[Senate Hearing 118-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S HIGH ALTITUDE SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Department of Defense,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m. in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Tester (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Tester, Murray, Schatz, Baldwin, Collins,
Murkowski, Moran, and Hoeven.
opening statement of senator jon tester
Senator Tester. I want thank you all for being here today
for this very important briefing. Before we get started, I want
to welcome Susan Collins.
Senator, thank you for being here, I look forward to
working with you. As the Vice Chair of this Committee, we have
had a long working relationship, and we expect to do good
things together.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Tester. Before we get into this briefing, I want to
start by setting the tone for what I hope can continue for the
next 2 years. As I travel across my State every year, and meet
with Montanans face-to-face, it doesn't matter if you are from
a rural town, like the one I live in, or a college town, I
always hear one thing, and that is: Why is Congress so divided?
Last week was a sober reminder of just how petty and divided
our politics have become.
Make no mistake about it, what China did last week was
completely unacceptable and a real threat to American
sovereignty, and it deserves a real response from a United
America.
I was very discouraged by some of the responses from
elected officials in the House and the Senate, decided this was
a great opportunity to score some cheap political points and
get attention on social media.
China is a real threat and one we need to take seriously,
which is exactly why we are here today.
Senator Collins and I were in touch throughout the day last
week when the news broke, we listened to each other, and we
agreed, we need to take swift action to make sure China's
reckless actions received real attention, not political talking
points.
We are holding this briefing today because American public
deserves to hear from the Department of Defense, not play
politics with the National Security. I do not care who is in
the White House, we will always do our job, and we will always
provide oversight. I trust that all of my colleagues here today
recognize the importance of these jobs and need to work
together to make sure that America is protected.
So do our briefers. I appreciate you all joining this
committee on relatively short notice. The American people
deserve answers about this Chinese spy balloon that was first
publicly reported to be in the United States airspace above my
home State of Montana. This is the first congressional meeting
open to the public to examine what happened.
Montanans and folks all across this country value their
freedom, they value their privacy. Those are American values,
and China wants to destroy on their way to replacing us as the
world's leading superpower.
I, along with many of my colleagues on this committee, have
been ringing the alarm bell on Chinese aggression long before
last week's news. And I will take on anyone to make sure China
does not weaken our country.
That is why I am prepared to hold anyone accountable
including the folks seated before this committee today, to get
real answers. This Administration owes Americans answers, not
only on what happened this past week, but also on what steps we
are going to take to ensure that this never happens again.
That is why it is critical that we look forward and have
appropriate practices in place to stop any future provocations
from China, or any other foreign adversary.
We live in a time where our technological and defense
capabilities are rapidly evolving. I, along with the rest of
this committee, look forward to making sure these evolving
capabilities are put to good use. That includes making sure
that you, at the DoD (Department of Defense), get a budget that
you need, on time.
Before you make your opening statements, I want to turn it
over to Senator Collins for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let
me began by saying how much I am looking forward to working
very closely with you in my new position on this subcommittee.
And I want to thank you also for holding this important
hearing on the brazen incursion into America's airspace by a
Chinese surveillance balloon.
So let me begin by noting the obvious. This was not a
harmless weather balloon somehow blown wildly off course, as
the Chinese have claimed. This was a serious and blatant
attempt by the Chinese to collect valuable data.
In fact, a sophisticated spy balloon such as this one
provides certain advantages over high-tech satellites. A key
element of the administration's calculus was to postpone
shooting down the Chinese spy balloon resting upon the goal of
avoiding undue risk to civilians on the ground.
However, it defies belief that there was not a single
opportunity to safely shoot down this spy balloon prior to the
Coast of South Carolina.
By the administration's logic we would allow the Chinese to
fly surveillance balloons over the Pentagon, or other sensitive
sites near populated areas. Obviously, every Administration has
an obligation to protect Americans on the ground, but also to
defend U.S. airspace against incursions by known foreign
surveillance aircraft.
A related question involves the timeline for destroying the
spy balloon. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense) was
tracking the balloon as it violated U.S. airspace over Alaska
on January 28, yet deliberations with the President to shoot
down the balloon apparently did not occur until 2 or 3 days
later when it approached the lower 48 States.
As the Senator from Alaska would tell us all, Alaskan
airspace is American airspace, period. This balloon could have
been shot down; it seems to me, over remote areas in Alaska, or
our territorial waters surrounding Alaska.
The best way to avoid conflict with China is for President
Xi and the Chinese Communist Party to have no doubt regarding
the resolve of the U.S. Government to defend our territory and
our interests, as the Secretary of State has said repeatedly,
this incursion violated American sovereignty, and international
law.
In my judgment, U.S. deterrence was weakened when the spy
balloon was permitted to transverse Alaska, and several other
States including, hovering over sensitive Military bases and
assets.
Finally, I shared the concerns that the Chairman has
raised, that there was not a consistent answer. There was also
not good communication between the administration and this
committee. This incident highlights the ongoing and
increasingly blatant threat to the United States posed by the
People's Republic of China, which is a pacing threat not just
for today but for the foreseeable future.
Ultimately, our subcommittee is responsible for making sure
that the Department of Defense has the resources needed to keep
America safe. Regarding previous balloons, it is alarming that
NORAD and NORTHCOM (Northern Command) were apparently unaware
of these incidents in real time. That exposes questions about
whether there are unacceptable gaps in the Military's ability
to detect and address potential airborne threats.
I look forward to hearing the testimony today, and to
better understanding how the Department handled this
surveillance, and how it will handle future violations of U.S.
airspace.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Vice Chair Collins, for those
comments.
We have four folks in front of us today. We have the
Honorable Melissa Dalton who is Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
We have Jedidiah Royal, who is the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security
Affairs.
We have Lieutenant General Douglas Sims II, who is Director
for Operations for Joint Staff (J3).
And, we have Vice Admiral Sara Joyner, who is Director of
Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, Joint Staff (J8).
Opening statements will be made by Melissa Dalton, and by
General Sims.
Melissa Dalton, you may start.
STATEMENT OF HON. MELISSA DALTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS
Ms. Dalton. Good morning, Chairman Tester, Vice Chair
Collins, and Subcommittee Members. Thank you for convening this
important roundtable this morning.
I know that the recent events surrounding the PRC's
(People's Republic of China) high altitude surveillance balloon
have directly affected a number of your States. I wanted to
provide you with a brief overview of events before turning over
to my colleagues, and answering any questions that you have.
The balloon entered our U.S. Air Defense Identification
Zone and then airspace over Alaska, on Saturday January 28. It
was over Alaska for a short period of time, and then flew over
Canada. We continued to track and assess the balloon learning
more about the PRC's capabilities and tradecraft.
On Tuesday, January 31, the balloon entered U.S.
continental airspace. We were able to protect against PRC
intelligence collection, which was straightforward since we
knew where the balloon was.
The President was briefed that same day and through
National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, directed the U.S.
Military to refine and present options to shoot the balloon
down.
The Military recommended taking the balloon down over
water, waiting to do so had three benefits. First, it gave us
additional time to observe the balloon, again assessing the
PRC's capabilities and tradecraft. Simultaneously, we protected
against intelligence collection, which again, was relatively
straightforward since we knew where the balloon was.
Second, this allowed us to refine options and decrease the
risk of debris causing harm to civilians. Please bear in mind,
the balloon itself was 200 feet tall with a jetliner size
payload. We consulted with NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's) who analyzed and assessed the potential
debris field that the balloon would create based on trajectory,
weather, and the estimated payload.
And third, waiting to shoot the balloon down over water
improved our prospects at recovery, which are ongoing.
Throughout Wednesday and Thursday, we continued to track the
balloon.
And then on Friday, February 3, President Biden was briefed
on the execution of a plan to shoot down the balloon once over
water. This plan included the air assets that we would use to
take down the balloon, as well as the joint forces we would use
to recover it.
He approved the plan, and throughout that night, National
Security Staff and the Department of Defense including Joint
Staff personnel worked to ensure this mission was successfully
executed. Throughout the night, as the President had requested,
National Security Advisor Sullivan provided him with regular
updates.
Saturday morning, February 4, President Biden spoke with
Secretary Austin multiple times about the mission, and it was
completed, as you are aware, on Saturday afternoon when the
balloon was shot down and crashed in the ocean roughly 6 miles
off the Coast of South Carolina, in our territorial waters.
Due to rough seas, debris collection began on February 5.
The USS Carter Hall is collecting debris in and around where
the balloon came down. The USNS Pathfinder is using sonar to
map the ocean floor and search for debris. The Coast Guard is
ensuring that the area is kept safe for both the public and our
Military personnel.
The PRC is DoD's pacing challenge, and the PRC's
irresponsible actions were visible for the American people and
all of the world to see. Ultimately, we were able to collect
intelligence from the balloon, we are recovering its contents,
and we sent a clear message to the PRC that activity such as
this is unacceptable.
PDASD Jed Royal is here today to answer any questions you
have about U.S. communications with the PRC and Indo-Pacific
affairs. We thank you again for convening this morning's
roundtable, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Tester. General Sims.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOUGLAS SIMS II,
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF (J3)
General Sims. Chairman Tester, Vice Chairwoman Collins,
ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
I appreciate today's opportunity to update you on the U.S.
Military efforts related to the recent high altitude balloon
from the People's Republic of China.
As Ms. Dalton noted, we acquired the balloon on January 28,
following the radar acquisition of the balloon as it approached
Alaska, and given the determination, the balloon was not a
threat to U.S. citizens or aviation traffic, and the lack of
its ability to conduct significant intelligence collection at
that time the NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander assessed and reported he
would continue to observe and report the balloon's movements.
He advised the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the
Secretary of Defense, who ensured the appropriate senior
leaders were aware of the ongoing situation. As the balloon
crossed through Canada and approached the United States border
the assessment for potential intel risk to sensitive, critical
U.S. sites in the Upper Midwest increased, and the President
asked for kinetic courses of action.
In determining potential options the risk of Chinese
intelligence collection was deemed to be low to moderate, while
the risk to U.S. personnel on the ground was assessed at
moderate to significant, given the various debris field models
combined with potential weaponeering. As the assessment for
risk to U.S. personnel outweighed the potential intelligence
loss, the recommendation was made to shoot the balloon down
over an area that minimized the risk to U.S. citizens. That
location was in the U.S. territorial airspace and waters off
the South Carolina Coast.
The recommendation was approved by the President, and
executed by the NORTHCOM Commander using an F-22 Raptor on
February 4. The decision to shoot down the balloon in waters
off South Carolina is allowing for the recovery of the balloon
and its materials, and the opportunity to gain additional
intelligence insights on Chinese balloon and surveillance
activities.
It is important to note at any point along the balloon's
path the U.S. Military possessed the authorities and the
ability to shoot down the balloon in defense of our citizens.
I look forward to your questions and appreciate the chance
to be here today. And I should add that Vice Admiral Joyner,
the Joint Staff (J8), is here to address any resourcing
questions. And I will do my best to cover operationally related
items. Thank you.
Senator Tester. I thank you for your testimony, General
Sims. There will be questions. In my particular case, you can
direct them anywhere you want to answer them. And keep in mind,
at 11:30, I think we have a classified briefing in the SCIF
(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) for all the
Senators, so we are going to try to be prompt.
So the first question I have is, when this entered U.S.
airspace, did we know what the Chinese were trying to collect?
Do we know? Do we know what they were doing? Do we know what
they were trying to collect?
ASSESSMENT
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for the question. As the
NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander has said, when the balloon entered
North American airspace, NORAD had custody of it, and was
tracking it closely.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Ms. Dalton. As it transited across Alaska, through Canada,
which is, of course, part of NORAD, I mean we were sharing
intelligence of real time and tracking and assessing with the
Canadians. And as it entered the Continental of the United
States we were able to track, and assess, and to better
understand----
Senator Tester. I got the tracking, and I got that.
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
Senator Tester. I want to know if we knew what the Chinese
were trying to collect with that balloon, with that
reconnaissance balloon.
Ms. Dalton. Jed, do you want to jump in?
Mr. Royal. Senator, thanks for the question. We can
probably get into details more in the classified setting in
terms of what was the intent.
Senator Tester. You can just say yes or no.
Mr. Royal. Sir----
Senator Tester. You don't need to get into the specifics.
Just did we know what they were trying to collect, yes or no.
Mr. Royal. Yes, sir. We understand it that this is a
broader--part of a broader suite of operations that China is
undertaking.
Senator Tester. So we knew what they were looking for?
Mr. Royal. Sir, I think we should talk about this more
explicitly in the classified session but, yes sir, we
understand that this is part of the broader suite of operations
that China is undertaking to try and get a better understanding
of U.S. certain----
Senator Tester. I got it. I mean, there is all sorts of
suites of operations we have with what is going on in outer
space. But the question is, did we know what that balloon was
trying to gather? Do we know what information it was trying to
gather from the United States? It did not fly over us by
accident. So it was intentional. Do we know what the Chinese
Communist Government was looking for?
Mr. Royal. Senator we have some very good guesses about
that, and we are learning more as we exploit the contents of
the balloon and the payload itself.
Senator Tester. Okay. So it has been brought to the
attention, not in classified session, but through the news that
this isn't the first time this has happened, this has happened
several times before. My question is, if we waited to shoot
this one down over water why didn't we shoot the last ones down
over water?
Mr. Royal. Senator, I will take that question. We are
learning more about the balloon program, we are more aware of
this balloon program in recent months than we have been in the
past. So Senator, I think that our assessments are maturing
about the intent behind these balloons, and the operational
activity.
Senator Tester. So let me get this right. I put a lot of
faith into the Military leadership. I have met with a lot of
Generals, and they are top-flight folks, including the ones
here, and Admirals. I put faith in them because I believe they
know the issue better than I do. Okay. So the real question
here is, if we had an incursion before, and we shot this one
down when it hit water, why didn't we shoot the previous ones
down and gather intelligence from those so we knew what was
going to happen?
And by the way, this is going to happen again. And so why
haven't we--either this is no big deal in the Military's eyes,
and I don't think you are going to say that, or there is not a
consistent plan on how to deal with them. Talk to me.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for your question. And if I
may, just to build upon what Jed was saying. The PRC Government
surveillance balloons have transited the continental United
States briefly, at least three times during the prior
administration, and when----
Senator Tester. Right. And so the question is, why didn't
we shoot them down over water then?
Ms. Dalton. The duration of this particular balloon was
much longer.
Senator Tester. Right.
Ms. Dalton. And the information that we have since gleaned
about the balloons that have transited globally was only
recently discovered. We can share more in the classified
setting.
Senator Tester. Okay. So we are talking about putting a
budget together for the Defense Department. It was a really
robust budget last cycle. I do not remember hearing about
anything that dealt with balloons in the budget. Do we have a
plan and what we are going to do next time this happens?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. As you know, in the
National Defense Strategy from 2022, the PRC is the pacing
challenge, and Defense for Homeland is one----
Senator Tester. I know, but what about the balloons? I got
all the other stuff, and we deal with it.
Ms. Dalton. Absolutely.
Senator Tester. Is there money in the budget; or if you are
not into that--if you are not in that pay grade.
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
Senator Tester. Do we have a plan for when this happens
again, and what we are going to do, and when we are going to do
it? I will tell you this, and I appreciate the--but the truth
is we think we know what they were going to collect. We don't
know. That scares the hell out of me.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. It is incredibly serious.
And please know, as we are recovering the balloon and learning
more about it, and also including that with what we learned
last week, we are building our understanding of what
capabilities they have, and what we need to do going forward.
Senator Tester. Okay. And what about--and I am over time,
and this is the last thing so you can answer, I hope. Do we
have a plan for the next thing that happens and how we are
going to deal with it? Because quite frankly, I will just tell
you, I don't want a damn balloon going across the United States
when we potentially could have taken it down over the Aleutian
Islands--no offense to Alaska--or Alaska, or in some other
areas in Montana?
And I understand public health, I understand doing damage,
I understand that could have been a nightmare. But the truth
is, I have got a problem with a Chinese balloon flying over my
State, much less the rest of the country.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, absolutely. We sent a very clear
message to the PRC when we shot it down in our sovereign
airspace, in our sovereign waters, that has established that
deterrent line.
Jed, maybe turn to you in terms of communications with the
PRC.
OUTREACH
Mr. Royal. Yes. Thank you, ma'am. We continue to conduct
outreach to the PRC, we conducted outreach during the course of
the events last week, and have attempted subsequently. Part of
the plan is to encourage the Chinese administration to open
their lines of communication with----
Senator Tester. And you can tell the folks at 11:30, in
classified session, I want to know what the response is going
to be for the next balloon that comes over, Military response.
Mr. Royal. Sir, thank you, sir.
Senator Tester. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Secretary Dalton, according to
your testimony, January 31 appears to be the first time that
President Biden was briefed by the Pentagon about the
surveillance balloon, which had been violating U.S. and
Canadian airspace since January 28. Are you aware of any
existing Department of Defense policy to treat violations of
U.S. sovereign airspace over Alaska differently from violations
over the lower 48 States?
Ms. Dalton. Senator Collins, no, I am not aware of such a
policy. Alaska is part of the United States, full stop.
Senator Collins. Then what explains that delay, days of
delay?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, on January 28 when the balloon entered
U.S. airspace over Alaska, the Pentagon was tracking it very
closely through NORAD, NORAD had custody of it, and there were
communications with the White House to apprise them of the
balloon's trajectory.
Senator Collins. Was the President informed?
Ms. Dalton. I would have to defer to the White House in
terms of internal White House communications.
Senator Collins. According to the White House Press
Secretary, he was not. And according to the testimony that we
heard there were 3 to 4 days before he was informed.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, I would have to defer to the White
House. Thank you.
Senator Collins. General Sims, the Commander of NORAD and
NORTHCOM recently said that when NORAD first detected the
balloon, as it approached Alaska, he determined that it was in
fact a surveillance balloon, but that it did not present a
physical military threat to North America. And he explained
that he didn't take immediate action because it was not
demonstrating hostile attack--or hostile intent. Why wouldn't a
foreign military surveillance aircraft, violating U.S. airspace
inherently be considered to have hostile intent?
General Sims. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I think
first of all, just to reiterate that General VanHerck did have
all the authorities necessary should he have determined it to
have been a threat. The key piece here I think, ma'am, is there
was no hostile act, or hostile intent, that would be the first.
There was no impact to Aviation routes, which would be another
piece of that. The other would be there was no--at the time--
there was no suspected impact to critical intelligence
gathering ability in terms of infrastructure.
That changed as the balloon made--as its path continued,
that changed, and that is what prompted a different decision,
or a different conversation, as it crossed into the United
States.
Senator Collins. Well, Alaska has a lot of--and I am going
to leave this to my colleague--but a lot of sensitive military
installations.
General Sims. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. And the advantage of a balloon over a
satellite is it can hover over those sensitive sites.
General Sims. Yes, ma'am. And throughout the path, and as
somebody who lived for a couple of years in Alaska, throughout
its path, ma'am, they were tracking exactly where it was in
relation to that sensitive critical infrastructure, and
intelligence gathering capabilities, it was not near those
locations, and as we reconstruct the path, we are not concerned
with intelligence gathering in Alaska. And based on that the
assessment continued from NORAD/NORTHCOM to continue to observe
and report.
Senator Collins. Well, it seems to me when you have a craft
that is violating international airspace, and you have
sensitive military installations whether they are in Hawaii, or
Alaska, or the lower 48, we should treat it the same. Could you
help educate the committee, the public, on why China is using
balloons and what benefits do they offer over satellites, or
other intelligence gathering platforms?
General Sims. I don't have a light on here, I don't know
if----
Senator Collins. You still have 40 seconds.
General Sims. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Ma'am, I think what we
have learned is that there are some advantages, it can loiter,
but what we think they gained was really very minor in
comparison to what we think we can gain with low Earth--LEO,
with low Earth orbiting. And that went into the conversation,
as everybody was working through the risk.
And as I mentioned earlier, we deem that risk as it moved
from Alaska towards the lower 48, we deemed that risk to change
a little, and we also knew that we had the ability to mitigate
that risk. And we will be able to talk to that further in the
session following.
Senator Collins. But just to end. Formerly, Air Force
General, Charlie Moore, who is Deputy Commander of Cyber
Command, just has pointed out, that if you have a balloon that
is moving extremely slowly, you have a persistence that you
can't get from a satellite.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, if I may? Just to add. Because we knew
where the balloon was tracking we took measures to protect
those sites per established protocols, that included sensitive
communications, and covering up certain facilities.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
TRANSPARENCY
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Next, we have the Chair of the Full Appropriations
Committee, Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Well thank you very much Senator Tester for
holding this briefing. And I just want to say that the
Appropriations Committee is really lucky to have you at the
helm, here on the Defense Subcommittee. And I look forward to
working with you and Senator Collins in this Congress.
I want to start off, by echoing what Senator Tester said
earlier. And I will tell you, as Chair of the Appropriations
Committee, I appreciate all of you coming before us today. But
on issues such as this, especially for Senators whose States
were affected, I expect this administration to be timely and
straightforward with information.
And more broadly, as Chair, along with Vice Chair Collins,
I further expect a very robust dialogue with the administration
including the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs, and through that
dialogue it is my priority to have information shared in a
timely fashion to make sure that all the members of this
Appropriations Committee have a solid handle on matters
impacting this committee and this country. So I want to make
sure you all knew that before we started questioning.
Let me ask you, one of the aspects of this situation that
really concerns me, is when you became aware that the
surveillance balloon had entered our airspace. It seems to me
it is critical, we are immediately identifying when something
like this balloon is approaching, or has crossed into the
United States, so we can act quickly and appropriately. And
that is, of course, especially important for States on the West
Coast, many on this committee, who could be the first impacted
by these threats.
So I want to know, as you tracked this balloon approaching
over Alaska, when did you determine the threat; and did you
have constant surveillance for the entire time it was in the
U.S. and Canadian airspace?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you very much for your question.
And it is absolutely our intent to provide timely information
to this subcommittee, and to Congress as a whole.
On Saturday, January 28, we tracked, through NORAD, that
the balloon was entering U.S. Air Defense Identification Zone
and U.S. airspace in Alaska. And from there NORAD had custody,
and we were tracking it across the----
Senator Murray. Did you have constant surveillance the
entire time that the balloon was--yes or no?
Ms. Dalton. Yes, it was.
Senator Murray. Okay. Let me ask you, do you think there is
any need for additional systems or investments to protect
against these high altitude surveillance threats?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. I am happy to start there.
And perhaps can turn to Vice Admiral Joyner as well.
MODERNIZATION
As General VanHerck has mentioned, the Department continues
to be acutely aware of the need to enhance persistent
surveillance of the aerospace and maritime approaches to North
America. To that end, we are working closely with our Canadian
allies to modernize NORAD surveillance capabilities, pace to
the current and future geopolitical environment.
In the near term, we are taking steps with Canada to
augment the existing North Warning System, including
development of a new system of sensors called ``Crossbow'' that
will enhance NORAD's ability to detect approaching airborne
threats. Longer-term modernization efforts include, but are not
limited to, the construction of the Over-the-Horizon radars, in
both the United States and Canada, to augment the existing
North Warning System and enhance NORAD's ability to perform its
aerospace warning, control, and maritime warning missions.
Vice Admiral Joyner.
Admiral Joyner. Senator, we continue to modernize the
existing systems that we have, so that has been an effort that
has been ongoing in conjunction with this Committee. In '23
significant investments in both the space architecture, which
we think is key for future monitoring and understanding of our
environment both within the United States, overseas, and
abroad.
And then undersea as well, investments have been made as
well to counter other threats in an integrated Air and Cruise
Missile Defense, the committees in Congress directed us to put
forward an acquisition lead, and Air Force is now the
acquisition lead for that effort. They are moving forward out
on that mission.
Army has the counter UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems), and
then the overall systems and the modernization of the over-the-
horizon radars will enhance our ability to look long range and
give us persistent forward look, in partnership with our
northern neighbors, NORAD/NORTHCOM. So the modernization is
important. The existing systems can meet our needs, we continue
to maintain and invest in maintaining those systems as we
modernize.
Senator Murray. Well, it is really important that we all
have a real clear handle on incidents like this in full
situational awareness over West Coast States of the Pacific. So
I know we are an open session today, but I hope all of you can
brief me and my office separately on the ability and
capability, to make sure we can adequately, identify and
determine threats before they are over the U.S. territory.
And let me just say this, this incident is greatly
concerning to me, not just because of the breach of our
airspace, but what it signals about our relationship with
China, the strength of our diplomacy, and really the state of
our domestic capabilities.
This Appropriations Committee is going to be taking a very
serious look at our approach to our relationship with China.
And I look forward to working with Senator Collins, and with
our colleagues here on this subcommittee, and others, on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Thank you Senator Murray.
Senator from Alaska, Senator Murkowski.
ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
that you and the Vice Chair have called this meeting so timely.
As an Alaskan, I am so angry. I want to use other words but
I am not going to. The fact of the matter is, Alaska is the
first line of defense for America, right? If you are going to
have Russia coming at you, if you are going to have China
coming at you, we know exactly how they come. They come up, and
they go over Alaska, sometimes they go on the top, sometimes
they go straight across, but Alaska is it.
And thank goodness the Pentagon and the Department of
Defense have recognized where we sit on the globe to take care
of the rest of this country. And thank goodness that we have
invested the resources to make sure that we have the eyes on
the skies here and every place else.
More fifth-generation fighters sit there in the State of
Alaska. We know that we are proud of it and everything that we
do to stay focused. Whether it is Cobra Dane out in the
Aleutians, or Clear Space Force Station that has the long-range
discrimination radar, or out in Greeley where we have the
ground based missile defense, we are ready, we are ready, man.
And to the point that Senator Collins makes, it is like
this administration doesn't think that Alaska is any part of
the rest of the country here. To get to the United States you
have got to come through Alaska. So when we see it first, as we
did, as we all knew; and as you have suggested, Mr. Royal, I
think you suggested, we knew when we first got eyes on this,
that this balloon was not a weather station, this was not
collecting weather information. We knew that.
And so think about it from Alaska's perspective. You said,
Ms. Dalton, that the clear message here, we sent a clear
message to the PRC when we shot this down in our sovereign
waters.
Seems to me the clear message to China is, we got free
range in Alaska because they are going to let us cruise over
that until it gets to more sensitive areas. Tell me, tell me
where the sensitive areas are.
Alaskans have stepped up willingly and support our
Military, but when we are talking about the sovereign waters
and the sovereign territories of this country, Alaska is part
of that. I know we are going to have an opportunity for more
information in the classified brief. I have already received
one, and it was pretty thorough. And I think that the American
public deserves more than they have seen in terms of
transparency about why this spy balloon was allowed to spend 2
days over our waters and over the State of Alaska, the State
that is the guardian for everybody else?
And you are saying that at that time there was not a threat
to Alaska citizens, or to the assets that we have? Or that the
risk assessment rose later as it was coming into the rest of
the lower 48 there?
You know, at what point, at what point do we say: A
surveillance balloon, a spy balloon coming from China is a
threat to our sovereignty? It should be the minute it crosses
the line, and that line is Alaska.
The question that I have; and I apologize that it has taken
me this long to get to the question. But I am really concerned
about what we have identified as these data gaps.
We know that we have seen balloons previous that were also
the surveillance balloons. We didn't realize until later
because we weren't able to do the analysis until later. This
committee is the Appropriations Committee. If we need to spend
the money to make sure that we don't have gaps in our own data,
that what we see is clearly understood, we need to know how to
fund that.
So Mr. Chairman, I am over my time. I don't think we will
get the answers that we need here in this subcommittee.
Unfortunately, we are going to have to get them in closed
hearing. But I think people in this country deserve to know why
the State that is the first line of defense was not able to
keep the rest of the country from being more vulnerable when it
came to collection of intelligence, as it flew over important
installations.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator from Hawaii, Senator Schatz.
CONUS V OCONUS
Senator Schatz. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Vice
Chair.
In terms of the sovereignty of our airspace, is there any
distinction between noncontiguous states and the continental
United States?
Ms. Dalton. No Senator, there is not.
Senator Schatz. In terms of the sovereignty of our
airspace, is there any distinction to be made in terms of
international law between a brief flyover and a lingering
flyover?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, the basis for us to shoot down the
balloon where we did, had a strong grounding in both domestic
and international law.
Senator Schatz. Yes. I am just trying to figure out whether
if they had been, you know, let us say they just clipped the
corner of the Florida Peninsula. Like let us say they just, you
know, go over Hawaii for 10 minutes, isn't that still a
violation of international law? Isn't that still a violation of
our airspace? And doesn't it merit the same kinetic action that
was taken?
Ms. Dalton. It is still a violation of our airspace.
Senator Schatz. Is DoD policy changing in this space?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, what I would say is that as we learn
more about these balloons, their global activities as we are
able to assess the collection capabilities of this particular
high altitude balloon, through the recovery efforts, we are
going to be assessing our overall posture, and disposition, and
strategic approach, and----
Senator Schatz. And I respect the need to keep some of this
classified, but we all understand that some of the desire to
keep things classified has to do with not wanting to disclose
to the public things that might be inconvenient, politically,
for the Department.
And so it seems to me that if we now--and look, I support
the actions that were taken, but I don't see a downside to a
signaling to any government that any violation of our airspace
that is not inadvertent, and certainly any violation that is
intentional and has a military component will be met with
immediate kinetic action. And that just doesn't seem to me to
be something that--that there is any benefit to keeping secret.
Ms. Dalton. Senator that is not our intent. And I do
believe we have sent that signal. This HAB was different than
the others in terms of the duration of its flight.
Senator Schatz. But that is what I am a little--first of
all let us start with this. Did we just set a precedent?
Ms. Dalton. I believe we established a deterrent line.
Senator Schatz. Fine. Second of all, is that deterrent line
contingent on where they go and how long they linger? Or just,
is it a bright red line called: Don't come into our airspace?
Ms. Dalton. It is when our airspace has been violated, we
took action when it was safe to do so, given the risk to
civilians on the ground per the advice of our Military
commanders.
Senator Schatz. Do you expect the PRC to proliferate these
kinds of programs?
Ms. Dalton. Jed, do you want to take that one?
Mr. Royal. Senator, we understand this balloon program is,
as I said earlier, a part of a broader suite. We understand
that it is connected with a broad range of intrusive action
from the PRC with its intent to coerce the United States, our
allies, and partners.
Senator Schatz. So I have heard two different things in a
public setting. One is what the Vice Chair said, which is the
persistence at lower altitudes gives them better fidelity on
photos, and even, you know, other information. And the other
is, look, these things are really deployed because they are
cheaper than satellites.
So those things seem to be in conflict with each other, my
instinct was always that balloons are cheaper than satellites,
and that is really what this is about. But are there
capabilities that balloons have that satellites do not?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for the question. And we
will be able to share more in a classified setting.
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Senator Schatz. And when will the damage assessment be
completed?
General Sims. Thank you. Sir, that is ongoing now. And we
continue to recover pieces each day, I think we are thinking
days to 2 weeks in terms of everything. But it does continue in
conjunction with the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). So
I would like to offer a Military perspective to your comment
about kinetic----
Senator Schatz. Sure. You have 22 seconds.
General Sims. Yes, sir. So I think having been in places
where, once you take a shot you can't get it back. I think it
is important for us to remember that if we establish that
precedent that precedent may be met--we may meet the same
precedent. In which case as opposed to thinking, and looking,
and then reacting, we may create something in which we are--is
to our detriment.
Senator Schatz. Fair enough.
Senator Tester. Senator from North Dakota, Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Secretary Dalton, I just was listening to
one of your responses, when you then spoke with Senator
Murkowski. If you had the opportunity to shoot the Chinese spy
balloon down, either over the remote mountains of Alaska, or
over water near Alaska, why didn't you? Why is it okay to have
the Chinese fly some type of aircraft over Alaskan airspace?
General Sims. Sir, let me, water to land for first. The
first would be, and in terms of the water, General VanHerck,
again assessed that it was not a--there was no hostile act,
hostile intent, or potential impact to critical intelligence
capabilities. More so, he was continuing to characterize the
system.
And it is for us now, looking back, there is an assertion
that we were absolutely certain that it was in fact conducting
surveillance, or intended to go in a certain space, and we will
talk more about that in the next session, but that was--those
were thoughtful actions.
The other piece I would add, over the land of Alaska, you
know, sir we spent a lot of time, as you know, determining
where we will take a shot in combat when we are fighting--when
we are fighting people who are fighting against us. And we work
our way to a near zero probability of collateral damage when we
take that shot.
Although Alaska is, in places, not as inhabited as other
places, it is inhabited. And at that time we didn't understand,
through the modeling, if we shot that, what it would do on the
ground. Ultimately, it came back to maybe a 20-mile by 20-mile
piece of ground, and without being able to clear that, we
wouldn't do that in combat, sir.
And I think in this case we certainly didn't want to take
that chance with Alaskans, or any other Americans throughout
the flight path.
Senator Hoeven. So we created a situation now where our
adversaries are going to kind of try to figure out what they
can and can't fly over our airspace? Well, maybe a balloon.
What are they going to try next, the UAV (Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles)--a UAS? Or, I mean, is that where we are at now? They
are going to all try to figure--I mean the Russians test our
airspace all the time, and you scramble fighters to interdict
them, because you are saying nothing can fly over our airspace.
That is sovereign airspace. So now we are in a new day where
our adversaries get to try to figure out what you are going to
let fly over and what you are not?
SAFETY
General Sims. No, sir. So I think, and kind of back to
Senator Tester's earlier comment; I would say, first of all, we
are certainly grateful for the support from this committee and
for your trust, sir. I would tell you that throughout this,
General VanHerck and the men and women who were serving under
him had American Safety in mind throughout. And at any moment
had it presented some sort of intent to hurt Americans, they
would have taken that balloon out of the sky. It would have
happened.
I would tell you that it is the same should something else
happen. General VanHerck, the rest of the Military stands ready
whatever threats come, but we do expect that they will assess
and report. And in this case, sir, he assessed and reported
based on the intent, and based on where it was at the time.
Senator Hoeven. So there are some things they can fly over,
or near Hawaii, there are some things they can fly over Alaska,
but maybe not over California, or possibly over Montana, or
North Dakota, it is just kind of, you know, you decide based on
the circumstance. Doesn't that create a situation where our
adversaries are going to test what you think can and can't fly
over different, or proximity to different parts of the country
on a regular basis?
Ms. Dalton. Senator.
Senator Hoeven. Is that good? Or how are you going to
prevent that kind of thing from now being tested, you know,
even more than you already are? And you are going to start
making subjective decisions about different types of aircraft,
and what proximity, and where they can fly? What States they
can and can't fly over, over Guam, or you know, pick a spot?
This is where, it seems to me, we are getting into a
dangerous place, in terms of how this was handled.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, if I may? This flight was different
than all the rest, and that is why we took the action that we
did. To the question of building upon General Sims' notes about
why we didn't take it down over Alaska; a key piece of this is
the recovery, for us to be able to exploit and understand this
balloon and its capabilities fully.
If we had taken it down over the State of Alaska, which is
part of the United States, it would have been a very different
recovery operation.
As Senator Murkowski knows, the water depths offshore the
Aleutians, at 6-plus nautical miles go very quickly from about
150 feet to over 18,000 feet, you know, the Bering Sea. The
winter water temperatures in the Bering Sea hover consistently
in the low-30s, which would make recovery and salvage
operations very dangerous.
Additionally, the northern portion of the Bering Sea has
ice cover, which can be extremely dangerous, which would induce
additional risk. So again, a key part of the calculus for this
operation was the ability to salvage, understand, and exploit
the capabilities of the high altitude balloon. And we look
forward to sharing that with you in a classified session, and
also openly as we learn more.
Senator Hoeven. With the indulgence of the Chairman, just
finishing up here.
Those are the kinds of things I think are important, people
want to understand that. People support our men and women in
uniform, we appreciate what you do, I mean we owe you our lives
and we are deeply thankful for that, but Americans don't
understand this situation. And so they need to understand why
the decisions were made that were made and, you know, whether
or not that is what is best for National Security.
And just a final quick question is, could that balloon not
be forced down some way, other than shooting it down? Obviously
we have aircraft that can exceed that altitude, and so just the
final question. Couldn't that have been forced down some way
rather than shooting it down, which would have, in a lot of
ways, been better? You avoid the risk to people on the ground,
and you get it intact?
General Sims. Yes sir. Sir, we were--there were--and we
will talk in the next session, I believe, about some thoughts.
We didn't have the ability to capture the balloon or bring the
balloon down with a particular munition that we thought would
make it less dangerous. And quite frankly, we didn't know where
it would go if we were to somehow impact its flight path at
that point, in terms of our ability to control it, what it
would do if it hit the ground.
But that is a great question, sir. I think we will address
that greater in the next session.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
Senator Tester. Yes. So Secretary Blinken canceled a
planned trip to Beijing over this incident, the Chinese lost
their balloon, that nobody believed was a weather balloon as
the Chinese Republic has stated. Do you--is it in your
estimation that this was an error by the Chinese Government? Or
was this planned?
Mr. Royal. Senator, we are continuing to make assessments
on the Chinese intent for this specific operation. And we will
have further to share in the classified setting along the
specific content. I think it would be false to try to
characterize this operation as purely a mistake. My
understanding, sir, is that this is consistent with a broader
set of actions China is undertaking to intrude our sovereign
territory and those of our allies and partners.
Senator Tester. So generally speaking, as this balloon went
over Alaska, Canada, and the United States, who got the most
information out of this; the Chinese, or us?
Mr. Royal. Sir, I don't have a judgment or evaluation to
pass along those lines for you right now. I do believe that the
United States collection on this particular balloon and on the
broader program is ongoing, and is significant.
Senator Tester. Senator Hoeven said something that is true,
not only for the American people, it is true for us. We don't
understand. We don't understand because, quite frankly, we have
been briefed in this committee over, and over, and over again
about the risk that China poses, both economically and
militarily. We know for a fact, going back to Senator Schatz's
comments, that there have been brief incursions on our
airspace. We didn't do anything about that. We also know that
China tends to push the envelope all the time, until a line is
set down.
It should not have been a surprise that China did this
because nothing happened before, at least to our knowledge,
nothing has happened before to them for these over flights.
So the question is, and it goes back to everything that
everybody on this committee has talked about, and that is, and
I am not sure you can answer it in this forum, but a violation
of airspace is a violation of airspace, and to know absolutely
that this was of no military threat to us. Boy, I want to hear
more about that in classified session too, because quite
frankly I am not sure that you can say that unequivocally.
And to the point that in Montana, for example, we have some
pretty important military assets that we use as a deterrent for
those folks who apparently, apparently, I don't know for sure
but apparently fly over, not accidentally, some of those, and
the same thing with assets in Alaska, and the same thing with
assets in the Midwest.
You guys have to help me understand why this ``baby''
wasn't taken out long before. And because I am telling you that
this ain't the last time. We saw brief incursions. Now we have
seen a long incursion, what happens next? I am sure you guys
have modeled that out too, maybe. I hope. If you haven't, you
should.
But in the end either China is a threat or it isn't. And I
think it is a huge threat. When this budget comes forth to
Senator Collins and I, and the rest of people on this
committee, and the rest of people in the Senate and Congress we
are going to be working on, I hope this is addressed in some
line item.
And not only addressed with dollars but addressed with
actions on how these monies will be put to work to make sure
that this never happens again. Because quite honestly, and I
get it, you guys have a tough job by the way, and as I said in
my opening statement the folks who are the Military, whether
rank and file, or the leadership, or the salt of the earth. But
we really do depend upon you to make the right decision. And I
am not sure I am bought and sold that the right decision was
made. But we have another hearing that is in classified session
that we will take that up further.
Senator Collins, do you have other comments?
Senator Collins. Just a few Mr. Chairman.
First, I would associate myself with everything that you
just said, and the other members of the committee, I think you
hear great frustration, and a great deal of concern about the
message that has been sent to China.
General, as I look through publicly available sources at
the flight of this balloon, and the bases, and sensitive
military sites that it passed over, its flight pattern,
clearly, is not accidental. Would you agree with that?
General Sims. Ma'am, I do have some thoughts on that that
will be in the next session. But you are right, the flight path
took it over areas that we would think were concerning, and we
are pretty certain we mitigated those. And we will discuss that
in the next session.
Senator Collins. Okay. I look forward to hearing the
specifics on that. I want to go back to Senator Murkowski's
point about Alaska. The U.S. airspace over and around Alaska is
known as the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. It is a
huge swath of air space that includes the airspace over
territorial waters, military training ranges, and very sparsely
populated areas.
And that is why it is so hard for us to understand why the
balloon wasn't taken out over Alaska. It is sparsely populated,
they are territorial waters, and it is a huge Defense
Identification Zone. It has bases, it has sensitive aircraft,
it has military equipment that is of great interest to the
Chinese for the exact reasons that Senator Murkowski said. And
yet the statement was made that when the balloon was over
Alaska it did not show evidence of hostile intent. Help me
understand that? Why was it there?
General Sims. Ma'am, while it was in Alaska we were
characterizing the balloon, I would tell you, one of the things
I think that is very different from our country than--and you
can look at historical examples, is we think before we shoot.
And in this case we thought before we shot. And again we will
talk more about it in other sessions.
I think that is something that as someone who flies around,
and Admiral Joyner, certainly, more than I, that we would
appreciate of our--of the rest of the world that they would
think before they shoot. Once you shoot, you can't take it
back.
Ma'am, I will be quite honest, as an American I understand
the impact and the unsettling feeling that is here. As someone
in the Military who sees the other side of that, I am very
confident in the authorities that were granted to the NORAD/
NORTHCOM Commander to make decisions here. That the decisions
he made were in the best interest of the United States and our
citizens, as were the decisions of our senior leadership, and
we will present more of that conversation in the next session.
Senator Collins. I am not implying that we want to be
anything like the Chinese Government in asking this question.
But do you think if we had an American surveillance balloon
going over sensitive Chinese Military sites; that the Chinese
Government would have, for a minute, hesitated before taking it
down?
General Sims. Ma'am, I will not answer on behalf of the
Chinese. But I think as an American, if I was flying in that
direction, I would hope that they would think before they made
a decision.
Senator Collins. Well, I have got to tell you, I think they
would not hesitate if we violated their territorial airspace,
to disable, and take down our surveillance platform.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Collins. One of the
things that was brought up, and then I am probably going to
wrap it up, unless you have more, Susan Collins, is that you
spoke about communications, Mr. Royal, with China. Could you
give me a brief update on where we are at from a communication
standpoint with China? Is it totally cut off, or are people
still communicating and talking?
Mr. Royal. Sir, with respect to this particular operation,
we engaged China on an urgent matter during the course of our
observations of this particular operation, but subsequent to
that, our diplomats engaged to make sure that the Chinese knew
that Secretary Blinken's trip would no longer be possible under
the current circumstances. And then further engaged the
Chinese, subsequent to the successful downing of the balloon,
to make sure they understood what activity we were undertaking
and why we did that.
I will say more broadly, sir, that it is really important,
during moments like this, that we maintain open lines of
communication.
Senator Tester. Absolutely.
Mr. Royal. And unfortunately the Chinese administration has
declined a request from Secretary Austin to communicate
directly with his counterpart in China. We believe that China
needs to be more responsive to the United States when it comes
to requests for further communication.
Senator Tester. I couldn't agree with you more, a hundred
percent, and the fact is, they are the ones that violated our
airspace, and they should be open to communications, because it
was a serious violation, I think, in everybody's opinion.
We appreciate you all being here today. We appreciate you
answering the questions, and your testimony. I think this was
helpful as an initial conversation. But I will tell you that
knowing Susan Collins very well, oversight isn't going to stop
here. We have important responsibilities in that vein, and we
will continue to do that, whether it is on Chinese threats to
our airspace, or any other thing that deals with the Department
of Defense.
CONCLUSION OF BRIEFING
And so with that, thank you for the work you guys do every
day. This Defense Subcommittee will reconvene on Tuesday,
February 14, at 10 a.m., for a classified briefing to discuss
other Chinese threats to the U.S. Homeland.
Thank you all. And we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., Thursday, February 9, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]
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