worth discussing.
    We have talked about resources, a number of other things, 
but I do think we have--we are talking about a new Cold War 
today. I think there are a lot of lessons from the old Cold 
War. I am an old Cold War product, I think most of us are. I 
went to Air Force Academy, and again, thank you for the 
introduction.
    Kind of lays out where I am going to go with this, but 
immediately after the Air Force Academy I picked up for the 
East-West Center in Hawaii, where I got my master's degree in 
Asian Studies. The East-West Center was funded by the U.S. 
Information Agency. The U.S. Information Agency, if you look at 
its charter, says it coordinates academic and cultural 
exchanges, international broadcasting, and other things.
    America's brand sells itself. We do not have to necessarily 
sell it or put so much effort into it. We should look back at 
what we did during the Cold War in terms of getting our brand 
out there so people can take advantage of it, recognize it, and 
then let them decide which message they buy more.
    I am telling you, when we get out there or when we bring 
our allies and partners or friends here to the U.S. and then 
they compare that to what they have seen in their other trips, 
we win. We cannot help but win in that case. An assessment we 
should make, though, is the difference in environments.
    We look at the open information environment in the United 
States as a liability and the PRC is running roughshod in the 
attachment that Senator Hagerty put up. Thank you for putting 
that out there. You can see that the PRC has CGTN, China Radio 
National, putting China Daily inserts in the New York Times, 
have full access to American people.
    Truth has a ring to it that everybody recognizes, but 
propaganda also carries a message as well, and the PRC effort 
here is to divide United States, is to make us fight ourselves 
so we are too weak to fight them when the time comes. Open 
information environment is a liability, but it is a massive 
advantage that they do not have.
    The point here, and this is one of those contradictions 
that we should take more advantage of, is they need our 
information to innovate because you cannot do it inside of an 
authoritarian closed country. You cannot share information 
about Xi Jinping in China today unless you want to call him 
``Winnie the Pooh.''
    They have to dance around these things. Innovation is tough 
in China. An example is in 1999 when a U.S. B-2 accidentally 
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the PRC routed--it got 
a bunch of its people out there to protest in front of the U.S. 
embassy, and they did for a time, but it did not take very long 
for them to all like gather their forces and go, you know what, 
let us next go down the Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound, 
and let us protest the authoritarian government in our country.
    That is the end of those sorts of protests because they 
inevitably go against their government. That closed information 
environment where those people know that they are being lied to 
is an advantage for us, and we should take advantage.
    We should also look at the contradictions and the paradox 
of a country that wants to control information because it is a 
direct threat to its continued leadership, but they also need 
it to compete with us.
    Again, I think we can use those to, one, just talk about it 
because it is very effective. Two, we can also put it out there 
for others in other agencies to take care of. I will offer two 
more thoughts here. I think there is an offensive opportunity 
here and there is a defensive opportunity.
    In the offensive opportunity, look at what Starlink did to 
Ukraine. If it were not for Starlink, remember the Russians cut 
off all fiber optic information access in Ukraine, Ukraine 
would have been forgotten about and it would be gone today, but 
within 48 hours of that cutting off information, Starlink and 
SpaceX put a communication on orbit, low latency 5G made it 
available for the President and for the Ukrainian people.
    That is an approach we should definitely take, and it is a 
human right. It is part of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that people have access to information. China is a 
signatory to the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, and 
therefore we should insist that they allow their people to have 
access.
    Where they do not, we should find ways to let their people 
have access. We talk about VPNs and other things. A second one 
is journalists in this country, and we worked really hard on 
this when I was in the previous Administration, was to make 
sure that there was an evenness in journalists. They kicked out 
all the good American journalists and we were down to like 30 
and they had 160.
    We kicked out 60 of their journalists. I think you are 
going to have to drive down to zero journalists on both sides. 
Then you give me one, I will give you one. Then when they kick 
one of ours out, we kick one of theirs out. It is called 
reciprocity. It is the basis of diplomacy, and we should focus 
on that.
    With my remaining 15 seconds, I want to point out that we 
have great advantages and we have yet to take advantage of 
them, but we had lessons from the Cold War and the U.S. 
Information Agency that we should look back on. Then Senator 
Cardin, I gave you that one book, Political Warfare. I think it 
is worth a look.
    Then this book out of the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic 
Studies about China's global influence is definitely worth a 
look as well. With that, I thank you for your attention.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Stilwell follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. David Stilwell

    BLUF: The U.S. disestablished its very capable United States 
Information Agency (USIA) at the end of the Cold War, leaving State 
Department vaguely in charge of coordinating external messaging. As the 
sole superpower without a serious challenger for the last 30 years, 
U.S. interests were supported by soft power and reputation. The rise of 
Xi Jinping's People's Republic of China (PRC) brings a challenge as 
serious as that of the Soviet Union 60 years ago, and a U.S. agency in 
charge of external messaging is desperately needed for the U.S. to 
compete effectively.
            the problem: the people's republic of china has 
                  been at war with the u.s. since 1950
    The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) strategy of Political Warfare 
reflects the Party's internal dialogue that has called the U.S. an 
enemy since the Korean War. Using its concept of Political Warfare, the 
PRC is actively conducting Warfare in the Economic, Information, Legal, 
Public Opinion, Psychological, and Technical domains. The only Warfare 
not actively employed today is Military Warfare (armed conflict), as it 
brings the highest cost and risk. Despite the evidence, most Americans 
have been led to believe that the U.S.-PRC relationship has been 
peaceful and cooperative. Yet, while successive U.S. governments have 
been trying to cooperate, the CCP has been competing, doing particular 
damage to U.S. Economic and Information interests, undermining 
America's global reputation and prosperity as Beijing seeks to ``take 
the center of the global stage.'' A prime example of Information 
Warfare took place in 2019: after a severe weather event in our 
hemisphere, U.S. agencies immediately set about the big job of 
repairing a small country's key infrastructure--getting ports, roads, 
water and power up and running again. For its part, Beijing sent in 
Huawei to get cell towers working, then handed out free Huawei 
handsets. As soon as a port would open, or water service was restored, 
the PRC systems would broadcast ``brought to you by the Chinese 
people.'' One can imagine the message to American diplomats in that 
country: ``What have you done for us lately? Look at how much China has 
done,'' thus undermining our reputation and influence.
    Until a few years ago, U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of 
China had been protracted patience in the hope that a steady supply of 
carrots would obviate the need for sticks. During my time as Defense 
Attache in our embassy in Beijing a decade ago, I dutifully carried out 
the NSC strategy of Engage, Bind, Balance, even though it was obvious 
that the first two elements required the PRC to play along, and they 
were having none of it. All the time we've been trying to cooperate, 
Beijing has been competing, across multiple domains, none more so than 
the Information domain. This was made clear every time the People's 
Liberation Army's leaders rebuffed Secretary of Defense Austin's 
requests for a phone call during periods of escalating tensions. 
Rejecting requests for consultation is in itself an information 
operation, showing the U.S. as weak and worried, and the PRC to be 
calmly in command. The U.S. Government Information machine needs to 
once again gird up to compete in this New Cold War environment.
    The PRC has perfected the idea ``Entropic Warfare'' against 
democracies. Entropic Warfare does not pick winners or losers, nor does 
it favor political parties. It simply seeks to use disinformation, 
trolls, bots, etc to create chaos, anger, and division in other 
societies to weaken them. This form of Information Warfare is active 
today and requires immediate action to prevent further damage to our 
democracy. U.S. responses to Entropic Warfare and the many other forms 
of PRC Information Warfare require developing and employing Offensive 
and Defensive strategies, which are quite different.
                u.s. responses in the information domain
    In the Economic space, the previous Administration began, and the 
current Administration continues, a long-overdue policy to bring the 
economic/trade relationship with the PRC back into balance, enacting 
punitive measures to change behavior, and where the PRC won't change, 
to punish their economy and protect ours. In the same way, in the 
Information domain, we started down a similar Public Diplomacy path to 
call out PRC disinformation activities (like those described at the 
beginning of this paper), employing transparency tools against a regime 
that is not bound by facts and cynically changes its story to suit 
current circumstances (ATCH 1). But the process of reestablishing U.S. 
Information dominance is in its infancy, and changing policies across 
administrations make the level of U.S. competition inconsistent. The 
outbreak of the COVID pandemic 3 years ago saw Beijing exert enormous 
effort to whitewash its culpability for failing to contain a pandemic 
that has caused 7 million deaths worldwide. It quickly became obvious 
that Beijing was going to try to shift blame for the global 
catastrophe, and we realized that a new, more muscular and more active 
approach to Public Diplomacy was needed.
    Bland, anodyne official statements from the U.S. Government (USG) 
were clearly not going to work in the face of advanced PRC Information 
and Public Opinion Warfare (examples at ATCH 2). So, rather than talk 
ourselves out of ``undiplomatic'' messaging, we chose to go at PRC 
malfeasance directly, and we did it in creative ways at all levels. One 
particularly productive initiative was State Department messaging on 
Twitter to draw out PRC ``Wolf Warriors'' with the intent to get them 
to say something embarrassing. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman 
Zhao Lijian accommodated us on 12 March 2020 (ATCH 3) when he accused 
the U.S. of bringing COVID to Wuhan China. A recent statement by PRC 
Ambassador to France Yu Shaye denying the sovereignty of former Soviet 
Union states (Ukraine and the Baltics) is the most recent example of 
the damage Wolf Warriors have caused--a significant vulnerability for 
the PRC, and an opportunity for State Department and others to exploit.
    During the last Administration, initial steps at messaging 
coordination yielded positive results. Inside State Department, we 
established regular, informal coordination between the East Asia and 
Pacific Bureau and the R (public diplomacy) family, including the 
Global Engagement Center, to get away from bland public press releases 
and vague SPOX statements. Rather than dance around the question of 
culpability, Secretary Pompeo went directly at the most obvious source 
of the pandemic, saying ``there is enormous evidence that the Pandemic 
originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.'' Former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State David Feith laid out the rationale and the 
evidence for this more direct approach in his testimony to the House 
Oversight Committee on 18 April 2023.
    But State Department Public Diplomacy can't do this by itself, so 
we reached out to the Department of Defense to establish Information 
coordination mechanisms. Simple steps like mutual awareness created 
synergies in Administration messaging; previous to that much of the 
messaging was done independently, sometimes at cross purposes. The 
synergies were obvious and required little additional effort making the 
initiative self-sustaining. At the same time we established an informal 
China Sync coordination mechanism to share information across State 
Department on each others' China initiatives, China Sync quickly grew 
to include voluntary representation from the Pentagon and other 
agencies. There is a demand for this sort of coordination but there is 
no acknowledged coordination agency (U.S. Information Agency) such as 
we had during the Cold War.
    The SFRC and this subcommittee understand better than most the 
importance of telling America's story well and preventing our 
adversaries from telling it for us. But there is much work to be done. 
There needs to be Goldwater Nichols-like legislation for the 
Interagency (one aspect of what the National Defense Strategy calls 
``Integrated Deterrence'') that forces messaging coordination and 
integration across government agencies--no two agencies are more 
important than State and Defense in this effort. Whereas we could once 
overpower any adversary with military force, the Information Age 
demands we take a more sophisticated and cooperative approach to using 
Information tools to coordinate with allies, incentivize potential 
partners, and to influence and deter adversaries.
    Deterrence is all about messaging--wielding information as an 
instrument of national power to prevent an adversary from taking (in 
this case) military action. Since the end of the Cold War and the 
demise of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, we have taken a passive/
reactive approach to employing the Information tool at the national 
level, assuming American Soft Power would be enough to encourage 
friends and deter adversaries. Information passivity at this point is 
dangerous: Deterrence happens before an attack; waiting until the 
attack occurs takes us down a much more dangerous and costly path, as 
was seen with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The study of deterrence 
theory has until now mostly been applied to U.S. strategic forces; 
today it needs to be expanded across government agencies and the 
domains they represent. Deterrence does not reside exclusively in the 
Information domain, but Information is the tool that organizes and 
shapes the coordinated message for adversary consumption.
    George Kennan, in his Policy Planning Staff Memorandum reminds us 
that political warfare measures (which rely heavily on the Information 
domain):

        `` . . . are both overt and covert. They range from such overt 
        actions as political alliances, economic measures, and `white' 
        propaganda, to such covert operations as clandestine support of 
        `friendly' foreign elements, `black' psychological warfare and 
        even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile 
        states.''

    Compared to what Kennan described, and the capabilities that were 
resident in the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Information machine 
has been sub-optimized for the last 30 years. We've been reluctant to 
acknowledge the threat from the PRC, while the CCP is very comfortable 
operating (unopposed) in the domains of Information Warfare, Public 
Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Influence Operations. With 
just a little effort, the U.S. can blunt the CCP's attacks on Democracy 
(it has to undermine Democracy because it is always a better governance 
alternative to XJP's new authoritarianism; for proof just look at the 
numbers of people immigrating to the U.S. vs the PRC). As long as 
democratic governments exist, they will present an existential threat 
to authoritarian government. This is an area of exclusive advantage for 
the U.S., but we have yet to take advantage of it.
     going on the offensive: recommended usg information activities
    The U.S. response doesn't have to be complicated; for starters we 
should demand and enforce strict Reciprocity in the Information domain. 
The U.S. should insist on reciprocal access to Chinese audiences and 
deny PRC Propaganda access to American audiences as much as the law 
will allow (including simply identifying the source of information as 
the CCP). As it stands, agents of the Chinese Government have 
unfettered access to American media; they spew carefully crafted 
disinformation from Twitter (banned in the PRC), they manipulate 
cognitive processes through TikTok (also banned in the PRC), they're 
all over our traditional and social media, even spreading propaganda 
messages on Sunday morning talk shows. At the same time, the Chinese 
people are denied access to U.S. messaging in the PRC. In 2020, then-
Ambassador Cui Tiankai denied responsibility for COVID and criticized 
the American response to the pandemic in OpEds, on talk shows, and in a 
public speech at Harvard. In response, State Department Public 
Diplomacy set out to demonstrate the lack of reciprocal access to 
Americans who assumed our diplomats enjoyed the same privileges. We 
drafted an uncontroversial OpEd for our Ambassador to have placed in 
the PRC's version of the New York Times--People's Daily. The People's 
Daily editorial staff not only rejected the OpEd, they provided a 
rejection letter (ATCH 4). State Department Public Diplomacy released 
the OpEd and the rejection letter side-by-side to show the American 
people the CCP's lopsided approach to diplomacy--an excellent example 
of the ease of going on the offensive in the Information realm if we 
would just start. What follows are two recommendations for employing 
Information on the offense: Reciprocal Journalist access, and giving 
PRC citizens unfettered access to the worldwide web as a human right.
    RECIPROCAL ACCESS FOR JOURNALISTS. Beijing routinely harasses and 
expels Western reporters (17 were expelled in the first half of 2020 
alone); in September 2020 Washington Post correspondent Alice Su was 
physically assaulted and then expelled for her reporting on the CCP 
closing Mongolian schools and preventing Mongolian language education. 
(ATCH 5) To address this abuse and to force Beijing to issue more 
journalist visas to American reporters, we sought reciprocity in PRC 
journalist access. In March 2020 there were 160 PRC ``journalists'' 
with journalist visas (when asked why we hadn't seen any reports filed 
in China by these journalists, the PRC ambassador explained their job 
was to tell China's story to the American people--I pointed out that 
his explanation defined diplomats, not journalists), with only 32 
American journalists remaining in the PRC at that time. To demonstrate 
our interest in balancing this relationship, we announced the removal 
of 60 of the 160 PRC journalists, with the intent of continuing to 
decrement PRC Government personnel (``journalists'' all work for the 
CCP or take direction from the Chinese Government) until Beijing made 
access more reciprocal. (ATCH 6)
    With the remaining imbalance in journalist access (100 Chinese, 32 
American), we assessed that Beijing would likely respond in kind to 
expulsions. If we stuck with a tit-for-tat approach, there would still 
be some 60 PRC ``journalists'' remaining in the U.S. after all 
Americans have been forced to leave China. A solution here was for the 
U.S. to suspend all journalist visas, and then rebuild rosters on a 
one-for-one basis, with the PRC granting visas first. There are 
quantitative and qualitative aspects to this approach. As it stands, 
Beijing issues visas to foreign journalists who toe the Party line, 
expelling or arresting those who criticize the Party. The best 
reporters are often expatriate native Chinese speakers, and the PRC 
routinely cancels or denies the visas. In rebuilding the rosters, 
Beijing would get no veto authority--once an American journalist visa 
is issued, the U.S. would issue a PRC-selected journalist their visa. 
If the U.S. journalist is harassed or expelled, the corresponding PRC 
journalist visa will be cancelled.
    ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT. A second Information-on-
the-offense approach reflects Kennan's quote earlier. The CCP 
recognizes the power of information and therefore tightly restricts its 
access by Chinese citizens, denying them a fundamental human right. The 
Chinese people have a right to know what's going on in their own 
country and in the wider world. If the Chinese Government doesn't think 
enough of its citizens to give them access, then steps can be taken to 
provide that access anyway. The SpaceX decision to deploy Starlink in 
Ukraine is a positive example of how to defeat an Authoritarians' 
reflexive need to control information and keep its people in the dark. 
In a Chinese setting, Information access would have to be 
unattributable to the individual accessing it, since the CCP punishes 
those who tunnel under, through or over the Great Firewall. Starlink is 
just one option; there are other opportunities to allow Chinese 
citizens access to real information without setting them up for 
punishment. Some of these solutions involve international organizations 
like the International Telecommunication Union, which until January 
2023 was led by PRC citizen and CCP member Zhao Houlin (2015-2022) who 
drove policies that protect authoritarian government and undermine free 
access to information, such as a rule that signals from space can only 
land in cooperating countries (denying PRC citizens access to 
Starlink).
          . . . while defending against prc information warfare
    This is where it gets tricky. There is only so much the U.S. 
Government can do to protect citizens from foreign propaganda and 
disinformation. The National Security Agency does its part to prevent 
hostile cyber attacks, but the U.S. Government is not well suited to 
referee what's Mal-, Mis- and Disinformation, versus unpopular opinions 
and points of disagreement. Filtering disinformation quickly runs into 
censorship, as was so clearly demonstrated with the Twitter Files. So 
as U.S. Government agencies do their part of protect Americans from 
external hostile forces, there's only so much we want them to do.
    Defending against PRC (and others') Information Warfare starts in 
school (K-12). The surest way to discern the difference between fact 
and fiction, between foreign disinformation and domestic bots, or to 
understand when only one side of a complex issue is being presented, is 
to arm individual citizens with the tools to defend themselves while 
online. Training the next generation on Critical Thinking (or Thinking 
about Thinking--understanding cognition) has never been more important. 
It is primarily the responsibility of parents, then of our education 
institutions. The PRC has become quite adept at selling its twisted 
version of the truth on social media, oftentimes hiding behind non-PRC-
looking persona to allay suspicion. The first rule of Critical Thinking 
is to cultivate a healthy skepticism of all information and then 
challenge assumptions. We don't want to raise a generation of cynics, 
but developing a healthy skepticism is the best defense against PRC 
Information Warfare as well as the other threats emanating from modern 
social media.
    Developing Critical Thinking skills will go a long way in defeating 
PRC disinformation while at the same time preparing young Americans for 
the divisive on-line environment. In this vein, all Americans need to 
get serious about assessing the reliability of their sources of 
information. Traditional media in the U.S. can no longer claim to be 
``the most trusted news source''--there is no Walter Cronkite who 
presents just the facts . . . there's no money in that. In the age of 
instant on-line breaking news, there is no penalty for being wrong, but 
there's money to be made by being sensational. The PRC plays off of 
this trend to steer public opinion in directions favorable to the CCP 
or creating division, friction and chaos among Americans. Meanwhile, 
the Great Firewall prevents the same public opinion warfare in China by 
blocking outside information and censoring domestic information.
                               conclusion
    We can't out-do the PRC in this contest to control and manipulate 
information. The short-term benefits of controlling information are 
many but there is significant long-term downside to the CCP denying the 
Chinese people access to the outside world. ChatGPT was initially 
welcomed by the CCP as a way to speed up decision making and out-think 
free countries, but since ChatGPT has yet to be sensitized politically, 
it often gives answers that undermine CCP authority and legitimacy. The 
CCP will limit the information AI tools can access, then filter the 
answers it provides, and in the end it will create programs that tell 
the CCP what it wants to hear--negating the utility of Artificial 
Intelligence. This is the PRC conducting Information Warfare against 
itself. So while we prosecute other Offensive and Defensive Information 
Warfare tools, blocking access by nefarious PRC software (TikTok, 
Weixin--ATCH 7) we should heed Napoleon's advice to ``never interrupt 
your adversary in the commission of a mistake'' and enjoy the show as 
the CCP struggles with the dilemma of needing to control information to 
protect its legitimacy, while accessing the wide world of information 
needed to compete effectively. The USSR faced a similar dilemma and 
failed to handle it properly.


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[Editor's note.--The document that follows can also be found at: 
https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CHINA-GLOBAL-INFLUENCE-
revised-final.pdf ]

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    Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank all three of our 
witnesses. This has been, I think, a very healthy debate, or 
discussion, I should say. I want to start with the point that 
Ms. Bennett mentioned.
    She gave us those numbers, which are pretty strong about 
the audience that our media outlets under the broadcasting have 
versus Russia and China, but I just happen to be concerned that 
if you look a decade from now, whether those numbers will hold. 
I see Russia and China just putting so much resources into our 
hemisphere, every time we travel, we see it.
    We know that they are physically present and using 
propaganda and disinformation in our hemisphere, in Africa. It 
gets back to the question I raised a little bit earlier and 
Senator Booker raised earlier, we have Voice of America. I 
understand that, but we have the specific entities that are 
with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. We have Radio Free 
Asia. We have our office in Cuba.
    We have our Middle East focus. We do not have in our 
hemisphere or in Africa. Should we be having a similar type of 
priority organization in those two regions of the world that 
might answer some of your questions about having local figures 
on our news media because you are there, and a more permanent 
presence, and you establish those types of relationships?
    To your point, General, the--yes, we have an advantage, but 
we don't always playing on a level playing field. We know that 
China, for example, on their contracts with the media 
companies, exclude access to our products. Being personally 
present, having a more personal involvement in the region seems 
to me might be a worthy investment. Ms. Brandt.
    Ms. Brandt. Thank you. Yes, as I mentioned, I do think that 
there is considerable wisdom in considering the feasibility of 
opening a regional bureau in Latin America.
    I mean, I think presence on the ground is essential to 
building out a network of stringer reporters, again, trusted 
relationships with local civil society members, activists, 
journalists, rights defenders in the community.
    I think building out a presence on the ground, I think, is 
something we ought to consider.
    Senator Cardin. Mr. Walker.
    Mr. Walker. One point I would make is that the Chinese 
authorities--the Chinese Party state--put a wide range of 
resources into those entities, some of which may seem nominally 
autonomous, but in the end they are working in coordination 
with the paramount political authorities in the country.
    It is a very different model. We are still grappling with 
the asymmetries posed by China. We can put additional resources 
into one of these regions, which I think is a wise idea, but 
that would be just one piece of a puzzle that would equip us to 
deal, for example, with information and broadcasting.
    China is undertaking a wide range of activities, including 
people-to-people exchanges, building relationships, putting 
people on the payroll who work in media, and doing that for the 
long haul.
    As you suggest, we should be in this for the long haul and 
think about ways to invest that are consistent with democratic 
values, but can compete in a meaningful way with this 
formidable challenge from China.
    Senator Cardin. Mr. Stilwell.
    Mr. Stilwell. Senator, it is a great question. We have a 
lot of resources. They are just not coordinated. My time at 
State Department, I reached over to--four or five different 
agencies that were working on getting our message out in the 
region and then to the PRC, in visible and not visible ways.
    They are scattered because after 1991 or 1999, when U.S. 
Information Agency was disbanded, we all kind of beat swords 
into plowshares. To stand up another agency is going to take a 
lot of time and negotiation. I am not saying we wait until 
that, but a mediocre plan executed with violence today beats a 
perfect plan tomorrow.
    Let us get to the 80 percent solution or the 50 percent 
solution, but let us start to coordinate. I would start with 
Defense and State, getting them to coordinate more directly.
    Senator Cardin. Which is the point I was raising a little 
bit earlier about this organizational structure. Look, the 
Congress has tried to struggle with this over. We have changed 
it twice in recent years, but we should be nimble enough to 
adjust to current priorities. I do not really see that.
    I do not see us adjusting, taking resources from one part 
of the world to another part of the world, because we see a 
National Security interest in getting information out, accurate 
information out because of the activities of our adversaries. I 
just have not seen that nimbleness.
    Part of that might be our responsibility in Congress, the 
way that we appropriate, the way that we have set up the 
structure. We know that we cannot always put a lot more 
resources into a program.
    If the resources are not being adequately used or are not 
being coordinated well, it is compromising our ability to 
accomplish the mission. It is something we need to take a look 
at.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I would like to 
come back to a couple of statements that struck me. First, Ms. 
Brandt, you said, and to use your own words, the information 
space is the most consequential, I think those are the words 
you used, modern day battleground where we encounter our 
adversaries.
    Something Ms. Bennett said, and I am glad you are still 
here, Ms. Bennett, that really struck me was the fact that 
USAGM is a weapon to use and deploy. Those are the words that 
you used, a weapon to use and deploy. I agree with you. I think 
USAGM is a strategic asset of the United States.
    As such, I think USAGM activity should be supportive of our 
foreign policy, and they should be aligned with our National 
Security interests. I just wanted to get that on the record. 
Your comment really struck me, and I look forward to following 
up with you again on some of the data that--and analytics that 
you have put together.
    General Stilwell, I would like to turn to you. It is great 
to see you again. I would like to say it was an honor to serve 
with you when I was U.S. ambassador to Japan and you took over 
the realm--took over the reins, I should say, of the East Asia 
Pacific Bureau.
    You are no stranger to communist China's malign influence 
and propaganda campaigns. When you served as the Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I know 
you worked very closely on closing China's consulate in 
Houston.
    You designated 15 Chinese state-run media outlets as 
foreign missions and drastically reduced the number of PRC 
state backed so-called journalists operating in the United 
States due to reciprocity issues and National Security issues.
    You touched on this earlier, but I would like, if you would 
General Stilwell, to go a little bit deeper into why you took 
the actions that you did when you were at the State Department 
and how important this is.
    Mr. Stilwell. Senator Hagerty, thank you for that. I could 
go on forever. I will keep it tight, though. When I was a 
defense attache, I could not call my counterpart on the Chinese 
military side. They would not give me the phone number. I had 
to fax them.
    I asked the Chinese defense attache here how he gets a hold 
of people, and he had every phone from the Department of 
Defense, every number on his phone. This is a problem of 
reciprocity.
    Over 40 years of trying to win the PRC over with carrots, 
we forgot about sticks, and we forgot to enforce the standards 
and universal standards. They signed up for UNCLOS. They walked 
away from it. They signed up for the basic law in Hong Kong and 
they walked away from it. We called these empty promises. These 
were promises made with no intention of following through.
    They just want the climate virtue with Paris and all the 
rest of that. Sir, with the help of great leadership from 
Secretary Pompeo and the Congress, we looked at those areas 
where the relationship was most out of balance, and we decided 
to take them to task not for the purpose of destroying the 
relationship, but to get them to see the benefit of 
reciprocity, to giving our journalists the same access in their 
country that theirs have in ours.
    The same with the consulate. There is certain limits to 
what you can do as a diplomat stipulated by the Vienna 
Convention. They were violating that left and right. It was--we 
had to do that. They closed Chengdu in return, and that is what 
you would expect, but there is a lot more work to do.
    We had other plans that we were going to execute that I am 
doing my best to work with the current Administration as well 
to enact.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, the term reciprocity, I think, 
really resonates with me, and I am sure that it does in many 
other cases. We have talked so often using other lexicon, free 
markets and that type of thing, but frankly, when you get down 
to it, reciprocity is a key operating principle. I appreciate 
you raising that.
    I would like for you, if you might, to just expand on how 
we could take lessons from what you did here in the United 
States to a global context.
    Mr. Stilwell. I think a coordinated effort across the 
interagency would be a great start. The current national 
defense strategy talks about integrated deterrence. That is 
integration across regions, but it really, the place we have to 
start as integration across agencies in the U.S. Government.
    This body has the capability to do that, to get Treasury 
and State, and pick an agency to start working together more 
closely. Sir, I think in the topic we are talking about today, 
I know I am beating a dead horse, that we need to get some 
central coordination body going in terms of over worldwide 
information sharing, and then those other things that the law 
allows us to do, but coordinate it versus just trusting that we 
will find the right answer eventually.
    Somebody has got to be in charge of information. If I could 
finish, in the military parlance, we talk about the levers of 
national power as the DIME: diplomacy, information, military, 
economic, and there are others, but there is an agency 
secretary, there is a cabinet level secretary for all of those 
except for one, and that is the ``I.''
    There is no cabinet level secretary for ``Information.'' I 
am sitting here today, I spent my whole life looking, studying 
war and bombs and bullets, and I am telling you, I am scared to 
death we are going to lose in the information space.
    Senator Hagerty. It is like what Ms. Brandt said, the most 
consequential competition that we have today. Thank you for 
raising that, General Stilwell. I look forward to continuing to 
work with you in terms of articulating a plan to coordinate, 
just as you say. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all 
of our panelists for being here today. The topic I would like 
to talk about is China's use of AI to become a global leader in 
artificial intelligence.
    They have been developing for a long time now something 
called ``deepfake technology'' and has progressed along to the 
point where they can be able to use AI to distort public 
figures. An example of how a public figure might be distorted 
is when Vladimir Zelensky was portrayed as announcing a 
surrender last year.
    The software could not only be used to distort real people, 
but could also create people out of whole cloth. I believe the 
Chinese state-aligned influence operation use a GAI generated 
fictitious news anchors to promote China's global role in 
spreading disinformation around the world.
    We have got this deepfake video technology that can create 
fictitious people. They can be used to really cloud even 
further people's ability to discern what is real information 
and what is not real information.
    I would like actually both Ms. Brandt and General Stilwell, 
would you answer this question, how concerned are you about our 
adversaries' use of AI and the deepfake technologies for 
disinformation purposes? What is the best way for the U.S. to 
respond?
    Ms. Brandt. The recent advances in generative AI, both in 
video, but also text and audio, could have enormous effects on 
the health and strength of our information environment. I think 
we could see it meaningfully changing the actors that are using 
these techniques, the behaviors that they adopt, and also the 
content itself, how persuasive it is and also how discoverable 
it is.
    I think it is something we ought to be paying attention to. 
Those are the first order consequences. There is a second order 
consequence. That is once we live in a world where we can no 
longer trust what we see with our own eyes--we call it the 
liar's dividend, right.
    Those who are willing to say that actually truthful video 
of me, it is not me, right. We live--we begin to live in a 
world where we can no longer trust what is before us, and I 
think that erodes the very basis of the information environment 
that, as I have described, is essential for democracies to 
thrive.
    Mr. Stilwell. Senator, the first one you'll agree with, the 
second one, you will tilt your head, but needs to be said. The 
first one is access to information. Information is the new oil, 
they say. We worked very hard to deny the PRC access to 
submarine cables.
    Huawei is big on this, and it is subsidized by Chinese 
Government, so you would be stupid to build one with an 
American or a French company when the Chinese are offering it 
to you at half price. Well, it is not free, and it is not 
cheap. You are going to pay for that in other ways.
    I think the first part and the first answer would be to 
deny--continue to deny them access to information freely, 
because that is the thing that makes AI work. The second part 
is just an observation that--we were reading. I kind of monitor 
what goes on the PRC fairly closely.
    When they first brought in ChatGPT, they were just like, 
hey, this will help with decision making which in the PRC is 
difficult. This was going to make their decisions for them and 
algorithmize it, and speed it up.
    Then all of a sudden, like next 2 days you hear all of a 
sudden, they shut it down. You can imagine they might have 
asked: ``What is the solution to Taiwan?'' The ChatGPT comes 
back with, ``Well, you should democratize.'' Everyone is like, 
okay, all right, all right, enough of that.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Stilwell. Seriously. What they are doing right now is 
they are taking AI, ChatGPT and they are desensitizing it, so 
it does not give answers it does not want. In some cases, we 
can just sit back and watch because they will not be able--
because they cannot allow free information, they are going to 
take this very good capability and reduce its capability.
    The second one, though, that is not really relevant to this 
group, but we should all think about is we need to arm our kids 
to deal with the social media space. A healthy--and it comes in 
the form of critical thinking, media literacy, and a bunch of 
other things. We are working with at the Air Force Academy 
right now is to seriously--just take critical thinking 
seriously because we cannot filter that--allow the government 
to filter information.
    We have tried filtering that. I am still banned from 
Twitter for suggesting that the virus, the pandemic began in 
Wuhan Institute of Virology. Two years ago, that was a 
conspiracy theory, and today we all see it as the most obvious 
answer.
    The Government cannot sift that information. We have to arm 
every individual so when you get into this information space to 
apply simple critical thinking concepts, so you do not become a 
dupe and a victim of disinformation.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you for that, General. I appreciate 
that. In fact, I would say that applies to everything today you 
read in the media. I cannot tell you how many times I have 
read, having been a former governor and knowing that stories 
get printed that are just not accurate, and then I read a story 
and I believe it right away.
    I said, why am I doing that? I should know that reporters, 
for a variety of reasons, do not always get it right, even in 
our most trusted sources. Now we are just going to have to take 
that to a whole new level when we have got AI that is going to 
be creating these fake stories. Thank you very much. Appreciate 
it.
    Senator Cardin. Let me just observe, first of all, that Ms. 
Bennett, you are still here. Thank you. That is not the 
normal--it is not normal for the Administration's witness to 
stay and listen to the second panel. We, thank you, and that 
is, I think, expected because of your desire to listen and to 
be part of a discussion.
    I thank you very much for remaining in the committee during 
that time. The committee record will remain open through close 
of business Friday. If any member has questions for the record, 
I would ask that you all respond promptly as you possibly can. 
I want to just thank all four of our witnesses.
    The purpose of our committee is oversight. This is a 
critically important weapon we have to get accurate information 
out where we have our adversaries trying to influence public 
opinion and influence action by their propaganda and 
disinformation.
    I thank you, and I can assure you the information that has 
been used today, we might be getting back to you, will help us 
in carrying out our responsibilities. With that, the 
subcommittee will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                             
                             ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Ms. Amanda Bennett to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. You have mentioned certain metrics in your opening 
statement about how we are outperforming competitors. Could you shed a 
little more light on what those metrics are?

    Answer. USAGM monitors the performance of its networks with 
indicators linked together through a theory of social change. The 
Impact Model Framework tracks awareness and use of our content among a 
general population, engagement of our audience as individuals, as well 
as the use and coverage of our content by institutions and governments 
in other countries.
    The keystone to the Agency's Impact Model is the concept of weekly 
reach, or the number of adults that access our content in a typical 
week. Our data shows that in 24 countries surveyed in 2022, USAGM's 
media brands typically reach and are recognized by substantially larger 
portions of the national population of other countries, than are PRC 
and Russian international media competitors. This is particularly true 
when accounting for the Agency's total measured audience on all 
distribution platforms, which includes less well-branded programs 
strategically placed on domestic affiliates. In contrast, Russia and 
the PRC champion a distribution strategy that offers international 
media content on fully-branded radio, cable, and/or satellite channels 
across multiple regions, in addition to placements with local partners.
    Audiences are choosing USAGM networks' content over competitors in 
a number of key target markets. In Nigeria, for example, VOA reaches a 
third of all adults while Russia's state-controlled network, RT, 
reaches just 1 percent and China Radio International, less than 3 
percent. In Cambodia, despite a government crackdown on the free press, 
RFA and VOA together reach 16 percent of adults, compared with China's 
state-controlled network, CGTN, at less than 2 percent.
    However, we cannot be complacent in the face of rising adversarial 
competition. When focusing the comparison on the Agency's ``brand'' 
users--those who consciously know our brands and report using them in 
the past 7 days--the differences between USAGM and competitors are 
smaller, and in some cases suggest a tightening race for media market 
share. In many countries, when asked whether they recognize and use 
USAGM brands, the reach of adversarial competitors is similar to or 
even larger than USAGM brands.
    In countries where USAGM content is strategically placed into the 
broadcasts of popular domestic affiliates, audiences may not recall 
accessing our brands, instead associating the program with the host 
name or the local station. To measure these audiences, surveys probe 
respondents further about their consumption of specific offering, using 
program and/or host names. Audiences who access USAGM programs, but do 
not always identify themselves as using our brands, are included in 
reach totals.
    The chart below shows weekly total reach (percent of adults who 
accessed content in the past 7 days) and weekly brand reach for USAGM, 
Russian, and PRC international media. Green text indicates where our 
brand-only reach is measurably higher reach than competitor brands, 
while red indicates a brand-only reach that is lower than competitor 
brands. While the chart uses VOA and RFE/RL, it generally is a 
placeholder for the translated name of the brand in the local language.
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    Question. Do you have any trend lines in terms of what it is 
costing us per person for USAGM to reach its audience?

    Answer. Over the course of the last 10 years, the agency has 
benefited from substantial budget increases (from a budget of $713 
million in FY 2013 to $854 million in FY 2022) and invested those 
increases to achieve even more substantial audience growth (nearly 
doubling in the same period, from 206 million people reached per week 
in FY 2013 to 410 million as of the end of FY 2022). The cost to U.S. 
taxpayers per audience member reached--always small--has declined 
steadily and significantly throughout that period, now just $2.08 per 
regular audience member for the entire year.
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    Question. Is there a way you are showing how the cost is impactful 
for the American taxpayer?

    Answer. Consistent with the American values of free speech and free 
expression, USAGM networks advance U.S. national interests by providing 
consistently accurate reporting and other content to large and growing 
audiences in closed societies, or where free media is not yet fully 
established, that opens minds and stimulates debate.
    Free press and free expression are universally acknowledged as key 
to free, open, democratic societies. Expanding the number of free, 
open, democratic societies supports U.S. interests because democratic 
countries enjoy greater stability and prosperity, live in peace with 
their neighbors, reject terrorism and extremism, and make better 
political allies and trade partners for the United States.
    Our work is guided by the principles of the U.S. International 
Broadcasting Act, USAGM's enabling legislation. Congress mandates USAGM 
to provide accurate, credible, and comprehensive news; to represent 
American society; and to present and discuss U.S. policy--all 
consistent with the standards of professional journalism. Doing so, as 
the Broadcasting Act establishes, ``contributes to international peace 
and stability'' and serves ``to support freedom and democracy--in a 
rapidly changing international environment.''

    Question. How is the Agency measuring success in obtaining the 
goals of freedom and democracy with its news coverage around the world?

    Answer. USAGM's approach to impact evaluation is grounded in a 
Logic Framework that charts the conditions, inputs, and outputs 
necessary to achieve the stated mission, and a Theory of Change that 
lays out the causal chain of events leading to a desired impact, 
including immediate outcomes but also short-, medium-, and long-term 
change. Over time, that framework has evolved into the current Impact 
Model utilized by the Agency to evaluate the effectiveness of its 
programming. The Impact Model is also the basis of the annual 
Performance and Accountability Report, which USAGM produces to satisfy 
Congressional requirements to assess the Agency's program performance, 
financial accountability, and managerial effectiveness. In addition, at 
the working level, each USAGM language service develops annual 
strategies that incorporate performance targets from the Impact Model.
    The ultimate goal of all USAGM programming is long-term and 
transformational: achieving freedom and democracy around the world. 
Although it would be impossible to attribute such transformations 
solely and directly to USAGM, the Impact Model provides a holistic tool 
to assess USAGM's contribution to that endeavor, defining milestones 
that suggest progress toward the Agency's long-term objectives. The 
Impact Model includes over 30 indicators organized around USAGM's 
mission--in the categories of Inform, Engage/Connect, and Be 
Influential--as well as more specific goals of Reaching Target 
Audiences, Providing Value, Engaging Target Audiences, Engaging/
Connecting Media Markets, Creating Loyalty, and Being Influential with 
People, Media, and Governments. The Model then operationalizes each of 
these goals by defining corresponding indicators to monitor the impact 
of USAGM networks' programming in each of the areas.
    To assess programming performance, the Impact Model draws from a 
diverse set of evidence comprising quantitative, qualitative, and 
anecdotal data. Surveys serve as one of the key inputs, providing data 
on questions such as media brand awareness and use, perceived 
trustworthiness of the media brand, or the extent to which USAGM helps 
improve the understanding of world events or U.S. policy over time. The 
survey data are augmented by digital metrics, using data from website 
and social media analytics that help provide accurate and real-time 
measurement of the effectiveness of the Agency's digital assets.
    To complement these quantifiable measures and provide a more 
comprehensive and holistic assessment of USAGM's programming, the 
Agency also collects structured anecdotal data that captures the impact 
of content produced by its networks, such as pick-ups of their coverage 
by other major news media, reactions from government officials, or 
visible policy change. Internal databases--for example, the list of 
partner media organizations and their standing in the target media 
market--as well as data such as the number of times USAGM content was 
downloaded by media partners for rebroadcasting or placement provide 
additional inputs for the Model. Taken together, this body of evidence 
provides the opportunity to evaluate and measure the success of USAGM 
programming in specific markets, as well as worldwide.
    For example, foundational audience reach measures--from surveys and 
digital analytics--report on the goal of Reaching Target Audiences, 
while measuring audiences' perceptions of content trustworthiness or 
uniqueness go further, reflecting the goal of Providing Value. Over 
time, by establishing themselves as prominent and trustworthy media 
sources, USAGM networks create enduring relationships with audiences 
who value objective and independent journalism. For the Engaging/
Connecting Media Markets goal, the Model tracks the number of affiliate 
media organizations in a particular country or region, as well as 
instances of content co-creation, training, and other capacity-building 
activities that help improve the overall quality of the media in the 
market. As part of its indicators comprising Engagement with Target 
Audiences, the Model considers audience-initiated dialogues around 
topics covered in programming and opportunities to expand internet 
access. These inputs contribute to greater freedom of speech and 
improved public discourse, which ultimately fosters higher civic 
engagement and democratic resilience. To address the Being Influential 
with People goal, the Impact Model monitors whether USAGM content helps 
to improve the audience's understanding of American society and foreign 
policy, and to inform audiences of current events in the country or the 
world--with the vision that increased knowledge empowers foreign 
populations to understand the workings of a democratic society, and 
advocate for similar approaches in their own systems of governance. 
Attention from foreign government officials, whether positive or 
negative, serves as an indicator for Being Influential with Governments 
and demonstrates independent journalism's potential to affect decision 
making or policy.
    The Impact Model provides a comprehensive view of USAGM's impact 
over time by establishing benchmarks for each indicator while comparing 
the performance to previous years. USAGM continues to refine the model, 
incorporating best practices from other public service media 
institutions and updating metrics through internal process improvements 
in the collection of survey and digital data. The Agency plans to 
release an updated version of the Model later in 2023.
    A few key indicators from the Impact Model, as documented in the 
Agency's FY 2022 Performance and Accountability Report, are included 
below for reference.
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