[Senate Hearing 118-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-43
COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION:
UKRAINE AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 26, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-759 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
McKee, Hon. Erin, Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC...... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 9
Wallander, Hon. Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Prepared Statement........................................... 15
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 44
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 46
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 51
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 55
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Mitt Romney............................................ 58
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator
Mitt
Romney......................................................... 59
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 61
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator
Todd Young..................................................... 62
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 62
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator John Barrasso.......................................... 63
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by
Senator John Barrasso.......................................... 64
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Bill Hagerty........................................... 66
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by
Senator Bill Hagerty........................................... 68
Letter to Secretary Blinken, Dated August 4, 2020, About Plans To
Nominate a Special Envoy to Belarus............................ 70
(iii)
COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION:
UKRAINE AND BEYOND
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, Chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
Almost 1 year ago, as Vladimir Putin amassed his forces
along the border with Ukraine, most of the world assumed the
Russian military was one of the most powerful on Earth, but for
nearly a year, brave Ukrainians, from army recruits to retired
grandmothers, have exposed just how weak the Kremlin military
really is because a leader who sends his soldiers into battle
with almost no food is weak.
An army that gives its recruits instructions to use their
weapons taken from Wikipedia is weak. Generals using maps from
the 1960s to fight a war in 2022 are weak.
Nothing underscores Putin's weakness more than his reliance
on the Wagner Group of mercenaries, a group that Putin's chef,
a former convict, a man sanctioned by the United States, leads
like a paramilitary death squad, a group recruiting violent
criminals from Russian prisons and sending them into battle as
cannon fodder.
Human Rights Watch documented one incident in the Central
Africa Republic where Wagner mercenaries stopped a group of
unarmed men at a roadblock. As the witness began to pray out
loud, the Russians forced the men to kneel and one by one they
shot them in the head.
These are not just criminals. They are war criminals and
they are leading the fight in Ukraine today for Putin because
Putin is failing spectacularly.
In fact, I am considering legislation to strengthen our
tools to counter the Wagner Group, prohibiting transactions
with those buying their natural resources as well as
restricting security assistance to countries supporting this
mercenary army.
Their reach is growing as Putin gets weaker, and weaker he
gets the more dangerous he gets, the more suffering he causes.
How many civilians will die from Russian missile attacks in
Ukraine because Putin cannot achieve his battlefield goals?
What will Putin do as he gets more desperate? More letter
bombing campaigns in NATO countries? Threats of nuclear war?
Now, I have been supportive of the Administration's
response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, from supplying
critical weapon systems and trainings to shoring up our allies
in Europe to supporting the millions of refugees who have fled
this war, including welcoming so many to the United States.
As I have said all along, this support should have come
sooner. Ukraine's embrace of good governance reforms in the
years leading up to Russia's invasion directly contributed to
the success we are seeing today. While we are still learning
more details, I want to commend President Zelensky and his
cabinet for their serious oversight plans for U.S. and
international assistance.
As I have said since Putin's invasion, and I will say it
again to the Ukrainian people, we will continue to support your
heroic efforts to achieve victory. We will stand with you as
you fight for your homeland against a dictator trying to erase
your nation by force.
We will work with you so that a free and democratic Ukraine
that respects the will and rights of its people survives and
flourishes after this war comes to an end.
We will continue to work with those countries Putin
threatens, from encouraging energy diversification to shoring
up democratic institutions to stop Putin from spreading his
poisonous autocratic savagery, and we must also support those
Russians who are in prison because they are brave enough to
stand up against Putin's war machine.
I am disappointed that the Administration has not met its
statutory deadline to make a determination with respect to
Magnitsky sanctions in response to the arrest of Vladimir Kara-
Murza.
Secretary Nuland, I hope you will tell us when we can get a
response to our letter on this matter. I look forward to
getting a full picture today from this entire panel on what the
Departments of State, Pentagon, USAID, is doing to support
Ukraine and counter future Russian aggression.
In the immediate term, I think there is a question that
needs to be answered, which is what is our strategy for helping
Ukraine achieve victory.
How are we taking lessons from the Ukrainian war to think
about preparing ourselves and our partners for potential
aggression from Russia in the future?
Because while Ukrainians are on the front lines of fighting
for democracy and the rule of law now, we know that Putin's
ambitions do not end on his borders.
The United States and our democratic allies must show the
authoritarian regimes of the world that the invasion and
subjugation of free people is unacceptable in the modern world,
is a violation of the international rule of law, and that is
what is also at stake in Ukraine.
Yes, it is about the freedom of the Ukrainian people to
decide their own future, but it is also to stand up for the
universal proposition that you cannot by force take another
country's territory.
With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member
for his remarks.
Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say I concur in remarks that you have
made and I am going to make some similar remarks along those
lines. I look forward to having a concrete discussion on the
Biden administration's policy toward Russia.
I hope to hear from you how the United States is planning
to do more and faster to help defeat Russia in Ukraine and
counter Russian aggression and malign influence around the
world.
Indeed, we are not the only ones that are hungry for this.
I think if you look around this room and see the attendance
today and see the gaggle of media people out in the hall
shouting questions at us, everyone is hungry for this
discussion and I hope we have a robust discussion on that
today.
It has been almost a year ago now that Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine turned the status quo of international
relations on its head. In response to this bold escalation, the
United States and our allies around the world quickly came to a
consensus that we need to support Ukraine's defense of its
people, territory, and way of life from Russian aggression.
Whenever we have a discussion like this it really ought to
start with a short--very short and brief discussion of how we
got here.
We all know that Ronald Reagan spent 8 years in his
presidency as his top priority bringing down and breaking up
the Soviet Union and pulling those satellite countries away
from Russia.
He was successful. He got that done, and we, as America,
adopted that as our policy. We promoted it. We helped it in
every way we can. One of the things that happened, of course,
was all the countries that were in the orbit of the USSR pulled
away and went on their own way.
That breakup included four countries that had nuclear
weapons at the time. One was Russia, of course, one was
Kazakhstan, one was Belarus, and one was Ukraine.
Obviously, it is also the policy of United States to
contain nuclear weapons and be against proliferation wherever
possible.
On December 5, 1995, the United States sat down in
Budapest, Hungary, with the Ukrainians, with the Brits at the
table and with the Russians at the table, and entered into an
agreement whereby they--that is, all of us--asked the
Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons in return for which
Ukraine would get security for their borders and against an
invasion by any country.
All four of us signed that. The Ukrainians did what they
agreed to do. They gave up their nuclear weapons, and where do
they find themselves in 2022? Facing an invasion by one of the
countries that actually signed that agreement.
We have not only a moral obligation, but a legal obligation
to do what we said we would do on December 5, 1995 and we are
doing that.
Over the past year, extensive discussions have taken place
about how the U.S. and our allies can support Ukraine. That is
the conversation of about every conversation you enter into
here in DC.
However, these discussions get bogged down by fears of
giving Ukraine too much equipment too quickly for fear of
upsetting Moscow.
I am tired of hearing that. Everyone talks about the need
to hand Russia a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but the
Administration's policy stopped short of fully supporting that
goal.
What is missing is a more robust discussion about U.S.
policy toward Russia now and, just as importantly, beyond the
current conflict. Any notion that we can interact with Russia
like we did a year ago was shattered by the invasion, but also
by Russia's noncompliance with the New START treaty and many
other malign actions it has taken around the world.
It has not only soured its relationship with us, it has
soured its relationship with virtually the rest of the planet
with the exception of a half a dozen of what I call no-goodnik
countries that are in league with them.
I expect our witnesses to help us better understand the
Administration's plans to confront all of Russia's malign
influence. It is critical that U.S. foreign policy be informed
by a long-term vision for a future where Russia coexists with
its neighbors and does not threaten to destabilize the
international community.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration has so far not made
clear a concrete policy for how the United States will directly
confront Russia as a strategic adversary.
While Putin has irreversibly tied the fate of his regime to
the outcome of the war in Ukraine, there is so much more to
confronting Russia that the United States must consider.
It is essential that the Biden administration's Russia
policy be characterized by leadership and initiative. I hope
your testimony and responses will be given with a focus on that
overreaching Russia policy today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, let me turn to our witnesses.
A long-time participant with this committee, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland has been a
diplomat for more than 30 years. She started very young. Among
her many accolades she previously led the Europe and Eurasia
Bureau at this--and served as ambassador to NATO and was the
State Department's spokesperson.
We are also joined by USAID's Assistant Administrator in
the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, Erin McKee, our former
ambassador to Papua New Guinea, to the Solomon Islands, and to
the Republic of Vanuatu, who began her career working on the
post-Soviet space.
Finally, we welcome Assistant Secretary Wallander, who has
worked on Russia at the National Security Council in the
Pentagon for many years and has published extensively on Russia
and Europe while outside of government.
Welcome to you all. Your full statements will be included
in the record, without objection.
I would ask that you try to summarize your statements in
about 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee can have
a conversation with you.
With that, Madam Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Risch, distinguished members of this committee.
It is an honor for all of us to join you for this first
hearing of the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are
meeting on Ukraine as we approach the 1-year anniversary, as
you both said.
First, let me thank this committee, the entire Congress,
for your continued strong bipartisan support for Ukraine's
battle for its sovereignty, indeed, its very right to exist.
The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for
security, economic, humanitarian support that you approved in
December for FY23 confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic,
teacher, and electricity technician that America stands with
them and we stand with them in saying ``no'' to a vicious
autocrat trying to redraw the maps of their country by force
and ``no'' to any others around the world with similar
ambitions, because Ukraine's fight, as you have both said, is
about so much more than Ukraine. It is about the world that our
children and our grandchildren will inherit.
Since I last sat before this committee in September,
Ukraine has regained control of large swaths of its territory
in Kherson and in Kharkiv with strong U.S. and international
support. It has held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very
high costs, but taken losses in the surrounding towns in
Soledar.
It has valiantly withstood Putin's latest barbaric tactic,
waves of drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity,
and water infrastructure, and with your help has begun to build
back and modernize its systems.
As you know, there was another vicious attack in four
cities last night, taking out heat and electricity for millions
of Ukrainians. Ukraine is already building that back.
Ukraine has also put forward a set of principles for a just
and sustainable peace and challenged Russia to engage
meaningfully around that framework. In just the last 2 weeks in
addition to last night, it has grieved the losses of so many
more innocents--Russian missiles destroyed an apartment in
Dnipro and, as you know, Ukraine lost senior members of its
government in a tragic helicopter crash.
Ukraine's fight must and will continue because, as my boss,
Secretary Blinken, has said so often, if Russia stops fighting
this war ends today, but if Ukraine stops fighting Ukraine
ends.
That is also the message that all of you heard from
President Zelensky when he made his historic visit to the Oval
Office on December 21 and also addressed the joint session of
Congress.
As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is
fighting back with our support. As Assistant Secretary McKee
and Assistant Secretary Wallander will outline in more detail,
we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them the
training, the equipment, and the support they need to defend
themselves and to make another concerted effort this spring to
push back Russian forces.
This includes providing the PATRIOT air defenses, counter-
drone systems, Abrams main battle tanks, the Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles, Stryker, artillery, and ammunition.
We and our partners are also speeding equipment and spare
parts to Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical
infrastructure, including a gas turbine provided by USAID just
yesterday that is the size of a tennis court.
We are also providing budget support, economic and
humanitarian assistance, and supporting those collecting
evidence of Russia's atrocities and crimes so there can be full
accountability.
Throughout this, the Administration remains laser focused
on ensuring that no aid or weapons are diverted. We have
plumped up our embassy staff in Kyiv for technical oversight.
We are also working with the World Bank, with Deloitte, and
with a team of U.S. Government auditors who are in Kyiv this
week, in fact, and we continue to support essential reform and
anti-corruption measures by the Ukrainian Government across the
country.
Ukraine must not simply survive this war. It must emerge
stronger, cleaner, more democratic, more European. That is what
Ukraine's patriots are fighting for. That is also central to
the support that the United States and our international
partners provide.
President Zelensky's decision this week to fire and accept
the resignations of officials suspected of corruption sends a
strong signal of Ukraine's own resolve in this regard.
In the meantime, our coalition of support for Ukraine
remains amazingly strong. In total, more than 50 partner
nations have committed tens of billions of dollars in military,
economic, humanitarian support, and taken in millions of
refugees.
We have also worked, as you know, on the Black Sea grain
deal--17 million metric tons liberated from Port of Odessa--and
we have helped Europe reduce its dependence on Russian fossil
fuel, more than doubling our own LNG exports to the continent,
and we have imposed far-reaching sanctions and a global price
cap on Russian oil to reduce revenues for Putin's vicious war
machine without destabilizing energy markets.
None of this--none of what we have seen in Ukraine over the
past year, would have been possible, without daily acts of
heroism by tens of millions of Ukrainians in all walks of life,
but it is also true that much of it would have been impossible
without the continued support of the Congress and the American
people.
President Biden has pledged that the U.S. will support
Ukraine for as long as it takes and we are grateful for the
partnership that we have with you in meeting this commitment
because it is in our own national interest.
We look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, it is an honor to join you for the first hearing of
the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are meeting on
Ukraine, as we approach the 1-year anniversary of Putin's brutal
invasion next month.
First, let me thank this Committee, and the entire Congress, for
your continued, and strong bipartisan support for Ukraine's battle for
its sovereignty--indeed its very right to exist.
The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for security,
economic, and humanitarian support that you approved in December for
FY23, confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic, teacher, and
electricity technician that America stands with them. We stand with
them in saying ``no'' to a vicious autocrat trying to redraw the map of
their country by force. And ``no'' to any others around the world with
similar ambitions. Because Ukraine's fight is about so much more than
Ukraine; it is about the world our own children and grandchildren will
inherit.
Since I last met with this Committee in September, Ukraine has:
Regained control of large swathes of its territory in
Kherson and Kharkiv, with strong U.S. and international
support;
Held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very high cost,
but taken losses in Soledar;
Valiantly withstood Putin's latest barbaric tactic--waves of
drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity, and
water infrastructure--and, with our help, begun to build back
and modernize its systems;
Put forward a set of principles for a just and sustainable
peace, challenging Russia to engage meaningfully; and
In the last 2 weeks, grieved the loss of so many innocents
when Russian missiles destroyed an apartment complex in Dnipro,
and the loss of senior government ministers in a tragic
helicopter crash.
Ukraine's fight must continue because, as Secretary Blinken has
said so often: if Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops
fighting, Ukraine ends. That was also the message that President
Zelenskyy delivered when he made his historic visit to the Oval Office
to thank President Biden and the American people, and when he addressed
all of you in a joint session of Congress on December 21.
As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is fighting
back with our support. As A/S Wallander and A/A McKee will outline in
more detail, we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them
the training, equipment, and support they need to defend themselves,
and make another concerted effort this spring to push Russian forces
back. This includes providing PATRIOT air defense and counter-drone
systems, Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles,
Stryker armored personnel carriers, and artillery and ammunition.
We and our partners are speeding equipment and spare parts to
Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical infrastructure--including
autotransformers as big as tennis courts. We are providing budget
support, economic, and humanitarian assistance, and supporting those
collecting evidence of Russia's atrocities and crimes so there can be
full accountability.
We also remain laser-focused on ensuring no aid or weapons are
diverted--using our Embassy staff in Kyiv along with technical
oversight from the World Bank, Deloitte, and U.S. Government auditors,
some of whom are in Ukraine this week. And we continue to support
essential reform and anti-corruption measures across the country.
Ukraine must not simply survive this war, it must emerge as a
stronger, more democratic, and European state--that is what Ukraine's
patriots are fighting for, and that is also central to U.S. and
international support. The dismissal this week of officials suspected
of corruption sends a strong signal of Ukraine's resolve in this
regard, as well as the effective action of Ukraine's anti-corruption
institutions, civil society, and independent media.
Meantime, our global coalition of support for Ukraine remains
strong. In total, more than 50 partner nations have committed tens of
billions of dollars in military, economic, and humanitarian support;
and taken in millions of refugees.
We have also worked together as a coalition to rally the world to
support the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, unlocking more than
17 million metric tons of food blocked by Russia. We helped Europe
reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, more than doubling our
own LNG exports to the continent. And together we've imposed far
reaching sanctions and a global price cap on Russian oil to reduce
revenue available to Russia's war machine without destabilizing energy
markets.
None of what we've seen in Ukraine over the past year would be
possible without daily acts of heroism by tens of millions of
Ukrainians in all walks of life. And much of it would be impossible
without the continued support of this Congress and the American public.
President Biden has pledged that the United States will support Ukraine
for as long as it takes.
We are grateful for your partnership in meeting that commitment
because it is in our own national interest. I look forward to answering
your questions.
The Chairman. Administrator McKee.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIN MCKEE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. McKee. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, distinguished members of this committee.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity to testify about
USAID's work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider
efforts to counter Russian aggression throughout Europe and
Eurasia.
I also have to thank you for passing the four supplemental
appropriations bills that allow the United States to present
such a strong united front in assisting Ukraine.
Today, as we have noted, marks 335 days of the Kremlin's
senseless brutal war on Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainians
are now refugees. Five point nine million Ukrainians are
internally displaced. Some 430 children have been killed, and
USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged
war crimes and human rights abuses.
Putin's unjustified war continues to cause catastrophic
loss of life and has undermined the security of Europe and the
global economy.
Yet, Putin drastically underestimated the Ukrainian people.
The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The
Ukrainian people demonstrate daily heroism and bravery.
Communities emerging from occupation exemplify this resilience
despite the horror that they have endured.
At USAID, we are proud to stand beside the Ukrainian people
in their fight for freedom. Foreign assistance is a critical
tool to realize the United States' goals of helping Ukraine win
its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory as a free,
prosperous, independent country with a path towards EU
accession.
Ukraine will need a well-functioning state, a vibrant
inclusive economy, a free press, and strong institutions free
from corruption to secure this future when the war ends.
The supplemental resources generously appropriated by
Congress allow USAID to address urgent needs immediately
created by the conflict while also remaining focused on what
will be needed for recovery and reconstruction.
With these funds we are investing in Ukraine's economy and
helping resuscitate it after the Kremlin's ruthless attacks on
its civilian infrastructure. We are repairing the country's
energy and heating systems to counter Putin's attempts to wield
the harsh winter as a weapon against the people of Ukraine.
We are protecting public health from the deadly
consequences of Russia's war and supporting Ukraine's health
system to restore services while at the same time advancing
progress on critical reforms.
We continue to fight corruption at every level, to build
public trust, maintain that trust as well as donor support,
attract critical private sector investment, safeguard the
country's institutions, and speed its integration with the rest
of Europe.
We have also delivered on the United States' commitment to
provide reliable and sustained economic support to the
Ukrainian Government, which is critical to ensuring that
Ukraine can defend itself and uphold the democratic government
and society that is at the core of Putin's aggression against
Ukraine.
The $13 billion in direct budget support that USAID has
provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine through generous
congressional appropriations has kept government services such
as health care, education, and basic utilities running.
This support has made it possible for the Ukrainian people
to sustain their resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with
unrelenting attacks on that country's energy grid.
USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility being
entrusted with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of
U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet critical needs of Ukrainian
citizens is USAID's priority for all budget support provided to
the Ukrainian Government, and the Ukrainian Government stands
as our partner in this accountability and knows we will be
exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.
Beyond the region, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is harming
the global economy and worsening global food insecurity due to
disruptions to food, fuel, fertilizer supplies, and subsequent
price volatility.
As Russia becomes more aggressive in its energy policy,
countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and
consequently are accelerating their transition to other energy
sources with U.S. Government assistance.
The countries in Central Asia are also facing serious
disruptions to their economies and food security and are
seeking alternatives to Moscow, which USAID is working to
support through regional cooperation.
The consequences of Putin's unprovoked unjustified war in
Ukraine extend beyond the battlefield, beyond Ukraine, and
beyond Europe. USAID will continue to stand with the Ukrainian
people and we are grateful for the support from Congress.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Erin McKee
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about USAID's
work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider efforts to counter
Russia's aggression and malign influence throughout Europe and Eurasia.
I also want to thank you for passing the four supplemental
appropriations bills that allow the United States to present such a
strong and united front in assisting Ukraine.
Today marks 335 days of the Kremlin's senseless, brutal assault on
Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainian citizens are now refugees, 5.9
million are internally displaced, some 430 children have been killed,
and USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged war
crimes and human rights abuses. Putin's unjustified war continues to
cause catastrophic loss of life and has undermined the security of
Europe and the global economy.
However, Putin drastically underestimated the people of Ukraine.
The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The people
of Ukraine demonstrate daily their heroism and bravery. Communities
emerging from occupation exemplify resilience, despite the horror they
have endured.
At USAID, we are proud of our support to the people of Ukraine as
they defend their country, their freedom, and their democracy.
usaid's pivotal role in helping ukraine win the war for its survival
Foreign assistance is a critical tool to realize U.S. goals of
helping Ukraine win its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory
as a free, prosperous, and independent country able to realize its
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including through EU accession. To secure
the future it has chosen, Ukraine must have a well-functioning state; a
vibrant, inclusive economy; a free press; and strong institutions free
of corruption to secure this future when the war ends. The supplemental
resources generously appropriated by Congress allow USAID to anchor
U.S. Government efforts to address the urgent humanitarian, economic,
energy, and other needs created by the war, while also remaining
focused on what will be required for recovery and reconstruction.
budget support helps alleviate the acute fiscal crisis caused by
russia's war
The United States' commitment to provide reliable and sustained
direct economic support to the Ukrainian Government is critical to
ensuring Ukraine can continue to function as an independent democratic
country, that its government can provide critical basic services to its
people, and to ensure it is able to stay on a democratic trajectory
toward full integration with Europe, which Putin's unprovoked war aims
to derail. The $13 billion in direct budget support the U.S. Government
has provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine, thanks to generous
Congressional appropriations, has kept essential government services
such as healthcare, education, and basic utilities running. This
support has made it possible for the people of Ukraine to sustain their
resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with unrelenting attacks on the
country's energy grid.
USAID delivers direct budget support through a World Bank
mechanism, which provides the most effective way to expediently deliver
urgently-needed funds with a high degree of accountability. Funds are
released to the Government of Ukraine on a reimbursement basis. This
mechanism provides a multi-tiered system for accountability--including
monitoring, reporting, and audit requirements--with Bank fees waived
since after the first tranche of budget support.
USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility of being entrusted
with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of and
accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet the critical
needs of Ukrainian citizens is a USAID priority. The Ukrainian
Government stands as our partner in this accountability and knows we
will be exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.
As such, USAID has deployed an independent third-party monitor to
review financial controls and procedures utilized by the Government of
Ukraine to track and oversee U.S. funds being used for direct budget
support. From day one of our assistance and continuing through the
disbursement of the last dollar, USAID will remain laser-focused on
making sure U.S. funds are reaching those they are intended to reach.
We also plan to expand and strengthen our toolkit of oversight
mechanisms, made possible with the most recent generous appropriation
of Ukraine funding.
usaid's support to energy infrastructure keeping ukraine warm this
winter
Last month, the United Nations reported that Russia had destroyed
50 percent of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, putting millions of
Ukrainian civilians at risk this winter. Strengthening Ukraine's
ability to maintain its systems despite Russia's attacks remains one of
our top priorities.
USAID has already delivered 1,700 generators to 22 oblasts across
Ukraine, with many more on the way. These generators ensure electricity
and heating for schools, hospitals, accommodation centers for
internally-displaced persons, district heating companies, and water
systems if and when power is knocked out by Russia's air strikes. For
example, in the city of Chernihiv, USAID provided 31 diesel generators
to the city's public schools, enough to ensure that 13,000
schoolchildren have electricity and heating despite Russia's ongoing
attacks.
USAID has announced investments totaling more than $220 million in
Ukraine's heating, energy, and utility infrastructure to help the
Ukrainian people get through winter and beyond. For example, this
assistance supports repairs and maintenance of pipes and other
equipment necessary to deliver heating to homes, hospitals, schools,
and businesses across Ukraine. This includes delivering 60 excavators
to repair infrastructure in 48 cities, and providing more than 16
kilometers of heating pipes, with roughly 70 more kilometers of pipes
planned for delivery. This builds on over two decades of support to
Ukraine to strengthen the country's energy security.
usaid provides $1.4b in humanitarian assistance to ukraine which is now
the world's largest displacement crisis
With nearly 14 million internally displaced persons and refugees,
Ukraine has now surpassed Syria as the world's largest displacement
crisis. The United States remains the largest donor to the humanitarian
response for Ukraine. Since the start of Putin's full-scale invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Government has provided more than
$1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to support people in Ukraine
and those fleeing to neighboring countries, including more than $1.4
billion in USAID humanitarian assistance.
USAID leads the U.S. humanitarian response for Ukraine through our
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART has been working
since day one to provide food and market-based assistance, safe
drinking water and hygiene support, health care, support to women,
children, and others affected by sexual violence or other trauma, and
other vital relief.
For example, USAID is supporting the World Food Programme (WFP) and
three international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to scale up
food assistance in Ukraine. During December 2022, WFP reached nearly
2.2 million people in Ukraine with in-kind food distributions,
including children who received supplementary feeding.
USAID will continue to coordinate with humanitarian partners in the
country and region to provide Ukrainian civilians with life-saving
humanitarian assistance while ramping up critical development
assistance to respond to cyber-attacks and threats to the energy
sector, countering disinformation, supporting small businesses and the
agriculture sector, documenting abuses and atrocities, human rights
violations, meeting essential health needs, and bolstering the
continued functioning of local, regional, and national government
entities.
usaid response as the war worsens global food insecurity and
malnutrition
Beyond the region, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is
harming the global economy and worsening global food insecurity and
malnutrition due to disruptions to food, fuel, and fertilizer supplies
and subsequent price volatility. Current estimates point to drops in
real income of around 1 percent of GDP across developing countries.
To bolster Ukrainian agriculture exports and help alleviate the
global food security crisis, USAID established the Agriculture
Resilience Initiative (AGRI). AGRI-Ukraine supports access to inputs,
finance, storage and drying services for farmers and agribusinesses,
and is addressing rail export logistics bottlenecks. In coordination
with the EU, UN, Ukrainian Government, and the private sector, AGRI-
Ukraine targets Ukraine's immediate agricultural production and export
challenges, while supporting the wider needs of Ukraine's agriculture
sector to ensure Ukraine's continued production and export of
agricultural commodities. USAID has also provided over 13,600 Ukrainian
farmers in Ukraine with seeds, fertilizers, crop protection, storage
services, and other support, reaching approximately 29 percent of the
country's registered agriculture enterprises, to help them deliver the
2022 harvest and plant for 2023 despite the devastation caused by
Russia's full-scale invasion. USAID also has helped farmers access
nearly $42 million in loans and state grants through USAID-supported
digital finance apps. These are just some examples of how USAID has
scaled up its assistance in response to rising global food insecurity.
The impact of the war is also worsening the effects of the historic
drought in the Horn of Africa, where at least 23 million people are in
need of emergency food assistance. Many of these countries previously
relied on imports of Ukrainian grain and fertilizer to meet food needs
and support domestic agricultural production. For example, before the
war, Somalia imported a majority of its wheat supply from Ukraine.
Additionally, high commodity and fuel prices due to disruptions in
global markets are decreasing the purchasing power of vulnerable
households and increasing the cost of providing humanitarian
assistance. Since February 2022, the U.S. Government has invested $7.66
billion to address the growing global food security crisis, including
$4.9 billion in humanitarian assistance. As part of that $4.9 billion
investment, Administrator Samantha Power announced nearly $1.2 billion
in additional funding to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia in July 2022,
covering a majority of the $1.8 billion urgent funding requirements
identified by the UN to support critical drought response activities
between May to December 2022. To support these investments, we are
using all of our tools creatively to communicate about U.S. food
security assistance, including reaching 12.9 million unique users in
Kenya, with 7.9 million engagements across Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, and YouTube.
Under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, USAID is partnering with the
WFP to help Ukraine export its wheat and continue to feed some of the
more than 200 million people globally experiencing acute food
security--meaning their lives and livelihoods are at serious risk. The
United States has provided more than $68 million to WFP as part of this
initiative. This supports WFP's ability to charter vessels for the
export of grain when commercial options are limited. To share one
example, in early November 2022, the Ikaria Angel, a USAID-supported
ship, departed Ukraine en route to Ethiopia carrying 20,000 metric tons
of WFP grain, enough to feed 3 million people for 3 months. To date,
WFP chartered vessels transported over 426,000 metric tons of wheat
through various Black Sea ports supporting Ethiopia, Afghanistan,
Yemen, and Somalia.
long term development investments remain important
In addition to strengthening Ukraine's energy security during
wartime, USAID assistance helps farmers in Ukraine to continue growing
food for domestic and global markets, supports Ukrainian efforts to
document and seek accountability for war crimes and other atrocities
and human rights abuses, fills critical gaps in Ukraine's health
system, and helps local government bodies in 91 communities respond to
challenges caused by Putin's brutal invasion.
A robust civil society and independent media sector is essential as
Ukrainian society resists Russia's aggression and strives to strengthen
its political and rule of law institutions and advance its Euro-
Atlantic integration. USAID's programs promote greater citizen
participation by enhancing civic education, supporting civic
initiatives, and building the organizational capacity of civil society
organizations. These efforts advance Ukraine's democratic development
and cultivate grassroots approaches to addressing development
challenges. USAID assistance strengthens the public service
broadcaster, promotes accountability in the media sector, and helps
media outlets create high-quality, fact-based content that educates
audiences and contributes to public debate on critical issues. USAID
also counters Kremlin disinformation narratives through fostering
collaboration among government, commercial media, the creative sector,
and civil society, helping these Ukrainian actors create and
disseminate high-quality, fact-based content targeted to the audiences
most vulnerable to disinformation.
Recently, USAID provided legal, financial, and technical assistance
to develop Diia for Ukrainian citizens. Diia is a mobile application
and online portal that provides digital access to 120 government
services and enables Ukrainian citizens to engage with their government
online in a one-stop-shop--from applying for benefits and government
programs to paying taxes, accessing important documents, registering
and running businesses, and providing identification and digital
signatures. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022, Diia has also enabled Ukrainian citizens to
electronically receive government services and social support in areas
impacted by war, and has been used by displaced Ukrainian citizens to
access aid and other critical services.
In the context of Russia's unprovoked invasion in February 2022,
USAID has continued to partner with the Government of Ukraine to
improve essential health services and build the resilience of health
systems and institutions to continue serving the Ukrainian people.
USAID health activities have continued to operate inside Ukraine,
pivoting assistance to ease strains on Ukraine's health system and
address the direct human costs of the war, interruptions to services,
and the health needs of the large number of displaced persons inside
the country. During the war, USAID's network of implementing partners
has continued working on the ground to meet immediate needs and support
long-term strengthening of Ukraine's health system.
regional perspective
With its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has created
new threats, economic turbulence, and uncertainty for countries across
the region. As Russia has become more destructive in its energy policy,
countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and, consequently,
are accelerating their transition to other energy sources with USAID
assistance. These countries have had to re-orient trade, and find new
and innovative ways to bolster their economies, even as some have seen
substantial influxes of people fleeing Ukraine and Putin's Russia.
In the earliest days of this crisis, the Lukashenka regime in
Belarus allowed Russia's forces to launch attacks from Belarusian
territory. We however continue to support Belarusian independent
journalists, media outlets, and bloggers as they provide fact-based
content for citizens beyond state-sponsored or Russian propaganda and
disinformation. We are also working to raise the civic literacy of
Belarusian citizens so that they may remain resilient to malign
influence.
At the same time, the Kremlin continues to employ its playbook of
malign influence through disinformation, economic and energy coercion,
and undermining neighboring democracies. USAID continues to address
this as well. For instance, USAID is working in Georgia to debunk the
Kremlin's false narrative that the United States is attempting to drag
Georgia into Russia's war against Ukraine, with a very successful
recent campaign that reached more than 400,000 viewers via one Facebook
video alone. Malign influence from the Kremlin is only likely to
increase in the near future, and USAID remains focused on ensuring our
programming builds the long-term resilience of our partners and is able
to respond to the Kremlin's hostile attempts to control others through
disinformation and digital authoritarianism.
Through the Countering Russia Influence Fund (CRIF), and in
alignment with the broader Countering America's Adversaries through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), USAID is working to bolster partner resilience
across key sectors, including to: (1) Counter the Kremlin's efforts to
undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law; (2) Resist the
manipulation of information; 3) Reduce energy vulnerabilities; and (4)
Reduce economic vulnerabilities, as well as counter the Kremlin's use
of corruption across all sectors.
Russia's war against Ukraine has also brought serious disruptions
to the economies of Central Asia, exacerbated food insecurities, and
strained if not broken the region's long-standing bonds with Moscow.
Central Asian governments are seeking alternatives to their former
reliance on Moscow, and USAID is working to enhance regional
cooperation, as well as promote new trade and energy corridors across
the Caspian, through the Caucasus and on to Europe.
conclusion
USAID remains committed to supporting the people of Ukraine as they
continue the fight to defend their country and their democracy. To
date, most of the humanitarian, economic, and budgetary support that
Congress previously provided for Ukraine in the supplemental packages
has been disbursed or committed. We continue to call on Allies and
partners to expeditiously meet their commitments to the people of
Ukraine.
USAID will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine and we are
grateful for the support from Congress. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Wallander.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Wallander. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you today to express the unwavering support of
the United States for Ukraine's sovereignty and security in the
face of Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion.
Thank you for holding this important hearing at this
pivotal time for the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and of the
world.
As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this
past November, our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an
investment in our own security and prosperity.
What happens in the coming months may prove decisive and we
are focused on providing Ukraine with the military capabilities
it needs to defend its people and its territory. We are doing
this in close cooperation with our allies and partners.
First, we have focused on a layered integrated approach to
air defense to counter Russia's devastating attacks on
Ukraine's population centers and civilian infrastructure.
The PATRIOT capability from the United States, Germany, and
the Netherlands will give Ukraine advanced long-range
capability. These are complemented by the medium and short-
range air defense capabilities such as NASAMs and Avenger that
we have provided.
Second, to enhance Ukraine's ability to maneuver, the
United States will provide Abrams main battle tanks, the best
tanks in the world. The United Kingdom has also committed
Challenger tanks and other European states will provide Leopard
tanks.
These main battle tanks are complemented by other vital
armor capabilities such as Bradleys and Strykers from the
United States, Swedish CV-90s, French AMX-10s, and German
Martyrs.
Third, we have expanded U.S.-led collective training to
enable the Ukrainians to integrate fires and maneuver. Our
training will complement the specialized training conducted by
the United States, the European Union, and our allies.
Finally, we continue to work with allies and partners to
deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition
so Ukraine can sustain its fight.
Russia has discovered that the United States and our allies
and partners are serious about supporting Ukraine for the long
haul.
Our assistance to Ukraine is possible thanks to bipartisan
support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates
the most recent Additional Supplemental Appropriations Act,
which provided presidential drawdown authority, funding for the
military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and funding
for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.
Presidential drawdown allows us to get Ukraine critical
capabilities quickly. USAI allows us to contract with industry
for new and innovative solutions while building Ukraine's
longer-term defense.
We are also ramping up defense industrial base production
of critical munitions and equipment, doubling or, in some
cases, tripling capacity. Even as we focus on getting Ukraine
what it needs we have always prioritized accountability, and
Ukraine has, too.
We have adapted our accountability practices for the combat
environment to address the risk of illicit diversion, using
mechanisms that go above and beyond our standard practices.
The U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any
diversion of U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead,
we see Ukraine's front line units effectively employing
security assistance every day on the battlefield.
Nearly a year ago, Russia launched its brutal invasion to
destroy Ukraine as a free and sovereign nation, threatening
European security and transatlantic unity. Today, NATO is
stronger, Europe is investing in its own security at record
rates, and the incredible people and armed forces of Ukraine
remain unbowed and unbroken.
This war has demonstrated that aggression is not worth the
price paid by the aggressor. That is a lesson that should
reverberate around the world, including among autocratic
leaders everywhere.
As Secretary Austin has said, free people always refuse to
replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by
force and fear.
We are determined to support Ukraine's fight against
tyranny and oppression and, in doing so, to defend the American
interests and values that are so clearly at stake.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Celeste Wallander
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Russia's war against Ukraine is the worst crisis in European
security since the end of the Second World War. It has upended peace
and stability on the continent, poses a historic challenge to European
Security, and without the U.S. and international response, would pose a
dangerous example to autocratic regimes around the world.
Three decades ago, the collapse of the Soviet empire brought to
Europe and Eurasia the possibility of a wider community of free,
peaceful, and independent states. Instead, Russia has launched a war
against Ukraine to change international borders and bend policies of
vulnerable neighbors to its will.
Russia's war against Ukraine is thus an assault on European and
global security. The security of the United States has long rested on
the transatlantic community. American forces have been stationed across
the Atlantic for decades to ensure peace in cooperation with our NATO
Allies. As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this
past November, ``our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an
investment in our own security and prosperity.''
At the same time, Russia's war is also an assault on our bedrock
values. In carrying out its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has
wreaked unconscionable death and destruction, killing thousands of
civilians, committing horrific atrocities, and attacking critical
infrastructure.
Yet nearly a year after Russia's full-scale invasion last February,
its attempt to eliminate Ukraine as an independent state has failed.
Russia's ground offensives, its air attacks, its assaults to freeze and
starve and subjugate--all this has only strengthened the spirit and
resolve of the indomitable people of Ukraine.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been failing since it
started in February 2022. Ukraine defeated Russia's strategic objective
to seize Kyiv in the first months. Since then, we have seen Ukraine
take the initiative, driving Russia's forces from Kharkiv and Kherson.
Failing on the ground in conventional battle, Russia turned to drone
and cruise missile attacks on power and energy systems, but Ukraine's
air defenses and infrastructure have so far proven resilient during the
cold winter, with thanks due in large measure to international support.
Now we are seeing intense fighting in the east--including around
Bakhmut, where Russia's forces led by Wagner have been trying to take
terrain for months at tremendous cost, and near Kreminna, where the
Ukrainians are on the offensive.
positioning ukraine for further success
Russia is trying to gain momentum against increasingly capable
Ukrainian Armed Forces along the front lines in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Our near-term objective is to enable Ukraine's forces to regain control
of their sovereign territory.
We are working to achieve that objective through enhanced and
carefully targeted security assistance, working with allies and
partners to provide critical new capabilities and training.
First, we have focused on enabling a layered and integrated
approach to air defense. The United States and Germany each have
committed to send Patriot systems, and the Netherlands has committed to
send launchers and missiles. These will give Ukraine a significantly
advanced, long-range capability alongside medium- and short-range air
defense capabilities, such as NASAMS and Avenger systems, that we have
already provided. Ukraine will have a layered air defense to protect
its citizens and fight for its territory.
Second, to enhance Ukraine's ability to conduct complex maneuvers,
in recent weeks the United States and several allies have committed to
provide important armor capabilities. From the United States, this
includes Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles,
and multiple types of armored personnel carriers, including Strykers.
These armored vehicles will complement Challenger tanks committed by
the UK, CV-90 infantry fighting vehicles from Sweden, AMX-10 light
armored vehicles from France, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles
from Germany.
Third, we have expanded U.S.-led training of Ukraine's forces to
focus on combined arms and joint maneuver operations. This collective
training is designed to integrate fires and maneuver--using infantry,
armor, artillery, and other capabilities concurrently to defeat an
adversary's ground forces. U.S.-led training will complement separate,
specialized training conducted by the European Union and by individual
Allies.
Fourth, we have made significant investments in the sustainment of
complex weapon systems. This will support current operations as well as
an enduring sustainment framework for meeting NATO standards that will
persist long after this conflict is over. The U.S.-led framework
enables robust and coordinated international capacity to more
effectively support maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations under
continuous, intense combat operations. Sustainment becomes increasingly
important as we introduce new and different systems to Ukraine.
Finally, we continue to deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds
and other ammunition to ensure Ukraine can sustain its fight against
Russia's forces, which continue to rely on mass artillery fires to
compensate for poorly trained forces.
sustaining u.s. support for the long term
Russia has discovered that the United States and our Allies and
partners are serious when we have said that we are committed to
supporting Ukraine for the long haul.
Our assistance to Ukraine has been made possible by extraordinary
support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates the most
recent Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act that provided
an increase in Presidential Drawdown Authority, replenishment funding
for the military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and
additional funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI). Using Presidential Drawdowns, we are able to get Ukraine the
critical capabilities it needs quickly from our own stocks. Through
USAI, we have been able to contract with industry for new and
innovative solutions, as well as building for Ukraine's longer-term
defense.
With congressional support, we are also ramping up defense
industrial base production of critical munitions and equipment--
doubling or tripling capacity in many cases. Allies have stepped up
impressively on bolstering global production as well.
Accountability for U.S. assistance also remains a top priority. The
U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any diversion of
U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead, we see Ukraine's
frontline units effectively employing security assistance on a large
scale every day on the battlefield. Nonetheless, we are keenly aware of
the possible risk of illicit diversion, and we are proactively taking
all possible steps to prevent this from happening. We have worked to
adapt our accountability practices for the combat environment in
Ukraine, through expanded reporting mechanisms and site inspections.
These measures go above and beyond prior practices and programs.
leading a global coalition, fortifying nato
While the United States is committing significant resources to
Ukraine's defense, we are far from alone. Secretary Austin has
marshaled a coalition of some 50 nations through the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group (UDCG), to provide security assistance now and to make
investments in a sustainable industrial base.
On January 20, we held the eighth meeting of the UDCG, at Ramstein
Air Base in Germany. This forum continues to generate significant
commitments from allies and partners--including in the top capability
priority areas of air defense, artillery, and armor. The most recent
meeting highlighted contributions at levels in scale, variety, and
likely battlefield impact even greater than the successful meetings in
2022.
And we have increased our own defense to deter future aggression by
Russia. Our transatlantic defense alliance is stronger than ever, and
NATO has bolstered its forward defenses and enhanced its forces. Since
last February, we have deployed or extended more than 20,000 additional
U.S. forces to Europe. In Poland, we have established the first
permanent U.S. forces on NATO's eastern flank. And we look forward to
welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO's ranks. U.S. forces maintain a
persistent combat credible presence across Europe in support of NATO,
including forward on NATO's eastern flank.
russia's diminished standing
Even as Russia's standing and strength are quickly eroding as a
result of its ill-considered war against Ukraine, Moscow continues in
its attempts to project influence around the globe. But one only needs
to look to Russia's neighbors to see how it is failing. As NATO's
cohesion and unity of purpose are reinforced, Russia's standing is
fraying among the countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate.
In Georgia, the United States is deepening our defense partnership
and undertaking significant new defense capacity building and reform
programs. Elsewhere, such as in Moldova, Armenia, and the states of
Central Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable
security partner. The Defense Department welcomes opportunities to
deepen our own defense relations with these and other states as part of
a whole-of-government approach that reinforces these states'
sovereignty, independence, shared values, and the rule of law.
* * * * *
Ultimately, when you take into account the fierce resistance of the
people of Ukraine, the strengthening of the transatlantic alliance, and
the massive costs to Russia, this war has already demonstrated that
aggression is not worth the price paid by the aggressor. That is a
lesson that should reverberate around the world--including among
autocratic leaders everywhere. The United States and our allies and
partners will not tolerate living in a world where borders can be
changed, or spheres of influence imposed, by force.
As Secretary Austin has said, ``free people always refuse to
replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by force
and fear.'' We are determined to support Ukraine's fight to defend its
freedom, democracy, and independence against Russia's aggression--and
by doing so, to defend the American interests and values that are so
clearly at stake.
The Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony. We will
start a round of 5-minute questions. Let me make some prefatory
remarks before I go to my questions here.
I am all in and have been since 2014 when I waved my saber
and said we should be far more responsive to the invasion of
Crimea because it was the warning sign, and the world,
including the United States, was relatively mute in its
response to the invasion and annexation of Crimea.
Then Putin got the message that you can march on and that
is part of what is at stake now, that he can march on.
There are those I know who have an insular view and others
who have a legitimate question, and as someone who back at home
in New Jersey when I am asked by my constituents why are we
spending so much money on Ukraine, I make the point to them
that, in fact, what is at stake is not only the Ukrainians'
freedom, which in and of itself is important, but also the
proposition that you cannot by force take another country's
territory, because if that can become the rule of the day,
there are many despots and authoritarians who will seek to do
that--China in Taiwan, North Korea, possibly, against South
Korea. The list is endless.
Having said that, I would commend to you, Madam Secretary,
to speak to the Secretary and to the Administration that I
think it is important that we articulate what is our definition
of victory and what is the blueprint for victory in order to
continue to have the bipartisan support of Congress for the
resources that will be necessary to achieve that victory.
I think that is critically important. I am not saying that
we do not have one, but it has not been well-articulated if
there is one, and if there is not a full vision of what that
blueprint is, we should be thinking about what it is and how we
execute on it.
With that, and we also--I am a strong supporter. I have
voted for everything for the Ukrainians in past legislation
going back to 2014, but we also have to tell our friends in
Ukraine you cannot sell white phosphorus to the Azerbaijanis
that kill Armenians. There are responsibilities as well, not
just the opportunity to receive resources.
My first question is about sanctions and it is particularly
about China. As you well know, President Putin met with Chinese
President Xi Jinping in February of 2022 where they touted
their no-limits partnership just weeks before Russia's invasion
of Ukraine.
Since that time, I understand there has been evidence that
Chinese companies, including working through Hong Kong, have
been exporting dual-use technologies, including semiconductor
chips, which are critically important to fill in, particularly
on missile guidance systems that Russia needs to continue its
onslaught of Ukraine.
It seems to me that we should not forsake the potential of
sanctions against China if it is providing critical assistance
and it should not be able to hide behind some companies.
Have we raised these concerns at the highest levels of the
Chinese Government? Is this support from China to Russia not a
direct violation of U.S. sanctions?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for your strong
personal support for Ukraine and your perfect articulation of
what is at stake here, which the President agrees with, as he
said yesterday.
With regard to China, yes. From well before this latest
invasion began in November and December even of 2021 we began
an intense conversation with China at every level, which the
President himself has led and all of our senior leaders have
been involved in with regard to their relationship with Russia
and about their own interests, in our view, and upholding the
U.N. Charter and not allowing Putin style rules of the road to
dominate, and we have made clear that we will bring to their
attention when we see sanctions violations by their companies
and we have been very clear with regard to the impact on our
relationship and their standing in the world were they----
The Chairman. I just do not think that we have followed up
those conversations with robust sanctions against companies
that are providing dual-use technology that is allowing the
Russians to continue to have access to missile capabilities
that we should not let them have.
Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I would----
The Chairman. It seems to me that--we need to in--addition
to all the money that we are providing, all the defense
equipment we are providing, we need to cut the head of the
snake off in every way we can and that means sanctioning it
directly and its inner core, which I give the Administration
credit for.
It also means sanctioning those vigorously who are
assisting Russia in this unjust and unholy war, and so I hope
we will be far more robust in that regard. I do not care that
it is China. I do not care who it is. At the end of the day,
they cannot act with impunity and face no consequence.
Ms. Nuland. We agree with that, Chairman, and we have a new
set of sanctions out today, which I think you will see some of
the things that you have been calling for----
The Chairman. I look forward to that.
Ms. Nuland. --particularly with regard to----
The Chairman. I do not know if you are familiar directly
with what I mentioned in my opening statement about the
Magnitsky letter and Vladimir Kara-Murza. It has past the time
statutorily to get an answer.
I see no reason why, in fact, we cannot, in essence, have
sanctions against someone who is one of Russia's biggest
critics--Putin's biggest critic, not Russia's biggest critic,
Putin's biggest critic--and is jailed as a result of it.
We should make it clear through Magnitsky sanctions.
Senator Cardin has been the author of that law. This is an
example of what it was meant to use. Can you get us an answer,
please?
Ms. Nuland. We are not only going to get you an answer, we
are going to get you Magnitsky sanctions in very short order.
The Chairman. Bravo. All right. Now, lastly, what are we
doing as it relates to the need for--some of us went to The
Hague earlier last year to press the case on sanctions and
prosecutions against those who are committing war crimes. There
must be. There must be accountability and accountability
without prosecutions is not accountability. Are we focused on
that as well?
Ms. Nuland. We are, Chairman. We have a G-7 working group
of lawyers as well as the group of G-7 political directors that
I am involved in looking at various models of accountability.
There are three or four under consideration.
I think we will have more to say about that as we approach
the anniversary in terms of the actual setting up of judicial
proceedings.
In the meantime--and Erin can speak to this in more
detail--we are involved in supporting all kinds of
accountability mechanisms on the ground in Ukraine, everything
from collecting evidence to supporting the cataloguing of
atrocities, et cetera, and we are working with the Ukrainians
on some interim measures of registries of attack, et cetera,
that could be used for future accountability.
I do not know if Erin has anything she wants to add there.
Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
We are working very closely on the ground through our Human
Rights and Access to Justice Centers that have a network
throughout Ukraine, over 22 locations, to gather and document
the evidence for such time to be able to, as you said,
prosecute and hold accountable those actions inside Ukraine.
We are not waiting for the determination for that process
to be set up, but preparing all we can so that when it is in
place, swift and appropriate due process can be made and the
evidence is available.
The Chairman. The earlier that possible prosecutions are
prosecuted and successfully done will send a chilling effect to
those who think they can act with impunity.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, you said there are going to be new
sanctions out today. Who are those going to be against? Who are
the targets of those sanctions?
Ms. Nuland. Ranking Member Risch, there are more than 40
sanctions coming out. They may actually have been published at
about 10:30. The vast majority of them are against Prigozhin
and the Wagner Group in Africa.
There are also sanctions against Putin's cronies, against
those who provide material support to Russia's military
industrial complex, and then there is one in particular that
addresses the Chairman's question with regard to China.
Senator Risch. The Chairman and I have both been anxious to
see what is happening with China because China seems to be
acting with impunity, and that we really need to ratchet up our
sanctions in that regard.
Nobody--they may be big, but they are not too big to fail
in that regard and we really need to ratchet the sanctions up
there.
Also, Secretary Nuland, first of all, I think most of us
here were glad to see that finally the Administration yesterday
agreed to provide Abrams tanks and we have been calling for
this for some time, but we have been repeatedly told over the
months that sending tanks to Ukraine was not possible or
desirable, or would somehow be escalatory, and all of a sudden
it changed yesterday.
How did that--this is embarrassing. How did that change?
What happened?
Ms. Nuland. I am going to let Assistant Secretary Wallander
talk about the internal discussion inside the Pentagon.
What I will say to you, Ranking Member, is that Abrams, as
you know, are very sophisticated tanks and they require
significant training. So even as we approved them yesterday it
is going to take some time to get them to the battlefields.
This is not something that is going to appear in time for the
spring offensive. What is most needed----
Senator Risch. Which brings it--which underscores what I
said. We have been asking for this for 6 months. Had you
started 6 months ago they would be all ready for the spring
offensive.
So what happened here? Who is to blame for this?
Ms. Nuland. I think at every stage of this we have looked
at what the Ukrainians have needed, what they have been
requesting. There was a period in the fall where they were
capturing a huge number of Russian tanks on the battlefield,
which they were able to use successfully in the Kherson and
Kharkiv offensive, but now they need more and so we are
responding.
Senator Risch. It did not answer the question, but I guess
we are not going to get an answer to that question. I got to
tell you, it is--all through this thing we have been pressing
the Administration to do things and usually they do the right
thing, but it takes forever to get there and, as a result of
that, there is a great loss on the battlefield and lives lost
in the meantime. I want to underscore that the Administration,
truly, needs to act more rapidly.
That brings us, Secretary Wallander, to the Stryker combat
vehicles. As we all know, there are different versions of the
Stryker vehicles and one of the things that Ukraine has been
asking for is the Strykers that are equipped with the cannons
that are comparable to those found on tanks, but the
Administration is declining to give them those. They are giving
them something with only machine guns and no heavy weapons, and
they are really not much more than an armored taxi cab.
What is going on there? Can we expect the reversal of that,
hopefully, in the near future?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I do not have information on the
specific variant of Stryker vehicles' APCs, as you refer to.
What I will say is that----
Senator Risch. You do know that they are not going to--they
have decided they are--at least they are telling us they are
not going to give them the ones with the cannons that are found
on the tanks?
Dr. Wallander. I would need to validate that, Senator, but
I will speak to the value of the Stryker capability and the
volume of the Stryker capability.
Senator Risch. We know the value of the Stryker capability
and we know how much it is enhanced if it has got a cannon on
it instead of machine guns.
I am not really interested in that part of the answer, but
again, I would urge you, and I suppose the way things go
eventually they will do it, but they need to do it and they
really need to do it rapidly.
My time is almost up. At some point in time we need to have
a really good discussion on what is going to happen when this
is over. It will be over at some point in time. Either the
Russians will quit fighting or the Ukrainians will quit
fighting. Neither one of them are near that point at this
point.
What is going to happen in the future? Look, we are not
going to go back to doing business with Russia as we have
before and so as a result of that we need to talk about how we
are going to interact with Russia.
The Europeans are already doing that. When they come to see
me they have already got blueprints as far as where--how they
are going to change directions, so I would like to hear how we
are going to change directions.
With that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our
three witnesses, not just for their testimony today, but for
your service to our country.
I want to follow up on Chairman Menendez's last point first
and that is accountability. Tomorrow is Holocaust Remembrance
Day, the 77th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.
I appreciate and believe we are making substantial progress
in maintaining the evidence to pursue war crimes or crimes
against humanity for those that are responsible at the highest
levels.
Early action is going to be important. Is there any hope
that we could move forward with some recognized international
mechanism that could start the process so that it is known
internationally that accountability is going to be part of the
resolution of this conflict?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, as I said, we are working hard
on this with our G-7 partners and with Ukraine. We want to
just----
Senator Cardin. I understand you are working on gathering
the evidence.
Ms. Nuland. No. Also on which of the various models for
pursuing justice.
Senator Cardin. What is the timing on that?
Ms. Nuland. I would like to see us come to conclusion
before the anniversary around February, but it may take another
few months. Certainly before the summer, I would hope.
Senator Cardin. That----
Ms. Nuland. I would also note that when I was out with the
Secretary in Kyiv in September we went to Irpin to see one of
the towns that had been decimated by Russian missiles and we
met with some of the nongovernmental organizations that USAID
is supporting, who were minutely gathering evidence and
plotting it. So----
Senator Cardin. No, I appreciate the fact.
Ms. Nuland. Yes.
Senator Cardin. I have been actually briefed on some of the
evidence that has actually been obtained.
Ms. Nuland. Yes.
Senator Cardin. My concern is will we have a mechanism that
will allow the international community to observe that
accountability is actually being pursued, such as like the
Nuremburg trials after World War II.
Are we going to have some mechanism like that? If I
understand your answer, we should know that in the next couple
of months.
Ms. Nuland. That is our aspiration, and in another setting
I can brief you on the various options we are considering.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. I will pursue that.
You have all mentioned the Wagner Group several times, and
as I understand there will be some additional sanctions in
regards to those involved in the Wagner Group.
You have taken certain steps to designate them as an
international criminal group. You have not designated them as a
foreign terrorist organization. Why not and what else can we
do? Because this is not only a threat to what is going on in
Ukraine, this is a global threat.
What else can we do to show that we are doing everything we
can to protect against the growth of this type of an
organization?
Ms. Nuland. We went, Senator, with a transnational criminal
organization designation because it better suits the way Wagner
operates, particularly what it is doing in Africa, that they
are in this for their own material gain and for power and for
ripping off the wealth of states, particularly in Africa.
In addition to sanctioning the main entities we are now
working on--the sanctions today go to some of those supporting
entities of Wagner, those they do business with.
We are also looking at gold and other main sources of
revenue for the Wagner team. As you know, they have access to
gold mines in Mali and in Central African Republic. They are
seeking more of that and that directly funds the combat that
they are engaged in in Ukraine.
We are working on some of those measures, and we are
working with African governments and encouraging those who have
gotten in bed with Wagner to rethink and trying to strengthen
those who are under threat of Wagner now.
Senator Cardin. Do you need any further guidance or support
from--by congressional action?
Ms. Nuland. Not at this moment, but as we pursue the drying
up of the financial network of Wagner we may come back to you
if we may, and then, as you know, in another setting we can
talk about some of the other activities that we are involved
with.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
I want to just mention one point in regards to USAID. I
understand you are now using some of the U.S.-Russia Investment
Fund dollars have been successfully rededicated to help
Ukraine. Can you just give us a quick status on the use of
those funds?
Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, it was, I think, with your help and bipartisan support
we were able to unlock those funds that have been frozen,
frankly, for 15 years and we are providing the vast majority of
those reflows that have been frozen to WNISEF, which is the
Western Newly Independent States Enterprise Fund, to stimulate
and support small and medium enterprise growth and activity and
access to finance and credit in Ukraine and Moldova, which is
part of their mandate.
The conclusion of the modifications to the various
instruments was done right before the holidays and we are
rolling ahead now with identifying those opportunities.
I need to note that WNISEF did not stop working inside
Ukraine at the start of the war or the second invasion, and
immediately mobilized their team, their network, and their
clients to relocate and stay in business, which was vital to
continue to help provide both livelihoods and income as well as
revenue to the Government of Ukraine.
Senator Cardin. Just please keep us informed as to how
those funds are being utilized. We appreciate it.
Ms. McKee. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. It has been argued that all we need is more
sanctions and there is an argument that sanctions have value,
but it is the unwinding and the leverage of removing sanctions
that actually accomplishes something, not adding more
sanctions.
In fact, Ms. Nuland, when you went to Moscow in October of
2021 you were only allowed to go because there was a
negotiation in advance of that where we agreed to take
sanctions off of a Russian individual and Russia agreed in
tandem to take sanctions off of you.
I have had this discussion for quite a while. We have
sanctions on 25 members of the Duma, mostly for political
reasons because they have politically spoken out against U.S.
interests, but they are, of course, Russians.
They also, in turn, sanction us as well. So 25, 30 members
of Congress are sanctioned as well.
Do you favor or oppose some sort of arrangement similar to
your arrangement where sanction removal was traded to enhance
diplomacy? Do you favor that for legislative sanctions on
individuals?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Paul, in the context of a Russian
decision to negotiate seriously and withdraw its forces from
Ukraine and return territory, I would certainly favor and I
believe Secretary Blinken would also favor sanctions relief in
that context.
Senator Paul. I do not think hardly taking off sanctions on
a member of the Duma is going to be traded for the end of the
war. I mean, I wish it were that easy.
What I am talking about is allowing members of their Duma,
many of whom may be favorable to our country, to travel to our
country, and vice versa. I am talking about diplomatic
legislative exchange. I am not talking about trading it for
peace.
I am sure that would be great, but I do not think that is
really on the table, trading--removing sanctions on Senator
Risch for peace. I wish that were important enough, but I do
not know that that is going to happen.
That is what I am talking about. I am talking about very
small, incremental removal of sanctions on legislative members
in exchange for them doing the same.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, all of the members of the Duma on whom
we have sanctions are people who have supported Russia's war,
the annexation of Crimea, et cetera.
Senator Paul. That would be about 90 percent of the people
of Russia.
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely.
Senator Paul. I mean, it probably would be 90 percent of
the Duma. We only have sanctions on 25 or 30, but I would
venture to say every member of the Duma probably supports
Crimea.
I am not saying it is right. I am just saying this is their
perspective, and if we are going to sanction people for their
belief and their sort of nationalist version of the world, then
we will not have any discussion between people or any
legislative exchange.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would say that if it is in U.S.
interest for there to be conversations with Russians, we should
look hard at what can be done to facilitate those and I----
Senator Paul. I would argue that it is. There has been a
great deal of discussion about prosecutions. Let us drag people
to The Hague. Let us have some prosecutions. Would Putin be one
of those targets?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, he is certainly guilty of prosecuting
war crimes. He is certainly the leader of this illegal
aggression. As I said to Senator Cardin----
Senator Paul. It sounds like the Administration would favor
taking him to The Hague?
Ms. Nuland. As I said to Senator Cardin, we are now looking
with our allies and partners and the Ukrainians at the
appropriate judicial mechanism and that would indicate the
scope of what would be covered.
Senator Paul. If you are really thinking ultimately that
there might be a peaceful settlement that does not involve
unconditional surrender by the Russians, or vice versa by the
Ukrainians, you might at least put some thought into the fact
that saying that he is guilty of war crimes and that it is a
possibility he is going to The Hague, that it may make any kind
of settlement--peaceful settlement or someone who is fighting a
war less likely to prosecute a peace or to engage in peace
talks if he thinks, hmm, if there is peace we are going to The
Hague--that there is going to be prosecutions.
I am not saying one way or another on the facts of whether
there are war crimes. I am just saying that if you say the
leader of somebody in a war that you would like to ultimately
resolve is guilty of these things, I think it makes it very
much less likely.
I think it is a careless remark and it is a remark that
does not really think fully through the ramifications of what
you say. Because when you say that, I think you are basically
saying this war is going to go on forever and with--if you want
to picture devastation--you see Ukraine now, in 5 years it will
be worse.
I mean, I do not imagine this getting better over the next
5 years, but if you preclude peace I think you inevitably will
make it worse.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, if I may.
I have spent my life at the State Department. We never
preclude peace. That is what we are about. I would cite the
precedent of Kosovo, of Bosnia, of Rwanda, where we have
successfully supported wars winding down through diplomatic
means while also pursuing justice.
Senator Paul. We kind of--just about unconditionally, one,
too--and we captured those people or somebody captured them and
gave them to us--I mean, that is what you would have to
imagine, and I do think that you need to think through this
because I do not think you or the Administration have or
anybody that is calling for prosecution of Putin for war crimes
and saying this is genocide and all of these things and saying
it is the Holocaust because once you say that I think you make
peace less likely.
Nothing of what I am saying is to say anything Putin has
done is justified. I am just saying that if you are going to
say these things you are very less likely to have any kind of
peaceful settlement.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank our three witnesses today, really, for the work that
you are doing. Your commitment and your leadership at a time of
global crisis is extraordinary, and I am just humbled and
grateful for your professionalism and your focus and,
obviously, for you being here today.
I want to mention how grateful I was in a bipartisan way
that in the NDAA we were able to get some more reporting
language requirements on the activities of the Wagner Group,
and I am very concerned--and it has already been addressed in
some other questioning--about the Wagner's activities in Africa
and cannot lose sight of how this is all interrelated.
We are in a moment in human history where this idea that
might makes right, where you can invade your neighbor--this is
not just a Ukrainian issue. This is very much, as I think my
senior senator and chairman said, an issue that all Americans
should be concerned with, and if we do not face this Russian
aggression here, we will see the crisis expand in ways that
threaten the world order and stability that we have fought and
invested in generations to establish not just in Europe, but
globally.
I would like to drill down, if I can, about my ongoing
concerns about food insecurity and how this is affecting global
issues.
Ukraine is obviously approaching its planting season. It is
likely that their agricultural capacity will be further reduced
by the effects of this invasion and this could, in turn, have
just impacts on what we are seeing now, which is not just
disruptions in the global food chain, but a level of food
insecurity globally that is some of the highest it has ever
been.
I am wondering what the Administration is doing to plan
ahead on this and what further resources might be needed from
Congress to address the growing crisis of food insecurity
globally.
Ms. Nuland. Why do I not start and then Assistant
Administrator McKee can jump in?
Senator, thank you for all of your support as well and your
frequent travel.
As I said in my opening, through the Black Sea Grain
Initiative brokered by the U.N., which we supported and helped
midwife, we have liberated about 17 million tons of Ukraine's
grain, but, as you said, their exports are still down about 30
percent and there are risks for planting.
From that perspective, the money that the Congress has
provided both last year and in FY23, we are working at every
level with the World Food Programme, as you know, to speed both
food and fertilizer to countries that would normally be
consumers of Ukraine and, frankly, Russia's output to ensure
that they can plant this year.
Secretary Blinken is particularly focused on ensuring that
we are working on this problem not just for today, but for
tomorrow, and particularly in Africa, but in other parts of the
world we have, over years of climate change, civil war, other
issues, drought, seen soil degraded, seen crops become
vulnerable, et cetera.
As we look at the appropriation that you have just given
us, we are focused in particular on soil health, on new kinds
of seeds and varietals, particularly on the continent of Africa
that can withstand climate change, on small farmer support, but
also more systemic answers to these questions, and we look
forward to working with you.
Erin, I do not know if you have anything to add to that.
Ms. McKee. I do, thank you, and I would like to build on
what Under Secretary Nuland mentioned with respect to what we
are doing inside Ukraine, who is a key supplier of agricultural
commodities and resources, but not the only one, both getting
the grain out, but ensuring that the next planting season takes
place.
Both through the Black Sea Grain Initiative as well as the
solidarity lanes to ensure that all of the above--our ability
to trust and rely on Putin to adhere to the agreement--is
something that--a factor that we must take into account.
As of at least yesterday there were 121 ships waiting to
leave the port in Odessa and there are about four to five ships
a day that--through inspections--that are sort of being slow
rolled. It is not the--it provided relief, but it is not the
only solution.
The greatest solution to helping Ukraine both continue its
agricultural contributions to global food security is,
obviously, to end the conflict.
I want to thank you, though, for your highlighting this
important topic because, as you know, in 2022, just last year,
over 205 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian
food assistance, which was an 8 percent increase over 2021 and
an 89 percent increase compared to 2016.
The global food security crisis that we are seeing today
created by climate change, the impacts of supply chain issues,
and everything--and compounded and exacerbated by Putin's
unjust war are resulting in a crisis that we have not seen in--
at least in my lifetime.
Senator Booker. I just want to add as I conclude, Russia is
in this doing a lot on disinformation to try to hide its
responsibility for this crisis and deflect responsibility and I
think it is just really important, especially as I just met
with many African leaders, that we make it clear that this is a
crisis being caused by Putin's war of choice, war of
aggression.
Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. Just to say, Senator, I feel that that message
is getting through. As you saw at the African Leaders Summit,
what they want is solutions and that is why the support you
have given us to work creatively with them is most important.
The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Nuland, I am curious about how much
information we have really been able to share with the public
with regard to the reasoning behind our funding for the
Ukrainians in this war with Russia.
Many of us have the opportunity to get the classified
discussions where we can be pretty frank about what is going
on. I think there is a lot of folks out there that have not had
the opportunity that we have had and they will challenge
whether or not we have been appropriate or reasonable in our
support--continued support for Ukraine in this particular
instance.
Would it be fair to say in this unclassified discussion
that the Administration's policy is or the position is that
Ukraine can win this war against Russian aggression?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think a year ago none of us would
have believed that we would be sitting here and Ukraine would
still be standing as she is. That said, a third of her
territory, as you know, is now held by Russia illegally.
If we did not think that this investment could push back
Putin and turn back this tactic that is lawless and creates a
world that none of us wants our children to live in, that you
can just take a piece of your neighbor's property by force and
that is okay, we would not be asking you, we would not be
asking the American people, for this support.
We have seen the gains that the Ukrainians were able to
make through September. We are now--they want to push again
very hard as the spring comes and that is why you see these new
forms of equipment that will help them, we believe, to push
Russia back further this spring.
Senator Rounds. In terms of the Administration's position,
our goal is one of, on the ground, seeing Ukraine regain lost
land that Russia has taken in previous offensive moves. Is that
a fair statement?
Ms. Nuland. That is a fair statement.
Senator Rounds. Longer term, would it be the position that
we continue to fund Ukraine as long as Russia has those ill-
gotten gains in their possession?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think we are going to have to ensure
that Ukraine has the defenses not only to continue to try to
push Russia back, but to ensure that Putin cannot reconstitute
and come back.
One scenario one could see and one that some think that the
Russians favor is a pause in this war now on these lines
because that would give Putin time to rest and refit and
rebuild his own military, and as we saw between 2014 and 2022
he will just be back and he will push further and he will come
not just for Ukraine, but for other countries around him. That
is why it has to end here.
Senator Rounds. It may be semantics, but what we are really
talking about is whether or not Ukraine can win this episode,
this war, and part of what you are telling me is within the
Administration it is a matter of taking back land from Russia
and putting them in a position to where they will not be able
to come back and attack again, and that suggests to me that we
really do believe that Ukraine can win this war.
Is that a fair statement or--I am trying to get you to
either say, yes, we believe Ukraine can win the war, or we are
not really making that statement. Do we believe that Ukraine
can win the war?
Ms. Nuland. We believe that Ukraine can regain the
sovereignty to survive and thrive and it can push Russia back
further, yes.
Senator Rounds. Does that mean they win the war?
Ms. Nuland. Ukraine will define what winning is, right, but
yes, I believe so.
Senator Rounds. The Administration has a belief that if we
continue to fund their needs, and those needs have yet to be
defined, it is based upon what the current requests are. Do we
know what the next requests are that would give them the
ability to retake this land?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, you and the American people have been
very generous for FY23. We are assuming that what you have
given us for 2023 will--is what we will have through September.
As we saw, a year is an eternity in Ukraine. We do not know
where we will be this summer.
Senator Rounds. What I am getting at is--and I do not mean
to be argumentative, but it is one thing to say that we are
going to put resources in. It is another thing to say that
Ukraine has made requests that we have either responded to and
said no to, or Ukraine is making requests that we are not going
to respond to.
We just did the Abrams tanks after a lot of foot dragging.
Are there other items out there that are in the near future
that we intend to expand on that we have simply not talked
about yet?
Ms. Nuland. In this setting I would simply say that we are
working in particular now on speeding more air defenses,
speeding more artillery, speeding more ammunition, to the
Ukrainians.
You have given us the ability and the financing that we
already have to do more between now and September, and we are
working with the Ukrainians as they proceed with their battle
plans to ensure that what we are giving meets the needs on the
ground.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for
going over. I just simply think it is really important that the
American people understand that this has not been a one step at
a time without knowing the direction that we are trying to go
and that there really is a plan in place. If not, there should
be a plan in place with strategies in place to be ahead of the
game rather than simply waiting for the next request in line.
Ms. Nuland. No, absolutely, and just understanding better
what you were getting at, as you saw from August to the Kherson
offensive in October we worked intensively with the Ukrainians
on the kinds of equipment and other kinds of support and
training that they needed to mount that offensive.
They did that and now they have plans for a spring
offensive and that is what we are focused on both in terms of
training and equipment.
I do not know if Assistant Secretary Wallander wants to
add.
Senator Rounds. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know members understand that we recognize we cross back
and forth and we recognize members who were present at the time
of the beginning of the hearing. I know some members have
waited, have come back. I just want to remind everybody of the
rules.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
thank all of you for your testimony and for your service.
Under Secretary Nuland, thank you and the team for all you
have been doing to support the people of Ukraine both on the
military front, the political front, and the economic front.
My question relates to sanctions because I think we put in
place early on important sanctions on the Russian economy.
Those include both financial sanctions, but also export
controls and I think, especially on the export control side as
time goes on, we have seen that they have had teeth.
The Russians are trying to cast about the world trying to
get parts for infrastructure and military. We also, of course,
as you mentioned in your testimony put in place an oil price
cap, and I do want to focus on that for a moment because
despite our sanctions the reality is because of Russian oil
exports they continue to reap an awful lot of revenue to
support their war machine.
I think the price cap on oil was an important innovation,
but I guess my question is what impact have we seen? Because as
I see it, I see some reduction in the price people are paying
for Russian oil, but I want to know if Russians are making up
for it on volume.
India, as you know, has been importing an awful lot of
Russian oil. I just saw the other day Pakistan decided to enter
into a long-term oil purchase agreement with Russia. Other
countries around the world are looking for cheaper oil.
Are they making--in terms of Russian revenue from oil what
is your projection as to both the impact of our sanctions and
where--what we can expect it to be over the next--the remainder
of the year?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
I think one of the success stories of this campaign with
our allies is that Europe, which was heavily dependent on
Russian oil, has now gone to zero and that the U.S. has
successfully been able to support them in that as well as
increasing our own LNG exports to Europe some 68 percent.
The oil price cap, which was a new tool of financial
diplomacy which some folks were skeptical of has been extremely
successful.
As you probably know, the price of Russian crude was over
$100 a barrel before the price cap and it is now trading at
around $40 per barrel as of January 9.
Even if Russia is pumping more to India and other
countries, the profit margin that they are making on it is
less. I, frankly, do not have in front of me the total numbers,
but if we had not instituted the price cap along with our
allies and partners the revenues would have been off the
charts.
Countries like India that need the oil, but do not want to
fund the fuel machine--the war machine have a better option.
Senator Van Hollen. Sure. I am going to go from this
hearing to a meeting with the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury,
who has been very involved, as you know, in this and try to get
a full readout, but there is no doubt there is progress on the
price of Russian oil and I applaud the Administration. That was
an innovative approach.
In terms of overall revenue coming into the Russian
coffers, I think we need to be very watchful of that because if
the overall objective is to reduce the money coming in for the
war machine, of less profit the Russians make, good, but so
long as they are making some profit and make up for lost profit
in volume on revenues we have not achieved our overall
objective, at least in my view.
I know there have been some questions about the Wagner
Group, including in the Central African Republic. Reporting
suggests Wagner is also very much in the mining business these
days in Africa and some of those proceeds can also help fund
the war against Ukraine.
Could you talk specifically about the situation in Burkina
Faso? Because I think we are familiar on this committee with
what happened in Mali. A lot of us are very concerned about the
Wagner Group's penetration into Burkina Faso.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, before you joined I made reference to
a new tranche of sanctions being announced today--they may
already have been announced--which include a large number of
Prigozhin and Wagner targets and particularly Wagner targets in
Africa, those who help facilitate his network there.
We are very focused on Burkina Faso. I think, as I
mentioned to you when I saw you in another setting, I was there
in October with an interagency delegation along with Assistant
Secretary Wallander, and at that time and continuing in a phone
call that I had with the acting president or with President
Traore around Christmas, he continued to say that he would not
invite Wagner, that he was accepting Russian equipment, but
that Burkinabe would fight for Burkina.
We have strongly encouraged them not to go in that
direction and cited the example of the Central African Republic
in Mali where they no longer control their own sovereignty,
their own territory, their own mines, that that is the property
of Wagner and directly funds the war in Ukraine.
We are continuing to work on that issue within the
constraints that we have in a country that has had a coup,
Section 7008. We are encouraging those allies who can provide
equipment to do so and continuing our own security support as
we are allowed.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to state that I certainly want to see
Ukraine win this conflict. The people of Tennessee, the people
of America, want to see that result, too, and I would like to
associate myself with the comments of our Chairman about having
a blueprint in place to understand the path to get there.
I think that is responsible, and to the extent you are able
to share that with us in this sort of setting or another I
would look forward to participating in that goal.
My real concern and what I would like to talk with you
first about is the magnitude of U.S. funding of this and the
accountability associated with it.
Right now, the United States is bearing the lion's share of
the funding for the assistance--the military assistance to
Ukraine and we are doing that despite real concerns about
accountability, about corruption.
President Zelensky recently, very recently, dismissed
senior officials over corruption concerns and many Americans,
certainly, many Tennesseans that talk to me are very concerned
about a type of open-ended commitment to Ukraine.
Again, this gets back to what the Chairman was raising.
Having a clear picture of where we are headed, I think, would
be most useful.
The other concern I hear about, though, greatly is where
the United States is relative to other European nations. Now,
the countries that are most proximate to the border countries
have really stepped up and punched above their weight when you
look at the share of their defense spending versus their GDP.
You have other major economies in Europe that are not
pulling their weight, and when you look at it relative to the
United States you have got countries like Germany where the
United States is paying double our GDP versus what the Germans
are doing. We are doing five times what France is spending as a
percentage of GDP in terms of supporting this war.
My first question is what are you--what are we doing as a
nation--what are you doing specifically to try to encourage
these large European allies who are far more proximate to the
problem to step up and do more?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Hagerty.
We should compare our statistics because, actually, we have
throughout this war worked very hard with our coalition of some
50 partners both on the security side and on the economic side
to ensure burden sharing, and our numbers indicate that our
allies and partners around the world are carrying at least half
of the burden, if not more, in some categories, including some
of the things that are hard to calculate like the millions--10
million or more--Ukrainian refugees in some of their cities,
and the recent announcement by the Germans of Leopard tanks
will make a significant increase to their particular
contribution, but what I am----
Senator Hagerty. I know it was very painful getting the
Germans to that point, but I appreciate the effort that went
into getting that to happen.
Ms. Nuland. With regard to the longer term as we spoke
about what is ahead for the Ukrainians, which is this strong
push in the spring, and I think we will see the results of that
and that will give us a sense, but what they have made clear is
they cannot pause now. That will only favor Russia, and we want
to put them in the best possible position so that whether this
war ends on the battlefield, whether it ends with diplomacy or
some combination that they are sitting on a map that is far
more advantageous for their long-term future----
Senator Hagerty. Understood.
Ms. Nuland. --and that Putin feels the strategic failure.
Senator Hagerty. I would just encourage continued efforts
working with our European allies to get them to step up and
find their way to the point that you just described where
German got to the tank support. Please do more of that.
Can I go to presidential drawdown authority right now and
what has happened there? I have watched this Administration
transfer billions of dollars worth of military equipment to
Ukraine under the PDA, but I watch what is happening in Taiwan
and this is a source of frustration, I think, you and I may
have discussed before. Right now my understanding is that we
have a $19 billion backlog--a years-long backlog of military
equipment that is destined for Taiwan, but is not yet there.
I have spent a tremendous amount of time on our foreign
military sales program here in America with our allies. The
system does not work as well as it should, and I would very
much appreciate the opportunity to hear from you if you have an
immediate perspective and then later, perhaps, a briefing on
where we are going with that.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would like to come back to you on
the specifics of Taiwan backlog and, perhaps, not in this
setting, but we agree with you that even as we support Ukraine
and push back Russia, we have to strengthen Taiwan's defenses
and we are engaged in that intensively with the Pentagon.
Senator Hagerty. Secretary Wallander, any further comments
on that?
Dr. Wallander. No, simply to agree that the Pentagon is
focused on the acute fight and importance of supporting
Ukraine, but at the same time is learning lessons for support
of Taiwan and shares concern about supply chain issues and
fulfilling of contracts and has a focused working group led by
the acquisition and sustainment portion of OSD to focus exactly
on that.
Senator Hagerty. I will have my team reach out and arrange
an update in the appropriate setting to follow up on this.
Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here. I will start with Secretary Wallander.
The Biden administration has so far been very successful in
keeping allies unified in response to Russian aggression. I
think the last few days, maybe the last week, has been
anomalous.
Can you tell me why--and why we should be reassured that
this was a blip on the screen and that we are going to move
forward in a more unified fashion, especially as I assume
wrangling has to happen all the time.
The fact that it happened in public was not insurmountable,
just a little bit of a stubbing of our toe, and we got through
it, but I want to make sure that this is not the new normal and
that we are going to go back to what I thought was pretty
extraordinary coordination and unity.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Senator.
The history of NATO, as Under Secretary Nuland can attest,
is one of bringing the alliance together because there is
always a common purpose, but there are different ideas about
how to get to that common purpose, and we are really grateful
and admiring of the work of European allies over the last year
in bringing different capabilities, different niches of
military capabilities, financing support, to Ukraine. It is a
work in progress always.
The specifics of the issue of how to move forward on armor,
there was a lot of success built up over the previous weeks on
APCs, on infantry fighting vehicles, on all kinds of armored
vehicles.
There was intensive discussions about the right mix to get
to Ukraine for the fight right away as well as the long term,
and the urgency of the fight right now, combined with at the
same time thinking about what we needed to provide Ukraine for
a longer-term capability, did kind of emerge in public, but
underneath we have been working with allies and partners all
along and we knew that we would get to a resolution and a
solution that provides Ukraine with the capability that it
needs.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Secretary Nuland, I want to talk to you about applying
Russia lessons to China, especially as it relates to the
economic sanctions regime.
Couple of thoughts. First, if you could just elucidate
briefly the differences, right. I think we had extraordinary
success, and quickly, in unifying not just allies, but almost
the entire planet around a sanctions regime and economic
isolation.
That is a heck of a lot harder to do if we are talking
about China and an invasion of Taiwan. That is number one, so
please talk about the differences.
Number two is can you reassure me that there is an
interagency process now on developing a sanctions regime? I get
the balance that you have to strike between signaling to China
that there will be consequences, but also, tactically speaking,
not telling them exactly what they might be facing so that they
can spend 5 years figuring out a plan to evade those sanctions.
Can you talk to me about where we are in that process?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator.
In this setting I am going to say the following, and I look
forward to following up in another setting if you would like.
Just as China is intensely learning the lessons of Putin's
failure and the way the world responded so are we thinking
about applying the lessons to any future contingencies in
Taiwan and, frankly, we are speaking very clearly to the
Chinese about it.
We are also speaking to the whole world about it. Were
there to be a conflict, as you know, in the Taiwan Straits, 50
percent of global commerce would be disrupted.
If we have had food insecurity as a result of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, we would have massive economic global
dislocation and China would be directly responsible. That is a
talking point that we are using not just with China, but with
other allies.
We are also talking about the need to have with every
partner, whether or it is an ally or whether it is a hedging
state or whether it is a state with deep relations with China,
about the concern about having over-reliance, whether it is in
their supply chains, whether it is in their strategic
relationships, whether in debt on China and creating
resiliency.
Senator Schatz. So derisking?
Ms. Nuland. Right.
Senator Schatz. I do want to--and you do not--maybe this is
not appropriate for an open session--but we are having a
discussion about how to configure a sanctions bill or send the
right signals and I would like for us to get it right and not
polarize this issue about are you tough on China or not and
make sure that we do not telegraph things that we do not want
to telegraph.
I think that they should be clear that there will be severe
consequences. I am not sure that they should know exactly what
they are because they may be capable of evading those
consequences if we tell them 5 years in advance.
Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. I think we would welcome the chance in another
setting for those conversations.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of you for being here and for the work that you are doing
every day.
Ambassador Nuland, I would like to begin with Belarus. Last
year, along with three other colleagues, we sent a bipartisan
letter to Secretary Blinken about plans to nominate a special
envoy to Belarus to succeed Julie Fisher. I did finally get a
letter last night in response to that.
Actually, Mr. Chairman, can I ask that we enter this letter
into the record?
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
There was nothing in the letter that I was surprised or
that I thought we would not have known 6 months ago. I guess my
question is while I know that the Belarus affairs unit
continues to be very important in supporting pro-democracy
movement in Belarus, can you tell me are there plans to appoint
a special envoy and who currently leads the Administration's
policy on Belarus?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I am going to apologize on behalf of our Department for
taking 6 months to answer a letter from you. That is
unacceptable, frankly.
We are looking for an appropriate candidate--a career
candidate for this job. It is a complex job, as you know,
because you have to work in Vilnius at this moment, given the
status.
We have a very excellent charge who is doing most of the on
the ground contact work, but our Assistant Secretary for Europe
and Eurasia, Karen Donfried, has been meeting with fellow
Russians as has her deputy, Robin Dunnigan, at regular
intervals to test whether there might be any openings there.
I would not say that we have had manifest success, but also
working intensively with the Belarusian opposition and Madam
Tikhanovskaya, and the Secretary is seeing her regularly.
We are continuing to work on this and I hope we will have
somebody to talk to you about in the not too distant future.
Senator Shaheen. Great. I would I point out that the
congressional delegation in Halifax met with Ms. Tikhanovskaya
and she was also very concerned about the lack of a special
envoy to address Belarus.
This next question is probably both for you and for
Secretary Wallander and it is really about Turkey's continued
failure to ratify Sweden and Finland's accession agreement into
NATO and their interest in getting F-16s and how we are
addressing that issue with them.
I would tell you that I, for one, am opposed to
supporting--providing F-16s to Turkey until they have ratified
that agreement and I think a number of my colleagues share that
concern. I know there are other issues around those F-16s, but
I just want to put that on the table as one of the concerns
that I have.
I think Sweden has moved very deliberately to address the
concerns that were discussed with Turkey in terms of their
accession into NATO and that their--President Erdogan,
unfortunately, is using this, it appears, for his domestic
political interests as opposed to really addressing what is in
the interest of NATO and the security agreement that we need as
we support Ukraine in their fight against Russia.
I do not know which of you would like to address that.
Ms. Nuland. Why do I not start?
We agree with you, Senator Shaheen, that Finland and Sweden
are ready to join NATO now and we were grateful for the speedy
ratification here and, as you know, almost all allies have now
ratified with the exception of Hungary and Turkey.
This comes up in every single conversation we have with
Turkey and we have tried to--the Swedes, as you know, have put
forward a roadmap that they worked through with Turkey. They
have met many of those benchmarks and they are continuing to
try to do more there.
We have made the same point to our Turkish allies that you
just made, that we need this Congress' support, moving forward,
for the security enhancements that we think that they need as
allies--F-16s, some of them are old--but that this Congress is
likely to look far more favorably on that after ratification.
Keep making your points and we will, too.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Would you like to add to that?
Dr. Wallander. I would just add that the Defense Department
makes precisely the same points to our Turkish allies at every
opportunity and reinforces that in the process--in the
democratic processes that support American foreign policy the
Congress plays an important role and they need to take that
seriously.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have lots of questions about
Russian influence in the Balkans, but I will save that for
another time.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
all of you.
I wanted to start by having you all and, particularly,
Secretary Nuland to address both with India, with South Africa,
with the ASEAN nations, the difficulty in getting them to take
a strong stand against Russia.
I think it particularly bothers me with democracy in South
Africa as democracies, and we have strong partnerships with
countries like the Philippines that--and a new government there
and, yet, we are not really seeing them as robustly supportive
of defending a republic against a dictatorial aggression.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, let me start with the Philippines and
the new government where actually they have been quite strong
supporters of Ukraine including voting with us in the United
Nations against the annexation of Ukrainian territories,
including some other work we are doing together on security
support, et cetera.
With regard to South Africa and India, as you know, these
countries have long-standing historic intertwinings with
Russia. We have been making the case regularly with them that
these dependencies that they have created make them more
vulnerable and we will continue to do that.
In the case of the oil price cap, as you know, which India
was quite skeptical of, they are now major beneficiaries
because the oil that they are buying from Russia is so much
cheaper, and we are now working with them on ways to diversify
away from Russian weapons. I will be in India next week talking
about that, among other things.
The South African situation is complex and is also tied to
some of the politics inside South Africa, but I would look
forward to talking with you offline about some of those things.
Senator Merkley. Great. I am glad to hear that you are
going to India and I would think that after the performance of
Russian weapons on the battlefield has been demonstrated they
might be somewhat less interested in. Also, that is a big issue
with the ASEAN countries, many of which depend on Russian
weapons.
Are you proceeding on to Jakarta or to the ASEAN after
India?
Ms. Nuland. This trip is South Asia. It is India, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, and then on to Qatar to work on some of the Afghan
SIV issues.
We have--Deputy Secretary Sherman and Secretary--Counselor
Chollet have all made these same points in ASEAN and on my last
trip to India that was one of the first things we said--look at
how these weapons perform on the battlefield.
I think they find themselves after 60 years of entanglement
having to find alternatives and that is part of the job we have
to do is help them with alternatives.
Senator Merkley. Yes. I want to turn to the stories that
have been raised about corruption concerns. Zelensky has fired
several people. There are stories about the military paying a
lot more than market price, which always implies corruption, in
buying food.
It is important for us to really work diligently to support
Zelensky's government in taking on corruption because it will
be a kind of a cancer eating away at that support that they
need from everyone in the world, and I would just get your
insights and commentary on that.
Ms. Nuland. Assistant Secretary McKee may have more to add,
but as I said in my opening, what Ukrainian patriots are
fighting for and what we in the international community are
supporting is a more democratic, cleaner, more European
Ukraine.
I think Zelensky is very conscious of that and we have been
very clear that we need to see, even as they prosecute this
war, the anti-corruption steps, including good corporate
governance and judicial measures, move forward.
We agree with you that the fact that a number of folks have
been dismissed or forced to resign as their cases are being
pursued that sends a very strong signal to others who would try
to rip off this war effort and is important for the future of
Ukraine.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Last question. My colleague was mentioning concern that the
Europeans are not putting as much into support of Ukraine as we
are and--but I wonder what that analysis looks like if one
considers the much higher prices that they are paying for
energy or to host refugees and if you have any sense of how all
that balances out in terms of our thinking about the sacrifices
that the European partners are making.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you for raising that, Senator Merkley.
I did mention the refugee burden--some 10 million refugees
hosted all over Europe--which impacts towns and communities all
over the continent and you see that everywhere.
Your point about the fact that most of my European friends
report a 300 percent increase in their energy bills over the
winter, and if you just think about the sticker shock that that
would create if it were happening here, you are absolutely
right.
That speaks to the fact that they have now woken up to the
fact that the dependence that they had on Russian oil was bad
for their national interest, and so there will be--as hard as
this has been there will be good structural changes that come
out the other end.
Senator Merkley. If there is any analysis that weighs those
different financial factors together to paint a more complete
picture I would just be interested in seeing it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to each of
the witnesses.
Ms. Nuland, as you know, in January of last year, the
Senate voted on my legislation to impose sanctions on the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline and it did so before Russia had invaded
Ukraine.
When the Senate voted on those sanctions, President
Zelensky publicly urged, even begged, the United States Senate
to pass those sanctions and President Zelensky said passing
those sanctions then were the last chance to prevent Russia
from invading Ukraine, the last chance to prevent Russian tanks
rolling into Ukraine.
Was President Zelensky wrong?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Cruz, like you, I am and, I think, the
Administration is very gratified to know that Nord Stream 2 is
now, as you like to say, a hunk of metal at the bottom of the
sea.
I, personally having been involved along with my boss,
Secretary Blinken, in all of those negotiations with Russia to
try to prevent this war in December, do not believe that had
that Nord Stream 2 been cut off in January, that would have
been decisive for Putin.
It was important that the day the war began the Germans cut
the pipeline, as did the rest of the Europeans, but he was
bound and determined to go into Ukraine, as you know.
Senator Cruz. You believe Zelensky was wrong when he said
stopping Nord Stream 2 was the last and best way to stop this
war?
Ms. Nuland. I do not think it would have stopped Putin and
I----
Senator Cruz. When the Government of Poland similarly
said--begged the United States Senate to pass those sanctions
and said this is the last and best opportunity to stop Russia
from invading Ukraine, you believe Poland was wrong, too?
Ms. Nuland. I do not believe we would have prevented this
war had the Europeans acted faster on Nord Stream 2. I wish it
were the case, but I do not think it would have stopped him.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Let us talk about how the war is going,
and I know that you and I both agree that it is important for
Russia to suffer a crushing defeat.
Putin is a KGB thug and he is committed to undermining our
interests, and our enemies across the globe, including in
particular China, are watching carefully what happens in
Ukraine.
The Iranian regime is watching as well and Iran is
committed to doing everything they can to ensure Putin's
victory. They are supplying Putin with resources, especially
drones, which are devastating Ukrainian civilians and military
assets.
Meanwhile, the Biden administration, which waived the
sanctions on Nord Stream 2, the last and best hope of
preventing the war, right now today continues to be obsessed
with a new nuclear deal with Iran.
Iranian officials say talks remain ongoing while
Administration officials say they remain committed to
diplomacy, but not right now.
I am deeply concerned that this Administration even in the
middle of a war is subordinating the need to counter the
Russian-Iranian alliance to its own partisan political
preferences.
For example, this Administration has dropped the general
U.N. arms embargo against Iran. This Administration has made
Russia our intermediary in nuclear talks with Iran.
This Administration has issued sanctions waivers, allowing
the Ayatollah to become Putin's nuclear client. This
Administration has withheld weapons for Ukraine to target
Iranian operatives in Crimea, helping Russia launch drones, and
this Administration has avoided using relevant sanctions
authority against Iranian banks, facilitating the transfer of
drones to Iran.
As a result, Iran has been able to dramatically boost
Putin's war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, America and the American
taxpayer are shouldering the burden of assisting Ukraine while
the Biden administration is greasing both sides of this war.
Let us talk about Iran's supply of drones to Russia. The
Biden administration made an immediate decision to go to the
United Nations and drop the general U.N. arms embargo on Iran
because they say it was required by the original JCPOA nuclear
deal.
Biden officials say part of the embargo dealing with drones
is still in place, but even that measure will expire this fall
pursuant to the JCPPA.
I believe the Biden administration should immediately go to
the U.N., invoke our snapback authority, and keep the embargo
in place.
Do you agree or do you believe we should allow the U.N.
arms embargo on Iran to expire and allow Iranian drones to
continue to go to Russia and be used against the people of
Ukraine?
The Chairman. The time of the senator has expired, but
please answer his question.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
Senator Cruz, you are absolutely right that Iranian drones
are fueling this war and that is why we have taken many, many
increased sanctions measures against Iran over the last couple
of months, including against the IRGC Guard Corps Aerospace
Force, the Quds Force aviation industry, the Shahed aviation
industry, Russian Aerospace Forces, the----
Senator Cruz. Have you stopped the drones?
Ms. Nuland. We have not stopped the drones and this is part
of the problem, but we know what Iran looks like and we also
know who Russia's friends are--Iran, North Korea, and Hamas.
As you know, we are not currently in active discussions
with Iran. It is not prepared to take these negotiations
seriously right now and we have many of the same concerns that
you have, but I look forward to speaking with you in a separate
setting about our larger strategy vis-a-vis Iran. I think this
is probably not the appropriate setting for that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you,
all three of you, for your service and for your work to
continue to help lead the efforts of our Administration in
combating Russia's aggression in Ukraine.
I thought the recent decision taken jointly by the United
States, Germany, and a number of other NATO allies and European
partners--soon to be NATO allies--to send main battle tanks as
well as to send Bradleys and Strykers from our Department of
Defense was the right one.
I am assuming, if I might, that this was not factored in to
your supplemental request last year, and on behalf of the DoD,
and if anyone else wants to speak, fine, but what impact does
it have on available resources for this new commitment to have
made and are there any additional resources or assistance
required to meet the additional requirements both security and
nonsecurity of deploying Abrams?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Senator.
DoD has a very focused process in preparing PDA packages
and USAI packages in light of what the Ukrainians prioritize,
what our assessment is that they require as well, what the
readiness impacts are, and what the costs are and
deliverability of the capabilities are.
While you are correct that the specific capabilities of the
last couple of weeks were not previewed necessarily in the
original supplemental, the scope of the supplemental for which
we are grateful is--does accommodate this planning and ongoing
planning.
That does not preclude that we may need to come back to
request additional funding, but for now, we are in a very good
place for that deliberate planning and constant provision of
capability to Ukraine.
Senator Coons. I think it is a positive step forward that
complements the Bradleys and Strykers that were already
announced.
I do think it is important for us to ensure that the
assistance made possible by the $45 billion supplemental
appropriations at the end of last year is used as intended,
that any misuse is identified and addressed.
I have raised these issues directly with President Zelensky
last week with the Deputy Prime Minister, the mayor of Kyiv,
with a number of legislators from Ukraine, also with our team
in Kyiv when I visited in November.
We provided significant additional resources through the
State and Foreign Operations appropriations provisions for both
USAID and State OIGs. I think enhanced oversight is a good
idea.
I would be interested whether, Ms. Nuland, you might
describe whether you think the accountability and oversight
mechanisms currently in place have been effective and what if
anything we need to do to strengthen them. If I might also, Ms.
Wallander?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Coons, for your attention
and support for all of this.
As I mentioned earlier, we have a layered approach on the
civilian side. As you know, we have extra staff thanks to you
and the embassy who are focused on accountability. We have the
budget support--that is the bulk of the economic support funds
goes through the World Bank so they actually pay the salaries,
et cetera, that we are intending to support and is double
monitored by Deloitte.
We also have--as you said, all of our OIGs are very, very
active. In fact, all three of them--State, USAID, and the
Department of Defense--as we sit here they are on the ground in
Kyiv now doing their first look at all of this.
I will not speak for my colleagues, but when I was in Kyiv
in December I got a very intensive brief from the military
about how they are accounting for every single artillery shell.
It is quite impressive.
Senator Coons. So did I in November and I found it
constructive. I just think it is important for our colleagues
to get as much of this as we possibly can.
I have just a minute left, if either you would like to
speak briefly to it.
Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
I wanted to add in addition to what Under Secretary Nuland
mentioned vis-a-vis the reimbursement process for direct budget
support through the World Bank and verifying through third
party monitoring that those arrears that we are covering are
valid.
We also entered into just last month an interagency
agreement with the GAO that is going to work with the financial
systems and the ministry of finance, of course, in Ukraine to
strengthen their own audit capability and with their supreme
audit authority to make more robust their internal controls as
well. We are moving out and expanding both our internal
capacity building as well as third party monitoring and
oversight.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I am near the end of my time. I
have another colleague waiting.
I will just comment that I am glad to see the
Administration has decided to sanction the Wagner Group. I am
very concerned about the scope and reach of their impact.
During the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit we pulled together a
meeting of five coastal West African national leaders who
expressed grave concern about their stability and security, and
I think Russia's malign actions are not limited to Ukraine by
any extent and I am concerned about a number of countries in
Africa, which I would be happy to work with you further on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Let me go to another part of the world. I
have questions for Secretaries Nuland and Wallander about
Russian activity in the Americas.
In June--past June, President Ortega in Nicaragua
authorized Russian troops, planes, and ships to deploy to
Nicaragua for purposes of training law enforcement or emergency
response. Russia called this a routine development.
In September, Ortega reached an agreement with Putin to air
Russian-produced media content through Russia's Sputnik Radio
network available to more than 20 Nicaraguan state channels
broadcasting to the country's nearly 7 million people.
In Venezuela, Russia has supported the oil industry, helped
Venezuela skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent military personnel and
equipment to the country. Some observers think that following
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Maduro's fortunes have improved
because, in large part, due to our campaign to limit people
using Russian oil revenues and the U.S.' consequent need for
other oil partners. The Venezuelan economy and energy situation
has gotten better.
I want to ask a couple of questions about this, first to
Secretary Nuland. Russia's state media conducts active
disinformation campaigns in Latin America through outlets like
RT in Espanol. Sputnik Mundo and RT play in Espanol.
How is the Department working with others to counter
Russian disinformation efforts in the region?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Kaine, thanks for this and for your
support of our efforts to beat back both Russian malign
influence and Chinese malign influence in the Americas.
We have robust programs both through our media hub for
Latin America, through all of our travel, and through our
embassy platforms to speak back ourselves, but also strengthen
investigative journalism and government journalists'
understanding of how the Russian disinformation networks work
and to be able to expose it as they see it.
Of course, in countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela, who
have set their lot with Russia, they are not so interested in
hearing it, but we do what we can in the Americas, more
broadly, with regard to that.
Senator Kaine. To Secretary Wallander, what is the DoD
assessment of the level of Russian military activity in
Nicaragua or more generally in the region?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, the first and most important duty
of the Department of Defense is to protect the American
homeland so the Department is always devoting resources in
tracking, monitoring, and planning to deter and defend against
any threat to the homeland.
The Department does not currently assess that there is a
heightened threat to the American homeland because of Russian
presence, but it is something that is tracked and monitored
every day.
Russian presence facilitated by countries like Nicaragua
is, of course, a major focus of tracking and watching. I can
reassure you that this is not lost upon us, but also reassure
that we do not see a heightened threat in the current
circumstance.
Senator Kaine. In recent visits to the region and
discussion with heads of state there, the Chinese presence is
very dominant economically and more and more military activity,
and the Russian presence is not at the same level and I think a
number of folks there see it as more kind of opportunistic or
to kind of annoy us, but we would be foolish to take it for
granted. We have to just keep monitoring it and I appreciate
the witnesses for your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Let me just join and I really appreciate Senator Kaine's
focus on the Americas. It is great to have someone else who
cares about it.
I want to echo his concerns about Russia's footprint in the
hemisphere, same as with China. We say that China is our
biggest geostrategic challenge. That means challenging in every
dimension in every part of the globe.
Here, with Russia, we see a footprint in Venezuela: the
president of Russian Security Services in the country,
cooperation with the Maduro regime on intelligence and cyber
capabilities, its ability to influence democratic institutions
in neighboring countries, the fact that Maduro invited Russia
to attend negotiations in Mexico City, media reports last year
about the presence of Russian radar deployed along Venezuela's
border utilized to surveillance the Colombian Government's
institutions. I know this is something you spoke about publicly
during your travel to Bogota last year.
We need to be focused multi-dimensionally as it relates to
Russia, and for that matter China, in our own hemisphere, and
if you are going to beat someone who you consider your single
biggest geostrategic challenge, i.e., China, and if we are
going to continue to weaken Russia in every dimension we can as
it relates to the war in Ukraine, that means playing three-
dimensional chess and that means also focusing on the
hemisphere.
I hope that the questions that Senator Kaine raised and
this comment helps us create some focus. I would love to hear
from our Assistant Secretary of the Western Hemisphere about
that focus in this regard.
Ms. Nuland. Just quickly, Senator, to say that you
mentioned it--you alluded to it, but one of the greatest risks
is democratic backsliding across the hemisphere and as these
countries--too many countries follow Putin and Xi Jinping's
model of governance and control of judiciaries and control of
the free press, et cetera. That is part of the larger message.
If I may just go back. Senator Hagerty asked me if Ukraine
can win. I believe and I believe the--all of us believe that if
we define winning as Ukraine surviving and thriving as a
cleaner, democratic state, it can and it must and it will with
our help.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I disagree with my colleague from Texas'
characterization of this Administration. I think no one has
been more insightful, decisive, and helpful to the Ukrainians
than the Biden administration and to suggest something else is
just a parallel alternate universe, but some of us seem to live
there.
In any event, there is one thing, though, that I do want to
echo on and that is Iranian drones. Iranian drones have been
present on the Ukrainian battlefield now for months.
It is inflicting massive damage to military and civilian
infrastructure across the country. We are reading troubling
reports that Russia now intends to acquire Iranian ballistic
missiles that can strike deep even into Europe, which would be
a game changer.
How is the Administration responding to the growing
military alliance between Iran and Russia and what measures, in
this case particularly in concert with our allies who should
understand that it is in their interest, particularly European
interests, to be more robust as it relates to Iran.
If Iran produces the missiles that it already has the
capacity and breadth of scope of reach and greater
sophistication in terms of targeting to Russia that can hit
different targets in Europe, it is a dramatically different
world.
They need to be engaged with us. They have been reticent
because they are looking for the JCPOA. Even the Iranians are
not interested in the JCPOA.
They need to now understand that the risk for them is
greater and the risk for all of us collectively as it relates
to success in Ukraine is greater if the Iranians can do all of
this with impunity and not face further consequences.
Ms. Nuland. Could not agree more, Senator, including about
the risk of Russian tech--missile technology helping the
Iranians get better at that themselves.
We are engaged in intensive conversations with our key
allies and partners about strengthening the sanctions regime in
response to this. As you know, we have done, and as I mentioned
earlier, a number of sanctions ourselves.
We are also engaged in a number of other things, which I
think we should talk about in another setting and we look
forward to it.
The Chairman. I am happy to do that.
I would just simply suggest that the Europeans have been
reticent about multilateralizing what is our sanctions as it
relates to Ukraine. The door is closed, from my perspective, on
the JCPOA because Iran itself has not sought to accept what I
thought was a bad deal, but, nonetheless, even that bad deal
they are not willing to accept it.
At the end of the day, now they are helping Russia. We are
pouring enormous amounts of resources, as are the Europeans, to
help Ukraine win this battle for itself and for the greater
existential threat.
It seems to me now the Europeans should think differently
about joining us in sanctions on Iran so that they understand
that--the Iranians understand there are consequences to their
actions because right now they do not.
This record of this hearing will remain open until the
close of business tomorrow. We thank all of you for your
appearance and for your insights.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Reconstruction: While it's a bit difficult to talk about
reconstruction while Russia continues to destroy anything it can in
Ukraine, I have begun thinking about what kind of legislative support
reconstruction will require--including ongoing governance reforms in
Ukraine and private sector engagement. Most importantly, Ukraine must
know that we will continue to stand with them. Other countries have
even appointed specific individuals to lead their efforts. How does the
Administration view medium- and long-term reconstruction, including
modernization efforts in Ukraine?
Answer. The Government of Ukraine must lead Ukraine's recovery, but
Ukraine alone cannot coordinate the extensive international effort
needed to implement recovery efforts. We continue to emphasize the need
for Ukraine to implement an inclusive, reform-minded program, with
focused attention on rule of law, good governance, and anticorruption
measures, which will be essential to building confidence in Ukraine and
stimulating private sector financing and investment. We are also
encouraging Ukraine to build in transparent and accessible
opportunities for private sector engagement in the reconstruction
process so that U.S. companies' experience and expertise can support
the massive rebuilding and modernization effort in Ukraine.
Question. War Crimes: Russia and the Wagner Group's war crimes
continue to mount. I am particularly concerned about kidnappings of
thousands of children, deportations via so-called filtration camps,
widespread sexual violence, murder, and targeting of civilian
infrastructure across Ukraine. Crimes will be prosecuted in different
ways, including by Ukrainian courts and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). What are the appropriate venues are for prosecuting the
different types of atrocities perpetrated by Russian forces? Are there
gaps in Ukraine's ability to prosecute these crimes caused by
jurisdictional issues, and how do we fill those gaps?
Answer. The Administration supports a range of existing mechanisms
and international inquiries to examine and investigate atrocities in
Ukraine, such as those of the International Criminal Court, the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, and other
efforts. We are devoting significant resources to strengthening the
capacity of Ukraine's justice system to ensure accountability,
including support to the Atrocities Crimes Advisory Group, a
multilateral initiative providing strategic advice and operational
assistance to Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General.
The fulsome investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes will
require legal reform in Ukraine, and a number of legal and practical
challenges have been identified. We are committed to working with
Ukraine to address those challenges as we have done with other
countries where large-scale atrocities have occurred.
Question. Sanctions: I am pleased by the sanctions the
Administration has imposed, but I believe there is more to be done to
go after Putin's inner circle. What more is the Administration
considering and has it coordinated these efforts with other allies?
Answer. The Administration has imposed sanctions on both Vladimir
Putin personally and a significant number of his associates. These
include Sergei Naryskin, Nikoai Patrushev, Sergei Lavrov, Boris and
Arkady Rotenberg, as well as numerous others. We are continuously
evaluating additional sanctions targets in this program, including
among Vladimir Putin's close associates. The Administration continues
to coordinate particularly closely with the United Kingdom, European
Union, and NATO Allies as well as with Japan and Five Eyes Partners.
Question. Wagner in Africa: In September, I asked our Sanctions
Coordinator, Amb. Jim O'Brien, why the Administration hadn't sanctioned
anyone in Africa in response to coups in the Sahel and West Africa, and
those known to be working with Wagner to export Sudanese gold to
Russia. He stated at that time that the Administration was well aware
of Wagner operations and Prigozhin (Pree-gojh-in) advertising himself
across the region, and indicated that Sudan and the gold trade are
``very important to us.'' Has the Administration taken further action
to look at particular individuals or entities relative to the export of
Sudanese gold to Russia since my exchange with Ambassador O'Brien in
September?
Answer. On January 26, we designated Wagner as a Transnational
Criminal Organization and levied new sanctions. This designation will
assist our efforts to disrupt their ability to profit from the gold
sector. We continue diplomatic outreach to gold producing and trading
countries to identify specific actors of concern and promote more
transparency in this sector. On January 31, Ambassador O'Brien and the
interagency convened an industry group to express concerns about the
role of Wagner in the gold supply chain and urge cooperation to limit
Wagner's ability to profit from operations in Africa. We will evaluate
further options.
Question. What about sanctions on leadership of governments and
juntas in Central Africa Republic and Mali who are working with Wagner
mercenaries alleged to have committed numerous human rights abuses?
Answer. We continually review and deploy all appropriate tools to
determine the best instruments to advance U.S. foreign policy goals in
both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. In Mali, we are
reviewing allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Malian
Armed Forces and others, and expect to issue new sanctions soon. In
CAR, as of January 26, we have sanctioned additional actors supporting
the Wagner Group's network. These actions provide greater authority and
ability for us to continue the use of sanctions and other tools over
time against actors working with Wagner to commit atrocities.
Question. Russian Disinformation in Latin America: The Putin regime
seeks to actively undermine democratic values by engaging in
sophisticated disinformation and propaganda operations. They do so not
just in Europe, but throughout the developing world, including in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Russian state media companies like Sputnik
and RT collude with authoritarian regimes in Cuba and Venezuela to
engage in Spanish-language information operations that have manipulated
regional information environments, spread lies about the war in
Ukraine, and exacerbated polarization. What steps is the United States
specifically taking to track and counter Russian information operations
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and how can we more effectively
protect vulnerable information ecosystems in our own hemisphere against
Russian malign influence?
Answer. The State Department is keenly aware of Russia's
disinformation campaign in the Western Hemisphere. In monitoring
disinformation, we have seen a sharp rise in viewership of Russian
state media in Latin America since 2020, reflecting the Kremlin's
increased priority of the region. Discussions with our foreign partners
indicate they are also aware of Russia's efforts to spread
disinformation, both before and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine
began. A key effort to combat Russia's disinformation efforts is the
implementation of programs that allow our partners to recognize and
counter disinformation and propaganda in civil society, academia, and
government. The State Department also supports fact-checkers and
independent media to increase journalistic standards and amplify
positive, fact-based content.
Question. Syria: Russia's barbarism against Ukrainian civilians is
not new. It developed and refined its playbook of war crimes in Syria,
where it continues to slaughter innocent civilians, emboldens Iranian
proxies like Hezbollah and is trying to facilitate closer ties between
Bashar al-Assad and President Erdogan of Turkey. What steps is the
Administration taking to counter Russian attempts to rehabilitate or
normalize the Assad regime?
Answer. This Administration does not support efforts to normalize
or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, which we have regularly and vocally
emphasized to our partners. We also do not support reconstruction of
Syria absent authentic and enduring progress towards a political
solution that meets the terms of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
2254. We urge states considering engagement with Syria to carefully
consider the regime's atrocities against the Syrian people over the
last decade, as well as the regime's ongoing efforts to deny much of
the country access to humanitarian aid and security. We continue
stressing to our partners that stability in Syria, and the greater
region, can only be achieved through a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led
political process consistent with UNSCR 2254.
Question. Have we seen any notable effect of Russia's setbacks in
Ukraine on its posture in Syria? What effect will continued Russian
setbacks in Ukraine, or sudden successes for that matter, have on
Russia's posture in Syria?
Answer. We have not seen Russia significantly reduce its force
posture or its military activities in Syria as a direct consequence of
its invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, over the last several months,
Russia has reportedly reinforced its presence in areas of northern
Syria and convened the defense ministers of Syria and Turkiye,
demonstrating that it remains committed to supporting the Assad regime
militarily.
Question. Arms Control: As you know Russia continues to block on-
site inspections of its nuclear facilities as required by the New START
Treaty. Is Russia's unwillingness to implement the New START treaty
explicitly tied to U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine?
Answer. In recent public statements, Russian officials have tied
U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine to New START
implementation. In fact, however, Russia has not complied since 2020,
initially citing COVID-19 as its reason. The overall deterioration of
the U.S.-Russian relationship is not an excuse for Russia to stop
complying with its treaty obligations. Maintaining and strengthening
nuclear guardrails only grows more important in times of heightened
tensions. The U.S. message to Russia is that the full, effective
implementation of New START is in our mutual security interests, that
Russia cannot selectively implement its legal obligations, and that the
United States will not trade concessions in Ukraine to get Russia to
fulfill its treaty obligations to us and to global security.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Military Assistance to Ukraine: Since the outset of
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Administration has repeatedly refused
to provide military capabilities requested by Ukrainian officials, such
as tanks, HIMARS, and air defense, only to subsequently change course
and provide them at a later date. What changed in the State
Department's decision-making about sending tanks to Ukraine that
resulted in the decision to do so now?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense, continuously work to
assess the military requirements of Ukraine. The decision to provide
Strykers, Bradleys, and Abrams is tied to Ukraine's specific
operational needs for its planned Spring counter-offensive, including
limitations of its existing battle-worn systems, and better positions
Ukraine for future offensive operations. We will continue to be
responsive to the evolving needs of the Ukrainian military, cognizant
of the level of support that is required to ensure Ukraine's ultimate
success on the battlefield.
Question. What changed in the State Department's decision-making
about sending Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in
the decision to do so now?
Answer. As the conflict in Ukraine evolves, we have been responsive
to Ukraine's evolving military requirements. Our assistance is meant to
counter Russia's actions. Stinger MANPADS blunted the original Russian
assault on Kyiv; Javelin anti-tank systems ravaged Russian columns in
the northern woods; HIMARS rocket systems have torn apart Russian
logistics hubs in the Donbas; and air defense systems have prevented
strikes against Ukrainian homes. Bradley and Stryker vehicles are
needed for Ukraine's planned Spring offensive, especially as Ukraine
has worn through so many of its Soviet era vehicles.
Question. When will the Administration agree to provide Ukraine
fighter planes such as the F-16?
Answer. We continue to look at Ukraine's evolving needs on the
battlefield, and to sustain an effective air defense. At each decision
stage, we weigh this against available resources, equipment, and
training timelines.
Question. If the Administration is opposed to providing F-16
capability, why?
Answer. We continue to be responsive to Ukraine's evolving military
requirements. I welcome continuing this discussion in a classified
setting.
Question. What is the Department's view on the provision of dual-
purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?
Answer. The Department of State recognizes the tragic cost to
civilians that can result from the use of cluster munitions and
emphasizes that their indiscriminate or disproportionate use violates
international humanitarian law. Current DoD policy restricts the
transfer to another government of cluster munitions with an unexploded
ordnance rate greater than 1 percent, consistent with longstanding U.S.
law.
Question. Direct Budgetary Support for Ukraine: Since February
2022, the United States has provided the overwhelming majority of
budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72 percent, of a total $18
billion mobilized to date--which is being disbursed through the
following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of Recovery from Economic
Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public Expenditures for
Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine Relief, Recovery,
Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and Contributions to
Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project. Does the Department
of State Office of the Inspector General maintain direct audit
authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the justification?
Answer. The United States has provided direct budget support (DBS)
to the Government of Ukraine (GOU) through the PEACE mechanism, the
World Bank's flagship financing instrument for Ukraine, and prior to
its creation, through the FREE Ukraine Multi-donor Trust Fund, the
World Bank's budget support package. As of April 12, 2023, $15.5
billion of the $22.9 billion in DBS funds has been disbursed to the
GOU, and $2.5 billion of the $22.9 billion has been transferred to the
World Bank to disburse in April and May. Neither the URTF nor HEAL have
been utilized for these payments.
The United States has employed a multi-tiered accountability system
to ensure oversight of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, which includes
third-party monitoring. We intend to further strengthen oversight with
additional measures using Ukraine supplemental funds. As required by
Ukraine supplemental legislation, the Department has submitted reports
on the implementation of this assistance. Additionally, in accordance
with the Ukraine legislation, State's OIG recently released its first
report on the Department's coordination with USAID on budget assistance
provided via the World Bank mechanisms. The Department is not aware of
any authority of any U.S. inspector general to audit the internal
operations of an international organization or international financial
institution.
OIG is separately responding to your question directly.
Question. Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports
or audits conducted on Ukraine assistance?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID, the Departments of
Defense and Treasury, and the Government of Ukraine are working closely
together to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability over U.S.
assistance to Ukraine. We are committed to accommodating the legitimate
needs of Congress for information necessary to perform its legislative
and oversight functions. When presented with specific requests for
information, including relating to assistance for Ukraine, we will work
with Congress, including the Committee, to accommodate such requests,
consistent with appropriate needs for protection of executive branch
confidentiality interests.
Question. Please describe the State Department's efforts to press
bilateral donors on the need for greater burden sharing to meet
Ukraine's assistance needs.
Answer. The United States is working closely with Allies and
partners around the world to provide Ukraine the assistance it needs to
defend itself against Russian aggression and initiate recovery and
reconstruction efforts. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance,
since February 2022, Ukraine has received $15.8 billion in budget
support from EU institutions and member states. EU institutions and
member states and other donors have provided $4.7 billion in
humanitarian aid, more than double the United States' $1.9 billion
contribution. Our European allies and partners are also bearing the
financial burden of hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees. Since
February 2022, our Allies and partners worldwide have also provided
more than $24 billion in security assistance.
Question. Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New
START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there
have been no treaty inspections during that time. What actions are your
Departments taking to mitigate against the risks associated with
Russia's non-compliance with the New START treaty?
Answer. The New START Treaty remains in U.S. national security
interests, and our objective is to return Russia to full compliance.
The State Department has and will continue to work with allies,
partners, and others in the international community to push Russia to
comply with its New START Treaty obligations. The United States will
also continue to monitor and assess what impact Russian noncompliance
has on U.S. national security. Russian actions will inform
consideration of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States will
ensure in any event that the United States is postured to defend the
United States and our allies.
Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia's efforts to
establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported
agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?
Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic,
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments,
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to
this question regarding the potential of a Russian naval base in Sudan,
and to give you our unvarnished assessment of the Wagner network and
our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified
briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department
bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified
setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and
staff.
Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other
Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S.
personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are
in place for responding to such incidents in the future?
Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic,
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments,
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to
this question regarding Wagner threats against our personnel, and to
give you our unvarnished assessment of the network and our plan for
thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your
convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC
and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome
continued engagements with Committee members and staff.
Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner
Group's outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the
Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?
Answer. I have discussed our concerns regarding the Kremlin-backed
Wagner Group directly with Transition President Traore both in-person
and over the phone, and he has repeatedly asserted that only Burkinabe
will defend their security and that they have no intention of inviting
in Wagner. I would need to provide further information on this question
in a classified setting.
Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats
in Africa?
Answer. Combatting cybercrime and improving cybersecurity practices
is critical for the economies and national security of all countries,
including those in Africa. Russia continues to improve its ability to
target critical infrastructure and allows cybercriminals to operate
from its territory with impunity. For example, Russia-based
cybercriminals are suspected by industry experts to have conducted
ransomware attacks against a South African transportation company in
July 2021, disrupting maritime shipping for nearly a week. In Africa
and elsewhere, Russian-led and affiliated disinformation campaigns seek
to spread falsehoods and destabilize societies.
Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to
African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner
governments?
Answer. The Department's implementation of CAATSA Section 231 has
had a substantial impact on Russian arms sales to African countries. As
detailed in the classified annexes to our quarterly reports to Congress
pursuant to Section 1294 of the 2018 John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act, we have urged African countries to abandon arms
deals with Russia and to sunset their use of legacy Russian military
equipment. Many African countries now realize the negative aspects of
engaging in significant transactions with Russia's defense sector and
are taking steps to reduce or end their dependency on Russian arms.
Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent
military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina
Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?
Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic,
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments,
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. Recent events in
Burkina Faso show how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it
did in Mali. To fully respond to the question concerning Wagner's role
in recent coups and irregular changes in government, along with giving
you our unvarnished assessment of the network and presenting our plan
for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at
your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed
SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome
continued engagements with Committee members and staff.
Question. How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group's
activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in
African countries, and for what purposes?
Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic,
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments,
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to
the question concerning the relation of Russia's war against Ukraine to
Wagner's activities in Africa, along with giving you our unvarnished
assessment of the network and presenting our plan for thwarting them,
we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience.
Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC
staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued
engagements with Committee members and staff.
Question. Mozambique Detainee: An American citizen, Ryan Koher, has
been detained without trial in Mozambique for 3 months. I spoke with
President Nyusi about this case on the sidelines of the U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit in December 2022, and he personally promised to examine
the situation and report back to me. I also understand that Ambassador
Vrooman and others at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo have engaged with
Mozambican officials on Mr. Koher's case. Yet, there appears to be no
movement toward either charging or releasing him. How and when does the
State Department plan to engage with the Mozambican Government on Mr.
Koher's case if there is no forward movement on either charging or
releasing him?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy and the Department have actively engaged
the Mozambican Government since learning of the U.S. citizen's initial
detention on November 4. This case has been raised multiple times at
the highest level of the Mozambican Government. The Consular Section
continues to receive regular updates from the U.S. citizen on the case.
The Embassy has communicated Ranking Member Risch's request for follow-
up to senior Mozambican officials.
Question. Sahel: The Administration adopted an interagency strategy
for the Sahel in March 2022, and you led an interagency delegation to
the Sahel in October 2022. According to the State Department's public
readout, your trip focused, in part, on the Wagner Group's role in the
region and underscored that ``good governance, the rule of law, respect
for human rights, education, and a vibrant civil society are key to
breaking the cycle of violent extremism.'' Since then, the security
situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has continued to deteriorate, Mali's
political transition has not advanced, and Burkina Faso's military
junta has decided to expel French military forces amid what appears to
be growing outreach from the Wagner Group.
What were the central conclusions of your meetings in Sahel
countries in October 2022, including with regard to Russia's malign
influence in the region? How have recent events in Mali and Burkina
Faso reshaped these conclusions and U.S. engagement moving forward?
Answer. Many countries of the Sahel face a crisis of governance
that has contributed to the spread of violent extremism. In the long-
term, we can only address this security challenge by addressing its
underlying causes, like access to education, healthcare, economic
opportunity, and good governance. Recent events in Burkina Faso show
how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it did in Mali. We
must not allow the Wagner Group to similarly exploit Burkina Faso's
resources, undermine its democracy, commit rampant human rights abuses,
and spread disinformation and lies, all while helping fund and
prosecute Russia's war against Ukraine.
Question. What is the Administration's plan for deterring and
responding to Russia's malign influence, including the Wagner Group's
presence, in the Sahel?
Answer. We seek to increase the cost and difficulty of doing
business for Yevgeniy Prigozhin through sanctions and blocking supply
routes. The Administration has designated the Wagner Group as a
significant transnational criminal organization, which will aid us in
preventing economic benefits from flowing to Russia via Wagner's
nefarious activities. We are sharing information on the deleterious
effects of the Wagner Group with our partners, reminding them that
countries that partner with Wagner become weaker, poorer, more volatile
and less secure. We are also working on campaigns to counter
disinformation so publics across the Sahel know what Wagner truly
represents.
Question. What has been the concrete impact of the 2022 Sahel
strategy, to date?
Answer. The Sahel strategy provides a framework for our medium- and
long-term policy and resource investments in the region. It's
underlying conclusion--that the region's security problems can only be
addressed with better governance solutions--remains valid. In the
period since the strategy was written, conditions on the ground have
worsened, requiring us to revise our near-term tactics. Nevertheless,
in accordance with the Sahel strategy we are collaborating more
effectively across the interagency and are engaging our multilateral
partners in new ways that complement existing activities. In a
resource-constrained environment, we are prioritizing activities to
support Sahelian democracies, to slow the spread of violent extremist
organizations southward, and to push the Wagner Group from the region.
Question. During the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, the
Administration announced a new initiative to ``engage with complex
political transitions in Africa and demonstrate U.S. Government support
to governments and civil society at critical moments.'' What will this
initiative mean, concretely, for U.S. engagement with political
transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali?
Answer. The Department continues to identify available resources to
support sustainable democratic transitions across the continent while
closely working with the interagency to operationalize the new
initiative. We intend to leverage available expertise and ensure a
coordinated response to the multiple dynamic transition processes
taking place. At the end of FY 2022, the Bureau of African Affairs
began developing a project with the United States Institute of Peace to
evaluate the ongoing transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea,
which we anticipate will support both existing democratic transitions
work and the new initiative.
Question. What role do you expect to play in implementing
deliverables announced by the White House during the December 2022
U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS)?
Answer. I have made three trips to Africa in the past 18 months and
expect that pace to continue. These trips, plus my regular interagency
engagement with African leaders when they visit Washington, afford lots
of opportunities to push implementation of the ALS deliverables. In
addition, the AF Bureau, including Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Special
Representative for ALS Implementation, is working intensively with
USAID and the rest of the USG interagency community to support
policies, programs and initiatives to advance these commitments. Since
the ALS, the Department has focused its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa
on priorities areas identified at the Summit and continuing to align
our resources with those, the State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy, and
the U.S. Strategy for Africa.
Question. The Administration pledged during the ALS, among other
things, to expand U.S. support for leadership training, economic and
trade integration, digital access and literacy, health system capacity,
food security, climate adaptation, and security sector reform in
Africa. How, and according to what benchmarks, does the State
Department intend to measure success in achieving these objectives?
Answer. As part of this pledge, the Administration announced new
programs, such as Digital Transformation for Africa, African Women's
Entrepreneurship Program--Reimagined, and a new security sector
consortium. It also announced new investments in existing programs such
as Prosper and Power Africa, Feed the Future, the U.S. President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Adaptation Fund.
Programs will be designed and regularly evaluated to determine if they
are achieving results or if adjustments are needed to ensure their
success. Another measure of success will be State's ability to elevate
our African partners to lead in addressing shared priorities and for
countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to emerge as prosperous and
peaceful.
Question. U.S.-Europe Coordination on China in Africa: In November
2020, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report calling
for greater U.S.-Europe cooperation on China. Among the recommendations
were for the United States and Europe to work toward a comprehensive
strategy that ``affirms the close linkage between democracy, good
governance, and sound economic management.'' What is the State
Department doing to coordinate U.S. and European messaging for African
political leaders and publics regarding China's engagement in the
region?
Answer. State Department officials meet routinely with our European
partners, bilaterally and multilaterally, to discuss and coordinate
messaging on People's Republic of China (PRC) engagement, including in
Africa. We meet with European counterparts in multilateral formats such
as the G7 Africa Directors Meeting. The State Department provides
guidance, talking points, and other materials to U.S. embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa to engage public audiences on the PRC's harmful
practices in the region. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
regularly speaks with European counterparts to coordinate European and
U.S. cooperation and messaging in sub-Saharan Africa, including related
to the PRC and Russia.
Question. To what extent is the Administration working with
European partners to deter Chinese-funded dual-use infrastructure
construction at African ports?
Answer. As mentioned in response to Q24, State Department officials
meet routinely with our European partners to discuss PRC-related
issues. We share concerns with our European partners about PRC's dual-
use ports in Africa and align our efforts to deter them.
______
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely
curtailed in recent years. What is the status of USAID's operations
inside the Russian Federation?
Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-
person at your convenience.
Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely
curtailed in recent years. Does USAID still operate any programs inside
of Russia? If so, please list them.
Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in
person at your convenience.
Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely
curtailed in recent years.
What is the status of USAID's activities involving Russian citizens
living abroad, including, but not limited to, Russian civil society and
independent media?
Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in
person at your convenience.
Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely
curtailed in recent years.
Does USAID maintain a plan in case there is an opportunity to
reengage in Russia or with the Russian population in the future?
Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-
person at your convenience.
Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
Please describe how Russia has exploited the Black Sea Grain
Initiative's grain inspections to stall vessels and limit Ukraine's
agricultural exports and revenue.
Answer. Under the terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI)
agreement, inbound and outbound vessels are inspected by teams
consisting of members of the United Nations and the three signatory
countries: Ukraine, Turkiye, and Russia. Ukraine's Ministry of
Infrastructure asserts that, as soon as the BSGI began to grow in
October, Russia reduced the number of inspection teams from five to
three without explanation and has artificially increased the time
required to conduct inspections by checking vessels' performance
indicators--which are not regulated by the BSGI Joint Coordination
Centre (JCC) or the grain agreement--and has been stalling over issues
like fumigation. Thus, it takes at least 4 hours to inspect one vessel,
and the JCC completes about five to seven inbound/outbound inspections
daily rather than the 16 to 18 that USAID-supported advisors to
Ukraine's Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food estimate are needed to
reach the ports' 6 million metric tons (MMT) per month capacity.
Ukraine is prioritizing the departure of larger vessels once loaded.
Although this can help increase export volumes, it leaves smaller
vessels waiting longer and incurring costs that make them less
competitive.
The BSGI JCC reports that, as of January 26, 676 vessels have
departed Ukrainian ports with 18,422,020 metric tons of grains,
oilseeds, and derivatives (e.g., edible oil, meal, and bran). This
represents an average of 3.16 MMT/month since BSGI began, about half of
the 6 MMT capacity of these ports (per Ukraine's Ministry of
Infrastructure). BSGI throughput remains limited and has experienced
some of its lowest throughput since the initiative began in August
2022. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports per day
was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels leaving per
day for every month except August 2022, when the initiative began.
January exports totaled 3.02 MMT, a figure lower than every month
except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and well below prior
year volumes of 5-7 MMT per month. This figure is also below the 5 MMT
that Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN Security
Council to press Russia to support.
The slowdown in inspections has led to lower revenues for Ukraine,
and lower prices for goods produced by Ukrainian farmers, as buyers
pass on the increased shipping costs caused by the slowdowns. The State
Department reported that the price of grain for importers has increased
by as much as 20 percent per ship, as shippers must cover the cost of
crews, fuel, and insurance for that idle time. The costs of these
delays exacerbate other cost increases for Black Sea shippers, such as
insurance, which has become costlier due to the high risks associated
with operating in a conflict area and a reduction in reinsurers willing
to cover ships. For each ship, each day waiting costs an additional
$20,000. The average waiting time of 21 days translated to over
$400,000 of additional costs for each shipload of grain, which results
in lower revenues for Ukraine and its farmers, and higher prices for
consumers.
Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
How have the inspections impacted global supply chains?
Answer. Disruptions in Black Sea Grain initiative (BSGI)
inspections have affected supply volumes in the short term and stand to
have long term effects in these areas if it is not resolved.
Volumes: As of January 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is
experiencing some of its lowest throughput levels to date due to slow
inspections. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports
per day was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels
leaving per day for every month, except August 2022 when the initiative
began. January exports totaled 3.02 million metric tons (MMT). This is
below every month except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and
well below prior year volumes of 5-7 MMT/month. This is also well below
the ports' 6 MMT capacity per Ukraine's Ministry of Infrastructure, and
below the 5 MMT that Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN
Security Council to press Russia to support.
These short-term supply decreases stand to affect longer-term
supply by reducing Ukrainian farmers' incomes, leaving them with fewer
resources to invest in planting and maintaining winter 2022 and spring
2023 crops. Additionally, farmers may be less motivated to plant if
they are not certain of a guaranteed market with sufficient profits.
Finally, some Ukrainian farmers are switching to more profitable
oilseeds, and away from less profitable grains like corn (which has a
higher cost of production and lower prices due to a backlog of corn as
a result of war-related port closures). Per the Ukrainian Club of
Agrarian Business, farmers expect to increase spring oilseed planting
area by 15 percent (due to higher profitability), decrease barley areas
by 15 percent, and decrease corn areas up to 30 percent (due to lower
profitability).
Prices: Per the State Department, the backlog has raised the price
of grain for importers by as much as 20 percent per ship because
shippers must cover the cost of crews, fuel, and insurance for that
idle time. The costs of these delays exacerbate other cost increases
for Black Sea shippers, such as insurance, which has become costlier
due to the high risks associated with operating in a conflict area, and
a more recent reduction in reinsurance options due to a decision by a
large group of specialty maritime vessel insurers to stop covering
Black Sea vessels (non-specialty reinsurers still offer cover). For
each ship, each day waiting costs an additional $20,000. The average
waiting time of 21 days translated to over $400,000 of additional costs
for each shipload of grain. Exporters have reduced the prices they pay
to Ukraine's farmers in order to cover their increased shipping costs,
further harming farmers' abilities and motivations to continue
planting.
Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
Given the conditional nature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative,
what is USAID doing to help Ukraine's agricultural economy recover and
regain its place in the global economy as a major grain exporter?
Answer. USAID is helping Ukraine's agricultural economy recover
through support for both production and exports, with a focus on
increasing the capacity of Ukraine's railway system to strengthen
resilience against shocks such as the war-induced port closures.
The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) has been a
critical component of increasing Ukrainian capacity to export and
supporting farmers needs--allowing over 20 million metric tons of food
to get to global markets, with nearly 20 percent going directly to
lower-income countries. However, Russia's unwillingness to fully
implement and facilitate the deal and its previous delays on renewal
are stark reminders that the deal is unstable, making support for
Ukraine's agriculture sector essential to both Ukraine's economic
survival and to helping vulnerable communities across the world.
In response to Russia's blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports and
the resulting impact on Ukrainian farmers and the agriculture sector,
USAID launched the Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine (AGRI-
Ukraine) in July to support Ukraine's agriculture sector. This
initiative was taken in direct response to the export crisis and with
an understanding that Russia would be an unreliable party to the BSGI,
then under negotiation and not yet launched, even if a deal were to be
reached.
USAID directly contributed $100 million in support to AGRI-Ukraine,
with a goal to raise $150 million in additional external funding. To
date, USAID has established a flagship partnership with Bayer, which
has invested approximately $35 million in Ukraine's agricultural
sector. AGRI-Ukraine is seeking to address Ukraine's immediate and
near-term agriculture production and export challenges, while also
supporting longer-term resilience. AGRI-Ukraine focuses on four areas
that are crucial to sustain Ukraine's agricultural production and
exports: providing critical inputs for farmers; improving export
logistics and infrastructure; increasing farmers' access to financing;
and supporting crop drying, storage, and processing needs.
On the production side, AGRI-Ukraine has reached over 13,600
farmers (about 29 percent of Ukraine's 47,000 registered farmers before
the war) with critical inputs, agricultural and financial services, and
storage through our AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, Agriculture
Growing Rural Opportunities (AGRO). The AGRI-Ukraine storage program
has helped farmers pack and store 501,500 metric tons of grain to allow
them to wait until export channels allow for and market prices justify
a sale. Since the war began, 604 farmers have accessed $48.2 million in
credit via three AGRO-supported finance apps.
On the export side, under AGRI-Ukraine's focus on export logistics
and infrastructure, USAID has coordinated closely with our European
allies on their Solidarity Lanes effort, the EU's primary initiative to
promote Ukrainian exports in the absence of a safe and reliable Black
Sea route. Another AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, the Economic
Resilience Activity (ERA), is supporting co-investments to improve rail
export capacity and border-crossing efficiency. As Ukraine has
historically exported about 95 percent of its grain and oilseeds via
the Black Sea, its rail and road export routes were not equipped to
handle agricultural export demands when the war shuttered ports. The
war underscored the need to bolster other export modalities, such as
rail transit. ERA is increasing rail carrying capacity by helping
exporters pilot Mega Big bags, which are large flexible, reusable,
food-safe bags that enable Ukraine Railways to carry grain in open-top
gondola cars, which are widely available and low-cost. This effort has
helped address Ukraine Railways' limited grain car stock, and the high
cost and long time involved in getting new grain cars. ERA is also co-
investing in transshipment improvements, which will increase export
speed and volumes by making the process of transferring grain across
transport modalities faster and more efficient (e.g., rail to sea
vessel), and increasing storage capacity at transshipment points (e.g.,
ports and land borders). These procurements support equipment and
facility improvements such as loading machines and conveyors for a
privately-owned terminal at Ukraine's Izmail port (Danube).
Question. Since February 2022, the United States has provided the
overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72
percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date--which is being
disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of
Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public
Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine
Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and
Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project.
Does the USAID Office of the Inspector General maintain direct
audit authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the
justification?
Answer. USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has independent
authority to conduct oversight of all USAID programs, including budget
support to Ukraine. In a recently released Congressionally-mandated
report, OIG determined that the design of the monitoring mechanisms and
safeguards for the World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative
Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism (through which USAID provides
budget support) are aligned with federal internal control standards.
USAID's OIG is working closely with the Department of State and
Department of Defense OIGs to take a whole-of-government approach to
accountability and oversight. Recently, the three IGs issued a hotline
poster in both English and Ukrainian, which is being widely distributed
in Ukraine. The three IGs also recently returned from a joint trip to
Kyiv, Poland, and Germany. The objectives of their trip were: (1)
continue to build a shared understanding of the circumstances on the
ground; (2) collaborate with oversight counterparts, demonstrating a
``whole-of-government'' approach to Ukraine response oversight; (3)
communicate expectations for transparency and accountability to the
U.S. and Ukrainian officials charged with overseeing the substantial
assistance provided by the U.S.; and (4) deepen their understanding of
response management and operations in Kyiv and Rzeszow to inform
oversight plans.
The USAID OIG has informed us that they will continue to
collaborate with oversight partners at the Department of State and
World Bank to monitor and strengthen USAID's management of direct
budget support to Ukraine. Accordingly, they are currently conducting
research to inform potential oversight efforts related to direct budget
support. We have flagged your interest in their potential audits to the
USAID OIG.
Question. Since February 2022, the United States has provided the
overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72
percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date--which is being
disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of
Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public
Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine
Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and
Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project.
Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports or audits
conducted on Ukraine assistance?
Answer. USAID has provided budget support to Ukraine via the World
Bank's Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE
Ukraine) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Public Expenditures for
Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism, and a Special
Transfer to the Ukraine Single-Donor Trust Fund. USAID will provide the
Committee with prompt and timely access to the results of audits
conducted on USAID-funded budget support for Ukraine.
______
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Military Assistance to Ukraine: Since the outset of
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Administration has repeatedly refused
to provide military capabilities requested by Ukrainian officials, such
as tanks, HIMARS, and air defense, only to subsequently change course
and provide them at a later date.
What changed in DoD's decision-making about sending tanks to
Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?
Answer. Secretary Austin is focused on ensuring that we deliver
full capabilities to the Ukrainians. When this involves highly
sophisticated systems with complex maintenance, sustainment, and other
considerations, all factors need to be assessed before moving forward
with introducing a new capability. Together with the collective
training we've been providing, armored capabilities will improve
Ukraine's ability to maneuver, which is critical for Ukraine as they
continue to defend and reclaim their territory. This includes Armored
Personnel Carriers, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and Main Battle Tanks.
Question. What changed in the DoD's decision-making about sending
Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in the decision
to do so now?
Answer. Secretary Austin is adamant about providing Ukraine with
the capability it needs, when it needs it. With collective training
efforts underway, the Department, in consultation with Ukrainian
counterparts, assessed a need to provide Ukraine additional armored
maneuver systems like Bradleys and Strykers.
Question. When the did the Department first receive a request from
the Ukrainian Government asking for Western Main Battle Tanks and
Infantry Fighting Vehicles?
Answer. For operational security reasons, the Department does not
comment in public settings on the status of official requests for
capabilities from partners.
However, we have been and continue to be in close and constant
consultation with Ukrainian counterparts regarding their most urgent
capability requirements. Throughout, we considered a broad range of
capabilities that Ukraine needs for the current fight and will need in
the future. These considerations evolve given dynamics on the
battlefield, which ultimately informs the contours of any security
assistance package provided to Ukraine.
Question. How long has the Department been aware of reported
shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine's Soviet-model
tank fleet? If the Administration was aware of looming 125mm tank
ammunition shortfalls, why did the Administration continue to provide
exclusively Soviet tanks as assistance until this week's sudden
decision to provide Abrams, which uses the more plentiful NATO-standard
120mm round?
Answer. The Department of Defense has been aware of reported
shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine's existing tank
fleet for some weeks now. That is why DoD decided to procure an
additional 100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition for Ukraine under
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) package we announced
on December 21, 2022. This procurement was designed to complement our
procurement of 45 upgraded T-72 tanks for Ukraine, also under USAI.
Tanks such as the T-72 are easier for Ukraine to integrate into its
existing forces, and we have seen their success on the battlefield.
Yesterday's announcement of Abrams, alongside Allied and partner
announcement of Leopards, will be the next step--a complex one--to
integrate Western main battle tanks to support its battlefield
objectives.
Question. When the will Administration agree to provide Ukraine
fighter planes such as the F-16?
Answer. The Administration does not currently plan to provide
Ukraine with U.S. fighter aircraft.
Question. If the Administration is opposed to providing F-16
capability, why?
Answer. The Administration has no plan to provide Ukraine with U.S.
fighter aircraft at this time.
Fighter aircraft considerations must be weighed against a number of
Ukraine's other priority capability requirements. This includes urgent
priorities to provide Ukraine additional air defense, artillery, long-
range fires, and armored vehicles.
Question. What is the United States doing to expedite the transfer
of military assistance that has already been announced?
Answer. The Department of Defense has continually expedited the
transfer of military assistance to Ukraine, including accelerating
requirements development, contracting timelines for new procurements,
and deliveries for immediately available equipment. U.S. Transportation
Command has moved large volumes of assistance at historic speed.
In November 2022, the Department also stood up the Security
Assistance Group-Ukraine or SAG-U to help execute the full-range of
U.S. security assistance activities for Ukraine. This includes
supporting the historic levels of security assistance and leading our
expanded training efforts in a more efficient and sustainable manner.
DoD is also working with industry to find ways to further speed up
procurement and delivery, such as expanding production capacity and
identifying and addressing issues around long lead-time components.
Question. What is the United States doing to expedite the
production of military vehicles, equipment, etc. that could be sent to
Ukraine or be used to backfill allies who have donated their own stocks
to Ukraine?
Answer. The Department appreciates Congress' support as it
continues to work to help expand the capacity of the Defense Industrial
Base to replenish the U.S. and allies and partners' inventories in
response to Ukraine Presidential Drawdowns. Through the use of Ukraine
replenishment and supplemental funding, actions such as investments in
the 155mm artillery industrial base or for Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle capacity expansion could enable the U.S. to more rapidly
replenish capabilities donated to Ukraine. As the situation continues
to develop, the Department will continue to utilize all its authorities
and available appropriations as it identifies opportunities to support
critical DIB capabilities.
Question. What is the Department's position on the provision of
dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?
Answer. Although the United States and Ukraine are not parties to
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, under current law the United
States Government may only transfer cluster munitions that are below
the 1 percent unexploded ordnance standard.
Question. How would a decision to provide DPICMs alleviate or
exacerbate pressure placed on other munitions stockpiles by our
assistance to Ukraine?
Answer. As noted above, the United States is currently prohibited
by statutory restriction to transfer DPICMs to Ukraine. The United
States maintains stockpiles of DPICMs. In theory, provision of these
DPICMs to Ukraine, which are nearing the end of their shelf life, might
lessen Ukraine's requirements for unitary rounds from other sources.
Question. What has been the battlefield impact of DPICMS provided
by other partners to Ukraine?
Answer. The Department of Defense assesses that DPICMs provided by
other partners to Ukraine have been effective against Russian armored
vehicles and dug-in troop formations in eastern Ukraine.
Question. Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New
START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there
have been no treaty inspections during that time.
What actions is your Department taking to mitigate against the
risks associated with Russia's non-compliance with the New START
treaty?
Answer. Mutual compliance with New START strengthens the security
of the United States, our allies and partners, Russia, and the world.
We have conveyed that Russia's noncompliance with the New START is
unfortunate and irresponsible. We have reiterated that the United
States remains ready to work constructively with Russia to fully
implement the New START Treaty. We are watching carefully to see what
Russia does moving forward. How Russia chooses to proceed will help
inform considerations of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States
will ensure in any event that we are postured to defend the United
States and our allies.
We have not determined that Russia's current noncompliance
threatens the national security interests of the United States. The
United States assesses that Russia did not engage in significant
activity above the Treaty limits and that Russia was likely under the
New START Treaty warhead limit at the end of 2022. We continue to
closely monitor Russian compliance with the New START Treaty limits.
Inspections play a critical role in verifying Russian compliance, but
are not the only source of U.S. information regarding Russian nuclear
forces. We also use U.S. means for monitoring Russian compliance, and
Russia has continued providing notifications and data updates as
required by the New START Treaty.
Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia's efforts to
establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported
agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?
Answer. Russia continues to pursue military basing infrastructure
in Africa, including in Sudan. Russia seeks to pursue implementation of
a 2017 agreement with the Bashir Government for a naval facility at
Port Sudan, though Sudanese authorities have thus far taken no steps to
implement it.
Moving forward with such a naval agreement or any other form of
security cooperation with Russia would further isolate Sudan's military
regime and undermine stability in the Horn of Africa and broader Red
Sea region.
Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other
Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S.
personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are
in place for responding to such incidents in the future?
Answer. The Department of Defense takes all threats to U.S.
personnel and U.S. citizens seriously and takes appropriate steps to
address them. We would be happy to discuss specific threats and the
steps we are taking to address them in a classified setting.
Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner
Group's outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the
Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?
Answer. We are monitoring the situation closely, and working with
the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou to ensure
that our messaging to the Burkina Faso Government is synchronized and
clear about the negative effects of Wagner's presence in their country.
We continue to explore ways to help the Burkina Faso Government address
its security concerns without turning to options that do not align with
their broader interests. We would be happy to discuss our current
assessment in a classified setting.
Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats
in Africa?
Answer. Russia has resisted the institutionalization of global
governance non-binding norms around cyber security of responsible state
behavior in cyberspace and has courted African countries to support its
positions in multilateral fora.
Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to
African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner
governments?
Answer. The Department of Defense defers to the Departments of
State and Treasury regarding the effectiveness of sanctions on Russian
arms sales to African countries and how African partner governments
perceive CAATSA. However, given that many African partners have legacy
Russian equipment, CAATSA has created an additional challenge for
African partners to purchase spare parts and/or replace equipment that
their forces have trained on in the past.
Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent
military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina
Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?
Answer. The Wagner Group has deployed across Africa and has
increased insecurity and instability, engaged in human rights abuses,
and eroded African leaders' control over their own security forces.
Wagner benefits from continued instability because Wagner relies on
instability to justify its presence in these countries. The result is a
vicious cycle of dependence and vulnerability to exploitation. We can
provide more details in a classified setting.
Question. How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group's
activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in
African countries, and for what purposes?
Answer. The Department of Defense assesses that Wagner activity in
Africa decreased during the early stages of the war in Ukraine, but
that this trend has since reversed. We defer to the Intelligence
Community to assess specifics, such as how the war in Ukraine has
affected Wagner's efforts to recruit locally in African countries.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney
Question. The U.S. Senate remains committed to supporting Ukraine
and pushing back on Putin's evil expansionist war. I remain concerned,
however, that we are only supporting Ukraine from collapsing, as
compared to winning. One cannot win a war purely using defensive
measures. Does this Administration support building up Ukraine's
offensive capabilities such that the Ukrainians can expel Russia from
Ukrainian territory?
Answer. We have tailored our assistance to meet Ukraine's evolving
military requirements, for both offensive and defensive operations.
Along with support from our Allies and partners, our assistance has
included Stinger and Javelin systems that blunted the original Russian
assault on Kyiv, as well as artillery systems, air defense systems, and
armored fighting vehicles that enabled the successful recapture of
large swaths of Ukrainian territory. Our ongoing assistance efforts are
meant to strengthen both Ukraine's short-term security needs, and long-
term defense, to ensure Russia cannot simply re-prosecute this war in a
few months or a few years.
Question. Some have suggested that the United States' support for
Ukraine is diminishing our resources and reserves such that we can't
effectively address the China threat. China is the greatest
geostrategic threat of the coming decades--but our support for Ukraine
can both limit Russia's ability to bolster China's power and show that
the United States unequivocally supports free nations attacked by
expansionist powers. What, if any, empirical evidence does the
Administration have on how U.S. support for Ukraine impacts our
preparedness regarding the threats in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. DoD has confirmed that no equipment purchased by Taiwan via
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process has been diverted to Ukraine,
and, to date, equipment transferred to Ukraine through PDA had no
negative impact on Taiwan's delivery timelines for defense articles
already on contract through FMS. U.S. and allies' coordinated, large-
scale support for Ukraine should be a warning to adversaries with
expansionist desires about what to expect in response to a range of
contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. China is also watching Russia's war
in Ukraine closely, and allied resolve to stand with Ukraine for as
long as it takes.
Question. Does this Administration believe that U.S. support for
Ukraine undermines our ability to address the China threat?
Answer. No.
Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that
people become desensitized to the tragedy being inflicted on the
Ukrainian people. How many civilians have been causalities of Putin's
murderous invasion?
Answer. According to an estimate from the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, as of January 30, more than 7,100
Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than 11,500 injured due
to Russia's war. The actual number is likely higher. The International
Organization for Migration estimates there are close to 6 million
Ukrainian internally displaced persons, and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees estimates there are nearly 8 million refugees recorded
across Europe since February 2022. As Putin failed to achieve his aims
on the battlefield, Russia's forces began deliberately targeting
civilians and civilian infrastructure, including residences, hospitals,
train stations, cultural and religious institutions, schools, and the
energy grid in the middle of winter. To give one recent example, on
January 14, a Russian ballistic missile that hit a residential building
in Dnipro killed at least 45 civilians, including six children, injured
79, and rendered more than 1,000 homeless.
Question. How many refugees have resulted from Putin's war, both
internal to Ukraine and external to Ukraine?
Answer. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports via its Ukraine
Refugee Situation Operational Data Portal that approximately 8 million
refugees from Ukraine were recorded across Europe as of January 26,
2023. They calculate this number based on data provided to them by
authorities in European countries hosting refugees from Ukraine.
The International Organization for Migration reports that as of
January 26, 2023, there were approximately 6 million internally
displaced persons across Ukraine.
Question. How many people have suffered from hunger in the world
because Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from
Ukraine?
Answer. In the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises updated in
September 2022, it was estimated the global population in need of
emergency food assistance would increase from 193 million in 2021 to
between 205 and 211 million in 2022 due to high global food, fuel, and
fertilizer prices resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, as well as drought, conflict, and other shocks. The Black Sea
Grain Initiative, brokered by the UN and Turkiye, has helped stabilize
global food supplies and brought prices down.
Question. How many people have been without power due to Russian
attempts to freeze Ukrainians this winter?
Answer. As a direct result of Russia's attacks, about 40 percent of
Ukraine's grid is degraded or destroyed and must be replaced or
repaired. Ukraine is managing this degraded grid through planned daily
power outages of varying length and severity. The exact number of
people impacted varies. These nationwide outages are best categorized
as follows: (1) scheduled blackouts lasting from a few to many hours
each day due to insufficient supply or to allow for repairs of damaged
infrastructure; (2) unscheduled blackouts that may last hours, days, or
weeks as a result of damaged infrastructure, with repairs underway; and
(3) continual blackouts in areas of massive damage that cannot be
repaired or are too dangerous for repair crews.
Question. How many children does the State Department estimate have
been taken from Ukraine and illegally transferred to Russia?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned with the
horrible impacts that Putin's war has had on children. While the State
Department does not maintain a comprehensive numerical estimate of the
number of children who have been taken from Ukraine and transferred to
Russia, the State Department-supported Conflict Observatory, which
independently compiles and documents evidence to support investigations
of abuses during Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, has
identified thousands of Ukraine's children who have been transferred to
facilities under Russia's control. According to this independent
analysis, the network of these facilities spans from Russia-occupied
Crimea across Russia itself, from the Black Sea region to its Far East.
______
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney
Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian
people.
How many civilians have been casualties of Putin's murderous
invasion?
Answer. As of January 22, 2023, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported 7,068 civilians in
Ukraine have been killed since February 24, 2022, including 438
children, and 11,415 civilians have been injured, including 838
children. OHCHR believes that the actual figures are considerably
higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense
hostilities have occurred has been delayed and many reports are still
pending corroboration. For example, these areas include Mariupol,
Lysychansk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk cities, where there are
allegations of numerous civilian casualties. Most of the civilian
casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with
wide area effects, including air strikes, missiles, and shelling from
artillery and rocket artillery. More than 9,900 civilian casualties--or
more than half of the recorded total--were in Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts.
Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian
people.
How many refugees have resulted from Putin's war?
Answer. According to reporting by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of January 24, 2023, there are 8
million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. This figure reflects individual
refugees who have fled since February 24, 2022, and are present in
European countries, of whom 4.9 million are registered for Temporary
Protection or similar national protection status. Additionally, there
are currently 5.4 million Ukrainians who are internally displaced
persons (IDPs) inside Ukraine as a result of the war, according to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian
people.
How many people have suffered from hunger in the world because
Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from Ukraine?
Answer. A series of political, security, and economic shocks have
occurred since 2019, each with complex and intertwined impacts on
global hunger. To date, no credible analysis has fully calculated the
specific, direct impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global
hunger. However, an assessment of existing poverty and acute hunger
data can suggest the order of magnitude of the invasion's impacts.
First, the World Bank estimates that global shocks since 2019
resulted in an additional 89 million extremely poor people in 2022. The
World Bank analysis does not break down this figure by specific driver
(e.g., COVID-19, global prices, etc). However, a multi-country analysis
conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute suggests
that one third of this total, equivalent to roughly 30 million people,
can be attributed to global price increases that occurred between 2019
and 2022. These increases in global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices
were driven by a combination of factors in addition to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, including the People's Republic of China's
restriction on fertilizer exports, reduced crop production in some key
exporting countries, and increased global demand related to economic
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Second, in terms of acute hunger, the Global Report on Food Crises
suggests that the global population in need of emergency food
assistance rose from 193 million in 2021 to 205-211 million in 2022.
One driver of this increase (12-18 million people) was high global
food, fuel, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, though drought, conflict, and other shocks also played a
significant role.
Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian
people.
How many people have been without power due to Russian attempts to
freeze Ukrainians this winter?
Answer. Since October, Russian attacks targeting critical
electricity infrastructure, particularly electric substations, have led
to power system outages throughout the country. Ukraine's utilities
have been able to repair some of the damaged equipment and/or reroute
power along alternative routes. Still, Ukraine's transmission system
operator, Ukrenergo, has been forced to institute rolling blackouts
given the significant damage to critical substation equipment, such as
transformers, which are necessary to transit electricity from power
plants to consumption centers across the country. As such, the number
and duration of outages across the country can vary considerably. As of
late January, Ukraine's power system is estimated to be able to meet
about 75 percent of normal customer demand, but it has at times fallen
below 50 percent due to rolling outages and/or restoration timelines
following attacks.
Question. I'm continually struck by the generosity of the American
people in sending over goods and funds to Ukraine. Whether it's food,
clothing, or generators, I know that Utahans remain firmly committed to
supporting the Ukrainian people.
For those who are still willing to help through donations, beyond
money transfers, what supplies are most needed on the ground in
Ukraine?
Answer. In order to maximize the effectiveness and speed of
international assistance during any international disaster, the proven
best practice to help the most people the fastest remains cash
donations to reputable relief organizations, rather than the cumbersome
and uneven process of in-kind donations. Unlike material donations,
cash involves no transportation costs, shipping delays, or customs
fees. It also enables relief organizations to spend more time providing
aid by spending less time managing goods. This is particularly the case
given the complex operating environment inside Ukraine. Financial
donations remain the best way that generous Utahns can help
humanitarian partners to procure any supplies that are needed for the
ongoing humanitarian response--and such assistance can be used
immediately.
To support those generously looking to assist, USAID manages our
Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) website
(CIDI.org), which provides a list of organizations that can be
supported through cash donations and information on how to donate. For
businesses and private sector actors looking to assist, the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Global
Compact, and the UN Connecting Business Initiative (CBi) have also
released a business guide, ``OCHA Business Guide: Ukraine Humanitarian
Crisis'' to support the engagement of the private sector in the Ukraine
response.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Media reports on a letter bomb campaign targeting our
Embassy in Spain cited unnamed U.S. officials claiming the perpetrators
acted under the direction of Russian intelligence. Regardless of the
credibility of this assessment, how likely is the general threat of
Russian asymmetrical tactics against U.S. interests?
Answer. Russian malign influence remains a significant threat to
U.S. interests and the interests of our Allies and partners. Russia's
aggression against Ukraine clearly demonstrates Moscow's willingness to
undermine the norms of the international system. Russia is engaged in
overt and covert campaigns to undermine core institutions, including
NATO and the EU, and to weaken faith in democratic governments and in
the free-market system. These campaigns are aggressive and coordinated.
The Department will continue to work with interagency and likeminded
Allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence through a
variety of tools.
Question. How is the Administration working to ensure the safety of
our civilian personnel and facilities in the face of this kind of
hybrid threat?
Answer. Department personnel serving overseas face and overcome
challenges daily in their effort to provide a safe and secure
environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Between November 21
and December 7, 2022, there were approximately 20 suspicious packages
received at various embassies and diplomatic facilities throughout
Europe. In response, the Department sent out notices to every U.S.
Mission instructing security personnel to review their security posture
and mail screening procedures and further discuss with host nation law
enforcement. Department policy requires all external mail to be
screened for explosive and other materials at established offsite
facilities. This is what occurred at the Embassy in Madrid when
explosives were detected.
Question. Noting your mention of a deepening partnership with
Tbilisi, can you explain why Georgia continues to maintain a
nonreciprocal visa-free regime for Russian citizens?
Answer. With 20 percent of its sovereign territory still under
Russian occupation, Georgians know all too well the effects of Russia's
aggression. Questions on Georgia's visa regime are best directed to the
Government of Georgia. At the same time, it is crucial for the Georgian
Government to provide safe-haven to those fleeing repression, including
from Russia.
Question. To what degree does Georgia's Russia policy undermine
U.S. and allied efforts to maintain maximum pressure on the Russian
economy?
Answer. Georgia has complied with international financial sanctions
against Russia and continues to work to comply with export controls.
The United States is working with Georgian authorities, border police,
customs, and government agencies to bolster these compliance efforts.
Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of Georgia, and Georgia works
through the Geneva International Discussions and other venues to
counter Russia's aggression. The United States is working to ensure
Georgia has the capacity to comply with international sanctions against
Russia.
Question. Provided Georgia addresses the EU's governance
priorities, what is your assessment of its candidate status?
Answer. The European Council's unanimous decision to grant European
perspective status to Georgia is an important step that recognizes the
European aspirations of the Georgian people. This step keeps Georgia on
the path to EU membership and the security, prosperity, and western
integration that comes with it. We continue to press Georgia's
government to undertake the meaningful reforms called for by the
European Commission for EU candidacy status.
Georgia's road to EU candidate status is clear and achievable. We
have strongly urged the government to seize this opportunity and work
with stakeholders across Georgian society to enact and implement the
necessary steps as laid out by the European Commission. We expect the
EU will review Georgia's candidate status application again by the end
of 2023.
______
Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. An asymmetric escalation of Russian tactics reminds us of
the sobering reality that our implementing partners present a very
attractive target for adversaries. How is USAID working to preserve
their security without overly constraining their ability to work where
U.S. assistance is most needed?
Answer. USAID has prioritized the safety and security of its
implementing partners working inside Ukraine. At Ukraine Mission
implementing partner (IP) meetings, USAID's Office for Security (SEC)
provides security briefings along with practical guidance for both
organizational and personal safety and security. Since Russia's full
scale invasion of Ukraine, IPs have augmented their security staff and
refined their security plans. USAID SEC has met directly and virtually
with our IPs to provide their expertise as they refine their security
plans. USAID maintains a very close relationship with the Embassy
Regional Security Officer (RSO) team. In December, the Ukraine Regional
Contracting Office organized a security-specific briefing, led by
Embassy RSO, for our IPs. As appropriate, USAID also masks
international and national non-governmental organization (NGO) partner
names in public communications to further protect their safety. USAID
also removed reports and evaluations from the Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC)--a public database housing USAID reports and
evaluations--as they may contain personal identifiable information. Our
implementers continue to submit reports and evaluations to the DEC,
however information is only visible internally within USAID. No public
reports are visible--for safety reasons--as they may mention names of
partners, civil society organizations, and individual names.
As part of the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)
application process, we ask applicants to submit safety and security
plans that reflect robust analysis and planning around facts in the
operating environment that impact safety and security. During the
application process, applicants also articulate the resources needed
for their safety and security for USAID/BHA consideration. USAID/BHA
also funds two organizations, including the United Nations Department
for Safety and Security (UNDSS), specifically to provide common safety
and security services to the humanitarian community in Ukraine. These
services include real-time reporting about security threats and
incidents.
______
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Noting Russia's ongoing difficulties procuring key
components for its defense industry, can you speak to the effect on its
military readiness in the region?
Answer. Despite degradations in its ability to procure key
components for its defense industry--thanks to sanctions and export
controls imposed by the international community--Russia remains a
formidable near-peer adversary, and its ability to rapidly reconstitute
its military inventory should not be taken for granted. Ensuring a
long-term strategic failure for Russian aggression will rely on a
whole-of-government effort combined with commitments from Allies and
partners.
Question. Seeing its very public losses on the battlefield, what is
the long-term reputational impact on Russia given its status as a
regional guarantor of security for its allies?
Answer. Russia's international standing has eroded as a result of
its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but Russia continues in its
attempts to project influence around the globe. However, one only needs
to look to Russia's neighbors to see how it is failing. Among the
countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate, Russia's
reputation is fraying. In Moldova, Armenia, and the states of Central
Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable security
partner.
Question. Noting Russia's formal defense pacts--and Iran's sales of
military hardware to Moscow--does Russia use the territory in these
countries as a waystation for Iranian arms shipments? And if so, how is
the Administration working to block the trafficking of these arms?
Answer. The Administration is using all the tools at our disposal,
including working with our Allies and partners, to stop and prevent all
support for Russia and its war effort. We are monitoring trade data to
identify jurisdictions where problematic transfers may be occurring to
prevent the movement of defense materiel or transactions in support of
this activity.
Question. What actions should the Administration pursue in Mali to
undermine the influence of the Wagner Group?
Answer. The United States Government employs a ``3D'' (development,
diplomacy, and defense) approach in Mali, subject to U.S. legal and
policy restrictions on cooperation with post-transition leaders in
Mali, and those leaders' willingness to work with the United States and
our allies and partners. We also continue to highlight to the Malian
transition government Wagner's human rights abuses against host
populations and other destabilizing activities, such as depleting
national resources for Wagner's own gain and undermining host nations'
control over their own territory. The Wagner Group has not improved
security anywhere it has deployed, including in Mali. To the contrary,
it has complicated and deepened conflicts.
Question. The Biden administration has consistently extended a
waiver that allows the United States to provide security and other
assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. To what extent has the
waiver extension translated into substantive U.S. military assistance
for Azerbaijan since its 2020 hostilities with Armenia?
Answer. U.S. military assistance for Azerbaijan has declined
considerably since the fall 2020 hostilities between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. This assistance has been focused on International Military
Education and Training (IMET) programs that work to strengthen ties
between the U.S. and Azerbaijani militaries, increase interoperability,
and provide English language programs to increase the exposure of
Azerbaijani military personnel to U.S. and western military values. All
assistance to Azerbaijan is carefully evaluated to ensure compliance so
that it is provided consistent with Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support
Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) and the related waiver of that restriction.
It is provided on terms that clarify both the intended purposes and
limitations of the use of such assistance, is carefully calibrated to
ensure it does not undermine or hamper efforts to negotiate a peaceful
settlement with Armenia, and is not to be used for offensive purposes.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Do you agree that the U.S. needs to ban Russian uranium?
Answer. Russia uses energy exports, including in the nuclear
sector, to exert political and economic pressure on its customers
globally. G7 nations have resolved to reduce their reliance on Russian
nuclear energy supplies and services and to help other countries
seeking to do the same. Several countries have taken important steps in
this direction, most recently Bulgaria. Consistent with our G7 pledge,
State is working with other departments and agencies to identify
alternatives, and we welcome Congressional support for that effort.
Question. What is the threat posed by the United States continuing
to be dependent upon Russia for energy?
Answer. Russia leverages national and regional dependencies on
Russian energy to expand its political, economic, and military
influence and to undermine transatlantic security and foreign policy
interests. In March 2022, the Administration banned imports of Russian
oil and petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and coal. We are
working with allies and partners to identify ways to further reduce
dependence on Russian energy, both in the United States and globally.
Consistent with our G7 pledge, the Administration is working to
identify alternatives to Russian enriched uranium supply, and we
welcome Congressional support for that effort.
Question. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24,
2022, Congress has passed four supplemental appropriations packages
that included funding for Ukraine. In total we have approved roughly
$113 billion. This includes $49 billion military aid, $41 billion in
economic aid and $23 billion for U.S. military operations in Europe and
other U.S. agencies: What steps is the Administration taking to ensure
this funding is not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into
the wrong hands?
Answer. We have focused on oversight and accountability from the
beginning. All budgetary support is disbursed through the World Bank
mechanism only after verification. Deloitte is there permanently to
audit the auditors. We have increased embassy staff, led by Ambassador
Brink, to focus on technical oversight, and increased OIG oversight
from State, USAID, and DoD with regular reporting to Congress. Finally,
we have an effective and comprehensive plan to prevent any diversion of
weapons systems.
Question. Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or
weapon systems falling into Russia's control?
Answer. The Pentagon reports it has seen no credible evidence of
diversion. We take every allegation of the capture of our military
equipment or weapon systems seriously, anywhere in the world. There is
an inherent risk of weapons capture and diversion on the battlefield in
any armed conflict, and it is reasonable to believe that Russian forces
have captured some Ukrainian weapons, which may include U.S.-origin
equipment or weapon systems. We cannot speak to what Russia does with
equipment it may capture on the battlefield. However, we can
confidently say Russia is constantly spreading disinformation regarding
weapons diversion in its bid to both discredit Kyiv and distract the
international community from its invasion of Ukraine.
Question. Do you estimate we will need further supplemental
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?
Answer. The Administration appreciates the supplemental
appropriations Congress provided to support the U.S. response to
Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale assault on Ukraine.
Despite this historic support, Ukraine faces monumental challenges in
funding the defense of its nation and our values, meeting the needs of
its people, and ultimately, recovering. We will be forward-leaning in
utilizing our available funding to address the highest needs and in
working with other donors to leverage additional support to help meet
Ukraine's budget gaps and assistance needs. Given the fluidity of the
situation on the ground, we will continue to assess requirements and
available resources to meet those needs.
Question. How can programs be properly evaluated and monitored with
the current restrictions on civilian personnel and in a deteriorating
security environment?
Answer. Embassy Kyiv's team remains engaged with interagency
partners and the Government of Ukraine on accountability issues related
to all foreign assistance, including budget support. This engagement
includes regular assistance oversight meetings. In addition, State,
USAID, and DoD Inspectors General have increased the frequency and
scope of their oversight reporting on U.S. assistance. On budget
support funds, State works closely with USAID and the Department of the
Treasury to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability of these
funds. The mechanisms to ensure budget support accountability include
World Bank verification of expenditures, third-party monitoring through
Deloitte, and Embassy Kyiv reviews of updates provided by Deloitte.
Question. What are biggest challenges in safely and quickly
delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine?
Answer. Our humanitarian partners bravely deliver assistance to
Ukraine in highly challenging circumstances while encountering major
obstacles, including: the difficult security environment in portions of
the country that are active war zones; populations living in areas
under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation, which
are hard to access and have severe needs; Russia's ongoing
infrastructure attacks and its impact on humanitarians' ability to
operate; and harsh winter conditions that hamper humanitarian activity.
______
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. On November 4, 2022, Sabrina Singh, Deputy Pentagon Press
Secretary said: ``In terms of why aren't we providing new tanks or
American tanks, introducing a new main battle tank is extremely costly,
it's time-sensitive, and it would be a huge undertaking for the
Ukrainian forces.'' Press Secretary Singh said it was time sensitive
that we provide the Ukrainians with old refurbished Russian T-72 tanks.
This was almost 3 months ago. We lost almost 3 months of training the
Ukrainians on the Abrams tank. The M1 Abrams tank is right next door in
Poland. I have seen the tanks at the training area myself.
What steps is the Administration taking to ensure this funding is
not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into the wrong
hands?
Answer. Last October, the Administration released the ``U.S. Plan
to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons
in Eastern Europe,'' which outlines how the United States is
proactively working to prevent the diversion of weapons from Ukraine.
The plan highlights three priorities: ensuring accountability,
enhancing border security, and building partner capacity.
Consistent with these objectives, DoD has adapted its
accountability practices for the combat environment; for example by
expanding self-reporting mechanisms for Ukraine, including by using
improved technologies, and conducting site inspections to verify
inventories of U.S.-provided equipment (when security conditions
permit).
DoD is also supporting broader U.S. Government outreach to Allies
and partners to promote multilateral cooperation to prevent arms
trafficking.
Question. Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or
weapon systems falling into Russia's control?
Answer. We are aware that Russia has captured relatively small
numbers of U.S.-provided weapons when it has overrun Ukrainian
positions. This is inevitable in war zones, and is a risk that DoD
factors into its calculus prior to providing security assistance.
However, the fact remains that DoD has not seen credible evidence
of the diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons by
Ukraine. Unfortunately, Russia continues to aggressively push
disinformation and false reports of arms trafficking in an attempt to
erode Kyiv's credibility and international support for Ukraine.
Question. Do you estimate we will need further supplemental
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?
Answer. The supplemental funding provided by Congress alongside the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 has been critical in supporting
Ukraine on the battlefield to ensure it has the strongest hand at the
negotiating table when that time comes. Each individual account line
has contributed to battlefield gains.
Our requests are always conditions based, and we expect to evaluate
the need for additional funding as the situation evolves.
Question. What are the key components to Ukraine's strategy to
drive Russians from occupied territory?
Answer. Ultimately, Ukraine determines its own strategy, but
Ukrainian resolve has proven critical to Ukraine's success in pushing
back Russia's brutality. The tremendous sacrifice and bravery of the
men and women of Ukraine as they defend their homeland with grit and
ingenuity has been the catalyst for repelling Russia's attacks and
regaining control over sovereign Ukrainian territory.
Broad international support for Ukraine has also been essential.
The eighth meeting of Secretary Austin's Ukraine Defense Contact Group
on January 20, 2023 again demonstrated the wide-sweeping support for
Ukraine, both in political terms as well as in security assistance with
the largest amount of donations committed by Ukraine's partners to
date.
Question. What is the Administration's strategy to help Ukraine
defend its people, and push Russia out?
Answer. As the Secretary of Defense has said, we are ``moving
heaven and earth'' to get Ukraine the capabilities they urgently need
to defend themselves and retake territory. To date, with the support of
Congress, the Administration's efforts have amounted to more than $27.1
billion in security assistance since Russia's unprovoked, full-scale
invasion. This assistance has included hundreds of armored vehicles,
more than 1 million rounds of artillery, thousands of arms, and key air
defense capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's military actions so
far?
Answer. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24,
2022, the Russian military has failed to achieve its strategic or
operational objectives. Russian forces have suffered enormous
casualties on the battlefield, have lost hundreds of pieces of military
equipment, and have expended significant numbers of precision and other
munitions. Russia's frequent changes in operational commanders, its
reliance on Wagner fighters, and its turn to external support from Iran
and North Korea are all indicators of its military failures.
Question. What weapons and equipment have been the most beneficial
to the Ukrainian military?
Answer. Ukraine's battlefield requirements have evolved over time.
At the outset of Russia's full-scale invasion, surging Stinger air
defense and Javelin anti-tank missiles proved critical. As the war
shifted to the south and east, the decision to provide HIMARS helped
Ukraine seize the momentum from Russia. Air defense became more
important as Russia's indiscriminate widespread air attacks increased
and we've committed key air defense systems, including NASAMS and
Patriot. In recent weeks, we have been laser-focused on getting Ukraine
more armored maneuver capability, which will enable them to continue to
push Russia further back and retake more territory.
Question. What are the greatest challenges to the Russian security
forces?
Answer. Throughout the last year of conflict, Russian forces in
Ukraine have faced significant challenges with command and control,
logistics, and morale, among other issues. To increase the number of
military personnel available for the war, Russian leadership had to
institute a mobilization drive in fall 2022. Russian stocks of
equipment and munitions have also been diminished as a result of the
conflict, as indicated by Russia's efforts to obtain supplies from Iran
and North Korea.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. In response to my question on how the Biden
administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to improve burden-sharing
and increase their relative contribution of total assistance to
Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S. allies and partners
roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January 27, 2023, Congress
has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to provide assistance
to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war since Russia's
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these appropriations
laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S. assistance. As tracked
by Germany's Kiel Institute--a reliable open-source database--aid from
non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of November 20, 2022 while
assistance from the United States to Ukraine totaled $66 billion during
the same period. In other words, the United States provided the bulk of
total aid to Ukraine--62 percent--during this time period. Moreover,
Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent of the weaponry--in dollar
value--received by Ukraine in this period has come from the United
States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country's total bilateral
assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian defense contact
group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80 percent), Poland (0.49
percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32 percent), and the
United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United States (0.22
percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08 percent of
GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance to Ukraine
during this period. Please note that none of the statistics from Kiel
Institute's dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law ($47.3
billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative
contributions. Under Secretary Nuland, do you disagree with any of this
open-source data that I've summarized?
Answer. The United States continues to work closely with allies and
partners around the world to provide Ukraine the vital assistance it
needs to defend itself against Russian aggression. From February 2022
through early April 2023, the United States has provided $56.9 billion
in economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. While we
are not in a position to validate the data gathered by nongovernmental
organizations, we currently estimate that our allies and partners have
provided approximately $60.7 billion in aid to Ukraine across all
sectors during that same timeframe. We will continue to prioritize
discussions with other nations to share in the responsibility we all
bear to ensure Russia's strategic failure in Ukraine.
Question. Would you like to clarify, expand, or amend your claim
that allied and partner contributions to aid Ukraine and affected
countries are roughly equal to U.S. contributions in the aggregate? I
would appreciate it if you could provide the data used to substantiate
your claim and its source. I request the data also be broken down by
military, economic, and humanitarian/other assistance categories.
Answer. U.S. allies and partners are assisting Ukraine in numerous
ways. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, since February 2022,
Ukraine has received $29.7 billion in budget support from non-U.S.
donors, of which $15.8 billion is from EU institutions and member
states, compared to $18 billion from the United States. EU institutions
and member states and other donors have provided $3.7 billion in
humanitarian aid, nearly double the United States' $1.9 billion
contribution. EU countries are also bearing the financial burden of
hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees (out of a total of 8 million
refugees). Since February 2022, the United States has provided
approximately $35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. Allies and
partners worldwide have provided or committed over $24 billion in
security assistance, and these contributions continue to accrue.
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Question. On the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA): In
response to my question on whether the Biden intends to use emergency
PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign military sales
backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the time and requested
an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan's arms backlog remains
roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon officials' assessment that
China will be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The FY 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1 billion per year in PDA to
transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the event of an emergency--the
same authorization that President Joe Biden used to send billions of
dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against Russia's invasion. Since
February 2022, the Biden administration has directed 30 drawdowns under
PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in weaponry from the
Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers, and Javelins. Under
Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the
current backlog in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19
billion? If not, please provide the updated statistic.
Answer. Claims of a $19 billion FMS backlog to Taiwan are
misleading. An FMS contract is often signed and funded months or years
after the Congressional Notification to the Hill, and U.S. defense
companies only start production after the contract is signed and
funded. While many of Taiwan's FMS cases are delivered by the mutually
agreed upon date in the contract paperwork, the actual, final delivery
date is driven by the manufacturer and other factors external to State
or Congressional control. That date is often only publicized if late.
Our experts would be happy to provide you and your staff a briefing on
the specifics of the current FMS pipeline for Taiwan.
Question. Under Secretary Nuland, why is the Administration not
invoking PDA to proactively provide arms necessary for Taiwan to deter
a possible Chinese invasion of the island?
Answer. The Administration is grateful for Congress' enactment of
this authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resiliency Act, and we are
actively discussing how best to exercise the $1 billion drawdown. We
recognize that military assistance drawdowns are one of the U.S.
Government's most valuable tools to provide defense articles to foreign
partners quickly. There are numerous policy and national security
implications the United States must consider before the President
decides to authorize a drawdown that would pull from DoD inventory. The
Administration looks forward to discussing the results of this review
with Congress in the coming months.
Question. Under Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander,
to what extent has the United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA
that could also be used for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?
Answer. Many of our partners have similar defense needs, and there
are similarities and differences between the capabilities Taiwan and
Ukraine need to effectively maintain their self-defense. We are
supporting both partners simultaneously and in a manner that does not
detract from either. There are technical considerations involved,
including whether DoD stock can be released to Ukraine and Taiwan.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the
U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S.
weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible
major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific? In response to my question
on how the Biden administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to
improve burden-sharing and increase their relative contribution of
total assistance to Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S.
allies and partners roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January
27, 2023, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to
provide assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war
since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these
appropriations laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S.
assistance. As tracked by Germany's Kiel Institute--a reliable open-
source database --aid from non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of
November 20, 2022 while assistance from the United States to Ukraine
totaled $66 billion during the same period. In other words, the United
States provided the bulk of total aid to Ukraine--62 percent--during
this time period. Moreover, Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent
of the weaponry--in dollar value--received by Ukraine in this period
has come from the United States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country's
total bilateral assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP). Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian
defense contact group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80
percent), Poland (0.49 percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32
percent), and the United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United
States (0.22 percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08
percent of GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance
to Ukraine during this period. Please note that none of the statistics
from Kiel Institute's dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law
($47.3 billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative
contributions.
Answer. DoD and State are working closely with the defense
industrial base to assess current needs, project future requirements in
the Indo-Pacific and globally, and lessen supply chain bottlenecks
negatively impacting production timelines. Through this process, the
Administration has been able to improve production timelines for
several weapons, including Javelins, Stingers, and HIMARS. The
Executive Branch is reviewing our processes to ensure defense
acquisitions proceed as quickly as possible, and we look forward to
collaborating with Congress on potential mechanisms to incentivize
defense partners to expand production capacity.
______
Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. In response to my question on whether the Biden intends
to use emergency PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign
military sales backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the
time and requested an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan's
arms backlog remains roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon
officials' assessment that China will be capable of invading Taiwan by
2027. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1
billion per year in PDA to transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the
event of an emergency--the same authorization that President Joe Biden
used to send billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against
Russia's invasion. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has
directed 30 drawdowns under PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in
weaponry from the Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers,
and Javelins.
Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the current backlog in
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19 billion? If not, please
provide the updated statistic.
Answer. DoD assesses the claim of a $19 billion FMS backlog to
Taiwan to be misleading. Actual contracts for arms and services
announced in Congressional Notifications are often signed and funded
months or years after an announced Congressional Notification. U.S.
defense companies only start production after the contract is signed,
and many of Taiwan's FMS cases are scheduled to be delivered by the
mutually agreed-upon date in the contract paperwork.
Question. Assistant Secretary Wallander, to what extent has the
United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA that could also be used
for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?
Answer. Support to Ukraine and support to Taiwan are not mutually
exclusive. We continue to work diligently to provide asymmetric
capabilities to Taiwan, including anti-ship missiles, command control
networks and secure communication systems, data links, early warning
radar, and integrated air and missile defense, as fast as possible
while also making sure Ukraine can defend itself against Russian
aggression. Although some of the systems we have transferred to Ukraine
under presidential drawdown align with some of Taiwan's priorities for
acquisition, it is important to reiterate that this is not a zero-sum
game.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the
U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S.
weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible
major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Thanks to Congressional support, the Department is
replenishing stocks of munitions transferred to Ukraine. The Department
is working with industry to increase production of certain capabilities
to continue meeting the needs of Ukrainian forces, while ensuring the
United States is ready to defend itself, our partners, and Allies.
The Department, through the Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive
(MIDD), has identified over 2 billion dollars of industrial base
investments to increase and/or accelerate production of Javelin,
Singer, HIMARS, GMLRS, 155mm artillery shells, and Patriot missiles, In
addition, the Department is leveraging lessons learned from supporting
the Ukraine conflict, as well as from its supply chain resiliency
analyses, to utilize various authorities to make the munitions supply
chain more resilient, increase its capacity, and maintain its
readiness.
More broadly, the Department has found that the traditional
munitions procurement practices resulted in ``feast or famine'' cycles
that created instability in the industrial base and incentivized
production sized only to current demand, with little slack for any
surges in demand. In addition, some munitions that are in high demand
by foreign partners--such as Stinger missiles--are not currently in use
by the U.S. military and therefore did not have active production
lines.
The authorities passed in the FY23 NDAA will provide the Department
the ability to lock in critical munitions investments, send a stable
demand signal to the munitions industrial base, and respond more
quickly to future contingencies. This includes Multi-year procurements
as well as the ability to purchase long-lead items for some key
systems. Long-term industrial base resilience will depend on increased
use of these authorities as well as consistent buying behavior, to send
the appropriate demand signals to industry, authorizing suppliers to
acquire long-lead-time items in advance, to reduce future production
times, and establishing additional U.S. and allied sources for critical
components.
______
Letter to Secretary Blinken, Dated August 4, 2020, About Plans To
Nominate a Special Envoy to Belarus
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