[Senate Hearing 118-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                         S. Hrg. 118-43

                    COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION: 
                           UKRAINE AND BEYOND

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            JANUARY 26, 2023
                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-759 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2023   



                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          



                              (ii)        


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

McKee, Hon. Erin, Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, 
  U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC......     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................     9

Wallander, Hon. Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    13
    Prepared Statement...........................................    15

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    44

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    46

Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    51

Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    55

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Mitt Romney............................................    58

Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Mitt 
  Romney.........................................................    59

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    61

Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Todd Young.....................................................    62

Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    62

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator John Barrasso..........................................    63

Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator John Barrasso..........................................    64

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Bill Hagerty...........................................    66

Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Bill Hagerty...........................................    68

Letter to Secretary Blinken, Dated August 4, 2020, About Plans To 
  Nominate a Special Envoy to Belarus............................    70

                                 (iii)

  

 
                    COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION: 
                           UKRAINE AND BEYOND

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 2023

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, Chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and 
Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
    Almost 1 year ago, as Vladimir Putin amassed his forces 
along the border with Ukraine, most of the world assumed the 
Russian military was one of the most powerful on Earth, but for 
nearly a year, brave Ukrainians, from army recruits to retired 
grandmothers, have exposed just how weak the Kremlin military 
really is because a leader who sends his soldiers into battle 
with almost no food is weak.
    An army that gives its recruits instructions to use their 
weapons taken from Wikipedia is weak. Generals using maps from 
the 1960s to fight a war in 2022 are weak.
    Nothing underscores Putin's weakness more than his reliance 
on the Wagner Group of mercenaries, a group that Putin's chef, 
a former convict, a man sanctioned by the United States, leads 
like a paramilitary death squad, a group recruiting violent 
criminals from Russian prisons and sending them into battle as 
cannon fodder.
    Human Rights Watch documented one incident in the Central 
Africa Republic where Wagner mercenaries stopped a group of 
unarmed men at a roadblock. As the witness began to pray out 
loud, the Russians forced the men to kneel and one by one they 
shot them in the head.
    These are not just criminals. They are war criminals and 
they are leading the fight in Ukraine today for Putin because 
Putin is failing spectacularly.
    In fact, I am considering legislation to strengthen our 
tools to counter the Wagner Group, prohibiting transactions 
with those buying their natural resources as well as 
restricting security assistance to countries supporting this 
mercenary army.
    Their reach is growing as Putin gets weaker, and weaker he 
gets the more dangerous he gets, the more suffering he causes. 
How many civilians will die from Russian missile attacks in 
Ukraine because Putin cannot achieve his battlefield goals?
    What will Putin do as he gets more desperate? More letter 
bombing campaigns in NATO countries? Threats of nuclear war?
    Now, I have been supportive of the Administration's 
response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, from supplying 
critical weapon systems and trainings to shoring up our allies 
in Europe to supporting the millions of refugees who have fled 
this war, including welcoming so many to the United States.
    As I have said all along, this support should have come 
sooner. Ukraine's embrace of good governance reforms in the 
years leading up to Russia's invasion directly contributed to 
the success we are seeing today. While we are still learning 
more details, I want to commend President Zelensky and his 
cabinet for their serious oversight plans for U.S. and 
international assistance.
    As I have said since Putin's invasion, and I will say it 
again to the Ukrainian people, we will continue to support your 
heroic efforts to achieve victory. We will stand with you as 
you fight for your homeland against a dictator trying to erase 
your nation by force.
    We will work with you so that a free and democratic Ukraine 
that respects the will and rights of its people survives and 
flourishes after this war comes to an end.
    We will continue to work with those countries Putin 
threatens, from encouraging energy diversification to shoring 
up democratic institutions to stop Putin from spreading his 
poisonous autocratic savagery, and we must also support those 
Russians who are in prison because they are brave enough to 
stand up against Putin's war machine.
    I am disappointed that the Administration has not met its 
statutory deadline to make a determination with respect to 
Magnitsky sanctions in response to the arrest of Vladimir Kara-
Murza.
    Secretary Nuland, I hope you will tell us when we can get a 
response to our letter on this matter. I look forward to 
getting a full picture today from this entire panel on what the 
Departments of State, Pentagon, USAID, is doing to support 
Ukraine and counter future Russian aggression.
    In the immediate term, I think there is a question that 
needs to be answered, which is what is our strategy for helping 
Ukraine achieve victory.
    How are we taking lessons from the Ukrainian war to think 
about preparing ourselves and our partners for potential 
aggression from Russia in the future?
    Because while Ukrainians are on the front lines of fighting 
for democracy and the rule of law now, we know that Putin's 
ambitions do not end on his borders.
    The United States and our democratic allies must show the 
authoritarian regimes of the world that the invasion and 
subjugation of free people is unacceptable in the modern world, 
is a violation of the international rule of law, and that is 
what is also at stake in Ukraine.
    Yes, it is about the freedom of the Ukrainian people to 
decide their own future, but it is also to stand up for the 
universal proposition that you cannot by force take another 
country's territory.
    With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member 
for his remarks.
    Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, let me say I concur in remarks that you have 
made and I am going to make some similar remarks along those 
lines. I look forward to having a concrete discussion on the 
Biden administration's policy toward Russia.
    I hope to hear from you how the United States is planning 
to do more and faster to help defeat Russia in Ukraine and 
counter Russian aggression and malign influence around the 
world.
    Indeed, we are not the only ones that are hungry for this. 
I think if you look around this room and see the attendance 
today and see the gaggle of media people out in the hall 
shouting questions at us, everyone is hungry for this 
discussion and I hope we have a robust discussion on that 
today.
    It has been almost a year ago now that Russia's full-scale 
invasion of Ukraine turned the status quo of international 
relations on its head. In response to this bold escalation, the 
United States and our allies around the world quickly came to a 
consensus that we need to support Ukraine's defense of its 
people, territory, and way of life from Russian aggression.
    Whenever we have a discussion like this it really ought to 
start with a short--very short and brief discussion of how we 
got here.
    We all know that Ronald Reagan spent 8 years in his 
presidency as his top priority bringing down and breaking up 
the Soviet Union and pulling those satellite countries away 
from Russia.
    He was successful. He got that done, and we, as America, 
adopted that as our policy. We promoted it. We helped it in 
every way we can. One of the things that happened, of course, 
was all the countries that were in the orbit of the USSR pulled 
away and went on their own way.
    That breakup included four countries that had nuclear 
weapons at the time. One was Russia, of course, one was 
Kazakhstan, one was Belarus, and one was Ukraine.
    Obviously, it is also the policy of United States to 
contain nuclear weapons and be against proliferation wherever 
possible.
    On December 5, 1995, the United States sat down in 
Budapest, Hungary, with the Ukrainians, with the Brits at the 
table and with the Russians at the table, and entered into an 
agreement whereby they--that is, all of us--asked the 
Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons in return for which 
Ukraine would get security for their borders and against an 
invasion by any country.
    All four of us signed that. The Ukrainians did what they 
agreed to do. They gave up their nuclear weapons, and where do 
they find themselves in 2022? Facing an invasion by one of the 
countries that actually signed that agreement.
    We have not only a moral obligation, but a legal obligation 
to do what we said we would do on December 5, 1995 and we are 
doing that.
    Over the past year, extensive discussions have taken place 
about how the U.S. and our allies can support Ukraine. That is 
the conversation of about every conversation you enter into 
here in DC.
    However, these discussions get bogged down by fears of 
giving Ukraine too much equipment too quickly for fear of 
upsetting Moscow.
    I am tired of hearing that. Everyone talks about the need 
to hand Russia a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but the 
Administration's policy stopped short of fully supporting that 
goal.
    What is missing is a more robust discussion about U.S. 
policy toward Russia now and, just as importantly, beyond the 
current conflict. Any notion that we can interact with Russia 
like we did a year ago was shattered by the invasion, but also 
by Russia's noncompliance with the New START treaty and many 
other malign actions it has taken around the world.
    It has not only soured its relationship with us, it has 
soured its relationship with virtually the rest of the planet 
with the exception of a half a dozen of what I call no-goodnik 
countries that are in league with them.
    I expect our witnesses to help us better understand the 
Administration's plans to confront all of Russia's malign 
influence. It is critical that U.S. foreign policy be informed 
by a long-term vision for a future where Russia coexists with 
its neighbors and does not threaten to destabilize the 
international community.
    Unfortunately, the Biden administration has so far not made 
clear a concrete policy for how the United States will directly 
confront Russia as a strategic adversary.
    While Putin has irreversibly tied the fate of his regime to 
the outcome of the war in Ukraine, there is so much more to 
confronting Russia that the United States must consider.
    It is essential that the Biden administration's Russia 
policy be characterized by leadership and initiative. I hope 
your testimony and responses will be given with a focus on that 
overreaching Russia policy today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    With that, let me turn to our witnesses.
    A long-time participant with this committee, Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland has been a 
diplomat for more than 30 years. She started very young. Among 
her many accolades she previously led the Europe and Eurasia 
Bureau at this--and served as ambassador to NATO and was the 
State Department's spokesperson.
    We are also joined by USAID's Assistant Administrator in 
the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, Erin McKee, our former 
ambassador to Papua New Guinea, to the Solomon Islands, and to 
the Republic of Vanuatu, who began her career working on the 
post-Soviet space.
    Finally, we welcome Assistant Secretary Wallander, who has 
worked on Russia at the National Security Council in the 
Pentagon for many years and has published extensively on Russia 
and Europe while outside of government.
    Welcome to you all. Your full statements will be included 
in the record, without objection.
    I would ask that you try to summarize your statements in 
about 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee can have 
a conversation with you.
    With that, Madam Secretary, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
    STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Risch, distinguished members of this committee.
    It is an honor for all of us to join you for this first 
hearing of the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are 
meeting on Ukraine as we approach the 1-year anniversary, as 
you both said.
    First, let me thank this committee, the entire Congress, 
for your continued strong bipartisan support for Ukraine's 
battle for its sovereignty, indeed, its very right to exist.
    The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for 
security, economic, humanitarian support that you approved in 
December for FY23 confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic, 
teacher, and electricity technician that America stands with 
them and we stand with them in saying ``no'' to a vicious 
autocrat trying to redraw the maps of their country by force 
and ``no'' to any others around the world with similar 
ambitions, because Ukraine's fight, as you have both said, is 
about so much more than Ukraine. It is about the world that our 
children and our grandchildren will inherit.
    Since I last sat before this committee in September, 
Ukraine has regained control of large swaths of its territory 
in Kherson and in Kharkiv with strong U.S. and international 
support. It has held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very 
high costs, but taken losses in the surrounding towns in 
Soledar.
    It has valiantly withstood Putin's latest barbaric tactic, 
waves of drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity, 
and water infrastructure, and with your help has begun to build 
back and modernize its systems.
    As you know, there was another vicious attack in four 
cities last night, taking out heat and electricity for millions 
of Ukrainians. Ukraine is already building that back.
    Ukraine has also put forward a set of principles for a just 
and sustainable peace and challenged Russia to engage 
meaningfully around that framework. In just the last 2 weeks in 
addition to last night, it has grieved the losses of so many 
more innocents--Russian missiles destroyed an apartment in 
Dnipro and, as you know, Ukraine lost senior members of its 
government in a tragic helicopter crash.
    Ukraine's fight must and will continue because, as my boss, 
Secretary Blinken, has said so often, if Russia stops fighting 
this war ends today, but if Ukraine stops fighting Ukraine 
ends.
    That is also the message that all of you heard from 
President Zelensky when he made his historic visit to the Oval 
Office on December 21 and also addressed the joint session of 
Congress.
    As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is 
fighting back with our support. As Assistant Secretary McKee 
and Assistant Secretary Wallander will outline in more detail, 
we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them the 
training, the equipment, and the support they need to defend 
themselves and to make another concerted effort this spring to 
push back Russian forces.
    This includes providing the PATRIOT air defenses, counter-
drone systems, Abrams main battle tanks, the Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicles, Stryker, artillery, and ammunition.
    We and our partners are also speeding equipment and spare 
parts to Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical 
infrastructure, including a gas turbine provided by USAID just 
yesterday that is the size of a tennis court.
    We are also providing budget support, economic and 
humanitarian assistance, and supporting those collecting 
evidence of Russia's atrocities and crimes so there can be full 
accountability.
    Throughout this, the Administration remains laser focused 
on ensuring that no aid or weapons are diverted. We have 
plumped up our embassy staff in Kyiv for technical oversight.
    We are also working with the World Bank, with Deloitte, and 
with a team of U.S. Government auditors who are in Kyiv this 
week, in fact, and we continue to support essential reform and 
anti-corruption measures by the Ukrainian Government across the 
country.
    Ukraine must not simply survive this war. It must emerge 
stronger, cleaner, more democratic, more European. That is what 
Ukraine's patriots are fighting for. That is also central to 
the support that the United States and our international 
partners provide.
    President Zelensky's decision this week to fire and accept 
the resignations of officials suspected of corruption sends a 
strong signal of Ukraine's own resolve in this regard.
    In the meantime, our coalition of support for Ukraine 
remains amazingly strong. In total, more than 50 partner 
nations have committed tens of billions of dollars in military, 
economic, humanitarian support, and taken in millions of 
refugees.
    We have also worked, as you know, on the Black Sea grain 
deal--17 million metric tons liberated from Port of Odessa--and 
we have helped Europe reduce its dependence on Russian fossil 
fuel, more than doubling our own LNG exports to the continent, 
and we have imposed far-reaching sanctions and a global price 
cap on Russian oil to reduce revenues for Putin's vicious war 
machine without destabilizing energy markets.
    None of this--none of what we have seen in Ukraine over the 
past year, would have been possible, without daily acts of 
heroism by tens of millions of Ukrainians in all walks of life, 
but it is also true that much of it would have been impossible 
without the continued support of the Congress and the American 
people.
    President Biden has pledged that the U.S. will support 
Ukraine for as long as it takes and we are grateful for the 
partnership that we have with you in meeting this commitment 
because it is in our own national interest.
    We look forward to taking your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members 
of the Committee, it is an honor to join you for the first hearing of 
the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are meeting on 
Ukraine, as we approach the 1-year anniversary of Putin's brutal 
invasion next month.
    First, let me thank this Committee, and the entire Congress, for 
your continued, and strong bipartisan support for Ukraine's battle for 
its sovereignty--indeed its very right to exist.
    The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for security, 
economic, and humanitarian support that you approved in December for 
FY23, confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic, teacher, and 
electricity technician that America stands with them. We stand with 
them in saying ``no'' to a vicious autocrat trying to redraw the map of 
their country by force. And ``no'' to any others around the world with 
similar ambitions. Because Ukraine's fight is about so much more than 
Ukraine; it is about the world our own children and grandchildren will 
inherit.
    Since I last met with this Committee in September, Ukraine has:

   Regained control of large swathes of its territory in 
        Kherson and Kharkiv, with strong U.S. and international 
        support;

   Held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very high cost, 
        but taken losses in Soledar;

   Valiantly withstood Putin's latest barbaric tactic--waves of 
        drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity, and 
        water infrastructure--and, with our help, begun to build back 
        and modernize its systems;

   Put forward a set of principles for a just and sustainable 
        peace, challenging Russia to engage meaningfully; and

   In the last 2 weeks, grieved the loss of so many innocents 
        when Russian missiles destroyed an apartment complex in Dnipro, 
        and the loss of senior government ministers in a tragic 
        helicopter crash.

    Ukraine's fight must continue because, as Secretary Blinken has 
said so often: if Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops 
fighting, Ukraine ends. That was also the message that President 
Zelenskyy delivered when he made his historic visit to the Oval Office 
to thank President Biden and the American people, and when he addressed 
all of you in a joint session of Congress on December 21.
    As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is fighting 
back with our support. As A/S Wallander and A/A McKee will outline in 
more detail, we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them 
the training, equipment, and support they need to defend themselves, 
and make another concerted effort this spring to push Russian forces 
back. This includes providing PATRIOT air defense and counter-drone 
systems, Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 
Stryker armored personnel carriers, and artillery and ammunition.
    We and our partners are speeding equipment and spare parts to 
Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical infrastructure--including 
autotransformers as big as tennis courts. We are providing budget 
support, economic, and humanitarian assistance, and supporting those 
collecting evidence of Russia's atrocities and crimes so there can be 
full accountability.
    We also remain laser-focused on ensuring no aid or weapons are 
diverted--using our Embassy staff in Kyiv along with technical 
oversight from the World Bank, Deloitte, and U.S. Government auditors, 
some of whom are in Ukraine this week. And we continue to support 
essential reform and anti-corruption measures across the country.
    Ukraine must not simply survive this war, it must emerge as a 
stronger, more democratic, and European state--that is what Ukraine's 
patriots are fighting for, and that is also central to U.S. and 
international support. The dismissal this week of officials suspected 
of corruption sends a strong signal of Ukraine's resolve in this 
regard, as well as the effective action of Ukraine's anti-corruption 
institutions, civil society, and independent media.
    Meantime, our global coalition of support for Ukraine remains 
strong. In total, more than 50 partner nations have committed tens of 
billions of dollars in military, economic, and humanitarian support; 
and taken in millions of refugees.
    We have also worked together as a coalition to rally the world to 
support the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, unlocking more than 
17 million metric tons of food blocked by Russia. We helped Europe 
reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, more than doubling our 
own LNG exports to the continent. And together we've imposed far 
reaching sanctions and a global price cap on Russian oil to reduce 
revenue available to Russia's war machine without destabilizing energy 
markets.
    None of what we've seen in Ukraine over the past year would be 
possible without daily acts of heroism by tens of millions of 
Ukrainians in all walks of life. And much of it would be impossible 
without the continued support of this Congress and the American public. 
President Biden has pledged that the United States will support Ukraine 
for as long as it takes.
    We are grateful for your partnership in meeting that commitment 
because it is in our own national interest. I look forward to answering 
your questions.

    The Chairman. Administrator McKee.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIN MCKEE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR 
     FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
                  DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. McKee. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, distinguished members of this committee.
    I deeply appreciate the opportunity to testify about 
USAID's work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider 
efforts to counter Russian aggression throughout Europe and 
Eurasia.
    I also have to thank you for passing the four supplemental 
appropriations bills that allow the United States to present 
such a strong united front in assisting Ukraine.
    Today, as we have noted, marks 335 days of the Kremlin's 
senseless brutal war on Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainians 
are now refugees. Five point nine million Ukrainians are 
internally displaced. Some 430 children have been killed, and 
USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged 
war crimes and human rights abuses.
    Putin's unjustified war continues to cause catastrophic 
loss of life and has undermined the security of Europe and the 
global economy.
    Yet, Putin drastically underestimated the Ukrainian people. 
The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The 
Ukrainian people demonstrate daily heroism and bravery. 
Communities emerging from occupation exemplify this resilience 
despite the horror that they have endured.
    At USAID, we are proud to stand beside the Ukrainian people 
in their fight for freedom. Foreign assistance is a critical 
tool to realize the United States' goals of helping Ukraine win 
its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory as a free, 
prosperous, independent country with a path towards EU 
accession.
    Ukraine will need a well-functioning state, a vibrant 
inclusive economy, a free press, and strong institutions free 
from corruption to secure this future when the war ends.
    The supplemental resources generously appropriated by 
Congress allow USAID to address urgent needs immediately 
created by the conflict while also remaining focused on what 
will be needed for recovery and reconstruction.
    With these funds we are investing in Ukraine's economy and 
helping resuscitate it after the Kremlin's ruthless attacks on 
its civilian infrastructure. We are repairing the country's 
energy and heating systems to counter Putin's attempts to wield 
the harsh winter as a weapon against the people of Ukraine.
    We are protecting public health from the deadly 
consequences of Russia's war and supporting Ukraine's health 
system to restore services while at the same time advancing 
progress on critical reforms.
    We continue to fight corruption at every level, to build 
public trust, maintain that trust as well as donor support, 
attract critical private sector investment, safeguard the 
country's institutions, and speed its integration with the rest 
of Europe.
    We have also delivered on the United States' commitment to 
provide reliable and sustained economic support to the 
Ukrainian Government, which is critical to ensuring that 
Ukraine can defend itself and uphold the democratic government 
and society that is at the core of Putin's aggression against 
Ukraine.
    The $13 billion in direct budget support that USAID has 
provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine through generous 
congressional appropriations has kept government services such 
as health care, education, and basic utilities running.
    This support has made it possible for the Ukrainian people 
to sustain their resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with 
unrelenting attacks on that country's energy grid.
    USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility being 
entrusted with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of 
U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet critical needs of Ukrainian 
citizens is USAID's priority for all budget support provided to 
the Ukrainian Government, and the Ukrainian Government stands 
as our partner in this accountability and knows we will be 
exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.
    Beyond the region, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is harming 
the global economy and worsening global food insecurity due to 
disruptions to food, fuel, fertilizer supplies, and subsequent 
price volatility.
    As Russia becomes more aggressive in its energy policy, 
countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and 
consequently are accelerating their transition to other energy 
sources with U.S. Government assistance.
    The countries in Central Asia are also facing serious 
disruptions to their economies and food security and are 
seeking alternatives to Moscow, which USAID is working to 
support through regional cooperation.
    The consequences of Putin's unprovoked unjustified war in 
Ukraine extend beyond the battlefield, beyond Ukraine, and 
beyond Europe. USAID will continue to stand with the Ukrainian 
people and we are grateful for the support from Congress.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. McKee follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ms. Erin McKee

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about USAID's 
work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider efforts to counter 
Russia's aggression and malign influence throughout Europe and Eurasia. 
I also want to thank you for passing the four supplemental 
appropriations bills that allow the United States to present such a 
strong and united front in assisting Ukraine.
    Today marks 335 days of the Kremlin's senseless, brutal assault on 
Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainian citizens are now refugees, 5.9 
million are internally displaced, some 430 children have been killed, 
and USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged war 
crimes and human rights abuses. Putin's unjustified war continues to 
cause catastrophic loss of life and has undermined the security of 
Europe and the global economy.
    However, Putin drastically underestimated the people of Ukraine. 
The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The people 
of Ukraine demonstrate daily their heroism and bravery. Communities 
emerging from occupation exemplify resilience, despite the horror they 
have endured.
    At USAID, we are proud of our support to the people of Ukraine as 
they defend their country, their freedom, and their democracy.
  usaid's pivotal role in helping ukraine win the war for its survival
    Foreign assistance is a critical tool to realize U.S. goals of 
helping Ukraine win its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory 
as a free, prosperous, and independent country able to realize its 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including through EU accession. To secure 
the future it has chosen, Ukraine must have a well-functioning state; a 
vibrant, inclusive economy; a free press; and strong institutions free 
of corruption to secure this future when the war ends. The supplemental 
resources generously appropriated by Congress allow USAID to anchor 
U.S. Government efforts to address the urgent humanitarian, economic, 
energy, and other needs created by the war, while also remaining 
focused on what will be required for recovery and reconstruction.
   budget support helps alleviate the acute fiscal crisis caused by 
                              russia's war
    The United States' commitment to provide reliable and sustained 
direct economic support to the Ukrainian Government is critical to 
ensuring Ukraine can continue to function as an independent democratic 
country, that its government can provide critical basic services to its 
people, and to ensure it is able to stay on a democratic trajectory 
toward full integration with Europe, which Putin's unprovoked war aims 
to derail. The $13 billion in direct budget support the U.S. Government 
has provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine, thanks to generous 
Congressional appropriations, has kept essential government services 
such as healthcare, education, and basic utilities running. This 
support has made it possible for the people of Ukraine to sustain their 
resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with unrelenting attacks on the 
country's energy grid.
    USAID delivers direct budget support through a World Bank 
mechanism, which provides the most effective way to expediently deliver 
urgently-needed funds with a high degree of accountability. Funds are 
released to the Government of Ukraine on a reimbursement basis. This 
mechanism provides a multi-tiered system for accountability--including 
monitoring, reporting, and audit requirements--with Bank fees waived 
since after the first tranche of budget support.
    USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility of being entrusted 
with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of and 
accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet the critical 
needs of Ukrainian citizens is a USAID priority. The Ukrainian 
Government stands as our partner in this accountability and knows we 
will be exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.
    As such, USAID has deployed an independent third-party monitor to 
review financial controls and procedures utilized by the Government of 
Ukraine to track and oversee U.S. funds being used for direct budget 
support. From day one of our assistance and continuing through the 
disbursement of the last dollar, USAID will remain laser-focused on 
making sure U.S. funds are reaching those they are intended to reach. 
We also plan to expand and strengthen our toolkit of oversight 
mechanisms, made possible with the most recent generous appropriation 
of Ukraine funding.
  usaid's support to energy infrastructure keeping ukraine warm this 
                                 winter
    Last month, the United Nations reported that Russia had destroyed 
50 percent of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, putting millions of 
Ukrainian civilians at risk this winter. Strengthening Ukraine's 
ability to maintain its systems despite Russia's attacks remains one of 
our top priorities.
    USAID has already delivered 1,700 generators to 22 oblasts across 
Ukraine, with many more on the way. These generators ensure electricity 
and heating for schools, hospitals, accommodation centers for 
internally-displaced persons, district heating companies, and water 
systems if and when power is knocked out by Russia's air strikes. For 
example, in the city of Chernihiv, USAID provided 31 diesel generators 
to the city's public schools, enough to ensure that 13,000 
schoolchildren have electricity and heating despite Russia's ongoing 
attacks.
    USAID has announced investments totaling more than $220 million in 
Ukraine's heating, energy, and utility infrastructure to help the 
Ukrainian people get through winter and beyond. For example, this 
assistance supports repairs and maintenance of pipes and other 
equipment necessary to deliver heating to homes, hospitals, schools, 
and businesses across Ukraine. This includes delivering 60 excavators 
to repair infrastructure in 48 cities, and providing more than 16 
kilometers of heating pipes, with roughly 70 more kilometers of pipes 
planned for delivery. This builds on over two decades of support to 
Ukraine to strengthen the country's energy security.
usaid provides $1.4b in humanitarian assistance to ukraine which is now 
                the world's largest displacement crisis
    With nearly 14 million internally displaced persons and refugees, 
Ukraine has now surpassed Syria as the world's largest displacement 
crisis. The United States remains the largest donor to the humanitarian 
response for Ukraine. Since the start of Putin's full-scale invasion of 
Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Government has provided more than 
$1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to support people in Ukraine 
and those fleeing to neighboring countries, including more than $1.4 
billion in USAID humanitarian assistance.
    USAID leads the U.S. humanitarian response for Ukraine through our 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART has been working 
since day one to provide food and market-based assistance, safe 
drinking water and hygiene support, health care, support to women, 
children, and others affected by sexual violence or other trauma, and 
other vital relief.
    For example, USAID is supporting the World Food Programme (WFP) and 
three international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to scale up 
food assistance in Ukraine. During December 2022, WFP reached nearly 
2.2 million people in Ukraine with in-kind food distributions, 
including children who received supplementary feeding.
    USAID will continue to coordinate with humanitarian partners in the 
country and region to provide Ukrainian civilians with life-saving 
humanitarian assistance while ramping up critical development 
assistance to respond to cyber-attacks and threats to the energy 
sector, countering disinformation, supporting small businesses and the 
agriculture sector, documenting abuses and atrocities, human rights 
violations, meeting essential health needs, and bolstering the 
continued functioning of local, regional, and national government 
entities.
     usaid response as the war worsens global food insecurity and 
                              malnutrition
    Beyond the region, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is 
harming the global economy and worsening global food insecurity and 
malnutrition due to disruptions to food, fuel, and fertilizer supplies 
and subsequent price volatility. Current estimates point to drops in 
real income of around 1 percent of GDP across developing countries.
    To bolster Ukrainian agriculture exports and help alleviate the 
global food security crisis, USAID established the Agriculture 
Resilience Initiative (AGRI). AGRI-Ukraine supports access to inputs, 
finance, storage and drying services for farmers and agribusinesses, 
and is addressing rail export logistics bottlenecks. In coordination 
with the EU, UN, Ukrainian Government, and the private sector, AGRI-
Ukraine targets Ukraine's immediate agricultural production and export 
challenges, while supporting the wider needs of Ukraine's agriculture 
sector to ensure Ukraine's continued production and export of 
agricultural commodities. USAID has also provided over 13,600 Ukrainian 
farmers in Ukraine with seeds, fertilizers, crop protection, storage 
services, and other support, reaching approximately 29 percent of the 
country's registered agriculture enterprises, to help them deliver the 
2022 harvest and plant for 2023 despite the devastation caused by 
Russia's full-scale invasion. USAID also has helped farmers access 
nearly $42 million in loans and state grants through USAID-supported 
digital finance apps. These are just some examples of how USAID has 
scaled up its assistance in response to rising global food insecurity.
    The impact of the war is also worsening the effects of the historic 
drought in the Horn of Africa, where at least 23 million people are in 
need of emergency food assistance. Many of these countries previously 
relied on imports of Ukrainian grain and fertilizer to meet food needs 
and support domestic agricultural production. For example, before the 
war, Somalia imported a majority of its wheat supply from Ukraine. 
Additionally, high commodity and fuel prices due to disruptions in 
global markets are decreasing the purchasing power of vulnerable 
households and increasing the cost of providing humanitarian 
assistance. Since February 2022, the U.S. Government has invested $7.66 
billion to address the growing global food security crisis, including 
$4.9 billion in humanitarian assistance. As part of that $4.9 billion 
investment, Administrator Samantha Power announced nearly $1.2 billion 
in additional funding to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia in July 2022, 
covering a majority of the $1.8 billion urgent funding requirements 
identified by the UN to support critical drought response activities 
between May to December 2022. To support these investments, we are 
using all of our tools creatively to communicate about U.S. food 
security assistance, including reaching 12.9 million unique users in 
Kenya, with 7.9 million engagements across Facebook, Instagram, 
Twitter, and YouTube.
    Under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, USAID is partnering with the 
WFP to help Ukraine export its wheat and continue to feed some of the 
more than 200 million people globally experiencing acute food 
security--meaning their lives and livelihoods are at serious risk. The 
United States has provided more than $68 million to WFP as part of this 
initiative. This supports WFP's ability to charter vessels for the 
export of grain when commercial options are limited. To share one 
example, in early November 2022, the Ikaria Angel, a USAID-supported 
ship, departed Ukraine en route to Ethiopia carrying 20,000 metric tons 
of WFP grain, enough to feed 3 million people for 3 months. To date, 
WFP chartered vessels transported over 426,000 metric tons of wheat 
through various Black Sea ports supporting Ethiopia, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, and Somalia.
           long term development investments remain important
    In addition to strengthening Ukraine's energy security during 
wartime, USAID assistance helps farmers in Ukraine to continue growing 
food for domestic and global markets, supports Ukrainian efforts to 
document and seek accountability for war crimes and other atrocities 
and human rights abuses, fills critical gaps in Ukraine's health 
system, and helps local government bodies in 91 communities respond to 
challenges caused by Putin's brutal invasion.
    A robust civil society and independent media sector is essential as 
Ukrainian society resists Russia's aggression and strives to strengthen 
its political and rule of law institutions and advance its Euro-
Atlantic integration. USAID's programs promote greater citizen 
participation by enhancing civic education, supporting civic 
initiatives, and building the organizational capacity of civil society 
organizations. These efforts advance Ukraine's democratic development 
and cultivate grassroots approaches to addressing development 
challenges. USAID assistance strengthens the public service 
broadcaster, promotes accountability in the media sector, and helps 
media outlets create high-quality, fact-based content that educates 
audiences and contributes to public debate on critical issues. USAID 
also counters Kremlin disinformation narratives through fostering 
collaboration among government, commercial media, the creative sector, 
and civil society, helping these Ukrainian actors create and 
disseminate high-quality, fact-based content targeted to the audiences 
most vulnerable to disinformation.
    Recently, USAID provided legal, financial, and technical assistance 
to develop Diia for Ukrainian citizens. Diia is a mobile application 
and online portal that provides digital access to 120 government 
services and enables Ukrainian citizens to engage with their government 
online in a one-stop-shop--from applying for benefits and government 
programs to paying taxes, accessing important documents, registering 
and running businesses, and providing identification and digital 
signatures. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 
February 2022, Diia has also enabled Ukrainian citizens to 
electronically receive government services and social support in areas 
impacted by war, and has been used by displaced Ukrainian citizens to 
access aid and other critical services.
    In the context of Russia's unprovoked invasion in February 2022, 
USAID has continued to partner with the Government of Ukraine to 
improve essential health services and build the resilience of health 
systems and institutions to continue serving the Ukrainian people. 
USAID health activities have continued to operate inside Ukraine, 
pivoting assistance to ease strains on Ukraine's health system and 
address the direct human costs of the war, interruptions to services, 
and the health needs of the large number of displaced persons inside 
the country. During the war, USAID's network of implementing partners 
has continued working on the ground to meet immediate needs and support 
long-term strengthening of Ukraine's health system.
                          regional perspective
    With its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has created 
new threats, economic turbulence, and uncertainty for countries across 
the region. As Russia has become more destructive in its energy policy, 
countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and, consequently, 
are accelerating their transition to other energy sources with USAID 
assistance. These countries have had to re-orient trade, and find new 
and innovative ways to bolster their economies, even as some have seen 
substantial influxes of people fleeing Ukraine and Putin's Russia.
    In the earliest days of this crisis, the Lukashenka regime in 
Belarus allowed Russia's forces to launch attacks from Belarusian 
territory. We however continue to support Belarusian independent 
journalists, media outlets, and bloggers as they provide fact-based 
content for citizens beyond state-sponsored or Russian propaganda and 
disinformation. We are also working to raise the civic literacy of 
Belarusian citizens so that they may remain resilient to malign 
influence.
    At the same time, the Kremlin continues to employ its playbook of 
malign influence through disinformation, economic and energy coercion, 
and undermining neighboring democracies. USAID continues to address 
this as well. For instance, USAID is working in Georgia to debunk the 
Kremlin's false narrative that the United States is attempting to drag 
Georgia into Russia's war against Ukraine, with a very successful 
recent campaign that reached more than 400,000 viewers via one Facebook 
video alone. Malign influence from the Kremlin is only likely to 
increase in the near future, and USAID remains focused on ensuring our 
programming builds the long-term resilience of our partners and is able 
to respond to the Kremlin's hostile attempts to control others through 
disinformation and digital authoritarianism.
    Through the Countering Russia Influence Fund (CRIF), and in 
alignment with the broader Countering America's Adversaries through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), USAID is working to bolster partner resilience 
across key sectors, including to: (1) Counter the Kremlin's efforts to 
undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law; (2) Resist the 
manipulation of information; 3) Reduce energy vulnerabilities; and (4) 
Reduce economic vulnerabilities, as well as counter the Kremlin's use 
of corruption across all sectors.
    Russia's war against Ukraine has also brought serious disruptions 
to the economies of Central Asia, exacerbated food insecurities, and 
strained if not broken the region's long-standing bonds with Moscow. 
Central Asian governments are seeking alternatives to their former 
reliance on Moscow, and USAID is working to enhance regional 
cooperation, as well as promote new trade and energy corridors across 
the Caspian, through the Caucasus and on to Europe.
                               conclusion
    USAID remains committed to supporting the people of Ukraine as they 
continue the fight to defend their country and their democracy. To 
date, most of the humanitarian, economic, and budgetary support that 
Congress previously provided for Ukraine in the supplemental packages 
has been disbursed or committed. We continue to call on Allies and 
partners to expeditiously meet their commitments to the people of 
Ukraine.
    USAID will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine and we are 
grateful for the support from Congress. Thank you for the opportunity 
to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Wallander.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. 
             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Wallander. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to 
appear before you today to express the unwavering support of 
the United States for Ukraine's sovereignty and security in the 
face of Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion.
    Thank you for holding this important hearing at this 
pivotal time for the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and of the 
world.
    As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this 
past November, our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an 
investment in our own security and prosperity.
    What happens in the coming months may prove decisive and we 
are focused on providing Ukraine with the military capabilities 
it needs to defend its people and its territory. We are doing 
this in close cooperation with our allies and partners.
    First, we have focused on a layered integrated approach to 
air defense to counter Russia's devastating attacks on 
Ukraine's population centers and civilian infrastructure.
    The PATRIOT capability from the United States, Germany, and 
the Netherlands will give Ukraine advanced long-range 
capability. These are complemented by the medium and short-
range air defense capabilities such as NASAMs and Avenger that 
we have provided.
    Second, to enhance Ukraine's ability to maneuver, the 
United States will provide Abrams main battle tanks, the best 
tanks in the world. The United Kingdom has also committed 
Challenger tanks and other European states will provide Leopard 
tanks.
    These main battle tanks are complemented by other vital 
armor capabilities such as Bradleys and Strykers from the 
United States, Swedish CV-90s, French AMX-10s, and German 
Martyrs.
    Third, we have expanded U.S.-led collective training to 
enable the Ukrainians to integrate fires and maneuver. Our 
training will complement the specialized training conducted by 
the United States, the European Union, and our allies.
    Finally, we continue to work with allies and partners to 
deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition 
so Ukraine can sustain its fight.
    Russia has discovered that the United States and our allies 
and partners are serious about supporting Ukraine for the long 
haul.
    Our assistance to Ukraine is possible thanks to bipartisan 
support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates 
the most recent Additional Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
which provided presidential drawdown authority, funding for the 
military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and funding 
for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.
    Presidential drawdown allows us to get Ukraine critical 
capabilities quickly. USAI allows us to contract with industry 
for new and innovative solutions while building Ukraine's 
longer-term defense.
    We are also ramping up defense industrial base production 
of critical munitions and equipment, doubling or, in some 
cases, tripling capacity. Even as we focus on getting Ukraine 
what it needs we have always prioritized accountability, and 
Ukraine has, too.
    We have adapted our accountability practices for the combat 
environment to address the risk of illicit diversion, using 
mechanisms that go above and beyond our standard practices.
    The U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any 
diversion of U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead, 
we see Ukraine's front line units effectively employing 
security assistance every day on the battlefield.
    Nearly a year ago, Russia launched its brutal invasion to 
destroy Ukraine as a free and sovereign nation, threatening 
European security and transatlantic unity. Today, NATO is 
stronger, Europe is investing in its own security at record 
rates, and the incredible people and armed forces of Ukraine 
remain unbowed and unbroken.
    This war has demonstrated that aggression is not worth the 
price paid by the aggressor. That is a lesson that should 
reverberate around the world, including among autocratic 
leaders everywhere.
    As Secretary Austin has said, free people always refuse to 
replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by 
force and fear.
    We are determined to support Ukraine's fight against 
tyranny and oppression and, in doing so, to defend the American 
interests and values that are so clearly at stake.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Dr. Celeste Wallander

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    Russia's war against Ukraine is the worst crisis in European 
security since the end of the Second World War. It has upended peace 
and stability on the continent, poses a historic challenge to European 
Security, and without the U.S. and international response, would pose a 
dangerous example to autocratic regimes around the world.
    Three decades ago, the collapse of the Soviet empire brought to 
Europe and Eurasia the possibility of a wider community of free, 
peaceful, and independent states. Instead, Russia has launched a war 
against Ukraine to change international borders and bend policies of 
vulnerable neighbors to its will.
    Russia's war against Ukraine is thus an assault on European and 
global security. The security of the United States has long rested on 
the transatlantic community. American forces have been stationed across 
the Atlantic for decades to ensure peace in cooperation with our NATO 
Allies. As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this 
past November, ``our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an 
investment in our own security and prosperity.''
    At the same time, Russia's war is also an assault on our bedrock 
values. In carrying out its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has 
wreaked unconscionable death and destruction, killing thousands of 
civilians, committing horrific atrocities, and attacking critical 
infrastructure.
    Yet nearly a year after Russia's full-scale invasion last February, 
its attempt to eliminate Ukraine as an independent state has failed. 
Russia's ground offensives, its air attacks, its assaults to freeze and 
starve and subjugate--all this has only strengthened the spirit and 
resolve of the indomitable people of Ukraine.
    Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been failing since it 
started in February 2022. Ukraine defeated Russia's strategic objective 
to seize Kyiv in the first months. Since then, we have seen Ukraine 
take the initiative, driving Russia's forces from Kharkiv and Kherson. 
Failing on the ground in conventional battle, Russia turned to drone 
and cruise missile attacks on power and energy systems, but Ukraine's 
air defenses and infrastructure have so far proven resilient during the 
cold winter, with thanks due in large measure to international support. 
Now we are seeing intense fighting in the east--including around 
Bakhmut, where Russia's forces led by Wagner have been trying to take 
terrain for months at tremendous cost, and near Kreminna, where the 
Ukrainians are on the offensive.
                positioning ukraine for further success
    Russia is trying to gain momentum against increasingly capable 
Ukrainian Armed Forces along the front lines in Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Our near-term objective is to enable Ukraine's forces to regain control 
of their sovereign territory.
    We are working to achieve that objective through enhanced and 
carefully targeted security assistance, working with allies and 
partners to provide critical new capabilities and training.
    First, we have focused on enabling a layered and integrated 
approach to air defense. The United States and Germany each have 
committed to send Patriot systems, and the Netherlands has committed to 
send launchers and missiles. These will give Ukraine a significantly 
advanced, long-range capability alongside medium- and short-range air 
defense capabilities, such as NASAMS and Avenger systems, that we have 
already provided. Ukraine will have a layered air defense to protect 
its citizens and fight for its territory.
    Second, to enhance Ukraine's ability to conduct complex maneuvers, 
in recent weeks the United States and several allies have committed to 
provide important armor capabilities. From the United States, this 
includes Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 
and multiple types of armored personnel carriers, including Strykers. 
These armored vehicles will complement Challenger tanks committed by 
the UK, CV-90 infantry fighting vehicles from Sweden, AMX-10 light 
armored vehicles from France, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles 
from Germany.
    Third, we have expanded U.S.-led training of Ukraine's forces to 
focus on combined arms and joint maneuver operations. This collective 
training is designed to integrate fires and maneuver--using infantry, 
armor, artillery, and other capabilities concurrently to defeat an 
adversary's ground forces. U.S.-led training will complement separate, 
specialized training conducted by the European Union and by individual 
Allies.
    Fourth, we have made significant investments in the sustainment of 
complex weapon systems. This will support current operations as well as 
an enduring sustainment framework for meeting NATO standards that will 
persist long after this conflict is over. The U.S.-led framework 
enables robust and coordinated international capacity to more 
effectively support maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations under 
continuous, intense combat operations. Sustainment becomes increasingly 
important as we introduce new and different systems to Ukraine.
    Finally, we continue to deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds 
and other ammunition to ensure Ukraine can sustain its fight against 
Russia's forces, which continue to rely on mass artillery fires to 
compensate for poorly trained forces.
               sustaining u.s. support for the long term
    Russia has discovered that the United States and our Allies and 
partners are serious when we have said that we are committed to 
supporting Ukraine for the long haul.
    Our assistance to Ukraine has been made possible by extraordinary 
support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates the most 
recent Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act that provided 
an increase in Presidential Drawdown Authority, replenishment funding 
for the military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and 
additional funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
(USAI). Using Presidential Drawdowns, we are able to get Ukraine the 
critical capabilities it needs quickly from our own stocks. Through 
USAI, we have been able to contract with industry for new and 
innovative solutions, as well as building for Ukraine's longer-term 
defense.
    With congressional support, we are also ramping up defense 
industrial base production of critical munitions and equipment--
doubling or tripling capacity in many cases. Allies have stepped up 
impressively on bolstering global production as well.
    Accountability for U.S. assistance also remains a top priority. The 
U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any diversion of 
U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead, we see Ukraine's 
frontline units effectively employing security assistance on a large 
scale every day on the battlefield. Nonetheless, we are keenly aware of 
the possible risk of illicit diversion, and we are proactively taking 
all possible steps to prevent this from happening. We have worked to 
adapt our accountability practices for the combat environment in 
Ukraine, through expanded reporting mechanisms and site inspections. 
These measures go above and beyond prior practices and programs.
              leading a global coalition, fortifying nato
    While the United States is committing significant resources to 
Ukraine's defense, we are far from alone. Secretary Austin has 
marshaled a coalition of some 50 nations through the Ukraine Defense 
Contact Group (UDCG), to provide security assistance now and to make 
investments in a sustainable industrial base.
    On January 20, we held the eighth meeting of the UDCG, at Ramstein 
Air Base in Germany. This forum continues to generate significant 
commitments from allies and partners--including in the top capability 
priority areas of air defense, artillery, and armor. The most recent 
meeting highlighted contributions at levels in scale, variety, and 
likely battlefield impact even greater than the successful meetings in 
2022.
    And we have increased our own defense to deter future aggression by 
Russia. Our transatlantic defense alliance is stronger than ever, and 
NATO has bolstered its forward defenses and enhanced its forces. Since 
last February, we have deployed or extended more than 20,000 additional 
U.S. forces to Europe. In Poland, we have established the first 
permanent U.S. forces on NATO's eastern flank. And we look forward to 
welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO's ranks. U.S. forces maintain a 
persistent combat credible presence across Europe in support of NATO, 
including forward on NATO's eastern flank.
                      russia's diminished standing
    Even as Russia's standing and strength are quickly eroding as a 
result of its ill-considered war against Ukraine, Moscow continues in 
its attempts to project influence around the globe. But one only needs 
to look to Russia's neighbors to see how it is failing. As NATO's 
cohesion and unity of purpose are reinforced, Russia's standing is 
fraying among the countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate.
    In Georgia, the United States is deepening our defense partnership 
and undertaking significant new defense capacity building and reform 
programs. Elsewhere, such as in Moldova, Armenia, and the states of 
Central Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable 
security partner. The Defense Department welcomes opportunities to 
deepen our own defense relations with these and other states as part of 
a whole-of-government approach that reinforces these states' 
sovereignty, independence, shared values, and the rule of law.

          * * * * *
    Ultimately, when you take into account the fierce resistance of the 
people of Ukraine, the strengthening of the transatlantic alliance, and 
the massive costs to Russia, this war has already demonstrated that 
aggression is not worth the price paid by the aggressor. That is a 
lesson that should reverberate around the world--including among 
autocratic leaders everywhere. The United States and our allies and 
partners will not tolerate living in a world where borders can be 
changed, or spheres of influence imposed, by force.
    As Secretary Austin has said, ``free people always refuse to 
replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by force 
and fear.'' We are determined to support Ukraine's fight to defend its 
freedom, democracy, and independence against Russia's aggression--and 
by doing so, to defend the American interests and values that are so 
clearly at stake.

    The Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony. We will 
start a round of 5-minute questions. Let me make some prefatory 
remarks before I go to my questions here.
    I am all in and have been since 2014 when I waved my saber 
and said we should be far more responsive to the invasion of 
Crimea because it was the warning sign, and the world, 
including the United States, was relatively mute in its 
response to the invasion and annexation of Crimea.
    Then Putin got the message that you can march on and that 
is part of what is at stake now, that he can march on.
    There are those I know who have an insular view and others 
who have a legitimate question, and as someone who back at home 
in New Jersey when I am asked by my constituents why are we 
spending so much money on Ukraine, I make the point to them 
that, in fact, what is at stake is not only the Ukrainians' 
freedom, which in and of itself is important, but also the 
proposition that you cannot by force take another country's 
territory, because if that can become the rule of the day, 
there are many despots and authoritarians who will seek to do 
that--China in Taiwan, North Korea, possibly, against South 
Korea. The list is endless.
    Having said that, I would commend to you, Madam Secretary, 
to speak to the Secretary and to the Administration that I 
think it is important that we articulate what is our definition 
of victory and what is the blueprint for victory in order to 
continue to have the bipartisan support of Congress for the 
resources that will be necessary to achieve that victory.
    I think that is critically important. I am not saying that 
we do not have one, but it has not been well-articulated if 
there is one, and if there is not a full vision of what that 
blueprint is, we should be thinking about what it is and how we 
execute on it.
    With that, and we also--I am a strong supporter. I have 
voted for everything for the Ukrainians in past legislation 
going back to 2014, but we also have to tell our friends in 
Ukraine you cannot sell white phosphorus to the Azerbaijanis 
that kill Armenians. There are responsibilities as well, not 
just the opportunity to receive resources.
    My first question is about sanctions and it is particularly 
about China. As you well know, President Putin met with Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in February of 2022 where they touted 
their no-limits partnership just weeks before Russia's invasion 
of Ukraine.
    Since that time, I understand there has been evidence that 
Chinese companies, including working through Hong Kong, have 
been exporting dual-use technologies, including semiconductor 
chips, which are critically important to fill in, particularly 
on missile guidance systems that Russia needs to continue its 
onslaught of Ukraine.
    It seems to me that we should not forsake the potential of 
sanctions against China if it is providing critical assistance 
and it should not be able to hide behind some companies.
    Have we raised these concerns at the highest levels of the 
Chinese Government? Is this support from China to Russia not a 
direct violation of U.S. sanctions?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for your strong 
personal support for Ukraine and your perfect articulation of 
what is at stake here, which the President agrees with, as he 
said yesterday.
    With regard to China, yes. From well before this latest 
invasion began in November and December even of 2021 we began 
an intense conversation with China at every level, which the 
President himself has led and all of our senior leaders have 
been involved in with regard to their relationship with Russia 
and about their own interests, in our view, and upholding the 
U.N. Charter and not allowing Putin style rules of the road to 
dominate, and we have made clear that we will bring to their 
attention when we see sanctions violations by their companies 
and we have been very clear with regard to the impact on our 
relationship and their standing in the world were they----
    The Chairman. I just do not think that we have followed up 
those conversations with robust sanctions against companies 
that are providing dual-use technology that is allowing the 
Russians to continue to have access to missile capabilities 
that we should not let them have.
    Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I would----
    The Chairman. It seems to me that--we need to in--addition 
to all the money that we are providing, all the defense 
equipment we are providing, we need to cut the head of the 
snake off in every way we can and that means sanctioning it 
directly and its inner core, which I give the Administration 
credit for.
    It also means sanctioning those vigorously who are 
assisting Russia in this unjust and unholy war, and so I hope 
we will be far more robust in that regard. I do not care that 
it is China. I do not care who it is. At the end of the day, 
they cannot act with impunity and face no consequence.
    Ms. Nuland. We agree with that, Chairman, and we have a new 
set of sanctions out today, which I think you will see some of 
the things that you have been calling for----
    The Chairman. I look forward to that.
    Ms. Nuland. --particularly with regard to----
    The Chairman. I do not know if you are familiar directly 
with what I mentioned in my opening statement about the 
Magnitsky letter and Vladimir Kara-Murza. It has past the time 
statutorily to get an answer.
    I see no reason why, in fact, we cannot, in essence, have 
sanctions against someone who is one of Russia's biggest 
critics--Putin's biggest critic, not Russia's biggest critic, 
Putin's biggest critic--and is jailed as a result of it.
    We should make it clear through Magnitsky sanctions. 
Senator Cardin has been the author of that law. This is an 
example of what it was meant to use. Can you get us an answer, 
please?
    Ms. Nuland. We are not only going to get you an answer, we 
are going to get you Magnitsky sanctions in very short order.
    The Chairman. Bravo. All right. Now, lastly, what are we 
doing as it relates to the need for--some of us went to The 
Hague earlier last year to press the case on sanctions and 
prosecutions against those who are committing war crimes. There 
must be. There must be accountability and accountability 
without prosecutions is not accountability. Are we focused on 
that as well?
    Ms. Nuland. We are, Chairman. We have a G-7 working group 
of lawyers as well as the group of G-7 political directors that 
I am involved in looking at various models of accountability. 
There are three or four under consideration.
    I think we will have more to say about that as we approach 
the anniversary in terms of the actual setting up of judicial 
proceedings.
    In the meantime--and Erin can speak to this in more 
detail--we are involved in supporting all kinds of 
accountability mechanisms on the ground in Ukraine, everything 
from collecting evidence to supporting the cataloguing of 
atrocities, et cetera, and we are working with the Ukrainians 
on some interim measures of registries of attack, et cetera, 
that could be used for future accountability.
    I do not know if Erin has anything she wants to add there.
    Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
    We are working very closely on the ground through our Human 
Rights and Access to Justice Centers that have a network 
throughout Ukraine, over 22 locations, to gather and document 
the evidence for such time to be able to, as you said, 
prosecute and hold accountable those actions inside Ukraine.
    We are not waiting for the determination for that process 
to be set up, but preparing all we can so that when it is in 
place, swift and appropriate due process can be made and the 
evidence is available.
    The Chairman. The earlier that possible prosecutions are 
prosecuted and successfully done will send a chilling effect to 
those who think they can act with impunity.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Nuland, you said there are going to be new 
sanctions out today. Who are those going to be against? Who are 
the targets of those sanctions?
    Ms. Nuland. Ranking Member Risch, there are more than 40 
sanctions coming out. They may actually have been published at 
about 10:30. The vast majority of them are against Prigozhin 
and the Wagner Group in Africa.
    There are also sanctions against Putin's cronies, against 
those who provide material support to Russia's military 
industrial complex, and then there is one in particular that 
addresses the Chairman's question with regard to China.
    Senator Risch. The Chairman and I have both been anxious to 
see what is happening with China because China seems to be 
acting with impunity, and that we really need to ratchet up our 
sanctions in that regard.
    Nobody--they may be big, but they are not too big to fail 
in that regard and we really need to ratchet the sanctions up 
there.
    Also, Secretary Nuland, first of all, I think most of us 
here were glad to see that finally the Administration yesterday 
agreed to provide Abrams tanks and we have been calling for 
this for some time, but we have been repeatedly told over the 
months that sending tanks to Ukraine was not possible or 
desirable, or would somehow be escalatory, and all of a sudden 
it changed yesterday.
    How did that--this is embarrassing. How did that change? 
What happened?
    Ms. Nuland. I am going to let Assistant Secretary Wallander 
talk about the internal discussion inside the Pentagon.
    What I will say to you, Ranking Member, is that Abrams, as 
you know, are very sophisticated tanks and they require 
significant training. So even as we approved them yesterday it 
is going to take some time to get them to the battlefields. 
This is not something that is going to appear in time for the 
spring offensive. What is most needed----
    Senator Risch. Which brings it--which underscores what I 
said. We have been asking for this for 6 months. Had you 
started 6 months ago they would be all ready for the spring 
offensive.
    So what happened here? Who is to blame for this?
    Ms. Nuland. I think at every stage of this we have looked 
at what the Ukrainians have needed, what they have been 
requesting. There was a period in the fall where they were 
capturing a huge number of Russian tanks on the battlefield, 
which they were able to use successfully in the Kherson and 
Kharkiv offensive, but now they need more and so we are 
responding.
    Senator Risch. It did not answer the question, but I guess 
we are not going to get an answer to that question. I got to 
tell you, it is--all through this thing we have been pressing 
the Administration to do things and usually they do the right 
thing, but it takes forever to get there and, as a result of 
that, there is a great loss on the battlefield and lives lost 
in the meantime. I want to underscore that the Administration, 
truly, needs to act more rapidly.
    That brings us, Secretary Wallander, to the Stryker combat 
vehicles. As we all know, there are different versions of the 
Stryker vehicles and one of the things that Ukraine has been 
asking for is the Strykers that are equipped with the cannons 
that are comparable to those found on tanks, but the 
Administration is declining to give them those. They are giving 
them something with only machine guns and no heavy weapons, and 
they are really not much more than an armored taxi cab.
    What is going on there? Can we expect the reversal of that, 
hopefully, in the near future?
    Dr. Wallander. Senator, I do not have information on the 
specific variant of Stryker vehicles' APCs, as you refer to. 
What I will say is that----
    Senator Risch. You do know that they are not going to--they 
have decided they are--at least they are telling us they are 
not going to give them the ones with the cannons that are found 
on the tanks?
    Dr. Wallander. I would need to validate that, Senator, but 
I will speak to the value of the Stryker capability and the 
volume of the Stryker capability.
    Senator Risch. We know the value of the Stryker capability 
and we know how much it is enhanced if it has got a cannon on 
it instead of machine guns.
    I am not really interested in that part of the answer, but 
again, I would urge you, and I suppose the way things go 
eventually they will do it, but they need to do it and they 
really need to do it rapidly.
    My time is almost up. At some point in time we need to have 
a really good discussion on what is going to happen when this 
is over. It will be over at some point in time. Either the 
Russians will quit fighting or the Ukrainians will quit 
fighting. Neither one of them are near that point at this 
point.
    What is going to happen in the future? Look, we are not 
going to go back to doing business with Russia as we have 
before and so as a result of that we need to talk about how we 
are going to interact with Russia.
    The Europeans are already doing that. When they come to see 
me they have already got blueprints as far as where--how they 
are going to change directions, so I would like to hear how we 
are going to change directions.
    With that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our 
three witnesses, not just for their testimony today, but for 
your service to our country.
    I want to follow up on Chairman Menendez's last point first 
and that is accountability. Tomorrow is Holocaust Remembrance 
Day, the 77th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.
    I appreciate and believe we are making substantial progress 
in maintaining the evidence to pursue war crimes or crimes 
against humanity for those that are responsible at the highest 
levels.
    Early action is going to be important. Is there any hope 
that we could move forward with some recognized international 
mechanism that could start the process so that it is known 
internationally that accountability is going to be part of the 
resolution of this conflict?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, as I said, we are working hard 
on this with our G-7 partners and with Ukraine. We want to 
just----
    Senator Cardin. I understand you are working on gathering 
the evidence.
    Ms. Nuland. No. Also on which of the various models for 
pursuing justice.
    Senator Cardin. What is the timing on that?
    Ms. Nuland. I would like to see us come to conclusion 
before the anniversary around February, but it may take another 
few months. Certainly before the summer, I would hope.
    Senator Cardin. That----
    Ms. Nuland. I would also note that when I was out with the 
Secretary in Kyiv in September we went to Irpin to see one of 
the towns that had been decimated by Russian missiles and we 
met with some of the nongovernmental organizations that USAID 
is supporting, who were minutely gathering evidence and 
plotting it. So----
    Senator Cardin. No, I appreciate the fact.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Cardin. I have been actually briefed on some of the 
evidence that has actually been obtained.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Cardin. My concern is will we have a mechanism that 
will allow the international community to observe that 
accountability is actually being pursued, such as like the 
Nuremburg trials after World War II.
    Are we going to have some mechanism like that? If I 
understand your answer, we should know that in the next couple 
of months.
    Ms. Nuland. That is our aspiration, and in another setting 
I can brief you on the various options we are considering.
    Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. I will pursue that.
    You have all mentioned the Wagner Group several times, and 
as I understand there will be some additional sanctions in 
regards to those involved in the Wagner Group.
    You have taken certain steps to designate them as an 
international criminal group. You have not designated them as a 
foreign terrorist organization. Why not and what else can we 
do? Because this is not only a threat to what is going on in 
Ukraine, this is a global threat.
    What else can we do to show that we are doing everything we 
can to protect against the growth of this type of an 
organization?
    Ms. Nuland. We went, Senator, with a transnational criminal 
organization designation because it better suits the way Wagner 
operates, particularly what it is doing in Africa, that they 
are in this for their own material gain and for power and for 
ripping off the wealth of states, particularly in Africa.
    In addition to sanctioning the main entities we are now 
working on--the sanctions today go to some of those supporting 
entities of Wagner, those they do business with.
    We are also looking at gold and other main sources of 
revenue for the Wagner team. As you know, they have access to 
gold mines in Mali and in Central African Republic. They are 
seeking more of that and that directly funds the combat that 
they are engaged in in Ukraine.
    We are working on some of those measures, and we are 
working with African governments and encouraging those who have 
gotten in bed with Wagner to rethink and trying to strengthen 
those who are under threat of Wagner now.
    Senator Cardin. Do you need any further guidance or support 
from--by congressional action?
    Ms. Nuland. Not at this moment, but as we pursue the drying 
up of the financial network of Wagner we may come back to you 
if we may, and then, as you know, in another setting we can 
talk about some of the other activities that we are involved 
with.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    I want to just mention one point in regards to USAID. I 
understand you are now using some of the U.S.-Russia Investment 
Fund dollars have been successfully rededicated to help 
Ukraine. Can you just give us a quick status on the use of 
those funds?
    Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
    Yes, it was, I think, with your help and bipartisan support 
we were able to unlock those funds that have been frozen, 
frankly, for 15 years and we are providing the vast majority of 
those reflows that have been frozen to WNISEF, which is the 
Western Newly Independent States Enterprise Fund, to stimulate 
and support small and medium enterprise growth and activity and 
access to finance and credit in Ukraine and Moldova, which is 
part of their mandate.
    The conclusion of the modifications to the various 
instruments was done right before the holidays and we are 
rolling ahead now with identifying those opportunities.
    I need to note that WNISEF did not stop working inside 
Ukraine at the start of the war or the second invasion, and 
immediately mobilized their team, their network, and their 
clients to relocate and stay in business, which was vital to 
continue to help provide both livelihoods and income as well as 
revenue to the Government of Ukraine.
    Senator Cardin. Just please keep us informed as to how 
those funds are being utilized. We appreciate it.
    Ms. McKee. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. It has been argued that all we need is more 
sanctions and there is an argument that sanctions have value, 
but it is the unwinding and the leverage of removing sanctions 
that actually accomplishes something, not adding more 
sanctions.
    In fact, Ms. Nuland, when you went to Moscow in October of 
2021 you were only allowed to go because there was a 
negotiation in advance of that where we agreed to take 
sanctions off of a Russian individual and Russia agreed in 
tandem to take sanctions off of you.
    I have had this discussion for quite a while. We have 
sanctions on 25 members of the Duma, mostly for political 
reasons because they have politically spoken out against U.S. 
interests, but they are, of course, Russians.
    They also, in turn, sanction us as well. So 25, 30 members 
of Congress are sanctioned as well.
    Do you favor or oppose some sort of arrangement similar to 
your arrangement where sanction removal was traded to enhance 
diplomacy? Do you favor that for legislative sanctions on 
individuals?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Paul, in the context of a Russian 
decision to negotiate seriously and withdraw its forces from 
Ukraine and return territory, I would certainly favor and I 
believe Secretary Blinken would also favor sanctions relief in 
that context.
    Senator Paul. I do not think hardly taking off sanctions on 
a member of the Duma is going to be traded for the end of the 
war. I mean, I wish it were that easy.
    What I am talking about is allowing members of their Duma, 
many of whom may be favorable to our country, to travel to our 
country, and vice versa. I am talking about diplomatic 
legislative exchange. I am not talking about trading it for 
peace.
    I am sure that would be great, but I do not think that is 
really on the table, trading--removing sanctions on Senator 
Risch for peace. I wish that were important enough, but I do 
not know that that is going to happen.
    That is what I am talking about. I am talking about very 
small, incremental removal of sanctions on legislative members 
in exchange for them doing the same.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, all of the members of the Duma on whom 
we have sanctions are people who have supported Russia's war, 
the annexation of Crimea, et cetera.
    Senator Paul. That would be about 90 percent of the people 
of Russia.
    Ms. Nuland. Absolutely.
    Senator Paul. I mean, it probably would be 90 percent of 
the Duma. We only have sanctions on 25 or 30, but I would 
venture to say every member of the Duma probably supports 
Crimea.
    I am not saying it is right. I am just saying this is their 
perspective, and if we are going to sanction people for their 
belief and their sort of nationalist version of the world, then 
we will not have any discussion between people or any 
legislative exchange.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would say that if it is in U.S. 
interest for there to be conversations with Russians, we should 
look hard at what can be done to facilitate those and I----
    Senator Paul. I would argue that it is. There has been a 
great deal of discussion about prosecutions. Let us drag people 
to The Hague. Let us have some prosecutions. Would Putin be one 
of those targets?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, he is certainly guilty of prosecuting 
war crimes. He is certainly the leader of this illegal 
aggression. As I said to Senator Cardin----
    Senator Paul. It sounds like the Administration would favor 
taking him to The Hague?
    Ms. Nuland. As I said to Senator Cardin, we are now looking 
with our allies and partners and the Ukrainians at the 
appropriate judicial mechanism and that would indicate the 
scope of what would be covered.
    Senator Paul. If you are really thinking ultimately that 
there might be a peaceful settlement that does not involve 
unconditional surrender by the Russians, or vice versa by the 
Ukrainians, you might at least put some thought into the fact 
that saying that he is guilty of war crimes and that it is a 
possibility he is going to The Hague, that it may make any kind 
of settlement--peaceful settlement or someone who is fighting a 
war less likely to prosecute a peace or to engage in peace 
talks if he thinks, hmm, if there is peace we are going to The 
Hague--that there is going to be prosecutions.
    I am not saying one way or another on the facts of whether 
there are war crimes. I am just saying that if you say the 
leader of somebody in a war that you would like to ultimately 
resolve is guilty of these things, I think it makes it very 
much less likely.
    I think it is a careless remark and it is a remark that 
does not really think fully through the ramifications of what 
you say. Because when you say that, I think you are basically 
saying this war is going to go on forever and with--if you want 
to picture devastation--you see Ukraine now, in 5 years it will 
be worse.
    I mean, I do not imagine this getting better over the next 
5 years, but if you preclude peace I think you inevitably will 
make it worse.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, if I may.
    I have spent my life at the State Department. We never 
preclude peace. That is what we are about. I would cite the 
precedent of Kosovo, of Bosnia, of Rwanda, where we have 
successfully supported wars winding down through diplomatic 
means while also pursuing justice.
    Senator Paul. We kind of--just about unconditionally, one, 
too--and we captured those people or somebody captured them and 
gave them to us--I mean, that is what you would have to 
imagine, and I do think that you need to think through this 
because I do not think you or the Administration have or 
anybody that is calling for prosecution of Putin for war crimes 
and saying this is genocide and all of these things and saying 
it is the Holocaust because once you say that I think you make 
peace less likely.
    Nothing of what I am saying is to say anything Putin has 
done is justified. I am just saying that if you are going to 
say these things you are very less likely to have any kind of 
peaceful settlement.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want 
to thank our three witnesses today, really, for the work that 
you are doing. Your commitment and your leadership at a time of 
global crisis is extraordinary, and I am just humbled and 
grateful for your professionalism and your focus and, 
obviously, for you being here today.
    I want to mention how grateful I was in a bipartisan way 
that in the NDAA we were able to get some more reporting 
language requirements on the activities of the Wagner Group, 
and I am very concerned--and it has already been addressed in 
some other questioning--about the Wagner's activities in Africa 
and cannot lose sight of how this is all interrelated.
    We are in a moment in human history where this idea that 
might makes right, where you can invade your neighbor--this is 
not just a Ukrainian issue. This is very much, as I think my 
senior senator and chairman said, an issue that all Americans 
should be concerned with, and if we do not face this Russian 
aggression here, we will see the crisis expand in ways that 
threaten the world order and stability that we have fought and 
invested in generations to establish not just in Europe, but 
globally.
    I would like to drill down, if I can, about my ongoing 
concerns about food insecurity and how this is affecting global 
issues.
    Ukraine is obviously approaching its planting season. It is 
likely that their agricultural capacity will be further reduced 
by the effects of this invasion and this could, in turn, have 
just impacts on what we are seeing now, which is not just 
disruptions in the global food chain, but a level of food 
insecurity globally that is some of the highest it has ever 
been.
    I am wondering what the Administration is doing to plan 
ahead on this and what further resources might be needed from 
Congress to address the growing crisis of food insecurity 
globally.
    Ms. Nuland. Why do I not start and then Assistant 
Administrator McKee can jump in?
    Senator, thank you for all of your support as well and your 
frequent travel.
    As I said in my opening, through the Black Sea Grain 
Initiative brokered by the U.N., which we supported and helped 
midwife, we have liberated about 17 million tons of Ukraine's 
grain, but, as you said, their exports are still down about 30 
percent and there are risks for planting.
    From that perspective, the money that the Congress has 
provided both last year and in FY23, we are working at every 
level with the World Food Programme, as you know, to speed both 
food and fertilizer to countries that would normally be 
consumers of Ukraine and, frankly, Russia's output to ensure 
that they can plant this year.
    Secretary Blinken is particularly focused on ensuring that 
we are working on this problem not just for today, but for 
tomorrow, and particularly in Africa, but in other parts of the 
world we have, over years of climate change, civil war, other 
issues, drought, seen soil degraded, seen crops become 
vulnerable, et cetera.
    As we look at the appropriation that you have just given 
us, we are focused in particular on soil health, on new kinds 
of seeds and varietals, particularly on the continent of Africa 
that can withstand climate change, on small farmer support, but 
also more systemic answers to these questions, and we look 
forward to working with you.
    Erin, I do not know if you have anything to add to that.
    Ms. McKee. I do, thank you, and I would like to build on 
what Under Secretary Nuland mentioned with respect to what we 
are doing inside Ukraine, who is a key supplier of agricultural 
commodities and resources, but not the only one, both getting 
the grain out, but ensuring that the next planting season takes 
place.
    Both through the Black Sea Grain Initiative as well as the 
solidarity lanes to ensure that all of the above--our ability 
to trust and rely on Putin to adhere to the agreement--is 
something that--a factor that we must take into account.
    As of at least yesterday there were 121 ships waiting to 
leave the port in Odessa and there are about four to five ships 
a day that--through inspections--that are sort of being slow 
rolled. It is not the--it provided relief, but it is not the 
only solution.
    The greatest solution to helping Ukraine both continue its 
agricultural contributions to global food security is, 
obviously, to end the conflict.
    I want to thank you, though, for your highlighting this 
important topic because, as you know, in 2022, just last year, 
over 205 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian 
food assistance, which was an 8 percent increase over 2021 and 
an 89 percent increase compared to 2016.
    The global food security crisis that we are seeing today 
created by climate change, the impacts of supply chain issues, 
and everything--and compounded and exacerbated by Putin's 
unjust war are resulting in a crisis that we have not seen in--
at least in my lifetime.
    Senator Booker. I just want to add as I conclude, Russia is 
in this doing a lot on disinformation to try to hide its 
responsibility for this crisis and deflect responsibility and I 
think it is just really important, especially as I just met 
with many African leaders, that we make it clear that this is a 
crisis being caused by Putin's war of choice, war of 
aggression.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Nuland. Just to say, Senator, I feel that that message 
is getting through. As you saw at the African Leaders Summit, 
what they want is solutions and that is why the support you 
have given us to work creatively with them is most important.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Under Secretary Nuland, I am curious about how much 
information we have really been able to share with the public 
with regard to the reasoning behind our funding for the 
Ukrainians in this war with Russia.
    Many of us have the opportunity to get the classified 
discussions where we can be pretty frank about what is going 
on. I think there is a lot of folks out there that have not had 
the opportunity that we have had and they will challenge 
whether or not we have been appropriate or reasonable in our 
support--continued support for Ukraine in this particular 
instance.
    Would it be fair to say in this unclassified discussion 
that the Administration's policy is or the position is that 
Ukraine can win this war against Russian aggression?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think a year ago none of us would 
have believed that we would be sitting here and Ukraine would 
still be standing as she is. That said, a third of her 
territory, as you know, is now held by Russia illegally.
    If we did not think that this investment could push back 
Putin and turn back this tactic that is lawless and creates a 
world that none of us wants our children to live in, that you 
can just take a piece of your neighbor's property by force and 
that is okay, we would not be asking you, we would not be 
asking the American people, for this support.
    We have seen the gains that the Ukrainians were able to 
make through September. We are now--they want to push again 
very hard as the spring comes and that is why you see these new 
forms of equipment that will help them, we believe, to push 
Russia back further this spring.
    Senator Rounds. In terms of the Administration's position, 
our goal is one of, on the ground, seeing Ukraine regain lost 
land that Russia has taken in previous offensive moves. Is that 
a fair statement?
    Ms. Nuland. That is a fair statement.
    Senator Rounds. Longer term, would it be the position that 
we continue to fund Ukraine as long as Russia has those ill-
gotten gains in their possession?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think we are going to have to ensure 
that Ukraine has the defenses not only to continue to try to 
push Russia back, but to ensure that Putin cannot reconstitute 
and come back.
    One scenario one could see and one that some think that the 
Russians favor is a pause in this war now on these lines 
because that would give Putin time to rest and refit and 
rebuild his own military, and as we saw between 2014 and 2022 
he will just be back and he will push further and he will come 
not just for Ukraine, but for other countries around him. That 
is why it has to end here.
    Senator Rounds. It may be semantics, but what we are really 
talking about is whether or not Ukraine can win this episode, 
this war, and part of what you are telling me is within the 
Administration it is a matter of taking back land from Russia 
and putting them in a position to where they will not be able 
to come back and attack again, and that suggests to me that we 
really do believe that Ukraine can win this war.
    Is that a fair statement or--I am trying to get you to 
either say, yes, we believe Ukraine can win the war, or we are 
not really making that statement. Do we believe that Ukraine 
can win the war?
    Ms. Nuland. We believe that Ukraine can regain the 
sovereignty to survive and thrive and it can push Russia back 
further, yes.
    Senator Rounds. Does that mean they win the war?
    Ms. Nuland. Ukraine will define what winning is, right, but 
yes, I believe so.
    Senator Rounds. The Administration has a belief that if we 
continue to fund their needs, and those needs have yet to be 
defined, it is based upon what the current requests are. Do we 
know what the next requests are that would give them the 
ability to retake this land?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, you and the American people have been 
very generous for FY23. We are assuming that what you have 
given us for 2023 will--is what we will have through September.
    As we saw, a year is an eternity in Ukraine. We do not know 
where we will be this summer.
    Senator Rounds. What I am getting at is--and I do not mean 
to be argumentative, but it is one thing to say that we are 
going to put resources in. It is another thing to say that 
Ukraine has made requests that we have either responded to and 
said no to, or Ukraine is making requests that we are not going 
to respond to.
    We just did the Abrams tanks after a lot of foot dragging. 
Are there other items out there that are in the near future 
that we intend to expand on that we have simply not talked 
about yet?
    Ms. Nuland. In this setting I would simply say that we are 
working in particular now on speeding more air defenses, 
speeding more artillery, speeding more ammunition, to the 
Ukrainians.
    You have given us the ability and the financing that we 
already have to do more between now and September, and we are 
working with the Ukrainians as they proceed with their battle 
plans to ensure that what we are giving meets the needs on the 
ground.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for 
going over. I just simply think it is really important that the 
American people understand that this has not been a one step at 
a time without knowing the direction that we are trying to go 
and that there really is a plan in place. If not, there should 
be a plan in place with strategies in place to be ahead of the 
game rather than simply waiting for the next request in line.
    Ms. Nuland. No, absolutely, and just understanding better 
what you were getting at, as you saw from August to the Kherson 
offensive in October we worked intensively with the Ukrainians 
on the kinds of equipment and other kinds of support and 
training that they needed to mount that offensive.
    They did that and now they have plans for a spring 
offensive and that is what we are focused on both in terms of 
training and equipment.
    I do not know if Assistant Secretary Wallander wants to 
add.
    Senator Rounds. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I know members understand that we recognize we cross back 
and forth and we recognize members who were present at the time 
of the beginning of the hearing. I know some members have 
waited, have come back. I just want to remind everybody of the 
rules.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
thank all of you for your testimony and for your service.
    Under Secretary Nuland, thank you and the team for all you 
have been doing to support the people of Ukraine both on the 
military front, the political front, and the economic front.
    My question relates to sanctions because I think we put in 
place early on important sanctions on the Russian economy. 
Those include both financial sanctions, but also export 
controls and I think, especially on the export control side as 
time goes on, we have seen that they have had teeth.
    The Russians are trying to cast about the world trying to 
get parts for infrastructure and military. We also, of course, 
as you mentioned in your testimony put in place an oil price 
cap, and I do want to focus on that for a moment because 
despite our sanctions the reality is because of Russian oil 
exports they continue to reap an awful lot of revenue to 
support their war machine.
    I think the price cap on oil was an important innovation, 
but I guess my question is what impact have we seen? Because as 
I see it, I see some reduction in the price people are paying 
for Russian oil, but I want to know if Russians are making up 
for it on volume.
    India, as you know, has been importing an awful lot of 
Russian oil. I just saw the other day Pakistan decided to enter 
into a long-term oil purchase agreement with Russia. Other 
countries around the world are looking for cheaper oil.
    Are they making--in terms of Russian revenue from oil what 
is your projection as to both the impact of our sanctions and 
where--what we can expect it to be over the next--the remainder 
of the year?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
    I think one of the success stories of this campaign with 
our allies is that Europe, which was heavily dependent on 
Russian oil, has now gone to zero and that the U.S. has 
successfully been able to support them in that as well as 
increasing our own LNG exports to Europe some 68 percent.
    The oil price cap, which was a new tool of financial 
diplomacy which some folks were skeptical of has been extremely 
successful.
    As you probably know, the price of Russian crude was over 
$100 a barrel before the price cap and it is now trading at 
around $40 per barrel as of January 9.
    Even if Russia is pumping more to India and other 
countries, the profit margin that they are making on it is 
less. I, frankly, do not have in front of me the total numbers, 
but if we had not instituted the price cap along with our 
allies and partners the revenues would have been off the 
charts.
    Countries like India that need the oil, but do not want to 
fund the fuel machine--the war machine have a better option.
    Senator Van Hollen. Sure. I am going to go from this 
hearing to a meeting with the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, 
who has been very involved, as you know, in this and try to get 
a full readout, but there is no doubt there is progress on the 
price of Russian oil and I applaud the Administration. That was 
an innovative approach.
    In terms of overall revenue coming into the Russian 
coffers, I think we need to be very watchful of that because if 
the overall objective is to reduce the money coming in for the 
war machine, of less profit the Russians make, good, but so 
long as they are making some profit and make up for lost profit 
in volume on revenues we have not achieved our overall 
objective, at least in my view.
    I know there have been some questions about the Wagner 
Group, including in the Central African Republic. Reporting 
suggests Wagner is also very much in the mining business these 
days in Africa and some of those proceeds can also help fund 
the war against Ukraine.
    Could you talk specifically about the situation in Burkina 
Faso? Because I think we are familiar on this committee with 
what happened in Mali. A lot of us are very concerned about the 
Wagner Group's penetration into Burkina Faso.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, before you joined I made reference to 
a new tranche of sanctions being announced today--they may 
already have been announced--which include a large number of 
Prigozhin and Wagner targets and particularly Wagner targets in 
Africa, those who help facilitate his network there.
    We are very focused on Burkina Faso. I think, as I 
mentioned to you when I saw you in another setting, I was there 
in October with an interagency delegation along with Assistant 
Secretary Wallander, and at that time and continuing in a phone 
call that I had with the acting president or with President 
Traore around Christmas, he continued to say that he would not 
invite Wagner, that he was accepting Russian equipment, but 
that Burkinabe would fight for Burkina.
    We have strongly encouraged them not to go in that 
direction and cited the example of the Central African Republic 
in Mali where they no longer control their own sovereignty, 
their own territory, their own mines, that that is the property 
of Wagner and directly funds the war in Ukraine.
    We are continuing to work on that issue within the 
constraints that we have in a country that has had a coup, 
Section 7008. We are encouraging those allies who can provide 
equipment to do so and continuing our own security support as 
we are allowed.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I would like to state that I certainly want to see 
Ukraine win this conflict. The people of Tennessee, the people 
of America, want to see that result, too, and I would like to 
associate myself with the comments of our Chairman about having 
a blueprint in place to understand the path to get there.
    I think that is responsible, and to the extent you are able 
to share that with us in this sort of setting or another I 
would look forward to participating in that goal.
    My real concern and what I would like to talk with you 
first about is the magnitude of U.S. funding of this and the 
accountability associated with it.
    Right now, the United States is bearing the lion's share of 
the funding for the assistance--the military assistance to 
Ukraine and we are doing that despite real concerns about 
accountability, about corruption.
    President Zelensky recently, very recently, dismissed 
senior officials over corruption concerns and many Americans, 
certainly, many Tennesseans that talk to me are very concerned 
about a type of open-ended commitment to Ukraine.
    Again, this gets back to what the Chairman was raising. 
Having a clear picture of where we are headed, I think, would 
be most useful.
    The other concern I hear about, though, greatly is where 
the United States is relative to other European nations. Now, 
the countries that are most proximate to the border countries 
have really stepped up and punched above their weight when you 
look at the share of their defense spending versus their GDP.
    You have other major economies in Europe that are not 
pulling their weight, and when you look at it relative to the 
United States you have got countries like Germany where the 
United States is paying double our GDP versus what the Germans 
are doing. We are doing five times what France is spending as a 
percentage of GDP in terms of supporting this war.
    My first question is what are you--what are we doing as a 
nation--what are you doing specifically to try to encourage 
these large European allies who are far more proximate to the 
problem to step up and do more?
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Hagerty.
    We should compare our statistics because, actually, we have 
throughout this war worked very hard with our coalition of some 
50 partners both on the security side and on the economic side 
to ensure burden sharing, and our numbers indicate that our 
allies and partners around the world are carrying at least half 
of the burden, if not more, in some categories, including some 
of the things that are hard to calculate like the millions--10 
million or more--Ukrainian refugees in some of their cities, 
and the recent announcement by the Germans of Leopard tanks 
will make a significant increase to their particular 
contribution, but what I am----
    Senator Hagerty. I know it was very painful getting the 
Germans to that point, but I appreciate the effort that went 
into getting that to happen.
    Ms. Nuland. With regard to the longer term as we spoke 
about what is ahead for the Ukrainians, which is this strong 
push in the spring, and I think we will see the results of that 
and that will give us a sense, but what they have made clear is 
they cannot pause now. That will only favor Russia, and we want 
to put them in the best possible position so that whether this 
war ends on the battlefield, whether it ends with diplomacy or 
some combination that they are sitting on a map that is far 
more advantageous for their long-term future----
    Senator Hagerty. Understood.
    Ms. Nuland. --and that Putin feels the strategic failure.
    Senator Hagerty. I would just encourage continued efforts 
working with our European allies to get them to step up and 
find their way to the point that you just described where 
German got to the tank support. Please do more of that.
    Can I go to presidential drawdown authority right now and 
what has happened there? I have watched this Administration 
transfer billions of dollars worth of military equipment to 
Ukraine under the PDA, but I watch what is happening in Taiwan 
and this is a source of frustration, I think, you and I may 
have discussed before. Right now my understanding is that we 
have a $19 billion backlog--a years-long backlog of military 
equipment that is destined for Taiwan, but is not yet there.
    I have spent a tremendous amount of time on our foreign 
military sales program here in America with our allies. The 
system does not work as well as it should, and I would very 
much appreciate the opportunity to hear from you if you have an 
immediate perspective and then later, perhaps, a briefing on 
where we are going with that.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would like to come back to you on 
the specifics of Taiwan backlog and, perhaps, not in this 
setting, but we agree with you that even as we support Ukraine 
and push back Russia, we have to strengthen Taiwan's defenses 
and we are engaged in that intensively with the Pentagon.
    Senator Hagerty. Secretary Wallander, any further comments 
on that?
    Dr. Wallander. No, simply to agree that the Pentagon is 
focused on the acute fight and importance of supporting 
Ukraine, but at the same time is learning lessons for support 
of Taiwan and shares concern about supply chain issues and 
fulfilling of contracts and has a focused working group led by 
the acquisition and sustainment portion of OSD to focus exactly 
on that.
    Senator Hagerty. I will have my team reach out and arrange 
an update in the appropriate setting to follow up on this.
    Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 
being here. I will start with Secretary Wallander.
    The Biden administration has so far been very successful in 
keeping allies unified in response to Russian aggression. I 
think the last few days, maybe the last week, has been 
anomalous.
    Can you tell me why--and why we should be reassured that 
this was a blip on the screen and that we are going to move 
forward in a more unified fashion, especially as I assume 
wrangling has to happen all the time.
    The fact that it happened in public was not insurmountable, 
just a little bit of a stubbing of our toe, and we got through 
it, but I want to make sure that this is not the new normal and 
that we are going to go back to what I thought was pretty 
extraordinary coordination and unity.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Senator.
    The history of NATO, as Under Secretary Nuland can attest, 
is one of bringing the alliance together because there is 
always a common purpose, but there are different ideas about 
how to get to that common purpose, and we are really grateful 
and admiring of the work of European allies over the last year 
in bringing different capabilities, different niches of 
military capabilities, financing support, to Ukraine. It is a 
work in progress always.
    The specifics of the issue of how to move forward on armor, 
there was a lot of success built up over the previous weeks on 
APCs, on infantry fighting vehicles, on all kinds of armored 
vehicles.
    There was intensive discussions about the right mix to get 
to Ukraine for the fight right away as well as the long term, 
and the urgency of the fight right now, combined with at the 
same time thinking about what we needed to provide Ukraine for 
a longer-term capability, did kind of emerge in public, but 
underneath we have been working with allies and partners all 
along and we knew that we would get to a resolution and a 
solution that provides Ukraine with the capability that it 
needs.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Secretary Nuland, I want to talk to you about applying 
Russia lessons to China, especially as it relates to the 
economic sanctions regime.
    Couple of thoughts. First, if you could just elucidate 
briefly the differences, right. I think we had extraordinary 
success, and quickly, in unifying not just allies, but almost 
the entire planet around a sanctions regime and economic 
isolation.
    That is a heck of a lot harder to do if we are talking 
about China and an invasion of Taiwan. That is number one, so 
please talk about the differences.
    Number two is can you reassure me that there is an 
interagency process now on developing a sanctions regime? I get 
the balance that you have to strike between signaling to China 
that there will be consequences, but also, tactically speaking, 
not telling them exactly what they might be facing so that they 
can spend 5 years figuring out a plan to evade those sanctions.
    Can you talk to me about where we are in that process?
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator.
    In this setting I am going to say the following, and I look 
forward to following up in another setting if you would like. 
Just as China is intensely learning the lessons of Putin's 
failure and the way the world responded so are we thinking 
about applying the lessons to any future contingencies in 
Taiwan and, frankly, we are speaking very clearly to the 
Chinese about it.
    We are also speaking to the whole world about it. Were 
there to be a conflict, as you know, in the Taiwan Straits, 50 
percent of global commerce would be disrupted.
    If we have had food insecurity as a result of the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine, we would have massive economic global 
dislocation and China would be directly responsible. That is a 
talking point that we are using not just with China, but with 
other allies.
    We are also talking about the need to have with every 
partner, whether or it is an ally or whether it is a hedging 
state or whether it is a state with deep relations with China, 
about the concern about having over-reliance, whether it is in 
their supply chains, whether it is in their strategic 
relationships, whether in debt on China and creating 
resiliency.
    Senator Schatz. So derisking?
    Ms. Nuland. Right.
    Senator Schatz. I do want to--and you do not--maybe this is 
not appropriate for an open session--but we are having a 
discussion about how to configure a sanctions bill or send the 
right signals and I would like for us to get it right and not 
polarize this issue about are you tough on China or not and 
make sure that we do not telegraph things that we do not want 
to telegraph.
    I think that they should be clear that there will be severe 
consequences. I am not sure that they should know exactly what 
they are because they may be capable of evading those 
consequences if we tell them 5 years in advance.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Nuland. I think we would welcome the chance in another 
setting for those conversations.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
each of you for being here and for the work that you are doing 
every day.
    Ambassador Nuland, I would like to begin with Belarus. Last 
year, along with three other colleagues, we sent a bipartisan 
letter to Secretary Blinken about plans to nominate a special 
envoy to Belarus to succeed Julie Fisher. I did finally get a 
letter last night in response to that.
    Actually, Mr. Chairman, can I ask that we enter this letter 
into the record?
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    There was nothing in the letter that I was surprised or 
that I thought we would not have known 6 months ago. I guess my 
question is while I know that the Belarus affairs unit 
continues to be very important in supporting pro-democracy 
movement in Belarus, can you tell me are there plans to appoint 
a special envoy and who currently leads the Administration's 
policy on Belarus?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    I am going to apologize on behalf of our Department for 
taking 6 months to answer a letter from you. That is 
unacceptable, frankly.
    We are looking for an appropriate candidate--a career 
candidate for this job. It is a complex job, as you know, 
because you have to work in Vilnius at this moment, given the 
status.
    We have a very excellent charge who is doing most of the on 
the ground contact work, but our Assistant Secretary for Europe 
and Eurasia, Karen Donfried, has been meeting with fellow 
Russians as has her deputy, Robin Dunnigan, at regular 
intervals to test whether there might be any openings there.
    I would not say that we have had manifest success, but also 
working intensively with the Belarusian opposition and Madam 
Tikhanovskaya, and the Secretary is seeing her regularly.
    We are continuing to work on this and I hope we will have 
somebody to talk to you about in the not too distant future.
    Senator Shaheen. Great. I would I point out that the 
congressional delegation in Halifax met with Ms. Tikhanovskaya 
and she was also very concerned about the lack of a special 
envoy to address Belarus.
    This next question is probably both for you and for 
Secretary Wallander and it is really about Turkey's continued 
failure to ratify Sweden and Finland's accession agreement into 
NATO and their interest in getting F-16s and how we are 
addressing that issue with them.
    I would tell you that I, for one, am opposed to 
supporting--providing F-16s to Turkey until they have ratified 
that agreement and I think a number of my colleagues share that 
concern. I know there are other issues around those F-16s, but 
I just want to put that on the table as one of the concerns 
that I have.
    I think Sweden has moved very deliberately to address the 
concerns that were discussed with Turkey in terms of their 
accession into NATO and that their--President Erdogan, 
unfortunately, is using this, it appears, for his domestic 
political interests as opposed to really addressing what is in 
the interest of NATO and the security agreement that we need as 
we support Ukraine in their fight against Russia.
    I do not know which of you would like to address that.
    Ms. Nuland. Why do I not start?
    We agree with you, Senator Shaheen, that Finland and Sweden 
are ready to join NATO now and we were grateful for the speedy 
ratification here and, as you know, almost all allies have now 
ratified with the exception of Hungary and Turkey.
    This comes up in every single conversation we have with 
Turkey and we have tried to--the Swedes, as you know, have put 
forward a roadmap that they worked through with Turkey. They 
have met many of those benchmarks and they are continuing to 
try to do more there.
    We have made the same point to our Turkish allies that you 
just made, that we need this Congress' support, moving forward, 
for the security enhancements that we think that they need as 
allies--F-16s, some of them are old--but that this Congress is 
likely to look far more favorably on that after ratification.
    Keep making your points and we will, too.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Would you like to add to that?
    Dr. Wallander. I would just add that the Defense Department 
makes precisely the same points to our Turkish allies at every 
opportunity and reinforces that in the process--in the 
democratic processes that support American foreign policy the 
Congress plays an important role and they need to take that 
seriously.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have lots of questions about 
Russian influence in the Balkans, but I will save that for 
another time.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to 
all of you.
    I wanted to start by having you all and, particularly, 
Secretary Nuland to address both with India, with South Africa, 
with the ASEAN nations, the difficulty in getting them to take 
a strong stand against Russia.
    I think it particularly bothers me with democracy in South 
Africa as democracies, and we have strong partnerships with 
countries like the Philippines that--and a new government there 
and, yet, we are not really seeing them as robustly supportive 
of defending a republic against a dictatorial aggression.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, let me start with the Philippines and 
the new government where actually they have been quite strong 
supporters of Ukraine including voting with us in the United 
Nations against the annexation of Ukrainian territories, 
including some other work we are doing together on security 
support, et cetera.
    With regard to South Africa and India, as you know, these 
countries have long-standing historic intertwinings with 
Russia. We have been making the case regularly with them that 
these dependencies that they have created make them more 
vulnerable and we will continue to do that.
    In the case of the oil price cap, as you know, which India 
was quite skeptical of, they are now major beneficiaries 
because the oil that they are buying from Russia is so much 
cheaper, and we are now working with them on ways to diversify 
away from Russian weapons. I will be in India next week talking 
about that, among other things.
    The South African situation is complex and is also tied to 
some of the politics inside South Africa, but I would look 
forward to talking with you offline about some of those things.
    Senator Merkley. Great. I am glad to hear that you are 
going to India and I would think that after the performance of 
Russian weapons on the battlefield has been demonstrated they 
might be somewhat less interested in. Also, that is a big issue 
with the ASEAN countries, many of which depend on Russian 
weapons.
    Are you proceeding on to Jakarta or to the ASEAN after 
India?
    Ms. Nuland. This trip is South Asia. It is India, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, and then on to Qatar to work on some of the Afghan 
SIV issues.
    We have--Deputy Secretary Sherman and Secretary--Counselor 
Chollet have all made these same points in ASEAN and on my last 
trip to India that was one of the first things we said--look at 
how these weapons perform on the battlefield.
    I think they find themselves after 60 years of entanglement 
having to find alternatives and that is part of the job we have 
to do is help them with alternatives.
    Senator Merkley. Yes. I want to turn to the stories that 
have been raised about corruption concerns. Zelensky has fired 
several people. There are stories about the military paying a 
lot more than market price, which always implies corruption, in 
buying food.
    It is important for us to really work diligently to support 
Zelensky's government in taking on corruption because it will 
be a kind of a cancer eating away at that support that they 
need from everyone in the world, and I would just get your 
insights and commentary on that.
    Ms. Nuland. Assistant Secretary McKee may have more to add, 
but as I said in my opening, what Ukrainian patriots are 
fighting for and what we in the international community are 
supporting is a more democratic, cleaner, more European 
Ukraine.
    I think Zelensky is very conscious of that and we have been 
very clear that we need to see, even as they prosecute this 
war, the anti-corruption steps, including good corporate 
governance and judicial measures, move forward.
    We agree with you that the fact that a number of folks have 
been dismissed or forced to resign as their cases are being 
pursued that sends a very strong signal to others who would try 
to rip off this war effort and is important for the future of 
Ukraine.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    Last question. My colleague was mentioning concern that the 
Europeans are not putting as much into support of Ukraine as we 
are and--but I wonder what that analysis looks like if one 
considers the much higher prices that they are paying for 
energy or to host refugees and if you have any sense of how all 
that balances out in terms of our thinking about the sacrifices 
that the European partners are making.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you for raising that, Senator Merkley.
    I did mention the refugee burden--some 10 million refugees 
hosted all over Europe--which impacts towns and communities all 
over the continent and you see that everywhere.
    Your point about the fact that most of my European friends 
report a 300 percent increase in their energy bills over the 
winter, and if you just think about the sticker shock that that 
would create if it were happening here, you are absolutely 
right.
    That speaks to the fact that they have now woken up to the 
fact that the dependence that they had on Russian oil was bad 
for their national interest, and so there will be--as hard as 
this has been there will be good structural changes that come 
out the other end.
    Senator Merkley. If there is any analysis that weighs those 
different financial factors together to paint a more complete 
picture I would just be interested in seeing it.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to each of 
the witnesses.
    Ms. Nuland, as you know, in January of last year, the 
Senate voted on my legislation to impose sanctions on the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline and it did so before Russia had invaded 
Ukraine.
    When the Senate voted on those sanctions, President 
Zelensky publicly urged, even begged, the United States Senate 
to pass those sanctions and President Zelensky said passing 
those sanctions then were the last chance to prevent Russia 
from invading Ukraine, the last chance to prevent Russian tanks 
rolling into Ukraine.
    Was President Zelensky wrong?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Cruz, like you, I am and, I think, the 
Administration is very gratified to know that Nord Stream 2 is 
now, as you like to say, a hunk of metal at the bottom of the 
sea.
    I, personally having been involved along with my boss, 
Secretary Blinken, in all of those negotiations with Russia to 
try to prevent this war in December, do not believe that had 
that Nord Stream 2 been cut off in January, that would have 
been decisive for Putin.
    It was important that the day the war began the Germans cut 
the pipeline, as did the rest of the Europeans, but he was 
bound and determined to go into Ukraine, as you know.
    Senator Cruz. You believe Zelensky was wrong when he said 
stopping Nord Stream 2 was the last and best way to stop this 
war?
    Ms. Nuland. I do not think it would have stopped Putin and 
I----
    Senator Cruz. When the Government of Poland similarly 
said--begged the United States Senate to pass those sanctions 
and said this is the last and best opportunity to stop Russia 
from invading Ukraine, you believe Poland was wrong, too?
    Ms. Nuland. I do not believe we would have prevented this 
war had the Europeans acted faster on Nord Stream 2. I wish it 
were the case, but I do not think it would have stopped him.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. Let us talk about how the war is going, 
and I know that you and I both agree that it is important for 
Russia to suffer a crushing defeat.
    Putin is a KGB thug and he is committed to undermining our 
interests, and our enemies across the globe, including in 
particular China, are watching carefully what happens in 
Ukraine.
    The Iranian regime is watching as well and Iran is 
committed to doing everything they can to ensure Putin's 
victory. They are supplying Putin with resources, especially 
drones, which are devastating Ukrainian civilians and military 
assets.
    Meanwhile, the Biden administration, which waived the 
sanctions on Nord Stream 2, the last and best hope of 
preventing the war, right now today continues to be obsessed 
with a new nuclear deal with Iran.
    Iranian officials say talks remain ongoing while 
Administration officials say they remain committed to 
diplomacy, but not right now.
    I am deeply concerned that this Administration even in the 
middle of a war is subordinating the need to counter the 
Russian-Iranian alliance to its own partisan political 
preferences.
    For example, this Administration has dropped the general 
U.N. arms embargo against Iran. This Administration has made 
Russia our intermediary in nuclear talks with Iran.
    This Administration has issued sanctions waivers, allowing 
the Ayatollah to become Putin's nuclear client. This 
Administration has withheld weapons for Ukraine to target 
Iranian operatives in Crimea, helping Russia launch drones, and 
this Administration has avoided using relevant sanctions 
authority against Iranian banks, facilitating the transfer of 
drones to Iran.
    As a result, Iran has been able to dramatically boost 
Putin's war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, America and the American 
taxpayer are shouldering the burden of assisting Ukraine while 
the Biden administration is greasing both sides of this war.
    Let us talk about Iran's supply of drones to Russia. The 
Biden administration made an immediate decision to go to the 
United Nations and drop the general U.N. arms embargo on Iran 
because they say it was required by the original JCPOA nuclear 
deal.
    Biden officials say part of the embargo dealing with drones 
is still in place, but even that measure will expire this fall 
pursuant to the JCPPA.
    I believe the Biden administration should immediately go to 
the U.N., invoke our snapback authority, and keep the embargo 
in place.
    Do you agree or do you believe we should allow the U.N. 
arms embargo on Iran to expire and allow Iranian drones to 
continue to go to Russia and be used against the people of 
Ukraine?
    The Chairman. The time of the senator has expired, but 
please answer his question.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz, you are absolutely right that Iranian drones 
are fueling this war and that is why we have taken many, many 
increased sanctions measures against Iran over the last couple 
of months, including against the IRGC Guard Corps Aerospace 
Force, the Quds Force aviation industry, the Shahed aviation 
industry, Russian Aerospace Forces, the----
    Senator Cruz. Have you stopped the drones?
    Ms. Nuland. We have not stopped the drones and this is part 
of the problem, but we know what Iran looks like and we also 
know who Russia's friends are--Iran, North Korea, and Hamas.
    As you know, we are not currently in active discussions 
with Iran. It is not prepared to take these negotiations 
seriously right now and we have many of the same concerns that 
you have, but I look forward to speaking with you in a separate 
setting about our larger strategy vis-a-vis Iran. I think this 
is probably not the appropriate setting for that.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you, 
all three of you, for your service and for your work to 
continue to help lead the efforts of our Administration in 
combating Russia's aggression in Ukraine.
    I thought the recent decision taken jointly by the United 
States, Germany, and a number of other NATO allies and European 
partners--soon to be NATO allies--to send main battle tanks as 
well as to send Bradleys and Strykers from our Department of 
Defense was the right one.
    I am assuming, if I might, that this was not factored in to 
your supplemental request last year, and on behalf of the DoD, 
and if anyone else wants to speak, fine, but what impact does 
it have on available resources for this new commitment to have 
made and are there any additional resources or assistance 
required to meet the additional requirements both security and 
nonsecurity of deploying Abrams?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Senator.
    DoD has a very focused process in preparing PDA packages 
and USAI packages in light of what the Ukrainians prioritize, 
what our assessment is that they require as well, what the 
readiness impacts are, and what the costs are and 
deliverability of the capabilities are.
    While you are correct that the specific capabilities of the 
last couple of weeks were not previewed necessarily in the 
original supplemental, the scope of the supplemental for which 
we are grateful is--does accommodate this planning and ongoing 
planning.
    That does not preclude that we may need to come back to 
request additional funding, but for now, we are in a very good 
place for that deliberate planning and constant provision of 
capability to Ukraine.
    Senator Coons. I think it is a positive step forward that 
complements the Bradleys and Strykers that were already 
announced.
    I do think it is important for us to ensure that the 
assistance made possible by the $45 billion supplemental 
appropriations at the end of last year is used as intended, 
that any misuse is identified and addressed.
    I have raised these issues directly with President Zelensky 
last week with the Deputy Prime Minister, the mayor of Kyiv, 
with a number of legislators from Ukraine, also with our team 
in Kyiv when I visited in November.
    We provided significant additional resources through the 
State and Foreign Operations appropriations provisions for both 
USAID and State OIGs. I think enhanced oversight is a good 
idea.
    I would be interested whether, Ms. Nuland, you might 
describe whether you think the accountability and oversight 
mechanisms currently in place have been effective and what if 
anything we need to do to strengthen them. If I might also, Ms. 
Wallander?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Coons, for your attention 
and support for all of this.
    As I mentioned earlier, we have a layered approach on the 
civilian side. As you know, we have extra staff thanks to you 
and the embassy who are focused on accountability. We have the 
budget support--that is the bulk of the economic support funds 
goes through the World Bank so they actually pay the salaries, 
et cetera, that we are intending to support and is double 
monitored by Deloitte.
    We also have--as you said, all of our OIGs are very, very 
active. In fact, all three of them--State, USAID, and the 
Department of Defense--as we sit here they are on the ground in 
Kyiv now doing their first look at all of this.
    I will not speak for my colleagues, but when I was in Kyiv 
in December I got a very intensive brief from the military 
about how they are accounting for every single artillery shell. 
It is quite impressive.
    Senator Coons. So did I in November and I found it 
constructive. I just think it is important for our colleagues 
to get as much of this as we possibly can.
    I have just a minute left, if either you would like to 
speak briefly to it.
    Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.
    I wanted to add in addition to what Under Secretary Nuland 
mentioned vis-a-vis the reimbursement process for direct budget 
support through the World Bank and verifying through third 
party monitoring that those arrears that we are covering are 
valid.
    We also entered into just last month an interagency 
agreement with the GAO that is going to work with the financial 
systems and the ministry of finance, of course, in Ukraine to 
strengthen their own audit capability and with their supreme 
audit authority to make more robust their internal controls as 
well. We are moving out and expanding both our internal 
capacity building as well as third party monitoring and 
oversight.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. I am near the end of my time. I 
have another colleague waiting.
    I will just comment that I am glad to see the 
Administration has decided to sanction the Wagner Group. I am 
very concerned about the scope and reach of their impact.
    During the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit we pulled together a 
meeting of five coastal West African national leaders who 
expressed grave concern about their stability and security, and 
I think Russia's malign actions are not limited to Ukraine by 
any extent and I am concerned about a number of countries in 
Africa, which I would be happy to work with you further on.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Let me go to another part of the world. I 
have questions for Secretaries Nuland and Wallander about 
Russian activity in the Americas.
    In June--past June, President Ortega in Nicaragua 
authorized Russian troops, planes, and ships to deploy to 
Nicaragua for purposes of training law enforcement or emergency 
response. Russia called this a routine development.
    In September, Ortega reached an agreement with Putin to air 
Russian-produced media content through Russia's Sputnik Radio 
network available to more than 20 Nicaraguan state channels 
broadcasting to the country's nearly 7 million people.
    In Venezuela, Russia has supported the oil industry, helped 
Venezuela skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent military personnel and 
equipment to the country. Some observers think that following 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Maduro's fortunes have improved 
because, in large part, due to our campaign to limit people 
using Russian oil revenues and the U.S.' consequent need for 
other oil partners. The Venezuelan economy and energy situation 
has gotten better.
    I want to ask a couple of questions about this, first to 
Secretary Nuland. Russia's state media conducts active 
disinformation campaigns in Latin America through outlets like 
RT in Espanol. Sputnik Mundo and RT play in Espanol.
    How is the Department working with others to counter 
Russian disinformation efforts in the region?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Kaine, thanks for this and for your 
support of our efforts to beat back both Russian malign 
influence and Chinese malign influence in the Americas.
    We have robust programs both through our media hub for 
Latin America, through all of our travel, and through our 
embassy platforms to speak back ourselves, but also strengthen 
investigative journalism and government journalists' 
understanding of how the Russian disinformation networks work 
and to be able to expose it as they see it.
    Of course, in countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela, who 
have set their lot with Russia, they are not so interested in 
hearing it, but we do what we can in the Americas, more 
broadly, with regard to that.
    Senator Kaine. To Secretary Wallander, what is the DoD 
assessment of the level of Russian military activity in 
Nicaragua or more generally in the region?
    Dr. Wallander. Senator, the first and most important duty 
of the Department of Defense is to protect the American 
homeland so the Department is always devoting resources in 
tracking, monitoring, and planning to deter and defend against 
any threat to the homeland.
    The Department does not currently assess that there is a 
heightened threat to the American homeland because of Russian 
presence, but it is something that is tracked and monitored 
every day.
    Russian presence facilitated by countries like Nicaragua 
is, of course, a major focus of tracking and watching. I can 
reassure you that this is not lost upon us, but also reassure 
that we do not see a heightened threat in the current 
circumstance.
    Senator Kaine. In recent visits to the region and 
discussion with heads of state there, the Chinese presence is 
very dominant economically and more and more military activity, 
and the Russian presence is not at the same level and I think a 
number of folks there see it as more kind of opportunistic or 
to kind of annoy us, but we would be foolish to take it for 
granted. We have to just keep monitoring it and I appreciate 
the witnesses for your answers.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Let me just join and I really appreciate Senator Kaine's 
focus on the Americas. It is great to have someone else who 
cares about it.
    I want to echo his concerns about Russia's footprint in the 
hemisphere, same as with China. We say that China is our 
biggest geostrategic challenge. That means challenging in every 
dimension in every part of the globe.
    Here, with Russia, we see a footprint in Venezuela: the 
president of Russian Security Services in the country, 
cooperation with the Maduro regime on intelligence and cyber 
capabilities, its ability to influence democratic institutions 
in neighboring countries, the fact that Maduro invited Russia 
to attend negotiations in Mexico City, media reports last year 
about the presence of Russian radar deployed along Venezuela's 
border utilized to surveillance the Colombian Government's 
institutions. I know this is something you spoke about publicly 
during your travel to Bogota last year.
    We need to be focused multi-dimensionally as it relates to 
Russia, and for that matter China, in our own hemisphere, and 
if you are going to beat someone who you consider your single 
biggest geostrategic challenge, i.e., China, and if we are 
going to continue to weaken Russia in every dimension we can as 
it relates to the war in Ukraine, that means playing three-
dimensional chess and that means also focusing on the 
hemisphere.
    I hope that the questions that Senator Kaine raised and 
this comment helps us create some focus. I would love to hear 
from our Assistant Secretary of the Western Hemisphere about 
that focus in this regard.
    Ms. Nuland. Just quickly, Senator, to say that you 
mentioned it--you alluded to it, but one of the greatest risks 
is democratic backsliding across the hemisphere and as these 
countries--too many countries follow Putin and Xi Jinping's 
model of governance and control of judiciaries and control of 
the free press, et cetera. That is part of the larger message.
    If I may just go back. Senator Hagerty asked me if Ukraine 
can win. I believe and I believe the--all of us believe that if 
we define winning as Ukraine surviving and thriving as a 
cleaner, democratic state, it can and it must and it will with 
our help.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. I disagree with my colleague from Texas' 
characterization of this Administration. I think no one has 
been more insightful, decisive, and helpful to the Ukrainians 
than the Biden administration and to suggest something else is 
just a parallel alternate universe, but some of us seem to live 
there.
    In any event, there is one thing, though, that I do want to 
echo on and that is Iranian drones. Iranian drones have been 
present on the Ukrainian battlefield now for months.
    It is inflicting massive damage to military and civilian 
infrastructure across the country. We are reading troubling 
reports that Russia now intends to acquire Iranian ballistic 
missiles that can strike deep even into Europe, which would be 
a game changer.
    How is the Administration responding to the growing 
military alliance between Iran and Russia and what measures, in 
this case particularly in concert with our allies who should 
understand that it is in their interest, particularly European 
interests, to be more robust as it relates to Iran.
    If Iran produces the missiles that it already has the 
capacity and breadth of scope of reach and greater 
sophistication in terms of targeting to Russia that can hit 
different targets in Europe, it is a dramatically different 
world.
    They need to be engaged with us. They have been reticent 
because they are looking for the JCPOA. Even the Iranians are 
not interested in the JCPOA.
    They need to now understand that the risk for them is 
greater and the risk for all of us collectively as it relates 
to success in Ukraine is greater if the Iranians can do all of 
this with impunity and not face further consequences.
    Ms. Nuland. Could not agree more, Senator, including about 
the risk of Russian tech--missile technology helping the 
Iranians get better at that themselves.
    We are engaged in intensive conversations with our key 
allies and partners about strengthening the sanctions regime in 
response to this. As you know, we have done, and as I mentioned 
earlier, a number of sanctions ourselves.
    We are also engaged in a number of other things, which I 
think we should talk about in another setting and we look 
forward to it.
    The Chairman. I am happy to do that.
    I would just simply suggest that the Europeans have been 
reticent about multilateralizing what is our sanctions as it 
relates to Ukraine. The door is closed, from my perspective, on 
the JCPOA because Iran itself has not sought to accept what I 
thought was a bad deal, but, nonetheless, even that bad deal 
they are not willing to accept it.
    At the end of the day, now they are helping Russia. We are 
pouring enormous amounts of resources, as are the Europeans, to 
help Ukraine win this battle for itself and for the greater 
existential threat.
    It seems to me now the Europeans should think differently 
about joining us in sanctions on Iran so that they understand 
that--the Iranians understand there are consequences to their 
actions because right now they do not.
    This record of this hearing will remain open until the 
close of business tomorrow. We thank all of you for your 
appearance and for your insights.
    This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Reconstruction: While it's a bit difficult to talk about 
reconstruction while Russia continues to destroy anything it can in 
Ukraine, I have begun thinking about what kind of legislative support 
reconstruction will require--including ongoing governance reforms in 
Ukraine and private sector engagement. Most importantly, Ukraine must 
know that we will continue to stand with them. Other countries have 
even appointed specific individuals to lead their efforts. How does the 
Administration view medium- and long-term reconstruction, including 
modernization efforts in Ukraine?

    Answer. The Government of Ukraine must lead Ukraine's recovery, but 
Ukraine alone cannot coordinate the extensive international effort 
needed to implement recovery efforts. We continue to emphasize the need 
for Ukraine to implement an inclusive, reform-minded program, with 
focused attention on rule of law, good governance, and anticorruption 
measures, which will be essential to building confidence in Ukraine and 
stimulating private sector financing and investment. We are also 
encouraging Ukraine to build in transparent and accessible 
opportunities for private sector engagement in the reconstruction 
process so that U.S. companies' experience and expertise can support 
the massive rebuilding and modernization effort in Ukraine.

    Question. War Crimes: Russia and the Wagner Group's war crimes 
continue to mount. I am particularly concerned about kidnappings of 
thousands of children, deportations via so-called filtration camps, 
widespread sexual violence, murder, and targeting of civilian 
infrastructure across Ukraine. Crimes will be prosecuted in different 
ways, including by Ukrainian courts and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). What are the appropriate venues are for prosecuting the 
different types of atrocities perpetrated by Russian forces? Are there 
gaps in Ukraine's ability to prosecute these crimes caused by 
jurisdictional issues, and how do we fill those gaps?

    Answer. The Administration supports a range of existing mechanisms 
and international inquiries to examine and investigate atrocities in 
Ukraine, such as those of the International Criminal Court, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, and other 
efforts. We are devoting significant resources to strengthening the 
capacity of Ukraine's justice system to ensure accountability, 
including support to the Atrocities Crimes Advisory Group, a 
multilateral initiative providing strategic advice and operational 
assistance to Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General.
    The fulsome investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes will 
require legal reform in Ukraine, and a number of legal and practical 
challenges have been identified. We are committed to working with 
Ukraine to address those challenges as we have done with other 
countries where large-scale atrocities have occurred.

    Question. Sanctions: I am pleased by the sanctions the 
Administration has imposed, but I believe there is more to be done to 
go after Putin's inner circle. What more is the Administration 
considering and has it coordinated these efforts with other allies?

    Answer. The Administration has imposed sanctions on both Vladimir 
Putin personally and a significant number of his associates. These 
include Sergei Naryskin, Nikoai Patrushev, Sergei Lavrov, Boris and 
Arkady Rotenberg, as well as numerous others. We are continuously 
evaluating additional sanctions targets in this program, including 
among Vladimir Putin's close associates. The Administration continues 
to coordinate particularly closely with the United Kingdom, European 
Union, and NATO Allies as well as with Japan and Five Eyes Partners.

    Question. Wagner in Africa: In September, I asked our Sanctions 
Coordinator, Amb. Jim O'Brien, why the Administration hadn't sanctioned 
anyone in Africa in response to coups in the Sahel and West Africa, and 
those known to be working with Wagner to export Sudanese gold to 
Russia. He stated at that time that the Administration was well aware 
of Wagner operations and Prigozhin (Pree-gojh-in) advertising himself 
across the region, and indicated that Sudan and the gold trade are 
``very important to us.'' Has the Administration taken further action 
to look at particular individuals or entities relative to the export of 
Sudanese gold to Russia since my exchange with Ambassador O'Brien in 
September?

    Answer. On January 26, we designated Wagner as a Transnational 
Criminal Organization and levied new sanctions. This designation will 
assist our efforts to disrupt their ability to profit from the gold 
sector. We continue diplomatic outreach to gold producing and trading 
countries to identify specific actors of concern and promote more 
transparency in this sector. On January 31, Ambassador O'Brien and the 
interagency convened an industry group to express concerns about the 
role of Wagner in the gold supply chain and urge cooperation to limit 
Wagner's ability to profit from operations in Africa. We will evaluate 
further options.

    Question. What about sanctions on leadership of governments and 
juntas in Central Africa Republic and Mali who are working with Wagner 
mercenaries alleged to have committed numerous human rights abuses?

    Answer. We continually review and deploy all appropriate tools to 
determine the best instruments to advance U.S. foreign policy goals in 
both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. In Mali, we are 
reviewing allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Malian 
Armed Forces and others, and expect to issue new sanctions soon. In 
CAR, as of January 26, we have sanctioned additional actors supporting 
the Wagner Group's network. These actions provide greater authority and 
ability for us to continue the use of sanctions and other tools over 
time against actors working with Wagner to commit atrocities.

    Question. Russian Disinformation in Latin America: The Putin regime 
seeks to actively undermine democratic values by engaging in 
sophisticated disinformation and propaganda operations. They do so not 
just in Europe, but throughout the developing world, including in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Russian state media companies like Sputnik 
and RT collude with authoritarian regimes in Cuba and Venezuela to 
engage in Spanish-language information operations that have manipulated 
regional information environments, spread lies about the war in 
Ukraine, and exacerbated polarization. What steps is the United States 
specifically taking to track and counter Russian information operations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and how can we more effectively 
protect vulnerable information ecosystems in our own hemisphere against 
Russian malign influence?

    Answer. The State Department is keenly aware of Russia's 
disinformation campaign in the Western Hemisphere. In monitoring 
disinformation, we have seen a sharp rise in viewership of Russian 
state media in Latin America since 2020, reflecting the Kremlin's 
increased priority of the region. Discussions with our foreign partners 
indicate they are also aware of Russia's efforts to spread 
disinformation, both before and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine 
began. A key effort to combat Russia's disinformation efforts is the 
implementation of programs that allow our partners to recognize and 
counter disinformation and propaganda in civil society, academia, and 
government. The State Department also supports fact-checkers and 
independent media to increase journalistic standards and amplify 
positive, fact-based content.

    Question. Syria: Russia's barbarism against Ukrainian civilians is 
not new. It developed and refined its playbook of war crimes in Syria, 
where it continues to slaughter innocent civilians, emboldens Iranian 
proxies like Hezbollah and is trying to facilitate closer ties between 
Bashar al-Assad and President Erdogan of Turkey. What steps is the 
Administration taking to counter Russian attempts to rehabilitate or 
normalize the Assad regime?

    Answer. This Administration does not support efforts to normalize 
or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, which we have regularly and vocally 
emphasized to our partners. We also do not support reconstruction of 
Syria absent authentic and enduring progress towards a political 
solution that meets the terms of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
2254. We urge states considering engagement with Syria to carefully 
consider the regime's atrocities against the Syrian people over the 
last decade, as well as the regime's ongoing efforts to deny much of 
the country access to humanitarian aid and security. We continue 
stressing to our partners that stability in Syria, and the greater 
region, can only be achieved through a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led 
political process consistent with UNSCR 2254.

    Question. Have we seen any notable effect of Russia's setbacks in 
Ukraine on its posture in Syria? What effect will continued Russian 
setbacks in Ukraine, or sudden successes for that matter, have on 
Russia's posture in Syria?

    Answer. We have not seen Russia significantly reduce its force 
posture or its military activities in Syria as a direct consequence of 
its invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, over the last several months, 
Russia has reportedly reinforced its presence in areas of northern 
Syria and convened the defense ministers of Syria and Turkiye, 
demonstrating that it remains committed to supporting the Assad regime 
militarily.

    Question. Arms Control: As you know Russia continues to block on-
site inspections of its nuclear facilities as required by the New START 
Treaty. Is Russia's unwillingness to implement the New START treaty 
explicitly tied to U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine?

    Answer. In recent public statements, Russian officials have tied 
U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine to New START 
implementation. In fact, however, Russia has not complied since 2020, 
initially citing COVID-19 as its reason. The overall deterioration of 
the U.S.-Russian relationship is not an excuse for Russia to stop 
complying with its treaty obligations. Maintaining and strengthening 
nuclear guardrails only grows more important in times of heightened 
tensions. The U.S. message to Russia is that the full, effective 
implementation of New START is in our mutual security interests, that 
Russia cannot selectively implement its legal obligations, and that the 
United States will not trade concessions in Ukraine to get Russia to 
fulfill its treaty obligations to us and to global security.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Military Assistance to Ukraine: Since the outset of 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Administration has repeatedly refused 
to provide military capabilities requested by Ukrainian officials, such 
as tanks, HIMARS, and air defense, only to subsequently change course 
and provide them at a later date. What changed in the State 
Department's decision-making about sending tanks to Ukraine that 
resulted in the decision to do so now?

    Answer. The Departments of State and Defense, continuously work to 
assess the military requirements of Ukraine. The decision to provide 
Strykers, Bradleys, and Abrams is tied to Ukraine's specific 
operational needs for its planned Spring counter-offensive, including 
limitations of its existing battle-worn systems, and better positions 
Ukraine for future offensive operations. We will continue to be 
responsive to the evolving needs of the Ukrainian military, cognizant 
of the level of support that is required to ensure Ukraine's ultimate 
success on the battlefield.

    Question. What changed in the State Department's decision-making 
about sending Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in 
the decision to do so now?

    Answer. As the conflict in Ukraine evolves, we have been responsive 
to Ukraine's evolving military requirements. Our assistance is meant to 
counter Russia's actions. Stinger MANPADS blunted the original Russian 
assault on Kyiv; Javelin anti-tank systems ravaged Russian columns in 
the northern woods; HIMARS rocket systems have torn apart Russian 
logistics hubs in the Donbas; and air defense systems have prevented 
strikes against Ukrainian homes. Bradley and Stryker vehicles are 
needed for Ukraine's planned Spring offensive, especially as Ukraine 
has worn through so many of its Soviet era vehicles.

    Question. When will the Administration agree to provide Ukraine 
fighter planes such as the F-16?

    Answer. We continue to look at Ukraine's evolving needs on the 
battlefield, and to sustain an effective air defense. At each decision 
stage, we weigh this against available resources, equipment, and 
training timelines.

    Question. If the Administration is opposed to providing F-16 
capability, why?

    Answer. We continue to be responsive to Ukraine's evolving military 
requirements. I welcome continuing this discussion in a classified 
setting.

    Question. What is the Department's view on the provision of dual-
purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department of State recognizes the tragic cost to 
civilians that can result from the use of cluster munitions and 
emphasizes that their indiscriminate or disproportionate use violates 
international humanitarian law. Current DoD policy restricts the 
transfer to another government of cluster munitions with an unexploded 
ordnance rate greater than 1 percent, consistent with longstanding U.S. 
law.

    Question. Direct Budgetary Support for Ukraine: Since February 
2022, the United States has provided the overwhelming majority of 
budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72 percent, of a total $18 
billion mobilized to date--which is being disbursed through the 
following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of Recovery from Economic 
Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public Expenditures for 
Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine Relief, Recovery, 
Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and Contributions to 
Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project. Does the Department 
of State Office of the Inspector General maintain direct audit 
authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the justification?

    Answer. The United States has provided direct budget support (DBS) 
to the Government of Ukraine (GOU) through the PEACE mechanism, the 
World Bank's flagship financing instrument for Ukraine, and prior to 
its creation, through the FREE Ukraine Multi-donor Trust Fund, the 
World Bank's budget support package. As of April 12, 2023, $15.5 
billion of the $22.9 billion in DBS funds has been disbursed to the 
GOU, and $2.5 billion of the $22.9 billion has been transferred to the 
World Bank to disburse in April and May. Neither the URTF nor HEAL have 
been utilized for these payments.
    The United States has employed a multi-tiered accountability system 
to ensure oversight of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, which includes 
third-party monitoring. We intend to further strengthen oversight with 
additional measures using Ukraine supplemental funds. As required by 
Ukraine supplemental legislation, the Department has submitted reports 
on the implementation of this assistance. Additionally, in accordance 
with the Ukraine legislation, State's OIG recently released its first 
report on the Department's coordination with USAID on budget assistance 
provided via the World Bank mechanisms. The Department is not aware of 
any authority of any U.S. inspector general to audit the internal 
operations of an international organization or international financial 
institution.
    OIG is separately responding to your question directly.

    Question. Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports 
or audits conducted on Ukraine assistance?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID, the Departments of 
Defense and Treasury, and the Government of Ukraine are working closely 
together to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability over U.S. 
assistance to Ukraine. We are committed to accommodating the legitimate 
needs of Congress for information necessary to perform its legislative 
and oversight functions. When presented with specific requests for 
information, including relating to assistance for Ukraine, we will work 
with Congress, including the Committee, to accommodate such requests, 
consistent with appropriate needs for protection of executive branch 
confidentiality interests.

    Question. Please describe the State Department's efforts to press 
bilateral donors on the need for greater burden sharing to meet 
Ukraine's assistance needs.

    Answer. The United States is working closely with Allies and 
partners around the world to provide Ukraine the assistance it needs to 
defend itself against Russian aggression and initiate recovery and 
reconstruction efforts. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, 
since February 2022, Ukraine has received $15.8 billion in budget 
support from EU institutions and member states. EU institutions and 
member states and other donors have provided $4.7 billion in 
humanitarian aid, more than double the United States' $1.9 billion 
contribution. Our European allies and partners are also bearing the 
financial burden of hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees. Since 
February 2022, our Allies and partners worldwide have also provided 
more than $24 billion in security assistance.

    Question. Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New 
START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there 
have been no treaty inspections during that time. What actions are your 
Departments taking to mitigate against the risks associated with 
Russia's non-compliance with the New START treaty?

    Answer. The New START Treaty remains in U.S. national security 
interests, and our objective is to return Russia to full compliance. 
The State Department has and will continue to work with allies, 
partners, and others in the international community to push Russia to 
comply with its New START Treaty obligations. The United States will 
also continue to monitor and assess what impact Russian noncompliance 
has on U.S. national security. Russian actions will inform 
consideration of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States will 
ensure in any event that the United States is postured to defend the 
United States and our allies.

    Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia's efforts to 
establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported 
agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?

    Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, 
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the 
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, 
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to 
this question regarding the potential of a Russian naval base in Sudan, 
and to give you our unvarnished assessment of the Wagner network and 
our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified 
briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department 
bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified 
setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and 
staff.

    Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other 
Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S. 
personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are 
in place for responding to such incidents in the future?

    Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, 
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the 
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, 
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to 
this question regarding Wagner threats against our personnel, and to 
give you our unvarnished assessment of the network and our plan for 
thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your 
convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC 
and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome 
continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

    Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner 
Group's outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the 
Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?

    Answer. I have discussed our concerns regarding the Kremlin-backed 
Wagner Group directly with Transition President Traore both in-person 
and over the phone, and he has repeatedly asserted that only Burkinabe 
will defend their security and that they have no intention of inviting 
in Wagner. I would need to provide further information on this question 
in a classified setting.

    Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats 
in Africa?

    Answer. Combatting cybercrime and improving cybersecurity practices 
is critical for the economies and national security of all countries, 
including those in Africa. Russia continues to improve its ability to 
target critical infrastructure and allows cybercriminals to operate 
from its territory with impunity. For example, Russia-based 
cybercriminals are suspected by industry experts to have conducted 
ransomware attacks against a South African transportation company in 
July 2021, disrupting maritime shipping for nearly a week. In Africa 
and elsewhere, Russian-led and affiliated disinformation campaigns seek 
to spread falsehoods and destabilize societies.

    Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to 
African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner 
governments?

    Answer. The Department's implementation of CAATSA Section 231 has 
had a substantial impact on Russian arms sales to African countries. As 
detailed in the classified annexes to our quarterly reports to Congress 
pursuant to Section 1294 of the 2018 John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act, we have urged African countries to abandon arms 
deals with Russia and to sunset their use of legacy Russian military 
equipment. Many African countries now realize the negative aspects of 
engaging in significant transactions with Russia's defense sector and 
are taking steps to reduce or end their dependency on Russian arms.

    Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent 
military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?

    Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, 
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the 
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, 
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. Recent events in 
Burkina Faso show how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it 
did in Mali. To fully respond to the question concerning Wagner's role 
in recent coups and irregular changes in government, along with giving 
you our unvarnished assessment of the network and presenting our plan 
for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at 
your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed 
SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome 
continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

    Question. How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group's 
activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in 
African countries, and for what purposes?

    Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, 
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the 
Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, 
exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to 
the question concerning the relation of Russia's war against Ukraine to 
Wagner's activities in Africa, along with giving you our unvarnished 
assessment of the network and presenting our plan for thwarting them, 
we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience. 
Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC 
staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued 
engagements with Committee members and staff.

    Question. Mozambique Detainee: An American citizen, Ryan Koher, has 
been detained without trial in Mozambique for 3 months. I spoke with 
President Nyusi about this case on the sidelines of the U.S.-Africa 
Leaders Summit in December 2022, and he personally promised to examine 
the situation and report back to me. I also understand that Ambassador 
Vrooman and others at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo have engaged with 
Mozambican officials on Mr. Koher's case. Yet, there appears to be no 
movement toward either charging or releasing him. How and when does the 
State Department plan to engage with the Mozambican Government on Mr. 
Koher's case if there is no forward movement on either charging or 
releasing him?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy and the Department have actively engaged 
the Mozambican Government since learning of the U.S. citizen's initial 
detention on November 4. This case has been raised multiple times at 
the highest level of the Mozambican Government. The Consular Section 
continues to receive regular updates from the U.S. citizen on the case. 
The Embassy has communicated Ranking Member Risch's request for follow-
up to senior Mozambican officials.

    Question. Sahel: The Administration adopted an interagency strategy 
for the Sahel in March 2022, and you led an interagency delegation to 
the Sahel in October 2022. According to the State Department's public 
readout, your trip focused, in part, on the Wagner Group's role in the 
region and underscored that ``good governance, the rule of law, respect 
for human rights, education, and a vibrant civil society are key to 
breaking the cycle of violent extremism.'' Since then, the security 
situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has continued to deteriorate, Mali's 
political transition has not advanced, and Burkina Faso's military 
junta has decided to expel French military forces amid what appears to 
be growing outreach from the Wagner Group.
    What were the central conclusions of your meetings in Sahel 
countries in October 2022, including with regard to Russia's malign 
influence in the region? How have recent events in Mali and Burkina 
Faso reshaped these conclusions and U.S. engagement moving forward?

    Answer. Many countries of the Sahel face a crisis of governance 
that has contributed to the spread of violent extremism. In the long-
term, we can only address this security challenge by addressing its 
underlying causes, like access to education, healthcare, economic 
opportunity, and good governance. Recent events in Burkina Faso show 
how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it did in Mali. We 
must not allow the Wagner Group to similarly exploit Burkina Faso's 
resources, undermine its democracy, commit rampant human rights abuses, 
and spread disinformation and lies, all while helping fund and 
prosecute Russia's war against Ukraine.

    Question. What is the Administration's plan for deterring and 
responding to Russia's malign influence, including the Wagner Group's 
presence, in the Sahel?

    Answer. We seek to increase the cost and difficulty of doing 
business for Yevgeniy Prigozhin through sanctions and blocking supply 
routes. The Administration has designated the Wagner Group as a 
significant transnational criminal organization, which will aid us in 
preventing economic benefits from flowing to Russia via Wagner's 
nefarious activities. We are sharing information on the deleterious 
effects of the Wagner Group with our partners, reminding them that 
countries that partner with Wagner become weaker, poorer, more volatile 
and less secure. We are also working on campaigns to counter 
disinformation so publics across the Sahel know what Wagner truly 
represents.

    Question. What has been the concrete impact of the 2022 Sahel 
strategy, to date?

    Answer. The Sahel strategy provides a framework for our medium- and 
long-term policy and resource investments in the region. It's 
underlying conclusion--that the region's security problems can only be 
addressed with better governance solutions--remains valid. In the 
period since the strategy was written, conditions on the ground have 
worsened, requiring us to revise our near-term tactics. Nevertheless, 
in accordance with the Sahel strategy we are collaborating more 
effectively across the interagency and are engaging our multilateral 
partners in new ways that complement existing activities. In a 
resource-constrained environment, we are prioritizing activities to 
support Sahelian democracies, to slow the spread of violent extremist 
organizations southward, and to push the Wagner Group from the region.

    Question. During the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, the 
Administration announced a new initiative to ``engage with complex 
political transitions in Africa and demonstrate U.S. Government support 
to governments and civil society at critical moments.'' What will this 
initiative mean, concretely, for U.S. engagement with political 
transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali?

    Answer. The Department continues to identify available resources to 
support sustainable democratic transitions across the continent while 
closely working with the interagency to operationalize the new 
initiative. We intend to leverage available expertise and ensure a 
coordinated response to the multiple dynamic transition processes 
taking place. At the end of FY 2022, the Bureau of African Affairs 
began developing a project with the United States Institute of Peace to 
evaluate the ongoing transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea, 
which we anticipate will support both existing democratic transitions 
work and the new initiative.

    Question. What role do you expect to play in implementing 
deliverables announced by the White House during the December 2022 
U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS)?

    Answer. I have made three trips to Africa in the past 18 months and 
expect that pace to continue. These trips, plus my regular interagency 
engagement with African leaders when they visit Washington, afford lots 
of opportunities to push implementation of the ALS deliverables. In 
addition, the AF Bureau, including Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Special 
Representative for ALS Implementation, is working intensively with 
USAID and the rest of the USG interagency community to support 
policies, programs and initiatives to advance these commitments. Since 
the ALS, the Department has focused its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
on priorities areas identified at the Summit and continuing to align 
our resources with those, the State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy, and 
the U.S. Strategy for Africa.

    Question. The Administration pledged during the ALS, among other 
things, to expand U.S. support for leadership training, economic and 
trade integration, digital access and literacy, health system capacity, 
food security, climate adaptation, and security sector reform in 
Africa. How, and according to what benchmarks, does the State 
Department intend to measure success in achieving these objectives?

    Answer. As part of this pledge, the Administration announced new 
programs, such as Digital Transformation for Africa, African Women's 
Entrepreneurship Program--Reimagined, and a new security sector 
consortium. It also announced new investments in existing programs such 
as Prosper and Power Africa, Feed the Future, the U.S. President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Adaptation Fund. 
Programs will be designed and regularly evaluated to determine if they 
are achieving results or if adjustments are needed to ensure their 
success. Another measure of success will be State's ability to elevate 
our African partners to lead in addressing shared priorities and for 
countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to emerge as prosperous and 
peaceful.

    Question. U.S.-Europe Coordination on China in Africa: In November 
2020, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report calling 
for greater U.S.-Europe cooperation on China. Among the recommendations 
were for the United States and Europe to work toward a comprehensive 
strategy that ``affirms the close linkage between democracy, good 
governance, and sound economic management.'' What is the State 
Department doing to coordinate U.S. and European messaging for African 
political leaders and publics regarding China's engagement in the 
region?

    Answer. State Department officials meet routinely with our European 
partners, bilaterally and multilaterally, to discuss and coordinate 
messaging on People's Republic of China (PRC) engagement, including in 
Africa. We meet with European counterparts in multilateral formats such 
as the G7 Africa Directors Meeting. The State Department provides 
guidance, talking points, and other materials to U.S. embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa to engage public audiences on the PRC's harmful 
practices in the region. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
regularly speaks with European counterparts to coordinate European and 
U.S. cooperation and messaging in sub-Saharan Africa, including related 
to the PRC and Russia.

    Question. To what extent is the Administration working with 
European partners to deter Chinese-funded dual-use infrastructure 
construction at African ports?

    Answer. As mentioned in response to Q24, State Department officials 
meet routinely with our European partners to discuss PRC-related 
issues. We share concerns with our European partners about PRC's dual-
use ports in Africa and align our efforts to deter them.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely 
curtailed in recent years. What is the status of USAID's operations 
inside the Russian Federation?

    Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-
person at your convenience.

    Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely 
curtailed in recent years. Does USAID still operate any programs inside 
of Russia? If so, please list them.

    Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in 
person at your convenience.

    Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely 
curtailed in recent years.
    What is the status of USAID's activities involving Russian citizens 
living abroad, including, but not limited to, Russian civil society and 
independent media?

    Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in 
person at your convenience.

    Question. USAID's operations inside of Russia have been severely 
curtailed in recent years.
    Does USAID maintain a plan in case there is an opportunity to 
reengage in Russia or with the Russian population in the future?

    Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-
person at your convenience.

    Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other 
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half 
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to 
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for 
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between 
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
    Please describe how Russia has exploited the Black Sea Grain 
Initiative's grain inspections to stall vessels and limit Ukraine's 
agricultural exports and revenue.

    Answer. Under the terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) 
agreement, inbound and outbound vessels are inspected by teams 
consisting of members of the United Nations and the three signatory 
countries: Ukraine, Turkiye, and Russia. Ukraine's Ministry of 
Infrastructure asserts that, as soon as the BSGI began to grow in 
October, Russia reduced the number of inspection teams from five to 
three without explanation and has artificially increased the time 
required to conduct inspections by checking vessels' performance 
indicators--which are not regulated by the BSGI Joint Coordination 
Centre (JCC) or the grain agreement--and has been stalling over issues 
like fumigation. Thus, it takes at least 4 hours to inspect one vessel, 
and the JCC completes about five to seven inbound/outbound inspections 
daily rather than the 16 to 18 that USAID-supported advisors to 
Ukraine's Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food estimate are needed to 
reach the ports' 6 million metric tons (MMT) per month capacity. 
Ukraine is prioritizing the departure of larger vessels once loaded. 
Although this can help increase export volumes, it leaves smaller 
vessels waiting longer and incurring costs that make them less 
competitive.
    The BSGI JCC reports that, as of January 26, 676 vessels have 
departed Ukrainian ports with 18,422,020 metric tons of grains, 
oilseeds, and derivatives (e.g., edible oil, meal, and bran). This 
represents an average of 3.16 MMT/month since BSGI began, about half of 
the 6 MMT capacity of these ports (per Ukraine's Ministry of 
Infrastructure). BSGI throughput remains limited and has experienced 
some of its lowest throughput since the initiative began in August 
2022. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports per day 
was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels leaving per 
day for every month except August 2022, when the initiative began. 
January exports totaled 3.02 MMT, a figure lower than every month 
except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and well below prior 
year volumes of 5-7 MMT per month. This figure is also below the 5 MMT 
that Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN Security 
Council to press Russia to support.
    The slowdown in inspections has led to lower revenues for Ukraine, 
and lower prices for goods produced by Ukrainian farmers, as buyers 
pass on the increased shipping costs caused by the slowdowns. The State 
Department reported that the price of grain for importers has increased 
by as much as 20 percent per ship, as shippers must cover the cost of 
crews, fuel, and insurance for that idle time. The costs of these 
delays exacerbate other cost increases for Black Sea shippers, such as 
insurance, which has become costlier due to the high risks associated 
with operating in a conflict area and a reduction in reinsurers willing 
to cover ships. For each ship, each day waiting costs an additional 
$20,000. The average waiting time of 21 days translated to over 
$400,000 of additional costs for each shipload of grain, which results 
in lower revenues for Ukraine and its farmers, and higher prices for 
consumers.

    Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other 
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half 
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to 
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for 
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between 
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
    How have the inspections impacted global supply chains?

    Answer. Disruptions in Black Sea Grain initiative (BSGI) 
inspections have affected supply volumes in the short term and stand to 
have long term effects in these areas if it is not resolved.
    Volumes: As of January 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is 
experiencing some of its lowest throughput levels to date due to slow 
inspections. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports 
per day was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels 
leaving per day for every month, except August 2022 when the initiative 
began. January exports totaled 3.02 million metric tons (MMT). This is 
below every month except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and 
well below prior year volumes of 5-7 MMT/month. This is also well below 
the ports' 6 MMT capacity per Ukraine's Ministry of Infrastructure, and 
below the 5 MMT that Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN 
Security Council to press Russia to support.
    These short-term supply decreases stand to affect longer-term 
supply by reducing Ukrainian farmers' incomes, leaving them with fewer 
resources to invest in planting and maintaining winter 2022 and spring 
2023 crops. Additionally, farmers may be less motivated to plant if 
they are not certain of a guaranteed market with sufficient profits. 
Finally, some Ukrainian farmers are switching to more profitable 
oilseeds, and away from less profitable grains like corn (which has a 
higher cost of production and lower prices due to a backlog of corn as 
a result of war-related port closures). Per the Ukrainian Club of 
Agrarian Business, farmers expect to increase spring oilseed planting 
area by 15 percent (due to higher profitability), decrease barley areas 
by 15 percent, and decrease corn areas up to 30 percent (due to lower 
profitability).
    Prices: Per the State Department, the backlog has raised the price 
of grain for importers by as much as 20 percent per ship because 
shippers must cover the cost of crews, fuel, and insurance for that 
idle time. The costs of these delays exacerbate other cost increases 
for Black Sea shippers, such as insurance, which has become costlier 
due to the high risks associated with operating in a conflict area, and 
a more recent reduction in reinsurance options due to a decision by a 
large group of specialty maritime vessel insurers to stop covering 
Black Sea vessels (non-specialty reinsurers still offer cover). For 
each ship, each day waiting costs an additional $20,000. The average 
waiting time of 21 days translated to over $400,000 of additional costs 
for each shipload of grain. Exporters have reduced the prices they pay 
to Ukraine's farmers in order to cover their increased shipping costs, 
further harming farmers' abilities and motivations to continue 
planting.

    Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other 
exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half 
since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to 
other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for 
inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between 
application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.
    Given the conditional nature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, 
what is USAID doing to help Ukraine's agricultural economy recover and 
regain its place in the global economy as a major grain exporter?

    Answer. USAID is helping Ukraine's agricultural economy recover 
through support for both production and exports, with a focus on 
increasing the capacity of Ukraine's railway system to strengthen 
resilience against shocks such as the war-induced port closures.
    The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) has been a 
critical component of increasing Ukrainian capacity to export and 
supporting farmers needs--allowing over 20 million metric tons of food 
to get to global markets, with nearly 20 percent going directly to 
lower-income countries. However, Russia's unwillingness to fully 
implement and facilitate the deal and its previous delays on renewal 
are stark reminders that the deal is unstable, making support for 
Ukraine's agriculture sector essential to both Ukraine's economic 
survival and to helping vulnerable communities across the world.
    In response to Russia's blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports and 
the resulting impact on Ukrainian farmers and the agriculture sector, 
USAID launched the Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine (AGRI-
Ukraine) in July to support Ukraine's agriculture sector. This 
initiative was taken in direct response to the export crisis and with 
an understanding that Russia would be an unreliable party to the BSGI, 
then under negotiation and not yet launched, even if a deal were to be 
reached.
    USAID directly contributed $100 million in support to AGRI-Ukraine, 
with a goal to raise $150 million in additional external funding. To 
date, USAID has established a flagship partnership with Bayer, which 
has invested approximately $35 million in Ukraine's agricultural 
sector. AGRI-Ukraine is seeking to address Ukraine's immediate and 
near-term agriculture production and export challenges, while also 
supporting longer-term resilience. AGRI-Ukraine focuses on four areas 
that are crucial to sustain Ukraine's agricultural production and 
exports: providing critical inputs for farmers; improving export 
logistics and infrastructure; increasing farmers' access to financing; 
and supporting crop drying, storage, and processing needs.
    On the production side, AGRI-Ukraine has reached over 13,600 
farmers (about 29 percent of Ukraine's 47,000 registered farmers before 
the war) with critical inputs, agricultural and financial services, and 
storage through our AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, Agriculture 
Growing Rural Opportunities (AGRO). The AGRI-Ukraine storage program 
has helped farmers pack and store 501,500 metric tons of grain to allow 
them to wait until export channels allow for and market prices justify 
a sale. Since the war began, 604 farmers have accessed $48.2 million in 
credit via three AGRO-supported finance apps.
    On the export side, under AGRI-Ukraine's focus on export logistics 
and infrastructure, USAID has coordinated closely with our European 
allies on their Solidarity Lanes effort, the EU's primary initiative to 
promote Ukrainian exports in the absence of a safe and reliable Black 
Sea route. Another AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, the Economic 
Resilience Activity (ERA), is supporting co-investments to improve rail 
export capacity and border-crossing efficiency. As Ukraine has 
historically exported about 95 percent of its grain and oilseeds via 
the Black Sea, its rail and road export routes were not equipped to 
handle agricultural export demands when the war shuttered ports. The 
war underscored the need to bolster other export modalities, such as 
rail transit. ERA is increasing rail carrying capacity by helping 
exporters pilot Mega Big bags, which are large flexible, reusable, 
food-safe bags that enable Ukraine Railways to carry grain in open-top 
gondola cars, which are widely available and low-cost. This effort has 
helped address Ukraine Railways' limited grain car stock, and the high 
cost and long time involved in getting new grain cars. ERA is also co-
investing in transshipment improvements, which will increase export 
speed and volumes by making the process of transferring grain across 
transport modalities faster and more efficient (e.g., rail to sea 
vessel), and increasing storage capacity at transshipment points (e.g., 
ports and land borders). These procurements support equipment and 
facility improvements such as loading machines and conveyors for a 
privately-owned terminal at Ukraine's Izmail port (Danube).

    Question. Since February 2022, the United States has provided the 
overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72 
percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date--which is being 
disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of 
Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public 
Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine 
Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and 
Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project.
    Does the USAID Office of the Inspector General maintain direct 
audit authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the 
justification?

    Answer. USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has independent 
authority to conduct oversight of all USAID programs, including budget 
support to Ukraine. In a recently released Congressionally-mandated 
report, OIG determined that the design of the monitoring mechanisms and 
safeguards for the World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative 
Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism (through which USAID provides 
budget support) are aligned with federal internal control standards.
    USAID's OIG is working closely with the Department of State and 
Department of Defense OIGs to take a whole-of-government approach to 
accountability and oversight. Recently, the three IGs issued a hotline 
poster in both English and Ukrainian, which is being widely distributed 
in Ukraine. The three IGs also recently returned from a joint trip to 
Kyiv, Poland, and Germany. The objectives of their trip were: (1) 
continue to build a shared understanding of the circumstances on the 
ground; (2) collaborate with oversight counterparts, demonstrating a 
``whole-of-government'' approach to Ukraine response oversight; (3) 
communicate expectations for transparency and accountability to the 
U.S. and Ukrainian officials charged with overseeing the substantial 
assistance provided by the U.S.; and (4) deepen their understanding of 
response management and operations in Kyiv and Rzeszow to inform 
oversight plans.
    The USAID OIG has informed us that they will continue to 
collaborate with oversight partners at the Department of State and 
World Bank to monitor and strengthen USAID's management of direct 
budget support to Ukraine. Accordingly, they are currently conducting 
research to inform potential oversight efforts related to direct budget 
support. We have flagged your interest in their potential audits to the 
USAID OIG.

    Question. Since February 2022, the United States has provided the 
overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine--$13 billion, or 72 
percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date--which is being 
disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of 
Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public 
Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine 
Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and 
Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project.
    Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports or audits 
conducted on Ukraine assistance?

    Answer. USAID has provided budget support to Ukraine via the World 
Bank's Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE 
Ukraine) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Public Expenditures for 
Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism, and a Special 
Transfer to the Ukraine Single-Donor Trust Fund. USAID will provide the 
Committee with prompt and timely access to the results of audits 
conducted on USAID-funded budget support for Ukraine.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Military Assistance to Ukraine: Since the outset of 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Administration has repeatedly refused 
to provide military capabilities requested by Ukrainian officials, such 
as tanks, HIMARS, and air defense, only to subsequently change course 
and provide them at a later date.
    What changed in DoD's decision-making about sending tanks to 
Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?

    Answer. Secretary Austin is focused on ensuring that we deliver 
full capabilities to the Ukrainians. When this involves highly 
sophisticated systems with complex maintenance, sustainment, and other 
considerations, all factors need to be assessed before moving forward 
with introducing a new capability. Together with the collective 
training we've been providing, armored capabilities will improve 
Ukraine's ability to maneuver, which is critical for Ukraine as they 
continue to defend and reclaim their territory. This includes Armored 
Personnel Carriers, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and Main Battle Tanks.

    Question. What changed in the DoD's decision-making about sending 
Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in the decision 
to do so now?

    Answer. Secretary Austin is adamant about providing Ukraine with 
the capability it needs, when it needs it. With collective training 
efforts underway, the Department, in consultation with Ukrainian 
counterparts, assessed a need to provide Ukraine additional armored 
maneuver systems like Bradleys and Strykers.

    Question. When the did the Department first receive a request from 
the Ukrainian Government asking for Western Main Battle Tanks and 
Infantry Fighting Vehicles?

    Answer. For operational security reasons, the Department does not 
comment in public settings on the status of official requests for 
capabilities from partners.
    However, we have been and continue to be in close and constant 
consultation with Ukrainian counterparts regarding their most urgent 
capability requirements. Throughout, we considered a broad range of 
capabilities that Ukraine needs for the current fight and will need in 
the future. These considerations evolve given dynamics on the 
battlefield, which ultimately informs the contours of any security 
assistance package provided to Ukraine.

    Question. How long has the Department been aware of reported 
shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine's Soviet-model 
tank fleet? If the Administration was aware of looming 125mm tank 
ammunition shortfalls, why did the Administration continue to provide 
exclusively Soviet tanks as assistance until this week's sudden 
decision to provide Abrams, which uses the more plentiful NATO-standard 
120mm round?

    Answer. The Department of Defense has been aware of reported 
shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine's existing tank 
fleet for some weeks now. That is why DoD decided to procure an 
additional 100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition for Ukraine under 
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) package we announced 
on December 21, 2022. This procurement was designed to complement our 
procurement of 45 upgraded T-72 tanks for Ukraine, also under USAI. 
Tanks such as the T-72 are easier for Ukraine to integrate into its 
existing forces, and we have seen their success on the battlefield. 
Yesterday's announcement of Abrams, alongside Allied and partner 
announcement of Leopards, will be the next step--a complex one--to 
integrate Western main battle tanks to support its battlefield 
objectives.

    Question. When the will Administration agree to provide Ukraine 
fighter planes such as the F-16?

    Answer. The Administration does not currently plan to provide 
Ukraine with U.S. fighter aircraft.

    Question. If the Administration is opposed to providing F-16 
capability, why?

    Answer. The Administration has no plan to provide Ukraine with U.S. 
fighter aircraft at this time.
    Fighter aircraft considerations must be weighed against a number of 
Ukraine's other priority capability requirements. This includes urgent 
priorities to provide Ukraine additional air defense, artillery, long-
range fires, and armored vehicles.

    Question. What is the United States doing to expedite the transfer 
of military assistance that has already been announced?

    Answer. The Department of Defense has continually expedited the 
transfer of military assistance to Ukraine, including accelerating 
requirements development, contracting timelines for new procurements, 
and deliveries for immediately available equipment. U.S. Transportation 
Command has moved large volumes of assistance at historic speed.
    In November 2022, the Department also stood up the Security 
Assistance Group-Ukraine or SAG-U to help execute the full-range of 
U.S. security assistance activities for Ukraine. This includes 
supporting the historic levels of security assistance and leading our 
expanded training efforts in a more efficient and sustainable manner.
    DoD is also working with industry to find ways to further speed up 
procurement and delivery, such as expanding production capacity and 
identifying and addressing issues around long lead-time components.

    Question. What is the United States doing to expedite the 
production of military vehicles, equipment, etc. that could be sent to 
Ukraine or be used to backfill allies who have donated their own stocks 
to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department appreciates Congress' support as it 
continues to work to help expand the capacity of the Defense Industrial 
Base to replenish the U.S. and allies and partners' inventories in 
response to Ukraine Presidential Drawdowns. Through the use of Ukraine 
replenishment and supplemental funding, actions such as investments in 
the 155mm artillery industrial base or for Armored Multi-Purpose 
Vehicle capacity expansion could enable the U.S. to more rapidly 
replenish capabilities donated to Ukraine. As the situation continues 
to develop, the Department will continue to utilize all its authorities 
and available appropriations as it identifies opportunities to support 
critical DIB capabilities.

    Question. What is the Department's position on the provision of 
dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?

    Answer. Although the United States and Ukraine are not parties to 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, under current law the United 
States Government may only transfer cluster munitions that are below 
the 1 percent unexploded ordnance standard.

    Question. How would a decision to provide DPICMs alleviate or 
exacerbate pressure placed on other munitions stockpiles by our 
assistance to Ukraine?

    Answer. As noted above, the United States is currently prohibited 
by statutory restriction to transfer DPICMs to Ukraine. The United 
States maintains stockpiles of DPICMs. In theory, provision of these 
DPICMs to Ukraine, which are nearing the end of their shelf life, might 
lessen Ukraine's requirements for unitary rounds from other sources.

    Question. What has been the battlefield impact of DPICMS provided 
by other partners to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department of Defense assesses that DPICMs provided by 
other partners to Ukraine have been effective against Russian armored 
vehicles and dug-in troop formations in eastern Ukraine.

    Question. Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New 
START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there 
have been no treaty inspections during that time.
    What actions is your Department taking to mitigate against the 
risks associated with Russia's non-compliance with the New START 
treaty?

    Answer. Mutual compliance with New START strengthens the security 
of the United States, our allies and partners, Russia, and the world. 
We have conveyed that Russia's noncompliance with the New START is 
unfortunate and irresponsible. We have reiterated that the United 
States remains ready to work constructively with Russia to fully 
implement the New START Treaty. We are watching carefully to see what 
Russia does moving forward. How Russia chooses to proceed will help 
inform considerations of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States 
will ensure in any event that we are postured to defend the United 
States and our allies.
    We have not determined that Russia's current noncompliance 
threatens the national security interests of the United States. The 
United States assesses that Russia did not engage in significant 
activity above the Treaty limits and that Russia was likely under the 
New START Treaty warhead limit at the end of 2022. We continue to 
closely monitor Russian compliance with the New START Treaty limits. 
Inspections play a critical role in verifying Russian compliance, but 
are not the only source of U.S. information regarding Russian nuclear 
forces. We also use U.S. means for monitoring Russian compliance, and 
Russia has continued providing notifications and data updates as 
required by the New START Treaty.

    Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia's efforts to 
establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported 
agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?

    Answer. Russia continues to pursue military basing infrastructure 
in Africa, including in Sudan. Russia seeks to pursue implementation of 
a 2017 agreement with the Bashir Government for a naval facility at 
Port Sudan, though Sudanese authorities have thus far taken no steps to 
implement it.
    Moving forward with such a naval agreement or any other form of 
security cooperation with Russia would further isolate Sudan's military 
regime and undermine stability in the Horn of Africa and broader Red 
Sea region.

    Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other 
Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S. 
personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are 
in place for responding to such incidents in the future?

    Answer. The Department of Defense takes all threats to U.S. 
personnel and U.S. citizens seriously and takes appropriate steps to 
address them. We would be happy to discuss specific threats and the 
steps we are taking to address them in a classified setting.

    Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner 
Group's outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the 
Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?

    Answer. We are monitoring the situation closely, and working with 
the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou to ensure 
that our messaging to the Burkina Faso Government is synchronized and 
clear about the negative effects of Wagner's presence in their country. 
We continue to explore ways to help the Burkina Faso Government address 
its security concerns without turning to options that do not align with 
their broader interests. We would be happy to discuss our current 
assessment in a classified setting.

    Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats 
in Africa?

    Answer. Russia has resisted the institutionalization of global 
governance non-binding norms around cyber security of responsible state 
behavior in cyberspace and has courted African countries to support its 
positions in multilateral fora.

    Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to 
African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner 
governments?

    Answer. The Department of Defense defers to the Departments of 
State and Treasury regarding the effectiveness of sanctions on Russian 
arms sales to African countries and how African partner governments 
perceive CAATSA. However, given that many African partners have legacy 
Russian equipment, CAATSA has created an additional challenge for 
African partners to purchase spare parts and/or replace equipment that 
their forces have trained on in the past.

    Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent 
military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?

    Answer. The Wagner Group has deployed across Africa and has 
increased insecurity and instability, engaged in human rights abuses, 
and eroded African leaders' control over their own security forces. 
Wagner benefits from continued instability because Wagner relies on 
instability to justify its presence in these countries. The result is a 
vicious cycle of dependence and vulnerability to exploitation. We can 
provide more details in a classified setting.

    Question. How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group's 
activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in 
African countries, and for what purposes?

    Answer. The Department of Defense assesses that Wagner activity in 
Africa decreased during the early stages of the war in Ukraine, but 
that this trend has since reversed. We defer to the Intelligence 
Community to assess specifics, such as how the war in Ukraine has 
affected Wagner's efforts to recruit locally in African countries.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney

    Question. The U.S. Senate remains committed to supporting Ukraine 
and pushing back on Putin's evil expansionist war. I remain concerned, 
however, that we are only supporting Ukraine from collapsing, as 
compared to winning. One cannot win a war purely using defensive 
measures. Does this Administration support building up Ukraine's 
offensive capabilities such that the Ukrainians can expel Russia from 
Ukrainian territory?

    Answer. We have tailored our assistance to meet Ukraine's evolving 
military requirements, for both offensive and defensive operations. 
Along with support from our Allies and partners, our assistance has 
included Stinger and Javelin systems that blunted the original Russian 
assault on Kyiv, as well as artillery systems, air defense systems, and 
armored fighting vehicles that enabled the successful recapture of 
large swaths of Ukrainian territory. Our ongoing assistance efforts are 
meant to strengthen both Ukraine's short-term security needs, and long-
term defense, to ensure Russia cannot simply re-prosecute this war in a 
few months or a few years.

    Question. Some have suggested that the United States' support for 
Ukraine is diminishing our resources and reserves such that we can't 
effectively address the China threat. China is the greatest 
geostrategic threat of the coming decades--but our support for Ukraine 
can both limit Russia's ability to bolster China's power and show that 
the United States unequivocally supports free nations attacked by 
expansionist powers. What, if any, empirical evidence does the 
Administration have on how U.S. support for Ukraine impacts our 
preparedness regarding the threats in the Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. DoD has confirmed that no equipment purchased by Taiwan via 
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process has been diverted to Ukraine, 
and, to date, equipment transferred to Ukraine through PDA had no 
negative impact on Taiwan's delivery timelines for defense articles 
already on contract through FMS. U.S. and allies' coordinated, large-
scale support for Ukraine should be a warning to adversaries with 
expansionist desires about what to expect in response to a range of 
contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. China is also watching Russia's war 
in Ukraine closely, and allied resolve to stand with Ukraine for as 
long as it takes.

    Question. Does this Administration believe that U.S. support for 
Ukraine undermines our ability to address the China threat?

    Answer. No.

    Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that 
people become desensitized to the tragedy being inflicted on the 
Ukrainian people. How many civilians have been causalities of Putin's 
murderous invasion?

    Answer. According to an estimate from the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, as of January 30, more than 7,100 
Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than 11,500 injured due 
to Russia's war. The actual number is likely higher. The International 
Organization for Migration estimates there are close to 6 million 
Ukrainian internally displaced persons, and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees estimates there are nearly 8 million refugees recorded 
across Europe since February 2022. As Putin failed to achieve his aims 
on the battlefield, Russia's forces began deliberately targeting 
civilians and civilian infrastructure, including residences, hospitals, 
train stations, cultural and religious institutions, schools, and the 
energy grid in the middle of winter. To give one recent example, on 
January 14, a Russian ballistic missile that hit a residential building 
in Dnipro killed at least 45 civilians, including six children, injured 
79, and rendered more than 1,000 homeless.

    Question. How many refugees have resulted from Putin's war, both 
internal to Ukraine and external to Ukraine?

    Answer. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports via its Ukraine 
Refugee Situation Operational Data Portal that approximately 8 million 
refugees from Ukraine were recorded across Europe as of January 26, 
2023. They calculate this number based on data provided to them by 
authorities in European countries hosting refugees from Ukraine.
    The International Organization for Migration reports that as of 
January 26, 2023, there were approximately 6 million internally 
displaced persons across Ukraine.

    Question. How many people have suffered from hunger in the world 
because Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from 
Ukraine?

    Answer. In the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises updated in 
September 2022, it was estimated the global population in need of 
emergency food assistance would increase from 193 million in 2021 to 
between 205 and 211 million in 2022 due to high global food, fuel, and 
fertilizer prices resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion of 
Ukraine, as well as drought, conflict, and other shocks. The Black Sea 
Grain Initiative, brokered by the UN and Turkiye, has helped stabilize 
global food supplies and brought prices down.

    Question. How many people have been without power due to Russian 
attempts to freeze Ukrainians this winter?

    Answer. As a direct result of Russia's attacks, about 40 percent of 
Ukraine's grid is degraded or destroyed and must be replaced or 
repaired. Ukraine is managing this degraded grid through planned daily 
power outages of varying length and severity. The exact number of 
people impacted varies. These nationwide outages are best categorized 
as follows: (1) scheduled blackouts lasting from a few to many hours 
each day due to insufficient supply or to allow for repairs of damaged 
infrastructure; (2) unscheduled blackouts that may last hours, days, or 
weeks as a result of damaged infrastructure, with repairs underway; and 
(3) continual blackouts in areas of massive damage that cannot be 
repaired or are too dangerous for repair crews.

    Question. How many children does the State Department estimate have 
been taken from Ukraine and illegally transferred to Russia?

    Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned with the 
horrible impacts that Putin's war has had on children. While the State 
Department does not maintain a comprehensive numerical estimate of the 
number of children who have been taken from Ukraine and transferred to 
Russia, the State Department-supported Conflict Observatory, which 
independently compiles and documents evidence to support investigations 
of abuses during Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, has 
identified thousands of Ukraine's children who have been transferred to 
facilities under Russia's control. According to this independent 
analysis, the network of these facilities spans from Russia-occupied 
Crimea across Russia itself, from the Black Sea region to its Far East.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney

    Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that 
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian 
people.
    How many civilians have been casualties of Putin's murderous 
invasion?

    Answer. As of January 22, 2023, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported 7,068 civilians in 
Ukraine have been killed since February 24, 2022, including 438 
children, and 11,415 civilians have been injured, including 838 
children. OHCHR believes that the actual figures are considerably 
higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense 
hostilities have occurred has been delayed and many reports are still 
pending corroboration. For example, these areas include Mariupol, 
Lysychansk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk cities, where there are 
allegations of numerous civilian casualties. Most of the civilian 
casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with 
wide area effects, including air strikes, missiles, and shelling from 
artillery and rocket artillery. More than 9,900 civilian casualties--or 
more than half of the recorded total--were in Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts.

    Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that 
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian 
people.
    How many refugees have resulted from Putin's war?

    Answer. According to reporting by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of January 24, 2023, there are 8 
million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. This figure reflects individual 
refugees who have fled since February 24, 2022, and are present in 
European countries, of whom 4.9 million are registered for Temporary 
Protection or similar national protection status. Additionally, there 
are currently 5.4 million Ukrainians who are internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) inside Ukraine as a result of the war, according to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).

    Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that 
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian 
people.
    How many people have suffered from hunger in the world because 
Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from Ukraine?

    Answer. A series of political, security, and economic shocks have 
occurred since 2019, each with complex and intertwined impacts on 
global hunger. To date, no credible analysis has fully calculated the 
specific, direct impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global 
hunger. However, an assessment of existing poverty and acute hunger 
data can suggest the order of magnitude of the invasion's impacts.
    First, the World Bank estimates that global shocks since 2019 
resulted in an additional 89 million extremely poor people in 2022. The 
World Bank analysis does not break down this figure by specific driver 
(e.g., COVID-19, global prices, etc). However, a multi-country analysis 
conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute suggests 
that one third of this total, equivalent to roughly 30 million people, 
can be attributed to global price increases that occurred between 2019 
and 2022. These increases in global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices 
were driven by a combination of factors in addition to Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine, including the People's Republic of China's 
restriction on fertilizer exports, reduced crop production in some key 
exporting countries, and increased global demand related to economic 
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Second, in terms of acute hunger, the Global Report on Food Crises 
suggests that the global population in need of emergency food 
assistance rose from 193 million in 2021 to 205-211 million in 2022. 
One driver of this increase (12-18 million people) was high global 
food, fuel, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine, though drought, conflict, and other shocks also played a 
significant role.

    Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that 
everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian 
people.
    How many people have been without power due to Russian attempts to 
freeze Ukrainians this winter?

    Answer. Since October, Russian attacks targeting critical 
electricity infrastructure, particularly electric substations, have led 
to power system outages throughout the country. Ukraine's utilities 
have been able to repair some of the damaged equipment and/or reroute 
power along alternative routes. Still, Ukraine's transmission system 
operator, Ukrenergo, has been forced to institute rolling blackouts 
given the significant damage to critical substation equipment, such as 
transformers, which are necessary to transit electricity from power 
plants to consumption centers across the country. As such, the number 
and duration of outages across the country can vary considerably. As of 
late January, Ukraine's power system is estimated to be able to meet 
about 75 percent of normal customer demand, but it has at times fallen 
below 50 percent due to rolling outages and/or restoration timelines 
following attacks.

    Question. I'm continually struck by the generosity of the American 
people in sending over goods and funds to Ukraine. Whether it's food, 
clothing, or generators, I know that Utahans remain firmly committed to 
supporting the Ukrainian people.
    For those who are still willing to help through donations, beyond 
money transfers, what supplies are most needed on the ground in 
Ukraine?

    Answer. In order to maximize the effectiveness and speed of 
international assistance during any international disaster, the proven 
best practice to help the most people the fastest remains cash 
donations to reputable relief organizations, rather than the cumbersome 
and uneven process of in-kind donations. Unlike material donations, 
cash involves no transportation costs, shipping delays, or customs 
fees. It also enables relief organizations to spend more time providing 
aid by spending less time managing goods. This is particularly the case 
given the complex operating environment inside Ukraine. Financial 
donations remain the best way that generous Utahns can help 
humanitarian partners to procure any supplies that are needed for the 
ongoing humanitarian response--and such assistance can be used 
immediately.
    To support those generously looking to assist, USAID manages our 
Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) website 
(CIDI.org), which provides a list of organizations that can be 
supported through cash donations and information on how to donate. For 
businesses and private sector actors looking to assist, the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Global 
Compact, and the UN Connecting Business Initiative (CBi) have also 
released a business guide, ``OCHA Business Guide: Ukraine Humanitarian 
Crisis'' to support the engagement of the private sector in the Ukraine 
response.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Media reports on a letter bomb campaign targeting our 
Embassy in Spain cited unnamed U.S. officials claiming the perpetrators 
acted under the direction of Russian intelligence. Regardless of the 
credibility of this assessment, how likely is the general threat of 
Russian asymmetrical tactics against U.S. interests?

    Answer. Russian malign influence remains a significant threat to 
U.S. interests and the interests of our Allies and partners. Russia's 
aggression against Ukraine clearly demonstrates Moscow's willingness to 
undermine the norms of the international system. Russia is engaged in 
overt and covert campaigns to undermine core institutions, including 
NATO and the EU, and to weaken faith in democratic governments and in 
the free-market system. These campaigns are aggressive and coordinated. 
The Department will continue to work with interagency and likeminded 
Allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence through a 
variety of tools.

    Question. How is the Administration working to ensure the safety of 
our civilian personnel and facilities in the face of this kind of 
hybrid threat?

    Answer. Department personnel serving overseas face and overcome 
challenges daily in their effort to provide a safe and secure 
environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Between November 21 
and December 7, 2022, there were approximately 20 suspicious packages 
received at various embassies and diplomatic facilities throughout 
Europe. In response, the Department sent out notices to every U.S. 
Mission instructing security personnel to review their security posture 
and mail screening procedures and further discuss with host nation law 
enforcement. Department policy requires all external mail to be 
screened for explosive and other materials at established offsite 
facilities. This is what occurred at the Embassy in Madrid when 
explosives were detected.

    Question. Noting your mention of a deepening partnership with 
Tbilisi, can you explain why Georgia continues to maintain a 
nonreciprocal visa-free regime for Russian citizens?

    Answer. With 20 percent of its sovereign territory still under 
Russian occupation, Georgians know all too well the effects of Russia's 
aggression. Questions on Georgia's visa regime are best directed to the 
Government of Georgia. At the same time, it is crucial for the Georgian 
Government to provide safe-haven to those fleeing repression, including 
from Russia.

    Question. To what degree does Georgia's Russia policy undermine 
U.S. and allied efforts to maintain maximum pressure on the Russian 
economy?

    Answer. Georgia has complied with international financial sanctions 
against Russia and continues to work to comply with export controls. 
The United States is working with Georgian authorities, border police, 
customs, and government agencies to bolster these compliance efforts. 
Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of Georgia, and Georgia works 
through the Geneva International Discussions and other venues to 
counter Russia's aggression. The United States is working to ensure 
Georgia has the capacity to comply with international sanctions against 
Russia.

    Question. Provided Georgia addresses the EU's governance 
priorities, what is your assessment of its candidate status?

    Answer. The European Council's unanimous decision to grant European 
perspective status to Georgia is an important step that recognizes the 
European aspirations of the Georgian people. This step keeps Georgia on 
the path to EU membership and the security, prosperity, and western 
integration that comes with it. We continue to press Georgia's 
government to undertake the meaningful reforms called for by the 
European Commission for EU candidacy status.
    Georgia's road to EU candidate status is clear and achievable. We 
have strongly urged the government to seize this opportunity and work 
with stakeholders across Georgian society to enact and implement the 
necessary steps as laid out by the European Commission. We expect the 
EU will review Georgia's candidate status application again by the end 
of 2023.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. An asymmetric escalation of Russian tactics reminds us of 
the sobering reality that our implementing partners present a very 
attractive target for adversaries. How is USAID working to preserve 
their security without overly constraining their ability to work where 
U.S. assistance is most needed?

    Answer. USAID has prioritized the safety and security of its 
implementing partners working inside Ukraine. At Ukraine Mission 
implementing partner (IP) meetings, USAID's Office for Security (SEC) 
provides security briefings along with practical guidance for both 
organizational and personal safety and security. Since Russia's full 
scale invasion of Ukraine, IPs have augmented their security staff and 
refined their security plans. USAID SEC has met directly and virtually 
with our IPs to provide their expertise as they refine their security 
plans. USAID maintains a very close relationship with the Embassy 
Regional Security Officer (RSO) team. In December, the Ukraine Regional 
Contracting Office organized a security-specific briefing, led by 
Embassy RSO, for our IPs. As appropriate, USAID also masks 
international and national non-governmental organization (NGO) partner 
names in public communications to further protect their safety. USAID 
also removed reports and evaluations from the Development Experience 
Clearinghouse (DEC)--a public database housing USAID reports and 
evaluations--as they may contain personal identifiable information. Our 
implementers continue to submit reports and evaluations to the DEC, 
however information is only visible internally within USAID. No public 
reports are visible--for safety reasons--as they may mention names of 
partners, civil society organizations, and individual names.
    As part of the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) 
application process, we ask applicants to submit safety and security 
plans that reflect robust analysis and planning around facts in the 
operating environment that impact safety and security. During the 
application process, applicants also articulate the resources needed 
for their safety and security for USAID/BHA consideration. USAID/BHA 
also funds two organizations, including the United Nations Department 
for Safety and Security (UNDSS), specifically to provide common safety 
and security services to the humanitarian community in Ukraine. These 
services include real-time reporting about security threats and 
incidents.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Noting Russia's ongoing difficulties procuring key 
components for its defense industry, can you speak to the effect on its 
military readiness in the region?

    Answer. Despite degradations in its ability to procure key 
components for its defense industry--thanks to sanctions and export 
controls imposed by the international community--Russia remains a 
formidable near-peer adversary, and its ability to rapidly reconstitute 
its military inventory should not be taken for granted. Ensuring a 
long-term strategic failure for Russian aggression will rely on a 
whole-of-government effort combined with commitments from Allies and 
partners.

    Question. Seeing its very public losses on the battlefield, what is 
the long-term reputational impact on Russia given its status as a 
regional guarantor of security for its allies?

    Answer. Russia's international standing has eroded as a result of 
its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but Russia continues in its 
attempts to project influence around the globe. However, one only needs 
to look to Russia's neighbors to see how it is failing. Among the 
countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate, Russia's 
reputation is fraying. In Moldova, Armenia, and the states of Central 
Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable security 
partner.

    Question. Noting Russia's formal defense pacts--and Iran's sales of 
military hardware to Moscow--does Russia use the territory in these 
countries as a waystation for Iranian arms shipments? And if so, how is 
the Administration working to block the trafficking of these arms?

    Answer. The Administration is using all the tools at our disposal, 
including working with our Allies and partners, to stop and prevent all 
support for Russia and its war effort. We are monitoring trade data to 
identify jurisdictions where problematic transfers may be occurring to 
prevent the movement of defense materiel or transactions in support of 
this activity.

    Question. What actions should the Administration pursue in Mali to 
undermine the influence of the Wagner Group?

    Answer. The United States Government employs a ``3D'' (development, 
diplomacy, and defense) approach in Mali, subject to U.S. legal and 
policy restrictions on cooperation with post-transition leaders in 
Mali, and those leaders' willingness to work with the United States and 
our allies and partners. We also continue to highlight to the Malian 
transition government Wagner's human rights abuses against host 
populations and other destabilizing activities, such as depleting 
national resources for Wagner's own gain and undermining host nations' 
control over their own territory. The Wagner Group has not improved 
security anywhere it has deployed, including in Mali. To the contrary, 
it has complicated and deepened conflicts.

    Question. The Biden administration has consistently extended a 
waiver that allows the United States to provide security and other 
assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. To what extent has the 
waiver extension translated into substantive U.S. military assistance 
for Azerbaijan since its 2020 hostilities with Armenia?

    Answer. U.S. military assistance for Azerbaijan has declined 
considerably since the fall 2020 hostilities between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. This assistance has been focused on International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) programs that work to strengthen ties 
between the U.S. and Azerbaijani militaries, increase interoperability, 
and provide English language programs to increase the exposure of 
Azerbaijani military personnel to U.S. and western military values. All 
assistance to Azerbaijan is carefully evaluated to ensure compliance so 
that it is provided consistent with Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support 
Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) and the related waiver of that restriction. 
It is provided on terms that clarify both the intended purposes and 
limitations of the use of such assistance, is carefully calibrated to 
ensure it does not undermine or hamper efforts to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement with Armenia, and is not to be used for offensive purposes.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. Do you agree that the U.S. needs to ban Russian uranium?

    Answer. Russia uses energy exports, including in the nuclear 
sector, to exert political and economic pressure on its customers 
globally. G7 nations have resolved to reduce their reliance on Russian 
nuclear energy supplies and services and to help other countries 
seeking to do the same. Several countries have taken important steps in 
this direction, most recently Bulgaria. Consistent with our G7 pledge, 
State is working with other departments and agencies to identify 
alternatives, and we welcome Congressional support for that effort.

    Question. What is the threat posed by the United States continuing 
to be dependent upon Russia for energy?

    Answer. Russia leverages national and regional dependencies on 
Russian energy to expand its political, economic, and military 
influence and to undermine transatlantic security and foreign policy 
interests. In March 2022, the Administration banned imports of Russian 
oil and petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and coal. We are 
working with allies and partners to identify ways to further reduce 
dependence on Russian energy, both in the United States and globally. 
Consistent with our G7 pledge, the Administration is working to 
identify alternatives to Russian enriched uranium supply, and we 
welcome Congressional support for that effort.

    Question. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 
2022, Congress has passed four supplemental appropriations packages 
that included funding for Ukraine. In total we have approved roughly 
$113 billion. This includes $49 billion military aid, $41 billion in 
economic aid and $23 billion for U.S. military operations in Europe and 
other U.S. agencies: What steps is the Administration taking to ensure 
this funding is not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into 
the wrong hands?

    Answer. We have focused on oversight and accountability from the 
beginning. All budgetary support is disbursed through the World Bank 
mechanism only after verification. Deloitte is there permanently to 
audit the auditors. We have increased embassy staff, led by Ambassador 
Brink, to focus on technical oversight, and increased OIG oversight 
from State, USAID, and DoD with regular reporting to Congress. Finally, 
we have an effective and comprehensive plan to prevent any diversion of 
weapons systems.

    Question. Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or 
weapon systems falling into Russia's control?

    Answer. The Pentagon reports it has seen no credible evidence of 
diversion. We take every allegation of the capture of our military 
equipment or weapon systems seriously, anywhere in the world. There is 
an inherent risk of weapons capture and diversion on the battlefield in 
any armed conflict, and it is reasonable to believe that Russian forces 
have captured some Ukrainian weapons, which may include U.S.-origin 
equipment or weapon systems. We cannot speak to what Russia does with 
equipment it may capture on the battlefield. However, we can 
confidently say Russia is constantly spreading disinformation regarding 
weapons diversion in its bid to both discredit Kyiv and distract the 
international community from its invasion of Ukraine.

    Question. Do you estimate we will need further supplemental 
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?

    Answer. The Administration appreciates the supplemental 
appropriations Congress provided to support the U.S. response to 
Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale assault on Ukraine. 
Despite this historic support, Ukraine faces monumental challenges in 
funding the defense of its nation and our values, meeting the needs of 
its people, and ultimately, recovering. We will be forward-leaning in 
utilizing our available funding to address the highest needs and in 
working with other donors to leverage additional support to help meet 
Ukraine's budget gaps and assistance needs. Given the fluidity of the 
situation on the ground, we will continue to assess requirements and 
available resources to meet those needs.

    Question. How can programs be properly evaluated and monitored with 
the current restrictions on civilian personnel and in a deteriorating 
security environment?

    Answer. Embassy Kyiv's team remains engaged with interagency 
partners and the Government of Ukraine on accountability issues related 
to all foreign assistance, including budget support. This engagement 
includes regular assistance oversight meetings. In addition, State, 
USAID, and DoD Inspectors General have increased the frequency and 
scope of their oversight reporting on U.S. assistance. On budget 
support funds, State works closely with USAID and the Department of the 
Treasury to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability of these 
funds. The mechanisms to ensure budget support accountability include 
World Bank verification of expenditures, third-party monitoring through 
Deloitte, and Embassy Kyiv reviews of updates provided by Deloitte.

    Question. What are biggest challenges in safely and quickly 
delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine?

    Answer. Our humanitarian partners bravely deliver assistance to 
Ukraine in highly challenging circumstances while encountering major 
obstacles, including: the difficult security environment in portions of 
the country that are active war zones; populations living in areas 
under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation, which 
are hard to access and have severe needs; Russia's ongoing 
infrastructure attacks and its impact on humanitarians' ability to 
operate; and harsh winter conditions that hamper humanitarian activity.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. On November 4, 2022, Sabrina Singh, Deputy Pentagon Press 
Secretary said: ``In terms of why aren't we providing new tanks or 
American tanks, introducing a new main battle tank is extremely costly, 
it's time-sensitive, and it would be a huge undertaking for the 
Ukrainian forces.'' Press Secretary Singh said it was time sensitive 
that we provide the Ukrainians with old refurbished Russian T-72 tanks. 
This was almost 3 months ago. We lost almost 3 months of training the 
Ukrainians on the Abrams tank. The M1 Abrams tank is right next door in 
Poland. I have seen the tanks at the training area myself.
    What steps is the Administration taking to ensure this funding is 
not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into the wrong 
hands?

    Answer. Last October, the Administration released the ``U.S. Plan 
to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons 
in Eastern Europe,'' which outlines how the United States is 
proactively working to prevent the diversion of weapons from Ukraine. 
The plan highlights three priorities: ensuring accountability, 
enhancing border security, and building partner capacity.
    Consistent with these objectives, DoD has adapted its 
accountability practices for the combat environment; for example by 
expanding self-reporting mechanisms for Ukraine, including by using 
improved technologies, and conducting site inspections to verify 
inventories of U.S.-provided equipment (when security conditions 
permit).
    DoD is also supporting broader U.S. Government outreach to Allies 
and partners to promote multilateral cooperation to prevent arms 
trafficking.

    Question. Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or 
weapon systems falling into Russia's control?

    Answer. We are aware that Russia has captured relatively small 
numbers of U.S.-provided weapons when it has overrun Ukrainian 
positions. This is inevitable in war zones, and is a risk that DoD 
factors into its calculus prior to providing security assistance.
    However, the fact remains that DoD has not seen credible evidence 
of the diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons by 
Ukraine. Unfortunately, Russia continues to aggressively push 
disinformation and false reports of arms trafficking in an attempt to 
erode Kyiv's credibility and international support for Ukraine.

    Question. Do you estimate we will need further supplemental 
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?

    Answer. The supplemental funding provided by Congress alongside the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 has been critical in supporting 
Ukraine on the battlefield to ensure it has the strongest hand at the 
negotiating table when that time comes. Each individual account line 
has contributed to battlefield gains.
    Our requests are always conditions based, and we expect to evaluate 
the need for additional funding as the situation evolves.

    Question. What are the key components to Ukraine's strategy to 
drive Russians from occupied territory?

    Answer. Ultimately, Ukraine determines its own strategy, but 
Ukrainian resolve has proven critical to Ukraine's success in pushing 
back Russia's brutality. The tremendous sacrifice and bravery of the 
men and women of Ukraine as they defend their homeland with grit and 
ingenuity has been the catalyst for repelling Russia's attacks and 
regaining control over sovereign Ukrainian territory.
    Broad international support for Ukraine has also been essential. 
The eighth meeting of Secretary Austin's Ukraine Defense Contact Group 
on January 20, 2023 again demonstrated the wide-sweeping support for 
Ukraine, both in political terms as well as in security assistance with 
the largest amount of donations committed by Ukraine's partners to 
date.

    Question. What is the Administration's strategy to help Ukraine 
defend its people, and push Russia out?

    Answer. As the Secretary of Defense has said, we are ``moving 
heaven and earth'' to get Ukraine the capabilities they urgently need 
to defend themselves and retake territory. To date, with the support of 
Congress, the Administration's efforts have amounted to more than $27.1 
billion in security assistance since Russia's unprovoked, full-scale 
invasion. This assistance has included hundreds of armored vehicles, 
more than 1 million rounds of artillery, thousands of arms, and key air 
defense capabilities.

    Question. What is your assessment of Russia's military actions so 
far?

    Answer. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 
2022, the Russian military has failed to achieve its strategic or 
operational objectives. Russian forces have suffered enormous 
casualties on the battlefield, have lost hundreds of pieces of military 
equipment, and have expended significant numbers of precision and other 
munitions. Russia's frequent changes in operational commanders, its 
reliance on Wagner fighters, and its turn to external support from Iran 
and North Korea are all indicators of its military failures.

    Question. What weapons and equipment have been the most beneficial 
to the Ukrainian military?

    Answer. Ukraine's battlefield requirements have evolved over time. 
At the outset of Russia's full-scale invasion, surging Stinger air 
defense and Javelin anti-tank missiles proved critical. As the war 
shifted to the south and east, the decision to provide HIMARS helped 
Ukraine seize the momentum from Russia. Air defense became more 
important as Russia's indiscriminate widespread air attacks increased 
and we've committed key air defense systems, including NASAMS and 
Patriot. In recent weeks, we have been laser-focused on getting Ukraine 
more armored maneuver capability, which will enable them to continue to 
push Russia further back and retake more territory.

    Question. What are the greatest challenges to the Russian security 
forces?

    Answer. Throughout the last year of conflict, Russian forces in 
Ukraine have faced significant challenges with command and control, 
logistics, and morale, among other issues. To increase the number of 
military personnel available for the war, Russian leadership had to 
institute a mobilization drive in fall 2022. Russian stocks of 
equipment and munitions have also been diminished as a result of the 
conflict, as indicated by Russia's efforts to obtain supplies from Iran 
and North Korea.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. In response to my question on how the Biden 
administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to improve burden-sharing 
and increase their relative contribution of total assistance to 
Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S. allies and partners 
roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January 27, 2023, Congress 
has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to provide assistance 
to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war since Russia's 
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these appropriations 
laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S. assistance. As tracked 
by Germany's Kiel Institute--a reliable open-source database--aid from 
non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of November 20, 2022 while 
assistance from the United States to Ukraine totaled $66 billion during 
the same period. In other words, the United States provided the bulk of 
total aid to Ukraine--62 percent--during this time period. Moreover, 
Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent of the weaponry--in dollar 
value--received by Ukraine in this period has come from the United 
States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country's total bilateral 
assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian defense contact 
group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80 percent), Poland (0.49 
percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32 percent), and the 
United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United States (0.22 
percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08 percent of 
GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance to Ukraine 
during this period. Please note that none of the statistics from Kiel 
Institute's dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law ($47.3 
billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative 
contributions. Under Secretary Nuland, do you disagree with any of this 
open-source data that I've summarized?

    Answer. The United States continues to work closely with allies and 
partners around the world to provide Ukraine the vital assistance it 
needs to defend itself against Russian aggression. From February 2022 
through early April 2023, the United States has provided $56.9 billion 
in economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. While we 
are not in a position to validate the data gathered by nongovernmental 
organizations, we currently estimate that our allies and partners have 
provided approximately $60.7 billion in aid to Ukraine across all 
sectors during that same timeframe. We will continue to prioritize 
discussions with other nations to share in the responsibility we all 
bear to ensure Russia's strategic failure in Ukraine.

    Question. Would you like to clarify, expand, or amend your claim 
that allied and partner contributions to aid Ukraine and affected 
countries are roughly equal to U.S. contributions in the aggregate? I 
would appreciate it if you could provide the data used to substantiate 
your claim and its source. I request the data also be broken down by 
military, economic, and humanitarian/other assistance categories.

    Answer. U.S. allies and partners are assisting Ukraine in numerous 
ways. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, since February 2022, 
Ukraine has received $29.7 billion in budget support from non-U.S. 
donors, of which $15.8 billion is from EU institutions and member 
states, compared to $18 billion from the United States. EU institutions 
and member states and other donors have provided $3.7 billion in 
humanitarian aid, nearly double the United States' $1.9 billion 
contribution. EU countries are also bearing the financial burden of 
hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees (out of a total of 8 million 
refugees). Since February 2022, the United States has provided 
approximately $35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. Allies and 
partners worldwide have provided or committed over $24 billion in 
security assistance, and these contributions continue to accrue.

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    Question. On the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA): In 
response to my question on whether the Biden intends to use emergency 
PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign military sales 
backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the time and requested 
an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan's arms backlog remains 
roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon officials' assessment that 
China will be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The FY 2023 National 
Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1 billion per year in PDA to 
transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the event of an emergency--the 
same authorization that President Joe Biden used to send billions of 
dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against Russia's invasion. Since 
February 2022, the Biden administration has directed 30 drawdowns under 
PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in weaponry from the 
Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers, and Javelins. Under 
Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the 
current backlog in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19 
billion? If not, please provide the updated statistic.

    Answer. Claims of a $19 billion FMS backlog to Taiwan are 
misleading. An FMS contract is often signed and funded months or years 
after the Congressional Notification to the Hill, and U.S. defense 
companies only start production after the contract is signed and 
funded. While many of Taiwan's FMS cases are delivered by the mutually 
agreed upon date in the contract paperwork, the actual, final delivery 
date is driven by the manufacturer and other factors external to State 
or Congressional control. That date is often only publicized if late. 
Our experts would be happy to provide you and your staff a briefing on 
the specifics of the current FMS pipeline for Taiwan.

    Question. Under Secretary Nuland, why is the Administration not 
invoking PDA to proactively provide arms necessary for Taiwan to deter 
a possible Chinese invasion of the island?

    Answer. The Administration is grateful for Congress' enactment of 
this authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resiliency Act, and we are 
actively discussing how best to exercise the $1 billion drawdown. We 
recognize that military assistance drawdowns are one of the U.S. 
Government's most valuable tools to provide defense articles to foreign 
partners quickly. There are numerous policy and national security 
implications the United States must consider before the President 
decides to authorize a drawdown that would pull from DoD inventory. The 
Administration looks forward to discussing the results of this review 
with Congress in the coming months.

    Question. Under Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander, 
to what extent has the United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA 
that could also be used for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?

    Answer. Many of our partners have similar defense needs, and there 
are similarities and differences between the capabilities Taiwan and 
Ukraine need to effectively maintain their self-defense. We are 
supporting both partners simultaneously and in a manner that does not 
detract from either. There are technical considerations involved, 
including whether DoD stock can be released to Ukraine and Taiwan.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the 
U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S. 
weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible 
major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific? In response to my question 
on how the Biden administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to 
improve burden-sharing and increase their relative contribution of 
total assistance to Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S. 
allies and partners roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January 
27, 2023, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to 
provide assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war 
since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these 
appropriations laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S. 
assistance. As tracked by Germany's Kiel Institute--a reliable open-
source database --aid from non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of 
November 20, 2022 while assistance from the United States to Ukraine 
totaled $66 billion during the same period. In other words, the United 
States provided the bulk of total aid to Ukraine--62 percent--during 
this time period. Moreover, Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent 
of the weaponry--in dollar value--received by Ukraine in this period 
has come from the United States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country's 
total bilateral assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian 
defense contact group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80 
percent), Poland (0.49 percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32 
percent), and the United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United 
States (0.22 percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08 
percent of GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance 
to Ukraine during this period. Please note that none of the statistics 
from Kiel Institute's dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law 
($47.3 billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative 
contributions.

    Answer. DoD and State are working closely with the defense 
industrial base to assess current needs, project future requirements in 
the Indo-Pacific and globally, and lessen supply chain bottlenecks 
negatively impacting production timelines. Through this process, the 
Administration has been able to improve production timelines for 
several weapons, including Javelins, Stingers, and HIMARS. The 
Executive Branch is reviewing our processes to ensure defense 
acquisitions proceed as quickly as possible, and we look forward to 
collaborating with Congress on potential mechanisms to incentivize 
defense partners to expand production capacity.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. In response to my question on whether the Biden intends 
to use emergency PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign 
military sales backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the 
time and requested an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan's 
arms backlog remains roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon 
officials' assessment that China will be capable of invading Taiwan by 
2027. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1 
billion per year in PDA to transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the 
event of an emergency--the same authorization that President Joe Biden 
used to send billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against 
Russia's invasion. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has 
directed 30 drawdowns under PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in 
weaponry from the Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers, 
and Javelins.
    Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the current backlog in 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19 billion? If not, please 
provide the updated statistic.

    Answer. DoD assesses the claim of a $19 billion FMS backlog to 
Taiwan to be misleading. Actual contracts for arms and services 
announced in Congressional Notifications are often signed and funded 
months or years after an announced Congressional Notification. U.S. 
defense companies only start production after the contract is signed, 
and many of Taiwan's FMS cases are scheduled to be delivered by the 
mutually agreed-upon date in the contract paperwork.

    Question. Assistant Secretary Wallander, to what extent has the 
United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA that could also be used 
for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?

    Answer. Support to Ukraine and support to Taiwan are not mutually 
exclusive. We continue to work diligently to provide asymmetric 
capabilities to Taiwan, including anti-ship missiles, command control 
networks and secure communication systems, data links, early warning 
radar, and integrated air and missile defense, as fast as possible 
while also making sure Ukraine can defend itself against Russian 
aggression. Although some of the systems we have transferred to Ukraine 
under presidential drawdown align with some of Taiwan's priorities for 
acquisition, it is important to reiterate that this is not a zero-sum 
game.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the 
U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S. 
weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible 
major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. Thanks to Congressional support, the Department is 
replenishing stocks of munitions transferred to Ukraine. The Department 
is working with industry to increase production of certain capabilities 
to continue meeting the needs of Ukrainian forces, while ensuring the 
United States is ready to defend itself, our partners, and Allies.
    The Department, through the Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive 
(MIDD), has identified over 2 billion dollars of industrial base 
investments to increase and/or accelerate production of Javelin, 
Singer, HIMARS, GMLRS, 155mm artillery shells, and Patriot missiles, In 
addition, the Department is leveraging lessons learned from supporting 
the Ukraine conflict, as well as from its supply chain resiliency 
analyses, to utilize various authorities to make the munitions supply 
chain more resilient, increase its capacity, and maintain its 
readiness.
    More broadly, the Department has found that the traditional 
munitions procurement practices resulted in ``feast or famine'' cycles 
that created instability in the industrial base and incentivized 
production sized only to current demand, with little slack for any 
surges in demand. In addition, some munitions that are in high demand 
by foreign partners--such as Stinger missiles--are not currently in use 
by the U.S. military and therefore did not have active production 
lines.
    The authorities passed in the FY23 NDAA will provide the Department 
the ability to lock in critical munitions investments, send a stable 
demand signal to the munitions industrial base, and respond more 
quickly to future contingencies. This includes Multi-year procurements 
as well as the ability to purchase long-lead items for some key 
systems. Long-term industrial base resilience will depend on increased 
use of these authorities as well as consistent buying behavior, to send 
the appropriate demand signals to industry, authorizing suppliers to 
acquire long-lead-time items in advance, to reduce future production 
times, and establishing additional U.S. and allied sources for critical 
components.
                                 ______
                                 

   Letter to Secretary Blinken, Dated August 4, 2020, About Plans To 
                  Nominate a Special Envoy to Belarus

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