[Senate Hearing 118-54]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-54
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL
LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR
2024 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-967 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Blinken, Hon. Antony, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 57
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 76
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 117
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by
Senator John Barrasso.......................................... 117
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by
Senator Chris Van Hollen....................................... 122
(iii)
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL
LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR
2024 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch,
Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Hagerty, Ricketts, and
Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Secretary Blinken, welcome back to the committee of which
you have a long history with, so we appreciate you being with
us again.
If we are going to address the enormous scale of the global
challenges we face in the 21st century, we need a well-
resourced State Department with the most appropriate personnel
and tools to promote American foreign policy: From the horrific
Russian invasion of Ukraine to increasing violence in the
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and a tenuous peace
agreement in Ethiopia, to multiple failed states and active
civil wars in the Middle East and North Africa, to the
migration crisis caused by dictatorships, waves of criminal
violence in Mexico and Central America and the tragedy in
Haiti, to food insecurity, severe natural disasters, and
extreme heat exacerbated by the climate crisis, as well as the
continuing issues related to the pandemic.
We want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, on how you plan to
ensure that the Department is resourced and staffed to project
American foreign policy including seriously countering the
growing threat from China for which I think you will feel
today, and I am sure in your other engagements, is strong,
bipartisan, I think, bicameral view, the single biggest
geostrategic challenge the United States faces.
China has made major investments in diplomacy and its
diplomats are outrunning ours, not because they are better, but
because there are more of them in more places in the world with
more embassies and a seemingly limitless checkbook.
We cannot be on the sidelines and mired down in
bureaucratic processes. We need ambitious and consistent
resourcing. As you know, Senator Risch and I are working to put
together a bill to put us on a stronger path to compete with
China globally.
This will include resources and staffing, strengthening
economic tools, expanding our engagement with Latin America,
the Middle East, and Africa where there is currently a 40
percent vacancy rate at key American posts.
Bolstering our diplomatic and economic tools to compete
with China is the key to avoiding a military confrontation
while also ensuring we are ready to prevail in a conflict if it
be necessary.
As we have seen with Russia and Ukraine, one dictator's
warped vision of the world is all it takes to unleash a brutal
modern war. Our unity of purpose with our democratic allies and
partners against Putin's illegal war is critical and goes far
beyond Ukraine's borders.
When we lead with diplomatic, military, and economic
support; others follow. Our continuing support for Ukraine is
not just about defeating Russia or to help Ukraine's freedom,
which in and of itself are worthy goals. It is important that
we send a message to others who would upend the rules-based
international order. You cannot by force take another country's
territory.
The U.S. needs to use all our tools more effectively to do
that, which brings me to a third priority area we would like to
see the Department address, which is security assistance.
Unfortunately, for years the Pentagon has encroached upon
the State Department's vital and statutory role in security
assistance, which is a critical tool of foreign policy, which
we have seen most recently leveraged in Ukraine.
This has increasingly untethered our assistance from human
rights and American values, which I believe damage our national
security interests, and it has led to policies that focus on
short-term tactical military assistance like we have seen with
Azerbaijan blocking Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
While I will continue working to solidify the State
Department's role in the provision of all security assistance
and sales and seek to claw that back where it rightfully
belongs and statutorily belongs, the Department has also worked
to make sure we can fulfill our security assistance commitments
to our partners while setting the stage to compete with and
deter bad actors like China, Russia, and Iran.
We must reorient American foreign policy to be rooted in
supporting democracy and human rights, which serve our long-
term interests. Our foreign policy needs to help activists,
environmental defenders, political prisoners, on the frontlines
of confronting autocrats.
We need to be able to isolate and weaken those who
undertake coups in countries like Chad, Sudan, Mali, and
Guinea. We have to do more to protect women, girls, and young
boys, who are the targets of sexual violence in conflict zones.
Finally, I want to reiterate the importance of building on
the last 2 years of bipartisan work to resuscitate the State
Department authorization process after a long hiatus.
I think this speaks volumes about how deeply the committee
values the Department's work and personnel. It is critical that
we modernize our diplomatic corps so it better represents our
nation's diverse backgrounds, views, and talents and it gives
them the tools they need to be successful.
We have got our work cut out for us, Mr. Secretary, and we
want to thank you for being a constructive partner in this
effort.
We appreciate the constant dialogue between our committee,
yourself, and the Department, and we look forward to discussing
President Biden's budget request in detail with you.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here. Thank you
for always being willing to take our calls when we have
important issues to discuss. I sincerely appreciate that.
Although we do not always agree, as you know, it is good to
talk and see if we cannot find middle ground to get to what
usually is a common interest and common objective and I
sincerely appreciate that.
These days there is no shortage of complex issues in
foreign relations, including Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine
to China's ongoing attempts to coerce and dominate nations
across the globe.
The American people need a State Department that is fully
capable of advancing interests and values of all Americans and
this will only increase in the future as China becomes a
greater and greater challenge for us.
Now, we should all remember that that is the first
challenge that we have even though we have other things going
on like the Ukraine war, which are very important to us, but we
can do more than one thing at a time. China is still the
challenge of the century.
The Department needs to be efficient and effective with
taxpayer dollars and use the authorities provided by Congress.
For example, my Global Health Security Act signed into law late
last year provided State with substantial new authorities.
The bill created a coordinator for global health security
at the Department with the power to reduce redundancy,
eliminate waste, and ensure unity of effort.
Remarkably, the Department provided zero funding for the
coordinator. I hope you are going to talk about this a little
bit today. I suspect you are since you and I have talked about
it at some length previously.
We also enacted my Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act, which allows our diplomats more freedom
to leave the embassy and do their job while dramatically
reducing the costs of embassies.
The authorities provided in SECCA should enhance our
presence in places like the Pacific Islands where we are
directly competing with Chinese Government for influence.
Secretary Blinken, I hope to hear how the Department is
utilizing these authorities in implementing these laws because
I remain concerned.
On Russia and its brutal war, I have visited Kyiv and seen
firsthand the destruction and resilience of the Ukrainian
people as well as the work the State Department personnel are
doing to advance our security.
There is clearly more that needs to be done, though. The
Administration should stop its dithering and follow the lead of
allies like Poland and send the F-16s. I do not want to see
this Administration push for a ceasefire in December because
not enough is being provided now. It is important that the help
be provided now.
Also, while I have consistently advocated for giving
Ukraine more of the systems it needs to win, I have also been
clear that we must conduct rigorous oversight to ensure that
our aid is effective as well as transparent and accountable to
the American taxpayer.
I have had direct conversations with President Zelensky
about this and he knows that we are serious about this. We
should increase embassy staffing and enable our diplomats to
get out and conduct more oversight of the assistance dollars.
More personnel are needed for end-use monitoring of
critical weapon systems and Washington needs to stop telling
our team in Ukraine when and where they can go to monitor this.
There are currently 64 ongoing or planned audits and
reports on U.S. assistance in Ukraine, and so far there has
been zero evidence of illicit weapons transfer or misuse of
taxpayer dollars.
Turning to the Indo-Pacific, I have long said we need
better resourcing. I welcome the Department's request for
increased funding. However, I remain concerned this money will
be directed towards promoting the Democrat Party's progressive
priorities rather than actually countering China, which is the
primary objective.
The Biden administration must tell Congress what all this
money is for. Right now without further details it looks like
slush funds for the Administration's desires.
On Taiwan, I am troubled, but not surprised that the budget
request lacks robust security assistance for Taiwan. Relegating
Taiwan to a sliver of $16 million in total FMF funding is
unserious and frankly offensive, given the threats emanating
from China.
Relatedly, in the Middle East, it is clear that the
Administration is failing to compete with China. I just
returned from the region and the Administration's policies
across the board have created great, great concerns for our
partners there.
Our partners continually point to an Iran policy that
undermines their security, an Afghanistan withdrawal that makes
them doubt American commitment, this Administration's slow
embrace of the Abraham Accords, and increasingly restrictive
arms sales, all evidence, they argue, of a retreating America.
It is difficult to persuade them otherwise in the face of
the evidence. The recent deal between Saudi Arabia, China, and
Iran proves the U.S. is sitting on the sidelines. Instead of
fixing its approach, the Administration blames our partners for
this outcome.
After all, great power competition is global. As a nation
that has fought in both Europe and the Pacific, we can walk and
chew gum at the same time.
Focusing on China is important, I have said for a long,
long time. That does not mean we turn our backs on the Middle
East.
Finally, as you have just returned from Africa, I would
like to hear how you plan to deliver on U.S. commitments on the
continent, including those made at the U.S.-Africa Leaders
Summit.
We can only deliver if we have sufficient personnel and
tools to conduct our diplomacy and development effectively.
Many issues--I have no doubt you are up to the task of
explaining them all to us in detail.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Mr. Secretary, we will turn to you. Your full statement
will be included in the record without objection, and you have
got a lot to cover so I do not want to ultimately constrain
your time, but we do want to have a conversation with you.
Please, you can commence.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANTONY BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez,
Ranking Member Risch, committee members. Very good to be with
you today as always, and thanks for the opportunity to speak to
the Administration's proposed FY24 budget for the State
Department and the Agency for International Development.
We meet at an inflection point and I think that is
reflected actually in what both the chairman and ranking member
said. The post-Cold War world era is over and there is an
intense competition underway to determine, to shape, what comes
next.
The United States has a positive vision for the future, a
world that is free, that is secure, that is open, that is
prosperous. The budget that we are putting forward will help us
advance that vision and deliver on issues that are important to
most of the American people by preparing us to engage
effectively two broad sets of challenges.
The first set is posed by our strategic competitors, the
immediate acute threat posed by Russia's autocracy and its
aggression against Ukraine and the long-term challenge from the
People's Republic of China.
The second set is posed by some shared global tests
including the climate crisis, migration, food and energy
insecurity, pandemics, all of which have a direct impact on the
lives and livelihoods of Americans as well as people around the
world.
With this committee's leadership and support across two
State Department authorization bills, the United States is in a
stronger geopolitical position than we were a couple of years
ago.
We have drawn enormous power from investments we have made
in our own economic strength and technological edge at home
including through the Infrastructure Investment Act, through
the CHIPS and Science Act, through the Inflation Reduction Act.
Our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships has
never been stronger. We are expanding our presence in critical
regions like the Indo-Pacific and we are leading unprecedented
coalitions to confront aggression and address humanitarian
crises around the world.
The President's FY24 budget request for the State
Department and USAID meet this moment head on. The budget will
sustain our security, economic, energy, and humanitarian
support for Ukraine to ensure that President Putin's war
remains a strategic failure.
The budget will also strengthen our efforts to outcompete
the PRC. President Biden and I share the chairman and ranking
member's commitment to the Indo-Pacific, which is why this
proposal asked for an 18 percent increase in our budget for
that region over FY23.
The budget contains both discretionary and mandatory
proposals for new innovative investments to outcompete China,
including by enhancing our presence in the region and ensuring
what we and other fellow democracies have to offer, including
things like maritime security, disease surveillance, clean
energy infrastructure, digital technology, is more attractive
than the alternative.
The budget will help us push back on advancing
authoritarianism and democratic backsliding by strengthening
democracies around the world, including through supporting
independent media, countering corruption, defending free and
fair elections, and it will allow us to pay our contributions
to international organizations because we need to be at the
table wherever and whenever new international rules that affect
the livelihoods of our people are actually being debated and
decided.
The budget will allow us to continue leading the world in
addressing global challenges from food and energy insecurity to
climate and health crises, and on that last point, we are
celebrating this week the 20th anniversary of PEPFAR, I think
one of the greatest achievements in our foreign policy in
recent decades, which has helped save 25 million lives around
the world.
This budget will help us continue the fight against HIV/
AIDS while advancing global health security more broadly
through a new Bureau of Global Health, Security, and Diplomacy,
which I look forward to working with Congress to establish this
year.
The budget will advance our efforts to modernize the State
Department including by expanding our training flow, updating
our technology, carrying out diversity, equity, inclusion,
accessibility initiatives, including to make our overseas
missions more accessible.
I am grateful for the progress that we have already made
together including Congress' support in updating the Secure
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and
Accountability Review Board, which gives us more flexibility to
open new missions and to better manage the risks that our
people face around the world.
We know there is more to do and we are looking forward to
working with Congress to accelerate modernization efforts so
that the Department can better attract and retain and support
our first-rate workforce as they advance our interests in what
is a complex and fast-moving landscape.
Finally, the budget will further a priority for me and I
know for many of you and that is supporting Enduring Welcome,
our whole-of-government effort to resettle our Afghan allies.
Keeping our promises to those who served with us remains an
unwavering priority. This budget will help us continue to make
good on that commitment.
Mr. Chairman, as you referenced, when I began this role I
committed to restoring a real partnership with Congress as an
equal partner in our foreign policymaking and I really value
tremendously the work that we have done together, the
engagements that we have had, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, and look forward to continuing those and also to working
on this budget together as we move forward in the months ahead.
Thank you very much for having me here today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Antony Blinken
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, committee members: thank
you for the opportunity to speak with you about the Administration's
proposed FY 2024 budget for the State Department and USAID.
We meet at an inflection point. The post-Cold War world is over,
and there is an intense competition underway to determine what comes
next. The United States has a positive vision for the future: a world
that's free, secure, open and prosperous.
This budget will help us advance that vision, and deliver on the
issues that matter most to the American people, by preparing us to meet
two major sets of challenges.
The first set is posed by our strategic competitors--the immediate,
acute threat posed by Russia's autocracy and aggression, most
destructively through its brutal war against Ukraine . . . and the
long-term challenge from the People's Republic of China.
The second set is posed by shared global tests, including the
climate crisis, migration, food and energy insecurity, and pandemics,
all of which directly impact the lives and livelihoods of Americans and
all peoples around the world.
With this Committee's leadership and support across two State
Department authorization bills, the United States is in a stronger
geopolitical position than we were 2 years ago.
We've drawn enormous power from investments we've made in our
economic strength and technological edge at home, including through the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and
the Inflation Reduction Act. Our unmatched network of alliances and
partnerships has never been stronger. We're expanding our presence in
critical regions, like the Indo-Pacific. And we're leading
unprecedented coalitions to confront aggression and address
humanitarian crises worldwide.
The President's FY 2024 Budget Request for the State Department and
USAID meets this moment head on.
This budget will sustain our security, economic, energy, and
humanitarian support for Ukraine to ensure President Putin's war
remains a strategic failure.
This budget will also strengthen our efforts to outcompete the PRC.
President Biden and I share the Chairman and Ranking Member's
commitment to the Indo-Pacific, which is why this proposal asks for an
18 percent increase in our budget for that region over FY 2023. The
Budget contains both discretionary and mandatory proposals for new
innovative investments to outcompete China--including by enhancing our
presence in the region, and ensuring what we and our fellow democracies
have to offer, including maritime security, disease surveillance, clean
energy infrastructure and digital technology, is more attractive than
any alternative.
This budget will help us push back on advancing authoritarianism
and democratic backsliding by strengthening democracies worldwide--
including through supporting independent media, countering corruption,
and defending free and fair elections. And it will allow us to pay our
contributions to international organizations, because the United States
needs to be at the table wherever and whenever new international rules
that affect the livelihoods of our people are debated and decided.
This budget will allow us to continue leading the world in
addressing global challenges, from food and energy insecurity to
climate and health crises. On that last point: we're celebrating the
20th anniversary of PEPFAR, which has helped us save 25 million lives
worldwide. This budget will help us continue the fight against HIV/
AIDS, while advancing health security more broadly through a new Bureau
of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, which I look forward to
working with Congress to establish this year.
This budget will advance our efforts to modernize the State
Department, including by expanding our training float, updating our
technology, and carrying out diversity, equity, inclusion and
accessibility initiatives, including to make our overseas missions more
accessible. I'm grateful for the progress we've already made together,
including Congress' support in updating the Secure Embassy Construction
and Counterterrorism Act and Accountability Review Board to give us the
flexibility to open new missions and better manage risks. We know
there's more to do, and we're looking forward to working with Congress
to accelerate modernization efforts, so the Department can better
attract, retain, and support our first-rate workforce as they advance
U.S. interests in a complex and fast-moving landscape.
Finally, this budget will further a personal priority for me, and I
know for many of you: supporting Enduring Welcome, our whole-of-
government effort to resettle our Afghan allies. Keeping our promises
to those who served the U.S. remains an unwavering priority, and this
budget will help us continue to make good on that commitment.
When I began this role, I committed to restoring Congress's place
as an equal partner in our foreign policymaking.
I'm looking forward to continuing our close coordination, and I'm
grateful for the chance to answer your questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. The committee
will be in order. The committee will be in order. The committee
will be in order.
The committee will stand in recess until the police can
restore order.
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come back to order.
Senator Risch says this never happened when he was
chairman. I do not remember that being the case.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let me just say to our guests, we invite the
public to be here so that they can see the proceedings, but
there is work being done here and so we cannot have disruptions
of that work.
You are welcome to join us, welcome to see what is
happening. I did not say anything when you lifted your signs,
but once you break into a public outcry, you disrupt the
proceedings. That is not democracy in action.
We will continue. Mr. Secretary, we will start a round of 7
minutes. Thank you for your statement.
We just saw that Xi Jinping is doubling down on his
commitment to support Russia's Vladimir Putin. Xi is no
peacemaker. He seems ready to validate Russia's war crimes in
Ukraine, required nothing of them to resolve the crisis except
to blame the West and the Ukrainians for having the audacity to
put up a fight against an illegal invasion.
In the process Putin has become Xi's junior partner,
because I was looking at those agreements and they basically--
well, actually, go one way towards China in terms of
investments, but very little back as it relates to Russia.
He needs the international approval that he thinks Xi gives
him and obviously they need each other for a variety of
reasons. This is just emblematic of the global strategic
challenge that China is to us.
We are focused on Ukraine, of course, as Russia continues
its illegal assault upon the Ukrainian people, and its war
crimes, and I appreciate that the Administration said crimes
against humanity, but our long-term geostrategic challenge is
China. How do you think this budget helps us begin to resource
that challenge? Because we have more embassies, more personnel,
in the Chinese Communist Party around the world than we do of
our own.
Secretary Blinken. No, I very much appreciate the question,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
A few things. First, there are a number of things beyond
the budget that we have done to put ourselves in a stronger
position to deal with the competition from China. One of them,
as I said, are the investments that we have made in ourselves
over the last couple of years, which are having a powerful
impact around the world as people see that we are serious about
our own future, and I point again specifically to CHIPS and
Science, but as well as some other legislation.
Second, we have made a very significant effort to align
with allies and partners around the world and we are seeing
that play out in Europe, we have seen that play out in Asia, in
terms of having a more common approach to the challenges posed
by China.
Having said that, this also needs to be effectively
resourced. One of the reasons that we are putting forward a
request for mandatory allocations here is because we are facing
a generational challenge and we think that the discretionary
alone is not enough to help us out compete China.
We have to find and the budget proposes some new and
innovative ways to provide viable alternatives at scale that
discretionary funding does not.
I think if you look at some of the work that we are trying
to do, we have a proposal for $400 million to counter specific
actions by China that counter our interests in the Indo-Pacific
and beyond--$2 billion for high quality infrastructure projects
to more effectively compete with the work that China does that
is not just economic, it is strategic in terms of advancing
infrastructure.
We need to be able not, of course, to match them dollar for
dollar, which we will never do, but to be more effective in
catalyzing private sector investment and doing it in a more
coordinated way with allies and partners.
We have investments in Indo-Pacific economies. We have a
new DFC Fund, which is a critical tool, I think, to leveraging
private sector investment and we have this commitment to the
Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, with
Palau, with Micronesia, as well as more broadly with the
Pacific Islands where we are going to significantly increase
our presence and engagement, all of which needs to be funded.
The Chairman. I appreciate that. I think we need--and
Senator Romney has raised this several times--this is like a
whole-of-government perspective. I have asked you about the
State Department, but you need a whole-of-government strategy
to meet the challenge of China.
The CHIPS Act was one element of that that the Congress
passed last year. I hope we can get a strategic vision from the
Administration as to all the integrations of an all-of-
government approach. These are good elements of that, but we
need something broader and we look forward to working with you
on that.
I want to turn to Iran for a moment. We have----
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess.
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come back to order. I
would ask the--maybe you should ask the million Uyghurs in
concentration camps how they feel about that.
Let me ask you about Iran. Iran continues to march on in
its fissile materials, about 87 percent now--still has not come
clean with the IAEA about its previous undeclared places--is
providing drones--yesterday there was an enormous number of
strikes against Ukraine by Iranian drones given to the Russians
and obviously they must be getting things from the Russians
that they need, particularly in equipment--that they need to
ultimately achieve some of their goals.
We have their oils being exported to countries that are not
observing the sanctions. At the end of the day, when are we
going to get our European allies to join us in coming to the
understanding that we are at a point that despite their best
efforts, Iran has not lived up to its obligations to them under
the JCPOA, to the international community, and continues to be
a challenge?
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, I actually think they are
at that point----
The Chairman. Are they ready to multilateralize sanctions
with us?
Secretary Blinken. Two things. One is as a result of the
effort to get back into mutual compliance with the JCPOA and
the fact that Iran rejected what was put on the table by the
European Union, by France, by Germany, by the United Kingdom,
as well as us and actually supported at the time by Russia and
China. I think that has demonstrated to our partners in Europe
that Iran was not serious about genuinely reengaging on nuclear
diplomacy.
At the same time, the developments of the last 6 months to
include the provision of drones to Russia for its war of
aggression against Ukraine to include, of course, what is
happening in the streets of Iran, the repression of its people,
all of that has further concentrated minds in a significant way
including in Europe.
We have taken increasingly coordinated actions together
with our partners, particularly with regard to sanctions. We
continue to do that.
We are pushing back with them on the provision of drones
and other technologies to Russia including seeking to break up
the networks, trying to get at the dual-use items that go into
the--construct the manufacturing of these drones and, of
course, we are working ourselves to deal with the actions that
some of their proxies are taking in the Middle East itself and
interacting----
The Chairman. I just think, Mr. Secretary, that the
Europeans have not joined us in multilateralizing our
sanctions, which at this time to Iran would have a huge
consequence and hopefully change their calculus in a peaceful
way, and I just hope we can engage more vigorously with them.
I certainly talk to those who come to visit us and
parliamentarians from those countries. It is time to come to
the conclusion that if we want Iran to move in a different
course, others have to join us as well, and I hope we are more
robust in that part of the element while we are dealing with
Iran.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I concur
with the chairman's remarks regarding the Iran situation.
The Chairman. Not on everything, just on----
Senator Risch. Let us not go overboard here.
He and I met with the IAEA and I think they are doing a
really good job. I really do. I think that there is a different
attitude there than there has been in years past and they are
very clear eyed and, more importantly, they are willing to
actually talk about it and say the things that is on their mind
about what they are finding and not finding.
Again, we need to encourage our European allies to join us
in what we are trying to do as far as Iran is concerned.
You probably are aware that here in the Senate last week
and this week and probably next week and maybe after that we
are talking about a potential repeal of the 2002 AUMF. There
are legitimate differences of opinion on this as to whether it
should be done completely, whether it should be done partially,
and that is all well and good and we are debating it.
Included in that, however, is an attempt to repeal the 2001
AUMF, and I have got a few questions I want to ask you about
the 2001 AUMF and that is--these are just 2001, not the 2002.
The first question I have is, is the Administration
currently using the 2001 AUMF legal authorities?
Secretary Blinken. We are.
Senator Risch. Second question I have is, in the absence of
a new AUMF to replace 2001, is it a vital authority?
Secretary Blinken. In the absence of being able to replace
it with something to rely on, yes, it is.
Senator Risch. Then, lastly, do you think the 2001 repeal
should take place before there is an actual replacement of it?
Secretary Blinken. I would hope that if we are moving in
that direction, we do this concurrently, which is to say there
should not be any gap between the potential repeal of the 2001
authorization and a replacement.
We are fully prepared to work with Congress on finding a
way if that is the direction you take to repeal, but replace
2001 with something if that is the direction of Congress that
is focused, appropriately targeted.
As it stands, we continue to rely on it to make sure that
we are protecting the security of Americans who remain under
threat from al-Qaeda, from ISIS-K.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that and----
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Committee
will come to order.
Committee will stand in recess until order is restored.
[Disruption in the room.]
Senator Risch. Moving along, I want to talk about the
outcompete China initiative, which I think we are all in
agreement on as far as objective is concerned.
How we get there, of course, is a matter of debate, and I
do not want to get too far in the weeds on budgeting, but this
is a budget hearing, after all, and the Department is seeking a
$2 billion mandatory expenditure and $250 million in
discretionary funds for that.
The $2 billion mandatory funds probably are less likely
than anything else. The question I have got for you is, are you
thinking that there is going to be another or the
Administration will be pursuing another supplemental if
necessary? Is that the thought process here or what----
Secretary Blinken. No, Senator. I mean, I cannot speak to
that at this point. I think it is premature to get to that.
The budget is on its own merits our best assessment of the
resources we believe we need, absent anything else, to
effectively advance the effort to deal with the challenges
posed by China.
Senator Risch. Fair enough, and although I think you would
agree with me that the $2 billion is--in mandatory is going to
be tough to do. Would you--that is probably going to be a
pretty heavy lift for the appropriators.
In that regard, as you know, I wrote to the Department
asking about expenditure for hard infrastructure including
transport, energy, and digital infrastructure, and I was
assured that that was going to happen with the $2 billion.
Then the question becomes if it moves from mandatory over
to discretionary will--is your view the same that these
expenditures will be for this hard infrastructure as opposed to
social kind of programs?
Secretary Blinken. I am certainly determined to do that. We
are going to have some top line budget challenges depending on
how these funds are actually apportioned.
Senator Risch. Fair statement.
Secretary Blinken. That would certainly be my
determination. Look, we--to your point, we are in a
competition, including on things like hard infrastructure where
they are able to mobilize all of the resources of the state to
do it in a way that invests in loss leader projects because it
is strategically important to them.
Now, we have seen something of a backlash against this in
country after country where it turns out that taking this money
is not necessarily leaving countries in the best place--piling
debt on, as we all know, bringing in laborers from China
instead of using local workforces, not caring about worker
rights, environmental protection, et cetera, bringing
corruption with it.
It has been a double-edged sword for a lot of people.
Nonetheless, the resources are significant. Our comparative
advantage is finding ways to catalyze more effectively private
sector investment. We need to be able to do that by putting
some of our own money down--equity down.
One of the tools, by the way, that you all know so well
because you have been instrumental in helping to shape it is
the Development Finance Corporation and we also think it would
be very useful to change the way that its equity participation
is scored, which makes it very hard for it to provide as much
equity investment in projects as it otherwise would.
It is what is most--it is the greatest guarantor to others
coming in on projects to see a little bit of money on the table
from the government. The DFC is an important vehicle for that.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. My time is almost up, but
I want to take one quick bite of the apple here on Taiwan.
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Standing in recess until the police can restore order.
We return to Senator Risch for----
Secretary Blinken. I notice, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking
Member, it does not seem to be directed at you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. No, it does not seem to be directed at me.
Senator Risch. One quick question before I yield here is
Taiwan. I was deeply disappointed when I saw what was proposed
here. The $16 million is--I mean, it is stunningly--if we are
going to--if we are going to pursue the porcupine theory of how
to defend Taiwan, I mean, the $16 million is--does not even pay
carfare over there, it seems like to me.
What are your thoughts on that? We got to do better than
that.
Secretary Blinken. No, a few things and this--I know this
warrants a longer conversation. Maybe we can at least start it.
When it comes to Taiwan, we have a couple of things. We
appreciate the authority that has been given for foreign
military financing. We also appreciate the drawdown authority,
which we are looking at how we could effectively use.
When it comes to the FMS, what we put in place in the
budget is a broader fund--an emerging priorities fund globally.
It is about $113 million, but when it comes to Taiwan, what we
have been focused on is foreign military sales and over the
course of the last few years we have done about $5 billion in
foreign military sales since the start of this Administration,
about $10 billion going back to 2019.
I have signed out more cases as Secretary of State last
year than any previous secretary has done. Taiwan increased its
defense budget by about 11 percent so it has significant means
to acquire this technology.
We are looking at the best ways to get it. One of the
challenges we have has little to do with our budgets or our
authorities as, I think, again, everyone on this committee
knows very well.
The long pole in the tent in providing equipment to Taiwan
to defend itself is the production capacity here and this is
something, of course, that we are working on, but in terms of
the--both the monies and the authorities, we found that the FMS
program in particular is best suited and there is certainly not
been any delay in getting these cases out the door. At the
State Department I turn them around very, very quickly.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Secretary,
welcome back. I want to focus on the Western Hemisphere.
The Administration's budget request is for $2.7 billion in
funding for the hemisphere and that is a $430 million, or 21
percent, increase from the FY22 actual levels.
Just a couple of highlights. The largest country or
regional level recipients are Central America, $979 million,
Haiti, $292 million, and about $275 million is intended for
hemispheric efforts to manage migration.
In the Central American area one of the challenges we have
is we would like to invest to deal with root causes of
immigration, promote stability, economic development, but many
of the government partners in that region are not reliable
partners.
How do we make an investment of that size, $979 million, or
any sizable investment when the partners--the governments there
are not reliable?
Secretary Blinken. I very much appreciate that, Senator,
and the short answer is by as necessary working around the
governments when we do not have effective partners.
Yes, we got about a billion dollars requested in aid for
Central America. We have, of course, laws and regulations to
ensure that the money is not diverted, for example, to corrupt
actors, but at the same time we want to make sure that it is
used effectively to do the things that we want to do, including
getting at some of these root causes.
Vice President Harris led a major and very successful
effort to generate significantly more private sector investment
in Central America, a call to action that has produced over $4
billion dollars in commitments from the private sector to
invest directly in projects in Central America which will
create opportunity, create jobs for people, and give them in
that sense a greater opportunity to stay, not to take the
hazardous journey to the United States.
Now, these things take time to realize, as you know, but we
have a lot of work that is going on there and, again, this is
not going to the governments. It is going to the private
sectors. It is going to implementing partners in terms of our
assistance.
We would like to be able to work as closely as possible
with governments, but unless and until we are satisfied that we
can do that in a way that does not result in the taxpayers'
money being ill spent we are going to continue to work directly
with NGOs or with the private sector.
Senator Kaine. Let me just--on the NGO point, just for my
colleagues and to put it on the record--I am sure you are
grappling with it--several countries in Central America have
either adopted or are considering adopting very stringent laws
against foreign NGOs.
Some of the very partners with whom we might be able to
effectively serve people in the Northern Triangle and other
nations are now kind of getting cracked down on by the
governments and this affects not only the NGOs, but even
USAID's ability to work with partner agencies.
Talk about the impacts of these laws and how you and USAID
are attempting to deal with that challenge.
Secretary Blinken. No, you are exactly right. We have seen
that these--some of these laws are ripped from the playbooks
from Russia, China, and other places.
[Disruption in the room.]
The Chairman. Committee will stand in recess until the
police can restore order.
Committee will come back to order. Please.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
No, you are exactly right. As I said--as you have said, we
have seen different countries, including in our own hemisphere,
put forward some of these laws that in very onerous ways
restrict and in a practical manner actually ended up crippling
some of the NGOs and their ability to operate.
Senator Kaine. In some nations like Nicaragua were not just
cracking down on NGOs, but kicking them out of the country.
Secretary Blinken. Yes. In effect, putting them out of
business entirely. That is exactly right.
This is also very much part of our own engagement, part of
our own diplomacy, and part of the conversation that we have
with other countries in the hemisphere who may have better
relations with some of these countries than we do, to press
them to use the influence that they have to make sure that that
space remains open and does not get shut down.
Senator Kaine. Who are the star performers in the region?
Because this is a region that really is backsliding in
democracy in many ways, but not everyone is backsliding. Some
are forward leaning. Who are some of the star performers in the
region in terms of, for example, willingness to call out bad
behavior, go to bat for NGOs?
Secretary Blinken. It is very interesting. I think,
Senator, as you know well, we have countries that have very
significant challenges, but a country like Ecuador continues to
stand strongly for democracy.
Chile also speaks up and speaks out in ways that I think
are compelling because it is not exclusively about governments
of the right. It goes to the governments of the left as well.
Those are two countries.
Now, of course, we have countries like Costa Rica that
remains a champion.
Senator Kaine. Costa Rica, for example, together with South
Korea, the Netherlands, the United States, and Zambia are five
of the co-hosts for the upcoming round two of the Summit for
Democracies.
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Kaine. What is the Administration expecting out of
the summit at the end of the month?
Secretary Blinken. Well, what we want to do and see, and we
will have more to say about that over the next week or so, is
to follow up on a lot of the work that was done at the first
summit to demonstrate that there are concrete results coming
out of these countries coming together.
For example, on media protections, which is something else
that is under challenge around the world, we have had very
concrete initiatives to help defend journalists if they are
literally under physical threat, to deal with lawfare that is
being used against them to try to put them out of business with
frivolous lawsuits coming from governments, funds that we have
established to do that and, of course, in the NGO space,
pushing back on the tightening of that space.
There are other countries in the hemisphere that have also
been very strong partners for us--the Dominican Republic, on
many things and as well Panama. There are--while trends have
been moving in some directions, I think we continue to see some
strong partners that we have a real incentive in working with
and trying to bolster.
Senator Kaine. With a minute left let me ask you about
Haiti. Obviously, we want to engage with other nations. I was
in the region recently. A lot of concern about the security
situation there.
There has to be something to stabilize the security
situation before you could get into any meaningful political
reform talks, elections, et cetera. Those are not going to
happen easily with a security situation that is unstable.
Talk a little bit about the U.S. efforts to work with
others to promote increased stability in Haiti.
Secretary Blinken. We have gangs running amok in Haiti and
dominating important parts of the capital, Port-au-Prince, as
well as other major cities, including ports, transportation
networks, terrorizing people in their daily lives, but also in
many cases aided and abetted by political figures and other
leaders who use them for their own purposes.
We have been trying to break that nexus including by
sanctioning leaders who we believe are supporting these gangs
to try to break that up.
At the same time, we have been working hard to try to
bolster the Haitian National Police along with a number of
other countries so that they can provide the basic security
that the state is supposed to be in the business of providing.
It is challenging. The HNP is very challenged, but we are
engaged along with Canada and some other countries in trying to
bolster them up. As you know, there is a very active discussion
going on now about whether some sort of international support
is needed to really manage the insecurity that Haitians are
facing to get to an election, which Haiti needs because it is
basically running out of legitimate actors at this point.
It, under present circumstances, would be very, very
difficult if not impossible to hold. It is something we are
very actively working on. The Security Council is also focused
on this and seized with this.
I do not want to minimize the challenge, the insecurity,
mostly as a result of gangs dominating the situation. It is a
big problem.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary for being here today.
I want to start by talking about the United Arab Emirates.
As you are aware, in January of--January 17, 2022, the Houthi-
backed rebels or the Houthi rebels backed by the Iranians
launched missiles and drones at Abu Dhabi and killed three
people, injured six others.
In our visit there last month, the number of officials in
the UAE treated this like their 9/11. They said those words
specifically, ``This was our 9/11.''
What they relayed to us was that they are unhappy with
regard to the Administration's response that President Biden
did not call. There was a weak response from the United States.
In fact, I think it was reported later that you later called
the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and apologized for not
having a stronger response.
I can tell you a year later they are still very mad that if
you did indeed call to apologize it did not do the trick
because they are still very, very unhappy. Instead of having
the opportunity to talk about how we can strengthen our
relationship with the UAE and how we might be able to make sure
that we have got a strong relationship versus the Chinese
Communist Party, we are instead lectured about this fumble in
diplomacy.
Again, this just leads to our allies in the region looking
for other help and we have seen that recently, for example,
with what the CCP is doing. Obviously, we have all read in the
newspapers about Saudi Arabia and Iran agreeing to establish
diplomatic relations with the help of the CCP brokering that
deal, which I think we all agree makes us look bad.
First of all, let us just start with how did it happen that
we did not call the Crown Prince and have President Biden call
him? I do not expect that that would be President Biden who
would be thinking those things up. Should there not be somebody
on his team be telling him, hey, you need to give Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed a phone call?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you. In fact, I spent not
just on the phone, I spent 2 and a half, 3 hours, in person
with bin Zayed in actually Morocco. This goes back to last
year.
We had a very lengthy discussion about this moment, and I
agree with you that for our Emirati partners and friends this
was a profound moment and I certainly heard from him what you
just shared, the concern that we had not adequately engaged
them.
Now, I will tell you that I, other partners in the
government, did reach out immediately to our counterparts, in
my case, the foreign minister.
If you ask the Secretary of Defense, he will tell you about
the assets that we deployed immediately to bolster the
Emirates' security. He will tell you as well that the
technology that was used to shoot down the incoming was
American technology that we provided.
Nonetheless, I am deeply sensitive to the way this was
perceived by our friends, and in my own conversations with MBZ
made it clear that we understood and that we would be with him
and stand with him against threats to their security.
Since then, we have been working on negotiating a strategic
framework agreement to in very concrete ways address some of
the concerns they have, to answer some of the questions they
have about their security, and we have done a lot of work on
that and made, I think, some very, very good progress.
We have worked very closely together in building out the
Abraham Accords. Part of--we started something together called
the Negev Forum along with Israel, with Bahrain, with Morocco,
with Egypt, that we all took part in.
We put something together that I think is going to bear
very good results, bringing together the Emirates, Israel,
India, and the United States, something we call I2U2, to
jointly invest in infrastructure projects and the first ones
are going forward in India.
We have made clear that in terms of some of the weapons
systems that they seek for their security, we are fully
prepared to move forward. These are systems that they started
to discuss previously. They pushed the pause button. We said we
would welcome pursuing this conversation, including the F-35s.
I think there are a whole variety of things that are going
on in the relationship that demonstrate the seriousness that we
attach to the partnership and our commitment to it.
Senator Ricketts. Yes. I appreciate that and it is an
important relationship. I encourage you to continue because I
can tell you having just been there last month they are still
not happy. This is still a very sore spot for them.
There is more that we need to do to make sure we can
strengthen this relationship so and I would encourage you to
figure out ways to not let this happen again to one of our key
allies where a call from the President is going to be
important.
I view this as the State Department and you as the head of
the State Department's responsibility to make sure the
President is informed about making these types of phone calls.
Next, I would like to move on to the effectiveness of the
sanctions in Russia. Early in February 2022, President Biden
warned Vladimir Putin that he has never seen sanctions like the
one I have promised to impose and soon after Russia's illegal
invasion of Ukraine the West did impose tough sanctions
including measures that included the removal of the Russian
banks from the SWIFT network, sanctions on Russia's central
bank, freezing $300 billion of Russia's foreign reserves, among
other things.
The expectation of this was this would cripple the Russian
economy. In April--the World Bank predicted by April 2022 the
Russian economy would be contracting by 11.2 percent. The
International Institute of Finance went even further,
predicting the Russian economy would decline by a whopping 15
percent.
Instead, the Russian economy was weakened, but it certainly
was not crippled, having shrunk maybe 2 to 4 percent last year,
much less than that 10 to 15 percent that people were
predicting.
My question is what did we miss. First, the ability for
Russians to sanction-proof its economy as well as actions taken
by the Russian central bank to implement aggressive capital
control measures and interest rate hikes to prevent the
collapse of the ruble.
Second, Russia would still be able to sell oil that would
have gone to Europe to countries like China and India and in
fact Indian imports of Russian oil are up 400 percent, as you
know.
Then, third, the ability of Russia to circumvent these
sanctions. For example, Turkish companies exported tens of
millions of dollars worth of machinery, electronics, spare
parts, and other items that Russia needs for its military.
Countries that border Russia like Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, have
become primary importers of dual-use goods from the West and
then reselling them in Russia.
This week, the New York Times reported that China has sold
more than $12 million in drones for Russia that they will use
in the war effort.
Clearly, we have to do better. In March last year you said
that Western sanctions are having a crippling effect on the
Russian economy.
After a year of conflict in Ukraine, do you believe that
these are crippling and, if not, what more do we need to do to
sanction Russia?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator.
Two things on this. First, Russia did take extraordinary
measures, for example, to prop up the ruble, the expenditures
from its sovereign wealth fund as well to make sure it was
propping up its economy. That certainly has some effect on some
of the macro numbers.
As I see it, the sanctions, the export controls, are having
and will have an increasingly powerful effect on Russia's
ability to prosecute modern warfare, to develop its economy, to
progress in its technology, to acquire and use energy
extraction technology that it needs, to modernize its aerospace
and defense sectors. All of these things are being dramatically
undercut by the sanctions and by the export controls.
Yes, it is finding some substitute parts for things that
are being denied by dozens of countries around the world. Those
parts are inferior.
It is having tremendous difficulty in replacing the weapons
that it is expending, particularly precision-guided munitions
in Ukraine, actually replacing those, getting the parts to do
that, and a combination of things along with the sanctions and
import controls, including the exodus of nearly a million
Russians, many of whom are the most educated, most
technologically sophisticated, the fact that a thousand or more
international companies have left Russia, do not want to do
business there.
All of these things taken together, never mind the fact
that horrifically some 200,000 Russians, by public estimates,
have either been killed or wounded in Ukraine. All of these
things will have growing and powerful effects on Russia's
ability both to continue to have a modern, effective military
and to have a modern effective economy, going forward. I have
no doubt about the powerful impact of these----
Senator Ricketts. Do we need to do more, though?
Secretary Blinken. We are working every single day, not
just us, but in very close coordination with dozens of
countries around the world. European Union has now done, I
think, 10 different sanctions packages on Russia. This is
something no one would have expected.
We have ourselves continued to look at the different actors
that we can go after, the different sectors that we can go
after, to have an impact and I think, again, you are going to
see this increasing.
They are having tremendous difficulty replacing the
equipment that they have been using up and they are looking
at--you are right, they are looking at different places around
the world, but it is not at all the same as what they had
before.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We have just witnessed a 3-day ``brofest'' with Putin and
Xi celebrating authoritarian power. China, certainly, running
over the top of Hong Kong and, of course, we are very concerned
about its threat to Taiwan.
Russia assaulting Ukraine and trying to take it in just a
brutal display of force.
How much should the American public be concerned about the
way these authoritarian leaders are approaching the world?
Secretary Blinken. On one level, this is no surprise. Both
countries have very different worldviews than our own. They may
find common cause in opposing the world view that we and so
many other countries around the world seek to defend and
advance.
Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, you will
remember that they had--President Xi and President Putin had a
meeting in which they declared a partnership with no limits or
limitless friendship, depending on how you translate it, and to
some extent, we continue to see that play out, I think, in many
ways with Russia now as the very junior partner in this
relationship, but a partner that may serve some interests that
China has.
What we have done at the same time is to make a major
reinvestment rejuvenation, reenergizing of our own alliances
and partnerships and we now have much greater convergence than
we had a couple of years ago on how to approach both of these
challenges.
You see that in the coalition that has come together to
oppose the Russian aggression against Ukraine, both in terms of
the support for Ukraine and the pressure being exerted against
Russia. You see that in the work that countries are doing
together to deal with some of the challenges that China poses.
We have with European partners, Asian partners, much
greater convergence on everything from investment screening
mechanisms to export controls to outward investment----
Senator Merkley. Thank you. I am quite impressed by the way
we have we have responded, but I do think that the
circumstances regarding Hong Kong, Ukraine, and China's use of
high-tech to suppress the Uyghurs are very appealing strategies
to many authoritarian leaders and we have decades ahead in
which we are going to be struggling for the vision of democracy
and human rights versus the authoritarian power.
One of the things that both Russia and China have been
engaged in is transnational repression and last week, I
introduced a bill with Senators Rubio, Cardin, and Hagerty, a
comprehensive bill.
I want--you may not have had a chance to look it over yet,
but certainly is trying to lay out a roadmap for us to respond
to transnational repression and I just want to keep raising
this as a growing threat to citizens inside our own country and
also the concern about how they are working to extradite people
back to China or Russia with the grave consequences.
Secretary Blinken. We very much share that concern, and
really welcome working with you, the other members, on that
legislation.
Senator Merkley. I will be leading a congressional
delegation to Vietnam and Indonesia here shortly at the
beginning of April and we will be going to Jakarta to have
conversations with ASEAN government. That is where their
capital is right now.
How do you evaluate how successful ASEAN will be in being a
significant part of the structure that kind of resists Chinese
expansionist power?
Secretary Blinken. I think we are seeing increased concern
among a number of countries in ASEAN for some of the exertions
of power and influence that China is displaying, particularly,
for example, when it comes to the maritime claims that they are
making that are in contradiction with international law, some
of the actions that the Chinese vessels of one kind or another
are taking and we see this play out on a regular basis.
We are very much engaged, for example, with the ASEAN
countries as well as within other countries and helping to
build up what is called maritime domain awareness, helping to
give them the tools to have much greater visibility on what is
going on in their own seas to be able to see in real time any
kind of aggressive action is being taken, to be able to see in
real time the illegal unreported, unregulated fishing that is
devastating livelihoods in many of these countries where China
is one of the principal actors.
I think you are seeing a real significant awareness of some
of these challenges and we are taking practical steps to try to
help countries address it.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
I might shift to Central America. A few years ago, I went
down with Tom Carper to assess the challenges and we found the
three C's, if you will. We found the cartels. We found the
corruption, and we found the climate change, all driving,
really, a disintegration of the economy and livability, which
were driving factors of folks deciding to take the risky
journey north.
We have a new opportunity with the new president. Well, not
so new now, but of Honduras, President Castro. How is that
going?
Secretary Blinken. We have been engaged with the President
Castro administration. I think, by the way, as you know, the
former president of Honduras is awaiting trial in the United
States for corruption, among other things.
We are working to engage these governments, whether it is
Honduras, whether it is Guatemala, whether it is El Salvador,
there are challenges posed by some of the policies that the
governments are pursuing, but we are working to find ways to
engage with them on issues of clearly mutual concern to us. We
are working on that on a regular basis.
Senator Merkley. Well, it is always helpful to have a new
opportunity, but it is very difficult for a president alone to
change policy when things are deeply embedded and the cartels
are very embedded and corruption is very much there, and
climate change is not going away. A lot to overcome.
Going across to Burma, I led a congressional delegation
years ago when Aung San Suu Kyi invited us to come and see that
there was nothing to hide and then at the last moment, she and
her team blocked our ability to see the some 300 villages that
had been burned and razed and then since then we have had the
military takeover and things have been perhaps even worse and
we always hope that there is some kind of path back to
democracy, back to some form of human rights, but it is not
looking too good.
Any ways you can make me feel better about this?
Secretary Blinken. I wish that I could, but unfortunately I
share your assessment. We have been working since the military
takeover to do a number of things including, of course, first
and foremost, stopping the violence, which continues to take
place every single day and that has gotten worse to release
prisoners and to get back on the path of democracy.
None of that has happened. We have been working with many
other countries to try to exert pressure on the military
regime. We have the--by the way, we have the Burma Act as well,
whose passage we appreciate and welcome. We are working
implement it.
Part of that goes to the support that we are providing to
democratic groups in Burma as well as ethnic groups that are
dealing with the repression coming from the military junta,
trying to prepare them effectively for governance. At the same
time, we continue to ramp up economic actions against the
regime.
We have designated, I think, to date about 80 individuals,
some 30 or 40 entities, military leaders, business affiliates,
arms dealers, energy companies that are supporting the regime
in an effort to exert some meaningful pressure to move them
back to the democratic path.
You were talking about ASEAN a minute ago. Of course, we
have been strongly encouraging the ASEAN five-point consensus
for them to actually implement it in a meaningful way. That has
been very challenging.
In short, I wish that I had something positive or hopeful
to say in this moment. It is an incredibly challenged
situation.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. On September 12 and November 7 of last year,
I sent letters to the State Department asking for records about
Coronavirus research that had been funded by the State
Department. The State Department refused to comply.
When Assistant Secretary Sherman came, I asked her the same
question. She did not seem to be aware that you had been
funding Coronavirus research, but you are. I got the ``I will
get back to you'' line.
A couple of weeks later, I met personally with you at the
State Department and asked you the same question. Will you not
divulge to us the records of the State Department's support for
Coronavirus research, particularly in China. You assured me you
would help.
We communicated several times over the phone with another
Assistant Secretary of State who finally sent us a letter and
said no, we are not going to give you anything.
That is where we stand and it is--my question is what is
the State Department hiding? Why will you not give these
records to the American people?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you, and yes, I
appreciated you raising this when we saw each other a month or
so ago. My understanding is that our teams have been working to
find accommodation. There is long-standing----
Senator Paul. We got a refusal, a blanket refusal, no, they
are not going to give us the records.
Secretary Blinken. We cannot directly provide the
unredacted----
Senator Paul. Sure, you can.
Secretary Blinken. --unredacted cables. We have a long
standing practice with this committee about how we do----
Senator Paul. You are refusing--you are refusing to release
then, not that you cannot.
Secretary Blinken. No, but I think----
Senator Paul. There is a difference between can and may.
You will not do it, but you can do it.
Secretary Blinken. My hope is that we can find a way
forward that answers your concerns so that you get the
information that you are looking for. My understanding is that
our team has been working on that and I commit to continue to
do that so we can get you the----
Senator Paul. We are talking about unclassified material.
Most of this is unclassified. We just had a unanimous vote in
the Senate and in the House and President Biden just signed a
bill saying he is going to declassify stuff.
If you declassify it and you still hide it from the
American people, that is a problem. I mean, we spend all of
this time lambasting authoritarians and for lack of
transparency, we have these silly networks on TV that are
aligned with the Democrat Party saying democracy is under
attack.
Well, do you think transparency has something to do with
democracy? You are refusing to give records on research--money
that went for research. We want to read the research grant
proposals.
We want to read what the people in Wuhan sent back to the
State Department saying they did. Which viruses did they
create? Because the thing is is it sounds all great. We are
going to identify all the viruses of the world, but part of
what they do is they take a virus they found 200 feet down in a
cave and they mix it with another virus to create a virus that
does not exist in nature because they say that is how we are
going to further identify it.
There is a big debate that should be had whether that is
safe, to take a virus from 100 feet down a bat cave 12 hours
south of Wuhan and take it to a city of 10 million and yet you
will not help us investigate this. You refuse and it makes--it
is reminiscent of the countries we criticize for lack of
transparency and yet you sit there and say you are still going
to continue to refuse.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I think there are very
important debates that certainly go beyond my knowledge and
expertise, for example, on gain of function, that I know there
is a vigorous debate about whether the risk outweighs the
reward. I do not have the expertise to know that and----
Senator Paul. How do we have oversight or investigate it if
you will not give us----
Secretary Blinken. So the program that in this instance
USAID was involved in was not engaged in gain of function----
Senator Paul. That is a debate----
Secretary Blinken. But----
Senator Paul. --and that is your opinion. We would like to
see the records.
Secretary Blinken. So----
Senator Paul. Fauci says there was no gain of function in
Wuhan and nobody believes him anymore.
Secretary Blinken. Again, there is a, I think, an important
debate about this. As I recall, during the Obama administration
there was actually a moratorium put on----
Senator Paul. I know, but it is not the debate. I do not
want to have that debate with you. I only want to have the
records.
Secretary Blinken. Again, I believe that we can find a way
to get you the information that you are looking for.
Senator Paul. All right, but the last response we have from
you is ``no.'' The American public needs to know, I have asked
many, many times.
I have asked you in-person. This is the second time in-
person. I have talked to two Assistant Secretaries of State,
and the writing we get back from you is ``no.'' Not maybe. Not
will work with you. It is ``no.'' That is where we are now.
Secretary Blinken. Senator--no, and it is not ``no,'' just
to be clear. We did reach back out to your team just as
recently as this week to offer to provide all of that
information in briefing form, which is to say----
Senator Paul. Which means you get to read it and interpret
it and spin it and we get to hear your spin. We do not want to
hear your spin. We want to look at the--we are talking about--
--
Secretary Blinken. We are not in--we are not in--we are not
in the business----
Senator Paul. We are talking about grant proposals. You ask
us--you act as if we are talking about the secrets of the
Manhattan Project. We are talking about grant proposals, and we
are talking about grant updates where someone has to write in
and say, oh, we did this experiment, this experiment and we got
this result. That is what we are talking about.
Same thing from NIH. Same thing from HHS. Everybody is
hiding it. It is not even really something to protect the Biden
administration. Most of this stuff happened in the previous
administration, but I do not get it.
Why circle the wagons? Maybe there is nothing to see here,
but then it makes the whole world think you are hiding
something if you will not give it to us----
Secretary Blinken. Again, this goes----
Senator Paul. --so just give it to us. It is a bunch of
bureaucratic paper that we are looking to sift through to see
if there are any clues because one of the biggest clues we have
that they did this is they asked DARPA and we only know this
through a whistleblower--they asked DARPA for money to take a
Coronavirus and put a fear and cleavage site in it to make it
more infectious, and lo and behold, that is what COVID-19 is.
It looks just like what they said they wanted to create
with our money and we turned them down. That does not mean they
did not do the research. We are looking for research like that
that they were performing.
We are looking for something that may be in their notes
that has not been public, that has not been sifted through, but
what we feel is that people at State Department and at NIH and
HHS are conflicted. Why? Because if you funded research that
somehow is linked to the pandemic or leakage of that, that does
not look so good for the people who funded it.
We see this as a circling of the wagons and a conflict of
interest that maybe there are people within the State
Department who funded research who are worried that it might be
linked to the pandemic.
We cannot just accept your spin on it because people there
may be self-interested, the people who funded the program. We
are just asking to look at the data, but so far your--it has
been ``no.'' We have had a few phone calls. Well, we do not
want your spin on it. We want to look at the documents
ourselves.
Secretary Blinken. We are not providing spin. As I said, I
believe we can provide the information you are looking for. We
have long-standing practices and procedures in terms of
actually providing documents and cables with this committee
that we are not prepared to change, but in terms of getting you
the information you are looking for----
Senator Paul. The only cables we have that are a value we
got leaked to us or actually they were declassified by the
Trump administration. Those cables said, and these were from
some State Department folks, and it was amazing. I do not
actually fault anybody for missing it. I am sure there are
thousands of cables, but in 2018 or 2017, they were sending
cables back saying, holy you know what, they are over here
working without gloves in unsafe conditions in a BSL 2 that
should be a BSL 4, not a very safe condition and that is why
some of our intelligence people have leaned towards this coming
from a lab.
Why would you not want to help us? Why would everybody not
want to help us?
Secretary Blinken. I have seen those cables. You are right.
They have come out and I think what they said, at least as I
read them, was that there were concerns based on State
Department officials visiting the lab, so were a member of
sufficiently trained----
Senator Paul. Right, but we only know those because someone
have the gumption to declassify them. I will end with this
because I know my time is up.
Mr. Chairman, it takes one signature. He will give all this
stuff to me tomorrow if you will sign a document, because he
says he will not sign it unless the chairman of a committee
does it and he is hiding behind some ruse. There is no law
saying this. He could do it if he wants, but he is hiding
behind some opinion that his own Administration makes the rules
to say they will not give it to Congress. If you will help me,
we can get the information tomorrow. Everything he is saying he
will not give me, he will give me tomorrow if you will sign a
letter.
The Chairman. I appreciate--the Senator's time has expired,
but I appreciate your concern. I understand that my committee
counsel spoke to your counsel this past Monday and your counsel
followed-up with us today and we are in pursuit of trying to
see how you can be accommodated and I look forward to making
that happen.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for being here today. Appreciate it. I wanted to
start with China being labeled as a developing country.
Today I led a group of 21 Senators--it was a bipartisan
group introducing legislation to end lending to China through
the multilateral development banks. Since 2016, China has
received about $23 billion from the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank.
American taxpayers--we are the largest contributor to these
banks, and it is completely unacceptable to me for Americans to
be subsidizing loans to China. The Administration continues to
allow American taxpayer dollars to go to the Chinese Communist
Party. I believe it needs to end. Not another dime should be
approved.
These banks are designed to assist developing countries and
China is no longer a developing country. It was years and years
ago when some of these international organizations were put
into place, but that designation has not changed.
China is the second largest economy in the world, clearly
has the financial resources, the access to capital, to meet its
own needs, without assistance from the international community,
but the Chinese Communist Party continues to exploit this
outdated label as a developing country to get these
preferential treatments in loans.
As a developing country--``developing country''--China also
receives funds from international bodies, mostly paid for by
American taxpayers. China just got $1.4 billion from the
multilateral fund at the Montreal Protocol, which is from back
in the eighties.
Let us be clear, this money moving from America to China,
to me, is making China stronger and America weaker. This is at
the time when China is blatantly flying spy balloons over the
nation, stealing intellectual property, sending fentanyl and
other opioids into the U.S., increasing military aggression. We
have got the whole list.
It just seems that China is playing the international
community as well as our own Administration as fools. Their
goal is simple. They want to be the world's dominant power.
Do you believe that China still qualifies as a developing
country and why should American taxpayers be supporting lending
and financial assistance that goes to China?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I very much appreciate the
point. I want to on that specific question I really have to
defer to my colleagues at the Treasury Department.
What I can tell you is this. I certainly see as a general
matter China continuing to raise the banner of developing
country in a variety of places that does not reflect the
reality.
Another part of this that I think is very important is on
debt relief where countries around the world that turn out to
owe a lot of money principally to China and then desperately
need relief we are also a creditor.
Countries in Europe or creditors and elsewhere. The Chinese
continue to insist on being treated differently, in the
technical parlance, not taking the same haircut that everyone
else is willing to take.
That is unsustainable and, in fact, in Sri Lanka recently
where we needed to help Sri Lanka get out of the devastating
debt situation it was in, we came together and insisted that no
one else would provide the relief unless China similarly
treated its debt.
I agree with you that these are important things we have to
work out. On the specific question, though, I really have to
defer to the Treasury Department.
Senator Barrasso. Because we see we are giving subsidized
loans to a country that then turns around and can use this
money to engage in predatory lending to developing nations, as
you have described.
Next, in terms of--I want to turn to European energy
security. Europe has learned some really hard lessons following
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. None are clearer than the need to
have access to affordable and dependable supply of energy.
Affordable, dependable, not--the word is not renewable. It is
affordable, available, reliable energy.
Russia has demonstrated over and over again its willingness
to use energy as a weapon to continue to do that. The world has
seen Russia threaten our allies and our partners with natural
gas. Europeans understand the crucial importance of increasing
U.S. oil and natural gas production and exports to them from
here.
Unfortunately, President Biden has not necessarily followed
that path because of his approach on the issue of climate and
carbon. Do you support increasing exports of American liquefied
natural gas to help our allies and partners escape this
dependence on Russia?
Secretary Blinken. I do and we have. Our exports to Europe
of liquefied natural gas over the last few years went up 140
percent. We made a commitment to Europeans, to our partners, in
dealing with the aggression against Ukraine to do whatever we
could to provide for their energy security as they worked to
move away from that dependence.
By the way, as you know, they have done actually remarkable
things just in the space of a year to try to end that
dependence both in terms of gas and in terms of oil.
We dramatically increased our LNG exports. Some of it we
redirected from Asia. Some of it was a result of increased
production. Oil production itself went up 11 percent and that
is a result of the policies that we pursued.
Senator Barrasso. Then you agree Europe is much better off
buying energy resources from the United States than having to
buy it from our adversaries?
Secretary Blinken. Absolutely.
Senator Barrasso. Great.
I wanted to talk about fentanyl. I mean, I am from Wyoming.
You would think, well, how much fentanyl could be going there.
It is not close to the border, but every state is a border
state.
Wyoming has seen an astronomical increase in the amount of
deaths related to fentanyl. Our Division of Criminal
Investigation just in 2020 seized about 1,600 dosage units.
This past year 13,000. A 13-fold increase in just a couple of--
and that was only for three quarters of the year.
What can we be doing more to work with the Government of
Mexico to stop the importation of fentanyl precursors from
China?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I could not agree with you
more. I think this is among the top, if not the top challenges
that we face. As you know well, the single biggest killer of
Americans aged 18 to 49 is fentanyl, synthetic opioids, and we
seized last year enough fentanyl to kill every American. This
is right at the top of the list.
Just a few things. I think we have a comprehensive approach
to this problem. Obviously, there is work that we are doing at
home just to protect our own people in terms of trying to
reduce demand, treatment, antidotes, et cetera, but what is
critical are a few things.
First, border security itself. We have the technology that
is being deployed more effectively now to the border to much
better detect the fentanyl that is coming into the United
States from Mexico. Ninety-six percent of it is coming through
ports of entry. The screening technology that is being deployed
that will make a difference.
We are working with Mexico to disrupt the cartels. Mexico
has actually taken with our support significant action to
arrest and to disrupt the cartels, the criminal enterprises
that are engaged in this, to shut down the labs, to go after
the leaders. Then, at the same time, there is another aspect of
this problem that goes beyond Mexico.
One of the challenges--and it goes to China, among other
countries--one of the challenges is the diversion of licit
precursors into the illicit production of fentanyl. There is a
lot that we are doing to try to rally the world to deal with
this problem and so, for example, voluntary agreements among
countries and companies, because the private sector is
critical, to share information, to better label products, to
make sure that you know your customer when you are shipping a
chemical that is legal, but then it is being diverted.
All of these are making a difference. For the very first
time--I just came from the G-20 foreign ministers meeting--for
the first time the United States got this on the G-20 agenda.
This is important because those countries, the wealthiest
economies in the world, are the very ones along with their
private sectors that can make a big difference.
We are putting all of this together. We have with the
Mexicans a joint synthetic drug action plan that we agreed to
last year that is intensely focused on synthetic opioids,
notably fentanyl.
By the way, one of the other things that is happening--I
will be quick--is the Mexicans themselves are feeling the brunt
of this, which is to say not only have they been a country
where this is being made in and shipped through, but more and
more Mexicans, unfortunately, are falling victim to synthetic
opioids.
Their feelings--I have spoken to President Lopez Obrador
about this directly. He sees with this we are doing a lot in
partnership with him to disrupt, to take these cartels down.
Senator Barrasso. Let me just end with this, Mr. Chairman,
and maybe put this to you in writing.
Last week, the U.S. Border Patrol--because you mentioned
border security--the Border Patrol chief Ortiz testified before
a House Homeland Security Committee hearing in McAllen, Texas.
He was pointedly asked whether or not the Department of
Homeland Security had operational control of the border and the
chief of the U.S. Border Patrol said, ``No, sir.''
Thank you. That is----
Secretary Blinken. The only thing I would just add, if I
could, Senator, is just in the case of fentanyl, that is
speaking to a larger issue. What we really have to bear down
on, I think, it is not my vector of expertise, but based on
what I know on the border itself, as I said, about 95 percent
of this is coming through the legal ports of entry. It is being
smuggled in through those ports, not at points along the
border.
We do have technology that is much more effective than we
have had to be able to detect it. It is being--it is under the
seats of cars----
Senator Barrasso. We have all--we have all had the tour and
seen what they describe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
The Chairman. According to President Lopez Obrador,
fentanyl is not produced in Mexico.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Blinken, for appearing here today. The meeting
earlier this week of our--of the leaders of our two main
strategic competitors demonstrate the continued urgency of our
nation having a diplomatic corps that is second to none. I
thank you for your efforts to make this a reality and look
forward to engaging more to support our ongoing progress
towards this goal.
I want to start with my concern with the PRC actions across
the Indo-Pacific from the Mekong River to the South China Sea
to the Pacific Island nations, and it is no secret that the PRC
is using economic coercion and expanding their diplomatic
presence in this key area and reality dictates that countries
in this region cannot ignore the PRC's presence and proximity
and, yet, I still hear from our allies and partners about how
the United States remain a strong partner of choice, and you
have mentioned this before.
I also hear from Southeast Asian partners specifically
about how central ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, is to their regional identity and as a shield against
dominance by foreign powers.
My colleague, Senator Merkley, mentioned the importance of
ASEAN and the role that it plays beyond economic organization,
for example, the work that it is doing to hold Burma
accountable for the fine points--concerns, and in February I
met a CODEL to Jakarta to engage with ASEAN as an institution
and with Indonesia bilaterally.
There, I saw firsthand the eagerness of our partners for
more, not less, U.S. engagement, particularly on economic
affairs.
Secretary Blinken, can you provide a candid analysis of
your Department's relationship building initiatives with key
allies and partners in Southeast Asia, particularly with
organizations like ASEAN, and in particular ASEAN itself and
explain how this budget will improve our ability to advance our
Indo-Pacific objectives?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much. I really appreciate
the question.
First, just very quickly, as you know very well, this is a
critical area for us. We have got 50 percent of the world's
population in the Indo-Pacific. We have got 60 percent of it is
GDP. We have a region that is driving basically 75 percent of
economic growth over the last 5 or 6 years.
This is vital to us. As it happens, China invests about 50
percent of its assistance programs and its economic and
diplomatic resources in the Indo-Pacific. We have to be there,
first and foremost, and that goes to the efforts that we are
doing and the chairman referenced it at the start.
We may not be able to match China person for person, but we
are going to be engaged in ways that we have not been. We are
significantly increasing our diplomatic presence in the Pacific
Islands.
As you know, we have opened to the Solomon Islands. We are
looking at other embassies in Tonga and in Kirabass. At the
same time, we have very significantly reengaged ASEAN,
including President Biden having an extraordinary summit
meeting with the ASEAN countries precisely because we think it
is an important institution for working together to deal with
some of these challenges.
At the same time--this goes back to the budget--we want to
make sure that we are appropriately resourced so that when it
comes to countries throughout the region that have interests
and have needs and may be looking to us to be a strong partner,
we actually have something to offer and it is less about, as I
said, forcing them to choose.
It is more about giving them a choice, and the budget is
really designed in that way when it comes, for example, to
having the resources to invest coherently in infrastructure, to
dealing with building climate resilience and adaptation. The
Pacific Island countries, of course, some of them are literally
at risk of no longer existing if they are not able to deal with
that.
We have the programs in place and the budget supports that
to be able to do that, but also their own diplomatic and
political weight is important and marshaling that on a given
problem whether it is Burma or whether it is some of the
actions that China engages in that they do not like and we do
not like, there is much more power and effectiveness and
doing--engaging these issues together than there is any one of
these countries doing it alone. That is why ASEAN itself is
important.
One of the things that they have worked on for years, as
you know, with China is a code of conduct in the maritime
space. I think China has been dragging that along for a long
time. We tried to help reinforce that.
For example, we put out--the State Department put out last
year the definitive legal analysis of all of the maritime
claims to basically help countries push back against some of
the egregious assertions by China in their maritime space in
very practical ways, as I mentioned earlier.
We are working to give them the tools and resources to have
better what is called maritime domain awareness--they have
better visibility on their own seas and oceans, for example, to
detect illegal unregulated unreported fishing, which is
devastating economies and livelihoods in a large part of the
region.
Across a whole series of things, we are working together
and the budget attempts to reflect the importance of that work.
Senator Duckworth. Does the budget include an increase to
our mission to ASEAN?
Secretary Blinken. I do not know if it actually has an
increase in what is needed for the mission. I believe that we
are appropriately resourced, but let me come back to you on
that and if you have identified any deficiencies I am happy to
hear them.
We sent someone very experienced, very close to the
President to be our representative to ASEAN and who was the
executive secretary of the National Security Council who has
been doing a terrific job. I have engaged repeatedly in-person
as well as, of course, remotely with all of our ASEAN
colleagues and with ASEAN itself.
Senator Duckworth. I would hope that our ambassador to
ASEAN is given all the tools he needs to do the job and I do
not think he has all the resources that he needs. I would love
to review the budget with you on that.
Secretary Blinken. I will follow up with you on that.
[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above
follows:]
The FY 2024 Diplomatic Engagement request includes an additional
$600,000, including a $500,000 increase to EAP for the U.S. Mission to
ASEAN and +$100,000 increase to ISN for ASEAN regional forum support,
which will be detailed in the release of the FY 2024 CBJ Appendix 1.
In addition, the FY 2024 foreign assistance request for ASEAN is
$72.6 million, which is an increase of $57.4 million over the FY 2022
actual and $47.6 million above the FY 2023 adjusted enacted.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Can you also elaborate more--
you touched on this--how the economic initiatives in the budget
include both newer initiatives such as Outcompete China and the
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, as well
as ongoing efforts like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
will advance our policy goals in the Indo-Pacific region?
Drill down a little bit more. I know I am getting into the
weeds, but I am very interested.
Secretary Blinken. No, I think it is important. We have a
number of programs that we propose to fund in the budget to
counter some of the challenges posed by China in the region.
For example, on supply chain dominance one of the things
that we put together is something called the Mineral Securities
Partnership, where we are pooling information and pooling
resources with a number of other countries to be able to invest
ourselves in critical minerals so that they are not dominated
by any one country.
We are working to build much greater supply chain
resiliency, particularly among countries in that region. We
have now about 17 economies that are part of this process to
prevent near-term disruptions, to make sure that we develop
early warning signals in case our supply chains are disrupted
and, of course, for more fundamentally, building out--helping
these countries build out a significant amount of
infrastructure.
We are doing that through some of the funding we have in
the budget for the Asia Pacific. We also more broadly have
something that the President established with the G-7 called
the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and
that really runs the gamut.
We have been able to generate investments, starting with
government resources, but primarily getting the private sector
to invest--we were the catalyst for it--in everything from
Brazil nickel and cobalt mining to the Indonesian energy
transition, a $20 billion investment in helping them make a
transition, upgrading telecom networks in the Pacific Island
countries, mobilizing investment capital for internet service
providers in the region as well as in Africa and in Latin
America, setting up vaccine manufacturing in Senegal, and rail
linkages among countries in Africa, all of which deals with
some of the challenges that China has posed and being able to
have the field to itself in many of these areas.
No longer the case, but there is an intense focus in the
budget on the Indo-Pacific more specifically, including a fund
to focus infrastructure investment in the region.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Wow, 7 minutes goes quick,
Mr. Chairman. Or 8 minutes.
The Chairman. It does when you are covering the world, or
even a very specific part of the world.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Good to see you, Mr. Secretary. Welcome to the committee.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
Senator Young. The CHIPS and Science Act established an
International Technology Security and Innovation Fund. I know
you are familiar with it--ITSI--at the State Department to
promote international 5G communication security and to secure
our semiconductor supply chains. Our long-term national
security and economic competitiveness hinge on these two
critical technologies.
First, I want to thank you and your staff for their hard
work on these critical topics. I was encouraged to hear that
the U.S. was first to engage with our allies to secure critical
semiconductor minerals and to create additional downstream
packaging capacity.
In my view, the first mover advantage further emphasizes
the importance of the CHIPS and Science Act. Mr. Secretary, can
you describe the strategic impact it would have if the ITSI
fund is fully resourced? Looking forward toward the next 5
years of this fund, what are your goals for this program? If
you could discuss that, and we will take it from there.
Secretary Blinken. Great. Well, Senator, thank you, and as
you know, I think that with your leadership what Congress was
able to do in putting together the CHIPS and Science Act is one
of the most important achievements we have had in our ability
to compete effectively, particularly with China.
By the way, when I go around the world, this is one of the
things I hear from country after country. They are very well
aware of CHIPS and Science and they appreciate it. I think one
of the great merits, from our perspective, is the fact that
under the Act, you provided funding over 5 years so it is very
predictable for us to really do two things, to shore up
semiconductor supply chains, downstream and upstream and also
to make sure on the telecommunication side that we are helping
countries put in place networks and infrastructure, using
trusted vendors and making sure that--and advancing technology
like ORAN that really is the future and, again, is necessary to
making sure that they are not dealing with untrusted vendors.
We have, as you know, and I know our teams have been
working very closely together, mapped out how we would use both
prongs of the fund--that is the semiconductor prong and the
information communications technology prong, making sure that
we are getting the upstream inputs and providing the critical
minerals that are needed for our own fabs that are now being
built to actually make the chips, a market that, as you know
better than anyone, the PRC currently dominates, but that now
we have an ability to make real inroads on.
Policy coordination among fab nations, usually important
and we are seeing that really come to fruition. We basically
cannot have countries leaking technology as fast as they can
make it and I think this fund gives us the resources to do
that.
Expanding downstream capacity, as you mentioned, in a very
significant way, and then the data mapping piece of this. We
are mapping the supply chains. We are mapping all the entities
involved to ensure that we are targeting them to the best
effect.
As I said, on the telecommunication side of things
developing, strengthening, and expanding international enabling
environments for these secure networks and deploying ICT
networks and services in partner countries, being able to go at
with a real alternative, 5G coming from other places with
something like ORAN driving down the costs, providing more
secure networks and all of this mapped out over 5 years because
we have got the predictable funding that is being provided.
Senator Young. Thank you for that. I think it will be
really helpful if on an ongoing basis members of this
committee--and I know my office has been working very closely
with your team--but if we were made privy to goals and any
adjustments that may be made and maybe give us some visibility
into the internal tools like supply chain mapping that you are
using to track progress towards those goals.
Secretary Blinken. Be happy to do that.
Senator Young. Thank you. Relatedly, how are you working
with Secretary Raimondo to align the priorities of your
respective departments with--as it relates to CHIPS and Science
implementation?
Secretary Blinken. I would say the best description is
hand-in-glove. I am not sure who is the hand, who is the glove,
but hand-in-glove. For example, the Secretary and I together
convened a couple dozen countries at the minister level--
commerce secretary foreign minister level--on supply chains, on
building out resilience, diversification, nearshoring,
friendshoring.
One of the things that came out of that ministerial--it is
an ongoing process--is putting in place now an early warning
system among these countries for any supply chain disruptions
when it comes to, for example, critical minerals, anything
going into a semiconductor.
That is the result directly of the work that our two
departments and we personally have done together.
Senator Young. Is there anything else Congress can do at
this point to assist you in your efforts with respect to CHIPS
and Science implementation?
Secretary Blinken. I think as it stands, our budget
reflects what we need, but what I want to do, if I can, is just
come back and make sure I am giving you the most considered
response possible in case I am missing anything because this is
too important not to get right.
[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above
follows:]
We are grateful to Congress for providing $500 million over 5 years
to empower the Department to work with our partners and allies to
secure and expand our critical semiconductor supply chains and promote
the adoption of trustworthy telecommunication technologies.
As is reflected in our budget request, the Department is working
tirelessly with our interagency partners to develop programs that meet
the Administration's priorities under the CHIPS Act.
We have been especially appreciative of our engagement with
Congress.
In addition to keeping all stakeholders apprised of developments,
these exchanges and informational briefings have ensured our planning
process was attuned to your concerns and reflected your feedback from
the earliest days of planning.
The result is an ambitious, multifaceted plan for Diplomatic
Engagement and Foreign Assistance programming that confronts
vulnerabilities of the global supply chain at every critical node.
In the coming weeks and months, we will be transmitting additional
foreign assistance Congressional Notifications (CNs) for the FY 2023
CHIPS ITSI Fund allocation.
We would ask for Congress's continued responsiveness in reviewing
these CNs and, as always, will stand ready to respond to your requests
for any additional briefings on the anticipated programs.
Senator Young. Finally, Mr. Secretary, your staff
identified the critical role that civilian, foreign law
enforcement, and military personnel play in establishing secure
communication networks.
Congress provided the authority through the Digital
Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership and the Economic
Support Fund to work with all of these groups with FY23 funds,
but not, as I understand it, for the rollover of earlier funds.
I look forward to working with my colleagues, particularly
those on the State and Foreign Ops Subcommittee, to provide the
necessary budgetary authority to continue this important work.
Is that something you would endorse?
Secretary Blinken. Unless I am missing something, I would
welcome that. I do not know if there is something in place that
has us covered that I am not aware of, but at least as
described it is something I would welcome.
Senator Young. Thank you. I yield back.
Secretary Blinken. Thanks.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is nice to see you again. It is nice to
have two opportunities today to ask about what is happening in
the world.
I want to start with Belarus because earlier today the Free
Belarus Caucus had a press conference with Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya, who is the pro-democracy leader of the movement
there and I think she is courageous and inspiring and they need
our help.
One of the things we talked about is, given the war in
Ukraine and what that has meant for the Belarusian people and
the lack of a special envoy for Belarus, there is nobody who
can help encourage the Europeans and the U.S. to work together
or serve as a conduit to the opposition movement.
Can you talk about what you are thinking with respect to a
special envoy for Belarus and when might we see that
appointment happen?
Secretary Blinken. No, thank you very much, Senator for
raising that and yes, two things. As you know, day in, day out,
we have the Vilnius-based, Lithuania-based Belarus affairs unit
that is embedded in our embassy and they are doing the day in,
day out, contact because so much, as you know, of the
democratic opposition is in Lithuania.
To your point, we are very actively looking at moving
forward with the special envoy. What I am considering right now
looking at is dual hatting a very senior official in our
European Affairs Bureau to also serve as the envoy to be able
to then go in and out, engage at senior levels with the
opposition, even as the Belarus affairs unit that is based in
Lithuania does the kind of day in, day out, engagement.
Senator Shaheen. Do you have a timetable for when you hope
to make that happen?
Secretary Blinken. I cannot put a--I hate to say very soon,
but very soon, I promise you very soon.
Senator Shaheen. I will hold you to that so the next time I
see you, hopefully, it will be done. I also want to say how
pleased I am to see the robust funding for the western Balkans
in the President's budget, particularly increased funding for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also very pleased to see the work
that the State Department has done with our European allies to
encourage Serbia and Kosovo to come to some agreement.
I wonder if you could talk about what kind of role the
Congress might play and whether there are particular incentives
that we should be thinking about to ensure that that agreement
actually gets implemented.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you. This is, I think, a hopeful
thing that is the progress that has been made between Serbia
and Kosovo, particularly an agreement that was reached just
this past weekend to implement with an implementation roadmap
understandings between them on the path to normalization.
I think what is significant about it, besides the fact that
both countries have nominally agreed to do it, is that that is
also embedded. Those commitments are embedded in their
respective European Union accession plans, so that gives them
some incentive, I hope, to follow through.
We have been, as you pointed out, intimately involved in
helping get to this result. The European Union has done a very
good job. We have been there every single step along the way.
I have engaged both Prime Minister Kurti and President
Vucic on numerous occasions on this. I think there is a
moment--there is a positive moment, but to your point, I think
it would be tremendously helpful if in your own engagements
with, for example, parliamentarians in both countries the clear
support of the Congress of the United States for moving forward
and for implementing these agreements, I think, could be
critical.
To some extent, for example, both leaders have to navigate
differences of opinion in their legislatures about this. I
think your voice on this could make a real difference. I would
strongly encourage that as well as your engagements with the
leaders themselves.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly think there is a lot of
interest on the part of the members of this committee in doing
that and thinking about how we can be supportive of the
implementation of the agreement actually happening.
One of the issues, as you know, is nonrecognition by a
number of European countries. Is this an issue that you are
raising with those five countries and are you seeing any
progress?
Secretary Blinken. It is very much an issue that we are
raising, will continue to raise, but I also think this
agreement, again, assuming it moves forward, actually puts us
on a path toward recognition by these countries. Now, Serbia
itself, that may be another matter for some time, but if they
get to a normalized relationship that would, I think, have very
positive effects just in the day in, day out, interactions, and
I think will eventually get there.
For the five holdout countries, the fact that the both
countries now have reached this agreement and assuming they
implement it, that will, I think, move them toward recognition.
Senator Shaheen. I agree. I certainly think it helps and I
think it is really important for the people in both Kosovo and
Serbia to see some benefit to in their personal lives from that
kind of an agreement that reduces tensions and, hopefully,
moves both countries towards membership in the EU.
On Lebanon, another area where they are facing real
challenges, what are we doing to try and encourage the
Government of Lebanon to implement necessary reforms in order
to get the IMF to--and the World Bank to support the economic
efforts that need to happen there and what more can we do?
Secretary Blinken. This is another very significant
challenge and the reality is--without sugarcoating it--is that
the economy is in a tailspin, and you have got vacancies in the
presidency, in the cabinet.
Parliament needs to actually elect a president. That is
long in the making form of government, and on that basis, be
able to actually implement the reforms that were necessary to
secure an IMF program.
In part, there is a chicken-egg problem here between the
necessary movement on the political side and what we believe is
vital on the economic side. It really is, as best we can tell,
the only way out, the only way to pull back from the precipice.
I do not see an international bailout coming. I really
think the IMF program is critical, but to get to the IMF
program you have got to have a government in place. At the same
time, we have been a very significant donor of assistance.
We continue to focus on livelihood support for two critical
institutions, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the internal
security forces. These are the state guarantors of Lebanon's
sovereignty and they have been incredibly challenged.
The value of the dollar equivalent and salary to a member
of the Lebanese Armed Forces has declined by 90 percent. Their
purchasing power has basically gone to zero. That is what we
have been trying to shore up.
It is really important that these institutions stay and
stick together. It is critical for the state and of course, it
is critical to push back against Hezbollah, trying to say no,
we are going to do that because these institutions cannot.
We are very, very focused there and we, of course, have
also been focused on some energy agreements that we are working
to do and there are a number of challenges that come with
those, but I think there is at least some hope on the energy
supply side that we are very actively working on, but this is
usually a challenge.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, thanks for being here today. It has certainly
been a long day for you at least, listening to all the
questions that you are receiving today. I know that Dr.
Barrasso spent some time talking about fentanyl and the crisis
that we have as a nation. Last month at this hearing--at a
hearing here, I had an opportunity to talk about a friend of
mine, a former business school dean at the College of
Charleston, whose son, Allen Child, his namesake, lost his life
to fentanyl on the first use, and it is hard to think about
this crisis simply by thinking about the numbers.
Over 70,000 other American families have had a similar
experience. These are fathers, brothers, sisters, daughters,
all lost because of fentanyl, and I know that you spoke
sometime with Dr. Barrasso about the importance of Mexico and
precursors from China and the approach that we should take with
the Mexican cartels.
I would like for you to illuminate some of the work that we
are doing because as I look through the budget I do not see--I
see a lot in the form of technical assistance, but I do not see
a lasting commitment to confronting this challenge.
Secretary, I know that you know that just a few weeks ago a
few South Carolinians were kidnapped and some died at the hands
of the Mexican cartels. We take this issue seriously as a
nation, but at home this is a sensitive and serious issue.
I would like to know what we are doing from an all-of-
government approach, not simply your Department, but seeing it
from a panoramic view, number one. Number two, what else can be
done with Mexico?
Number three, I know that there are times when fentanyl
could literally be shipped from China straight to America. What
can we do to cut that off?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator, and I
could not--look, could not agree with you more. I deeply share
this concern and I think you are exactly right that it is so
important to put a name and a face to it because these numbers
become abstractions and hopefully we would be galvanized by the
fact that it is the number-one killer of Americans aged 18 to
49.
It does come down to these individual stories, and I also
fully agree with you that we have to have and I believe we do
have a comprehensive approach that--here at home I mentioned we
are of course working as we always need to on the demand side,
on the treatment side, on the antidote side. That is vitally
important, but of course that does not answer the problem. It
is a necessary component of it.
Second, we talked a little bit about this with Senator
Barrasso. On the border itself, we do have good technology that
can better detect the efforts to smuggle pills that are
produced in Mexico and brought over the border because 95
percent of this is coming through legal ports of entry. It is
not being smuggled across points of the border that are in
between points of entry, but at the points of entry. There is
the technology that can better detect that. Third----
Senator Scott. Mr. Secretary, on that point----
Secretary Blinken. Please.
Senator Scott. --is there is a high utilization of the
technology that we have?
Secretary Blinken. I think it is, as I understand it, and
this is not--I do not want to speak--try to speak
authoritatively because it is beyond my area of expertise.
Senator Scott. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. As I understand it, we have been working
as a government over several years now over a couple of
administrations to deploy this technology. It has been a little
slower than I think everyone would have liked. It is now
speeding up, and, in fact, there was a very interesting piece,
I think, a week or two ago in the Washington Post laying out
some of the work that is being done.
We need to press the accelerator on that because the
technology is effective. When I was last in Mexico with
President Biden, one of the things that we talked about with
President Lopez Obrador was the deployment of this technology
as well on the Mexican side of the border, so that is two.
Three, to your point, we have to press even harder on the
accelerator in the work that we are doing jointly and
supporting Mexico in doing in breaking up these cartels,
breaking up the finance networks, taking down the labs.
Of course, it is not just the precursors of the pills
themselves. It is the pill presses that are fabricated----
Senator Scott. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. --and that come across, all that.
Now, in fairness, they are making a very significant effort
and they have put far more resources into this. They have
actually done an effective job in disbanding, disrupting labs,
but--and arresting dozens of high-ranking officials in these
cartels, but these labs, as you know, can fit in a room----
Senator Scott. And pop back up.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, just pop back up, so that is a
challenge. There is another--one last thing. I know--I do not
want to at this time.
Senator Scott. Two questions with 2 minutes left, so if you
could wrap up.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, very quickly.
The other big piece I mentioned is internationally, one of
the big problems is the diversion of perfectly legal precursors
into illicit use and making fentanyl.
We have seized the G-20, the largest economies in the
world. We just had a foreign ministers meeting. I got put on
the agenda as an action item for the G-20 building out a
coalition to try to deal more effectively with this, and what
does that mean?
It means simply among other things that working with the
private sectors in all of these countries, we do a better job.
Sharing information about diversion, getting better labeling on
legal precursors that then get diverted, and making sure that
there is a program in place so that you know your customer.
If you are shipping a chemical you actually know where it
is going. You put all of these pieces together I think you can
have a greater impact.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
According to the recent report from the IAEA, Iran is
getting dangerously close to having weapons grade plutonium.
Last month the agency reported the discovery of uranium
particles enriched up to 84 percent, 6 percent below the
threshold necessary to create a nuclear weapon.
Given the regime's brutal crackdown against peaceful
protesters and their efforts to sabotage negotiations to most
people in the room it seems clear that negotiating a new JCPOA
should be completely off the table, from our perspective. I
hope that is yours as well.
What practical steps are you taking to work with our allies
and partners to actually address this threat, especially given
the fact that certain sanction requirements are about to lapse?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
Well, as a practical matter the JCPOA is not on the table
at this moment in large part because as we were working in good
faith to see if we could get a mutual return to compliance by
Iran and by the United States, the Iranians rejected a proposal
that was on the table put forward by the European Union, by our
European partners, actually endorsed even by Russia and China.
They rejected that last summer and they have not
demonstrated seriousness. That we are determined one way or
another that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon. I have to tell
you, we continue to believe that in terms of getting an
effective result, diplomacy is still the most effective way to
do that, but it takes two to tango, as we would say, and the
Iranians have not demonstrated seriousness of purpose.
Meanwhile, we are working in close concert with allies and
partners. I was talking about this little bit earlier. I think
we now have a much more shared perspective on this challenge.
I think minds have also been galvanized by what has
happened in the streets of Iran over the last 6 or 9 months by
the provision by Iran to Russia of drone technology for the war
of aggression against Ukraine. All of that has brought
countries closer together and trying to deal with some of these
egregious actions.
Senator Scott. I know I am out of time, but a short
question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Blinken. I will try and be short.
Senator Scott. U.S. embassies in Africa, there is a
shortage of staff. What are you doing about it and, frankly,
you think about the CCP and as issues in its growth through its
Belt and Road projects seems like we need to have more focus on
Africa than we have.
I know that you have had some work with the African Leaders
Summit. Would love to hear your thoughts on, A, the shortage
and, B, strategy.
Secretary Blinken. Yes. Thank you. This is something we are
very actively working on. The shortage is a problem. Actually,
in the budget, we have increased dollars for additional hires
that will help in part. It will not solve the problem, but it
will help address the problem.
We are also reviewing why some of our posts do not receive
sufficient bids because, as you know, the way this works in
part is our Foreign Service officers say, hey, here is where I
want to go, and we have seen in a number of countries the bids
just are not there.
We are trying to understand why that is and then to see
what we can do to incentivize people to serve in posts that,
for one reason or another, have not been attracting the
personnel they deserve.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is always a pleasure to have you before
the committee. Thank you very much for your service.
Let me start with an issue that Senator Menendez raised in
his opening comments and that is the capacity of the State
Department to meet the challenges that we have globally.
I think never in our history have we had so many global
challenges in which the work of the State Department can be
critically important for us achieving our objectives.
Senator Hagerty and I have worked together in regards to
the State Department's capacity to deal with these issues. We
made several recommendations in the last Congress that were
enacted into law.
I know that you have been questioned on this before the
Appropriations Committee, but I want to get our committee
engaged on these issues as well.
In that recommendations, some were more short-term changes
that we thought should be made as quickly as possible,
including dealing with the training capacity at State
Department by having a board of visitors, by making it a more
professional educational experience, by expanding training
opportunities. We thought these are proposals that could be
implemented in the short term.
Others were longer-term issues and that is why we
recommended a commission which is now in the process of being
named and I would like to get your understanding about how to
implement these changes.
They were done, I think, with full support and cooperation
from the leadership at the State Department. We know you always
have challenges. Part of this is going to be budgetary. For
people to go into training you have to be able to backfill
those positions. That is not always available.
Tell me how you think you can use the tools that we made
available in the last Congress to implement these changes and
what we can do to help you moving forward?
Secretary Blinken. Well, first, let me just say how much I
appreciate the work that you have done on this and the
leadership on it. It is hugely important to the future of the
Department.
It is hugely important to our ability to attract, but also
retain the best talent and we are in a competition for talent
and we need to make sure that we have the tools not just to
recruit people, but to make sure that they stay at the
Department.
I think a big part of that is career-long learning because,
as we have been talking about in many ways, things are changing
so fast that unless you are able to as an institution make sure
that your people have the ability to continuously upgrade their
game, you are not going to be able to do the job.
Now, I think some of the tools, authorities, resources
provided by Congress to us are making a big difference. For
example, over the last couple of years and now in our budget I
hope that will be realized this year, we have been able to hire
a significantly greater number of people, both Foreign Service
officers as well as civil servants.
That has tremendous benefits, one of which, of course, is
making sure that when we have gaps in places we have the
personnel to fill them, but one of the most critical, I think,
initiatives we are taking is making sure that we have a
significant float of personnel by which we can pull out of day
in, day out, service someone, put them into a training program
of some kind, whether it is one that we are doing ourselves,
time at an academic institution, time, by the way, here in
Congress and do it in a way that does not disrupt the day in,
day out, activities of the Department. That is a big
initiative. We now have real resources to do that in ways we
never had before.
Second, you talked about the short term. I could not agree
more. We just spent a morning with the Foreign Service
Institute leadership on new programs they are putting in place
for both incoming, but also mid-career learning, particularly
in areas that the Department has not in the past usually been
focused on and where we need to have critical skills and have
people develop them.
You will see and we will share with you, I think, some very
significant initiatives that are creating important
opportunities for career-long learning developed by the Foreign
Service Institute that we will be actually implementing very,
very soon.
There are a host of things that I think will make a real
difference. I think the moving out on the Board of Visitors, on
the provost, we are doing that. We are preparing actually the
position description for the provost as we speak so that we can
begin the hiring process.
We are actually leveraging the results of some, I think,
important assessments in terms of what we are looking for and
what we need, and we are on track to have the Board of Visitors
identified and recruited by the end of this year.
Senator Cardin. In regards to the commission, some are
appointed by the Congress, but some are appointed by the
Administration. Is that advancing on the Administration side?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, and I think not only is it
advancing, I believe that we have asked actually your
respective teams for recommendations and we really look to
that, and I also believe that we actually have the resources
even within our existing authorities to move forward on that.
Senator Cardin. Part of this in-training deals with an area
that I have talked about frequently with you and that is our
anti-corruption efforts. The President has talked about that as
a national security core concern.
We find that one of the resistance we get to being more
active in establishing international standards on corruption is
the capacity of our missions, particularly in country, to be
able to evaluate and move forward on anti-corruption programs.
Are you taking steps to improve the capacity at the State
Department to deal with this priority area?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. We have really elevated this. As
you know, we put in place a senior official who is charged with
this responsibility and one of the things that I have been
working on and I think it is important across the institution
is we do a lot as an institution that is top-down. We do some
that is bottom-up. Probably need to do more.
Where we really need to be doing more is horizontally
across the institution, by which I mean this. On anti-
corruption this needs to be embedded horizontally in all of our
different bureaus in our regional bureaus, but also as well in
some of our functional bureaus.
What I have been pushing is for the senior official and his
team responsible for dealing with anti-corruption to be engaged
on the takeoff, not just on the landing, with different
colleagues across the enterprise so that they have the focus
and they also dedicate the time and resources within their
areas of responsibility to making combating corruption one of
their responsibilities.
I think we are making progress there. I am sure we can do
more, but I am very seized with this mission because something
that you have been leading on for many, many years it is--there
are few things that are more corrosive of democratic systems
than corruption.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you for your leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
take a minute for my National Security Adviser Bobby Zarate to
put up a photo, a photo that concerns me very much and I am
certain it does you as well, Mr. Secretary, probably all of us
here.
It is a photo of CCP diplomat Wang Yi with Iranian and
Saudi officials. It is not a good thing. It is the anti-Abraham
Accords, in my view. What it is doing is it depicts the
normalization of relations with Iran rather than our ally,
Israel. It is certainly not a situation that I think that Saudi
Arabia and Iran would have come to of their own accord.
My question to you, Mr. Secretary, is what exactly did the
Communist China promise to Saudi Arabia and to Iran to get them
to come to this agreement?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I think there is a back story
here and I think it is, in some sense, a little bit more
complicated. The Saudis and the Iranians have been talking for
the better part of the last couple of years, including in Oman,
including in Baghdad, to look to see if they could get back to
where they were before they interrupted their diplomatic
relations.
You remember the Saudis put to death a prominent Shi'a
cleric. That resulted in a protest or storming of the Saudi
Embassy in Tehran. They broke off diplomatic relations, I
think, back in 2016.
In the last couple of years, not a couple of months, they
have been looking to see if they could get back to a slightly
more normal place, and based on the information we have, I
think what China did, in a sense, cleverly, was to at the very
end of that process take advantage of the work that these
countries have done and then basically host the conclusion of
the agreement that they reached to restore diplomatic
relations.
Not to bring it together themselves. They just happened to
be the host of it, and I think it sent a diplomatic signal.
There is no doubt about that.
I have to say, I see some positives to this as well as some
concerns. The positives are these. If, and there is a big if
here because we really do not know if the commitments made
under this agreement will actually be implemented. That really
remains to be seen and we have seen in the past that Iran has
promised to do things that, of course, it has not done.
If they do and, principally, if they cease or reduce their
support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who, among other things,
are attacking Saudi Arabia and helping to perpetuate a war on
Yemen, if that stops or decreases, that can be beneficial.
It can be beneficial to ending the war in Yemen. It can be
beneficial to helping defend or make sure that Saudi Arabia is
not under attack. There are 80,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia.
We have an interest in that, too.
It is a long way of saying if this results in the curbing
of some of Iran's malicious activities, I actually do not think
that is a bad thing.
By the way, it does not in any way substitute for our
determination to pursue the deepening as well as the expansion
of the Abraham Accords. I had a long discussion with Prime
Minister Netanyahu about this when I was recently in Israel. We
are very focused on that, and I also do not think it will
change the interests of other countries in pursuing that.
Senator Hagerty. To go back to the photo itself, though, I
think the image itself suggests to me that China may be trying
to pull our ally, Saudi Arabia, into their orbit along with
Russia and Iran.
It also suggests to me that China may be laying the
groundwork for a petroyuan environment--to replace the
petrodollar. I think this is something that would benefit from
a deeper conversation with you, perhaps a conversation in
closed session and I might ask the chairman and ranking member
if we could arrange that at some point soon. I think that would
be beneficial.
I would like to show another image that is also quite
concerning. This is an image of CCP General Secretary Xi
Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin who recently held
high profile meetings in Moscow. This is also not a good thing.
In a video released overnight, Chairman Xi tells Putin that
Communist China and Russia are going to be pushing for changes
not seen for 100 years, and I would like to know, Mr.
Secretary, what changes not seen for 100 years is Xi Jinping
talking about and would that be detrimental to U.S. national
security interest? What impact would those changes have on U.S.
national security interests?
Secretary Blinken. I think it is no secret that both
countries have a very different worldview than our own or, for
that matter, a different worldview than dozens and dozens of
our allies and partners around the world and, in particular,
they have a different view of what a world order and rules of
the road should look like than we do.
I think when it comes to China they actually want a world
order, but an illiberal one. We continue to stand strongly for
a liberal one. I am not sure that Russia or Vladimir Putin
wants a world order, maybe more like world disorder, but in
part as a result of having this very different worldview than
we do, they have a marriage of convenience. I am not sure if it
is conviction. Russia is very much the junior partner in this
relationship and we have seen that again on display quite
literally right here before us.
Recall, as you know, right before the Russian aggression
against Ukraine they had a meeting, they talked about a
partnership with no limits and we have seen further expression
of that, but as they have been doing this, we have been over
the last 2 years reenergizing, rejuvenating, reengaging all of
our alliances and partnerships and in ways that are paying
tremendous dividends, both in dealing with the Russian
aggression against Ukraine and in dealing with some of the
challenges posed by China.
We have greater convergence today with allies and partners
in Europe as well as in Asia on how to deal with those
challenges than we have had in--certainly, in my memory, and
besides doing that we have also created new collections, new
coalitions of countries, that are kind of more fit for purpose
on individual issues.
I mentioned earlier the Mineral Security Partnership where
we are getting countries together.
Senator Hagerty. I am going to have to--just because of
time I have to go to my next question, but this is a topic we
have discussed in the past. I know you have discussed it with
my colleagues today and that has to do with fentanyl and the
ravages that it is creating on America.
We spoke about this a year ago and since we spoke about it,
how many sanctions have been placed on Chinese individuals or
entities that are involved in the fentanyl trade?
Secretary Blinken. What we have been working--the aspect of
China that is deeply problematic, as you know, when it comes to
fentanyl is the production in China precursors that get--that
then become used in the production of fentanyl and we have had
sought to try to get China to, in a cooperative way because it
is actually in their interest to do this, to deal more
effectively in cracking down on the diversion of those
precursors.
Senator Hagerty. Let me interrupt just in the interest of
time.
I understand you have sought to do so, but it has not
worked and, in fact, there have been zero sanctions issued
since you and I talked about this.
How hard would it be for President Biden to pick the phone
up and call President Xi Jinping tomorrow and lay out a set of
consequences including sanctions that are going to be delivered
upon China if they do not stop sending fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors here to kill our youth?
Seventy thousand young people a year are dying of this, 23
times the deaths associated with the 9/11 attacks. This is a
war on our youth. We have got to do something about it, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Blinken. Like you, I am very seized with this
including in my own engagements with Chinese counterparts and
Chinese officials.
We have made very clear to them that we need to see this
cooperation on dealing with synthetic opioids and fentanyl and
if that cooperation is not forthcoming, we are going to have to
look at other steps that we can take.
What want to do is to make sure that we are being as
effective as possible. One of the challenges when it comes to,
as I mentioned, China is that what often happens is perfectly,
as you know, legal chemicals, precursors, get diverted either
intentionally or unintentionally, in some cases, to the illicit
production of fentanyl.
There are agreements, systems, procedures that we want to
put in place, which is why I seized the G-20 with this just a
few weeks ago and now have agreement from the G-20, which
includes China, leading countries' economies in the world, to
work on this together.
For example, much better information sharing, labeling,
know your customer, so that at least when it comes to the
unintentional diversion of these precursors, we are doing
something about that.
Now, if it is intentional, that of course is a different
matter.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you this afternoon. I thank you
for your testimony this morning in Appropriations and for the
benefit of Chairman Menendez I thank the Secretary for the
implementation of the Foreign Service Families Act that we
passed a couple years ago and, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
help in getting that through the United States Congress.
We also discussed the meeting took place that was just
portrayed in this photograph between Putin and Xi, and, Mr.
Secretary, you underscored what I think is an imperative that
we be prepared, fully prepared, if China provides material
military support to Russia to work in concert with our allies
to immediately impose very tough economic sanctions and I know
work is being done to make sure we are ready to do that.
I understand the issue of the critical minerals security
partnership was raised here so I will not go over that. I do
want to follow-through on a couple issues that were raised at
this morning's hearing, one by my colleague, Senator Schatz, on
the issue of press freedom, because I appreciate very much the
State Department Human Rights Report and I appreciate the fact
that it is insulated, I think, to the extent possible and
pretty well from political forces.
I know what a challenge that is. I do want to just raise
concerns about crackdown on freedom of the press in two
countries where I hope we will continue to have strong
relations with.
One is a country I have spent a lot of time in, a member of
the Quad, and that is India. If you look at recent reports,
there is a significant crackdown on press freedom in India. It
is the world's largest democracy, but this is very, very
troubling.
The other is neighboring Pakistan, which at times has had a
very vibrant press, but right now we are seeing a critical
crackdown and I just want to point out that the State
Department Human Rights Report, which was just released Monday,
indicates that both India and Pakistan have seen increasing
threats on press freedom.
Both countries are increasingly dangerous places for
journalists trying to do their jobs, and the State Department
is not alone in this. Other organizations that are out there to
protect freedom of the press have indicated both these
countries have serious problems. Reporters Without Borders
ranks India 150 out of 180 and Pakistan 157 out of 180.
I am not going to go into great detail today, but I am
interested in following-up with you and your team on those
issues.
I do want to pick up on our earlier conversation today
about some concerning actions taken by the Government of Israel
as we work to try to create a period of time where we can
deescalate and this morning you agree that the recent action
taken by the Knesset really just yesterday that rolled back the
agreement made more than 20 years ago by Israel to evacuate
four settlements was inconsistent with the obligations that the
Government of Israel has taken on in Aqaba and Sharm-el-Sheikh,
and I think we need to press those issues on both sides
whenever we see violations of this agreement.
I do want to talk about certain elements of the new
government, which are really extreme forces within this
government. One of them is Ben-Gvir. The other is Smotrich.
Ben-Gvir is--and these are not backbenchers. They are not
backbenchers. They have very important responsibilities within
this new government.
Ben-Gvir is the Minister of National Security in charge of
statewide law enforcement and the Israeli police. Smotrich is
the Minister of Finance and also, as you know, minister in the
Defense Ministry that has authority over civilian issues in the
West Bank, including illegal construction and authority over
planning and construction for settlements.
Just a few days ago, Smotrich commented as follows, that
there is no such thing as Palestinians because there is no such
thing as a Palestinian people.
This was condemned by Biden administration officials and,
Mr. Secretary, you are here today. Do you join in condemning
that comment?
Secretary Blinken. I do.
Senator Van Hollen. This is not the first time that
Smotrich made these very incendiary comments, incitements to
violence. It was just a few weeks ago where he stated in
reference to the Palestinian village of Hawara that it needs to
be, ``wiped out,'' and that, ``the state of Israel should do
it.''
Now, I agree with President Biden as a longtime supporter
of the U.S.-Israel relationship that it has been built on
interests and built on values.
You have to agree, Mr. Secretary, that those comments by
Smotrich, the Minister of Finance, and somebody who has an
important portfolio over the West Bank, those do not reflect
our values, do they?
Secretary Blinken. They do not, and I would also point out
that the second comment you alluded to on Hawara, Prime
Minister Netanyahu insisted that the person in question walk
those comments back, which he did, for what that is worth.
I would also note that the legislation you referred to
which, again, we think is indeed inconsistent with commitments
made and in fact inconsistent with long standing commitments
because those were commitments undertaken, I believe, during
the Bush administration.
My understanding is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has said
that they have no intention of actually--the government--this
was a Knesset law--has no intention of actually moving forward
on the authorities that it has been apparently given.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
Mr. Secretary, all of this raises the issue that Prime
Minister Netanyahu says he has two hands on the steering wheel,
meaning that he is in control of this government, but we are
looking at actions his ministers are taking and actions in
portfolios that are very significant that go directly contrary
to that, and Prime Minister Netanyahu, as we discussed this
morning, specifically himself disavowed the agreement reached
in Aqaba within 24 hours of it having been reached.
I just go back to make my final point I did this morning,
which is I appreciate the statements that have been made by
Biden administration officials. I think, Mr. Secretary, it is
important for you personally also to continue to speak out and
I think we look weak when we see time after time actions taken
inconsistent with our positions with no consequence at all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, good to see you.
Senator Cruz. You have spoken passionately and I believe
honestly about your commitment to helping Ukraine to defeat
Vladimir Putin. I agree wholeheartedly that it is an important
national security interest of the United States for Russia to
lose.
Putin as a KGB thug who seeks to reassemble the Soviet
empire at the expense of American interest and at the expense
of the safety and security of Americans, and of course in
China, Xi is watching closely to see how America responds to
Putin's aggression.
I am deeply concerned, however, that no matter how much you
may want to help Ukraine, there is something the Biden
administration wants more, which is to reenter a nuclear
agreement with Iran.
This Administration has shown weakness on Iran since day
one and continues to do so. Just in the last few weeks there
have been reports that you again waived congressional sanctions
to allow Iraq to move money to the Central Bank of Iran, which
the Ayatollah uses for terrorism, for ballistic missile
development, and nuclear weapons work.
Of course, that is not all Iran is doing. In January, Mr.
Secretary, you publicly assessed that Iran had become
``Russia's top military backer.'' That is a quote. Indeed,
Russia uses Iranian banks and tankers and planes to move
weapons and to dodge sanctions.
Yet, the Administration and the State Department in
particular continue to allow Russia-Iranian cooperation out of
a refusal to crack down on Iran. The Biden administration is
boosting and, in many cases, funding both sides of this war. If
you look at energy--and I want to start with this. I want to
ask you about the use by Russia of Iranian oil tankers.
As you know, Iran violates U.S. energy sanctions by using
its own tankers as well as a ghost fleet of foreign flag ships.
You have allowed that ghost fleet to grow dramatically. The
Iranians were using about 70 tankers when President Biden was
elected. Today, they are using about 300 tankers.
You did not sanction those tankers. Instead, the
Administration allowed Iran to restore its energy exports,
getting above 1 million barrels a day, which is funding the
regime and funding the war on Ukraine.
Last month was the highest oil exports Iran has had since
2018. Now, we can argue about what that means for Iran, but I
want to ask what it means for Ukraine and for Russia.
Russia is now using dozens and dozens of tankers from that
ghost fleet that the Administration allowed to grow in
violation of our energy sanctions directly to aid Putin's
aggression in Ukraine.
Why has the Biden administration not sanctioned them?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, two things. First, going back
to the first point, the symbiotic relationship that we are
seeing emerge between Iran and Russia to include the provision
by Iran of drone technology to Russia for use in Ukraine and
the provision by Russia to Iran or the threatened provision of
weapons systems, including planes, this is something that we
are very actively and aggressively working to break up.
Across the government we have gone after the drone network,
working to sanction dozens of individuals----
Senator Cruz. Have you reimposed the oil sanctions?
Secretary Blinken. We are looking at the most effective way
we can to the ghost fleet.
Senator Cruz. Have you reimposed the oil sanctions?
Secretary Blinken. We have imposed sanctions across the
entire UAV network. We are looking at how we can most
effectively deal with the ghost fleet and also the----
Senator Cruz. Have you stopped the Ayatollah from selling a
million barrels a day of oil?
Secretary Blinken. We are working on making sure that we
can do that effectively.
Senator Cruz. It was done in the prior Administration. It
was this Administration that refused to enforce those sanctions
that allowed billions of dollars to flow to the Ayatollah that
is being used to attack the Ukrainians right now.
Secretary Blinken. We are working every day to enforce the
existing sanctions on Iran even as we are looking at imposing
new ones, and at the same time----
Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, with respect, that is not
remotely true. The oil sanctions you could enforce tomorrow,
but it is a political decision not to enforce it and you are
providing the funds that Iran is using to provide drones that
are attacking Ukrainian military, attacking Ukrainian
civilians.
You said you just noticed recently the growing cooperation
between Russia and Iran. If you were not aware of that 2 years
ago, this Administration has not been paying attention.
Let us talk, for example, about Russia and Iranian nuclear
cooperation. President Zelensky has repeatedly said that Russia
is compensating Iran for weapons through nuclear cooperation.
Last year you signed waivers specifically related to the
Iran nuclear deal that suspended congressional sanctions
against Russia and Iran conducting exactly this kind of nuclear
cooperation.
You recently renewed these waivers. President Zelensky is
right. You know that so much so that in your recent
transmissions you wrote to Congress that previous waivers you
had issued, ``would expand Iran's nuclear programs and further
deepen cooperation between Iran and Russia at a time that Iran
is providing lethal aid to Russia for its use and its illegal
invasion in Ukraine.''
You did not cancel the waivers. Instead, you signed them,
enabling broad Russia-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Why did you
sign these waivers and why did you do so repeatedly?
Secretary Blinken. These waivers have been in the
nonproliferation interests of the United States, particularly
to make sure that materials that Iran could use to develop its
nuclear program were shipped out of Iran and to make sure that
facilities in Iran would not be developed in a way that could
lead to further proliferation or the advancement of the
program.
In the last instance, we have narrowed the waivers
significantly, again, to make sure that they are focused only
on activities that actually advance our nonproliferation goals
to make sure that Iran----
Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, that
answer does not does not pass the laugh test. Under this
Administration, you have allowed Iran to get to the brink of a
nuclear weapon. There is no work being conducted to make the
program safer.
Russia is on the side of Iran and Iran is on the side of
Russia. They are both against us, and it is staggering that the
Biden administration would say Russia is still on our side
trying to constrain Iran.
You could halt this cooperation. You could halt the
civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia. You could halt the
oil sales, but this Administration is not willing to do so
because of politics and as a result the billions of dollars the
Ayatollah is getting because of your decisions and President
Biden's decisions are funding the war in Ukraine.
Why is this Administration funding both sides of this war?
Secretary Blinken. I fundamentally disagree with that
judgment, Senator. We had Iran's nuclear program in a box.
Unfortunately, it got out of that box as a result of pulling
out, not by us, of the nuclear agreement.
As a result, despite the maximum pressure that has been
exerted by the previous Administration, by our Administration.
Senator Cruz. Would you answer the question I asked? Why
are you funding both sides of the war?
Secretary Blinken. That nuclear program has moved forward--
--
Senator Cruz. Would you answer the question? Why are you
funding both sides of the Ukraine war?
Secretary Blinken. We are not funding both sides. We are
trying to make sure wherever we can that we are pushing back on
Iran having access to resources----
Senator Cruz. You are not going to stop the oil sales?
Secretary Blinken. We are looking at the most effective way
to deal with these----
Senator Cruz. Enforce the sanctions. It is not complicated.
The Chairman. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you and I
want to thank you, again, for having members of this committee
over to the State Department. I thought it was a really
productive conversation.
I just want to jump in, first and foremost, just about food
security in general. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was
extended on March 18. It gives me a lot of hope, but for only
60 days, unfortunately, and half of that time period
stipulated, really, in the original agreement makes me have
some concerns.
Relief agencies themselves, as you know, have been
expressing disappointment in the shortened duration, stressing
that a lot of the countries in East Africa will be entering the
lean season and have a lot of crises.
I know negotiations to allow for the safe passage of
commercial ships carrying Ukrainian agricultural exports from
the Black Sea have really been facing challenges. We know that
the Russians are doing a lot of things to slow down the
processes. They have created backlogs and there has been a
significant drop. I know you are aware of all this.
Can you just help me better understand the importance of
the Black Sea Grain Initiative, how the Administration is
working to ensure Russia fully meets its obligations, and have
you started work with other countries dependent upon Russia and
Ukraine grain to become more food sovereign and independent?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. A couple of things. Thank you,
Senator, for raising that.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the Black Sea
grain corridor. As you know well, Ukraine had been, before the
Russian aggression, one of the main breadbaskets of the world
including Africa, and the--one of the results of the Russian
aggression, of course, was to disrupt significantly its export
of grain, of wheat.
The Black Sea grain corridor has been a--it never should
have been necessary in the first place because it was only
necessary because Russia was blocking exports out of Ukraine,
blocking the port of Odessa, but once put in place was a
significant success, getting out about 24 million metric tons
of grain from Ukraine, the equivalent of 8 billion loaves of
bread. The vast majority of that was going to the Global South.
It has had a direct impact.
By the way, when I was just in Ethiopia, I saw large bags--
sacks of Ukrainian grain that were there as a result of the
Black Sea grain corridor initiative.
It is imperative that it be sustained. There is a renewal,
but the Russians continue to manipulate it and play with it.
The number of ships, as you mentioned, that are actually
allowed to go through, they have been playing games with so
that the number of ships is smaller.
We are pushing every day on the U.N. and with the U.N. and
others to make sure that not only is it sustained, but it is
allowed to operate efficiently and effectively.
However, even with that we have been seized with the global
food crisis and global food insecurity in two ways--and very
quickly.
One is, of course, dealing with the emergency problem that
so many countries are facing. Over the last year, we provided
on top of what we were already doing an additional $13.5
billion to advance food security around the world and to deal
with emergency situations.
We are by far the largest donor to the World Food
Programme. We provide about 20 percent of its budget.
Senator Booker. Do you think that the Fiscal Year 2024
request of--I think it is about $5 billion, if I am getting
this right--is that enough?
Secretary Blinken. I want to say at this point I believe it
is, but this is a perfect storm in so many ways that could get
worse. We want to make sure that we retain the flexibility. We
have the Feed the Future program, which is dealing with the
longer-term aspect of this, which is well funded, and is in the
budget. This is helping countries actually build their own
sustainable productive capacity, not just have to rely on
emergency assistance.
Senator Booker. Can I dig deeper in your recent trip to
Ethiopia?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Booker. You said that both sides have been guilty,
really, of war crimes. We see a nation that is going to have a
lot of challenges ahead of it. Millions of people are in need
of assistance right now and the security situation remains
volatile and it will probably be contributed to that
insecurity, will be the sheer needs of the populations.
I know the Administration is working with the U.N. and
other partners to meet this unbelievable humanitarian crisis,
but I guess what I want to ask you is are we putting enough
resources? I guess the FY24 budget request--$286 million for
Ethiopia and $331 million for new humanitarian assistance--I am
just curious, as you engage with people on the ground, are we
doing enough in terms of helping that country get up off its
knees after this horrific crisis and humanitarian crisis?
Secretary Blinken. One, I believe that we are, but I also
believe and hope that we will actually be able to do more and
partly that is dependent on Ethiopia following through on the
hugely important agreement that was reached for the cessation
of hostilities in Tigray.
We were not erasing the last couple of years and, in fact,
as you noted, we just announced the other day that it is our
assessment that all sides have committed atrocities and we
detail those.
The agreement that was reached has resulted in this. The
guns are silent. The humanitarian assistance is flowing to the
north. Services are being restored. The Eritreans have pulled
back and are pulling out.
The TPLF has put down its heavy weapons. They are standing
up an interim administration and there is the beginnings of a
transitional justice process in place that Prime Minister Abiy
is supporting and advancing.
What I told him when I saw him was as they move down this
road and implement the very important decisions made that will
allow us and presumably allow Congress to support greater
renewed engagement with Ethiopia, greater renewed support both
in terms of our own assistance programs, some of which--now, I
will say despite the last 2 years when it comes to basic
humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, we have sustained
virtually all of it.
There are other things that can be done on an economic
level that would really benefit Ethiopia and as it travels this
path of peace, of accountability, of reconciliation, we will be
able to do that. The international financial institutions as
well are looking at how they can reengage.
Senator Booker. Can I just really quickly--I know it is a
priority for you--about diversity and inclusion. I really
appreciate the conversations we have had since before you were
even confirmed.
In July, a GAO report analyzing the Department's DEIA
practices provided a lot of recommendations, in short. Can you
speak to how the Department plans to continue to use the
funding requested for the DEIA office and how the Department's
implementation to these kind of priorities is going to go
forward? Again, has the work that you have been doing in your
retention unit informed your Department's budget request for
priorities? Can you just give me some more?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. In fact, so the--and thank you for
raising the retention unit.
First, let me just say very quickly this has been from day
one--and it goes back, Mr. Chairman, to when this committee was
good enough to confirm me--I made a commitment that I would
be--I would see a marker of my success or not in this job
whether or not the institution made real progress in building
an institution that actually reflects the country that we are
there to represent. This has been a priority of mine from day
one.
We established the Office of the CDIO, the Chief Diversity
Inclusion Office. Never had that before. Reports directly to
me.
We have a 5-year strategic plan that was put in place. We
have for the first time disaggregated data that looks across
every office of the Department, so we have a clearer picture of
where we are and where we are not.
We have senior officers from every bureau at the deputy
assistant secretary level who are assigned to carry this
portfolio in their bureaus from the very beginning of the
pipeline to the end of the pipeline--that is, from recruitment
all the way to promotion and advancement with retention in the
middle.
We are intensely focused. We are trying to open more hearts
and minds to the idea of serving in government and serving,
hopefully, at the State Department.
I have done that directly myself, senior officials have.
Retention, though, is a critical piece because what we found is
we get people through the door at C Street, but then they do
not stay and disproportionately the people who do not stay tend
to be from groups that have been historically underrepresented
at the Department.
We need to understand why and part of that was setting up a
retention unit where we have been engaged in interviewing
everyone who is willing, who is leaving the Department or
thinking about leaving the Department, as well as doing
statistical surveys, but the in-person interviews are really
important to try to better understand this.
Just got the initial results from the first surveys and
interviews that are very instructive and illuminating about
what it is we can do better to make sure we are retaining
people.
Then it is vital that people be promoted, that everyone in
the Department sees that they can aspire to hold the highest
jobs in the Department, and opening that process up with more
transparency, especially at the senior levels, that is
something we have done, too.
Let me just say very quickly one of the things I am
grateful to the Congress for, is for the first time we have
paid internships, as you know, at the State Department. That
means that socio-economically we widen the aperture
dramatically.
The enthusiasm for those has been through the roof, and
based on the budget my hope and expectation is we will get over
the next couple of years to having a thousand paid internships
at the Department and that is making a huge difference.
We have put in place new fellowships that are designed to
attract, again, underrepresented populations in the Department.
We just named one after Colin Powell that we put together last
year. We have another one that I think will further diversify
the core of our Diplomatic Security Service, which is vitally
important.
Anyway, it is a long way of saying there is a lot that is
going on and it is something that I am absolutely seized with.
I want to make sure that--the last thing I will say is the more
we are able to institutionalize these initiatives so that they
remain there long after I am gone and others are gone, that is
usually important, too. We are looking at ways to do that
effectively.
Senator Booker. It is tremendous work, and when it comes to
naming fellowships after this hearing, you might want to name
one after Ted Cruz. I am sure that would go a long way in
bipartisan unity and support for the State Department's
programs.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Booker. That is good, wise advice from a Jersey
boy.
The Chairman. I am not going to follow on--on that.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you have been very gracious
with your time. I just want to close out on a couple of
questions and then we will let you go.
What do you call a country that violates another country's
airspace and territorial waters without provocations, drills in
its exclusive--in another country's exclusive economic zone,
that buys Russian military equipment in violation of U.S. law,
that has more lawyers and journalists in jail than almost any
other country and jails its main political opponent right
before elections, a country that seeks by force to block the
rights of a EU country to explore its energy deposits off its
outer continental shelf, a country that not has only--not has
joined EU-led sanctions against Russia, but has exported about
$800 million worth of goods to Russia, a country that continues
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, including against U.S. partners
like the Syrian Democratic Forces, that stops a critical
enlargement of NATO, that continues to occupy a EU country with
40,000 troops, and in violation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions seeks to open up an area that has been frozen by
the United Nations, that denies religious freedom to the
religious leader of millions of citizens of Greek Orthodox
faith, that converts a church into a mosque in violation of its
UNESCO commitments and that arrests and jails U.S. embassy
locally employed staff?
What do you call such a country?
Secretary Blinken. I think I would call that a challenging
ally.
The Chairman. Well, I call the country Turkey and the
reality is I do not believe that such a country--and I did not
continue, which I could have--deserves to have F-16s sold to
it.
I mean, I do not know what messages we send in the world
that you can do all of those things and, yet, you can get U.S.
military assistance, at the end of the day.
I know the aspiration we have for Turkey, but it is not the
Turkey under President Erdogan, and so it seems to me there has
to be a roadmap in which it says if you really want this then
you have to deal with some of these issues because if we just
give them the F-16s and all of this remains outstanding, I do
not know what global message we send.
In a similar light, in the past year we have seen
Azerbaijan invade Armenia, manufacture a food security crisis
in Nagorno-Karabakh with its ongoing blockade, continue rampant
repression domestically including with the unjustified
detention of activists like Bakhtiyar Hajiyev.
In the past 5 years we have seen Azerbaijan start a war
that killed 6,500 people, forced almost 100,000 Karabakh
Armenians from their homes.
I am concerned about providing assistance to the Aliyev
regime, but it strikes me as particularly egregious that the
Administration would request $700,000 in international military
education and training funds for Azerbaijan.
Can you explain to the American people why we would want to
provide military education and training to an aggressor state
that attacks its neighbors and violates the rights of its
citizens?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I know we have had opportunity
to discuss this before. There are a few things here.
First of all, when it comes to the military assistance and
particularly to the infamous Section 901 waiver that that we
engage in, look, there are some very practical reasons for
that.
One is to actually strengthen, as you know, the
interoperability between their forces and ours, NATO's. They
engage in peacekeeping. They have a long border with Iran that
needs defending, but also to this point we think there is real
benefit to increasing the Western education, maybe orientation,
of some of their officers, so that is important.
Let me just step back and----
The Chairman. I hope that Western education is not what
they have learned to do what they did in blockading these
people, starting a conflict, 6,500 dead. That, I hope, is not
Western education.
Secretary Blinken. Just to step back for one second because
I do think this is an important moment and something that I
think we should really also pursue the conversation on.
I have been very engaged on seeing what we can do to help
Armenia and Azerbaijan come to a peace agreement that
normalizes the relationship between them as well as deal with,
obviously, the rights and protections for Armenian activists in
Nagorno-Karabakh, dealing with border delimitation, et cetera,
and I think there is an opportunity--I do not want to
exaggerate it--but an opportunity actually to bring a peace
agreement to fruition.
I had Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev
together in Munich at the Security Conference. I have had the
foreign ministers here in Washington. I expect that they will
come back.
We have worked on a text, and this is not something that we
are imposing on Armenia. We are answering the strong desire
expressed by Armenia to see if we can help them reach an
agreement which would end at least in many ways 30-plus years
of conflict.
It is challenging and it is fraught. At the same time, you
are exactly right to point out the real problems in the Lachin
corridor with the ability of people, private citizens,
commercial traffic, to flow to get what is needed to people in
Nagorno-Karabakh. I am pressing on Azerbaijan including as
recently as this week to reopen that corridor.
We are working on that, but I do think that there is
without exaggerating it a moment of opportunity here that would
profoundly be in the interests of the people of Armenia as well
as Azerbaijan.
The Chairman. As we are aspiring to that, and that is a
worthy aspiration, but I hope that we are committed to making
sure that humanitarian assistance reaches the Karabakh
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. I hope you use your good offices to make that
happen.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. Two last things. Your announcement of your
determination related to war crimes and crimes against humanity
in Ethiopia was well welcomed and I salute you for it. I, along
with other senators, have been pushing for such a determination
for 2 years.
I agree with your position that justice and accountability
for the crimes committed during the course of the war are a
fundamental element of a sustainable peace.
State Department officials have indicated that human rights
monitors will have full and unfettered access to Tigray in the
wake of the November agreements.
Will you commit to update your determination periodically
as the monitors gather more information?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. We are tracking this, Mr. Chairman,
every step along the way and the access for monitors is a vital
part of this agreement.
The Chairman. Okay. That is great. Will any update include
a finding related to the International Commission of Human
Rights experts on Ethiopia's report from September of last year
that, ``The denial and obstruction of humanitarian access to
Tigray region by the Federal Government and allied regional
state governments was committed for the purpose of depriving
the Tigrayan population of objects indispensable for its
survival, including food?''
Secretary Blinken. Actually, I think that is reflected in
our determination. If you look at the determination that we
made, there are a number of different elements that apply.
Some do not apply to all of the actors in this and one of
the things that is clear in the determination that we made was
that, in effect, trying to cut off the population of Tigray
from humanitarian access constituted a serious offense that we
noted in our determination.
The Chairman. All right. We look forward to that.
I hope we will commit to supporting the extension of the
mandate of the International Commission of Human Rights experts
on Ethiopia as part of our effort.
Lastly, I want to echo Senator Booker's--as you know, I
have had a nearly 30-year journey on diversity with the State
Department. It has been most of the time rather lonely, most of
the time unsuccessful, and so I appreciate the answer that you
gave him.
I just hope that as we pursue that diversity, that this
diversity is as broad as possible and that what we are doing in
the budget, which seeks the recruitment and retention of an
additional 164 Foreign Service and 351 civil service personnel
is going to have these DEIA initiatives penetrating that effort
as well.
Is that what your expectation is?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, and, in fact, we made changes to
the Foreign Service exam to make sure that it was
unintentionally, but as a practical matter actually being more
of a barrier to diversification than it should be.
We have also, among other things, made working for
advancing DEIA one of the criteria for promotion in the
Department.
The Chairman. Okay. I look forward to holding a hearing
later this year with the chief diversity and inclusion officer
of the Department, which is in and of itself a good step. Of
course, all of that only matters if we see change in numbers,
which I appreciate from your answer to Senator Booker you are
working on trying to make a reality.
Senator Risch had to leave, but he asked me on behalf of
both of us to thank you. You have been very gracious with your
time, very thorough in your answers.
This hearing record will remain open to the close of
business on Wednesday, March 29. If there are questions for the
record, please submit it no later than then.
With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Democracy & Human Rights in the Indo-Pacific: The
Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes that to achieve our
goals in the Indo-Pacific, a critical component of our increased
engagement must focus on supporting democracy, human rights, rule of
law, and support for international law. Yet none of the new staff
positions requested related to the Indo-Pacific Strategy are slated to
be in bureaus or positions working on these policy areas. How is your
current budget seeking to strengthen the components of the State
Department's workforce needed to address these important human rights
and democracy components of the Indo-Pacific strategy and our global
competition with China?
Answer. The State Department puts democracy, human rights, and
governance at the center of U.S. foreign policy, including in the Indo-
Pacific strategy and through global competition with the People's
Republic of China. The FY 2024 budget request seeks increases for both
regional and functional bureaus to improve the Department's ability to
advance democracy, promote human rights, and improve governance in the
Indo-Pacific. The request will allow for expanded programming, staffing
increases both domestically and abroad, and enable the Department to
sustain prior year increases in staffing.
Question. Staffing for the China Challenge: For years we have
focused on the necessity of increasing resources to the Indo-Pacific,
but I firmly believe that the challenge China poses is a global one and
that we are behind the curve in places like Africa and the Western
Hemisphere. One of the strategies that the Department has used to
increase the focus on what China is doing around the world is the
Regional China Officer (RCO) program. Although the program has grown, I
understand that the Department has around 20 Regional China Officer
(RCO) positions globally and that the China House administers the
program out of a small four-person unit focused on the global aspects
of the competition. What impact does the RCO program have on our
awareness of, and ability to respond to, malign PRC activities
globally?
Answer. The Regional China Officers are some of the Department's
most critical nodes for understanding the PRC's global inroads. They
have produced hundreds of reports and actively work to share and
coordinate our insights with Department leadership, the interagency,
and our allies and partners to align our collective responses to the
PRC challenge. RCOs also build our global capacity to identify and
respond to problematic PRC behavior through senior level briefings,
regional conferences, and help shape and evaluate proposals for the
Countering PRC Influence Fund.
Question. Are these officers connected to resources back in
Washington to help us get ahead of troubling developments--such as
economic coercion by the PRC--or to respond quickly and effectively
when they occur?
Answer. The Regional China Officers (RCOs) are part of the
Department's Office of China Coordination (``China House''). Through
China House and its extensive interconnectivity within the Department
and beyond, RCOs have a robust network of partners and resources in
Washington they routinely draw upon. The State Department's Foreign
Service Institute also provides training on China, including a new area
studies program designed to enable U.S. foreign affairs professionals
to apply a deeper understanding of PRC's methods and strategies of
exerting influence globally to their analysis and reporting.
Question. What more could be accomplished if this program was
expanded, including to our multilateral missions?
Answer. An expansion of the RCO program could advance three major
goals: ensure more comprehensive coverage in large regions (such as
Africa where over 50 countries are covered by just three officers);
allow focused engagement in capitals with particularly important allies
such as Japan and the UK; and enhance our ability to respond to the
PRC's undermining of the multilateral system by embedding dedicated
RCOs within our multilateral missions, where they could bring their
China expertise and access to the knowledge and resources of the China
Office of Coordination (``China House'').
Question. What is needed in terms of additional training and
resources to make this program more effective?
Answer. The RCO program operates with less than $1 million in 0.2
percent diplomatic program funding to cover all activities. While this
provides the ability to sponsor trainings and travel in their region,
its uses are limited. The RCOs benefitted from collaborating with the
Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy for a one-time
allocation of $2 million in 0.7 (PD) funds in 2020 which funded over a
dozen tailored programs, which continue to pay dividends. Even modest
amounts of 0.2 funds, and/or a larger allotment of 0.7 funds for public
diplomacy collaborations between Public Diplomacy Sections and RCOs,
would greatly enhance the ability of RCOs to effectively partner with
posts to push back PRC inroads. Additional RCO positions would also
greatly increase impact.
Question. Please explain how these funds will contribute to our
efforts to fully staff and resource our efforts in multinational fora
like the IAEA, UN and elsewhere, where China is increasingly wielding
influence.
Answer. The Regional China Officer (RCO) program seeks to raise
awareness of PRC problematic behaviors globally, including in
multilateral fora. Additional resources would enable the program to
expand coverage into international organizations in Europe and
elsewhere, giving us greater China expertise as we engage on PRC issues
in these organizations.
Question. Taiwan FMF Financing: Last year, we were able to secure
the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (previously known as the Taiwan
Policy Act) into the FY 2023 NDAA--designed to dramatically enhance the
United States' defense partnership with Taiwan by authorizing foreign
military financing to modernize their security capabilities to deter
and, if necessary, defeat aggression by the People's Republic of China.
The T.E.R.A explicitly authorized up to $2 billion per year over the
next 5 years for FMF for Taiwan, but most of our FMF assistance goes to
countries in the Middle East. Why did the Administration not request a
more ambitious increase in the topline FMF account--to properly fund
the authorization provided by Congress while also increasing the State
Department's leadership and oversight over key security assistance
accounts?
Answer. The Department appreciates the authorizations in the TERA
of FMF grant assistance to Taiwan and continues to explore options for
Taiwan. This request includes $113 million to address emerging
priorities globally, which may include Taiwan. A strategic allocation
of FMF could be accomplished with increased flexibility within the
annual appropriations bill.
Question. Retaliation against U.S. citizens/Transnational
Repression: Mr. Turkel serves as Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and is seeking to be reunited
with his mother in China. He has worked closely with my office on
Uyghur issues. Chinese officials will not permit his ailing and widowed
mother to travel to the U.S. to see her American children and meet her
American grandchildren. I understand that you personally raised Mr.
Turkel's family case with your Chinese Government counterpart, but Mr.
Turkel's mother is still unable to leave China, which is clearly a
retaliation against a vocal U.S. citizen. It's brutal that Chinese
authorities are retaliating against Mr. Turkel for his human rights
work on behalf of Uyghurs, and service to the U.S. Government. Did the
President raise Mrs. Turkel's case with Xi Jinping? What specifically
is the Administration doing to prioritize this case and reunite this
family?
Answer. In a meeting with President Xi on the margins of the Bali
G20 Leaders' Summit, President Biden raised concerns about human
rights, including the PRC's practices in Xinjiang. The Department
raises priority cases with the PRC Government at the highest levels,
including advocating for Ayshem Mamut to be reunited with Mr. Turkel
and other family members.
Question. Humanitarian Assistance and Food Security: Global food
insecurity continues to rapidly rise, fueled by Putin's invasion of
Ukraine, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Current funds are
insufficient, and worryingly, I have heard reports of WFP and its
partners cutting food rations for vulnerable populations in Africa and
elsewhere due to a lack of funding, including reports of impending or
actualized ration cuts in Syria, in the West Bank and Gaza, Yemen and
in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Please walk us through how
this budget request, paired with last year's Ukraine supplemental
requests, will address humanitarian funding needs to stabilize
conditions in key parts of the world during this extraordinary moment
of need?
Answer. Generous supplemental appropriations allowed the United
States to scale up humanitarian assistance to meet unprecedented
needs--especially in Ukraine and in the Horn of Africa--across FY 2022
and FY 2023. The FY 2024 request of $6.5 billion for USAID-managed
humanitarian assistance funding is an increase over base enacted
appropriations for FY 2023. While we will continue to prioritize
available resources for the most acute emergencies and needs,
significant resources are needed to address unprecedented humanitarian
needs worldwide. The U.S. Government continues to press other donors to
increase humanitarian contributions.
Question. Human Rights and Democracy Fund: The funding requested
for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) is $180.7 million--a
decrease from the FY23 enacted level of $222.45 million. Could you
elaborate how the State Department intends to address these critical
issues with this funding level?
Answer. While the budget request for DRL's FY 2024 HRDF funding is
less than the FY 2023 enacted level for HRDF, the overall USG
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance request level in FY 2024 did
increase by $250 million from the FY 2023 request. The Department
employs a range of diplomatic and programmatic tools to address
troubling democratic trends globally. Our resources, including HRDF,
are used for targeted democracy and human rights programs that are
designed to combat democratic erosion and other threats to democracy
that operate in lockstep with our bilateral, multistakeholder, and
bilateral initiatives.
Question. What resources are necessary to adequately address the
multiple, competing crises related to democracy, governance, and human
rights?
Answer. The Department employs a range of diplomatic, programmatic,
and public diplomacy tools to support democracy, governance, and human
rights globally. The level of resources included in the FY 2024 request
will comprehensively fund these tools. As the lead for democracy,
governance, and human rights, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (DRL) implements targeted foreign assistance programs to
address human rights crises and to support democratic openings
globally.
Question. For Afghanistan, given the fluidity of the situation on
the ground, are there plans to pivot funding from previous programs
supporting women/girls/gender to countries to where Afghans are
fleeing, e.g., increasing INL/JTIP GBV and anti-TIP programs available
to Afghan women/girls in Pakistan?
Answer. The Department rigorously reviews ongoing programming and
prior year resources to adjust to the situation on the ground and
provide support to women and girls inside and outside of Afghanistan.
This includes emergency assistance, such as shelter and protection, for
individuals facing threats of gender-based violence (GBV) and working
with civil society organization on prevention of GBV. Outside of
Afghanistan, the Department and USAID fund variety of scholarships and
specialized training programs that create opportunities for women and
girls to receive higher education.
Question. Supporting Democratic Partners in the Americas: Growing
authoritarianism poses a grave threat to peace and security in our
hemisphere. We already have three consolidated dictatorships in Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua. It is more imperative than ever that our
remaining democratic partners in the hemisphere know that the United
States stands with them. Given high rates of migration from those
fleeing authoritarian regimes, violence, and economic decline, do you
believe the proposed budget is sufficient to address the migration and
refugee challenges in the region?
Answer. The FY 2024 budget request prioritizes addressing migration
and refugee challenges in the region. In support of the 2022 Los
Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, the request includes
nearly $274 million in assistance across all accounts, representing a
significant increase to meet the outstanding needs of the region.
Without these resources, the Department will be severely constrained
given the global rise in humanitarian needs and refugee resettlement
priorities.
Question. Deforestation in Amazon: The President's budget requests
$75 million for a new Strengthening Forest Conservation and Land
Management fund to catalyze private sector financing in the sector. At
an earlier hearing, however, Deputy Climate Envoy, Rick Duke, indicated
that the need is far greater and more in line with what I've proposed
in my AMAZON21 Act. Can you please explain how, if appropriated, the
requested funds would be leveraged to tackle deforestation in Brazil
and around the globe?
Answer. Funding will support actions to restore degraded or
deforested landscapes; improve resilience; incentivize forest
conservation and sustainable forest and land management; promote
production practices consistent with environmental and social goals;
and catalyze private sector investment and action, particularly in key
areas for sustaining biodiversity and ecosystem function. As Deputy
Envoy Duke noted, halting deforestation, and restoring intact and
biodiversity rich ecosystems in Brazil and beyond will require
significant collective action and support. A fund could be one
component of a comprehensive USG approach in support of this objective.
Question. Moreover, what are the longer-term investment needs to
halt and reverse global deforestation, an imperative that is critical
to addressing the climate crisis?
Answer. The drivers of deforestation are complex and varied, as are
the tools needed to combat deforestation. We need to improve, both at
home and abroad, data analysis, project monitoring and evaluation, and
promotion and enforcement of the rule of law as well as the quality,
availability, and accessibility of land cover and land use change data.
Finally, developing alternative livelihoods and energy sources, and
improved agricultural productivity are essential to address
deforestation's root causes. In addition, natural capital must be
accounted for, and incentives must be shifted so that forests are worth
more standing than deforested.
Question. Modernizing Diplomacy: This year's budget funds
provisions put forward by our committee's FY22 State Authorization bill
supporting the recruitment and retention of personnel with backgrounds
in cybersecurity, engineering, data science, and other specialized
skills or training needed to address 21st century challenges. Please
describe the Department's current hiring efforts in this area. Does the
Department require additional hiring authorities or funding to recruit
personnel who are skilled in these disciplines?
Answer. The State Department leverages available hiring authorities
to employ the specialized talent we need to advance our global mission.
However, traditional recruitment mechanisms are slow and inefficient,
hindering the Department's ability to expediently hire needed
specialized foreign affairs skillsets in areas such as climate,
economics, health, and cyber affairs. In addition, the new 10-year term
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) authority series does
not include all desired government-wide STEM Direct Hire Authority
series (e.g., all GS-2210 IT Specialists, GS-1560 Data Scientist,
etc.). Department efforts to hire needed specialized skillsets would
greatly benefit from an expansion of direct hire authority to
additional STEM series and foreign affairs specialty series.
Question. Embassy Construction: GAO found that construction
inflation contributed to slowing the pace of State's embassy
construction program, which had only received one inflation adjustment
in the past 20 years. (GAO-18-653) In accordance with a GAO
recommendation, State assessed that inflation reduced its purchasing
power by more than $700 million. How many embassies or consulates still
need to be replaced and, given the impact of continued inflation as
well as other factors slowing the pace of construction, how many years
does State estimate it will take to complete these new embassies and
consulates?
Answer. Since the Capital Security Construction Program began in
2001, the Department has built 95 new embassies and consulates (NEC/
NCC) with another 45 major construction projects already underway or
planned for award by FY 2027. With a historical average timeline of 7
years for a NEC/NCC, we estimate it would take about 30 years to
address the remaining facilities. However, we are reevaluating long-
term solutions such as the collocation, reduced setback, and stay-in-
place flexibilities offered by the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act 2022 as an alternative to new construction, which
could reduce the timeline.
Question. Has State considered increasing its and other agencies'
Capital Security Cost Sharing Program contributions so that requested
funding keeps pace to some extent with inflation costs?
Answer. In the FY 2024 President's budget request, the Department,
in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, proposed
increasing the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program contributions to
address inflation. It requests an overall program level of $2.4
billion, which is an increase of $238.9 million from the FY 2023
overall cost sharing program level of $2.2 billion. The increase will
be used to address the maintenance backlog and offset lost purchasing
power.
Question. Diplomatic Reserve Corps: Former and current State
Department officials have proposed a diplomatic reserve corps drawn
from the ranks of retired FSOs who possess the expertise and experience
required to serve when additional manpower is needed. Last year's NDAA
calls for the Department to conduct a study of the feasibility and cost
of establishing a diplomatic officers' reserve corps. Can you provide
an update, if any, on the status of this study?
Answer. The Department is planning to conduct the Diplomatic
Reserve Corps feasibility study required in the FY 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act to evaluate the concept, assess costs and
legal authorities, and consider implementation options. This initial
planning will continue over the coming months, and the FY 2024 budget
requests $11 million in anticipation of an initial pilot phase for at
least 50 initial hires.
Question. Cyberspace and Emerging Technologies: While I am pleased
to see an increase in funding, albeit marginal, for the new Bureau for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP), in this year's request, I am
concerned that our approach to cyber-related assistance remains
disjointed, with different authorities attached to different types of
funding and none of them fit for purpose. The status quo appears to
hamper the CDP Bureau's ability to leverage assistance to foreign
counterparts in a manner that delivers on the Bureau's integrated
mandate, whether it be cyber incident response assistance or
programming to promote internet freedom. Why did the Department not
seek a specific, fit for purpose cyber assistance funding line?
Answer. The State Department prioritizes digital and cyber
assistance support for allies and partners as an important instrument
of U.S. foreign policy. The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy is
building programs to meet the high and growing international demand for
cyber and digital capacity building and incident response. The bureau
continues to identify methods to streamline and enhance foreign
assistance programs, including through a potential dedicated digital
and cyber assistance fund. We welcome continued conversations with
Congress on how best to design and implement such a mechanism.
Question. In the absence of addressing persistent challenges of
delivering assistance in this space, how does the Department intend to
ensure that the Cyber Bureau is sufficiently funded and capable of
delivering on its ambitious mandate?
Answer. The elevation and integration of cyberspace and digital
policy in the State Department allows for a more consolidated,
efficient, and effective approach to delivering cyber and digital
foreign assistance. In addressing foreign policy priorities in this
space, the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy relies on a number
of sources of funding, including the regular budget process and other
programs such as the CHIPS ITSI Fund and the Countering PRC Influence
Fund. As demands for assistance in these sectors continue to grow, we
will work with Congress to ensure these activities are sufficiently
resourced.
Question. How do you assess the CDP Bureau's ability to coordinate
cyber and digital-related funds across the Department, with USAID and
other key interagency partners?
Answer. CDP's integrated mandate and streamlined foreign assistance
work are improving coordination and monitoring functions, ensuring that
programs are complementary, aligned with U.S. policy, and impactful. As
one element of its foreign assistance approach, the Digital
Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) is a key initiative
that coordinates with Posts, regional/functional bureaus, and
interagency partners including USAID to identify programmatic gaps and
opportunities and prioritize proposals. DCCP's working group is co-
chaired by the Department and USAID.
Question. Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility: Last
year's DEIA hearing identified that Latinos, African-Americans, Native
Americans and other racial and ethnic groups only account for roughly
15 percent of the Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service.
What is being done to address this finding and strengthen diversity in
the Department's leadership pipeline?
Answer. In addition to the Congressionally supported paid
internship program, the Department applauded fellowships that target
historically underrepresented populations such as the Pickering,
Powell, and Rangel programs and the Foreign Affairs Information
Technology and Clarke Diplomatic Security fellowships. Our Diplomats in
Residence recruit diverse talent. In our senior ranks, we now advertise
nearly all opportunities, including most recently Deputy Assistant
Secretary positions, and selections to senior positions are done by
diverse panels rather than individual decisionmakers.
Question. Please explain how DEIA initiatives would be incorporated
into the recruitment and retention of the additional 164 Foreign
Service and 351 Civil Service personnel included in the budget request?
Answer. DEIA initiatives continue to be critical to my
Modernization Agenda, and DEIA underpins recruitment and retention for
both Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel, including for these
additional requested positions. We have been intentional in
institutionalizing DEIA into all aspects of the Department's workforce
processes so they will apply to all current and future personnel. We
also created a Retention Unit in the Bureau of Global Talent Management
that is working on a strategy to ensure that State prioritizes a work
culture that attracts and retains diverse talent.
Question. On March 21, the world marked the International Day for
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighting the need for
continued global actions. Successful implementation of the E.O. could
do much to not only address racial discrimination, but also other
inequities in our country and abroad. Given the enormity of the tasks
that the equity team must undertake to review and/or develop racial and
other equity programs and policies for the entire Department on
multiple continents (e.g., Department policies, overseas programming,
procurement efforts with minority businesses, etc.): Will the equity
team be situated in the Secretary's front office, and have the ability
to work directly with agency leadership to implement its work?
Answer. I appointed Desiree Cormier Smith as the Special
Representative for Racial Equity and Justice and the Department's
senior designated official for the Agency Equity Team. The Special
Representative and her team are situated in the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor's front office. The Special Representative
coordinates closely with the senior official in the Office of Global
Women's Issues, the chief diversity and inclusion officer, the senior
environmental justice officer, the special envoy for LGBTQI+, and other
senior officials leading and shaping the agency's equity strategies
across offices and functions.
Question. Are the staffing and resources needed to implement the
Racial Equity E.O. reflected in the budget request? If not, how will
the staffing and activities of the equity team be funded, and what are
the expected costs?
Answer. The special representative for racial equity and justice is
the senior designated official for the Department's Agency Equity Team,
which is created from existing Department resources and staffing
structures. Executive Order 14091 outlines coordination across the
Department, which will require dedicated resources to ensure equity
initiatives are cohesive and effective, that the Department remains
accountable to the public for its equity work, and that its efforts
match the intent of the executive order. The Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor (DRL) will work with relevant Department stakeholders
to ensure the budget reflects this commitment.
Question. The Department's 2022 Equity Action Plan, stated that the
Department will ``develop analytic tools for integrating equity into
the development and implementation of foreign policy by 2024.'' So far,
what analytic tools have been developed and integrated into the foreign
policy decision-making process as a result of this equity initiative?
Answer. To integrate equity into the development and implementation
of foreign policy by 2024, the Department has created and launched
``Equity Across Foreign Affairs'' Agency Priority Goal (APG) for FYs
2022-2023, an analytical tool that establishes strategies and
performance metrics to gauge APG progress and success. This APG will be
renewed for FY 2024-2025. Additionally, together with USAID, the State
Department developed and is currently implementing a Joint Strategic
Plan for FY 2022-2026 that includes Strategic Objective 3.2: Advance
equity, accessibility, and rights for all.
Question. PEPFAR: In the GAO report, (GAO-23-105347, 12/12/2022) it
noted that ``State Has Taken Actions to Address Coordination
Challenges, but Staffing Challenges Persist.'' What is the status of
efforts to address staffing gaps in the Office of the Global AIDS
Coordinator?
Answer. HHS/CDC, USAID, DoD, and Peace Corps helped the Office of
the Global Aids Coordinator (S/GAC) address its chronic staffing
challenges by providing 28 short-term detailees in the fall of 2022.
Surge support from the Department is enabling S/GAC to accelerate
hiring of 40 individuals through a variety of hiring mechanisms. In
2023, we are redirecting our focus and developing a long-term strategy
that will close the staffing gap and increase staff retention.
Question. The same report on page 20 notes, ``As of September 2022,
216 of 308 positions in S/GAC's HQ office were vacant (70 percent)''
and on page 21, ``As of August 2022, 25 of the 28 PEPFAR country
coordinator positions (89 percent) were filled by an acting
coordinator.''Further it states that persistent PEPFAR staffing
vacancies have led to heavy workload and retention issues, yet S/GAC
has not identified or addressed underlying causes of vacancies, and it
does not address long-term human capital gaps program-wide by, for
example, developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and
retaining staff to achieve program goals. To address this finding, GAO
recommended that the coordinator develop a strategic workforce planning
process to identify and address the underlying causes for persistent
staffing vacancies in S/GAC headquarters and country teams. What do you
think are the major impediments to hiring and retention of employees
for PEPFAR?
Answer. Hiring and retention of both coordinators and S/GAC staff
is a responsibility I take very seriously. Alignment of the necessary
subject matter expertise--in public health, medicine, epidemiology,
data science, as well as skills in diplomacy, policy, budget, and
program management--is critical to provide appropriate oversight of the
PEPFAR program both at the field and headquarter levels. Furthermore,
insufficient requisite job series and lack of promotion opportunities
have been central challenges. Conducting a workforce planning study
will further identify those roles impacted by attrition.
Recruitment and retention have improved considerably and with the
anticipated strategic workforce planning process, we expect a more
positive outcome to these metrics.
Question. What is the status of the development of long-term
strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff?
Answer. Talent management and development remains at the forefront
of priority business needs for the Office of the Global Aids
Coordinator (S/GAC). S/GAC has addressed the challenges in mobilizing a
diverse talent pool and expediting the security clearance process by
introducing a fully functional EX capability. This capability within S/
GAC will drive these critical Talent Acquisition initiatives.
S/GAC is also benefiting from the Department's broader
modernization agenda, which has prioritized improving professional
development opportunities for Civil Service employees. Through the
appropriate authorities, S/GAC will utilize a broad range of hiring
flexibilities to quickly address bureau needs.
Question. Staffing in Africa: A number of the career foreign
service officers recently nominated to serve as Ambassador in key posts
in Africa such as Mali and Sudan, either have no experience serving in
Africa, have never served as an Ambassador, or both. All of these
officers are very accomplished diplomats, but the absence of prior
Africa or Chief of Mission experience is surprising. To what extent do
Foreign Service officers who have served in Africa have the same
opportunity for advancement as those who serve in other regions?
Answer. The Department seeks to attract the widest pool of
qualified candidates for senior leadership positions, reflecting the
diversity and breadth of experience of the foreign affairs community,
and reviews the qualifications of proposed candidates, considering the
Department's leadership and management principles and the post-specific
requirements identified for each position. Officers who serve in Africa
have the same opportunity for advancement globally, including for chief
of mission positions, and are evaluated by a service-wide set of core
precepts or competencies in which potential must be demonstrated to
advance. The conditions and challenges unique to assignments in Africa
often provide officers professional development opportunities and
supervisory experience earlier in their careers.
Question. Is there data supporting your response? If so, please
share it with the Committee.
Answer. As one example, 10 of the 12 current nominees for chief of
mission positions in the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) countries have
served at least one AF tour. Last year, 21 of the 24 nominees had prior
AF experience. Moreover, nominees for chief of mission positions in
other regional bureaus frequently have extensive experience working at
AF posts as well.
Question. Are you concerned about the message that selecting
Foreign Service Officers who have never served in the region at any
point in their career sends a signal to U.S. diplomats who have spent
considerable time working at difficult and challenging posts in Africa
that their prospects for career advancement are limited?
Answer. Ensuring the selection of the most qualified officers for
important leadership positions is essential to the successful conduct
of U.S. foreign policy and the leadership of our missions overseas. The
Department has a robust process for choosing chiefs of mission to
ensure that we identify highly qualified individuals for every one of
these positions in the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), particularly
emphasizing those candidates with hardship and/or regional experience.
The majority of nominees for chiefs of mission in African countries
have prior AF experience, including 10 of the 12 nominees currently
awaiting confirmation.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that officers serving
in Africa can have confidence that they have the same career
advancement opportunities as those who serve in other regions?
Answer. The Department seeks to attract the widest pool of
qualified candidates for leadership positions, reflecting the diversity
and breadth of experience of the foreign affairs community, and reviews
the qualifications of proposed candidates, considering the Department's
leadership and management principles and the post-specific requirements
identified for each position. Opening leadership opportunities to
qualified staff, regardless of previous regional expertise, is an
important factor in maintaining morale among the senior ranks of the
service. Just as highly qualified leaders from throughout the
Department are considered for positions in Africa, statistics
demonstrate that those who spend considerable time in Africa are highly
competitive for positions worldwide and are promoted more rapidly than
those without Africa experience.
Question. Ethiopia: The International Commission of Human Rights
Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) report from September 2022 stated that
``the denial and obstruction of humanitarian access to Tigray Region by
the Federal Government and allied regional State governments was
committed for the purpose of depriving the Tigrayan population of
objects indispensable for its survival, including food.'' You indicated
in the budget hearing on March 22 that your determination regarding
atrocities in Ethiopia addressed denial and obstruction of humanitarian
access. How did that conduct factor into your assessments regarding war
crimes and crimes against humanity?
Answer. The determination is not intended to be an exhaustive
accounting of all acts that constitute atrocities over the course of
the conflict. Given the various allegations relating to this armed
conflict, we decided to address the atrocities collectively and not
make public determinations for each specific instance. Our focus was on
the final determination, which was that all of the major parties to the
conflict committed atrocities.
Question. What role do you assess that the civilian authorities at
the federal level played in such denial and obstruction?
Answer. Our atrocities determination is not meant to ``name
names,'' nor be an exhaustive accounting of all crimes by all actors
over the course of the conflict. There are several tools at our
disposal, including visa sanctions and President Biden's September 2021
executive order, to target individuals, both military and civilian,
proven to be involved in atrocities. We stand ready to use these tools
if and when conditions warrant.
Question. Did the State Department agree to end the mandate of the
International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia in
exchange for the Ethiopian Government dropping its efforts to disband
ICHREE early?
Answer. The U.S. decision on whether to support renewal of the
ICHREE mandate will be based on the human rights situation on the
ground. Upon learning that the Government of Ethiopia was considering
tabling a resolution to prematurely end the mandate of ICHREE, the
United States and like-minded partners immediately shared with
Ethiopian officials that this would not be in their best interest, and
that the Commission must be allowed to complete its mandate. We also
conveyed our grave concerns over the institutional damage the precedent
of early termination could cause to the Human Rights Council.
Question. How do you expect the judicial systems of Ethiopia or
Eritrea to hold those responsible for atrocity crimes accountable?
Neither country has a track record of delivering justice through the
courts.
Answer. We are encouraged by the Government of Ethiopia's efforts
to establish a credible, nationwide transitional justice process that
meets international standards. We believe that our diplomatic
engagement can help support Ethiopians who are committed to a
meaningful accountability process. We also believe that durable
accountability processes must be driven by Ethiopians--rather than
outsiders--regardless of what the country's history with accountability
may be. A credible Ethiopian-led process will make it more likely that
Eritrea pursues its own accountability measures.
Question. The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that,
according to the U.S. Charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, the atrocities
determination you announced will not present any barrier to the
bilateral relations of Ethiopia and the United States. The MFA also
indicated that the Charge conveyed that the U.S. was ready to support
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission--Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights Joint Investigation and Transitional Justice Policy.
What are the legal and policy implications for assistance--including
the provision of security assistance--given your determination related
to the atrocities carried out by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces?
Answer. An atrocity determination, which acknowledges that
atrocities were committed, is independent of the legal requirement to
determine whether there is an ongoing pattern of gross violations of
human rights. Currently, we have assistance restrictions in place and
will re-evaluate based on verifiable evidence. For diplomatic
engagement with the Government of Ethiopia regarding the determination,
the State Department provided carefully tailored messaging, which U.S.
Embassy Addis Ababa meticulously followed.
Question. Is the United States supporting the Ethiopian Human
Rights Commission-Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Joint
Investigation and Transitional Justice Policy? If so, in what way?
Answer. A credible transitional justice process that meets
international standards is important to securing lasting peace in
Ethiopia. We are in regular contact with transitional justice
stakeholders in Addis and are considering options to support human
rights accountability within the current legal and policy constraints.
This may or may not include direct support to the independent Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission.
Question. Mali/Sahel: The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Program Act of 2022, which I led in the Senate, required the
Administration to deliver a strategy specifically for Mali to Congress,
but that strategy was never produced. Instead, the Committee received a
copy of the Integrated Country Strategy, a publicly available document
which was developed before the law was even passed. Considering the
French military withdrawal, and the partnership between the Malian
junta and Wagner--which has committed egregious human rights abuses
while failing to improve the security situation--it might have been
useful to have a strategy on hand. I understand that there is now an
effort underway to develop a strategy for Mali. When can we expect to
see it? Do I have your commitment that going forward, State Department
will comply with Congressionally mandated requirements?
Answer. We continue to refine our thinking on the dynamic problems
in Mali. A strategic review of policy options is underway in the
context of the Administration's Sahel Strategy as well as deliberations
for the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA. Mali
is also central to our efforts to curb Wagner's expansion in Africa. We
will provide an updated Mali strategy as soon as it is completed, and
in the meantime will endeavor to explain new provisions that are being
considered. We also will provide a general overview of our strategy for
the MINUSMA mandate renewal negotiations once finalized.
Question. A September 2020 Inspector General's report identified
$200 million in potentially wasteful spending on Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership programs due to mismanagement and
inadequate oversight from staff in the Africa Bureau caused, in part,
by staffing shortages. The report found that the State Department has
not appropriately prioritized the Africa Bureau's needs. This neglect
appears to extend to overseas postings, where our embassies in Niger
and the Central African Republic, among others, have lacked key staff
for extended periods of time. As of July 2022, more than 20 percent of
approved State Department positions in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali,
and Mauritania were vacant. Our embassy in Niger had as high as a 40
percent vacancy rate and lacked both a political and economic officer
for months on end. Have the vacancies that were identified been filled?
Answer. A top priority at the Bureau of African Affairs is to
ensure that vacancies at all posts are filled with competent and
experienced officers as quickly as possible. The Department is actively
filling vacant positions in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Mauritania throughout the summer transfer season, further reducing the
vacancy rates.
Question. How will the budget proposal help with persistent
staffing gaps in the Sahel?
Answer. Staffing gaps at Sahel posts have been substantially
reduced in the past year. The Department will continue its efforts to
further reduce these gaps through targeted recruitment and existing
incentives.
Question. What steps should the State Department take to better
incentivize assignments to challenging posts in Africa?
Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS)
posts are in Africa. The Department continues to use increased
incentives for service in HDS posts around the world, including service
needs differential for extended service, along with hardship
differentials, and prioritized assignments. Additionally, several
initiatives are underway, including development of regional support
models. In the last year, the Department also has reformed incentives
to better focus bidders' attention on the most difficult to staff
posts.
Question. What additional steps do you plan to take this fiscal
year to ensure that the Africa Bureau has adequate resources and staff,
including a properly skilled, trained, and incentivized workforce
equipped to meet the Bureau's needs and objectives?
Answer. As part of its effort to address the staffing challenges in
Africa, the Bureau for African Affairs (AF) routinely works with the
Bureau of Global Talent Management to fill its entry-level positions.
In addition, the FY 2024 request includes $37 million for AF in
operating and Public Diplomacy (PD) resources, including 15 new
positions, to increase capacity for regional competition with the PRC
and help manage complex embassies. In addition, in the last year, the
Department has reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders'
attention on the most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore
creative solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these
difficult locations.
Question. Democratic Republic of Congo: Mr. Secretary, I am
concerned about escalating tensions in eastern Congo. On February 6,
Human Rights Watch reported that, ``Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in North
Kivu are leaving behind a growing trail of war crimes against
civilians.'' The very next day, the UN Joint Human Rights Office in
DRC, reported that M23 executed 171 Congolese civilians in two villages
in eastern DRC during just 1 week in November. How are you engaging to
deescalate and discourage Rwandans from fighting alongside M23 rebels?
Answer. The Department of State is similarly alarmed about
escalating tensions in eastern DRC and has been engaging at high levels
on this issue. Secretary Blinken, Deputy Secretary Sherman, and
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Phee have made it clear to
President Kagame and Foreign Minister Biruta that Rwandan support to
the UN-sanctioned M23 rebel group must stop and Rwanda must withdraw
its troops from DRC. We will maintain high-level diplomatic
engagement--with a focus on regional mediation efforts--and consider
every tool available to end the conflict in eastern DRC.
Question. Do you believe Rwanda is implicated in the atrocities
Human Rights Watch and the UN allege the M23 committed?
Answer. The Department of State finds the evidence presented by the
UN Group of Experts about Rwanda's support for M23 and the human rights
abuses by M23 to be credible. The United States continues to engage
with Rwanda to cease its support for M23. We remain deeply concerned by
the reports of abuses and violations of human rights and violations of
international humanitarian law against the people living in eastern
DRC.
Question. Will you or another member of your senior team travel to
the region as soon as possible along with counterparts from France and
the European Union on a mission to ease tensions?
Answer. Secretary Blinken traveled to Rwanda and DRC in August
2022, where he met with Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi. He continues
to engage them, their foreign ministers, and other regional leaders on
a regular basis. Ambassador Robert Wood, the United States' Alternate
Representative to the UN for Special Political Affairs, accompanied the
UN Security Council high-level visit to DRC in March. Assistant
Secretary Phee also met with President Kagame and other leaders in
Addis Ababa in February. The Department of State will maintain high-
level engagement to resolve the conflict.
Question. What is the status of the review of our Rwanda policy
requested by SFRC staff?
Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs continues to review U.S.
policy towards Rwanda and would be glad to brief your office when the
review is complete.
Question. South Sudan: Concerns about mismanagement at Embassy Juba
prompted visits by the Inspectors General for both State and USAID late
last year. The Director General of the Foreign Service also visited.
What prompted these visits?
Answer. A regular OIG inspection of Embassy Juba was overdue and
was scheduled as part of the Inspector General's inspection cycle. It
focused on State-only personnel and operations. The director general
visited Post at the Ambassador's and the Bureau for African Affairs'
request during a multi-country visit to the African continent.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Do you commit to addressing any personnel and/or
management concerns at Embassy Juba as soon as possible?
Answer. Yes. Embassy leadership has consistently made clear that it
prioritizes putting people first, including by addressing any issues
that could impact U.S. and Locally Employed staff wellbeing and morale,
and actively promoting mission-wide collaboration and inclusion.
Question. IMET: I was pleased to see the Administration request $1
million in International Military and Education Training (IMET) for
Greece, but this is only 56 percent of what Congress authorized as part
of my bipartisan U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act. And
while I was also pleased by the request for $500,000 in IMET for
Cyprus, I think that could be boosted as well. However, now that the
State Department has certified that Cyprus has met the necessary
conditions for lifting defense trade restrictions for FY 2023, in
accordance with my bipartisan Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy
Partnership Act, what needs to happen for the Administration to request
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriations for Cyprus to help
defend itself amid Turkey's ongoing occupation?
Answer. We work to ensure IMET meets our partners' needs within the
bounds of our budgetary priorities and the partners' capacity to absorb
funding. Cyprus cannot receive FMF until they are eligible for Foreign
Military Sales, which would require a Presidential Determination under
the Arms Export Control Act. Our security relationship with Cyprus has
improved gradually since 2018. We could consider this Determination in
the future. Cyprus can presently purchase Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
commodities, which are appropriate for Cyprus' current defense needs
and its budget.
Question. The governments of Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, and eSwatini are
all reportedly responsible for or complicit recent violations and
abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian
law. In Chad, for instance, the Chadian military junta is responsible
for the massacre of more than 100 pro-democracy protesters in October
2022 and the arbitrary arrest and disappearance of hundreds more. The
Rwandan military is once again supporting and fighting alongside UN-
sanctioned M23 rebels in eastern DRC. The eSwatini Government massacred
dozens of pro-democracy protesters in 2021 and assassinated one of the
country's most prominent human rights activists in January 2023.
Ugandan security forces, meanwhile, continue to use torture and forced
disappearance with impunity to target opposition activists and those
critical of the Museveni government. The FY 2024 budget request
allocates $800,000 in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) to Chad, $200,000 in IMET to Eswatini, $550,000 in IMET to
Rwanda, and $700,000 in IMET to Uganda. Do you agree that there is
credible evidence implicating the Chadian military junta in the deaths
and torture of civilian protesters in October 2022 and the Rwandan
military in violations and abuses committed by M23 in eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo?
Answer. The United States is concerned by the violence against
civilian protesters in Chad and human rights abuses by armed groups in
the DRC. We continue to press for full investigation of these
incidents, including through an international inquiry into October 20
violence in Chad, leading to accountability for those responsible. We
urge Eswatini officials to address human rights issues and closely
monitor the ongoing investigation into the January 2023 murder of
Thulani Maseko, pressing for full accountability for those responsible.
The United States has repeatedly publicly and privately called on
Rwanda and all actors in the region to cease support to M23 or other
armed groups. In addition, the United States has not obligated any
security assistance programming for the Rwandan military, including
IMET, since summer 2022.
Question. What do we hope to accomplish with such assistance given
the long track record of abuses and impunity?
Answer. IMET funds enable professional military education and
building relationships with future military leaders that have a better
appreciation for human rights, and civilian control of the military.
More professional security forces that are respectful of human rights
is important to strengthening democracy and governance in Africa.
Continued engagement with our security partners is critical to regional
security, and for sustaining democratic gains in the region. More
professional military leaders with significant influence from the
United States also allow for an ongoing dialogue and frank
conversations about shared goals and objectives at high levels of
government that are otherwise closed to international engagement and
cooperation.
Question. How are we assessing impact of our assistance?
Answer. State has funded a monitoring and evaluation team to assess
the impact of the IMET program. One objective of the IMET program is to
enhance our bilateral military-to-military relationships resulting from
the one-to-one relationships and experience forged during various U.S.
Government-funded military courses in the United States. Through the
accession of IMET alumni to senior-level leadership positions, the U.S.
Government may find increasing number of individuals with experience
and knowledge of U.S. military doctrine and technical skills in the
host nation government. Therefore, building these key relationships
assists in maintaining U.S. Government access and influence.
Question. Migration/Refugee Challenges in the Americas: I know that
the Administration developed a Root Causes Strategy and signed the Los
Angeles Declaration on Migration with partner countries to address the
migration and refugee challenges in the Americas. I have been closely
following these efforts. While we may have differences in our
approaches, the fundamental problem here seems to be that the
Administration is frankly not dedicating enough resources to implement
these efforts. We have dedicated more resources to manage the Syrian
and Ukraine migration and refugee crises, than we have in our own
hemisphere to address the migration and refugee crises with the most
immediate impact on our country. Secretary Blinken, can you help me
understand this discrepancy?
Answer. The Administration has continually sought to increase the
level of funding to address migration and refugee challenges in the
Americas and support the successful implementation of the Root Causes
Strategy, the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, and the Los
Angeles Declaration. From FY 2020-2022, U.S. humanitarian assistance in
the Americas increased from more than $911 million to nearly $1.15
billion; moreover, USG commitment to address root causes has led to an
increase in funding from nearly $92 million in FY 2021 to nearly $274
million in the FY 2024 President's request (283 percent).
Question. Do you believe the Administration's current budget is
sufficient to address the migration and refugee challenges in the
Americas.
Answer. Funding constraints for migration and refugee needs remain
a challenge globally, however, our current budget request prioritizes
addressing these needs and supports the 2022 Los Angeles Declaration on
Migration and Protection. The Administration has committed to long-
term, multifaceted solutions that address the root causes of migration
and encourage collaborative migration management throughout the
hemisphere. Progress requires sustained political commitment and
cooperation across a range of stakeholders, combined with private
sector and foreign assistance investments.
Question. Mexico: Secretary Blinken, the United States relationship
with Mexico has more impact on the daily lives of our fellow citizens
than nearly any other in the world. For this reason, in the last
several years, I have been raising the alarm on how President Lopez
Obrador's actions are making the U.S.-Mexico partnership increasingly
difficult. From his repeated efforts to undermine democracy, including
by gutting Mexico's independent electoral authority, to his
unwillingness to confront cartels and acknowledge his country's role in
producing the illicit fentanyl poisoning our citizens, President Lopez
Obrador is setting the clock back on U.S.-Mexico relations. How have
you personally engaged on issues of democracy and combatting gangs and
fentanyl trafficking with the Lopez Obrador government?
Answer. I share your commitment to democratic principles, human
rights, and rule of law--free of political influence--in Mexico. I
raise these issues regularly with officials at the most senior levels
of Mexico's government in both public and private conversations. The
Department supports a well-resourced, independent judiciary and
electoral institution. U.S. foreign assistance strengthens democratic
institutions, civil society, and the rule of law, and combats the
production and trafficking of fentanyl.
Question. How is the Administration dedicating resources to address
bipartisan concerns on these issues?
Answer. Addressing the production and trafficking of fentanyl is a
top priority. The State Department has sponsored U.S.-Mexico forensic
exchanges on synthetic drug synthesis, held fentanyl awareness
trainings for Mexican law enforcement, and donated detection canines
and protective equipment to facilitate fentanyl interdiction. The
Department also promotes inclusive approaches to open government
principles for more transparent, participatory, and accountable
governance through policy and programming.
Question. The Administration takes the position that India is and
will continue to be an important strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific
and a key member of the Quad, and yet we have seen a number of
concerning trends emerging in Indian democracy, as well as abroad--not
least is their willingness to continue to purchase Russian oil and
arms. With that in mind, what steps is the Administration taking to
support democracy and human rights in India?
Answer. I regularly engage with Indian Government officials on
human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and encourage
India to uphold its human rights commitments. Through the U.S.-India
Global Issues Forum and the Human Rights Report we communicate our
concerns about censorship, internet freedom, the detention of human
rights activists, and other human rights issues. The Administration
also meets with civil society representatives both in the United States
and India to hear their perspectives regarding human rights conditions
on the ground.
Question. Lebanon: In December, Senator Risch and I wrote a letter
to Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen and yourself, calling for the
use of sanctions against Lebanon's financial and political elite for
obstructing the election of a president and implementation of needed
financial reforms. Since then, gridlock and suffering in Lebanon has
only gotten worse. Why has the Administration yet to announce any
additional sanctions against corrupt officials in Lebanon?
Answer. I share your concerns about endemic corruption in Lebanon,
officials' reluctance to implement reforms, and stalled presidential
elections. We continue to press Lebanese officials at all levels on
these priorities. In addition to diplomatic engagement, sanctions can
be a useful tool to encourage progress and a warning to those
undermining the rule of law. Our previous designations clearly
demonstrate our commitment to combatting corruption, and we continue to
work with the Department of the Treasury to identify impactful targets.
Question. Does the Administration require new authorities in order
to sanction such individuals?
Answer. We are committed to combatting corruption and encouraging
reform. I am confident that our existing tools, including sanctions
authorities such as Executive Order 13441, are sufficient to promote
accountability for corrupt Lebanese officials who contributed to
undermining the rule of law and democratic institutions and processes
in Lebanon. To this end, I continue to work closely with my colleagues
at the Department of the Treasury to use all available tools, as
demonstrated by several previous designations.
Question. Syria: I was heartened to see the Administration's recent
designation of individuals under authorities pursuant to the Caesar
Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019. Unfortunately, there is no
shortage of candidates for Caesar sanctions. When can we expect further
designations pursuant to Caesar authorities?
Answer. The Administration is fully committed to upholding its
legal obligations under the Caesar Act and appreciates having this
important tool at our disposal to enforce accountability on the Syrian
regime. Over the past year, the Department of State worked closely with
the Department of the Treasury and other interagency partners to
identify suitable targets, and gather sufficient evidence, that met the
legal requirements for designations under the Caesar Act and other
sanctions authorities. The Department will continue to work actively
with Treasury to identify targets for potential future sanctions,
including under the Caesar Act.
Question. The Administration is required under the 2023 NDAA to
provide a report and strategy on its response to Captagon trafficking.
Will you commit to providing that report before its due date?
Answer. The Department is actively working with interagency
colleagues to draft an interagency strategy on disrupting and
dismantling the captagon trade, as required under the 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We look forward to submitting the
final report by the 180-day deadline specified in the NDAA.
Question. The State Department has rightfully worked to seek
accountability for Russian war crimes in Ukraine. It is less clear what
the United States is doing to hold the Assad regime accountable for the
crimes it has perpetrated against its own people. Specifically, what is
the State Department, along with other U.S. Government agencies and in
conjunction with other nations, international organizations, and NGOs,
doing to advance justice and accountability in Syria?
Answer. Our commitment to hold the Assad regime to account for its
atrocities in Syria is unwavering. The Department supports UN
accountability mechanisms, including the International, Impartial, and
Independent Mechanism and the Commission of Inquiry; leads efforts in
the UN to hold the regime to account, including in the UNGA Third
Committee and at the UN Human Rights Council; and publicly designated
regime officials involved in human rights violations under section
7031(c) of the Department of State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act.
Question. Iraq: I have welcomed the Administration's announcement
of the end of combat operations in Iraq and its commitment to
transitioning the U.S.-Iraq relationship to one led by traditional
bilateral diplomacy. However, I am very concerned that the
Administration's request of $75 million in FMF for Iraq is too low to
address the threats facing Iraq, even within the context of our
evolving relationship. Please explain the process by which the
Administration came to this amount, especially following reductions in
previous year's requests.
Answer. The Administration's FY 2024 request reflects the
Department's careful assessment of all available prior-year FMF funding
for Iraq. This amount includes $250 million per year directed by
Congress over multiple years and appropriated above request levels.
When prior year funds are coupled with the FY 2024 request of $75
million, we believe there will be sufficient FMF to address the threats
facing Iraq and support ongoing maintenance, sustainment, training, and
equipment needs for current and planned programs supporting the Iraqi
Security Forces.
Question. Please also provide a detailed assessment of what these
cuts mean for the Administration's ability to continue to build out the
strategic foundation of the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
Answer. We do not anticipate an impact on the strategic foundation
of the U.S.-Iraq relationship due to the FY 2024 request of $75 million
in Foreign Military Financing. Our partnership with Iraq stretches far
beyond our security assistance and is underpinned by a shared
commitment to the full range of bilateral issues enumerated in the
Strategic Framework Agreement.
Question. Can you outline the mutual military support we are seeing
between Iran and Russia as a result of Iran's provision of lethal UAVs
for Russia's use against Ukraine?
Answer. Iran has become Russia's top military backer. Since August,
Iran has transferred several hundred UAVs to Russia. In November, Iran
shipped artillery and tank rounds to Russia for use in Ukraine. In
return, Russia has been offering Iran unprecedented defense
cooperation, including on missiles, electronics, and air defense.
We continue to counter, expose, and disrupt these activities,
including through sanctions designations and export controls, and we
are prepared to do more.
Question. What further support can we expect both countries to
provide in the coming weeks and months?
Answer. Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle shipments are likely to
continue, and in turn is seeking to purchase military equipment from
Russia, including Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, and
YAK-130 combat trainer aircraft. This partnership poses a threat not
just to Ukraine, but to Iran's neighbors in the region as well. We have
shared this information with partners in the Middle East and around the
world, and we will continue to use the tools at our disposal to expose
and disrupt these activities.
Question. What more could the United States, working with our
allies, do to combat Iran's arming of Russia and the Russian support of
Iran's advanced capabilities in areas like cyber and elsewhere?
Answer. The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and State have
imposed sanctions on 41 entities or individuals involved in Iran's
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry since 2021, and we will continue
to pursue sanctions and export controls to counter Iranian UAV
transfers to Russia. Existing sanctions have deterred or disrupted many
billions of dollars' worth of Russian arms sales and we continue to
monitor for other potentially sanctionable activities.
Question. How is the Administration ensuring that the Human Rights
Council-created Fact Finding Mission on Iran is receiving adequate
support to carry out its ongoing investigation into violations of the
human rights of protesters?
Answer. We are closely following the work of the independent fact-
finding mission created by the Human Rights Council. The fact-finding
mission was fully funded from the UN budget and is building its staff.
We have met with the commissioners responsible for the fact-finding
mission to ensure they have adequate support. We believe the Human
Rights Council is an appropriate venue to discuss the regime's conduct
and amplify the voices of the Iranian people, and we look forward to
joining our partners in that effort.
Question. Despite intermittent U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil
exports, the regime is exporting more oil today than at any time since
2018 when the sanctions were reimposed. Why hasn't the State Department
worked with interagency partners to seize and consign illicit Iranian
oil shipments?
Answer. We have continued to enforce our sanctions against Iran,
including targeting of PRC-based entities engaged in sanctions evasion.
For example, on March 9 we designated a ``shadow banking'' network of
39 entities across multiple jurisdictions, including the PRC, for
facilitating transactions and shipment of Iranian petrochemicals and
petroleum products worth tens of billions of dollars annually for the
Iranian regime.
Question. What is your strategy to change China's calculus on
importing Iranian oil?
Answer. We regularly engage with the PRC and strongly discourage
them from taking steps vis-a-vis Iran that contravene U.S. sanctions.
We also remain concerned about Iran's sanctions evasion activity,
including activity involving the PRC, and will not hesitate to take
actions against sanctions evaders. For example, on March 9 we
designated a ``shadow banking'' network of 39 entities, including PRC-
backed entities, for facilitating transactions and shipment of Iranian
petrochemicals and petroleum.
Question. Is the Administration considering Global Magnitsky
sanctions against senior Iranian leadership?
Answer. To mark International Human Rights Day on December 9, 2022,
the Administration used the Global Magnitsky authority for the first
time against Iranian individuals involved in serious human rights
abuses in connection with violent protests following the death of Mahsa
Amini while in custody. We will continue to find ways, including
sanctions, to impose costs on Iranian individuals and entities who
brutally repress the Iranian people.
Question. What additional non-sanction steps is the State
Department taking to support those in Iran seeking their basic human
rights and freedoms? Please provide a detailed explanation of our
current programmatic efforts to target broadcasting to Iranians.
Answer. The State Department continues to partner with outside
organizations to support civil society and human rights defenders in
Iran and to promote the free flow of information to the Iranian people.
In the United Nations and other multilateral fora, we and partners are
holding Iran accountable for its human rights abuses. We issued General
License D-2, expanding internet-based services for Iranians. We
continue to support efforts to deliver information to the Iranian
people through the U.S. Agency for Global Media's Persian language
television, radio, and social media channels.
Question. Israel: The United States regularly expresses opposition
to resolutions and mechanisms reflecting anti-Israel bias at the UN.
Please share what the State Department and our missions to the UN in
New York and Geneva are doing to bring about the end of the one-sided
and harmful Commission of Inquiry on Israel, which has an open-ended
mandate, and the Human Rights Council's biased agenda item 7.
Answer. We continue building a coalition of partners to end this
open-ended and vaguely defined Commission of Inquiry (COI). During the
March session of the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Taylor delivered
a statement outlining U.S. objections to the COI. During the June 2022
session, the United States also led a joint statement signed by a
cross-regional group of over 20 countries condemning the COI's mandate.
We continue to raise our concerns about bias against Israel in the UN
system with the president of the UN Human Rights Committee and high
commissioner, as well as the secretary-general's point person to combat
antisemitism in the UN system, High Representative for the UN Alliance
of Civilizations Miguel Moratinos.
Question. Jordan: I am supportive of the Administration's new
assistance MOU with Jordan and the conditionality included in it to
incentivize important reforms to the country's water and civil service
sectors. Will the Administration still have the leverage needed to push
these reforms if Congress appropriates more than what is requested?
Answer. We are committed to working with Jordan to support its
reform agenda, including in the water and public sectors, a commitment
enshrined in the memorandum of understanding for strategic partnership.
These mutually established reforms are critical for Jordan's economic
and political stability and we hope and expect that Jordan will carry
them out. While we are evaluating options to incentivize these reforms
in light of the higher appropriation level, I request Congress provide
us with the additional flexibilities requested in the President's FY
2024 budget so that we can fully implement the memorandum of
understanding.
Question. Abraham Accords/Negev Forum: How can the State Department
promote U.S. private sector engagement and the role of civil society
within the Negev Forum?
Answer. We are focused on expanding and deepening the Abraham
Accords and normalization agreements. These efforts include exploring
potential partnerships between the Negev Forum Working Groups and the
private sector to develop and implement projects, as well as consulting
with a range of non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society
organizations. We look forward to continuing to work with our Negev
Forum partners to build on these efforts.
Question. What programs or mechanisms within the State Department
are most effective for fostering and advancing Israeli-Arab engagement
and greater regional cooperation across the Middle East and North
Africa?
Answer. We are using all our available tools to build the
connections between regional partners that are essential to the
region's prosperity, peace, security, and stability. State and U.S.
Agency and International Development exchange programs, including the
Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act, bolster critical
people-to-people breakthroughs. New formats for engagement include the
Negev Forum and I2U2 (Israel, India, United States, UAE), which brings
together India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States to collaborate
on shared challenges, from clean energy to food security, and to
solidify connections with the private sectors.
Question. Are there existing governmental tools that could be
better utilized?
Answer. We are continuously exploring opportunities to leverage new
and existing programs to advance Arab-Israeli relations and regional
cooperation. The Department consults with the interagency, including
the Department of Defense, Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Trade
and Development Agency, U.S. Agency for International Development, and
others, to help identify and develop these opportunities.
Question. MENA Opportunity Fund: The budget proposal includes $90
million for a new Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund and
lists a variety of countries and priorities in how the funds may be
deployed, including Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as to support
regional integration efforts. The amount of money allocated for this
fund is comparatively small, while the scale of the policy challenges
listed are quite significant. At the same time, I'd note the budget
request includes modest cuts to other programming across the region.
Since this is a new fund, I'm interested to hear exactly what the
Administration intends to do with this fund, how it will prioritize its
use, and how it differs from our ongoing bilateral economic support
programs? I also want to better understand how the Administration
intends to consult Congress in a meaningful way on its intended use and
programming of the new fund.
Answer. The fund would be a rapid mechanism to address unforeseen
opportunities or challenges; it is not intended to fill bilateral
programmatic gaps but rather enable us to better address emerging,
concrete changes or opportunities through expeditious interventions
covering specific geopolitical, economic, and environmental areas.
Funds will be scrutinized to ensure they address gaps unmet with other
bilateral, regional, or global resources and directly support explicit
foreign policy goals; funds will be subject to standard congressional
notification processes.
Question. Central Asia: Central Asian nations continue to have an
abysmal human rights record and constrained by their geography next to
China and Russia, they generally do not vote with us in the UN.
However, last year, several of Central Asia's leaders exhibited modest,
yet remarkable exercises of sovereignty. For example, both Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan both made statements refusing to recognize Russia's
annexation of parts of Ukraine. While this Administration seeks
increased partnership and cooperation with Central Asian governments,
how you will also advance progress on human rights and political reform
in the region?
Answer. As we strengthen our partnerships with Central Asian
countries, we increase space to discuss human rights and other
sensitive issues. We have engaged Central Asian leaders with
unprecedented frequency over the past year and raise human rights
concerns and political reforms in every interaction. We regularly
champion press freedom in all five countries, and our foreign
assistance supports civil society and media organizations across the
region. As a result of this long-standing advocacy, we have seen
incremental, encouraging, and important progress, including the
International Labor Organization's finding in 2022 that Uzbekistan's
cotton industry is free of systemic forced labor and child labor.
______
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. GLOBAL HEALTH AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE--Global Health
Security: A key lesson from the largest, most successful U.S. global
health program in history--the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR)--is the need to ensure greater coordination of effort,
transparency, and accountability among the agencies implementing
programs on the ground. A high-level, impartial coordinator at the
Department, which is not an implementer, can achieve these goals far
more effectively than the implementing agencies themselves. Notably,
the budget does not request program funds for the Coordinator for
Global Health Security and Diplomacy, who will be housed in the
Department's proposed Bureau for Global Health Security. With no new
program funds for pandemic preparedness in the bureau, what is its
purpose?
Answer. The new Bureau for Global Health Security will be led by an
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Health Security and Diplomacy, who will
be dual-hatted as the Global AIDS Coordinator. The bureau will bring
together existing health functions from across the Department,
strengthening the U.S. ability to advance global health priorities
through diplomacy and allowing for increased internal and interagency
coordination. The new Bureau would continue to use foreign assistance
resources under PEPFAR to advance the HIV/AIDS mission and manage other
existing programming that addresses other infectious diseases and
broader global health security issues. The bureau will build on the
strengths of the Department in leading in foreign policy and diplomacy,
which extends beyond foreign assistance.
Question. What will the Coordinator, and the bureau that he runs,
be coordinating?
Answer. The Global AIDS Coordinator and Ambassador-at-Large for
Global Health Security and Diplomacy would continue to oversee the work
of PEPFAR programs implemented by interagency partners including USAID,
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, and the
Peace Corps through annual country operational plans, interagency
workplans, and quarterly reports submitted by operational units, as
well as perform the functions outlined under section 5562 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, subject to
Senate advice and consent.
Question. Moreover, with no program funds to coordinate, how will
the Coordinator for Global Health security and Diplomacy be empowered
to ensure greater coordination of effort, transparency, and
accountability among the implementing agencies, i.e., USAID and CDC,
who all too often conflict with one another?
Answer. The Ambassador-at-Large for Global Health Security and
Diplomacy would serve as a strong voice in U.S. interagency discussions
and multilateral fora, representing the State Department and supported
by staff with vast global health security expertise, to guide the
Department's programming in accordance with U.S. and global health
security interests. They would work closely with U.S. chiefs of
missions on implementation of the Department's foreign assistance
programming related to global health security.
Question. While requesting no program funds for the Coordinator for
Global Health Security and Diplomacy to coordinate, the Administration
has decided to ``dual-hat'' Ambassador Nkengasong, such that he serves
concurrently as the Coordinator for Global Health Security and
Diplomacy and PEPFAR. How will you ensure the PEPFAR resources managed
by Ambassador Nkengasong and the bureau are not diverted for other
purposes, thereby undermining one of the most effective U.S. foreign
assistance programs in history?
Answer. PEPFAR will continue to focus only on work to bring the
HIV/AIDS pandemic to an end. I am committed to this mandate and will
ensure PEPFAR's resources are utilized consistent with the authorities
and appropriations for PEPFAR programs, so that the U.S. Government can
sustain PEPFAR's impact and end HIV/AIDS by 2030.
Question. Of the $1.245 billion requested for Global Health
Security, $745 million is for the U.S. Agency for International
Development and $500 million is for the newly established Pandemic
Fund, housed at the World Bank. The Global Health Security and Pandemic
Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Act, enacted as part of the FY
2022 National Defense Authorization Act, caps U.S. contributions to the
Pandemic Fund at 33 percent. What is the status of other donor
contributions to the Pandemic Fund?
Answer. The recently enacted legislation regarding the Pandemic
Fund provides a strong signal of U.S. commitment to global health
security. The Pandemic Fund currently has nearly $600 million in
available resources with $1.6 billion in total pledges from 26 donors.
All donors must sign their contribution agreements by May, when the
Board resets for a 2-year term. We are available to brief you or your
team with more information at that point.
Question. Is the $500 million U.S. contribution proposed in the
budget request realistic or aspirational?
Answer. Strong and early commitments from the United States are
critical to catalyzing significant investments from partners, as
evidenced by the initial U.S. pledge of $450 million to support the
Pandemic Fund that helped spur a total of $1.6 billion in pledges from
global donors within 1 year. While the Pandemic Fund needs additional
and sustainable financing to be successful, we believe that the
proposed $500 million contribution from the United States is realistic
to meet identified demand while spurring additional commitments from
others.
Question. The newly established Coordinator for Global Health
Security is meant to serve as the U.S. representative to the Pandemic
Fund. How will the Coordinator ensure that the Fund focuses on
prevention, preparedness, and building the capacity to respond, rather
prioritizing response after an outbreak already has occurred?
Answer. A focus on preparedness and prevention is a foundational
principle of the Pandemic Fund and has been codified in several
Governing Board-approved documents, including the Results Framework,
Governance Framework, and Operations Manual. The new Ambassador-at-
Large position and the new Bureau will play a key role in driving
attention and focus toward continued prioritization of this critical
area of work.
Question. I have introduced a resolution that would deny funds for
the implementation of an international pandemics treaty, accord, or
other instrument that would be legally binding upon the United States
absent Senate advice and consent. Will you commit to sending any
pandemics treaty, accord, or other instrument that would be legally
binding upon the United States to the Senate for advice and consent?
Answer. To protect the national security of the United States, the
Biden administration has prioritized improving international global
health security to prevent, detect, and respond to potential health
emergencies at their source. The pandemic accord negotiation team has,
and will continue to, consult with Congress regularly and transparently
as the negotiations to develop a pandemic accord progress.
Question. Food Aid: The budget request ``reflects the importance of
in-kind agricultural commodities to humanitarian response, but also
acknowledges the opportunity to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of U.S. food assistance programs through the reauthorization
of the Food for Peace Act.'' What reforms are you seeking to make U.S.
food aid more efficient and effective? Please be specific.
Answer. To decrease barriers to entry for new and local
organizations, while maintaining rigorous oversight of taxpayer
dollars, USAID will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of food
assistance by providing partners with more choice when designing non-
emergency programs. This will address the root causes of chronic hunger
in vulnerable communities. USAID is also simplifying complex accounting
requirements, consistent with standards for other USAID funding
accounts, to reduce administrative burden on USAID and partner staff.
Question. STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY--State
Department Management: Please provide a full list of any State
Department-owned or -leased facilities abroad--embassies and
consulates--that were built by Chinese companies or owned Chinese
citizens.
Answer. All Department facilities meet all safety and security
standards required by law and the Department's internal policies and
regulations, which do not apply on the basis of the national origin or
affiliation of the companies involved in the construction of them.
While the Department's real property data collection does not include
builder information, the Department's safety and security analyses for
newly acquired facilities are carried out on an individualized basis
for each such facility against the backdrop of the specific threat
environment in which they exist.
In China, the Department has leased the Consulate General in
Shanghai since 1991 and acquired the Consulate General in Shenyang in
1984, both of which are Chinese-built facilities. Chinese companies
also built the unclassified facilities at the Consulate in Guangzhou
and the new office annex on the Beijing Embassy Compound. Additionally,
the Department leases consular facilities in Chinese-built commercial
office buildings in Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan. Chinese companies
built these commercial office buildings and U.S. companies carried out
the lease fit-outs on behalf of the Department.
Question. I have been surprised at the number of embassies and
consulates that are closed on Friday afternoons (or the equivalent,
depending on the country), even when congressional representatives are
visiting posts. Do United States embassies and consulates overseas have
standard business hours? If so, what are they? If not, please provide
business hours for each embassy and consulate.
Answer. In accordance with long-standing policy, operating hours of
embassies and consulates conform with local laws, customs, and
conditions. In locations where it is customary for businesses and
public offices to close on Friday afternoon, business hours are
adjusted on other days to ensure a 40-hour work week. Formal business
hours do not limit posts' ability to provide necessary support for all
official visits. Posts routinely arrange official events outside of
business hours to advance U.S. Government priorities as needed.
Question. Do State Department officers at posts abroad receive time
off for U.S. federal holidays?
Answer. Yes, State Department foreign and civil service employees
assigned overseas are entitled to paid holiday time off on or close to
designated federal holidays.
Question. Do State Department officers at posts abroad receive time
off for local holidays?
Answer. Yes, State Department foreign and civil service employees
assigned overseas are entitled to paid holiday time off on certain,
designated local holidays.
Question. How many days off, on average, does an officer abroad
receive between federal and local holidays?
Answer. State Department regulations set a total cap of 21 paid
holidays overseas: 11 federal holidays and up to 10 local holidays.
Question. The Office of the Inspector General found that during the
pandemic, the Department encouraged maximum telework for both domestic
and overseas staff. COVID-19 cases have drastically declined in the
United States and around the world. The Biden administration declared
its intent to end the national emergency and public health emergency
declarations related to the COVID-19 pandemic on May 11, 2023. How can
employees who regularly handle classified information consistently work
from home?
Answer. When employees handle classified information, they work on-
site. In extremely limited exceptional situations, employees may be
granted a secure communication kit to enable access to classified
information from approved alternate work locations. This capability
assists with responding to emergencies and conducting urgent business
around the clock.
Question. When the public health emergency declaration is over,
will you advocate for the full return to work for all State Department
employees? Please explain in detail your justification.
Answer. From the Department's inception, we have worked across the
globe--at all hours and in dispersed locations. Throughout the pandemic
we used a variety of work arrangements to assist U.S. citizens and
address global emergencies. Since spring 2022, all overseas U.S. direct
hires and most domestic employees have routinely worked on-site. We
will continue innovating and leveraging technology to increase our
operational efficiency and agility to achieve the Department's
objectives in the face of 21st century challenges.
Question. Consular Affairs: What is the ideal time for the State
Department to process the average visa and what is the current average
time?
Answer. For a visitor visa, the global median interview appointment
wait time is less than 2 months, half what it was in June 2022.
Appointment wait times for all other visa categories, including for
visitor visa renewals, are lower. We are focused on reducing wait times
for first-time visitor visa applicants in historically high-demand
areas, where pandemic-related closures resulted in pent-up demand and
longer wait times. Wait times for students and temporary worker visas,
are at or below pre-pandemic levels.
Question. What accounts for this discrepancy?
Answer. The long interview appointment wait times for first-time
B1/B2 visitor visas in some countries are the result of pent-up visa
demand outpacing consular staffing levels when pandemic-related travel
restrictions ended. Nonimmigrant visa (NIV) interview wait times are
coming down faster than projected due to policy changes, innovations,
and staffing surge efforts in target locations. The Department is
working to assign as many adjudicators as possible overseas, with the
aim of reaching global pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year.
Question. What steps is the State Department taking to speed up the
visa approval process and are there viable alternatives to in-person
interviews?
Answer. The State Department is pursuing multiple strategies to
streamline visa processing and dedicate more resources to reducing wait
times consistent with national security. This includes surging staff
overseas, working with DHS to pursue expanded interview waiver
authorities for additional categories of low-risk visa applicants, and
expanding the development and use of technological solutions to
remotely adjudicate applications that do not require interviews. The
Department will soon pilot domestic revalidation of certain petition-
based nonimmigrant visas.
Question. Due to the wide variation in wait times for visa
appointments, is the State Department focusing on consulates with
longer than average wait times? If so, what is the Department doing to
support consulates with a longer than average wait time?
Answer. In FY 2022, the Department exceeded pre-pandemic levels of
nonimmigrant visa (NIV) issuances in categories critical to economic
and bilateral interests, including for seasonal workers, students, and
crewmembers. In the first quarter of 2023, the Department surged
resources to locations with high wait times for first-time B1/B2
visitor visa applicants, such as India and Mexico. Consular officers in
some locations are remotely adjudicating tens of thousands of interview
waiver visas each week. Visa renewal wait times, crucial to the
economy, are low.
Question. Do you have the funding and other resources necessary to
reduce wait times for appointments? If not, what do you need in order
to reduce the backlog?
Answer. Since early 2022, the Department reduced gaps in consular
staffing overseas caused by the drop in fee revenue due to the
pandemic's near-shutdown of international travel. With the resurgence
of travel, the Bureau of Consular Affairs' financial situation has
improved. The Department is striving to ensure that as many
adjudicators as possible are assigned to overseas positions, to reach
worldwide pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year. Maintaining
expanded spending authorities and additional fee flexibilities would
help allow for continued innovation and additional hiring.
Question. When will the State Department return to pre-pandemic
processing times?
Answer. In many places, visa appointment wait times have returned
to pre-pandemic averages. Except for first time B1/B2 visitors in
certain countries, wait times for all other nonimmigrant visa (NIV)
categories, including students and temporary workers, are at or below
pre-pandemic levels. The Department updates NIV wait time information
on its public website weekly. Wait times vary depending on the visa
category, appointment availability, and demand. The Department issued
18 percent more NIVs in the first 5 months of FY 2023 compared to the
same period in FY 2019, pre-pandemic.
Question. What is the ideal time for the State Department to
process the average passport renewal and what is the current average
time?
Answer. Passport processing times vary throughout the year and are
dependent upon workload, which traditionally increases in the lead-up
to seasonal spring and summer travel. Processing times nearly matched
pre-pandemic levels until application volumes reached unprecedented
levels early this year. On March 24, processing times increased to 10-
13 weeks for routine service and 7-9 weeks for expedited service. Our
goal is to ensure the average application is processed within the
service commitments. Many receive their passports weeks earlier than
advertised.
Question. What steps is the State Department taking to speed up the
passport approval process?
Answer. We are making every effort to tackle unprecedented demand
for passports. CA has instituted an ``all-hands-on-deck'' posture
requiring passport headquarters staff and field managers to adjudicate,
has authorized over 30,000 overtime hours a month, and recruited
volunteers, including re-employed annuitants, to work in Washington,
DC's satellite office. We have been aggressively recruiting since
January 2022, and have successfully increased our adjudicative staff by
more than 100, with another 170 candidates in the recruitment pipeline.
Question. China/COVID: How many times did the Department approve a
limited waiver of inviolability (LWOI) for personnel in China related
to COVID?
Answer. Starting June 2020, for each flight returning people to
China, the Department approved a partial waiver of personal
inviolability to allow specific U.S. diplomats and/or their family
members to be tested for COVID upon their arrival in China and then
again during a quarantine period. In May 2022, Embassy Beijing
requested, and the Department approved, a partial waiver of personal
inviolability and an exception to Department policy to allow mission
personnel to submit to ``community'' testing to allow our personnel to
move freely about the city where they were located.
Question. Would you agree to waivers of diplomatic immunity for
embassy personnel in an adversarial country like China?
Answer. If faced with the same extraordinary situation like we had
in China and other countries during the pandemic, I would again
instruct all posts to push back against unreasonable or invasive
restrictions applied to our diplomatic personnel and staff while
considering limited waivers of immunity to permit testing and other,
less intrusive, health measures. I would evaluate whether a waiver
would be contrary to the U.S. Government's interests and whether it
would pose a security problem for the mission, its personnel, or family
members. I would also weigh this against the need to maintain
diplomatic presence in country.
Question. Do you commit to consult with Congress before taking any
steps to approve any waiver of inviolability (LWOI) for personnel in an
adversarial country?
Answer. If presented with a similar decision on limited waivers of
diplomatic immunity for embassy personnel during a pandemic or other
global health crisis, I would weigh the merits of the decision while
considering all aspects of the situation, including the impact on the
U.S. national security interests and personnel in that country.
Question. Does the Department commit not to nominate or re-nominate
to a Senate- confirmed position any officials who were involved in
developing or approving the policy to comply with the PRC's COVID
protocols, including detention in fever clinics, invasive, non-
transparent testing procedures, and arbitrary movement restrictions and
lockdowns, family separation, and the limited waivers of inviolability
that allowed these practices to happen?
Answer. The President makes decisions with respect to nominating or
re-nominating officials to Senate-confirmed positions. The Department
has a robust process for choosing Chiefs of Mission candidates to
recommend to the President for nomination. I am committed to working
with the rest of my team to ensure the Department continues to identify
individuals with demonstrated relevant experience and a track record of
successful leadership in challenging posts.
Question. In briefings to SFRC staff and in formal front-channel
communications, the Department confirmed that 30 Americans had been
detained in Chinese fever clinics. Following press reports on the
situation at Mission China, this number was revised to 16. What
accounts for the change in the number of Americans the Department says
were detained in Chinese fever clinics?
Answer. Thirty personnel tested positive for COVID upon return to
China. Of these 30, 16 spent some period in a facility of the kind
characterized in press reports as ``fever hospitals.'' The 14 others
were cleared in the confirmatory process or intermediate steps and did
not proceed to such a facility.
Question. During which period of time and under what definitions of
``American,'' and ``detained,'' were these figures determined?
Answer. ``American'' in this context refers to a U.S. Mission China
U.S. direct hire employee or family member. ``Detained'' means that an
American was housed in a facility under the protocol steps of the PRC
health regulations for having tested positive for COVID. The period of
time was the return of Mission China diplomatic staff and personnel to
China after authorized departure in June 2020, until Ambassador Burns
arrived in Beijing and assumed duties as chief of mission in March
2022.
Question. When the United States re-imposed COVID testing
requirements for Chinese citizens traveling to the United States, did
the PRC Embassy submit an LWOI or equivalent in order for its diplomats
to comply when entering the United States?
Answer. Under the U.S. testing requirements, travelers from China
were required to test pre-departure in China and not upon arrival in
the United States. The United States did not impose testing on PRC
diplomats in the United States. Pre-flight testing of PRC diplomats in
China does not implicate their immunity and therefore would not require
a limited waiver of inviolability (LWOI).
Question. Fifteen to 20 years to build an embassy is far too long
and is one of the factors in the increasing cost of building posts
abroad. Please explain why it takes so long to build an embassy and why
it is so expensive.
Answer. Building worldwide embassy compounds to U.S. design codes
and security standards is a complex and stringently regulated
undertaking. While implementation of the 2022 Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act will improve efficiencies, the
Department has identified that U.S. Government acquisition regulations;
unique local host country zoning, permits, construction practices and
labor laws; security risks; and evolving climate threats add to project
cost and duration. Although some complex projects with difficult site
acquisitions can take upward of 15 years, the average new embassy
compound takes 6 to 8 years to complete from design to occupancy.
Question. Are there authorities or other resources the Department
needs to build new embassies and consulates more quickly?
Answer. Recent legislative changes such as the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 provide the Department
increased flexibility for setback, co-location, site selection, and
design and construction solutions that will allow us to deliver
projects more quickly. Additional federal contracting and security
compliance review options would further increase flexibilities by
expanding the available contractor pool, increase competitive bidding,
and allow for an optimal project delivery solution. Adjusting threshold
mandates to accommodate for inflation will also streamline project
delivery duration.
Question. Do you believe that there are posts where U.S. diplomats
struggle to get outside of embassy or consulate on a regular basis? If
so, where?
Answer. Our regional security offices and emergency action
committees continually evaluate threat environments, risk tolerance,
and available risk mitigation measures to facilitate diplomatic
engagements outside embassies to the maximum extent possible. In 2021,
94 percent of movements requested at our highest threat posts were
approved. In 2022, 11,528 more moves were requested at our highest
threat posts versus 2021, and 93 percent of those movements were
approved.
Question. Do Chinese, Russian, or Iranian diplomats have trouble
accessing local populations in countries in which they operate?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security does not monitor or track
foreign diplomatic engagements domestically or abroad. However, foreign
diplomats have traditionally been targeted less than U.S. Government
personnel and, per open source reporting, Chinese and Russian diplomats
may be engaging more frequently in certain high threat locations, but
they pay a great cost for doing so. In the last 6 months, Russian
diplomats in Kabul, for example, were killed in front of their embassy.
A Chinese delegation was also present during an attack at the
Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while visiting members of the
Taliban in their offices.
Question. How do you intend to improve the access of U.S. diplomats
to local populations at our posts abroad, especially in high-threat
posts where embassy rules make getting off the compound difficult or
nearly impossible?
Answer. The security and threat environment at a given post has a
direct impact on a post's ability to safely facilitate engagements. Our
regional security offices and emergency action committees continually
evaluate threat environments, risk tolerance, and available risk
mitigation measures to facilitate diplomatic engagements outside
embassies to the maximum extent possible. In 2021, 94 percent of off-
compound movements requested at our highest threat posts were approved.
In 2022, off-compound movement requests increased by 11,528 at our
highest threat posts, and 93 percent of requests were approved.
Question. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security frequently cites
statistics on the number of travel requests abroad that regional
security officers approve. Do those statistics include the number of
requests that were never submitted to the RSO because there was no
faith that the RSO would approve the request?
Answer. Travel policies at a given post are the shared product of
the Emergency Action Committee, with the ultimate approver of any
travel request being the Chief of Mission, not the RSO. We have no
statistics or information for requests not made, and we are proud of
both the approval rate and increasing rate of engagement worldwide,
particularly at our high threat/high risk posts.
Question. Is that statistic useful if it doesn't include the
potentially large number of requests that are never submitted due to
lack of faith in approval?
Answer. Both the 2021 and 2022 statistics convey the extensive
efforts our security personnel undertake daily to safely facilitate
diplomatic engagements worldwide, and the increasing rate at which we
are undertaking such engagements. We have no statistics or information
for requests not made, and we are proud of both the approval rate and
increasing rate of engagement worldwide, particularly at our high
threat/high risk posts.
Question. Should the Department increase the number of Diplomatic
Security officers to better staff priorities and avoid DS personnel
burnout?
Answer. The health and well-being of our security personnel is of
utmost importance. I understand the sacrifices our diplomatic security
personnel make to keep our people safe. The Department continues to
look at solutions to alleviate the pressure of increased protective
operations, ensure that personnel are compensated for the long hours
worked, and expand our overseas missions to mitigate personnel burnout.
If additional positions are required, the Department will work to
identify those resources.
Question. State Department Authorization: The Department has been
late in providing requests or feedback to our committee on State
Department authorization, making it difficult or at points impossible
to include some Department asks. How can the State Department work in a
more positive manner with our committee on State Department
authorization bills?
Answer. I am pleased the Department and Congress have reinvigorated
the State authorization bill process, including through the Department
submitting legislative proposals to committee staff and working the
committees to address feedback and refine the proposals. I deeply
appreciate that the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022
included many provisions that the Department requested. As we are
moving into the next year of this process, it is my hope that our teams
will work collectively to further streamline the process to allow for
even more constructive discussions, direct redline edits where
possible, and real-time engagement with a particular focus on including
Department priorities.
Question. Do you commit to providing all of the Department's
authorization requests by April 14, 2023?
Answer. I recognize and appreciate that working together to develop
flexible authorization legislation for the Department is an important
process premised on close and transparent communication. The Department
has already submitted nearly 30 legislative proposals for Congress'
consideration. I remain committed to working within the Department and
with interagency partners to identify and propose to Congress in a
timely manner authorities for Department operations that will help the
Department advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and take care of our
employees both domestically and aboard.
Question. Medical Clearances: Though the Department provides
medical clearances to officers prior to a permanent change station
abroad, it does not evaluate officers for fitness for duty. I have
heard from embassies that foreign service officers are being allowed to
serve abroad, even while in hospice or under other terminal health
situations. Should the Department be assigning personnel abroad who are
terminally ill?
Answer. Prior to each overseas assignment the Department issues
medical clearances in a manner that is consistent with federal law and
Department policy. Currently, the Department issues a class 1 clearance
to those with no significant medical condition or a class 2 clearance
for those persons for whom the degree of care required for their
condition matches the care available at their assigned post. Employees
with unstable medical conditions (including unstable terminal
conditions) are issued a class 5 clearance and are limited to service
within the United States.
Question. What is the purpose of a medical clearance if it does not
indicate whether someone is fit for service?
Answer. The medical clearance process is designed to identify
medical, mental health, and educational needs that may require
specialty management, follow-up, or monitoring. The Department
personnel dedicated to adjudicating medical clearances evaluate the
health information identified to match the medical needs of personnel
and family members with available resources at the post of assignment.
At present, the Department will not ``clear'' an individual (or their
family members) to go to a post that does not have adequate resources
to meet their medical needs.
Question. Does a Foreign Service Officer have a ``right'' to die
abroad while working for the State Department?
Answer. The Department works diligently to ensure our employees and
their family members are assigned to posts where they can obtain the
medical care needed to support the medical conditions with which they
may be living. In the event an individual's condition deteriorates to
the point where local resources cannot provide adequate care, the
Department, consistent with 22 U.S.C. 4081, will evacuate the employee
and/or their family either back to the United States or to a regional
medical evacuation center where the care they need can be obtained.
Question. Given the small number of posts who can handle class 2
cases, does the Department risk overwhelming the capacity of those
embassy medical units?
Answer. The Department recognizes that healthcare is not the same
industry today as it was when the class 2 designation was first
defined.
Breakthroughs in technology, pharmaceuticals, and service delivery,
among other things, have created a world in which we see individuals
with a class 2 clearance serving at nearly every post around the world.
As a result, those with a class 2 clearance are placed at posts
throughout the world, and the Department consistently monitors health
unit capacity so that none are at risk for being overwhelmed.
Question. What resources would be needed to require fitness for
duty evaluations for all officers prior to permanently changing
stations abroad?
Answer. ``Fitness for duty'' is an evaluation that currently only
applies to diplomatic security agents, and even then, is only applied
when such fitness comes into question. Requiring fitness for duty
evaluations for all foreign service officers would initially require
the Department to establish fitness standards that would apply to every
job series for which it hires, most of which are jobs with limited to
no physical requirements. Based on those fitness standards, the
Department would need to craft a program that includes individual
assessments for each job series and then evaluate each employee's
ability to meet the standards before entering on duty, much like
onboarding diplomatic security special agents.
Question. Foreign Service Worldwide Availability: The Department
recently agreed to limit severely the definition of worldwide
availability and has not been responsive to my requests for a briefing
on the situation. What do the words ``worldwide availability'' mean to
you?
Answer. Under the revised minimum medical qualification standard
for Department of State career foreign service generalists and
specialists, except medical specialists, applicants will need to be
medically cleared to serve at all designated regional medical
evacuation centers (currently Bangkok, London, Pretoria, and
Singapore). A separate revised minimum medical qualification standard
has been agreed to for medical specialists. Assignments will not be
limited to those four posts, and employees--including those with a
disability--will be expected to bid competitively and serve at a wide
variety of posts based upon the needs of the service.
Question. Has the Department effectively eliminated ``worldwide
availability'' by reducing it to just a handful of posts?
Answer. The revised minimum medical qualification standard recently
adopted by the Department will be used only to determine whether an
applicant is medically qualified for hire and will not be used to
define or limit the universe of posts at which the applicant can serve.
Employees, including those with a disability, will be expected to serve
at a wide variety of posts. Adoption of the revised minimum medical
qualification standard is an important step forward in the Department's
efforts to create a workforce that reflects the full diversity of the
American people and ensure we have the best team representing the
United States abroad.
Question. I frequently hear from the Department and its personnel
that the Foreign Service is akin to the U.S. armed forces. Does the
change in definition of ``worldwide'' availability diminish the
similarities between the Foreign Service and our armed forces? If yes,
does that demand a reevaluation of employee benefits for the Foreign
Service?
Answer. The revised minimum medical qualification standard recently
adopted by the Department will be used only to determine whether an
applicant is medically qualified for hire and will not be used to
define or limit the universe of posts at which the applicant can serve.
Career foreign service candidates will still be expected to serve at a
wide variety of posts around the world, and the revised minimum medical
qualification standard is expected to enable the Department to meet its
foreign policy and national security mission at posts throughout the
globe.
Question. HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS--International Organizations: The budget request includes
$344 million to pay a portion of the UN peacekeeping ``arrears'' that
have accrued over the last several years. These arrears are a result of
a disagreement between the UN and the United States on the ``scales of
assessment''--a formula used by the UN to determine the amount member
states are expected to contribute for the general and peacekeeping
budgets. Per U.S. law, the United States will only pay up to 25 percent
of the UN peacekeeping budget. However, the UN ``assesses'' the United
States at a rate of up to 27.9 percent (now 29.6 for the next 3 years).
Will you pledge to withhold payment of U.S. peacekeeping arrears until
the UN establishes a 25 percent cap on contributions by any single
nation?
Answer. We believe that other countries can and should assume more
of the financial burden for UN peacekeeping. We also believe that the
United States' influence at the UN, our ability to strengthen the
integrity of the rules-based international system, and our ability to
lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay our bills in full and on
time.
Question. Would you agree that paying back peacekeeping arrears
before securing the 25 percent assessment rate would be giving away any
leverage in the negotiations? Why or why not?
Answer. We believe that other countries can and should assume more
of the financial burden for UN peacekeeping. However, once the UN
General Assembly has reached agreement on the distribution of financial
responsibility, each country should uphold their responsibility to pay
their share. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue
further in the context of the next negotiation on how much each country
contributes.
Question. As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden agreement, the
Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-Secretary
General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that the United
States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay, the roughly
$500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly excluded
from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since then, the
UN has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama administration
and the Biden administration has sought to pay over Congressional
objections. Do you commit not to pay these ``contested arrears'' per
Congressional intent as outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement?
Answer. My firm belief is that the United States should pay its
assessed contributions in full and on time, while concurrently working
to reduce those contributions by maximizing efficiencies and
encouraging other member states to assume more of the financial burden.
As indicated in the President's FY 2024 budget request, the Department
is seeking funds and authority from Congress to enable payment of
peacekeeping arrears that accrued over the past 4 years. These arrears
are not subject to the Helms-Biden agreement.
Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the UN should
take to reduce the overall size of the UN peacekeeping budget? If so,
what are they?
Answer. UN Security Council mandates are the primary drivers for
the budgetary size of each peacekeeping mission. In these mandates, the
United States works to require missions to develop transition
strategies focused on concrete objectives and to ensure missions have
an exit strategy. Once the secretary-general proposes a budget, we work
to ensure that the budget levels agreed to by the UN General Assembly
are appropriately sized to each mission by finding opportunities to
achieve efficiencies and contain costs to reduce the overall size of
the UN peacekeeping budget.
Question. Are there any specific UN peacekeeping missions you would
support reducing or terminating in order to reduce UN peacekeeping
costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you believe should be
reduced or terminated?
Answer. The United States supports terminating the UN Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), which has long since fulfilled its original purpose.
Unfortunately, Russia and its UNSC partners have blocked efforts to end
the mission. The United States also supports ongoing, mandated
drawdowns of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
(MONUSCO) and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).
We continue to insist those transitions remain conditions-based;
informed by joint UN/host government planning; and attentive to the
security needs of vulnerable populations.
Question. The resumption of funds to the controversial UN
organization, UNRWA, has amounted to close to $1 billion since the
start of the Biden administration and very few reforms have been made.
Please provide an explanation of the reforms initially laid out prior
to the resumption of funds and if or if not those have been undertaken.
Answer. U.S. contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) give the United
States a seat at the table to help strengthen UNRWA's programs and
oversight. Since the resumption of U.S. funding, UNRWA has made
significant reforms. For example, as committed in the U.S.-UNRWA
Framework for Cooperation, UNRWA inspected 87 percent of its facilities
at least twice in 2021 and 100 percent in 2022 to confirm they were
safe and adhered to the Agency's neutrality policies, up from just 28
percent in 2020. With targeted U.S. funding, UNRWA also modernized its
financial and whistleblower policies to ensure alignment with global
best practice and is in the process of introducing digital refugee
identity verification to prevent fraud.
Question. Do you believe that UNRWA is meeting its mandate? Why or
why not?
Answer. Yes. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is mandated by the UN
General Assembly to provide essential services directly to Palestinian
refugees in its five fields of operation. UNRWA's activities include
providing emergency services, education, health, protection, and
livelihoods programming for Palestinian refugees, all of which are
within its mandate. UNRWA plays an essential role in promoting
stability in the region, which benefits the United States and our
regional partners, including Israel.
Question. Please explain efforts by the USG to encourage UNRWA to
diversify its donor funds.
Answer. The United States has frequently encouraged the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) to diversify its donor funding. This includes advocacy with
traditional donors and regional partners, including significant
engagement with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. UN Secretary-General
Guterres has also engaged potential donors directly on UNRWA's behalf.
In 2022, several of these donors announced new funding for UNRWA,
including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Norway, and the European Union.
The U.S. Government will continue to encourage contributions to UNRWA
to help reduce the Agency's financial shortfalls.
Question. In recent engagements with the Palestinian Authority, did
you discuss UNRWA's failure to meet one of its core mandates,
neutrality? Why or why not?
Answer. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) continues to implement essential
regulations regarding UNRWA and its staff's neutrality, integrity, and
impartiality. The United States engages regularly with the Palestinian
Authority on a wide range of issues related to UNRWA, including the
agency's commitment to humanitarian principles, including neutrality.
We are committed to continue working with UNRWA to promote its
provision of effective and efficient assistance with transparency and
accountability in a manner consistent with the principles of
neutrality, tolerance, respect for human rights, and non-
discrimination.
Question. What was the result?
Answer. In these meetings, the Department has underscored the
Administration is seeking to re-build our relationship with the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian people on a basis of
trust, cooperation, and shared values that advance respect for the
human rights of all. As part of these efforts, the Administration also
is fully committed to working with UNRWA and the PA to root out any
problematic content in textbooks, to build the capacity of UNRWA's
teachers, and to monitor UNRWA's efforts. UNRWA's schools are often the
only option for many Palestinian refugee children.
Question. What are your views on the need for management reform
within the UN system?
Answer. An efficient, effective UN is essential to achieving
America's strategic objectives. We consistently work to ensure
international organizations in the UN system adhere to the best
management and oversight practices in the areas of protecting
whistleblowers, ensuring accountability for sexual exploitation and
abuse, promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial
and managerial transparency.
Question. What has the Administration done in regards to UNOPS
controversial investments?
Answer. U.S.-led efforts to reform the United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS) require the organization to return to a focus
on its core mandate to expand implementation capacity for UN entities
and member states; suspend the work of the unit responsible for the
controversial investments; return a portion of excess reserves to
partners; refrain from the pursuit of further activity regarding impact
investments until approved by the Executive Board; strengthen internal
controls, including ethics and audit functions; and pursue
accountability of any officials involved in the fraud/mismanagement.
Question. Has there been any investigation conducted?
Answer. The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
conducted an internal investigation, the report of which has not been
made public. Following the investigation, the United Nations terminated
the contract of Vitaly Vanshelboim, the deputy head of the United
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the CEO of the unit
responsible for the controversial investments.
Question. Please explain your views on reform of the UN Security
Council, particularly on the veto and expansion of permanent member
seats.
Answer. A reformed UN Security Council, as President Biden has
said, is in the best interests of the United States. We support the
expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the UN
Security Council, including permanent seats for countries from Africa
as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. However, we do not support
the expansion or the alteration of the veto.
Question. The United States has rejoined the UN Human Rights
Council and in the last year was able to successfully lobby for the
removal of Russia from the Council over its war crimes in Ukraine.
Since then, what reforms has the Biden administration advocated for?
Answer. The United States continues to seek reforms of the UN Human
Rights Council (HRC), particularly with respect to its membership. The
United States actively engages with allies and partners to work to keep
some countries with the worst human rights records off the HRC and
encourage those with better records to run for seats. The United States
also encourages UN regional groups to field competitive slates, as
appropriate, and press member states to more carefully consider human
rights records of countries running for HRC election.
Question. Have any of these reforms gained traction?
Answer. Yes, U.S. efforts to encourage countries with better human
rights records to run for seats on the Human Rights Council (HRC) and
across UN bodies have been well received by allies and partners. In
October, Venezuela lost its seat to Chile and Costa Rica in a
competitive election. Additionally, during the April 2023 elections for
United Nations Economic and Social Council subsidiary bodies, Russia
was defeated in all the races where they ran on contested slates.
Across UN bodies, the United States will continue to use our vote and
influence to promote and support geographically diverse candidates that
share our values and support the integrity of UN elections.
Question. Does the Biden administration believe it spends a
disproportionate amount of attention on criticizing Israel?
Answer. Yes, we agree the Human Rights Council (HRC)
disproportionately criticizes Israel. As an HRC member state, we remain
committed to partnering with like-minded countries to reduce the amount
of time spent on Israel and anti-Israel resolutions at the HRC. Though
we disagree strongly with the HRC's disproportionate focus on Israel,
U.S. engagement has resulted in many important achievements on the
Human Rights Council, including a Commission of Inquiry on Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, strong statements against PRC human rights abuses
and violations in Xinjiang, and accountability mechanisms on Belarus,
Iran, and Syria, among others.
Question. What steps has the Administration taken to eliminate the
Commission of Inquiry (COI) established to investigate Israel?
Answer. We continue building a coalition of partners to end this
open-ended and vaguely defined COI. During the March session of the
Human Rights Council (HRC), Ambassador Taylor delivered a statement
outlining U.S. objections to the COI. During the June 2022 session, the
United States also led a joint statement signed by a cross-regional
group of over 20 countries condemning the COI's mandate. We continue to
raise our concerns about bias against Israel in the UN system with the
President of the HRC and High Commissioner, as well as with the
Secretary-General's designee as focal point to combat antisemitism in
the UN system, Under-Secretary-General Moratinos.
Question. Does the Administration believe that the Council is a
productive body for the discussion of human rights? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, the Human Rights Council is a productive body for
discussing and advocating for the respect of human rights, and the U.S.
presence has ensured that we can shape the HRC agenda and outcomes. In
addition to ensuring resolutions unfairly targeting Israel were not
adopted unanimously without a vote, we have played a key role in
successful efforts to create and extend the Commission of Inquiry on
Ukraine; create the first ever Special Rapporteur on the human rights
situation in Russia; present the first-ever resolution on the human
rights situation in Xinjiang, China; extend the Fact- Finding Mission
(FFM) on Venezuela; and establish an FFM on Iran.
Question. The lack of progress on a more durable solution to cross
border humanitarian operations into Syria is of grave concern to me.
The recent earthquake worsened already dire conditions the Syrian
people face, particularly those in the northwest. How would you or our
Ambassador to the UN engage with partners in the UNSC to ensure this
mandate renewal passes?
Answer. U.S. officials, including those at the U.S. Mission to the
UN, consistently highlight the scale and scope of the humanitarian
crisis in Syria, as well as the effectiveness and transparency of the
UN cross-border assistance delivery mechanism. We will continue to
vigorously engage members of the UN Security Council, both in New York
and in their respective capitals, to emphasize the need to maintain and
expand the authorization of UN assistance from Turkiye.
Question. Would you recommend that President Biden engage at the
highest possible levels on this important issue?
Answer. We will use all available means to advocate for and support
the continuation of cross-border humanitarian assistance to the people
of northwest Syria, including, as appropriate, diplomacy at the highest
levels.
Question. How will you work to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars
that fund UN humanitarian assistance are not being used to effectively
subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades assistance to Syrians
through seizure of cross-line assistance delivery attempts?
Answer. Humanitarian partners implementing our programs in regime-
held areas must put in place robust risk mitigation mechanisms before
receiving funding, to ensure our aid is not diverted by the regime or
other malign actors. All partners, including the UN, are required to:
1) fully cooperate with third-party monitoring to verify program
implementation; 2) provide immediate updates on any interference with
U.S.-funded assistance; 3) have confidential complaint mechanisms; and
4) submit reports on actual and alleged diversions, such as aid
interference, fraud, waste, or abuse.
Question. Do you believe that cross-line assistance is an
acceptable modality of delivery of humanitarian assistance or as an
alternative to cross-border?
Answer. The United States supports expanding humanitarian access to
all Syrians in need through all modalities, including both cross-border
and cross-line. However, cross-line assistance to northwest Syria is
not an alternative to cross-border assistance in that it cannot match
the scope and scale of cross-border assistance.
Question. In the event of non-renewal of the Syria cross border
mandate, what preparations have been made to continue to support
Syrians with life-saving aid?
Answer. Nothing can replicate the scale of UN cross-border aid. If
the UN cross-border aid mechanism is not renewed, the amount of
humanitarian aid reaching people in need in northwest Syria will
decrease dramatically. However, we have been preparing for this
possibility in response to previous Russian veto threats. We will use
all available means to advocate for and support continued cross-border
humanitarian assistance to northwest Syria. This includes encouraging
UN and NGO partners to pre-position supplies and expand alternative
delivery approaches.
Question. Has the U.S. Government consulted with partners and
allies on alternatives and contingency plans for continuing to support
Syrians with life-saving aid? If so, what are those plans?
Answer. We coordinate closely with our partners and allies,
including fellow donor governments and the Government of Turkiye, and
with our humanitarian partners, regarding contingency plans. We would
welcome the opportunity to discuss those plans in greater depth in an
appropriate setting.
Question. What steps are the United Nations and UN agencies taking
to appropriately plan for the event of non-renewal?
Answer. We would welcome the chance to discuss such plans in depth
in a higher classification setting.
Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria adequately
planned for this event?
Answer. UN agencies have contingency plans in place in the event
the cross-border mandate is not re-authorized in July. However, UN
contingency planning has affirmed that there is no viable alternative
to the existing cross-border mechanism to provide the scale and scope
of assistance currently provided by the UN.
Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria created plans
for eventual hand-off to local partners if non-renewal happens?
Answer. We would welcome the chance to discuss such plans in-depth
in a higher classification setting.
Question. Now that the Office of ``Multilateral Personnel and
Strategy'' has been established, please provide your assessments of the
office's work to achieve its mission to increase Americans in the UN
system and combat malign influence in international organizations.
Answer. Since its formal creation in June 2021, IO's Office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) has made significant progress
in increasing the numbers of U.S. entry-level talent in the UN system
through the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program, increased
advocacy on behalf of U.S. applicants to UN positions, and successfully
campaigned for the election of American candidates to UN leadership
positions, including Doreen Bogdan-Martin's historic election as
Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union last
year. MSP has further ensured U.S. leadership successes and combatted
malign influence by working with allies and partners to advance our
affirmative view of a strong, resilient, and inclusive UN.
Question. Specifically on the Junior Professional Officer (JPO)
program, how can the Administration better recruit and retain talented
Americans for this program?
Answer. The Department of State is employing a multi-pronged
approach to increase the recruitment and retention of U.S. citizens for
the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Program, including increasing
outreach opportunities through virtual or in-person recruitment and
networking events, identifying strategic opportunities for entry-level
placement in UN agencies such as specialized agencies that focus on
emerging priorities, and continuing to foster network building and
mentorship opportunities involving current U.S. citizen staff in the UN
system.
Question. UNFPA: The FY 2024 Budget Request includes $57.5 million
for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). How will you ensure that none of
these funds are used in the support or participates in the management
of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary stabilization in
violation of the Kemp-Kasten amendment?
Answer. UNFPA does not support or participate in the management of
a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. UNFPA
opposes any form of coercive sexual and reproductive health policies or
programs, including but not limited to forced abortion and forced
sterilization, and has worked to eliminate them. UNFPA has consistently
advocated for and promoted the basic right of all couples and
individuals in China and globally to decide freely and responsibly the
number, spacing, and timing of their children.
Question. The UN Peacebuilding Fund: The FY 2024 budget request
includes $1.5 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund for the first time.
Can you explain how the UN Peacebuilding fund promotes peace?
Answer. The Fund may invest with UN entities, governments, regional
organizations, multilateral banks or civil society organizations to
mitigate drivers of fragility and reduce the recurrence of conflict.
The Fund is designed to provide a small injection of support and be a
catalyst for other funding to sustainably address conflict drivers,
such as by supporting the reintegration of armed group members in the
Central African Republic and mitigating inter-clan disputes in Somalia.
Since the Fund's establishment in 2006, it has allocated over $1.6
billion to 65 recipient post-conflict countries.
Question. How does the UN Peacebuilding Fund match with U.S.
National Security Interests?
Answer. The Fund helps stabilize conflict-affected areas, prevents
conflict recurrence, and contributes to the UN's Sustainable
Development Goals. Fund resources address issues such as human rights,
Women, Peace and Security, institution building, transitional justice,
and electoral processes. The Fund additionally complements UN special
political mission resourcing. As it oversees synergy with the Fund,
U.S. leadership on the Peacebuilding Commission ensures constructive
advice to the Security Council and supports implementation of the
Global Fragility Act.
Question. UNESCO: The U.S. ceased funding to UNESCO because it
granted Palestinians full membership. U.S. code (P.L. 101-146 and P.L.
103-236) prohibits the U.S. from funding any organization which grants
full membership to the Palestinians. The FY 2024 budget request
includes $150 million in payments of arrears to UNESCO. Why is the
Administration requesting money to pay arrears which are a direct
result of Palestinian membership?
Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations act includes a waiver authority
that, if exercised, would allow the United States to provide
contributions to UNESCO. The President's FY 2024 budget request
includes approximately $75 million to pay an assessed contribution to
UNESCO and $75 million to pay a portion of accumulated U.S. arrears, a
total of $150 million.
The Department's request for arrears is equally as important as
funding for assessed contributions. Should the United States resume
UNESCO membership without addressing arrears such as through a payment
plan, the UNESCO Constitution will not allow us to serve on the
Executive Board nor vote in the General Conference, limiting our
ability to advance U.S. interests in the organization.
Question. If paid, how will the arrears be distributed?
Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations act includes a presidential
waiver authority that, if exercised, would allow the United States to
provide contributions to UNESCO. Any decision on the use of a potential
arrears payment can only be taken by the UNESCO General Conference.
Any U.S. contributions provided to pay outstanding assessments
would initially be credited to the UNESCO general fund, pending General
Conference consideration of a proposal by the UNESCO director-general
on the use of the funds.
Question. Will the money be returned to other members including the
Palestinians?
Answer. UNESCO reduced its budget to account for unpaid U.S.
contributions while the United States was still a member and not paying
assessed contributions. Accordingly, while a decision by the General
Conference would be made on the use of funds, including application of
those funds to future UNESCO projects in member states, we would not
expect U.S. contributions, such as for arrears, to go to member states
as a result of previously unpaid U.S. contributions.
Question. Summit for Democracy: In 2021, I submitted a question for
the record (QFR) about the Summit for Democracy, which stated: ``The
budget includes programming for democracy, human rights, freedom, and
the rule of law which we welcome. It also references the
Administration's plan for a Summit of Democracy. What definition of
democracy will be you using for inviting countries to participate?''
Answer. We did not use a specific definition of democracy in
deciding which countries to invite to the two summits. As with the
first summit, the second was meant to be inclusive of a regionally and
socioeconomically diverse group of well-established as well as emerging
democracies. We approached the two summits with a clear-eyed
recognition that no democracy is perfect nor the same as another.
Question. Can you please tell us more details of this Summit and
its goals?
Answer. The second Summit for Democracy gathered democratic
leaders, civil society partners, and the private sector for 3 days of
hybrid programming in Washington and co-host countries. The second
summit focused on how democracies deliver economic prosperity, access
to justice, respect for human rights for citizens, and how democracies
are best suited to address the world's most pressing challenges. The
U.S. held an in-person event specifically devoted to exploring how to
help ensure that technology contributes to and does not detract from
democracy.
Question. Two years later, one summit completed, what is your
assessment of Summit(s)?
Answer. The summit process has re-energized democracies abroad and
helped demonstrate how democracies deliver for their citizens. It
strengthened and expanded partnerships with governments and non-
governmental partners to take meaningful action on over 750 commitments
made at the first summit. The Presidential Initiative for Democratic
Renewal has rolled out new initiatives to combat corruption, support
media freedom, protect human rights, and counter the misuse of
technology, including new guidelines for democracies on surveillance.
Question. Do you feel that the Summit for Democracy has achieved
the goals initially laid out? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. The summit has demonstrated how democracies deliver
for their citizens and how democracies are best suited to address the
world's most pressing challenges. The goal of re-energizing democratic
countries and partners was achieved in several ways: the 16 democracy
cohorts that launched (in partnership with civil society); over 70
governments and authorities endorsing a declaration affirming political
commitments; and more than 20 partners joining a commitment to enhance
beneficial ownership transparency.
Question. Does the Administration have a plan for post-Summit?
Answer. The Administration will be working with the Republic of
Korea, which has announced it will host a third summit. We will
encourage our embassies and civil society interlocutors to help
countries and authorities implement the commitments they have made. The
Department of State and USAID will also follow-up from headquarters to
fulfill the ambitious goals laid out at the summit. Summit efforts will
also continue through several democracy cohorts, including the two
U.S.-led cohorts.
Question. What steps are in place to hold countries accountable for
their commitments made during the summit(s) or ``year of action'' in
between?
Answer. At the first summit, nearly 100 participating governments
and authorities made commitments related to democratic renewal and were
invited to submit progress reports on their implementation. Additional
accountability has been provided by non-governmental organizations,
such as Accountability Lab, the Open Government Partnership, and
International IDEA, which developed commitment trackers. The United
States will continue to work with a range of multi-stakeholder
initiatives to track progress on summit commitments.
Question. Why were democratic groups omitted from participation in
the Summit such as the National Unity Government of Burma?
Answer. Representatives from the National Unity Government (NUG)
were featured speakers in summit-related events, including a panel
discussion hosted by the United States Institute of Peace on Burma that
included DRL Acting Assistant Secretary Erin Barclay. We regularly
engage with the NUG as part of larger outreach and engagement with
Burma's pro-democracy movement. The Summit for Democracy aimed to be
inclusive and representative of a regionally and socioeconomically
diverse slate of countries and democratic actors.
Question. Since August 2021, thousands of Afghans and Americans
have been evacuated to the U.S. and Congress formally established the
CARE Office. How many Americans remain in Afghanistan? Of this number,
how many have expressed their intent to depart via USG channels?
Answer. The number of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan fluctuates
regularly as individuals enter and depart Afghanistan. U.S. citizens
are not required to provide the U.S. Government their travel plans. The
number of U.S. citizens remaining in Afghanistan, as tracked by CARE
via their database management system known as FALCON, is 115. Of these,
approximately 40 percent are waiting for their family members'
immigration cases to become interview-ready so that CARE can manifest
them to CAS for further processing. For the other 60 percent, the
Department of State has no record of any immigrant visa application.
The primary applicant American citizens attached to these cases choose
to remain in Afghanistan with their family.
They may travel with USG assistance or by their own means. The
State Department provides immediate relocation assistance to any U.S.
citizen who is in touch with the Department and who requests such
assistance.
Question. How many post-COM SIV principal applicants remain in
Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department does not track the location of SIV
applicants until they are interview-ready and their case files are
assigned to the visa processing post where their consular interviews
will occur outside Afghanistan. The Department prioritizes and
schedules visa interview appointments for Afghan SIV applicants able to
travel outside of Afghanistan at any immigrant visa post where they are
able to appear. The Department continues its efforts to facilitate the
safe and orderly travel of Afghan allies and their eligible family
members who wish to leave Afghanistan.
Question. How many Americans and Afghans remain in Albania?
Answer. To date, I am not aware of any U.S. citizens in Albania
with their Afghan family members. Of the Afghan individuals presently
in Albania, the U.S. Government relocated a limited number from
Afghanistan. The remainder arrived in Albania through other non-USG
channels. We continue to process all Afghans in Albania who are
eligible for relocation under Enduring Welcome. We cannot provide
specific numbers of Afghans in this response, but would be happy to
provide this information in a closed session.
Question. How many Americans and Afghans remain in Kosovo?
Answer. We would be happy to provide this information in a closed
session. We continue to process all Afghans in Kosovo who are eligible
for relocation under Enduring Welcome.
Question. What is the Department's plan to ensure this population
is able to depart Afghanistan, should they wish?
Answer. CARE immediately manifests for relocation out of
Afghanistan every U.S. citizen and Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) who
requests relocation assistance. CARE is aware of several U.S. citizens
and LPRs in Afghanistan who are ready and willing to leave the country,
and we are in touch with these individuals and are actively working to
relocate them. CARE welcomes being apprised of any American citizen or
LPR cases, by phone, email, WhatsApp, or any other method, in order to
immediately effect their departure.
Question. Please provide an overview of how evacuation flights are
administratively operated, including the process in which flights are
selected, the manifests, and the routes to Camp As-Sayliyah (CAS) in
Qatar.
Answer. CARE works with a contractor providing commercial air
services to prepare and relocate eligible Afghans out of Kabul to
platforms in third countries. Routes and cadence are planned according
to commercial and safety standards to meet CARE operational
requirements and in cooperation with host nations willing to accept
eligible Afghans and permit the U.S. Government to process Special
Immigrant Visas, Immigrant Visas, and U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
cases. Manifests are created by a logistics team, drawing from a
population of Afghans who are vetted and travel-ready.
Question. UN Cybercrime Treaty: Congress has received numerous
updates regarding the U.S. effort to negotiate a UN ``Cybercrime
Treaty,'' but concerns remain about scope and intent. Does the
Department intend to submit the Treaty to the United States Senate upon
completion?
Answer. Within the Ad Hoc Committee process, the United States
continues to work towards consensus on a narrowly focused criminal
justice instrument that advances three core priorities: increasing
international cooperation to fight cybercrime, respecting human rights,
and supporting multistakeholder engagement. The United States will
analyze the finalized treaty text to determine whether it is in line
with U.S. interests before signing and submitting to the Senate for
advice and consent if appropriate.
Question. What steps is the Department taking to ensure that any
new agreement remains compatible with existing international agreements
like the Budapest Convention?
Answer. The United States is working towards a UN treaty that
complements the Budapest Convention and can be ratified by both
Budapest and non-Budapest member states. The United States is working
closely with other Budapest member states participating in the UN
cybercrime treaty negotiations to ensure that any new treaty is
consistent with and complementary to the Budapest Convention. Since Ad
Hoc Committee treaty negotiations began, three countries have joined
the Budapest Convention.
Question. In what ways have Authoritarian states attempted to
subvert the stated intent of the UN Cybercrime Treaty during
negotiations?
Answer. Russia and its allies are endeavoring to leverage this
process to advance their positions supporting government control of
communication technologies. They are pushing proposals that would
compel States Parties to cooperate in criminal cases without sufficient
safeguards, including for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such
as the freedom of expression. The United States and its like-minded
partners have been successful in countering these Russian-driven
proposals by pushing for a narrowly tailored criminal justice
instrument.
Question. What steps are you taking to prevent these countries,
particularly Russia and the PRC, from rewriting key definitions or
attempting to reinterpret or side-step longstanding international
standards and best practices that the United States supports?
Answer. The United States is seeking to use established terms and
definitions that are consistent with U.S. law and well-known to the
international community of law enforcement practitioners. Some member
states, including Russia and its allies, are proposing new concepts,
terms and definitions that are incongruent with longstanding
international norms and existing agreements. The United States has and
will continue to advance strategic coordination with its like-minded
partners to oppose such proposals, and to secure agreement for language
reflecting international best practices, standards, norms, and
definitions.
Question. The Chinese Communist Party has put forth a consideration
to consider criminalizing ``Dissemination of False Information'' in the
fourth round of negotiations in Vienna. Is the Department aware of this
proposal and what is the plan to combat using such language to
accomplish malign means?
Answer. The language proposed by the PRC is deeply concerning to
the United States. The United States has and will continue to engage
broadly with other countries to build support for a narrowly tailored
criminal justice instrument and to oppose any proposals that directly
cater to authoritarian regimes.
Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please
provide working definitions for ``cyber'' as it relates to negotiation
for the treaty.
Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In the
context of the UN treaty negotiation process, the United States has not
proposed a definition for the term ``cyber,'' and does not believe a
definition of ``cyber'' is necessary in this convention. The United
States is seeking consensus on definitions consistent with the
provisions of the Budapest Convention and U.S. domestic criminal law,
neither of which includes a definition of ``cyber.''
Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please
provide working definitions for ``crime'' as it relates to negotiation
for the treaty.
Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this
context, the United States has not proposed a definition for the term
``crime,'' and does not believe a definition of ``crime'' is necessary
in this convention.
Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please
provide working definitions for ``computer'' as it relates to
negotiation for the treaty.
Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this
context, the United States has not proposed a definition for the term
``computer,'' but has proposed definitions for the terms ``computer
system'' and ``computer data'' drawn from the Budapest Convention.
Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please
provide working definitions for ``cybercrime'' as it relates to
negotiation for the treaty.
Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this
context, the United States has proposed that ``cybercrime'' be defined
to mean those offenses that are established under the convention. The
United States is seeking to use established terms and definitions that
are consistent with U.S. law and well-known to the international
community of law enforcement practitioners.
Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please
provide working definitions for ``cyberattack'' as it relates to
negotiation for the treaty.
Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. The United
States has not proposed a definition for the term ``cyberattack,'' and
does not believe a definition of ``cyberattack,'' which implicates
topics that are beyond the scope of this treaty, is necessary.
Question. Does the International Criminal Court have jurisdiction
over U.S. citizens?
Answer. I continue to strongly disagree with the International
Criminal Court's prior actions relating to the Afghanistan situation
with regard to U.S. personnel and maintain our longstanding objection
to the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel.
Question. Does the International Criminal Court have jurisdiction
over citizens of Israel?
Answer. As I conveyed publicly, the United States firmly opposes
the opening of the investigation by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) into the Palestinian situation. The ICC has no
jurisdiction over this matter. The United States does not believe that
the Palestinians qualify as a sovereign state and therefore they are
not qualified to obtain membership as a state, or participate as a
state, in international organizations, entities, or conferences,
including the ICC. The United States maintains the position that the
ICC should focus on its core mission of serving as the court of last
resort in punishing and deterring atrocity crimes.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that
the open investigation into U.S. personnel in Afghanistan is closed?
Answer. I continue to object to the International Criminal Court's
previous attempt to assert jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. I believe
our concerns are best addressed through engagement with all
stakeholders. On April 4, an ICC appeals chamber issued a judgment
clearing the way for the prosecutor to investigate ongoing abuses by
the Islamic State-Khorasan Province and the Taliban, in line with the
prosecutor's decision to de-prioritize other aspects of the Afghanistan
investigation. I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of the
human rights situation in Afghanistan, including allegations of
atrocities and the persecution of women, girls, journalists, rights
activists, and members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and
welcome efforts to pursue accountability for such acts.
Question. Does the term ``human rights'' include a right to access
an abortion?
Answer. The United States is not a party to any international human
rights treaty that enumerates a right to abortion. The United States
recognizes that everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, including for sexual
and reproductive health.
Question. The funding requested for the Human Rights and Democracy
Fund (HRDF) is $180.7 million--a decrease from the FY 2023 enacted
level of $222.45 million. Could you elaborate how the State Department
intends to address troubling democratic trends with this decrease in
funding?
Answer. While the budget request for Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor's (DRL) FY 2024 Human Rights and Democracy Fund
(HRDF) funding is less than the FY 2023 enacted level for HRDF, the
overall USG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance request level in FY
2024 increased by $250 million from the FY 2023 request. The Department
employs a range of diplomatic and programmatic tools to address
troubling democratic trends globally. Our resources, including HRDF,
are used for targeted democracy and human rights programs that are
designed to combat democratic erosion and other threats to democracy
that operate in lockstep with our bilateral, multistakeholder, and
bilateral initiatives.
Question. How can the Department adequately support civil society
actors abroad to prevent further democratic backsliding?
Answer. The Department supports civil society through several
foreign assistance programs, in addition to ongoing diplomatic
engagement. Some build the capacity of civil society to promote
democracy and human rights and hold their governments accountable.
Others support civil society and human rights defenders when they come
under threat through several rapid response and emergency assistance
programs.
Question. Atrocity Prevention: The Administration's FY 2024 budget
request does not include specific funding for atrocity prevention writ
large and specifically for the Task Force. Could you please explain the
rationale for the omission and elaborate on the reasoning why?
Answer. The Department utilizes current funding, including funds
not specifically earmarked for atrocity prevention, to support the
Atrocity Prevention Task Force in implementing the United States
Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, including
both prevention and response work. This includes programmatic and
diplomatic efforts, drawing from various funding resources from
different operating units, as well as engagement with civil society and
likeminded governments and multilateral actors.
Question. Does this omission indicate that atrocities prevention
and response is not a priority of the Administration despite the
requirements of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act?
Answer. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to fulfill the
requirements of the Elie Wiesel Act, including expanding the number of
individuals trained in atrocity prevention and widening the scope of
the training targets to include interagency and multilateral partners.
The Task Force will refine the Elie Wiesel Act annual report to ensure
the 2023 report provides greater clarity and detail on the atrocity
prevention work of the Task Force and its participating departments and
agencies, including work in specific country contexts.
Question. What resources does the State Department require to
successfully implement the Elie Wiesel Act and Atrocities Prevention
Strategy?
Answer. Utilizing the current atrocity prevention resources, the
Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to implement the U.S. Strategy
to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, engaging in
prevention, response, and recovery work. This includes programmatic
work, diplomatic efforts, engagement with and support for civil
society, and partnering with likeminded governments and multilateral
actors. It also involves building capacity in affected communities;
supporting justice, including accountability and services for
survivors; and synchronizing efforts between aligned work streams,
including the Global Fragility Act, the Updated U.S. Strategy to
Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence, and the Women, Peace, and
Security agenda.
Question. Does the State Department plan to mandate training for
key personnel, particularly foreign service officers beyond those
traditionally responsible for ``human rights'' or other related reports
and senior leadership?
Answer. State Department personnel receive instruction on key
policy issues, including human rights, at every level of their careers,
in courses ranging from new-hire orientation training to our most
senior leadership training, including the Ambassadorial Seminar. In
accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act (as amended),
training on promoting and protecting International Religious Freedom is
mandatory for all foreign service officers and specialists at all
levels.
Question. How is the State Department working with civil society in
states that are at-risk or experiencing atrocities? What does that
partnership look like?
Answer. The Department works with civil society in atrocity risk-
affected communities in myriad ways, including information sharing,
building early warning and early response networks, providing
psychosocial support, and training civil society on documenting
atrocities. The Department develops and shares broader best practices
around related concepts of transitional justice and peacebuilding,
community building and social cohesion efforts, addressing historical
grievances, empowering historically underrepresented individuals to
participate in peace processes, empowering and protecting journalists,
and supporting human rights defenders.
Question. How is the State Department supporting the work of the
Ukraine Atrocities Advisory Group?
Answer. The State Department has joined together with the EU's
European External Action Service and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office to form the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for
Ukraine (ACA). The State Department's Office of Global Criminal Justice
(GCJ) provided a $10 million grant to Georgetown University, which
serves as the lead coordinator for the ACA. GCJ hopes to provide an
additional $10 million grant to continue this initiative to support
Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) by deploying experts
and leading international prosecutors in the investigation and
prosecution of atrocity crimes.
Question. What resources does the Ukraine Atrocities Advisory Group
require to be most effective?
Answer. The United States, UK, and EU established the Atrocity
Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine (ACA) as a coordination mechanism to
pool our collective resources to assist Ukraine's War Crimes Units
working under the Office of the Prosecutor General. Our EU and UK
partners are invested in this initiative and ensuring the future
success of the ACA. An ACA ``Framework Arrangement'' has now been
signed between the United States, UK and EU partners that consolidates
this united effort. We understand that securing accountability for
atrocity crimes will take time and that we need to make a long-term
investment in supporting the domestic authorities of Ukraine to do
their work.
Question. What other atrocities documentation and evidence
preservation efforts does the State Department plan to support in FY
2024?
Answer. Justice and accountability are central pillars of the U.S.
response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including through
support for mechanisms designed to bring perpetrators of atrocities to
justice. The FY 2024 budget request includes funding to continue
efforts to document and raise awareness of atrocities, preserve
potential evidence, identify suspects, and prepare war crimes cases for
prosecution. This assistance will support Ukraine and the international
community in holding accountable perpetrators of war crimes and crimes
against humanity in Ukraine.
Question. Beyond Ukraine, what other geographic areas is the State
Department focusing on to prevent and respond to atrocities?
Answer. The Department works globally to prevent and respond to
atrocities, with atrocity prevention work happening in every region.
This work utilizes all available tools to prevent, respond, and recover
from atrocities, and includes work with a wide range of partners, both
from governments and civil society.
Question. How do you plan to elevate atrocity prevention within the
interagency and expedite the implementation of the Elie Wiesel Act and
Atrocities Prevention Strategy?
Answer. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to mainstream
atrocity prevention into broader policy decision-making processes, by
consistently looking to expand and improve outreach, and by ensuring
the work of the task force is clearly articulated and the value of both
the task force and the subsequent prevention and response work is front
and center of public facing statements and interactions. This includes
engaging with the interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partners,
legislative colleagues, civil society, the think-tank community, and
with academia on methods and opportunities for prevention.
Question. Genocide: Do you believe that the Russian Federation and
its designees are actively or have been actively committing genocide
against the people of Ukraine since February 2022? Why or why not?
Answer. We have been closely tracking the wide-ranging abuses and
atrocities committed by Russia's forces since they first invaded
Ukraine in 2014. Since 2022, we have assessed that Russia's forces have
committed war crimes and members of Russia's forces and other Russian
officials have committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. These do
not foreclose future determinations of other atrocity crimes. We
continue to closely monitor, document, and analyze the situation and
provide support to others to do the same. We are committed to
accountability for Russia's heinous actions.
Question. Should the International Criminal Court issue other
arrest warrants to hold Russia or other designees accountable for its
crimes in Ukraine?
Answer. As President Biden said, the warrants of arrest that have
been issued are justified. There is no doubt that Russia is committing
war crimes and atrocities in Ukraine, and we have been clear that those
responsible must be held accountable. The International Criminal Court
prosecutor is an independent actor and makes his own prosecutorial
decisions based on the evidence before him.
Question. At the March 22, 2023, hearing, you said that the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) system was the preferred way to help Taiwan
strengthen its defenses rather than Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
grants. What role do you see for Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)
in providing rapid capability for Taiwan?
Answer. The Department recognizes that the drawdown authority is
one of the USG's most valuable tools to quickly provide defense
articles to foreign partners. As you know, there are numerous policy
and national security implications the United States must consider
before the President decides whether to authorize a drawdown. DoD,
State, and interagency partners closely review all potential security
cooperation tools, including the drawdown authorities and FMF, to
decide the most appropriate mechanisms to support Taiwan.
Question. Will use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)
diminish the importance of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as the
principal means of providing security assistance to foreign partners?
Answer. No, assistance to Ukraine through the military assistance
drawdown authority can be a vital mechanism for providing arms quickly
because the articles are coming from DoD stock. However, pulling from
DoD stock is not a sustainable, global solution. FMF is more suitable
for supporting enduring requirements and can be used to complement PDA
in situations like the one in Ukraine.
Question. While you have a central role in the notification of
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to Congress, these packages are
developed at DoD without input from State. Does the use of PDA further
erode State's lead role in the security assistance function?
Answer. No, the Department of State is involved throughout the
drawdown process, including implementation. Under delegation from the
President, the Secretary of State has directed each military assistance
drawdown for Ukraine since September 2021.
Question. The Department's FY 2024 budget requests $6.1 billion in
FMF globally. This represents only a $71,500 increase above the FY 2023
enacted FMF topline. Further, the East Asia and Pacific FMF topline of
$129 million remains the same as FY 2023 appropriations. How do you
justify a flat FMF topline for the East Asia Pacific in light of, and
by the Biden administration's own statements, the significant and
growing threat China poses to the region?
Answer. The Department weighed its global priorities against
budgetary constraints and political realities when requesting the $6.1
billion in total FMF for FY 2024. The requested $129 million in FMF for
the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region--and additional $113 million
request in FMF for emerging priorities that could potentially support
the Indo-Pacific--balances requirements in EAP countries for FMF in
recent years with emerging priorities for the region and partners'
ability to finance their own defense needs without requiring additional
funds from the U.S. taxpayer.
Question. Do you believe Taiwan is a priority security partner for
the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific? If so, why does the FY 2024 budget
request not include earmarked funds for Taiwan FMF?
Answer. We have been quite clear that our support to Taiwan is
rock-solid. Taiwan has a high-income economy capable of supporting a
multi-billion-dollar defense budget. The Department is seeking to
address requirements in Taiwan through a range of available foreign
policy tools, including our FY 2024 FMF request of $113 million to
address emerging priorities globally, which could include Taiwan.
Question. The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA), which was
included in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
authorized up to $2 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) grants to Taiwan. Despite this new authority, and the Biden
administration's support for TERA, the Department's FY 2024 budget
request does not explicitly provide any FMF funding for Taiwan. Do you
support full implementation of TERA, including FMF grants to Taiwan? If
so, why is this support not reflected in the Department's FY 2024
budget request? If not, why not?
Answer. The Department appreciates the provisions in the TERA on
FMF grant assistance to Taiwan, and we are exploring options for
Taiwan. The FY 2024 budget includes a new FMF request of $113 million
to address emerging priorities globally, which could include Taiwan.
Question. The State Department's FY 2024 budget requests $129
million in FMF for the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region, $50 million
of which is for the ``State East Asia and Pacific Regional'' FMF line.
Does the Department plan to allocate any of this $50 million in EAP FMF
to Taiwan?
Answer. Taiwan could be considered as a potential recipient for the
requested $50 million in EAP FMF. However, this would have to be
balanced with the requirements other EAP partners.
Question. The Department's FY24 budget requests $50 million in FMF
for the ``Countering People's Republic of China Influence Fund''
(CPIF). Does the Department plan to allocate any of this $50 million in
CPIF FMF to Taiwan?
Answer. Taiwan may be considered for CPIF FMF funding. All CPIF
proposals are evaluated against other global and emerging priorities as
well as their potential to meaningfully counter malign PRC influence.
Question. The Department's FY 2024 budget requests $113 million in
FMF in a new ``Emerging Global Priorities'' line. Of that, the budget
requests only $16 million for Indo-Pacific partners, including
potentially Taiwan. How much of this $16 million in FMF does the
Department plan to allocate to Taiwan?
Answer. By requesting FMF in this manner, the Department is seeking
to retain the flexibility to address urgent and emergent requirements
in the year of execution, of which Taiwan would almost certainly rank
as a top priority. I hope Congress will support our request for this
new global FMF line to target such critical gaps.
Question. Does the Department believe $16 million or less in FMF to
Taiwan is a serious or remotely credible deterrent against Chinese
aggression?
Answer. FMF is not our only tool for deterrence in Taiwan or
elsewhere. The Department is taking a range of actions across military,
diplomatic, and economic realms to strengthen Taiwan's deterrence. We
are reviewing all available authorities, including security assistance,
to consider short- and long-term opportunities to bolster support for
Taiwan and other critical partners in the region.
Question. Foreign Military Sales: Our Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
system is currently facing significant case backlogs, long delivery
leads, and slow processing times, leaving U.S. security partners with
capability gaps and driving many of them to look elsewhere--in some
cases, to our competitors--to fill their defense equipment needs. In
order to ameliorate these and other problems in the FMS system, the
Department of Defense (DoD) is undertaking a comprehensive study on its
role in FMS and possible executive and legislative reforms to FMS more
broadly. DoD and the State Department must work together in order to
ensure FMS reforms are collaborative and appropriately address issues
within the system. Are you committed to maintaining the State
Department's leadership role in FMS as outlined in the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA)?
Answer. Yes, consistent with section 2 of the Arms Export Control
Act, the State Department remains committed to maintaining and
exercising its statutory authorities with respect to the FMS program.
Question. What is the status of the Department's own review of FMS
procedures?
Answer. The review is complete, and we expect to brief our
committees of jurisdiction on our proposals in the near future.
Question. AUKUS: Does the Department already have the statutory
authority it would need to implement changes to export control
procedures (under ITAR and the AECA) in order to facilitate and
operationalize the implementation of AUKUS? If so, has the Department
used any of these authorities in relation to AUKUS? If not, why not?
Answer. I support facilitating secure defense trade with our allies
to ensure we realize the goals of AUKUS. The Department is confident
that current statutory authorities provide us the ability to develop
new, cross-cutting export control tools tailored to allow sharing of
our most sensitive technology for AUKUS programs. We are currently in
discussions with the Department of Defense to implement such new tools
and look forward to providing further details to Congress as the
discussions progress.
Question. Has the Department provided Australia and the United
Kingdom specific guidance or a list of tangible steps they need to take
in order for their export control systems to be considered
``comparable'' by the State Department to that of the United States?
Answer. As allies, friends, and partners, we are working together
to ensure our technology security frameworks are aligned and responsive
to known threats, especially in relation to the sharing and co-
developing of technology that provides critical military or
intelligence advantages to the United States and our allies. The
Department continues to engage with both Australia and the United
Kingdom on tangible steps our countries should take to best facilitate
secure defense trade between our nations.
Question. In what ways are the UK and Australian legal, regulatory
and technology systems insufficient to grant them a 38J license
exemption?
Answer. Among other requirements the Congress laid out in section
38(j) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Department notes that the UK
and Australia's current controls on the export of tangible or
intangible technology are not assessed to be comparable to those of the
United States.
Question. Will the Department provide any 38J license exemption for
Australia and the United Kingdom?
Answer. We are currently working with the Department of Defense to
implement a new cross-cutting export control tool to allow our most
sensitive technology to be exported expeditiously and securely for
AUKUS programs. With this in mind, the Department continues to discuss
the requirements outlined in Arms Export Control Act section 38(j)
within the dedicated defense trade dialogues we hold with both
Australia and the UK.
Question. AFRICA--U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit: The Biden
administration committed $55 billion in investments in Africa over the
next 3 years during the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit (ALS), ``working
closely with Congress''. How is this $55 billion investment reflected
in the FY 2024 budget request?
Answer. The President announced $55 billion for Africa at the
second U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit in December 2022. This funding level
consisted of appropriated and requested funds from many U.S. Government
agencies, including State and USAID, over three fiscal years (FY 2021
through FY 2023) for north and sub-Saharan Africa. The over $8 billion
in State and USAID foreign assistance included in the FY 2024 request
is a historic high for the continent and is in addition to the $55
billion announced at the Africa Leaders' Summit.
Question. I understand that the $55 billion figure is largely made
up of prior year funds. How will the Administration message to African
governments, who have high hopes for a large influx of new U.S.
investment, that this commitment is actually just a continuation of
regular programming?
Answer. The $55 billion announced for Africa at the 2022 U.S.-
Africa Leaders' Summit is a continuation of long-standing U.S.
leadership and commitment to African security, democracy, development,
and economic growth. The United States is the largest single donor to
Africa. The more than $8 billion in foreign assistance for Africa in
the President's FY 2024 budget request is a historically high level and
underscores our intention to continue providing robust U.S. support for
African partners.
Question. Despite repeated requests for Congress to be
substantively engaged in ALS, including through my S.Res.538 which
passed the Senate with unanimous consent on May 26, 2022, Congress was
not meaningfully consulted or involved in ALS or the commitment of $55
billion. How do you plan to remedy this?
Answer. The National Security Council engaged with Members of
Congress leading up to the Africa Leaders' Summit and the Department
notified close to $9.8 billion in assistance supporting Sub-Saharan
Africa included in the $55 billion announcement. We will continue to
stress the importance of stakeholder engagement and continue to notify
Congress before releasing foreign assistance funds as required and
leverage engagement mechanisms, such as pre-consults, to improve the
quality of those interactions.
Question. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT)
was announced during the ALS, to ``support emerging democratic
governments and civil society at critical moments.'' What criteria will
be used to determine ``critical moments''?
Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT)
initiative enables the U.S. Government to partner with regional bodies,
governments, and civil society to support successful, stable, and
sustainable democratic transitions. ADAPT will surge experts to the
field to support transition tasks and fund programming such as national
dialogues, census taking, voter registration, and constitutional
reforms, among other potential activities. Benefiting countries will be
identified based on political transitions on the continent.
Question. How will ADAPT be managed and implemented to ensure funds
can be released quickly in order to enable a timely response to
opportunities in critical moments?
Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT)
initiative, totaling $75 million over 3 years, is an interagency effort
designed to enable the U.S. Government to expeditiously support
democratic transitions. We will do so by quickly deploying experts
during a transition and ensuring close coordination among key
stakeholders across the interagency. These efforts will help ensure
ADAPT resources are released quickly and utilized effectively and
successfully.
Question. I understand that $25 million of FY 2022 funds and $25
million of FY 2023 funds will be combined with the $25 million FY24
request to make up the initial $75 million investment in ADAPT. Where
was the $50 million from FY 2022 and FY 2023 taken from to make it
available for ADAPT?
Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT)
program is a 3-year State and USAID initiative, announced at the 2022
U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit, which will support democratic transitions
and counter democratic backsliding in partnership with African regional
bodies, governments, and civil society. The funding allocations for FY
2022 and FY 2023 are still being finalized, and additional funding will
be sought from the FY 2024 and FY 2025 budgets, subject to the
availability of funds.
Question. The FY 2024 request includes $50 million for an
initiative announced at ALS called Digital Transformation in Africa.
This follows a FY23 $20 million request for $20 million for Digital
Africa. Can you please provide more information on the new program
Digital Transformation in Africa?
Answer. A signature initiative of the Biden-Harris administration,
Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) will expand digital access and
literacy and strengthen digital enabling environments across the
continent. DTA aims to facilitate over $450 million in financing for
Africa in line with the African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy
and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. DTA will support
increased economic opportunity and improved e-government service
delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient African digital
ecosystem led by African communities and built on an open,
interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.
Question. Ethiopia: On March 20, 2023, you made an atrocities
determination for Ethiopia, finding that war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing were committed over the course of the
conflict in Northern Ethiopia. I publicly called for accountability for
atrocities committed in Ethiopia in April 2021, May 2021, June 2021,
August 2021, September 2021, November 2021, December 2021, March 2022,
June 2022, July 2022, August 2022, and November 2022, and introduced
S.Res.97 (117th Congress) and was the lead-cosponsor on S.3199 (117th
Congress) with Senator Menendez to call for and require accountability
measures. Additionally, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House
Foreign Affairs Committee staff repeatedly raised the question of an
atrocities determination for the conflict in Northern Ethiopia in
regular calls with the State Department for over 2 years. Why was the
atrocities determination for the conflict in Northern Ethiopia made
after the cessation of hostilities in December 2022, and not used as an
accountability tool as atrocities were being committed?
Answer. An atrocity determination is one tool among many to promote
justice and prevent atrocities. I made the determination now based on
review of the law and the facts and considering the situation in
Ethiopia, including the status of diplomatic efforts to end fighting
and facilitate peace negotiations. Throughout the conflict, we
repeatedly condemned human rights abuses and violations, calling for
investigation and accountability for those responsible. I have and will
continue to stress that any lasting peace depends on accountability,
including for those in positions of command.
Question. How is the atrocities designation balanced with State
Department and USAID efforts to restore development assistance to
Ethiopia and the increase in the budget request for FY 2024 over FY
2023?
Answer. An atrocity determination is a result of a careful review
of the law and available facts. A determination, which acknowledges
that atrocities were committed, is independent of the development
assistance requirement to determine if there are ongoing gross
violations of human rights by a government. Currently, we have
assistance restrictions in place, and will re-evaluate based on the
situation on the ground.
Question. Did the United States commit, along with the European
Union, to the Government of Ethiopia that it would allow the mandate of
the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
(ICHREE) expire in October 2023?
Answer. Upon learning that the Government of Ethiopia was
considering tabling a resolution to prematurely end the mandate of
ICHREE, the United States, together with likeminded partners,
immediately engaged senior Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa,
Washington, and Geneva and prevailed upon them to allow ICHREE to
continue its work and complete its full mandate, ending in September
2023. We also conveyed our grave concerns over the significant
institutional damage the precedent of early termination would cause.
Whether the ICHREE mandate is further renewed will be subject to the
decision of the UN Human Rights Council members, and the U.S. position
will be based on the human rights situation on the ground.
Question. Last year, the ICHREE reported its finding that the
Ethiopian Government committed crimes against humanity in its denial
and obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Tigray, and the war crime
of using starvation as a weapon of war. Did the State Department's
review that led to the atrocities determination confirm that finding?
Answer. The determination was not intended to be an exhaustive
accounting of all acts that constituted atrocity crimes over the course
of the conflict. We may revise and expand our determination as
warranted.
Given the allegations of many different specific war crimes in this
armed conflict, we decided to address the category of war crimes
collectively and not attempt to make public determinations as to each
specific war crime. Our focus was on the final determination, which was
that all parties to the conflict committed war crimes.
Question. Does the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) have full, unhindered access to the Tigray region, to include
Western Tigray?
Answer. OHCHR has informed us it has access throughout Tigray,
though it has not attempted to travel to Western Tigray in recent
months due to security and resource constraints. USAID has provided $1
million to OHCHR to cover the cost of four additional international
monitors, which should be deployed within the next several weeks. Other
international partners are funding additional monitors.
Question. As you know, conflict in Ethiopia is not limited to
Tigray and surrounding areas. Tensions are high and conflict is brewing
in multiple regions of Ethiopia, including in Oromia, the Somali
Region, and Benishangul-Gumuz. How are U.S. resources, including those
requested for FY 2024, being utilized to address widespread conflict in
Ethiopia and to support the development of responsive, inclusive and
representative democratic institutions?
Answer. We remain concerned about tensions and conflict in all
parts of the country, in particular Oromia. The United States regularly
calls upon the parties there to engage in political dialogue and
exercise restraint. Through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, we support programs aimed at conflict-mitigation and
peacebuilding focusing on Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and People's Region. USAID Office of Transition
Initiatives also supports peace and reconciliation processes with a
current focus in Addis Ababa and the regional states of Oromia and
Amhara.
Current assistance limitations prevent the United States from
supporting certain programs to address the root causes of conflict,
such as poverty and unemployment. USG funding that is not currently
restricted is being used to improve the capacity of Ethiopian civil
society to engage constructively in transitional justice and national
dialogue processes.
Question. On March 22, 2023, two days following your announcement
of the atrocities determination, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs detailed, on Twitter, a discussion between Minister of Foreign
Affairs Mesganu Arga and U.S. Charge d'Affairs Tracy Jacobson, where
Ambassador Jacobson reportedly said that the atrocities determination
``will not have legal implication or any barrier on the bilateral
relations of Ethiopia and the United States''. Is this an accurate
depiction of Ambassador Jacobson's comments during the meeting? If no,
what was said during the meeting on the impact of the atrocities
determination on U.S./Ethiopia bilateral relations? If yes, do you
agree with this reported statement by Ambassador Jacobson?
Answer. As part of the atrocity determination notification process,
the U.S. embassy, including the Charge d'Affaires, engaged with the
Government of Ethiopia at several levels to discuss the determination
and next steps. In those meetings, Embassy officers explained why the
United States was announcing the atrocity determination, indicated
which institutions were found to have committed what atrocity crimes,
and urged the Government of Ethiopia to pursue accountability and
reconciliation through a comprehensive, credible, genuine, and
inclusive transitional justice process.
While there generally are no legal consequences triggered by an
atrocity determination in and of itself, the determination recognizes
the severity of the crimes that were committed on all sides of this
conflict. We have emphasized to the Government of Ethiopia at all
levels that it is crucial to acknowledge these crimes in order to move
forward, commit to truth-telling, and seek justice for victims. We have
also noted that such a process is key to our bilateral relationship
going forward.
Question. What implications does the atrocities determination have
for the U.S./Ethiopia relationship?
Answer. This determination is about revealing the truth,
acknowledging the suffering of victims and survivors, and pursuing
justice and accountability. We have emphasized to the Ethiopian
Government the importance of acknowledging the abuses that took place
in the recent past and a comprehensive, credible, genuine, and
inclusive transitional justice process, which will be key to our
bilateral relationship going forward. The United States stands ready to
support Ethiopians in a credible process to break the cycle of violence
and forge a durable peace for the future.
Question. How does the atrocities designation affect Ethiopia's
eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for
2024?
Answer. This determination is based on actions that occurred in
connection with the conflict. It does not preclude Ethiopia from
qualifying for AGOA privileges again, assuming the United States is
able to confidently assess that the Government of Ethiopia is no longer
engaged in gross violations of human rights.
To help make that assessment, we are pressing the Government of
Ethiopia to continue allowing access for international human rights
monitors.
Question. Horn of Africa: Now that the implementation of the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement for the war in northern Ethiopia is
well underway, do you plan to expand the mandate of the Special Envoy
for the Horn of Africa to cover additional issues in the Horn of Africa
region, including but not limited to Somalia, conflicts in Ethiopia
beyond Tigray and the surrounding areas, and the ongoing humanitarian
crisis caused by acute food insecurity?
Answer. While there has been significant progress in implementing
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on northern Ethiopia, the
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) remains fully engaged to
consolidate a lasting peace, including regarding human rights
accountability and transitional justice. SEHOA also is fully engaged on
forging a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region. SEHOA
contributes to other policy goals in the region as needed.
Question. Burundi: The State Department's 2022 Human Rights Report
for Burundi detailed the significant human rights issues that persist
in Burundi, including ``extrajudicial killings; forced disappearance;
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by or
on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions, arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or
detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary . .
. serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including
violence or threats of violence against journalists and censorship;
substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and
freedom of association . . . serious and unreasonable restrictions on
political participation; serious government corruption; [and] serious
government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international
human rights organizations.'' These findings are in stark contrast with
U.S. efforts to reengage with the Government of Burundi after the death
of President Nkurunziza in June 2020 and taking office of President
Ndayishimiye. The FY 2024 request for Burundi is 10.4 percent higher
than the FY23 request. How does the FY 2024 budget request address the
human rights concerns raised in the 2022 Human Rights Report for
Burundi?
Answer. The Department of State welcomes the improved relationship
between the United States and Burundi, which we have used to engage on
areas of concern for the U.S. Government, including human rights. The
FY 2024 request continues support for programming to strengthen the
capacity of civil society organizations to advocate for an improved
human rights environment. We will also seek resources through centrally
managed and regional accounts, as appropriate, to complement our
existing bilateral programming.
Question. Given the poor human rights record detailed in the most
recent Burundi Human Rights Report (2022), why was there no increase to
the Democracy, Human rights and Governance line item for Burundi
(relative to the FY 2023 request) commiserate or in excess of the
overall increase for Burundi?
Answer. Department of State officials, including Assistant
Secretary of State Molly Phee and Ambassador Melanie Higgins, regularly
raise human rights concerns with Burundian officials. The FY 2024
request increases democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding
to Sub-Saharan Africa by 53 percent over the FY 2023 request, including
significant increases in regional and sub-regional operating units.
Additional funding for regional sub-regional operating units will
ensure our DRG resources are nimble and responsive to emerging or dire
DRG needs, such as those in Burundi.
Question. What is the benefit to the United States in the Biden
administration abandoning its ``human rights first foreign policy'' in
Burundi in order to build a closer relationship to the Ndayishimiye
government?
Answer. The Department of State continues to promote respect for
human rights around the world, including in Burundi. Department
officials regularly raise human rights concerns with Burundian
officials, urging them to conduct complete and transparent
investigations into alleged abuses, hold those responsible accountable,
and cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. The improved
relationship between the United States and Burundi means such
conversations are more constructive than in the past.
Question. Does the Biden administration plan to hold anyone
accountable for the atrocities and human rights violations that have
occurred under President Ndayishimiye?
Answer. In December 2022, the United States designated former Prime
Minister Alain Guillaume Bunyoni under Section 7031(c) of the annual
appropriations act for his involvement in a gross violation of human
rights. In line with our global commitment to promote respect for human
rights and accountability, the Department continues to proactively
consider the use of all available tools to respond to any new or
continuing human rights violations and abuses in Burundi.
Question. Africa Bureau Staffing: In responses to Questions for the
Record as part of your confirmation process, you committed to working
``with the White House and relevant State Department bureaus and
offices to ensure that all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently
and consistently staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' I similarly
asked you the following question for the record following the hearing
on the FY23 State Department Budget Request: ``Under your leadership,
how has the Department budgeted for and taken steps to ensure that the
Department `sufficiently and consistently' staffs `all posts' in the
region?''
Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS)
posts are in Africa. I remain deeply committed to resolving the
challenge of filling positions in those posts. Insufficient
infrastructure, inadequate schools, health care challenges, and the
remote nature of many postings in Africa are inherent impediments to
getting our posts to full staffing. In the last year the Department has
reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders' attention on the
most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore creative
solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these difficult
locations.
Question. You responded: ``Recruiting and assignments of Foreign
Service (FS) officers are controlled by the Bureau of Global Talent
Management (GTM). We expect to increase our FS hiring by at least 30
percent this fiscal year from the previous year, which will be the
highest FS hiring in a decade. The Entry Level Division of GTM's Career
Development and Assignments Office works closely with the AF Bureau
staff to ensure entry-level positions in AF are filled in a timely
manner. Similarly, we strive to fill every available mid-level job in
AF. However, the pool of potential candidates for AF service is
diminished due to medical care and schooling concerns, particularly for
parents of high schoolers or children with special needs. The
Department continues to explore ways to remove such barriers to
service. The majority of the vacancies in AF are at the FS-02 and FS-03
level, which reflects both the global shortage of FSOs due to reduced
hiring and a Department-wide shortage of specialists in IT, facilities
management, security, and office support.'' The Africa Bureau remains
chronically under-staffed, both in Washington, DC and in Embassies on
the continent. What do you believe your record is, as Secretary, in
addressing the acute staffing challenges faced by the Africa Bureau?
Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS)
posts are in Africa. I remain deeply committed to resolving the
challenge of filling positions in those posts. Insufficient
infrastructure, inadequate schools, health care challenges, and the
remote nature of many postings in Africa are inherent impediments to
getting our posts to full staffing. In the last year the Department has
reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders' attention on the
most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore creative
solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these difficult
locations.
Question. Under your leadership, how has the Department taken steps
to ensure that the Department ``sufficiently and consistently'' staff
``all posts'' in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Answer. The Department continues to use increased incentives for
service in historically difficult to staff posts around the world,
including service needs differential for extended service, along with
hardship differentials, and prioritized assignments. Additionally,
several initiatives are underway, including development of regional
support models and use of a new assignments algorithm that matches
bidders and bureaus based on mutual preferences. In the last year, the
Department has reformed incentives to better focus bidders' attention
on the most difficult to staff posts.
Question. What resources are included in the FY24 request to
specifically address staffing challenges in the Africa Bureau?
Answer. The Department's FY 2024 request supports funding for 15
new U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) positions in the Bureau for African Affairs
(AF), including 10 overseas program positions, three domestic program
positions, and two public diplomacy positions.
Question. Has the Africa Bureau requested resources to address its
acute staffing challenges that are not reflected in the FY 2024 budget
request? If yes, what resources were requested?
Answer. As part of its effort to address the staffing challenges in
Africa, the Bureau for African Affairs (AF) routinely works with the
Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) to fill its entry-level
positions. The FY 2024 request includes $37 million for AF in operating
and public diplomacy resources, including 15 new positions, to increase
capacity for regional competition with the PRC and help manage complex
embassies.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should put forward
its most experienced and adaptable personnel in Africa to compete
against China and Russia and to fulfill our policy objectives?
Answer. The Department always strives to place our most experienced
and adaptable personnel in places where needs are most acute to advance
U.S. interests, including in Africa.
Question. Thirty of the last 45 career Foreign Service nominees for
ambassadorial posts in the Africa Bureau were to serve as first time
ambassadors. While every ambassador has a first post somewhere, first
time ambassadors have been nominated for positions in highly complex
political and conflict environments that are stated national security
priorities for the United States in Africa, including Ethiopia, Sudan,
South Sudan, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. What will you do to ensure
that experienced ambassadorial nominees are selected for high-profile
and strategic U.S. missions in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Answer. The Department has a robust process for choosing chiefs of
mission. I am committed to identifying highly qualified individuals for
every one of these positions in the Bureau of African Affairs,
particularly emphasizing those candidates with hardship and regional
experience, as well as demonstrated leadership experience. In a number
of cases, the best qualified individual has not yet been an ambassador.
Question. Prosper Africa: Prosper Africa brings together 17 U.S.
Government departments and agencies to foster two-way trade and
investment between the U.S. and Africa, with a secretariat led by
USAID. The FY 2024 request includes $100 million for Prosper Africa.
This follows a $100 million FY 2023 request, $77 million FY 2022
request and a $75 million FY 2021 request.
What are the concrete accomplishments of Prosper Africa to date?
Answer. With dedicated funding, Prosper Africa has established a
deal facilitation platform where advisors have built a pipeline of
nearly 500 deals valued at over $25 billion. It has launched robust
continental services, including networks of African suppliers and U.S.
buyers, and a catalytic investment facility, which are expected to
boost African exports and U.S. investment by $2 billion in the next 5
years. It also helped mobilize $1.5 billion of investment in climate,
health, and sustainable infrastructure via new partnerships between the
$1 trillion U.S. pension community and African counterparts.
Question. What will an additional $100 million investment help
Prosper Africa accomplish?
Answer. Prosper Africa is redoubling its efforts by planning to
invest $171 million of FY 2021 to FY 2023 funding that will increase
U.S. investment in Africa and African exports to the United States by
$2 billion in the next 5 years--a conservative estimate. The additional
$100 million in FY 2024 funds requested will enable Prosper Africa to
dramatically increase the number of supported transactions, broaden its
geographic coverage, bolster the activities and staff capacity of other
U.S. Government agencies, and create more opportunities to leverage
private capital. In Kenya, $5.3 million in Prosper Africa funds have
leveraged more than $265 million--a 50:1 return.
Question. Now 4 years into Prosper Africa, do you think the
existing organizational structure is conducive to a whole-of-government
approach to increasing trade and investment with Africa?
Answer. Prosper Africa advisors in Washington and across North and
Sub-Saharan Africa are critical to advancing the initiative's mission.
Advisors in Africa work with U.S. embassy colleagues while those in
Washington, DC work with partner agencies across the U.S. Government;
this coordinated approach enables the U.S. Government to respond more
efficiently and effectively to private sector needs. The Secretariat
supports hosting interagency detailees. Legislation codifying Prosper
Africa's mission would further increase the initiative's effectiveness.
Question. Is USAID best suited to lead the secretariat given
Prosper Africa's goals and objectives?
Answer. USAID's strong technical expertise in trade and investment,
extensive field presence, and flexible cross-continental programs
enable it to lead Prosper Africa. USAID has established the structures
critical to the initiative's operations, including the Prosper Africa
Secretariat, and a new program that offers a robust package of
continent-wide services which are expected to boost U.S. investment and
African exports by $2 billion over the next 5 years.
Question. Do you believe that Chiefs of Mission are sufficiently
empowered to drive trade and investment priorities in Africa?
Answer. Yes, our ambassadors are empowered to drive trade and
investment priorities in Africa, as is evidenced by their strong track
record advocating for U.S. firms with their host governments. Several
State Department bureaus offer programmatic resources for embassy deal
teams. Some of these resources include the Commerce-State Partner Post
Program, Direct Line, Business Facilitation Incentive Fund (BFIF), the
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and the
Minerals Security Partnership.
Question. Somalia: The largest request for Democracy, Human Rights
and Governance funding in Sub-Saharan Africa for FY 2024 is for Somalia
($33 million), a 73.7 percent increase over the FY 2023 request. The
security environment in Somalia, lack of political will for democratic
reforms, an inability to hold one-person-one-vote elections for 50
years (due to the security situation and lack of political will) and
limited freedom of movement of Somali and implementing partners makes
democracy, human rights and governance programs difficult to implement
and expensive.
Answer. Yes, the State Department is committed to advocating
strongly for democratic reforms in Somalia, including human rights and
good governance, which we view as inextricably linked to our overall
goal of advancing peace and stability in the country.
Question. Somalia: Does this prioritization of Somalia for
democracy, human rights, and governance resources in the budget reflect
the Department's diplomatic commitment to pursuing democratic reforms
in Somalia?
Answer. Yes, the State Department is committed to advocating
strongly for democratic reforms in Somalia, including human rights and
good governance, which we view as inextricably linked to our overall
goal of advancing peace and stability in the country.
Question. Will the Department commit to matching its planned
funding of these Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programs with
commensurate diplomatic and other approaches to hold the Somali
Government accountable to their commitments and to ensure that U.S.
funding for universal suffrage in Somalia is not met with another
disappointing indirect selection process?
Answer. The State Department is committed to advocating
diplomatically for Somalia to hold inclusive, transparent, and
democratic elections at all levels of government. We are encouraging
the Federal Government of Somalia to begin the political, technical,
and legal preparations for the 2026 election cycle as soon as possible
to avoid the potential for another flawed indirect selection process.
We also are urging it to adopt a realistic timeline for holding
universal suffrage elections at the national level.
Question. What adjustments in strategy, as compared to the strategy
pursued from 2017-2022, will the Department pursue to ensure that
investments of significant democracy, human rights and governance funds
in Somalia achieve results.
Answer. We are advocating for the Federal Government of Somalia to
advance technical reforms and develop governance institutions at the
same time it builds political consensus on elections, the constitution,
and other federal agreements. We have also broadened engagement and
outreach to international actors to ensure a more unified approach to
supporting political reconciliation and reform. Diverging approaches by
external actors was a significant impediment to progress from 2017 to
2022.
Question. Where does Somalia rank on the State Department's list of
priorities for Africa?
Answer. Advancing peace and stability in Somalia is among the State
Department's top Africa priorities, given the threat that Al-Shabaab
and other terrorists in Somalia pose to U.S. citizens and interests in
the region. Continued instability in Somalia also threatens broader
U.S. interests and impedes economic growth and development.
Question. Nigeria: The FY 2024 request for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Governance funding for Nigeria ($25.5 million) is a 56.4 percent
increase over the FY 2023 request. At the same time, the Peace and
Security budget request for Nigeria decreased by 17.3 percent. Does the
Department regard support to election in Nigeria as a cyclical or
continuous need?
Answer. Our elections assistance is designed to build systems and
processes over the long term so that electoral outcomes are viewed as
free and fair, to educate the public on their civic rights to vote, to
give voice to the youth, and to help all Nigerians see a future running
for office. These results are ultimately designed to increase electoral
participation and to see an improvement from the poor 27 percent
turnout of the most recent presidential election. This work requires
continuous engagement in order to achieve results and, therefore, the
Department regards this funding as a continuous need.
Question. What is the rationale for such a significant increase in
the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance budget for Nigeria, given
that national elections (approaching elections are typically the
rationale for an increased budget) were just held in the last 2 weeks?
Answer. This increase reflects a broader request across missions in
Africa for increased funding. For Nigeria in particular, it is worth
noting that FY 2024 funds would support activities taking place in
2025, 2 years before Nigeria's 2027 national elections. That said,
election support is one component of a diverse Democracy, Human Rights,
and Governance (DRG) portfolio in Nigeria. DRG activities also enhance
civic voices and accountability, increase accountability and
effectiveness of public institutions, and help prevent conflict.
Question. Given the significant and myriad security challenges
facing Nigeria, ranging from an intractable violent extremist
insurgency, widespread banditry, farmer/herder conflict and revival of
separatist movements, please explain the reduction in budget for Peace
and Security initiatives in Nigeria.
Answer. Peace and security assistance to Nigeria includes
activities funded within the following accounts: Development
Assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). While IMET and
INCLE funding has remained relatively straight-lined over the past
several fiscal years, there is a slight reduction to DA-funded peace
and security assistance in the FY 2024 request given the need to make
tradeoffs for other critical programming priorities such as robust
increase for democracy, human rights and governance assistance.
Question. The 2023 national (February 25) and state-level (March
18) elections in Nigeria were widely viewed as flawed by international
observers, Nigerian candidates and political parties, and the Nigerian
public. Despite this, on March 1--the same day as the election
commission announced presidential results--the State Department
congratulated the president-elect and the Nigerian people on the
conduct and result of the February 25 election, noting it ushered in a
``new period for Nigerian politics and democracy.'' Given how the
electoral process has continued to play out since the March 1
announcement of results, including with the March 18 state-level
elections, do you think the State Department's March 1 congratulatory
remarks and tone were premature?
Answer. Our decision to offer congratulations was made after
careful analysis of the official results announced by the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the results of the parallel
vote tabulation process, which largely corroborated that announcement.
INEC is constitutionally empowered to announce election results and
recognizing its announcement of Tinubu as the winner was consistent
with our support for Nigeria's constitutional democracy. We have been
very clear, however, about our concerns regarding the process,
particularly the logistical shortcomings that contributed to the
disappointingly low turnout percentage. We recognize that INEC must
continue to improve, and that we must play our part in fostering a more
effective electoral process.
Question. Do you think the State Department's position on the 2023
electoral process has caused the U.S. to lose credibility with the
Nigerian people?
Answer. Our position has been consistent throughout this election
season: we support a peaceful, credible, and transparent electoral
process. Even as we congratulated the president-elect as the announced
winner, we expressed our concerns about the failures of the Independent
National Electoral Commission and emphasized to candidates and parties
that any disputes must be resolved peacefully in the courts. Our
diplomats in Nigeria routinely engage with a wide variety of civil
society actors, and I am confident that our messaging continues to
resonate with the Nigerian people.
Question. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has, in a bi-
partisan manner, been critical of proposed arms sales to Nigeria due to
the abysmal human rights record of the Nigerian military. Most
recently, a shocking December 2022 Reuters investigative piece reports
on a secret mass abortion (at least 10,000) program and child killings
carried out by the Nigerian military in its war against Boko Haram.
Nigerian solutions, including the investigation by the Nigerian Human
Rights Commission, are important to investigating these reports.
However, the use of taxpayer dollars to support development and
security efforts in Nigeria, coupled with a global commitment to
protecting internationally recognized human rights, necessitates that
the U.S. engage in serious independent efforts to investigate and
respond to allegations of this nature. What is the State Department
doing to verify the Reuters report and engage with the Nigerian
Government on human rights concerns related to the Nigerian military?
Answer. I, too, was shocked and dismayed to read about the
allegations and we have taken them very seriously. Our diplomats in
Abuja and senior officials in Washington have spoken directly with
Nigerian officials at the highest levels to strongly emphasize the need
for a thorough and transparent investigation. As a result of our
efforts, the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission is conducting an
investigation with the results expected later this summer. We will
continue to monitor the progress of this investigation and urge that it
be done in a transparent manner while protecting any individuals who
may be interviewed, or who may come forward with information, about the
accusations.
Question. South Sudan: While a reduction in the budget request for
South Sudan is appropriate given the general failure of the parties in
South Sudan to make good on their commitments outlined in the
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
(R-ARCSS), the dire humanitarian situation faced by the South Sudanese
people, and the continuation of localized proxy conflicts, it is
curious that the line items for Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization,
and Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance were reduced. What is the
State Department, alongside USAID, trying to achieve in South Sudan?
Answer. Our goal is to support the South Sudanese people's demands
for an inclusive transition to democracy and a peaceful, stable future.
We continue to work to mitigate and prevent sub-national violence;
protect human rights; better target U.S. assistance to communities in
need; protect and defend civic space for civil society, independent
media, and peaceful political voices; and hold the transitional
government accountable to its commitments. The lower level of
assistance signals our concerns with the lack of sustained progress by
South Sudan's leaders.
Question. How does this budget request reflect those goals?
Answer. The request for a lower level of assistance signals our
concerns with the lack of sustained progress by South Sudan's leaders
in preventing subnational violence, protecting human rights, tackling
corruption, facilitating humanitarian access, and assuming a greater
responsibility for service delivery. Despite budget reductions, funding
for critical agriculture, education, health, democracy, and
humanitarian assistance continues. I continue to press for peace and
accountability for human rights abuses through targeted sanctions under
E.O. 13664 and 13818.
Question. Will the Department conduct a review of foreign
assistance to South Sudan this fiscal year to ensure that U.S.
assistance adheres to the principal of ``do no harm''?
Answer. The Department and USAID routinely monitor and review all
U.S. assistance flows to South Sudan to ensure alignment with ``do no
harm principles,'' program goals, and proper stewardship of U.S.
taxpayer dollars. To enhance these efforts this fiscal year, USAID is
finalizing a program to fund a risk management officer within the UN
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The officer would support UNMISS's
efforts to better organize the international community to address
continuing challenges with assistance diversion, threats, and taxation
in South Sudan.
Question. Why has the Department chosen not to put the support we
know will be needed for Ukraine in FY 2024 into the budget proposal you
submitted to Congress?
Answer. The FY 2024 budget request for Ukraine of $753.2 million
builds on critical work we initiated with the supplemental
appropriations. It also takes into consideration that State and USAID
are currently working to allocate more than $16.5 billion made
available in the fourth Ukraine supplemental. Given the fluidity of the
situation, we will continue to assess requirements and available
resources to meet those needs.
Question. There is less than $4 billion remaining in the
Presidential Drawdown Account for FY 2023. There are over 6 months
remaining in the fiscal year. Given PDA burn rates over the past year,
it seems clear that the PDA account will run dry long before the end of
FY 2023. Does the Administration intend to submit a Ukraine
Supplemental Request in the coming weeks or months?
Answer. We appreciate the Ukraine supplemental appropriations
Congress provided for Ukraine, including through the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative and Foreign Military Financing, as well as the
increased authority for drawdowns under section 506(a)(1) and section
552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Administration has not
made a determination regarding a supplemental request for Ukraine for
FY 2023, however, we continue to assess the requirements as well as
available resources to support Ukraine.
Question. Does the Administration intend to continue depending on
supplemental budget requests to Congress to keep funding our military,
economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine?
Answer. We appreciate the significant supplemental appropriations
Congress provided to support the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale
war against Ukraine. We will utilize all available funding to address
the highest needs and continue to work with other donors to leverage
additional support to help meet Ukraine's needs, including its
security, humanitarian, and economic assistance needs. Given the
fluidity of the situation on the ground, we will continue to assess
requirements and available resources to meet those needs.
Question. Rebuilding Ukraine is a project that must begin now, even
before the fighting stops. What role do you believe the United States
should play in rebuilding Ukraine?
Answer. Ukraine will lead its recovery, but the United States must
play a crucial role in supporting these efforts. Diplomatically, we
will continue to engage with Allies and partners, including in the G7,
on supporting Ukraine's recovery. We will continue to support
engagement by multilateral development banks, and we will continue to
engage with the private sector on opportunities to help Ukraine rebuild
and modernize. We will use the assistance resources provided to us by
Congress to contribute to this historic effort to help Ukraine and its
people recover from Russia's war and continue their European path.
Question. What role does the U.S. expect the European Union to play
in the reconstruction of Ukraine?
Answer. We will continue to partner with the European Union (EU) in
supporting Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. The EU has made
substantial commitments of economic support, including =18 billion for
budget support through 2023. We anticipate that EU engagement will
deepen as Ukraine continues its path to EU membership, particularly on
supporting the Government of Ukraine's efforts to enact reforms, ensure
macro-financial stability, and repair or modernize its infrastructure.
We will coordinate closely with the EU, including through a G7 multi-
donor coordination platform, to ensure that we advance our mutual
goals.
Question. When the reconstruction of Ukraine begins in earnest, how
does the State Department expect to financially contribute?
Answer. We are still in the process of evaluating potential
reconstruction needs given the fluidity of the situation on the ground.
The U.S. effort will include working with Ukraine and other donors to
develop a comprehensive framework of reconstruction and reform
requirements and resourcing needs. The United States will continue to
stand with Ukraine, work with allies to burden share in reconstruction
efforts, and use resources responsibly to advance U.S. foreign policy
goals.
Question. Do you anticipate the need for supplemental budget
requests to fund reconstruction of Ukraine?
Answer. We continue to work within the interagency and with the
Government of Ukraine and other donors to assess funding needs for
Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. Given the fluidity of the
situation on the ground, we continuously assess requirements and
available resources to meet those needs, to include burden sharing with
allies. The President would determine if another supplemental budget
request is needed in order to continue supporting Ukraine in defending
and rebuilding its country.
Question. Does the Administration support the concept of
confiscating or repurposing frozen Russian sovereign assets, in
coordination with an international coalition, in order to support
Ukraine?
Answer. The Administration supports exploring all legally available
options, in coordination with Allies and partners, that would ensure
that Russia pays for the damage it has caused, including to Ukraine's
critical infrastructure. With our G7 partners, we stated our
determination, consistent with our respective legal systems, that
Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized
until there is a resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's
violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Question. Has the Government of Ukraine ever conveyed support for
using frozen Russian sovereign funds to support in meetings with U.S.
officials?
Answer. The Government of Ukraine has conveyed its support publicly
and in meetings with U.S. officials for careful consideration of all
options that would ensure that Russia pays for the damage it has caused
to Ukraine, including using frozen Russian sovereign funds to rebuild
Ukraine.
Question. Have any other Allies or partners expressed interest in
using frozen Russian sovereign assets in order to support Ukraine?
Answer. Along with our G7 partners and consistent with our
respective legal systems, we stated our determination that Russia's
sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until
there is a resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's violation
of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Together with our
Allies and partners, we are exploring legally available options for
using frozen Russian sovereign assets to help pay for Ukraine's long-
term reconstruction.
Question. Has the Department conveyed any opinion or position on
using frozen Russian sovereign assets in order to support Ukraine?
Answer. We have stated our determination, with G7 partners, that
Russian sovereign assets will remain immobilized until there is a
resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's violation of
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any resolution to the
conflict must ensure Russia pays for the damage it has caused.
Question. Does the Executive Branch currently possess the
authorities to confiscate or redirect frozen sovereign assets to
Ukraine? If so, what are those authorities?
Answer. The Executive Branch possesses a number of tools to support
Ukraine and hold Russia to account, including section 1708 of the
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. M, P.L.
117-328), which provides for the Department of Justice to transfer
certain forfeited Russian assets to the Department of State for use in
Ukraine, our general asset forfeiture authorities, and our broad array
of sanctions authorities. We value the tools that Congress has provided
us, and we are considering all available options to make the most
effective use of these tools.
Question. Would a permissive authority allowing the USG to
confiscate Russian sovereign assets and direct them to Ukraine increase
or decrease U.S. leverage over Russia?
Answer. The Executive Branch possesses a number of tools to support
Ukraine and hold Russia to account, including section 1708 of the
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. M, P.L.
117-328), which provides for the Department of Justice to transfer
certain forfeited Russian assets to the Department of State for use in
Ukraine, our general asset forfeiture authorities, and our broad array
of sanctions authorities. We value the tools that Congress has provided
us and we are considering all available options to make the most
effective use of these tools.
Question. Embassy Issues in Europe: For the last few years, two of
the U.S.-sponsored Voluntary National Contribution positions at NATO
have been given to U.S. foreign service officers who are China experts.
The U.S. has purposefully made the decision to devote these two
positions to China-watchers with the goal of raising NATO's level of
knowledge about China. We now understand that despite the acute need
for a better understanding of China in NATO, and NATO's recent move to
spend more time and energy on confronting the China question, the State
Department has made the decision that these two positions will no
longer be filled by China hands. Why was this decision made?
Answer. The Department is working to identify resources to renew
these two Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) positions on NATO
international staff since they were previously established with
temporary resources.
Question. Does the State Department believe that this staffing
decision is in line with the National Security Strategy's stated goal
``to align our efforts [on China] with our network of allies and
partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause''?
Answer. The Department is working to identify resources to renew
these two Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) positions on NATO
international staff since they were previously established with
temporary resources.
Question. Over the past several years, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
has had its staff severely reduced by actions taken by the Russian
Government. Please provide an update on the staffing situation,
including the Russian Federation's provision of diplomatic visas for
U.S. foreign service officers, at Embassy Moscow.
Answer. The embassy continues to face staffing and other challenges
as the result of Russian actions, including the ongoing impasse with
the Russians on diplomatic visas.
Together with the embassy team and Washington, I am committed to
strengthening our mission's operations, and, where possible, engaging
with the Russian Government to seek practical solutions to enable the
mission to continue its important diplomatic work.
Question. Please provide an update on the staffing situation at the
Russian Federation's Embassy in the United States, including
consulates.
Answer. The Russian Federation maintains a diplomatic presence at
its embassy in Washington, DC and two consulates in New York City and
Houston. The Russian Federation also maintains a presence at its UN
Mission in New York City.
Question. Has the Russian embassy's staffing in the United States
now been reduced to match the low level of staffing at the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow remains understaffed, as a
result of actions taken by the Russian Government. We continue to
engage the Russian Government over diplomatic visas to address our
staffing needs. We remain focused on a better balance in our respective
staffing postures.
Question. INDO-PACIFIC--Mission China: Your FY 2024 budget requests
asks for an increase of 69 locally employed staff for our Mission in
China. What is the rationale behind these increases?
Answer. The FY 2024 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)
request includes $2.3 million for an additional 69 locally employed
staff in the Indo-Pacific region to align support staff with the
growing numbers of new initiatives and U.S. direct hire positions. Of
the 69 positions, 11 would be allocated to Mission China to support
management functions in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. The FY 2024
budget rollout slide deck incorrectly asserts that all positions
support Mission China operations--this was a technical error.
Additional detail related to this request will be included in EAP
chapter of the FY 2024 CBJ A-1.
Question. Is it to fill staffing gaps caused by curtailments of
Direct Hires during COVID, or challenges recruiting Direct Hires to go
to China?
Answer. Neither. This was in error. The FY 2024 budget rollout
slide deck incorrectly asserts that all 69 locally employed staff
positions support Mission China operations. The FY 2024 Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) request includes $2.3 million for an
additional 69 locally employed staff in the Indo-Pacific region to
align support staff with the growing numbers of new initiatives and
USDH positions. Of the 69 positions, 11 would be allocated to Mission
China to support management functions in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Wuhan.
Additional detail will be included in the EAP chapter of the FY 2024
CBJ A-1.
Question. How is the Department vetting these individuals?
Answer. Like all U.S. missions abroad, Mission China may appoint
locally employed staff (LE staff) only after completion of a thorough
background investigation (to include collaboration with the host
government, as appropriate) and security certification process. Each
case is reviewed by a regional security officer for issuance of a final
security certification. LE staff members are reinvestigated on a
regular, recurring basis to maintain their security certification.
Question. What safeguards are you taking with respect to
counterintelligence concerns, including LE Staff who may be forced or
pressured by the PRC Government to do things they do not want to do?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Office of
Counterintelligence (DS/CI) created a dedicated counterintelligence
(CI) unit within Embassy Beijing's Regional Security Office (RSO). DS/
CI and the Beijing CI unit are responsible for measures against CI
threats from foreign intelligence services targeting Mission China
personnel, information, and facilities. They are supported by
Washington-based investigative, analytical, and program staff. Mission
China issued guidance to LE Staff on what to do if approached by PRC
security officials, instructing them to report interactions to the RSO.
Question. China/Indo-Pacific: The Department has asked for $2
billion in mandatory spending for the Indo-Pacific region and $2
billion for hard infrastructure, but did not propose offsets. Do you
support cutting funding from somewhere else--including domestic
spending--to ensure that these foreign policy priorities are funded
properly?
Answer. The Department continues to stand by all elements included
in the FY 2024 President's budget request, both on the mandatory and
discretionary sides. It is critical that these foreign assistance
investments are made in order to for us to effectively compete with the
PRC globally. We are not providing specific offsets attached to this
proposal, as the Administration has proposed offsets as a whole across
the FY 2024 President's budget.
Question. Please provide at least 5 examples of projects or
initiatives you would like to support through this $2 billion in
mandatory funding.
Answer. Funding will support competitive connectivity in the Indo-
Pacific, making economies more connected and resilient through
transformative investments in emerging technologies, supply chains, and
transportation. Programs will advance a robust regional approach to
secure Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) digital technology and other
secure, high-standard technologies that provide like-minded
alternatives to the PRC's predatory and coercive economic practices.
Funding will also enable the United States to coordinate strategic
investments with likeminded partners and incentivize lasting
commitments from host governments that advance longer-term, deeper
cooperation in countries most at risk of coercion and predatory
influence.
Question. Your proposal includes $2 billion in a new revolving fund
for Development Finance Corporation (DFC) equity investments. There is
bipartisan support for using the DFC to advance a credible U.S.
economic policy and counter bad investments by China. Unfortunately,
the Biden administration has turned it into an organization to advance
progressive policy priorities like climate and gender--including a
mandate that the DFC cannot work on natural gas projects, causing many
U.S. partners to turn to dirty coal from China. What reason do we have
to believe that the Administration will not use this new ``revolving
fund'' towards the same ends?
Answer. Being able to make equity investments helps DFC offer an
attractive and viable alternative to potential partners in markets
where the PRC is often active. The proposed revolving equity fund would
enable DFC to reinvest returns from its initial investments to provide
the higher value investments that host countries would prefer, an
important tool in our strategy to outcompete the PRC. DFC would use
these resources to support critical private sector projects consistent
with applicable investment policies, and natural gas projects would not
be categorically excluded from receiving support.
Question. Infrastructure/PGII: The Department is seeking $2 billion
in mandatory funds for ``hard'' infrastructure and another $250 million
in discretionary funds, which would go to Project for Infrastructure
and Investment (PGII) projects on climate and gender equity. Do you
support cutting domestic spending to offset the costs of this line item
and to ensure this national security priority is actually funded?
Answer. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
(PGII) was launched by the G7 to offer a credible alternative for
financing of high-quality infrastructure in emerging markets. These
investments across discretionary and mandatory funding will allow us to
advance strategic, capital-intensive, and multi-year hard
infrastructure projects necessary to effectively outcompete China. We
are not providing specific offsets attached to this proposal as the
Administration has proposed offsets as a whole across the FY 2024
President's budget.
Question. If the mandatory funding does not materialize, will you
prioritize ``hard'' infrastructure over climate and gender projects to
advance competition with China?
Answer. The foreign assistance levels in the FY 2024 President's
budget request will be critical for us to effectively compete with the
PRC. We cannot succeed by taking a piecemeal approach. The requested $2
billion in mandatory funding is necessary to advance strategic,
capital-intensive, multi-year infrastructure projects--such as undersea
fiberoptic cables and 5G networks--that would otherwise be lost to
geostrategic competitors. Project for Infrastructure and Investment
(PGII) resources are needed to further level the playing field in
digital connectivity and security, climate, clean energy supply chains,
and energy security sectors.
Question. Will you state publicly that the purpose of PGII is focus
on hard infrastructure? I have been told privately in writing that this
is the case, and members of the State Department have also stated this
on briefing calls with SFRC staff. However, the Administration
continues to emphasize the prioritization of climate, gender, etc. in
its public messaging.
Answer. Fundamentally, PGII aims to support the infrastructure
investments our partners are seeking. While some of this funding may be
used for projects that have co-benefits to our energy security work and
advance gender equity goals, the majority would be used for a variety
of strategic infrastructure projects including trusted information and
communications technology networks, connective transportation corridors
and hubs, as well as agriculture-related infrastructure and health
systems.
Question. Please provide at least 5 examples of projects or
initiatives you would like to support through this $2 billion in
mandatory funding.
Answer. Mandatory infrastructure funding will focus on advancing
specific hard infrastructure projects that are highly strategic,
including fiberoptic cables and 5G networks with trusted vendors; ports
and railroads connecting critical minerals to Western markets; and
vaccine manufacturing. For example, we are looking to build out the
Lobito Corridor--a rail linkage that would be the only non-PRC
infrastructure connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo's copper
and cobalt belt with global markets through Angola. PGII is seeking to
layer additional investments in digital, energy, agribusiness, and
other areas to maximize the economic and development impacts for both
the U.S. and the local partners.
Question. MIDDLE EAST--Strategic Competition: Our longstanding
Middle East partners are increasingly seeking to diversify their
defense and diplomatic relationships in a manner that is often
inconsistent with U.S. national security objectives. These partners
point to Biden administration Iran policies, overly restrictive arms
sales, the pivot to the Asia Pacific, the Afghanistan withdrawal, and a
lukewarm embrace of the Abraham Accords as evidence of a U.S. retreat
from the region and a reason to diversify relationships with Russia and
China. How do you address these concerns and ensure the primacy of the
United States as the partner of choice in the Middle East?
Answer. Our affirmative agenda of regional engagement is anchored
by work with partners to mitigate food insecurity, address climate
change, enhance maritime security, and cooperatively bolster air and
missile defense. We also working vigorously to advance regional
integration through the Negev Forum and to broaden, deepen, and expand
the Abraham Accords. We continue to advance robust, purposeful defense
cooperation with our partners to meet their security requirements. Our
partners strongly prefer U.S. military equipment while PRC sales to the
region remain comparatively modest.
Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle
East, what are the implications for U.S. interests?
Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as
the partner of choice across the Middle East. Russia and the PRC
continue to support malign state and non-state actors that fuel unrest
throughout the region. They shield Tehran from accountability for its
support for the Houthis, and Russia's Wagner mercenaries are
responsible for atrocities in Syria and Libya that have fed instability
more widely in Africa. De-escalation and diplomacy together with
deterrence have been at the core of the Biden administration's approach
to the Middle East.
Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle
East, what are the implications for global energy commons?
Answer. The Middle East's energy industry is dominated by national
oil companies that operate largely independently of foreign powers.
While some are seeking to expand relationships with China, Middle
Eastern countries maintain longstanding ties with U.S. companies and
look to U.S. and other western companies for innovative technologies.
The United States remains the top global producer and a key exporter of
oil, gas, and energy technologies, and is contributing to ensuring
global energy markets are stable.
Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle
East, what are the implications for the generational struggle against
terrorism?
Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as
the partner of choice across the Middle East. The United States remains
committed to working with our allies and partners to reduce tensions
and build governing and security structures strong enough to withstand
and combat the spread of terrorism in the Middle East. Russia is
focused on its war of aggression against Ukraine and the PRC has yet to
show the willingness to constructively combat the threat of terrorism.
At the same time, both Russia and the PRC are strengthening their ties
to Iran, the single-most destabilizing force in the region and largest
sponsor of global terrorism.
Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle
East, what are the implications for human rights?
Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as
the partner of choice across the Middle East, and both work at cross-
purposes to our own efforts to address human rights concerns. This
includes the genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and
refoulement of Uyghurs to the PRC. Russia's support for Syria and Iran
contributes to regime violence against their own citizens, and against
civilians in Yemen through Tehran's support for the Houthis. Russia's
Wagner mercenaries are responsible for atrocities in Syria and Libya
and have fed instability more widely in Africa.
Question. Iran: On February 20, 2023, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) announced Iran has developed uranium enriched to
84 percent, just short of weapon-grade uranium. Does the Administration
continue to maintain a policy to ensure Iran will never acquire or
develop nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes, President Biden is absolutely committed to ensuring
Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. If Iran crosses the 90 percent threshold of uranium
enrichment, how is the Administration prepared to respond?
Answer. We remain absolutely committed to ensuring Iran never
acquires a nuclear weapon. We are preparing for all possible
contingencies, including the possibility Iran will cross the 90 percent
threshold, in full coordination with Israel and our other partners and
allies.
Question. If Iran crosses the 90 percent threshold of uranium
enrichment, is the Administration prepared to respond militarily?
Answer. The President is absolutely committed to ensuring that Iran
never acquires a nuclear weapon, and we believe diplomacy is the best
way to accomplish this goal. President Biden has been clear that we
have not removed any option from the table.
Question. What discussions has the Biden administration had with
the Israelis on what Iranian nuclear non-compliance would merit a
military response? If we haven't had these discussions, why not?
Answer. There is no greater supporter of Israel's security than
President Biden. We are preparing for all possible contingencies in
full coordination with our partners and allies, including Israel.
Question. What support is the United States prepared to provide to
Israel in the event of a military response to Iranian nuclear non-
compliance?
Answer. There is no greater supporter of Israel's security than
President Biden, and he is absolutely committed to ensuring Iran never
acquires a nuclear weapon. We are preparing for all possible
contingencies in full coordination with our partners and allies,
including Israel.
Question. What discussions has the United States had with the other
signatories of the JCPOA, particularly the E3, on what Iranian nuclear
non-compliance would trigger snapback at the UN under UNSCR 2231?If we
haven't had these discussions, why not?
Answer. We remain greatly concerned by Iran's continued expansion
of its nuclear activities and are in close contact with our allies and
partners, including the E3, on these and related matters, including the
snapback mechanism under UNSCR 2231. We will continue to vigorously
implement and enforce U.S. sanctions and the provisions of UNSCR 2231,
in close coordination with our European allies.
Question. The growing alignment between Iran, Russia, and China
raises concerns for regional deterrence and global strategic
competition. What specific steps is the Administration taking to drive
a wedge between Russia and Iran and discourage continued cooperation?
Answer. Iran and Russia's deepening security partnership continues
to be a grave concern. This partnership poses a threat not just to
Ukraine, but to Iran's neighbors in the region. We have shared this
information with partners in the Middle East and around the world.
We continue to counter, expose, and disrupt this defense
cooperation, including through the imposition and enforcement of
sanctions as well as export controls and by monitoring Iran's material
support for Russia. We remain very focused on this issue.
Question. How is the Administration investigating export control
gaps for Iranian drones used in Ukraine, which reportedly have key
parts developed by American companies?
Answer. The Administration has undertaken a broad interagency
process to ensure we can counter, expose, and disrupt Iran's transfer
of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine and will continue to take
steps necessary to fill any gaps. So far, we have imposed restrictions
on five individuals with a U.S.-designated Iranian company responsible
for UAV design and designated seven Iranian UAV producers.
Additionally, Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations to
impose new export control measures on Iran.
Question. Why does the Administration continue issuing nuclear
project waivers to Rosatom, a Russian state-owned enterprise involved
in the invasion of Ukraine?
Answer. Earlier this year, I issued a waiver to enable third
parties to facilitate certain nuclear nonproliferation- and safety-
related activities with Iran that remain in the U.S. national interest,
irrespective of the JCPOA, including operations, training, and services
related to Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1. I decided to exclude
from the waiver the construction of additional reactor units at Bushehr
to ensure the waiver is tailored narrowly to achieving U.S.
nonproliferation and nuclear safety objectives.
Question. How does the Administration plan to prevent sanctions
evasion through Russian and Iranian oil sales to China and other
countries?
Answer. The PRC is Iran's largest oil customer. We have continued
to enforce our sanctions against Iran, including targeting of PRC-based
entities engaged in sanctions evasion. For example, on March 9 we
designated a ``shadow banking'' network of 39 entities across multiple
jurisdictions, including the PRC, for facilitating transactions worth
tens of billions of dollars annually for the Iranian regime.
Question. The Iranian ``ghost armada'' has grown from approximately
60 to over 300 vessels during the Biden administration. What specific
steps is the Biden administration taking to counter illicit sales of
Iranian oil to China, laundering Russian oil on international markets,
and illicit sales to other countries?
Answer. The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State have
imposed sanctions on 150 entities and individuals across multiple
jurisdictions involved in the production, sale, and transfer of Iranian
petroleum and petrochemical products abroad under this Administration.
We have sanctioned 41 vessels linked to Iran that were engaged in
sanctions evasion, particularly petrochemical sales. We also sanctioned
39 ``shadow banking'' entities across multiple jurisdictions for
facilitating illicit sales and transport of Iranian petrochemical and
petroleum products.
Question. Do you support expediting Israel's request for KC-46
aerial refueling tanker aircraft to strengthen deterrence against Iran?
Answer. The U.S. commitment to Israel's security is ironclad, and
assisting Israel in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-
defense capability is vital to U.S. national interests. Unfortunately,
defense industrial capacity challenges are impacting schedules across
many of our programs, and we also need to consider U.S. Air Force
readiness requirements in determining our delivery schedule. We are
working with the Government of Israel to identify interim solutions to
meet its aerial refueling needs.
Question. How does the Administration plan to replenish munitions
stored in Israel from the drawdown of support to Ukraine?
Answer. The U.S. commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. For
questions on strategic planning of pre-positioned war reserve stocks, I
would refer you to the Department of Defense.
Question. Arab-Israeli normalization through the Abraham Accords
has had many economic, social, and security benefits. The Negev Forum,
which builds on the Abraham Accords, presents an opportunity to further
increase normalization benefits and incentivize other countries to join
the Abraham Accords. How does the Administration plan to encourage
expanding the membership of the Abraham Accords?
Answer. The Administration is strongly encouraging countries across
the region to normalize their relations with Israel, as well as to join
multilateral initiatives like the Negev Forum where they can benefit
from cooperation among members, including Israel. We will continue to
work closely with governments who have joined the Abraham Accords and
the Negev Forum to support these bilateral and multilateral
initiatives, as well as work with the private sector, non-profits, and
other organizations to identify new opportunities to expand cooperation
with Israel.
Question. How can the Administration amplify the success of the
Abraham Accords?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports the Abraham Accords
and normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the Arab
and Muslim worlds. I regularly work with our partners across the region
to highlight the significant benefits of the Abraham Accords and expand
normalization to new countries. I also amplify the Abraham Accords by
working to support multilateral initiatives like the Negev Forum and
I2U2, demonstrating the benefits of Arab-Israeli cooperation to
populations across the broader region.
Question. How will the Administration encourage economic relations
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?
Answer. Just last month, Israel and the UAE signed a comprehensive
free trade pact--the first between an Arab country and Israel, with
trade surpassing $3 billion in 2022. Bahrain and Israel also have a
bilateral trade agreement that has generated a similar growth in trade.
We are building on this already significant economic cooperation with
Israel and expanding it to the broader region through multilateral
initiatives like I2U2, the Negev Forum, and Project Prosperity.
Question. How will the Administration encourage social relations
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?
Answer. We are working to enhance people-to-people initiatives
between Israel and other countries in the region, leveraging ongoing
work through frameworks such as the Negev Forum Education and
Coexistence and Tourism Working Groups. Our team is also engaged with
religious institutions, non-profits, and the private sector to
encourage the development of non-governmental initiatives that promote
religious and cultural understanding and strengthen people-to-people
ties.
Question. How will the Administration encourage security relations
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?
Answer. Israel's integration into the region and its strong
partnerships with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, in addition to its
longstanding relationships with Egypt and Jordan, has created important
new opportunities to enhance regional security and stability. I consult
regularly with the Department of Defense to ensure our efforts mutually
reinforce regional security cooperation. I continue to press for deeper
security cooperation between Israel and its neighbors through bilateral
initiatives and multilateral constructs such as the Negev Forum
Regional Security Working Group.
Question. Saudi Arabia has expressed a willingness to normalize
relations with Israel in exchange for changes in U.S. policy to include
a security commitment and non-standard 123 agreement. What concrete
steps is the Administration taking to reach agreement on these issues
and add Saudi Arabia to the circle of friends with Israel?
Answer. The United States strongly supports Israel's integration
into the Middle East, including normalized relations with Saudi Arabia.
The Administration's engagement already has resulted in critical steps
like the opening of Saudi airspace to flights to and from Israel. The
Administration also supports Saudi Arabia's clean energy transition.
The United States commenced negotiations with Saudi Arabia in 2012 to
establish a peaceful nuclear cooperation (123) agreement. We will
continue to work with the Kingdom on these goals.
Question. Syria: What action is the Administration taking to oppose
normalization between the Assad regime and our Middle Eastern partners?
Answer. This Administration will not support efforts to normalize
or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, which we have regularly and vocally
made clear to our partners and allies. In those discussions, we
continue to underline the Assad regime's horrific atrocities against
Syrians, as well as its continuing efforts to deny much of the country
access to humanitarian aid and security. We also continue to emphasize
that U.S. sanctions remain in place and that any entity seeking to
invest in Syria could risk exposure to U.S. sanctions.
Question. Do you agree the Arab Gas Pipeline, which would supply
gas to Lebanon via Syria, would be susceptible to diversion by the
Assad regime?
Answer. This Administration is focused on maximizing the benefits
of a potential deal to the Lebanese people--who continue to struggle
with an acute energy crisis--while minimizing any potential benefit to
the Assad regime. These agreements could help Lebanon begin to address
its energy crisis in a sustainable and transparent manner. The
Administration awaits final details of the project's scope, along with
the financing details, before we can evaluate any potential risk.
Question. Do you agree that the Arab Gas Pipeline, if pursued,
would violate Caesar sanctions? If no, please provide a detailed legal
explanation.
Answer. The Administration has not waived Caesar Act sanctions,
which remain an important tool to press for accountability of the Assad
regime's atrocious record of human rights abuses. The Administration
awaits final details of the scope of the project, along with financing
details. Once those details are finalized, we will be able to evaluate
the potential sanctions implications.
Question. How is the Administration working to prevent Syria's
continuing emergence as a narcotic state through the illegal production
and distribution of captagon and other illicit substances?
Answer. The Department is working with interagency colleagues to
draft an interagency strategy to disrupt and dismantle the captagon
trade, as required in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). Several U.S. Government agencies provide support to our law
enforcement partners in the region including through information
sharing and capacity building. The Department is also actively working
with interagency partners to leverage a range of tools to address the
captagon trade, including sanctions.
Question. Given Saudi Arabia's dramatic improvement to reduce
civilian casualties, do you support supplying Saudi Arabia with the
precision guided missiles (PGM) needed to deter Iran and its proxies,
such as the Houthis?
Answer. To bring an end to the conflict, the Administration has
ended all support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen,
including relevant arms sales. However, the Administration has
continued to support Saudi Arabia defending its sovereignty and
territorial integrity against threats from Iranian-supplied forces in
multiple countries. It remains in the United States' vital national
interest to help our Gulf partners defend themselves against external
aggression. However, the Administration has not changed its policy
against providing offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia.
Question. Do delays in security assistance to Saudi Arabia open the
door for strategic competitors like Russia and China to supply Saudi
Arabia with defense articles?
Answer. The United States remains Saudi Arabia's partner of choice
when it comes to defense cooperation. We have a robust system in place
to prioritize the transfer of certain systems to our partners in a
manner that best advances U.S. national interests and is consistent
with U.S. values. In contrast, we assess that Russia's poor military
performance in Ukraine and growing relationship with Iran will likely
be deterrents to closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Russia.
Question. Would the United States be disadvantaged by Russia or
China supplying defense articles to Saudi Arabia, or any other Middle
East partner?
Answer. Neither Russia nor the PRC is displacing the United States
as the security partner of choice in Saudi Arabia or across the Middle
East. We continue to maintain robust defense cooperation with our
partners in the region while PRC sales to the region remain
comparatively miniscule. The United States raises its concerns with
Middle Eastern partners over the potential costs and liabilities
inherent in acquiring defense technology from suppliers in the PRC and
Russia.
Question. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA: Have terrorism threats to South
and Central Asia increased since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
in August 2021?
Answer. The threat of terrorism from Afghanistan remains high and
the State Department has issued a level four travel advisory asking
U.S. citizens not to travel to Afghanistan. Terrorist groups in
Afghanistan pose a threat to countries in the region. The United States
continues to press the Taliban to uphold their counterterrorism
commitments and works with countries in the region to counter terrorist
threats. President Biden has made clear that when the Taliban fail to
remove terrorist threats, then the United States will do so, as it did
with Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Question. The United States does not currently provide any security
assistance to Pakistan. Given the withdrawal from Afghanistan and
credible reports of terrorists harbored in Afghanistan, should the
United States re-visit security assistance to Pakistan?
Answer. We share Pakistan's concern over the ability of terrorists
to operate from Afghanistan. While large-scale military grant
assistance remains suspended, the Department continues to support
Pakistani counterterrorism efforts, including through the Bureau of
Counterterrorism-funded Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, INL
support to police and the Frontier Corps, and foreign military and
direct commercial sales. The March U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism
Dialogue furthered cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.
Question. What conditions must be met for the United States to
restart security assistance to Pakistan?
Answer. While we do not envision a return to large-scale military
grant assistance to Pakistan in the near term, we continue to work
closely with our Pakistani counterparts to expand cooperation in areas
of shared security interests. These include counterterrorism, border
security, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and maritime security.
Recent engagements, including the February mid-level defense dialogue
and March counterterrorism dialogue, as well as our continued support
for Pakistan's F-16 program, illustrate our robust collaboration in
these areas.
Question. Please explain the justification for more than tripling
the South and Central Asia regional foreign military finance budget.
Answer. The Department has consistently requested a robust foreign
military financing (FMF) budget for the South and Central Asia (SCA)
region. The FY 2024 FMF request for the SCA region is comparable to
prior years' request level, including the FY 2022 $50 million request.
The FY 2024 FMF request reflects the Department's commitment to the
Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Central Asia security
objectives.
Question. What is the difference between the ``Central Asia
Regional'' FMF and the ``South and Central Asia Regional'' FMF?
Answer. ``Central Asia Regional'' foreign military financing (FMF)
is requested for the Central Asia countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. ``South and Central Asia
Regional'' FMF is requested in support of security goals in the Indo-
Pacific and will likely benefit Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka. However, all countries in the SCA region may benefit depending
on the requirements in the year of execution.
Question. How will you ensure the $122.9 million in economic
support fund (ESF) for Afghanistan will not be diverted by the Taliban?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID conduct regular and
rigorous analysis by third-party contract organizations and
international NGOs to prevent diversion and ensure that assistance
reaches the intended beneficiaries. Implementing partners must comply
with robust financial and programmatic monitoring, reporting, and
compliance mechanisms, as enumerated by both the Department's standard
terms and conditions for federal awards as well as consistent with U.S.
laws and regulations. Through this, we can identify attempted diversion
and suspend or terminate programs, if necessary.
Question. Afghanistan was listed among ``major drug transit or
major illicit drug producing countries'' for Fiscal Year 2023. Why does
the budget request cut international narcotics and law enforcement
(INCLE) funds?
Answer. The FY 2024 INCLE request for Afghanistan is reduced due to
the changed operating environment and adjustments to the type and scale
of programs we have in Afghanistan. The Department has sufficient
prior-year INCLE funds to support some programs such as
counternarcotics programs focusing on alternative development, drug
demand reduction, and crop monitoring and analysis--without going
through or benefiting the Taliban.
Question. Pakistan was listed among ``major drug transit or major
illicit drug producing countries'' for Fiscal Year 2023. Why does the
budget request cut INCLE funds?
Answer. Pakistan remains a major transit country for the southern
trafficking route of narcotics from Afghanistan. The FY 2023 INCLE
request for Pakistan takes into consideration programming needs,
operating environment, and prior year funds to adequately support
Pakistan's counternarcotics efforts. Beyond counternarcotics, Pakistan
INCLE funds also support projects in the justice, law enforcement,
corrections, and gender sectors.
______
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What is the State Department and the Coordinator for
Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Team doing to ensure that our Afghan
allies are receiving timely assistance for asylum claims?
Answer. Individuals in the United States may apply for asylum
regardless of country of nationality or current immigration status.
Asylum claims are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS). We would direct asylum-related questions to USCIS.
Question. What is preventing the State Department and the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Team from more rapidly
assisting our Afghan allies with asylum claims?
Answer. Asylum claims are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). We would direct asylum-related questions
to USCIS.
______
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. The State Department recently changed expected wait time
for passport processing. Processing times went from the typical 6-9
weeks for a routine application to 10-13 weeks. Currently, the
expedited processing takes 7-9 weeks. How many U.S. citizens have
missed their trips due to the State Department's delay in processing
passports since January?
Answer. We do not collect or verify data on the number of U.S.
citizens who may have potentially missed their trip. From January 1 to
April 6, our staff served more than 269,000 customers with emergency or
urgent travel at our counters and issued over 4.7 million passports for
customers who applied through the mail. We strongly recommend customers
apply early, and by mail or at an acceptance facility, and undertake
public messaging campaigns to this effect.
Question. What is your strategy to address the current backlog and
extended wait times for passport processing?
Answer. We are making every effort to tackle unprecedented demand
for passports. CA has instituted an ``all hands on deck'' posture
requiring passport headquarters staff and field managers to adjudicate
applications, authorized over 30,000 overtime hours a month, and
recruited volunteers, including re-employed annuitants, to work in
Washington, DC's Satellite Office. We have been aggressively recruiting
new staff since January 2022 and successfully increased our
adjudicative staff by more than 100 new employees, with another 170
candidates in the recruitment pipeline.
Question. What is your best estimate on when you expect wait times
to return to normal?
Answer. Passport processing times historically fluctuate based on
demand and seasonality. We posted increased processing times most
recently on March 24 as a result of the unprecedented demand levels
observed in 2023. If 2023 follows historical patterns, processing times
may decrease in the fall. We are committed to reducing processing times
as quickly as possible.
Question. When did you start bringing on retired employees to help
address the issues with passport processing?
Answer. Passport Services began hiring retired Foreign Service
employees to help adjudicate passport renewal applications in the
Satellite Office of the Washington Passport Agency in 2019. In FY 2021,
we obtained delegated authority from OPM to approve reemployment
without reduction of annuity (a dual compensation waiver) for former
Civil Service staff with passport adjudication experience to help
address passport application backlogs in FYs 2022-2023. We are working
on a request to extend the waiver into FYs 2024-2025 to augment our
adjudicative capacity.
Question. How many are currently helping address the backlog?
Answer. Applications are accepted at our network of over 7,000
acceptances facilities. More than 1,900 government staff and 2,000
contract staff are contributing to the Department's processing and/or
adjudication of passport applications. We also have 20 retirees and 34
staff from other parts of Consular Affairs providing additional
assistance at the Satellite Office in DC and across the country at our
passport agencies and centers. Many other offices are helping with
recruiting, clearing, onboarding, and training new staff so that we can
further increase our adjudicative capacity.
Question. Are additional trainings necessary?
Answer. Training courses and programs specific to the needs of
newly-hired staff and returning retirees are already established and
provided timely as part of onboarding or return to duty. The formal
new-hire training program is typically completed in the first 2 months
of duty for new passport specialists. Retirees complete 1-day refresher
training when returning to the workforce.
Question. How long do you anticipate needing the assistance of
these additional workers?
Answer. We will need to devote additional resources to address the
passport applications pending adjudication until our adjudicative
capacity exceeds the volume of incoming new applications. Demand is
unlikely to begin tapering until we approach the fall, therefore we
anticipate the assistance of additional workers will be needed until
processing times decline. We continue to aggressively hire new
adjudicative staff and are reviewing our staffing levels to ensure we
can best serve the American public.
Question. The State Department's budget request for Fiscal Year
2024 included funding for an additional 164 Foreign Service and 351
Civil Service personnel. The State Department indicated it would
allocate the largest shares of these positions, about 204 positions, to
bolster passport and visa processing. Beyond hiring additional staff,
what actions does the State Department need to take to address the
backlog and delays in passport processing?
Answer. We are maintaining a focus on modernization and efficiency,
which calls for recruitment and retention of a skilled, dedicated
workforce. The online passport renewal pilot demonstrated that
applicants can and want the ability to submit applications from the
convenience of their homes, without physical forms and mailing. Our
employees processed applications using this technology both in the
office and remotely, allowing them to continue to work when adverse
weather conditions would have previously stopped all processing of
passport applications.
Question. According to a 2021 report from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), China owns roughly 384,000 acres of U.S.
agricultural land. Ownership jumped by 30 percent from 2019 to 2020.
What national security and food supply chain risks are associated with
foreign control over U.S. agricultural land by the Government of China?
Answer. National security concerns stem from the control and
influence that the PRC can have over companies from the PRC. Risks may
occur if a vulnerability is created because an investment can shift
ownership, rights, or control of agricultural lands that are critical
to United States supply chain resilience and be combined with foreign
actor actions used to exploit that vulnerability.
Question. How are you working with the USDA to ensure the purchase
of U.S. agricultural land by China and other countries does not pose a
risk to the United States?
Answer. The State Department does not have any programs in place
related to the prevention of private land purchases in the United
States. We would refer you to Treasury on any questions regarding the
Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS).
Question. What reporting requirements does the State Department
currently provide Congress regarding foreign countries purchasing and
owning agricultural land across our nation?
Answer. The Department defers to the USDA. The Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) of 1978 established a nationwide
system for the collection of information pertaining to foreign
ownership in U.S. agricultural land. The regulations require foreign
investors who acquire, transfer, or hold an interest in U.S.
agricultural land to report such holdings and transactions to the
Secretary of Agriculture. The Farm Service Agency (FSA) is responsible
for the implementation of the law and regulations as they relate to
foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land.
Question. Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. Border Patrol Chief Raul Ortiz testified that the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security does not have operational control of the border.
This assessment is in direct contradiction of Secretary Alejandro
Mayorkas assertion that we have operational control of the border. Do
you believe the United States has operational control of the southern
border?
Answer. Yes, the United States has operational control of the
southern border. The Department of State works closely with Mexico on
issues related to border security and facilitating legitimate trade and
travel across the U.S.-Mexico border. We also maintain five consulates
along the border that support these efforts and provide critical
support for U.S. citizens. I would defer you to the Department of
Homeland Security for additional information on its agencies'
operations along the border.
Question. When is the last time you met with Vice President Harris
to discuss the crisis on the southern border?
Answer. Both the office of the Secretary and the Vice President are
part of a continuous foreign policy process where we hold regular
discussions on a variety of foreign policy issues in the
Administration. We share our views on global issues, including humane
management of irregular migration, through that process.
Question. U.S. National Security Council Spokesman John Kirby
recently stated that Poland's decision to send its Soviet-designed
fighter jets ``doesn't change our calculus with regards to F-16s,'' in
reference to providing Ukraine with F-16s. How would providing Ukraine
with F-16s and A-10 Warthogs enhance Ukraine's ability to win the war?
Answer. As President Biden has said, we are not planning to provide
F-16s to Ukraine at this time. We are focused on providing Ukraine
military assistance that can brought to bear rapidly, efficiently, and
with maximum battlefield effect. We also strongly encourage other
countries to continue providing the necessary military equipment for
Ukraine to defend itself against Russia, and we are working to
facilitate transfers as appropriate.
Question. What safeguards and accountability mechanisms are in
place to ensure U.S. assistance to Ukraine is used appropriately and
going to the intended recipients?
Answer. The Department of State takes very seriously the obligation
to ensure appropriate oversight of all assistance as good stewards of
U.S. resources. The Department of State employs multiple accountability
safeguards and mechanisms, in conjunction with DoD, USAID, Treasury,
and the World Bank, and is actively engaged with the Government of
Ukraine to reinforce our joint commitment to effective oversight.
Ambassador Brink and her team in Kyiv work in conjunction with
interagency partners and the Government of Ukraine on accountability
issues related to all foreign assistance, including budget support and
security assistance. The World Bank manages budget support assistance
provided by the United States through its trust funds in accordance
with its financial control policies. State, USAID, and DoD inspectors
general have increased the frequency and scope of their oversight
reporting on U.S. assistance for Ukraine. In addition, State is
procuring a contract for monitoring, evaluation, and audit services
that will fund Ukraine-based oversight and produce analyses and
reports.
The Department works with DoD to manage military assistance. The
Government of Ukraine has shown they take the responsibility to
safeguard arms seriously. We are confident in the Government of
Ukraine's commitment to appropriately safeguard and account for
transferred U.S.-origin defense equipment.
Question. International treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol and
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), continue to
define China as a developing country. Do you believe China is a
developing country?
Answer. As economic circumstances change in the PRC, the Department
seeks opportunities to work with like-minded governments to reduce or
eliminate inappropriate assistance or advantages the PRC might receive
under agreements and multilateral frameworks. As we work to ensure the
PRC does not benefit inappropriately, it is important to design
approaches that will be effective in a particular context without
inadvertently rallying other countries to support PRC positions.
Question. What are the differences between the requirements,
assistance and obligations provided under the UNFCCC for the United
States versus China?
Answer. The UNFCCC, which the United States joined in 1994,
contains various categories of Parties for different purposes,
including a non-binding emissions aim for so-called ``Annex I'' Parties
(including the United States). The United States rejected the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which imposed binding emissions obligations only on
Annex I Parties. The 2015 Paris Agreement did away with characterizing
Parties as included (or not included) in Annex I. On the core issue of
emission reductions, all Parties--including both the United States and
the PRC--are required to submit ``nationally determined
contributions,'' update them regularly, and report on their
implementation. In terms of financial support, the Paris Agreement
continues the UNFCCC's collective obligations to assist developing
countries. It does not define ``developing countries,'' an issue that
is left to the various operating entities that serve the Agreement's
financial mechanism.
Question. Are you committed to ensuring future treaties no longer
define China as a developing country?
Answer. Treaties vary in how they establish or define categories
such as ``developing,'' ``least developed,'' ``middle-income,'' or
``developed'' countries, or whether such categories are even used.
There is no uniform approach to defining ``developing countries.''
Therefore, as we seek to ensure that the PRC does not benefit
inappropriately, it is important to design approaches that will be
effective in each particular context. The United States will continue
to build support with other governments for tailored approaches with
respect to relevant international agreements.
Question. What is your plan to end China's unfair advantage of
being mislabeled a developing country in the international community?
Answer. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to addressing this
important issue. As we seek to ensure the PRC does not benefit from
inappropriate assistance, it is important to design approaches that
will be effective in a particular context and that will not backfire or
inadvertently rally other countries in support of PRC positions. The
Department therefore seeks opportunities on a case-by-case basis to
work with likeminded governments in order to reduce or eliminate
inappropriate assistance or advantages the PRC might receive under
particular agreements or multilateral frameworks.
Question. How much funding has China received from the UNFCCC?
Please provide the amount of money China received from various UNFCCC
funding mechanisms, including but not limited to, the Global
Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least
Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund established under the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and the Green Climate Fund.
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has received
approximately $544 million in grants and $100 million in loans from
funds affiliated with the UNFCCC for climate-related activities. Since
1991, the PRC received $538 million in grants for single-country
climate-related activities from the Global Environment Facility (GEF),
or roughly 6 percent of finance disbursed by the GEF for climate-
related activities. The PRC also received $5.9 million in grants for
three projects with the Special Climate Change Fund and $100 million in
loans for one project with the Green Climate Fund. The PRC has not
accessed funding from either the Least Developed Countries Fund or the
Adaptation Fund.
Question. How much funding has the United States contributed to the
UNFCCC? Please provide the amount of money the United States provided
to various UNFCCC funding mechanisms, including but not limited to, the
Global Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least
Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund established under the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and the Green Climate Fund.
Answer. The United States has provided $129.2 million to the UNFCCC
since 1991. The United States has provided $50 million to the Special
Climate Change Fund since FY 2010, $158.2 million to the Least
Developed Countries Fund since FY 2010, $0 to the Adaptation Fund, and
$1 billion to the Green Climate Fund since FY 2016. The United States
has also contributed $3.1 billion to the Global Environment Facility
(GEF) since its inception in 1992. As the GEF serves as part of the
financial mechanism for five multilateral environmental agreements,
these funds have gone towards projects to deliver global environmental
benefits for biodiversity, climate change, land degradation,
international waters, and chemicals and waste.
Question. How much funding has China received from the Climate
Investment Funds?
Answer. The People's Republic of China has not accessed any support
from the Climate Investment Funds.
Question. How much funding has the United States contributed to the
Climate Investment Funds?
Answer. The United States has contributed $2.95 billion to the
Climate Investment Funds since their establishment in 2008, comprised
of $950 million in loan contributions and $2 billion in grant
contributions.
Question. How much total funding has the Climate Investment Fund
received from foreign governments and the private sector?
Answer. The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund,
together constituting the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), have received
a total of $11.5 billion in contributions since their establishment in
2008. Of this, $8.5 billion has been received from foreign governments.
Private sector actors do not contribute funds directly to the CIF but
are recipients of CIF funding via the CIF's multilateral development
bank implementing partners. The CIF have financed nearly $1.9 billion
in private sector projects and generated $18.9 billion in private
sector co-financing across the entire CIF project portfolio.
Question. As part of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, agreed to by
the Obama Administration, developed country Parties to the UNFCCC,
including the United States, committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly
$100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing
countries. How much money was ultimately mobilized from 2010 to 2020 by
the developed country parties?
Answer. From 2010 to 2020 developed country Parties to the UNFCCC
have collectively mobilized at least $565.5 billion to support climate
action in developing countries. This includes finance from bilateral
channels, multilateral channels (i.e., multilateral development banks
and multilateral climate funds), and private finance mobilized, noting
that data is not available on private finance mobilized for 2010, 2011,
2012, and 2015.
Question. How much money was mobilized by the United States?
Answer. From 2010-2020 the United States has reported $24.8 billion
in climate finance to support climate action in developing countries
through bilateral channels and contributions to multilateral climate
funds. In addition, the United States supports climate action in
developing countries through its contributions to multilateral
development banks and mobilizing private finance in cooperation with
partners; these efforts are reported at the collective level rather
than the individual country level in order to avoid double-counting.
Question. How much money was appropriated by Congress?
Answer. All climate finance provided by the United States is
supported by budget authority appropriated by Congress. We look forward
to continuing our close collaboration with Congress on financing.
Question. How much of the total U.S. contribution went to China?
Answer. Of the climate finance reported by the United States from
2010-2020, $29.6 million has supported climate action in the PRC. Since
2018, the United States has not provided any climate finance to the PRC
through its bilateral efforts.
Question. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there have been
several reports of Putin ordering the transfer of Ukrainian children to
Russia to be adopted and become citizens. What efforts are being taken
by the State Department to help reunite these vulnerable Ukrainian
children with their families?
Answer. The United States is funding research and advocacy programs
aimed at documenting and exposing Russia's system to forcibly relocate
and ``re-educate'' Ukrainian children. In addition, we continue to
raise awareness of Russia's war crimes, maintain the largest sanctions
regime ever imposed on any country in history, and assist Ukrainian and
other accountability efforts. Russia's limitation of access to these
children by outside organizations complicates efforts to reunite them
with their families, but we remain focused and undeterred.
Question. How does the Biden administration plan to hold Putin
accountable for the forced abduction and deportation of Ukrainian
children?
Answer. I determined that members of Russia's forces and other
Russian officials have committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine,
including deporting Ukrainian children to Russia. We will continue to
appropriately declassify and publicize the Russian Government's
actions, support the judicial process in Ukraine, and assist broader
international investigations and accountability efforts. At the same
time, we continue to maintain and expand the most extensive sanctions
regime ever imposed on any country in history.
Question. What is the best estimate for the number of Ukrainian
children who have been forcibly deported to Russia?
Answer. As of April 10, the Ukrainian Government is tracking more
than 19,544 specific children forcibly transferred and deported to
Russia, with only 364 returned to their parents or legal guardians to
date. Some Ukrainian Government estimates put the actual number of
children forced transfers and deportations as high as 150,000. It is
hard to determine one single estimate given limited insight into Russia
and Russia-occupied territory, the opaqueness of Russia's filtration
operations which can result in deportation, and the number of children
who are missing.
______
Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Press Freedom: India and Pakistan: The State Department's
Human Rights Report was released on March 20--according to the report,
both India and Pakistan have seen increasing threats on press freedom
and the report indicates that they are increasingly dangerous places
for journalists trying to do their jobs. The State Department is not
alone in sounding the alarm--Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranks
India at 150 out of 180 and Pakistan at 157 out of 180 in the World
Press Freedom Index and cites the dangers involved with being a
journalist in both countries. According to both the Human Rights Report
and RSF, journalists are subjected to harassment, threats, and even
death in the course of their work. This is concerning not only for
freedom of speech but for the overall rule of law in both countries.
What is the State Department doing to not only promote free speech but
to protect journalists in both India and Pakistan?
Answer. The United States regularly consults with India and
Pakistan at the highest levels on issues impacting the press and free
speech advocates. I also engage regularly with civil society, tech
companies, and media outlets on how we can encourage governments to
uphold international standards and mitigate the impact of regulations
on freedom of expression.
The Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau, through the Human
Rights and Democracy Fund earmark, protects human rights defenders in
Pakistan through programming that increases the capacity of young
journalists to hold their governments accountable and builds
sustainable initiatives to support the next generation of independent
journalists.
Question. Israel NGO Legislation: The Israeli Knesset is expected
to take up a new bill which would require reporting and allow the
government to impose up to a 37 percent tax on Israeli registered
organizations receiving more than $50,000 in funding from foreign
entities like the U.S. NGOs working in the West Bank must register with
the Israeli Government in order to operate, and this additional
taxation would be at the discretion of the government. Organizations
that primarily receive donations from private individuals and not from
foreign governments would not be impacted. When Egypt, another large
recipient of U.S. assistance, passed restrictive laws designed to
weaken NGOs in 2017, the U.S. Government strongly objected to those
measures. Does the Biden administration have concerns about this
impending legislation, and if so, has it raised these concerns directly
with the Israeli Government? If so, what feedback have you received?
Answer. The United States strongly believes in the importance of
civil society organizations and the critical role they play in
defending human rights and supporting peacebuilding efforts. The United
States has made clear the importance of ensuring that independent civil
society organizations in the West Bank and Israel are able to continue
their important work, including by ensuring legitimate organizations do
not face burdensome economic requirements that make it difficult to
carry out their work.
Question. What measures, if any, is the Biden administration
prepared to take to continue to support work being done by NGOs to
advance humanitarian efforts and human rights?
Answer. The U.S. Government strongly believes that respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a strong civil society, are
critically important to responsible, responsive, and democratic
governance. This Administration values the advancement of human rights
along with the human rights violations and abuses monitoring that
independent NGOs undertake in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and
elsewhere. The United States continues to engage with the UN, NGOs, and
international partners to support civil society organizations.
Question. The Minerals Security Partnership launched last summer
with the goal to build a framework for developing critical minerals
with friendly countries, and supporting mining projects with high ESG
standards. How effective is the MSP at breaking into markets where
other countries, namely PRC, are already present?
Answer. Historically, extractive industry business models turned
into bad deals for landowners, governments, mine workers, and
communities surrounding mines. The Minerals Security Partnership seeks
to present a different value proposition by supporting projects along
the mineral value chain--including extraction, processing, and
recycling--through financing, promoting high standards for responsible
mining and processing, and engaging project operators and governments
to champion projects that benefit all involved. This should give more
options to countries hosting these resources.
Question. What does the MSP offer to nations with large deposits of
critical minerals that makes these partnerships an attractive option?
Answer. The Minerals Security Partnership shares information among
partners on minerals projects and develops action plans to support the
most promising projects through coordinated support including
financing, promoting high standards for responsible mining and
processing, and engaging project operators and governments. This should
generate more options for countries with these resources. We offer a
different value proposition compared to the PRC and hear repeatedly
from foreign interlocutors that they would like to have more options
and more value-added operations in their countries.
Question. Semiconductor Agreement: Following the agreement between
the United States, Japan, and Netherlands on semiconductor exports:
What are the next steps to ensure the PRC is not getting access to the
most advanced semiconductors?
Answer. We regularly consult with allies and partners who are
Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls.
We will continue to hold regular dialogues with allies and partners to
discuss technology, supply chain resilience, and ensuring our
technology is not used to undermine our national security. We will
continue to evaluate the impacts of the U.S. export controls
regulations, which were implemented to reduce PRC capabilities in
supercomputing and advanced semiconductor manufacturing over time.
Question. The U.S. made this deal with the Netherlands, and not
with the EU. Many EU countries, like Germany and Belgium, supply parts
crucial to making semiconductors. How is the U.S. engaging with the
rest of the EU to safeguard the supply chain?
Answer. Since 2021, the U.S. and the EU have worked together
through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to build more
resilient semiconductor supply chains by sharing information and best
practices, and by developing a common understanding of semiconductor
market dynamics.
Our goal is to avoid subsidy races and market distortions and
ensure a resilient, sustainable, and innovative semiconductors value
chain. At the December 2022 TTC, the U.S. and EU announced a joint
early warning mechanism to address and mitigate semiconductor supply
chain disruptions.
Question. Elections are scheduled to take place in Turkey on May
14. In the lead-up to the elections, the Government of Turkey has
intensified a media crackdown and sentenced a leading opposition figure
to prison for just long enough to disqualify him from running. The
state media agency has begun to heavily sanction and fine Turkish TV
stations for their coverage of the earthquake and has continued to
stifle social media, including banning Twitter and a popular forum
site. There are also concerns over the past performance of the Turkish
Election Council, which has not addressed irregularities that favor
Erdogan, and annulled elections not in his favor. What, if anything, is
the U.S. doing to promote and ensure free and fair elections in Turkey?
Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Turkiye to be a
stable, democratic, and prosperous Ally. The Administration regularly
reinforces the importance of democracy and human rights to our
bilateral relationship--including free and fair democratic electoral
processes--and urges the Turkish Government to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms. We continue to raise with the government our
concerns about the Turkish media environment. The United States
supports a robust election observation mission and plans to contribute
observers to the upcoming observation mission of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Turkiye's elections.
Question. Will the U.S. assist in any election monitoring or
oversight?
Answer. The United States will contribute 26 short-term observers,
contingent on availability of funding, to the election observation
mission in Turkey of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). The mission will include 28 long-term and 350 short-term
observers from many of the OSCE's 57 participating States.
Question. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
(PGII): During the SFRC Africa and Global Health Policy Subcommittee
hearing on the FY23 Budget for Africa on July 27, 2022, I emphasized
the importance of investment in infrastructure. I highlighted President
Biden's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which he
had just announced with the G7 and the EU, to fund infrastructure
projects in developing nations--but this new initiative seems to build
on a number of existing authorities and pots of money. The FY24 budget
requests $250 million for PGII--but there are claims that the budget
``supports more than $50 billion to support PGII,'' and up to $600
billion over 5 years. Could you please provide a breakdown of the $50
billion mentioned in the budget request to support the PGII, including
how much is being pulled from which accounts, how much is ``new''
money, and how much is from existing appropriations?
Answer. The $50 billion for the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in the President's Budget is an
attribution of existing resources across the U.S. Government in support
of our commitments to the G7 initiative. Of this $50 billion, $4.7
billion is Economic Support Funds (ESF) across State and USAID in the
following sectors: digital connectivity and cyber security ($296M),
health systems and health security ($2.1B), gender equity ($209M) and
climate and energy security ($2.1B). While this funding is not ``new,''
it represents programming that is in direct support of the important
objectives of PGII.
Question. How does the PGII differ from our previous approaches to
funding development projects around the world?
Answer. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
(PGII) was launched in partnership with the G7 to offer a credible
alternative for financing of sustainable, quality infrastructure in
emerging markets, centered on unlocking public and private capital. In
particular, PGII is seeking to expand strategic investments in hard and
virtual infrastructure across clean energy supply chains, trusted ICT
networks, connective transportation corridors, and resilient health
systems to create eco-systems of transformative economic corridors and
development. Through improved collaboration within the U.S. Government
and with our G7 partners, PGII aims to better deploy our respective
tools to leverage private capital and advance strategic projects.
Question. Pakistan: Pakistan's continued human rights abuses are
troubling. The 2022 Human Rights Report, which spans both the current
and previous government, finds that ``there was a lack of government
accountability, and abuses, including corruption and misconduct, often
went unpunished, fostering a culture of impunity.'' These abuses are
not confined to a specific government, and are an alarming continued
trend. Journalists and civil society activists are routinely jailed and
harassed for trying to do their jobs. How will the U.S. engage with the
Pakistani Government on the Human Rights Report to encourage meaningful
reforms and respect for human rights?
Answer. The United States regularly engages with the Pakistani
Government, through Pakistan's embassy in Washington and our embassy
and consulates in Pakistan, on human rights issues, particularly
religious freedom and freedom of speech and media. We will continue to
implement programs and initiatives that support Pakistan's capacity to
curb human rights abuses and promote accountability, while seeking to
empower vulnerable populations. My senior leadership and I have raised
human rights concerns with Pakistan's Foreign Minister and with
Pakistani political leadership in Islamabad. We have emphasized the
need to allow political space for the opposition.
Question. Visa Wait Times: Secretary Blinken--As you know,
international tourism to the U.S. has a significant impact on the
economy. According to the Department of Commerce, in 2019 roughly 80
million international travelers visited the United States, contributing
nearly $240 billion to the U.S. economy. That year, 43 percent of
international visitors--and $120 billion in spending--came from
countries where a visa is required to enter the United States.
Unfortunately, current tourism numbers continue to lag pre-pandemic
levels. It's clear, however, that the continued slow recovery for
tourism is at least partially attributable to a severe backlog in the
processing of U.S. visitor visas. For example, we're seeing unusually
long delays in the processing of visas for first-time visitors from
Brazil, India and Mexico. In Brazil, wait times can take up to a year
and 3 months. The situation is worse in India, where wait times for a
visa appointment can take up to 2 years and 8 months. According to an
analysis by economists at the U.S. Travel Association, in 2023, the
U.S. is projected to lose 6.6 million potential visitors and $11.6
billion in projected loss spending as a result of likely international
travelers being unable to obtain a visitor visa to travel to the U.S.
in a timely manner. In the top three largest markets, Brazil, India and
Mexico, projected spending losses could total $5.2 billion alone. Given
the scale of this problem, I want to ask: What action is the State
Department taking to decrease visa interview wait times and increase
the economic impact from international visitors?
Answer. As of April 1, the median global nonimmigrant visa wait
time for first time applicants was under 2 months, about half of what
it was in October 2022. Wait times reflect heavy demand for visas; in
Mexico and Brazil, we issued more visitor visas in FY 2022 than we did
in FY 2019. The Department is focused on equipping all posts with the
staffing and resources needed to continue to reduce wait times. Reasons
for the slow recovery of inbound travel are complex. For example,
citizens of Visa Waiver Program countries, who make up the majority of
U.S. tourists, show reduced levels of inbound travel.
Question. Is the State Department developing a strategy to bolster
staffing and resources for countries seeing unusually long wait times?
Answer. The Department is striving to ensure that as many
adjudicators as possible are assigned to overseas positions in order to
reach worldwide pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year. In the
first quarter of 2023, the Department surged staff to locations with
long interview appointment wait times for visitor visa applicants, such
as India and Mexico. Consular officers in some overseas locations are
remotely adjudicating tens of thousands of interview waiver visas each
week to support posts with long wait times. Wait times in other visa
categories, including renewals, are low.
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