[Senate Hearing 118-106]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 118-106

                  LESSONS LEARNED: 10 YEARS SINCE THE BOSTON 
                             MARATHON BOMBINGS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                EMERGING THREATS AND SPENDING OVERSIGHT

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS


                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 26, 2023

                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov       
  

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
        
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                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-435 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MITT ROMNEY, Utah
ALEX PADILLA, California             RICK SCOTT, Florida
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
           William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                   Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk


        SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND SPENDING OVERSIGHT

                 MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire, Chairman
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida

                    Jason M. Yanussi, Staff Director
              Jillian R. Joyce, Professional Staff Member
           Scott Maclean Richardson, Minority Staff Director
        Margaret E. Frankel, Minority Professional Staff Member
                      Kate Kielceski, Chief Clerk
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Hassan...............................................     1
    Senator Romney...............................................     2
    Senator Rosen................................................    15
Prepared statements:
    Senator Hassan...............................................    25
    Senator Romney...............................................    27

                               WITNESSES
                       Wednesday, April 26, 2023

Hon. Richard A. Serino, Distinguished Senior Fellow, National 
  Preparedness Leadership Institute, Harvard University..........     4
Kerry Sleeper, Special Advisor, Secure Community Network.........     6
Edward Davis, Former Commissioner, Boston Police Department......     9

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Davis, Edward:
    Testimony....................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    39
Serino, Hon. Richard A.:
    Testimony....................................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................    28
Sleeper, Kerry:
    Testimony....................................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................    33

 
      LESSONS LEARNED: 10 YEARS SINCE THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2023

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                       Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
                                        Spending Oversight,
                    of the Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in 
room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Margaret Wood 
Hassan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Hassan [presiding], Sinema, Rosen, 
Ossoff, Romney, and Scott.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN\1\

    Senator Hassan. Last week marked the 10th anniversary of 
the terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon. We organized 
today's hearing to examine how the response to the Boston 
Marathon bombing impacted emergency preparedness and homeland 
security in the decade since they occurred, how law enforcement 
and first responders have improved their planning and response 
efforts, and what additional actions we may still need to take 
to secure community events as threats to the homeland emerge 
and evolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Hassan appears in the 
Appendix on page 25.
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    I am honored to welcome our distinguished witnesses: Ed 
Davis, former Commissioner of the Boston Police Department; 
Rich Serino, who served as the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Deputy Administrator and also as Chief of Boston 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS); and Kerry Sleeper, who served 
as a State Homeland Security Advisor and also as Assistant 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
    Before we begin our discussion, I would like to take a 
moment to acknowledge and honor the victims of the Boston 
Marathon bombing and the manhunt that followed. We must never 
forget the lives that were lost--Krystle Campbell, Lu Lingzi, 
Martin Richard, Officer Sean Collier, and Sergeant Dennis 
Simmonds. Our hearts go out to their families, their friends, 
and their communities.
    We must also acknowledge the physical and emotional toll 
that this tragedy has taken on countless individuals and 
families. Our thoughts remain with all those who were affected 
by the cowardly attack 10 years ago, and we are deeply grateful 
for the dedicated efforts of our first responders and law 
enforcement officials who worked to save lives and bring those 
responsible to justice.
    The Boston Marathon bombing was a senseless act of violence 
that claimed the lives of three civilians and two law 
enforcement officers, and injured hundreds more. It turned a 
worldwide sporting event, and a local celebration of patriotism 
and pride, into a scene of carnage and mayhem. It was a stark 
reminder of the ongoing threat of terrorism and the importance 
of being prepared to respond to emergencies of all kinds. The 
attack also highlighted the resilience and strength of the 
Boston and New England community, and the bravery and 
dedication of our emergency responders and law enforcement 
officials.
    Since the Boston Marathon bombing, we have made significant 
strides in enhancing our emergency preparedness and 
counterterrorism efforts. We have improved intelligence sharing 
and analysis, and invested in training and resources for our 
emergency responders. We have also invested in resources to 
strengthen security of what we call soft targets--from 
community events to National Football League (NFL) games--using 
shared best practices and funding provided through FEMA's 
Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). We learned that 
critical emergency response tools, like tourniquets and 
priority cellular service for first responders, are necessary 
to save lives.
    As a New Englander, I am proud of the rapid response to the 
horror of the attack on that day, and last week, on the 10th 
anniversary of the bombing, I was proud to watch joyful crowds 
urging on determined race participants. However, there is still 
much work to do to strengthen our ability to prevent and 
respond to emerging threats.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity to reflect on the 
progress we have made over the past 10 years and identify areas 
where further improvements can be made. Our distinguished 
witnesses have a wealth of expertise in emergency management 
and law enforcement, and I look forward to hearing their 
insights and recommendations for enhancing our emergency 
preparedness and counterterrorism efforts.
    Thank you. I will now recognize Ranking Member Romney for 
his opening remarks.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY\1\

    Senator Romney. Thank you, Chair Hassan, for convening this 
panel. Two of them, at least, are long-term friends. 
Commissioner Davis and I worked together when he was 
Superintendent of the police department in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, and then became Commissioner in Boston. Rick 
Serino and I, as well, have also worked together and he has 
been a real force in our community and nationally. I do not 
know Mr. Sleeper as well, but I presume I will be more informed 
by the time this day is over.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Romney appears in the 
Appendix on page 27.
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    I appreciate the witnesses that are here, able to describe 
some of the lessons we have learned from that terrible tragedy 
a decade ago and to help us understand what things we can do to 
improve our readiness for potential acts of devastation in the 
future.
    Obviously, in the years that have passed, a lot of steps 
have been taken by the public sector, the private sector, as 
well as the Federal Government to make our nation more secure. 
But we have learned from some of the security gaps that have 
existed in the past, and we have made an effort to become safer 
as a Nation.
    The coordination between Federal, State, and local agencies 
has become a high priority after September 11, 2001 (9/11), as 
well as after the bombing in Boston. That is, I think, even 
more important, following our withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
the ongoing turmoil that we are seeing in the Middle East. 
These call for continued vigilance and effort to make sure that 
we are doing everything we possibly can to protect the homeland 
and our citizens.
    I also know that the 2013 Boston Marathon attack coincided 
with the rise of social media, and I am interested in your 
perspectives on the impact of social media on the security of 
our Nation. Obviously, the number of tips that must come in to 
law enforcement is an extraordinarily large number. Finding 
ones that are likely to result in death or destruction has to 
be like looking for a needle in a haystack and how we are able 
to do that is a question of great concern.
    I am going to pause with those opening comments and make 
sure that we have the time to hear from our witnesses. But with 
that, Madam Chair, thank you for your convening of this group 
and hopefully we can learn lessons that are able to be passed 
through our Federal, State, and local communities. Thank you.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Senator Romney.
    It is the practice of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses, 
so if you all will please stand and raise your right hand.
    Do you swear that the testimony you give before this 
Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you, God?
    Mr. Serino. I do.
    Mr. Sleeper. I do.
    Mr. Davis. I do.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Please be seated.
    Our first witness today is Mr. Rich Serino. In 2013, at the 
time of the Boston Marathon bombings, Mr. Serino was serving as 
Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (COO) at FEMA. 
Prior to that, he spent 36 years with Boston Emergency Medical 
Services, where he rose through the ranks to become Chief. 
Today Mr. Serino is the Distinguished Visiting Fellow at 
Harvard University's National Preparedness Leadership 
Initiative.
    Welcome, Mr. Serino. You are recognized for your opening 
statement.

 TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD A. SERINO,\1\ DISTINGUISHED SENIOR 
 FELLOW, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE, HARVARD 
                           UNIVERSITY

    Mr. Serino. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member, and 
Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify 
here today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Serino appears in the Appendix on 
page 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ten years ago I sat testifying to the same Committee to 
highlight the preparation that took place before the attack, 
that saved hundreds of lives that devastating day. Today I am 
here to highlight and apply lessons we have learned from the 
attack to the current emerging threats across the United 
States.
    When I think back to April 15, 2013, I see my city shining. 
The streets were filled with millions of residents and visitors 
from around the world--Patriots' Day, an early Red Sox game, 
and the Marathon come together to create a day like no other. 
These are the streets where I spent 36 years working at Boston 
EMS, the streets where I grew up, the area that I still call 
home today.
    The second thing I see when I think back is a community 
that came together in the face of danger in an unprecedented 
way. In the words of the late Boston EMS Captain, Bob ``Sarge'' 
Haley, ``Everybody ran the right way that day.'' Emergency 
medical technicians (EMTs), paramedics, police officers, 
firefighters, and civilians all saved lives together that day.
    While nothing can replace those we lost, as a community we 
take solace that our preparedness saved lives. I often say it 
was no accident that Boston was prepared to respond that day. 
It was no accident that equipment was onsite. It was no 
accident that the patients were equally distributed to all the 
hospitals. It was no accident that lives were saved with 
tourniquets. Boston was strong because Boston was prepared.
    Some of the lessons we learned from the successes in the 
response have been directly applied to programs on a national 
level. We saw that tourniquets worked, and that started the 
formation of a program called ``Stop the Bleed'' that has saved 
countless lives. The Boston Public Health Commission on 
Emergency Preparedness worked with family reunification and 
mental health support. Their efforts were crucial successes in 
supporting survivors and their families.
    We now apply that same level of care in the wake of 
terrorist events in communities across the world with the 
organization ``One World Strong.'' One World Strong has helped 
thousands of survivors around the world, from the Pulse 
nightclub shooting to Las Vegas to Uvalde to Manchester, United 
Kingdom (UK), to France, and more. These are initiatives formed 
from the tragedy by survivors helping survivors, with the 
leadership of Dave Fortier, and Dave is with us here today.
    We also saw phenomenal coordination of leadership working 
across agencies, with everyone working together in their 
respective silos or as we call them ``cylinders of 
excellence.'' In the years following, many people studied the 
leaders of the response and the level of coordination. This 
exploration led to the development of ``Swarm Leadership'' from 
Harvard's National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, 
preparing hundreds of past, current, and future leaders to 
respond as effectively as those women and men did 10 years ago.
    The five key aspects of Swarm Leadership principles used 
during the Marathon response, from studying the leaders, were 
unity of mission, save lives; No. 2, the generosity of spirit 
and action, people able to help one another. We saw that in the 
community. We saw that in the Boston One Fund. Stay in your 
lane, do your job, and help others succeed. What have you got? 
What do you need? No ego, no blame. No one took credit for all 
the successes, and conversely, no one pointed fingers when 
problems arose. Having that foundation of trusting 
relationships.
    I would like to offer a special thank you to the late Mayor 
Tom Menino and Governor Patrick for their leadership before, 
during, and after. Mayor Menino and Governor Patrick set the 
tone long before the bombing in stressing the importance of 
preparing, practicing, and cooperating with compassion for 
disasters. Both leaders demonstrated the best of servant 
leadership and allowed their teams to function at their highest 
level for the greater good.
    Other lessons are less easily captured in a single 
initiative or organization. Today I want to highlight the need 
for these lessons to be broadly applied to ensure national 
security.
    After the bombing, we learned the value of recognizing the 
impact of the trauma on first responders, families, and the 
community. Now more than ever, EMTs, paramedics, police 
officers, firefighters, health care workers, emergency 
managers, and public health workers are in need of that 
recognition and support. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
has left a devastating toll on the workforce we depend on in 
the aftermath of a crisis.
    We must take care of this workforce with adequate mental 
health services, strong leadership, and cross-functional 
collaboration so they do not feel abandoned. We are leaving the 
United States exposed to catastrophic future attacks being left 
unanswered both in the context of lives and economic well-being 
if we do not take care of our workforce.
    In the response to the Marathon bombing, we also learned 
how impactful rapid, accurate, and transparent communication is 
for the whole-of-community response. Twitter was used to 
communicate crucial information to the entire city, and Ed led 
that whole part of the Twitter response. However, today in the 
face of cyberattacks, mis-and disinformation, we are starting 
to lose the trust and the ability to communicate effectively. 
We need to remember the value of crisis communication from the 
Boston Marathon and institutionalize it across Federal, State, 
local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies.
    Unlike ever before, our local emergency managers and public 
health workers are dealing with overlapping crises, or poly 
crises. It is not just floods, hurricanes, tornados, and 
wildfires anymore. It is the fentanyl epidemic, it is 
homelessness, it is immigration, it is terrorism, it is 
biosecurity and cybersecurity threats.
    We need to prioritize funding and building stronger public 
health systems, and stronger emergency management systems and 
work together on the local level, with support from the Federal 
level. Local leaders need ongoing support to maintain the 
ability to break through the purposeful disinformation aimed at 
eroding trust, so that they are able to manage everything that 
is put on their plate.
    Last, the Boston Marathon response showed us the resilience 
of a community that stands together. Yet today, we live in a 
fragmented society in the wake of COVID. There is a lack of 
social cohesion in towns and cities across the country. How can 
we bring people together again? Our nation is left weaker if we 
do not recreate that sense of community and purpose that we 
felt in Boston in April 2013.
    Emergency managers are conveners. They bring people 
together after a disaster. How can we lean on their skillset to 
help bring people together before a crisis happens to build 
resiliency?
    Let us take the lessons we have learned from the Boston 
Marathon and use them to ensure all American's health, safety, 
and well-being. Let us continue to honor the lives lost by 
preventing future disasters from becoming fatal. This moment of 
reflection on the Boston Marathon bombing is an opportunity to 
truly transform the way we recover from COVID and prepare for 
the next disaster. We can do this by supporting public health, 
emergency management, and the EMS workforce and public safety, 
regaining the ability to provide trustworthy communication, and 
finding meaningful ways to bring people together again.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 
your questions.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Serino.
    Next is Mr. Kerry Sleeper. In 2013, Mr. Sleeper was serving 
as Deputy Assistant Director at the FBI. In 2014, he was 
promoted to the position of Assistant Director for the Office 
of Partner Engagement. Mr. Sleeper was also the first Homeland 
Security Advisor (HSA) for the State of Vermont. Mr. Sleeper 
has expertise in information and intelligence sharing between 
State, local, and Federal law enforcement and private sector 
partners. He currently serves as Special Advisor to the Secure 
Community Network (SCN).
    Welcome, Mr. Sleeper. You are recognized for your opening 
statement.

    TESTIMONY OF KERRY SLEEPER,\1\ SPECIAL ADVISOR, SECURE 
                       COMMUNITY NETWORK

    Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Chair Hassan, Ranking Member 
Romney, other distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my 
privilege to appear before you today. My testimony regarding 
``Lessons Learned: ``10 Years Since the Boston Marathon 
Bombings'' will be focused on intelligence and information 
sharing efforts, those initiatives intended to prevent or 
mitigate acts of targeted violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sleeper appears in the Appendix 
on page 33.
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    In the years after 9/11 and preceding the Boston Marathon 
bombing, the domestic intelligence architecture, or the process 
of how Federal, State, and local law enforcement shared threat 
information, underwent a remarkable enhancement and 
transformation. It was understood that State and local law 
enforcement played a pivotal role in protecting their 
communities from acts of targeted violence. It followed that 
the Federal Government needed to ensure they integrated their 
intelligence efforts with their State and local partners. From 
this understanding grew critical information sharing processes 
such as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), State and 
local Fusion Centers, and the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign, also known as 
Suspicious Activity Reporting.
    With these processes in place, State and local fusion 
centers could receive sensitive or classified information from 
their Federal partners, analyze or assess that information for 
context in the communities they serve, develop intelligence 
products to share within their community to convey the threat, 
and encourage Suspicious Activity Reporting information back 
for further investigation or analysis efforts. In addition, the 
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, numbering over 200 across 
the Nation with hundreds of State and local officers assigned, 
were developed to investigate both international and domestic 
threats of terrorism.
    Both the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, the city of 
Boston's Fusion Center, and the Boston Field Office JTTF played 
critical roles in supporting intelligence and information 
sharing requirements in the security planning for the Boston 
Marathon, as well as the investigative phase and apprehension 
of the perpetrators.
    One of the most important lessons learned in the 
intelligence and information sharing efforts was that Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev was the subject of an FBI assessment prior to the 
bombing. The assessment alleged he appeared to be radicalizing 
with potential ties to foreign terrorist organizations, 
although the assessment was eventually closed for lack of 
additional information.
    The information on this assessment of Tsarnaev was not 
provided to State and local law enforcement, and the logical 
question was asked, if they had known, could they have 
disrupted the plotting? More precisely, could State and local 
law enforcement have pursued the allegation of Tsarnaev's 
radicalization beyond what the FBI Domestic Investigations and 
Operations Guide (DIOG) legally allowed?
    This question, and the lesson learned, resulted in a swift 
change in JTTF protocols for State and local JTTF members. The 
FBI clarified that the names of individuals who were the 
subject of assessments or threats were to be shared with the 
relevant law enforcement agencies and/or State and local JTTF 
members. This action, or lesson learned, impacted State and 
local law enforcement agencies by providing transparency into 
the subjects of JTTF investigations across the country.
    The positive lesson learned from the Marathon bombing is 
when great leaders exemplify and drive the importance of 
collaboration, the public is well protected. Both Rich and Ed, 
seated in front of you, emulate that spirit of collaboration.
    Now I would like to discuss the gaps I see in security for 
today's threat environment, specifically in the area of 
intelligence and information sharing to prevent mass casualty 
attacks.
    As devastating as the Boston bombing was to both Boston and 
our Nation, we are in a far more complex and dynamic threat 
environment then we were in 2013.
    Individuals with little or aspirational association to 
terror or hate groups, citing personal grievances or 
affiliation to a cause, calling for death and destruction, are 
committing mass casualty attacks at a record pace. Whether the 
intent is terroristic, criminal, or due to an underlying mental 
health issue, the deadly results are the same to the victims 
and the communities where they occur, as well as our society 
more broadly. Public gatherings, special events, parades, 
schools, places of worship, grocery stores, retail businesses, 
funeral homes, and street corners are all recent locations of 
these tragedies.
    The causation of this rise in deadly targeted violence is 
complex, but it can be more successfully understood and 
mitigated with a more effective whole-of-government approach to 
intelligence and analysis of the threats and of the individuals 
committing these acts of violence.
    Unfortunately, since COVID, we have seen a significant 
degrading in our national collaboration between Federal, State 
and local law enforcement. I want to stress, this is not at the 
local level. I am talking about national collaboration. In 
short, the system is breaking down. People and agencies are not 
talking to each other as effectively as they should. This 
deficiency has been widely observed by law enforcement 
leadership across the county and recently documented in the 
2022 Intelligence Summit Post-Event Report, a convening hosted 
by the Department of Homeland Security and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, in coordination with law 
enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners 
across the Nation.
    Since 2004, the preeminent process for Federal, State and 
local law enforcement to coordinate their intelligence and 
information sharing efforts in meeting emerging threats was the 
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC). The CICC 
serves as the voice for all levels of law enforcement on the 
best use of criminal intelligence to keep the country safe.
    The CICC has successfully provided interagency law 
enforcement coordination on critical issues, to include Fusion 
Centers, Suspicious Activity Reporting, coordination with 
JTTFs, and how to manage emerging threats on a national level. 
The CICC, under the Global Advisory Committee, serves as a 
Federal Advisory Committee and advises the U.S. Attorney 
General. The oversight of the CICC currently resides within the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). BJA urgently needs 
additional resources to reinvigorate the CICC for the specific 
intent of bringing together Federal, State and local law 
enforcement leadership, with appropriate private sector 
participation, to strategize on how best to meet today's 
complex and dynamic threat environment. Without this convening 
process, efforts to mitigate our evolving threat environment 
will be left to local authorities and ad hoc efforts.
    I do not need to inform this body that law enforcement 
resources across our nation are facing critical shortages. 
Swatting incidents across our country are further stretching 
those resources in feigned calls of active shooters at schools, 
medical facilities, and workplaces. Given the high number of 
actual recent mass shooting events, authorities have no option 
but to respond with all available resources.
    Foreign and domestic terrorism, mass shootings, hate 
crimes, threats on social media, and deep and dark web usage by 
offenders are all inextricably intertwined and highlight both 
the dynamic nature and complexity of today's threat 
environment. Those threats we face require the development of a 
national strategy that integrates every law enforcement agency 
into the plan and the solution. That plan requires an 
understanding of the threat through detailed analysis, 
utilizing up-to-date tools and technology to access the threat, 
updating training to utilize the tools and adapt to the 
constantly evolving nature of the threat, and the rapid sharing 
of threat information to prevent an attack once there is likely 
evidence. There needs to be a central focal point for this type 
of planning and collaboration, but to date that is not 
occurring at the national level to the degree we require. The 
strengthening of the CICC would be a step forward you could 
undertake to ensure this type of collaboration required to meet 
today's threat is taking place. Thank you.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Sleeper.
    Our third witness is Mr. Ed Davis. In 2013, Mr. Davis was 
serving as the Commissioner of the Boston Police Department 
during the Marathon bombing. He retired after more than 35 
years of law enforcement experience, and he is now the 
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Edward Davis 
Company, a business strategy and security services firm.
    Welcome, Mr. Davis. You are recognized for your opening 
statement.

   TESTIMONY OF EDWARD DAVIS,\1\ FORMER COMMISSIONER, BOSTON 
                       POLICE DEPARTMENT

    Mr. Davis. Good morning, Chair Hassan, Ranking Member 
Romney, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I would 
like to thank you for having me here, especially in the company 
of two former colleagues. We have been friends for many years, 
and I will endeavor not to repeat the things that you have 
heard from my two co-witnesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the Appendix on 
page 39.
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    My firm now is at the intersection of security and 
technology. We work on cyber and physical security issues. I 
will try to touch on the things that we see out there that 
really affect things beyond the Marathon.
    I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify at 
today's hearing to examine the lessons learned in the 10 years 
since the Boston Marathon bombings, and the many security 
enhancements that have been made to protect the United States.
    The impact of the terrorist bombing and resulting 
investigation at the Boston Marathon, on Patriots' Day that 
took the lives of three people--Lu Lingzi, Krystle Campbell, 
and Martin Richard--at the scene and injured hundreds of 
others, and later, during the pursuit, Officer Sean Collier and 
Dennis Simmonds were killed in this senseless attack. The 
attack forever changed the city of Boston. In 2013, the Boston 
Marathon bombing also significantly strengthened how law 
enforcement, the media, and the community respond to these 
grave incidents and the way we conduct terrorist 
investigations.
    Since 2013, the government has made significant 
improvements in the realm of security measures, including 
cybersecurity, border security, emergency response planning, 
and response to natural disasters. These improvements include 
more advanced technologies, more comprehensive planning, and 
increased public education and awareness supported by many 
public-private relationships and innovative companies. As I 
discuss some of these companies and their impact on public 
safety, I recognize there is always more work to be done. The 
advancement of technology will require strong consideration of 
privacy rights and protections led by Congress, research, and 
funding priorities for technological resources impacting the 
landscape of policing and investigations.
    As a member of the Board of Advisors for AT&T and the 
company's FirstNet platform, I have seen the public-private 
partnership of FirstNet take on this challenge and improve 
first responders' ability to communicate on scene. The 
development of FirstNet was conceived by Congress following 9/
11 and came to fruition in 2012, when Congress created the 
``First Responder Network Authority.'' I worked with 
congressional leaders on this solution for decades, and I 
sincerely thank Congress for their vital legislation.
    FirstNet was on scene at the Boston Marathon this year. 
They provided a cell on wheels to increase the capacity for 
communications among first responders. They also utilized 
advanced technology that identified the location of all medical 
personnel in the area for more direct response, in the case of 
injury.
    Another aspect of technology that has seen great 
improvement is the proliferation in artificial intelligence 
(AI) capabilities of video and photo surveillance, both public 
and private. Genetec has sophisticated cameras that leverage 
radar and laser imaging, detection, and ranging (LiDAR) 
capabilities combined with machine learning. They use AI 
software that can learn from normal activity and notify 
operators of approaching threats and of anomalies. Another 
company, Altumint, uses proprietary AI networks designed to 
detect and process traffic violations. This innovative tool 
allows for data-driven traffic calming tactics and allows law 
enforcement to shift limited resources to other priorities. 
Prepared allows a 911 caller to activate their camera with one 
touch, so dispatch can see exactly what is happening at the 
scene. This allows better de-escalation techniques to be 
implemented.
    Ten years later, as artificial intelligence continues to 
mature, these capabilities grow exponentially more helpful and 
more dangerous. AI can create realistic, false images of people 
and voice replication. These ``deep fakes,'' when used to 
interfere or disrupt an investigation, as we encountered during 
the Boston Marathon investigation, pose a distinct challenge to 
law enforcement that Congress could anticipate and prevent. 
Laws and regulations need to be formulated to safeguard these 
profound technology advancements as they continues to expand. 
Nefarious use of AI presents a clear and present danger to the 
safety of the American public.
    The private sector is utilizing these tools extensively. 
However, United States policing still lags woefully behind in 
the implementation of many of these important technologies. 
This is due to a lack of resources and a hesitance to implement 
potentially controversial techniques. Clarity on privacy 
concerns and acceptable police procedures needed to effectively 
pursue perpetrators of these terribly violent acts needs 
congressionally led debate, legislative authorization, and 
funding. Technology will save lives.
    In closing, while these advancements have improved the 
environment for law enforcement and agencies to respond to 
crimes, the level of danger and sacrifice that police 
throughout our nation face cannot be underestimated. As new 
technology becomes available to law enforcement, it also 
becomes available to criminals and terrorists. New threats, 
both physical and cyber, are presented today. Police will 
continue to adapt and overcome.
    With that, I would like to thank all of our law enforcement 
and intelligence community (IC) partners for their dedication 
to protect our Nation, and I thank you all for providing me the 
opportunity to reflect and share these important lessons 
learned since the Boston Marathon tragedy 10 years ago. Thank 
you.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis. Thank you, 
all three, for very compelling and thought-provoking testimony.
    We are going to turn to our questions now, and I will start 
with a 7-minute round of questions, and then turn it over to 
Senator Romney. I am going to start with a question to you, Mr. 
Serino. The bombings at the Boston Marathon finish line killed 
three individuals before they made it to the hospital. Hundreds 
of individuals were injured, but every single person, as I 
understand it, who made it to a hospital survived.
    How did planning and preparation save lives at the 
Marathon?
    Mr. Serino. Madam Chair, the work of preparing ahead of 
time, that was no accident, practicing and drills. We called 
the response to the Marathon, the 4th of July, we call that 
special events as a plan disaster. We take the opportunity to 
train and exercise. In fact, in 2009, we had brought together 
leaders from around the world from bombings. We brought 
together the head of New Scotland Yard, the superintendent of 
New Scotland Yard after the 7/7 bombings. We brought together 
the EMS chief from Northern Ireland after the bombings there. 
We brought in trauma surgeons from Madrid after the bombings 
there, as well as folks from Pakistan and India, and brought 
together folks actually at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Library, 
about 450 first responders from Federal, State, local level, 
hospitals, EMS, police, fire, all the different agencies, and 
had that presentation.
    But the second day was probably the more important day 
where we brought the leaders together, about 35 of the leaders 
of all those agencies and hospitals, and asked what do we have 
to change? What can we learn from others? We learned from those 
folks, and we learned what they did. Then we had drills after 
that. We had exercises, the Urban Shield exercise. Practicing 
and preparing paid off.
    Senator Hassan. You talked about lessons you learned from 
the convening exercise beforehand. Have the lessons learned in 
planning and preparation from the Marathon event itself 
impacted emergency preparedness policy and practices today?
    Mr. Serino. It has effects across the board, from how 
hospitals treat patients, from how they do everything from 
electronic records to treatment. It has affected how EMS and 
emergency management, as well as firefighters and police 
officers, how they respond, and what we have learned from that. 
In fact, I had a seminar a little while later, about a year 
later, when the Paris attacks happened, and the people from 
Paris actually said they learned from what they had read about 
what happened in Boston, and that helped save lives there. Then 
they came to Boston and we learned from them and have shared 
that even more broadly, again, across multiple disciplines. A 
lot of lessons learned.
    Senator Hassan. That kind of ongoing convening, sharing 
information, reflecting, which takes time and resources to do, 
has been really important.
    Mr. Serino. It is very important, and what is also 
sometimes difficult is the ability for people to take the time 
to learn. As I mentioned, people are very busy in all sorts of, 
as we call, poly crises now, one after another after another. 
Not having the time and the resources to do that, to actually 
send people away. A few people came to D.C. last week to learn 
about issues in responding to these types of incidents. But we 
are only able to have two or three people attend. How do we 
look at expanding that so we are able to either go to them or 
the ability to send people to certain trainings?
    Then also I think the training of leaders. We trained 
people in tactics, and that is very important, but how do we 
train leaders. That is really one of the most critical aspects. 
The leaders include the leaders of the agency, but also how do 
we train, dare I say, politicians, especially mayors and 
Governors? I know I have former Governors here who understand 
how important that is, and you have both led during a crisis. 
But how do we get people the opportunity to learn that as well.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Good food for thought, to be 
sure.
    Mr. Sleeper, prior to the Boston Marathon attack the FBI 
had information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev that the Boston Police 
Department did not have, and you referenced that. Some have 
argued that the Boston Police Department could have done more 
to prevent this attack if the FBI had provided the information 
to them.
    How did the Boston Marathon attack impact information 
sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies, and are 
there other aspects of information sharing that you think still 
need improvement?
    Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Senator. It had a profound effect 
on the FBI. It had a profound effect on how Federal Government 
shares information with its State and local partners. 
Immediately after the concern was articulated regarding the 
assessment that had not been shared. Protocols and processes 
were changed, where the FBI ensured that information was being 
shared in the JTTFs, with their State and local partners, for 
public safety purposes.
    In fact, now many JTTFs are run by State and local law 
enforcement officers, for that exact purpose, of ensuring that 
local nuance is applied to a Federal investigation. It was a 
painful lesson learned, but the results were dramatic.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    A question for you, Mr. Davis. In the aftermath of the 
Boston Marathon attack the FBI, Boston Police Department, and 
other agencies effectively collaborated to identify the 
bombers. Can you speak to the importance of this collaboration 
and how it helped to support the emergency response and 
investigation efforts? Are there any specific strategies or 
practices that you believe were particularly effective in 
facilitating this collaboration?
    Mr. Davis. Yes, Chairman. Thank you for that question. I 
can tell you that when I speak about this issue and talk about 
what we went through in 2013, the big lesson that I learned was 
you cannot make a relationship during a crisis. You need to 
know people beforehand.
    In the case of this incident, the first two people I called 
were the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Rick DesLauriers, 
and Tim Alben, the colonel from the Massachusetts State Police. 
I did that because, as Rich said, we had practiced beforehand, 
so we knew what needed to be done and what resources were 
available to accomplish that task. Rick had a special weapons 
and tactics (SWAT) team available, Tim had a SWAT team 
available. They both picked up the call, and importantly, not 
only did I have their cellphone numbers, but we used to meet 
quarterly for breakfast and discuss issues that affected us. We 
were a known quantity to each other. That was true with General 
Rice from the National Guard. It was true with Rich Serino and 
the staff at EMS and the fire staff. It was a team.
    I was reflecting on dating back to Governor Cellucci and 
Governor Romney. In public safety we have always been at the 
table, from the highest levels of leadership in Massachusetts. 
That is why Governor Patrick and Mayor Menino worked so closely 
and so well with us, because we all knew each other. I think 
that is really the solution or the necessary preparation that 
every city should have in place.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you very much for that insight. I 
will now turn to Senator Romney for his questions.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Commissioner Davis, I am interested in your perspective 
today as to what lessons we learned that we really have not 
implemented change to address, from this tragedy. You look back 
and say, we have done a better job, perhaps, in coordinating 
with the FBI and getting information from the FBI to local law 
enforcement. But the response to the Marathon bombing was seen 
as being effective, by and large, but there are certainly 
lessons that were considered that we really have not fully 
acted upon. I wonder if you were to say what are the 
priorities, what are the things we really ought to do 
differently, where have we not stepped up as far as we should 
have from the things we did learn?
    I am going to let each of the individuals respond to that 
same question. I am putting you on the spot first, in part 
because of our relationship. But what are we missing? What 
should we be doing that we really are not doing as a result of 
what we learned from that tragic event?
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that. Kerry 
said exactly what I think. The FBI made enormous strides just 
after this incident. I testified, I met with Director Mueller, 
and they responded quickly, and the JTTFs were more effective 
afterwards because of the changes that the Bureau put in place.
    We all have respect for each other. We have worked very 
closely together on these issues.
    But I see a very interesting situation developing now with 
an uncertainty about what police tactics are appropriate. I 
just spent 2 days with police chiefs from all over the country 
at Harvard, and there is a continuing sort of message that we 
do not want to go near any sensitive technologies because of 
the backlash we could get from it. There is really an 
uncertainty as to what is proper.
    There are some jurisdictions, some in Massachusetts, that 
at the local level have stopped police from using things like 
facial recognition technology or access to camera technology. I 
understand the concerns about privacy in those situations, but 
we must remember, as a government, that the police are the 
security team for the poor people in our cities, and it is 
scary to think that a political body has eliminated the use of 
an effective tool to solve crime at the local level when people 
who are the people I work with, in the Fortune 500 companies, 
can purchase the technology and use it. The uncertainty of what 
a police department should be doing in this realm on the 
technology side needs a clear debate and direction. I think 
that is one of the biggest impediments that I see.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. Mr. Sleeper.
    Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Senator. I will follow very closely 
behind Ed's comments. Today we are awash in threats in this 
country, whether they are terrorism threats, 
counterintelligence threats, threats on social media, deep, 
dark web people claiming to belong to some type of an ideology 
or a grievance they hold. The FBI's National Threat Operations 
Center receives about 3,000 threats a day, that they have to 
mitigate with their State and local partners. On top of that we 
have the swatting calls that every State has been experiencing 
across the country.
    Our responders are tired. They are stretched thin. We have 
resource concerns. The only way for us to effectively mitigate 
that is to be smarter, is to use tools and technology to be 
able to mitigate those threats, to use intelligence and 
analysis as effectively as we possibly can in order to mitigate 
those threats.
    We had a remarkable focus post-9/11, Federal, State, and 
local partners coming together across the broad public safety 
spectrum after Boston. Unfortunately, I am going to say again, 
because of COVID, I will not say ground to a halt, but many 
critical functions and meetings that should be taking place to 
stay ahead of the threat are not happening. That would be my 
response.
    Senator Romney. Yes, thank you. Mr. Serino.
    Mr. Serino. Along the same lines is that lack of social 
cohesion, partly because of COVID. From 10 years ago, after the 
Boston Marathon bombings, we saw people coming together. Then 
COVID happened and we started to see that fragmentation, and we 
started to see the inability. You can do certain meetings on 
Zoom, and that is great, but there is nothing like having that 
cup of coffee or perhaps an adult beverage sometimes with a 
counterpart, understanding their issues, and understanding how 
to come together.
    I think also, as we start to look at the workforce, we are 
losing people all across public safety, across public health, 
and across emergency management and hospitals. Unless we start 
to really look at how we can start to change the paradigm of 
how people look at service in this country.
    I had the opportunity when I was at FEMA, we started 
something called FEMA Corps, where 18- to 24-year-olds do a 
year of service. Imagine doing some service in public safety, 
or doing service in emergency management or public health, and 
taking that opportunity to give people, whether it is a gap 
year or when they are in college or after college, in that age 
group, to do a year of service, to make that something that 
then will help us. We need teachers across the board.
    How do we actually start to look at all those issues around 
the workforce and create something that is an opportunity for 
young people to actually do service to the country, because we 
are seeing such a need. That, unfortunately, is going to take 
an investment. It is going to take an investment of time, it is 
going to take an investment in money, and it is going to take 
an investment in people.
    But without the people we are not going to be able to 
respond to crisis. As both Ed and Kerry have mentioned, crises 
are coming. We see poly crises. Every 15 days now there is a 
major disaster in this country, every 15 days. It keeps getting 
worse and worse and worse. We have to start to address those 
issues now.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. I will turn back to the Chair 
because I noticed we have another Member that has some 
questions, and I will get my chance again in just a moment.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Senator Romney, and I recognize 
Senator Rosen for her 7-minute round.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Hassan and Ranking Member 
Romney, for holding this hearing. It is so important that we 
learn the lessons and we hear from all of you what worked and 
what you think we need to do in the new and always expanding 
threat environment.
    Today, as we are reflecting on the horrific Boston Marathon 
bombing attack that occurred 10 years ago, I do want to focus 
my questions on the effectiveness of the DHS programs to 
prevent future attacks, how we empower our local communities, 
the things that you have already been speaking about so well.
    I want to talk about the Nonprofit Security Grant Program. 
The Nonprofit Security Grant Program provides resources to 
support religious institutions and nonprofit organizations that 
are high risk for terrorist attacks and targeted violence. We 
have seen this all across the country. Last year, I helped 
secure increased funding for the program to ensure the 
availability of these grants can keep up with the rapidly 
growing demand.
    Mr. Sleeper, can you speak to the effectiveness of the 
Nonprofit Security Grant Program in protecting these eligible 
nonprofits from the threat of terrorism and specifically 
targeted violence?
    Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Senator, for that question. One of 
my responsibilities now as a senior advisor for the Secure 
Community Network (SCN), which is the official safety and 
security organization of the Jewish community of North America. 
We are responsible for providing physical security to thousands 
of locations across this country. In order to meet the threat 
that is being directed toward the faith-based community, the 
Jewish community, it is absolutely essential that there be 
physical safeguards in place.
    The essential tool for that is the grant program that you 
discuss, where the faith-based community can utilize those 
fundings for very basic things, starting with things like locks 
on their doors, very similar to what we think about when we are 
protecting schools across the country. Start conducting 
assessment, start with the basics--locks, bulletproof glass. It 
is unfortunate that we have to discuss having these types of 
security measures, but we do--video cameras, fencing. Another 
critical component of that is training, the training of 
congregants--run, hide, fight.
    That is essential funding to provide security to these 
facilities. It is not enough funding. It probably never is. But 
only a small portion of those facilities applying for the funds 
receive them.
    Senator Rosen. We are working to increase that this year. 
But I want to build on what you just said. Do you think FEMA is 
providing sufficient outreach and engagement, training, and all 
of those things alongside with the Nonprofit Security Grants?
    Mr. Sleeper. FEMA has been providing outstanding support to 
the grant program in meeting the needs and the expectations 
there.
    Senator Rosen. That is fantastic. I want to keep thinking 
about, just as the Boston Marathon, you are so proud to be the 
host of that every year. It is so great. You have so many other 
events with a global following.
    Las Vegas, we are quickly becoming the world capital of 
entertainment and sports events ourselves. We have the next 
Super Bowl coming. We have the Formula One race coming up in 
November, and so many other things going on. We understand the 
importance, just like you do, of securing our city for these 
major events, doing everything in our power to prevent from a 
possible terrorist attack.
    The Special Event Assessment Ratings (SEAR), they determine 
the level of support that DHS provides to these high-risk 
events, like the Boston Marathon or like our Formula One race 
coming up, or the Super Bowl. I raised these issues with DHS 
Secretary Mayorkas last week, that the SEAR assessment, the 
process is often flawed, with high-risk major events sometimes 
receiving the same rating as less-complex events, and I am 
going to quote, ``that require only limited Federal support.''
    As we contemplate how to prevent these future terrorist 
attacks, particularly at major sporting events, major events 
like the Boston Marathon, I think we have to have a discussion 
about what those specific things look like, and modify the 
formula.
    Mr. Serino and then Mr. Sleeper, do you have some opinion 
about how the SEAR assessment process can be improved to really 
incorporate as we surge up for a particular event that we rise 
up and then have to go back down to whatever our normal level 
is.
    Mr. Serino. I think as far as the SEAR event rating--I am 
not an expert on it; I will start out with that--but I think 
one of the important things to realize, as we have been talking 
about, is people coming together, whether it is an official 
SEAR event or not a SEAR event, is bringing together the 
Federal, State, local, and if appropriate, territorial or 
tribal organizations ahead of time, and doing that practice 
ahead of time, and bringing them to practice, to understand 
long before the disaster happens, long before any sort of event 
happens. Because the communications in how you are able to deal 
with something that happens small, early on in an event, can 
stop it from becoming much larger. That is critical by having, 
whether it is a multiagency communication center or having 
groups of people together in a command post all across the 
board.
    Unfortunately, that is not the case in every incident, that 
you have not only the public safety officials and emergency 
management and public health, but also the sponsor of the 
event, to make sure you are communicating with them as well, to 
have all those people together.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you.
    Mr. Sleeper. Senator, your Las Vegas Fusion Center 
Director, Cary Underwood----
    Senator Rosen. I know him well.
    Mr. Sleeper [continuing]. Is across town at the National 
Network of Fusion Center Association event. He, in fact, was 
named Fusion Center Director of the country at that event 
yesterday, so you should be very proud.
    Senator Rosen. I am going to call him right after this. I 
had a meeting with him a couple of weeks ago as we were working 
on these.
    Mr. Sleeper. He has articulated the concerns that he has 
with the SEAR event rating and the necessity for additional 
Federal support, so it is an appropriate discussion to have to 
FEMA, given the high-profile event that you will be dealing 
with.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to working on 
that, because although Nevada does not have a large population, 
we surge up at these times, in a very concentrated area. Those 
USCI formulas, the SEAR formulas, they need to be reflective of 
the events and not necessarily the population in your city at 
any one point.
    Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
    I will turn back to Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Madam Chair. I had the occasion 
to help organize the Olympic Games in 2002, in Salt Lake City, 
and this was, of course, following only by 5 or 6 months, the 
attack on 9/11. We suddenly became very focused on how we could 
protect the games and wondered if they would be the target of a 
terror act.
    There were three major categories that we focused on. One 
was hardening the places that they might attack. Given the fact 
that there were very few places to harden, relatively, we knew 
what we had to do and we hardened those things. No. 2 was our 
capacity to respond if there were an attack, and again, we knew 
the days that the attack might occur was the roughly 3 weeks of 
the Olympics. We knew where we had to be, where the EMS 
vehicles needed to be, and so forth. Then finally, 
intelligence. I must admit, that which gave me the greatest 
confidence that our games would be safe was that the FBI put in 
place a very substantial intelligence capability in Utah prior 
to the games, and was following potential threats. I felt 
relatively secure.
    As we now look at the circumstance of protecting our cities 
and our people, those three categories are more challenging 
because you are not just protecting a single site for a few 
days. There are so many potential sites. Hardening, for 
instance, all the churches, all the malls, all the grocery 
stores, all the sporting events--it strikes me as being almost 
impossible to harden every potential target.
    Our response capability is really quite good. We have 
improved our capacity to respond to an emergency. Our law 
enforcement is coordinating far better than we have before.
    But I look and believe that intelligence and threat 
assessment is probably the one area that is most critical to 
being able to protect our citizens, and I wonder how we are 
doing in our intelligence gathering, in identifying threats, 
and protecting against those threats that are identified, and 
what we need to be doing more in that regard.
    Commissioner Davis spoke about the technology that we might 
be able to use. Is that the great gap we have? Our foes have 
access to new technology that did not exist back in 2002, 
frankly, and now are we lagging in that area? But of the three 
categories, if you will--the hardening, the responding, or in 
the intelligence gathering--where is the greatest gap? Where is 
the vulnerability the greatest? Where should we be devoting our 
focus and the need for the greatest improvement?
    I will start with you, Mr. Sleeper, and then turn to Mr. 
Serino, and finally the commissioner.
    Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Senator. It is a complex question, 
sir. It would take a complex response.
    As I said earlier, unfortunately as a country we are awash 
in threats. First starting with the intelligence community, our 
intelligence community's efforts, that have never been greater, 
but our adversaries have never been greater--Russia, Iran, 
North Korea, China. We were concerned about Chinese spy 
balloons going over our country, but yet a number of our public 
safety agencies use DJI UAS aerial vehicles that have the 
likelihood of conveying all the sensitive information they can 
convey back to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), looking at 
our cities, our counties, our States with advanced technology.
    Senator Romney. It makes no sense, does it?
    Mr. Sleeper. No, sir. That is one example. But the threats 
we face are being addressed by the intelligence community, by 
our Federal partners, but they are stretched. They are 
stretched to their limits. As Ed indicated, technology is both 
a friend and a foe to us in those areas.
    What is particularly concerning to me, from an intelligence 
information sharing process, and the reason why I indicated why 
we--and I mean the Federal partners, the State and local 
partners, our lawmakers--really need to convene and have a 
discussion as simple as authorities. There are debates on what 
authorities our Federal partners have to effectively assist 
State and local law enforcement right now. We have to address 
those issues. We are in the middle of a threat environment, and 
we cannot be trying to decide who can look at this or who 
cannot because of what tool they have or what authorities they 
have. That needs to be resolved so it is perfectly clear.
    Finally as Ed indicated, while there is move toward 
ensuring the privacy of all of us, which we want, in 
information sharing, there is also a concern that we ensure 
there is a cutout, a legal and appropriate cutout, for State 
and local law enforcement so we do not go dark with 
information. Because the foes we are looking at now are not in 
a clubhouse. If they were, when I was doing this business, you 
could wire someone up and send them in. They are on social 
media. That is where they are meeting. If we do not have access 
to that social media, the deep and dark web, we cannot protect 
the communities we are there to serve.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Serino. Thank you. I think on the intelligence aspect, 
on those three aspects--the hardening, the response, and the 
intel, and I think you have two experts, Kerry and Ed, on the 
intel--but I would also emphasize, on the part of the intel, is 
looking at the public as an asset versus a liability at times, 
looking at how we can educate the public and how we can gain 
information from them, to share information. That goes back to 
what we mentioned earlier about trust, generating enough trust 
that the public will then trust the law enforcement and public 
safety, public health. We have seen deterioration of trust in 
emergency management.
    I think that is one really key aspect as part of the 
intelligence, as well as everything that Kerry and Ed had said.
    But in addition, not just the response, because the public 
can be an asset there too, the response. We saw that in the 
Marathon bombing, how the public helped save lives using 
tourniquets, even though a lot of places were not using them. 
Now we have seen thousands of lives saved since.
    The hardening of the areas is key. We cannot let each one 
of those stay in their own silos, in their own cylinder of 
excellence. We have to bring them together. But I also think we 
have to look at how do we do recovery, and more importantly, 
mitigation ahead of time, to mitigate a lot of the issues, 
whether around security or response to disasters as well, and 
look at as we bring all of that together. It cannot just be 
one. We have to bring them all together.
    Senator Romney. Yes, thank you. Commissioner.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Senator. To the edge, get them to the 
people who are in the field is extremely important. I just want 
to touch on that.
    We do target hardening every day. We go into facilities, 
schools, houses of worship and government buildings, and we are 
surprised at how woefully inadequate some of the places are. It 
does not take much to get them up to a level that might 
dissuade somebody from attacking them, but it is sort of the 
attitude that this cannot happen here that we battle, right.
    Congress passed the SAFETY Act after 9/11, and the sports 
facilities that we work in have SAFETY Act certification, and 
to maintain that certification they must have testing done. We 
can go in and do a plan for somebody and improve the locks and 
then walk away and everything goes to hell afterwards. But if 
there is a continual process of auditing, red-teaming, checking 
on the improvements that were made, that is what makes the 
SAFETY Act so important and impactful to these facilities. 
Expanding those possibilities into houses of worship and 
schools I think makes an enormous amount of sense because those 
requirements will be in place there will be a constant review 
of what is happening there.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. I am over my time. Sorry. I had 
a different topic, an entirely different topic, and I cannot 
resist with the former commissioner just raising that topic. I 
have noted with alarm a huge increase in crime in the District 
of Columbia, and I do not know to what extent that has happened 
around the country. But I look at cities like San Francisco and 
Portland, and from what I read it suggests that a degree of 
lawlessness has increased in those places, and in other of our 
cities. I do not specifically know what has happened in your 
former city, the city of Lowell or the city of Boston.
    But do you have a sense of what it is that is going wrong 
and what we need to do to adjust ourselves, in some respects? 
In the D.C. area, automobile theft is up dramatically, assaults 
are up dramatically, murders are up dramatically. I saw 
Jackson, Mississippi, in a report on the news last night went 
from 50 murders per year to now 150 murders per year. What are 
we doing wrong? What is the gap here? As a former commissioner 
of the Boston Police Department with a very impressive record 
in that responsibility, do you have some advice that you might 
give to us?
    Mr. Davis. Every year in my career in Lowell, the crime 
rate went up, for 20 years, until we found out that community 
policing and problem-solving could stop that. As soon as we 
implemented that program, the crime rate dropped 5 percent 
every year after we did that. It went down 50 percent. The same 
thing happened in Boston. We implemented Compstat and community 
policing, and the crime rate went down. For 7 years it went 
down 5 percent per year.
    We learned how to control this. In the course of that did 
we lock too many people up? Yes, we did. The prisons became 
packed, and there needed to be an adjustment. But the whiplash 
has been so severe that now no one is going into jail. They are 
letting people who are violent criminals reoffend over and over 
again, and they are not being held.
    The thing that we learned in the 1980s and the 1990s, is 
there is a very small percentage of people who commit a large 
percentage of the crimes, and if you separate those people from 
society, the crime rate will go down. I know there are all 
sorts of race and culture and enforcement debates going on, but 
we lost sight of that simple fact, that if you continue to 
offend violently, you should be separated from the community.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Commissioner. Thank you, Madam 
Chair, for that indulgence.
    Senator Hassan. No, I thank you for the question, and I 
thank the commissioner for his response and expertise. There 
has been a lot of great work done to pull people who are 
suffering from mental illness and substance use disorder who 
are not violent out of incarceration, but recognizing violent 
reoffenders is also a really important piece of this. I thank 
you for that response.
    I want to turn back to lessons learned and what we need to 
be thinking about moving forward in terms of emergency 
preparedness. This is a question to you, Commissioner. An 
after-action report about the response to the Boston Marathon 
bombing identified the challenges arising when more than 2,500 
officers from multiple jurisdictions converged on Watertown, 
Massachusetts, to apprehend Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. What lessons did 
law enforcement learn in the aftermath of the search for the 
Tsarnaev brothers about how to coordinate? How do they impact 
law enforcement practices today? I can certainly remember we 
had law enforcement from New Hampshire headed down to 
Massachusetts and Watertown. What kind of coordination lessons 
did we learn?
    Mr. Davis. It is a very difficult problem, Senator. For the 
first 10 or 15 minutes of a firefight, where people are 
throwing bombs at you, you want everybody that you can get to 
come to the scene, and so a call goes out. There are 
diminishing returns, though, after the first half hour, and 
there needs to be a way to stop that flow of people who are 
self-deploying.
    If our commanders say, ``We need 10 officers from the State 
Police and we need 10 officers from the Belmont Police 
Department,'' which is right next to Watertown, that can be 
handled. But I remember being in New York 2 weeks after the 
attack, and I met with a sergeant from the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD), who was put in charge of containment of the 
officers who were self-deploying. They had a field set up at 
the United Nations, and everybody was sent to that location to 
be effectively deployed. We did the same thing on the day of 
the bombing attack, but in Watertown, because it was an 
unfolding incident, that did not happen.
    We need to be urgently paying attention to that, assign 
people to contain any officers that show up there, and then 
also send the word out that if you are not called, you should 
not self-deploy.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Davis, I have another 
question for you too, because the purpose of today's hearing is 
not just to take a retrospective look at the Boston Marathon 
attack but to look ahead at the emerging threats, to mass 
gatherings, and soft targets. We have talked a little bit about 
that today.
    Based on your 35 years of experience in law enforcement and 
your current role as President and CEO of a security service 
firm, what are the current and emerging threats to mass 
gathering that you are seeing or are most concerned about?
    Mr. Davis. Clearly over the year, this year, over 160 
incidents. The lethal combination of military weapons and of 
people with psychological problems creates a witch's brew that 
results in lethal problems. When you add to that things that 
happen online--we work cases every week where people are 
masking their identifies and threatening and destroying 
people's reputations, and utilizing social media to attack 
individuals for nefarious reasons.
    We need help in those areas. Ideally, some database of 
people that should not be able to buy guns or buy large amounts 
of ammunition is sorely needed right now. Then the ability to 
get behind the veil set up by some of these social media 
companies. There is a very onerous process right now. You 
cannot get a subpoena unless there is a threat of physical 
harm. Then you get the subpoena and you go to the FBI and they 
are backed up, or you go to the local police department and 
they are backed up, and it takes months to get the information. 
In the meantime, victims are living in a state of fear and the 
potential of destruction of their reputations because you 
cannot get in to the person that is doing it, to say nothing of 
virtual private networks (VPNs) and other ways that they can 
disguise.
    It is a huge problem right now, and we have to pay 
attention to this emerging AI situation that is going to crush 
us.
    Senator Hassan. I take it from your testimony--and then I 
am going to turn to another issue--that local and State and 
Federal law enforcement need more tools and more authorities to 
effectively combat this kind of emerging intersection of 
weaponry and technology.
    Mr. Davis. Precisely.
    Senator Hassan. OK. I want to turn to the issue of mental 
health of survivors and first responders, and Mr. Serino, you 
touched on that. The Marathon attacks impacted the mental 
health of survivors and first responders and law enforcement. 
Clearly, for those of us who have visited with some of the 
survivors that was palpable early on and continues.
    In your view, what are some of the lessons learned from the 
Boston Marathon bombing when it comes to supporting the mental 
health of individuals and families impacted by terrorist 
attacks and mass violence?
    Mr. Serino. Thank you for that question, ma'am, because the 
mental health aspects are something that unfortunately gets 
overlooked at a lot of incidents, right after and the long-term 
effects. We have seen, on the 10-year anniversary, still 
affecting friends of mine, still affecting some of the 
survivors, still affecting the families, and the city.
    Boston has come back tremendously, but that was because it 
was a lot of work. Boston Public Health Commission spent 2 
years working with survivors, working with the families, in 
getting them the help that they needed.
    As I mentioned earlier, Dave Fortier from One World Strong 
has been doing amazing work in helping survivors around the 
world, but also helping in prevention, in targeting, in working 
with how to target people who are perhaps being radicalized. 
How do you start to work with them ahead of time?
    I think the mental health aspect is what is needed not only 
right after an event but also before an event. We have to look 
at how we can start doing some prevention and continue with the 
mental health aspects, not just events of trauma but what 
people see each and every day. People are working crazy amounts 
of hours in emergency management, EMS, police officers, 
firefighters. How can we take the opportunity to make sure that 
their mental health is there, but at the same time providing 
service. Again, that takes resources.
    Senator Hassan. Yes. I appreciate that very much and I 
appreciate your focus. I will tell you that as I travel around 
New Hampshire, if there is a single issue that people from all 
walks of life and all perspectives want to talk to me about is 
mental health and the need for resources for mental health.
    I have told this story, and a number of my colleagues have 
heard me tell it a lot. In the spring of 2021, when schools 
were beginning to open back up, it was a 10-year-old who asked 
me, at one of my school visits, what I was doing about mental 
health resources. I had been kind of tiptoeing around it with 
the kids and they were not having it because they are concerned 
for themselves and their friends as well as their families. It 
was an important reminder to me that we have so much work to 
do.
    Mr. Serino. I think the ability to talk about it is key. 
That is the start, is to have that discussion about the mental 
health issues. For years--and guilty as charged--we would say, 
``Oh, we are OK. We are too tough. We do not need to worry 
about this.'' But I think it is important to really recognize 
that, and recognize it is the first responders and it is the 
survivors and the public as well.
    Senator Hassan. Yes. Thank you. I am appreciative to all 
three of you, not only for your testimony but for your work and 
your experience and your willingness to share it with all of 
us.
    I am going to give you all one last chance to anything that 
you wanted to touch on that we have not, or to conclude before 
we gavel out the hearing. Why don't we start with you, Mr. 
Serino.
    Mr. Serino. Thank you, first of all, for having us here and 
to remember the 10-year anniversary of the Marathon and 
unfortunately the people who passed away, and the survivors, 
but also what is needed to go forward.
    One of the things we did not touch on is how do we look at 
a national, if you will, a national strategy for crisis, or a 
national strategy for emergency management. It just came out a 
national strategy for cybersecurity. We have other national 
strategies. But we do not have a national strategy to how to 
respond to a crisis, or a national strategy for emergency 
management. FEMA has their strategic plan, which is great for 
FEMA--and I am not talking just FEMA. I am talking across the 
board. I think Kerry touched on how do we do that earlier? How 
do start to bring people together? But we need a national 
strategy on how to move forward.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Mr. Sleeper.
    Mr. Sleeper. Senator, thank you for taking the time to 
bring us together. I will follow Rich's discussion. Much like 
we did post 9/11, after Boston, and after some other national 
tragedies, we convened bodies together to discuss how we can be 
more effective. That has not occurred in the last few years. It 
needs to occur.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Commissioner.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Senator. The problem that is facing 
police department around the country, from what I have heard, 
is the hiring issue and the inability to get good people. We 
need to have a conversation about that.
    But I would like to say thank you for your leadership on 
this and for bringing these issues up. As Kerry and Rich said, 
we need to have a continuing dialog on it. In the past, the 
Federal Government has played an enormously important role in 
making our communities safer. We are at a precipice right now 
where that needs to happen again. Thank you and Senator Romney 
for pushing this forward.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, and I would like to 
thank all three of you for your work, for your time, and for 
your testimony today.
    The hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until 5 
p.m. on May 11th, for submissions of statements and questions 
for the record. With that the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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