[Senate Hearing 118-58]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-58
U.S. POLICY ON TUNISIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-007 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey MARCO RUBIO, Florida
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut.......... 1
Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana...................... 3
Harris, Joshua, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for North
Africa, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Doherty, Megan, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the
Middle East, United States Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 9
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Joshua Harris to Questions Submitted by Senator
Cory A. Booker................................................. 25
Responses of Ms. Megan Doherty to Questions Submitted by Senator
Cory A. Booker................................................. 26
(iii)
U.S. POLICY ON TUNISIA
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Murphy presiding.
Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Kaine, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Good afternoon. We are going to call this
meeting of the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central
Asia, and Counterterrorism to order.
We will open with short opening statements and turn it over
to our witnesses. I look forward to our discussion with the
subcommittee.
We convene this subcommittee today to discuss American
policy towards Tunisia. You might ask why is a Senate
subcommittee that has jurisdiction over nearly a third of the
world holding a hearing on a country that is just a little bit
bigger than Indiana.
The answer is pretty simple. Tunisia is a country that for
a long time showed what was possible in the Middle East and
North Africa. It was a country that had seemingly gotten it
right and was able to stay on a democratic path while
transitions faltered in Egypt and Libya and Yemen.
Tunisia drafted a new constitution, held multiple free and
fair elections. After a really high-profile series of terrorist
attacks, Tunisian security forces, with the support of the
United States, increased their capacity to protect the country,
but also balance protecting civil liberties. Civil society
groups, independent media proliferated, exercising their
newfound rights to hold Tunisia's leaders accountable, but
amidst all of this progress, institutional reforms and
accountability initiatives, they really stalled and economic
conditions worsened. Widespread corruption persisted. Public
services got worse. There was police brutality left and right
and the political elites were just squabbling.
It ended up being a pretty terrible advertisement for
democracy. Tunisian people saw what democracy looked like and
they did not love it. It was in this context that President
Kais Saied promised Tunisians that he was going to fix this
mess that many Tunisians had grown really tired of.
When I first met President Saied in Tunisia in August of
2021, he told me and our delegation that his intent was not to
get rid of democracy, but that he was just going to fix the
problem of Tunisia having adopted the wrong kind of democracy,
the wrong model, and he was just going to bring a model that
worked.
I am going to be honest, in that same meeting I saw all the
trappings of a despot in waiting. President Saied was self-
adulating, saying that he was the only one pure enough to lead.
Everybody else was tainted and corrupt.
He was conspiratorial about dark enemies he saw around
every corner. He bristled at public criticism, telling me no
less than three times that his seizure of power was not a coup.
I left that meeting pretty convinced that Tunisia was
likely headed in the wrong direction and, unfortunately, over
the last 21 months my worst fears have borne to be true.
Since that meeting, President Saied has followed a
dictator's handbook almost to the letter, disbanding
parliament, writing a new constitution that consolidates his
power, disbanding judicial independence, and employing military
tribunals, arresting members of the opposition including just
recently this week treason charges for the leader of the
primary opposition.
These are not the actions of a leader who intends to
restore democracy just under a different model. Over the last
21 months that President Saied has been steadily dismantling
Tunisian democracy, the U.S. policy unfortunately has been
hesitant.
I would argue that it has been halfhearted and often naive.
By failing to draw our lines in the sand Saied has felt
confident in taking one step after another to consolidate power
and ignore polite requests from American diplomats to change
course.
We are talking about Tunisia and only Tunisia today
because, I would argue, that this is a place for the United
States to correct course. When it comes to our tendency to talk
a tough game on human rights and democracy, but then not really
lead by example, we cut deals with dictators.
We sell billions of dollars of weapons to dangerous
autocrats. We send regular signals that there are few
consequences for your political and economic relationship with
the United States if you move from democracy to repression.
I argue that this is a hearing in which through the prism
of Tunisia policy we can also talk about how we cannot afford
this duality--talk tough, but act often too weakly on human
rights and democracy.
We are going to ask these questions today how we can adjust
our assistance policies so that we are supporting the Tunisian
people and their ability to speak freely and to hold their
leaders accountable.
We are going to ask how we can empower our diplomats to do
that work inside Tunisia. Lastly, I hope that we are also going
to talk about China because anytime that I argue that we should
be reforming our partnerships with dictators in the region,
whether it be Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, or Tunisia, the counter
that I often hear is that if we do not extend that hand, no
matter how repressive the regime is, China is going to fill the
void.
I think we have to realize that not everything is a zero-
sum game in our competition with China and that we do not have
to make deeper commitments to authoritarians just because China
is making a competing offer.
I think the best way to compete with China is not to try to
beat China in a race to the human rights bottom. If China can
only do deep economic deals with countries in which the IMF
deems to be unbankable that is a pretty bad long-term prospect
for Chinese economic diplomacy.
I would argue that Tunisia is a critical test case to
change tack and to back up our words with actions and so I am
looking forward to this discussion with our very able guests
today.
With that, I will turn to the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to
help shed a light on the erosion of democratic institutions in
Tunisia and the rise once again of authoritarian regimes in
that country.
I greatly appreciate your participation, Ms. Doherty. I
know we have had an opportunity to work together when you were
with Mercy Corps. Thank you for serving our country in this
capacity.
Mr. Harris, thank you for your career service of the State
Department and our country.
As the Biden administration is proud to point out its
defense of democracy in places such as Ukraine, I cannot help
but observe its noticeable silence in other key areas such as
the Biden administration failing to mention the resistance in
Myanmar to the military junta during its recent Summit for
Democracy and failing to respond to the authoritarians in
Tunisia, which is what we are here to discuss today.
Following the Tunisian revolution in 2011 when the people
rose up against corruption and the lack of freedoms in their
country they inspired actions that sought to bring democracy to
Tunisia and inspired the Arab Spring which swept across the
Arab world.
However, since 2019 President Saied has increasingly
tightened his grip on power. In recent weeks he has dismantled
institutional checks and balances, developed a new
constitution, and taken Tunisia back in an authoritarian
direction.
Today, I hope we hear from our witnesses what actions, not
just words that we are going to see from the Administration to
meaningfully counter Tunisia's current trajectory.
While I am sure our witnesses will point to the reductions
for Tunisia in the President's budget request to Congress, I do
not think we should be naive enough to think that minor
budgetary reductions will be sufficient to get the attention of
President Saied.
Of course, this conversation is complicated by Tunisia's
support for our counterterrorism activities in North Africa,
which, in my view, is precisely why we must get the government
back into a place of better behavior.
The urgency of reversing this erosion of democratic
institutions could not be more relevant to our own national
security. As with other topics and geographies that we have
discussed in this subcommittee, China is again present in
Tunisia.
Beijing, of course, does not reinforce any of these
messages about democratic backsliding or protecting
institutions. The authoritarians in Tunis are happy to welcome
Huawei into their system and are also partnering on various R&D
partnerships with Beijing.
All of this points to a deeply uncertain future for the
Tunisian people. President Saied may attempt to blame others,
but the people of Tunisia must know that their troubles are a
direct result of the failures of their own government.
While the Tunisian people have risen up before I pray that
they will not have to rise up again. If we are able to work
together with our likeminded partners I am confident that we
can help bring the government back into a better behavior.
Again, I am pleased that we are here to discuss such an
important issue and I look forward to the conversation, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Young.
Let me now introduce our witnesses.
First, it is my pleasure to welcome Mr. Joshua Harris, who
is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for North Africa in
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Previously served as
director for North African Affairs at the NSC as well as
holding other positions in the State Department in Libya,
Tunisia, Iraq, Slovenia, and Croatia.
Also joining us today is Ms. Megan Doherty. Senator Young
mentioned her service at Mercy Corps and NDI, but she also has
held positions at the National Security Council and the State
Department, working in the Middle East and North Africa. She is
here in her capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator of the
Bureau for the Middle East at USAID.
I will hand the floor over to both of you for your opening
comments and then we will engage in a discussion. Thank you
very much.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HARRIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NORTH AFRICA, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Harris. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member
Young, Senator Kaine. Thank you very much for the opportunity
to share the Department of State's assessment of the situation
in Tunisia.
While a fundamental commitment to the Tunisian people in
line with U.S. values and interests endures in unbreakable
friendship, Secretary Blinken has spoken very clearly to the
reversal of many of the Tunisian people's hard-won democratic
gains over the past 21 months.
The actions of the Tunisian Government have impacted every
aspect of our relationship. The Department of State continues
to adapt to the dramatically altered landscape in Tunisia since
July 25, 2021 and working very closely with allies and partners
to marshal all diplomatic tools including recalibrated foreign
assistance to advance our objectives.
In this unsettled environment the United States has
significant interests that guide our diplomacy: forestalling an
economic collapse that would further destabilize the situation
in Tunisia and regionally, including for our NATO allies;
promoting democratic and constitutional governance that is able
to safeguard the rule of law to promote respect for human
rights and secure the fundamental freedoms Tunisians cherish;
challenging the pernicious attempts of our adversaries to
exploit the country's upheaval; and sustaining critical
cooperation with the Tunisian military provided it remains
apolitical and professional in order to pressure terrorist
networks and maintain support for U.S. and allied activities.
Most immediately, Tunisia is confronting a spiraling
economic emergency. The Tunisian Government in response last
year developed a rigorous reform program which enabled Tunisia
to conclude an IMF staff level agreement in October of 2022 on
a $1.9 billion support package.
As President Saied has indicated publicly, he has decided
not to move forward with crucial reforms even as international
partners have stepped forward with more than $1 billion to
bolster Tunisia's reform efforts.
A Tunisia that unravels economically cannot be an
environment in which democratic governance can flourish nor one
in which other vital U.S. interests can be effectively
advanced.
For this reason, Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary
Leaf, Ambassador Hood, among others, have emphasized to
Tunisian counterparts that the United States will support
Tunisia in implementing its reform program negotiated with the
IMF if it chooses to do so.
Whether and how Tunisia opts to proceed is a sovereign
choice that only President Saied can make. An IMF program
cannot be imposed.
Concurrent with this economic crisis Tunisia is
experiencing profound political changes. A consolidation of
executive power has now been formalized through a referendum
marked by low voter turnout. The judiciary has faced
significant pressures amid the arrests and prosecutions of
perceived government critics, business leaders, political
activists, and journalists.
Taken together, the past 21 months in Tunisia have, as
Secretary Blinken has said, borne witness to an alarming
erosion of democratic norms. The Department has and will
continue to condemn politically motivated arrests both in our
private diplomatic engagements and publicly.
The arrest by the Tunisian Government of opponents and
critics are a troubling escalation fundamentally at odds with a
Tunisian constitution that explicitly guarantees the freedom of
opinion, thought, and expression.
Within hours of the emergency declaration, Secretary
Blinken engaged President Saied directly to share our alarm
about the consolidation of executive power. Over the past 21
months U.S. officials at all levels have reinforced that our
relationship is strongest when there is a shared respect for
democratic principles, for human rights, and for fundamental
freedoms and the Department continues to consult broadly with
international voices in support of a democratic and prosperous
future for all Tunisians.
The Department is continuously reviewing all aspects of
U.S. diplomacy including our foreign assistance programs to
ensure alignment with U.S. policy goals.
Since July of 2021 and amid our deep concerns about
democratic governance the State Department has recalibrated
U.S. programs to reflect the changed landscape and to ensure
consistency with our interests and values.
The President, in fiscal year 2024, has therefore reduced
the top line budget request for Tunisia by 65 percent. The
President's budget request reinforces an unambiguous message
that there can be no business as usual amid this crisis.
The recalibration has sought to ensure what economic and
development assistance continues is directly benefiting the
Tunisian people, including crucial investments in civil
society.
U.S. assistance represents targeted life-improving
investments for Tunisians in need, which reflects that economic
and political empowerment are fundamentally linked.
The Department's relationship with Tunisians who serve
their country in uniform is targeted to U.S. interests. A
guiding principle remains engaging on the vital national
interests of protecting U.S. diplomatic personnel and
facilities, the welfare of American citizens in Tunisia, and
neutralizing the continuing threat of terrorism while promoting
respect for the rule of law.
It remains in the U.S. interest to see a secure and
prosperous Tunisia, led in a manner accountable to the people
that can deliver economic stability and protect the fundamental
freedoms of all.
We will continue to speak frankly with the Tunisian
Government about its actions and policies and align our
diplomacy with U.S. interests and values in the spirit of long-
term friendship between the American and Tunisian people.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Joshua Harris
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity to share the Department of State's
assessment of the situation in Tunisia.
While a fundamental commitment to the Tunisian people in line with
U.S. values and interests endures in unbreakable friendship, Secretary
Blinken has spoken clearly to the reversal of many of the Tunisian
people's hard-won democratic gains over the past 21 months. The actions
of the Tunisian Government have impacted every aspect of the U.S.-
Tunisia relationship. The Department continues to adapt to the
dramatically altered landscape in Tunisia since July 25, 2021, and,
working closely with Allies and partners, to marshal all diplomatic
tools--including recalibrated foreign assistance--to advance U.S.
objectives in this new context.
In this unsettled environment, the United States has significant
interests that guide our diplomacy: forestalling an economic collapse
that would further destabilize the situation in Tunisia and regionally,
including for our NATO Allies; promoting democratic and constitutional
governance that is able to safeguard the rule of law, promote respect
for human rights, and secure the fundamental freedoms Tunisians
cherish; challenging the pernicious attempts by our adversaries to
exploit the country's upheaval against both Tunisian and American
interests; and sustaining critical cooperation with the Tunisian
military, provided it remains apolitical and professional, to pressure
terrorist networks and maintain support capabilities for U.S. and
Allied activities.
Today, I would like to update the Subcommittee on the Department's
diplomatic efforts and programs to advance these priorities.
Most immediately, Tunisia is confronting a spiraling economic
emergency. The disruptions in global food and energy markets spurred by
Russia's aggression in Ukraine and the lingering impact of the COVID-19
pandemic have compounded structural weaknesses in Tunisia's public
finances after decades of deferred reforms. On a human scale, the
ensuing crisis has left Tunisian families often unable to find or
afford basic consumer goods and medical supplies, a burden faced most
acutely by the most vulnerable and economically precarious communities.
The Tunisian Government in response last year developed a
technically rigorous reform program to stabilize the economy. If
implemented, these reforms would better manage the public wage bill,
ensure the viability of state-owned enterprises, and target subsidies
to those in greatest need. This Tunisian plan won support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and thus enabled Tunisia to conclude
a staff-level agreement in October 2022 on a $1.9 billion support
package. As President Saied has indicated publicly, he has decided not
to move forward on crucial reforms, and the program is thus unable to
advance for IMF Board approval, even as international partners have
generously stepped forward with more than $1 billion to bolster
Tunisia's reform efforts. With this IMF program and associated donor
commitments on hold, Tunisian economic officials have made efforts to
mitigate the impact of the economic crisis, including through
improvements in tax collection and greater domestic borrowing. Such
measures, however, cannot substitute for a robust reform program and a
sustainable solution.
A Tunisia that unravels economically cannot be an environment in
which democratic governance can flourish, nor one in which other vital
U.S. interests can be effectively advanced.
For this reason, Secretary Blinken, Assistant Secretary Leaf, and
Ambassador Hood, among others, have emphasized to Tunisian counterparts
that the United States will support Tunisia in implementing its reform
program negotiated with the IMF, if it chooses to do so. We recognize
that whether and how Tunisia opts to proceed is a sovereign choice that
only President Saied can make; an IMF program cannot be imposed.
Regrettably, intensive U.S. diplomatic engagements at all levels have
raised significant questions about whether the political support exists
in Tunis to enable this reform package and the external financing these
reforms would unlock. This is a question of Tunisian, not U.S., policy.
If Tunisia decides not to proceed with reforms within the framework of
an IMF program, the United States--as a country deeply invested in the
Tunisian people--will continue to consult with the country's leaders on
what they see as the alternative.
Concurrent with this economic crisis, Tunisia is experiencing
profound political changes. The overhaul of the political system began
with the July 2021 emergency declaration and suspension of the former
parliament. The resulting consolidation of executive power has now been
formalized through a referendum marked by low voter participation. A
new parliament has been seated, but questions remain about whether
meaningful checks and balances can be realized. The judiciary has faced
significant pressures amid the arrests and prosecutions of perceived
government critics, business leaders, political activists, and
journalists. Authorities have brought criminal proceedings against
Tunisians for ``spreading false news,'' tried civilians in military
courts, and levied terrorism accusations against those who hold
different opinions about the country's future.
Taken together, the past 21 months in Tunisia have, as Secretary
Blinken said, borne witness to an alarming erosion of democratic norms.
The Department has and will continue to condemn politically
motivated arrests, both in our private diplomatic engagements and
publicly. The arrests by the Tunisian Government of opponents and
critics are fundamentally at odds with the principles Tunisians adopted
in a constitution that explicitly guarantees the freedom of opinion,
thought, and expression. Such actions, including the arrest of the
former Speaker of Parliament, and the Tunisian Government's implication
that this arrest was based on public statements, are rightly condemned
as a troubling escalation by the Tunisian Government. The concern is
larger than any one individual, party, or ideology. As with all
governments, the Tunisian Government has an obligation to safeguard
human rights, including freedom of expression, which are essential to a
vibrant democracy and the strongest possible U.S.-Tunisia relationship.
Particularly disturbing is the targeting of foreigners as
scapegoats for the country's economic crisis. Violence and intimidation
against the vulnerable shock the conscience, both American and
Tunisian.
Within hours of the emergency declaration on July 25, 2021,
Secretary Blinken engaged President Saied directly to share our alarm
about the consolidation of executive power. Over the past 21 months,
U.S. officials at all levels have reinforced that our relationship is
strongest when there is a shared respect for democratic principles, for
human rights, and for fundamental freedoms. Secretary Blinken has
emphasized directly with President Saied the importance of inclusive
reforms to strengthen democratic checks and balances and the protection
of fundamental freedoms. And the Department continues to consult with a
broad range of regional and international voices in support of a
democratic and prosperous future for all Tunisians. We have not and
will not shy away from frank conversations with Tunisian officials to
urge that they advance democratic governance, respect the rule of law
and independence of the judiciary, end politically motivated arrests
and prosecutions, and repudiate the perception that Tunisians may face
reprisals for speaking their mind. In doing so, we do not seek to
impose U.S. values, but rather to support the ideals endorsed in
Tunisia's July 2022 constitution.
Another key objective of U.S. policy toward Tunisia is to stave off
our adversaries' predatory exploitation of the simultaneous economic
and political crises to gain a foothold in strategic sectors of the
Tunisian economy and burrow in strategic infrastructure with no regard
for Tunisian sovereignty or the economic well-being of the Tunisian
people.
The Department is continuously reviewing all aspects of U.S.
diplomacy, including our foreign assistance programs, to ensure that
U.S. dollars are aligned with U.S. policy goals. As the Subcommittee
knows, the United States invested more than $2 billion from 2011 to
2021 to support Tunisian-led efforts to make government more
accountable and responsive to the people, to fight corruption, to
promote inclusive economic growth and development, and to develop an
effective security partnership that serves both U.S. and Tunisian
interests. Since July 2021 and amid our deep concerns about democratic
governance, the State Department in coordination with other departments
and agencies has recalibrated U.S. programs to reflect the changed
landscape and to ensure consistency with our interests and values.
The President in Fiscal Year 2024 has, therefore, reduced the
topline budget request for Tunisia by 65 percent. The President's
Fiscal Year 2024 budget request reinforces an unambiguous message to
Tunisian leaders and to our international partners that there can be no
business-as-usual amid this crisis, and action by the Tunisian
Government is needed to restore confidence in the country's democratic
trajectory.
The recalibration has sought to ensure what economic and
development assistance continues is directly benefitting the Tunisian
people, including critical investments in civil society. U.S.
assistance represents targeted, life-improving investments able to
offer a small measure of relief for Tunisians in need. Programming
creates thousands of direly needed private sector jobs in remote areas,
drives investments in clean energy, promotes civic engagement,
addresses food insecurity, and supports the vital contributions of
Tunisian civil society. Continuing these targeted investments is in the
U.S. interest, and reflects that economic and political empowerment are
fundamentally linked. To abandon all such programs would not only be
counter to U.S. interests but risk the perception of collective
punishment against the Tunisian people based on the alarming actions
taken by the government.
Guided during a time of extraordinary upheaval by our long-standing
friendship with the Tunisian people, the Department is continuing to
review U.S. assistance programming to ensure it is addressing the needs
of economically vulnerable Tunisians and contributing to an inclusive
political future. We are continuously refining our approach to advance
these goals, and will not hesitate to consider course corrections
should they be warranted. While the United States has reduced our
bilateral aid to Tunisia, the President has requested resources in
Fiscal Year 2024 to establish a Middle East and North Africa
Opportunity Fund, which is designed to allow for agile responses to
emerging opportunities that further U.S. policy goals or respond to
crises and challenges that threaten U.S. interests and security.
The Department's relationship with and support for Tunisians who
serve their country in uniform is targeted to U.S. interests and is
being continuously reviewed. A guiding principle remains engaging with
the Tunisian Government on the vital national interests of protecting
U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities, the welfare of American
citizens in Tunisia, and neutralizing the continuing threat of
terrorism, while promoting accountability and respect for the rule of
law. The professional women and men of the Tunisian Armed Forces remain
on the front lines of the fight against terrorism in Tunisia and the
Sahel, guarding against instability emanating from Libya and providing
airlift and support capabilities for U.S. and Allied activities. In
partnership with the United States, Tunisians have made notable
progress against terrorist networks; this fight is not yet won. Walking
away from a security partnership with Tunisia focused on U.S. interests
would carry the risk that terrorist groups could regain strength and
again threaten Tunisia and, from Tunisia, our Allies and partners.
The Tunisian Armed Forces have stood by and secured the country's
defense amid the upheaval since July 2021--as a professional force
should. Together with our partners in the Department of Defense, the
Department believes it is vital that the Tunisian Armed Forces remain
apolitical, professional, and resourced to fulfill their defense
mandate in support of the Tunisian people and alignment with U.S.
interests.
It remains in the U.S. interest to see a secure and prosperous
Tunisia, led in a manner accountable to the people that can deliver
economic stability and protect the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all.
Tunisia's elected leadership faces a sovereign choice about whether
and how to go forward with the government's reform plans and enable a
democratic and prosperous future. These are questions of Tunisian
policy. We will nonetheless continue to speak frankly with the Tunisian
Government about its actions and policies, and align our diplomacy with
U.S. interests and values in the spirit of long-term friendship between
the American and Tunisian people.
After a decade of bipartisan U.S. support reflecting the Tunisian
people's hard-won democratic gains in 2011, the context in which we are
now pursuing U.S. interests is markedly different. As such, the
relationship between the United States Government and the Tunisian
Government has changed in far-reaching ways since July 25, 2021. The
goal of seeing the Tunisian people realize their vision for a brighter
future, however, has not.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today on
the situation in Tunisia, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MEGAN DOHERTY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Doherty. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, Senator
Kaine, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today
about the role of the U.S. Agency for International Development
and supporting the Tunisian people.
Tunisia's future feels increasingly tenuous. The Tunisian
people find their democracy and fundamental freedoms endangered
at the same time that their economy is significantly
struggling.
Despite the downward trajectory and the disillusionment of
many Tunisians with their political leaders since 2011, a
recent poll shows that more than 70 percent of Tunisians
believe democracy is still the best form of governance and
there is still an active and vibrant civil society.
Our strategy is to invest in the Tunisian people and their
resilience to both political and economic shocks. In response
to the democratic backsliding we pivoted our assistance to work
directly with the Tunisian people and we are committed to
supporting Tunisians' democratic aspirations while also helping
them address the very real economic challenges that they face
today.
Right now inflation is at a four-decade high. Food prices
and food insecurity are on the rise and more than a third of
Tunisians under the age of 35 are unemployed.
As the economy continues to contract, the number of
Tunisians attempting to migrate to Europe has surged five-fold
since 2019. USAID's investments in the Tunisian private sector
are targeted to support the Tunisians that are trying to rescue
their economy and we know that these investments work.
Thanks to the generosity of Congress over the last 4 years,
our economic growth work has helped more than 44,000 Tunisian
small businesses increase their sales by more than $580
million.
This work has created 48,000 new sustainable jobs, two-
thirds of which are held by women. The current economic crisis
is of particular risk to Tunisia's most vulnerable, especially
in the marginalized cities outside the capital.
Last year we provided $60 million to UNICEF to help
Tunisian families keep food on the table and keep their kids in
school. Just last week we partnered with the World Bank to
offset the rising food insecurity caused by Russia's invasion
of Ukraine.
Beyond the economy, USAID is also working to support
Tunisian civil society, to protect the integrity of democratic
processes, and to combat mis- and disinformation. The goal here
is not just to support Tunisians in their current crisis, but
also to invest in the core pillars needed for a healthy
sustainable democracy for Tunisia's future.
The dissolution of parliament and municipal councils,
decrees limiting freedoms, politically motivated arrests, these
have all had a real chilling effect on Tunisian civil society
and, yet, they continue to organize bravely in the face of
growing threats.
For example, for the December 2022 legislative elections
USAID supported 90 percent of the domestic and international
observers who monitored and reported not only on electoral
issues, but also hate speech and misinformation.
In the July 2022 national referendum, it was USAID-
supported partners who caught erroneous voting data from the
election commission, publicly called for corrections, and
succeeded in getting the commission to publicize all of their
counting data.
With presidential and local elections on the horizon,
domestic observer groups are already organizing and advocating
for a more inclusive, accessible electoral process.
USAID has also been investing in countering the dangerous
rise in mis- and disinformation that we have seen across the
country. Our partners have trained more than a hundred
journalists and reached more than 700,000 Tunisians with
countering disinformation campaigns.
They have also launched initiatives to dispel rumors to
make sure that Tunisians have timely accurate information. The
democratic and economic threats facing Tunisia are significant,
but so too is the distance that the country and its people have
come in the decade after 2011.
Despite the real risks facing Tunisia's economy and
democracy, many Tunisians are leading the hard work to recover
the economy and to protect their rights and freedoms. We will
continue to stand with them and support them.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee
on this important issue, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Doherty follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Megan Doherty
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the role of
the U.S. Agency for International Development in supporting the
Tunisian people.
Despite slow but laudable democratic progress over the past decade,
today Tunisia's future feels increasingly tenuous. Tunisians are
finding their democracy increasingly endangered, while the economic
situation continues to worsen. Inflation hovers at a four-decade high,
including food prices, which have risen over 15 percent since last
year, and more than a third of Tunisians under 35 are unemployed.
The increasing number of arrests and criminal investigations
targeting journalists, politicians, and others have had a chilling
effect on civil society and shows that democratic backsliding remains a
serious concern. As the economy continues to contract, many Tunisians
are looking to Europe to find economic opportunities despite mounting
horrific stories of migrants perishing at sea.
While these statistics show a concerning trajectory for the
country, we know that building a stable and prosperous democracy is a
long-term proposition, and Tunisia is now only a little more than a
decade into its democratic transition. Despite the deep disillusionment
of many Tunisians with their political leaders since 2011, more than 70
percent of Tunisians surveyed still believe democracy remains the best
system of governance and some windows of opportunity remain.
Addressing the country's fragile economic state is critical to
create space for democratic progress. This is especially true outside
of Tunis where the economic plight is even worse and shortages in basic
supplies from food to medicine are common. Our approach is to build
Tunisian resilience to both economic and political shocks. In response
to the democratic backsliding, we pivoted our assistance away from the
government to work directly with the Tunisian people.
economy
Addressing Tunisia's economic crisis is essential in order to
create an environment in which democratic progress can occur. The
lingering economic and social impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic and
price increases caused by Russia's war on Ukraine have exacerbated the
challenges of daily life for the Tunisian people. Already, Tunisians
face major shortages in basic items ranging from food to medicine. Food
prices have risen more than 15 percent since last year, according to
the National Institute of Statistics, and inflation and unemployment--
already above 10 and 15 percent respectively--continue to rise.
As a prosperous future feels increasingly out of reach for
Tunisians, more are attempting dangerous migrations to Europe. The
number of Tunisians attempting to migrate to Europe has surged five-
fold since 2019.
USAID's investments in the private sector directly support
Tunisians who are working to rescue their economy. Small businesses are
the primary source of income and opportunity for jobless Tunisians, and
their best chance to find hope amid a failing economy and rising costs
of living. Over the past 4 years, our economic growth portfolio has
helped more than 44,500 Tunisian micro and small businesses increase
sales by $580 million, expand exports by $430 million, secure $217
million in new loans and create 48,000 new jobs, of which 67 percent
are for women. The confidence USAID partnership inspires also helped
these small businesses attract $132 million in additional investments.
Over the past 4 years, we have also partnered with Tunisian
universities, vocational schools, and career centers nationwide to help
students build the skills for private sector employment to ensure jobs
are not just paychecks, but true careers and opportunities. We helped
universities upgrade the business administration and information and
communication technology curricula for approximately 6,000 students a
year. We paired this work with training, job fairs, internships, and
career services to make sure more than 14,500 young Tunisians a year
have the skills and opportunities to find meaningful private sector
employment.
Amid these opportunities to help move Tunisians forward, we know
that Tunisia's current economy places many at greater risk of being
left behind. Last year we provided $60 million to UNICEF to keep food
on the table and kids in school in Tunisia's most vulnerable
households, and just this past week, we partnered with the World Bank
to help offset the food security impacts caused by Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. We know that these activities alone will not turn the tide of
the economic crisis, but they will lessen the suffering of the most
vulnerable during a time of extraordinary economic turmoil.
democracy
USAID is working in partnership with the Tunisian people to build
an even more resilient civil society, to promote the integrity of
elections and other democratic processes, and to combat mis- and
disinformation in all forms of media. Given Tunisians' long tradition
of civil society activism, investments in these efforts will not only
support Tunisians in the face of current challenges, but also help as
they work to build the core pillars needed for a healthy, sustainable
democracy in Tunisia's future.
Resilient Civil Society
Tunisians have seen the dissolution of municipal councils and
parliament, a slew of decrees limiting freedoms, and politically
motivated arrests. Despite increasing fears, Tunisian civil society is
still bravely organizing in the face of growing threats.
For example, following the leaked amendments of Decree 88 that
would outlaw foreign funding for civil society groups, Tunisian civil
society organizations unified to reject these restrictions. And just
this month, parliament's decision to restrict broadcasting of
parliamentary sessions to only national television met such vocal
opposition from the journalist syndicates that parliament reversed its
decision and opened access to all accredited media outlets.
To continue building on more than a decade supporting Tunisian-led
public engagement, we will launch a new effort to ensure the long-term
viability and impact of civil society this year. Through this
initiative, we will provide training to help CSOs build plans for long-
term financial stability, improve their internal governance, and
increase their public reach and impact.
Protect Election Integrity
Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of functioning
democracies, and the Tunisian partners we support are acting to protect
these processes. For the December 2022 legislative elections, USAID
funded 90 percent of the domestic and international observers, who
monitored and reported not only on electoral violations of
international best practices, but also hate speech and misinformation.
In the July 2022 national referendum, USAID-supported partners
caught erroneous voting data reporting from the Tunisian Independent
High Authority for Elections (ISIE), publicly called for corrections,
and persuaded the commission to publicize all of their counting
reports, allowing both Tunisians and international observers to see
corrected data for themselves. With presidential and local elections on
the horizon for 2023-2024, a USAID-supported network of domestic
elections observer groups is advocating for reforms of the electoral
framework through outreach to other civil society organizations, the
media, and Tunisian citizens.
Countering Mis- and Disinformation
In addition to these efforts, USAID integrates information
integrity into our democracy work. We are investing broadly in
countering the growing threat of mis- and disinformation. From rumors
about COVID vaccines to disinformation about rapidly unfolding
political events, misinformation is free flowing in Tunisia, especially
on social media platforms.
Since 2020, USAID has trained more than 100 journalists and
supported media fact checking efforts to dispel rumors and help provide
Tunisians with reliable sources of information. We have seen strong
returns from these investments, including Tunisian-led initiatives to
confront false information, address hate speech, and stop rumors. This
year, a local media partner launched ``Tunisia Investigating,'' a new
broadcast program to counter false claims and rumors, including during
the recent wave of attacks against sub-Saharan migrants.
While training for media professionals is important, reaching the
general public is equally vital. Last year, our online educational
campaigns to counter disinformation reached more than 700,000
Tunisians. We will continue to support our partners as they combat mis-
and disinformation and work to ensure Tunisians are getting the
information they need.
Building Strong Social Ties
Finally, our democracy and governance efforts empower and include
marginalized groups, youth, and women. Real disparities exist across
Tunisia. The coastal regions account for 90 percent of employment and
80 percent of the country's urban areas. Young Tunisians between the
ages of 15-29 make up nearly one-third of the country's population, but
the unemployment rate for those under 35 is 37 percent. And young
people in the interior account for a disproportionate amount of that
number as their unemployment rates are more than three times higher
than those in the coastal areas.
Supporting these young people to develop their skills, learn about
public policy, and take action locally helps them tackle the issues
that are front and center to Tunisian families. USAID has seen our
young Tunisian partners drive COVID-19 vaccination efforts, run for
local office, renovate community spaces, and advocate for improved
local services. More than 80 percent of young Tunisians who
participated in USAID youth programs now volunteer for community
organizations or participate in advocacy campaigns on issues ranging
from water scarcity and sanitation to political inclusion of
marginalized groups.
USAID's support for training for young and historically
underrepresented Tunisians activates them as engaged members of their
communities and country and empowers them to raise their voices and
vision long past when USAID's support for specific activities ends.
sustaining commitment to tunisians
I have been honored to visit Tunisia and meet with youth activists,
entrepreneurs, and community organizers. Despite the real risks facing
Tunisia's economy and democracy, many Tunisians are leading hard work
to grow the economy and protect fundamental freedoms. However, the risk
of disillusionment with the promises of democracy increases as
Tunisians see growing distance between their desire for a brighter
future and their economic plight today. Protecting Tunisia's democratic
future requires investments in the Tunisian people who are working to
build not only the pillars of democratic governance, but forging a
pathway towards a viable economy.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee on this
important issue. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much to both of you for your
testimony.
Mr. Harris, a couple of times in your testimony you refer
to the military as being apolitical or having an apolitical
reputation. It is no worry that all of the diminution in aid in
this budget comes from nonmilitary assistance and so the
question is whether that is still an accurate assessment of the
Tunisian military.
Remember, it was the military that shut the doors of
parliament upon President Saied's order. This is not apples to
apples, but it is roughly the equivalent of the U.S. military
assisting the January 6 protesters in their assault on the
Capitol.
I mean, they were front and center in the shutdown of
democracy and since then they have regularly appeared at
President Saied's side as he issues the decrees that
consolidate his power.
How do we come to the conclusion that we are sending a
message, as you said in your testimony that it is not business
as usual when we continue full funding or flat funding of the
security assistance while at the same time the security forces
seem to be participating in this crackdown on democracy and
political speech?
Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first thing I would say is that the consolidation of
executive power and the overall political trajectory you
described is an assessment that we share. It is one that we
have engaged directly with the Tunisian Government on, that
Secretary Blinken has engaged with President Saied directly on
at all levels.
With regard to our specific assistance figures as reflected
in the President's 2024 budget request, we have requested
reductions across the board within Tunisia, including with
respect to our security assistance.
Our request is approximately halved, which in our judgment
reflects an unambiguous message that there simply cannot be a
business as usual so long as the concurrent economic and
political crises that are playing out in Tunisia continue and,
moreover, that tangible steps in Tunis to restore confidence in
the country's democratic trajectory are needed to enable the
strongest possible bilateral relationship including with the
Tunisian military.
At the same point, the activities that we are undertaking
with the professional women and men of the Tunisian armed
forces are focused very specifically on vital U.S. interests.
These are programs that address the safety of U.S.
diplomatic personnel and facilities, that address the wellbeing
of American citizens in Tunisia, that seek to sustain pressure
on terrorist groups that threaten Tunisia and through Tunisia
our allies and partners, and that also seek to promote a
culture of respect for the rule of law and accountability
within the security forces.
The concerns about attempted politicization are ones that
we fully share and we are continuing to address that very
directly both at a political level and directly with the
Tunisian armed forces to ensure that they remain professional
and fulfill their constitutional mandate.
Senator Murphy. Let me just clarify. Your current budget
request for 2024 does not request flat funding for military
security aid, or do I have that wrong? You do not--you are not
asking for a reduction in military funding to Tunisia?
Mr. Harris. Since the events of July 25, 2021 we have
adjusted every aspect of our assistance request, including with
respect to security assistance.
Senator Murphy. Correct. Last year's budget passed by
Congress reduced assistance to Tunisia, but this year's request
from the Administration foresees continued funding at 2023
levels for the military, but on the other hand requests
reductions in funding for civil society and human rights.
I mean, this is the part that I do not understand and this
is my question to you, Ms. Doherty. You gave a pretty sunny
description of the state of U.S. support for Tunisian civil
society, but I am looking at a budget that is contemplating a
reduction of funding for civil society and for human rights and
a maintenance of funding for the very institutions that are
standing side-by-side with Saied in his campaign of repression.
How does that send a signal to the Tunisian people that we are
with them?
Be fair with us because I understand the complexities of
this. We cannot pick our partners all the time. Much of this
money has to run through institutions that the president may
control and so share with us if there are practical limitations
to our ability to get money to the right players to support
civil society or whether this is actually a strategic decision
by the Administration to reduce funding to civil society while
maintaining funding for security.
Ms. Doherty. Thank you. While I am very, very proud of the
investments that we have made and the work that our Tunisian
partners are doing on the ground right now in this moment of
economic and democratic crisis, in no means do I mean to
understate the challenges that are facing our partners right
now.
It is not a rosy picture, and as it relates to our
relationship with Tunisian civil society we are not walking
away. We have been working with them since 2011 and I would say
despite the very real challenges they face, they are one of the
bright spots in this moment.
While the FY24 budget does reflect a proportional decrease,
we are actually about to launch a new $25 million program of
support to Tunisian civil society that is going to work with
organizations across the country, including in some of the more
historically underrepresented and marginalized regions, and at
the same time, we are also coordinating with other donors who
also have significant interests in Tunisia and share our
approach to make sure that we are identifying and filling gaps
and that we are deconflicting and coordinating assistance
across the board to make sure that Tunisian civil society gets
the support that it needs.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Ms. Doherty, you just mentioned coordination with other
donors and that sort of helps me zoom out as a reminder to
anyone who may be attentive to these proceedings.
We have partners throughout Africa, throughout the North
Africa sort of region, that can help us influence the
Government of Tunisia and I think to the extent we can leverage
those relationships that will advance our own objectives of
ensuring not just stability in the region, but trying to bring
the leadership of Tunisia in a position of better behavior.
I ask both witnesses to what extent is the United States
engaging some of our partners in Europe and in Africa to come
up with a multilateral and coordinated strategy in our approach
to Tunisia?
Mr. Harris. Senator, coordination with our allies and
partners is a central aspect of our diplomacy. That is
especially the case on a very difficult problem set as is
playing out in Tunisia right now.
Even today I was in coordination with a number of European
partners about specific issues in Tunisia. The Secretary has
been in touch with his counterparts across Europe, the Middle
East, and North Africa.
What we have heard in those conversations is a shared
concern about the instability, both economically and
politically, that is playing out in the country right now. That
instability risks not being confined to Tunisia itself.
For a number of our friends and partners, they see the
potential for this, too, to destabilize more broadly, to spill
out across Tunisia's borders, and for that reason that has
animated a very serious international effort to bring a
multitude of voices to bear on this problem.
There are different degrees of influence, different
relationships, that different actors across Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa have with the Tunisian Government, with others
with influence.
A core priority for our diplomacy has been to seek to align
those conversations and to bring a broad range of voices to
bear on a very challenging situation.
Senator Young. As we seek alignment, are there key areas--
either Mr. Harris or Ms. Doherty--of divergence where we are
attempting to achieve more alignment, more harmonization, and
have greater effect on the behavior of the current Tunisian
regime?
Ms. Doherty. On the assistance side we have seen tremendous
alignment, actually. I would argue that this crisis has helped
us strengthen our coordination. There is a very strong
coordinated donor community, particularly around democratic
processes, elections, civil society support.
We have an active working group both in Tunis and also
constant communication between capitals. I am actually getting
on a plane on Monday to go to Brussels and meet with my EU
counterparts and we will be raising this issue with them as
well.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Tunisia signed an MOU with China in 2018 to be included in
the Belt and Road Initiative. There has been a debt crisis
looming and we have recently seen China reducing its
investments in Africa, particularly where investments have
underperformed or been threatened by some measure of
instability.
We have also seen China signal that it is disinclined to
help Tunisia should it fail to secure a loan from the IMF.
Mr. Harris, can you describe the risk of Tunisia moving
further into China's orbit, as you see it? Do the circumstances
of this suggest that perhaps the U.S. can use some of its
leverage to influence Tunisia for the better without risking
the country turning to Beijing?
Mr. Harris. Senator, what we are witnessing in Tunisia is
the very pernicious attempts of our adversaries, including the
PRC, to seek to exploit the simultaneous crises that are
playing out in Tunisia.
We see that in terms of an attempt to get a foothold in
strategic sectors of the Tunisian economy, to burrow in in
strategic infrastructure, with no regard for Tunisian
sovereignty or the wellbeing of the Tunisian people.
These are issues that we would welcome the chance to
discuss with the subcommittee in a different setting in greater
detail.
A fundamental goal and principle of our approach is to
address the urgent instability economically and politically
that is creating these vulnerabilities and for that reason
seeing a Tunisia that is able to stabilize its economy, to
consider its path forward with respect to these economic
reforms negotiated with the IMF, to take the tangible steps
necessary to advance constitutional democratic governance, we
really see these as the fundamental actions that will change
the trajectory and begin to address the significant
vulnerabilities that our adversaries are trying to exploit
there.
Senator Young. The Government of Tunisia--the current
leadership clearly recognizes that there is a near-term need to
stabilize the economy in order to, if not serve the people, at
least strengthen their own position within the government.
At the same time you have China pulling back on its
investments from Africa more generally, but more specifically
from Tunisia.
I guess the question is as you seek to balance these
different forces, do you see an opportunity to at once use the
opportunity to invest in Tunisia for purposes of economic
stability and to help the people, but also to push them into a
position of--onto a path of better behavior?
Mr. Harris. With regard to our assistance activities, I
would say we are constantly looking at the diplomatic tools
that we have and that includes assistance programs.
This is something that that is not static, but we are
continuously looking at through the lens of making sure the
activities we are undertaking are those that are addressing the
economic needs of vulnerable communities, as my colleague spoke
to, and contributing to those trying to work towards an
inclusive political future.
Senator Young. Right.
Mr. Harris. Where we have opportunities and where
conditions may warrant a course correction that is, obviously,
something----
Senator Young. I know you are attempting to answer the
question. It is a very vague response to an observation that
leverage exists and it may be an opportunity to tie certain
investments in Tunisia to better behavior as the Chinese pull
back.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thanks.
We will do a second round here because I think we have got
a few more topics to explore. Let me try to tie a bow on this
concern I have about the muddled message we are sending through
your funding request.
Just to maybe follow up on your response, Ms. Doherty, are
you--is our reduction in funding for civil society and human
rights--I mean, it is pretty exceptional. We are zeroing out
funding for human rights. We have got a budget that has a zero
on the human rights line item for Tunisia.
Are we doing that to send a signal? Are we doing that
because we do not think that we can get money to the people
that need it? Or are we doing that because, as you referenced
in your answer to my first question, we are going to make up
for that money somewhere else?
I just do not--I do not quite understand what message we
are sending when we are holding military aid constant, but we
are reducing aid to civil society. When I hear your testimony
it kind of sounds like if what you were saying was true we
would be seeing a budget request that suggested the opposite.
Ms. Doherty. Thank you, Senator.
For human rights funding specifically, I will refer you to
my colleague from the State Department, but as it relates to
civil society, the new budget figures they reflect a few
things, some of which you mentioned.
One is the changed operating environment. The other is the
pivoting away from--we had some quite large-scale programs
planned with the Tunisian Government that we are no longer
doing and at the same time we are using some of our prior year
funding.
That is where the $60 million investment in social safety
net for vulnerable Tunisian families and the new program that I
mentioned that we will be launching soon, the $25 million scale
up for civil society.
Senator Murphy. Let me ask you about--Mr. Harris, about
that cut to human rights funding.
Mr. Harris. Senator, certainly, human rights is a central
aspect of our engagement. That is true worldwide. It is true in
Tunisia as well.
With regard to the budget in particular, in addition to the
bilateral lines that you made reference to there is an overall
increase in the budget requested for democracy, human rights,
and governance programming across the State Department and
USAID that presents opportunities to mobilize in support of the
Tunisian people and address these very serious issues. That
includes issues related to the freedom of expression, the
fundamental contributions that a vibrant civil society has to
play.
Both programmatically and frankly in terms of policy we see
this as something quite fundamental that we are doing in
Tunisia and our policy engagements as well from the Secretary
on down.
In all of our conversations with the Tunisian Government,
this is a central element and I believe in the request that we
have brought forward through this overall global requested
increase we are requesting the tools in order to advance that.
Senator Murphy. I understand that many of these decisions
are made by others and not you. I understand this is a broader
set of decision makers, but I just do not think that is true. I
just do not think it is true that if your primary objective is
to support civil society and human rights that this is a budget
that reflects that priority. I just do not think that is true.
Maybe you are right that you are going to find money for
Tunisia through some other mechanism, but you know and the
Administration knows that when you put a budget that zeros out
funding for that specific line item people are going to take a
message from it.
Let me turn to another piece of policy and that is the
pending compact with MCC. The State Department is a board
member and my understanding is that this contract has been on
hold since August of 2021 waiting to see how constitutional
reforms and parliamentary elections would go, but the
benchmarks that we were looking for have come and gone, and
from what I understand the MCC compact is still sort of sitting
out there in the ether, a possibility.
What benchmarks are we looking for? What are the next
benchmarks that will educate the decision we make on the MCC
and is not the MCC compact still being a potential for Tunisia
another signal that the United States' message on Saied's march
away from democracy continues to be muddled?
Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, as you know the MCC board has
spoken to how it is unable to advance the proposed compact with
Tunisia at this time, but certainly has looked forward to the
MCC continuance engagements should conditions evolve.
As the State Department we have been consulting quite
regularly with our MC colleagues on this matter. One aspect of
that coordination reflects that the MCC, of course, is mandated
by statute to provide assistance to eligible countries that
demonstrate a commitment to just and democratic governance.
As an overall point with respect to our assistance, I would
say we are continuing to engage with the Tunisian Government,
reflecting that we do not see the possibility of business as
usual amid this crisis and that very tangible steps by the
Tunisian Government are going to be needed to restore
confidence and the types of specific things that we have
discussed in that context are issues related to, for example,
the trying of civilians in military courts, the restrictions--
perceived restrictions on civil society, the targeting of
individuals based on allegations of false news, fundamental
actions to promote an inclusive political future.
That is what is going to create the conditions, more
broadly, for us to have the strongest possible relationship
with Tunisia.
Senator Murphy. Yes. I think we just may have a difference
of opinion as to whether those reforms are possible or whether
Saied has made a pretty concrete decision as to which direction
he is going to push his country in.
Let me ask you to sort of look retrospectively. Over the
course of about 10 years we have spent $274 million on
supporting Tunisian democracy, something that we were very
proud of as a country.
I remember going there with Senator McCain to celebrate the
success of Tunisian democracy. Tunisia is--I joke that it is
just twice the size of Indiana, but it is still a pretty big
country. Two hundred and seventy-four million dollars is a lot
of money to American taxpayers, but it is a relatively small
amount of money when you are trying to support a nascent
democracy.
What lessons do we draw from the investments that we made
over 10 years in Tunisian democracy that arguably did not pan
out the way that we had hoped? Is it a question of
misallocating resources?
Is it a question of it just not being enough? Is it a
question of circumstances on the ground moving in directions
with such a strong current that there was no amount of American
spending that was going to sort of stop this slide away from
democracy?
Or is it that that money that we spend can still pay
dividends in the future, that we help support a group of
reformers and activists that are still making good trouble and
standing up for Tunisian democracy?
What do we think about the way in which we supported
Tunisian democracy for 10 years that has looked like a
successful partnership that now looks a little bit more sour?
Ms. Doherty. Senator, I can answer on the assistance side.
I mean, this is one of the questions that has been in my mind a
lot lately, and I think one of the biggest lessons that we have
learned looking at Tunisia is in terms of the importance of the
long game and these longer-term investments.
Civil society and democracy, as you know so well from your
many years in the region and your service in the world, they do
not develop overnight. They do not do that in Tunisia. They do
not do that in any other country.
What we have seen through various starts and stumbles in
the decade following 2011 is significant strides from those
investments that we have made. The organizations that I
remember from the early days in 2011 where you would have two
or three people saying, I want to form a civil society
organization--I am not sure what that means--or people saying I
would like to understand how an actual democratic election
works, and what we have seen since then these incredible
organizations that have pushed for more accountability, that
have influenced legislation, the first ever Tunisian election
observer network has been one of the most impressive ones in
the region. They have done truly incredible work.
They have mobilized hundreds and actually millions of
voters and educated people across the country and what we are
seeing right now is that these are the same organizations, so
the same organizations and individuals that are on the
frontlines of trying to reclaim their country's democracy. They
are countering disinformation, misinformation.
As I mentioned, they are continuing to observe electoral
processes. I do not think they would be able to do that if we
had not had that sustained investment over the last decade, but
to your question of, okay, then how did we end up in the place
where we are right now, I think this is not ultimately a
resourcing issue. This is not a matter of assistance programs.
Some of these drivers are inherently political.
Senator Murphy. Senator Young is on his way back, as I
understand, for a second round. Let me ask a question of both
of you, but I think you previewed it in your testimony, Ms.
Doherty, and that is the information space.
I was really blown away during my brief visit to Tunisia to
learn that I was an agent of Ennahda and that I was simply in
Tunisia to front for the Muslim Brotherhood.
It was pretty impressive how the misinformation campaign
had really overwhelmed the U.S. embassy there and they were
unable to get out ahead of a narrative that the United States
was showing up with a very political partisan agenda that was
totally disconnected from reality, completely disconnected from
reality.
The United States does not play favorites. We do not pick
sides. I had no idea who these people were that they claimed
that I was aligned with, but the narrative was so powerful and
it was so clear to me that we did not have the tools to set the
record straight.
I am the author of the Global Engagement Center. I am a
proud believer that the State Department now has more
capacities to fight back against propaganda, but maybe describe
to me the challenge of the information space inside Tunisia
today and what new tools you need and our diplomats need just
to make sure that people understand the truth about America's
agenda.
We clearly have lost or are losing that fight right now and
I am not sure who is funding all the misinformation. That is
not all coming domestically, and maybe you can also suggest to
me who is putting all of that false information about the U.S.
agenda into the information space.
Ms. Doherty. Thank you, Senator.
I will admit I followed your trip while you were there and
I was also surprised to see some of the headlines and the
rumors swirling about your visit.
As you noted well, the information landscape is incredibly
fraught right now. We have seen a real rise in mis- and
disinformation. That is one of the reasons as part of the
assistance pivot that we were describing earlier we are trying
to drill more into the countering disinformation, countering
misinformation space.
To give you a few examples, we have been working with our
Tunisian partners, who are far more tech savvy than I, but they
have created a fact-checking platform that is being used right
now by independent media outlets to help them identify and to
combat disinformation and also hate speech.
We are also trying to help our partners get certified with
entities like--international standard entities like the
International Federation--Fact-Checking Network, the IFCN, so
that platform that is recognized by most major social media
companies and actually helps them take down posts in real time
much more effectively.
We have also been training hundreds of journalists in media
literacy and also helping them put out content. We launched a
media literacy broadcast program that is designed to educate
Tunisians on how to spot fake news, falsehoods, disinformation,
and some of this work has--through our tracking has reached
about 700,000 Tunisians so far, but we are hoping to grow it
because it is such an important space for investment.
Senator Murphy. Well, listen, I would suggest that the good
work you are doing in this space is reason to double down and I
would hope that we would look to plus up those capacities in
the coming budget.
Before I turn it over to Senator Young for a second round
just a final question to you, Mr. Harris. Talk a little bit
about the Gulf's role and interests in Tunisia. I do not think
that they have always been terribly constructive.
At the same time, my impression is that President Saied was
maybe hoping to get more no-strings economic help from the Gulf
than he has received and perhaps he is now more potentially
reliant on China, in part because the Gulf is equally as
reluctant as the IMF to get in deep to support an economy
without reform.
Talk to me a little bit about what our Gulf partners'
interests are in Tunisia and whether they are always aligned
with our interests.
Mr. Harris. Senator, what we have seen in our conversations
with Gulf partners is a very high degree of concern about the
economic instability, in the first instance, that is playing
out in Tunisia, and in a context where the Tunisian Government
has developed reforms that have won support from the IMF, but
as we have seen reflected in President Saied's own statements
not as yet taken the decision to move forward with that reform
program.
Any financial contributions that may be contemplated from
the Gulf have not advanced. Our sense is that there is broadly
a willingness to support reforms with the IMF, but the
fundamental question of whether or not that happens or goes
forward really does not rest in Gulf capitals, but back in
Tunis.
The question fundamentally is is the Tunisian Government
going to be able to advance its own set of reforms. If so, I
think there is a broad range of countries including some within
the Gulf that would be prepared to support that, motivated by a
serious concern about the consequences of instability, but
those investments cannot go anywhere if there is not a decision
in Tunis to enable the IMF path in the first place.
Senator Murphy. I think that is positive that the Gulf has
stayed, largely, aligned with the IMF goals. I would assume,
though, that they have not been as enthusiastic on political
reform as they have been on economic reform.
Their focus is more on economic reform. They are not
whispering in Saied's ears to reverse the slide away from
democratic norms.
Mr. Harris. I cannot speak with any authority to
conversations that another government may be having in Tunis. I
can tell you in our own conversations with Gulf partners what
we are reflecting is that we see economic and political
empowerment as fundamentally linked and that the way to address
the economic instability concerns that they are voicing is, on
the one hand, certainly to enable this reform program
negotiated with the IMF to restore the macro economy to health.
At the same time and in the same breath tangible steps to
put things on the path of democratic and constitutional
governance are vital to address those same instability
concerns.
Senator Murphy. I will turn it over to Senator Young.
I think that is a very nimble answer. I think it is okay
for the Administration to say that the Gulf is not as
interested in political reform as they are in economic reform.
I do not think you are going to make the Gulf upset if you say
on the record that the Gulf countries are not terribly
interested in midwifing healthy democracies in the region.
I appreciate your answer. I think that is right, that we
believe the two are linked and we continue to make that case,
but I think we have to understand that our alliance with the
Gulf on Tunisia policies is limited.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman, for the benefit. I know
our witnesses understand, but anyone else I had to step out and
make sure that my constituents were enfranchised. It turned out
for the benefit of the chairman, votes were somehow withdrawn.
I am still trying to figure out this place.
Senator Murphy. It is a nice walk.
Senator Young. Yes. It was a nice saunter.
One of the things I would like to explore in light of
Tunisia's economic challenges, their high inflation, and the
interest so many Tunisians have in getting foreign direct
investment into the country is this IMF loan.
I understand that blocking the IMF loan could at worst case
crash the Tunisian economy, leading to much higher inflation,
even hyperinflation, and default on debt obligations.
With that in mind, Ms. Doherty or Mr. Harris, how involved
should the United States be in Tunisia's negotiations with the
IMF and how might we use this as an opportunity to require
tangible rule of law reforms from President Saied?
Mr. Harris. Senator, I agree with the characterization that
you described of how central finding a path to address these
reforms negotiated with the IMF is.
As you know, last year the Tunisian Government, in response
to a very serious series of external shocks including Russia's
aggression compounding decades of deferred reform developed a
reform package that, if implemented, would enable the
government to better manage the public wage bill, to ensure
subsidies are targeted to those in greatest need, to restore
state-owned enterprises to a degree of sustainability and
health.
That program in October of last year, with our active
engagement and consultation with the Tunisian Government, with
the IMF, with international partners, but fundamentally based
on the reforms that Tunisia itself developed won support and
enabled Tunisia to conclude a staff level agreement.
As President Saied has indicated publicly, he has as yet
decided not to move forward with crucial elements of that
reform program and, thus, that program is unable to advance to
the IMF board for approval. As we were discussing just a moment
ago, a number of international partners have generously stepped
forward to provide support, but only in the context of that IMF
program.
As we are approaching this and as Secretary Blinken,
Assistant Secretary Leaf, others in the Administration have
communicated directly to the Tunisian Government, we are
prepared to support Tunisia in moving forward on this reform
program.
The fundamental question is where they are if Tunisia
chooses to do so. There is a fundamental decision point faced
in Tunis about these matters.
Senator Young. I am inferring that the U.S. Government is
prepared to support Tunisia in implementing these reforms, not
just so that they can secure consummation of the IMF
assistance, but also because we believe that the reform program
would increase the level of stability in Tunisia as opposed to
undermining it as oftentimes fiscal austerity measures do.
Mr. Harris. Certainly. As we are looking at it, a Tunisia
that continues to unravel in this way economically where
Tunisian individuals and households are struggling to access
and purchase basic consumer goods, medicine, is not an
environment that is most conducive to the type of democratic
governance that we all want to see nor one in which our other
priorities in the country could be advanced.
For that reason we have been very intensively engaged with
Tunisians to support this reform program, but again this is
fundamentally a question of Tunisian policy and whether or not
they choose to proceed.
Senator Young. Let us assume the government changes heart,
changes its mind and implements the reform program, receives
the IMF assistance. At that point, will President Saied feel
emboldened to act with greater disregard from the rule of law?
If yes, why? If not, why not?
Mr. Harris. It is difficult for me to speculate about
future actions. What I would say is as we are kind of assessing
the situation right now, if Tunisia were to make a decision to
move forward with this reform program and thus the program
negotiated last October could go forward to IMF board approval,
that would begin to provide just a little bit of breathing
room.
Tunisians that are really hurting, that are really hurting
economically--I have spent a lot of time in the country
including recently and you feel this on a very visceral level.
The human cost of this economic situation is very serious and
that directly plays back to the political situation.
Even in discussing with Tunisian counterparts, the recent
elections cycle what we often hear is it is very difficult to
put one's full energies and attention behind these very serious
political matters and elections process, these fundamental
questions of Tunisia moving forward with constitutional
governance, where these very human needs cannot be met in a
time of economic unraveling.
Senator Young. I can certainly understand how one would
make either argument in the wake of receiving an infusion of
funds. That is either emboldening the president to continue to
disregard the rule of law and basic human rights or going the
other direction.
As the Administration continues to assess that important
question and resolves the matter I hope they will be in touch
with Senator Murphy and myself.
How would either of you rate the potential for Tunisia to
default on its debt obligations and what would be the impact of
that?
Mr. Harris. We spend a considerable amount of time both
internally and with our Tunisian counterparts to understand the
macroeconomic outlay.
What we have seen in recent months is that the
professionals--the Tunisian economic officials are taking the
measures that you would expect in a very difficult environment
to stabilize to the extent possible the situation.
That includes steps to address tax collection. There has
been greater domestic borrowing. The overall global energy
markets have provided a little bit of additional breathing room
very modestly within the Tunisian budget this year. Those are
prudent measures.
At the same time, they cannot substitute for a sustainable
solution. With regard specifically to the debt outlook,
Tunisia, over the coming year, has a number of external
financing obligations.
This is simply one--another reason--a critical reason why
finding a path forward on these economic reforms, if that is
what Tunis chooses to do, is so vital. Thus far, the sum of
these extraordinary measures, including domestic borrowing and
the use of foreign exchange reserves, have limits and simply
cannot substitute and really address the--those fundamental
stability questions.
Senator Young. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. I will ask--I know Senator Booker is on his
way. I will ask one last question. If he is not here, we can
close the hearing down. You guys have been very generous with
your time.
Mr. Harris, maybe give an assessment to the committee of
the health of the political opposition today. Again, these are
powerful forces that can align behind reform--the public
employee unions, the bar, but Saied has also engaged in a
pretty deliberate campaign to make it harder for those entities
to join together, to speak up, and to contest the changes he
has made.
While I was there, again, a long time ago, he was very
popular and my sense is he is maybe not as popular, but he
still has a decent amount of support in the country. What is
the state of the array of individuals and institutions that are
opposing the changes he has made to democratic norms and is
there liability one of--one imposed by Saied and his repression
or by a public that is not yet ready to give up on Saied and
his reform plan?
Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, prior to July of 2021 in our
experience when you ask many Tunisians how things were going in
terms of the political health, there is both on the one hand a
very deep visceral connection to the freedom of expression and
hard-won gains of 2011 and, yet, on the other hand, a deep
frustration with the unfulfilled realizations, a deep
frustration with a--the perception of a ruling class,
institutions that left many Tunisians behind, particularly with
respect to delivering the tangible economic stability and
prosperity.
In that context, since July 25, 2021, what we have seen is,
on the one hand, kind of a real concern about official
corruption, about the behavior of elites, the perception of a
disconnect between those in power and those that they
purportedly would represent and to some degree that has been
reflected in a recognition that changes in the Tunisian
political system are needed.
On the other hand, the issues related to the freedom of
expression, the shrinking of the space for genuine debate, is a
very serious matter and one that, to my knowledge and from my
own experience, is of broad concern.
The hard-fought gains of 2011 have, as Secretary Blinken
has spoken to publicly, to some degree have been reversed and
the concern about that closing of space for debate is of broad
concern.
At this point, I cannot say I think that there is unanimity
across the Tunisian space on these matters. I do think, on the
one hand, there is broad concern about some of these underlying
deep systemic challenges, serious concerns about corruption,
and yet recognition that freedom of expression in this vibrant
culture is really critical to where most Tunisians would like
the country to go.
Senator Murphy. Does that space still exist? Are you
confident that if the Tunisian people made the decision that
they wanted to go in a different direction that the campaign of
repression has not become so effective and limiting they would
not be able to have their way?
Mr. Harris. I think there is no question that we have
witnessed an alarming erosion of these democratic norms,
including with respect to human rights, including the freedom
of expression.
That is something that we have heard very clearly reflected
in a multitude of conversations with Tunisians in the
government and outside of the government, but at the same time,
these are issues of deep emotional resonance in my experience
with Tunisians. The culture of freedom of expression, the
culture of freedom to criticize, to say what you want, to speak
your mind is one that is very deeply felt and for that reason
part of our engagement with the Tunisian Government since July
of 2021 has been to engage on the fundamental need to repudiate
any notion, any self-censorship, any perception, that Tunisians
will face reprisals for speaking their mind. That is
something--an ongoing conversation that we are still having
with the Tunisian Government.
Senator Murphy. Well, thank you both for your testimony
today. Thank you for your commitment to the U.S.-Tunisia
relationship.
We are going to keep the record open for questions until
the close of business on Friday. If we get any additional
questions, we will forward them to you.
With that, thanks to the subcommittee and the staff, this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Joshua Harris to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. Food Security: Tunisia's food security crisis is a
symptom of its own domestic turmoil and external events. Ukraine
accounted for nearly half of Tunisia's wheat imports prior to Russia's
invasion, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative has only restored limited
supplies. The uncertainty surrounding the extension of the grain deal
has caused a recent spike in wheat prices. Moreover, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has projected below-average wheat and
barley harvests in Tunisia this year due to ``insufficient rainfall and
high temperatures.''
Given Tunisia's history of bread riots, what is the risk that
continued supply disruptions and price volatility of wheat will spark
widespread unrest and cause political instability?
Answer. Disruptions in global food and energy markets spurred by
Russia's aggression in Ukraine, as well as the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic and climate change, have compounded structural weaknesses in
Tunisia's public finances and already contributed to the heightened
risk of instability in Tunisia. Continued supply disruptions and food
price volatility would likely exacerbate the economic emergency in
Tunisia and increase this risk. We remain focused on ensuring that U.S.
economic and development assistance to Tunisia is directly benefitting
the Tunisian people, including in terms of mitigating food insecurity.
To this end, the United States, through USAID in partnership with the
World Bank and UNICEF, is enabling the purchase of 25,000 metric tons
of American durum wheat and providing $60 million in support to
vulnerable Tunisian families as the Tunisian people face supply
disruptions and increased prices fueled by Russia's aggression.
Question. What role can Congress play in prioritizing U.S.
Government food aid support for countries like Tunisia that are
affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Russia's continued
manipulation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative?
Answer. We fully share the concern about the harmful impact in
Tunisia of the food insecurity exacerbated by Russia's aggression in
Ukraine and manipulation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In October
2022, we announced $60 million in direct assistance to the most
vulnerable Tunisians amid the broad array of economic shocks they face.
In April 2023, we announced a partnership with the World Bank to help
finance the purchase of 25,000 metric tons of American durum wheat. We
are also working with the World Bank to strengthen Tunisia's grain
supply chain to mitigate potential future disruptions. Congress
continues to play a vital role in highlighting the tangible impact of
Russia's aggression on food insecurity in Tunisia and enabling U.S.
programs that promote greater security and prosperity for the Tunisia
people.
______
Responses of Ms. Megan Doherty to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. According to a USAID press release dated April 21, the
United States, in partnership with the World Bank, has financed the
purchase of 25,000 metric tons of American durum wheat to help the
Tunisian people deal with supply disruptions caused by Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. The release also stated that USAID will send
agricultural experts to provide recommendations on how to increase the
country's resilience.
What was the reaction of the Tunisian Government to the
announcement of the wheat donation? What do the Tunisian people blame
for supply disruptions?
How will USAID leverage technical assistance on food security to
advance Tunisian administrative reforms? Will U.S.-funded agricultural
experts make policy recommendations related to subsidies and price
caps?
Answer. USAID established a partnership with the World Bank to
finance a wheat donation under a broader World Bank-led social safety
net effort. The Tunisian Government has been supportive of the World
Bank's efforts to strengthen the social protection system in Tunisia,
as a part of the COVID-19 response initiated in 2021. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs issued a public statement of appreciation, and the
Ministries of Agriculture and Social Affairs also expressed their
appreciation for U.S. assistance.
Since 2020, Tunisians have seen an increase in supply disruptions,
which are frequently attributed in the press and public discourse to
government mismanagement and the global impact of Russia's war in
Ukraine.
To ensure a more sustainable approach to food insecurity in
Tunisia, part of USAID's collaboration with the World Bank will include
analyses for a broader food security policy reform agenda, which may
include recommendations to improve agricultural-related subsidies;
identification of more efficient ways to procure cereals; and
development of a 10-year reform strategy. While the Tunisian Government
is aware of the impact of subsidies on their national debt, the
President has been reluctant to cut politically sensitive subsidies.
[all]