[Senate Hearing 118-54]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 118-54

                     AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL
                 LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR
                  2024 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             MARCH 22, 2023

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                       Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-967 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Blinken, Hon. Antony, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of 
  State, Washington, DC..........................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    57

Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    76

Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................   117

Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator John Barrasso..........................................   117

Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Chris Van Hollen.......................................   122

                                 (iii)
 
                     AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL
                 LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR
                  2024 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, 
Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Hagerty, Ricketts, and 
Scott.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Secretary Blinken, welcome back to the committee of which 
you have a long history with, so we appreciate you being with 
us again.
    If we are going to address the enormous scale of the global 
challenges we face in the 21st century, we need a well-
resourced State Department with the most appropriate personnel 
and tools to promote American foreign policy: From the horrific 
Russian invasion of Ukraine to increasing violence in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and a tenuous peace 
agreement in Ethiopia, to multiple failed states and active 
civil wars in the Middle East and North Africa, to the 
migration crisis caused by dictatorships, waves of criminal 
violence in Mexico and Central America and the tragedy in 
Haiti, to food insecurity, severe natural disasters, and 
extreme heat exacerbated by the climate crisis, as well as the 
continuing issues related to the pandemic.
    We want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, on how you plan to 
ensure that the Department is resourced and staffed to project 
American foreign policy including seriously countering the 
growing threat from China for which I think you will feel 
today, and I am sure in your other engagements, is strong, 
bipartisan, I think, bicameral view, the single biggest 
geostrategic challenge the United States faces.
    China has made major investments in diplomacy and its 
diplomats are outrunning ours, not because they are better, but 
because there are more of them in more places in the world with 
more embassies and a seemingly limitless checkbook.
    We cannot be on the sidelines and mired down in 
bureaucratic processes. We need ambitious and consistent 
resourcing. As you know, Senator Risch and I are working to put 
together a bill to put us on a stronger path to compete with 
China globally.
    This will include resources and staffing, strengthening 
economic tools, expanding our engagement with Latin America, 
the Middle East, and Africa where there is currently a 40 
percent vacancy rate at key American posts.
    Bolstering our diplomatic and economic tools to compete 
with China is the key to avoiding a military confrontation 
while also ensuring we are ready to prevail in a conflict if it 
be necessary.
    As we have seen with Russia and Ukraine, one dictator's 
warped vision of the world is all it takes to unleash a brutal 
modern war. Our unity of purpose with our democratic allies and 
partners against Putin's illegal war is critical and goes far 
beyond Ukraine's borders.
    When we lead with diplomatic, military, and economic 
support; others follow. Our continuing support for Ukraine is 
not just about defeating Russia or to help Ukraine's freedom, 
which in and of itself are worthy goals. It is important that 
we send a message to others who would upend the rules-based 
international order. You cannot by force take another country's 
territory.
    The U.S. needs to use all our tools more effectively to do 
that, which brings me to a third priority area we would like to 
see the Department address, which is security assistance.
    Unfortunately, for years the Pentagon has encroached upon 
the State Department's vital and statutory role in security 
assistance, which is a critical tool of foreign policy, which 
we have seen most recently leveraged in Ukraine.
    This has increasingly untethered our assistance from human 
rights and American values, which I believe damage our national 
security interests, and it has led to policies that focus on 
short-term tactical military assistance like we have seen with 
Azerbaijan blocking Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    While I will continue working to solidify the State 
Department's role in the provision of all security assistance 
and sales and seek to claw that back where it rightfully 
belongs and statutorily belongs, the Department has also worked 
to make sure we can fulfill our security assistance commitments 
to our partners while setting the stage to compete with and 
deter bad actors like China, Russia, and Iran.
    We must reorient American foreign policy to be rooted in 
supporting democracy and human rights, which serve our long-
term interests. Our foreign policy needs to help activists, 
environmental defenders, political prisoners, on the frontlines 
of confronting autocrats.
    We need to be able to isolate and weaken those who 
undertake coups in countries like Chad, Sudan, Mali, and 
Guinea. We have to do more to protect women, girls, and young 
boys, who are the targets of sexual violence in conflict zones.
    Finally, I want to reiterate the importance of building on 
the last 2 years of bipartisan work to resuscitate the State 
Department authorization process after a long hiatus.
    I think this speaks volumes about how deeply the committee 
values the Department's work and personnel. It is critical that 
we modernize our diplomatic corps so it better represents our 
nation's diverse backgrounds, views, and talents and it gives 
them the tools they need to be successful.
    We have got our work cut out for us, Mr. Secretary, and we 
want to thank you for being a constructive partner in this 
effort.
    We appreciate the constant dialogue between our committee, 
yourself, and the Department, and we look forward to discussing 
President Biden's budget request in detail with you.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator 
Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here. Thank you 
for always being willing to take our calls when we have 
important issues to discuss. I sincerely appreciate that.
    Although we do not always agree, as you know, it is good to 
talk and see if we cannot find middle ground to get to what 
usually is a common interest and common objective and I 
sincerely appreciate that.
    These days there is no shortage of complex issues in 
foreign relations, including Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine 
to China's ongoing attempts to coerce and dominate nations 
across the globe.
    The American people need a State Department that is fully 
capable of advancing interests and values of all Americans and 
this will only increase in the future as China becomes a 
greater and greater challenge for us.
    Now, we should all remember that that is the first 
challenge that we have even though we have other things going 
on like the Ukraine war, which are very important to us, but we 
can do more than one thing at a time. China is still the 
challenge of the century.
    The Department needs to be efficient and effective with 
taxpayer dollars and use the authorities provided by Congress. 
For example, my Global Health Security Act signed into law late 
last year provided State with substantial new authorities.
    The bill created a coordinator for global health security 
at the Department with the power to reduce redundancy, 
eliminate waste, and ensure unity of effort.
    Remarkably, the Department provided zero funding for the 
coordinator. I hope you are going to talk about this a little 
bit today. I suspect you are since you and I have talked about 
it at some length previously.
    We also enacted my Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counterterrorism Act, which allows our diplomats more freedom 
to leave the embassy and do their job while dramatically 
reducing the costs of embassies.
    The authorities provided in SECCA should enhance our 
presence in places like the Pacific Islands where we are 
directly competing with Chinese Government for influence.
    Secretary Blinken, I hope to hear how the Department is 
utilizing these authorities in implementing these laws because 
I remain concerned.
    On Russia and its brutal war, I have visited Kyiv and seen 
firsthand the destruction and resilience of the Ukrainian 
people as well as the work the State Department personnel are 
doing to advance our security.
    There is clearly more that needs to be done, though. The 
Administration should stop its dithering and follow the lead of 
allies like Poland and send the F-16s. I do not want to see 
this Administration push for a ceasefire in December because 
not enough is being provided now. It is important that the help 
be provided now.
    Also, while I have consistently advocated for giving 
Ukraine more of the systems it needs to win, I have also been 
clear that we must conduct rigorous oversight to ensure that 
our aid is effective as well as transparent and accountable to 
the American taxpayer.
    I have had direct conversations with President Zelensky 
about this and he knows that we are serious about this. We 
should increase embassy staffing and enable our diplomats to 
get out and conduct more oversight of the assistance dollars.
    More personnel are needed for end-use monitoring of 
critical weapon systems and Washington needs to stop telling 
our team in Ukraine when and where they can go to monitor this.
    There are currently 64 ongoing or planned audits and 
reports on U.S. assistance in Ukraine, and so far there has 
been zero evidence of illicit weapons transfer or misuse of 
taxpayer dollars.
    Turning to the Indo-Pacific, I have long said we need 
better resourcing. I welcome the Department's request for 
increased funding. However, I remain concerned this money will 
be directed towards promoting the Democrat Party's progressive 
priorities rather than actually countering China, which is the 
primary objective.
    The Biden administration must tell Congress what all this 
money is for. Right now without further details it looks like 
slush funds for the Administration's desires.
    On Taiwan, I am troubled, but not surprised that the budget 
request lacks robust security assistance for Taiwan. Relegating 
Taiwan to a sliver of $16 million in total FMF funding is 
unserious and frankly offensive, given the threats emanating 
from China.
    Relatedly, in the Middle East, it is clear that the 
Administration is failing to compete with China. I just 
returned from the region and the Administration's policies 
across the board have created great, great concerns for our 
partners there.
    Our partners continually point to an Iran policy that 
undermines their security, an Afghanistan withdrawal that makes 
them doubt American commitment, this Administration's slow 
embrace of the Abraham Accords, and increasingly restrictive 
arms sales, all evidence, they argue, of a retreating America.
    It is difficult to persuade them otherwise in the face of 
the evidence. The recent deal between Saudi Arabia, China, and 
Iran proves the U.S. is sitting on the sidelines. Instead of 
fixing its approach, the Administration blames our partners for 
this outcome.
    After all, great power competition is global. As a nation 
that has fought in both Europe and the Pacific, we can walk and 
chew gum at the same time.
    Focusing on China is important, I have said for a long, 
long time. That does not mean we turn our backs on the Middle 
East.
    Finally, as you have just returned from Africa, I would 
like to hear how you plan to deliver on U.S. commitments on the 
continent, including those made at the U.S.-Africa Leaders 
Summit.
    We can only deliver if we have sufficient personnel and 
tools to conduct our diplomacy and development effectively. 
Many issues--I have no doubt you are up to the task of 
explaining them all to us in detail.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Mr. Secretary, we will turn to you. Your full statement 
will be included in the record without objection, and you have 
got a lot to cover so I do not want to ultimately constrain 
your time, but we do want to have a conversation with you. 
Please, you can commence.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANTONY BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, 
Ranking Member Risch, committee members. Very good to be with 
you today as always, and thanks for the opportunity to speak to 
the Administration's proposed FY24 budget for the State 
Department and the Agency for International Development.
    We meet at an inflection point and I think that is 
reflected actually in what both the chairman and ranking member 
said. The post-Cold War world era is over and there is an 
intense competition underway to determine, to shape, what comes 
next.
    The United States has a positive vision for the future, a 
world that is free, that is secure, that is open, that is 
prosperous. The budget that we are putting forward will help us 
advance that vision and deliver on issues that are important to 
most of the American people by preparing us to engage 
effectively two broad sets of challenges.
    The first set is posed by our strategic competitors, the 
immediate acute threat posed by Russia's autocracy and its 
aggression against Ukraine and the long-term challenge from the 
People's Republic of China.
    The second set is posed by some shared global tests 
including the climate crisis, migration, food and energy 
insecurity, pandemics, all of which have a direct impact on the 
lives and livelihoods of Americans as well as people around the 
world.
    With this committee's leadership and support across two 
State Department authorization bills, the United States is in a 
stronger geopolitical position than we were a couple of years 
ago.
    We have drawn enormous power from investments we have made 
in our own economic strength and technological edge at home 
including through the Infrastructure Investment Act, through 
the CHIPS and Science Act, through the Inflation Reduction Act.
    Our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships has 
never been stronger. We are expanding our presence in critical 
regions like the Indo-Pacific and we are leading unprecedented 
coalitions to confront aggression and address humanitarian 
crises around the world.
    The President's FY24 budget request for the State 
Department and USAID meet this moment head on. The budget will 
sustain our security, economic, energy, and humanitarian 
support for Ukraine to ensure that President Putin's war 
remains a strategic failure.
    The budget will also strengthen our efforts to outcompete 
the PRC. President Biden and I share the chairman and ranking 
member's commitment to the Indo-Pacific, which is why this 
proposal asked for an 18 percent increase in our budget for 
that region over FY23.
    The budget contains both discretionary and mandatory 
proposals for new innovative investments to outcompete China, 
including by enhancing our presence in the region and ensuring 
what we and other fellow democracies have to offer, including 
things like maritime security, disease surveillance, clean 
energy infrastructure, digital technology, is more attractive 
than the alternative.
    The budget will help us push back on advancing 
authoritarianism and democratic backsliding by strengthening 
democracies around the world, including through supporting 
independent media, countering corruption, defending free and 
fair elections, and it will allow us to pay our contributions 
to international organizations because we need to be at the 
table wherever and whenever new international rules that affect 
the livelihoods of our people are actually being debated and 
decided.
    The budget will allow us to continue leading the world in 
addressing global challenges from food and energy insecurity to 
climate and health crises, and on that last point, we are 
celebrating this week the 20th anniversary of PEPFAR, I think 
one of the greatest achievements in our foreign policy in 
recent decades, which has helped save 25 million lives around 
the world.
    This budget will help us continue the fight against HIV/
AIDS while advancing global health security more broadly 
through a new Bureau of Global Health, Security, and Diplomacy, 
which I look forward to working with Congress to establish this 
year.
    The budget will advance our efforts to modernize the State 
Department including by expanding our training flow, updating 
our technology, carrying out diversity, equity, inclusion, 
accessibility initiatives, including to make our overseas 
missions more accessible.
    I am grateful for the progress that we have already made 
together including Congress' support in updating the Secure 
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and 
Accountability Review Board, which gives us more flexibility to 
open new missions and to better manage the risks that our 
people face around the world.
    We know there is more to do and we are looking forward to 
working with Congress to accelerate modernization efforts so 
that the Department can better attract and retain and support 
our first-rate workforce as they advance our interests in what 
is a complex and fast-moving landscape.
    Finally, the budget will further a priority for me and I 
know for many of you and that is supporting Enduring Welcome, 
our whole-of-government effort to resettle our Afghan allies. 
Keeping our promises to those who served with us remains an 
unwavering priority. This budget will help us continue to make 
good on that commitment.
    Mr. Chairman, as you referenced, when I began this role I 
committed to restoring a real partnership with Congress as an 
equal partner in our foreign policymaking and I really value 
tremendously the work that we have done together, the 
engagements that we have had, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch, and look forward to continuing those and also to working 
on this budget together as we move forward in the months ahead.
    Thank you very much for having me here today.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Secretary Antony Blinken

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, committee members: thank 
you for the opportunity to speak with you about the Administration's 
proposed FY 2024 budget for the State Department and USAID.
    We meet at an inflection point. The post-Cold War world is over, 
and there is an intense competition underway to determine what comes 
next. The United States has a positive vision for the future: a world 
that's free, secure, open and prosperous.
    This budget will help us advance that vision, and deliver on the 
issues that matter most to the American people, by preparing us to meet 
two major sets of challenges.
    The first set is posed by our strategic competitors--the immediate, 
acute threat posed by Russia's autocracy and aggression, most 
destructively through its brutal war against Ukraine . . . and the 
long-term challenge from the People's Republic of China.
    The second set is posed by shared global tests, including the 
climate crisis, migration, food and energy insecurity, and pandemics, 
all of which directly impact the lives and livelihoods of Americans and 
all peoples around the world.
    With this Committee's leadership and support across two State 
Department authorization bills, the United States is in a stronger 
geopolitical position than we were 2 years ago.
    We've drawn enormous power from investments we've made in our 
economic strength and technological edge at home, including through the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and 
the Inflation Reduction Act. Our unmatched network of alliances and 
partnerships has never been stronger. We're expanding our presence in 
critical regions, like the Indo-Pacific. And we're leading 
unprecedented coalitions to confront aggression and address 
humanitarian crises worldwide.
    The President's FY 2024 Budget Request for the State Department and 
USAID meets this moment head on.
    This budget will sustain our security, economic, energy, and 
humanitarian support for Ukraine to ensure President Putin's war 
remains a strategic failure.
    This budget will also strengthen our efforts to outcompete the PRC. 
President Biden and I share the Chairman and Ranking Member's 
commitment to the Indo-Pacific, which is why this proposal asks for an 
18 percent increase in our budget for that region over FY 2023. The 
Budget contains both discretionary and mandatory proposals for new 
innovative investments to outcompete China--including by enhancing our 
presence in the region, and ensuring what we and our fellow democracies 
have to offer, including maritime security, disease surveillance, clean 
energy infrastructure and digital technology, is more attractive than 
any alternative.
    This budget will help us push back on advancing authoritarianism 
and democratic backsliding by strengthening democracies worldwide--
including through supporting independent media, countering corruption, 
and defending free and fair elections. And it will allow us to pay our 
contributions to international organizations, because the United States 
needs to be at the table wherever and whenever new international rules 
that affect the livelihoods of our people are debated and decided.
    This budget will allow us to continue leading the world in 
addressing global challenges, from food and energy insecurity to 
climate and health crises. On that last point: we're celebrating the 
20th anniversary of PEPFAR, which has helped us save 25 million lives 
worldwide. This budget will help us continue the fight against HIV/
AIDS, while advancing health security more broadly through a new Bureau 
of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, which I look forward to 
working with Congress to establish this year.
    This budget will advance our efforts to modernize the State 
Department, including by expanding our training float, updating our 
technology, and carrying out diversity, equity, inclusion and 
accessibility initiatives, including to make our overseas missions more 
accessible. I'm grateful for the progress we've already made together, 
including Congress' support in updating the Secure Embassy Construction 
and Counterterrorism Act and Accountability Review Board to give us the 
flexibility to open new missions and better manage risks. We know 
there's more to do, and we're looking forward to working with Congress 
to accelerate modernization efforts, so the Department can better 
attract, retain, and support our first-rate workforce as they advance 
U.S. interests in a complex and fast-moving landscape.
    Finally, this budget will further a personal priority for me, and I 
know for many of you: supporting Enduring Welcome, our whole-of-
government effort to resettle our Afghan allies. Keeping our promises 
to those who served the U.S. remains an unwavering priority, and this 
budget will help us continue to make good on that commitment.
    When I began this role, I committed to restoring Congress's place 
as an equal partner in our foreign policymaking.
    I'm looking forward to continuing our close coordination, and I'm 
grateful for the chance to answer your questions. Thank you.

    The Chairman. All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will be in order. The committee 
will be in order. The committee will be in order. The committee 
will be in order.
    The committee will stand in recess until the police can 
restore order.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come back to order.
    Senator Risch says this never happened when he was 
chairman. I do not remember that being the case.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Let me just say to our guests, we invite the 
public to be here so that they can see the proceedings, but 
there is work being done here and so we cannot have disruptions 
of that work.
    You are welcome to join us, welcome to see what is 
happening. I did not say anything when you lifted your signs, 
but once you break into a public outcry, you disrupt the 
proceedings. That is not democracy in action.
    We will continue. Mr. Secretary, we will start a round of 7 
minutes. Thank you for your statement.
    We just saw that Xi Jinping is doubling down on his 
commitment to support Russia's Vladimir Putin. Xi is no 
peacemaker. He seems ready to validate Russia's war crimes in 
Ukraine, required nothing of them to resolve the crisis except 
to blame the West and the Ukrainians for having the audacity to 
put up a fight against an illegal invasion.
    In the process Putin has become Xi's junior partner, 
because I was looking at those agreements and they basically--
well, actually, go one way towards China in terms of 
investments, but very little back as it relates to Russia.
    He needs the international approval that he thinks Xi gives 
him and obviously they need each other for a variety of 
reasons. This is just emblematic of the global strategic 
challenge that China is to us.
    We are focused on Ukraine, of course, as Russia continues 
its illegal assault upon the Ukrainian people, and its war 
crimes, and I appreciate that the Administration said crimes 
against humanity, but our long-term geostrategic challenge is 
China. How do you think this budget helps us begin to resource 
that challenge? Because we have more embassies, more personnel, 
in the Chinese Communist Party around the world than we do of 
our own.
    Secretary Blinken. No, I very much appreciate the question, 
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    A few things. First, there are a number of things beyond 
the budget that we have done to put ourselves in a stronger 
position to deal with the competition from China. One of them, 
as I said, are the investments that we have made in ourselves 
over the last couple of years, which are having a powerful 
impact around the world as people see that we are serious about 
our own future, and I point again specifically to CHIPS and 
Science, but as well as some other legislation.
    Second, we have made a very significant effort to align 
with allies and partners around the world and we are seeing 
that play out in Europe, we have seen that play out in Asia, in 
terms of having a more common approach to the challenges posed 
by China.
    Having said that, this also needs to be effectively 
resourced. One of the reasons that we are putting forward a 
request for mandatory allocations here is because we are facing 
a generational challenge and we think that the discretionary 
alone is not enough to help us out compete China.
    We have to find and the budget proposes some new and 
innovative ways to provide viable alternatives at scale that 
discretionary funding does not.
    I think if you look at some of the work that we are trying 
to do, we have a proposal for $400 million to counter specific 
actions by China that counter our interests in the Indo-Pacific 
and beyond--$2 billion for high quality infrastructure projects 
to more effectively compete with the work that China does that 
is not just economic, it is strategic in terms of advancing 
infrastructure.
    We need to be able not, of course, to match them dollar for 
dollar, which we will never do, but to be more effective in 
catalyzing private sector investment and doing it in a more 
coordinated way with allies and partners.
    We have investments in Indo-Pacific economies. We have a 
new DFC Fund, which is a critical tool, I think, to leveraging 
private sector investment and we have this commitment to the 
Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, with 
Palau, with Micronesia, as well as more broadly with the 
Pacific Islands where we are going to significantly increase 
our presence and engagement, all of which needs to be funded.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that. I think we need--and 
Senator Romney has raised this several times--this is like a 
whole-of-government perspective. I have asked you about the 
State Department, but you need a whole-of-government strategy 
to meet the challenge of China.
    The CHIPS Act was one element of that that the Congress 
passed last year. I hope we can get a strategic vision from the 
Administration as to all the integrations of an all-of-
government approach. These are good elements of that, but we 
need something broader and we look forward to working with you 
on that.
    I want to turn to Iran for a moment. We have----
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come back to order. I 
would ask the--maybe you should ask the million Uyghurs in 
concentration camps how they feel about that.
    Let me ask you about Iran. Iran continues to march on in 
its fissile materials, about 87 percent now--still has not come 
clean with the IAEA about its previous undeclared places--is 
providing drones--yesterday there was an enormous number of 
strikes against Ukraine by Iranian drones given to the Russians 
and obviously they must be getting things from the Russians 
that they need, particularly in equipment--that they need to 
ultimately achieve some of their goals.
    We have their oils being exported to countries that are not 
observing the sanctions. At the end of the day, when are we 
going to get our European allies to join us in coming to the 
understanding that we are at a point that despite their best 
efforts, Iran has not lived up to its obligations to them under 
the JCPOA, to the international community, and continues to be 
a challenge?
    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, I actually think they are 
at that point----
    The Chairman. Are they ready to multilateralize sanctions 
with us?
    Secretary Blinken. Two things. One is as a result of the 
effort to get back into mutual compliance with the JCPOA and 
the fact that Iran rejected what was put on the table by the 
European Union, by France, by Germany, by the United Kingdom, 
as well as us and actually supported at the time by Russia and 
China. I think that has demonstrated to our partners in Europe 
that Iran was not serious about genuinely reengaging on nuclear 
diplomacy.
    At the same time, the developments of the last 6 months to 
include the provision of drones to Russia for its war of 
aggression against Ukraine to include, of course, what is 
happening in the streets of Iran, the repression of its people, 
all of that has further concentrated minds in a significant way 
including in Europe.
    We have taken increasingly coordinated actions together 
with our partners, particularly with regard to sanctions. We 
continue to do that.
    We are pushing back with them on the provision of drones 
and other technologies to Russia including seeking to break up 
the networks, trying to get at the dual-use items that go into 
the--construct the manufacturing of these drones and, of 
course, we are working ourselves to deal with the actions that 
some of their proxies are taking in the Middle East itself and 
interacting----
    The Chairman. I just think, Mr. Secretary, that the 
Europeans have not joined us in multilateralizing our 
sanctions, which at this time to Iran would have a huge 
consequence and hopefully change their calculus in a peaceful 
way, and I just hope we can engage more vigorously with them.
    I certainly talk to those who come to visit us and 
parliamentarians from those countries. It is time to come to 
the conclusion that if we want Iran to move in a different 
course, others have to join us as well, and I hope we are more 
robust in that part of the element while we are dealing with 
Iran.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I concur 
with the chairman's remarks regarding the Iran situation.
    The Chairman. Not on everything, just on----
    Senator Risch. Let us not go overboard here.
    He and I met with the IAEA and I think they are doing a 
really good job. I really do. I think that there is a different 
attitude there than there has been in years past and they are 
very clear eyed and, more importantly, they are willing to 
actually talk about it and say the things that is on their mind 
about what they are finding and not finding.
    Again, we need to encourage our European allies to join us 
in what we are trying to do as far as Iran is concerned.
    You probably are aware that here in the Senate last week 
and this week and probably next week and maybe after that we 
are talking about a potential repeal of the 2002 AUMF. There 
are legitimate differences of opinion on this as to whether it 
should be done completely, whether it should be done partially, 
and that is all well and good and we are debating it.
    Included in that, however, is an attempt to repeal the 2001 
AUMF, and I have got a few questions I want to ask you about 
the 2001 AUMF and that is--these are just 2001, not the 2002.
    The first question I have is, is the Administration 
currently using the 2001 AUMF legal authorities?
    Secretary Blinken. We are.
    Senator Risch. Second question I have is, in the absence of 
a new AUMF to replace 2001, is it a vital authority?
    Secretary Blinken. In the absence of being able to replace 
it with something to rely on, yes, it is.
    Senator Risch. Then, lastly, do you think the 2001 repeal 
should take place before there is an actual replacement of it?
    Secretary Blinken. I would hope that if we are moving in 
that direction, we do this concurrently, which is to say there 
should not be any gap between the potential repeal of the 2001 
authorization and a replacement.
    We are fully prepared to work with Congress on finding a 
way if that is the direction you take to repeal, but replace 
2001 with something if that is the direction of Congress that 
is focused, appropriately targeted.
    As it stands, we continue to rely on it to make sure that 
we are protecting the security of Americans who remain under 
threat from al-Qaeda, from ISIS-K.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that and----
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Committee 
will come to order.
    Committee will stand in recess until order is restored.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    Senator Risch. Moving along, I want to talk about the 
outcompete China initiative, which I think we are all in 
agreement on as far as objective is concerned.
    How we get there, of course, is a matter of debate, and I 
do not want to get too far in the weeds on budgeting, but this 
is a budget hearing, after all, and the Department is seeking a 
$2 billion mandatory expenditure and $250 million in 
discretionary funds for that.
    The $2 billion mandatory funds probably are less likely 
than anything else. The question I have got for you is, are you 
thinking that there is going to be another or the 
Administration will be pursuing another supplemental if 
necessary? Is that the thought process here or what----
    Secretary Blinken. No, Senator. I mean, I cannot speak to 
that at this point. I think it is premature to get to that.
    The budget is on its own merits our best assessment of the 
resources we believe we need, absent anything else, to 
effectively advance the effort to deal with the challenges 
posed by China.
    Senator Risch. Fair enough, and although I think you would 
agree with me that the $2 billion is--in mandatory is going to 
be tough to do. Would you--that is probably going to be a 
pretty heavy lift for the appropriators.
    In that regard, as you know, I wrote to the Department 
asking about expenditure for hard infrastructure including 
transport, energy, and digital infrastructure, and I was 
assured that that was going to happen with the $2 billion.
    Then the question becomes if it moves from mandatory over 
to discretionary will--is your view the same that these 
expenditures will be for this hard infrastructure as opposed to 
social kind of programs?
    Secretary Blinken. I am certainly determined to do that. We 
are going to have some top line budget challenges depending on 
how these funds are actually apportioned.
    Senator Risch. Fair statement.
    Secretary Blinken. That would certainly be my 
determination. Look, we--to your point, we are in a 
competition, including on things like hard infrastructure where 
they are able to mobilize all of the resources of the state to 
do it in a way that invests in loss leader projects because it 
is strategically important to them.
    Now, we have seen something of a backlash against this in 
country after country where it turns out that taking this money 
is not necessarily leaving countries in the best place--piling 
debt on, as we all know, bringing in laborers from China 
instead of using local workforces, not caring about worker 
rights, environmental protection, et cetera, bringing 
corruption with it.
    It has been a double-edged sword for a lot of people. 
Nonetheless, the resources are significant. Our comparative 
advantage is finding ways to catalyze more effectively private 
sector investment. We need to be able to do that by putting 
some of our own money down--equity down.
    One of the tools, by the way, that you all know so well 
because you have been instrumental in helping to shape it is 
the Development Finance Corporation and we also think it would 
be very useful to change the way that its equity participation 
is scored, which makes it very hard for it to provide as much 
equity investment in projects as it otherwise would.
    It is what is most--it is the greatest guarantor to others 
coming in on projects to see a little bit of money on the table 
from the government. The DFC is an important vehicle for that.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. My time is almost up, but 
I want to take one quick bite of the apple here on Taiwan.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Standing in recess until the police can restore order.
    We return to Senator Risch for----
    Secretary Blinken. I notice, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 
Member, it does not seem to be directed at you.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. No, it does not seem to be directed at me.
    Senator Risch. One quick question before I yield here is 
Taiwan. I was deeply disappointed when I saw what was proposed 
here. The $16 million is--I mean, it is stunningly--if we are 
going to--if we are going to pursue the porcupine theory of how 
to defend Taiwan, I mean, the $16 million is--does not even pay 
carfare over there, it seems like to me.
    What are your thoughts on that? We got to do better than 
that.
    Secretary Blinken. No, a few things and this--I know this 
warrants a longer conversation. Maybe we can at least start it.
    When it comes to Taiwan, we have a couple of things. We 
appreciate the authority that has been given for foreign 
military financing. We also appreciate the drawdown authority, 
which we are looking at how we could effectively use.
    When it comes to the FMS, what we put in place in the 
budget is a broader fund--an emerging priorities fund globally. 
It is about $113 million, but when it comes to Taiwan, what we 
have been focused on is foreign military sales and over the 
course of the last few years we have done about $5 billion in 
foreign military sales since the start of this Administration, 
about $10 billion going back to 2019.
    I have signed out more cases as Secretary of State last 
year than any previous secretary has done. Taiwan increased its 
defense budget by about 11 percent so it has significant means 
to acquire this technology.
    We are looking at the best ways to get it. One of the 
challenges we have has little to do with our budgets or our 
authorities as, I think, again, everyone on this committee 
knows very well.
    The long pole in the tent in providing equipment to Taiwan 
to defend itself is the production capacity here and this is 
something, of course, that we are working on, but in terms of 
the--both the monies and the authorities, we found that the FMS 
program in particular is best suited and there is certainly not 
been any delay in getting these cases out the door. At the 
State Department I turn them around very, very quickly.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Secretary, 
welcome back. I want to focus on the Western Hemisphere.
    The Administration's budget request is for $2.7 billion in 
funding for the hemisphere and that is a $430 million, or 21 
percent, increase from the FY22 actual levels.
    Just a couple of highlights. The largest country or 
regional level recipients are Central America, $979 million, 
Haiti, $292 million, and about $275 million is intended for 
hemispheric efforts to manage migration.
    In the Central American area one of the challenges we have 
is we would like to invest to deal with root causes of 
immigration, promote stability, economic development, but many 
of the government partners in that region are not reliable 
partners.
    How do we make an investment of that size, $979 million, or 
any sizable investment when the partners--the governments there 
are not reliable?
    Secretary Blinken. I very much appreciate that, Senator, 
and the short answer is by as necessary working around the 
governments when we do not have effective partners.
    Yes, we got about a billion dollars requested in aid for 
Central America. We have, of course, laws and regulations to 
ensure that the money is not diverted, for example, to corrupt 
actors, but at the same time we want to make sure that it is 
used effectively to do the things that we want to do, including 
getting at some of these root causes.
    Vice President Harris led a major and very successful 
effort to generate significantly more private sector investment 
in Central America, a call to action that has produced over $4 
billion dollars in commitments from the private sector to 
invest directly in projects in Central America which will 
create opportunity, create jobs for people, and give them in 
that sense a greater opportunity to stay, not to take the 
hazardous journey to the United States.
    Now, these things take time to realize, as you know, but we 
have a lot of work that is going on there and, again, this is 
not going to the governments. It is going to the private 
sectors. It is going to implementing partners in terms of our 
assistance.
    We would like to be able to work as closely as possible 
with governments, but unless and until we are satisfied that we 
can do that in a way that does not result in the taxpayers' 
money being ill spent we are going to continue to work directly 
with NGOs or with the private sector.
    Senator Kaine. Let me just--on the NGO point, just for my 
colleagues and to put it on the record--I am sure you are 
grappling with it--several countries in Central America have 
either adopted or are considering adopting very stringent laws 
against foreign NGOs.
    Some of the very partners with whom we might be able to 
effectively serve people in the Northern Triangle and other 
nations are now kind of getting cracked down on by the 
governments and this affects not only the NGOs, but even 
USAID's ability to work with partner agencies.
    Talk about the impacts of these laws and how you and USAID 
are attempting to deal with that challenge.
    Secretary Blinken. No, you are exactly right. We have seen 
that these--some of these laws are ripped from the playbooks 
from Russia, China, and other places.
    [Disruption in the room.]
    The Chairman. Committee will stand in recess until the 
police can restore order.
    Committee will come back to order. Please.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    No, you are exactly right. As I said--as you have said, we 
have seen different countries, including in our own hemisphere, 
put forward some of these laws that in very onerous ways 
restrict and in a practical manner actually ended up crippling 
some of the NGOs and their ability to operate.
    Senator Kaine. In some nations like Nicaragua were not just 
cracking down on NGOs, but kicking them out of the country.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. In effect, putting them out of 
business entirely. That is exactly right.
    This is also very much part of our own engagement, part of 
our own diplomacy, and part of the conversation that we have 
with other countries in the hemisphere who may have better 
relations with some of these countries than we do, to press 
them to use the influence that they have to make sure that that 
space remains open and does not get shut down.
    Senator Kaine. Who are the star performers in the region? 
Because this is a region that really is backsliding in 
democracy in many ways, but not everyone is backsliding. Some 
are forward leaning. Who are some of the star performers in the 
region in terms of, for example, willingness to call out bad 
behavior, go to bat for NGOs?
    Secretary Blinken. It is very interesting. I think, 
Senator, as you know well, we have countries that have very 
significant challenges, but a country like Ecuador continues to 
stand strongly for democracy.
    Chile also speaks up and speaks out in ways that I think 
are compelling because it is not exclusively about governments 
of the right. It goes to the governments of the left as well. 
Those are two countries.
    Now, of course, we have countries like Costa Rica that 
remains a champion.
    Senator Kaine. Costa Rica, for example, together with South 
Korea, the Netherlands, the United States, and Zambia are five 
of the co-hosts for the upcoming round two of the Summit for 
Democracies.
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Kaine. What is the Administration expecting out of 
the summit at the end of the month?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, what we want to do and see, and we 
will have more to say about that over the next week or so, is 
to follow up on a lot of the work that was done at the first 
summit to demonstrate that there are concrete results coming 
out of these countries coming together.
    For example, on media protections, which is something else 
that is under challenge around the world, we have had very 
concrete initiatives to help defend journalists if they are 
literally under physical threat, to deal with lawfare that is 
being used against them to try to put them out of business with 
frivolous lawsuits coming from governments, funds that we have 
established to do that and, of course, in the NGO space, 
pushing back on the tightening of that space.
    There are other countries in the hemisphere that have also 
been very strong partners for us--the Dominican Republic, on 
many things and as well Panama. There are--while trends have 
been moving in some directions, I think we continue to see some 
strong partners that we have a real incentive in working with 
and trying to bolster.
    Senator Kaine. With a minute left let me ask you about 
Haiti. Obviously, we want to engage with other nations. I was 
in the region recently. A lot of concern about the security 
situation there.
    There has to be something to stabilize the security 
situation before you could get into any meaningful political 
reform talks, elections, et cetera. Those are not going to 
happen easily with a security situation that is unstable.
    Talk a little bit about the U.S. efforts to work with 
others to promote increased stability in Haiti.
    Secretary Blinken. We have gangs running amok in Haiti and 
dominating important parts of the capital, Port-au-Prince, as 
well as other major cities, including ports, transportation 
networks, terrorizing people in their daily lives, but also in 
many cases aided and abetted by political figures and other 
leaders who use them for their own purposes.
    We have been trying to break that nexus including by 
sanctioning leaders who we believe are supporting these gangs 
to try to break that up.
    At the same time, we have been working hard to try to 
bolster the Haitian National Police along with a number of 
other countries so that they can provide the basic security 
that the state is supposed to be in the business of providing.
    It is challenging. The HNP is very challenged, but we are 
engaged along with Canada and some other countries in trying to 
bolster them up. As you know, there is a very active discussion 
going on now about whether some sort of international support 
is needed to really manage the insecurity that Haitians are 
facing to get to an election, which Haiti needs because it is 
basically running out of legitimate actors at this point.
    It, under present circumstances, would be very, very 
difficult if not impossible to hold. It is something we are 
very actively working on. The Security Council is also focused 
on this and seized with this.
    I do not want to minimize the challenge, the insecurity, 
mostly as a result of gangs dominating the situation. It is a 
big problem.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you, Mr. Secretary for being here today.
    I want to start by talking about the United Arab Emirates. 
As you are aware, in January of--January 17, 2022, the Houthi-
backed rebels or the Houthi rebels backed by the Iranians 
launched missiles and drones at Abu Dhabi and killed three 
people, injured six others.
    In our visit there last month, the number of officials in 
the UAE treated this like their 9/11. They said those words 
specifically, ``This was our 9/11.''
    What they relayed to us was that they are unhappy with 
regard to the Administration's response that President Biden 
did not call. There was a weak response from the United States. 
In fact, I think it was reported later that you later called 
the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and apologized for not 
having a stronger response.
    I can tell you a year later they are still very mad that if 
you did indeed call to apologize it did not do the trick 
because they are still very, very unhappy. Instead of having 
the opportunity to talk about how we can strengthen our 
relationship with the UAE and how we might be able to make sure 
that we have got a strong relationship versus the Chinese 
Communist Party, we are instead lectured about this fumble in 
diplomacy.
    Again, this just leads to our allies in the region looking 
for other help and we have seen that recently, for example, 
with what the CCP is doing. Obviously, we have all read in the 
newspapers about Saudi Arabia and Iran agreeing to establish 
diplomatic relations with the help of the CCP brokering that 
deal, which I think we all agree makes us look bad.
    First of all, let us just start with how did it happen that 
we did not call the Crown Prince and have President Biden call 
him? I do not expect that that would be President Biden who 
would be thinking those things up. Should there not be somebody 
on his team be telling him, hey, you need to give Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed a phone call?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you. In fact, I spent not 
just on the phone, I spent 2 and a half, 3 hours, in person 
with bin Zayed in actually Morocco. This goes back to last 
year.
    We had a very lengthy discussion about this moment, and I 
agree with you that for our Emirati partners and friends this 
was a profound moment and I certainly heard from him what you 
just shared, the concern that we had not adequately engaged 
them.
    Now, I will tell you that I, other partners in the 
government, did reach out immediately to our counterparts, in 
my case, the foreign minister.
    If you ask the Secretary of Defense, he will tell you about 
the assets that we deployed immediately to bolster the 
Emirates' security. He will tell you as well that the 
technology that was used to shoot down the incoming was 
American technology that we provided.
    Nonetheless, I am deeply sensitive to the way this was 
perceived by our friends, and in my own conversations with MBZ 
made it clear that we understood and that we would be with him 
and stand with him against threats to their security.
    Since then, we have been working on negotiating a strategic 
framework agreement to in very concrete ways address some of 
the concerns they have, to answer some of the questions they 
have about their security, and we have done a lot of work on 
that and made, I think, some very, very good progress.
    We have worked very closely together in building out the 
Abraham Accords. Part of--we started something together called 
the Negev Forum along with Israel, with Bahrain, with Morocco, 
with Egypt, that we all took part in.
    We put something together that I think is going to bear 
very good results, bringing together the Emirates, Israel, 
India, and the United States, something we call I2U2, to 
jointly invest in infrastructure projects and the first ones 
are going forward in India.
    We have made clear that in terms of some of the weapons 
systems that they seek for their security, we are fully 
prepared to move forward. These are systems that they started 
to discuss previously. They pushed the pause button. We said we 
would welcome pursuing this conversation, including the F-35s.
    I think there are a whole variety of things that are going 
on in the relationship that demonstrate the seriousness that we 
attach to the partnership and our commitment to it.
    Senator Ricketts. Yes. I appreciate that and it is an 
important relationship. I encourage you to continue because I 
can tell you having just been there last month they are still 
not happy. This is still a very sore spot for them.
    There is more that we need to do to make sure we can 
strengthen this relationship so and I would encourage you to 
figure out ways to not let this happen again to one of our key 
allies where a call from the President is going to be 
important.
    I view this as the State Department and you as the head of 
the State Department's responsibility to make sure the 
President is informed about making these types of phone calls.
    Next, I would like to move on to the effectiveness of the 
sanctions in Russia. Early in February 2022, President Biden 
warned Vladimir Putin that he has never seen sanctions like the 
one I have promised to impose and soon after Russia's illegal 
invasion of Ukraine the West did impose tough sanctions 
including measures that included the removal of the Russian 
banks from the SWIFT network, sanctions on Russia's central 
bank, freezing $300 billion of Russia's foreign reserves, among 
other things.
    The expectation of this was this would cripple the Russian 
economy. In April--the World Bank predicted by April 2022 the 
Russian economy would be contracting by 11.2 percent. The 
International Institute of Finance went even further, 
predicting the Russian economy would decline by a whopping 15 
percent.
    Instead, the Russian economy was weakened, but it certainly 
was not crippled, having shrunk maybe 2 to 4 percent last year, 
much less than that 10 to 15 percent that people were 
predicting.
    My question is what did we miss. First, the ability for 
Russians to sanction-proof its economy as well as actions taken 
by the Russian central bank to implement aggressive capital 
control measures and interest rate hikes to prevent the 
collapse of the ruble.
    Second, Russia would still be able to sell oil that would 
have gone to Europe to countries like China and India and in 
fact Indian imports of Russian oil are up 400 percent, as you 
know.
    Then, third, the ability of Russia to circumvent these 
sanctions. For example, Turkish companies exported tens of 
millions of dollars worth of machinery, electronics, spare 
parts, and other items that Russia needs for its military.
    Countries that border Russia like Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, have 
become primary importers of dual-use goods from the West and 
then reselling them in Russia.
    This week, the New York Times reported that China has sold 
more than $12 million in drones for Russia that they will use 
in the war effort.
    Clearly, we have to do better. In March last year you said 
that Western sanctions are having a crippling effect on the 
Russian economy.
    After a year of conflict in Ukraine, do you believe that 
these are crippling and, if not, what more do we need to do to 
sanction Russia?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Two things on this. First, Russia did take extraordinary 
measures, for example, to prop up the ruble, the expenditures 
from its sovereign wealth fund as well to make sure it was 
propping up its economy. That certainly has some effect on some 
of the macro numbers.
    As I see it, the sanctions, the export controls, are having 
and will have an increasingly powerful effect on Russia's 
ability to prosecute modern warfare, to develop its economy, to 
progress in its technology, to acquire and use energy 
extraction technology that it needs, to modernize its aerospace 
and defense sectors. All of these things are being dramatically 
undercut by the sanctions and by the export controls.
    Yes, it is finding some substitute parts for things that 
are being denied by dozens of countries around the world. Those 
parts are inferior.
    It is having tremendous difficulty in replacing the weapons 
that it is expending, particularly precision-guided munitions 
in Ukraine, actually replacing those, getting the parts to do 
that, and a combination of things along with the sanctions and 
import controls, including the exodus of nearly a million 
Russians, many of whom are the most educated, most 
technologically sophisticated, the fact that a thousand or more 
international companies have left Russia, do not want to do 
business there.
    All of these things taken together, never mind the fact 
that horrifically some 200,000 Russians, by public estimates, 
have either been killed or wounded in Ukraine. All of these 
things will have growing and powerful effects on Russia's 
ability both to continue to have a modern, effective military 
and to have a modern effective economy, going forward. I have 
no doubt about the powerful impact of these----
    Senator Ricketts. Do we need to do more, though?
    Secretary Blinken. We are working every single day, not 
just us, but in very close coordination with dozens of 
countries around the world. European Union has now done, I 
think, 10 different sanctions packages on Russia. This is 
something no one would have expected.
    We have ourselves continued to look at the different actors 
that we can go after, the different sectors that we can go 
after, to have an impact and I think, again, you are going to 
see this increasing.
    They are having tremendous difficulty replacing the 
equipment that they have been using up and they are looking 
at--you are right, they are looking at different places around 
the world, but it is not at all the same as what they had 
before.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    We have just witnessed a 3-day ``brofest'' with Putin and 
Xi celebrating authoritarian power. China, certainly, running 
over the top of Hong Kong and, of course, we are very concerned 
about its threat to Taiwan.
    Russia assaulting Ukraine and trying to take it in just a 
brutal display of force.
    How much should the American public be concerned about the 
way these authoritarian leaders are approaching the world?
    Secretary Blinken. On one level, this is no surprise. Both 
countries have very different worldviews than our own. They may 
find common cause in opposing the world view that we and so 
many other countries around the world seek to defend and 
advance.
    Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, you will 
remember that they had--President Xi and President Putin had a 
meeting in which they declared a partnership with no limits or 
limitless friendship, depending on how you translate it, and to 
some extent, we continue to see that play out, I think, in many 
ways with Russia now as the very junior partner in this 
relationship, but a partner that may serve some interests that 
China has.
    What we have done at the same time is to make a major 
reinvestment rejuvenation, reenergizing of our own alliances 
and partnerships and we now have much greater convergence than 
we had a couple of years ago on how to approach both of these 
challenges.
    You see that in the coalition that has come together to 
oppose the Russian aggression against Ukraine, both in terms of 
the support for Ukraine and the pressure being exerted against 
Russia. You see that in the work that countries are doing 
together to deal with some of the challenges that China poses.
    We have with European partners, Asian partners, much 
greater convergence on everything from investment screening 
mechanisms to export controls to outward investment----
    Senator Merkley. Thank you. I am quite impressed by the way 
we have we have responded, but I do think that the 
circumstances regarding Hong Kong, Ukraine, and China's use of 
high-tech to suppress the Uyghurs are very appealing strategies 
to many authoritarian leaders and we have decades ahead in 
which we are going to be struggling for the vision of democracy 
and human rights versus the authoritarian power.
    One of the things that both Russia and China have been 
engaged in is transnational repression and last week, I 
introduced a bill with Senators Rubio, Cardin, and Hagerty, a 
comprehensive bill.
    I want--you may not have had a chance to look it over yet, 
but certainly is trying to lay out a roadmap for us to respond 
to transnational repression and I just want to keep raising 
this as a growing threat to citizens inside our own country and 
also the concern about how they are working to extradite people 
back to China or Russia with the grave consequences.
    Secretary Blinken. We very much share that concern, and 
really welcome working with you, the other members, on that 
legislation.
    Senator Merkley. I will be leading a congressional 
delegation to Vietnam and Indonesia here shortly at the 
beginning of April and we will be going to Jakarta to have 
conversations with ASEAN government. That is where their 
capital is right now.
    How do you evaluate how successful ASEAN will be in being a 
significant part of the structure that kind of resists Chinese 
expansionist power?
    Secretary Blinken. I think we are seeing increased concern 
among a number of countries in ASEAN for some of the exertions 
of power and influence that China is displaying, particularly, 
for example, when it comes to the maritime claims that they are 
making that are in contradiction with international law, some 
of the actions that the Chinese vessels of one kind or another 
are taking and we see this play out on a regular basis.
    We are very much engaged, for example, with the ASEAN 
countries as well as within other countries and helping to 
build up what is called maritime domain awareness, helping to 
give them the tools to have much greater visibility on what is 
going on in their own seas to be able to see in real time any 
kind of aggressive action is being taken, to be able to see in 
real time the illegal unreported, unregulated fishing that is 
devastating livelihoods in many of these countries where China 
is one of the principal actors.
    I think you are seeing a real significant awareness of some 
of these challenges and we are taking practical steps to try to 
help countries address it.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    I might shift to Central America. A few years ago, I went 
down with Tom Carper to assess the challenges and we found the 
three C's, if you will. We found the cartels. We found the 
corruption, and we found the climate change, all driving, 
really, a disintegration of the economy and livability, which 
were driving factors of folks deciding to take the risky 
journey north.
    We have a new opportunity with the new president. Well, not 
so new now, but of Honduras, President Castro. How is that 
going?
    Secretary Blinken. We have been engaged with the President 
Castro administration. I think, by the way, as you know, the 
former president of Honduras is awaiting trial in the United 
States for corruption, among other things.
    We are working to engage these governments, whether it is 
Honduras, whether it is Guatemala, whether it is El Salvador, 
there are challenges posed by some of the policies that the 
governments are pursuing, but we are working to find ways to 
engage with them on issues of clearly mutual concern to us. We 
are working on that on a regular basis.
    Senator Merkley. Well, it is always helpful to have a new 
opportunity, but it is very difficult for a president alone to 
change policy when things are deeply embedded and the cartels 
are very embedded and corruption is very much there, and 
climate change is not going away. A lot to overcome.
    Going across to Burma, I led a congressional delegation 
years ago when Aung San Suu Kyi invited us to come and see that 
there was nothing to hide and then at the last moment, she and 
her team blocked our ability to see the some 300 villages that 
had been burned and razed and then since then we have had the 
military takeover and things have been perhaps even worse and 
we always hope that there is some kind of path back to 
democracy, back to some form of human rights, but it is not 
looking too good.
    Any ways you can make me feel better about this?
    Secretary Blinken. I wish that I could, but unfortunately I 
share your assessment. We have been working since the military 
takeover to do a number of things including, of course, first 
and foremost, stopping the violence, which continues to take 
place every single day and that has gotten worse to release 
prisoners and to get back on the path of democracy.
    None of that has happened. We have been working with many 
other countries to try to exert pressure on the military 
regime. We have the--by the way, we have the Burma Act as well, 
whose passage we appreciate and welcome. We are working 
implement it.
    Part of that goes to the support that we are providing to 
democratic groups in Burma as well as ethnic groups that are 
dealing with the repression coming from the military junta, 
trying to prepare them effectively for governance. At the same 
time, we continue to ramp up economic actions against the 
regime.
    We have designated, I think, to date about 80 individuals, 
some 30 or 40 entities, military leaders, business affiliates, 
arms dealers, energy companies that are supporting the regime 
in an effort to exert some meaningful pressure to move them 
back to the democratic path.
    You were talking about ASEAN a minute ago. Of course, we 
have been strongly encouraging the ASEAN five-point consensus 
for them to actually implement it in a meaningful way. That has 
been very challenging.
    In short, I wish that I had something positive or hopeful 
to say in this moment. It is an incredibly challenged 
situation.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. On September 12 and November 7 of last year, 
I sent letters to the State Department asking for records about 
Coronavirus research that had been funded by the State 
Department. The State Department refused to comply.
    When Assistant Secretary Sherman came, I asked her the same 
question. She did not seem to be aware that you had been 
funding Coronavirus research, but you are. I got the ``I will 
get back to you'' line.
    A couple of weeks later, I met personally with you at the 
State Department and asked you the same question. Will you not 
divulge to us the records of the State Department's support for 
Coronavirus research, particularly in China. You assured me you 
would help.
    We communicated several times over the phone with another 
Assistant Secretary of State who finally sent us a letter and 
said no, we are not going to give you anything.
    That is where we stand and it is--my question is what is 
the State Department hiding? Why will you not give these 
records to the American people?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you, and yes, I 
appreciated you raising this when we saw each other a month or 
so ago. My understanding is that our teams have been working to 
find accommodation. There is long-standing----
    Senator Paul. We got a refusal, a blanket refusal, no, they 
are not going to give us the records.
    Secretary Blinken. We cannot directly provide the 
unredacted----
    Senator Paul. Sure, you can.
    Secretary Blinken. --unredacted cables. We have a long 
standing practice with this committee about how we do----
    Senator Paul. You are refusing--you are refusing to release 
then, not that you cannot.
    Secretary Blinken. No, but I think----
    Senator Paul. There is a difference between can and may. 
You will not do it, but you can do it.
    Secretary Blinken. My hope is that we can find a way 
forward that answers your concerns so that you get the 
information that you are looking for. My understanding is that 
our team has been working on that and I commit to continue to 
do that so we can get you the----
    Senator Paul. We are talking about unclassified material. 
Most of this is unclassified. We just had a unanimous vote in 
the Senate and in the House and President Biden just signed a 
bill saying he is going to declassify stuff.
    If you declassify it and you still hide it from the 
American people, that is a problem. I mean, we spend all of 
this time lambasting authoritarians and for lack of 
transparency, we have these silly networks on TV that are 
aligned with the Democrat Party saying democracy is under 
attack.
    Well, do you think transparency has something to do with 
democracy? You are refusing to give records on research--money 
that went for research. We want to read the research grant 
proposals.
    We want to read what the people in Wuhan sent back to the 
State Department saying they did. Which viruses did they 
create? Because the thing is is it sounds all great. We are 
going to identify all the viruses of the world, but part of 
what they do is they take a virus they found 200 feet down in a 
cave and they mix it with another virus to create a virus that 
does not exist in nature because they say that is how we are 
going to further identify it.
    There is a big debate that should be had whether that is 
safe, to take a virus from 100 feet down a bat cave 12 hours 
south of Wuhan and take it to a city of 10 million and yet you 
will not help us investigate this. You refuse and it makes--it 
is reminiscent of the countries we criticize for lack of 
transparency and yet you sit there and say you are still going 
to continue to refuse.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I think there are very 
important debates that certainly go beyond my knowledge and 
expertise, for example, on gain of function, that I know there 
is a vigorous debate about whether the risk outweighs the 
reward. I do not have the expertise to know that and----
    Senator Paul. How do we have oversight or investigate it if 
you will not give us----
    Secretary Blinken. So the program that in this instance 
USAID was involved in was not engaged in gain of function----
    Senator Paul. That is a debate----
    Secretary Blinken. But----
    Senator Paul. --and that is your opinion. We would like to 
see the records.
    Secretary Blinken. So----
    Senator Paul. Fauci says there was no gain of function in 
Wuhan and nobody believes him anymore.
    Secretary Blinken. Again, there is a, I think, an important 
debate about this. As I recall, during the Obama administration 
there was actually a moratorium put on----
    Senator Paul. I know, but it is not the debate. I do not 
want to have that debate with you. I only want to have the 
records.
    Secretary Blinken. Again, I believe that we can find a way 
to get you the information that you are looking for.
    Senator Paul. All right, but the last response we have from 
you is ``no.'' The American public needs to know, I have asked 
many, many times.
    I have asked you in-person. This is the second time in-
person. I have talked to two Assistant Secretaries of State, 
and the writing we get back from you is ``no.'' Not maybe. Not 
will work with you. It is ``no.'' That is where we are now.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator--no, and it is not ``no,'' just 
to be clear. We did reach back out to your team just as 
recently as this week to offer to provide all of that 
information in briefing form, which is to say----
    Senator Paul. Which means you get to read it and interpret 
it and spin it and we get to hear your spin. We do not want to 
hear your spin. We want to look at the--we are talking about--
--
    Secretary Blinken. We are not in--we are not in--we are not 
in the business----
    Senator Paul. We are talking about grant proposals. You ask 
us--you act as if we are talking about the secrets of the 
Manhattan Project. We are talking about grant proposals, and we 
are talking about grant updates where someone has to write in 
and say, oh, we did this experiment, this experiment and we got 
this result. That is what we are talking about.
    Same thing from NIH. Same thing from HHS. Everybody is 
hiding it. It is not even really something to protect the Biden 
administration. Most of this stuff happened in the previous 
administration, but I do not get it.
    Why circle the wagons? Maybe there is nothing to see here, 
but then it makes the whole world think you are hiding 
something if you will not give it to us----
    Secretary Blinken. Again, this goes----
    Senator Paul. --so just give it to us. It is a bunch of 
bureaucratic paper that we are looking to sift through to see 
if there are any clues because one of the biggest clues we have 
that they did this is they asked DARPA and we only know this 
through a whistleblower--they asked DARPA for money to take a 
Coronavirus and put a fear and cleavage site in it to make it 
more infectious, and lo and behold, that is what COVID-19 is.
    It looks just like what they said they wanted to create 
with our money and we turned them down. That does not mean they 
did not do the research. We are looking for research like that 
that they were performing.
    We are looking for something that may be in their notes 
that has not been public, that has not been sifted through, but 
what we feel is that people at State Department and at NIH and 
HHS are conflicted. Why? Because if you funded research that 
somehow is linked to the pandemic or leakage of that, that does 
not look so good for the people who funded it.
    We see this as a circling of the wagons and a conflict of 
interest that maybe there are people within the State 
Department who funded research who are worried that it might be 
linked to the pandemic.
    We cannot just accept your spin on it because people there 
may be self-interested, the people who funded the program. We 
are just asking to look at the data, but so far your--it has 
been ``no.'' We have had a few phone calls. Well, we do not 
want your spin on it. We want to look at the documents 
ourselves.
    Secretary Blinken. We are not providing spin. As I said, I 
believe we can provide the information you are looking for. We 
have long-standing practices and procedures in terms of 
actually providing documents and cables with this committee 
that we are not prepared to change, but in terms of getting you 
the information you are looking for----
    Senator Paul. The only cables we have that are a value we 
got leaked to us or actually they were declassified by the 
Trump administration. Those cables said, and these were from 
some State Department folks, and it was amazing. I do not 
actually fault anybody for missing it. I am sure there are 
thousands of cables, but in 2018 or 2017, they were sending 
cables back saying, holy you know what, they are over here 
working without gloves in unsafe conditions in a BSL 2 that 
should be a BSL 4, not a very safe condition and that is why 
some of our intelligence people have leaned towards this coming 
from a lab.
    Why would you not want to help us? Why would everybody not 
want to help us?
    Secretary Blinken. I have seen those cables. You are right. 
They have come out and I think what they said, at least as I 
read them, was that there were concerns based on State 
Department officials visiting the lab, so were a member of 
sufficiently trained----
    Senator Paul. Right, but we only know those because someone 
have the gumption to declassify them. I will end with this 
because I know my time is up.
    Mr. Chairman, it takes one signature. He will give all this 
stuff to me tomorrow if you will sign a document, because he 
says he will not sign it unless the chairman of a committee 
does it and he is hiding behind some ruse. There is no law 
saying this. He could do it if he wants, but he is hiding 
behind some opinion that his own Administration makes the rules 
to say they will not give it to Congress. If you will help me, 
we can get the information tomorrow. Everything he is saying he 
will not give me, he will give me tomorrow if you will sign a 
letter.
    The Chairman. I appreciate--the Senator's time has expired, 
but I appreciate your concern. I understand that my committee 
counsel spoke to your counsel this past Monday and your counsel 
followed-up with us today and we are in pursuit of trying to 
see how you can be accommodated and I look forward to making 
that happen.
    Senator Paul. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for being here today. Appreciate it. I wanted to 
start with China being labeled as a developing country.
    Today I led a group of 21 Senators--it was a bipartisan 
group introducing legislation to end lending to China through 
the multilateral development banks. Since 2016, China has 
received about $23 billion from the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank.
    American taxpayers--we are the largest contributor to these 
banks, and it is completely unacceptable to me for Americans to 
be subsidizing loans to China. The Administration continues to 
allow American taxpayer dollars to go to the Chinese Communist 
Party. I believe it needs to end. Not another dime should be 
approved.
    These banks are designed to assist developing countries and 
China is no longer a developing country. It was years and years 
ago when some of these international organizations were put 
into place, but that designation has not changed.
    China is the second largest economy in the world, clearly 
has the financial resources, the access to capital, to meet its 
own needs, without assistance from the international community, 
but the Chinese Communist Party continues to exploit this 
outdated label as a developing country to get these 
preferential treatments in loans.
    As a developing country--``developing country''--China also 
receives funds from international bodies, mostly paid for by 
American taxpayers. China just got $1.4 billion from the 
multilateral fund at the Montreal Protocol, which is from back 
in the eighties.
    Let us be clear, this money moving from America to China, 
to me, is making China stronger and America weaker. This is at 
the time when China is blatantly flying spy balloons over the 
nation, stealing intellectual property, sending fentanyl and 
other opioids into the U.S., increasing military aggression. We 
have got the whole list.
    It just seems that China is playing the international 
community as well as our own Administration as fools. Their 
goal is simple. They want to be the world's dominant power.
    Do you believe that China still qualifies as a developing 
country and why should American taxpayers be supporting lending 
and financial assistance that goes to China?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I very much appreciate the 
point. I want to on that specific question I really have to 
defer to my colleagues at the Treasury Department.
    What I can tell you is this. I certainly see as a general 
matter China continuing to raise the banner of developing 
country in a variety of places that does not reflect the 
reality.
    Another part of this that I think is very important is on 
debt relief where countries around the world that turn out to 
owe a lot of money principally to China and then desperately 
need relief we are also a creditor.
    Countries in Europe or creditors and elsewhere. The Chinese 
continue to insist on being treated differently, in the 
technical parlance, not taking the same haircut that everyone 
else is willing to take.
    That is unsustainable and, in fact, in Sri Lanka recently 
where we needed to help Sri Lanka get out of the devastating 
debt situation it was in, we came together and insisted that no 
one else would provide the relief unless China similarly 
treated its debt.
    I agree with you that these are important things we have to 
work out. On the specific question, though, I really have to 
defer to the Treasury Department.
    Senator Barrasso. Because we see we are giving subsidized 
loans to a country that then turns around and can use this 
money to engage in predatory lending to developing nations, as 
you have described.
    Next, in terms of--I want to turn to European energy 
security. Europe has learned some really hard lessons following 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. None are clearer than the need to 
have access to affordable and dependable supply of energy. 
Affordable, dependable, not--the word is not renewable. It is 
affordable, available, reliable energy.
    Russia has demonstrated over and over again its willingness 
to use energy as a weapon to continue to do that. The world has 
seen Russia threaten our allies and our partners with natural 
gas. Europeans understand the crucial importance of increasing 
U.S. oil and natural gas production and exports to them from 
here.
    Unfortunately, President Biden has not necessarily followed 
that path because of his approach on the issue of climate and 
carbon. Do you support increasing exports of American liquefied 
natural gas to help our allies and partners escape this 
dependence on Russia?
    Secretary Blinken. I do and we have. Our exports to Europe 
of liquefied natural gas over the last few years went up 140 
percent. We made a commitment to Europeans, to our partners, in 
dealing with the aggression against Ukraine to do whatever we 
could to provide for their energy security as they worked to 
move away from that dependence.
    By the way, as you know, they have done actually remarkable 
things just in the space of a year to try to end that 
dependence both in terms of gas and in terms of oil.
    We dramatically increased our LNG exports. Some of it we 
redirected from Asia. Some of it was a result of increased 
production. Oil production itself went up 11 percent and that 
is a result of the policies that we pursued.
    Senator Barrasso. Then you agree Europe is much better off 
buying energy resources from the United States than having to 
buy it from our adversaries?
    Secretary Blinken. Absolutely.
    Senator Barrasso. Great.
    I wanted to talk about fentanyl. I mean, I am from Wyoming. 
You would think, well, how much fentanyl could be going there. 
It is not close to the border, but every state is a border 
state.
    Wyoming has seen an astronomical increase in the amount of 
deaths related to fentanyl. Our Division of Criminal 
Investigation just in 2020 seized about 1,600 dosage units. 
This past year 13,000. A 13-fold increase in just a couple of--
and that was only for three quarters of the year.
    What can we be doing more to work with the Government of 
Mexico to stop the importation of fentanyl precursors from 
China?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I could not agree with you 
more. I think this is among the top, if not the top challenges 
that we face. As you know well, the single biggest killer of 
Americans aged 18 to 49 is fentanyl, synthetic opioids, and we 
seized last year enough fentanyl to kill every American. This 
is right at the top of the list.
    Just a few things. I think we have a comprehensive approach 
to this problem. Obviously, there is work that we are doing at 
home just to protect our own people in terms of trying to 
reduce demand, treatment, antidotes, et cetera, but what is 
critical are a few things.
    First, border security itself. We have the technology that 
is being deployed more effectively now to the border to much 
better detect the fentanyl that is coming into the United 
States from Mexico. Ninety-six percent of it is coming through 
ports of entry. The screening technology that is being deployed 
that will make a difference.
    We are working with Mexico to disrupt the cartels. Mexico 
has actually taken with our support significant action to 
arrest and to disrupt the cartels, the criminal enterprises 
that are engaged in this, to shut down the labs, to go after 
the leaders. Then, at the same time, there is another aspect of 
this problem that goes beyond Mexico.
    One of the challenges--and it goes to China, among other 
countries--one of the challenges is the diversion of licit 
precursors into the illicit production of fentanyl. There is a 
lot that we are doing to try to rally the world to deal with 
this problem and so, for example, voluntary agreements among 
countries and companies, because the private sector is 
critical, to share information, to better label products, to 
make sure that you know your customer when you are shipping a 
chemical that is legal, but then it is being diverted.
    All of these are making a difference. For the very first 
time--I just came from the G-20 foreign ministers meeting--for 
the first time the United States got this on the G-20 agenda. 
This is important because those countries, the wealthiest 
economies in the world, are the very ones along with their 
private sectors that can make a big difference.
    We are putting all of this together. We have with the 
Mexicans a joint synthetic drug action plan that we agreed to 
last year that is intensely focused on synthetic opioids, 
notably fentanyl.
    By the way, one of the other things that is happening--I 
will be quick--is the Mexicans themselves are feeling the brunt 
of this, which is to say not only have they been a country 
where this is being made in and shipped through, but more and 
more Mexicans, unfortunately, are falling victim to synthetic 
opioids.
    Their feelings--I have spoken to President Lopez Obrador 
about this directly. He sees with this we are doing a lot in 
partnership with him to disrupt, to take these cartels down.
    Senator Barrasso. Let me just end with this, Mr. Chairman, 
and maybe put this to you in writing.
    Last week, the U.S. Border Patrol--because you mentioned 
border security--the Border Patrol chief Ortiz testified before 
a House Homeland Security Committee hearing in McAllen, Texas.
    He was pointedly asked whether or not the Department of 
Homeland Security had operational control of the border and the 
chief of the U.S. Border Patrol said, ``No, sir.''
    Thank you. That is----
    Secretary Blinken. The only thing I would just add, if I 
could, Senator, is just in the case of fentanyl, that is 
speaking to a larger issue. What we really have to bear down 
on, I think, it is not my vector of expertise, but based on 
what I know on the border itself, as I said, about 95 percent 
of this is coming through the legal ports of entry. It is being 
smuggled in through those ports, not at points along the 
border.
    We do have technology that is much more effective than we 
have had to be able to detect it. It is being--it is under the 
seats of cars----
    Senator Barrasso. We have all--we have all had the tour and 
seen what they describe.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    The Chairman. According to President Lopez Obrador, 
fentanyl is not produced in Mexico.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Secretary Blinken, for appearing here today. The meeting 
earlier this week of our--of the leaders of our two main 
strategic competitors demonstrate the continued urgency of our 
nation having a diplomatic corps that is second to none. I 
thank you for your efforts to make this a reality and look 
forward to engaging more to support our ongoing progress 
towards this goal.
    I want to start with my concern with the PRC actions across 
the Indo-Pacific from the Mekong River to the South China Sea 
to the Pacific Island nations, and it is no secret that the PRC 
is using economic coercion and expanding their diplomatic 
presence in this key area and reality dictates that countries 
in this region cannot ignore the PRC's presence and proximity 
and, yet, I still hear from our allies and partners about how 
the United States remain a strong partner of choice, and you 
have mentioned this before.
    I also hear from Southeast Asian partners specifically 
about how central ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, is to their regional identity and as a shield against 
dominance by foreign powers.
    My colleague, Senator Merkley, mentioned the importance of 
ASEAN and the role that it plays beyond economic organization, 
for example, the work that it is doing to hold Burma 
accountable for the fine points--concerns, and in February I 
met a CODEL to Jakarta to engage with ASEAN as an institution 
and with Indonesia bilaterally.
    There, I saw firsthand the eagerness of our partners for 
more, not less, U.S. engagement, particularly on economic 
affairs.
    Secretary Blinken, can you provide a candid analysis of 
your Department's relationship building initiatives with key 
allies and partners in Southeast Asia, particularly with 
organizations like ASEAN, and in particular ASEAN itself and 
explain how this budget will improve our ability to advance our 
Indo-Pacific objectives?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much. I really appreciate 
the question.
    First, just very quickly, as you know very well, this is a 
critical area for us. We have got 50 percent of the world's 
population in the Indo-Pacific. We have got 60 percent of it is 
GDP. We have a region that is driving basically 75 percent of 
economic growth over the last 5 or 6 years.
    This is vital to us. As it happens, China invests about 50 
percent of its assistance programs and its economic and 
diplomatic resources in the Indo-Pacific. We have to be there, 
first and foremost, and that goes to the efforts that we are 
doing and the chairman referenced it at the start.
    We may not be able to match China person for person, but we 
are going to be engaged in ways that we have not been. We are 
significantly increasing our diplomatic presence in the Pacific 
Islands.
    As you know, we have opened to the Solomon Islands. We are 
looking at other embassies in Tonga and in Kirabass. At the 
same time, we have very significantly reengaged ASEAN, 
including President Biden having an extraordinary summit 
meeting with the ASEAN countries precisely because we think it 
is an important institution for working together to deal with 
some of these challenges.
    At the same time--this goes back to the budget--we want to 
make sure that we are appropriately resourced so that when it 
comes to countries throughout the region that have interests 
and have needs and may be looking to us to be a strong partner, 
we actually have something to offer and it is less about, as I 
said, forcing them to choose.
    It is more about giving them a choice, and the budget is 
really designed in that way when it comes, for example, to 
having the resources to invest coherently in infrastructure, to 
dealing with building climate resilience and adaptation. The 
Pacific Island countries, of course, some of them are literally 
at risk of no longer existing if they are not able to deal with 
that.
    We have the programs in place and the budget supports that 
to be able to do that, but also their own diplomatic and 
political weight is important and marshaling that on a given 
problem whether it is Burma or whether it is some of the 
actions that China engages in that they do not like and we do 
not like, there is much more power and effectiveness and 
doing--engaging these issues together than there is any one of 
these countries doing it alone. That is why ASEAN itself is 
important.
    One of the things that they have worked on for years, as 
you know, with China is a code of conduct in the maritime 
space. I think China has been dragging that along for a long 
time. We tried to help reinforce that.
    For example, we put out--the State Department put out last 
year the definitive legal analysis of all of the maritime 
claims to basically help countries push back against some of 
the egregious assertions by China in their maritime space in 
very practical ways, as I mentioned earlier.
    We are working to give them the tools and resources to have 
better what is called maritime domain awareness--they have 
better visibility on their own seas and oceans, for example, to 
detect illegal unregulated unreported fishing, which is 
devastating economies and livelihoods in a large part of the 
region.
    Across a whole series of things, we are working together 
and the budget attempts to reflect the importance of that work.
    Senator Duckworth. Does the budget include an increase to 
our mission to ASEAN?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not know if it actually has an 
increase in what is needed for the mission. I believe that we 
are appropriately resourced, but let me come back to you on 
that and if you have identified any deficiencies I am happy to 
hear them.
    We sent someone very experienced, very close to the 
President to be our representative to ASEAN and who was the 
executive secretary of the National Security Council who has 
been doing a terrific job. I have engaged repeatedly in-person 
as well as, of course, remotely with all of our ASEAN 
colleagues and with ASEAN itself.
    Senator Duckworth. I would hope that our ambassador to 
ASEAN is given all the tools he needs to do the job and I do 
not think he has all the resources that he needs. I would love 
to review the budget with you on that.
    Secretary Blinken. I will follow up with you on that.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    The FY 2024 Diplomatic Engagement request includes an additional 
$600,000, including a $500,000 increase to EAP for the U.S. Mission to 
ASEAN and +$100,000 increase to ISN for ASEAN regional forum support, 
which will be detailed in the release of the FY 2024 CBJ Appendix 1.
    In addition, the FY 2024 foreign assistance request for ASEAN is 
$72.6 million, which is an increase of $57.4 million over the FY 2022 
actual and $47.6 million above the FY 2023 adjusted enacted.

    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Can you also elaborate more--
you touched on this--how the economic initiatives in the budget 
include both newer initiatives such as Outcompete China and the 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, as well 
as ongoing efforts like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 
will advance our policy goals in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Drill down a little bit more. I know I am getting into the 
weeds, but I am very interested.
    Secretary Blinken. No, I think it is important. We have a 
number of programs that we propose to fund in the budget to 
counter some of the challenges posed by China in the region.
    For example, on supply chain dominance one of the things 
that we put together is something called the Mineral Securities 
Partnership, where we are pooling information and pooling 
resources with a number of other countries to be able to invest 
ourselves in critical minerals so that they are not dominated 
by any one country.
    We are working to build much greater supply chain 
resiliency, particularly among countries in that region. We 
have now about 17 economies that are part of this process to 
prevent near-term disruptions, to make sure that we develop 
early warning signals in case our supply chains are disrupted 
and, of course, for more fundamentally, building out--helping 
these countries build out a significant amount of 
infrastructure.
    We are doing that through some of the funding we have in 
the budget for the Asia Pacific. We also more broadly have 
something that the President established with the G-7 called 
the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and 
that really runs the gamut.
    We have been able to generate investments, starting with 
government resources, but primarily getting the private sector 
to invest--we were the catalyst for it--in everything from 
Brazil nickel and cobalt mining to the Indonesian energy 
transition, a $20 billion investment in helping them make a 
transition, upgrading telecom networks in the Pacific Island 
countries, mobilizing investment capital for internet service 
providers in the region as well as in Africa and in Latin 
America, setting up vaccine manufacturing in Senegal, and rail 
linkages among countries in Africa, all of which deals with 
some of the challenges that China has posed and being able to 
have the field to itself in many of these areas.
    No longer the case, but there is an intense focus in the 
budget on the Indo-Pacific more specifically, including a fund 
to focus infrastructure investment in the region.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Wow, 7 minutes goes quick, 
Mr. Chairman. Or 8 minutes.
    The Chairman. It does when you are covering the world, or 
even a very specific part of the world.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    Good to see you, Mr. Secretary. Welcome to the committee.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    Senator Young. The CHIPS and Science Act established an 
International Technology Security and Innovation Fund. I know 
you are familiar with it--ITSI--at the State Department to 
promote international 5G communication security and to secure 
our semiconductor supply chains. Our long-term national 
security and economic competitiveness hinge on these two 
critical technologies.
    First, I want to thank you and your staff for their hard 
work on these critical topics. I was encouraged to hear that 
the U.S. was first to engage with our allies to secure critical 
semiconductor minerals and to create additional downstream 
packaging capacity.
    In my view, the first mover advantage further emphasizes 
the importance of the CHIPS and Science Act. Mr. Secretary, can 
you describe the strategic impact it would have if the ITSI 
fund is fully resourced? Looking forward toward the next 5 
years of this fund, what are your goals for this program? If 
you could discuss that, and we will take it from there.
    Secretary Blinken. Great. Well, Senator, thank you, and as 
you know, I think that with your leadership what Congress was 
able to do in putting together the CHIPS and Science Act is one 
of the most important achievements we have had in our ability 
to compete effectively, particularly with China.
    By the way, when I go around the world, this is one of the 
things I hear from country after country. They are very well 
aware of CHIPS and Science and they appreciate it. I think one 
of the great merits, from our perspective, is the fact that 
under the Act, you provided funding over 5 years so it is very 
predictable for us to really do two things, to shore up 
semiconductor supply chains, downstream and upstream and also 
to make sure on the telecommunication side that we are helping 
countries put in place networks and infrastructure, using 
trusted vendors and making sure that--and advancing technology 
like ORAN that really is the future and, again, is necessary to 
making sure that they are not dealing with untrusted vendors.
    We have, as you know, and I know our teams have been 
working very closely together, mapped out how we would use both 
prongs of the fund--that is the semiconductor prong and the 
information communications technology prong, making sure that 
we are getting the upstream inputs and providing the critical 
minerals that are needed for our own fabs that are now being 
built to actually make the chips, a market that, as you know 
better than anyone, the PRC currently dominates, but that now 
we have an ability to make real inroads on.
    Policy coordination among fab nations, usually important 
and we are seeing that really come to fruition. We basically 
cannot have countries leaking technology as fast as they can 
make it and I think this fund gives us the resources to do 
that.
    Expanding downstream capacity, as you mentioned, in a very 
significant way, and then the data mapping piece of this. We 
are mapping the supply chains. We are mapping all the entities 
involved to ensure that we are targeting them to the best 
effect.
    As I said, on the telecommunication side of things 
developing, strengthening, and expanding international enabling 
environments for these secure networks and deploying ICT 
networks and services in partner countries, being able to go at 
with a real alternative, 5G coming from other places with 
something like ORAN driving down the costs, providing more 
secure networks and all of this mapped out over 5 years because 
we have got the predictable funding that is being provided.
    Senator Young. Thank you for that. I think it will be 
really helpful if on an ongoing basis members of this 
committee--and I know my office has been working very closely 
with your team--but if we were made privy to goals and any 
adjustments that may be made and maybe give us some visibility 
into the internal tools like supply chain mapping that you are 
using to track progress towards those goals.
    Secretary Blinken. Be happy to do that.
    Senator Young. Thank you. Relatedly, how are you working 
with Secretary Raimondo to align the priorities of your 
respective departments with--as it relates to CHIPS and Science 
implementation?
    Secretary Blinken. I would say the best description is 
hand-in-glove. I am not sure who is the hand, who is the glove, 
but hand-in-glove. For example, the Secretary and I together 
convened a couple dozen countries at the minister level--
commerce secretary foreign minister level--on supply chains, on 
building out resilience, diversification, nearshoring, 
friendshoring.
    One of the things that came out of that ministerial--it is 
an ongoing process--is putting in place now an early warning 
system among these countries for any supply chain disruptions 
when it comes to, for example, critical minerals, anything 
going into a semiconductor.
    That is the result directly of the work that our two 
departments and we personally have done together.
    Senator Young. Is there anything else Congress can do at 
this point to assist you in your efforts with respect to CHIPS 
and Science implementation?
    Secretary Blinken. I think as it stands, our budget 
reflects what we need, but what I want to do, if I can, is just 
come back and make sure I am giving you the most considered 
response possible in case I am missing anything because this is 
too important not to get right.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    We are grateful to Congress for providing $500 million over 5 years 
to empower the Department to work with our partners and allies to 
secure and expand our critical semiconductor supply chains and promote 
the adoption of trustworthy telecommunication technologies.
    As is reflected in our budget request, the Department is working 
tirelessly with our interagency partners to develop programs that meet 
the Administration's priorities under the CHIPS Act.
    We have been especially appreciative of our engagement with 
Congress.
    In addition to keeping all stakeholders apprised of developments, 
these exchanges and informational briefings have ensured our planning 
process was attuned to your concerns and reflected your feedback from 
the earliest days of planning.
    The result is an ambitious, multifaceted plan for Diplomatic 
Engagement and Foreign Assistance programming that confronts 
vulnerabilities of the global supply chain at every critical node.
    In the coming weeks and months, we will be transmitting additional 
foreign assistance Congressional Notifications (CNs) for the FY 2023 
CHIPS ITSI Fund allocation.
    We would ask for Congress's continued responsiveness in reviewing 
these CNs and, as always, will stand ready to respond to your requests 
for any additional briefings on the anticipated programs.

    Senator Young. Finally, Mr. Secretary, your staff 
identified the critical role that civilian, foreign law 
enforcement, and military personnel play in establishing secure 
communication networks.
    Congress provided the authority through the Digital 
Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership and the Economic 
Support Fund to work with all of these groups with FY23 funds, 
but not, as I understand it, for the rollover of earlier funds.
    I look forward to working with my colleagues, particularly 
those on the State and Foreign Ops Subcommittee, to provide the 
necessary budgetary authority to continue this important work. 
Is that something you would endorse?
    Secretary Blinken. Unless I am missing something, I would 
welcome that. I do not know if there is something in place that 
has us covered that I am not aware of, but at least as 
described it is something I would welcome.
    Senator Young. Thank you. I yield back.
    Secretary Blinken. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, it is nice to see you again. It is nice to 
have two opportunities today to ask about what is happening in 
the world.
    I want to start with Belarus because earlier today the Free 
Belarus Caucus had a press conference with Sviatlana 
Tsikhanouskaya, who is the pro-democracy leader of the movement 
there and I think she is courageous and inspiring and they need 
our help.
    One of the things we talked about is, given the war in 
Ukraine and what that has meant for the Belarusian people and 
the lack of a special envoy for Belarus, there is nobody who 
can help encourage the Europeans and the U.S. to work together 
or serve as a conduit to the opposition movement.
    Can you talk about what you are thinking with respect to a 
special envoy for Belarus and when might we see that 
appointment happen?
    Secretary Blinken. No, thank you very much, Senator for 
raising that and yes, two things. As you know, day in, day out, 
we have the Vilnius-based, Lithuania-based Belarus affairs unit 
that is embedded in our embassy and they are doing the day in, 
day out, contact because so much, as you know, of the 
democratic opposition is in Lithuania.
    To your point, we are very actively looking at moving 
forward with the special envoy. What I am considering right now 
looking at is dual hatting a very senior official in our 
European Affairs Bureau to also serve as the envoy to be able 
to then go in and out, engage at senior levels with the 
opposition, even as the Belarus affairs unit that is based in 
Lithuania does the kind of day in, day out, engagement.
    Senator Shaheen. Do you have a timetable for when you hope 
to make that happen?
    Secretary Blinken. I cannot put a--I hate to say very soon, 
but very soon, I promise you very soon.
    Senator Shaheen. I will hold you to that so the next time I 
see you, hopefully, it will be done. I also want to say how 
pleased I am to see the robust funding for the western Balkans 
in the President's budget, particularly increased funding for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also very pleased to see the work 
that the State Department has done with our European allies to 
encourage Serbia and Kosovo to come to some agreement.
    I wonder if you could talk about what kind of role the 
Congress might play and whether there are particular incentives 
that we should be thinking about to ensure that that agreement 
actually gets implemented.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you. This is, I think, a hopeful 
thing that is the progress that has been made between Serbia 
and Kosovo, particularly an agreement that was reached just 
this past weekend to implement with an implementation roadmap 
understandings between them on the path to normalization.
    I think what is significant about it, besides the fact that 
both countries have nominally agreed to do it, is that that is 
also embedded. Those commitments are embedded in their 
respective European Union accession plans, so that gives them 
some incentive, I hope, to follow through.
    We have been, as you pointed out, intimately involved in 
helping get to this result. The European Union has done a very 
good job. We have been there every single step along the way.
    I have engaged both Prime Minister Kurti and President 
Vucic on numerous occasions on this. I think there is a 
moment--there is a positive moment, but to your point, I think 
it would be tremendously helpful if in your own engagements 
with, for example, parliamentarians in both countries the clear 
support of the Congress of the United States for moving forward 
and for implementing these agreements, I think, could be 
critical.
    To some extent, for example, both leaders have to navigate 
differences of opinion in their legislatures about this. I 
think your voice on this could make a real difference. I would 
strongly encourage that as well as your engagements with the 
leaders themselves.
    Senator Shaheen. I certainly think there is a lot of 
interest on the part of the members of this committee in doing 
that and thinking about how we can be supportive of the 
implementation of the agreement actually happening.
    One of the issues, as you know, is nonrecognition by a 
number of European countries. Is this an issue that you are 
raising with those five countries and are you seeing any 
progress?
    Secretary Blinken. It is very much an issue that we are 
raising, will continue to raise, but I also think this 
agreement, again, assuming it moves forward, actually puts us 
on a path toward recognition by these countries. Now, Serbia 
itself, that may be another matter for some time, but if they 
get to a normalized relationship that would, I think, have very 
positive effects just in the day in, day out, interactions, and 
I think will eventually get there.
    For the five holdout countries, the fact that the both 
countries now have reached this agreement and assuming they 
implement it, that will, I think, move them toward recognition.
    Senator Shaheen. I agree. I certainly think it helps and I 
think it is really important for the people in both Kosovo and 
Serbia to see some benefit to in their personal lives from that 
kind of an agreement that reduces tensions and, hopefully, 
moves both countries towards membership in the EU.
    On Lebanon, another area where they are facing real 
challenges, what are we doing to try and encourage the 
Government of Lebanon to implement necessary reforms in order 
to get the IMF to--and the World Bank to support the economic 
efforts that need to happen there and what more can we do?
    Secretary Blinken. This is another very significant 
challenge and the reality is--without sugarcoating it--is that 
the economy is in a tailspin, and you have got vacancies in the 
presidency, in the cabinet.
    Parliament needs to actually elect a president. That is 
long in the making form of government, and on that basis, be 
able to actually implement the reforms that were necessary to 
secure an IMF program.
    In part, there is a chicken-egg problem here between the 
necessary movement on the political side and what we believe is 
vital on the economic side. It really is, as best we can tell, 
the only way out, the only way to pull back from the precipice.
    I do not see an international bailout coming. I really 
think the IMF program is critical, but to get to the IMF 
program you have got to have a government in place. At the same 
time, we have been a very significant donor of assistance.
    We continue to focus on livelihood support for two critical 
institutions, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the internal 
security forces. These are the state guarantors of Lebanon's 
sovereignty and they have been incredibly challenged.
    The value of the dollar equivalent and salary to a member 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces has declined by 90 percent. Their 
purchasing power has basically gone to zero. That is what we 
have been trying to shore up.
    It is really important that these institutions stay and 
stick together. It is critical for the state and of course, it 
is critical to push back against Hezbollah, trying to say no, 
we are going to do that because these institutions cannot.
    We are very, very focused there and we, of course, have 
also been focused on some energy agreements that we are working 
to do and there are a number of challenges that come with 
those, but I think there is at least some hope on the energy 
supply side that we are very actively working on, but this is 
usually a challenge.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Scott.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary, thanks for being here today. It has certainly 
been a long day for you at least, listening to all the 
questions that you are receiving today. I know that Dr. 
Barrasso spent some time talking about fentanyl and the crisis 
that we have as a nation. Last month at this hearing--at a 
hearing here, I had an opportunity to talk about a friend of 
mine, a former business school dean at the College of 
Charleston, whose son, Allen Child, his namesake, lost his life 
to fentanyl on the first use, and it is hard to think about 
this crisis simply by thinking about the numbers.
    Over 70,000 other American families have had a similar 
experience. These are fathers, brothers, sisters, daughters, 
all lost because of fentanyl, and I know that you spoke 
sometime with Dr. Barrasso about the importance of Mexico and 
precursors from China and the approach that we should take with 
the Mexican cartels.
    I would like for you to illuminate some of the work that we 
are doing because as I look through the budget I do not see--I 
see a lot in the form of technical assistance, but I do not see 
a lasting commitment to confronting this challenge.
    Secretary, I know that you know that just a few weeks ago a 
few South Carolinians were kidnapped and some died at the hands 
of the Mexican cartels. We take this issue seriously as a 
nation, but at home this is a sensitive and serious issue.
    I would like to know what we are doing from an all-of-
government approach, not simply your Department, but seeing it 
from a panoramic view, number one. Number two, what else can be 
done with Mexico?
    Number three, I know that there are times when fentanyl 
could literally be shipped from China straight to America. What 
can we do to cut that off?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator, and I 
could not--look, could not agree with you more. I deeply share 
this concern and I think you are exactly right that it is so 
important to put a name and a face to it because these numbers 
become abstractions and hopefully we would be galvanized by the 
fact that it is the number-one killer of Americans aged 18 to 
49.
    It does come down to these individual stories, and I also 
fully agree with you that we have to have and I believe we do 
have a comprehensive approach that--here at home I mentioned we 
are of course working as we always need to on the demand side, 
on the treatment side, on the antidote side. That is vitally 
important, but of course that does not answer the problem. It 
is a necessary component of it.
    Second, we talked a little bit about this with Senator 
Barrasso. On the border itself, we do have good technology that 
can better detect the efforts to smuggle pills that are 
produced in Mexico and brought over the border because 95 
percent of this is coming through legal ports of entry. It is 
not being smuggled across points of the border that are in 
between points of entry, but at the points of entry. There is 
the technology that can better detect that. Third----
    Senator Scott. Mr. Secretary, on that point----
    Secretary Blinken. Please.
    Senator Scott. --is there is a high utilization of the 
technology that we have?
    Secretary Blinken. I think it is, as I understand it, and 
this is not--I do not want to speak--try to speak 
authoritatively because it is beyond my area of expertise.
    Senator Scott. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. As I understand it, we have been working 
as a government over several years now over a couple of 
administrations to deploy this technology. It has been a little 
slower than I think everyone would have liked. It is now 
speeding up, and, in fact, there was a very interesting piece, 
I think, a week or two ago in the Washington Post laying out 
some of the work that is being done.
    We need to press the accelerator on that because the 
technology is effective. When I was last in Mexico with 
President Biden, one of the things that we talked about with 
President Lopez Obrador was the deployment of this technology 
as well on the Mexican side of the border, so that is two.
    Three, to your point, we have to press even harder on the 
accelerator in the work that we are doing jointly and 
supporting Mexico in doing in breaking up these cartels, 
breaking up the finance networks, taking down the labs.
    Of course, it is not just the precursors of the pills 
themselves. It is the pill presses that are fabricated----
    Senator Scott. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. --and that come across, all that.
    Now, in fairness, they are making a very significant effort 
and they have put far more resources into this. They have 
actually done an effective job in disbanding, disrupting labs, 
but--and arresting dozens of high-ranking officials in these 
cartels, but these labs, as you know, can fit in a room----
    Senator Scott. And pop back up.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, just pop back up, so that is a 
challenge. There is another--one last thing. I know--I do not 
want to at this time.
    Senator Scott. Two questions with 2 minutes left, so if you 
could wrap up.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, very quickly.
    The other big piece I mentioned is internationally, one of 
the big problems is the diversion of perfectly legal precursors 
into illicit use and making fentanyl.
    We have seized the G-20, the largest economies in the 
world. We just had a foreign ministers meeting. I got put on 
the agenda as an action item for the G-20 building out a 
coalition to try to deal more effectively with this, and what 
does that mean?
    It means simply among other things that working with the 
private sectors in all of these countries, we do a better job. 
Sharing information about diversion, getting better labeling on 
legal precursors that then get diverted, and making sure that 
there is a program in place so that you know your customer.
    If you are shipping a chemical you actually know where it 
is going. You put all of these pieces together I think you can 
have a greater impact.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    According to the recent report from the IAEA, Iran is 
getting dangerously close to having weapons grade plutonium. 
Last month the agency reported the discovery of uranium 
particles enriched up to 84 percent, 6 percent below the 
threshold necessary to create a nuclear weapon.
    Given the regime's brutal crackdown against peaceful 
protesters and their efforts to sabotage negotiations to most 
people in the room it seems clear that negotiating a new JCPOA 
should be completely off the table, from our perspective. I 
hope that is yours as well.
    What practical steps are you taking to work with our allies 
and partners to actually address this threat, especially given 
the fact that certain sanction requirements are about to lapse?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    Well, as a practical matter the JCPOA is not on the table 
at this moment in large part because as we were working in good 
faith to see if we could get a mutual return to compliance by 
Iran and by the United States, the Iranians rejected a proposal 
that was on the table put forward by the European Union, by our 
European partners, actually endorsed even by Russia and China.
    They rejected that last summer and they have not 
demonstrated seriousness. That we are determined one way or 
another that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon. I have to tell 
you, we continue to believe that in terms of getting an 
effective result, diplomacy is still the most effective way to 
do that, but it takes two to tango, as we would say, and the 
Iranians have not demonstrated seriousness of purpose.
    Meanwhile, we are working in close concert with allies and 
partners. I was talking about this little bit earlier. I think 
we now have a much more shared perspective on this challenge.
    I think minds have also been galvanized by what has 
happened in the streets of Iran over the last 6 or 9 months by 
the provision by Iran to Russia of drone technology for the war 
of aggression against Ukraine. All of that has brought 
countries closer together and trying to deal with some of these 
egregious actions.
    Senator Scott. I know I am out of time, but a short 
question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Blinken. I will try and be short.
    Senator Scott. U.S. embassies in Africa, there is a 
shortage of staff. What are you doing about it and, frankly, 
you think about the CCP and as issues in its growth through its 
Belt and Road projects seems like we need to have more focus on 
Africa than we have.
    I know that you have had some work with the African Leaders 
Summit. Would love to hear your thoughts on, A, the shortage 
and, B, strategy.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. Thank you. This is something we are 
very actively working on. The shortage is a problem. Actually, 
in the budget, we have increased dollars for additional hires 
that will help in part. It will not solve the problem, but it 
will help address the problem.
    We are also reviewing why some of our posts do not receive 
sufficient bids because, as you know, the way this works in 
part is our Foreign Service officers say, hey, here is where I 
want to go, and we have seen in a number of countries the bids 
just are not there.
    We are trying to understand why that is and then to see 
what we can do to incentivize people to serve in posts that, 
for one reason or another, have not been attracting the 
personnel they deserve.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, it is always a pleasure to have you before 
the committee. Thank you very much for your service.
    Let me start with an issue that Senator Menendez raised in 
his opening comments and that is the capacity of the State 
Department to meet the challenges that we have globally.
    I think never in our history have we had so many global 
challenges in which the work of the State Department can be 
critically important for us achieving our objectives.
    Senator Hagerty and I have worked together in regards to 
the State Department's capacity to deal with these issues. We 
made several recommendations in the last Congress that were 
enacted into law.
    I know that you have been questioned on this before the 
Appropriations Committee, but I want to get our committee 
engaged on these issues as well.
    In that recommendations, some were more short-term changes 
that we thought should be made as quickly as possible, 
including dealing with the training capacity at State 
Department by having a board of visitors, by making it a more 
professional educational experience, by expanding training 
opportunities. We thought these are proposals that could be 
implemented in the short term.
    Others were longer-term issues and that is why we 
recommended a commission which is now in the process of being 
named and I would like to get your understanding about how to 
implement these changes.
    They were done, I think, with full support and cooperation 
from the leadership at the State Department. We know you always 
have challenges. Part of this is going to be budgetary. For 
people to go into training you have to be able to backfill 
those positions. That is not always available.
    Tell me how you think you can use the tools that we made 
available in the last Congress to implement these changes and 
what we can do to help you moving forward?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, first, let me just say how much I 
appreciate the work that you have done on this and the 
leadership on it. It is hugely important to the future of the 
Department.
    It is hugely important to our ability to attract, but also 
retain the best talent and we are in a competition for talent 
and we need to make sure that we have the tools not just to 
recruit people, but to make sure that they stay at the 
Department.
    I think a big part of that is career-long learning because, 
as we have been talking about in many ways, things are changing 
so fast that unless you are able to as an institution make sure 
that your people have the ability to continuously upgrade their 
game, you are not going to be able to do the job.
    Now, I think some of the tools, authorities, resources 
provided by Congress to us are making a big difference. For 
example, over the last couple of years and now in our budget I 
hope that will be realized this year, we have been able to hire 
a significantly greater number of people, both Foreign Service 
officers as well as civil servants.
    That has tremendous benefits, one of which, of course, is 
making sure that when we have gaps in places we have the 
personnel to fill them, but one of the most critical, I think, 
initiatives we are taking is making sure that we have a 
significant float of personnel by which we can pull out of day 
in, day out, service someone, put them into a training program 
of some kind, whether it is one that we are doing ourselves, 
time at an academic institution, time, by the way, here in 
Congress and do it in a way that does not disrupt the day in, 
day out, activities of the Department. That is a big 
initiative. We now have real resources to do that in ways we 
never had before.
    Second, you talked about the short term. I could not agree 
more. We just spent a morning with the Foreign Service 
Institute leadership on new programs they are putting in place 
for both incoming, but also mid-career learning, particularly 
in areas that the Department has not in the past usually been 
focused on and where we need to have critical skills and have 
people develop them.
    You will see and we will share with you, I think, some very 
significant initiatives that are creating important 
opportunities for career-long learning developed by the Foreign 
Service Institute that we will be actually implementing very, 
very soon.
    There are a host of things that I think will make a real 
difference. I think the moving out on the Board of Visitors, on 
the provost, we are doing that. We are preparing actually the 
position description for the provost as we speak so that we can 
begin the hiring process.
    We are actually leveraging the results of some, I think, 
important assessments in terms of what we are looking for and 
what we need, and we are on track to have the Board of Visitors 
identified and recruited by the end of this year.
    Senator Cardin. In regards to the commission, some are 
appointed by the Congress, but some are appointed by the 
Administration. Is that advancing on the Administration side?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, and I think not only is it 
advancing, I believe that we have asked actually your 
respective teams for recommendations and we really look to 
that, and I also believe that we actually have the resources 
even within our existing authorities to move forward on that.
    Senator Cardin. Part of this in-training deals with an area 
that I have talked about frequently with you and that is our 
anti-corruption efforts. The President has talked about that as 
a national security core concern.
    We find that one of the resistance we get to being more 
active in establishing international standards on corruption is 
the capacity of our missions, particularly in country, to be 
able to evaluate and move forward on anti-corruption programs. 
Are you taking steps to improve the capacity at the State 
Department to deal with this priority area?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. We have really elevated this. As 
you know, we put in place a senior official who is charged with 
this responsibility and one of the things that I have been 
working on and I think it is important across the institution 
is we do a lot as an institution that is top-down. We do some 
that is bottom-up. Probably need to do more.
    Where we really need to be doing more is horizontally 
across the institution, by which I mean this. On anti-
corruption this needs to be embedded horizontally in all of our 
different bureaus in our regional bureaus, but also as well in 
some of our functional bureaus.
    What I have been pushing is for the senior official and his 
team responsible for dealing with anti-corruption to be engaged 
on the takeoff, not just on the landing, with different 
colleagues across the enterprise so that they have the focus 
and they also dedicate the time and resources within their 
areas of responsibility to making combating corruption one of 
their responsibilities.
    I think we are making progress there. I am sure we can do 
more, but I am very seized with this mission because something 
that you have been leading on for many, many years it is--there 
are few things that are more corrosive of democratic systems 
than corruption.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you for your leadership.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to 
take a minute for my National Security Adviser Bobby Zarate to 
put up a photo, a photo that concerns me very much and I am 
certain it does you as well, Mr. Secretary, probably all of us 
here.
    It is a photo of CCP diplomat Wang Yi with Iranian and 
Saudi officials. It is not a good thing. It is the anti-Abraham 
Accords, in my view. What it is doing is it depicts the 
normalization of relations with Iran rather than our ally, 
Israel. It is certainly not a situation that I think that Saudi 
Arabia and Iran would have come to of their own accord.
    My question to you, Mr. Secretary, is what exactly did the 
Communist China promise to Saudi Arabia and to Iran to get them 
to come to this agreement?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I think there is a back story 
here and I think it is, in some sense, a little bit more 
complicated. The Saudis and the Iranians have been talking for 
the better part of the last couple of years, including in Oman, 
including in Baghdad, to look to see if they could get back to 
where they were before they interrupted their diplomatic 
relations.
    You remember the Saudis put to death a prominent Shi'a 
cleric. That resulted in a protest or storming of the Saudi 
Embassy in Tehran. They broke off diplomatic relations, I 
think, back in 2016.
    In the last couple of years, not a couple of months, they 
have been looking to see if they could get back to a slightly 
more normal place, and based on the information we have, I 
think what China did, in a sense, cleverly, was to at the very 
end of that process take advantage of the work that these 
countries have done and then basically host the conclusion of 
the agreement that they reached to restore diplomatic 
relations.
    Not to bring it together themselves. They just happened to 
be the host of it, and I think it sent a diplomatic signal. 
There is no doubt about that.
    I have to say, I see some positives to this as well as some 
concerns. The positives are these. If, and there is a big if 
here because we really do not know if the commitments made 
under this agreement will actually be implemented. That really 
remains to be seen and we have seen in the past that Iran has 
promised to do things that, of course, it has not done.
    If they do and, principally, if they cease or reduce their 
support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who, among other things, 
are attacking Saudi Arabia and helping to perpetuate a war on 
Yemen, if that stops or decreases, that can be beneficial.
    It can be beneficial to ending the war in Yemen. It can be 
beneficial to helping defend or make sure that Saudi Arabia is 
not under attack. There are 80,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia. 
We have an interest in that, too.
    It is a long way of saying if this results in the curbing 
of some of Iran's malicious activities, I actually do not think 
that is a bad thing.
    By the way, it does not in any way substitute for our 
determination to pursue the deepening as well as the expansion 
of the Abraham Accords. I had a long discussion with Prime 
Minister Netanyahu about this when I was recently in Israel. We 
are very focused on that, and I also do not think it will 
change the interests of other countries in pursuing that.
    Senator Hagerty. To go back to the photo itself, though, I 
think the image itself suggests to me that China may be trying 
to pull our ally, Saudi Arabia, into their orbit along with 
Russia and Iran.
    It also suggests to me that China may be laying the 
groundwork for a petroyuan environment--to replace the 
petrodollar. I think this is something that would benefit from 
a deeper conversation with you, perhaps a conversation in 
closed session and I might ask the chairman and ranking member 
if we could arrange that at some point soon. I think that would 
be beneficial.
    I would like to show another image that is also quite 
concerning. This is an image of CCP General Secretary Xi 
Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin who recently held 
high profile meetings in Moscow. This is also not a good thing.
    In a video released overnight, Chairman Xi tells Putin that 
Communist China and Russia are going to be pushing for changes 
not seen for 100 years, and I would like to know, Mr. 
Secretary, what changes not seen for 100 years is Xi Jinping 
talking about and would that be detrimental to U.S. national 
security interest? What impact would those changes have on U.S. 
national security interests?
    Secretary Blinken. I think it is no secret that both 
countries have a very different worldview than our own or, for 
that matter, a different worldview than dozens and dozens of 
our allies and partners around the world and, in particular, 
they have a different view of what a world order and rules of 
the road should look like than we do.
    I think when it comes to China they actually want a world 
order, but an illiberal one. We continue to stand strongly for 
a liberal one. I am not sure that Russia or Vladimir Putin 
wants a world order, maybe more like world disorder, but in 
part as a result of having this very different worldview than 
we do, they have a marriage of convenience. I am not sure if it 
is conviction. Russia is very much the junior partner in this 
relationship and we have seen that again on display quite 
literally right here before us.
    Recall, as you know, right before the Russian aggression 
against Ukraine they had a meeting, they talked about a 
partnership with no limits and we have seen further expression 
of that, but as they have been doing this, we have been over 
the last 2 years reenergizing, rejuvenating, reengaging all of 
our alliances and partnerships and in ways that are paying 
tremendous dividends, both in dealing with the Russian 
aggression against Ukraine and in dealing with some of the 
challenges posed by China.
    We have greater convergence today with allies and partners 
in Europe as well as in Asia on how to deal with those 
challenges than we have had in--certainly, in my memory, and 
besides doing that we have also created new collections, new 
coalitions of countries, that are kind of more fit for purpose 
on individual issues.
    I mentioned earlier the Mineral Security Partnership where 
we are getting countries together.
    Senator Hagerty. I am going to have to--just because of 
time I have to go to my next question, but this is a topic we 
have discussed in the past. I know you have discussed it with 
my colleagues today and that has to do with fentanyl and the 
ravages that it is creating on America.
    We spoke about this a year ago and since we spoke about it, 
how many sanctions have been placed on Chinese individuals or 
entities that are involved in the fentanyl trade?
    Secretary Blinken. What we have been working--the aspect of 
China that is deeply problematic, as you know, when it comes to 
fentanyl is the production in China precursors that get--that 
then become used in the production of fentanyl and we have had 
sought to try to get China to, in a cooperative way because it 
is actually in their interest to do this, to deal more 
effectively in cracking down on the diversion of those 
precursors.
    Senator Hagerty. Let me interrupt just in the interest of 
time.
    I understand you have sought to do so, but it has not 
worked and, in fact, there have been zero sanctions issued 
since you and I talked about this.
    How hard would it be for President Biden to pick the phone 
up and call President Xi Jinping tomorrow and lay out a set of 
consequences including sanctions that are going to be delivered 
upon China if they do not stop sending fentanyl and fentanyl 
precursors here to kill our youth?
    Seventy thousand young people a year are dying of this, 23 
times the deaths associated with the 9/11 attacks. This is a 
war on our youth. We have got to do something about it, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Secretary Blinken. Like you, I am very seized with this 
including in my own engagements with Chinese counterparts and 
Chinese officials.
    We have made very clear to them that we need to see this 
cooperation on dealing with synthetic opioids and fentanyl and 
if that cooperation is not forthcoming, we are going to have to 
look at other steps that we can take.
    What want to do is to make sure that we are being as 
effective as possible. One of the challenges when it comes to, 
as I mentioned, China is that what often happens is perfectly, 
as you know, legal chemicals, precursors, get diverted either 
intentionally or unintentionally, in some cases, to the illicit 
production of fentanyl.
    There are agreements, systems, procedures that we want to 
put in place, which is why I seized the G-20 with this just a 
few weeks ago and now have agreement from the G-20, which 
includes China, leading countries' economies in the world, to 
work on this together.
    For example, much better information sharing, labeling, 
know your customer, so that at least when it comes to the 
unintentional diversion of these precursors, we are doing 
something about that.
    Now, if it is intentional, that of course is a different 
matter.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, good to see you this afternoon. I thank you 
for your testimony this morning in Appropriations and for the 
benefit of Chairman Menendez I thank the Secretary for the 
implementation of the Foreign Service Families Act that we 
passed a couple years ago and, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your 
help in getting that through the United States Congress.
    We also discussed the meeting took place that was just 
portrayed in this photograph between Putin and Xi, and, Mr. 
Secretary, you underscored what I think is an imperative that 
we be prepared, fully prepared, if China provides material 
military support to Russia to work in concert with our allies 
to immediately impose very tough economic sanctions and I know 
work is being done to make sure we are ready to do that.
    I understand the issue of the critical minerals security 
partnership was raised here so I will not go over that. I do 
want to follow-through on a couple issues that were raised at 
this morning's hearing, one by my colleague, Senator Schatz, on 
the issue of press freedom, because I appreciate very much the 
State Department Human Rights Report and I appreciate the fact 
that it is insulated, I think, to the extent possible and 
pretty well from political forces.
    I know what a challenge that is. I do want to just raise 
concerns about crackdown on freedom of the press in two 
countries where I hope we will continue to have strong 
relations with.
    One is a country I have spent a lot of time in, a member of 
the Quad, and that is India. If you look at recent reports, 
there is a significant crackdown on press freedom in India. It 
is the world's largest democracy, but this is very, very 
troubling.
    The other is neighboring Pakistan, which at times has had a 
very vibrant press, but right now we are seeing a critical 
crackdown and I just want to point out that the State 
Department Human Rights Report, which was just released Monday, 
indicates that both India and Pakistan have seen increasing 
threats on press freedom.
    Both countries are increasingly dangerous places for 
journalists trying to do their jobs, and the State Department 
is not alone in this. Other organizations that are out there to 
protect freedom of the press have indicated both these 
countries have serious problems. Reporters Without Borders 
ranks India 150 out of 180 and Pakistan 157 out of 180.
    I am not going to go into great detail today, but I am 
interested in following-up with you and your team on those 
issues.
    I do want to pick up on our earlier conversation today 
about some concerning actions taken by the Government of Israel 
as we work to try to create a period of time where we can 
deescalate and this morning you agree that the recent action 
taken by the Knesset really just yesterday that rolled back the 
agreement made more than 20 years ago by Israel to evacuate 
four settlements was inconsistent with the obligations that the 
Government of Israel has taken on in Aqaba and Sharm-el-Sheikh, 
and I think we need to press those issues on both sides 
whenever we see violations of this agreement.
    I do want to talk about certain elements of the new 
government, which are really extreme forces within this 
government. One of them is Ben-Gvir. The other is Smotrich. 
Ben-Gvir is--and these are not backbenchers. They are not 
backbenchers. They have very important responsibilities within 
this new government.
    Ben-Gvir is the Minister of National Security in charge of 
statewide law enforcement and the Israeli police. Smotrich is 
the Minister of Finance and also, as you know, minister in the 
Defense Ministry that has authority over civilian issues in the 
West Bank, including illegal construction and authority over 
planning and construction for settlements.
    Just a few days ago, Smotrich commented as follows, that 
there is no such thing as Palestinians because there is no such 
thing as a Palestinian people.
    This was condemned by Biden administration officials and, 
Mr. Secretary, you are here today. Do you join in condemning 
that comment?
    Secretary Blinken. I do.
    Senator Van Hollen. This is not the first time that 
Smotrich made these very incendiary comments, incitements to 
violence. It was just a few weeks ago where he stated in 
reference to the Palestinian village of Hawara that it needs to 
be, ``wiped out,'' and that, ``the state of Israel should do 
it.''
    Now, I agree with President Biden as a longtime supporter 
of the U.S.-Israel relationship that it has been built on 
interests and built on values.
    You have to agree, Mr. Secretary, that those comments by 
Smotrich, the Minister of Finance, and somebody who has an 
important portfolio over the West Bank, those do not reflect 
our values, do they?
    Secretary Blinken. They do not, and I would also point out 
that the second comment you alluded to on Hawara, Prime 
Minister Netanyahu insisted that the person in question walk 
those comments back, which he did, for what that is worth.
    I would also note that the legislation you referred to 
which, again, we think is indeed inconsistent with commitments 
made and in fact inconsistent with long standing commitments 
because those were commitments undertaken, I believe, during 
the Bush administration.
    My understanding is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has said 
that they have no intention of actually--the government--this 
was a Knesset law--has no intention of actually moving forward 
on the authorities that it has been apparently given.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
    Mr. Secretary, all of this raises the issue that Prime 
Minister Netanyahu says he has two hands on the steering wheel, 
meaning that he is in control of this government, but we are 
looking at actions his ministers are taking and actions in 
portfolios that are very significant that go directly contrary 
to that, and Prime Minister Netanyahu, as we discussed this 
morning, specifically himself disavowed the agreement reached 
in Aqaba within 24 hours of it having been reached.
    I just go back to make my final point I did this morning, 
which is I appreciate the statements that have been made by 
Biden administration officials. I think, Mr. Secretary, it is 
important for you personally also to continue to speak out and 
I think we look weak when we see time after time actions taken 
inconsistent with our positions with no consequence at all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, welcome.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, good to see you.
    Senator Cruz. You have spoken passionately and I believe 
honestly about your commitment to helping Ukraine to defeat 
Vladimir Putin. I agree wholeheartedly that it is an important 
national security interest of the United States for Russia to 
lose.
    Putin as a KGB thug who seeks to reassemble the Soviet 
empire at the expense of American interest and at the expense 
of the safety and security of Americans, and of course in 
China, Xi is watching closely to see how America responds to 
Putin's aggression.
    I am deeply concerned, however, that no matter how much you 
may want to help Ukraine, there is something the Biden 
administration wants more, which is to reenter a nuclear 
agreement with Iran.
    This Administration has shown weakness on Iran since day 
one and continues to do so. Just in the last few weeks there 
have been reports that you again waived congressional sanctions 
to allow Iraq to move money to the Central Bank of Iran, which 
the Ayatollah uses for terrorism, for ballistic missile 
development, and nuclear weapons work.
    Of course, that is not all Iran is doing. In January, Mr. 
Secretary, you publicly assessed that Iran had become 
``Russia's top military backer.'' That is a quote. Indeed, 
Russia uses Iranian banks and tankers and planes to move 
weapons and to dodge sanctions.
    Yet, the Administration and the State Department in 
particular continue to allow Russia-Iranian cooperation out of 
a refusal to crack down on Iran. The Biden administration is 
boosting and, in many cases, funding both sides of this war. If 
you look at energy--and I want to start with this. I want to 
ask you about the use by Russia of Iranian oil tankers.
    As you know, Iran violates U.S. energy sanctions by using 
its own tankers as well as a ghost fleet of foreign flag ships. 
You have allowed that ghost fleet to grow dramatically. The 
Iranians were using about 70 tankers when President Biden was 
elected. Today, they are using about 300 tankers.
    You did not sanction those tankers. Instead, the 
Administration allowed Iran to restore its energy exports, 
getting above 1 million barrels a day, which is funding the 
regime and funding the war on Ukraine.
    Last month was the highest oil exports Iran has had since 
2018. Now, we can argue about what that means for Iran, but I 
want to ask what it means for Ukraine and for Russia.
    Russia is now using dozens and dozens of tankers from that 
ghost fleet that the Administration allowed to grow in 
violation of our energy sanctions directly to aid Putin's 
aggression in Ukraine.
    Why has the Biden administration not sanctioned them?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, two things. First, going back 
to the first point, the symbiotic relationship that we are 
seeing emerge between Iran and Russia to include the provision 
by Iran of drone technology to Russia for use in Ukraine and 
the provision by Russia to Iran or the threatened provision of 
weapons systems, including planes, this is something that we 
are very actively and aggressively working to break up.
    Across the government we have gone after the drone network, 
working to sanction dozens of individuals----
    Senator Cruz. Have you reimposed the oil sanctions?
    Secretary Blinken. We are looking at the most effective way 
we can to the ghost fleet.
    Senator Cruz. Have you reimposed the oil sanctions?
    Secretary Blinken. We have imposed sanctions across the 
entire UAV network. We are looking at how we can most 
effectively deal with the ghost fleet and also the----
    Senator Cruz. Have you stopped the Ayatollah from selling a 
million barrels a day of oil?
    Secretary Blinken. We are working on making sure that we 
can do that effectively.
    Senator Cruz. It was done in the prior Administration. It 
was this Administration that refused to enforce those sanctions 
that allowed billions of dollars to flow to the Ayatollah that 
is being used to attack the Ukrainians right now.
    Secretary Blinken. We are working every day to enforce the 
existing sanctions on Iran even as we are looking at imposing 
new ones, and at the same time----
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, with respect, that is not 
remotely true. The oil sanctions you could enforce tomorrow, 
but it is a political decision not to enforce it and you are 
providing the funds that Iran is using to provide drones that 
are attacking Ukrainian military, attacking Ukrainian 
civilians.
    You said you just noticed recently the growing cooperation 
between Russia and Iran. If you were not aware of that 2 years 
ago, this Administration has not been paying attention.
    Let us talk, for example, about Russia and Iranian nuclear 
cooperation. President Zelensky has repeatedly said that Russia 
is compensating Iran for weapons through nuclear cooperation.
    Last year you signed waivers specifically related to the 
Iran nuclear deal that suspended congressional sanctions 
against Russia and Iran conducting exactly this kind of nuclear 
cooperation.
    You recently renewed these waivers. President Zelensky is 
right. You know that so much so that in your recent 
transmissions you wrote to Congress that previous waivers you 
had issued, ``would expand Iran's nuclear programs and further 
deepen cooperation between Iran and Russia at a time that Iran 
is providing lethal aid to Russia for its use and its illegal 
invasion in Ukraine.''
    You did not cancel the waivers. Instead, you signed them, 
enabling broad Russia-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Why did you 
sign these waivers and why did you do so repeatedly?
    Secretary Blinken. These waivers have been in the 
nonproliferation interests of the United States, particularly 
to make sure that materials that Iran could use to develop its 
nuclear program were shipped out of Iran and to make sure that 
facilities in Iran would not be developed in a way that could 
lead to further proliferation or the advancement of the 
program.
    In the last instance, we have narrowed the waivers 
significantly, again, to make sure that they are focused only 
on activities that actually advance our nonproliferation goals 
to make sure that Iran----
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, that 
answer does not does not pass the laugh test. Under this 
Administration, you have allowed Iran to get to the brink of a 
nuclear weapon. There is no work being conducted to make the 
program safer.
    Russia is on the side of Iran and Iran is on the side of 
Russia. They are both against us, and it is staggering that the 
Biden administration would say Russia is still on our side 
trying to constrain Iran.
    You could halt this cooperation. You could halt the 
civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia. You could halt the 
oil sales, but this Administration is not willing to do so 
because of politics and as a result the billions of dollars the 
Ayatollah is getting because of your decisions and President 
Biden's decisions are funding the war in Ukraine.
    Why is this Administration funding both sides of this war?
    Secretary Blinken. I fundamentally disagree with that 
judgment, Senator. We had Iran's nuclear program in a box. 
Unfortunately, it got out of that box as a result of pulling 
out, not by us, of the nuclear agreement.
    As a result, despite the maximum pressure that has been 
exerted by the previous Administration, by our Administration.
    Senator Cruz. Would you answer the question I asked? Why 
are you funding both sides of the war?
    Secretary Blinken. That nuclear program has moved forward--
--
    Senator Cruz. Would you answer the question? Why are you 
funding both sides of the Ukraine war?
    Secretary Blinken. We are not funding both sides. We are 
trying to make sure wherever we can that we are pushing back on 
Iran having access to resources----
    Senator Cruz. You are not going to stop the oil sales?
    Secretary Blinken. We are looking at the most effective way 
to deal with these----
    Senator Cruz. Enforce the sanctions. It is not complicated.
    The Chairman. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you and I 
want to thank you, again, for having members of this committee 
over to the State Department. I thought it was a really 
productive conversation.
    I just want to jump in, first and foremost, just about food 
security in general. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was 
extended on March 18. It gives me a lot of hope, but for only 
60 days, unfortunately, and half of that time period 
stipulated, really, in the original agreement makes me have 
some concerns.
    Relief agencies themselves, as you know, have been 
expressing disappointment in the shortened duration, stressing 
that a lot of the countries in East Africa will be entering the 
lean season and have a lot of crises.
    I know negotiations to allow for the safe passage of 
commercial ships carrying Ukrainian agricultural exports from 
the Black Sea have really been facing challenges. We know that 
the Russians are doing a lot of things to slow down the 
processes. They have created backlogs and there has been a 
significant drop. I know you are aware of all this.
    Can you just help me better understand the importance of 
the Black Sea Grain Initiative, how the Administration is 
working to ensure Russia fully meets its obligations, and have 
you started work with other countries dependent upon Russia and 
Ukraine grain to become more food sovereign and independent?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. A couple of things. Thank you, 
Senator, for raising that.
    It is hard to overstate the importance of the Black Sea 
grain corridor. As you know well, Ukraine had been, before the 
Russian aggression, one of the main breadbaskets of the world 
including Africa, and the--one of the results of the Russian 
aggression, of course, was to disrupt significantly its export 
of grain, of wheat.
    The Black Sea grain corridor has been a--it never should 
have been necessary in the first place because it was only 
necessary because Russia was blocking exports out of Ukraine, 
blocking the port of Odessa, but once put in place was a 
significant success, getting out about 24 million metric tons 
of grain from Ukraine, the equivalent of 8 billion loaves of 
bread. The vast majority of that was going to the Global South. 
It has had a direct impact.
    By the way, when I was just in Ethiopia, I saw large bags--
sacks of Ukrainian grain that were there as a result of the 
Black Sea grain corridor initiative.
    It is imperative that it be sustained. There is a renewal, 
but the Russians continue to manipulate it and play with it. 
The number of ships, as you mentioned, that are actually 
allowed to go through, they have been playing games with so 
that the number of ships is smaller.
    We are pushing every day on the U.N. and with the U.N. and 
others to make sure that not only is it sustained, but it is 
allowed to operate efficiently and effectively.
    However, even with that we have been seized with the global 
food crisis and global food insecurity in two ways--and very 
quickly.
    One is, of course, dealing with the emergency problem that 
so many countries are facing. Over the last year, we provided 
on top of what we were already doing an additional $13.5 
billion to advance food security around the world and to deal 
with emergency situations.
    We are by far the largest donor to the World Food 
Programme. We provide about 20 percent of its budget.
    Senator Booker. Do you think that the Fiscal Year 2024 
request of--I think it is about $5 billion, if I am getting 
this right--is that enough?
    Secretary Blinken. I want to say at this point I believe it 
is, but this is a perfect storm in so many ways that could get 
worse. We want to make sure that we retain the flexibility. We 
have the Feed the Future program, which is dealing with the 
longer-term aspect of this, which is well funded, and is in the 
budget. This is helping countries actually build their own 
sustainable productive capacity, not just have to rely on 
emergency assistance.
    Senator Booker. Can I dig deeper in your recent trip to 
Ethiopia?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Booker. You said that both sides have been guilty, 
really, of war crimes. We see a nation that is going to have a 
lot of challenges ahead of it. Millions of people are in need 
of assistance right now and the security situation remains 
volatile and it will probably be contributed to that 
insecurity, will be the sheer needs of the populations.
    I know the Administration is working with the U.N. and 
other partners to meet this unbelievable humanitarian crisis, 
but I guess what I want to ask you is are we putting enough 
resources? I guess the FY24 budget request--$286 million for 
Ethiopia and $331 million for new humanitarian assistance--I am 
just curious, as you engage with people on the ground, are we 
doing enough in terms of helping that country get up off its 
knees after this horrific crisis and humanitarian crisis?
    Secretary Blinken. One, I believe that we are, but I also 
believe and hope that we will actually be able to do more and 
partly that is dependent on Ethiopia following through on the 
hugely important agreement that was reached for the cessation 
of hostilities in Tigray.
    We were not erasing the last couple of years and, in fact, 
as you noted, we just announced the other day that it is our 
assessment that all sides have committed atrocities and we 
detail those.
    The agreement that was reached has resulted in this. The 
guns are silent. The humanitarian assistance is flowing to the 
north. Services are being restored. The Eritreans have pulled 
back and are pulling out.
    The TPLF has put down its heavy weapons. They are standing 
up an interim administration and there is the beginnings of a 
transitional justice process in place that Prime Minister Abiy 
is supporting and advancing.
    What I told him when I saw him was as they move down this 
road and implement the very important decisions made that will 
allow us and presumably allow Congress to support greater 
renewed engagement with Ethiopia, greater renewed support both 
in terms of our own assistance programs, some of which--now, I 
will say despite the last 2 years when it comes to basic 
humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, we have sustained 
virtually all of it.
    There are other things that can be done on an economic 
level that would really benefit Ethiopia and as it travels this 
path of peace, of accountability, of reconciliation, we will be 
able to do that. The international financial institutions as 
well are looking at how they can reengage.
    Senator Booker. Can I just really quickly--I know it is a 
priority for you--about diversity and inclusion. I really 
appreciate the conversations we have had since before you were 
even confirmed.
    In July, a GAO report analyzing the Department's DEIA 
practices provided a lot of recommendations, in short. Can you 
speak to how the Department plans to continue to use the 
funding requested for the DEIA office and how the Department's 
implementation to these kind of priorities is going to go 
forward? Again, has the work that you have been doing in your 
retention unit informed your Department's budget request for 
priorities? Can you just give me some more?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. In fact, so the--and thank you for 
raising the retention unit.
    First, let me just say very quickly this has been from day 
one--and it goes back, Mr. Chairman, to when this committee was 
good enough to confirm me--I made a commitment that I would 
be--I would see a marker of my success or not in this job 
whether or not the institution made real progress in building 
an institution that actually reflects the country that we are 
there to represent. This has been a priority of mine from day 
one.
    We established the Office of the CDIO, the Chief Diversity 
Inclusion Office. Never had that before. Reports directly to 
me.
    We have a 5-year strategic plan that was put in place. We 
have for the first time disaggregated data that looks across 
every office of the Department, so we have a clearer picture of 
where we are and where we are not.
    We have senior officers from every bureau at the deputy 
assistant secretary level who are assigned to carry this 
portfolio in their bureaus from the very beginning of the 
pipeline to the end of the pipeline--that is, from recruitment 
all the way to promotion and advancement with retention in the 
middle.
    We are intensely focused. We are trying to open more hearts 
and minds to the idea of serving in government and serving, 
hopefully, at the State Department.
    I have done that directly myself, senior officials have. 
Retention, though, is a critical piece because what we found is 
we get people through the door at C Street, but then they do 
not stay and disproportionately the people who do not stay tend 
to be from groups that have been historically underrepresented 
at the Department.
    We need to understand why and part of that was setting up a 
retention unit where we have been engaged in interviewing 
everyone who is willing, who is leaving the Department or 
thinking about leaving the Department, as well as doing 
statistical surveys, but the in-person interviews are really 
important to try to better understand this.
    Just got the initial results from the first surveys and 
interviews that are very instructive and illuminating about 
what it is we can do better to make sure we are retaining 
people.
    Then it is vital that people be promoted, that everyone in 
the Department sees that they can aspire to hold the highest 
jobs in the Department, and opening that process up with more 
transparency, especially at the senior levels, that is 
something we have done, too.
    Let me just say very quickly one of the things I am 
grateful to the Congress for, is for the first time we have 
paid internships, as you know, at the State Department. That 
means that socio-economically we widen the aperture 
dramatically.
    The enthusiasm for those has been through the roof, and 
based on the budget my hope and expectation is we will get over 
the next couple of years to having a thousand paid internships 
at the Department and that is making a huge difference.
    We have put in place new fellowships that are designed to 
attract, again, underrepresented populations in the Department. 
We just named one after Colin Powell that we put together last 
year. We have another one that I think will further diversify 
the core of our Diplomatic Security Service, which is vitally 
important.
    Anyway, it is a long way of saying there is a lot that is 
going on and it is something that I am absolutely seized with. 
I want to make sure that--the last thing I will say is the more 
we are able to institutionalize these initiatives so that they 
remain there long after I am gone and others are gone, that is 
usually important, too. We are looking at ways to do that 
effectively.
    Senator Booker. It is tremendous work, and when it comes to 
naming fellowships after this hearing, you might want to name 
one after Ted Cruz. I am sure that would go a long way in 
bipartisan unity and support for the State Department's 
programs.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Booker. That is good, wise advice from a Jersey 
boy.
    The Chairman. I am not going to follow on--on that.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you have been very gracious 
with your time. I just want to close out on a couple of 
questions and then we will let you go.
    What do you call a country that violates another country's 
airspace and territorial waters without provocations, drills in 
its exclusive--in another country's exclusive economic zone, 
that buys Russian military equipment in violation of U.S. law, 
that has more lawyers and journalists in jail than almost any 
other country and jails its main political opponent right 
before elections, a country that seeks by force to block the 
rights of a EU country to explore its energy deposits off its 
outer continental shelf, a country that not has only--not has 
joined EU-led sanctions against Russia, but has exported about 
$800 million worth of goods to Russia, a country that continues 
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, including against U.S. partners 
like the Syrian Democratic Forces, that stops a critical 
enlargement of NATO, that continues to occupy a EU country with 
40,000 troops, and in violation of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions seeks to open up an area that has been frozen by 
the United Nations, that denies religious freedom to the 
religious leader of millions of citizens of Greek Orthodox 
faith, that converts a church into a mosque in violation of its 
UNESCO commitments and that arrests and jails U.S. embassy 
locally employed staff?
    What do you call such a country?
    Secretary Blinken. I think I would call that a challenging 
ally.
    The Chairman. Well, I call the country Turkey and the 
reality is I do not believe that such a country--and I did not 
continue, which I could have--deserves to have F-16s sold to 
it.
    I mean, I do not know what messages we send in the world 
that you can do all of those things and, yet, you can get U.S. 
military assistance, at the end of the day.
    I know the aspiration we have for Turkey, but it is not the 
Turkey under President Erdogan, and so it seems to me there has 
to be a roadmap in which it says if you really want this then 
you have to deal with some of these issues because if we just 
give them the F-16s and all of this remains outstanding, I do 
not know what global message we send.
    In a similar light, in the past year we have seen 
Azerbaijan invade Armenia, manufacture a food security crisis 
in Nagorno-Karabakh with its ongoing blockade, continue rampant 
repression domestically including with the unjustified 
detention of activists like Bakhtiyar Hajiyev.
    In the past 5 years we have seen Azerbaijan start a war 
that killed 6,500 people, forced almost 100,000 Karabakh 
Armenians from their homes.
    I am concerned about providing assistance to the Aliyev 
regime, but it strikes me as particularly egregious that the 
Administration would request $700,000 in international military 
education and training funds for Azerbaijan.
    Can you explain to the American people why we would want to 
provide military education and training to an aggressor state 
that attacks its neighbors and violates the rights of its 
citizens?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I know we have had opportunity 
to discuss this before. There are a few things here.
    First of all, when it comes to the military assistance and 
particularly to the infamous Section 901 waiver that that we 
engage in, look, there are some very practical reasons for 
that.
    One is to actually strengthen, as you know, the 
interoperability between their forces and ours, NATO's. They 
engage in peacekeeping. They have a long border with Iran that 
needs defending, but also to this point we think there is real 
benefit to increasing the Western education, maybe orientation, 
of some of their officers, so that is important.
    Let me just step back and----
    The Chairman. I hope that Western education is not what 
they have learned to do what they did in blockading these 
people, starting a conflict, 6,500 dead. That, I hope, is not 
Western education.
    Secretary Blinken. Just to step back for one second because 
I do think this is an important moment and something that I 
think we should really also pursue the conversation on.
    I have been very engaged on seeing what we can do to help 
Armenia and Azerbaijan come to a peace agreement that 
normalizes the relationship between them as well as deal with, 
obviously, the rights and protections for Armenian activists in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, dealing with border delimitation, et cetera, 
and I think there is an opportunity--I do not want to 
exaggerate it--but an opportunity actually to bring a peace 
agreement to fruition.
    I had Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev 
together in Munich at the Security Conference. I have had the 
foreign ministers here in Washington. I expect that they will 
come back.
    We have worked on a text, and this is not something that we 
are imposing on Armenia. We are answering the strong desire 
expressed by Armenia to see if we can help them reach an 
agreement which would end at least in many ways 30-plus years 
of conflict.
    It is challenging and it is fraught. At the same time, you 
are exactly right to point out the real problems in the Lachin 
corridor with the ability of people, private citizens, 
commercial traffic, to flow to get what is needed to people in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. I am pressing on Azerbaijan including as 
recently as this week to reopen that corridor.
    We are working on that, but I do think that there is 
without exaggerating it a moment of opportunity here that would 
profoundly be in the interests of the people of Armenia as well 
as Azerbaijan.
    The Chairman. As we are aspiring to that, and that is a 
worthy aspiration, but I hope that we are committed to making 
sure that humanitarian assistance reaches the Karabakh 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. I hope you use your good offices to make that 
happen.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. Two last things. Your announcement of your 
determination related to war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in Ethiopia was well welcomed and I salute you for it. I, along 
with other senators, have been pushing for such a determination 
for 2 years.
    I agree with your position that justice and accountability 
for the crimes committed during the course of the war are a 
fundamental element of a sustainable peace.
    State Department officials have indicated that human rights 
monitors will have full and unfettered access to Tigray in the 
wake of the November agreements.
    Will you commit to update your determination periodically 
as the monitors gather more information?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. We are tracking this, Mr. Chairman, 
every step along the way and the access for monitors is a vital 
part of this agreement.
    The Chairman. Okay. That is great. Will any update include 
a finding related to the International Commission of Human 
Rights experts on Ethiopia's report from September of last year 
that, ``The denial and obstruction of humanitarian access to 
Tigray region by the Federal Government and allied regional 
state governments was committed for the purpose of depriving 
the Tigrayan population of objects indispensable for its 
survival, including food?''
    Secretary Blinken. Actually, I think that is reflected in 
our determination. If you look at the determination that we 
made, there are a number of different elements that apply.
    Some do not apply to all of the actors in this and one of 
the things that is clear in the determination that we made was 
that, in effect, trying to cut off the population of Tigray 
from humanitarian access constituted a serious offense that we 
noted in our determination.
    The Chairman. All right. We look forward to that.
    I hope we will commit to supporting the extension of the 
mandate of the International Commission of Human Rights experts 
on Ethiopia as part of our effort.
    Lastly, I want to echo Senator Booker's--as you know, I 
have had a nearly 30-year journey on diversity with the State 
Department. It has been most of the time rather lonely, most of 
the time unsuccessful, and so I appreciate the answer that you 
gave him.
    I just hope that as we pursue that diversity, that this 
diversity is as broad as possible and that what we are doing in 
the budget, which seeks the recruitment and retention of an 
additional 164 Foreign Service and 351 civil service personnel 
is going to have these DEIA initiatives penetrating that effort 
as well.
    Is that what your expectation is?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, and, in fact, we made changes to 
the Foreign Service exam to make sure that it was 
unintentionally, but as a practical matter actually being more 
of a barrier to diversification than it should be.
    We have also, among other things, made working for 
advancing DEIA one of the criteria for promotion in the 
Department.
    The Chairman. Okay. I look forward to holding a hearing 
later this year with the chief diversity and inclusion officer 
of the Department, which is in and of itself a good step. Of 
course, all of that only matters if we see change in numbers, 
which I appreciate from your answer to Senator Booker you are 
working on trying to make a reality.
    Senator Risch had to leave, but he asked me on behalf of 
both of us to thank you. You have been very gracious with your 
time, very thorough in your answers.
    This hearing record will remain open to the close of 
business on Wednesday, March 29. If there are questions for the 
record, please submit it no later than then.
    With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Democracy & Human Rights in the Indo-Pacific: The 
Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes that to achieve our 
goals in the Indo-Pacific, a critical component of our increased 
engagement must focus on supporting democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, and support for international law. Yet none of the new staff 
positions requested related to the Indo-Pacific Strategy are slated to 
be in bureaus or positions working on these policy areas. How is your 
current budget seeking to strengthen the components of the State 
Department's workforce needed to address these important human rights 
and democracy components of the Indo-Pacific strategy and our global 
competition with China?

    Answer. The State Department puts democracy, human rights, and 
governance at the center of U.S. foreign policy, including in the Indo-
Pacific strategy and through global competition with the People's 
Republic of China. The FY 2024 budget request seeks increases for both 
regional and functional bureaus to improve the Department's ability to 
advance democracy, promote human rights, and improve governance in the 
Indo-Pacific. The request will allow for expanded programming, staffing 
increases both domestically and abroad, and enable the Department to 
sustain prior year increases in staffing.

    Question. Staffing for the China Challenge: For years we have 
focused on the necessity of increasing resources to the Indo-Pacific, 
but I firmly believe that the challenge China poses is a global one and 
that we are behind the curve in places like Africa and the Western 
Hemisphere. One of the strategies that the Department has used to 
increase the focus on what China is doing around the world is the 
Regional China Officer (RCO) program. Although the program has grown, I 
understand that the Department has around 20 Regional China Officer 
(RCO) positions globally and that the China House administers the 
program out of a small four-person unit focused on the global aspects 
of the competition. What impact does the RCO program have on our 
awareness of, and ability to respond to, malign PRC activities 
globally?

    Answer. The Regional China Officers are some of the Department's 
most critical nodes for understanding the PRC's global inroads. They 
have produced hundreds of reports and actively work to share and 
coordinate our insights with Department leadership, the interagency, 
and our allies and partners to align our collective responses to the 
PRC challenge. RCOs also build our global capacity to identify and 
respond to problematic PRC behavior through senior level briefings, 
regional conferences, and help shape and evaluate proposals for the 
Countering PRC Influence Fund.

    Question. Are these officers connected to resources back in 
Washington to help us get ahead of troubling developments--such as 
economic coercion by the PRC--or to respond quickly and effectively 
when they occur?

    Answer. The Regional China Officers (RCOs) are part of the 
Department's Office of China Coordination (``China House''). Through 
China House and its extensive interconnectivity within the Department 
and beyond, RCOs have a robust network of partners and resources in 
Washington they routinely draw upon. The State Department's Foreign 
Service Institute also provides training on China, including a new area 
studies program designed to enable U.S. foreign affairs professionals 
to apply a deeper understanding of PRC's methods and strategies of 
exerting influence globally to their analysis and reporting.

    Question. What more could be accomplished if this program was 
expanded, including to our multilateral missions?

    Answer. An expansion of the RCO program could advance three major 
goals: ensure more comprehensive coverage in large regions (such as 
Africa where over 50 countries are covered by just three officers); 
allow focused engagement in capitals with particularly important allies 
such as Japan and the UK; and enhance our ability to respond to the 
PRC's undermining of the multilateral system by embedding dedicated 
RCOs within our multilateral missions, where they could bring their 
China expertise and access to the knowledge and resources of the China 
Office of Coordination (``China House'').

    Question. What is needed in terms of additional training and 
resources to make this program more effective?

    Answer. The RCO program operates with less than $1 million in 0.2 
percent diplomatic program funding to cover all activities. While this 
provides the ability to sponsor trainings and travel in their region, 
its uses are limited. The RCOs benefitted from collaborating with the 
Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy for a one-time 
allocation of $2 million in 0.7 (PD) funds in 2020 which funded over a 
dozen tailored programs, which continue to pay dividends. Even modest 
amounts of 0.2 funds, and/or a larger allotment of 0.7 funds for public 
diplomacy collaborations between Public Diplomacy Sections and RCOs, 
would greatly enhance the ability of RCOs to effectively partner with 
posts to push back PRC inroads. Additional RCO positions would also 
greatly increase impact.

    Question. Please explain how these funds will contribute to our 
efforts to fully staff and resource our efforts in multinational fora 
like the IAEA, UN and elsewhere, where China is increasingly wielding 
influence.

    Answer. The Regional China Officer (RCO) program seeks to raise 
awareness of PRC problematic behaviors globally, including in 
multilateral fora. Additional resources would enable the program to 
expand coverage into international organizations in Europe and 
elsewhere, giving us greater China expertise as we engage on PRC issues 
in these organizations.

    Question. Taiwan FMF Financing: Last year, we were able to secure 
the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (previously known as the Taiwan 
Policy Act) into the FY 2023 NDAA--designed to dramatically enhance the 
United States' defense partnership with Taiwan by authorizing foreign 
military financing to modernize their security capabilities to deter 
and, if necessary, defeat aggression by the People's Republic of China. 
The T.E.R.A explicitly authorized up to $2 billion per year over the 
next 5 years for FMF for Taiwan, but most of our FMF assistance goes to 
countries in the Middle East. Why did the Administration not request a 
more ambitious increase in the topline FMF account--to properly fund 
the authorization provided by Congress while also increasing the State 
Department's leadership and oversight over key security assistance 
accounts?

    Answer. The Department appreciates the authorizations in the TERA 
of FMF grant assistance to Taiwan and continues to explore options for 
Taiwan. This request includes $113 million to address emerging 
priorities globally, which may include Taiwan. A strategic allocation 
of FMF could be accomplished with increased flexibility within the 
annual appropriations bill.

    Question. Retaliation against U.S. citizens/Transnational 
Repression: Mr. Turkel serves as Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and is seeking to be reunited 
with his mother in China. He has worked closely with my office on 
Uyghur issues. Chinese officials will not permit his ailing and widowed 
mother to travel to the U.S. to see her American children and meet her 
American grandchildren. I understand that you personally raised Mr. 
Turkel's family case with your Chinese Government counterpart, but Mr. 
Turkel's mother is still unable to leave China, which is clearly a 
retaliation against a vocal U.S. citizen. It's brutal that Chinese 
authorities are retaliating against Mr. Turkel for his human rights 
work on behalf of Uyghurs, and service to the U.S. Government. Did the 
President raise Mrs. Turkel's case with Xi Jinping? What specifically 
is the Administration doing to prioritize this case and reunite this 
family?

    Answer. In a meeting with President Xi on the margins of the Bali 
G20 Leaders' Summit, President Biden raised concerns about human 
rights, including the PRC's practices in Xinjiang. The Department 
raises priority cases with the PRC Government at the highest levels, 
including advocating for Ayshem Mamut to be reunited with Mr. Turkel 
and other family members.

    Question. Humanitarian Assistance and Food Security: Global food 
insecurity continues to rapidly rise, fueled by Putin's invasion of 
Ukraine, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Current funds are 
insufficient, and worryingly, I have heard reports of WFP and its 
partners cutting food rations for vulnerable populations in Africa and 
elsewhere due to a lack of funding, including reports of impending or 
actualized ration cuts in Syria, in the West Bank and Gaza, Yemen and 
in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Please walk us through how 
this budget request, paired with last year's Ukraine supplemental 
requests, will address humanitarian funding needs to stabilize 
conditions in key parts of the world during this extraordinary moment 
of need?

    Answer. Generous supplemental appropriations allowed the United 
States to scale up humanitarian assistance to meet unprecedented 
needs--especially in Ukraine and in the Horn of Africa--across FY 2022 
and FY 2023. The FY 2024 request of $6.5 billion for USAID-managed 
humanitarian assistance funding is an increase over base enacted 
appropriations for FY 2023. While we will continue to prioritize 
available resources for the most acute emergencies and needs, 
significant resources are needed to address unprecedented humanitarian 
needs worldwide. The U.S. Government continues to press other donors to 
increase humanitarian contributions.

    Question. Human Rights and Democracy Fund: The funding requested 
for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) is $180.7 million--a 
decrease from the FY23 enacted level of $222.45 million. Could you 
elaborate how the State Department intends to address these critical 
issues with this funding level?

    Answer. While the budget request for DRL's FY 2024 HRDF funding is 
less than the FY 2023 enacted level for HRDF, the overall USG 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance request level in FY 2024 did 
increase by $250 million from the FY 2023 request. The Department 
employs a range of diplomatic and programmatic tools to address 
troubling democratic trends globally. Our resources, including HRDF, 
are used for targeted democracy and human rights programs that are 
designed to combat democratic erosion and other threats to democracy 
that operate in lockstep with our bilateral, multistakeholder, and 
bilateral initiatives.

    Question. What resources are necessary to adequately address the 
multiple, competing crises related to democracy, governance, and human 
rights?

    Answer. The Department employs a range of diplomatic, programmatic, 
and public diplomacy tools to support democracy, governance, and human 
rights globally. The level of resources included in the FY 2024 request 
will comprehensively fund these tools. As the lead for democracy, 
governance, and human rights, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor (DRL) implements targeted foreign assistance programs to 
address human rights crises and to support democratic openings 
globally.

    Question. For Afghanistan, given the fluidity of the situation on 
the ground, are there plans to pivot funding from previous programs 
supporting women/girls/gender to countries to where Afghans are 
fleeing, e.g., increasing INL/JTIP GBV and anti-TIP programs available 
to Afghan women/girls in Pakistan?

    Answer. The Department rigorously reviews ongoing programming and 
prior year resources to adjust to the situation on the ground and 
provide support to women and girls inside and outside of Afghanistan. 
This includes emergency assistance, such as shelter and protection, for 
individuals facing threats of gender-based violence (GBV) and working 
with civil society organization on prevention of GBV. Outside of 
Afghanistan, the Department and USAID fund variety of scholarships and 
specialized training programs that create opportunities for women and 
girls to receive higher education.

    Question. Supporting Democratic Partners in the Americas: Growing 
authoritarianism poses a grave threat to peace and security in our 
hemisphere. We already have three consolidated dictatorships in Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua. It is more imperative than ever that our 
remaining democratic partners in the hemisphere know that the United 
States stands with them. Given high rates of migration from those 
fleeing authoritarian regimes, violence, and economic decline, do you 
believe the proposed budget is sufficient to address the migration and 
refugee challenges in the region?

    Answer. The FY 2024 budget request prioritizes addressing migration 
and refugee challenges in the region. In support of the 2022 Los 
Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, the request includes 
nearly $274 million in assistance across all accounts, representing a 
significant increase to meet the outstanding needs of the region. 
Without these resources, the Department will be severely constrained 
given the global rise in humanitarian needs and refugee resettlement 
priorities.

    Question. Deforestation in Amazon: The President's budget requests 
$75 million for a new Strengthening Forest Conservation and Land 
Management fund to catalyze private sector financing in the sector. At 
an earlier hearing, however, Deputy Climate Envoy, Rick Duke, indicated 
that the need is far greater and more in line with what I've proposed 
in my AMAZON21 Act. Can you please explain how, if appropriated, the 
requested funds would be leveraged to tackle deforestation in Brazil 
and around the globe?

    Answer. Funding will support actions to restore degraded or 
deforested landscapes; improve resilience; incentivize forest 
conservation and sustainable forest and land management; promote 
production practices consistent with environmental and social goals; 
and catalyze private sector investment and action, particularly in key 
areas for sustaining biodiversity and ecosystem function. As Deputy 
Envoy Duke noted, halting deforestation, and restoring intact and 
biodiversity rich ecosystems in Brazil and beyond will require 
significant collective action and support. A fund could be one 
component of a comprehensive USG approach in support of this objective.

    Question. Moreover, what are the longer-term investment needs to 
halt and reverse global deforestation, an imperative that is critical 
to addressing the climate crisis?

    Answer. The drivers of deforestation are complex and varied, as are 
the tools needed to combat deforestation. We need to improve, both at 
home and abroad, data analysis, project monitoring and evaluation, and 
promotion and enforcement of the rule of law as well as the quality, 
availability, and accessibility of land cover and land use change data. 
Finally, developing alternative livelihoods and energy sources, and 
improved agricultural productivity are essential to address 
deforestation's root causes. In addition, natural capital must be 
accounted for, and incentives must be shifted so that forests are worth 
more standing than deforested.

    Question. Modernizing Diplomacy: This year's budget funds 
provisions put forward by our committee's FY22 State Authorization bill 
supporting the recruitment and retention of personnel with backgrounds 
in cybersecurity, engineering, data science, and other specialized 
skills or training needed to address 21st century challenges. Please 
describe the Department's current hiring efforts in this area. Does the 
Department require additional hiring authorities or funding to recruit 
personnel who are skilled in these disciplines?

    Answer. The State Department leverages available hiring authorities 
to employ the specialized talent we need to advance our global mission. 
However, traditional recruitment mechanisms are slow and inefficient, 
hindering the Department's ability to expediently hire needed 
specialized foreign affairs skillsets in areas such as climate, 
economics, health, and cyber affairs. In addition, the new 10-year term 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) authority series does 
not include all desired government-wide STEM Direct Hire Authority 
series (e.g., all GS-2210 IT Specialists, GS-1560 Data Scientist, 
etc.). Department efforts to hire needed specialized skillsets would 
greatly benefit from an expansion of direct hire authority to 
additional STEM series and foreign affairs specialty series.

    Question. Embassy Construction: GAO found that construction 
inflation contributed to slowing the pace of State's embassy 
construction program, which had only received one inflation adjustment 
in the past 20 years. (GAO-18-653) In accordance with a GAO 
recommendation, State assessed that inflation reduced its purchasing 
power by more than $700 million. How many embassies or consulates still 
need to be replaced and, given the impact of continued inflation as 
well as other factors slowing the pace of construction, how many years 
does State estimate it will take to complete these new embassies and 
consulates?

    Answer. Since the Capital Security Construction Program began in 
2001, the Department has built 95 new embassies and consulates (NEC/
NCC) with another 45 major construction projects already underway or 
planned for award by FY 2027. With a historical average timeline of 7 
years for a NEC/NCC, we estimate it would take about 30 years to 
address the remaining facilities. However, we are reevaluating long-
term solutions such as the collocation, reduced setback, and stay-in-
place flexibilities offered by the Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counterterrorism Act 2022 as an alternative to new construction, which 
could reduce the timeline.

    Question. Has State considered increasing its and other agencies' 
Capital Security Cost Sharing Program contributions so that requested 
funding keeps pace to some extent with inflation costs?

    Answer. In the FY 2024 President's budget request, the Department, 
in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, proposed 
increasing the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program contributions to 
address inflation. It requests an overall program level of $2.4 
billion, which is an increase of $238.9 million from the FY 2023 
overall cost sharing program level of $2.2 billion. The increase will 
be used to address the maintenance backlog and offset lost purchasing 
power.

    Question. Diplomatic Reserve Corps: Former and current State 
Department officials have proposed a diplomatic reserve corps drawn 
from the ranks of retired FSOs who possess the expertise and experience 
required to serve when additional manpower is needed. Last year's NDAA 
calls for the Department to conduct a study of the feasibility and cost 
of establishing a diplomatic officers' reserve corps. Can you provide 
an update, if any, on the status of this study?

    Answer. The Department is planning to conduct the Diplomatic 
Reserve Corps feasibility study required in the FY 2023 National 
Defense Authorization Act to evaluate the concept, assess costs and 
legal authorities, and consider implementation options. This initial 
planning will continue over the coming months, and the FY 2024 budget 
requests $11 million in anticipation of an initial pilot phase for at 
least 50 initial hires.

    Question. Cyberspace and Emerging Technologies: While I am pleased 
to see an increase in funding, albeit marginal, for the new Bureau for 
Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP), in this year's request, I am 
concerned that our approach to cyber-related assistance remains 
disjointed, with different authorities attached to different types of 
funding and none of them fit for purpose. The status quo appears to 
hamper the CDP Bureau's ability to leverage assistance to foreign 
counterparts in a manner that delivers on the Bureau's integrated 
mandate, whether it be cyber incident response assistance or 
programming to promote internet freedom. Why did the Department not 
seek a specific, fit for purpose cyber assistance funding line?

    Answer. The State Department prioritizes digital and cyber 
assistance support for allies and partners as an important instrument 
of U.S. foreign policy. The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy is 
building programs to meet the high and growing international demand for 
cyber and digital capacity building and incident response. The bureau 
continues to identify methods to streamline and enhance foreign 
assistance programs, including through a potential dedicated digital 
and cyber assistance fund. We welcome continued conversations with 
Congress on how best to design and implement such a mechanism.

    Question. In the absence of addressing persistent challenges of 
delivering assistance in this space, how does the Department intend to 
ensure that the Cyber Bureau is sufficiently funded and capable of 
delivering on its ambitious mandate?

    Answer. The elevation and integration of cyberspace and digital 
policy in the State Department allows for a more consolidated, 
efficient, and effective approach to delivering cyber and digital 
foreign assistance. In addressing foreign policy priorities in this 
space, the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy relies on a number 
of sources of funding, including the regular budget process and other 
programs such as the CHIPS ITSI Fund and the Countering PRC Influence 
Fund. As demands for assistance in these sectors continue to grow, we 
will work with Congress to ensure these activities are sufficiently 
resourced.

    Question. How do you assess the CDP Bureau's ability to coordinate 
cyber and digital-related funds across the Department, with USAID and 
other key interagency partners?

    Answer. CDP's integrated mandate and streamlined foreign assistance 
work are improving coordination and monitoring functions, ensuring that 
programs are complementary, aligned with U.S. policy, and impactful. As 
one element of its foreign assistance approach, the Digital 
Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) is a key initiative 
that coordinates with Posts, regional/functional bureaus, and 
interagency partners including USAID to identify programmatic gaps and 
opportunities and prioritize proposals. DCCP's working group is co-
chaired by the Department and USAID.

    Question. Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility: Last 
year's DEIA hearing identified that Latinos, African-Americans, Native 
Americans and other racial and ethnic groups only account for roughly 
15 percent of the Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service. 
What is being done to address this finding and strengthen diversity in 
the Department's leadership pipeline?

    Answer. In addition to the Congressionally supported paid 
internship program, the Department applauded fellowships that target 
historically underrepresented populations such as the Pickering, 
Powell, and Rangel programs and the Foreign Affairs Information 
Technology and Clarke Diplomatic Security fellowships. Our Diplomats in 
Residence recruit diverse talent. In our senior ranks, we now advertise 
nearly all opportunities, including most recently Deputy Assistant 
Secretary positions, and selections to senior positions are done by 
diverse panels rather than individual decisionmakers.

    Question. Please explain how DEIA initiatives would be incorporated 
into the recruitment and retention of the additional 164 Foreign 
Service and 351 Civil Service personnel included in the budget request?

    Answer. DEIA initiatives continue to be critical to my 
Modernization Agenda, and DEIA underpins recruitment and retention for 
both Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel, including for these 
additional requested positions. We have been intentional in 
institutionalizing DEIA into all aspects of the Department's workforce 
processes so they will apply to all current and future personnel. We 
also created a Retention Unit in the Bureau of Global Talent Management 
that is working on a strategy to ensure that State prioritizes a work 
culture that attracts and retains diverse talent.

    Question. On March 21, the world marked the International Day for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighting the need for 
continued global actions. Successful implementation of the E.O. could 
do much to not only address racial discrimination, but also other 
inequities in our country and abroad. Given the enormity of the tasks 
that the equity team must undertake to review and/or develop racial and 
other equity programs and policies for the entire Department on 
multiple continents (e.g., Department policies, overseas programming, 
procurement efforts with minority businesses, etc.): Will the equity 
team be situated in the Secretary's front office, and have the ability 
to work directly with agency leadership to implement its work?

    Answer. I appointed Desiree Cormier Smith as the Special 
Representative for Racial Equity and Justice and the Department's 
senior designated official for the Agency Equity Team. The Special 
Representative and her team are situated in the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor's front office. The Special Representative 
coordinates closely with the senior official in the Office of Global 
Women's Issues, the chief diversity and inclusion officer, the senior 
environmental justice officer, the special envoy for LGBTQI+, and other 
senior officials leading and shaping the agency's equity strategies 
across offices and functions.

    Question. Are the staffing and resources needed to implement the 
Racial Equity E.O. reflected in the budget request? If not, how will 
the staffing and activities of the equity team be funded, and what are 
the expected costs?

    Answer. The special representative for racial equity and justice is 
the senior designated official for the Department's Agency Equity Team, 
which is created from existing Department resources and staffing 
structures. Executive Order 14091 outlines coordination across the 
Department, which will require dedicated resources to ensure equity 
initiatives are cohesive and effective, that the Department remains 
accountable to the public for its equity work, and that its efforts 
match the intent of the executive order. The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor (DRL) will work with relevant Department stakeholders 
to ensure the budget reflects this commitment.

    Question. The Department's 2022 Equity Action Plan, stated that the 
Department will ``develop analytic tools for integrating equity into 
the development and implementation of foreign policy by 2024.'' So far, 
what analytic tools have been developed and integrated into the foreign 
policy decision-making process as a result of this equity initiative?

    Answer. To integrate equity into the development and implementation 
of foreign policy by 2024, the Department has created and launched 
``Equity Across Foreign Affairs'' Agency Priority Goal (APG) for FYs 
2022-2023, an analytical tool that establishes strategies and 
performance metrics to gauge APG progress and success. This APG will be 
renewed for FY 2024-2025. Additionally, together with USAID, the State 
Department developed and is currently implementing a Joint Strategic 
Plan for FY 2022-2026 that includes Strategic Objective 3.2: Advance 
equity, accessibility, and rights for all.

    Question. PEPFAR: In the GAO report, (GAO-23-105347, 12/12/2022) it 
noted that ``State Has Taken Actions to Address Coordination 
Challenges, but Staffing Challenges Persist.'' What is the status of 
efforts to address staffing gaps in the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator?

    Answer. HHS/CDC, USAID, DoD, and Peace Corps helped the Office of 
the Global Aids Coordinator (S/GAC) address its chronic staffing 
challenges by providing 28 short-term detailees in the fall of 2022. 
Surge support from the Department is enabling S/GAC to accelerate 
hiring of 40 individuals through a variety of hiring mechanisms. In 
2023, we are redirecting our focus and developing a long-term strategy 
that will close the staffing gap and increase staff retention.

    Question. The same report on page 20 notes, ``As of September 2022, 
216 of 308 positions in S/GAC's HQ office were vacant (70 percent)'' 
and on page 21, ``As of August 2022, 25 of the 28 PEPFAR country 
coordinator positions (89 percent) were filled by an acting 
coordinator.''Further it states that persistent PEPFAR staffing 
vacancies have led to heavy workload and retention issues, yet S/GAC 
has not identified or addressed underlying causes of vacancies, and it 
does not address long-term human capital gaps program-wide by, for 
example, developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and 
retaining staff to achieve program goals. To address this finding, GAO 
recommended that the coordinator develop a strategic workforce planning 
process to identify and address the underlying causes for persistent 
staffing vacancies in S/GAC headquarters and country teams. What do you 
think are the major impediments to hiring and retention of employees 
for PEPFAR?

    Answer. Hiring and retention of both coordinators and S/GAC staff 
is a responsibility I take very seriously. Alignment of the necessary 
subject matter expertise--in public health, medicine, epidemiology, 
data science, as well as skills in diplomacy, policy, budget, and 
program management--is critical to provide appropriate oversight of the 
PEPFAR program both at the field and headquarter levels. Furthermore, 
insufficient requisite job series and lack of promotion opportunities 
have been central challenges. Conducting a workforce planning study 
will further identify those roles impacted by attrition.
    Recruitment and retention have improved considerably and with the 
anticipated strategic workforce planning process, we expect a more 
positive outcome to these metrics.

    Question. What is the status of the development of long-term 
strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff?

    Answer. Talent management and development remains at the forefront 
of priority business needs for the Office of the Global Aids 
Coordinator (S/GAC). S/GAC has addressed the challenges in mobilizing a 
diverse talent pool and expediting the security clearance process by 
introducing a fully functional EX capability. This capability within S/
GAC will drive these critical Talent Acquisition initiatives.
    S/GAC is also benefiting from the Department's broader 
modernization agenda, which has prioritized improving professional 
development opportunities for Civil Service employees. Through the 
appropriate authorities, S/GAC will utilize a broad range of hiring 
flexibilities to quickly address bureau needs.

    Question. Staffing in Africa: A number of the career foreign 
service officers recently nominated to serve as Ambassador in key posts 
in Africa such as Mali and Sudan, either have no experience serving in 
Africa, have never served as an Ambassador, or both. All of these 
officers are very accomplished diplomats, but the absence of prior 
Africa or Chief of Mission experience is surprising. To what extent do 
Foreign Service officers who have served in Africa have the same 
opportunity for advancement as those who serve in other regions?

    Answer. The Department seeks to attract the widest pool of 
qualified candidates for senior leadership positions, reflecting the 
diversity and breadth of experience of the foreign affairs community, 
and reviews the qualifications of proposed candidates, considering the 
Department's leadership and management principles and the post-specific 
requirements identified for each position. Officers who serve in Africa 
have the same opportunity for advancement globally, including for chief 
of mission positions, and are evaluated by a service-wide set of core 
precepts or competencies in which potential must be demonstrated to 
advance. The conditions and challenges unique to assignments in Africa 
often provide officers professional development opportunities and 
supervisory experience earlier in their careers.

    Question. Is there data supporting your response? If so, please 
share it with the Committee.

    Answer. As one example, 10 of the 12 current nominees for chief of 
mission positions in the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) countries have 
served at least one AF tour. Last year, 21 of the 24 nominees had prior 
AF experience. Moreover, nominees for chief of mission positions in 
other regional bureaus frequently have extensive experience working at 
AF posts as well.

    Question. Are you concerned about the message that selecting 
Foreign Service Officers who have never served in the region at any 
point in their career sends a signal to U.S. diplomats who have spent 
considerable time working at difficult and challenging posts in Africa 
that their prospects for career advancement are limited?

    Answer. Ensuring the selection of the most qualified officers for 
important leadership positions is essential to the successful conduct 
of U.S. foreign policy and the leadership of our missions overseas. The 
Department has a robust process for choosing chiefs of mission to 
ensure that we identify highly qualified individuals for every one of 
these positions in the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), particularly 
emphasizing those candidates with hardship and/or regional experience. 
The majority of nominees for chiefs of mission in African countries 
have prior AF experience, including 10 of the 12 nominees currently 
awaiting confirmation.

    Question. What steps will you take to ensure that officers serving 
in Africa can have confidence that they have the same career 
advancement opportunities as those who serve in other regions?

    Answer. The Department seeks to attract the widest pool of 
qualified candidates for leadership positions, reflecting the diversity 
and breadth of experience of the foreign affairs community, and reviews 
the qualifications of proposed candidates, considering the Department's 
leadership and management principles and the post-specific requirements 
identified for each position. Opening leadership opportunities to 
qualified staff, regardless of previous regional expertise, is an 
important factor in maintaining morale among the senior ranks of the 
service. Just as highly qualified leaders from throughout the 
Department are considered for positions in Africa, statistics 
demonstrate that those who spend considerable time in Africa are highly 
competitive for positions worldwide and are promoted more rapidly than 
those without Africa experience.

    Question. Ethiopia: The International Commission of Human Rights 
Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) report from September 2022 stated that 
``the denial and obstruction of humanitarian access to Tigray Region by 
the Federal Government and allied regional State governments was 
committed for the purpose of depriving the Tigrayan population of 
objects indispensable for its survival, including food.'' You indicated 
in the budget hearing on March 22 that your determination regarding 
atrocities in Ethiopia addressed denial and obstruction of humanitarian 
access. How did that conduct factor into your assessments regarding war 
crimes and crimes against humanity?

    Answer. The determination is not intended to be an exhaustive 
accounting of all acts that constitute atrocities over the course of 
the conflict. Given the various allegations relating to this armed 
conflict, we decided to address the atrocities collectively and not 
make public determinations for each specific instance. Our focus was on 
the final determination, which was that all of the major parties to the 
conflict committed atrocities.

    Question. What role do you assess that the civilian authorities at 
the federal level played in such denial and obstruction?

    Answer. Our atrocities determination is not meant to ``name 
names,'' nor be an exhaustive accounting of all crimes by all actors 
over the course of the conflict. There are several tools at our 
disposal, including visa sanctions and President Biden's September 2021 
executive order, to target individuals, both military and civilian, 
proven to be involved in atrocities. We stand ready to use these tools 
if and when conditions warrant.

    Question. Did the State Department agree to end the mandate of the 
International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia in 
exchange for the Ethiopian Government dropping its efforts to disband 
ICHREE early?

    Answer. The U.S. decision on whether to support renewal of the 
ICHREE mandate will be based on the human rights situation on the 
ground. Upon learning that the Government of Ethiopia was considering 
tabling a resolution to prematurely end the mandate of ICHREE, the 
United States and like-minded partners immediately shared with 
Ethiopian officials that this would not be in their best interest, and 
that the Commission must be allowed to complete its mandate. We also 
conveyed our grave concerns over the institutional damage the precedent 
of early termination could cause to the Human Rights Council.

    Question. How do you expect the judicial systems of Ethiopia or 
Eritrea to hold those responsible for atrocity crimes accountable? 
Neither country has a track record of delivering justice through the 
courts.

    Answer. We are encouraged by the Government of Ethiopia's efforts 
to establish a credible, nationwide transitional justice process that 
meets international standards. We believe that our diplomatic 
engagement can help support Ethiopians who are committed to a 
meaningful accountability process. We also believe that durable 
accountability processes must be driven by Ethiopians--rather than 
outsiders--regardless of what the country's history with accountability 
may be. A credible Ethiopian-led process will make it more likely that 
Eritrea pursues its own accountability measures.

    Question. The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that, 
according to the U.S. Charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, the atrocities 
determination you announced will not present any barrier to the 
bilateral relations of Ethiopia and the United States. The MFA also 
indicated that the Charge conveyed that the U.S. was ready to support 
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission--Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Joint Investigation and Transitional Justice Policy. 
What are the legal and policy implications for assistance--including 
the provision of security assistance--given your determination related 
to the atrocities carried out by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces?

    Answer. An atrocity determination, which acknowledges that 
atrocities were committed, is independent of the legal requirement to 
determine whether there is an ongoing pattern of gross violations of 
human rights. Currently, we have assistance restrictions in place and 
will re-evaluate based on verifiable evidence. For diplomatic 
engagement with the Government of Ethiopia regarding the determination, 
the State Department provided carefully tailored messaging, which U.S. 
Embassy Addis Ababa meticulously followed.

    Question. Is the United States supporting the Ethiopian Human 
Rights Commission-Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Joint 
Investigation and Transitional Justice Policy? If so, in what way?

    Answer. A credible transitional justice process that meets 
international standards is important to securing lasting peace in 
Ethiopia. We are in regular contact with transitional justice 
stakeholders in Addis and are considering options to support human 
rights accountability within the current legal and policy constraints. 
This may or may not include direct support to the independent Ethiopian 
Human Rights Commission.

    Question. Mali/Sahel: The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
Program Act of 2022, which I led in the Senate, required the 
Administration to deliver a strategy specifically for Mali to Congress, 
but that strategy was never produced. Instead, the Committee received a 
copy of the Integrated Country Strategy, a publicly available document 
which was developed before the law was even passed. Considering the 
French military withdrawal, and the partnership between the Malian 
junta and Wagner--which has committed egregious human rights abuses 
while failing to improve the security situation--it might have been 
useful to have a strategy on hand. I understand that there is now an 
effort underway to develop a strategy for Mali. When can we expect to 
see it? Do I have your commitment that going forward, State Department 
will comply with Congressionally mandated requirements?

    Answer. We continue to refine our thinking on the dynamic problems 
in Mali. A strategic review of policy options is underway in the 
context of the Administration's Sahel Strategy as well as deliberations 
for the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA. Mali 
is also central to our efforts to curb Wagner's expansion in Africa. We 
will provide an updated Mali strategy as soon as it is completed, and 
in the meantime will endeavor to explain new provisions that are being 
considered. We also will provide a general overview of our strategy for 
the MINUSMA mandate renewal negotiations once finalized.

    Question. A September 2020 Inspector General's report identified 
$200 million in potentially wasteful spending on Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership programs due to mismanagement and 
inadequate oversight from staff in the Africa Bureau caused, in part, 
by staffing shortages. The report found that the State Department has 
not appropriately prioritized the Africa Bureau's needs. This neglect 
appears to extend to overseas postings, where our embassies in Niger 
and the Central African Republic, among others, have lacked key staff 
for extended periods of time. As of July 2022, more than 20 percent of 
approved State Department positions in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Mauritania were vacant. Our embassy in Niger had as high as a 40 
percent vacancy rate and lacked both a political and economic officer 
for months on end. Have the vacancies that were identified been filled?

    Answer. A top priority at the Bureau of African Affairs is to 
ensure that vacancies at all posts are filled with competent and 
experienced officers as quickly as possible. The Department is actively 
filling vacant positions in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Mauritania throughout the summer transfer season, further reducing the 
vacancy rates.

    Question. How will the budget proposal help with persistent 
staffing gaps in the Sahel?

    Answer. Staffing gaps at Sahel posts have been substantially 
reduced in the past year. The Department will continue its efforts to 
further reduce these gaps through targeted recruitment and existing 
incentives.

    Question. What steps should the State Department take to better 
incentivize assignments to challenging posts in Africa?

    Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS) 
posts are in Africa. The Department continues to use increased 
incentives for service in HDS posts around the world, including service 
needs differential for extended service, along with hardship 
differentials, and prioritized assignments. Additionally, several 
initiatives are underway, including development of regional support 
models. In the last year, the Department also has reformed incentives 
to better focus bidders' attention on the most difficult to staff 
posts.

    Question. What additional steps do you plan to take this fiscal 
year to ensure that the Africa Bureau has adequate resources and staff, 
including a properly skilled, trained, and incentivized workforce 
equipped to meet the Bureau's needs and objectives?

    Answer. As part of its effort to address the staffing challenges in 
Africa, the Bureau for African Affairs (AF) routinely works with the 
Bureau of Global Talent Management to fill its entry-level positions. 
In addition, the FY 2024 request includes $37 million for AF in 
operating and Public Diplomacy (PD) resources, including 15 new 
positions, to increase capacity for regional competition with the PRC 
and help manage complex embassies. In addition, in the last year, the 
Department has reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders' 
attention on the most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore 
creative solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these 
difficult locations.

    Question. Democratic Republic of Congo: Mr. Secretary, I am 
concerned about escalating tensions in eastern Congo. On February 6, 
Human Rights Watch reported that, ``Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in North 
Kivu are leaving behind a growing trail of war crimes against 
civilians.'' The very next day, the UN Joint Human Rights Office in 
DRC, reported that M23 executed 171 Congolese civilians in two villages 
in eastern DRC during just 1 week in November. How are you engaging to 
deescalate and discourage Rwandans from fighting alongside M23 rebels?

    Answer. The Department of State is similarly alarmed about 
escalating tensions in eastern DRC and has been engaging at high levels 
on this issue. Secretary Blinken, Deputy Secretary Sherman, and 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Phee have made it clear to 
President Kagame and Foreign Minister Biruta that Rwandan support to 
the UN-sanctioned M23 rebel group must stop and Rwanda must withdraw 
its troops from DRC. We will maintain high-level diplomatic 
engagement--with a focus on regional mediation efforts--and consider 
every tool available to end the conflict in eastern DRC.

    Question. Do you believe Rwanda is implicated in the atrocities 
Human Rights Watch and the UN allege the M23 committed?

    Answer. The Department of State finds the evidence presented by the 
UN Group of Experts about Rwanda's support for M23 and the human rights 
abuses by M23 to be credible. The United States continues to engage 
with Rwanda to cease its support for M23. We remain deeply concerned by 
the reports of abuses and violations of human rights and violations of 
international humanitarian law against the people living in eastern 
DRC.

    Question. Will you or another member of your senior team travel to 
the region as soon as possible along with counterparts from France and 
the European Union on a mission to ease tensions?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken traveled to Rwanda and DRC in August 
2022, where he met with Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi. He continues 
to engage them, their foreign ministers, and other regional leaders on 
a regular basis. Ambassador Robert Wood, the United States' Alternate 
Representative to the UN for Special Political Affairs, accompanied the 
UN Security Council high-level visit to DRC in March. Assistant 
Secretary Phee also met with President Kagame and other leaders in 
Addis Ababa in February. The Department of State will maintain high-
level engagement to resolve the conflict.

    Question. What is the status of the review of our Rwanda policy 
requested by SFRC staff?

    Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs continues to review U.S. 
policy towards Rwanda and would be glad to brief your office when the 
review is complete.

    Question. South Sudan: Concerns about mismanagement at Embassy Juba 
prompted visits by the Inspectors General for both State and USAID late 
last year. The Director General of the Foreign Service also visited. 
What prompted these visits?

    Answer. A regular OIG inspection of Embassy Juba was overdue and 
was scheduled as part of the Inspector General's inspection cycle. It 
focused on State-only personnel and operations. The director general 
visited Post at the Ambassador's and the Bureau for African Affairs' 
request during a multi-country visit to the African continent.

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    Question. Do you commit to addressing any personnel and/or 
management concerns at Embassy Juba as soon as possible?

    Answer. Yes. Embassy leadership has consistently made clear that it 
prioritizes putting people first, including by addressing any issues 
that could impact U.S. and Locally Employed staff wellbeing and morale, 
and actively promoting mission-wide collaboration and inclusion.

    Question. IMET: I was pleased to see the Administration request $1 
million in International Military and Education Training (IMET) for 
Greece, but this is only 56 percent of what Congress authorized as part 
of my bipartisan U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act. And 
while I was also pleased by the request for $500,000 in IMET for 
Cyprus, I think that could be boosted as well. However, now that the 
State Department has certified that Cyprus has met the necessary 
conditions for lifting defense trade restrictions for FY 2023, in 
accordance with my bipartisan Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy 
Partnership Act, what needs to happen for the Administration to request 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriations for Cyprus to help 
defend itself amid Turkey's ongoing occupation?

    Answer. We work to ensure IMET meets our partners' needs within the 
bounds of our budgetary priorities and the partners' capacity to absorb 
funding. Cyprus cannot receive FMF until they are eligible for Foreign 
Military Sales, which would require a Presidential Determination under 
the Arms Export Control Act. Our security relationship with Cyprus has 
improved gradually since 2018. We could consider this Determination in 
the future. Cyprus can presently purchase Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 
commodities, which are appropriate for Cyprus' current defense needs 
and its budget.

    Question. The governments of Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, and eSwatini are 
all reportedly responsible for or complicit recent violations and 
abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian 
law. In Chad, for instance, the Chadian military junta is responsible 
for the massacre of more than 100 pro-democracy protesters in October 
2022 and the arbitrary arrest and disappearance of hundreds more. The 
Rwandan military is once again supporting and fighting alongside UN-
sanctioned M23 rebels in eastern DRC. The eSwatini Government massacred 
dozens of pro-democracy protesters in 2021 and assassinated one of the 
country's most prominent human rights activists in January 2023. 
Ugandan security forces, meanwhile, continue to use torture and forced 
disappearance with impunity to target opposition activists and those 
critical of the Museveni government. The FY 2024 budget request 
allocates $800,000 in International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) to Chad, $200,000 in IMET to Eswatini, $550,000 in IMET to 
Rwanda, and $700,000 in IMET to Uganda. Do you agree that there is 
credible evidence implicating the Chadian military junta in the deaths 
and torture of civilian protesters in October 2022 and the Rwandan 
military in violations and abuses committed by M23 in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo?

    Answer. The United States is concerned by the violence against 
civilian protesters in Chad and human rights abuses by armed groups in 
the DRC. We continue to press for full investigation of these 
incidents, including through an international inquiry into October 20 
violence in Chad, leading to accountability for those responsible. We 
urge Eswatini officials to address human rights issues and closely 
monitor the ongoing investigation into the January 2023 murder of 
Thulani Maseko, pressing for full accountability for those responsible. 
The United States has repeatedly publicly and privately called on 
Rwanda and all actors in the region to cease support to M23 or other 
armed groups. In addition, the United States has not obligated any 
security assistance programming for the Rwandan military, including 
IMET, since summer 2022.

    Question. What do we hope to accomplish with such assistance given 
the long track record of abuses and impunity?

    Answer. IMET funds enable professional military education and 
building relationships with future military leaders that have a better 
appreciation for human rights, and civilian control of the military. 
More professional security forces that are respectful of human rights 
is important to strengthening democracy and governance in Africa. 
Continued engagement with our security partners is critical to regional 
security, and for sustaining democratic gains in the region. More 
professional military leaders with significant influence from the 
United States also allow for an ongoing dialogue and frank 
conversations about shared goals and objectives at high levels of 
government that are otherwise closed to international engagement and 
cooperation.

    Question. How are we assessing impact of our assistance?

    Answer. State has funded a monitoring and evaluation team to assess 
the impact of the IMET program. One objective of the IMET program is to 
enhance our bilateral military-to-military relationships resulting from 
the one-to-one relationships and experience forged during various U.S. 
Government-funded military courses in the United States. Through the 
accession of IMET alumni to senior-level leadership positions, the U.S. 
Government may find increasing number of individuals with experience 
and knowledge of U.S. military doctrine and technical skills in the 
host nation government. Therefore, building these key relationships 
assists in maintaining U.S. Government access and influence.

    Question. Migration/Refugee Challenges in the Americas: I know that 
the Administration developed a Root Causes Strategy and signed the Los 
Angeles Declaration on Migration with partner countries to address the 
migration and refugee challenges in the Americas. I have been closely 
following these efforts. While we may have differences in our 
approaches, the fundamental problem here seems to be that the 
Administration is frankly not dedicating enough resources to implement 
these efforts. We have dedicated more resources to manage the Syrian 
and Ukraine migration and refugee crises, than we have in our own 
hemisphere to address the migration and refugee crises with the most 
immediate impact on our country. Secretary Blinken, can you help me 
understand this discrepancy?

    Answer. The Administration has continually sought to increase the 
level of funding to address migration and refugee challenges in the 
Americas and support the successful implementation of the Root Causes 
Strategy, the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, and the Los 
Angeles Declaration. From FY 2020-2022, U.S. humanitarian assistance in 
the Americas increased from more than $911 million to nearly $1.15 
billion; moreover, USG commitment to address root causes has led to an 
increase in funding from nearly $92 million in FY 2021 to nearly $274 
million in the FY 2024 President's request (283 percent).

    Question. Do you believe the Administration's current budget is 
sufficient to address the migration and refugee challenges in the 
Americas.

    Answer. Funding constraints for migration and refugee needs remain 
a challenge globally, however, our current budget request prioritizes 
addressing these needs and supports the 2022 Los Angeles Declaration on 
Migration and Protection. The Administration has committed to long-
term, multifaceted solutions that address the root causes of migration 
and encourage collaborative migration management throughout the 
hemisphere. Progress requires sustained political commitment and 
cooperation across a range of stakeholders, combined with private 
sector and foreign assistance investments.

    Question. Mexico: Secretary Blinken, the United States relationship 
with Mexico has more impact on the daily lives of our fellow citizens 
than nearly any other in the world. For this reason, in the last 
several years, I have been raising the alarm on how President Lopez 
Obrador's actions are making the U.S.-Mexico partnership increasingly 
difficult. From his repeated efforts to undermine democracy, including 
by gutting Mexico's independent electoral authority, to his 
unwillingness to confront cartels and acknowledge his country's role in 
producing the illicit fentanyl poisoning our citizens, President Lopez 
Obrador is setting the clock back on U.S.-Mexico relations. How have 
you personally engaged on issues of democracy and combatting gangs and 
fentanyl trafficking with the Lopez Obrador government?

    Answer. I share your commitment to democratic principles, human 
rights, and rule of law--free of political influence--in Mexico. I 
raise these issues regularly with officials at the most senior levels 
of Mexico's government in both public and private conversations. The 
Department supports a well-resourced, independent judiciary and 
electoral institution. U.S. foreign assistance strengthens democratic 
institutions, civil society, and the rule of law, and combats the 
production and trafficking of fentanyl.

    Question. How is the Administration dedicating resources to address 
bipartisan concerns on these issues?

    Answer. Addressing the production and trafficking of fentanyl is a 
top priority. The State Department has sponsored U.S.-Mexico forensic 
exchanges on synthetic drug synthesis, held fentanyl awareness 
trainings for Mexican law enforcement, and donated detection canines 
and protective equipment to facilitate fentanyl interdiction. The 
Department also promotes inclusive approaches to open government 
principles for more transparent, participatory, and accountable 
governance through policy and programming.

    Question. The Administration takes the position that India is and 
will continue to be an important strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific 
and a key member of the Quad, and yet we have seen a number of 
concerning trends emerging in Indian democracy, as well as abroad--not 
least is their willingness to continue to purchase Russian oil and 
arms. With that in mind, what steps is the Administration taking to 
support democracy and human rights in India?

    Answer. I regularly engage with Indian Government officials on 
human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and encourage 
India to uphold its human rights commitments. Through the U.S.-India 
Global Issues Forum and the Human Rights Report we communicate our 
concerns about censorship, internet freedom, the detention of human 
rights activists, and other human rights issues. The Administration 
also meets with civil society representatives both in the United States 
and India to hear their perspectives regarding human rights conditions 
on the ground.

    Question. Lebanon: In December, Senator Risch and I wrote a letter 
to Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen and yourself, calling for the 
use of sanctions against Lebanon's financial and political elite for 
obstructing the election of a president and implementation of needed 
financial reforms. Since then, gridlock and suffering in Lebanon has 
only gotten worse. Why has the Administration yet to announce any 
additional sanctions against corrupt officials in Lebanon?

    Answer. I share your concerns about endemic corruption in Lebanon, 
officials' reluctance to implement reforms, and stalled presidential 
elections. We continue to press Lebanese officials at all levels on 
these priorities. In addition to diplomatic engagement, sanctions can 
be a useful tool to encourage progress and a warning to those 
undermining the rule of law. Our previous designations clearly 
demonstrate our commitment to combatting corruption, and we continue to 
work with the Department of the Treasury to identify impactful targets.

    Question. Does the Administration require new authorities in order 
to sanction such individuals?

    Answer. We are committed to combatting corruption and encouraging 
reform. I am confident that our existing tools, including sanctions 
authorities such as Executive Order 13441, are sufficient to promote 
accountability for corrupt Lebanese officials who contributed to 
undermining the rule of law and democratic institutions and processes 
in Lebanon. To this end, I continue to work closely with my colleagues 
at the Department of the Treasury to use all available tools, as 
demonstrated by several previous designations.

    Question. Syria: I was heartened to see the Administration's recent 
designation of individuals under authorities pursuant to the Caesar 
Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019. Unfortunately, there is no 
shortage of candidates for Caesar sanctions. When can we expect further 
designations pursuant to Caesar authorities?

    Answer. The Administration is fully committed to upholding its 
legal obligations under the Caesar Act and appreciates having this 
important tool at our disposal to enforce accountability on the Syrian 
regime. Over the past year, the Department of State worked closely with 
the Department of the Treasury and other interagency partners to 
identify suitable targets, and gather sufficient evidence, that met the 
legal requirements for designations under the Caesar Act and other 
sanctions authorities. The Department will continue to work actively 
with Treasury to identify targets for potential future sanctions, 
including under the Caesar Act.

    Question. The Administration is required under the 2023 NDAA to 
provide a report and strategy on its response to Captagon trafficking. 
Will you commit to providing that report before its due date?

    Answer. The Department is actively working with interagency 
colleagues to draft an interagency strategy on disrupting and 
dismantling the captagon trade, as required under the 2023 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We look forward to submitting the 
final report by the 180-day deadline specified in the NDAA.

    Question. The State Department has rightfully worked to seek 
accountability for Russian war crimes in Ukraine. It is less clear what 
the United States is doing to hold the Assad regime accountable for the 
crimes it has perpetrated against its own people. Specifically, what is 
the State Department, along with other U.S. Government agencies and in 
conjunction with other nations, international organizations, and NGOs, 
doing to advance justice and accountability in Syria?

    Answer. Our commitment to hold the Assad regime to account for its 
atrocities in Syria is unwavering. The Department supports UN 
accountability mechanisms, including the International, Impartial, and 
Independent Mechanism and the Commission of Inquiry; leads efforts in 
the UN to hold the regime to account, including in the UNGA Third 
Committee and at the UN Human Rights Council; and publicly designated 
regime officials involved in human rights violations under section 
7031(c) of the Department of State and Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act.

    Question. Iraq: I have welcomed the Administration's announcement 
of the end of combat operations in Iraq and its commitment to 
transitioning the U.S.-Iraq relationship to one led by traditional 
bilateral diplomacy. However, I am very concerned that the 
Administration's request of $75 million in FMF for Iraq is too low to 
address the threats facing Iraq, even within the context of our 
evolving relationship. Please explain the process by which the 
Administration came to this amount, especially following reductions in 
previous year's requests.

    Answer. The Administration's FY 2024 request reflects the 
Department's careful assessment of all available prior-year FMF funding 
for Iraq. This amount includes $250 million per year directed by 
Congress over multiple years and appropriated above request levels. 
When prior year funds are coupled with the FY 2024 request of $75 
million, we believe there will be sufficient FMF to address the threats 
facing Iraq and support ongoing maintenance, sustainment, training, and 
equipment needs for current and planned programs supporting the Iraqi 
Security Forces.

    Question. Please also provide a detailed assessment of what these 
cuts mean for the Administration's ability to continue to build out the 
strategic foundation of the U.S.-Iraq relationship.

    Answer. We do not anticipate an impact on the strategic foundation 
of the U.S.-Iraq relationship due to the FY 2024 request of $75 million 
in Foreign Military Financing. Our partnership with Iraq stretches far 
beyond our security assistance and is underpinned by a shared 
commitment to the full range of bilateral issues enumerated in the 
Strategic Framework Agreement.

    Question. Can you outline the mutual military support we are seeing 
between Iran and Russia as a result of Iran's provision of lethal UAVs 
for Russia's use against Ukraine?

    Answer. Iran has become Russia's top military backer. Since August, 
Iran has transferred several hundred UAVs to Russia. In November, Iran 
shipped artillery and tank rounds to Russia for use in Ukraine. In 
return, Russia has been offering Iran unprecedented defense 
cooperation, including on missiles, electronics, and air defense.
    We continue to counter, expose, and disrupt these activities, 
including through sanctions designations and export controls, and we 
are prepared to do more.

    Question. What further support can we expect both countries to 
provide in the coming weeks and months?

    Answer. Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle shipments are likely to 
continue, and in turn is seeking to purchase military equipment from 
Russia, including Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, and 
YAK-130 combat trainer aircraft. This partnership poses a threat not 
just to Ukraine, but to Iran's neighbors in the region as well. We have 
shared this information with partners in the Middle East and around the 
world, and we will continue to use the tools at our disposal to expose 
and disrupt these activities.

    Question. What more could the United States, working with our 
allies, do to combat Iran's arming of Russia and the Russian support of 
Iran's advanced capabilities in areas like cyber and elsewhere?

    Answer. The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and State have 
imposed sanctions on 41 entities or individuals involved in Iran's 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry since 2021, and we will continue 
to pursue sanctions and export controls to counter Iranian UAV 
transfers to Russia. Existing sanctions have deterred or disrupted many 
billions of dollars' worth of Russian arms sales and we continue to 
monitor for other potentially sanctionable activities.

    Question. How is the Administration ensuring that the Human Rights 
Council-created Fact Finding Mission on Iran is receiving adequate 
support to carry out its ongoing investigation into violations of the 
human rights of protesters?

    Answer. We are closely following the work of the independent fact-
finding mission created by the Human Rights Council. The fact-finding 
mission was fully funded from the UN budget and is building its staff. 
We have met with the commissioners responsible for the fact-finding 
mission to ensure they have adequate support. We believe the Human 
Rights Council is an appropriate venue to discuss the regime's conduct 
and amplify the voices of the Iranian people, and we look forward to 
joining our partners in that effort.

    Question. Despite intermittent U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil 
exports, the regime is exporting more oil today than at any time since 
2018 when the sanctions were reimposed. Why hasn't the State Department 
worked with interagency partners to seize and consign illicit Iranian 
oil shipments?

    Answer. We have continued to enforce our sanctions against Iran, 
including targeting of PRC-based entities engaged in sanctions evasion. 
For example, on March 9 we designated a ``shadow banking'' network of 
39 entities across multiple jurisdictions, including the PRC, for 
facilitating transactions and shipment of Iranian petrochemicals and 
petroleum products worth tens of billions of dollars annually for the 
Iranian regime.

    Question. What is your strategy to change China's calculus on 
importing Iranian oil?

    Answer. We regularly engage with the PRC and strongly discourage 
them from taking steps vis-a-vis Iran that contravene U.S. sanctions. 
We also remain concerned about Iran's sanctions evasion activity, 
including activity involving the PRC, and will not hesitate to take 
actions against sanctions evaders. For example, on March 9 we 
designated a ``shadow banking'' network of 39 entities, including PRC-
backed entities, for facilitating transactions and shipment of Iranian 
petrochemicals and petroleum.

    Question. Is the Administration considering Global Magnitsky 
sanctions against senior Iranian leadership?

    Answer. To mark International Human Rights Day on December 9, 2022, 
the Administration used the Global Magnitsky authority for the first 
time against Iranian individuals involved in serious human rights 
abuses in connection with violent protests following the death of Mahsa 
Amini while in custody. We will continue to find ways, including 
sanctions, to impose costs on Iranian individuals and entities who 
brutally repress the Iranian people.

    Question. What additional non-sanction steps is the State 
Department taking to support those in Iran seeking their basic human 
rights and freedoms? Please provide a detailed explanation of our 
current programmatic efforts to target broadcasting to Iranians.

    Answer. The State Department continues to partner with outside 
organizations to support civil society and human rights defenders in 
Iran and to promote the free flow of information to the Iranian people. 
In the United Nations and other multilateral fora, we and partners are 
holding Iran accountable for its human rights abuses. We issued General 
License D-2, expanding internet-based services for Iranians. We 
continue to support efforts to deliver information to the Iranian 
people through the U.S. Agency for Global Media's Persian language 
television, radio, and social media channels.

    Question. Israel: The United States regularly expresses opposition 
to resolutions and mechanisms reflecting anti-Israel bias at the UN. 
Please share what the State Department and our missions to the UN in 
New York and Geneva are doing to bring about the end of the one-sided 
and harmful Commission of Inquiry on Israel, which has an open-ended 
mandate, and the Human Rights Council's biased agenda item 7.

    Answer. We continue building a coalition of partners to end this 
open-ended and vaguely defined Commission of Inquiry (COI). During the 
March session of the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Taylor delivered 
a statement outlining U.S. objections to the COI. During the June 2022 
session, the United States also led a joint statement signed by a 
cross-regional group of over 20 countries condemning the COI's mandate. 
We continue to raise our concerns about bias against Israel in the UN 
system with the president of the UN Human Rights Committee and high 
commissioner, as well as the secretary-general's point person to combat 
antisemitism in the UN system, High Representative for the UN Alliance 
of Civilizations Miguel Moratinos.

    Question. Jordan: I am supportive of the Administration's new 
assistance MOU with Jordan and the conditionality included in it to 
incentivize important reforms to the country's water and civil service 
sectors. Will the Administration still have the leverage needed to push 
these reforms if Congress appropriates more than what is requested?

    Answer. We are committed to working with Jordan to support its 
reform agenda, including in the water and public sectors, a commitment 
enshrined in the memorandum of understanding for strategic partnership. 
These mutually established reforms are critical for Jordan's economic 
and political stability and we hope and expect that Jordan will carry 
them out. While we are evaluating options to incentivize these reforms 
in light of the higher appropriation level, I request Congress provide 
us with the additional flexibilities requested in the President's FY 
2024 budget so that we can fully implement the memorandum of 
understanding.

    Question. Abraham Accords/Negev Forum: How can the State Department 
promote U.S. private sector engagement and the role of civil society 
within the Negev Forum?

    Answer. We are focused on expanding and deepening the Abraham 
Accords and normalization agreements. These efforts include exploring 
potential partnerships between the Negev Forum Working Groups and the 
private sector to develop and implement projects, as well as consulting 
with a range of non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society 
organizations. We look forward to continuing to work with our Negev 
Forum partners to build on these efforts.

    Question. What programs or mechanisms within the State Department 
are most effective for fostering and advancing Israeli-Arab engagement 
and greater regional cooperation across the Middle East and North 
Africa?

    Answer. We are using all our available tools to build the 
connections between regional partners that are essential to the 
region's prosperity, peace, security, and stability. State and U.S. 
Agency and International Development exchange programs, including the 
Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act, bolster critical 
people-to-people breakthroughs. New formats for engagement include the 
Negev Forum and I2U2 (Israel, India, United States, UAE), which brings 
together India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States to collaborate 
on shared challenges, from clean energy to food security, and to 
solidify connections with the private sectors.

    Question. Are there existing governmental tools that could be 
better utilized?

    Answer. We are continuously exploring opportunities to leverage new 
and existing programs to advance Arab-Israeli relations and regional 
cooperation. The Department consults with the interagency, including 
the Department of Defense, Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Trade 
and Development Agency, U.S. Agency for International Development, and 
others, to help identify and develop these opportunities.

    Question. MENA Opportunity Fund: The budget proposal includes $90 
million for a new Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund and 
lists a variety of countries and priorities in how the funds may be 
deployed, including Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as to support 
regional integration efforts. The amount of money allocated for this 
fund is comparatively small, while the scale of the policy challenges 
listed are quite significant. At the same time, I'd note the budget 
request includes modest cuts to other programming across the region. 
Since this is a new fund, I'm interested to hear exactly what the 
Administration intends to do with this fund, how it will prioritize its 
use, and how it differs from our ongoing bilateral economic support 
programs? I also want to better understand how the Administration 
intends to consult Congress in a meaningful way on its intended use and 
programming of the new fund.

    Answer. The fund would be a rapid mechanism to address unforeseen 
opportunities or challenges; it is not intended to fill bilateral 
programmatic gaps but rather enable us to better address emerging, 
concrete changes or opportunities through expeditious interventions 
covering specific geopolitical, economic, and environmental areas. 
Funds will be scrutinized to ensure they address gaps unmet with other 
bilateral, regional, or global resources and directly support explicit 
foreign policy goals; funds will be subject to standard congressional 
notification processes.

    Question. Central Asia: Central Asian nations continue to have an 
abysmal human rights record and constrained by their geography next to 
China and Russia, they generally do not vote with us in the UN. 
However, last year, several of Central Asia's leaders exhibited modest, 
yet remarkable exercises of sovereignty. For example, both Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan both made statements refusing to recognize Russia's 
annexation of parts of Ukraine. While this Administration seeks 
increased partnership and cooperation with Central Asian governments, 
how you will also advance progress on human rights and political reform 
in the region?

    Answer. As we strengthen our partnerships with Central Asian 
countries, we increase space to discuss human rights and other 
sensitive issues. We have engaged Central Asian leaders with 
unprecedented frequency over the past year and raise human rights 
concerns and political reforms in every interaction. We regularly 
champion press freedom in all five countries, and our foreign 
assistance supports civil society and media organizations across the 
region. As a result of this long-standing advocacy, we have seen 
incremental, encouraging, and important progress, including the 
International Labor Organization's finding in 2022 that Uzbekistan's 
cotton industry is free of systemic forced labor and child labor.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. GLOBAL HEALTH AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE--Global Health 
Security: A key lesson from the largest, most successful U.S. global 
health program in history--the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR)--is the need to ensure greater coordination of effort, 
transparency, and accountability among the agencies implementing 
programs on the ground. A high-level, impartial coordinator at the 
Department, which is not an implementer, can achieve these goals far 
more effectively than the implementing agencies themselves. Notably, 
the budget does not request program funds for the Coordinator for 
Global Health Security and Diplomacy, who will be housed in the 
Department's proposed Bureau for Global Health Security. With no new 
program funds for pandemic preparedness in the bureau, what is its 
purpose?

    Answer. The new Bureau for Global Health Security will be led by an 
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Health Security and Diplomacy, who will 
be dual-hatted as the Global AIDS Coordinator. The bureau will bring 
together existing health functions from across the Department, 
strengthening the U.S. ability to advance global health priorities 
through diplomacy and allowing for increased internal and interagency 
coordination. The new Bureau would continue to use foreign assistance 
resources under PEPFAR to advance the HIV/AIDS mission and manage other 
existing programming that addresses other infectious diseases and 
broader global health security issues. The bureau will build on the 
strengths of the Department in leading in foreign policy and diplomacy, 
which extends beyond foreign assistance.

    Question. What will the Coordinator, and the bureau that he runs, 
be coordinating?

    Answer. The Global AIDS Coordinator and Ambassador-at-Large for 
Global Health Security and Diplomacy would continue to oversee the work 
of PEPFAR programs implemented by interagency partners including USAID, 
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, and the 
Peace Corps through annual country operational plans, interagency 
workplans, and quarterly reports submitted by operational units, as 
well as perform the functions outlined under section 5562 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, subject to 
Senate advice and consent.

    Question. Moreover, with no program funds to coordinate, how will 
the Coordinator for Global Health security and Diplomacy be empowered 
to ensure greater coordination of effort, transparency, and 
accountability among the implementing agencies, i.e., USAID and CDC, 
who all too often conflict with one another?

    Answer. The Ambassador-at-Large for Global Health Security and 
Diplomacy would serve as a strong voice in U.S. interagency discussions 
and multilateral fora, representing the State Department and supported 
by staff with vast global health security expertise, to guide the 
Department's programming in accordance with U.S. and global health 
security interests. They would work closely with U.S. chiefs of 
missions on implementation of the Department's foreign assistance 
programming related to global health security.

    Question. While requesting no program funds for the Coordinator for 
Global Health Security and Diplomacy to coordinate, the Administration 
has decided to ``dual-hat'' Ambassador Nkengasong, such that he serves 
concurrently as the Coordinator for Global Health Security and 
Diplomacy and PEPFAR. How will you ensure the PEPFAR resources managed 
by Ambassador Nkengasong and the bureau are not diverted for other 
purposes, thereby undermining one of the most effective U.S. foreign 
assistance programs in history?

    Answer. PEPFAR will continue to focus only on work to bring the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic to an end. I am committed to this mandate and will 
ensure PEPFAR's resources are utilized consistent with the authorities 
and appropriations for PEPFAR programs, so that the U.S. Government can 
sustain PEPFAR's impact and end HIV/AIDS by 2030.

    Question. Of the $1.245 billion requested for Global Health 
Security, $745 million is for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and $500 million is for the newly established Pandemic 
Fund, housed at the World Bank. The Global Health Security and Pandemic 
Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Act, enacted as part of the FY 
2022 National Defense Authorization Act, caps U.S. contributions to the 
Pandemic Fund at 33 percent. What is the status of other donor 
contributions to the Pandemic Fund?

    Answer. The recently enacted legislation regarding the Pandemic 
Fund provides a strong signal of U.S. commitment to global health 
security. The Pandemic Fund currently has nearly $600 million in 
available resources with $1.6 billion in total pledges from 26 donors. 
All donors must sign their contribution agreements by May, when the 
Board resets for a 2-year term. We are available to brief you or your 
team with more information at that point.

    Question. Is the $500 million U.S. contribution proposed in the 
budget request realistic or aspirational?

    Answer. Strong and early commitments from the United States are 
critical to catalyzing significant investments from partners, as 
evidenced by the initial U.S. pledge of $450 million to support the 
Pandemic Fund that helped spur a total of $1.6 billion in pledges from 
global donors within 1 year. While the Pandemic Fund needs additional 
and sustainable financing to be successful, we believe that the 
proposed $500 million contribution from the United States is realistic 
to meet identified demand while spurring additional commitments from 
others.

    Question. The newly established Coordinator for Global Health 
Security is meant to serve as the U.S. representative to the Pandemic 
Fund. How will the Coordinator ensure that the Fund focuses on 
prevention, preparedness, and building the capacity to respond, rather 
prioritizing response after an outbreak already has occurred?

    Answer. A focus on preparedness and prevention is a foundational 
principle of the Pandemic Fund and has been codified in several 
Governing Board-approved documents, including the Results Framework, 
Governance Framework, and Operations Manual. The new Ambassador-at-
Large position and the new Bureau will play a key role in driving 
attention and focus toward continued prioritization of this critical 
area of work.

    Question. I have introduced a resolution that would deny funds for 
the implementation of an international pandemics treaty, accord, or 
other instrument that would be legally binding upon the United States 
absent Senate advice and consent. Will you commit to sending any 
pandemics treaty, accord, or other instrument that would be legally 
binding upon the United States to the Senate for advice and consent?

    Answer. To protect the national security of the United States, the 
Biden administration has prioritized improving international global 
health security to prevent, detect, and respond to potential health 
emergencies at their source. The pandemic accord negotiation team has, 
and will continue to, consult with Congress regularly and transparently 
as the negotiations to develop a pandemic accord progress.

    Question. Food Aid: The budget request ``reflects the importance of 
in-kind agricultural commodities to humanitarian response, but also 
acknowledges the opportunity to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of U.S. food assistance programs through the reauthorization 
of the Food for Peace Act.'' What reforms are you seeking to make U.S. 
food aid more efficient and effective? Please be specific.

    Answer. To decrease barriers to entry for new and local 
organizations, while maintaining rigorous oversight of taxpayer 
dollars, USAID will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of food 
assistance by providing partners with more choice when designing non-
emergency programs. This will address the root causes of chronic hunger 
in vulnerable communities. USAID is also simplifying complex accounting 
requirements, consistent with standards for other USAID funding 
accounts, to reduce administrative burden on USAID and partner staff.

    Question. STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY--State 
Department Management: Please provide a full list of any State 
Department-owned or -leased facilities abroad--embassies and 
consulates--that were built by Chinese companies or owned Chinese 
citizens.

    Answer. All Department facilities meet all safety and security 
standards required by law and the Department's internal policies and 
regulations, which do not apply on the basis of the national origin or 
affiliation of the companies involved in the construction of them. 
While the Department's real property data collection does not include 
builder information, the Department's safety and security analyses for 
newly acquired facilities are carried out on an individualized basis 
for each such facility against the backdrop of the specific threat 
environment in which they exist.
    In China, the Department has leased the Consulate General in 
Shanghai since 1991 and acquired the Consulate General in Shenyang in 
1984, both of which are Chinese-built facilities. Chinese companies 
also built the unclassified facilities at the Consulate in Guangzhou 
and the new office annex on the Beijing Embassy Compound. Additionally, 
the Department leases consular facilities in Chinese-built commercial 
office buildings in Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan. Chinese companies 
built these commercial office buildings and U.S. companies carried out 
the lease fit-outs on behalf of the Department.

    Question. I have been surprised at the number of embassies and 
consulates that are closed on Friday afternoons (or the equivalent, 
depending on the country), even when congressional representatives are 
visiting posts. Do United States embassies and consulates overseas have 
standard business hours? If so, what are they? If not, please provide 
business hours for each embassy and consulate.

    Answer. In accordance with long-standing policy, operating hours of 
embassies and consulates conform with local laws, customs, and 
conditions. In locations where it is customary for businesses and 
public offices to close on Friday afternoon, business hours are 
adjusted on other days to ensure a 40-hour work week. Formal business 
hours do not limit posts' ability to provide necessary support for all 
official visits. Posts routinely arrange official events outside of 
business hours to advance U.S. Government priorities as needed.

    Question. Do State Department officers at posts abroad receive time 
off for U.S. federal holidays?

    Answer. Yes, State Department foreign and civil service employees 
assigned overseas are entitled to paid holiday time off on or close to 
designated federal holidays.

    Question. Do State Department officers at posts abroad receive time 
off for local holidays?

    Answer. Yes, State Department foreign and civil service employees 
assigned overseas are entitled to paid holiday time off on certain, 
designated local holidays.

    Question. How many days off, on average, does an officer abroad 
receive between federal and local holidays?

    Answer. State Department regulations set a total cap of 21 paid 
holidays overseas: 11 federal holidays and up to 10 local holidays.

    Question. The Office of the Inspector General found that during the 
pandemic, the Department encouraged maximum telework for both domestic 
and overseas staff. COVID-19 cases have drastically declined in the 
United States and around the world. The Biden administration declared 
its intent to end the national emergency and public health emergency 
declarations related to the COVID-19 pandemic on May 11, 2023. How can 
employees who regularly handle classified information consistently work 
from home?

    Answer. When employees handle classified information, they work on-
site. In extremely limited exceptional situations, employees may be 
granted a secure communication kit to enable access to classified 
information from approved alternate work locations. This capability 
assists with responding to emergencies and conducting urgent business 
around the clock.

    Question. When the public health emergency declaration is over, 
will you advocate for the full return to work for all State Department 
employees? Please explain in detail your justification.

    Answer. From the Department's inception, we have worked across the 
globe--at all hours and in dispersed locations. Throughout the pandemic 
we used a variety of work arrangements to assist U.S. citizens and 
address global emergencies. Since spring 2022, all overseas U.S. direct 
hires and most domestic employees have routinely worked on-site. We 
will continue innovating and leveraging technology to increase our 
operational efficiency and agility to achieve the Department's 
objectives in the face of 21st century challenges.

    Question. Consular Affairs: What is the ideal time for the State 
Department to process the average visa and what is the current average 
time?

    Answer. For a visitor visa, the global median interview appointment 
wait time is less than 2 months, half what it was in June 2022. 
Appointment wait times for all other visa categories, including for 
visitor visa renewals, are lower. We are focused on reducing wait times 
for first-time visitor visa applicants in historically high-demand 
areas, where pandemic-related closures resulted in pent-up demand and 
longer wait times. Wait times for students and temporary worker visas, 
are at or below pre-pandemic levels.

    Question. What accounts for this discrepancy?

    Answer. The long interview appointment wait times for first-time 
B1/B2 visitor visas in some countries are the result of pent-up visa 
demand outpacing consular staffing levels when pandemic-related travel 
restrictions ended. Nonimmigrant visa (NIV) interview wait times are 
coming down faster than projected due to policy changes, innovations, 
and staffing surge efforts in target locations. The Department is 
working to assign as many adjudicators as possible overseas, with the 
aim of reaching global pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year.

    Question. What steps is the State Department taking to speed up the 
visa approval process and are there viable alternatives to in-person 
interviews?

    Answer. The State Department is pursuing multiple strategies to 
streamline visa processing and dedicate more resources to reducing wait 
times consistent with national security. This includes surging staff 
overseas, working with DHS to pursue expanded interview waiver 
authorities for additional categories of low-risk visa applicants, and 
expanding the development and use of technological solutions to 
remotely adjudicate applications that do not require interviews. The 
Department will soon pilot domestic revalidation of certain petition-
based nonimmigrant visas.

    Question. Due to the wide variation in wait times for visa 
appointments, is the State Department focusing on consulates with 
longer than average wait times? If so, what is the Department doing to 
support consulates with a longer than average wait time?

    Answer. In FY 2022, the Department exceeded pre-pandemic levels of 
nonimmigrant visa (NIV) issuances in categories critical to economic 
and bilateral interests, including for seasonal workers, students, and 
crewmembers. In the first quarter of 2023, the Department surged 
resources to locations with high wait times for first-time B1/B2 
visitor visa applicants, such as India and Mexico. Consular officers in 
some locations are remotely adjudicating tens of thousands of interview 
waiver visas each week. Visa renewal wait times, crucial to the 
economy, are low.

    Question. Do you have the funding and other resources necessary to 
reduce wait times for appointments? If not, what do you need in order 
to reduce the backlog?

    Answer. Since early 2022, the Department reduced gaps in consular 
staffing overseas caused by the drop in fee revenue due to the 
pandemic's near-shutdown of international travel. With the resurgence 
of travel, the Bureau of Consular Affairs' financial situation has 
improved. The Department is striving to ensure that as many 
adjudicators as possible are assigned to overseas positions, to reach 
worldwide pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year. Maintaining 
expanded spending authorities and additional fee flexibilities would 
help allow for continued innovation and additional hiring.

    Question. When will the State Department return to pre-pandemic 
processing times?

    Answer. In many places, visa appointment wait times have returned 
to pre-pandemic averages. Except for first time B1/B2 visitors in 
certain countries, wait times for all other nonimmigrant visa (NIV) 
categories, including students and temporary workers, are at or below 
pre-pandemic levels. The Department updates NIV wait time information 
on its public website weekly. Wait times vary depending on the visa 
category, appointment availability, and demand. The Department issued 
18 percent more NIVs in the first 5 months of FY 2023 compared to the 
same period in FY 2019, pre-pandemic.

    Question. What is the ideal time for the State Department to 
process the average passport renewal and what is the current average 
time?

    Answer. Passport processing times vary throughout the year and are 
dependent upon workload, which traditionally increases in the lead-up 
to seasonal spring and summer travel. Processing times nearly matched 
pre-pandemic levels until application volumes reached unprecedented 
levels early this year. On March 24, processing times increased to 10-
13 weeks for routine service and 7-9 weeks for expedited service. Our 
goal is to ensure the average application is processed within the 
service commitments. Many receive their passports weeks earlier than 
advertised.

    Question. What steps is the State Department taking to speed up the 
passport approval process?

    Answer. We are making every effort to tackle unprecedented demand 
for passports. CA has instituted an ``all-hands-on-deck'' posture 
requiring passport headquarters staff and field managers to adjudicate, 
has authorized over 30,000 overtime hours a month, and recruited 
volunteers, including re-employed annuitants, to work in Washington, 
DC's satellite office. We have been aggressively recruiting since 
January 2022, and have successfully increased our adjudicative staff by 
more than 100, with another 170 candidates in the recruitment pipeline.

    Question. China/COVID: How many times did the Department approve a 
limited waiver of inviolability (LWOI) for personnel in China related 
to COVID?

    Answer. Starting June 2020, for each flight returning people to 
China, the Department approved a partial waiver of personal 
inviolability to allow specific U.S. diplomats and/or their family 
members to be tested for COVID upon their arrival in China and then 
again during a quarantine period. In May 2022, Embassy Beijing 
requested, and the Department approved, a partial waiver of personal 
inviolability and an exception to Department policy to allow mission 
personnel to submit to ``community'' testing to allow our personnel to 
move freely about the city where they were located.

    Question. Would you agree to waivers of diplomatic immunity for 
embassy personnel in an adversarial country like China?

    Answer. If faced with the same extraordinary situation like we had 
in China and other countries during the pandemic, I would again 
instruct all posts to push back against unreasonable or invasive 
restrictions applied to our diplomatic personnel and staff while 
considering limited waivers of immunity to permit testing and other, 
less intrusive, health measures. I would evaluate whether a waiver 
would be contrary to the U.S. Government's interests and whether it 
would pose a security problem for the mission, its personnel, or family 
members. I would also weigh this against the need to maintain 
diplomatic presence in country.

    Question. Do you commit to consult with Congress before taking any 
steps to approve any waiver of inviolability (LWOI) for personnel in an 
adversarial country?

    Answer. If presented with a similar decision on limited waivers of 
diplomatic immunity for embassy personnel during a pandemic or other 
global health crisis, I would weigh the merits of the decision while 
considering all aspects of the situation, including the impact on the 
U.S. national security interests and personnel in that country.

    Question. Does the Department commit not to nominate or re-nominate 
to a Senate- confirmed position any officials who were involved in 
developing or approving the policy to comply with the PRC's COVID 
protocols, including detention in fever clinics, invasive, non-
transparent testing procedures, and arbitrary movement restrictions and 
lockdowns, family separation, and the limited waivers of inviolability 
that allowed these practices to happen?

    Answer. The President makes decisions with respect to nominating or 
re-nominating officials to Senate-confirmed positions. The Department 
has a robust process for choosing Chiefs of Mission candidates to 
recommend to the President for nomination. I am committed to working 
with the rest of my team to ensure the Department continues to identify 
individuals with demonstrated relevant experience and a track record of 
successful leadership in challenging posts.

    Question. In briefings to SFRC staff and in formal front-channel 
communications, the Department confirmed that 30 Americans had been 
detained in Chinese fever clinics. Following press reports on the 
situation at Mission China, this number was revised to 16. What 
accounts for the change in the number of Americans the Department says 
were detained in Chinese fever clinics?

    Answer. Thirty personnel tested positive for COVID upon return to 
China. Of these 30, 16 spent some period in a facility of the kind 
characterized in press reports as ``fever hospitals.'' The 14 others 
were cleared in the confirmatory process or intermediate steps and did 
not proceed to such a facility.

    Question. During which period of time and under what definitions of 
``American,'' and ``detained,'' were these figures determined?

    Answer. ``American'' in this context refers to a U.S. Mission China 
U.S. direct hire employee or family member. ``Detained'' means that an 
American was housed in a facility under the protocol steps of the PRC 
health regulations for having tested positive for COVID. The period of 
time was the return of Mission China diplomatic staff and personnel to 
China after authorized departure in June 2020, until Ambassador Burns 
arrived in Beijing and assumed duties as chief of mission in March 
2022.

    Question. When the United States re-imposed COVID testing 
requirements for Chinese citizens traveling to the United States, did 
the PRC Embassy submit an LWOI or equivalent in order for its diplomats 
to comply when entering the United States?

    Answer. Under the U.S. testing requirements, travelers from China 
were required to test pre-departure in China and not upon arrival in 
the United States. The United States did not impose testing on PRC 
diplomats in the United States. Pre-flight testing of PRC diplomats in 
China does not implicate their immunity and therefore would not require 
a limited waiver of inviolability (LWOI).

    Question. Fifteen to 20 years to build an embassy is far too long 
and is one of the factors in the increasing cost of building posts 
abroad. Please explain why it takes so long to build an embassy and why 
it is so expensive.

    Answer. Building worldwide embassy compounds to U.S. design codes 
and security standards is a complex and stringently regulated 
undertaking. While implementation of the 2022 Secure Embassy 
Construction and Counterterrorism Act will improve efficiencies, the 
Department has identified that U.S. Government acquisition regulations; 
unique local host country zoning, permits, construction practices and 
labor laws; security risks; and evolving climate threats add to project 
cost and duration. Although some complex projects with difficult site 
acquisitions can take upward of 15 years, the average new embassy 
compound takes 6 to 8 years to complete from design to occupancy.

    Question. Are there authorities or other resources the Department 
needs to build new embassies and consulates more quickly?

    Answer. Recent legislative changes such as the Secure Embassy 
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 provide the Department 
increased flexibility for setback, co-location, site selection, and 
design and construction solutions that will allow us to deliver 
projects more quickly. Additional federal contracting and security 
compliance review options would further increase flexibilities by 
expanding the available contractor pool, increase competitive bidding, 
and allow for an optimal project delivery solution. Adjusting threshold 
mandates to accommodate for inflation will also streamline project 
delivery duration.

    Question. Do you believe that there are posts where U.S. diplomats 
struggle to get outside of embassy or consulate on a regular basis? If 
so, where?

    Answer. Our regional security offices and emergency action 
committees continually evaluate threat environments, risk tolerance, 
and available risk mitigation measures to facilitate diplomatic 
engagements outside embassies to the maximum extent possible. In 2021, 
94 percent of movements requested at our highest threat posts were 
approved. In 2022, 11,528 more moves were requested at our highest 
threat posts versus 2021, and 93 percent of those movements were 
approved.

    Question. Do Chinese, Russian, or Iranian diplomats have trouble 
accessing local populations in countries in which they operate?

    Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security does not monitor or track 
foreign diplomatic engagements domestically or abroad. However, foreign 
diplomats have traditionally been targeted less than U.S. Government 
personnel and, per open source reporting, Chinese and Russian diplomats 
may be engaging more frequently in certain high threat locations, but 
they pay a great cost for doing so. In the last 6 months, Russian 
diplomats in Kabul, for example, were killed in front of their embassy. 
A Chinese delegation was also present during an attack at the 
Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while visiting members of the 
Taliban in their offices.

    Question. How do you intend to improve the access of U.S. diplomats 
to local populations at our posts abroad, especially in high-threat 
posts where embassy rules make getting off the compound difficult or 
nearly impossible?

    Answer. The security and threat environment at a given post has a 
direct impact on a post's ability to safely facilitate engagements. Our 
regional security offices and emergency action committees continually 
evaluate threat environments, risk tolerance, and available risk 
mitigation measures to facilitate diplomatic engagements outside 
embassies to the maximum extent possible. In 2021, 94 percent of off-
compound movements requested at our highest threat posts were approved. 
In 2022, off-compound movement requests increased by 11,528 at our 
highest threat posts, and 93 percent of requests were approved.

    Question. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security frequently cites 
statistics on the number of travel requests abroad that regional 
security officers approve. Do those statistics include the number of 
requests that were never submitted to the RSO because there was no 
faith that the RSO would approve the request?

    Answer. Travel policies at a given post are the shared product of 
the Emergency Action Committee, with the ultimate approver of any 
travel request being the Chief of Mission, not the RSO. We have no 
statistics or information for requests not made, and we are proud of 
both the approval rate and increasing rate of engagement worldwide, 
particularly at our high threat/high risk posts.

    Question. Is that statistic useful if it doesn't include the 
potentially large number of requests that are never submitted due to 
lack of faith in approval?

    Answer. Both the 2021 and 2022 statistics convey the extensive 
efforts our security personnel undertake daily to safely facilitate 
diplomatic engagements worldwide, and the increasing rate at which we 
are undertaking such engagements. We have no statistics or information 
for requests not made, and we are proud of both the approval rate and 
increasing rate of engagement worldwide, particularly at our high 
threat/high risk posts.

    Question. Should the Department increase the number of Diplomatic 
Security officers to better staff priorities and avoid DS personnel 
burnout?

    Answer. The health and well-being of our security personnel is of 
utmost importance. I understand the sacrifices our diplomatic security 
personnel make to keep our people safe. The Department continues to 
look at solutions to alleviate the pressure of increased protective 
operations, ensure that personnel are compensated for the long hours 
worked, and expand our overseas missions to mitigate personnel burnout. 
If additional positions are required, the Department will work to 
identify those resources.

    Question. State Department Authorization: The Department has been 
late in providing requests or feedback to our committee on State 
Department authorization, making it difficult or at points impossible 
to include some Department asks. How can the State Department work in a 
more positive manner with our committee on State Department 
authorization bills?

    Answer. I am pleased the Department and Congress have reinvigorated 
the State authorization bill process, including through the Department 
submitting legislative proposals to committee staff and working the 
committees to address feedback and refine the proposals. I deeply 
appreciate that the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 
included many provisions that the Department requested. As we are 
moving into the next year of this process, it is my hope that our teams 
will work collectively to further streamline the process to allow for 
even more constructive discussions, direct redline edits where 
possible, and real-time engagement with a particular focus on including 
Department priorities.

    Question. Do you commit to providing all of the Department's 
authorization requests by April 14, 2023?

    Answer. I recognize and appreciate that working together to develop 
flexible authorization legislation for the Department is an important 
process premised on close and transparent communication. The Department 
has already submitted nearly 30 legislative proposals for Congress' 
consideration. I remain committed to working within the Department and 
with interagency partners to identify and propose to Congress in a 
timely manner authorities for Department operations that will help the 
Department advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and take care of our 
employees both domestically and aboard.

    Question. Medical Clearances: Though the Department provides 
medical clearances to officers prior to a permanent change station 
abroad, it does not evaluate officers for fitness for duty. I have 
heard from embassies that foreign service officers are being allowed to 
serve abroad, even while in hospice or under other terminal health 
situations. Should the Department be assigning personnel abroad who are 
terminally ill?

    Answer. Prior to each overseas assignment the Department issues 
medical clearances in a manner that is consistent with federal law and 
Department policy. Currently, the Department issues a class 1 clearance 
to those with no significant medical condition or a class 2 clearance 
for those persons for whom the degree of care required for their 
condition matches the care available at their assigned post. Employees 
with unstable medical conditions (including unstable terminal 
conditions) are issued a class 5 clearance and are limited to service 
within the United States.

    Question. What is the purpose of a medical clearance if it does not 
indicate whether someone is fit for service?

    Answer. The medical clearance process is designed to identify 
medical, mental health, and educational needs that may require 
specialty management, follow-up, or monitoring. The Department 
personnel dedicated to adjudicating medical clearances evaluate the 
health information identified to match the medical needs of personnel 
and family members with available resources at the post of assignment. 
At present, the Department will not ``clear'' an individual (or their 
family members) to go to a post that does not have adequate resources 
to meet their medical needs.

    Question. Does a Foreign Service Officer have a ``right'' to die 
abroad while working for the State Department?

    Answer. The Department works diligently to ensure our employees and 
their family members are assigned to posts where they can obtain the 
medical care needed to support the medical conditions with which they 
may be living. In the event an individual's condition deteriorates to 
the point where local resources cannot provide adequate care, the 
Department, consistent with 22 U.S.C. 4081, will evacuate the employee 
and/or their family either back to the United States or to a regional 
medical evacuation center where the care they need can be obtained.

    Question. Given the small number of posts who can handle class 2 
cases, does the Department risk overwhelming the capacity of those 
embassy medical units?

    Answer. The Department recognizes that healthcare is not the same 
industry today as it was when the class 2 designation was first 
defined.
    Breakthroughs in technology, pharmaceuticals, and service delivery, 
among other things, have created a world in which we see individuals 
with a class 2 clearance serving at nearly every post around the world. 
As a result, those with a class 2 clearance are placed at posts 
throughout the world, and the Department consistently monitors health 
unit capacity so that none are at risk for being overwhelmed.

    Question. What resources would be needed to require fitness for 
duty evaluations for all officers prior to permanently changing 
stations abroad?

    Answer. ``Fitness for duty'' is an evaluation that currently only 
applies to diplomatic security agents, and even then, is only applied 
when such fitness comes into question. Requiring fitness for duty 
evaluations for all foreign service officers would initially require 
the Department to establish fitness standards that would apply to every 
job series for which it hires, most of which are jobs with limited to 
no physical requirements. Based on those fitness standards, the 
Department would need to craft a program that includes individual 
assessments for each job series and then evaluate each employee's 
ability to meet the standards before entering on duty, much like 
onboarding diplomatic security special agents.

    Question. Foreign Service Worldwide Availability: The Department 
recently agreed to limit severely the definition of worldwide 
availability and has not been responsive to my requests for a briefing 
on the situation. What do the words ``worldwide availability'' mean to 
you?

    Answer. Under the revised minimum medical qualification standard 
for Department of State career foreign service generalists and 
specialists, except medical specialists, applicants will need to be 
medically cleared to serve at all designated regional medical 
evacuation centers (currently Bangkok, London, Pretoria, and 
Singapore). A separate revised minimum medical qualification standard 
has been agreed to for medical specialists. Assignments will not be 
limited to those four posts, and employees--including those with a 
disability--will be expected to bid competitively and serve at a wide 
variety of posts based upon the needs of the service.

    Question. Has the Department effectively eliminated ``worldwide 
availability'' by reducing it to just a handful of posts?

    Answer. The revised minimum medical qualification standard recently 
adopted by the Department will be used only to determine whether an 
applicant is medically qualified for hire and will not be used to 
define or limit the universe of posts at which the applicant can serve. 
Employees, including those with a disability, will be expected to serve 
at a wide variety of posts. Adoption of the revised minimum medical 
qualification standard is an important step forward in the Department's 
efforts to create a workforce that reflects the full diversity of the 
American people and ensure we have the best team representing the 
United States abroad.

    Question. I frequently hear from the Department and its personnel 
that the Foreign Service is akin to the U.S. armed forces. Does the 
change in definition of ``worldwide'' availability diminish the 
similarities between the Foreign Service and our armed forces? If yes, 
does that demand a reevaluation of employee benefits for the Foreign 
Service?

    Answer. The revised minimum medical qualification standard recently 
adopted by the Department will be used only to determine whether an 
applicant is medically qualified for hire and will not be used to 
define or limit the universe of posts at which the applicant can serve. 
Career foreign service candidates will still be expected to serve at a 
wide variety of posts around the world, and the revised minimum medical 
qualification standard is expected to enable the Department to meet its 
foreign policy and national security mission at posts throughout the 
globe.

    Question. HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS--International Organizations: The budget request includes 
$344 million to pay a portion of the UN peacekeeping ``arrears'' that 
have accrued over the last several years. These arrears are a result of 
a disagreement between the UN and the United States on the ``scales of 
assessment''--a formula used by the UN to determine the amount member 
states are expected to contribute for the general and peacekeeping 
budgets. Per U.S. law, the United States will only pay up to 25 percent 
of the UN peacekeeping budget. However, the UN ``assesses'' the United 
States at a rate of up to 27.9 percent (now 29.6 for the next 3 years). 
Will you pledge to withhold payment of U.S. peacekeeping arrears until 
the UN establishes a 25 percent cap on contributions by any single 
nation?

    Answer. We believe that other countries can and should assume more 
of the financial burden for UN peacekeeping. We also believe that the 
United States' influence at the UN, our ability to strengthen the 
integrity of the rules-based international system, and our ability to 
lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay our bills in full and on 
time.

    Question. Would you agree that paying back peacekeeping arrears 
before securing the 25 percent assessment rate would be giving away any 
leverage in the negotiations? Why or why not?

    Answer. We believe that other countries can and should assume more 
of the financial burden for UN peacekeeping. However, once the UN 
General Assembly has reached agreement on the distribution of financial 
responsibility, each country should uphold their responsibility to pay 
their share. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue 
further in the context of the next negotiation on how much each country 
contributes.

    Question. As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden agreement, the 
Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-Secretary 
General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that the United 
States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay, the roughly 
$500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly excluded 
from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since then, the 
UN has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama administration 
and the Biden administration has sought to pay over Congressional 
objections. Do you commit not to pay these ``contested arrears'' per 
Congressional intent as outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement?

    Answer. My firm belief is that the United States should pay its 
assessed contributions in full and on time, while concurrently working 
to reduce those contributions by maximizing efficiencies and 
encouraging other member states to assume more of the financial burden. 
As indicated in the President's FY 2024 budget request, the Department 
is seeking funds and authority from Congress to enable payment of 
peacekeeping arrears that accrued over the past 4 years. These arrears 
are not subject to the Helms-Biden agreement.

    Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the UN should 
take to reduce the overall size of the UN peacekeeping budget? If so, 
what are they?

    Answer. UN Security Council mandates are the primary drivers for 
the budgetary size of each peacekeeping mission. In these mandates, the 
United States works to require missions to develop transition 
strategies focused on concrete objectives and to ensure missions have 
an exit strategy. Once the secretary-general proposes a budget, we work 
to ensure that the budget levels agreed to by the UN General Assembly 
are appropriately sized to each mission by finding opportunities to 
achieve efficiencies and contain costs to reduce the overall size of 
the UN peacekeeping budget.

    Question. Are there any specific UN peacekeeping missions you would 
support reducing or terminating in order to reduce UN peacekeeping 
costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you believe should be 
reduced or terminated?

    Answer. The United States supports terminating the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), which has long since fulfilled its original purpose. 
Unfortunately, Russia and its UNSC partners have blocked efforts to end 
the mission. The United States also supports ongoing, mandated 
drawdowns of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). 
We continue to insist those transitions remain conditions-based; 
informed by joint UN/host government planning; and attentive to the 
security needs of vulnerable populations.

    Question. The resumption of funds to the controversial UN 
organization, UNRWA, has amounted to close to $1 billion since the 
start of the Biden administration and very few reforms have been made. 
Please provide an explanation of the reforms initially laid out prior 
to the resumption of funds and if or if not those have been undertaken.

    Answer. U.S. contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) give the United 
States a seat at the table to help strengthen UNRWA's programs and 
oversight. Since the resumption of U.S. funding, UNRWA has made 
significant reforms. For example, as committed in the U.S.-UNRWA 
Framework for Cooperation, UNRWA inspected 87 percent of its facilities 
at least twice in 2021 and 100 percent in 2022 to confirm they were 
safe and adhered to the Agency's neutrality policies, up from just 28 
percent in 2020. With targeted U.S. funding, UNRWA also modernized its 
financial and whistleblower policies to ensure alignment with global 
best practice and is in the process of introducing digital refugee 
identity verification to prevent fraud.

    Question. Do you believe that UNRWA is meeting its mandate? Why or 
why not?

    Answer. Yes. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is mandated by the UN 
General Assembly to provide essential services directly to Palestinian 
refugees in its five fields of operation. UNRWA's activities include 
providing emergency services, education, health, protection, and 
livelihoods programming for Palestinian refugees, all of which are 
within its mandate. UNRWA plays an essential role in promoting 
stability in the region, which benefits the United States and our 
regional partners, including Israel.

    Question. Please explain efforts by the USG to encourage UNRWA to 
diversify its donor funds.

    Answer. The United States has frequently encouraged the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) to diversify its donor funding. This includes advocacy with 
traditional donors and regional partners, including significant 
engagement with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. UN Secretary-General 
Guterres has also engaged potential donors directly on UNRWA's behalf. 
In 2022, several of these donors announced new funding for UNRWA, 
including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Norway, and the European Union. 
The U.S. Government will continue to encourage contributions to UNRWA 
to help reduce the Agency's financial shortfalls.

    Question. In recent engagements with the Palestinian Authority, did 
you discuss UNRWA's failure to meet one of its core mandates, 
neutrality? Why or why not?

    Answer. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) continues to implement essential 
regulations regarding UNRWA and its staff's neutrality, integrity, and 
impartiality. The United States engages regularly with the Palestinian 
Authority on a wide range of issues related to UNRWA, including the 
agency's commitment to humanitarian principles, including neutrality. 
We are committed to continue working with UNRWA to promote its 
provision of effective and efficient assistance with transparency and 
accountability in a manner consistent with the principles of 
neutrality, tolerance, respect for human rights, and non-
discrimination.

    Question. What was the result?

    Answer. In these meetings, the Department has underscored the 
Administration is seeking to re-build our relationship with the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian people on a basis of 
trust, cooperation, and shared values that advance respect for the 
human rights of all. As part of these efforts, the Administration also 
is fully committed to working with UNRWA and the PA to root out any 
problematic content in textbooks, to build the capacity of UNRWA's 
teachers, and to monitor UNRWA's efforts. UNRWA's schools are often the 
only option for many Palestinian refugee children.

    Question. What are your views on the need for management reform 
within the UN system?

    Answer. An efficient, effective UN is essential to achieving 
America's strategic objectives. We consistently work to ensure 
international organizations in the UN system adhere to the best 
management and oversight practices in the areas of protecting 
whistleblowers, ensuring accountability for sexual exploitation and 
abuse, promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial 
and managerial transparency.

    Question. What has the Administration done in regards to UNOPS 
controversial investments?

    Answer. U.S.-led efforts to reform the United Nations Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS) require the organization to return to a focus 
on its core mandate to expand implementation capacity for UN entities 
and member states; suspend the work of the unit responsible for the 
controversial investments; return a portion of excess reserves to 
partners; refrain from the pursuit of further activity regarding impact 
investments until approved by the Executive Board; strengthen internal 
controls, including ethics and audit functions; and pursue 
accountability of any officials involved in the fraud/mismanagement.

    Question. Has there been any investigation conducted?

    Answer. The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 
conducted an internal investigation, the report of which has not been 
made public. Following the investigation, the United Nations terminated 
the contract of Vitaly Vanshelboim, the deputy head of the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the CEO of the unit 
responsible for the controversial investments.

    Question. Please explain your views on reform of the UN Security 
Council, particularly on the veto and expansion of permanent member 
seats.

    Answer. A reformed UN Security Council, as President Biden has 
said, is in the best interests of the United States. We support the 
expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council, including permanent seats for countries from Africa 
as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. However, we do not support 
the expansion or the alteration of the veto.

    Question. The United States has rejoined the UN Human Rights 
Council and in the last year was able to successfully lobby for the 
removal of Russia from the Council over its war crimes in Ukraine. 
Since then, what reforms has the Biden administration advocated for?

    Answer. The United States continues to seek reforms of the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC), particularly with respect to its membership. The 
United States actively engages with allies and partners to work to keep 
some countries with the worst human rights records off the HRC and 
encourage those with better records to run for seats. The United States 
also encourages UN regional groups to field competitive slates, as 
appropriate, and press member states to more carefully consider human 
rights records of countries running for HRC election.

    Question. Have any of these reforms gained traction?

    Answer. Yes, U.S. efforts to encourage countries with better human 
rights records to run for seats on the Human Rights Council (HRC) and 
across UN bodies have been well received by allies and partners. In 
October, Venezuela lost its seat to Chile and Costa Rica in a 
competitive election. Additionally, during the April 2023 elections for 
United Nations Economic and Social Council subsidiary bodies, Russia 
was defeated in all the races where they ran on contested slates. 
Across UN bodies, the United States will continue to use our vote and 
influence to promote and support geographically diverse candidates that 
share our values and support the integrity of UN elections.

    Question. Does the Biden administration believe it spends a 
disproportionate amount of attention on criticizing Israel?

    Answer. Yes, we agree the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
disproportionately criticizes Israel. As an HRC member state, we remain 
committed to partnering with like-minded countries to reduce the amount 
of time spent on Israel and anti-Israel resolutions at the HRC. Though 
we disagree strongly with the HRC's disproportionate focus on Israel, 
U.S. engagement has resulted in many important achievements on the 
Human Rights Council, including a Commission of Inquiry on Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine, strong statements against PRC human rights abuses 
and violations in Xinjiang, and accountability mechanisms on Belarus, 
Iran, and Syria, among others.

    Question. What steps has the Administration taken to eliminate the 
Commission of Inquiry (COI) established to investigate Israel?

    Answer. We continue building a coalition of partners to end this 
open-ended and vaguely defined COI. During the March session of the 
Human Rights Council (HRC), Ambassador Taylor delivered a statement 
outlining U.S. objections to the COI. During the June 2022 session, the 
United States also led a joint statement signed by a cross-regional 
group of over 20 countries condemning the COI's mandate. We continue to 
raise our concerns about bias against Israel in the UN system with the 
President of the HRC and High Commissioner, as well as with the 
Secretary-General's designee as focal point to combat antisemitism in 
the UN system, Under-Secretary-General Moratinos.

    Question. Does the Administration believe that the Council is a 
productive body for the discussion of human rights? Why or why not?

    Answer. Yes, the Human Rights Council is a productive body for 
discussing and advocating for the respect of human rights, and the U.S. 
presence has ensured that we can shape the HRC agenda and outcomes. In 
addition to ensuring resolutions unfairly targeting Israel were not 
adopted unanimously without a vote, we have played a key role in 
successful efforts to create and extend the Commission of Inquiry on 
Ukraine; create the first ever Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
situation in Russia; present the first-ever resolution on the human 
rights situation in Xinjiang, China; extend the Fact- Finding Mission 
(FFM) on Venezuela; and establish an FFM on Iran.

    Question. The lack of progress on a more durable solution to cross 
border humanitarian operations into Syria is of grave concern to me. 
The recent earthquake worsened already dire conditions the Syrian 
people face, particularly those in the northwest. How would you or our 
Ambassador to the UN engage with partners in the UNSC to ensure this 
mandate renewal passes?

    Answer. U.S. officials, including those at the U.S. Mission to the 
UN, consistently highlight the scale and scope of the humanitarian 
crisis in Syria, as well as the effectiveness and transparency of the 
UN cross-border assistance delivery mechanism. We will continue to 
vigorously engage members of the UN Security Council, both in New York 
and in their respective capitals, to emphasize the need to maintain and 
expand the authorization of UN assistance from Turkiye.

    Question. Would you recommend that President Biden engage at the 
highest possible levels on this important issue?

    Answer. We will use all available means to advocate for and support 
the continuation of cross-border humanitarian assistance to the people 
of northwest Syria, including, as appropriate, diplomacy at the highest 
levels.

    Question. How will you work to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars 
that fund UN humanitarian assistance are not being used to effectively 
subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades assistance to Syrians 
through seizure of cross-line assistance delivery attempts?

    Answer. Humanitarian partners implementing our programs in regime-
held areas must put in place robust risk mitigation mechanisms before 
receiving funding, to ensure our aid is not diverted by the regime or 
other malign actors. All partners, including the UN, are required to: 
1) fully cooperate with third-party monitoring to verify program 
implementation; 2) provide immediate updates on any interference with 
U.S.-funded assistance; 3) have confidential complaint mechanisms; and 
4) submit reports on actual and alleged diversions, such as aid 
interference, fraud, waste, or abuse.

    Question. Do you believe that cross-line assistance is an 
acceptable modality of delivery of humanitarian assistance or as an 
alternative to cross-border?

    Answer. The United States supports expanding humanitarian access to 
all Syrians in need through all modalities, including both cross-border 
and cross-line. However, cross-line assistance to northwest Syria is 
not an alternative to cross-border assistance in that it cannot match 
the scope and scale of cross-border assistance.

    Question. In the event of non-renewal of the Syria cross border 
mandate, what preparations have been made to continue to support 
Syrians with life-saving aid?

    Answer. Nothing can replicate the scale of UN cross-border aid. If 
the UN cross-border aid mechanism is not renewed, the amount of 
humanitarian aid reaching people in need in northwest Syria will 
decrease dramatically. However, we have been preparing for this 
possibility in response to previous Russian veto threats. We will use 
all available means to advocate for and support continued cross-border 
humanitarian assistance to northwest Syria. This includes encouraging 
UN and NGO partners to pre-position supplies and expand alternative 
delivery approaches.

    Question. Has the U.S. Government consulted with partners and 
allies on alternatives and contingency plans for continuing to support 
Syrians with life-saving aid? If so, what are those plans?

    Answer. We coordinate closely with our partners and allies, 
including fellow donor governments and the Government of Turkiye, and 
with our humanitarian partners, regarding contingency plans. We would 
welcome the opportunity to discuss those plans in greater depth in an 
appropriate setting.

    Question. What steps are the United Nations and UN agencies taking 
to appropriately plan for the event of non-renewal?

    Answer. We would welcome the chance to discuss such plans in depth 
in a higher classification setting.

    Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria adequately 
planned for this event?

    Answer. UN agencies have contingency plans in place in the event 
the cross-border mandate is not re-authorized in July. However, UN 
contingency planning has affirmed that there is no viable alternative 
to the existing cross-border mechanism to provide the scale and scope 
of assistance currently provided by the UN.

    Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria created plans 
for eventual hand-off to local partners if non-renewal happens?

    Answer. We would welcome the chance to discuss such plans in-depth 
in a higher classification setting.

    Question. Now that the Office of ``Multilateral Personnel and 
Strategy'' has been established, please provide your assessments of the 
office's work to achieve its mission to increase Americans in the UN 
system and combat malign influence in international organizations.

    Answer. Since its formal creation in June 2021, IO's Office of 
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) has made significant progress 
in increasing the numbers of U.S. entry-level talent in the UN system 
through the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program, increased 
advocacy on behalf of U.S. applicants to UN positions, and successfully 
campaigned for the election of American candidates to UN leadership 
positions, including Doreen Bogdan-Martin's historic election as 
Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union last 
year. MSP has further ensured U.S. leadership successes and combatted 
malign influence by working with allies and partners to advance our 
affirmative view of a strong, resilient, and inclusive UN.

    Question. Specifically on the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) 
program, how can the Administration better recruit and retain talented 
Americans for this program?

    Answer. The Department of State is employing a multi-pronged 
approach to increase the recruitment and retention of U.S. citizens for 
the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Program, including increasing 
outreach opportunities through virtual or in-person recruitment and 
networking events, identifying strategic opportunities for entry-level 
placement in UN agencies such as specialized agencies that focus on 
emerging priorities, and continuing to foster network building and 
mentorship opportunities involving current U.S. citizen staff in the UN 
system.

    Question. UNFPA: The FY 2024 Budget Request includes $57.5 million 
for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). How will you ensure that none of 
these funds are used in the support or participates in the management 
of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary stabilization in 
violation of the Kemp-Kasten amendment?

    Answer. UNFPA does not support or participate in the management of 
a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. UNFPA 
opposes any form of coercive sexual and reproductive health policies or 
programs, including but not limited to forced abortion and forced 
sterilization, and has worked to eliminate them. UNFPA has consistently 
advocated for and promoted the basic right of all couples and 
individuals in China and globally to decide freely and responsibly the 
number, spacing, and timing of their children.

    Question. The UN Peacebuilding Fund: The FY 2024 budget request 
includes $1.5 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund for the first time. 
Can you explain how the UN Peacebuilding fund promotes peace?

    Answer. The Fund may invest with UN entities, governments, regional 
organizations, multilateral banks or civil society organizations to 
mitigate drivers of fragility and reduce the recurrence of conflict. 
The Fund is designed to provide a small injection of support and be a 
catalyst for other funding to sustainably address conflict drivers, 
such as by supporting the reintegration of armed group members in the 
Central African Republic and mitigating inter-clan disputes in Somalia. 
Since the Fund's establishment in 2006, it has allocated over $1.6 
billion to 65 recipient post-conflict countries.

    Question. How does the UN Peacebuilding Fund match with U.S. 
National Security Interests?

    Answer. The Fund helps stabilize conflict-affected areas, prevents 
conflict recurrence, and contributes to the UN's Sustainable 
Development Goals. Fund resources address issues such as human rights, 
Women, Peace and Security, institution building, transitional justice, 
and electoral processes. The Fund additionally complements UN special 
political mission resourcing. As it oversees synergy with the Fund, 
U.S. leadership on the Peacebuilding Commission ensures constructive 
advice to the Security Council and supports implementation of the 
Global Fragility Act.

    Question. UNESCO: The U.S. ceased funding to UNESCO because it 
granted Palestinians full membership. U.S. code (P.L. 101-146 and P.L. 
103-236) prohibits the U.S. from funding any organization which grants 
full membership to the Palestinians. The FY 2024 budget request 
includes $150 million in payments of arrears to UNESCO. Why is the 
Administration requesting money to pay arrears which are a direct 
result of Palestinian membership?

    Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations act includes a waiver authority 
that, if exercised, would allow the United States to provide 
contributions to UNESCO. The President's FY 2024 budget request 
includes approximately $75 million to pay an assessed contribution to 
UNESCO and $75 million to pay a portion of accumulated U.S. arrears, a 
total of $150 million.
    The Department's request for arrears is equally as important as 
funding for assessed contributions. Should the United States resume 
UNESCO membership without addressing arrears such as through a payment 
plan, the UNESCO Constitution will not allow us to serve on the 
Executive Board nor vote in the General Conference, limiting our 
ability to advance U.S. interests in the organization.

    Question. If paid, how will the arrears be distributed?

    Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations act includes a presidential 
waiver authority that, if exercised, would allow the United States to 
provide contributions to UNESCO. Any decision on the use of a potential 
arrears payment can only be taken by the UNESCO General Conference.
    Any U.S. contributions provided to pay outstanding assessments 
would initially be credited to the UNESCO general fund, pending General 
Conference consideration of a proposal by the UNESCO director-general 
on the use of the funds.

    Question. Will the money be returned to other members including the 
Palestinians?

    Answer. UNESCO reduced its budget to account for unpaid U.S. 
contributions while the United States was still a member and not paying 
assessed contributions. Accordingly, while a decision by the General 
Conference would be made on the use of funds, including application of 
those funds to future UNESCO projects in member states, we would not 
expect U.S. contributions, such as for arrears, to go to member states 
as a result of previously unpaid U.S. contributions.

    Question. Summit for Democracy: In 2021, I submitted a question for 
the record (QFR) about the Summit for Democracy, which stated: ``The 
budget includes programming for democracy, human rights, freedom, and 
the rule of law which we welcome. It also references the 
Administration's plan for a Summit of Democracy. What definition of 
democracy will be you using for inviting countries to participate?''

    Answer. We did not use a specific definition of democracy in 
deciding which countries to invite to the two summits. As with the 
first summit, the second was meant to be inclusive of a regionally and 
socioeconomically diverse group of well-established as well as emerging 
democracies. We approached the two summits with a clear-eyed 
recognition that no democracy is perfect nor the same as another.

    Question. Can you please tell us more details of this Summit and 
its goals?

    Answer. The second Summit for Democracy gathered democratic 
leaders, civil society partners, and the private sector for 3 days of 
hybrid programming in Washington and co-host countries. The second 
summit focused on how democracies deliver economic prosperity, access 
to justice, respect for human rights for citizens, and how democracies 
are best suited to address the world's most pressing challenges. The 
U.S. held an in-person event specifically devoted to exploring how to 
help ensure that technology contributes to and does not detract from 
democracy.

    Question. Two years later, one summit completed, what is your 
assessment of Summit(s)?

    Answer. The summit process has re-energized democracies abroad and 
helped demonstrate how democracies deliver for their citizens. It 
strengthened and expanded partnerships with governments and non-
governmental partners to take meaningful action on over 750 commitments 
made at the first summit. The Presidential Initiative for Democratic 
Renewal has rolled out new initiatives to combat corruption, support 
media freedom, protect human rights, and counter the misuse of 
technology, including new guidelines for democracies on surveillance.

    Question. Do you feel that the Summit for Democracy has achieved 
the goals initially laid out? Why or why not?

    Answer. Yes. The summit has demonstrated how democracies deliver 
for their citizens and how democracies are best suited to address the 
world's most pressing challenges. The goal of re-energizing democratic 
countries and partners was achieved in several ways: the 16 democracy 
cohorts that launched (in partnership with civil society); over 70 
governments and authorities endorsing a declaration affirming political 
commitments; and more than 20 partners joining a commitment to enhance 
beneficial ownership transparency.

    Question. Does the Administration have a plan for post-Summit?

    Answer. The Administration will be working with the Republic of 
Korea, which has announced it will host a third summit. We will 
encourage our embassies and civil society interlocutors to help 
countries and authorities implement the commitments they have made. The 
Department of State and USAID will also follow-up from headquarters to 
fulfill the ambitious goals laid out at the summit. Summit efforts will 
also continue through several democracy cohorts, including the two 
U.S.-led cohorts.

    Question. What steps are in place to hold countries accountable for 
their commitments made during the summit(s) or ``year of action'' in 
between?

    Answer. At the first summit, nearly 100 participating governments 
and authorities made commitments related to democratic renewal and were 
invited to submit progress reports on their implementation. Additional 
accountability has been provided by non-governmental organizations, 
such as Accountability Lab, the Open Government Partnership, and 
International IDEA, which developed commitment trackers. The United 
States will continue to work with a range of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives to track progress on summit commitments.

    Question. Why were democratic groups omitted from participation in 
the Summit such as the National Unity Government of Burma?

    Answer. Representatives from the National Unity Government (NUG) 
were featured speakers in summit-related events, including a panel 
discussion hosted by the United States Institute of Peace on Burma that 
included DRL Acting Assistant Secretary Erin Barclay. We regularly 
engage with the NUG as part of larger outreach and engagement with 
Burma's pro-democracy movement. The Summit for Democracy aimed to be 
inclusive and representative of a regionally and socioeconomically 
diverse slate of countries and democratic actors.

    Question. Since August 2021, thousands of Afghans and Americans 
have been evacuated to the U.S. and Congress formally established the 
CARE Office. How many Americans remain in Afghanistan? Of this number, 
how many have expressed their intent to depart via USG channels?

    Answer. The number of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan fluctuates 
regularly as individuals enter and depart Afghanistan. U.S. citizens 
are not required to provide the U.S. Government their travel plans. The 
number of U.S. citizens remaining in Afghanistan, as tracked by CARE 
via their database management system known as FALCON, is 115. Of these, 
approximately 40 percent are waiting for their family members' 
immigration cases to become interview-ready so that CARE can manifest 
them to CAS for further processing. For the other 60 percent, the 
Department of State has no record of any immigrant visa application. 
The primary applicant American citizens attached to these cases choose 
to remain in Afghanistan with their family.
    They may travel with USG assistance or by their own means. The 
State Department provides immediate relocation assistance to any U.S. 
citizen who is in touch with the Department and who requests such 
assistance.

    Question. How many post-COM SIV principal applicants remain in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department does not track the location of SIV 
applicants until they are interview-ready and their case files are 
assigned to the visa processing post where their consular interviews 
will occur outside Afghanistan. The Department prioritizes and 
schedules visa interview appointments for Afghan SIV applicants able to 
travel outside of Afghanistan at any immigrant visa post where they are 
able to appear. The Department continues its efforts to facilitate the 
safe and orderly travel of Afghan allies and their eligible family 
members who wish to leave Afghanistan.

    Question. How many Americans and Afghans remain in Albania?

    Answer. To date, I am not aware of any U.S. citizens in Albania 
with their Afghan family members. Of the Afghan individuals presently 
in Albania, the U.S. Government relocated a limited number from 
Afghanistan. The remainder arrived in Albania through other non-USG 
channels. We continue to process all Afghans in Albania who are 
eligible for relocation under Enduring Welcome. We cannot provide 
specific numbers of Afghans in this response, but would be happy to 
provide this information in a closed session.

    Question. How many Americans and Afghans remain in Kosovo?

    Answer. We would be happy to provide this information in a closed 
session. We continue to process all Afghans in Kosovo who are eligible 
for relocation under Enduring Welcome.

    Question. What is the Department's plan to ensure this population 
is able to depart Afghanistan, should they wish?

    Answer. CARE immediately manifests for relocation out of 
Afghanistan every U.S. citizen and Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) who 
requests relocation assistance. CARE is aware of several U.S. citizens 
and LPRs in Afghanistan who are ready and willing to leave the country, 
and we are in touch with these individuals and are actively working to 
relocate them. CARE welcomes being apprised of any American citizen or 
LPR cases, by phone, email, WhatsApp, or any other method, in order to 
immediately effect their departure.

    Question. Please provide an overview of how evacuation flights are 
administratively operated, including the process in which flights are 
selected, the manifests, and the routes to Camp As-Sayliyah (CAS) in 
Qatar.

    Answer. CARE works with a contractor providing commercial air 
services to prepare and relocate eligible Afghans out of Kabul to 
platforms in third countries. Routes and cadence are planned according 
to commercial and safety standards to meet CARE operational 
requirements and in cooperation with host nations willing to accept 
eligible Afghans and permit the U.S. Government to process Special 
Immigrant Visas, Immigrant Visas, and U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
cases. Manifests are created by a logistics team, drawing from a 
population of Afghans who are vetted and travel-ready.

    Question. UN Cybercrime Treaty: Congress has received numerous 
updates regarding the U.S. effort to negotiate a UN ``Cybercrime 
Treaty,'' but concerns remain about scope and intent. Does the 
Department intend to submit the Treaty to the United States Senate upon 
completion?

    Answer. Within the Ad Hoc Committee process, the United States 
continues to work towards consensus on a narrowly focused criminal 
justice instrument that advances three core priorities: increasing 
international cooperation to fight cybercrime, respecting human rights, 
and supporting multistakeholder engagement. The United States will 
analyze the finalized treaty text to determine whether it is in line 
with U.S. interests before signing and submitting to the Senate for 
advice and consent if appropriate.

    Question. What steps is the Department taking to ensure that any 
new agreement remains compatible with existing international agreements 
like the Budapest Convention?

    Answer. The United States is working towards a UN treaty that 
complements the Budapest Convention and can be ratified by both 
Budapest and non-Budapest member states. The United States is working 
closely with other Budapest member states participating in the UN 
cybercrime treaty negotiations to ensure that any new treaty is 
consistent with and complementary to the Budapest Convention. Since Ad 
Hoc Committee treaty negotiations began, three countries have joined 
the Budapest Convention.

    Question. In what ways have Authoritarian states attempted to 
subvert the stated intent of the UN Cybercrime Treaty during 
negotiations?

    Answer. Russia and its allies are endeavoring to leverage this 
process to advance their positions supporting government control of 
communication technologies. They are pushing proposals that would 
compel States Parties to cooperate in criminal cases without sufficient 
safeguards, including for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such 
as the freedom of expression. The United States and its like-minded 
partners have been successful in countering these Russian-driven 
proposals by pushing for a narrowly tailored criminal justice 
instrument.

    Question. What steps are you taking to prevent these countries, 
particularly Russia and the PRC, from rewriting key definitions or 
attempting to reinterpret or side-step longstanding international 
standards and best practices that the United States supports?

    Answer. The United States is seeking to use established terms and 
definitions that are consistent with U.S. law and well-known to the 
international community of law enforcement practitioners. Some member 
states, including Russia and its allies, are proposing new concepts, 
terms and definitions that are incongruent with longstanding 
international norms and existing agreements. The United States has and 
will continue to advance strategic coordination with its like-minded 
partners to oppose such proposals, and to secure agreement for language 
reflecting international best practices, standards, norms, and 
definitions.

    Question. The Chinese Communist Party has put forth a consideration 
to consider criminalizing ``Dissemination of False Information'' in the 
fourth round of negotiations in Vienna. Is the Department aware of this 
proposal and what is the plan to combat using such language to 
accomplish malign means?

    Answer. The language proposed by the PRC is deeply concerning to 
the United States. The United States has and will continue to engage 
broadly with other countries to build support for a narrowly tailored 
criminal justice instrument and to oppose any proposals that directly 
cater to authoritarian regimes.

    Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity 
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please 
provide working definitions for ``cyber'' as it relates to negotiation 
for the treaty.

    Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and 
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an 
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In the 
context of the UN treaty negotiation process, the United States has not 
proposed a definition for the term ``cyber,'' and does not believe a 
definition of ``cyber'' is necessary in this convention. The United 
States is seeking consensus on definitions consistent with the 
provisions of the Budapest Convention and U.S. domestic criminal law, 
neither of which includes a definition of ``cyber.''

    Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity 
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please 
provide working definitions for ``crime'' as it relates to negotiation 
for the treaty.

    Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and 
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an 
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this 
context, the United States has not proposed a definition for the term 
``crime,'' and does not believe a definition of ``crime'' is necessary 
in this convention.

    Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity 
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please 
provide working definitions for ``computer'' as it relates to 
negotiation for the treaty.

    Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and 
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an 
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this 
context, the United States has not proposed a definition for the term 
``computer,'' but has proposed definitions for the terms ``computer 
system'' and ``computer data'' drawn from the Budapest Convention.

    Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity 
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please 
provide working definitions for ``cybercrime'' as it relates to 
negotiation for the treaty.

    Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and 
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an 
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. In this 
context, the United States has proposed that ``cybercrime'' be defined 
to mean those offenses that are established under the convention. The 
United States is seeking to use established terms and definitions that 
are consistent with U.S. law and well-known to the international 
community of law enforcement practitioners.

    Question. Understanding that there is a lack of agreement or unity 
of definition on key terms relating to Cyber and Cyber security, please 
provide working definitions for ``cyberattack'' as it relates to 
negotiation for the treaty.

    Answer. The United States has proposed drawing on the terms and 
definitions used in the Budapest Convention, which has been an 
effective international cybercrime treaty for two decades. The United 
States has not proposed a definition for the term ``cyberattack,'' and 
does not believe a definition of ``cyberattack,'' which implicates 
topics that are beyond the scope of this treaty, is necessary.

    Question. Does the International Criminal Court have jurisdiction 
over U.S. citizens?

    Answer. I continue to strongly disagree with the International 
Criminal Court's prior actions relating to the Afghanistan situation 
with regard to U.S. personnel and maintain our longstanding objection 
to the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel.

    Question. Does the International Criminal Court have jurisdiction 
over citizens of Israel?

    Answer. As I conveyed publicly, the United States firmly opposes 
the opening of the investigation by the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) into the Palestinian situation. The ICC has no 
jurisdiction over this matter. The United States does not believe that 
the Palestinians qualify as a sovereign state and therefore they are 
not qualified to obtain membership as a state, or participate as a 
state, in international organizations, entities, or conferences, 
including the ICC. The United States maintains the position that the 
ICC should focus on its core mission of serving as the court of last 
resort in punishing and deterring atrocity crimes.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that 
the open investigation into U.S. personnel in Afghanistan is closed?

    Answer. I continue to object to the International Criminal Court's 
previous attempt to assert jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. I believe 
our concerns are best addressed through engagement with all 
stakeholders. On April 4, an ICC appeals chamber issued a judgment 
clearing the way for the prosecutor to investigate ongoing abuses by 
the Islamic State-Khorasan Province and the Taliban, in line with the 
prosecutor's decision to de-prioritize other aspects of the Afghanistan 
investigation. I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of the 
human rights situation in Afghanistan, including allegations of 
atrocities and the persecution of women, girls, journalists, rights 
activists, and members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and 
welcome efforts to pursue accountability for such acts.

    Question. Does the term ``human rights'' include a right to access 
an abortion?

    Answer. The United States is not a party to any international human 
rights treaty that enumerates a right to abortion. The United States 
recognizes that everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, including for sexual 
and reproductive health.

    Question. The funding requested for the Human Rights and Democracy 
Fund (HRDF) is $180.7 million--a decrease from the FY 2023 enacted 
level of $222.45 million. Could you elaborate how the State Department 
intends to address troubling democratic trends with this decrease in 
funding?

    Answer. While the budget request for Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor's (DRL) FY 2024 Human Rights and Democracy Fund 
(HRDF) funding is less than the FY 2023 enacted level for HRDF, the 
overall USG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance request level in FY 
2024 increased by $250 million from the FY 2023 request. The Department 
employs a range of diplomatic and programmatic tools to address 
troubling democratic trends globally. Our resources, including HRDF, 
are used for targeted democracy and human rights programs that are 
designed to combat democratic erosion and other threats to democracy 
that operate in lockstep with our bilateral, multistakeholder, and 
bilateral initiatives.

    Question. How can the Department adequately support civil society 
actors abroad to prevent further democratic backsliding?

    Answer. The Department supports civil society through several 
foreign assistance programs, in addition to ongoing diplomatic 
engagement. Some build the capacity of civil society to promote 
democracy and human rights and hold their governments accountable. 
Others support civil society and human rights defenders when they come 
under threat through several rapid response and emergency assistance 
programs.

    Question. Atrocity Prevention: The Administration's FY 2024 budget 
request does not include specific funding for atrocity prevention writ 
large and specifically for the Task Force. Could you please explain the 
rationale for the omission and elaborate on the reasoning why?

    Answer. The Department utilizes current funding, including funds 
not specifically earmarked for atrocity prevention, to support the 
Atrocity Prevention Task Force in implementing the United States 
Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, including 
both prevention and response work. This includes programmatic and 
diplomatic efforts, drawing from various funding resources from 
different operating units, as well as engagement with civil society and 
likeminded governments and multilateral actors.

    Question. Does this omission indicate that atrocities prevention 
and response is not a priority of the Administration despite the 
requirements of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act?

    Answer. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to fulfill the 
requirements of the Elie Wiesel Act, including expanding the number of 
individuals trained in atrocity prevention and widening the scope of 
the training targets to include interagency and multilateral partners. 
The Task Force will refine the Elie Wiesel Act annual report to ensure 
the 2023 report provides greater clarity and detail on the atrocity 
prevention work of the Task Force and its participating departments and 
agencies, including work in specific country contexts.

    Question. What resources does the State Department require to 
successfully implement the Elie Wiesel Act and Atrocities Prevention 
Strategy?

    Answer. Utilizing the current atrocity prevention resources, the 
Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to implement the U.S. Strategy 
to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, engaging in 
prevention, response, and recovery work. This includes programmatic 
work, diplomatic efforts, engagement with and support for civil 
society, and partnering with likeminded governments and multilateral 
actors. It also involves building capacity in affected communities; 
supporting justice, including accountability and services for 
survivors; and synchronizing efforts between aligned work streams, 
including the Global Fragility Act, the Updated U.S. Strategy to 
Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence, and the Women, Peace, and 
Security agenda.

    Question. Does the State Department plan to mandate training for 
key personnel, particularly foreign service officers beyond those 
traditionally responsible for ``human rights'' or other related reports 
and senior leadership?

    Answer. State Department personnel receive instruction on key 
policy issues, including human rights, at every level of their careers, 
in courses ranging from new-hire orientation training to our most 
senior leadership training, including the Ambassadorial Seminar. In 
accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act (as amended), 
training on promoting and protecting International Religious Freedom is 
mandatory for all foreign service officers and specialists at all 
levels.

    Question. How is the State Department working with civil society in 
states that are at-risk or experiencing atrocities? What does that 
partnership look like?

    Answer. The Department works with civil society in atrocity risk-
affected communities in myriad ways, including information sharing, 
building early warning and early response networks, providing 
psychosocial support, and training civil society on documenting 
atrocities. The Department develops and shares broader best practices 
around related concepts of transitional justice and peacebuilding, 
community building and social cohesion efforts, addressing historical 
grievances, empowering historically underrepresented individuals to 
participate in peace processes, empowering and protecting journalists, 
and supporting human rights defenders.

    Question. How is the State Department supporting the work of the 
Ukraine Atrocities Advisory Group?

    Answer. The State Department has joined together with the EU's 
European External Action Service and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office to form the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for 
Ukraine (ACA). The State Department's Office of Global Criminal Justice 
(GCJ) provided a $10 million grant to Georgetown University, which 
serves as the lead coordinator for the ACA. GCJ hopes to provide an 
additional $10 million grant to continue this initiative to support 
Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) by deploying experts 
and leading international prosecutors in the investigation and 
prosecution of atrocity crimes.

    Question. What resources does the Ukraine Atrocities Advisory Group 
require to be most effective?

    Answer. The United States, UK, and EU established the Atrocity 
Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine (ACA) as a coordination mechanism to 
pool our collective resources to assist Ukraine's War Crimes Units 
working under the Office of the Prosecutor General. Our EU and UK 
partners are invested in this initiative and ensuring the future 
success of the ACA. An ACA ``Framework Arrangement'' has now been 
signed between the United States, UK and EU partners that consolidates 
this united effort. We understand that securing accountability for 
atrocity crimes will take time and that we need to make a long-term 
investment in supporting the domestic authorities of Ukraine to do 
their work.

    Question. What other atrocities documentation and evidence 
preservation efforts does the State Department plan to support in FY 
2024?

    Answer. Justice and accountability are central pillars of the U.S. 
response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including through 
support for mechanisms designed to bring perpetrators of atrocities to 
justice. The FY 2024 budget request includes funding to continue 
efforts to document and raise awareness of atrocities, preserve 
potential evidence, identify suspects, and prepare war crimes cases for 
prosecution. This assistance will support Ukraine and the international 
community in holding accountable perpetrators of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Ukraine.

    Question. Beyond Ukraine, what other geographic areas is the State 
Department focusing on to prevent and respond to atrocities?

    Answer. The Department works globally to prevent and respond to 
atrocities, with atrocity prevention work happening in every region. 
This work utilizes all available tools to prevent, respond, and recover 
from atrocities, and includes work with a wide range of partners, both 
from governments and civil society.

    Question. How do you plan to elevate atrocity prevention within the 
interagency and expedite the implementation of the Elie Wiesel Act and 
Atrocities Prevention Strategy?

    Answer. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force continues to mainstream 
atrocity prevention into broader policy decision-making processes, by 
consistently looking to expand and improve outreach, and by ensuring 
the work of the task force is clearly articulated and the value of both 
the task force and the subsequent prevention and response work is front 
and center of public facing statements and interactions. This includes 
engaging with the interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partners, 
legislative colleagues, civil society, the think-tank community, and 
with academia on methods and opportunities for prevention.

    Question. Genocide: Do you believe that the Russian Federation and 
its designees are actively or have been actively committing genocide 
against the people of Ukraine since February 2022? Why or why not?

    Answer. We have been closely tracking the wide-ranging abuses and 
atrocities committed by Russia's forces since they first invaded 
Ukraine in 2014. Since 2022, we have assessed that Russia's forces have 
committed war crimes and members of Russia's forces and other Russian 
officials have committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. These do 
not foreclose future determinations of other atrocity crimes. We 
continue to closely monitor, document, and analyze the situation and 
provide support to others to do the same. We are committed to 
accountability for Russia's heinous actions.

    Question. Should the International Criminal Court issue other 
arrest warrants to hold Russia or other designees accountable for its 
crimes in Ukraine?

    Answer. As President Biden said, the warrants of arrest that have 
been issued are justified. There is no doubt that Russia is committing 
war crimes and atrocities in Ukraine, and we have been clear that those 
responsible must be held accountable. The International Criminal Court 
prosecutor is an independent actor and makes his own prosecutorial 
decisions based on the evidence before him.

    Question. At the March 22, 2023, hearing, you said that the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) system was the preferred way to help Taiwan 
strengthen its defenses rather than Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
grants. What role do you see for Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) 
in providing rapid capability for Taiwan?

    Answer. The Department recognizes that the drawdown authority is 
one of the USG's most valuable tools to quickly provide defense 
articles to foreign partners. As you know, there are numerous policy 
and national security implications the United States must consider 
before the President decides whether to authorize a drawdown. DoD, 
State, and interagency partners closely review all potential security 
cooperation tools, including the drawdown authorities and FMF, to 
decide the most appropriate mechanisms to support Taiwan.

    Question. Will use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) 
diminish the importance of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as the 
principal means of providing security assistance to foreign partners?

    Answer. No, assistance to Ukraine through the military assistance 
drawdown authority can be a vital mechanism for providing arms quickly 
because the articles are coming from DoD stock. However, pulling from 
DoD stock is not a sustainable, global solution. FMF is more suitable 
for supporting enduring requirements and can be used to complement PDA 
in situations like the one in Ukraine.

    Question. While you have a central role in the notification of 
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to Congress, these packages are 
developed at DoD without input from State. Does the use of PDA further 
erode State's lead role in the security assistance function?

    Answer. No, the Department of State is involved throughout the 
drawdown process, including implementation. Under delegation from the 
President, the Secretary of State has directed each military assistance 
drawdown for Ukraine since September 2021.

    Question. The Department's FY 2024 budget requests $6.1 billion in 
FMF globally. This represents only a $71,500 increase above the FY 2023 
enacted FMF topline. Further, the East Asia and Pacific FMF topline of 
$129 million remains the same as FY 2023 appropriations. How do you 
justify a flat FMF topline for the East Asia Pacific in light of, and 
by the Biden administration's own statements, the significant and 
growing threat China poses to the region?

    Answer. The Department weighed its global priorities against 
budgetary constraints and political realities when requesting the $6.1 
billion in total FMF for FY 2024. The requested $129 million in FMF for 
the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region--and additional $113 million 
request in FMF for emerging priorities that could potentially support 
the Indo-Pacific--balances requirements in EAP countries for FMF in 
recent years with emerging priorities for the region and partners' 
ability to finance their own defense needs without requiring additional 
funds from the U.S. taxpayer.

    Question. Do you believe Taiwan is a priority security partner for 
the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific? If so, why does the FY 2024 budget 
request not include earmarked funds for Taiwan FMF?

    Answer. We have been quite clear that our support to Taiwan is 
rock-solid. Taiwan has a high-income economy capable of supporting a 
multi-billion-dollar defense budget. The Department is seeking to 
address requirements in Taiwan through a range of available foreign 
policy tools, including our FY 2024 FMF request of $113 million to 
address emerging priorities globally, which could include Taiwan.

    Question. The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA), which was 
included in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
authorized up to $2 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) grants to Taiwan. Despite this new authority, and the Biden 
administration's support for TERA, the Department's FY 2024 budget 
request does not explicitly provide any FMF funding for Taiwan. Do you 
support full implementation of TERA, including FMF grants to Taiwan? If 
so, why is this support not reflected in the Department's FY 2024 
budget request? If not, why not?

    Answer. The Department appreciates the provisions in the TERA on 
FMF grant assistance to Taiwan, and we are exploring options for 
Taiwan. The FY 2024 budget includes a new FMF request of $113 million 
to address emerging priorities globally, which could include Taiwan.

    Question. The State Department's FY 2024 budget requests $129 
million in FMF for the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region, $50 million 
of which is for the ``State East Asia and Pacific Regional'' FMF line. 
Does the Department plan to allocate any of this $50 million in EAP FMF 
to Taiwan?

    Answer. Taiwan could be considered as a potential recipient for the 
requested $50 million in EAP FMF. However, this would have to be 
balanced with the requirements other EAP partners.

    Question. The Department's FY24 budget requests $50 million in FMF 
for the ``Countering People's Republic of China Influence Fund'' 
(CPIF). Does the Department plan to allocate any of this $50 million in 
CPIF FMF to Taiwan?

    Answer. Taiwan may be considered for CPIF FMF funding. All CPIF 
proposals are evaluated against other global and emerging priorities as 
well as their potential to meaningfully counter malign PRC influence.

    Question. The Department's FY 2024 budget requests $113 million in 
FMF in a new ``Emerging Global Priorities'' line. Of that, the budget 
requests only $16 million for Indo-Pacific partners, including 
potentially Taiwan. How much of this $16 million in FMF does the 
Department plan to allocate to Taiwan?

    Answer. By requesting FMF in this manner, the Department is seeking 
to retain the flexibility to address urgent and emergent requirements 
in the year of execution, of which Taiwan would almost certainly rank 
as a top priority. I hope Congress will support our request for this 
new global FMF line to target such critical gaps.

    Question. Does the Department believe $16 million or less in FMF to 
Taiwan is a serious or remotely credible deterrent against Chinese 
aggression?

    Answer. FMF is not our only tool for deterrence in Taiwan or 
elsewhere. The Department is taking a range of actions across military, 
diplomatic, and economic realms to strengthen Taiwan's deterrence. We 
are reviewing all available authorities, including security assistance, 
to consider short- and long-term opportunities to bolster support for 
Taiwan and other critical partners in the region.

    Question. Foreign Military Sales: Our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
system is currently facing significant case backlogs, long delivery 
leads, and slow processing times, leaving U.S. security partners with 
capability gaps and driving many of them to look elsewhere--in some 
cases, to our competitors--to fill their defense equipment needs. In 
order to ameliorate these and other problems in the FMS system, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is undertaking a comprehensive study on its 
role in FMS and possible executive and legislative reforms to FMS more 
broadly. DoD and the State Department must work together in order to 
ensure FMS reforms are collaborative and appropriately address issues 
within the system. Are you committed to maintaining the State 
Department's leadership role in FMS as outlined in the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA)?

    Answer. Yes, consistent with section 2 of the Arms Export Control 
Act, the State Department remains committed to maintaining and 
exercising its statutory authorities with respect to the FMS program.

    Question. What is the status of the Department's own review of FMS 
procedures?

    Answer. The review is complete, and we expect to brief our 
committees of jurisdiction on our proposals in the near future.

    Question. AUKUS: Does the Department already have the statutory 
authority it would need to implement changes to export control 
procedures (under ITAR and the AECA) in order to facilitate and 
operationalize the implementation of AUKUS? If so, has the Department 
used any of these authorities in relation to AUKUS? If not, why not?

    Answer. I support facilitating secure defense trade with our allies 
to ensure we realize the goals of AUKUS. The Department is confident 
that current statutory authorities provide us the ability to develop 
new, cross-cutting export control tools tailored to allow sharing of 
our most sensitive technology for AUKUS programs. We are currently in 
discussions with the Department of Defense to implement such new tools 
and look forward to providing further details to Congress as the 
discussions progress.

    Question. Has the Department provided Australia and the United 
Kingdom specific guidance or a list of tangible steps they need to take 
in order for their export control systems to be considered 
``comparable'' by the State Department to that of the United States?

    Answer. As allies, friends, and partners, we are working together 
to ensure our technology security frameworks are aligned and responsive 
to known threats, especially in relation to the sharing and co-
developing of technology that provides critical military or 
intelligence advantages to the United States and our allies. The 
Department continues to engage with both Australia and the United 
Kingdom on tangible steps our countries should take to best facilitate 
secure defense trade between our nations.

    Question. In what ways are the UK and Australian legal, regulatory 
and technology systems insufficient to grant them a 38J license 
exemption?

    Answer. Among other requirements the Congress laid out in section 
38(j) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Department notes that the UK 
and Australia's current controls on the export of tangible or 
intangible technology are not assessed to be comparable to those of the 
United States.

    Question. Will the Department provide any 38J license exemption for 
Australia and the United Kingdom?

    Answer. We are currently working with the Department of Defense to 
implement a new cross-cutting export control tool to allow our most 
sensitive technology to be exported expeditiously and securely for 
AUKUS programs. With this in mind, the Department continues to discuss 
the requirements outlined in Arms Export Control Act section 38(j) 
within the dedicated defense trade dialogues we hold with both 
Australia and the UK.

    Question. AFRICA--U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit: The Biden 
administration committed $55 billion in investments in Africa over the 
next 3 years during the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit (ALS), ``working 
closely with Congress''. How is this $55 billion investment reflected 
in the FY 2024 budget request?

    Answer. The President announced $55 billion for Africa at the 
second U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit in December 2022. This funding level 
consisted of appropriated and requested funds from many U.S. Government 
agencies, including State and USAID, over three fiscal years (FY 2021 
through FY 2023) for north and sub-Saharan Africa. The over $8 billion 
in State and USAID foreign assistance included in the FY 2024 request 
is a historic high for the continent and is in addition to the $55 
billion announced at the Africa Leaders' Summit.

    Question. I understand that the $55 billion figure is largely made 
up of prior year funds. How will the Administration message to African 
governments, who have high hopes for a large influx of new U.S. 
investment, that this commitment is actually just a continuation of 
regular programming?

    Answer. The $55 billion announced for Africa at the 2022 U.S.-
Africa Leaders' Summit is a continuation of long-standing U.S. 
leadership and commitment to African security, democracy, development, 
and economic growth. The United States is the largest single donor to 
Africa. The more than $8 billion in foreign assistance for Africa in 
the President's FY 2024 budget request is a historically high level and 
underscores our intention to continue providing robust U.S. support for 
African partners.

    Question. Despite repeated requests for Congress to be 
substantively engaged in ALS, including through my S.Res.538 which 
passed the Senate with unanimous consent on May 26, 2022, Congress was 
not meaningfully consulted or involved in ALS or the commitment of $55 
billion. How do you plan to remedy this?

    Answer. The National Security Council engaged with Members of 
Congress leading up to the Africa Leaders' Summit and the Department 
notified close to $9.8 billion in assistance supporting Sub-Saharan 
Africa included in the $55 billion announcement. We will continue to 
stress the importance of stakeholder engagement and continue to notify 
Congress before releasing foreign assistance funds as required and 
leverage engagement mechanisms, such as pre-consults, to improve the 
quality of those interactions.

    Question. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) 
was announced during the ALS, to ``support emerging democratic 
governments and civil society at critical moments.'' What criteria will 
be used to determine ``critical moments''?

    Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) 
initiative enables the U.S. Government to partner with regional bodies, 
governments, and civil society to support successful, stable, and 
sustainable democratic transitions. ADAPT will surge experts to the 
field to support transition tasks and fund programming such as national 
dialogues, census taking, voter registration, and constitutional 
reforms, among other potential activities. Benefiting countries will be 
identified based on political transitions on the continent.

    Question. How will ADAPT be managed and implemented to ensure funds 
can be released quickly in order to enable a timely response to 
opportunities in critical moments?

    Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) 
initiative, totaling $75 million over 3 years, is an interagency effort 
designed to enable the U.S. Government to expeditiously support 
democratic transitions. We will do so by quickly deploying experts 
during a transition and ensuring close coordination among key 
stakeholders across the interagency. These efforts will help ensure 
ADAPT resources are released quickly and utilized effectively and 
successfully.

    Question. I understand that $25 million of FY 2022 funds and $25 
million of FY 2023 funds will be combined with the $25 million FY24 
request to make up the initial $75 million investment in ADAPT. Where 
was the $50 million from FY 2022 and FY 2023 taken from to make it 
available for ADAPT?

    Answer. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) 
program is a 3-year State and USAID initiative, announced at the 2022 
U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit, which will support democratic transitions 
and counter democratic backsliding in partnership with African regional 
bodies, governments, and civil society. The funding allocations for FY 
2022 and FY 2023 are still being finalized, and additional funding will 
be sought from the FY 2024 and FY 2025 budgets, subject to the 
availability of funds.

    Question. The FY 2024 request includes $50 million for an 
initiative announced at ALS called Digital Transformation in Africa. 
This follows a FY23 $20 million request for $20 million for Digital 
Africa. Can you please provide more information on the new program 
Digital Transformation in Africa?

    Answer. A signature initiative of the Biden-Harris administration, 
Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) will expand digital access and 
literacy and strengthen digital enabling environments across the 
continent. DTA aims to facilitate over $450 million in financing for 
Africa in line with the African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy 
and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. DTA will support 
increased economic opportunity and improved e-government service 
delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient African digital 
ecosystem led by African communities and built on an open, 
interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.

    Question. Ethiopia: On March 20, 2023, you made an atrocities 
determination for Ethiopia, finding that war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing were committed over the course of the 
conflict in Northern Ethiopia. I publicly called for accountability for 
atrocities committed in Ethiopia in April 2021, May 2021, June 2021, 
August 2021, September 2021, November 2021, December 2021, March 2022, 
June 2022, July 2022, August 2022, and November 2022, and introduced 
S.Res.97 (117th Congress) and was the lead-cosponsor on S.3199 (117th 
Congress) with Senator Menendez to call for and require accountability 
measures. Additionally, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House 
Foreign Affairs Committee staff repeatedly raised the question of an 
atrocities determination for the conflict in Northern Ethiopia in 
regular calls with the State Department for over 2 years. Why was the 
atrocities determination for the conflict in Northern Ethiopia made 
after the cessation of hostilities in December 2022, and not used as an 
accountability tool as atrocities were being committed?

    Answer. An atrocity determination is one tool among many to promote 
justice and prevent atrocities. I made the determination now based on 
review of the law and the facts and considering the situation in 
Ethiopia, including the status of diplomatic efforts to end fighting 
and facilitate peace negotiations. Throughout the conflict, we 
repeatedly condemned human rights abuses and violations, calling for 
investigation and accountability for those responsible. I have and will 
continue to stress that any lasting peace depends on accountability, 
including for those in positions of command.

    Question. How is the atrocities designation balanced with State 
Department and USAID efforts to restore development assistance to 
Ethiopia and the increase in the budget request for FY 2024 over FY 
2023?

    Answer. An atrocity determination is a result of a careful review 
of the law and available facts. A determination, which acknowledges 
that atrocities were committed, is independent of the development 
assistance requirement to determine if there are ongoing gross 
violations of human rights by a government. Currently, we have 
assistance restrictions in place, and will re-evaluate based on the 
situation on the ground.

    Question. Did the United States commit, along with the European 
Union, to the Government of Ethiopia that it would allow the mandate of 
the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 
(ICHREE) expire in October 2023?

    Answer. Upon learning that the Government of Ethiopia was 
considering tabling a resolution to prematurely end the mandate of 
ICHREE, the United States, together with likeminded partners, 
immediately engaged senior Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa, 
Washington, and Geneva and prevailed upon them to allow ICHREE to 
continue its work and complete its full mandate, ending in September 
2023. We also conveyed our grave concerns over the significant 
institutional damage the precedent of early termination would cause. 
Whether the ICHREE mandate is further renewed will be subject to the 
decision of the UN Human Rights Council members, and the U.S. position 
will be based on the human rights situation on the ground.

    Question. Last year, the ICHREE reported its finding that the 
Ethiopian Government committed crimes against humanity in its denial 
and obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Tigray, and the war crime 
of using starvation as a weapon of war. Did the State Department's 
review that led to the atrocities determination confirm that finding?

    Answer. The determination was not intended to be an exhaustive 
accounting of all acts that constituted atrocity crimes over the course 
of the conflict. We may revise and expand our determination as 
warranted.
    Given the allegations of many different specific war crimes in this 
armed conflict, we decided to address the category of war crimes 
collectively and not attempt to make public determinations as to each 
specific war crime. Our focus was on the final determination, which was 
that all parties to the conflict committed war crimes.

    Question. Does the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) have full, unhindered access to the Tigray region, to include 
Western Tigray?

    Answer. OHCHR has informed us it has access throughout Tigray, 
though it has not attempted to travel to Western Tigray in recent 
months due to security and resource constraints. USAID has provided $1 
million to OHCHR to cover the cost of four additional international 
monitors, which should be deployed within the next several weeks. Other 
international partners are funding additional monitors.

    Question. As you know, conflict in Ethiopia is not limited to 
Tigray and surrounding areas. Tensions are high and conflict is brewing 
in multiple regions of Ethiopia, including in Oromia, the Somali 
Region, and Benishangul-Gumuz. How are U.S. resources, including those 
requested for FY 2024, being utilized to address widespread conflict in 
Ethiopia and to support the development of responsive, inclusive and 
representative democratic institutions?

    Answer. We remain concerned about tensions and conflict in all 
parts of the country, in particular Oromia. The United States regularly 
calls upon the parties there to engage in political dialogue and 
exercise restraint. Through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, we support programs aimed at conflict-mitigation and 
peacebuilding focusing on Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and People's Region. USAID Office of Transition 
Initiatives also supports peace and reconciliation processes with a 
current focus in Addis Ababa and the regional states of Oromia and 
Amhara.
    Current assistance limitations prevent the United States from 
supporting certain programs to address the root causes of conflict, 
such as poverty and unemployment. USG funding that is not currently 
restricted is being used to improve the capacity of Ethiopian civil 
society to engage constructively in transitional justice and national 
dialogue processes.

    Question. On March 22, 2023, two days following your announcement 
of the atrocities determination, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs detailed, on Twitter, a discussion between Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mesganu Arga and U.S. Charge d'Affairs Tracy Jacobson, where 
Ambassador Jacobson reportedly said that the atrocities determination 
``will not have legal implication or any barrier on the bilateral 
relations of Ethiopia and the United States''. Is this an accurate 
depiction of Ambassador Jacobson's comments during the meeting? If no, 
what was said during the meeting on the impact of the atrocities 
determination on U.S./Ethiopia bilateral relations? If yes, do you 
agree with this reported statement by Ambassador Jacobson?

    Answer. As part of the atrocity determination notification process, 
the U.S. embassy, including the Charge d'Affaires, engaged with the 
Government of Ethiopia at several levels to discuss the determination 
and next steps. In those meetings, Embassy officers explained why the 
United States was announcing the atrocity determination, indicated 
which institutions were found to have committed what atrocity crimes, 
and urged the Government of Ethiopia to pursue accountability and 
reconciliation through a comprehensive, credible, genuine, and 
inclusive transitional justice process.
    While there generally are no legal consequences triggered by an 
atrocity determination in and of itself, the determination recognizes 
the severity of the crimes that were committed on all sides of this 
conflict. We have emphasized to the Government of Ethiopia at all 
levels that it is crucial to acknowledge these crimes in order to move 
forward, commit to truth-telling, and seek justice for victims. We have 
also noted that such a process is key to our bilateral relationship 
going forward.

    Question. What implications does the atrocities determination have 
for the U.S./Ethiopia relationship?

    Answer. This determination is about revealing the truth, 
acknowledging the suffering of victims and survivors, and pursuing 
justice and accountability. We have emphasized to the Ethiopian 
Government the importance of acknowledging the abuses that took place 
in the recent past and a comprehensive, credible, genuine, and 
inclusive transitional justice process, which will be key to our 
bilateral relationship going forward. The United States stands ready to 
support Ethiopians in a credible process to break the cycle of violence 
and forge a durable peace for the future.

    Question. How does the atrocities designation affect Ethiopia's 
eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for 
2024?

    Answer. This determination is based on actions that occurred in 
connection with the conflict. It does not preclude Ethiopia from 
qualifying for AGOA privileges again, assuming the United States is 
able to confidently assess that the Government of Ethiopia is no longer 
engaged in gross violations of human rights.
    To help make that assessment, we are pressing the Government of 
Ethiopia to continue allowing access for international human rights 
monitors.

    Question. Horn of Africa: Now that the implementation of the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement for the war in northern Ethiopia is 
well underway, do you plan to expand the mandate of the Special Envoy 
for the Horn of Africa to cover additional issues in the Horn of Africa 
region, including but not limited to Somalia, conflicts in Ethiopia 
beyond Tigray and the surrounding areas, and the ongoing humanitarian 
crisis caused by acute food insecurity?

    Answer. While there has been significant progress in implementing 
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on northern Ethiopia, the 
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) remains fully engaged to 
consolidate a lasting peace, including regarding human rights 
accountability and transitional justice. SEHOA also is fully engaged on 
forging a diplomatic resolution to issues related to the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would achieve the interests of all 
parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region. SEHOA 
contributes to other policy goals in the region as needed.

    Question. Burundi: The State Department's 2022 Human Rights Report 
for Burundi detailed the significant human rights issues that persist 
in Burundi, including ``extrajudicial killings; forced disappearance; 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by or 
on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison 
conditions, arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or 
detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary . . 
. serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including 
violence or threats of violence against journalists and censorship; 
substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and 
freedom of association . . . serious and unreasonable restrictions on 
political participation; serious government corruption; [and] serious 
government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international 
human rights organizations.'' These findings are in stark contrast with 
U.S. efforts to reengage with the Government of Burundi after the death 
of President Nkurunziza in June 2020 and taking office of President 
Ndayishimiye. The FY 2024 request for Burundi is 10.4 percent higher 
than the FY23 request. How does the FY 2024 budget request address the 
human rights concerns raised in the 2022 Human Rights Report for 
Burundi?

    Answer. The Department of State welcomes the improved relationship 
between the United States and Burundi, which we have used to engage on 
areas of concern for the U.S. Government, including human rights. The 
FY 2024 request continues support for programming to strengthen the 
capacity of civil society organizations to advocate for an improved 
human rights environment. We will also seek resources through centrally 
managed and regional accounts, as appropriate, to complement our 
existing bilateral programming.

    Question. Given the poor human rights record detailed in the most 
recent Burundi Human Rights Report (2022), why was there no increase to 
the Democracy, Human rights and Governance line item for Burundi 
(relative to the FY 2023 request) commiserate or in excess of the 
overall increase for Burundi?

    Answer. Department of State officials, including Assistant 
Secretary of State Molly Phee and Ambassador Melanie Higgins, regularly 
raise human rights concerns with Burundian officials. The FY 2024 
request increases democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding 
to Sub-Saharan Africa by 53 percent over the FY 2023 request, including 
significant increases in regional and sub-regional operating units. 
Additional funding for regional sub-regional operating units will 
ensure our DRG resources are nimble and responsive to emerging or dire 
DRG needs, such as those in Burundi.

    Question. What is the benefit to the United States in the Biden 
administration abandoning its ``human rights first foreign policy'' in 
Burundi in order to build a closer relationship to the Ndayishimiye 
government?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to promote respect for 
human rights around the world, including in Burundi. Department 
officials regularly raise human rights concerns with Burundian 
officials, urging them to conduct complete and transparent 
investigations into alleged abuses, hold those responsible accountable, 
and cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. The improved 
relationship between the United States and Burundi means such 
conversations are more constructive than in the past.

    Question. Does the Biden administration plan to hold anyone 
accountable for the atrocities and human rights violations that have 
occurred under President Ndayishimiye?

    Answer. In December 2022, the United States designated former Prime 
Minister Alain Guillaume Bunyoni under Section 7031(c) of the annual 
appropriations act for his involvement in a gross violation of human 
rights. In line with our global commitment to promote respect for human 
rights and accountability, the Department continues to proactively 
consider the use of all available tools to respond to any new or 
continuing human rights violations and abuses in Burundi.

    Question. Africa Bureau Staffing: In responses to Questions for the 
Record as part of your confirmation process, you committed to working 
``with the White House and relevant State Department bureaus and 
offices to ensure that all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently 
and consistently staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' I similarly 
asked you the following question for the record following the hearing 
on the FY23 State Department Budget Request: ``Under your leadership, 
how has the Department budgeted for and taken steps to ensure that the 
Department `sufficiently and consistently' staffs `all posts' in the 
region?''

    Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS) 
posts are in Africa. I remain deeply committed to resolving the 
challenge of filling positions in those posts. Insufficient 
infrastructure, inadequate schools, health care challenges, and the 
remote nature of many postings in Africa are inherent impediments to 
getting our posts to full staffing. In the last year the Department has 
reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders' attention on the 
most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore creative 
solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these difficult 
locations.

    Question. You responded: ``Recruiting and assignments of Foreign 
Service (FS) officers are controlled by the Bureau of Global Talent 
Management (GTM). We expect to increase our FS hiring by at least 30 
percent this fiscal year from the previous year, which will be the 
highest FS hiring in a decade. The Entry Level Division of GTM's Career 
Development and Assignments Office works closely with the AF Bureau 
staff to ensure entry-level positions in AF are filled in a timely 
manner. Similarly, we strive to fill every available mid-level job in 
AF. However, the pool of potential candidates for AF service is 
diminished due to medical care and schooling concerns, particularly for 
parents of high schoolers or children with special needs. The 
Department continues to explore ways to remove such barriers to 
service. The majority of the vacancies in AF are at the FS-02 and FS-03 
level, which reflects both the global shortage of FSOs due to reduced 
hiring and a Department-wide shortage of specialists in IT, facilities 
management, security, and office support.'' The Africa Bureau remains 
chronically under-staffed, both in Washington, DC and in Embassies on 
the continent. What do you believe your record is, as Secretary, in 
addressing the acute staffing challenges faced by the Africa Bureau?

    Answer. More than half of our historically difficult to staff (HDS) 
posts are in Africa. I remain deeply committed to resolving the 
challenge of filling positions in those posts. Insufficient 
infrastructure, inadequate schools, health care challenges, and the 
remote nature of many postings in Africa are inherent impediments to 
getting our posts to full staffing. In the last year the Department has 
reformed bidding incentives to better focus bidders' attention on the 
most difficult to staff posts and continues to explore creative 
solutions for recruiting and retaining talent in these difficult 
locations.

    Question. Under your leadership, how has the Department taken steps 
to ensure that the Department ``sufficiently and consistently'' staff 
``all posts'' in Sub-Saharan Africa?

    Answer. The Department continues to use increased incentives for 
service in historically difficult to staff posts around the world, 
including service needs differential for extended service, along with 
hardship differentials, and prioritized assignments. Additionally, 
several initiatives are underway, including development of regional 
support models and use of a new assignments algorithm that matches 
bidders and bureaus based on mutual preferences. In the last year, the 
Department has reformed incentives to better focus bidders' attention 
on the most difficult to staff posts.

    Question. What resources are included in the FY24 request to 
specifically address staffing challenges in the Africa Bureau?

    Answer. The Department's FY 2024 request supports funding for 15 
new U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) positions in the Bureau for African Affairs 
(AF), including 10 overseas program positions, three domestic program 
positions, and two public diplomacy positions.

    Question. Has the Africa Bureau requested resources to address its 
acute staffing challenges that are not reflected in the FY 2024 budget 
request? If yes, what resources were requested?

    Answer. As part of its effort to address the staffing challenges in 
Africa, the Bureau for African Affairs (AF) routinely works with the 
Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) to fill its entry-level 
positions. The FY 2024 request includes $37 million for AF in operating 
and public diplomacy resources, including 15 new positions, to increase 
capacity for regional competition with the PRC and help manage complex 
embassies.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States should put forward 
its most experienced and adaptable personnel in Africa to compete 
against China and Russia and to fulfill our policy objectives?

    Answer. The Department always strives to place our most experienced 
and adaptable personnel in places where needs are most acute to advance 
U.S. interests, including in Africa.

    Question. Thirty of the last 45 career Foreign Service nominees for 
ambassadorial posts in the Africa Bureau were to serve as first time 
ambassadors. While every ambassador has a first post somewhere, first 
time ambassadors have been nominated for positions in highly complex 
political and conflict environments that are stated national security 
priorities for the United States in Africa, including Ethiopia, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. What will you do to ensure 
that experienced ambassadorial nominees are selected for high-profile 
and strategic U.S. missions in Sub-Saharan Africa?

    Answer. The Department has a robust process for choosing chiefs of 
mission. I am committed to identifying highly qualified individuals for 
every one of these positions in the Bureau of African Affairs, 
particularly emphasizing those candidates with hardship and regional 
experience, as well as demonstrated leadership experience. In a number 
of cases, the best qualified individual has not yet been an ambassador.

    Question. Prosper Africa: Prosper Africa brings together 17 U.S. 
Government departments and agencies to foster two-way trade and 
investment between the U.S. and Africa, with a secretariat led by 
USAID. The FY 2024 request includes $100 million for Prosper Africa. 
This follows a $100 million FY 2023 request, $77 million FY 2022 
request and a $75 million FY 2021 request.
    What are the concrete accomplishments of Prosper Africa to date?

    Answer. With dedicated funding, Prosper Africa has established a 
deal facilitation platform where advisors have built a pipeline of 
nearly 500 deals valued at over $25 billion. It has launched robust 
continental services, including networks of African suppliers and U.S. 
buyers, and a catalytic investment facility, which are expected to 
boost African exports and U.S. investment by $2 billion in the next 5 
years. It also helped mobilize $1.5 billion of investment in climate, 
health, and sustainable infrastructure via new partnerships between the 
$1 trillion U.S. pension community and African counterparts.

    Question. What will an additional $100 million investment help 
Prosper Africa accomplish?

    Answer. Prosper Africa is redoubling its efforts by planning to 
invest $171 million of FY 2021 to FY 2023 funding that will increase 
U.S. investment in Africa and African exports to the United States by 
$2 billion in the next 5 years--a conservative estimate. The additional 
$100 million in FY 2024 funds requested will enable Prosper Africa to 
dramatically increase the number of supported transactions, broaden its 
geographic coverage, bolster the activities and staff capacity of other 
U.S. Government agencies, and create more opportunities to leverage 
private capital. In Kenya, $5.3 million in Prosper Africa funds have 
leveraged more than $265 million--a 50:1 return.

    Question. Now 4 years into Prosper Africa, do you think the 
existing organizational structure is conducive to a whole-of-government 
approach to increasing trade and investment with Africa?

    Answer. Prosper Africa advisors in Washington and across North and 
Sub-Saharan Africa are critical to advancing the initiative's mission. 
Advisors in Africa work with U.S. embassy colleagues while those in 
Washington, DC work with partner agencies across the U.S. Government; 
this coordinated approach enables the U.S. Government to respond more 
efficiently and effectively to private sector needs. The Secretariat 
supports hosting interagency detailees. Legislation codifying Prosper 
Africa's mission would further increase the initiative's effectiveness.

    Question. Is USAID best suited to lead the secretariat given 
Prosper Africa's goals and objectives?

    Answer. USAID's strong technical expertise in trade and investment, 
extensive field presence, and flexible cross-continental programs 
enable it to lead Prosper Africa. USAID has established the structures 
critical to the initiative's operations, including the Prosper Africa 
Secretariat, and a new program that offers a robust package of 
continent-wide services which are expected to boost U.S. investment and 
African exports by $2 billion over the next 5 years.

    Question. Do you believe that Chiefs of Mission are sufficiently 
empowered to drive trade and investment priorities in Africa?

    Answer. Yes, our ambassadors are empowered to drive trade and 
investment priorities in Africa, as is evidenced by their strong track 
record advocating for U.S. firms with their host governments. Several 
State Department bureaus offer programmatic resources for embassy deal 
teams. Some of these resources include the Commerce-State Partner Post 
Program, Direct Line, Business Facilitation Incentive Fund (BFIF), the 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and the 
Minerals Security Partnership.

    Question. Somalia: The largest request for Democracy, Human Rights 
and Governance funding in Sub-Saharan Africa for FY 2024 is for Somalia 
($33 million), a 73.7 percent increase over the FY 2023 request. The 
security environment in Somalia, lack of political will for democratic 
reforms, an inability to hold one-person-one-vote elections for 50 
years (due to the security situation and lack of political will) and 
limited freedom of movement of Somali and implementing partners makes 
democracy, human rights and governance programs difficult to implement 
and expensive.

    Answer. Yes, the State Department is committed to advocating 
strongly for democratic reforms in Somalia, including human rights and 
good governance, which we view as inextricably linked to our overall 
goal of advancing peace and stability in the country.

    Question. Somalia: Does this prioritization of Somalia for 
democracy, human rights, and governance resources in the budget reflect 
the Department's diplomatic commitment to pursuing democratic reforms 
in Somalia?

    Answer. Yes, the State Department is committed to advocating 
strongly for democratic reforms in Somalia, including human rights and 
good governance, which we view as inextricably linked to our overall 
goal of advancing peace and stability in the country.

    Question. Will the Department commit to matching its planned 
funding of these Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programs with 
commensurate diplomatic and other approaches to hold the Somali 
Government accountable to their commitments and to ensure that U.S. 
funding for universal suffrage in Somalia is not met with another 
disappointing indirect selection process?

    Answer. The State Department is committed to advocating 
diplomatically for Somalia to hold inclusive, transparent, and 
democratic elections at all levels of government. We are encouraging 
the Federal Government of Somalia to begin the political, technical, 
and legal preparations for the 2026 election cycle as soon as possible 
to avoid the potential for another flawed indirect selection process. 
We also are urging it to adopt a realistic timeline for holding 
universal suffrage elections at the national level.

    Question. What adjustments in strategy, as compared to the strategy 
pursued from 2017-2022, will the Department pursue to ensure that 
investments of significant democracy, human rights and governance funds 
in Somalia achieve results.

    Answer. We are advocating for the Federal Government of Somalia to 
advance technical reforms and develop governance institutions at the 
same time it builds political consensus on elections, the constitution, 
and other federal agreements. We have also broadened engagement and 
outreach to international actors to ensure a more unified approach to 
supporting political reconciliation and reform. Diverging approaches by 
external actors was a significant impediment to progress from 2017 to 
2022.

    Question. Where does Somalia rank on the State Department's list of 
priorities for Africa?

    Answer. Advancing peace and stability in Somalia is among the State 
Department's top Africa priorities, given the threat that Al-Shabaab 
and other terrorists in Somalia pose to U.S. citizens and interests in 
the region. Continued instability in Somalia also threatens broader 
U.S. interests and impedes economic growth and development.

    Question. Nigeria: The FY 2024 request for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Governance funding for Nigeria ($25.5 million) is a 56.4 percent 
increase over the FY 2023 request. At the same time, the Peace and 
Security budget request for Nigeria decreased by 17.3 percent. Does the 
Department regard support to election in Nigeria as a cyclical or 
continuous need?

    Answer. Our elections assistance is designed to build systems and 
processes over the long term so that electoral outcomes are viewed as 
free and fair, to educate the public on their civic rights to vote, to 
give voice to the youth, and to help all Nigerians see a future running 
for office. These results are ultimately designed to increase electoral 
participation and to see an improvement from the poor 27 percent 
turnout of the most recent presidential election. This work requires 
continuous engagement in order to achieve results and, therefore, the 
Department regards this funding as a continuous need.

    Question. What is the rationale for such a significant increase in 
the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance budget for Nigeria, given 
that national elections (approaching elections are typically the 
rationale for an increased budget) were just held in the last 2 weeks?

    Answer. This increase reflects a broader request across missions in 
Africa for increased funding. For Nigeria in particular, it is worth 
noting that FY 2024 funds would support activities taking place in 
2025, 2 years before Nigeria's 2027 national elections. That said, 
election support is one component of a diverse Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Governance (DRG) portfolio in Nigeria. DRG activities also enhance 
civic voices and accountability, increase accountability and 
effectiveness of public institutions, and help prevent conflict.

    Question. Given the significant and myriad security challenges 
facing Nigeria, ranging from an intractable violent extremist 
insurgency, widespread banditry, farmer/herder conflict and revival of 
separatist movements, please explain the reduction in budget for Peace 
and Security initiatives in Nigeria.

    Answer. Peace and security assistance to Nigeria includes 
activities funded within the following accounts: Development 
Assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). While IMET and 
INCLE funding has remained relatively straight-lined over the past 
several fiscal years, there is a slight reduction to DA-funded peace 
and security assistance in the FY 2024 request given the need to make 
tradeoffs for other critical programming priorities such as robust 
increase for democracy, human rights and governance assistance.

    Question. The 2023 national (February 25) and state-level (March 
18) elections in Nigeria were widely viewed as flawed by international 
observers, Nigerian candidates and political parties, and the Nigerian 
public. Despite this, on March 1--the same day as the election 
commission announced presidential results--the State Department 
congratulated the president-elect and the Nigerian people on the 
conduct and result of the February 25 election, noting it ushered in a 
``new period for Nigerian politics and democracy.'' Given how the 
electoral process has continued to play out since the March 1 
announcement of results, including with the March 18 state-level 
elections, do you think the State Department's March 1 congratulatory 
remarks and tone were premature?

    Answer. Our decision to offer congratulations was made after 
careful analysis of the official results announced by the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the results of the parallel 
vote tabulation process, which largely corroborated that announcement. 
INEC is constitutionally empowered to announce election results and 
recognizing its announcement of Tinubu as the winner was consistent 
with our support for Nigeria's constitutional democracy. We have been 
very clear, however, about our concerns regarding the process, 
particularly the logistical shortcomings that contributed to the 
disappointingly low turnout percentage. We recognize that INEC must 
continue to improve, and that we must play our part in fostering a more 
effective electoral process.

    Question. Do you think the State Department's position on the 2023 
electoral process has caused the U.S. to lose credibility with the 
Nigerian people?

    Answer. Our position has been consistent throughout this election 
season: we support a peaceful, credible, and transparent electoral 
process. Even as we congratulated the president-elect as the announced 
winner, we expressed our concerns about the failures of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission and emphasized to candidates and parties 
that any disputes must be resolved peacefully in the courts. Our 
diplomats in Nigeria routinely engage with a wide variety of civil 
society actors, and I am confident that our messaging continues to 
resonate with the Nigerian people.

    Question. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has, in a bi-
partisan manner, been critical of proposed arms sales to Nigeria due to 
the abysmal human rights record of the Nigerian military. Most 
recently, a shocking December 2022 Reuters investigative piece reports 
on a secret mass abortion (at least 10,000) program and child killings 
carried out by the Nigerian military in its war against Boko Haram. 
Nigerian solutions, including the investigation by the Nigerian Human 
Rights Commission, are important to investigating these reports. 
However, the use of taxpayer dollars to support development and 
security efforts in Nigeria, coupled with a global commitment to 
protecting internationally recognized human rights, necessitates that 
the U.S. engage in serious independent efforts to investigate and 
respond to allegations of this nature. What is the State Department 
doing to verify the Reuters report and engage with the Nigerian 
Government on human rights concerns related to the Nigerian military?

    Answer. I, too, was shocked and dismayed to read about the 
allegations and we have taken them very seriously. Our diplomats in 
Abuja and senior officials in Washington have spoken directly with 
Nigerian officials at the highest levels to strongly emphasize the need 
for a thorough and transparent investigation. As a result of our 
efforts, the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission is conducting an 
investigation with the results expected later this summer. We will 
continue to monitor the progress of this investigation and urge that it 
be done in a transparent manner while protecting any individuals who 
may be interviewed, or who may come forward with information, about the 
accusations.

    Question. South Sudan: While a reduction in the budget request for 
South Sudan is appropriate given the general failure of the parties in 
South Sudan to make good on their commitments outlined in the 
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 
(R-ARCSS), the dire humanitarian situation faced by the South Sudanese 
people, and the continuation of localized proxy conflicts, it is 
curious that the line items for Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization, 
and Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance were reduced. What is the 
State Department, alongside USAID, trying to achieve in South Sudan?

    Answer. Our goal is to support the South Sudanese people's demands 
for an inclusive transition to democracy and a peaceful, stable future. 
We continue to work to mitigate and prevent sub-national violence; 
protect human rights; better target U.S. assistance to communities in 
need; protect and defend civic space for civil society, independent 
media, and peaceful political voices; and hold the transitional 
government accountable to its commitments. The lower level of 
assistance signals our concerns with the lack of sustained progress by 
South Sudan's leaders.

    Question. How does this budget request reflect those goals?

    Answer. The request for a lower level of assistance signals our 
concerns with the lack of sustained progress by South Sudan's leaders 
in preventing subnational violence, protecting human rights, tackling 
corruption, facilitating humanitarian access, and assuming a greater 
responsibility for service delivery. Despite budget reductions, funding 
for critical agriculture, education, health, democracy, and 
humanitarian assistance continues. I continue to press for peace and 
accountability for human rights abuses through targeted sanctions under 
E.O. 13664 and 13818.

    Question. Will the Department conduct a review of foreign 
assistance to South Sudan this fiscal year to ensure that U.S. 
assistance adheres to the principal of ``do no harm''?

    Answer. The Department and USAID routinely monitor and review all 
U.S. assistance flows to South Sudan to ensure alignment with ``do no 
harm principles,'' program goals, and proper stewardship of U.S. 
taxpayer dollars. To enhance these efforts this fiscal year, USAID is 
finalizing a program to fund a risk management officer within the UN 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The officer would support UNMISS's 
efforts to better organize the international community to address 
continuing challenges with assistance diversion, threats, and taxation 
in South Sudan.

    Question. Why has the Department chosen not to put the support we 
know will be needed for Ukraine in FY 2024 into the budget proposal you 
submitted to Congress?

    Answer. The FY 2024 budget request for Ukraine of $753.2 million 
builds on critical work we initiated with the supplemental 
appropriations. It also takes into consideration that State and USAID 
are currently working to allocate more than $16.5 billion made 
available in the fourth Ukraine supplemental. Given the fluidity of the 
situation, we will continue to assess requirements and available 
resources to meet those needs.

    Question. There is less than $4 billion remaining in the 
Presidential Drawdown Account for FY 2023. There are over 6 months 
remaining in the fiscal year. Given PDA burn rates over the past year, 
it seems clear that the PDA account will run dry long before the end of 
FY 2023. Does the Administration intend to submit a Ukraine 
Supplemental Request in the coming weeks or months?

    Answer. We appreciate the Ukraine supplemental appropriations 
Congress provided for Ukraine, including through the Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative and Foreign Military Financing, as well as the 
increased authority for drawdowns under section 506(a)(1) and section 
552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Administration has not 
made a determination regarding a supplemental request for Ukraine for 
FY 2023, however, we continue to assess the requirements as well as 
available resources to support Ukraine.

    Question. Does the Administration intend to continue depending on 
supplemental budget requests to Congress to keep funding our military, 
economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine?

    Answer. We appreciate the significant supplemental appropriations 
Congress provided to support the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale 
war against Ukraine. We will utilize all available funding to address 
the highest needs and continue to work with other donors to leverage 
additional support to help meet Ukraine's needs, including its 
security, humanitarian, and economic assistance needs. Given the 
fluidity of the situation on the ground, we will continue to assess 
requirements and available resources to meet those needs.

    Question. Rebuilding Ukraine is a project that must begin now, even 
before the fighting stops. What role do you believe the United States 
should play in rebuilding Ukraine?

    Answer. Ukraine will lead its recovery, but the United States must 
play a crucial role in supporting these efforts. Diplomatically, we 
will continue to engage with Allies and partners, including in the G7, 
on supporting Ukraine's recovery. We will continue to support 
engagement by multilateral development banks, and we will continue to 
engage with the private sector on opportunities to help Ukraine rebuild 
and modernize. We will use the assistance resources provided to us by 
Congress to contribute to this historic effort to help Ukraine and its 
people recover from Russia's war and continue their European path.

    Question. What role does the U.S. expect the European Union to play 
in the reconstruction of Ukraine?

    Answer. We will continue to partner with the European Union (EU) in 
supporting Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. The EU has made 
substantial commitments of economic support, including =18 billion for 
budget support through 2023. We anticipate that EU engagement will 
deepen as Ukraine continues its path to EU membership, particularly on 
supporting the Government of Ukraine's efforts to enact reforms, ensure 
macro-financial stability, and repair or modernize its infrastructure. 
We will coordinate closely with the EU, including through a G7 multi-
donor coordination platform, to ensure that we advance our mutual 
goals.

    Question. When the reconstruction of Ukraine begins in earnest, how 
does the State Department expect to financially contribute?

    Answer. We are still in the process of evaluating potential 
reconstruction needs given the fluidity of the situation on the ground. 
The U.S. effort will include working with Ukraine and other donors to 
develop a comprehensive framework of reconstruction and reform 
requirements and resourcing needs. The United States will continue to 
stand with Ukraine, work with allies to burden share in reconstruction 
efforts, and use resources responsibly to advance U.S. foreign policy 
goals.

    Question. Do you anticipate the need for supplemental budget 
requests to fund reconstruction of Ukraine?

    Answer. We continue to work within the interagency and with the 
Government of Ukraine and other donors to assess funding needs for 
Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. Given the fluidity of the 
situation on the ground, we continuously assess requirements and 
available resources to meet those needs, to include burden sharing with 
allies. The President would determine if another supplemental budget 
request is needed in order to continue supporting Ukraine in defending 
and rebuilding its country.

    Question. Does the Administration support the concept of 
confiscating or repurposing frozen Russian sovereign assets, in 
coordination with an international coalition, in order to support 
Ukraine?

    Answer. The Administration supports exploring all legally available 
options, in coordination with Allies and partners, that would ensure 
that Russia pays for the damage it has caused, including to Ukraine's 
critical infrastructure. With our G7 partners, we stated our 
determination, consistent with our respective legal systems, that 
Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized 
until there is a resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's 
violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    Question. Has the Government of Ukraine ever conveyed support for 
using frozen Russian sovereign funds to support in meetings with U.S. 
officials?

    Answer. The Government of Ukraine has conveyed its support publicly 
and in meetings with U.S. officials for careful consideration of all 
options that would ensure that Russia pays for the damage it has caused 
to Ukraine, including using frozen Russian sovereign funds to rebuild 
Ukraine.

    Question. Have any other Allies or partners expressed interest in 
using frozen Russian sovereign assets in order to support Ukraine?

    Answer. Along with our G7 partners and consistent with our 
respective legal systems, we stated our determination that Russia's 
sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until 
there is a resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's violation 
of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Together with our 
Allies and partners, we are exploring legally available options for 
using frozen Russian sovereign assets to help pay for Ukraine's long-
term reconstruction.

    Question. Has the Department conveyed any opinion or position on 
using frozen Russian sovereign assets in order to support Ukraine?

    Answer. We have stated our determination, with G7 partners, that 
Russian sovereign assets will remain immobilized until there is a 
resolution to the conflict that addresses Russia's violation of 
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any resolution to the 
conflict must ensure Russia pays for the damage it has caused.

    Question. Does the Executive Branch currently possess the 
authorities to confiscate or redirect frozen sovereign assets to 
Ukraine? If so, what are those authorities?

    Answer. The Executive Branch possesses a number of tools to support 
Ukraine and hold Russia to account, including section 1708 of the 
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. M, P.L. 
117-328), which provides for the Department of Justice to transfer 
certain forfeited Russian assets to the Department of State for use in 
Ukraine, our general asset forfeiture authorities, and our broad array 
of sanctions authorities. We value the tools that Congress has provided 
us, and we are considering all available options to make the most 
effective use of these tools.

    Question. Would a permissive authority allowing the USG to 
confiscate Russian sovereign assets and direct them to Ukraine increase 
or decrease U.S. leverage over Russia?

    Answer. The Executive Branch possesses a number of tools to support 
Ukraine and hold Russia to account, including section 1708 of the 
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. M, P.L. 
117-328), which provides for the Department of Justice to transfer 
certain forfeited Russian assets to the Department of State for use in 
Ukraine, our general asset forfeiture authorities, and our broad array 
of sanctions authorities. We value the tools that Congress has provided 
us and we are considering all available options to make the most 
effective use of these tools.

    Question. Embassy Issues in Europe: For the last few years, two of 
the U.S.-sponsored Voluntary National Contribution positions at NATO 
have been given to U.S. foreign service officers who are China experts. 
The U.S. has purposefully made the decision to devote these two 
positions to China-watchers with the goal of raising NATO's level of 
knowledge about China. We now understand that despite the acute need 
for a better understanding of China in NATO, and NATO's recent move to 
spend more time and energy on confronting the China question, the State 
Department has made the decision that these two positions will no 
longer be filled by China hands. Why was this decision made?

    Answer. The Department is working to identify resources to renew 
these two Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) positions on NATO 
international staff since they were previously established with 
temporary resources.

    Question. Does the State Department believe that this staffing 
decision is in line with the National Security Strategy's stated goal 
``to align our efforts [on China] with our network of allies and 
partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause''?

    Answer. The Department is working to identify resources to renew 
these two Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) positions on NATO 
international staff since they were previously established with 
temporary resources.

    Question. Over the past several years, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow 
has had its staff severely reduced by actions taken by the Russian 
Government. Please provide an update on the staffing situation, 
including the Russian Federation's provision of diplomatic visas for 
U.S. foreign service officers, at Embassy Moscow.

    Answer. The embassy continues to face staffing and other challenges 
as the result of Russian actions, including the ongoing impasse with 
the Russians on diplomatic visas.
    Together with the embassy team and Washington, I am committed to 
strengthening our mission's operations, and, where possible, engaging 
with the Russian Government to seek practical solutions to enable the 
mission to continue its important diplomatic work.

    Question. Please provide an update on the staffing situation at the 
Russian Federation's Embassy in the United States, including 
consulates.

    Answer. The Russian Federation maintains a diplomatic presence at 
its embassy in Washington, DC and two consulates in New York City and 
Houston. The Russian Federation also maintains a presence at its UN 
Mission in New York City.

    Question. Has the Russian embassy's staffing in the United States 
now been reduced to match the low level of staffing at the U.S. Embassy 
in Moscow?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow remains understaffed, as a 
result of actions taken by the Russian Government. We continue to 
engage the Russian Government over diplomatic visas to address our 
staffing needs. We remain focused on a better balance in our respective 
staffing postures.

    Question. INDO-PACIFIC--Mission China: Your FY 2024 budget requests 
asks for an increase of 69 locally employed staff for our Mission in 
China. What is the rationale behind these increases?

    Answer. The FY 2024 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) 
request includes $2.3 million for an additional 69 locally employed 
staff in the Indo-Pacific region to align support staff with the 
growing numbers of new initiatives and U.S. direct hire positions. Of 
the 69 positions, 11 would be allocated to Mission China to support 
management functions in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. The FY 2024 
budget rollout slide deck incorrectly asserts that all positions 
support Mission China operations--this was a technical error. 
Additional detail related to this request will be included in EAP 
chapter of the FY 2024 CBJ A-1.

    Question. Is it to fill staffing gaps caused by curtailments of 
Direct Hires during COVID, or challenges recruiting Direct Hires to go 
to China?

    Answer. Neither. This was in error. The FY 2024 budget rollout 
slide deck incorrectly asserts that all 69 locally employed staff 
positions support Mission China operations. The FY 2024 Bureau of East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) request includes $2.3 million for an 
additional 69 locally employed staff in the Indo-Pacific region to 
align support staff with the growing numbers of new initiatives and 
USDH positions. Of the 69 positions, 11 would be allocated to Mission 
China to support management functions in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. 
Additional detail will be included in the EAP chapter of the FY 2024 
CBJ A-1.

    Question. How is the Department vetting these individuals?

    Answer. Like all U.S. missions abroad, Mission China may appoint 
locally employed staff (LE staff) only after completion of a thorough 
background investigation (to include collaboration with the host 
government, as appropriate) and security certification process. Each 
case is reviewed by a regional security officer for issuance of a final 
security certification. LE staff members are reinvestigated on a 
regular, recurring basis to maintain their security certification.

    Question. What safeguards are you taking with respect to 
counterintelligence concerns, including LE Staff who may be forced or 
pressured by the PRC Government to do things they do not want to do?

    Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Office of 
Counterintelligence (DS/CI) created a dedicated counterintelligence 
(CI) unit within Embassy Beijing's Regional Security Office (RSO). DS/
CI and the Beijing CI unit are responsible for measures against CI 
threats from foreign intelligence services targeting Mission China 
personnel, information, and facilities. They are supported by 
Washington-based investigative, analytical, and program staff. Mission 
China issued guidance to LE Staff on what to do if approached by PRC 
security officials, instructing them to report interactions to the RSO.

    Question. China/Indo-Pacific: The Department has asked for $2 
billion in mandatory spending for the Indo-Pacific region and $2 
billion for hard infrastructure, but did not propose offsets. Do you 
support cutting funding from somewhere else--including domestic 
spending--to ensure that these foreign policy priorities are funded 
properly?

    Answer. The Department continues to stand by all elements included 
in the FY 2024 President's budget request, both on the mandatory and 
discretionary sides. It is critical that these foreign assistance 
investments are made in order to for us to effectively compete with the 
PRC globally. We are not providing specific offsets attached to this 
proposal, as the Administration has proposed offsets as a whole across 
the FY 2024 President's budget.

    Question. Please provide at least 5 examples of projects or 
initiatives you would like to support through this $2 billion in 
mandatory funding.

    Answer. Funding will support competitive connectivity in the Indo-
Pacific, making economies more connected and resilient through 
transformative investments in emerging technologies, supply chains, and 
transportation. Programs will advance a robust regional approach to 
secure Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) digital technology and other 
secure, high-standard technologies that provide like-minded 
alternatives to the PRC's predatory and coercive economic practices. 
Funding will also enable the United States to coordinate strategic 
investments with likeminded partners and incentivize lasting 
commitments from host governments that advance longer-term, deeper 
cooperation in countries most at risk of coercion and predatory 
influence.

    Question. Your proposal includes $2 billion in a new revolving fund 
for Development Finance Corporation (DFC) equity investments. There is 
bipartisan support for using the DFC to advance a credible U.S. 
economic policy and counter bad investments by China. Unfortunately, 
the Biden administration has turned it into an organization to advance 
progressive policy priorities like climate and gender--including a 
mandate that the DFC cannot work on natural gas projects, causing many 
U.S. partners to turn to dirty coal from China. What reason do we have 
to believe that the Administration will not use this new ``revolving 
fund'' towards the same ends?

    Answer. Being able to make equity investments helps DFC offer an 
attractive and viable alternative to potential partners in markets 
where the PRC is often active. The proposed revolving equity fund would 
enable DFC to reinvest returns from its initial investments to provide 
the higher value investments that host countries would prefer, an 
important tool in our strategy to outcompete the PRC. DFC would use 
these resources to support critical private sector projects consistent 
with applicable investment policies, and natural gas projects would not 
be categorically excluded from receiving support.

    Question. Infrastructure/PGII: The Department is seeking $2 billion 
in mandatory funds for ``hard'' infrastructure and another $250 million 
in discretionary funds, which would go to Project for Infrastructure 
and Investment (PGII) projects on climate and gender equity. Do you 
support cutting domestic spending to offset the costs of this line item 
and to ensure this national security priority is actually funded?

    Answer. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment 
(PGII) was launched by the G7 to offer a credible alternative for 
financing of high-quality infrastructure in emerging markets. These 
investments across discretionary and mandatory funding will allow us to 
advance strategic, capital-intensive, and multi-year hard 
infrastructure projects necessary to effectively outcompete China. We 
are not providing specific offsets attached to this proposal as the 
Administration has proposed offsets as a whole across the FY 2024 
President's budget.

    Question. If the mandatory funding does not materialize, will you 
prioritize ``hard'' infrastructure over climate and gender projects to 
advance competition with China?

    Answer. The foreign assistance levels in the FY 2024 President's 
budget request will be critical for us to effectively compete with the 
PRC. We cannot succeed by taking a piecemeal approach. The requested $2 
billion in mandatory funding is necessary to advance strategic, 
capital-intensive, multi-year infrastructure projects--such as undersea 
fiberoptic cables and 5G networks--that would otherwise be lost to 
geostrategic competitors. Project for Infrastructure and Investment 
(PGII) resources are needed to further level the playing field in 
digital connectivity and security, climate, clean energy supply chains, 
and energy security sectors.

    Question. Will you state publicly that the purpose of PGII is focus 
on hard infrastructure? I have been told privately in writing that this 
is the case, and members of the State Department have also stated this 
on briefing calls with SFRC staff. However, the Administration 
continues to emphasize the prioritization of climate, gender, etc. in 
its public messaging.

    Answer. Fundamentally, PGII aims to support the infrastructure 
investments our partners are seeking. While some of this funding may be 
used for projects that have co-benefits to our energy security work and 
advance gender equity goals, the majority would be used for a variety 
of strategic infrastructure projects including trusted information and 
communications technology networks, connective transportation corridors 
and hubs, as well as agriculture-related infrastructure and health 
systems.

    Question. Please provide at least 5 examples of projects or 
initiatives you would like to support through this $2 billion in 
mandatory funding.

    Answer. Mandatory infrastructure funding will focus on advancing 
specific hard infrastructure projects that are highly strategic, 
including fiberoptic cables and 5G networks with trusted vendors; ports 
and railroads connecting critical minerals to Western markets; and 
vaccine manufacturing. For example, we are looking to build out the 
Lobito Corridor--a rail linkage that would be the only non-PRC 
infrastructure connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo's copper 
and cobalt belt with global markets through Angola. PGII is seeking to 
layer additional investments in digital, energy, agribusiness, and 
other areas to maximize the economic and development impacts for both 
the U.S. and the local partners.

    Question. MIDDLE EAST--Strategic Competition: Our longstanding 
Middle East partners are increasingly seeking to diversify their 
defense and diplomatic relationships in a manner that is often 
inconsistent with U.S. national security objectives. These partners 
point to Biden administration Iran policies, overly restrictive arms 
sales, the pivot to the Asia Pacific, the Afghanistan withdrawal, and a 
lukewarm embrace of the Abraham Accords as evidence of a U.S. retreat 
from the region and a reason to diversify relationships with Russia and 
China. How do you address these concerns and ensure the primacy of the 
United States as the partner of choice in the Middle East?

    Answer. Our affirmative agenda of regional engagement is anchored 
by work with partners to mitigate food insecurity, address climate 
change, enhance maritime security, and cooperatively bolster air and 
missile defense. We also working vigorously to advance regional 
integration through the Negev Forum and to broaden, deepen, and expand 
the Abraham Accords. We continue to advance robust, purposeful defense 
cooperation with our partners to meet their security requirements. Our 
partners strongly prefer U.S. military equipment while PRC sales to the 
region remain comparatively modest.

    Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle 
East, what are the implications for U.S. interests?

    Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as 
the partner of choice across the Middle East. Russia and the PRC 
continue to support malign state and non-state actors that fuel unrest 
throughout the region. They shield Tehran from accountability for its 
support for the Houthis, and Russia's Wagner mercenaries are 
responsible for atrocities in Syria and Libya that have fed instability 
more widely in Africa. De-escalation and diplomacy together with 
deterrence have been at the core of the Biden administration's approach 
to the Middle East.

    Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle 
East, what are the implications for global energy commons?

    Answer. The Middle East's energy industry is dominated by national 
oil companies that operate largely independently of foreign powers. 
While some are seeking to expand relationships with China, Middle 
Eastern countries maintain longstanding ties with U.S. companies and 
look to U.S. and other western companies for innovative technologies. 
The United States remains the top global producer and a key exporter of 
oil, gas, and energy technologies, and is contributing to ensuring 
global energy markets are stable.

    Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle 
East, what are the implications for the generational struggle against 
terrorism?

    Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as 
the partner of choice across the Middle East. The United States remains 
committed to working with our allies and partners to reduce tensions 
and build governing and security structures strong enough to withstand 
and combat the spread of terrorism in the Middle East. Russia is 
focused on its war of aggression against Ukraine and the PRC has yet to 
show the willingness to constructively combat the threat of terrorism. 
At the same time, both Russia and the PRC are strengthening their ties 
to Iran, the single-most destabilizing force in the region and largest 
sponsor of global terrorism.

    Question. Should Russia and China establish dominance in the Middle 
East, what are the implications for human rights?

    Answer. Neither Russia nor China is displacing the United States as 
the partner of choice across the Middle East, and both work at cross-
purposes to our own efforts to address human rights concerns. This 
includes the genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and 
refoulement of Uyghurs to the PRC. Russia's support for Syria and Iran 
contributes to regime violence against their own citizens, and against 
civilians in Yemen through Tehran's support for the Houthis. Russia's 
Wagner mercenaries are responsible for atrocities in Syria and Libya 
and have fed instability more widely in Africa.

    Question. Iran: On February 20, 2023, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) announced Iran has developed uranium enriched to 
84 percent, just short of weapon-grade uranium. Does the Administration 
continue to maintain a policy to ensure Iran will never acquire or 
develop nuclear weapons?

    Answer. Yes, President Biden is absolutely committed to ensuring 
Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

    Question. If Iran crosses the 90 percent threshold of uranium 
enrichment, how is the Administration prepared to respond?

    Answer. We remain absolutely committed to ensuring Iran never 
acquires a nuclear weapon. We are preparing for all possible 
contingencies, including the possibility Iran will cross the 90 percent 
threshold, in full coordination with Israel and our other partners and 
allies.

    Question. If Iran crosses the 90 percent threshold of uranium 
enrichment, is the Administration prepared to respond militarily?

    Answer. The President is absolutely committed to ensuring that Iran 
never acquires a nuclear weapon, and we believe diplomacy is the best 
way to accomplish this goal. President Biden has been clear that we 
have not removed any option from the table.

    Question. What discussions has the Biden administration had with 
the Israelis on what Iranian nuclear non-compliance would merit a 
military response? If we haven't had these discussions, why not?

    Answer. There is no greater supporter of Israel's security than 
President Biden. We are preparing for all possible contingencies in 
full coordination with our partners and allies, including Israel.

    Question. What support is the United States prepared to provide to 
Israel in the event of a military response to Iranian nuclear non-
compliance?

    Answer. There is no greater supporter of Israel's security than 
President Biden, and he is absolutely committed to ensuring Iran never 
acquires a nuclear weapon. We are preparing for all possible 
contingencies in full coordination with our partners and allies, 
including Israel.

    Question. What discussions has the United States had with the other 
signatories of the JCPOA, particularly the E3, on what Iranian nuclear 
non-compliance would trigger snapback at the UN under UNSCR 2231?If we 
haven't had these discussions, why not?

    Answer. We remain greatly concerned by Iran's continued expansion 
of its nuclear activities and are in close contact with our allies and 
partners, including the E3, on these and related matters, including the 
snapback mechanism under UNSCR 2231. We will continue to vigorously 
implement and enforce U.S. sanctions and the provisions of UNSCR 2231, 
in close coordination with our European allies.

    Question. The growing alignment between Iran, Russia, and China 
raises concerns for regional deterrence and global strategic 
competition. What specific steps is the Administration taking to drive 
a wedge between Russia and Iran and discourage continued cooperation?

    Answer. Iran and Russia's deepening security partnership continues 
to be a grave concern. This partnership poses a threat not just to 
Ukraine, but to Iran's neighbors in the region. We have shared this 
information with partners in the Middle East and around the world.
    We continue to counter, expose, and disrupt this defense 
cooperation, including through the imposition and enforcement of 
sanctions as well as export controls and by monitoring Iran's material 
support for Russia. We remain very focused on this issue.

    Question. How is the Administration investigating export control 
gaps for Iranian drones used in Ukraine, which reportedly have key 
parts developed by American companies?

    Answer. The Administration has undertaken a broad interagency 
process to ensure we can counter, expose, and disrupt Iran's transfer 
of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine and will continue to take 
steps necessary to fill any gaps. So far, we have imposed restrictions 
on five individuals with a U.S.-designated Iranian company responsible 
for UAV design and designated seven Iranian UAV producers. 
Additionally, Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations to 
impose new export control measures on Iran.

    Question. Why does the Administration continue issuing nuclear 
project waivers to Rosatom, a Russian state-owned enterprise involved 
in the invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. Earlier this year, I issued a waiver to enable third 
parties to facilitate certain nuclear nonproliferation- and safety-
related activities with Iran that remain in the U.S. national interest, 
irrespective of the JCPOA, including operations, training, and services 
related to Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1. I decided to exclude 
from the waiver the construction of additional reactor units at Bushehr 
to ensure the waiver is tailored narrowly to achieving U.S. 
nonproliferation and nuclear safety objectives.

    Question. How does the Administration plan to prevent sanctions 
evasion through Russian and Iranian oil sales to China and other 
countries?

    Answer. The PRC is Iran's largest oil customer. We have continued 
to enforce our sanctions against Iran, including targeting of PRC-based 
entities engaged in sanctions evasion. For example, on March 9 we 
designated a ``shadow banking'' network of 39 entities across multiple 
jurisdictions, including the PRC, for facilitating transactions worth 
tens of billions of dollars annually for the Iranian regime.

    Question. The Iranian ``ghost armada'' has grown from approximately 
60 to over 300 vessels during the Biden administration. What specific 
steps is the Biden administration taking to counter illicit sales of 
Iranian oil to China, laundering Russian oil on international markets, 
and illicit sales to other countries?

    Answer. The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State have 
imposed sanctions on 150 entities and individuals across multiple 
jurisdictions involved in the production, sale, and transfer of Iranian 
petroleum and petrochemical products abroad under this Administration. 
We have sanctioned 41 vessels linked to Iran that were engaged in 
sanctions evasion, particularly petrochemical sales. We also sanctioned 
39 ``shadow banking'' entities across multiple jurisdictions for 
facilitating illicit sales and transport of Iranian petrochemical and 
petroleum products.

    Question. Do you support expediting Israel's request for KC-46 
aerial refueling tanker aircraft to strengthen deterrence against Iran?

    Answer. The U.S. commitment to Israel's security is ironclad, and 
assisting Israel in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-
defense capability is vital to U.S. national interests. Unfortunately, 
defense industrial capacity challenges are impacting schedules across 
many of our programs, and we also need to consider U.S. Air Force 
readiness requirements in determining our delivery schedule. We are 
working with the Government of Israel to identify interim solutions to 
meet its aerial refueling needs.

    Question. How does the Administration plan to replenish munitions 
stored in Israel from the drawdown of support to Ukraine?

    Answer. The U.S. commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. For 
questions on strategic planning of pre-positioned war reserve stocks, I 
would refer you to the Department of Defense.

    Question. Arab-Israeli normalization through the Abraham Accords 
has had many economic, social, and security benefits. The Negev Forum, 
which builds on the Abraham Accords, presents an opportunity to further 
increase normalization benefits and incentivize other countries to join 
the Abraham Accords. How does the Administration plan to encourage 
expanding the membership of the Abraham Accords?

    Answer. The Administration is strongly encouraging countries across 
the region to normalize their relations with Israel, as well as to join 
multilateral initiatives like the Negev Forum where they can benefit 
from cooperation among members, including Israel. We will continue to 
work closely with governments who have joined the Abraham Accords and 
the Negev Forum to support these bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives, as well as work with the private sector, non-profits, and 
other organizations to identify new opportunities to expand cooperation 
with Israel.

    Question. How can the Administration amplify the success of the 
Abraham Accords?

    Answer. The Administration strongly supports the Abraham Accords 
and normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the Arab 
and Muslim worlds. I regularly work with our partners across the region 
to highlight the significant benefits of the Abraham Accords and expand 
normalization to new countries. I also amplify the Abraham Accords by 
working to support multilateral initiatives like the Negev Forum and 
I2U2, demonstrating the benefits of Arab-Israeli cooperation to 
populations across the broader region.

    Question. How will the Administration encourage economic relations 
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?

    Answer. Just last month, Israel and the UAE signed a comprehensive 
free trade pact--the first between an Arab country and Israel, with 
trade surpassing $3 billion in 2022. Bahrain and Israel also have a 
bilateral trade agreement that has generated a similar growth in trade. 
We are building on this already significant economic cooperation with 
Israel and expanding it to the broader region through multilateral 
initiatives like I2U2, the Negev Forum, and Project Prosperity.

    Question. How will the Administration encourage social relations 
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?

    Answer. We are working to enhance people-to-people initiatives 
between Israel and other countries in the region, leveraging ongoing 
work through frameworks such as the Negev Forum Education and 
Coexistence and Tourism Working Groups. Our team is also engaged with 
religious institutions, non-profits, and the private sector to 
encourage the development of non-governmental initiatives that promote 
religious and cultural understanding and strengthen people-to-people 
ties.

    Question. How will the Administration encourage security relations 
among Abraham Accords/Negev Forum participants?

    Answer. Israel's integration into the region and its strong 
partnerships with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, in addition to its 
longstanding relationships with Egypt and Jordan, has created important 
new opportunities to enhance regional security and stability. I consult 
regularly with the Department of Defense to ensure our efforts mutually 
reinforce regional security cooperation. I continue to press for deeper 
security cooperation between Israel and its neighbors through bilateral 
initiatives and multilateral constructs such as the Negev Forum 
Regional Security Working Group.

    Question. Saudi Arabia has expressed a willingness to normalize 
relations with Israel in exchange for changes in U.S. policy to include 
a security commitment and non-standard 123 agreement. What concrete 
steps is the Administration taking to reach agreement on these issues 
and add Saudi Arabia to the circle of friends with Israel?

    Answer. The United States strongly supports Israel's integration 
into the Middle East, including normalized relations with Saudi Arabia. 
The Administration's engagement already has resulted in critical steps 
like the opening of Saudi airspace to flights to and from Israel. The 
Administration also supports Saudi Arabia's clean energy transition. 
The United States commenced negotiations with Saudi Arabia in 2012 to 
establish a peaceful nuclear cooperation (123) agreement. We will 
continue to work with the Kingdom on these goals.

    Question. Syria: What action is the Administration taking to oppose 
normalization between the Assad regime and our Middle Eastern partners?

    Answer. This Administration will not support efforts to normalize 
or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, which we have regularly and vocally 
made clear to our partners and allies. In those discussions, we 
continue to underline the Assad regime's horrific atrocities against 
Syrians, as well as its continuing efforts to deny much of the country 
access to humanitarian aid and security. We also continue to emphasize 
that U.S. sanctions remain in place and that any entity seeking to 
invest in Syria could risk exposure to U.S. sanctions.

    Question. Do you agree the Arab Gas Pipeline, which would supply 
gas to Lebanon via Syria, would be susceptible to diversion by the 
Assad regime?

    Answer. This Administration is focused on maximizing the benefits 
of a potential deal to the Lebanese people--who continue to struggle 
with an acute energy crisis--while minimizing any potential benefit to 
the Assad regime. These agreements could help Lebanon begin to address 
its energy crisis in a sustainable and transparent manner. The 
Administration awaits final details of the project's scope, along with 
the financing details, before we can evaluate any potential risk.

    Question. Do you agree that the Arab Gas Pipeline, if pursued, 
would violate Caesar sanctions? If no, please provide a detailed legal 
explanation.

    Answer. The Administration has not waived Caesar Act sanctions, 
which remain an important tool to press for accountability of the Assad 
regime's atrocious record of human rights abuses. The Administration 
awaits final details of the scope of the project, along with financing 
details. Once those details are finalized, we will be able to evaluate 
the potential sanctions implications.

    Question. How is the Administration working to prevent Syria's 
continuing emergence as a narcotic state through the illegal production 
and distribution of captagon and other illicit substances?

    Answer. The Department is working with interagency colleagues to 
draft an interagency strategy to disrupt and dismantle the captagon 
trade, as required in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA). Several U.S. Government agencies provide support to our law 
enforcement partners in the region including through information 
sharing and capacity building. The Department is also actively working 
with interagency partners to leverage a range of tools to address the 
captagon trade, including sanctions.

    Question. Given Saudi Arabia's dramatic improvement to reduce 
civilian casualties, do you support supplying Saudi Arabia with the 
precision guided missiles (PGM) needed to deter Iran and its proxies, 
such as the Houthis?

    Answer. To bring an end to the conflict, the Administration has 
ended all support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, 
including relevant arms sales. However, the Administration has 
continued to support Saudi Arabia defending its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity against threats from Iranian-supplied forces in 
multiple countries. It remains in the United States' vital national 
interest to help our Gulf partners defend themselves against external 
aggression. However, the Administration has not changed its policy 
against providing offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia.

    Question. Do delays in security assistance to Saudi Arabia open the 
door for strategic competitors like Russia and China to supply Saudi 
Arabia with defense articles?

    Answer. The United States remains Saudi Arabia's partner of choice 
when it comes to defense cooperation. We have a robust system in place 
to prioritize the transfer of certain systems to our partners in a 
manner that best advances U.S. national interests and is consistent 
with U.S. values. In contrast, we assess that Russia's poor military 
performance in Ukraine and growing relationship with Iran will likely 
be deterrents to closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Russia.

    Question. Would the United States be disadvantaged by Russia or 
China supplying defense articles to Saudi Arabia, or any other Middle 
East partner?

    Answer. Neither Russia nor the PRC is displacing the United States 
as the security partner of choice in Saudi Arabia or across the Middle 
East. We continue to maintain robust defense cooperation with our 
partners in the region while PRC sales to the region remain 
comparatively miniscule. The United States raises its concerns with 
Middle Eastern partners over the potential costs and liabilities 
inherent in acquiring defense technology from suppliers in the PRC and 
Russia.

    Question. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA: Have terrorism threats to South 
and Central Asia increased since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan 
in August 2021?

    Answer. The threat of terrorism from Afghanistan remains high and 
the State Department has issued a level four travel advisory asking 
U.S. citizens not to travel to Afghanistan. Terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan pose a threat to countries in the region. The United States 
continues to press the Taliban to uphold their counterterrorism 
commitments and works with countries in the region to counter terrorist 
threats. President Biden has made clear that when the Taliban fail to 
remove terrorist threats, then the United States will do so, as it did 
with Ayman al-Zawahiri.

    Question. The United States does not currently provide any security 
assistance to Pakistan. Given the withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
credible reports of terrorists harbored in Afghanistan, should the 
United States re-visit security assistance to Pakistan?

    Answer. We share Pakistan's concern over the ability of terrorists 
to operate from Afghanistan. While large-scale military grant 
assistance remains suspended, the Department continues to support 
Pakistani counterterrorism efforts, including through the Bureau of 
Counterterrorism-funded Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, INL 
support to police and the Frontier Corps, and foreign military and 
direct commercial sales. The March U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism 
Dialogue furthered cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.

    Question. What conditions must be met for the United States to 
restart security assistance to Pakistan?

    Answer. While we do not envision a return to large-scale military 
grant assistance to Pakistan in the near term, we continue to work 
closely with our Pakistani counterparts to expand cooperation in areas 
of shared security interests. These include counterterrorism, border 
security, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and maritime security. 
Recent engagements, including the February mid-level defense dialogue 
and March counterterrorism dialogue, as well as our continued support 
for Pakistan's F-16 program, illustrate our robust collaboration in 
these areas.

    Question. Please explain the justification for more than tripling 
the South and Central Asia regional foreign military finance budget.

    Answer. The Department has consistently requested a robust foreign 
military financing (FMF) budget for the South and Central Asia (SCA) 
region. The FY 2024 FMF request for the SCA region is comparable to 
prior years' request level, including the FY 2022 $50 million request. 
The FY 2024 FMF request reflects the Department's commitment to the 
Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Central Asia security 
objectives.

    Question. What is the difference between the ``Central Asia 
Regional'' FMF and the ``South and Central Asia Regional'' FMF?

    Answer. ``Central Asia Regional'' foreign military financing (FMF) 
is requested for the Central Asia countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. ``South and Central Asia 
Regional'' FMF is requested in support of security goals in the Indo-
Pacific and will likely benefit Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka. However, all countries in the SCA region may benefit depending 
on the requirements in the year of execution.

    Question. How will you ensure the $122.9 million in economic 
support fund (ESF) for Afghanistan will not be diverted by the Taliban?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID conduct regular and 
rigorous analysis by third-party contract organizations and 
international NGOs to prevent diversion and ensure that assistance 
reaches the intended beneficiaries. Implementing partners must comply 
with robust financial and programmatic monitoring, reporting, and 
compliance mechanisms, as enumerated by both the Department's standard 
terms and conditions for federal awards as well as consistent with U.S. 
laws and regulations. Through this, we can identify attempted diversion 
and suspend or terminate programs, if necessary.

    Question. Afghanistan was listed among ``major drug transit or 
major illicit drug producing countries'' for Fiscal Year 2023. Why does 
the budget request cut international narcotics and law enforcement 
(INCLE) funds?

    Answer. The FY 2024 INCLE request for Afghanistan is reduced due to 
the changed operating environment and adjustments to the type and scale 
of programs we have in Afghanistan. The Department has sufficient 
prior-year INCLE funds to support some programs such as 
counternarcotics programs focusing on alternative development, drug 
demand reduction, and crop monitoring and analysis--without going 
through or benefiting the Taliban.

    Question. Pakistan was listed among ``major drug transit or major 
illicit drug producing countries'' for Fiscal Year 2023. Why does the 
budget request cut INCLE funds?

    Answer. Pakistan remains a major transit country for the southern 
trafficking route of narcotics from Afghanistan. The FY 2023 INCLE 
request for Pakistan takes into consideration programming needs, 
operating environment, and prior year funds to adequately support 
Pakistan's counternarcotics efforts. Beyond counternarcotics, Pakistan 
INCLE funds also support projects in the justice, law enforcement, 
corrections, and gender sectors.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What is the State Department and the Coordinator for 
Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Team doing to ensure that our Afghan 
allies are receiving timely assistance for asylum claims?

    Answer. Individuals in the United States may apply for asylum 
regardless of country of nationality or current immigration status. 
Asylum claims are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS). We would direct asylum-related questions to USCIS.

    Question. What is preventing the State Department and the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Team from more rapidly 
assisting our Afghan allies with asylum claims?

    Answer. Asylum claims are adjudicated by U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). We would direct asylum-related questions 
to USCIS.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. The State Department recently changed expected wait time 
for passport processing. Processing times went from the typical 6-9 
weeks for a routine application to 10-13 weeks. Currently, the 
expedited processing takes 7-9 weeks. How many U.S. citizens have 
missed their trips due to the State Department's delay in processing 
passports since January?

    Answer. We do not collect or verify data on the number of U.S. 
citizens who may have potentially missed their trip. From January 1 to 
April 6, our staff served more than 269,000 customers with emergency or 
urgent travel at our counters and issued over 4.7 million passports for 
customers who applied through the mail. We strongly recommend customers 
apply early, and by mail or at an acceptance facility, and undertake 
public messaging campaigns to this effect.

    Question. What is your strategy to address the current backlog and 
extended wait times for passport processing?

    Answer. We are making every effort to tackle unprecedented demand 
for passports. CA has instituted an ``all hands on deck'' posture 
requiring passport headquarters staff and field managers to adjudicate 
applications, authorized over 30,000 overtime hours a month, and 
recruited volunteers, including re-employed annuitants, to work in 
Washington, DC's Satellite Office. We have been aggressively recruiting 
new staff since January 2022 and successfully increased our 
adjudicative staff by more than 100 new employees, with another 170 
candidates in the recruitment pipeline.

    Question. What is your best estimate on when you expect wait times 
to return to normal?

    Answer. Passport processing times historically fluctuate based on 
demand and seasonality. We posted increased processing times most 
recently on March 24 as a result of the unprecedented demand levels 
observed in 2023. If 2023 follows historical patterns, processing times 
may decrease in the fall. We are committed to reducing processing times 
as quickly as possible.

    Question. When did you start bringing on retired employees to help 
address the issues with passport processing?

    Answer. Passport Services began hiring retired Foreign Service 
employees to help adjudicate passport renewal applications in the 
Satellite Office of the Washington Passport Agency in 2019. In FY 2021, 
we obtained delegated authority from OPM to approve reemployment 
without reduction of annuity (a dual compensation waiver) for former 
Civil Service staff with passport adjudication experience to help 
address passport application backlogs in FYs 2022-2023. We are working 
on a request to extend the waiver into FYs 2024-2025 to augment our 
adjudicative capacity.

    Question. How many are currently helping address the backlog?

    Answer. Applications are accepted at our network of over 7,000 
acceptances facilities. More than 1,900 government staff and 2,000 
contract staff are contributing to the Department's processing and/or 
adjudication of passport applications. We also have 20 retirees and 34 
staff from other parts of Consular Affairs providing additional 
assistance at the Satellite Office in DC and across the country at our 
passport agencies and centers. Many other offices are helping with 
recruiting, clearing, onboarding, and training new staff so that we can 
further increase our adjudicative capacity.

    Question. Are additional trainings necessary?

    Answer. Training courses and programs specific to the needs of 
newly-hired staff and returning retirees are already established and 
provided timely as part of onboarding or return to duty. The formal 
new-hire training program is typically completed in the first 2 months 
of duty for new passport specialists. Retirees complete 1-day refresher 
training when returning to the workforce.

    Question. How long do you anticipate needing the assistance of 
these additional workers?

    Answer. We will need to devote additional resources to address the 
passport applications pending adjudication until our adjudicative 
capacity exceeds the volume of incoming new applications. Demand is 
unlikely to begin tapering until we approach the fall, therefore we 
anticipate the assistance of additional workers will be needed until 
processing times decline. We continue to aggressively hire new 
adjudicative staff and are reviewing our staffing levels to ensure we 
can best serve the American public.

    Question. The State Department's budget request for Fiscal Year 
2024 included funding for an additional 164 Foreign Service and 351 
Civil Service personnel. The State Department indicated it would 
allocate the largest shares of these positions, about 204 positions, to 
bolster passport and visa processing. Beyond hiring additional staff, 
what actions does the State Department need to take to address the 
backlog and delays in passport processing?

    Answer. We are maintaining a focus on modernization and efficiency, 
which calls for recruitment and retention of a skilled, dedicated 
workforce. The online passport renewal pilot demonstrated that 
applicants can and want the ability to submit applications from the 
convenience of their homes, without physical forms and mailing. Our 
employees processed applications using this technology both in the 
office and remotely, allowing them to continue to work when adverse 
weather conditions would have previously stopped all processing of 
passport applications.

    Question. According to a 2021 report from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), China owns roughly 384,000 acres of U.S. 
agricultural land. Ownership jumped by 30 percent from 2019 to 2020. 
What national security and food supply chain risks are associated with 
foreign control over U.S. agricultural land by the Government of China?

    Answer. National security concerns stem from the control and 
influence that the PRC can have over companies from the PRC. Risks may 
occur if a vulnerability is created because an investment can shift 
ownership, rights, or control of agricultural lands that are critical 
to United States supply chain resilience and be combined with foreign 
actor actions used to exploit that vulnerability.

    Question. How are you working with the USDA to ensure the purchase 
of U.S. agricultural land by China and other countries does not pose a 
risk to the United States?

    Answer. The State Department does not have any programs in place 
related to the prevention of private land purchases in the United 
States. We would refer you to Treasury on any questions regarding the 
Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS).

    Question. What reporting requirements does the State Department 
currently provide Congress regarding foreign countries purchasing and 
owning agricultural land across our nation?

    Answer. The Department defers to the USDA. The Agricultural Foreign 
Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) of 1978 established a nationwide 
system for the collection of information pertaining to foreign 
ownership in U.S. agricultural land. The regulations require foreign 
investors who acquire, transfer, or hold an interest in U.S. 
agricultural land to report such holdings and transactions to the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The Farm Service Agency (FSA) is responsible 
for the implementation of the law and regulations as they relate to 
foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land.

    Question. Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, 
U.S. Border Patrol Chief Raul Ortiz testified that the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security does not have operational control of the border. 
This assessment is in direct contradiction of Secretary Alejandro 
Mayorkas assertion that we have operational control of the border. Do 
you believe the United States has operational control of the southern 
border?

    Answer. Yes, the United States has operational control of the 
southern border. The Department of State works closely with Mexico on 
issues related to border security and facilitating legitimate trade and 
travel across the U.S.-Mexico border. We also maintain five consulates 
along the border that support these efforts and provide critical 
support for U.S. citizens. I would defer you to the Department of 
Homeland Security for additional information on its agencies' 
operations along the border.

    Question. When is the last time you met with Vice President Harris 
to discuss the crisis on the southern border?

    Answer. Both the office of the Secretary and the Vice President are 
part of a continuous foreign policy process where we hold regular 
discussions on a variety of foreign policy issues in the 
Administration. We share our views on global issues, including humane 
management of irregular migration, through that process.

    Question. U.S. National Security Council Spokesman John Kirby 
recently stated that Poland's decision to send its Soviet-designed 
fighter jets ``doesn't change our calculus with regards to F-16s,'' in 
reference to providing Ukraine with F-16s. How would providing Ukraine 
with F-16s and A-10 Warthogs enhance Ukraine's ability to win the war?

    Answer. As President Biden has said, we are not planning to provide 
F-16s to Ukraine at this time. We are focused on providing Ukraine 
military assistance that can brought to bear rapidly, efficiently, and 
with maximum battlefield effect. We also strongly encourage other 
countries to continue providing the necessary military equipment for 
Ukraine to defend itself against Russia, and we are working to 
facilitate transfers as appropriate.

    Question. What safeguards and accountability mechanisms are in 
place to ensure U.S. assistance to Ukraine is used appropriately and 
going to the intended recipients?

    Answer. The Department of State takes very seriously the obligation 
to ensure appropriate oversight of all assistance as good stewards of 
U.S. resources. The Department of State employs multiple accountability 
safeguards and mechanisms, in conjunction with DoD, USAID, Treasury, 
and the World Bank, and is actively engaged with the Government of 
Ukraine to reinforce our joint commitment to effective oversight. 
Ambassador Brink and her team in Kyiv work in conjunction with 
interagency partners and the Government of Ukraine on accountability 
issues related to all foreign assistance, including budget support and 
security assistance. The World Bank manages budget support assistance 
provided by the United States through its trust funds in accordance 
with its financial control policies. State, USAID, and DoD inspectors 
general have increased the frequency and scope of their oversight 
reporting on U.S. assistance for Ukraine. In addition, State is 
procuring a contract for monitoring, evaluation, and audit services 
that will fund Ukraine-based oversight and produce analyses and 
reports.
    The Department works with DoD to manage military assistance. The 
Government of Ukraine has shown they take the responsibility to 
safeguard arms seriously. We are confident in the Government of 
Ukraine's commitment to appropriately safeguard and account for 
transferred U.S.-origin defense equipment.

    Question. International treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol and 
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), continue to 
define China as a developing country. Do you believe China is a 
developing country?

    Answer. As economic circumstances change in the PRC, the Department 
seeks opportunities to work with like-minded governments to reduce or 
eliminate inappropriate assistance or advantages the PRC might receive 
under agreements and multilateral frameworks. As we work to ensure the 
PRC does not benefit inappropriately, it is important to design 
approaches that will be effective in a particular context without 
inadvertently rallying other countries to support PRC positions.

    Question. What are the differences between the requirements, 
assistance and obligations provided under the UNFCCC for the United 
States versus China?

    Answer. The UNFCCC, which the United States joined in 1994, 
contains various categories of Parties for different purposes, 
including a non-binding emissions aim for so-called ``Annex I'' Parties 
(including the United States). The United States rejected the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, which imposed binding emissions obligations only on 
Annex I Parties. The 2015 Paris Agreement did away with characterizing 
Parties as included (or not included) in Annex I. On the core issue of 
emission reductions, all Parties--including both the United States and 
the PRC--are required to submit ``nationally determined 
contributions,'' update them regularly, and report on their 
implementation. In terms of financial support, the Paris Agreement 
continues the UNFCCC's collective obligations to assist developing 
countries. It does not define ``developing countries,'' an issue that 
is left to the various operating entities that serve the Agreement's 
financial mechanism.

    Question. Are you committed to ensuring future treaties no longer 
define China as a developing country?

    Answer. Treaties vary in how they establish or define categories 
such as ``developing,'' ``least developed,'' ``middle-income,'' or 
``developed'' countries, or whether such categories are even used. 
There is no uniform approach to defining ``developing countries.''
    Therefore, as we seek to ensure that the PRC does not benefit 
inappropriately, it is important to design approaches that will be 
effective in each particular context. The United States will continue 
to build support with other governments for tailored approaches with 
respect to relevant international agreements.

    Question. What is your plan to end China's unfair advantage of 
being mislabeled a developing country in the international community?

    Answer. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to addressing this 
important issue. As we seek to ensure the PRC does not benefit from 
inappropriate assistance, it is important to design approaches that 
will be effective in a particular context and that will not backfire or 
inadvertently rally other countries in support of PRC positions. The 
Department therefore seeks opportunities on a case-by-case basis to 
work with likeminded governments in order to reduce or eliminate 
inappropriate assistance or advantages the PRC might receive under 
particular agreements or multilateral frameworks.

    Question. How much funding has China received from the UNFCCC? 
Please provide the amount of money China received from various UNFCCC 
funding mechanisms, including but not limited to, the Global 
Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least 
Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund established under the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and the Green Climate Fund.

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has received 
approximately $544 million in grants and $100 million in loans from 
funds affiliated with the UNFCCC for climate-related activities. Since 
1991, the PRC received $538 million in grants for single-country 
climate-related activities from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
or roughly 6 percent of finance disbursed by the GEF for climate-
related activities. The PRC also received $5.9 million in grants for 
three projects with the Special Climate Change Fund and $100 million in 
loans for one project with the Green Climate Fund. The PRC has not 
accessed funding from either the Least Developed Countries Fund or the 
Adaptation Fund.

    Question. How much funding has the United States contributed to the 
UNFCCC? Please provide the amount of money the United States provided 
to various UNFCCC funding mechanisms, including but not limited to, the 
Global Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least 
Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund established under the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and the Green Climate Fund.

    Answer. The United States has provided $129.2 million to the UNFCCC 
since 1991. The United States has provided $50 million to the Special 
Climate Change Fund since FY 2010, $158.2 million to the Least 
Developed Countries Fund since FY 2010, $0 to the Adaptation Fund, and 
$1 billion to the Green Climate Fund since FY 2016. The United States 
has also contributed $3.1 billion to the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) since its inception in 1992. As the GEF serves as part of the 
financial mechanism for five multilateral environmental agreements, 
these funds have gone towards projects to deliver global environmental 
benefits for biodiversity, climate change, land degradation, 
international waters, and chemicals and waste.

    Question. How much funding has China received from the Climate 
Investment Funds?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China has not accessed any support 
from the Climate Investment Funds.

    Question. How much funding has the United States contributed to the 
Climate Investment Funds?

    Answer. The United States has contributed $2.95 billion to the 
Climate Investment Funds since their establishment in 2008, comprised 
of $950 million in loan contributions and $2 billion in grant 
contributions.

    Question. How much total funding has the Climate Investment Fund 
received from foreign governments and the private sector?

    Answer. The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund, 
together constituting the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), have received 
a total of $11.5 billion in contributions since their establishment in 
2008. Of this, $8.5 billion has been received from foreign governments. 
Private sector actors do not contribute funds directly to the CIF but 
are recipients of CIF funding via the CIF's multilateral development 
bank implementing partners. The CIF have financed nearly $1.9 billion 
in private sector projects and generated $18.9 billion in private 
sector co-financing across the entire CIF project portfolio.

    Question. As part of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, agreed to by 
the Obama Administration, developed country Parties to the UNFCCC, 
including the United States, committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly 
$100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing 
countries. How much money was ultimately mobilized from 2010 to 2020 by 
the developed country parties?

    Answer. From 2010 to 2020 developed country Parties to the UNFCCC 
have collectively mobilized at least $565.5 billion to support climate 
action in developing countries. This includes finance from bilateral 
channels, multilateral channels (i.e., multilateral development banks 
and multilateral climate funds), and private finance mobilized, noting 
that data is not available on private finance mobilized for 2010, 2011, 
2012, and 2015.

    Question. How much money was mobilized by the United States?

    Answer. From 2010-2020 the United States has reported $24.8 billion 
in climate finance to support climate action in developing countries 
through bilateral channels and contributions to multilateral climate 
funds. In addition, the United States supports climate action in 
developing countries through its contributions to multilateral 
development banks and mobilizing private finance in cooperation with 
partners; these efforts are reported at the collective level rather 
than the individual country level in order to avoid double-counting.

    Question. How much money was appropriated by Congress?

    Answer. All climate finance provided by the United States is 
supported by budget authority appropriated by Congress. We look forward 
to continuing our close collaboration with Congress on financing.

    Question. How much of the total U.S. contribution went to China?

    Answer. Of the climate finance reported by the United States from 
2010-2020, $29.6 million has supported climate action in the PRC. Since 
2018, the United States has not provided any climate finance to the PRC 
through its bilateral efforts.

    Question. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there have been 
several reports of Putin ordering the transfer of Ukrainian children to 
Russia to be adopted and become citizens. What efforts are being taken 
by the State Department to help reunite these vulnerable Ukrainian 
children with their families?

    Answer. The United States is funding research and advocacy programs 
aimed at documenting and exposing Russia's system to forcibly relocate 
and ``re-educate'' Ukrainian children. In addition, we continue to 
raise awareness of Russia's war crimes, maintain the largest sanctions 
regime ever imposed on any country in history, and assist Ukrainian and 
other accountability efforts. Russia's limitation of access to these 
children by outside organizations complicates efforts to reunite them 
with their families, but we remain focused and undeterred.

    Question. How does the Biden administration plan to hold Putin 
accountable for the forced abduction and deportation of Ukrainian 
children?

    Answer. I determined that members of Russia's forces and other 
Russian officials have committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine, 
including deporting Ukrainian children to Russia. We will continue to 
appropriately declassify and publicize the Russian Government's 
actions, support the judicial process in Ukraine, and assist broader 
international investigations and accountability efforts. At the same 
time, we continue to maintain and expand the most extensive sanctions 
regime ever imposed on any country in history.

    Question. What is the best estimate for the number of Ukrainian 
children who have been forcibly deported to Russia?

    Answer. As of April 10, the Ukrainian Government is tracking more 
than 19,544 specific children forcibly transferred and deported to 
Russia, with only 364 returned to their parents or legal guardians to 
date. Some Ukrainian Government estimates put the actual number of 
children forced transfers and deportations as high as 150,000. It is 
hard to determine one single estimate given limited insight into Russia 
and Russia-occupied territory, the opaqueness of Russia's filtration 
operations which can result in deportation, and the number of children 
who are missing.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Secretary Antony Blinken to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. Press Freedom: India and Pakistan: The State Department's 
Human Rights Report was released on March 20--according to the report, 
both India and Pakistan have seen increasing threats on press freedom 
and the report indicates that they are increasingly dangerous places 
for journalists trying to do their jobs. The State Department is not 
alone in sounding the alarm--Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranks 
India at 150 out of 180 and Pakistan at 157 out of 180 in the World 
Press Freedom Index and cites the dangers involved with being a 
journalist in both countries. According to both the Human Rights Report 
and RSF, journalists are subjected to harassment, threats, and even 
death in the course of their work. This is concerning not only for 
freedom of speech but for the overall rule of law in both countries. 
What is the State Department doing to not only promote free speech but 
to protect journalists in both India and Pakistan?

    Answer. The United States regularly consults with India and 
Pakistan at the highest levels on issues impacting the press and free 
speech advocates. I also engage regularly with civil society, tech 
companies, and media outlets on how we can encourage governments to 
uphold international standards and mitigate the impact of regulations 
on freedom of expression.
    The Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau, through the Human 
Rights and Democracy Fund earmark, protects human rights defenders in 
Pakistan through programming that increases the capacity of young 
journalists to hold their governments accountable and builds 
sustainable initiatives to support the next generation of independent 
journalists.

    Question. Israel NGO Legislation: The Israeli Knesset is expected 
to take up a new bill which would require reporting and allow the 
government to impose up to a 37 percent tax on Israeli registered 
organizations receiving more than $50,000 in funding from foreign 
entities like the U.S. NGOs working in the West Bank must register with 
the Israeli Government in order to operate, and this additional 
taxation would be at the discretion of the government. Organizations 
that primarily receive donations from private individuals and not from 
foreign governments would not be impacted. When Egypt, another large 
recipient of U.S. assistance, passed restrictive laws designed to 
weaken NGOs in 2017, the U.S. Government strongly objected to those 
measures. Does the Biden administration have concerns about this 
impending legislation, and if so, has it raised these concerns directly 
with the Israeli Government? If so, what feedback have you received?

    Answer. The United States strongly believes in the importance of 
civil society organizations and the critical role they play in 
defending human rights and supporting peacebuilding efforts. The United 
States has made clear the importance of ensuring that independent civil 
society organizations in the West Bank and Israel are able to continue 
their important work, including by ensuring legitimate organizations do 
not face burdensome economic requirements that make it difficult to 
carry out their work.

    Question. What measures, if any, is the Biden administration 
prepared to take to continue to support work being done by NGOs to 
advance humanitarian efforts and human rights?

    Answer. The U.S. Government strongly believes that respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a strong civil society, are 
critically important to responsible, responsive, and democratic 
governance. This Administration values the advancement of human rights 
along with the human rights violations and abuses monitoring that 
independent NGOs undertake in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and 
elsewhere. The United States continues to engage with the UN, NGOs, and 
international partners to support civil society organizations.

    Question. The Minerals Security Partnership launched last summer 
with the goal to build a framework for developing critical minerals 
with friendly countries, and supporting mining projects with high ESG 
standards. How effective is the MSP at breaking into markets where 
other countries, namely PRC, are already present?

    Answer. Historically, extractive industry business models turned 
into bad deals for landowners, governments, mine workers, and 
communities surrounding mines. The Minerals Security Partnership seeks 
to present a different value proposition by supporting projects along 
the mineral value chain--including extraction, processing, and 
recycling--through financing, promoting high standards for responsible 
mining and processing, and engaging project operators and governments 
to champion projects that benefit all involved. This should give more 
options to countries hosting these resources.

    Question. What does the MSP offer to nations with large deposits of 
critical minerals that makes these partnerships an attractive option?

    Answer. The Minerals Security Partnership shares information among 
partners on minerals projects and develops action plans to support the 
most promising projects through coordinated support including 
financing, promoting high standards for responsible mining and 
processing, and engaging project operators and governments. This should 
generate more options for countries with these resources. We offer a 
different value proposition compared to the PRC and hear repeatedly 
from foreign interlocutors that they would like to have more options 
and more value-added operations in their countries.

    Question. Semiconductor Agreement: Following the agreement between 
the United States, Japan, and Netherlands on semiconductor exports: 
What are the next steps to ensure the PRC is not getting access to the 
most advanced semiconductors?

    Answer. We regularly consult with allies and partners who are 
Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls. 
We will continue to hold regular dialogues with allies and partners to 
discuss technology, supply chain resilience, and ensuring our 
technology is not used to undermine our national security. We will 
continue to evaluate the impacts of the U.S. export controls 
regulations, which were implemented to reduce PRC capabilities in 
supercomputing and advanced semiconductor manufacturing over time.

    Question. The U.S. made this deal with the Netherlands, and not 
with the EU. Many EU countries, like Germany and Belgium, supply parts 
crucial to making semiconductors. How is the U.S. engaging with the 
rest of the EU to safeguard the supply chain?

    Answer. Since 2021, the U.S. and the EU have worked together 
through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to build more 
resilient semiconductor supply chains by sharing information and best 
practices, and by developing a common understanding of semiconductor 
market dynamics.
    Our goal is to avoid subsidy races and market distortions and 
ensure a resilient, sustainable, and innovative semiconductors value 
chain. At the December 2022 TTC, the U.S. and EU announced a joint 
early warning mechanism to address and mitigate semiconductor supply 
chain disruptions.

    Question. Elections are scheduled to take place in Turkey on May 
14. In the lead-up to the elections, the Government of Turkey has 
intensified a media crackdown and sentenced a leading opposition figure 
to prison for just long enough to disqualify him from running. The 
state media agency has begun to heavily sanction and fine Turkish TV 
stations for their coverage of the earthquake and has continued to 
stifle social media, including banning Twitter and a popular forum 
site. There are also concerns over the past performance of the Turkish 
Election Council, which has not addressed irregularities that favor 
Erdogan, and annulled elections not in his favor. What, if anything, is 
the U.S. doing to promote and ensure free and fair elections in Turkey?

    Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Turkiye to be a 
stable, democratic, and prosperous Ally. The Administration regularly 
reinforces the importance of democracy and human rights to our 
bilateral relationship--including free and fair democratic electoral 
processes--and urges the Turkish Government to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. We continue to raise with the government our 
concerns about the Turkish media environment. The United States 
supports a robust election observation mission and plans to contribute 
observers to the upcoming observation mission of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Turkiye's elections.

    Question. Will the U.S. assist in any election monitoring or 
oversight?

    Answer. The United States will contribute 26 short-term observers, 
contingent on availability of funding, to the election observation 
mission in Turkey of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). The mission will include 28 long-term and 350 short-term 
observers from many of the OSCE's 57 participating States.

    Question. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment 
(PGII): During the SFRC Africa and Global Health Policy Subcommittee 
hearing on the FY23 Budget for Africa on July 27, 2022, I emphasized 
the importance of investment in infrastructure. I highlighted President 
Biden's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which he 
had just announced with the G7 and the EU, to fund infrastructure 
projects in developing nations--but this new initiative seems to build 
on a number of existing authorities and pots of money. The FY24 budget 
requests $250 million for PGII--but there are claims that the budget 
``supports more than $50 billion to support PGII,'' and up to $600 
billion over 5 years. Could you please provide a breakdown of the $50 
billion mentioned in the budget request to support the PGII, including 
how much is being pulled from which accounts, how much is ``new'' 
money, and how much is from existing appropriations?

    Answer. The $50 billion for the Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in the President's Budget is an 
attribution of existing resources across the U.S. Government in support 
of our commitments to the G7 initiative. Of this $50 billion, $4.7 
billion is Economic Support Funds (ESF) across State and USAID in the 
following sectors: digital connectivity and cyber security ($296M), 
health systems and health security ($2.1B), gender equity ($209M) and 
climate and energy security ($2.1B). While this funding is not ``new,'' 
it represents programming that is in direct support of the important 
objectives of PGII.

    Question. How does the PGII differ from our previous approaches to 
funding development projects around the world?

    Answer. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment 
(PGII) was launched in partnership with the G7 to offer a credible 
alternative for financing of sustainable, quality infrastructure in 
emerging markets, centered on unlocking public and private capital. In 
particular, PGII is seeking to expand strategic investments in hard and 
virtual infrastructure across clean energy supply chains, trusted ICT 
networks, connective transportation corridors, and resilient health 
systems to create eco-systems of transformative economic corridors and 
development. Through improved collaboration within the U.S. Government 
and with our G7 partners, PGII aims to better deploy our respective 
tools to leverage private capital and advance strategic projects.

    Question. Pakistan: Pakistan's continued human rights abuses are 
troubling. The 2022 Human Rights Report, which spans both the current 
and previous government, finds that ``there was a lack of government 
accountability, and abuses, including corruption and misconduct, often 
went unpunished, fostering a culture of impunity.'' These abuses are 
not confined to a specific government, and are an alarming continued 
trend. Journalists and civil society activists are routinely jailed and 
harassed for trying to do their jobs. How will the U.S. engage with the 
Pakistani Government on the Human Rights Report to encourage meaningful 
reforms and respect for human rights?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages with the Pakistani 
Government, through Pakistan's embassy in Washington and our embassy 
and consulates in Pakistan, on human rights issues, particularly 
religious freedom and freedom of speech and media. We will continue to 
implement programs and initiatives that support Pakistan's capacity to 
curb human rights abuses and promote accountability, while seeking to 
empower vulnerable populations. My senior leadership and I have raised 
human rights concerns with Pakistan's Foreign Minister and with 
Pakistani political leadership in Islamabad. We have emphasized the 
need to allow political space for the opposition.

    Question. Visa Wait Times: Secretary Blinken--As you know, 
international tourism to the U.S. has a significant impact on the 
economy. According to the Department of Commerce, in 2019 roughly 80 
million international travelers visited the United States, contributing 
nearly $240 billion to the U.S. economy. That year, 43 percent of 
international visitors--and $120 billion in spending--came from 
countries where a visa is required to enter the United States. 
Unfortunately, current tourism numbers continue to lag pre-pandemic 
levels. It's clear, however, that the continued slow recovery for 
tourism is at least partially attributable to a severe backlog in the 
processing of U.S. visitor visas. For example, we're seeing unusually 
long delays in the processing of visas for first-time visitors from 
Brazil, India and Mexico. In Brazil, wait times can take up to a year 
and 3 months. The situation is worse in India, where wait times for a 
visa appointment can take up to 2 years and 8 months. According to an 
analysis by economists at the U.S. Travel Association, in 2023, the 
U.S. is projected to lose 6.6 million potential visitors and $11.6 
billion in projected loss spending as a result of likely international 
travelers being unable to obtain a visitor visa to travel to the U.S. 
in a timely manner. In the top three largest markets, Brazil, India and 
Mexico, projected spending losses could total $5.2 billion alone. Given 
the scale of this problem, I want to ask: What action is the State 
Department taking to decrease visa interview wait times and increase 
the economic impact from international visitors?

    Answer. As of April 1, the median global nonimmigrant visa wait 
time for first time applicants was under 2 months, about half of what 
it was in October 2022. Wait times reflect heavy demand for visas; in 
Mexico and Brazil, we issued more visitor visas in FY 2022 than we did 
in FY 2019. The Department is focused on equipping all posts with the 
staffing and resources needed to continue to reduce wait times. Reasons 
for the slow recovery of inbound travel are complex. For example, 
citizens of Visa Waiver Program countries, who make up the majority of 
U.S. tourists, show reduced levels of inbound travel.

    Question. Is the State Department developing a strategy to bolster 
staffing and resources for countries seeing unusually long wait times?

    Answer. The Department is striving to ensure that as many 
adjudicators as possible are assigned to overseas positions in order to 
reach worldwide pre-pandemic staffing by the end of this year. In the 
first quarter of 2023, the Department surged staff to locations with 
long interview appointment wait times for visitor visa applicants, such 
as India and Mexico. Consular officers in some overseas locations are 
remotely adjudicating tens of thousands of interview waiver visas each 
week to support posts with long wait times. Wait times in other visa 
categories, including renewals, are low.

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